J-A24034-15

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION SUCCESSOR BY 

MERGER TO WACHOVIA MORTGAGE, 

FSB F/K/A WORLD SAVINGS BANK, 

FSB,

 Appellee

v.

ERIC HUDSON, A/K/A ERIC B. 

HUDSON OR OCCUPANTS,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 3597 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Dated November 14, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, 

Civil Division at No.: 14-00757

BEFORE: PANELLA, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2015

Eric Hudson, a/k/a Eric B. Hudson or Occupants, (Hudson) appeals 

from the November 14, 2014 order granting summary judgment in favor of 

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association Successor by Merger to Wachovia 

Mortgage, FSB f/k/a World Savings Bank, FSB, (Wells Fargo). Upon review, 

we affirm.

Wells Fargo initiated this ejectment action on January 31, 2014. In its 

complaint, Wells Fargo alleged that it was the record owner of property 

located at 400 Jacobs Court, Exton, Pennsylvania, by virtue of a foreclosure 

and sheriff’s sale of the property on July 18, 2013, and that Hudson was 

unlawfully occupying the property. Wells Fargo attached the sheriff’s deed, 
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which was recorded with the Chester County Recorder of Deeds on August 

22, 2013, as “Exhibit A” to the complaint. Hudson filed preliminary 

objections to the complaint, which were overruled. On July 7, 2014, Hudson 

filed an answer and new matter, and Wells Fargo subsequently filed a reply. 

On August 6, 2014, Wells Fargo filed its motion for summary judgment, 

which Hudson opposed. The trial court granted the motion in favor of Wells 

Fargo on November 14, 2014. 

Hudson timely filed an appeal to this Court. The trial court ordered 

Hudson to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and one was filed. On February 6, 2015, the 

trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

On appeal, Hudson essentially argues, inter alia, that the trial court 

improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo, because the 

sheriff’s deed Wells Fargo attached to the complaint does not constitute a 

proper “abstract of title” as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1054(b).1 We do not 

reach the merits of this issue, however, because we agree with Wells Fargo 

that Hudson has waived it for failing to file timely his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. 

In Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998), the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania held that “from this date forward, in order to preserve 

 

1

Pa.R.C.P. 1054(b) provides that, in an ejection action, “[a] party shall set 

forth in the complaint or answer an abstract of the title upon which the party 

relies at least from the common source of the adverse titles of the parties.” 
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their claims for appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the 

trial court orders them to file a Statement of [Errors] Complained of on 

Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925. Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement 

will be deemed waived.” Id. at 309. 

In Greater Erie Industrial Development Corp. v. Presque Isle 

Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), this Court 

explained that “[o]ur Supreme Court intended the holding in Lord to operate 

as a bright-line rule, such that failure to comply with the minimal 

requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the 

issues raised.” Id. at 224 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We continued by explaining that, at one time, “this Court 

purported to carve out a number of exceptions to Rule 1925(b) waiver,” 

such as “endors[ing] the discretionary review of appeals where trial courts 

relied upon appellants’ untimely Rule 1925(b) statements and addressed the 

merits of issues raised therein.” Id. Nevertheless, we explained that “in 

affirming Lord’s bright line, our Supreme Court specifically removed our 

authority to allow such discretionary review”:

Stated simply, it is no longer within this Court’s discretion 

to review the merits of an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement 

based solely on the trial court’s decision to address the merits of 

those untimely raised issues. Under current precedent, even if a 

trial court ignores the untimeliness of a Rule 1925(b) statement 

and addresses the merits, those claims still must be considered 

waived....

Id. at 224-25.
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Notwithstanding the above, this Court explained that “[i]n determining 

whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on noncompliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an 

appellant’s obligation ... therefore, we look first to the language of that 

order” to determine whether it meets the requirements set forth in the rule. 

Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those requirements are as 

follows.

(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained of on 

appeal; instructions to the appellant and the trial court.--If 

the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal 

(“judge”) desires clarification of the errors complained of on 

appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant to 

file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a concise 

statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).

***

(2) Time for filing and service.--The judge shall allow the 

appellant at least 21 days from the date of the order’s 

entry on the docket for the filing and service of the 

Statement. Upon application of the appellant and for good 

cause shown, the judge may enlarge the time period 

initially specified or permit an amended or supplemental 

Statement to be filed. Good cause includes, but is not 

limited to, delay in the production of a transcript necessary 

to develop the Statement so long as the delay is not 

attributable to a lack of diligence in ordering or paying for 

such transcript by the party or counsel on appeal. In 

extraordinary circumstances, the judge may allow for the 

filing of a Statement or amended or supplemental 

Statement nunc pro tunc.

