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******************************************************STATE v

. JORDAN—CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT ZARELLA, J., with whom PALMER and EVELEIGH, Js., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s conclusion in part I of its opinion that the defendant, Victor L. Jordan, Sr., was not deprived of his right to a fair trial because of the prosecutor’s failure to correct the potentially misleading testimony of two state witnesses. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion in part II ofits opinion that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155. In my view, the majority’s analysis is flawed because it overlooksthetestimonyofakeystatewitnessregarding the defendant’sbeliefatthetimehe discardedthe clothing, ignores other evidence that the defendant intended to discard the clothing because he believed an official proceedingwasprobable, andmisconstruesthis court’s holding in State v. Foreshaw, 214 Conn. 540, 572 A.2d 1006 (1990). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from part II of the majority opinion.
I
I begin with the majority’s failure to acknowledge the highly persuasive testimony of Jennifer Campbell,

akeyprosecution witness. The majoritystates that ‘‘the jury could not reasonably have concluded that the defendant believed that an official proceeding against him was probable when he discarded the evidence’’ because ‘‘there was no evidence that the defendant believed that the police officer knew his identity or had any other information connecting him to the crime.’’ The majority further maintains that ‘‘[t]here [was] no evidence that when the defendant discarded the clothing he believed that the police officer had any information, other than the clothing, linking him to the attemptedbankrobbery. Thus, the defendant discarded the only piece of evidence connecting him to the crime

. . . .’’ The majority thus concludes that the evidence

was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendanttampered withphysical evidence inviolation of § 53a-155 (a). I disagree.
Attrial, Campbell, the defendant’s girlfriend, testified that the defendant called her and asked her to meet him at a nearby motel on the evening of April 1, 2008, shortly after he eluded the police. Campbell also testified that, when she asked the defendant what had happened and why he was wet and hisjeans were muddy, he stated that ‘‘he was going to commit a heist, but the place was closed.’’ Campbell added in response to a question as to whetherthe defendant had said anything aboutbeing chased: ‘‘Yes. He saidhe [was] beingchased through the muddy woods because the police had assumed he was the person in the mask.’’From this undisputed testimony, thejury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant believed at the timehe disposedofthe clothingthatanofficialproceedingwasprobablebecause, inhismind, thepolice officer chasing him assumed he was the person who had attemptedto enterthebank. Thefactthatthe defendant

was apparently unaware ofthe parking lot witness, the police radio report describing a suspicious male who hadtriedto enterthe bank, oranyother direct evidence connecting him to the crime is immaterial. Campbell’s testimony as to what the defendant believed, together withevidencethathehidthehighlyidentifiable clothing in aclosedtrash containerandbehind anearby carport, is undeniably powerful and, in my view, indicative of his guilt. Indeed, I would suggest that the foregoing evidence is even more persuasive than the evidence this courtfound convincinginStatev. Foreshaw, supra, 214 Conn. 550, because there was no testimony inForeshaw regarding the defendant’s state of mind before she disposed of the gun. See id., 550–51.
The majority dismisses Campbell’s testimony, claimingthat ‘‘the mostreasonable explanationforthe defendant’ssubsequentremovalanddiscardingofthe clothes

. . . was that he did so in the hope that, if the police ultimately apprehended him, they would be unable to identify him as the person who had been wearing the clothes.’’ Footnote21 ofthemajorityopinion. Idisagree, especially when Campbell’s testimony is considered togetherwithotherevidence ofthe defendant’s conduct during and following the pursuit.
After the defendant’s initial contact with the police, he decided to run, with thepolice officer chasing him, to his own, easily identifiable vehicle to speak with Herman Cordero, his friend, on Birch Meadow Drive,

a dead-end street that required Cordero to drive past the officer in order to escape. It is common sense that the defendant would believe that the officer saw him stop and speak to Cordero and that the officer would be able to provide an accurate description of the vehicle, and possibly even a license plate number. The defendant also knew that his cell phone was in the vehicle and contained additional identifying information.
Once the defendant arrived at Sprucewood Road, the next street over, he appeared to believe he was still being chased, but, presumably, after seeing that the officer had not successfully followed him through the woods, he stopped and looked around. Only after the defendant escaped the officer’s pursuit did he begin taking off some of his outer clothing. Moreover, the defendant did not throw the clothing to the ground, as
onewouldexpectfromsomeonefleeingfromthepolice but, instead, hid them in a closed trash container and behind anearby carport. Ifthe defendant trulybelieved thatthe police didnothave enough informationto iden-tify and arrest him, it would have been far more logical and efficient for him to discard the clothing quickly rather than taking the time to conceal it. Accordingly, because the defendant would have known, at the time he hid the clothing, that the police had, or would soon have, asignificant amount ofevidence thatwouldlikely result in his arrest and prosecution, thejury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant believed at that time that an official proceeding was probable.
The majority posits that the fact that the defendant said to Cordero, ‘‘meet me on the other street, meet
me on the other street,’’ when he spoke with Cordero

