This opinion is subject to revision before

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2016 UT 44

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DANNY LOGUE,

Petitioner,

v.

COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH, and THIRD DISTRICT COURT,

Respondents.

No. 20160498

Filed October 20, 2016

Fourth District, Provo

The Honorable Derek P. Pullan

No. 111401543

On Petition for Extraordinary Writ

Attorneys:

Herschel Bullen, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Tyler R. Green, Solic. Gen., 

Thomas B. Brunker, Deputy Solic. Gen., Mark C. Field, Asst. Solic. Gen., 

Salt Lake City, for respondents

Nancy J. Sylvester, Salt Lake City, for respondent

Administrative Office of the Courts

PER CURIAM:

¶ 1 In a petition for extraordinary relief, Danny Logue asks us to 

direct the district court to entertain a motion for a new trial based on 

newly discovered evidence, despite the fact that the time for filing such 

a motion has already expired. We deny Mr. Logue’s petition for two 

reasons: (1) it fails to comply with the pleading requirements 

prescribed in rule 19(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 

(2) Mr. Logue has failed to carry his burden of showing that the newly 
LOGUE v. COURT OF APPEALS

Opinion of the Court

2

discovered impeachment evidence in this case justifies our granting 

extraordinary relief.

¶ 2 After a fourteen-day jury trial, Mr. Logue was convicted of 

aggravated murder, possession of a dangerous weapon by restricted 

person, and obstruction of justice. Brandon Wright was one of the 

State’s witnesses at trial. He testified that Mr. Logue admitted to the 

aggravated murder in 2014 when they were both serving prison time 

on the same cell block. The jury also heard evidence of Mr. Wright’s 

lengthy criminal record, including his prior gang affiliation.

¶ 3 Mr. Logue was sentenced on May 14, 2015. He filed a motion 

for a new trial, which was denied on December 9, 2015. On 

December 28, 2015, he filed his notice of appeal. Approximately three 

months later, while Mr. Logue’s appeal was pending, Mr. Wright 

walked into a police station and confessed to an unrelated twenty-yearold murder.

¶ 4 Mr. Logue now petitions for extraordinary relief based on 

Mr. Wright’s confession. Mr. Logue argues that unless we exercise our 

authority to issue an extraordinary writ, he will be unable to seek a new 

trial based on this newly discovered evidence until after he has 

exhausted his direct appeal—a process that could take months or years.

¶ 5 We broadly take Mr. Logue’s point. Rule 24(c) of the Utah 

Rules of Criminal Procedure generally requires that a motion for new 

trial be made “not later than 14 days after entry of the sentence.” The 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure likewise require litigants to seek relief 

from judgment based on new evidence no later than ninety days from 

the entry of judgment against them. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2), (c).1

Moreover, it appears that Mr. Logue may not petition for 

postconviction relief until he exhausts his direct appeal. See UTAH 

CODE §§ 78B-9-102(1), 78B-9-107(1)–(2).2 Thus, it appears that criminal 

defendants, like Mr. Logue, who discover new evidence more than 

ninety days after sentencing must await the conclusion of their appeal 

 

1 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may apply in criminal 

proceedings when “there is no other applicable statute or rule.” UTAH

R. CIV. P. 81(e). 

2 Because Mr. Logue does not seek to raise a claim of factual 

innocence, we do not reach whether factual innocence claims may be 

exempt from this limitation. See UTAH CODE § 78B-9-402. 
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Opinion of the Court

3

before attempting to seek relief based on this evidence, even if it would 

likely entitle them to a new trial.

¶ 6 We share Mr. Logue’s concerns that there may be a period of 

time during which defendants in Mr. Logue’s shoes are procedurally 

unable to press potentially meritorious claims. We nevertheless deny 

Mr. Logue’s petition because we conclude that Mr. Logue failed to 

carry his burden of showing that the newly discovered impeachment 

evidence in this case justifies our issuing an extraordinary writ. See 

Kettner v. Snow, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962) (“[T]he burden of showing 

facts to justify [granting extraordinary relief] is upon him who seeks 

such relief.”). Mr. Logue contends that Mr. Wright’s posttrial 

confession to an unrelated murder shows that he “seriously perjured 

himself by the material omission of the fact that he had committed a 

murder in Washington State for which he had not been brought to 

justice.” But Mr. Logue has not explained how Mr. Wright’s omission 

of this fact amounts to perjury. Moreover, the jury knew that 

Mr. Wright had a lengthy criminal record, including prior affiliation 

with a prison gang. Mr. Logue has not persuaded us that the jury’s 

assessment of Mr. Wright’s credibility would have been significantly 

affected by the additional information that he had committed an 

unsolved serious crime. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 66, 114 P.3d 

551 (newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial if it is 

merely cumulative); see also State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 28, 25 P.3d 985 

(“As a general rule, newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new 

trial where its only use is impeachment.”); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 

839, 851 (Utah 1988) (denying motion for new trial when newly 

discovered evidence had only “minor impeachment value”).3

¶ 7 We accordingly decline to exercise our discretion to grant 

Mr. Logue’s petition for extraordinary relief. But we will direct the 

appropriate standing committee on the rules of procedure to consider 

 3 We also note that Mr. Logue did not comply with rule 19(b) of the 

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This rule requires a petition for an 

extraordinary writ to contain, among other things, “[a] statement of the 

reasons why no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy exists and 

why the writ should issue.” UTAH R. APP. P. 19(b)(4). Mr. Logue’s 

petition does not even attempt to explain why his inability to pursue a 

new trial until after he has exhausted his appeal deprived him of a 

“plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.” Indeed, nowhere in Mr. Logue’s 

petition does the phrase “plain, speedy, or adequate remedy” even 

appear.
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Opinion of the Court

4

revising them so that they do not act as a categorical bar to motions for 

new trials in cases like these.