IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 76 / 06–2110 

Filed September 19, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA,

 Appellee, 

vs. 

HECTOR GARCIA, 

 Appellant. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Kirk A. 

Daily, Judge. 

 Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon 

his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense. AFFIRMED. 

 Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, 

Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant 

Attorney General, Mark Tremmel, County Attorney, and Russell Rigdon, 

III, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
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BAKER, Justice.

 Hector Garcia appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 

upon his conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), first offense. 

We are asked to decide whether Iowa’s implied consent law requires a 

law enforcement officer who has asked a person suspected of driving 

under the influence of alcohol to submit to chemical testing to make 

reasonable efforts to convey the consequences of the person’s refusal to 

submit to the test or failure of the test. We adopt a standard which 

requires an officer under the circumstances facing him or her at the time 

of the arrest to utilize methods which are reasonable and would 

reasonably convey Iowa’s implied consent warnings. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

At approximately 4:03 p.m. on January 27, 2006, Ottumwa Police 

Officer Becky Strunk was dispatched to investigate a report of a male 

slumped over the steering wheel of a truck. According to the report, the 

truck had been in the parking lot of a Casey’s carwash “for a while.” 

Upon arrival, Officer Strunk observed the truck parked at the vacuums, 

with its engine running. Strunk observed Hector Garcia in the truck, 

with his eyes closed. When Strunk knocked on the window of the truck, 

Garcia did not respond.

Officer Strunk opened the door and told Garcia who she was. She 

observed an open can of Bud Light in the cup holder closest to Garcia. 

When Garcia still did not wake up after she opened the door and spoke 

to him, Strunk shook Garcia to wake him. Strunk asked Garcia if he 

needed an ambulance, and he responded that he was fine, he had just 

been working and was tired. While talking to Garcia, Strunk smelled the 

odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath and observed that Garcia had 

bloodshot, watery eyes. According to Strunk, Garcia’s English was “not 
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real clear,” but she could understand him, and he seemed to understand 

her. 

Officer Strunk asked Garcia to step out of the truck to perform 

field sobriety tests. She asked him if he wore contact lenses or glasses. 

He responded that he did not and reached for the sunglasses on the 

dashboard, stating those were the only glasses he wore. Garcia failed the 

horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. He refused to take any more 

tests, stating there was no problem. Strunk asked Garcia to take a 

preliminary breath screening test. According to the police report, Strunk 

held a wrapped straw to her mouth and explained to Garcia that she 

wanted him to blow steadily through the tube. At approximately 4:15 

p.m., Garcia performed the preliminary screening breath test, which 

registered a breath alcohol concentration (BAC) of .198. 

Strunk placed Garcia under arrest. According to Strunk’s 

testimony, when Garcia was being arrested and was told his vehicle 

would be towed, he gave Strunk the names and telephone numbers of 

persons to contact to come and get the truck. 

Strunk transported Garcia to the Wapello County jail. At 

approximately 5:10 p.m., Strunk attempted to read Garcia his Miranda

rights, and he advised her that he did not understand English. She then 

gave him a copy of his Miranda rights in Spanish. Garcia signed a form, 

written in English, which listed his Miranda rights. Strunk then read 

Garcia the implied consent advisory in English, and she asked him if he 

understood. Garcia said that he would do what Strunk wanted, “no 

problem.” Garcia signed the Iowa Department of Transportation 

“Request and Notice Under Iowa Code Chapter 321J/Section 321.208” 

form, written in English, which stated in pertinent part that he 

consented to give a sample of his breath. Garcia submitted to a 
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Datamaster breath test, which registered his BAC at .144. No attempts 

were made to communicate the implied consent advisory to Garcia in 

Spanish. Garcia testified that he signed the implied consent advisory 

“because the official told [him] to sign” and that he understood nothing 

that was written on the form. At approximately 5:24 p.m., Strunk read 

Garcia his notice of revocation. 

On February 7, 2006, Garcia was charged by trial information with 

OWI in violation of Iowa Codes section 321J.2(1)(a) and (b) (2005). 

Garcia filed a written arraignment and plea of not guilty, in which he 

waived his right to a speedy trial and stated that he did not read or 

understand English. Garcia applied for a court-appointed interpreter, 

which the court granted. 

On August 22, 2006, Garcia filed a motion to suppress the breath 

test results, which the State resisted. Garcia challenged the adequacy of 

the implied consent advisory given to him, asserting that he did not 

comprehend the advisory when he signed it. A hearing on the motion to 

suppress was held on September 14. On October 2, the district court 

issued an order denying the motion. The court found Officer Strunk’s 

testimony that Garcia was able to answer her questions in English to be 

credible and concluded that Garcia “has some understanding of English.” 

Garcia waived his right to a jury trial. On November 22, the case 

was submitted to the district court as a bench trial based on the minutes 

of testimony, depositions, and the record made at the motion-tosuppress hearing. The court found Garcia guilty of OWI. During the 

trial, Garcia renewed his motion to suppress, which the court denied. 

The court sentenced Garcia to serve two days in the county jail and pay a 

$1,000 fine. Garcia appeals from his conviction and sentence, 

contending the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
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II. Scope of Review. 

When a defendant who has submitted to chemical testing asserts 

that the submission was involuntary, we evaluate the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether or not the decision was made 

voluntarily. State v. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1994). Our 

review is de novo. Id. While we are not bound by the district court’s 

factual findings, we give considerable weight to the court’s assessment of 

the voluntariness of the defendant’s submission to the chemical test. Id.

To the extent the issue presents a question of statutory 

interpretation, our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. 

Palmer, 554 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Iowa 1996). 

III. Reasonable Effort to Convey Implied Consent Warning.

Garcia contends he did not voluntarily submit to the breath test 

because he does not have a sufficient understanding of the English 

language to have made a reasoned and informed decision under the 

circumstances of this case. The issue presented is whether Iowa Code 

section 321J.8 requires an officer who has asked a person suspected of 

driving under the influence of alcohol to submit to chemical testing to 

make reasonable efforts to convey the consequences of the person’s 

refusal to submit to the test or his failure of the test. 

A. Implied Consent. Iowa Code section 321J.2(1) makes it an 

offense to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 

alcoholic beverage or while having an alcohol concentration of .08 or 

more. “[C]hapter 321J provides authority for chemical testing of bodily 

substances from persons suspected of driving while intoxicated.” Palmer, 

554 N.W.2d at 861; see also Iowa Code § 321J.6. 

Iowa’s implied consent law “is based on the premise ‘that a driver 

impliedly agrees to submit to a test in return for the privilege of using the 
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public highways.’ ” State v. Knous, 313 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa 1981) 

(quoting State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980)). The law 

“was enacted to help reduce the appalling number of highway deaths 

resulting in part at least from intoxicated drivers.” State v. Wallin, 195 

N.W.2d 95, 96 (Iowa 1972). “Implied consent procedures are reasonably 

calculated to further this objective.” Knous, 313 N.W.2d at 511–12. 

While under the implied consent statute a person impliedly agrees 

to submit to chemical testing, a person “has the right to withdraw his 

implied consent and refuse the test.” State v. Massengale, 745 N.W.2d 

499, 501 (Iowa 2008); see also Iowa Code § 321J.9 (“If a person refuses 

to submit to the chemical testing, a test shall not be given . . . .”). To be 

valid, the driver’s decision to consent to testing must be voluntary, i.e., 

freely made, uncoerced, reasoned, and informed. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 

at 381; see also State v. Bernhard, 657 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa 2003) 

(noting “[t]he ultimate question is whether the decision to comply with a 

valid request under the implied-consent law is a reasoned and informed 

decision” and applying the standard to “conclude that defendant’s 

consent to a chemical test was voluntary”). To summarize, a driver’s 

consent to testing may be considered involuntary, and therefore invalid, 

if it is coerced or if the driver is not reasonably informed of the 

consequences of refusal to submit to the test or failure of the test. Here 

we are concerned only with whether Garcia’s consent was reasoned and 

informed. 

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.8: 

A person who has been requested to submit to a 

chemical test shall be advised by a peace officer of the 

following: 

1. If the person refuses to submit to the test, the person’s 

driver’s license or nonresident operating privilege will be 
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revoked by the department as required by and for the 

applicable period specified under section 321J.9. 

2. If the person submits to the test and the results indicate 

the presence of a controlled substance or other drug, or an 

alcohol concentration equal to or in excess of the level 

prohibited by section 321J.2 or 321J.2A, the person’s 

driver’s license or nonresident operating privilege will be 

revoked by the department as required by and for the 

applicable period specified under section 321J.12. 

Under section 321J.8, when a person has been asked to submit to 

chemical testing, the officer must advise the person of the consequences 

of refusing to submit to the test and the consequences of not passing the 

test, including the potential periods of license revocation. Voss v. Iowa 

Dep’t of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001). 

The clear intent of section 321J.8 is to provide a person who 

has been asked to submit to chemical testing “a basis for 

evaluation and decision-making in regard to either 

submitting or not submitting to the test. This involves a 

weighing of the consequences if the test is refused against 

the consequences if the test reflects a controlled substance, 

drug, or alcohol concentration in excess of the ‘legal’ limit.” 

Massengale, 745 N.W.2d at 501 (quoting Voss, 621 N.W.2d at 212). 

B. Reasonable Efforts. The primary issue on appeal is whether 

Iowa Code section 321J.8 requires a law enforcement officer to make 

reasonable efforts to convey the implied consent warning to a nonEnglish speaking person. Other jurisdictions have taken differing 

approaches to resolving this issue. In those states where the primary 

purpose of the implied consent law is to aid the state in making its 

highways safe by encouraging suspected persons to take the test, courts 

have determined the statute requires only the warning be given, not that 

the driver understand the consequences of refusal. See, e.g., FurcalPeguero v. State, 566 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); People v. 

Wegielnik, 605 N.E.2d 487, 489–90 (Ill. 1992). Other states have 

determined that the driver need only understand that he or she has been 
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asked to take a test. There is no requirement that the driver understand 

the consequences of refusal or be able to make a reasoned judgment. 

See, e.g., Yokoyama v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 356 N.W.2d 830, 

831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Martinez v. Peterson, 322 N.W.2d 386, 

388 (Neb. 1982). 

Garcia urges us to apply the reasonableness standard adopted by 

the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether a person’s consent 

to a chemical test is valid. See State v. Piddington, 623 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 

2001). Under Wisconsin law, a law enforcement officer who asks a 

person to submit to chemical testing must warn the person of the 

potential revocation consequences of refusing to submit to the test or of 

failing the test. Id. at 534 n.2 (citing Wis. Code § 343.305(4) (1995-96)). 

The purpose behind [Wisconsin’s] implied consent law is to 

combat drunk driving by “facilit[ating] the gathering of 

evidence against drunk drivers. . . .” The specific objective of 

Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) within the implied consent statutory 

scheme is to “advise the accused about the nature of the 

driver’s implied consent.” 

Id. at 538 (citations omitted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that 

the law “requires the arresting officer under the circumstances facing 

him or her at the time of the arrest, to utilize those methods which are 

reasonable, and would reasonably convey the implied consent warnings.” 

Id. at 534–35. 

We have stated the purpose of Iowa’s implied consent statute “is to 

reduce the holocaust on our highways part of which is due to the driver 

who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor.” Severson v. Sueppel, 260 

Iowa 1169, 1174, 152 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967). We have also stated the 

purpose of the statute is “provide a person who has been asked to 

submit to chemical testing ‘a basis for evaluation and decision-making in 
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regard to either submitting or not submitting to the test.’ ” Massengale, 

745 N.W.2d at 501 (quoting Voss, 621 N.W.2d at 212). 

Like Wisconsin’s implied consent law, the purpose of Iowa’s 

implied consent statutory scheme is to combat drunk driving, but the 

purpose of Iowa Code section 321J.8 within the statutory scheme is to 

advise accused drivers of the consequences of submitting to or failing the 

chemical test. See Piddington, 623 N.W.2d at 538. The purpose of 

providing the accused driver a basis for evaluation and decision-making 

“is fulfilled, rather than undermined, if the law enforcement officer must 

use reasonable methods that reasonably convey the implied consent 

warnings, in consideration of circumstances facing him or her.” Id. at 

540. This interpretation allows a person asked to submit to chemical 

testing to be “properly advised under the implied consent law, without 

raising the specter of subjective confusion.” Id. 

Because the purpose of Iowa Code section 321J.8 within the 

statutory scheme is to advise accused drivers of the consequences of 

submitting to or failing the chemical test, we adopt the Wisconsin 

standard which requires the officer “under the circumstances facing him 

or her at the time of the arrest to utilize those methods which are 

reasonable, and would reasonably convey the implied consent warnings.” 

Id. at 534–35. In determining what is reasonable, a pragmatic approach 

must be utilized. 

That a law enforcement officer must use reasonable methods 

to convey the implied consent warnings does not mean the 

officer must take extraordinary, or even impracticable 

measures to convey the implied consent warnings. 

Reasonableness under the circumstances also requires 

consideration of the fact that alcohol dissipates from the 

blood over time, particularly after the subject has stopped 

drinking. The State cannot be expected to wait indefinitely 

to obtain an interpreter and risk losing evidence of 

intoxication. Such would defeat, rather than advance, the 
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intent of the implied consent law “to facilitate the gathering 

of evidence against drunk drivers in order to remove them 

from the state’s highway.” The approach we adopt today 

only ensures that barriers which may affect the arresting 

officer’s ability to reasonably convey the implied consent 

warnings to an accused driver . . . are taken into account 

and accommodated as much as is reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

Id. at 542 (citations omitted). “Although making an interpreter available 

when possible is desirable, finding an interpreter is not absolutely 

necessary and should not ‘interfere with the evidence-gathering purposes 

of the implied consent statute.’ ” Yokoyama, 356 N.W.2d at 831 

(citations omitted). 

C. Applicable Standard. The Wisconsin court determined that in 

judging the reasonableness of the efforts to convey the implied consent 

warnings an objective standard is to be used. 

[T]he determination of whether the law enforcement officer 

reasonably conveyed the implied consent warnings is based 

upon the objective conduct of that officer, rather than upon 

the comprehension of the accused driver. This approach 

ensures that the driver cannot subsequently raise a defense 

of “subjective confusion,” that is, whether the implied 

consent warnings were sufficiently administered must not 

depend upon the perception of the accused driver. 

Piddington, 623 N.W.2d at 539 (citations omitted). 

In determining whether a defendant’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, 

and intelligent, we have employed an objective test. See State v. Hajtic,

724 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 2006). We agree that the test of whether the 

implied consent warnings were sufficiently administered should be an 

objective test. 

D. Application of Standard. We turn then to the question of 

whether, under the circumstances presented to Officer Strunk, she used 

those methods which would reasonably convey the implied consent 

warnings to Garcia. Officer Strunk testified that she could understand 
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Garcia and he seemed to understand her. There were numerous 

conversations between Strunk and Garcia with little apparent difficulty 

in communicating. Garcia signed the implied consent form, and he did 

not indicate that he did not understand. It was not until the motion to 

suppress that his lack of understanding was raised. Applying the 

“reasonable efforts” standard to the facts and circumstances of this case, 

we hold that Officer Strunk, under the circumstances facing her at the 

time of the arrest, utilized reasonable methods to reasonably convey the 

implied consent warnings to Garcia. 

IV. Conclusion. 

We adopt a reasonableness standard, which requires a law 

enforcement officer who has asked a person suspected of driving under 

the influence of alcohol to submit to chemical testing, under the 

circumstances facing the officer at the time of the arrest, to utilize those 

methods which are reasonable and would reasonably convey Iowa’s 

implied consent warnings. In this case, Officer Strunk utilized 

reasonable methods to reasonably convey the implied consent warnings 

to Garcia. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Garcia’s 

motion to suppress. 

AFFIRMED.