COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

ANTHONY BOONE, S/K/A 

 ANTHONY BREYEON BOONE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1537-07-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

 SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge 

Dianne G. Ringer (Bierowicz & Ringer, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant. 

Jennifer C. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General; Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

The trial court found Anthony Boone guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, Boone challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence offered to prove he intended to distribute the marijuana. Finding the evidence 

sufficient, we affirm. 

I. 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). This principle 

requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, 

and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair 

inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 

759 (1980) (emphasis and citation omitted). 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
 The evidence at trial showed that Boone actually or constructively possessed the 

following items: 

 two plastic baggies containing “bulk marijuana” weighing 20.6 grams,1

 six clear, empty baggies that were “cut off” for distribution purposes, 

 two cell phones, and 

 one package of cigars. 

Boone did not possess any rolling papers or smoking pipes. Upon his arrest, Boone denied the 

marijuana belonged to him but admitted he had a “bad habit” of smoking marijuana. 

 At trial, a police detective qualified as an expert on marijuana distribution and explained 

the significance of each item of evidence from the viewpoint of a trained narcotics officer. The 

two baggies of “bulk marijuana,” he testified, were not sufficient by themselves to demonstrate 

an intent to distribute. But the six clear, empty baggies altered the equation substantially. These 

baggies were “cut up” for distribution purposes. And, in his experience, six such baggies was a 

“large amount,” the detective said. 

The detective also noted the absence of any user paraphernalia like rolling papers or 

smoking pipes. As for the package of cigars, the detective observed that dealers sometimes sell 

“what they call a package on the street” which includes a cigar and a “dime bag of marijuana.” 

They “sell them as a package” and price them “depending on the grade” of the marijuana. In 

addition, the detective found it significant that Boone possessed two, rather than one, cell 

phones. In his experience, one is typically reserved for personal use while the other is dedicated 

solely to commercial use. 

 1

 Police also found seven plastic baggies containing “suspected” marijuana residue. The 

Department of Forensic Science did not test the residue. Boone, however, did not object at trial 

to the police officer’s testimony that the baggies contained what he suspected to be marijuana 

residue. On appeal, Boone accepts that the evidence suggests the baggies “had suspected 

marijuana residue on them.” Appellant’s Br. at 3. 

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The trial court acknowledged the case was a “close one” but, finding the detective’s 

expert testimony persuasive, concluded the totality of the circumstances demonstrated Boone 

intended to distribute the marijuana. On appeal, Boone claims the evidence as a matter of law 

failed to prove an intent to distribute. 

II. 

 SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA

“Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the 

evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). It follows that a reviewing court does 

not “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original and 

citation omitted). 

Instead, we ask only “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 

502 (2008) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (emphasis in original). These principles 

recognize that an appellate court is “not permitted to reweigh the evidence,” Nusbaum v. Berlin, 

273 Va. 385, 408, 641 S.E.2d 494, 507 (2007), because appellate courts have no authority “to 

preside de novo over a second trial.” Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 11, 602 S.E.2d 

402, 407 (2004). 2

 2

 This deferential standard of review “applies not only to the historical facts themselves, 

but the inferences from those facts as well.” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 663 

n.2, 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 n.2 (2003). Thus, a factfinder may “draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts,” Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 10, 602 S.E.2d at 406 (citations omitted), 

unless doing so would push “into the realm of non sequitur,” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 48 

Va. App. 605, 608, 633 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2006) (citation omitted). 

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To be found guilty under Code § 18.2-248, a defendant must possess “the controlled 

substance contemporaneously with his intention to distribute that substance.” Craddock v. 

Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 553, 580 S.E.2d 454, 461 (2003) (citation omitted). Like any 

other mens rea issue, intent to distribute can be (and usually must be) inferred from the 

surrounding circumstances. Harper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 517, 521, 642 S.E.2d 779, 

781 (2007) (citation omitted). “It is ‘often impossible’ to do otherwise given the common 

absence of direct evidence of intent to distribute.” Id. (citations omitted). The surrounding 

circumstances, moreover, must not be “viewed in isolation.” Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 

Va. App. 263, 277, 597 S.E.2d 242, 249 (2004) (citation omitted). “While no single piece of 

evidence may be sufficient, the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, 

each insufficient in itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.’” Harper, 49 

Va. App. at 522, 642 S.E.2d at 781 (citation omitted). 

In this case, a rational factfinder could find the detective’s expert testimony persuasive 

and conclude Boone possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute.3 The six clear, empty 

baggies were “cut up” for distribution purposes. The detective could not hypothesize a reason 

for a mere user to possess them. Underlying the detective’s opinion is the observation that users 

buy marijuana already in baggies. They do not buy it unpackaged and then separately purchase 

or create tiny little baggies to organize their stash. Boone’s possession of empty distribution 

baggies demonstrated an intent to distribute the marijuana he currently possessed. See, e.g., 

Bolden v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 285, 293-94, 640 S.E.2d 526, 530 (2007) (noting 

 3

 A factfinder may rely on expert testimony, “usually that of a police officer,” to discern 

the incriminating import of seemingly innocuous circumstances that nonetheless have 

incriminating relevance in the drug trade. Williams v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 194, 202, 

662 S.E.2d 627, 631 (2008) (quoting Askew v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 104, 110, 578 

S.E.2d 58, 61 (2003) (citation omitted)). The “credibility of the expert witness and the weight to 

be accorded the evidence,” moreover, are matters solely “within the province” of the factfinder. 

Lemond v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 687, 694, 454 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1995) (quoting Horsley v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 335, 339, 343 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1986)). 

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-5-

presence of “empty plastic bags” used “to package drugs for distribution”), aff’d, 275 Va. 144, 

654 S.E.2d 584 (2008); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 755, 607 S.E.2d 738, 744, 

adopted upon reh’g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005) (noting expert opinion that 

empty “plastic baggies” are “commonly used in the drug trade for distribution purposes”); accord

United States v. Nelson, 6 F.3d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1993) (observing that “corners cut from 

sandwich bags . . . are commonly used to package drugs for sale”). 

Added to this incriminating circumstance is the absence of any rolling papers or smoking 

pipes typically found on a marijuana user. Perhaps the package of cigars could be considered an 

item indicating personal use. But the detective testified that, in his expert opinion, the package 

of cigars could just as well be inventory for a “dime” marijuana “package,” which in street 

jargon meant a small amount of marijuana accompanied by a single cigar. Finally, the trial court 

was also entitled to accept the detective’s observation that the possession of two cell phones 

implied that one was for personal use while the other served Boone’s commercial interests. 

III. 

No one circumstance, standing alone, proved Boone’s intent to distribute. But, taken 

together, the clustering circumstances provided a rational basis for the trial court’s finding that 

Boone possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute.4

 We thus affirm. 

 Affirmed.

 4

 At oral argument, Boone pointed out that the trial court did not specifically address the 

probative weight of each item of evidence or expressly adopt the opinion of the expert witness. 

On appeal, however, “when ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting 

inferences,’ a court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence ‘must presume — even if it does 

not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor 

of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’” Harper, 49 Va. App. at 523, 642 S.E.2d at 

782 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); see also Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 22 

n.1, 660 S.E.2d 687, 689 n.1 (2008).