alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 20, 2013

p1113

Order 

Clerk

November 20, 2013

146596 & (72)(77)(78)(79)

CAPITAL AREA DISTRICT LIBRARY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 146596

COA: 304582

Ingham CC: 11-000200-CZ

MICHIGAN OPEN CARRY, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motions for leave to file brief amicus curiae are 

GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the October 25, 2012 judgment of the 

Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the 

questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

CAVANAGH, J., would grant leave to appeal.
STATE v. John SINCLAIR

261P16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

September 22, 2016

Mr. John Sinclair, Pro Se.

*236Mr. Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mr. L. Johnson Britt, III, District Attorney, For State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 11th of July 2016 by Defendant for Notice of Appeal:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of September 2016."
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 136560 Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 136560 

 COA: 274094 

Wayne CC: 06-005505-01

TERRANCE JONES,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 10, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0915 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 22, 2008 

 Clerk
In the Matter of T.C.R.

No. COA15-1366.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 7, 2016.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Kenneth R. McNEILL, Employee, Plaintiff, v. Shawn McNEILL and/or Garnie McNeill d/b/a Ferrell's Construction and/or Ferrells' Construction, Employer, Noninsured, and Shawn McNeill and/or Garnie McNeill, Individually, Defendants.

No. COA15-1041.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 3, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3952 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3952

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend for one year the 
                credits for energy-efficient appliances.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 28, 2014

 Mr. Grayson introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend for one year the 
                credits for energy-efficient appliances.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF CREDITS FOR ENERGY-EFFICIENT APPLIANCES.

    (a) In General.--Subsection (b) of section 45M of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``or 2013'' each place it 
appears in paragraphs (1)(E), (2)(F), and (3)(F) and inserting ``2013, 
or 2014''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to appliances produced after December 31, 2013.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trai Thien USA Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Haley Manchester, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Date: August 31, 2010/s/ Haley ManchesterHaley Manchester
Chief Executive Officer
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report dated February 17, 1995 on Comcast UK Cable Partners Limited and
subsidiaries, included in Comcast UK Cable Partners Limited's Form 10-K for the
year ended December 31, 1996, into Comcast UK Cable Partners Limited's
previously filed Registration Statement File No. 333-02718.



                                         /s/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP



Philadelphia, Pa.,
     March 26, 1997


<PAGE>

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report dated February 17, 1995 on Cambridge Holding Company Limited and
subsidiaries, incorporated by reference in Comcast UK Cable Partners Limited's
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1996, into Comcast UK Cable Partners
Limited's previously filed Registration Statement File No. 333-02718.



                                         /s/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP



Philadelphia, Pa.,
     March 26, 1997
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, O. Joe Caldarelli, certify that:

1.                  Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of CPI International, Inc;

2.                  Basedon my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement ofa material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements weremade, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

3.                  Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant asof, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4.                  Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)                Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

b)               Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this quarterlyreport based on such evaluation; and

c)                Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal year thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.                  Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)                Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

b)               Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
| Date:  | February 12, 2007 |   | Signature: |                                        |   | /s/ O. Joe Caldarelli |
|--------|-------------------|--------|------------|---------------------------------------------|--------|----------------------------|
|   |              |   |       | O. Joe Caldarelli,  Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
STEWART v. WEBB.

No. 274P15-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 2015.

Robert K. Stewart, Marion, for Stewart, Robert K.

Amy Kunstling Irene, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Maureen Krueger, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 28th of October 2015 by Plaintiff for Complaint:

> "Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of December 2015."
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-07-262-CR

GENE NEWTON	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Gene Newton appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance.  We affirm.

	A jury convicted appellant of possession with intent to deliver four or more but less than 200 grams of cocaine.2  At the punishment phase, appellant pleaded true to enhancement allegations and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. 

	In his sole point, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting a mistrial after sustaining appellant’s objection to the State’s jury argument and issuing an instruction to disregard.

	When the trial court sustains an objection raised on the basis of improper jury argument and instructs the jury to disregard but denies a defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial.3  Only in extreme circumstances, when the prejudice caused by the improper argument is incurable, i.e., “so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile,” will a mistrial be required.4   In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial, we balance three factors:  (1) the severity of the misconduct (prejudicial effect), (2) curative measures, and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct.5 

	In response to defense counsel’s closing argument that the police arrested appellant before they had probable cause and, consequently, before they were legally authorized to do so, the prosecutor stated that she and the police were sworn to uphold the constitution and laws of the state.  The trial court sustained appellant’s objection to the argument, instructed the jury to disregard, but denied appellant’s motion for mistrial. 

	Although the prosecutor’s comment that she and the police had sworn to uphold the law was improper in that it placed matters before the jury that were outside the record,6 the comment was not extreme and was made in response to defense counsel’s argument that the police exceeded their authority in making the arrest.  Further, we find the trial court’s prompt instruction to disregard was sufficient to cure any error and that, based on the evidence presented at trial, the comment had no effect on the outcome of trial.

	We overrule appellant’s sole point and affirm the judgment.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL:  CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  October 2, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-4860

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY LAMAR EVANS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,

District Judge. (CR-99-126)

Submitted: May 14, 2004 Decided: July 27, 2004

Before LUTTIG, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Carl J. Roncaglione, Jr., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.

Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, John J. Frail, Assistant

United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Lamar Evans was convicted of aiding and abetting

cocaine base possession with intent to distribute, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). Evans was

sentenced to 188 months incarceration, 3 years of supervised

release, and a $100 special assessment. Evans has timely appealed,

raising two issues.

First, Evans asserts the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction. We review a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Government, there is substantial

evidence to support the conviction. United States v. Glasser, 315

U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Evans’ claim is meritless. Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, witness

testimony was sufficient to sustain Evans’ conviction, and witness

credibility is not subject to appellate review. United States v.

Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). 

Second, Evans asserts the district court erred in issuing

a supplemental instruction to the jury. We review the district

court’s instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 1994). Evans’ challenge to

the supplemental instruction is also meritless. Evans fails to

establish the instructions, taken as a whole, fail to state the
- 3 -

controlling law. United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788-89 (4th

Cir. 1990). 

Accordingly, we affirm Evans’ conviction and sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 24 June 2008 – Commission v Luxembourg**

**(Case C‐272/07)**

Public procurement – Directive 2004/18/EC – Coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts
– Failure to transpose within the prescribed period

1.                     *Acts of the institutions – Directives – Implementation by Member States – Transposition of a directive without legislative
action (Art. 249 EC) (see paras 10-11)*

2.                     *Member States – Obligations – Implementation of directives – Failure to fulfil obligations – National system pleaded as justification
(Art. 226 EC) (see paras 13-14)*

3.                     *Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Examination of the merits by the Court – Situation to be taken into consideration
– Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 226 EC) (see para. 15)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Failure to take, within the prescribed period, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Declares that, in failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, all the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs. |
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 23.3

                         INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S CONSENT



The Board of Directors
Health Partners, Inc.:



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(Nos. 333-41989, 333-20007, and 333-31351) on Form S-3 and registration
statements (Nos. 333-31341, 333-34027, 333-16741 and 33-00074) on Form S-8 of
FPA Medical Management, Inc. of our report dated February 28, 1997, with respect
to the consolidated statement of financial position of Health Partners, Inc. and
Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996, and the related consolidated
statements of operations, changes in stockholders' equity, and cash flows for
each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 1996, which report
appears in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of FPA Medical Management, Inc. dated
March 27, 1998.

                                        (signed) KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP

White Plains, New York
March 27, 1998
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 2, 2008*

Decided October 9, 2008

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08-2179

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT L. SLEEPERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, 

South Bend Division.

No. 3:03 CR 084 AS

Robert L. Miller, Jr., Chief 

Judge.

Order

Sleepers pleaded guilty in 2004 to a cocaine-distribution conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. §846. 

He admitted in a written plea agreement to distributing approximately 100 kilograms 

of cocaine. This, plus Sleepers’s prior convictions (covered by an information under 21 

U.S.C. §851), set the statutory minimum penalty at 240 months’ imprisonment, which 

was the sentence the district court imposed. After the Sentencing Commission lowered 

the offense level for crack cocaine and made the change retroactive, see U.S.S.G. 

§2D1.1(c); Amendment 706, Sleepers asked the district court to reduce his sentence. The 

judge declined, and Sleepers has appealed.

All that need be said to resolve this appeal is that Sleepers’s sentence is already the 

lowest permitted by law. It therefore makes no difference how much of the 100 kilograms was crack and how much was cocaine hydrochloride, or what changes the 

Commission has made to the Guidelines. Nothing the Commission has done could 

authorize (or purports to authorize) a district judge to disregard a statutory minimum 

penalty. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). (Sleepers believes that his 240- month sentence is unlawful because the §251 information was untimely, but he has al-

 

*

 After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No. 08-2179 Page 2

ready filed and lost a collateral attack. The requirements of a successive collateral attack 

have not been satisfied, so application of the statutory minimum is no longer open to 

question. See Godoski v. United States, 304 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2002).)

AFFIRMED
STATE of North Carolina v. Edoardo Antonio AGATI.

No. COA15-1053.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 21, 2016.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

No Error.
Joseph P. McVicker and wife, Susan McVicker, Plaintiffs, v. Bogue Sound Yacht Club, Inc., Defendant.

No. COA16-456

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 6, 2016

DISMISSED.
# C_2008285EN.01003702.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/37

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 24 September 2008 — DC-Hadler Networks v Commission

(Case T-264/06) (1)

1

(Public supply contracts - TACIS programme - Decision to annul the call for tenders - Application for annulment - Duty to state reasons)

(2008/C 285/67)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: DC-Hadler Networks SA (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: L. Muller, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: initially by E. Cujo and P. Kuijper, and subsequently by M. Wilderspin and E. Cujo, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Application to annul the Commission decision of 14 July 2006 to annul the tender procedure in respect of Europe Aid/122742/C/SUP/RU relating to the supply of IT and office equipment for the information network and of social integration and rehabilitation-related equipment for the disabled in the federal district of the Volga (Russian Federation).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the Commission decision of 14 July 2006 annulling the tender procedure in respect of Europe Aid/122742/C/SUP/RU; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the Commission decision of 14 July 2006 annulling the tender procedure in respect of Europe Aid/122742/C/SUP/RU;

| 2. | Orders the Commission and DC-Hadler Networks to pay their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Commission and DC-Hadler Networks to pay their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 294, 2.12.2006.

1

---
# C_2010209EN.01003202.xml

| 31.7.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 209/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.7.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 209/32

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 June 2010 — Mediaset v Commission

(Case T-177/07) (1)

1

(State aid - Telecommunications - Subsidised purchase of digital decoders - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the common market and ordering its recovery - Concept of State aid - Exclusion of decoders for the reception of television programmes broadcast by satellite - Advantage - Selective nature - Adverse effect on competition - Obligation to state reasons)

2010/C 209/46

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Mediaset SpA (Milan, Italy) (represented by: K. Adamantopoulos, G. Rossi, E. Petritsi and A. Nucara, lawyers, and by D. O’Keeffe and P. Boyle, Solicitors)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Martenczuk, G. Conte and E. Righini, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: Sky Italia Srl (Rome, Italy) (represented intially by: F.E. González Díaz and D. Gerard, and subsequently by F.E. González Díaz, lawyers)

Intervener in support of the defendant

Re:

Re:

Application for the annulment of Commission Decision 2007/374/EC of 24 January 2007 on State aid C 52/2005 (ex NN 88/2005, ex CP 101/2004) implemented by the Italian Republic for the subsidised purchase of digital decoders (OJ 2007 L 147, p. 1)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mediaset SpA to bear its own costs and to pay those of the European Commission and Sky Italia Srl. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mediaset SpA to bear its own costs and to pay those of the European Commission and Sky Italia Srl.

---

(1)  OJ C 170, 21.7.2007.

1

---