IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12–2120

Filed June 6, 2014

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA; TERRY BRANSTAD, Governor of the State of Iowa, 

Individually and in His Official Capacity; KIMBERLY REYNOLDS, 

Lieutenant Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in Her Official 

Capacity; JEFF BOEYINK, Chief of Staff to the Governor of the State of 

Iowa, Individually and in His Official Capacity; BRENNA FINDLEY, Legal 

Counsel to the Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in Her 

Official Capacity; TIMOTHY ALBRECHT, Communications Director to 

the Governor of the State of Iowa, Individually and in His Official 

Capacity; and TERESA WAHLERT, Director, Iowa Workforce 

Development, Individually and in Her Official Capacity,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. 

Hutchison, Judge.

A claimant under the Iowa Tort Claims Act appeals a district court 

decision dismissing some of his claims. REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED.

Roxanne Barton Conlin of Roxanne Conlin & Associates, P.C., 

Des Moines, for appellant.

George A. LaMarca, Andrew H. Doane, and Phillip J. De Koster of 

LaMarca & Landry, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
2

Ryan G. Koopmans of Nyemaster Goode P.C., Des Moines, for 

amicus curiae National Governors Association.
3

WIGGINS, Justice.

A plaintiff brought an action against the State of Iowa and 

individual defendants. The plaintiff named the individual defendants in 

their official and individual capacities. The attorney general certified 

under Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) (2011) that at certain times material 

to the plaintiff’s allegations, the individual defendants were acting within 

the scope of their employment. Thus, certain immunities under Iowa 

Code section 669.14 applied to various counts of the petition. The 

district court held the attorney general’s certification was applicable to all 

of the plaintiff’s claims. Consequently, the district court dismissed those 

counts alleging the individual defendants acted outside the scope of their 

employment.

On appeal, we hold the attorney general’s certification is not 

applicable to plaintiff’s common law claims alleging the individual 

defendants acted outside the scope of their employment. Therefore, we 

remand the case back to the district court to allow the fact finder to 

decide whether the individual defendants’ actions were within each 

individual’s scope of employment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Christopher J. Godfrey is the workers’ compensation 

commissioner. In 2009, Governor Chet Culver appointed him to this 

position for a six-year term. Godfrey’s term expires on April 30, 2015. 

Prior to July 2011, Godfrey’s salary was $112,068.84. 

On December 3, 2010, Governor-elect Terry Branstad demanded 

Godfrey’s resignation. Godfrey refused. After Godfrey’s refusal to resign, 

Godfrey alleges he had a meeting with the chief of staff to the governor, 

Jeffrey Boeyink, and the legal counsel to the governor, Brenna Findley, in 

which these individuals attempted to intimidate and harass him into 
4

resigning by threatening to reduce his salary. Godfrey again refused to 

resign. Subsequently, the Governor reduced Godfrey’s salary to $73,250. 

In response to these actions, Godfrey filed an amended petition 

alleging causes of action against the State of Iowa; Terry Branstad, 

Governor of the State of Iowa, individually and in his official capacity; 

Kimberly Reynolds, Lieutenant Governor, individually and in her official 

capacity; Jeffrey Boeyink, chief of staff to the governor, individually and 

in his official capacity; Brenna Findley, legal counsel to the governor, 

individually and in her official capacity; Timothy Albrecht, 

communications director to the governor, individually and in his official 

capacity; and Teresa Wahlert, director of Iowa Workforce Development, 

individually and in her official capacity. The counts relevant to this 

appeal are counts VI through XVI: procedural and substantive due 

process claims against all defendants under the Iowa Constitution for 

Godfrey’s property interest in his employment; procedural and 

substantive due process claims against all defendants under the Iowa 

Constitution for Godfrey’s liberty interest in his reputation; an equal 

protection claim against the State under the Iowa Constitution; 

interference-with-contract-relations claims against the individual 

defendants; interference-with-prospective-business-advantage claims 

against the individual defendants; defamation claims against defendant 

Reynolds, defendant Albrecht, defendant Branstad, and defendant 

Boeyink; and extortion claims against defendant Findley and defendant 

Boeyink. By bringing his suit against defendants individually and in 

their official capacities, Godfrey joined his claims against the individual 

defendants with his claims against the defendants in their official 

capacity. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.231 (allowing the joinder of multiple or 

alternative claims in a single petition against a single defendant under 
5

certain circumstances); id. r. 1.233 (allowing the joinder of multiple 

defendants in a single petition under certain circumstances).

The Iowa attorney general provided a certification pursuant to Iowa 

Code section 669.5(2)(a) certifying the individual defendants were acting 

within the scope of their employment at the time of the allegations 

contained in the amended petition. The defendants then moved to 

substitute the State of Iowa in place of the individual defendants for 

counts VI through XVI pursuant to Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a). The 

relief asked for in the motion was to strike all references to the individual 

defendants in counts VI through XVI. The individual defendants did not 

ask the court to dismiss any counts of the petition.

Godfrey resisted the motion on two grounds. First, he argued the 

individual defendants were not acting within the scope of their 

employment, and therefore, were not subject to substitution based on the 

attorney general’s certification under section 669.5(2)(a). Second, he 

argued the substitution of the State for the named defendants in these 

counts did not automatically require dismissal of those counts. 

The district court held a hearing on the motion to substitute. At 

the hearing, the district court asked Godfrey’s trial counsel if Godfrey 

was resisting any of the counts discussed in the partial summary 

judgment motion. Counsel responded as follows:

MS. CONLIN: I don’t think so, Your Honor.

We also agree that claims for prejudgment interest and 

punitive damages are not proper against the State, but we 

don’t think we ever pled them against the State. And if we 

did, that was a mistake. So this depends on the Court’s 

ruling as to the individual defendants.

In paragraph 4 –incidentally, Your Honor, paragraph 4 

of our resistance we withdraw those claims, but I don’t think 

we want to withdraw them as to the individual defendants. 
6

. . . .

MS. CONLIN: . . . . And so it seems to us that we can 

maintain claims for prejudgment interest and for punitive 

damages against the individual defendants insofar as they 

are still parties to this proceeding.

And if I may say, Your Honor, in connection with our 

earlier motion, what the State says is that a state employee 

is for all times and all purposes cloaked with immunity for 

things like assault and battery. So if a state employee goes 

out at lunch, it’s a business lunch, and gets into a quarrel 

and knocks somebody down, the State says they are 

immune. And I say they are not. 

. . . .

MS. CONLIN: I think the State’s position on this is 

just untenable, and a state employee is a state employee 

when he or she is acting in the scope of employment, but not 

otherwise. 

Trial counsel’s statements identify a distinction between the claims 

Godfrey made against the defendants in their official capacities, i.e., in 

their scope of employment where the court could properly substitute the 

State, and the claims Godfrey made against the defendants in their 

individual capacities.1 

Subsequent to the hearing, the parties agreed the district court 

should dismiss counts X through XV in their entirety if (1) the district 

court granted the defendants’ motion to substitute the State of Iowa, (2) 

the district court found against Godfrey on his claim that substitution of 

 1In oral argument, Godfrey’s counsel made the same assertion she made in the 

district court. Specifically she stated:

I wanted to address some of the issues that you’ve raised. In my 

pleading I did not bring the action under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. Did I 

file with the Iowa Tort Claims Act people? Absolutely because it seems 

as though that was a good thing to do just in case but I didn’t bring it 

that way. I brought it at common law. All six of the claims that were 

dismissed were brought at common law because I do not think that the 

Governor defamed Chris Godfrey in his scope of his employment.
7

the State for the named defendants did not lead to the automatic 

dismissal of those counts, and (3) the district court decided the 

certification did not allow Godfrey to pursue his actions against the

individual defendants who were not acting within the scope of their 

employment.2 The district court granted the motion to substitute on 

counts VI through XVI and dismissed counts X through XV as per the 

parties’ agreement. 

