alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1686.

#### Altman *v.*The State.

Hill, C. J.

Where, on a trial for burglary, the evidence relied' upon *by*the State was that of an accomplice, it was error to charge the jury that proof of the corpus delicti would be sufficient corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice to warrant a conviction. The rule is well settled that the testimony of an accomplice in a felony ease must be corroborated by some independent fact or circumstance which, taken by itself, leads to the inference not only that a crime has been committed, but that the defendant is implicated in its commission. Proof of the corpus delicti independently of the evidence of the accomplice is corroborative of the guilt of the accomplice, but does not at all corroborate his testimony as to the guilt of another. Penal Code. §991; *Child*
      *834
      *ers*v. *State,*52 *Ga.*106; *McCalla*v. *State,*66 *Ga.*346; Roscoe’s Crim. Ev. 122. *Judgment reversed.*

Indictment for burglary, from Pierce superior court — Judge Parker. January 9, 1909.

Submitted March 9,

Decided March 16, 1909.

J *ames B. Thomas,*fox plaintiff in .error.

*James II. Thomas, solicitor-general, John W. Bennett,*contra.
State of North Carolina v. Richard Lee Nealen

No. 258P16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 12, 2016.

Richard Lee Nealen, for Nealen, Richard Lee.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

**ORDER**

Upon consideration of the application filed by Petitioner on the 11th of July 2016 in this matter for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Catawba County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th of July 2016."
STATE v. David Michael WILSON

164P16-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 23, 2017

David Michael Wilson, for Wilson, David Michael.

Anne M. Middleton, Special Deputy Attorney General, Todd Williams, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 3rd of January 2017 by Defendant for Notice of Appeal:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
State v. Marvin Wade Millsaps

374P13-6

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 9, 2016

*385Barry H. Bloch, Assistant Attorney General, Sarah Kirkman, District Attorney, For State of North Carolina.

Marvin W. Millsaps, Pro Se.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 15th of April 2016 by Defendant for Extraordinary Writ:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of June 2016."
State of North Carolina v. Marcus Antonio Logan

No. COA16-418

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 6, 2016

NO ERROR IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Innocap, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended April 30, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul Tidwell, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  1. The Report fully complies with requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  Date: June 16, 2014  /s/ Paul Tidwell Paul Tidwell Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer   1
Exhibit 10.8 

**Description of reimbursement of certain tax costs for directors William B. Slaton and Dwayne A. Shackelford**

On March 29, 2007, theBoard of Directors of Placer Sierra Bancshares (the “Company”) adopted resolutions to reimburse fees and additional taxes imposed for the taxability of health care costs provided to two of its outside directors William B. Slaton and DwayneA. Shackelford. Mr. Slaton has been receiving benefits since 2003 and Mr. Shackelford began receiving the benefits in 2006. Since 2003, when the benefits were offered, health care costs paid by the Company for its outside directors havenot been reported as taxable income to these outside directors. The Company has since determined that the health benefits are taxable to the outside directors. The Board adopted a resolution for the Company to pay these directors a one-time fee tocover the taxes and additional costs that will be incurred to file amended tax returns in the following amounts: (1) William B. Slaton—$10,000, and (2) Dwayne A. Shackelford—$2,000.
# C o u rt o f

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J ay B. Go r e e f

i l ed t hi s ap pl i cat io n fo r di s cret io n ary rev i ew o f a ju d g m en t

en t e r ed b y t h e m ag i s t rat e co u rt

. Ho wev er, “ [t ] he o n l y av en u e o f ap p eal av ai l ab l e

fro m [a] m ag i s t rat e co u rt ju d g m en t i s p ro v i d ed b y O CGA § 1 5-1 0 -4 1 (b ) (1 ), wh i ch

al l o ws fo r a d e n ov o ap p eal t o t h e s tat e o r s u p eri o r co u rt .” Ha n dl er v. Hu ls ey , 1 9 9 Ga.

Ap p

. 7 5 1 (4 0 6 SE2 d 2 2 5 ) (1 9 9 1 ). Th i s C o u r t m ay o n l y ad d res s m ag is t rat e co u rt

m at t ers t hat al read y h av e been rev i ewed b y t h e s t at e o r su p eri o r co u r t

. See i d .;

W es t wi nd Co r

p

. v. W a s h i n g t o n Fed

er a l S a vi n gs & Lo an As s n. , 1 9 5 Ga. Ap p. 4 1 1 (1 )

(3 9 3 SE2 d 4 7 9 ) (1 9 9 0 ).

Th e Geo rg i a C o n s ti t u t i o n req u i res t h at “ [a] n y co u rt s h al l t ran sfer t o t h e

ap p ro p ri at e co urt i n t h e s t at e an y ci v i l cas e i n wh i ch i t d et erm i n es th at ju ri s di ct i o n o r

v en ue l i es el s ewh ere.” See Ga. Co n s t

. of 1 98 3

, A rt

. V I, Sec. I, P a r. VIII; Bo s ma v.

Gu n t er , 2 5 8 Ga. 6 64 (3 7 3 SE2 d 3 6 8 ) (1 9 8 8). Acco rd i ng l y , t h is cas e i s h e r e by

TRANSFERRED t o t h e DeKal b Co u n t y Su p eri o r Co u rt

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t i f y t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

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. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 07/23/2015 July 23, 2015
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-3415

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri.

DeAndre Thompson, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 3, 2008 

Filed: October 16, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After DeAndre Thompson (Thompson) received a 70-month prison sentence

for possessing a stolen firearm, he filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction in the

district court, claiming that, under the Sentencing Guidelines, he should have received

credit against his federal sentence for time spent in state custody. The district court

denied the motion on the merits. Thompson then moved for reconsideration, which

the district court denied, and he now appeals the district court’s orders.

We construe Thompson’s initial motion as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition because

Thompson sought to have time spent in custody credited against his current federal

sentence. Cf. Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining the
-2-

central focus of a writ of habeas corpus is to provide a remedy for prisoners

challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seeking immediate or speedier

release). While the district court properly denied relief, it should not have reached the

merits because Thompson failed to demonstrate he had presented his claim to the

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) before seeking habeas corpus relief. See United States v.

Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (concluding the district

court did not err in denying a federal prisoner’s motion seeking pretrial credit against

his sentence because the prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies);

United States v. Iversen, 90 F.3d 1340, 1344 (8th Cir. 1996) (deciding the district

court lacks authority to credit a defendant for previous detention if the claim is not

first presented to the BOP); Kendrick v. Carlson, 995 F.2d 1440, 1447 (8th Cir. 1993)

(declaring federal prisoners who desire credit against a sentence must exhaust their

administrative remedies before seeking habeas corpus relief). 

Therefore, we vacate the district court’s orders and remand with instructions to

dismiss the action without prejudice so Thompson can exhaust his remedies with the

BOP before filing a new section 2241 petition in the appropriate judicial district. See

Chappel, 208 F.3d at 1069-70 (ruling that, because the district court dismissed the

action without prejudice, the prisoner had the right, after exhausting his remedies with

the BOP, to file a § 2241 petition in either the district where he is confined, in district

court for the District of Columbia, or in any district in which the BOP maintains a

regional office).

______________________________
STATE of North Carolina v. Shawn Germaine FRALEY

No. 407P13-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 14, 2017.

Sherri Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General, James R. O'Neill, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Shawn Germaine Fraley, Lexington, for Fraley, Shawn Germaine.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the application filed by Defendant on the 14th of March 2017 in this matter for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Forsyth County:

*789"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 14th of March 2017."

Ervin, J. recused
# C_2008079EN.01003601.xml

| 29.3.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 79/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.3.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 79/36

---

Action brought on 17 December 2007 — Hristova v Commission

(Case F-50/07)

(2008/C 79/68)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Valentina Hristova, (Pavlikeni, Bulgaria) (represented by: Georgi Kerelov, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities

Defendant:

Pleas in law and main arguments

The annulment of the decision of 3 April 2007 of the selection board of the competition EPSO/AST/14/06 not to admit the applicant to the competition and not to mark her practical test because her post-secondary education is not in a field relevant to the duties described in the Notice of competition and she does not have 3 years full-time professional experience in the relevant field after having obtained the secondary education.

Form of order sought

The applicant claim that the Tribunal should:

| — | annul the decision of 3 April 2007 of the selection board for competition EPSO/AST/14/06 not to admit her to that competition; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 3 April 2007 of the selection board for competition EPSO/AST/14/06 not to admit her to that competition;

| — | order the defendant to pay the applicant fixed damages assessed on equitable principles at EUR 28 718 (one year's salary) in respect of the material and non-material damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the illegal decision of the competition selection board, with statutory interest from the date on which the application was lodged; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the applicant fixed damages assessed on equitable principles at EUR 28 718 (one year's salary) in respect of the material and non-material damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the illegal decision of the competition selection board, with statutory interest from the date on which the application was lodged;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

---
EXHIBIT 21.1

Subsidiaries of Placer Sierra Bancshares

Placer Sierra Bancshares has six direct subsidiaries:



| | 1. | Placer Sierra Bank, a California corporation.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Placer Statutory Trust II, a Connecticut statutory business trust.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 3. | Southland Statutory Trust I, a Connecticut statutory business trust.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 4. | First Financial Bancorp Statutory Trust I, a Connecticut statutory business trust.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 5. | Placer Statutory Trust III, a Delaware statutory business trust.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------



| | 6. | Southwest Community Statutory Trust I, a Connecticut statutory trust.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------

Placer Sierra Bank has five direct subsidiaries of its own, only one of which is active:



| | 1. | Central Square Company, Inc., a California corporation.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------

The other
remaining subsidiaries are: PIB Mortgage Company, SCB Investment Company, SCB Financial Software, Inc. and FDS Liquidation Corporation.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350

The following statement is provided by the undersigned to accompany the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended December 30, 2006 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any other
securities law.

