### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 9, 200 8 S es sio n
ROY S. LAWRE NCE, ET AL 

### . v. HC A H EAL TH SE RV ICES OF TENNES SEE, I NC. d/b/ a S UMMIT MEDICAL CE NTER, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 03C-795 Barbara N . Haynes, Jud ge

No. M2007- 01128-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 12, 2008

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed t his premises li ability action for persona l injuries sustained by the elder ly husband who was injured when automatic doors at the entra nce to a medical office building struck him causing him to fall. In the premises liability action that followe d, Plaintiffs alleg ed that the major tena

nt of the off

ice buildingand the property manag ement company failed to e x erc ise the require d due ca

re in the ma intenance , inspection, and re pair o f the doors a nd/or to proper ly

war n Plaint i ff s of the da

ng ers e x isting at the of

fice building. The trial court summarily dismiss ed the claims ag ainst both defenda nts. W e have deter

mined the major tena

nt ow ed no duty to Plaintiffs a nd thus was entitled to summary judgme nt. W e h av e al s o deter mined that the prope rty

manag ement company did not cre ate the alleg ed dang erous or defe ctive condition, and it did not have a ctual or
c on str uc tiv e kn ow le dg e that a

da ng e ro us or

de fe c tiv e c on dit ion

e xiste d. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R

. , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o urt, in which A NDY D. B E NN E TT and R I C HAR D H. D I NK I NS , J J ., joined.

B . K e ithWilli ams, Jaso n G . D e nto n an d J ame s R. Sto c ks , L e ba no n, Te nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lla nts , Roy S. L awr ence and F leeta L awr ence

.
Br y an Essar y and B rian P. Ma

nookian, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the appellee , HCA Hea lth Services of Tenne ssee, Inc., d/b/a Summit M edica l Center.

Wil liam B. J ak es , I I I , and Hug h C. Grac ey , I I I , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, H olladay Property Service s, Inc.
OP IN ION Roy S. L awr ence had an a

ppointment on Ma

rch 18, 2002, w ith his podi atrist, Dr. Ha wthorn, whose off ice wa s located in the m ultiple-tenant m edica l office building at Summi t Medica l Center. Mr. L awr ence was seventy -eig ht y ear s old at the time and had diff iculty walking , requiringthe-2-

assistance of a w alker . As a c onsequenc e, his wife, F leeta L awr ence , drove the car and ac companied him to his appointment with Dr. Ha wthorn.

After driving t o t he entr ance of the medic al offic e building, Mr s. L awr ence helped he r husband g et out of the c ar a nd walked w ith him t hroug h the automatic door s at t h e front of the medical of

fice building into the lobby wher e he w aited as she parke d the car

. After parkingthe ca

r, Mrs. L awr ence returne d to ass i s t her husba nd as he w alked to Dr . Hawthor n’s offic e, which w as located w ithin the medical office building. Mrs. L awr ence did not stay with Mr. L awr ence during his appointment, but later re turned to the medic al offi ce buildingwher e she f ound Mr. L awr ence waiting in the lobby . Mrs. L awr ence left him there to wai t wh i le she re turned with the c ar. Unfort u n at ely , Mr. L awr ence did not wait for his wife to r eturn. Instead, he chose to e x it the building without his wife’s a ssistance. The d o o r s o p e n ed automatica lly as Mr. L awr ence approa ched the front door

of the medic al offic e building. A s he wa s walkingthroug h the do o rway with the assistance of hi s walker , the automatic doors bega n to close. Trag ically , Mr. L awr ence was hit by the closing doors and he fell to the g round. As a r esult of his fall, Mr. L awr ence sustained a he ad inj ur y , a br ok e n h ip, and

re late d in jur ie s.
On Marc h 1 8, 20 03 , Pl a int if fs , Ro y S. L awr e nc e and

his wi fe , F le e ta

L awr e nc e , f

ile d th e fi rs t of two neg lige nce a ctions ag ainst s ev era l defe ndants. The or igina l defe ndants wer e HCA, Inc., Hospital Corporation of Ame rica , HCA Hea lth Service s of Tennessee, I nc., d/b/a Summit M edica l Center, HCA H ealth Servic es of Te nnessee , Inc., d/b/a S u m m it Ambulatory Surg ery Center a nd Medica l Office Building s of Tennessee L L C. One of the orig inal defe ndants, HCA Hea lth Services of Tenne ssee, Inc., d/b/a Summi t Me dical Center, was the ma jor tenant of the office building. On J une 24, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a second and esse ntially identical ac tion ag ainst the proper ty manag er of the office building, Holladay Property Service s, Inc. In eac h of the Complaints, Pl aintiffs alleg ed that th e de fe nd ants fa ile d to e xer c ise the re qu ir e d d ue c are in the ma int e na

nc e , insp e c tio n, and

re pa ir of the automatic doors and/or to pr operly war n Plaintiffs of the dang ers exis ting at the o ffice building. The tw o actions we re soon c onsolidated. Ther eaf ter, the c laims ag ainst all of the defe ndants except for H CA Hea lth Services of Te nnessee , Inc., d / b / a S u mmit M edica l Center (“H CA”) a

nd Holladay

Property Service s, Inc. (“ Holladay”) w ere dismiss ed.

HCA and Hollada

y both moved for summ ary judgme nt. HCA contende d it was neither a n owner nor oper ator of the office building, that it wa s mere ly a lessee , that the automatic door s were part o f t h e co m m on are a, not its leased pr emises, and that it had no duty to maintain or conduc t inspections of the common are a, namely the automatic doors. Alternatively , HCA contende d that if there was a

duty , there was no e vidence on which to conc lude that HC A ca used or c reated the dang erous c ondition or that it had actual or constructive notice of the injury -ca using condition. F or its p art, H o ll a d ay c o n te n d e d it w a s n o t li a b le b e c a u s e it d id n o t c a

u s e o r c r e a te a dang erous condition, it did not have a ctual noti ce o f a d anger ous condition, and it did not have construc tive notice of a

dang erous c ondition. Plaintiffs oppose d the motions re lying in pr incipal par t on the deposition and supplemental repor t of their expert witness, who testified in g ener al terms that the de fenda nts should have-3-

pe rf or me d d a ily

sa fe ty c he c ks tha

t w ou ld h ave dis c ov e re d a ny e xistin g de fect s or malf un c tio ns

. Plaintiffs’ also relied on this cour t’s opinion in another automatic door case , Frazer v. Horton Automatics , No. E2006-00102- COA-R9-CV, 2006 WL3001013 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 23, 2006).

After a hea ringon the motions, the trial court summarily d i s m i s s ed all claims ag ainst the defe ndants without stating the leg al g rounds for grantingsummary judgme nt. This appea l followed.

S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW
Th e iss ue s we re re so lve d in the tr ia l c ourt

up on summa ry jud g me nt. Sum mary

jud g me nts do not e njoy a presumption of corr ectne ss on appea l, BellSouth Adve r. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson , 100 S.W .3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003) , and on appe al we must make a fr esh dete rm i n at i on that the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have bee n satisfied. Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S

. W

. 2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997) . We consider the e vidence in the light most favor able to the n o n -m oving pa rty and resolve all infere nces in that pa rty ’s favor. Stovall v. Clarke , 113 S.W .3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003) ; Go dfre yv . R uiz , 90 S.W .3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)

. A N A L Y SIS
For there to be a viable ca u s e o f ac t i on for ne g lige nce, the plaintiff must establish the following elements a s to eac h defe ndant: (1) a duty of car e owed by the defe ndant to the plaintiff; (2) c onduct fa lling below the applicable standard of car e amounting t o a breac h of t hat dut y ; (3) an injury or l oss; (4) causation i n fac t; and (5) leg al ca use-f ormerly known as proximate cause

. Mc Cal l v. W ilder , 9 1 3 S.W .2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995) ; Kilpat rick v . Bryant , 868 S.W .2d 594, 598 (Tenn. 19 93 ); Bradshaw v. Daniel , 8 54 S.W. 2d 86 5, 86 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; McClenahan v. Cooley , 806 S.W .2d 767, 774 (Tenn. 1991)