Godfrey applied for an interlocutory appeal, asking us to review the 

district court’s ruling to allow substitution and its dismissal of counts X 

through XV in reliance on the attorney general’s certification. We 

granted the application. 

II. Issues.

The only issue on appeal is whether the attorney general’s 

certification pursuant to Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) is applicable to 

Godfrey’s common law claims alleging the individual defendants acted 

outside the scope of their employment. 

III. Standard of Review.

Godfrey argues the district court’s finding was an improper 

statutory interpretation and this interpretation violated the Iowa 

Constitution. We review a district court’s statutory interpretation for 

correction of errors at law. See City of Postville v. Upper Explorerland 

Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 834 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2013). 

 2Godfrey’s claims in counts X through XV included claims of interference with 

contract relations, interference with prospective business advantage, and defamation. 

Under Iowa Code section 669.14(4), the Iowa Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign 

immunity for these claims. Thus, if the district court properly substituted the State in 

the place of the individual defendants for these claims, Godfrey could not maintain 

these claims against the State.
8

IV. Immunity for State Employees Under the Iowa Tort Claims 

Act. 

The doctrine of sovereign immunity originally prohibited tort suits 

against the State of Iowa. Hansen v. State, 298 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa

1980). Sovereign immunity also applied to governmental subdivisions. 

See, e.g., Canade, Inc. v. Town of Blue Grass, 195 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Iowa 

1972) (recognizing the rule of governmental immunity applied to a claim 

of negligence against a municipality). This immunity was jurisdictional; 

thus, the courts lacked jurisdiction over tort actions against the State or 

its agencies. Lloyd v. State, 251 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Iowa 1977). In 1965, 

the general assembly enacted the Iowa Tort Claims Act and thereby 

waived the State’s sovereign immunity for certain tort claims against the 

State. See 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 25A (1966), 

current version at Iowa Code ch. 669). In 1968, the general assembly 

enacted the Municipal Tort Claims Act and similarly waived a political 

subdivision’s immunity for certain tort claims against a political 

subdivision. See 1967 Iowa Acts ch. 405 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 613A 

(1971), current version at Iowa Code ch. 670).

However, prior to the waiver of sovereign immunity under the state 

and municipal tort claims acts, an individual could maintain a cause of 

action in tort against a government employee in his or her personal 

capacity. See Montanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 442, 459, 280 N.W. 608, 

617 (1938). In Montanick, a plaintiff sued a Wapello County employee for 

monetary damages resulting from a car accident in which the employee 

was driving a municipal vehicle. Id. at 444–46, 280 N.W. at 609–10. The 

plaintiff voluntarily dismissed a cause of action against Wapello County 

and proceeded only against the employee in his individual capacity. Id.

at 446, 280 N.W. at 610. We noted the employee’s liability did not relate 
9

to his employment, but stemmed from pure tort law. Id. at 452, 280 

N.W. at 613. 

We then identified a claim against an employee as involving 

potentially two separate actions. Id. at 453, 280 N.W. at 613–14. We 

recognized under the principle of respondeat superior a party could sue 

both the servant and the master. Id. This was an additional remedy to 

an injured party. Id. Thus, in theory an injured party could sue both 

the employee and the employer, though at this time if the employer was a 

governmental body, the employer was immune from suit. See id. at 453, 

280 N.W. at 614. However, the exemption of governmental bodies from 

liability due to sovereign immunity did not extinguish the primary 

remedy that a person “who wrongfully inflicts injury upon another is 

liable to the injured person for damages.” Id. at 453, 280 N.W. at 614. 

We stated, “[p]ublic service should not be a shield to protect a public 

servant from the consequences of his [or her] personal misconduct.” Id.

at 455, 280 N.W. at 615. We also stated, “this general obligation to 

injure no man by an act of misfeasance is neither increased nor 

diminished by the fact that the negligent party is an employee of a 

municipal corporation.” Id. at 458, 280 N.W. at 616. We subsequently 

held “an employee of a city, county or state who commits a wrongful or 

tortious act, violates a duty which he owed to the one who is injured, and 

is personally liable.” Id. at 459, 280 N.W. at 617. 

We applied the same reasoning to a claim against a state employee. 

Johnson v. Baker, 254 Iowa 1077, 1086–89, 120 N.W.2d 502, 507–09 

(1963). In Johnson, we cited a Drake Law Review article as properly 

summarizing the law in this area. Id. at 1087–88, 120 N.W.2d at 508. 

The article examined governmental immunities and came to the following 

conclusion:
10

In summary, if the individual employee is engaged in a 

ministerial act he may or may not be liable for his own 

negligence. The employee can escape liability under a cloak 

of governmental immunity in such cases only if: (1) the 

activity is within the scope of the acts which he is authorized 

to perform, and (2) the negligence is a matter of nonfeasance. 

He may be held liable for his own negligence if: (1) the act 

was not within his scope of authority, or (2) for an act of 

misfeasance even if it is within his scope of authorization.

J. Robert Hard, Liability of Public Bodies, Officers, and Employees —

Governmental Immunity, 11 Drake L. Rev. 79, 106 (1962). We have never 

applied sovereign immunity where state employees commit a tort when 

acting outside the scope of their employment.

After the enactment of the state and municipal tort claims acts, we 

continued to apply the rule that an employee can be liable for acts 

outside the scope of his or her employment. See, e.g., Roberts v. 

Timmins, 281 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Iowa 1979). In Roberts, the plaintiff 

brought a claim against several municipal employees for preventing him 

“from continuing his auto repair business by shutting off his city water 

supply, issuing a ‘health denunciation’ and attempting to get a local 

utility to cut off his gas and electric service.” Id. at 21. The employees 

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff’s claim failed 

because he did not follow the claim procedures under the Municipal Tort 

Claims Act. Id. The district court sustained the motion. Id. at 22. On 

appeal, we observed a person attempting to recover damages against a 

municipality or any of its officers, employees, or agents acting within the 

scope of their employment must follow the procedures of the Municipal 

Tort Claims Act to proceed. Id. at 24. Nonetheless, taking all wellpleaded facts as true, we found the plaintiff alleged the “defendants acted 

willfully, maliciously and without authorization outside the scope of their 

employment”; therefore, the procedures of the Municipal Tort Claims Act 
11

did not govern the action. See id. Accordingly, we reversed the district 

court and allowed the suit to continue until the evidence showed 

otherwise. See id.

In summary, even after the enactment of the state and municipal 

tort claims acts, the victim of a tort could sue an employee in his or her 

personal capacity for acts outside the scope of his or her employment.3

V. Certification Under Iowa Code Section 669.5(2)(a).

Prior to the passage of section 669.5(2)(a), the State protected its 

employees from the expense of defending a lawsuit by requiring the State 

to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless an employee from any claim 

against the employee, provided the employee performed the alleged 

actions within the scope of his or her employment. 1975 Iowa Acts ch. 

80, § 7 (codified at Iowa Code § 25A.21 (1977), current version at Iowa 

Code § 669.21) (amending the Iowa Tort Claims Act to provide the State 

would defend state employees). 

The general assembly added the certification provision in 2006 as 

an amendment to the Iowa Tort Claims Act. 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1185, 

§ 107 (codified at Iowa Code § 669.5(2)(a) (2008)). The language of the 

certification provision is similar to the language used by Congress in the 

Westfall Act. Compare Iowa Code § 669.5(2)(a) (2011), with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2679(d)(1) (2012). We also believe the general assembly’s purpose in 

amending the Iowa Tort Claims Act is the same purpose Congress 

intended when it passed the Westfall Act.

 3The Iowa Code provides, “ ‘[a]cting within the scope of the employee’s office or 

employment’ means acting in the employee’s line of duty as an employee of the state.” 

Iowa Code § 669.2(1) (emphasis omitted). We need not decide the meaning of this 

section to decide this appeal.
12

Congress enacted the Westfall Act in response to the United States 

Supreme Court decision in the case of Westfall v. Erwin. See 484 U.S. 

292, 108 S. Ct. 580, 98 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1988), superseded by statute, 

Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, as recognized in

Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 425, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 

2232, 132 L. Ed. 2d 375, 384–85 (1995). In Westfall, the Supreme Court 

limited a federal employee’s immunity from suit by finding immunity was 

only available to the employee when the employee both acted within the 

scope of his or her employment and the alleged wrongful act was 

discretionary in nature. Westfall, 484 U.S. at 300, 108 S. Ct. at 585, 98 

L. Ed. 2d at 628. Congress responded by expanding immunity under the 

Westfall Act, finding the Westfall decision created a threat of increased 

personal tort litigation against federal employees. Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 

425–26, 115 S. Ct. at 2232, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 385.

Congress enacted the Westfall Act as an act independent of the 

Federal Tort Claims Act. Cf. id. at 419–20, 115 S. Ct. at 2229, 132 L. Ed. 

2d at 381 (recognizing the Federal Tort Claims Act only came into play if 

the Attorney General certified the defendants as acting within the scope 

of their employment under the Westfall Act). As one court explained

the purpose of the Westfall Act is to assure that the 

decisions and conduct of federal public servants in the 

course of their work will not be adversely affected by fear of 

personal liability for money damages and of the burden of 

defending damage liability claims. Congress thus wished to 

grant immunity from both liability and litigation in those 

instances in which the employee was acting within the scope 

of his or her office or employment. At the same time, 

Congress wished to leave undisturbed the rights of those 

injured by federal employees who were not acting within the 

scope of their office or employment.

Melo v. Hafer, 13 F.3d 736, 744 (3d Cir. 1994).
13

The Westfall Act sets forth the procedure for the Attorney General 

to certify an employee was acting within the scope of his or her 

employment. When a person or entity sues an employee of the federal 

government, the employee delivers the suit papers to the Attorney 

General. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c). The Attorney General then decides 

whether to provide the certification. If the Attorney General provides a 

certification and the plaintiff filed the action in state court, the action is 

removed to federal court. Id. § 2679(d)(2). The Supreme Court 

determined the Attorney General’s certification is reviewable. Lamagno, 

515 U.S. at 434, 115 S. Ct. at 2236, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 390. If the court 

finds the employee’s actions are not within the scope of employment, the

action proceeds as a regular tort claim.

VI. Analysis.

To decide this appeal, we do not need to decide whether the Iowa 

attorney general’s certification is reviewable. Rather, we must address 

whether the attorney general’s certification is applicable to claims 

alleging individual defendants were acting outside the scope of their 

employment. Congress enacted the Westfall Act independently of the 

Federal Tort Claims Act and set forth the procedure to follow when a 

person or entity sues a federal employee. Under the Westfall Act, the 

Attorney General may provide his certification in any action, even those 

not brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See id. at 419–20, 115 S. 

Ct. at 2229, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 381 (affirming the Attorney General can 

provide a certification in a case that originated as a regular tort case filed 

in state court).

The general assembly included a similar certification provision in 

the Iowa Tort Claims Act. See Iowa Code § 669.5(2)(a). However, the 

first sentence of section 669.5 makes it clear the provisions of section 
14

669.5 only apply to suits brought under the Iowa Tort Claims Act. See

id. § 669.5(1) (“A suit shall not be permitted for a claim under this 

chapter unless the attorney general has made final disposition of the 

claim.” (Emphasis added.)). 

By limiting the attorney general’s certification to actions where the 

plaintiff claims the employee is acting within the scope of his or her 

employment, we preserve one purpose of the certification provision. 

Those employees who act within the scope of their employment are 

granted immunity from both liability and litigation and will not be 

adversely affected by fear of personal liability for money damages and the 

burden of defending damage liability claims. 

A plaintiff’s claim the state employee was not acting within the 

scope of his or her employment is not a claim brought under the Iowa 

Tort Claims Act. See id. § 669.2(3)(b) (defining “claim” for purposes of 

the Iowa Tort Claims Act as those claims against a state employee where 

the employee acts within the scope of his or her employment). Thus, we 

conclude the attorney general’s certification can only apply to actions 

brought under the Iowa Tort Claims Act and not those brought against 

an employee acting outside the scope of employment. Our holding in 

this regard also preserves the other purpose of the certification—to leave 

undisturbed the rights of those injured by state employees who were not 

acting within the scope of their employment.

Applying these principles, we recognize Godfrey has argued his 

claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities do 

not derive from actions that occurred within the scope of their 

employment. Thus, the attorney general’s certification does not apply to 

his claims against the individual defendants in their individual 

capacities. These claims against the individual defendants in their 
15

individual capacities must proceed outside the Iowa Tort Claims Act until 

such time the fact finder establishes that at the time of the alleged 

actions, the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their 

employment. Generally in a tort action, the fact finder decides whether 

an act is within the employee’s scope of employment. See Godar v. 

Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 706 (Iowa 1999). However, the State or an 

employee may file a motion for summary judgment to resolve this issue. 

See Boelman v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 826 N.W.2d 494, 501 (Iowa 

2013). (“We can resolve a matter on summary judgment if the record 

reveals a conflict concerning only the legal consequences of undisputed 

facts.”). 

If the court can resolve the scope of employment issue by summary 

judgment, the court shall substitute the State as the defendant for the 

employee. If not, the employee will remain a defendant until the fact 

finder establishes that at the time of the alleged actions the employee 

was acting within the scope of his or her employment. If the fact finder 

establishes the employee was acting within the scope of his or her 

employment, the court shall substitute the State as the defendant for the 

employee. 

Our decision today does not change the way the State has 

administered claims against state employees or open the floodgates for 

state employees to be sued individually and to pay the defense costs out 

of their own pockets when they commit a tort in the scope of their 

employment. First, it has always been the law of this State that when a 

public employee acts outside the scope of his or her employment, the 

employee is personally responsible for the cost of defense and any 

damages he or she may have caused. See Montanick, 225 Iowa at 455–
16

57, 280 N.W. at 615; see also 4 Eugene McQuillen, The Law of Municipal 

Corporations § 12:269, at 400–13 (3d ed. rev. vol. 2011).

For example, if a judge attends a board of supervisors meeting and 

protests the placement of a hog lot near his or her property and in doing 

so defames the hog lot owner, the public fisc should not be responsible to 

defend that judge or pay damages on behalf of that judge if the hog lot 

owner is successful in his suit against the judge. The reason the public 

fisc is not at risk is that when the judge made the alleged defamatory 

remarks, he or she was not acting within the scope of his or her 

employment. 

Second, the Iowa Code requires the State to defend, indemnify and 

hold harmless any employee whose tort was committed when the 

employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment. Iowa Code 

§ 669.21. Moreover, we have previously held “[t]he duty to defend is 

broader than the duty to indemnify.” First Newton Nat’l Bank v. Gen. 

Cas. Co. of Wis., 426 N.W.2d 618, 630 (Iowa 1988). When a state 

employee is sued and the employee contends the suit arises out of 

actions performed in the employee’s scope of employment, the employee 

should deliver the suit papers to the attorney general and ask the State 

for indemnity under section 669.21. Section 669.21 requires the State to 

indemnify the employee if the employee was acting in the scope of his or 

her employment. See Iowa Code § 669.21. Thus, under the example 

discussed earlier, if the same judge allegedly makes a defamatory 

statement against an individual and a question exists as to whether he 

or she made the statement in the scope of his or her employment, the 

State has a duty to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the judge until 
17

such time as it is finally determined by a court the judge’s actions were 

outside the scope of his or her employment.4

When there is no factual dispute as to whether the employee was 

acting within the scope of his or her employment, the certification 

procedure relieves the employee of personal liability by substituting the 

State as the only defendant. However, when a factual dispute exists as 

to whether the state employee was acting within the scope of his or her 

employment, the court cannot substitute the State as the defendant until 

the court determines the employee acted within the scope of his or her 

employment. Otherwise, the attorney general could provide a 

certification when the employee was not acting within the scope of his or 

her employment and put the public fisc at risk when it has never 

previously been at risk.

In summary, where a question of fact exists as to whether a state

employee’s actions were within the scope of his or her employment, the 

state employee is going to be defended, indemnified and held harmless 

from any damages and should not fear that his or her personal assets 

will be at risk, unless it is finally determined the employee was acting 

outside the scope of his or her employment. When a state employee acts 

outside the scope of his or her employment, the employee should be 

responsible for the attorney fees and the damages, not the public fisc.

For these reasons we hold the attorney general’s certification under 

Iowa Code section 669.5(2)(a) is not applicable to Godfrey’s claims that 

the individual defendants were acting outside the scope of their 

employment. In circumstances where the employee’s actions are not 

within the scope of their employment, the public fisc should not be used 

 4This would include defending the judge through any appeals.
18

to pay for that employee’s defense or damages awarded a third party for 

that employee’s actions. The legislature has never authorized the 

expenditure of public funds to pay for the acts of its employees when 

done outside the scope of their employment. We are not going to do so 

today. Therefore, Godfrey may proceed on these claims against the 

defendants individually until such time it is determined the defendants 

were acting within the scope of their employment.

VII. Conclusion and Disposition.

We hold the Iowa Tort Claims Act only applies to torts committed 

by state employees when acting within the scope of their employment. 

Therefore, the certification provisions of section 669.5(2)(a) do not apply 

when state employees commit a tort when acting outside the scope of 

their employment. This holding upholds the purpose of the Act by 

relieving state employees of personal liability if their tort is committed 

when they were acting within the scope of their employment. At the 

same time, our holding protects the public fisc by making sure the State 

does not have to pay any defense costs or damages arising out of a tort 

committed by state employees acting outside the scope of their 

employment. 

We reverse the judgment of the district court substituting the State 

in counts VI through XVI and dismissing counts X through XV in their 

entirety. We remand the case back to the district court to allow the fact 

finder to decide whether the individual defendants’ actions were within 

the scope of their employment for these counts. 

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

All justices concur except Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., who 

dissent.
19

#12–2120, Godfrey v. State

WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent for the reasons articulated in Justice 

Mansfield’s dissent, which I join. I write separately to elaborate on the 

purposes behind the attorney general certification procedure and the 

statutory immunities undermined by the majority today. The legislature 

provided our public officials certain immunities from suit under the Iowa 

Tort Claims Act (ITCA), Iowa Code ch. 669 (2011), and a straightforward, 

simple certification procedure to extricate state employees from lawsuits 

arising from the performance of their duties. Iowa Code §§ 669.5(2) 

(certification), 669.14 (immunities), 669.21 (defense and indemnity). The 

intent of the legislature was to allow our state employees to do their jobs 

without fear of the expense, distraction, and risk of personal financial 

ruin caused by lawsuits. 

Certification not only spares the public official the risk of a ruinous 

personal judgment, but also the costs of defending a lawsuit. As Voltaire 

famously reflected, “ ‘I was never ruined but twice: once when I lost a 

lawsuit, and once when I won one.’ ” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leo A. Daly 

Co., 870 F. Supp. 925, 941 (S.D. Iowa 1994). Until today, our public 

officials sued personally for doing their jobs could quickly avoid the cost 

of defending the suit upon the attorney general’s certification that they 

were acting within their scope of employment. The majority, however, 

remands this case to have the scope-of-employment issue determined by 

the fact finder, the jury. Significantly, under the majority’s 

interpretation, a plaintiff suing any state official can sidestep the 

attorney general’s certification merely by alleging the claim is brought 

against the defendant in his or her “individual capacity.” By alleging that 

simple phrase, the employee could be denied indemnification for ongoing 
20

defense costs. In effect, the majority creates an anticertification loophole 

that substitutes plaintiff’s counsel for the attorney general to make the 

determination whether the defendant state employee must defend the 

lawsuit at his or her own expense. So now the state defendants are likely 

to remain personally entangled in costly litigation all the way through 

trial. 

The majority asserts it is protecting the public fisc by sparing our 

state treasury the cost of defending lawsuits naming public officials in 

their individual capacity. But, who decides at the threshold of a lawsuit 

whether the state employee was acting within the scope of his or her 

employment—the Iowa Attorney General, to whom the legislature 

entrusted this determination? Or Godfrey’s attorney, based on unproven 

allegations in the petition? Who is more likely to protect the public fisc? 

The attorney general, who is elected by the people of Iowa and 

accountable to the voters? Or a private lawyer for a claimant suing the 

State and state employees, whose attorney fee is contingent on a 

monetary recovery and increases with the size of the verdict or 

settlement? With good reason, our legislature enacted the certification 

procedure to empower the attorney general to decide the issue, with 

judicial review limited to cases where the attorney general refuses 

certification. See Iowa Code § 669.5(2); see also id. § 13.2 (defining 

duties of attorney general)5. 

 5As relevant, Iowa Code section 13.2 provides: 

1. It shall be the duty of the attorney general, except as otherwise 

provided by law to: 

a. Prosecute and defend all causes in the appellate courts in 

which the state is a party or interested.

b. Prosecute and defend in any other court or tribunal, all 

actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a 
21

I predict the consequences of today’s decision will be to hamper job 

performance by state officials and to deter good people from public 

service. Why take a government job if your personal savings could be 

lost in a lawsuit? Why give a negative job performance evaluation of 

someone you supervise if he can sue you personally for defamation and 

take that case all the way to trial? 

In this case, for example, the plaintiff has sued the Governor for 

making “false, defamatory statements to news organizations, including 

WHO-Radio and WHO-TV,” wherein the Governor “blamed Plaintiff for 

rising workers’ compensation costs for Iowa businesses.” Because it is 

important for public officials to communicate with the public, it has been 

the law for the last fifty years that defamation claims are not available 

against any public official who was acting in his or her official capacity. 

The attorney general, after independently reviewing the matter, found 

that the Governor was acting in his official capacity when he went on the 

radio and television to make these statements. The defamation claims 

were therefore dismissed, with the plaintiff being free to pursue his 

constitutional and discrimination claims. However, because the plaintiff 

_____________________

party or interested, when, in the attorney general’s judgment, the interest 

of the state requires such action, or when requested to do so by the 

governor, executive council, or general assembly.

c. Prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings brought by 

or against any state officer in the officer’s official capacity.

d. Prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings brought by 

or against any employee of a judicial district department of correctional 

services in the performance of an assessment of risk.

e. Give an opinion in writing, when requested, upon all questions 

of law submitted by the general assembly or by either house thereof, or 

by any state officer, elective or appointive. Questions submitted by state 

officers must be of a public nature and relate to the duties of such 

officer.
22

included a bare allegation that the Governor was acting “individually and 

in his official capacity,” the majority now strips the attorney general of 

his authority, revives the plaintiff’s defamation claims, and puts the 

Governor in the position of having to defend them. 

This will create a strong incentive for public officials to clam up 

and not participate in press conferences or allow media interviews. Is 

this what we want? Is it what the legislature intended? It should be 

noted that the decision in this case applies to all branches of 

government, including members of the general assembly. Allowing 

plaintiffs to sidestep the safeguards of the certification procedure will 

have a chilling effect on the willingness of state officials to answer 

questions about official actions or pending legislation. The price of the 

majority opinion will be less transparency and openness in our state 

government. 

The majority ignores the admonitions our court reiterated just a 

few years ago on the important purposes served by immunities for public 

employees: 

As recognized at common law, public officers require 

this protection [(immunity)] to shield them from undue 

interference with their duties and from potentially disabling 

threats of liability. 

Without such protection, there is the danger that fear of 

being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most 

resolute, or the most irresponsible, public officials in the 

unflinching discharge of their duties. 

Hlubek v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Iowa 2005) (citations omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 

444 (Iowa 2013) (“We find it equally self-evident that the purpose of 

section 669.24 [volunteer immunity] is to encourage people to provide 

volunteer services to the state by removing the threat of personal 
23

liability.”). The certification procedure and accompanying immunities 

help our state officials execute their duties without being intimidated by 

the threat of personal liability. We should interpret the ITCA to 

effectuate that purpose, not undermine it. See Harden v. State, 434 

N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1989) (“We seek a reasonable interpretation that 

will best effect the purpose of the [ITCA] . . . .”); cf. Hlubek, 701 N.W.2d at 

98 (recognizing the importance of protecting school officials from 

personal liability). 

Federal courts likewise have echoed the importance of immunity 

for public officials: 

The purpose of immunity is to protect “[t]he societal 

interest in providing such public officials with the maximum 

ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at 

large. . . . The point of immunity for such officials is to 

forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict 

with their resolve to perform their designated functions in a 

principled fashion.” 

El Dia, Inc. v. Rossello, 20 F. Supp. 2d 296, 301 (D.P.R. 1998) (quoting 

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1644, 137 L. Ed. 2d 

945, 960 (1997)), aff’d El Dia, Inc. v. Rossello, 165 F.3d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 

1999). The Wisconsin Supreme Court elaborated on the public policies 

underlying immunity for public officials: 

These considerations have been variously identified in the 

cases as follows: (1) The danger of influencing public officers 

in the performance of their functions by the threat of 

lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of personal 

liability might have on those who are considering entering 

public service; (3) the drain on valuable time caused by such 

actions; (4) the unfairness of subjecting officials to personal 

liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) the feeling 

that the ballot and removal procedures are more appropriate 

methods of dealing with misconduct in public offic[e].

Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621 (Wis. 1976). Each of the 

foregoing public policies is undermined by today’s majority decision. 
24

The district court correctly upheld the attorney general’s 

certification in this case and dismissed the relevant claims against the 

defendants personally. I would affirm. 

Mansfield, J., joins this dissent. 
25

#12–2120, Godfrey v. State

MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The majority’s understanding of the Iowa 

Tort Claims Act is not what the plaintiff argued, is contrary to the 

language of the statute, and is unworkable as a practical matter. If we 

consider the argument that Christopher Godfrey actually made, both 

here and below, I think the district court made the right decision, and I 

would affirm.

I. The Majority’s Reading of the Iowa Tort Claims Act.

Let me begin with the majority’s reading of the Iowa Tort Claims 

Act (ITCA). According to the majority, a plaintiff who brings an action 

against state employees need only add to the case caption that each 

employee is being named “individually and in his [or her] official 

capacity.” This small insertion then becomes a way for the plaintiff to 

have all the benefits of the ITCA while avoiding its adverse consequences.

Having used the “individual and official” language in the case 

caption, the plaintiff gets the ball rolling by submitting the entire dispute 

to the state appeal board, as the plaintiff did here. See Iowa Code 

§ 669.3(2)–(3) (2011) (instructing a plaintiff to file a claim with the 

director of the department of management and granting state appeal 

board authority over claims). Assuming the board rejects the claim or 

doesn’t act, the plaintiff can go to court, as the plaintiff did here. See id.

§ 669.5(1). 

Next up is certification. If the attorney general certifies the 

defendants were state employees acting within the scope of their office or 

employment, the plaintiff gets the best of both worlds. As to any tort 

claims that are allowed under the ITCA, the employees are conclusively 

deemed to have acted within the scope of employment, the State is 
26

substituted as a defendant, and the State is bound by the employees’ 

actions and has to pay the bill for them. See id. §§ 669.5(2)(a), .21. On 

the other hand, with respect to tort claims that are not allowed under the 

ITCA because the State hasn’t waived sovereign immunity, the plaintiff 

can freely argue the inconsistent position that the state employees were 

not acting within the scope of their office or employment. Furthermore, 

the plaintiff can take this inconsistent position without any repercussion, 

because the State is irrevocably on the hook for the covered claims. See 

id. 

Now, one might say that a shrewd attorney general could refuse to 

make a certification, thereby keeping his or her options open. But this 

won’t happen because, in that event, the defendants would file petitions 

asking the court to find they were acting within the scope of their 

employment. See id. § 669.5(2)(b). And assuming the court grants the 

petitions, the plaintiff would again have the best of both worlds. He or 

she would be able to argue the defendants were not acting within the 

scope of their office or employment with respect to uncovered tort claims, 

while benefiting from a prior conclusive determination that with respect 

to covered tort claims they were acting within the scope of their office or 

employment.

I disagree that the ITCA establishes such a no-lose proposition for 

the plaintiff, so long as the plaintiff is astute enough to include six words 

in the case caption—“individually and in his [or her] official capacity.” 

While the majority’s position is a no-lose for the plaintiff, it is a 

lose-lose for the defendants. Instead of getting an early determination 

one way or the other that their liability will or will not be covered by the 

State, state employees are left hanging until trial or summary judgment 

with respect to the uncovered claims. Until the jury renders a verdict, if 
27

there is any issue of fact, they won’t know if they are going to have to pay 

damages out of their own pockets.

II. How the ITCA Actually Works: The Plaintiff’s Two Options. 

In my view, this is wrong. I believe the law is straightforward and 

works like this: A plaintiff who believes he or she has been wronged by a 

state employee acting outside the scope of employment always has the 

option of bringing a stand-alone lawsuit against that employee without 

going through the ITCA presuit notice procedures. In that event, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to show he or she acted within the scope 

of employment and therefore the claim or claims are covered by the ITCA. 

See, e.g., Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 519–20 (Iowa 2013); see 

also Iowa Code § 669.2(3)–(4) (defining “claim” covered by the ITCA and 

“employee of the state”).6 

On the other hand, should the plaintiff choose to follow the ITCA 

presuit notice procedures and then file suit based upon that notice, the 

plaintiff becomes subject to the attorney general’s certification with 

respect to the entire suit.

The statute in my view compels this interpretation by making it 

quite clear that certification applies to “suit[s],” not individual causes of 

action. See Iowa Code § 669.5. Thus, the ITCA first requires a “claim 

made under” the Act to be filed with the department of management. See 

id. § 669.3(2). Once the appeal board acts on the claim, or in the event 

 6In Thomas, for example, the defendants, whom the plaintiff had sued without 

going through ITCA procedures, moved for summary judgment. See 838 N.W.2d at 519. 

The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the defendants were 

employees of the State and that the plaintiffs’ claims fell within the scope of the Act. Id. 

at 520. We ultimately reversed the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 527. Similarly, 

in McGill v. Fish, a state university employee filed a gross negligence claim against 

several coemployees, without going through ITCA procedures. See 790 N.W.2d 113, 

116 (Iowa 2010). The State brought a motion to dismiss on behalf of the coemployees 

based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which the district court denied. 

Id. We ultimately reversed the denial of the motion. Id. at 121. 
28

the board fails to act within six months, the plaintiff may bring a “suit” 

for the “claim.” See id. § 669.5(1). This triggers the attorney general’s 

certification power. See id. § 669.5(2)(a). The attorney general can then 

certify that a defendant in the “suit” was a state employee acting within 

the scope of the employee’s office or employment at the time of the 

incident upon which the claim is based. See id. If that occurs, “the suit” 

shall be deemed to be an action against the State, and the State shall be 

substituted as the defendant in place of the employee. See id. Let me 

quote the entire language of the subsection: 

Upon certification by the attorney general that a defendant 

in a suit was an employee of the state acting within the 

scope of the employee’s office or employment at the time of 

the incident upon which the claim is based, the suit 

commenced upon the claim shall be deemed to be an action 

against the state under the provisions of this chapter, and if 

the state is not already a defendant, the state shall be 

substituted as the defendant in place of the employee.

Id. 

In short, the certification process operates on “the suit,” not merely 

part of it, as the majority concludes. See id. Certification results in the 

state employee ceasing to be “a defendant,” rather than just removing 

that employee from some parts of the case, as the majority would have it. 

See id.7 

 7I recognize the state employee would remain a defendant to the extent any civil 

rights claims are asserted against him or her under chapter 216. See Vivian v. 

Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Iowa 1999) (“The legislature’s use of the words ‘person’ 

and ‘employer’ in section 216.6(1), and throughout the chapter, indicates a clear intent 

to hold a ‘person’ subject to liability separately and apart from the liability imposed on 

an ‘employer.’ ”). That is because those claims are governed by a separate 

administrative regime that subjects supervisory employees who commit wrongful 

discrimination to personal liability. Id.
29

III. Applying Those Principles Here.

Here, Godfrey filed a petition naming the State and six state 

employees, including the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, as 

defendants. The body of the petition alleged various acts and causes of 

action, but did not indicate whether or not the defendants were acting 

within the scope of their office or employment when they committed 

those acts. As noted above, the caption listed each defendant followed by 

the words, “Individually and in His [or Her] Official Capacity.”

Before bringing this petition in court, Godfrey submitted it in its 

entirety to the state appeal board. The amended petition actually says 

this. It recites, “On January 9, 2012, within two years of the acts of 

which he complains, Plaintiff filed with the State Appeals Board a State 

Tort Claims Act claims for the damages herein sought against the abovenamed state DEFENDANTS and the State of IOWA.” The transcript of 

the appellate oral argument also confirms that Godfrey previously 

submitted everything to the state appeal board.8 

For these reasons, I believe that the attorney general’s certification 

affects the entire suit except for the civil rights claims. It results in the 

state employees no longer being defendants to any tort claims, exactly as 

section 669.5(2)(a) provides. And Godfrey has not heretofore disputed 

 8JUSTICE MANSFIELD: You gave the presuit notice—

MS. CONLIN: I did.

JUSTICE MANSFIELD: Did you include all of the claims including 

the defamation and extortion?

MS. CONLIN: Yes, sir, I did.

JUSTICE MANSFIELD: So when you say you didn’t bring it under 

the Iowa Tort Claims Act, you followed the Iowa Tort Claims Act 

procedure, would that be fair.

MS. CONLIN: I absolutely followed the Iowa Tort Claims Act 

procedure before I went to court just in case.
30

that point. Instead, his position in the district court and this court was 

that the attorney general’s certification was not conclusive and could be 

judicially reviewed. For example, his application for interlocutory review 

asserted as follows:

Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant 

interlocutory review of the District Court’s ruling and find 

that an attorney general’s certification in accordance with 

Iowa Code Chapter 669 is not conclusive as to whether the 

state defendants were acting within the scope of their 

employment for purposes of Plaintiff’s claims and that 

judicial review of such certification is necessary and proper 

in the first instance, with the matter submitted as a question 

of fact for resolution by the jury.9 

IV. Is the Attorney General’s Certification Reviewable?

I now turn to the question that Godfrey actually argued—i.e., 

whether the attorney general’s certification is judicially reviewable. Here 

I would follow the well-reasoned opinion of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Iowa. See Mills v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 

770 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Iowa 2011). As that opinion demonstrates, 

the Iowa legislature intended to give final effect to the attorney general’s 

 9Consider also the following excerpt from oral argument before this court, where 

the court and Godfrey’s counsel discussed the possibility that certification might not 

affect Godfrey’s individual capacity or “common law” claims:

JUSTICE WIGGINS: Do you think that this Court could say that 

your causes of action and the last five or six counts are barred under the 

State Tort Claim Act if--say there is no review of the certification and we 

agree with Mr. LaMarca’s argument and we say there is no review, it’s 

final as to the State’s Tort Claim Act, couldn’t we also say that as to any 

common law action it would not be final after review? 

MS. CONLIN: I think that would be true, your Honor. 

JUSTICE WIGGINS: Then the burden would be on you to show it 

was outside the course of their employment in those other actions? 

MS. CONLIN: Yes, your Honor, and I wish I would have thought of 

that when I was in the district court but I did not. 
31

certifications under the ITCA that state employees were acting in the 

scope of their employment. See id. at 994–96.

This system in no way works unfairness on plaintiffs. As I have 

already noted, a plaintiff always has the option of suing a state employee 

outside the ITCA on an allegation that the employee was not acting in the 

scope of state employment. This puts the employee in the position of 

having to prove to the satisfaction of an Iowa district court that the 

employee was acting in the scope of state employment. Godfrey here 

chose not to exercise that option.

On the other hand, if the plaintiff, as here, proceeds under the 

ITCA, then the certification process comes into play. Note again the 

wording of section 669.5(2)(a). When the attorney general certifies that a 

defendant was a state employee acting within the scope of state 

employment, the suit “shall” be deemed to be an action against the State 

under the provisions of this chapter. Iowa Code § 669.5(2)(a). The 

employee is removed from the case, and the State “shall” be substituted. 

Id.

This evenhanded system has benefits for the plaintiff. The plaintiff 

knows once and for all that a defendant with billions of dollars in assets, 

i.e., the State, will pay the bill if he or she prevails. Following 

certification, the plaintiff no longer has to worry about proving that a 

particular defendant acted in the scope of employment. The system also 

has benefits for the employee. The employee is removed from the lawsuit 

as an individual defendant and is not subject to liability. And it has 

benefits for the State. Certain kinds of claims—e.g., some but not all of 

the claims in this case—cannot be pursued.

Under section 669.5(2)(b), as I’ve already mentioned, if the attorney 

general refuses to make a certification that a state employee was acting 
32

within the scope of his or her employment, the defendant may “petition 

the court . . . for the court to find and certify that the defendant was an 

employee of the state and was acting within the scope of the defendant’s 

office or employment.” Id. § 669.5(2)(b). However, there is no provision 

allowing the plaintiff to petition the court for review of the attorney 

general’s certification. As the Mills court pointed out, the existence of a 

provision within section 669.5 allowing judicial review at the request of 

the defendant only is a powerful indicator that the legislature did not 

intend to allow judicial review of a certification at the plaintiff’s request. 

770 F. Supp. 2d at 995–96 (“This provision makes clear that if the Iowa 

legislature had intended to provide for judicial review over the Attorney 

General’s certification, it certainly knew how to do so.”); see also Chiodo 

v. Section 43.24 Panel, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014) (plurality opinion) 

(applying this principle).

On first glance, that might seem unfair to the plaintiff. The 

defendant can get judicial review but the plaintiff cannot. But on a more 

thorough consideration, it isn’t. Again, if the plaintiff believes the 

individual defendant was not acting in the scope of state employment, 

the plaintiff can always file a garden-variety lawsuit against that 

defendant in state court. That lawsuit will go forward against the 

individual defendant, unless the defendant in some way asserts the ITCA 

is applicable. The defendant’s contention that the ITCA applies would 

then be ruled upon by the court. See, e.g., Thomas, 838 N.W.2d at 519–

20; cf. Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 405 (Iowa 2012) (finding that a 

claim against a department of human services employee was barred for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the ITCA, even though 

the employee was sued individually).
33

In other words, a plaintiff who believes the defendant was not 

acting within the scope of his or her state employment can always get a 

judicial determination of that issue. The plaintiff simply has to sue that 

defendant in his or her individual capacity in state court without going 

through the ITCA. Yet the news for the plaintiff gets even better. Under 

our recent decision in Rivera v. Woodward Resource Center, even if the 

plaintiff guesses wrong and a judge later determines the defendant was 

acting within the scope of state employment, the plaintiff’s deadline for 

filing a claim with the director of management under the ITCA is 

extended. See 830 N.W.2d 724, 725–26 (Iowa 2013).

So what Godfrey really wanted here was a second mechanism for 

judicial review, one not provided by Iowa law. I would deny that effort. I 

think section 669.5 is very clear. If the attorney general makes the 

certification, the action “shall” be deemed against the State and the State 

“shall” be substituted. Iowa Code § 669.5(2)(a). A denial of certification 

is reviewable at the request of the employee, but there is no provision for 

review of a certification. 

V. The Federal Precedents Under the Westfall Act.

Godfrey argues that we should follow the United States Supreme 

Court’s interpretation of the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2012), 

which is part of the federal tort claims system. He cites Walker v. State

for that proposition. 801 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 2011). Yet in Walker, 

although we were interpreting a provision of the ITCA that had the same 

wording as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80, we 

did not follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation. See 801 N.W.2d at 

565–66. Instead, we followed a separate opinion written by Justice 

Scalia concurring in the judgment only. See id. (noting that “Justice 

Scalia wrote separately to voice his disagreement with the analysis 
34

employed by the majority” and concluding “our analys[is] in our prior 

discretionary function cases [is] more in line with Justice Scalia’s 

analysis”). In short, Walker was a case where we did not track the 

majority views of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting Iowa’s 

own tort claims act. 

In any event, what we have said is that we are guided by 

interpretations of the FTCA “when the wording of the two Acts is identical 

or similar.” Thomas, 838 N.W.2d at 525. In Thomas and Walker it was. 

Id.; Walker, 801 N.W.2d at 565–66. Here it is not.

The Westfall Act, unlike the ITCA, has separate language providing 

that the attorney general’s certification is “conclusive” in only one 

circumstance—namely removal. It reads in relevant part as follows:

(1) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the 

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office 

or employment at the time of the incident out of which the 

claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon 

such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed 

an action against the United States under the provisions of 

this title and all references thereto, and the United States 

shall be substituted as the party defendant.

(2) Upon certification by the Attorney General that the 

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office 

or employment at the time of the incident out of which the 

claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon 

such claim in a State court shall be removed without bond at 

any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district 

court of the United States for the district and division 

embracing the place in which the action or proceeding is 

pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be 

an action or proceeding brought against the United States 

under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, 

and the United States shall be substituted as the party 

defendant. This certification of the Attorney General shall 

conclusively establish scope of office or employment for 

purposes of removal.

(3) In the event that the Attorney General has refused 

to certify scope of office or employment under this section, 

the employee may at any time before trial petition the court 

to find and certify that the employee was acting within the 
35

scope of his office or employment. Upon such certification 

by the court, such action or proceeding shall be deemed to 

be an action or proceeding brought against the United States 

under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, 

and the United States shall be substituted as the party 

defendant. 

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (emphasis added).

Thus, by specifically stating that certification is conclusive in the 

context of removal, the Westfall Act allows for an inference that the 

attorney general’s certification is not conclusive in situations other than 

removal. The ITCA contains no comparable language. The presence of 

the “conclusively” language was critical to the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno. See 515 U.S. 417, 433–34, 115 

S. Ct. 2227, 2235–36, 132 L. Ed. 2d 375, 388–90 (1995). That language 

made the statute “reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation” and 

thus allowed the Court to follow the interpretive principle “that executive 

determinations generally are subject to judicial review.” Id. at 434, 115 

S. Ct. at 2236, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 390.

Notably, four justices dissented in Lamagno and said that “a plain 

reading of the text” did not allow for judicial review of the attorney 

general’s certification that the defendant was acting within the scope of 

his or her federal employment. Id. at 439–40, 115 S. Ct. at 2238–39, 132 

L. Ed. 2d at 392–94 (Souter, J., dissenting). But for present purposes, as 

the district court emphasized in Mills, we need only focus on the relevant 

differences between the ITCA and federal law as revealed by the majority 

opinion in Lamagno. Mills, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 994–95. As the Mills 

court put it, “[I]t is the final sentence of the removal provision of 

§ 2679(d)(2) that creates an ambiguity in the framework of the federal 

statute, leaving it open to judicial interpretation.” Id. at 995 (citing 
36

Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 434, 115 S. Ct. at 2236, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 390). 

And that final sentence is not present in the ITCA.

Furthermore, if you think about it, the different outcome in 

Lamagno makes sense. Suppose the federal judge who wrote Mills and I 

got into a public spat and said bad things about each other. (That would 

never happen, but let’s assume it did for hypothetical purposes.) If he 

sued me for defamation in my personal capacity, I would have to defend 

the case personally or persuade a court that I was acting in the scope of 

my employment. On the other hand, if I sued him for defamation in his 

personal capacity, the United States Attorney General could unilaterally 

remove the case to federal court under Title 28 of the United States Code 

section 2679(d)(2). Then, but for Lamagno, the Attorney General could 

certify that this federal judge was acting in the scope of employment, 

thereby depriving me of my cause of action because, under both the ITCA 

and the FTCA, defamation claims are not available. In short, judicial 

review of certification is needed to plug a potential reviewability hole in 

the federal system, but not in the state system.10

The facts of Lamagno illustrate this point. Late at night, in 

Colombia, South America, a car driven by an allegedly intoxicated drug 

enforcement agent ran into the plaintiff’s vehicle. 515 U.S. at 420–21, 

 10I acknowledge that the Alaska Supreme Court followed Lamagno in holding 

that a certification by the Alaska attorney general under Alaska’s counterpart to the 

Westfall Act is judicially reviewable. See State v. Heisey, 271 P.3d 1082, 1088–91 

(Alaska 2012). I believe Lamagno does not apply to the ITCA, for the reasons I have 

already explained. Regardless, the Alaska Supreme Court did not embrace my 

colleagues’ view that certification can never occur when a state employee is named in 

his or her individual capacity. See id. at 1085–86 (“When a lawsuit is filed against state 

employees, AS 09.50.253(c) allows the Attorney General to determine whether the 

individually named defendants were acting within the scope of their employment during 

the conduct giving rise to the lawsuit.”). Further, while the Alaska court recognized a 

right to judicial review, it emphasized that the review should be performed by a court, 

not by a jury, and should always occur before trial. See id. at 1090–91.
37

115 S. Ct. at 2229, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 381. The plaintiff sued the agent in 

the United States and maintained the agent had been acting in his 

personal capacity. The Attorney General, however, certified the agent 

had been acting in the scope of his employment when driving the vehicle. 

Id. at 421, 115 S. Ct. at 2230, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 382. At that point, the 

lawsuit ended, because the FTCA does not allow claims that arose in a 

foreign country, until the United States Supreme Court reversed and 

found the Attorney General’s certification reviewable. Id. at 422–23, 115 

S. Ct. at 2230–31, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 383.

That situation could not arise under the ITCA. Under the ITCA, if 

the defendant is sued in his or her personal capacity outside the 

framework of the ITCA, the case goes forward unless and until a court 

rules that the defendant was acting in the scope of state employment.

Still, Lamagno leads me to two additional observations regarding 

the majority opinion. First of all, if the majority is right, then the entire 

United States Supreme Court missed the boat in Lamagno. In a case 

where the plaintiff maintained the defendant had not been acting in the 

scope of his government employment, the Justices devoted many pages 

to debating a single fighting issue—i.e., whether the Attorney General’s 

certification could be judicially reviewed or not. My colleagues indicate 

that this was wasted effort. So long as the complaint contained some 

allegation that the defendant was also being sued individually, the 

certification would have no impact. I think this would be a revelation for 

the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. To the contrary, the 

Westfall Act allows the Attorney General to issue a certification whether 

or not the employee has been sued in his individual capacity. See, e.g., 

Winters v. Taylor, 333 Fed. Appx. 113, 116 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The Westfall 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, allows a federal employee sued in an individual 
38

capacity to convert the action to one against the United States, thereby 

obtaining indirectly the benefit of the United States’ sovereign 

immunity.”).

The majority suggests the ITCA should be interpreted differently 

because “the first sentence of section 669.5 makes it clear the provisions 

of section 669.5 only apply to suits brought under the Iowa Tort Claims 

Act.” But as I have already explained, this is a suit under the ITCA. It 

contains “a claim under [chapter 669].” See Iowa Code § 669.5(1).11

My second observation is that although the Lamagno decision went 

against the government, it protects government employees in an 

important, practical way. It does so by assuring the attorney general’s 

certification, if challenged by the plaintiff, will be reviewed by “the 

District Court.” Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 436–37, 115 S. Ct. at 2237, 132 

L. Ed. 2d at 391. By contrast, as I have already noted, the majority’s 

approach here simply renders the certification irrelevant and leaves the

state employee dangling until trial or at best summary judgment, unable 

to ascertain whether he or she will or will not have personal liability. 