on Birch Meadow Drive weighs against an inference that the defendant believed an official proceeding was probable. Ifanything, however, this statement supports the opposite conclusion. Afterthe defendant told Cordero to ‘‘meet [him] on the other street,’’ the defendant

ran into the woods and onto Sprucewood Road, where he appeared to be looking around. Cordero, however,

neverarrivedat Sprucewood Road. Fromthis evidence, the jury could have reasoned that the defendant expectedto see Cordero on Sprucewood Roadandthat, after Cordero failed to appear, the defendant believed Cordero had been stopped and would provide information to the police about the attempted robbery.
The defendant’s actions afterhe discarded the clothing also suggest that he believed an official proceeding

was probable. For example, instead ofgoing home that night, the defendant chose to stay in a motel with his family. He also asked Campbell to check them in under her name. Such precautions would have been unnecessary if the defendant had believed the police did not have enough information to identify, locate and arrest him.1
Ajury also couldreasonablyfind, merely onthe basis of evidence that the defendant discarded the clothing, that he did so with the intent to prevent its availability at a probable future proceeding. This court has stated that ‘‘[i]ntent may be, and usually is, inferred from [a] defendant’s verbal or physical conduct.

. . . Intent may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

. . . Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences ofhis voluntary conduct.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 312 Conn. 551, 565, 93 A.3d 1128 (2014). Thus, ifthe circumstances were such that the defendant believed that an official proceeding

waslikelyandthatthe items ofclothingprobablywould be used againsthim atasubsequenttrial, then itfollows that the defendant’s disposal or concealment of that evidence evinced his intent to obstruct the use of the evidence at the future proceeding.
In the present case, because the defendant had covered his face, making identification difficult, the dark,heavy clothing was one of the most important pieces ofevidenceconnectinghimtothecrime. Itisreasonable to infer, however, that the defendant did not believe that the clothing was the only evidence linking him to the crime because, as previously explained, he would have been aware that there existed other incriminating evidence, as well. Thus, although disposal ofthe clothingwouldnothavepreventedthepolicefromeventually identifying and arresting him, it would have made the state’s case more difficult to prove at trial.
‘‘When reviewing a sufficiency ofthe evidence claim,

we do not attempt to weigh the credibility of the evidence offered at trial, nor do we purport to substitute

our judgment for that of the jury. Instead, our review consists of a two-step process in which we construe the evidencepresentedat trialinalightmostfavorable to sustaining the verdict

. . . and then determine whether the jury could reasonably have found, [on the basisof] thefactsestablishedandtheinferencesreasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect ofthe evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 572. Section 53a-155 (a) requires only that a defendant believe that an official proceeding is probable and thatthe evidence was discardedto prevent its availability for use in such a proceeding. I thus disagree with the majority that ‘‘the most reasonable explanation for the defendant’s subsequent removal and discarding of the clothes

. . . was that he did so in the hope that, if the police ultimately apprehended him, they would be unable to identify him as the person who had been wearing the clothes.’’ Footnote 21 ofthe majority opinion. Rather, in view of Campbell’s testimony regarding the defendant’s state of mind when he saw the police officer chasing him, as well as all ofthe other evidence of his conduct during and following the pursuit, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant hid the highly identifiable clothing not only to prevent the police from finding it and using it to apprehend and identify him, but to conceal it so that it would be unavailable at a proceeding that was ‘‘about to be instituted

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-155.
II
I also disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Foreshaw

. The majority appears to suggest that, under Foreshaw, the state must prove that the defendant believed an official proceeding was probable because he was aware of significant evidence connecting him to the crime. The majority explains that, ‘‘because [the defendant in Foreshaw] anticipated that the police would apprehend her on the basis ofinformation connecting her to the shooting, she disposed of the gun believing that an official proceeding, and not just an investigation, was pending or probable.

