United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

M.P., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Miami, FL, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 14-1172 

Issued: October 14, 2014 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge 

MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On April 24, 2014 appellant filed a timely appeal of a January 24, 2014 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ 

Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to 

consider the merits of the case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained an 

emotional condition on December 8, 2013 in the performance of duty. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On December 12, 2013 appellant, then a 32-year-old air traffic control specialist, filed a 

traumatic injury claim alleging that on December 8, 2013 an aircraft with which she worked 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

crashed shortly after she transferred control to another airport tower. She was notified of the loss 

of life of all persons onboard. Appellant stated that she experienced restlessness, insomnia, 

stress, night sweats and loss of appetite as well as disturbing images of probable events in the 

cockpit prior to and during the crash. 

In a letter dated December 17, 2013, OWCP requested additional factual and medical 

evidence from appellant regarding her traumatic injury claim. It noted that she had not submitted 

any medical evidence of a diagnosed condition. OWCP also requested that she complete a 

factual questionnaire. It allowed 30 days for a response. 

Dr. William M. Beecham, Ph.D. a clinical psychologist, completed a report on 

December 20, 2013 noting that appellant was an air traffic controller. On Sunday, December 8, 

2013 appellant cleared a departing aircraft out of Fort Pierce Airport, climbed the aircraft to the 

requested altitude and turned the plane on course. She handed the aircraft off to Orlando 

Approach Control. The airplane then crashed killing all three persons on board. Appellant’s 

supervisor informed appellant of the crash during her shift on December 8, 2013 and she 

continued working until the end of her shift. Appellant reported to work on Monday and again 

on Tuesday, when she had an emergency, but that plane landed safely. On Wednesday, she was 

instructed to go to the tape room to complete an official statement regarding the aircraft that 

crashed. At that point, appellant learned that the pilot was transporting his daughter back to 

college and his other daughter was along for the ride. The pilot was unable to see the runway for 

a landing and the tower controller instructed him to go around and try again. The aircraft came 

too low to the ground and crashed into a lake near the runway. All three persons aboard died. 

Appellant reported her obsessive thoughts about the crash, her loss of appetite and insomnia. 

Dr. Beecham diagnosed acute stress disorder as the result of the traumatic event involving the 

death of the pilot and his daughters. 

The employing establishment provided appellant with a Form CA-16 authorization for 

examination to receive treatment as medically necessary. Dr. Beecham completed the form on 

December 20, 2013 indicating with a checkmark “yes” that he believed that her condition of 

acute anxiety reaction was caused or aggravated by the employment incident. He found that 

appellant was temporarily totally disabled. 

By decision dated January 24, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It found that she 

failed to establish that the employment incident occurred in the performance of duty. It found 

that the injury did not arise during the course of employment or within the scope of compensable 

work factors. OWCP found that appellant was not in control of the aircraft at the time it crashed. 

Appellant’s reaction to the news of it later crashing did not occur while she was in the 

performance of duty. While the aircraft was under her control, she handled its navigation 

through her control space and safely transferred it to another control center. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA2

 has the burden of establishing the essential 

elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence, 

 2 Id. 
3

including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United States” within the meaning of 

FECA and that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time limitation period of FECA, 

that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged and that any disability or 

specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment 

injury.3 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of 

whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.4

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

5

 the Board 

explained that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a 

compensable emotional condition arising under FECA.6 There are situations where an injury or 

illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within 

coverage under FECA.7

 When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or 

her employment duties and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an 

emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury 

arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability 

results from his or her emotional reaction to a special assignment or other requirement imposed 

by the employing establishment or by the nature of the work.8

 In contrast, a disabling condition 

resulting from an employee’s feelings of job insecurity is not sufficient to constitute a personal 

injury sustained in the performance of duty within the meaning of FECA. Thus, disability is not 

covered when it results from an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force. Nor is disability 

covered when it results from such factors as an employee’s frustration in not being permitted to 

work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position.9 

Congress, in providing for a compensation program for federal employees, did not 

contemplate an insurance program against any and every injury, illness or mishap that might befall 

an employee contemporaneous or coincidental with her employment; liability does not attach 

merely upon the existence of any employee/employer relation.10 FECA provides for the payment 

of compensation for disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained 

while in the performance of duty.11 The term “in the performance of duty” has been interpreted to 

be the equivalent of the commonly found prerequisite in workers’ compensation law, “arising out 

 3 Kathryn Haggerty, 45 ECAB 383, 388 (1994); Elaine Pendleton, 41 ECAB 1143 (1989). 

4 Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989). 

5

 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

6 See supra note 1. 

7 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 136 (1999). 

8 Supra note 5. 

9 Id. 

10 Christine Lawrence, 36 ECAB 422, 423-24 (1985); Minnie N. Heubner (Robert A. Heubner), 2 ECAB 20, 

24 (1948). 

11 See supra note 1.
4

of and in the course of employment.”12 “In the course of employment” deals with the work setting, 

the locale and time of injury.13 In addressing this issue, the Board has stated: 

“In the compensation field, to occur in the course of employment, in general, an 

injury must occur -- 

(1) at a time when the employee may reasonably be said to be engaged in 

her master’s business; 

(2) at a place where she may reasonably be expected to be in connection 

with the employment; 

(3) while she was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or 

engaged in doing something incidental thereto.”14

This alone is not sufficient to establish entitlement to benefits for compensability. The 

concomitant requirement of an injury “arising out of the employment” must be shown and this 

encompasses not only the work setting but also a causal concept, the requirement being that the 

employment caused the injury. In order for an injury to be considered as arising out of the 

employment, the facts of the case must show some substantial employer benefit is derived or an 

employment requirement gave rise to the injury.15

ANALYSIS 

Appellant alleged that she developed an emotional condition following the crash of an 

aircraft she had directed and handed off to another control tower. The record does not establish 

that she was in control of the aircraft at the time of the crash, that she observed the crash on radar 

or that she had any further contact with the aircraft or other control tower after relinquishing 

control. 

The Board found a compensable factor in the performance of duty in M.L.,16 in which an 

air traffic controller alleged that he sustained an emotional condition when an aircraft over which 

he handed control to another airport crashed. He was also involved in the after-accident 

investigation. In M.L., however, the employee was on duty and monitoring the radar screens and 

observed activity on the radar screen regarding the plane over which he relinquished control and 

called the other airport to question what he just saw. The Board found that he was reasonably 

fulfilling his duty to warn the other airport. Therefore, the employee’s emotional condition was 

found a reaction to regularly or specially assigned duties. The Board noted that it was not a 

situation where the employee was simply standing near the radar and witnessed a stressful 

 12 James E. Chadden, Sr., 40 ECAB 312, 314 (1988). 

13 Denis F. Rafferty, 16 ECAB 413, 414 (1965). 

14 Carmen B. Gutierrez, 7 ECAB 58, 59 (1954). 

15 See Eugene G. Chin, 39 ECAB 598, 602 (1988). 

16 Docket No. 12-354 (issued February 26, 2013). 
5

incident. In the present case, unlike in M.L., appellant had no further contact with the plane and 

did not witness any activity on the radar screen regarding the aircraft prior to its crash. She 

continued to perform her work functions when her supervisor informed her of the news of the 

crash. The Board finds that this case is distinguishable from M.L., as appellant was not 

personally involved in the immediate circumstances surrounding the crash. She did not retain 

any professional responsibility for the aircraft. 

The facts in this current case are also distinguished from A.C.,

17 in which the claimant 

was working on radar and became aware of a potential conflict with two aircraft converging on 

radar. The employee took action to separate them. The Board noted the potential for a collision 

based on the speed and direction of two planes and the employee’s responsibility for monitoring 

live aircraft traffic on radar. The employing establishment later informed the claimant in a 

disciplinary letter that it was his obligation to take action even if the ultimate responsibility for 

such action was with another radar center. The Board found that the claimant was performing 

his regular duties under Cutler when the potential collision arose. The incident arose in the 

performance of duty and was a compensable employment factor. In the present case, there is no 

evidence of record that appellant had responsibility to take any action regarding the plane that 

subsequently crashed while attempting to land. There is no evidence that she was in contact with 

the other tower or the pilot or that her duties required to assist. 

In L.G.,18 an employee had no operational responsibilities for the aircraft involved in a 

potential crash situation. He was present in the control room but was not operating the radar or 

responsible for the operation of the radar at the time of the incident involving two aircraft. The 

Board held that the incident was not in the performance of duty or a compensable factor of 

employment. As noted, appellant had no operational responsibilities for the aircraft and was not 

the responsible air traffic controller at the time of the crash. As noted, while she learned of the 

crash during her shift on December 8, 2013, this knowledge was reported to her by her 

supervisor after the fact and the nexus to establish performance of duty was not present. The 

Board finds that the incident did not arise out of the course of her assigned duties. Her emotional 

reaction is not in the performance of duty. 

The Board notes that the employing establishment properly issued a Form CA-16 which 

authorized medical treatment as a result of the employee’s claim for an employment-related 

injury. The CA-16 form creates a contractual obligation, which does not involve the employee 

directly, to pay for the cost of the examination or treatment regardless of the action taken on the 

claim.19 The period for which treatment is authorized by a CA-16 form is limited to 60 days 

from the date of issuance, unless terminated earlier by OWCP.20 On return of the record, OWCP 

should adjudicate whether appellant’s examination or treatment is reimbursable under the form. 

 17 Docket No. 12-1050 (issued December 28, 2012). 

18 Docket No. 09-276 (issued August 11, 2009). 

19 L.E., Docket No. 14-684 (issued July 29, 2014); see Tracy P. Spillane, 54 ECAB 608 (2003). 

20 See 20 C.F.R. § 10.300(c). 
6

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that the December 8, 2013 employment incident did not arise out of the 

course of appellant’s assigned duties. Appellant has not established a compensable work factor. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 24, 2014 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: October 14, 2014 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board