alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2008223EN.01001201.xml

| 30.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/12

---

Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 17 July 2008 — Franco Campoli v Commission of the European Communities, Council of the European Union

(Case C-71/07 P) (1)

1

(Appeal - Officials - Remuneration - Pension - Application of the correction coefficient calculated on the basis of the average cost of living in the country of residence - Transitional arrangements established by the Regulation amending the Staff Regulations - Objection of illegality)

(2008/C 223/18)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Franco Campoli (represented by: G. Vandersanden, L. Levi and S. Rodrigues, avocats)

Appellant:

Other parties to the proceedings: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: V. Joris and D. Martin, acting as Agents), Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Arpio Santacruz and I. Šulce, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings:

Re:

Appeal brought against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) of 29 November 2006 in Case T-135/05 Campoli v Commission, by which the Court dismissed as partially inadmissible and partially unfounded the action for annulment of the appellant's pension payslips from May to July 2004, in as much as they applied for the first time a weighting calculated in an allegedly unlawful manner on the basis of the average cost of living in the appellant's country of residence, rather than, as previously, in relation to the cost of living in the capital of that country — Effect of the entry into force of the new Staff Regulations of Officials on the system of weighting — Transitional system for officials who retired before 1 April 2004 — Method of calculating weighting and respect for the principle of the equality of treatment — Obligation to state reasons

Campoli

Commission

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the principal appeal and the cross-appeal. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the principal appeal and the cross-appeal.

| 2. | Orders the parties to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the parties to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 117, 26.5.2007.

1

---
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4192 Engrossed in House (EH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4192

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To amend the Act entitled ``An Act to regulate the height of buildings 
 in the District of Columbia'' to clarify the rules of the District of 
Columbia regarding human occupancy of penthouses above the top story of 
            the building upon which the penthouse is placed.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF RULES APPLYING TO HUMAN OCCUPANCY OF 
              PENTHOUSES IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BUILDINGS.

    (a) Permitting Human Occupancy of Penthouses Within Certain Height 
Limit.--The eighth paragraph of section 5 of the Act entitled ``An Act 
to regulate the height of buildings in the District of Columbia'', 
approved June 1, 1910 (sec. 6-601.05(h), D.C. Official Code) is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``penthouses over elevator shafts,'' and 
        inserting ``penthouses,''; and
            (2) by striking ``and no floor or compartment thereof shall 
        be constructed or used for human occupancy above the top story 
        of the building upon which such structures are placed'' and 
        inserting ``and, except in the case of a penthouse which is 
        erected to a height of one story of 20 feet or less above the 
        level of the roof, no floor or compartment thereof shall be 
        constructed or used for human occupancy above the top story of 
        the building upon which such structures are placed''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 28, 2014.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
113th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 4192

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

To amend the Act entitled ``An Act to regulate the height of buildings 
 in the District of Columbia'' to clarify the rules of the District of 
Columbia regarding human occupancy of penthouses above the top story of 
            the building upon which the penthouse is placed.
```
1

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-3363

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Jose Lopez-Rodriguez, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 5, 2009

Filed: February 25, 2009

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Jose Lopez-Rodriguez guilty of illegally reentering the United

States after having been deported. The district court1

 sentenced him to 63 months in

prison and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw,

and in a brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), he argues that (1)

the district court erred in adding language to the theory-of-defense instruction, and (2)

the sentence was unreasonable. We affirm.
-2-

The only issue at trial was whether Lopez-Rodriguez had previously been

deported. He requested an instruction informing the jury that illegal reentry required

proof that he had been previously physically removed from the United States. The

court agreed to give the instruction, but added language--over Lopez-Rodriguez’s

objection--indicating that the jury should consider all of the evidence, and that the

government was not required to present a witness to testify that he or she personally

watched the defendant cross the border into Mexico. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in adding the foregoing language to the jury instruction. See United

States v. Aleman, 548 F.3d 1158, 1166 (8th Cir. 2008) (this court reviews jury

instructions for abuse of discretion and will affirm so long as instructions, taken as

whole, fairly and adequately submitted issues to jury); United States v. Davis, 534

F.3d 903, 913 (8th Cir. 2008) (government’s case may be based on circumstantial

evidence), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 15, 2009) (No. 08-8267). 

We also find that the sentence, which was at the bottom of the Guidelines range,

was not unreasonable. See United States v. Bonahoom, 484 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (reasonableness of sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion);

United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (sentence within advisory

Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable on appeal). The district court properly

discussed the factors it was to consider in imposing the sentence and carefully

weighed those factors. See United States v. Boss, 493 F.3d 986, 987 (8th Cir. 2007)

(discussing abuse-of-discretion standard). 

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we have found no non-frivolous issues. Accordingly, the judgment is

affirmed. We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw on the condition that counsel

inform appellant about the procedures for filing petitions for rehearing and for

certiorari.

______________________________
STATE of North Carolina v. David Matthew LOWE.

No. 278PA15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 28, 2016.

M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Chapel Hill, Attorney at Law, for Lowe, David Matthew.

Derrick Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 8th of September 2015 by State of NC in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of January 2016."

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 15(g)(2).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

No. DA 23-0549 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

vs. 

MATTHEW JASON WELCH, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

GRANT 

Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the 

Appellant is given an extension of time until November 27, 2023, to 

prepare, file, and serve the Appellant's opening brief. 

10/20/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0549
Perrin Q. Henderson, Plaintiff v. Mary Ward Henderson, Defendant

No. COA16-72

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 20, 2016

AFFIRMED.
LANDOVER HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SANDERS, et al.

No. 13P16-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 13, 2016.

Nelson G. Harris, Raleigh, for Landover Homeowners Association, Inc.

Matthew D. Quinn, Raleigh, for Sanders, Thomas B., et al.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 14th of January 2016 by Defendants for Temporary Stay:

> "Motion Dissolved by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of April 2016."
Exhibit 10.1 Q3 FY2014






            
        
TWENTY- FIFTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT






This Twenty-Fifth Amendment to Employment Agreement is made and entered into as of March 1, 2014, by and between PriceSmart, Inc., a Delaware Corporation ("Employer") and John Hildebrandt ("Executive").


Recitals


		
	A)
	On June 1, 2001 an Employment Agreement was made and entered into by and between Employer and Executive.




		
	B)
	Said Employment Agreement has been amended on twenty-four prior occasions;




		
	C)
	Employer and Executive now desire to further amend the Employment Agreement, as set forth hereinbelow:




Agreement




		
	1.
	Section 3.1 of the Agreement which provides: 




3.1    Term. The term of Executive’s employment hereunder shall commence on June 1, 2001 and shall continue until March 31, 2014 unless sooner terminated or extended as hereinafter provided.


is hereby amended, effective March 1, 2014, to provide as follows:


3.1    Term.  The term of Executive’s employment hereunder shall commence on June 1, 2001 and shall continue until March 31, 2015 unless sooner terminated or extended as hereinafter provided.
 


		
	2.
	All other terms of the Employment Agreement, as amended, shall remain unaltered and fully effective.






Executed in San Diego, California, as of the date first written above.




EXECUTIVE                            EMPLOYER
PriceSmart, INC.


John Hildebrandt                    By: ____________________


______________________                Name: Jose Luis Laparte    


Its: CEO & President
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-60509

Conference Calendar

 

JOHN JOSEPH DEDEAUX, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CAPTAIN BANNISTER; SHERRIE PHILLIPS; EMMITT L. SPARKMAN, Warden;

JUSTIN HALL; TODD GUELKER; PAULA GUELKER; E. G. NEALS; VERA

SPEARS; WILLIAM PERRY; LIONEL SIMON; WILLIE GILLOM; JACKIE MOORE;

JACQUELINE SIMS; RONALD WILLIAMS; SALLY SPENCER; DAVID HELMIC;

JOHN SMITH; SHERMAN BUFORD; DOCTOR WELCH,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:97-CV-159-S-A

- - - - - - - - - -

June 15, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mississippi prisoner John Dedeaux, No. 93417, appeals from

the district court’s dismissal as frivolous of his civil rights

complaint. Dedeaux’s complaint alleged that he suffered an

adverse reaction to medicine prescribed for a bladder infection

and that his attempts to file an administrative remedy procedure

(ARP) complaining of this problem were thwarted by unknown

persons; that, after defendant Todd Guelker filed false 
No. 98-60509

-2-

disciplinary charges against him, Dedeaux was confined in a

shower stall for several hours until a disciplinary cell became

available; that his confinement in the shower stall exacerbated a

congenital problem with his left knee; that he was denied

