UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-1940

SELMA MARIE MATHIAS FERRIS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

AAF-MCQUAY, INCORPORATED, t/a McQuay International, 

 Defendant – Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Samuel G. Wilson, 

District Judge. (5:06-cv-00082-sgw) 

Submitted: October 21, 2008 Decided: October 23, 2008 

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Richard F. Hawkins, III, HAWKINS LAW FIRM, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Douglas M. Nabhan, Heath H. Galloway, WILLIAMS 

MULLEN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Selma Marie Mathias Ferris appeals from the district 

court's adverse grant of summary judgment, and dismissal of her 

action alleging that AAF-McQuay, Inc. (“McQuay”) discriminated 

and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2000), when it 

terminated her employment in October 2004.1 Our review of the 

record and the district court's opinion discloses that this 

appeal is without merit. We find, even assuming Ferris 

established a prima facie case of retaliation, that the district 

court correctly determined that she failed to rebut the 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons McQuay proffered to 

support its decision to discharge her. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Price v. Thompson, 380 

F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). Specifically, the undisputed 

evidence established that McQuay’s business substantially slowed 

and it was forced to downsize in the fall of 2004, that Ferris 

was the lowest-ranking member of her department and one of 

 1

 Ferris suffered from a severe bout of adult respiratory 

distress syndrome in July 1997, over seven years prior to her 

discharge. She admitted that McQuay was supportive of her 

throughout her extended illness, held her position open for 

almost six months until her return, and tried to accommodate her 

requests for a smoke-free work environment. She contends that 

her discharge was in retaliation for a complaint she made to the 

corporate office contesting her move to an office that was not 

smoke-free and thus detrimental to her health condition. 

2 
approximately forty hourly and salaried employees who were 

discharged as part of the company’s downsizing efforts,2 and that 

Ferris’ job responsibilities were assumed by her supervisor and 

her position was not filled for over a year following her 

discharge. Moreover, the record contains ample evidence of 

Ferris’ history of poor work performance, documented by the 

employer and other employees. Significantly, Ferris admits that 

she performed poorly for over two years prior to her discharge 

and that she lacked concentration and focus in her work. The 

record reflects deficiencies that began prior to Ferris’ 

complaint to the corporate office, and continued up to the time 

McQuay terminated her. Ferris’ own, unsubstantiated assertions 

as to pretext3 are insufficient to create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to pretext, or to stave off summary judgment. 

See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2003). 

 As Ferris failed to rebut the legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons McQuay proffered for discharging her, 

 2

 Ferris admitted that such financially-driven layoffs were 

not uncommon in the department, and that she had been concerned 

at various times about the possibility that she would be laid 

off due to adverse economic conditions faced by the company. 

3

 Her assertion that McQuay’s failure to provide her with a 

formal personal improvement plan demonstrates pretext does not 

create a genuine issue of material fact in opposition to the 

well-documented and conceded history of Ferris’ extensive work 

problems, which date back to 2002, prior to the 2003 and 2004 

evaluations she claims are evidence of pretext. 

3 
4 

we conclude the district court properly granted McQuay’s motion 

for summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED