alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Order of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 27 June 2008 – Philip Morris Products v OHIM**

**(Case C‐497/07 P)**

Appeal – Community trade mark – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Three-dimensional mark representing the shape of a packet of cigarettes – Refusal to register

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks devoid of any distinctive character – Three-dimensional mark constituted by the shape of the product (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 7(1)(b)) (see para. 25)

**Re:**

| | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) of 12 September 2007 in Case T-140/06 | Philip Morris Products | v | OHIM | by which that Court dismissed the action brought by the applicant against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 24 February 2006 concerning its application for registration of the shape of a packet of cigarettes as a Community trade mark – Infringement of Articles 4 and 7(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) – Distinctive character of a three-dimensional shape – Ways of embodying that shape and time at which it is to be assessed. |

**Operative part**

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | The appeal is dismissed; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Philip Morris SA shall pay the costs. |
SETTLERS EDGE HOLDING COMPANY, LLC; Mountain Air Development Corporation; Virginia A. Banks; William R. Banks ; Jeani H. Banks; Michael R. Watson ; Sheree B. Watson; Virginia A. Banks, William R. Banks, and Sheree B. Watson in their Capacity as Trustees of William A. Banks Revocable Trust; Morris Atkins in his Capacity as Trustee of William Banks Family Irrevocable Trust Number 1; and Morris Atkins in his Capacity as Trustee of William Banks Family Irrevocable Trust Number 2 v. RES-NC SETTLERS EDGE, LLC

No. 17P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

G. Kirkland Hardymon, Attorney at Law, Ross R. Fulton, Attorney at Law, Benjamin E. Shook, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for Settlers Edge Holding Company, LLC, et al.

Christopher Blake, Attorney at Law, D. Martin Warf, Attorney at Law, Leslie L. Mize, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for RES-NC Settlers Edge, LLC.

*296***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the conditional petition filed on the 24th of January 2017 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
---

CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002

I, Taras Chebountchak, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer of FC Financial Services Inc.. (the Company), hereby certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

| | (i)  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company, for
      the fiscal quarter ended May 31, 2006, and to which this certification is
      attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the Report) fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
      in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
      operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                                        

| | By:    | /s/
      Taras Chebountchak                             
| | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------
| |        |                                                          
| | Name:  | TARAS CHEBOUNTCHAK                                       
| |        |                                                          
| | Title: | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
      Officer
| |        |                                                          
| | Date:  | July 14, 2006                                            

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-QSB to which it
relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is
not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made
before or after the date of the Form 10-QSB), irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.

---
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Richard N. Small, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, as amended, of PointTherapeutics, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this reportdoes not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period coveredby this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report isbeing prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in thisreport any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: June 1, 2004
STATE of North Carolina v. John Phillip LOCKLEAR

No. 43P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

Craig M. Cooley, Attorney at Law, Cary, for Locklear, John Phillip.

Tiffany Y. Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, David Learner, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 1st of February 2017 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
STATE of North Carolina v. Jaime Duarte Sierra EL-BEY.

No. 93A93-4.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 17, 2016.

Jaime Duarte Sierra, for Sierra El-Bey, Jaime Duarte.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Vernon K. Stewart, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 20th of January 2016 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of March 2016."
STATE of North Carolina v. Tardra Eterell BOUKNIGHT

No. 119P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 8, 2017

Jillian C. Katz, Assistant Appellant Defender, for Bouknight, Tardra Eterell.

Colin A. Justice, Assistant Attorney General, R. Andrew Murray, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 11th of April 2017 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."
FMC.2014.06.30 Ex. 10.2






Exhibit 10.2


SECOND AMENDMENT OF
FMC TECHNOLOGIES, INC. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT PROGRAM
PART I SALARIED AND NONUNION HOURLY EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT PLAN
WHEREAS, FMC Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the FMC Technologies, Inc. Employees’ Retirement Program Part I Salaried and Nonunion Hourly Employees’ Retirement Plan, as amended and restated effective January 1, 2013 (the “Plan”);
WHEREAS, the Company now deems it necessary and desirable to amend the Plan to spinoff the assets and liabilities of certain Participants into the FMC Technologies, Inc. Frozen Retirement Plan, which plan is also maintained by the Company; and
WHEREAS, this Second Amendment shall supersede the provisions of the Plan to the extent those provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of the amendment;
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue and in exercise of the powers reserved to the Company under Section 11.1 Plan Amendment or Termination of the Plan, the Plan is hereby amended as follows, effective as of June 1, 2014:
		
	•
	Effective as of June 1, 2014, the following text is hereby added to the Plan to read as follows:


SPINOFF OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Effective as of June 1, 2014, the assets and liabilities attributable to Participants who are (a) either (i) Frozen Participants or (ii) Participants that incurred a Severance From Service Date and subsequently became re-employed on or after January 1, 2010, and (b) active Employees of the Company or an Affiliate as of June 1, 2014 (each, a “Transferred Participant”) are hereby transferred from the Plan to the FMC Technologies, Inc. Frozen Retirement Plan (the “Frozen Plan”).  In accordance with Section 414(l) of the Code, the benefit each such Transferred Participant would receive if the Frozen Plan were terminated immediately after the transfer is not less than the benefit each such Participant would have received if the Plan had terminated immediately before the transfer.  The transfer of assets and liabilities from the Plan to the Frozen Plan shall be accomplished in a manner that complies with Section 414(l) of the Code and Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder (including the allocation of excess assets), the protected benefit rules under Section 411(d)(6) of Code and Treasury regulations promulgated thereunder and all other applicable laws.







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this amendment to be executed by a duly authorized representative this 30th day of June, 2014.
FMC Technologies, Inc.




By: Maryann T. Seaman        
Its:  Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6936

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JIMMY EUGENE PARKER, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (1:05-cr-00158-JAB-1; 1:07-cv-00213-JAB-PTS)

Submitted: October 15, 2008 Decided: October 24, 2008

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jimmy Eugene Parker, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jimmy Eugene Parker, Jr. seeks to appeal the district

court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge

and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Parker has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for a

certificate of appealability, deny his motion to appoint counsel,

and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
# C_2009055EN.01002502.xml

| 7.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 55/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 55/25

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 17 December 2008 — Portela v Commission

(Case T-137/07) (1)

1

(Non-contractual liability - Marketing of defective digital thermometers bearing the marking ‘CE’ - Failure to act on the part of the Commission - Causal connection - Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded in law)

(2009/C 55/46)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Portela — Comércio de artigos ortopédicos e hospitalares, Lda (Queluz, Portugal) (represented by: C. Mourato, lawyer)

Applicant:

da

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: P. Guerra e Andrade and B. Schima, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Claim requesting that the Court of First Instance should impose on the Commission the obligation to act in accordance with Article 14b of Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices (OJ 1993 L 169, p. 1), as amended by Directive 98/79/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices (OJ 1998 L 331, p. 1), by ordering the certification company TÜV Rheinland Product Safety GmbH, through the Federal Republic of Germany, to activate, in favour of the applicant, the mandatory civil liability insurance provided for in point 6 of Annex XI to Directive 93/42, which that company took out, and, if the alleged damage cannot be remedied by the principal claim, in the alternative, a claim for compensation for the damage sustained by the applicant on account of the various omissions on the part of the Commission

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Portela — Comércio de artigos ortopédicos e hospitalares, Lda is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Portela — Comércio de artigos ortopédicos e hospitalares, Lda is ordered to pay the costs.

da

---

(1)  OJ C 155, 7.7.2007.

1

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136671 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 136671 

 COA: 283613 

Midland CC: 06-002836-FC 

RONALD SAMUEL GROSS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 22, 2008 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

0915 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 22, 2008 

 Clerk
1473.

#### Rossiter MacGovern & Company *v.*Carrollton Electric Light Company *et al.*

Powell, J.

1. The claimant to the fund sought to be subjected to an attachment through the service of summons of garnishment is not entitled to move to dismiss or quash the attachment; his remedy is to move to dismiss the levy, if for any reason the attachment is defective. *Morrison*v. *Anderson,*111 *Ga.*847 (36 S. E. 462), and cit.; *Carreker*v. *Thornton,*1 *Ga. App.*511 (57 S. E. 988).

2. Where an attachment against a non-resident is levied by service of summons of garnishment, and the garnishee files an .answer in the nature of an interpleader, admitting possession of certain property asserted to be the property of the defendant, but claimed also by a third person, between which rival claims he is unable to decide, and this third person files a statutory claim and dissolves the garnishment, and the plaintiff, traverses the answer and asserts that the property is subject, it is not error to overrule a motion to dismiss the proceedings, on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction because no property or fund was caught by the attachment, the motion being made before the court has determined the issue raised by the traverse and the claim. *Small*v. *Mendel,*96 *Ga.*532 (23 S. E. 834).

3. Grounds of a motion for a new trial, excepting to the admission of writings, will not be considered, unless the substance of the writings appears in the motion itself, or in an exhibit attached thereto. Incorporation of copies of the writings into the brief of the evidence is not sufficient.

*394Levy and claim, from city court of .Carrollton — Judge Hodnett-Oetober 16, 1908. .

Submitted December 11,

Decided December 23, 1908.

*Beall &*Adamson, for plaintiffs in error.

*Brown &*Boop, contra.

4. The judgment of,the court, in the nature of a verdict, is not without, evidence to support it. *Judgment affirmed.*
**Exhibit 21.1**

**SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT**

| 1.     | “Tier   Technologies (Australia) PTY Limited”, an Australian corporation.  |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                 |
| 2      | “Tier   Technologies (United Kingdom), Inc.”, a Delaware corporation. |
|   |                                                                                 |
| 3.     | “Tsource, Inc.”,   a Delaware corporation.                            |
|   |                                                                                 |
| 4.     | “ADC Consultants   PTY Limited”, an Australian corporation.                |
|   |                                                                                 |
| 5.     | “Simsion   Bowles & Associates”, an Australian corporation.       |
|   |                                                                                 |
| 6.     | “Official   Payments Corporation”, a Delaware corporation.                 |
|   |                                                                                 |
| 7.     | “EPOS   Corporation”, an Alabama corporation.                              |
State of North Carolina v. Robert Lee Golden

No. 509P13-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 30, 2016.

Robert Golden, for Golden, Robert Lee.

Amy Kunstling Irene, Special Deputy Attorney General, Ben R. David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina

**ORDER**

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 1st of June 2016 in this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, New Hanover County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 29th of June 2016."
Slip Op. 08-108 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

 

 Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge 

 Court No. 07-00322 

 

JUDGMENT 

In this action, Defendant sought and received a voluntary remand. See

Order dated August 18, 2008. Defendant filed its remand results on October 3, 

2008. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Voluntary Remand, 

Macau Youcheng Trading Co. v. United States, Court No. 07-00322 (Oct. 3, 

2008) (“Redetermination”). All parties in this action concur with the 

Redetermination. Accordingly, upon the court’s review of the Redetermination, 

and all relevant papers and proceedings had herein, and upon due deliberation, it 

is hereby 

 ORDERED that the Redetermination is sustained. 

 /s/ Leo M. Gordon 

 Judge Leo M. Gordon 

Dated: October 10, 2008 

 New York, New York 

MACAU YOUCHENG TRADING CO. AND 

ZHONGSHAN YOUCHENG WOODEN 

ARTS AND CRAFTS CO., LTD., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant.