alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended September 30, 2008 (the Form 10-Q)
fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ FRED M. POWELLFred M. PowellChief Financial Officer
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-16-0000878

27-SEP-2017

07:54 AM
HARRIS v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

110A17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 22, 2017

Tamika L. Henderson, Assistant Attorney Geneal, for N.C. Department of Public Safety.

Michael C. Byrne, Attorney at Law, for Harris, Steven.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 20th of June 2017 by Petitioner:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of June 2017."

Petitioner shall have up to and including the 10th day of August 2017 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

L.M., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, Milwaukee, WI, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 13-1700 

Issued: May 15, 2014 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

Before: 

RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

On July 1, 2013 appellant filed a timely appeal of a June 7, 2013 Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs’ (OWCP) decision. The Board docketed the appeal as No. 13-1700. 

By its June 7, 2013 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a schedule award, finding that 

he had no ratable impairment of the right upper extremity causally related to his accepted right 

shoulder and right arm conditions. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1

(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this 

case. 

The Board has duly considered the matter and notes that in the case of William A. 

Couch,

2

 the Board held that, when adjudicating a claim, OWCP is obligated to consider all 

evidence properly submitted by a claimant and received by OWCP before the final decision is 

issued. OWCP stated in its June 7, 2013 decision that appellant had not submitted any evidence 

after the February 22, 2013 developmental letter in which it informed him that it required 

additional medical evidence in support of his schedule award claim. This was not correct; 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 

2

 41 ECAB 548 (1990). 
2

appellant submitted numerous medical reports in March and April 2013, including several 

reports containing examination findings. While OWCP is not required to list every piece of 

evidence submitted to the record, the record is clear that the evidence he submitted in March and 

April 2013 was not reviewed, as OWCP specifically stated in its decisions that no additional 

evidence was received. 

For this reason, the case will be remanded to OWCP to enable it to properly consider all 

the evidence submitted prior to the issuance of the June 7, 2013 decision. Following such further 

development as OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue an appropriate decision on the merits. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 7, 2013 decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs is set aside; the case record is remanded to OWCP for further 

proceedings consistent with this order of the Board. 

Issued: May 15, 2014 

Washington, DC 

 

 Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-155-CV

DAVID SCOT LYND APPELLANT

V.

LEA ALIENE COX APPELLEE

----------

FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

------------

On July 31, 2008, this court issued an order affirming the trial court’s

order sustaining a contest to appellant’s affidavit of inability to pay because,

after reviewing the record from the trial court’s hearing on the contest, we

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence

supported the trial court’s order sustaining the contest. Appellant subsequently

filed a motion for rehearing that was denied without opinion on September 17,
2... See Supreme Court of Tex., Order Regarding Fees Charged in Civil

Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals and Before the Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 07-9138 (Aug. 28, 2007)

(listing fees in courts of appeals).

2

2008. Also on September 17, 2008, we notified appellant, in accordance with

rule of appellate procedure 42.3(c), that we would dismiss this appeal unless

the $175 filing fee was paid on or before September 29, 2008. See Tex. R.

App. P. 42.3(c). Appellant has not paid the $175 filing fee. See Tex. R. App.

P. 5, 12.1(b).

Because appellant has failed to comply with a requirement of the rules of

appellate procedure and the Texas Supreme Court’s order of August 28, 2007,

2

we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c), 43.2(f).

Appellant shall pay all costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: HOLMAN, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DELIVERED: October 9, 2008
Exhibit 23

                        Consent of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP









The Board of Directors and Stockholders
Horizon Financial Services Corporation:

         We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(No.  33-87030  and  33-94324)  on  Form  S-8  of  Horizon  Financial   Services
Corporation  of our report  dated July 29,  1998,  relating to the  consolidated
balance sheets of Horizon Financial Services  Corporation and subsidiaries as of
June 30, 1998 and 1997, and the related  consolidated  statements of operations,
stockholders'  equity,  and cash  flows for each of the years in the  three-year
ended June 30, 1998,  which report appears in the June 30, 1998 annual report on
Form 10-KSB of Horizon Financial Services Corporation and subsidiaries.



                                                        /s/KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
                                                        ------------------------
                                                           KPMG Peat Marwick LLP





Des Moines, Iowa
September 25, 1998
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of Renal Care Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gary A.
Brukardt Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

   (1)        The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   (2)        The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
              material  respects,  the financial  condition and results of
              operations of the Company.