appropriate medical treatment for his knee; and that he was

required to perform work which was inconsistent with his medical

limitations. 

By failing to address in his appellate brief the problems

related to his bladder infection, his inability to file an ARP, 

the allegedly false disciplinary charges filed by defendant

Guelker, or the allegedly inappropriate work assignments he

received, Dedeaux has abandoned these issues. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v.

Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.

1987); FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A). 

Dedeaux does not suggest that his relatively brief

confinement in the shower stall was cruel and unusual punishment

per se, and this court has held that a short period of

confinement under unpleasant conditions does not violate the

constitution. See Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1004-06 (5th

Cir. 1998). Nothing in the record suggests that the defendants

exhibited deliberate indifference to a serious medical problem

when they confined Dedeaux in the shower stall. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Dedeaux received

constitutionally adequate medical treatment. His disagreement

with that treatment will not support a § 1983 claim. Varnado v.

Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
No. 98-60509

-3-

AFFIRMED.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3777 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to disregard students as 

employees for purposes of determining employer health care shared responsibility. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 16, 2013 

Mr. DAINES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to disregard 

students as employees for purposes of determining employer health care shared responsibility. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Jobs for 

5 Students Act’’. 


sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3777 IH

1 SEC. 2. STUDENTS DISREGARDED AS EMPLOYEES FOR PUR2 POSES OF DETERMINING EMPLOYER SHARED 

3 RESPONSIBILITY. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 4980H 

5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by re6 designating paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) as paragraphs 

7 (6), (7), and (8), respectively, and by inserting after para8 graph (4) the following new paragraph: 

9 ‘‘(5) EXCEPTION FOR STUDENTS.—The number 

10 of employees employed by an employer for any pe11 riod shall be determined without regard to any indi12 vidual who, during such period— 

13 ‘‘(A) is a student enrolled at an institution 

14 of higher education (as defined in section 102 

15 of the Higher Education Act of 1965), and 

16 ‘‘(B)(i) is participating in an activity under 

17 a Federal work-study program under part C of 

18 title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 

19 ‘‘(ii) is employed as a condition of such en20 rollment, of such individual’s degree program, 

21 or of receiving a scholarship or tuition reduc22 tion with respect to such enrollment, 

23 ‘‘(iii) is receiving credit towards a degree 

24 at such institution with respect to employment 

25 by such employer, or 


sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3777 IH

1 ‘‘(iv) is employed by such institution (other 

2 than employment described in clause (i), (ii), or 

(iii)) and is carrying at least 1 3 ⁄2 the normal full4 time work load for the course of study the stu5 dent is pursuing.’’. 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

7 this section shall apply to months beginning after Decem8 ber 31, 2013. 

Æ 


sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3758 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3758

    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the second 
generation biofuel producer credit and the special allowance for second 
                   generation biofuel plant property.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 12, 2013

   Mr. Peters of California introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend the second 
generation biofuel producer credit and the special allowance for second 
                   generation biofuel plant property.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Second Generation Biofuel Extension 
Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF SECOND GENERATION BIOFUEL PRODUCER CREDIT AND 
              SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR SECOND GENERATION BIOFUEL PLANT 
              PROPERTY.

    (a) Second Generation Biofuel Producer Credit.--Subparagraph (J) of 
section 40(b)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
striking ``January 1, 2014'' and inserting ``January 1, 2015''.
    (b) Special Allowance for Second Generation Biofuel Plant 
Property.--
            (1) Extension.--Subparagraph (D) of section 168(l)(2) of 
        such Code is amended by striking ``January 1, 2014'' and 
        inserting ``January 1, 2015''.
            (2) Conforming amendments.--Paragraph (4) of section 168(l) 
        of such Code is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of 
        subparagraph (A), by striking the period at the end of 
        subparagraph (B) and inserting ``, and'', and by adding at the 
        end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) by substituting `January 1, 2015' for 
                `January 1, 2014' each place it appears therein.''.
    (c) Effective Date.--
            (1) Credit.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
        apply with respect to qualified second generation biofuel 
        production after December 31, 2013.
            (2) Allowance.--The amendment made by subsection (b) shall 
        apply with respect to property placed in service after December 
        31, 2013.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 31.2**
I, Richard Pyle, Chief Financial Officer of Town Sports International Holdings,Inc., certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Town SportsInternational Holdings, Inc.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(a) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and wehave:
     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report isbeing prepared; and
     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end ofthe period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth quarter in the case ofan annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting;
     5.The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent function):
     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weakness in the designor operation of internal controls which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and
     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting;
Date: November 10, 2004   By: /s/ Richard Pyle   Richard Pyle *Chief Financial Officer* *Office of the President*
Exhibit
      32.1





CERTIFICATION


OF


CHIEF
      EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of PureDepth,
      Inc.
      do hereby certify that:





(a)
      the
      quarterly report on Form 10-QSB/A of PureDepth, Inc. for the period ended April
      30, 2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(b)
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of PureDepth,
      Inc.







Dated:
      December 4, 2007







/s/
      Thomas L. Marcus





Thomas
      L.
      Marcus


Chief
      Executive Officer







/s/
      Jonathan J. McCaman





Jonathan
      J. McCaman


Chief
      Financial Officer