Each of the undersigned certifies that the foregoing Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a), or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sensus Metering
Systems (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus Metering Systems Inc.



|         |  |                                                                           |  |  |  |          |  |                                                                          
|-------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | -------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|         |  | /s/ DANIEL W. HARNESS                                                     |  |  |  |          |  | /s/ PETER MAINZ                                                          
|Name:    |  | Daniel W. Harness                                                         |  |  |  | Name:    |  | Peter Mainz                                                              
|Title:   |  | Chief Executive Officer and President                                     |  |  |  | Title:   |  | Chief Financial Officer                                                  
|Company: |  | Sensus Metering Systems (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and
Sensus Metering Systems Inc. |  |  |  | Company: |  | Sensus Metering Systems (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus Metering Systems Inc.
|Date:    |  | January 26, 2007                                                          |  |  |  | Date:    |  | January 26, 2007
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-40095

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RUBEN CASTANEDA-VELEZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:07-CR-1330-ALL

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ruben Castaneda-Velez (Castaneda) pleaded guilty to attempting to

reenter the United States without having obtained consent to reapply for

admission. Castaneda’s guidelines sentencing range was enhanced by 16 levels

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 because he had previously been deported following

a conviction for a crime of violence. The district court sentenced him to 77

months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 25, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-40095

2

Castaneda contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable

because the district court did not give a sufficient explanation for the sentence.

Because Castaneda did not object to the explanation at sentencing, we review

this contention for plain error. See Unites States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d

804, 806 (5th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed (July 25, 2008)(No. 08-5514).

The district court’s adoption of the presentence report (PSR) and

consideration of Castaneda’s objections to the PSR, arguments for a belowguidelines sentence, and the § 3553(a) factors in determining Castaneda’s

within-guidelines sentence constituted sufficient reasons for imposing the

sentence. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007); United

States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2006). There was no clear or

obvious error that affected Castaneda’s substantial rights or rendered the

sentence procedurally unreasonable. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 3468-69.

Castaneda also argues that although his was a within-guidelines sentence,

it should not be presumed reasonable because U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 is flawed under

Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574 (2007), wherein the Supreme

Court recognized that certain Guidelines do not take account of empirical data

and national experience. This argument is also reviewed for plain error. See

United States v.Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 2005).

Although Kimbrough made clear that a district court may, in certain cases,

conclude that the Guidelines fail properly to reflect § 3553(a)’s considerations

and may disagree with guidelines policy, it does not follow that a district court

abuses its discretion when it concludes, as the district court did here, that the

Guidelines are appropriate. This court recently rejected a similar argument in

United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2008), petition

for cert. filed (Aug. 20, 2008) (No. 08-5988).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31.1  Section 302 Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer    I, B. Alva Schoomer, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Innocap, Inc.  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;  4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.    Date: December 23, 2008  /s/ B. Alva Schoomer B. Alva Schoomer Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S NO. WR-81,768-01
IN RE RAMON C ASTIL LO, Relator
ON AP P LICATION FOR AWRIT OF M ANDAM US CAUSE NO. 85-CR- 3655-A F ROM BEXAR COUNTY
Per curiam . O R D E R
Relator has filed a motion for leave to file a wr i t of mandamus pursuant to the orig inal jurisdiction of this Court. I n it, he contends that he filed an a pplication for a

writ of habea s corpus in Be x ar County , that more than 35 day s have elaps ed , an d that the application has not y et been forwa rded to this Court. In these circ umstances, additional fac ts are neede d. Respondent, the District Clerk of Be x ar County , is or dere d to f

ile a response , which may be made by submitt ing the rec ord on such habea s corpus application, submitt ing a copy of a timely filed order which desig nates issues to be investigated (see McCree v. Hampton , 824 S.W .2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), or stating that Relator has not filed an application for a writ of habea s corpus in Be x ar County
. Should the response-2-

include an orde r designatingissues, proof of the date the district attorney ’s offic e was serve d with the habeas application shall also be subm itted wi th the response. This application for leave to file
a writ of mandamus shall be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitt ed the appropr iate response . Such response shall be submitted within 30 day s of the date of this order.

Filed: Jul y

30, 2014 Do not publish