/s/ Gary A. Brukardt
-------------------------------------
Gary A. Brukardt
Chief Executive Officer
March 4, 2004
Exhibit
32.2




SECTION
1350 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER




Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, David E. Fractor, hereby certify that the April
30, 2008 Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q as filed by iDcentrix, Inc. (the
“Company”), which contains the Company’s financial statements, fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in such
Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:  June
      13, 2008
            /s/  David
      E. FractorDavid
      E. FractorChief
      Financial Officer and Treasurer(Principal
      Financial Officer)
1284.

#### Georgia Southern & Florida Railway Co. *v.*Walker.

Action for damages, from city court of Nashville — Judge Peeples. June 20, 1908.

Submitted October 28,

Decided November 10, 1908.

*John I. & J. E. Hall, Buie & Knight,*for plaintiff in error..

*Alexander & Gary,*contra.

Russell, J.

1. The evidence authorized the verdict, and the errors complained of are not of sufficient materiality to require the grant of a. new trial.

2. Evidence which is sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence may itself be discredited by proof of physical facts and circumstances which show such testimony to be incredible. *Western & Atlantic R. Co.*v. *Clark,*2 *Ga. App.*346 (58 S. E. 510) *; Atlantic*& *Birmingham Ry. Co.*v. *Clute,*3 *Ga. App.*508 (60 S. E. 277).

3. Any witness may give his opinion, after having given the facts upon which he bases it, so as to enable the jury to determine the probative-value of his -opinionative evidence. The value of services rendered maybe proved in this way. *Judgment affirmed.*
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

					NO. 2-08-144-CR				

TYSON MONTRELL BANKS						       	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	----------

	FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	----------

	We have considered appellant’s “Motion To Dismiss Appeal.”  The motion complies with rule 42.2(a) of the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a).  No decision of this court having been delivered before we received this motion, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.  See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

								PER CURIAM

PANEL:  CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON, and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: October 9, 2008
1503.

#### Canady *v.*The State.

Hill, C. J. 1. Where, on the call of a ease in this court, it appears that the plaintiff in error has fully complied with the judgment of the trial court, and has paid to the sheriff the full amount of the fine and cost required of him as the alternative sentence imposed against him in *365the case, and has thereripon been discharged from custody, Ms writ of error will be dismissed.

2. Where a motion to dismiss the writ of error is made by the solicitor-general; on the ground stated in the foregoing headnote, and is granted, the State will thereafter be estopped from in any manner contesting the truth of the ground stated in the motion, or from enforcing any part of the sentence of the lower court.

Motion to dismiss the writ of error.

Argued December 8,

Decided December *22,*1908.

*Sajfold & Larsen,*for plaintiff in error.

*Henry B. Daniel, solicitor, Williams & Bradley,*contra.

Hill, C. J.

When this case was called in this court, the solicitor-general made' a motion to dismiss the writ of error, because, after his motion for a new trial had been overruled, the plaintiff in error submitted to the judgment of the court against him and fully paid the fine and cost imposed by-the court as the alternative sentence. The attorney of the plaintiff in error contested the truth of the statement that the fine and cost had been paid, and asked that the court grant him time to submit evidence in support of his contention. This court does not deem it necessary to grant the request for further time for the purpose stated, and, in view of the positive' statement contained in the affidavit of the sheriff of the county, that the plaintiff in error had paid to him the fine and cost, and had thereupon been discharged from custody, will dismiss the writ of error. Whatever may be the truth as to the payment of the fine and cost by the plaintiff in error, the State would thereafter be concluded by the solieitor-generabs motion to dismiss the writ of error, which was granted by this court on the assumption that the motion to dismiss contained a true statement of the fact. Having made the motion to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that the judgment of the trial court had been fully submitted to by the plaintiff in error, in the payment by him of the fine and cost imposed in the sentence, and the motion having been granted in pursuance of that statement, the State would thereafter be estopped from in any manner contesting the truth of the statement or enforcing any part of the judgment and sentence. • *Writ of error dismissed.*
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF C. A. S., JR AND

S. E. R. S., CHILDREN

,

Appellant

. **§**

**§**

**§**

**§**

**§**

**§**

**§** No. 08

- 2 2

- 00 027

- C V

Appeal from the

109 th D istrict Court

of And rews C ounty, Texas

(TC# 21,851)

O R D E R

In order to protect the identity of the minor child ren who are t he subject of this appeal, the

Court has determined on its own motion that it is necessary to identify the child ren by their initials,

C. A. S., Jr. and S. E. R. S

., and the parent by initials as well, in all papers submitted to the Court,

including letters, motions, and briefs. See Tex.R.App.P. 9..8. The Court will also refer to th e

child ren and parent by their initials in correspondence, orders, and in its opinion and judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21 st d ay of January

, 20 2 2

.

PER CURIAM

Before Rodriguez , C.J., Palafox and Alley, JJ

.
# Official Journal C 29/2016

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 29 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5926 January 2016 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 29

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5926 January 2016

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Parliament |
| 2016/C 029/1 | Contribution of the LIV COSAC — Luxembourg, 30 November to 1 December 2015 | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Parliament

2016/C 029/1

Contribution of the LIV COSAC — Luxembourg, 30 November to 1 December 2015

1

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| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
STATE of North Carolina v. Dwayne Demont HAIZLIP

No. 345P16-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 13, 2017

James D. Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Dwayne Dumont Haizlip, for Haizlip, Dwayne Dumont.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the application filed by Defendant on the 10th of April 2017 in this matter for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Guilford County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of April 2017."

Ervin, J. recused
# C_2009141EN.01001302.xml

| 20.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 141/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 141/13

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 23 April 2009 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Bergamo (Italy)) — Luigi Scarpelli v NEOS Banca SpA

(Case C-509/07) (1)

1

(Directive 87/102/EEC - Consumer protection - Consumer credit - Breach of contract of sale)

2009/C 141/21

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunale di Bergamo

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Luigi Scarpelli

Applicant:

Defendant: NEOS Banca SpA

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Tribunale di Bergamo — Interpretation of Article 11(2) of Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L 42, p. 48) — Consumer credit — Right of the consumer to pursue remedies against the grantor of credit for breach of the contract of sale relating to the goods financed by the credit

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 11(2) of Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit is to be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, an agreement between a supplier and a grantor of credit whereunder credit is made available exclusively by that grantor of credit to customers of that supplier is not a necessary condition for the right of those customers to pursue remedies against the grantor of credit — where the supplier is in breach of contract — in order to obtain the termination of the credit agreement and the subsequent reimbursement of the sums already paid to the grantor of credit.

---

(1)  OJ C 37, 9.2.2008.

1

---
NO. 12-08-00341-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

MICHAEL KENNEDY, § APPEAL FROM THE 3RD

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

MARK W. CARGILL,

APPELLEE § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

On August 21, 2008, Michael Kennedy filed a notice of appeal “from a civil rights

complaint.” On that same date, this court notified Kennedy, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 37.1, that the information received in this appeal does not contain a final judgment or

other appealable order. Kennedy was further informed that the appeal would be dismissed if the

information received in the appeal was not amended on or before September 2, 2008 to show the

jurisdiction of this court. The deadline for amendment has passed, and Kennedy has neither

responded to the August 21, 2008 notice or otherwise shown the jurisdiction of this court.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.1, 42.3.

Opinion delivered October 22, 2008.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk May 21, 2012

h0514 

# Order

May 21, 2012

144251

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144251 COA: 299787 Saginaw CC: 10-034039-FH MICHAEL LEE WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.

___________________ _________________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the November 15, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
State v. JaRonta Raynor

284P16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 8, 2016

JaRonta Raynor, Pro Se.

Mr. Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, Ms. Valerie Mitchell Asbell, District Attorney, For State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 2nd of August 2016 by Defendant of Dismissal:

*513"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."
**Exhibit 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-131859, 333-128184, 333-121955, 333-114315, 333-111595, 333-105127, 333-102829, 333-64176,  333-67213 and 333-25987) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-136271, 333-97719, 333-86817, 333-67223, 333-28403, 333-26557, 333-20939 and 333-17209) of Viewpoint Corporation of our report dated March 16, 2007  relating to the consolidated financial statements, financial statement schedules, management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal  control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 10-K/A.

/s/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLPNew York, New YorkApril 26, 2007
DOOLITTLE v. GEORGE, et al.

195P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 16, 2017

Natalia K. Isenberg, Attorney at Law, Bryan T. Simpson, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for George, Robert M.

Paul A. Tharp, Attorney at Law, Matthew R. Arnold, Attorney at Law, J. Bradley Smith, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for Doolittle, Chelsea.

Patrick H. Flanagan, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for Sipe, Vidal A., et al.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 15th of June 2017 by Defendant (Robert M. George) for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of June 2017."