This seems to undermine one purpose of the ITCA, which is to encourage 

people to work for the government by providing safeguards if they are 

 11Furthermore, nothing in the Westfall Act affirmatively indicates the United 

States Attorney General’s certification authority extends to cases where a federal 

employee has been sued in his or her individual capacity, but the statute has been 

uniformly interpreted as granting that authority, because otherwise it would make no 

sense. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (stating that the remedy is exclusive for injury or 

property loss “arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment”); 

see also, e.g., Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2013); Sharratt v. 

Murtha, 437 F. App’x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2011); Parham v. Clinton, 374 F. App’x 503, 506 

(5th Cir. 2010); Winters, 333 Fed. Appx. at 116.
39

sued. Those safeguards mean little if the plaintiff can simply circumvent 

them by adding a few words in the caption of a lawsuit.12 

VI. Defense Costs. 

I now turn to the subject of defense costs. Here we come to 

another flaw in the majority’s opinion. 

The majority says that the attorney general’s certification authority 

only extends to claims as defined in section 669.2(3)(b). Such claims, in 

the majority’s view, cannot include claims where the state employee is 

alleged to have acted in his or her individual capacity. Thus, for 

certification purposes, according to the majority, we go claim by claim 

and the allegations control. 

However, when my colleagues get to the subject of defense costs, 

their reading of the statute changes. My colleagues say the State has a 

duty to defend the state employee if “a question exists” as to whether he 

or she was acting in the scope of employment, even if the plaintiff alleges 

the state employee was not acting in the scope of employment.13 

How can this be? How can the certification authority be narrower 

than the authority to provide a defense? Iowa Code sections 669.21 and 

669.5 incorporate the same definition of claim from Iowa Code section 

669.2(3)(b). Thus, section 669.21, which the majority cites but does not 

quote, provides that the State “shall defend any employee, and shall 

 12As the United States Supreme Court has said, “the purpose of the Westfall Act 

[is] to shield covered employees not only from liability but from suit.” Osborn v. Haley, 

549 U.S. 225, 248, 127 S. Ct. 881, 898, 166 L. Ed. 2d 819, 841 (2007). I think the 

general assembly had the same purpose when it enacted section 669.5, modeled after 

the Westfall Act, in 2006. See 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1185, § 107 (codified at Iowa Code 

§ 669.5 (2007)).

13Who decides if “a question exists”? The majority does not say, but presumably 

this would be the attorney general. According to the majority, the employee “should 

deliver the suit papers to the attorney general.” 
40

indemnify and hold harmless an employee against any claim as defined 

in section 669.2, subsection 3, paragraph ‘b.’ ” Iowa Code § 669.21. 

I submit: Either you can go behind the allegations of individual 

capacity or you cannot. The majority cannot interpret the same 

statute—section 669.2(3)(b)—two different ways in the same opinion. 

The majority justifies this contradiction by citing a private 

insurance case for the proposition that “[t]he duty to defend is broader 

than the duty to indemnify.” First Newton Nat’l Bank v. Gen. Cas. Co. of 

Wis., 426 N.W.2d 618, 630 (Iowa 1988). I do not follow the majority’s 

reasoning. In First Newton National Bank, we held as a matter of 

insurance law that when a lawsuit includes covered and uncovered 

claims, the insurer has a duty to defend the entire lawsuit. Id. That 

case does not apply here because we are interpreting statutes and do not 

get to write the law ourselves. The legislature has defined the duty to 

defend and indemnify in section 669.21 based on the definition of claim 

in section 669.2(3)(b). We are constrained by those definitions. Either 

the statutory definition of claim allows the attorney general to look past 

the bare allegations to the underlying facts, or it doesn’t. Chapter 669 

will not support an interpretation that the attorney general gets to look 

beyond the bare allegations for defense and indemnification purposes but 

not for certification purposes. 

In any event, First Newton National Bank does not go where the 

majority wants to go. That decision only imposes a duty to defend when 

a lawsuit includes both covered and uncovered claims, and thus would 

not apply to the majority’s example of a state employee who is sued only 

in his or her individual capacity. Further, First Newton National Bank

distinguishes the duty to defend from the duty to indemnify, whereas the 

majority is talking about something different and wants to distinguish 
41

both of those duties from the ability to certify. For all these reasons, the 

majority’s private insurance analogy falls apart on careful analysis. 

I can understand the majority’s reluctance to reach the logical 

conclusion of their reasoning and their desire to limit the collateral 

damage from today’s opinion. Still, there should be no doubt that this 

reluctance leads them to interpret section 669.2(3)(b) in two different 

ways in the same opinion. 

VII. Conclusion. 

Offering a policy justification for today’s decision, the majority 

says: 

In circumstances where the employee’s actions are not 

within the scope of their employment, the public fisc should 

not be used to pay for that employee’s defense or damages 

awarded a third party for that employee’s actions. The 

legislature has never authorized the expenditure of public 

funds to pay for the acts of its employees when done outside 

the scope of their employment. We are not going to do so 

today. 

No one disputes this broad proposition that the public should not pay for 

actions taken by state employees outside the scope of their employment, 

including the defense of lawsuits against those employees. The majority, 

in this regard, is attacking a straw man. The real issue we need to 

resolve is who decides the employee’s status. 

As I’ve already explained, I believe a plaintiff has two alternatives. 

If the plaintiff elects to proceed under the ITCA, then he or she 

authorizes the attorney general to decide whether the claims within that 

suit are in fact claims against a state employee in the scope of 

employment. Public funds will not pay for the defense of the employee 

unless the attorney general, an elected official answerable to the citizens 

of this State, makes this determination. 
42

Alternatively, if the plaintiff wants to have a court decide whether 

the state employee acted within the scope of employment, he or she need 

only file a run-of-the-mill tort lawsuit against the employee. At that 

point, the employee must raise as a defense that he or she was acting 

within the scope of state employment. A court would decide whether the 

defense is valid. 

In short, the ITCA contemplates a quick, early decision by either 

the attorney general or a court, depending on how the plaintiff chooses to 

bring his or her action. Either way, a third-party decision maker 

protects the public fisc. And the plaintiff, by choosing whether to 

proceed inside or outside the ITCA, gets to select that decision maker. 

I want to note one further inconsistency in the majority opinion. 

The majority asserts that “our holding protects the public fisc by making 

sure the State does not have to pay any defense costs or damages arising 

out of a tort committed by state employees acting outside the scope of 

their employment.” Yet just a few paragraphs before, the majority 

indicates that if a state employee is sued on an allegation that he or she 

acted outside the scope of employment, the public fisc must pay for the 

employee’s defense if merely “a question exists” whether he or she acted 

in the scope of employment. Since a mere “question” in the eyes of the 

attorney general is enough to require the State to provide a defense, 

according to the majority, there obviously will be situations where the 

employee gets a state-paid defense even though it is later determined he 

or she was not acting in the course of employment. 

Finally, I would like to close with a practical point. 

Notwithstanding the zealous and effective advocacy by both sides before 

this court, the attorney general’s certification actually eliminates only a 

small part of Godfrey’s case. It has no impact on Godfrey’s civil rights 
43

claims, including his allegation that he was discriminated against based 

on sexual orientation. Nor does it affect his constitutional claims or his 

extortion claim. The certification would only bar Godfrey’s intentional 

interference and defamation claims, which are expressly exempt from the 

ITCA. See Iowa Code § 669.14(4). The FTCA has comparable 

exemptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Presumably, these exemptions are 

based on the general notion of giving public officials some leeway in 

speaking and acting when they are performing their job duties. My vote 

would be to preserve that leeway, by allowing the ITCA to operate as the 

legislature intended. Regardless, Godfrey would still have his full day in 

court on the discrimination and constitutional claims that are the core of 

his lawsuit.

Waterman, J. joins this dissent.