alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle

409PA15-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 28, 2016

J. David Breemer, Attorney at Law, Keith P. Anthony, Attorney at Law, Durham, for Nies, Gregory P., et al.

Brian E. Edes, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Norwood P. Blanchard, III, Attorney at Law, J. Allen Jernigan, Attorney at Law, for Town of Emerald Isle.

Elliot Engstrom, Attorney at Law, for Civitas Institute Center for Law and Freedom.

Robert H. Thomas, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, Jason T. Campbell, Attorney at Law, Durham, for Owners' Counsel of America, et al.

James Patrick Longest, Jr., Attorney at Law, for Surfrider Foundation.

Geoffrey R. Gisler, Attorney at Law, Derb S. Carter, Jr., Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, for Southern Environmental Law Center.

Mary Louise Lucasse, Special Deputy Attorney General, for N.C. Coastal Resources Commission.

Todd S. Roessler, Attorney at Law, Phillip A. Harris, Jr., Attorney at Law, Joseph S. Dowdy, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Joseph J. Kalo, Attorney at Law, Amy Y. Bason, General Counsel, Walter Derrickson Taylor, Attorney at Law, Neil B. Whitford, Attorney at Law, Morehead City, Garris Neil Yarborough, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Charles S. Lanier, Attorney at Law, Jacksonville, Carl W. Thurman, III, Attorney at Law, Stephen D. Coggins, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Wanda M. Copley, County Attorney, John C. Wessell, III, Attorney at Law, Charlotte Noel Fox, Attorney at Law, A. A. Canoutas, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Robert V. Shaver, Jr., Attorney at Law, Charles S. Baldwin, IV, Attorney at Law, Justin K. Humphries, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Michael R. Isenberg, Attorney at Law, Southport, G. Grady Richardson, Jr., Attorney at Law, for Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus Joseph Kalo, et al.

John F. Maddrey, Solicitor General, Elizabeth A. Fisher, Assistant Solicitor General, Marc Bernstein, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina Ex Rel. Attorney General Roy Cooper.

J. Mitchell Armbruster, Attorney at Law, B. Davis Horne, Jr., Attorney at Law, Eva G. Frongello, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for N.C. Travel and Tourism Coalition, et al.

Sam Hayes, Attorney at Law, David B. Efird, Deputy General Counsel, Beth A. Onyenwoke, Attorney at Law, Kevin V. Howell, Attorney at Law, for Department of Environmental Quality, et al.

Benjamin Marshall Gallop, Attorney at Law, John D. Leidy, Attorney at Law, Elizabeth City, Robert B. Hobbs, Jr., Attorney at Law, Nags Head, Donald I. McRee, Jr., Currituck County Attorney, Ronald G. Baker, Attorney at Law, Casey C. Varnell, Attorney at Law, For County of Dare, et al.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of July 2016 by N.C. Coastal Resources Commission for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of July 2016."

Unless already submitted, the Amicus Brief shall be submitted to the court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 28(i).
1148.

#### Southwestern Sheep Company *v.*Thompson.

Trover, from city court of Miller county — Judge Bush. February 28, 1908.

Submitted July 2,

Decided November 24, 1908.

The action was for the recovery of sheep owned by the plaintiff and impounded by the defendant, who was marshal of the City of Colquitt, and who set up that he was holding them under an ordinance of the city, the sheep having been found running at large in the streets, and the plaintiff refusing to pay the impounding fee prescribed by the ordinance. The verdict was for the defendant. 'The plaintiff excepted to the overruling of its motion for a new trial, which was on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to law, evidence, etc.

*William I. Geer,*for plaintiff. *Perry D. Rich,*for defendant.

Hill, C. J.

This ease is controlled by the decision of this court in *Geer*v. *Thompson,*4 *Ga. App.*756 (62 S. E. 500), and the decision of the Supreme Court in *Stone*v. *Town of Tallulah Falls,*131 *Ga.*452 (62 S. E. 592). * *Judgment affirmed.*
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ICP Solar Technologies Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending April 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Sass Peress, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Sass Peress 
Sass Peress
Chief Executive Officer
June 15, 2009

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The foregoing certifications are accompanying the Company's Form 10-Q solely pursuant to section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.

---
----

EXHIBIT 31.1 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

I, Sass Peress, Chief Executive Officer of ICP SolarTechnologies Inc. (the "registrant"), certify that: 

1. 

I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q of ICP Solar Technologies Inc.; 

2. 

Based on myknowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; 

3. 

Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this quarterly report; 

4. 

The registrant'sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

a) 

designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisquarterly report is being prepared; 

b) 

evaluated theeffectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and 

c) 

disclosed inthis report any change in the registrant's internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. 

The registrant'sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant'sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

a) 

all significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of our financialreporting internal controls which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and 

b) 

any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.Date: June 23, 2008 

/s/ *Sass Peress                          *Sass Peress Chief Executive Officer 

----
1

... This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2008-CR-3740, styled The State of Texas v. Jerry Settles, in the

226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Sid L. Harle presiding.

i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00653-CR

IN RE Jerry SETTLES

Original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 24, 2008

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

On August 27, 2008, relator Jerry Settles filed a petition entitled “petition for writ of habeas

corpus motion to appeal,” seeking relief relating to the sentence imposed on him following a

criminal conviction. We construe relator’s petition as a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas

corpus. In criminal matters, the courts authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus are the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals, the district courts, and the county courts. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 11.05 (Vernon 2005). This Court has no jurisdiction to consider a post-conviction petition

for writ of habeas corpus in a felony case. See Board of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court

of Appeals for the Eighth District, 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); In re Gutierrez,
04-08-00653-CR

-2-

No. 04-06-00382-CV, 2006 WL 1748421, *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 28, 2006, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.). 

If relator intended to file a notice of appeal, he should have filed a timely notice of appeal

in the trial court. A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke a court of appeals’ jurisdiction.

See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A notice of appeal is timely if it

is filed within thirty days of the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or within ninety

days after sentencing if the defendant timely files a motion for new trial. TEX.R.APP.P. 26.2(a)-(b).

However, Rule 26.3 allows the appellate court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal if, within

fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice of appeal, the party files: (1) a notice of appeal

with the trial court, and (2) files a motion in the court of appeals that complies with Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 10.5(b). TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. If relator fails to comply with Rules 26.2 and

26.3, only the Court of Criminal Appeals has the exclusive authority to grant post-conviction relief,

such as an out-of-time appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 3 (Vernon Supp.

2007); Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus and all relief requested is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
In the MATTERS OF: J.R.E., J.J.E., J.L.E., K.B.E.

No. COA16-1140

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: May 16, 2017

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7663

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSE ELMER CHAVEZ BENITEZ, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, 

District Judge. (1:04-cr-00006-LMB-1; 1:08-cv-586) 

Submitted: October 14, 2008 Decided: October 20, 2008 

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Jose Elmer Chavez Benitez, Appellant Pro Se. Rebeca Hidalgo 

Bellows, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, 

for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Jose Elmer Chavez Benitez seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Benitez has 

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Benitez’s 

motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the 

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-08-00365-CV

Wendy Walicek, Appellant

v.

Jackson Ruiz Salon L.C., Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-08-001231, HONORABLE GUS J. STRAUSS JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Wendy Walicek filed a motion requesting that this appeal be dismissed.

See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

__________________________________________

Diane M. Henson, Justice

Before Justices Patterson, Waldrop and Henson

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: September 25, 2008
# C_2009006EN.01002703.xml

| 10.1.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 6/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.1.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 6/27

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 25 November 2008 — Caisse fédérale du Crédit mutuel Centre-Est Europe v OHIM (SURFCARD)

(Case T-325/07) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Application for Community word mark SURFCARD - Absolute ground for refusal - Partially descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94)

(2009/C 6/56)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Caisse fédérale du Crédit mutuel Centre-Est Europe (CFCMCEE) (Strasbourg, France) (represented by: P. Greffe, J. Schouman and L. Paudrat, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 14 June 2007 (Case R 1130/2006-1) concerning an application for registration of the word sign SURFCARD as a Community trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 14 June 2007 (Case R 1130/2006-1) to the extent that it refuses the registration as a Community trade mark of the word sign SURFCARD for ‘magnetic data media, optical data media’ falling within Class 9 and ‘credit card services, debit card services’ falling within Class 36 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 14 June 2007 (Case R 1130/2006-1) to the extent that it refuses the registration as a Community trade mark of the word sign SURFCARD for ‘magnetic data media, optical data media’ falling within Class 9 and ‘credit card services, debit card services’ falling within Class 36 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended.

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder.

| 3. | Orders the Caisse fédérale du Crédit mutuel Centre-Est Europe (CFCMCEE) and OHIM to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Caisse fédérale du Crédit mutuel Centre-Est Europe (CFCMCEE) and OHIM to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 269, 10.11.2007.

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1387

LAWRENCE WILDER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA96-3472-S)

Submitted: June 19, 1997 Decided: June 27, 1997

Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.

Lawrence Wilder, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the following district court orders: (1)

letter order finding no ground to act upon Appellant's complaints

against his former counsel; (2) order denying Appellant's motion

for preliminary injunction; (3) marginal order denying Appellant's

motion for appointment of counsel; (4) order denying Appellant's

motion for the court to order his union to provide him with counsel; and (5) letter order returning documents unrelated to any

pending motion.

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). To the

extent that Appellant seeks review of the denial of his motion for

preliminary injunction, this court has jurisdiction over that portion of the appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We find that the

district court did not err in denying the motion. Accordingly, we

affirm the denial of the motion on the reasoning of the district

court. Wilder v. Shalala, No. CA-96-3472-S (D. Md. Feb. 12, 1997).

To the extent that Appellant seeks review of the remaining

orders, this court does not have jurisdiction because the orders

are neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral

orders. We therefore dismiss the appeal as to the denials of

remaining motions.
3

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART
EXHIBIT 23.1

Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Form S-8 and the Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 to the
Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-07295) pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan, 1996 Director's Stock Option Plan and Employees and Consultants Stock Option
Agreement/Plan, the Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-58303) pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan, and 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, the
Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-87369) pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan, the Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-44736)
pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan, the Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-86644) pertaining to the 1996 Directors' Stock Option Plan and 1998 Employee Stock
Purchase Plan, the Post-Effective Amendment No. 6 on Form S-3 to Form SB-2 (Form SB-2 No. 333-476-LA) for
the registration of 4,477,402 shares of common stock and 328,500 warrants to purchase common stock, the Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-88051) for the registration
of 2,014,036 shares of common stock, the Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-52326) for the registration of 697,533 shares of common stock, the
Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-95177) for the registration of 136,130 shares of common stock, the Form S-3 (Registration
No. 333-100707) for the registration of 3,930,800 shares of common stock, the Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-104255) for the registration of
11,549,219 shares of common stock, the Form S-3 (Registration No. 333-107301) for the registration of 5,004,000 shares of common stock, and the
Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-110152) pertaining to the 2003 Stock Plan and related prospectuses, of our report dated February 18, 2004, with respect to
the consolidated financial statements of SuperGen, Inc. included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003.



Palo
Alto, California
March 2, 2004

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QuickLinks
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

132921 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. JEFFREY M. RUPERSBURG, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices v SC: 132921 COA: 262470 ETKIN SKANSKA CONSTRUCTION Oakland CC: 2000-023553-NO COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, f/k/a A.J. ETKIN CONSTRUCTION COMP ANY, and BAKER CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendants-Appellants, and

WHALEY STEEL CORP ORATION and L.W. CONNELLY & SON, INC., Defendants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the November 30, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

t0319 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 26, 2007

Clerk
Kenneth C. ADAMS v. THE CITY OF RALEIGH

No. 102P16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

September 22, 2016

Joseph H. Nanney, Jr., Attorney at Law, Raleigh, For Adams, Kenneth C.

Hunt K. Choi, Deputy City Attorney, For The City of Raleigh.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 22nd of March 2016 by Plaintiff in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of September 2016."
State v. Tae Kwon Hammonds

389A15-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 29, 2016

Barbara S. Blackman, Assistant Appellate Defender, Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Hammonds, Tae Kwon.

Joseph E. Elder, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

John R. Rittelmeyer, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Anne Bleyman, Attorney at Law, for Disability Rights North Carolina, et al.

Trey Robison, District Attorney.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Supplemental Brief filed on the 28th of December 2016 by Defendant:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 29th of December 2016."

Defendant shall have up to and including the 3rd day of February 2017 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.