1 Filed 4/23/15 Franklyn v. Koegler CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DAVID FRANKLYN, Respondent,

v. SHAHNAZ BRIGITTE KOEGLER, Appellant. A139255
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. FAM0101000)

In this action for dissolution of marri age, appellant Shahnaz Brigitte Koegler (Brigitte) appealed after th e trial court divided marita l property between her and respondent David Fr anklyn and denied both parties’ re quests for attorney fees. Brigitte complains about several aspect s of the proceedings below, but because her contentions are unsupported by factual or legal citati ons, we consider them waived and affirm.
I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Brigitte and David were married on May 30, 1992, and they separated in September 2008, with David ap parently filing a petition for dissolution of marriage that same month. The parties litigated various ma tters over the next few years. A trial was held over four days between March 20 and April 2, 2013, regarding the characterization and division of marital property. The reporte r’s transcript of the proceedings spans about 500 pages. Brigitte, David, an d five other witnesses testif ied, and 38 exhibits were
submitted into evidence.2 Following posttrial briefing, the trial c ourt issued a 14-page final statement of decision on May 16, 2013. Brigitte and David both filed motions for attorney fees, but
the trial court declined to award fees to e ither party by order dated June 27, 2013. Brigitte appealed both the order dividing pr operty and the order denying attorney fees.
II. D ISCUSSION Brigitte has filed a 32-page opening brief in this court challenging several aspects of the proceedings below. She argues, amon g other things, that sh e detrimentally relied on the trial court to follow its own orders, that the court entered various orders but then later reversed them and “fail[ed ] to follow the law,” that the court displayed judicial bias in its order regarding attorney fees, and th at David violated several orders but was rewarded for doing so. Asid e from the authority for appealing the trial court’s orders, Brigitte does not cite any legal support for her arguments. And her opening brief contains just two citations to the record, e ach to the same two pages of the reporter’s transcript. After David filed a brief argui ng why the trial cour t’s orders should be affirmed, appellant declined to file a reply brief. “The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions ar e indulged in its favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” ( City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) It is an appellant’s bur den to affirmatively show error. ( Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Brigitte has faile d to meet this burden. By failing to provide citations to the reco rd to support her arguments , she has waived them. ( City of
Santa Maria , at pp. 286-287; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App. 4th 1229, 1246.) Likewise, we “need not address arguments for which a party provides no supporting authority.” ( Michael P. v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 10 36, 1042.) It is not this court’s role to develop a party’s argumen t where the party simply hints at it, without more. ( Cryoport Systems v. CNA Ins. Cos. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) And where an appellant does not respond to a re spondent’s argument by way of reply, we may assume that appellant was pe rsuaded by the argument. ( People v. Hightower (1996)3 41 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1112, fn. 3. ) Although Brigitte appears in this court without an attorney, that does not entitle her to special treatment. ( Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 524.) At oral argument, Brigitte clarified that she sought reversal of the portion of the
trial court’s order that she considers to ha ve sanctioned David’s us e of community funds, in violation of a previous order, to remodel their home after separation. A review of the trial court’s findings reveals that the trial court was well aware David had violated the previous order, but it determined that the ex penditure greatly increas ed the value of the home, a community asset, and that David had violated no fiduciary duty to Brigitte. Although Brigitte no doubt is still upset, she has not shown any legal error. She also clarified at oral argument that she challenges the trial court’s order declining to award her attorney fees. Our review of the record reveals that each side won and lost various issues,
and we therefore cannot conclude that the or der awarding neither side attorneys fees
constituted an abuse of discretion. Because Brigitte has not met her burden to demonstrate reversible error, we
otherwise decline to examine the record unassisted and c onsider her arguments waived.
III. D ISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders are affirmed. David shall recover his costs on appeal.4 _ ____________ ____________ Humes, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Margulies, J.

_____________ ____________ Banke, J.