NO. 81-312 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

ALLEN W. GRENFELL, Froposed intervenor, 

Appellant, 

vs . 

DARI ANN DUFFY et al., 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

VS. 

A/T RANCH INC., a Montana Corporation, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula 

Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Morales, Volinkaty & Harr, Missoula, Montana 

For Plaintiffs: 

Ferguson & Mitchell, Missoula, Montana 

For Defendant: 

Recht & Greef, Hamilton, Montana 

Submitted on briefs: March 5, 1982 

Decided: April 27, 1982 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

On May 15, 1980, the Fourth Judicial District Court 

ordered defendant/respondent, A/T Ranch, to pay plaintiffs/ 

respondents over $25,000 for debts owed by the ranch corporation 

to the plaintiffs. That order was pursuant to a consent 

decree to which the corporation agreed on May 8, 1980. On 

August 29, 1980, Allen Grenfell filed a motion to intervene 

in the matter on behalf of the defendant corporation. 

Following a hearing, an order denying Grenfell's motion to 

intervene was issued February 27, 1981. Allen Grenfell now 

appeals that order. 

A/T Ranch is a family corporation. It was incorporated 

on February 21, 1974. Allen and Lillian Grenfell, husband 

and wife, are each 50 percent stockholders in the corporation. 

Allen and Lillian Grenfell and Lillian's son, Daniel J. 

Duffy, compose the corporation's Board of Directors. Mr. 

and Mrs. Grenfell separated in April of 1976 and later 

divorced. Mr. Grenfell has been completely inactive in the 

corporation since November 28, 1976. Lillian and her son, 

Daniel, have been the only active directors since that time. 

Lillian is the registered agent for the corporation. 

In June of 1979, Mr. Grenfell commenced proceedings in 

the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, requesting 

that the corporation be dissolved and a receivership be 

created to manage the corporate affairs. That action is 

still pending before Judge Wheelis. 

A complaint was filed against A/T Ranch on August 31, 

1979, by Dari Ann Duffy, Daniel J. Duffy, Dayne Grenfell and 

Darrell Grenfell. The complaint alleged several debts due 
and owing plaintiffs by the corporation. That complaint was 

never served upon defendant corporation. It was amended on 

~pril 17, 1980, and again on April 30, 1980. Lillian Grenfell 

was added as a plaintiff. Both of the amended complaints 

were served on defendant, through its registered agent, 

Lillian Grenfell. 

Several of the nine counts in the second amended complaint 

allege debts owed by the corporation to its active directors. 

Lillian Grenfell alleges that the corporation owes her 

$3,350.00 for money lent the corporation for the remodeling 

of the ranch dwelling. Daniel Duffy alleges that the corporation 

owes him a total of $8,566.82: $209.00 for construction 

expenses; $640.77 for expenses accrued as director; $6,717.05 

for breach of a contract by which the corporation agreed to 

feed and care for Daniel's cattle; and $1,000.00 for lost 

profits due to the breach of the above-described contract. 

The remaining counts allege wages and loans past due and 

owing to the children of the Grenfells. 

Lillian Grenfell, as president and registered agent of 

the corporation, appeared at the May 8, 1980, hearing and 

consented to an entry of judgment against the corporation 

with respect to all nine counts in the complaint. Judgment 

against the corporation was ordered May 15, 1980. 

Although not a party to the action, Mr. Grenfell received 

actual notice of the initial complaint. He was assured by 

plaintiff's attorney that he would be notified when actual 

service was made on the corporation. He was not so notified. 

He received notice of the entry of judgment on June 17, 

1980, from the corporation's counsel. On July 2, 1980, Mr. 

Grenfell filed a motion for relief from the judgment. No 

action was taken on that motion. A motion to intervene was 
then filed by Mr. Grenfell on August 29, 1980. 

 he attorney for the corporation, Mr. H. L. McChesney, 

informed Judge Wheelis on October 27, 1980, that he did not 

wish to represent the corporation on the motion to intervene 

as he felt there was a conflict of interest involved. ~t 

that time, he was representing the corporation in the pending 

dissolution proceedings. In his letter, Mr. McChesney also 

stated, "I do not feel that Mr. Grenfell's motion to intervene 

is well taken and I think the corporation should resist this 

motion. " 

Pursuant to Mr. McChesneyls request, an order was 

issued October 31, 1980, removing Mr. McChesney as attorney 

of record for the corporation and directing the corporation 

to retain other counsel. The order also stated that ". . . 

the retained counsel shall have until December 8, 1980 in 

which to prepare, file and serve a written brief in opposition 

to the Motion to Intervene. . ." Mr. Charles Recht was 

subsequently retained by the corporation. 