(3) Contents of order.--The judge’s order directing the 

filing and service of a Statement shall specify:
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(i) the number of days after the date of entry of the 

judge’s order within which the appellant must file 

and serve the Statement;

(ii) that the Statement shall be filed of record;

(iii) that the Statement shall be served on the judge 

pursuant to paragraph (b)(1);

(iv) that any issue not properly included in the 

Statement timely filed and served pursuant to 

subdivision (b) shall be deemed waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Here, the record reveals that, on December 16, 2014, the trial court 

issued the following order, which we conclude is in compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b):

AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 2014, pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)(1), [Hudson] 

is hereby ORDERED to file of record and serve a Statement of 

Errors Complained of on Appeal no later than twenty-one (21) 

days after entry of this Order. Service shall be made on the 

undersigned pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). Service on all 

counsel of record and unrepresented parties shall be made 

concurrent with filing by any means of service specified under 

Pa.R.A.P. 121(c).

Any issue not properly included in the Statement timely 

filed and served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) shall be deemed 

waived.

Order, 12/16/2014.

We also conclude that the parties received proper notice of the above 

order. See Greater Erie Industrial, 88 A.3d at 226 (observing that “strict 

application of the bright-line rule in Lord necessitates strict interpretation of 

the rules regarding notice of Rule 1925(b) orders” and that “a failure by the 
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prothonotary to give written notice of the entry of a court order and to note 

on the docket that notice was given will prevent waiver for timeliness 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Here, the docket contains an entry on December 16, 

2014, indicating that copies of the court’s order were “sent to all counsel and 

unrepresented parties.”

We now turn to Hudson’s Rule 1925(b) statement. As stated 

previously, the trial court ordered Hudson to file his Rule 1925(b) statement 

“no later than twenty-one (21) days after entry of this Order.” Order, 

12/16/2014. “[T]he date of entry of an order in a matter subject to the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be the day on which the clerk 

makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has been 

given.” Greater Erie Industrial, 88 A.3d at 226 (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 

108(b)). Thus, the trial court’s order was entered on December 16, 2014. 

Based on the above, Hudson had until January 6, 2015, to file timely 

his 1925(b) statement. See id. (“‘When any period of time is referred to in 

any rule, such period in all cases ... shall be so computed as to exclude the 

first and include the last day of such period.’”) (quoting Pa.R.C.P. 106(a)). 

Hudson did not file his 1925(b) statement until January 9, 2015. There is no 

indication in the certified record that Hudson sought or was granted an 
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extension of time for filing his statement. Thus, we conclude that Hudson 

untimely filed his 1925(b) statement.2

 

2 The trial court’s order contains a stamp that reads “SENT DEC 17 2014,” 

though the stamp does not indicate to whom the order was sent on that 

date. Furthermore, Hudson’s 1925(b) statement and accompanying 

certificate of service, though filed on January 9, 2015, are both dated 

January 7, 2015. To the extent that an argument can be made that 

Hudson’s 1925(b) statement is timely filed given these circumstances, we 

reject it. As this Court stated in Greater Erie Industrial:

Pa.R.C.P. 205.1 provides: “Any legal paper not requiring the 

signature of, or action by, a judge prior to filing may be 

delivered or mailed to the prothonotary.... A paper sent by mail 

shall not be deemed filed until received by the appropriate 

officer. Additionally, Pa.R.A.P. 121 provides: “Filing may be 

accomplished by mail addressed to the prothonotary, but ... filing 

shall not be timely unless the papers are received by the 

prothonotary within the time fixed for filing.” Furthermore, this 

Court has stated: “If an appellant does not comply with an 

order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, all issues on appeal are 

waived—even if the Rule 1925(b) statement was served on the 

trial judge who subsequently addressed in an opinion the issues 

raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement.”

Greater Erie Industrial, 88 A.3d at 226 n.5 (citations omitted). Thus, it is 

of no import that Hudson’s 1925(b) statement and accompanying certificate 

of service are dated January 7, 2015. Moreover,

“[T]he date of mailing or service does not necessarily control the 

timeliness of a Rule 1925(b) statement in the civil context. In 

relevant part, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1) states:

Filing of record and service on the judge shall be in person 

or by mail ... and shall be complete on mailing if appellant 

obtains a United States Postal Service Form 3817, 

Certificate of Mailing, or other similar United States Postal 

Service form from which the date of deposit can be 

verified.

Id. at 226 n.6. None of the required postal forms appears in the record to 

enable this Court to conclude that Hudson filed his 1925(b) statement on 
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Because Hudson has failed to file timely his 1925(b) statement, he has 

waived his issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial 

court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/2015

 

January 7, 2015. Thus, even if we were to assume that December 17, 2014, 

was the date upon which to calculate the deadline for filing timely the 

1925(b) statement, which would be January 7, 2015, Hudson’s statement 

would still be two days late.