. To be e nt i t led to summary judgme nt, a def

endant must aff

irmatively

neg ate a n essential element of

the plaintiff’s c laim, or establis h an aff irmative def

ense that conclusively

defe ats the plaintiff’s cla im. Cherry v. W illiams , 3 6 S. W.3 d 78, 82 -8 3 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) . T e nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .04 was amended e ffe ctive Jul y 1, 2007, to require the trial court to “state the leg al g rounds upon which the court denies or g rants” the motion for summary judgme nt. The orde r g rantingsummary jud g me nt i n th is c a se wa s e nte re d p ri or to t he e ff e c tiv e date of

the ame ndme nt a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

did not s t at e t h e l ega l g rounds upon which it g rante d the motions. W e will, there fore , focus on the g rounds asser

ted by the defe ndants to se e if any of them are sufficie nt to neg ate a n essential ele ment
o f P l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i m s

. W e w i l l an a l yz e th e c l a i m s a g a i n s te a c hd e f e n d an ts e p ar a t e l y.
HCA Hea lth Services of Te nnessee , Inc. HCA contends, inte r a lia , that it did not owe a duty to Mr. L awr ence beca

use it did not own or oper ate the me dical off ice building , it was mere ly a tena nt in a building with multiple tenants, a nd that Mr. L awr ence was injured in the common are a, not within the premises for which H CA had a duty to maintain.-4-

The c ritical question in many neg lige nce case s is whether the defe ndant owed a duty to the plaintiff. See W

est v. East Tennesse e Pionee r Oil Co. , 172 S.W .3d 545, 550 (Tenn. 2005) ; Bradshaw v. Daniel , 854 S.W .2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993) . In decidingthe issue of duty , courts look at whe ther a par ticular de fenda

nt was under

any obligation imp o s ed b y law for the bene fit of a pa

rticular plaintiff. Do ole

yv . E v e re tt , 805 S.W. 2d 38 0, 38 4 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 0) ; Ri c e v . S ab ir , 979 S.W .2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998)

. The question of whether a defe ndant owed a duty to a plaintiff is a que stion of law. Drap e r v . W

este rfi e ld, 18 1 S.W. 3d 28 3, 29 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) ; Bradshaw , 854 S.W .2d at 869.

I t is undisput ed t h at HC A was not the owner of the medica l office building. Instead, the medical of

fice building in which Dr

. Ha wthorne’ s office was located was owned and ope rate d by Medica l Office Building s of Tenne ssee ( “MedCap” ), which w as neve r made a par ty to this action. HCA was one of seve ral tena nts in the medical off

ice building , albeit the major te nant.

Te nn e sse e ha s lon g he ld, a bs e nt a n a g re e me nt t o th e c on tr ary , th a t th e owne r i s r e sp on sib le for the c ondition of the common are as in a premises wher e there are multipl e tena nts. Thompson v. Ruby Tuesday, I

nc ., No. M2004-01869-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 468724, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27 , 2 00 6) (h old ingthat w he re the ow ne r r e ta ins po ss ess io n of a pa rt of the pr e mis e s f

or us e in
c omm on by se ve ra l te na

nts, th e own er “ is und e r a c on tin uin g duty imp os e d b y

law t o e xer c ise
rea sonable care to keep the common are as i n g ood repa ir and saf e condition”) ; W

oo ds v

. Fo re

st H ill Ce me te ry , 192 S.W .2d 987, 991 (Tenn. 1946) ; Bu gg s v

. Me mp his Ho us . A uth ., 450 S.W .2d 596, 598 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).

HCA had no contra ctual duty to ma intain or repa ir the automatic door s at the entra nce to the office building. To the c ontrary , as the lea se with MedCap ex p re s s l y provides, MedCap ha d the aff irmative duty

to maintain the common are as, includingthe automatic doors at issue. Moreove r, MedCap contr ac t ed with Holladay to provide the re quisite property manag ement ser

vice f or the mul ti pl e-t e na

nt o ff ic e bu ild ing , a

nd Ho lla da y c on tr a c te d w ithMid

South Auto matic Do or

to maintain and ser

vice the a utomatic doors. Although the owner

is responsible for ma intaining the c ommon area s, tenants m ay have a duty to s e e that th e le a se d p re mis e s, pa rt ic ula rl y the a pp ro a c h to the pr e mis e s le a se d b y the te na nt, is in a rea sonably

safe condition. Berry v . Houche ns Marke t of Tenne ssee, I nc ., 253 S.W .3d 141, 146 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) ( holding that a lthough the la ndlord has the duty

to keep common area s safe
and in g oo d r e pa ir , a

te na nt a lso ha s a

“ duty to s e e that the leased pre mises and its approach is i n a re a so na bly sa fe c on dit ion ” (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); Gladman v. Re vco D isc. Drug Ctrs., Inc. , 669 S.W .2d 677, 678-79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). There are , howeve r, prac tical limit ations to the conce pt that a te n an t m ay

h av e a d u ty to s e e th a t t

h e a p p r o a c hto th e te n an t’ s p r e mi s e s is r e a s o n a b ly s a f e. In both Be rry

and Gladman , it was contende d that a tena nt in a multipl e-te nant shoppingcente r owe d
a duty to the pla int if

f wh o wa s in

jur e d in a c omm on are a , th e pa

rk inglot ; ho we ve r, the c ourt in b oth Be rry and Gladman conclude d that a customer trave rsing the parking lot of a m u l t i p l e-tenant sh op pin gc e nte r d id n ot c on sti tut e “ an in g re ss/ e g re ss c ir c ums tanc e ” and the te na nt did no t owe a

duty to the plaintiffs. Be rry , 253 S.W .3d at 146.W e ackno wl ed ge t hat P l ai nt i f f s co nt end that o ur decis i o n i n F r aze r v. H ort on A ut om at i cs , N o. E2006- 00102- 1 CO A- R9- CV , 2006 W L 3001013 ( T en n

. C t

. A pp. O ct

. 23, 2006)
, p re c lud e s su m m a ry j u d g m e n t i n fav o r o f H C A . W e
res p ect f ul l y dis agree, f

i nd i ng F r aze r t o be dis t i ngui shable b ec ause H C A was nei t her an owne r nor op erat o r of t he

m ed i cal off

i ce b ui l d i ng and had no d ut y t o m ai nt ai n t he co m m o n areas o r t he aut o m at i c d o o rs

. In F r aze r , we det er mi ned tha t t h e o w n e r a n d o c c u p ie r o f t h e b u ild ing ha d a d u ty to m a inta in the a u to m a tic d o o rs tha t we re a t i ssu e in tha t ca se

. I d.

a t *6

. H e re w e d e te rm ine d tha t H C A w a s n o t a n o w n e r o r o p e ra to r o f the m e d ic a l o ff ic e b u ild ing ; t h e re fo re , F ra zer do es
no t ap p l y
. A s f

o r H o l l ad ay, we have d et erm i ned t hat i t had a duty t o m ai nt ai n t he aut o m at i c d o o rs

. T he i ss ue co ncerni ng H ol l aday i s wh et her i t ha d act ual or cons t r uct i ve kn owl edge of a dange r ous o r d ef

ect i ve condi t i on. As we di s cus s l at er in th is o p inio n , t h e re is no e v id e n c e in the re c o rd o n w h ic h to fi n d tha t i t ha d the re q u isite n o tice o r k n o w le d g e

. -5- Her e, the injury

to Mr. L awr ence did not occur on or within the premises lea s ed by HCA. Acc ording ly , the only

basis upon which HCA may owe a duty to Mr. L awr ence woul d b e if the ingr ess/eg ress e x tension of a tena nt’s premises liability

applies. We, howeve r, find no basis upon which to a pply the ingr ess/eg ress principle in this case beca use Mr. L awr ence was not in the building to visitHCA’s lea sed pre mises. I nstead, Mr. L awr ence was in the bui lding to see his podiatrist, Dr. Hawthor n. Acc ording ly , if the ing ress/egress princ iple applied, it would be Dr . Hawthor n, not HCA, who owed a

duty to Mr. L awr ence to provide saf e ing ress a

nd eg ress. See I

d. ; see also Thompson , 20 06 WL46 87 24 , at *5 ; Frazee v

. Med Center Inns of America, I nc. , No. 01A01-9301- CV-00034, 1993 WL312674, at *4-5 (T enn. Ct. App. Aug . 18, 1993).

As pr e vio us ly e xpla ine d, the e sta bli sh me nt of a duty ow e d by a de fe nd ant to the pla int if f i s an esse ntial element in a ne g lige nce a ction. Church v. Pe rales , 39 S.W .3d 149, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 00 ); Bradshaw , 854 S.W .2d at 869. I f a de fenda nt neg ates a

n essential ele ment of the plaintiff’ s claim, it is entitl ed to summary judgme nt. Che rry , 3 6 S. W.3 d at 82 -8 3; By rd v. Hal l , 847 S.W .2d 208, 216 n.5 (Tenn. 1993) . We have de termined a s a matter of law th at HC A did not owe Mr. L awr en ce a duty

to maintain the automatic doors. Ac cording ly , HCA was e ntitled to sum mary jud g me nt. 1 Assuming HCA O wed a Duty to Plainti ffs Assuming, arguendo, that HCA did owe Mr. L awr ence a duty of ca re r elative to the automatic doors, we will determi n e wh et her H CA has neg ated a nother e ssential element of Pla int if fs ’ c la im. Business pr oprietors a

re not insure rs of their patrons’ saf ety

. Blair v

. W est To wn M

all , 130 S.W .3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004) . They are , howeve r, re quired to u s e “due ca re unde r all the circ umstances.” Id. (c i t i n g Martin v. W ashmaster Auto Ctr., U.S.A. , 9 46 S.W. 2d 31 4, 31 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1996)). For an operator of a premises to be held liable for neg lige nce in allowing a dang erous or de fe c tiv e c on dit ion

to e xist o n th e pr e mis e s, the pla int if f m us t pr ov e , in

a dd iti on to t he e le me nts of ne g lig e nc e , th at “ the c on dit ion wa s ca us e d or c re a te d b y

the owne r, op e ra

tor , o r h is a g e nt, ” or

if the condition was cre ated by someone other than the owner , operator, or his a g ent, “that the owner or oper ator ha d actua l or construc tive notice that the condition ex isted prior to the ac cident.” Id. (citations omitted). Constructive notice may be established by proof that the da

ng erous or

defe ctive condition exi sted for such a leng th of time that the defe ndant should have be come a war e of theT h is w a s d o n e p u rs u a n t t o a ve rb a l un d e rs ta n d ing b e tw e e n H C A a n d H o llad a y. 2

-6- condition in the exercise of r easona ble ca re. Id. (c i t i n g Simmons v. Se ar s , R o ebuck &Co. , 713 S.W .2d 640, 641 (Tenn. 1986) ).

Plaintiffs contend that HCA’s f ailure to c onduct daily

safe ty chec ks cause d the dang erous condition of the automatic doors. We find no merit to this contention because HCA had no duty or responsibility to chec k or service the automatic doors. The only duty HCA assumed that pe rtained to t he a uto matic do or s wa s to un loc k the do or s e a c h mor nin g , and Pla int if fs have fa ile d to e xpla in how t h i s limit ed role could be c onstrued to impose a duty on HCA to inspect and maintain the doors. As the lease ag ree ment expressly provided, inspection and maintenanc e of the doors was the

2 responsibility

of the owne r of the building , not HCA. In fac t, Mid S outh Automatic Doors wa s under
c o n tr a c t t o p e r f

o r m p e r i o d i c m a i n t e n an c e an d s e r v i c e w o r k o n th e d o o r s

. M o r e o v e r , MidSou th perf orm ed a c omp le te Am e ri c an A sso c iatio n o f Auto matic Do or Manu fa c tur e rs (A AA DM ) in s p e c t i o n th r e e d ay s p r i o r t o M r

. L aw r e n c e ’ s i n j ur y
. C o n s i d e r i n g th e e v i d e n c e i n th e l i g h t mo st favor able to Plaintiffs, we find no evidenc e upon which to conc lude that the condition was c aused
or c re ate d b y

HC A o r i ts a g e nt.
As for actua l or constructive know ledg e, the r ecor d shows that if and whe n HCA rec eived
no tic e that th e a

uto matic do or s n e e de d s e rv ic e or repa ir, H CAwo uld pr omp tly no tif y Mid South Automatic Door. As was the case on Fr iday , Marc h 13, 2002, when someone notified HCA that the doors wer e “dr ag ging,” HCA promptly notified Mid South and Mid S outh promptly dispatched someone to service the doors. After corr ecting the “drag g ing” problem, t he technician per formed
a compl ete AA ADM inspection on the door s. This inspection, which was done three day s befor e Mr. L awr ence ’s injury , included a c heck of all the doors’ sensors, saf ety features, and othe r func tions to ensure the doors wer e openingproper ly . Notably , no acc ident repor ts or complaints were made reg arding the automatic door s betwee n this last ins pection on F riday , Marc h 15, 2002, and whe n Mr. L awr ence was injured on Monda y , Marc h 18, 2002. Considering the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to Plaintiffs, we find no evidenc e upon which to conc lude that HCA had a ctual or c onstructive knowledg e that a problem existed with the do or se ns or s p ri or

to M r. L awr e nc e ’s fa ll.

Th e re fo re , a ssumin g that H CAow e d Pl a int if fs a duty of c are re lativ e to t

he a uto matic do or s, we f ind no evidence upon which to conc lude that HCA ca used or created a dang erous c ondition or that it had actua l or construc tive notice that a dang erous condition exis ted prior to Mr. L awr ence ’s fa ll. Havingaddre ssed the cla ims ag ainst HCA , we wi l l now deter mine whether

the trial cour

t
corr ectly g rante d summary

judgme nt to Holladay

.-7- Holladay Property Service s Holladay was unde r contra ct with the building’ s o wn er t o p rovide maintena nce a nd
mana g e me nt s e rv ic e s to the me dic a l off ic e bu ild ing . H oll a da

y ’s re sp on sib ili tie s in c lud e d p ro pe rt y inspections, preve ntative maintenanc e, sche du l i n g maintenanc e, customer service , and proble m so lvi ngfo r t

he me dic a l of

fi c e bu ild ing . A s a

c on se qu e nc e of

its c on tractu al agre e me nt w ith M ed C ap , Ho l l ad ay

b ec am e a no p er at o r o f t h e m ed i ca l o ff i ce b u i l d i n g.
As is the c a se wi th t

he ow ne r, an o pe rator

of a pr e mis e s c an b e he ld l ia

ble fo r n e g lig e nc e in allowing a dang erous or

defe ctive condition to exis t on the premises if it is established that condition
wa s cr ea t ed b y

the oper ator or the operator had a ctual or c onstructive notice that the condition exis ted prior to the a ccide nt. Neffv. Southeastern SalvageCo. , 694 S.W .2d 311, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 8 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Jones v . Zayre, Inc

. , 6 00 S.W. 2d 73 0, 73 2 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 198 0))

. Th e re fo re , in
or de r t o h old

Ho lla da y lia ble fo r t he al leged mal fu

nc tio n o f t

he a uto matic do or s, Pla int if

fs mus t show that Holladay

either c reated the dang erous c ondition or had ac tual or construc tive notice of the da ng e ro us c on dit ion

of the a uto matic do or s. Se e Ne

ff , 694 S.W .2d at 313. I f l iability of the ope rator is to be predicated on construc tive knowledg e, t h e p ro o f m ust show the dang erous or defe ctive condition exi sted for suc h leng th of time that the operator knew, or in the exercise of

ordinary car e should have known, of

its ex istence. Ogle v. W

inn-Dixie G reenv ille, Inc. , 919 S.W .2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).

Th e op e rator

of a pla c e of bu sin e ss is no t an ins ur e r o f t he sa fe ty of its c us tom e rs but mu st exercise ordinary car e to m aintain the pre mises in a rea sonably safe condition. Jones , 600 S.W .2d at 732 (quotingPatterson v. Kroger Co. , 38 9 S.W. 2d 28 3, 28 6 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 64 )) . The d uty imp os e d o n th e op e rator

of a pr e mis e s do e s no t inc lud e the re sp on sib ili ty to r e mov e or

wa rn a g a ins t “conditions from whic h no unrea sonable risk wa s to be anticipate d, or fr om those which the occ upier neither knew about nor could have discovere d with rea sonable c are .” Ri c e v . S ab ir , 979 S.W .2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting W. P ag e Ke eton, Pros se r & Ke e ton on Tor ts , § 61 at 426 (5th ed.1984) ). In th i s r e g ar d , “ th e m e r e e x i s t e n c e o f a d e f e c to r d an g e r i s g e n e r a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t t o e s t a

b l i s hl i a b i l i ty, unless it is shown to be of such a chara cter or of suc h duration that the jury may rea sonably

conclude that du e ca re wo u l dhave disc overe d it.” Id. (c itatio n o mitte d) . T he lia bil ity of an o pe rator

in premises liability

case s stems from superior know ledg e of the condition of the pre mises. Og le , 919 S

. W

. 2 d at4 6 (c i t i n g Mc Cor

mi c k v . W ate rs , 594 S.W .2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1980) ).

There is no evidence in the rec ord to sug g est that Holladay cre ated a dang erous c ondition. There fore , the issue bef

ore this cour

t is whe ther the evidenc e prese nted in f avor of and in oppositi on to Holladay ’s motion for summary judgme nt was sufficient t o cre ate a g enuine issue of a mater ial fac t on the question of whether Holladay had ac tual notice or c onstructive notice that a dang erous or def ective c ondition ex isted with reg ard to the a utomatic doors.

Pursuant to a contract with Mid South Door Com pany , the doors we re inspec ted y ear ly by a pr o fe s s i o n al servic e compa ny , and ea ch month the prope rty manag er e mploy ed by

HolladayW hen r evi ewi ng t he evi dence , we f i r s t det er mi ne whe t her f act ual di s put es exi s t

. I f a f act ual d i s put e exi s t s , we 3
t hen d et erm i ne whether the f act is m at eri al to t he cl ai m o r def ense upo n whi ch t he summ ary judgm ent i s p redicat ed and

w h e the r th e d isp u te d fac t cr e a te s a ge n u ine issu e fo r tria l. Byrd , 8 4 7 S .W .2 d a t 2 1 4 ; R u t h erfo rd v. P o l a r T a n k T ra i l er, I nc
. , 97 8 S.W

. 2 d 10 2 , 10 4 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 9 8 ).
-8- conducte d a monthly

walk-through inspection of the medical of fice building. Pursuant to a pr otocol established by

Holladay , when a

ny one would inform Hollada y of a conc ern or

complaint, Holladay would arr ang e for an inspection and service

. In fac t, three da y s prior to Mr. L awr ence ’s injury , the automatic doors at issue were inspected a nd passed a

full AAADM inspec tion by Mid Sout h. During the three day s betwee n the full AAAD M i n s p ec tion and Mr. L awr ence ’s fa ll, no one repor ted a problem with the doors. In fac t, prior to Mr. L awr ence ’s injury on Marc h 18, 2002, there had neve r been a repor t, c omplaint, or work order indicating that the automatic door s at issue had struc k anyone or that the sensor s wer e malfunctioning in a manner as to cause the doors to close while a per son was walkingthroug h the doors. Ac cording ly , there is no evidenc e upon which to find that a dang erous or de fe c tiv e c on dit ion

e xiste d p ri or

to M r. L awr e nc e ’s fa ll. Summary judgme nt is appropriate wher e a pa rty establishes that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that a judgment m ay be rendere d as a matter of law

. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; 3 Sto v all , 113 S.W .3d at 72 1

. The pa rty seekinga summary

judgme nt bear s the burden of demon st rat ingtha

t no g e nu ine dis pute s o f m ate ri a l f a c t e xist a

nd that th e pa

rt y is e nti tle d to judgme nt as a matter

of law. Godfrey , 90 S.W .3d at 695. Summa ry judgme nt should be g rante d when the undisputed f

acts, a nd the infer ence s rea sonably drawn from the undisput ed fa cts, support
on e c on c lusion, wh ic h is the pa rt y se e kin g the summa

ry jud g me nt i s e nti tle d to a jud g me nt a s a matter of la

w. Pero’s Steak

&Spaghetti House v. Lee , 90 S.W. 3d 61 4, 62 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; W ebber v. State Farm M

ut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 4 9 S. W .3 d 26 5, 26 9 (Te nn . 2 00 1) ; By rd , 847 S.W .2d at 210; EV COCor p. v . R os s , 528 S.W .2d 20, 24-25 (Te nn. 1975).

For the re asons stated a

bove, we have de termined that Hollada y is en t i t l ed to summary judgme nt as a matter

of law.

I N C ONCL US I ON
The judgme nt of the trial court is a ffirme d, and this matter is r emande d with c osts of appea l
a sse sse d a g a ins t Pla int if

fs

.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CL EMENT, JR ., J UDGE