Following a hearing on the motion, an order was issued 

on February 27, 1981, denying Mr. Grenfell's motion to 

intervene. The order stated that the District Court had 

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; that 

Mr. Grenfell had "no standing to intervene because the 

corporation was legally represented by its present corporate 

officers"; and that the motion to intervene was not timely 

made. Those conclusions were based on several findings of 

fact: (1) Mr. Grenfell made no showing of bad faith or 

fraud on the part of the corporation and its officers. (2) 

Allowing Mr. Grenfell to intervene would result in delay, 

circuity and multiplicity of actions. (3) Mr.Grenfellls 

rights could be adequately protected in the pending dissolution 

proceeding. 
A subsequent hearing was held April 15, 1981, regarding 

attorney fees. At the close of the hearing, the court 

ordered the corporation to pay Charles Recht legal fees 

of $1,470.00 and costs of $41.38, for a total of $1,511.38. 

In appealing these orders, Mr. Grenfell presents three 

issues to this Court. 

(1) Was the service of process upon the defendant 

corporation sufficient for personal jurisdiction of the 

District Court over the defendant corporation? 

(2) Was the motion to intervene improperly denied? 

(3) Did the District Court abuse its discretion when 

it ordered the corporation to retain new counsel to resist 

the appellant's motion to intervene and then subsequently 

ordered the corporation to pay all attorney fees incurred? 

We need not reach the issue of whether or not the 

service of process on the defendant corporation gave the 

District Court personal jurisdiction over the corporation. 

The corporation voluntarily appeared before the court through 

Lillian Grenfell, its president and registered agent. Lack 

of jurisdiction due to any failure of service of process is 

cured if that party voluntarily appears in court. Wilson v. 

Thelen (1940), 110 Mont. 305, 100 P.2d 923; Deich v. Deich 

(1958), 136 Mont. 566, 323 P.2d 35. In addition, Rule 

4B(2), M.R.Civ.P. states: 

"Acquisition of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 

may be acquired by our courts over any person 

through service of process as herein provided; or by the voluntary appearance in an 

action by any person either personally, or 

through an attorney, or through any other 

authorized officer, agent or employee." 

Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P. defines "person" to include a corporation. Therefore, the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over 

the corporation in these proceedings as the corporation 

voluntarily appeared. 
Rule 24, M.R.Civ.P., governs intervention in civil 

proceedings. Rule 24(a.), Intervention of Bight, applies to 

Mr. Grenfell. As a 50 percent stockholder in the corporation, 

he has a substantial property interest at stake. A stockholder's 

interest in a corporation has been held to be an interest 

giving an intervention of right. Pellegrino v. Nesbit (1953), 

203 F.2d 463; U. S. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of 

Lexington, Kentucky (1967), 280 F.Supp. 260, aff'd 391 U.S. 

The relevant portion of Rule 24(a), M.R.Civ.P., states: 

"Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 

property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 

that the disposition of the action may as 

a practical matter impair or impede his 

ability to protect that interest, unless 

the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." 

The District Court held that Mr. Grenfell's motion to 

intervene was not timely made. We agree. Mr. Grenfell was 

given actual notice of the original complaint sometime prior 

to April 17, 1980. He did not file the motion until August 

29, 1980, more than four and one-half months after he became 

aware of the initial claim. As Mr. Grenfell was not a party 

to the original action, no one was under any duty to inform 

him of the proceedings. As a 50 percent stockholder and 

inactive director of the corporation, he had every right to 

contact the Board of Directors to ascertain the progress of 

the proceedings. He failed to do so. Therefore, he is not 

entitled to avoid the "timeliness" requirement by asserting 

that he was unaware of the proceedings until June 17, 1980, 

when corporate counsel enlightened him. 

The intervention rule is a discretionary judicial 
efficiency rule used to avoid delay, circuity and multiplicity 

of suits. State ex rel. Westlake v. ~istrict Court, First 

Judicial District (1946), 119 Mont. 222, 173 P.2d 896. To 

grant appellant's motion to intervene would require an abuse 

of trial court discretion. We find none here. 

Refusing to grant appellant's motion to intervene does 

not leave him with a lack of ability to protect his property 

interests. The corporation dissolution proceeding is still 

pending before the same District Court judge. Mr. Grenfell 

may pursue his claims in that proceeding. To allow him to 

pursue his claims by intervening in a proceeding which has 

been final for practically two years would create the 

delay, circuity and multiplicity of actions sought to be avoided 

in State ex rel. Westlake, supra. 

Finally, Mr. Grenfell asserts that it was an abuse of 

discretion for the District Court to order the corporation 

to pay its retained counsel for his services. The awarding 

of attorney fees is within the discretionary power of the 

District Court. Arwood Stickney, et al. v. State of Montana 

(1981), 38 St.Rep. 1991, 636 P.2d 860. It is axiomatic that 

a party normally pays the fees of its own attorney. The court did 

not abuse its discretion. 

Appellant claims that since counsel for the corporation 

wrote a brief supporting the denial of his motion to intervene, 

he primarily benefited plaintiffs. Therefore, he asserts 

that plaintiffs should pay counsel's fees rather than further 

reducing the corporation's assets to pay the fees of an 

attorney who primarily benefited plaintiffs. If Mr. Grenfell's 

claim is true, the court in the pending dissolution proceedings 

can rectify the matter by decreasing plaintiffs' share of 

the corporation's assets. 
We affirm the dec~sion of the District Court. 

We Concur: 

?!! dl- 4. P&&D 

Chief ,Justice