. . . Conversely, had [the defendant] discarded the gun to pre-vent detection or to avoid being implicated in the shooting in thefirst instance, and thus believing that only an investigation, and not an official proceeding,

was pending orprobable, the beliefand intent elements [of] § 53a-155 would be lacking.’’ (Emphasis added.) I disagree with the majority’s interpretation ofForeshaw because it conflates the evidence in that case with the legal principles on which the Foreshaw court relied in upholding the defendant’s conviction. Although the court relied in part on evidence that therewerewitnessestothe shooting, ithadno intention of establishing a new legal principle that a defendant’s knowledge of witnesses or other direct evidence connecting him to the crime is absolutely necessary to establish the mens rea element of § 53a-155. See State

v. Foreshaw, supra, 214 Conn. 550–51. Rather, the court reasoned that ‘‘[t]he statute

. . . speaks to that which isreadilyapt to comeinto existenceorbecontemplated and thus plainly applies to the official proceeding arising out of such an incident.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 551. In other words, the court construed the statute broadly in order to accommodate the wide range of evidence from which ajury could inferthat a defendant believedan officialproceedingwasprobablewhentamperingwithphysical evidence. Thus, thetype ofincriminating evidence the court found persuasive in Foreshaw, which consisted of witnesses to the shooting, the defendant’s immediate flight from the scene, and her subsequent admission that she discarded the gun to avoid being caught with it in herpossession; id., 550; is persuasive in other cases only to the extent they involve similar facts. Imposing an inflexible requirement that there be evidence ofthe defendant’s prior knowledge ofwitnesses

or other evidence directly connecting him to the crime is unwise because it is not mandated by the statute and invades the province of the jury. Section 53a-155 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Aperson is guilty oftampering with

. . . physical evidence if, believing that an officialproceeding is pending, or aboutto be instituted, he (1) Alters, destroys, conceals orremoves anyrecord, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding

. . . .’’ The statute makes no reference to the type of evidence required to satisfy the mens rea element, and for good reason. As this court recently noted in a case involving witness tampering under General Statutes § 53a-151 (a),2 which contains a similar mens rea element, ‘‘the inferences made from a defendant’s conduct will depend on the facts and circumstances ofeachindividualcaseunder both §§ 53a-151 (a) and 53a-155

. Thus, we do not agree

. . . that these inferences are invariably compelled as a matter of law but, instead, conclude that the defendant’s belief and intent are questions of fact forthejuryto decide.’’ (Emphasisadded.)Statev. Ortiz, supra, 312 Conn. 566 n.7. Accordingly, requiring as amatter of law that the defendant have knowledge of witnesses or other evidence directly connecting him to the underlying crime in order to establish the mens
rea element of § 53a-155, which is what the majority appears to have done, strips the jury of its authority to decide whether other evidence, such as evidence indirectly connecting the defendant to the underlying crime, is sufficient to support an inference that the element has been satisfied. I therefore disagree with the majority that Foreshaw compels the application of such a requirement in this or any future case in which the facts may differ.
In sum, this court’s task is not to determine the most compelling or likely scenario but, rather, to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support that verdict. The majority’s approach in the present case ‘‘simply is inconsistent with our well settled review of sufficiency challenges, which are conducted with an eye toward sustaining jury verdicts, even those with which this court may disagree.’’ State v. Fourtin, 307 Conn. 186, 231, 52 A.3d 674 (2012) (

Norcott, J., dissenting). Consequently, because I believe there is sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendantactedwiththe requisite beliefandintent, and because it is uncontested that the defendant disposed of the relevant evidence, I would conclude that the defendant’s conviction of tampering with physical evidence should stand.
Forthe foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from part II of the majority opinion.

1 I agree with the majority that the relevant inquiry is whether the defendantbelieved, at the timehe discarded the clothing, that an officialproceedingwasprobable. Thatdoesnotmean, however,thatthejurycannotconsider events that occurred after the defendant discarded the clothing to infer that belief, such as his checking into a motel under Campbell’s name. This court commonly considers subsequent actions by the defendant to determine an earlier intent. For instance, we consider evidence offleeing from the scene of a crime as evidence of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Figueroa, 257 Conn. 192, 196, 777 A.2d 587 (2001) (‘‘[f]light, when unexplained, tends to prove a consciousness of guilt’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The weight of this evidence is a question for the jury. In the present case, the defendant checked into the motel mere hours after the alleged crime occurred. This evidence clearly would be relevant to ajury in determining whether the defendant believed an official proceeding was probable when he had discarded the clothing.

2 General Statutes § 53a-151 (a) provides: ‘‘Aperson is guilty oftampering with a witness if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted, he induces or attempts to induce awitness to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process summoning him to testify or absent himself from any official proceeding.’’