* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-40332

Summary Calendar

DIANE HOBBS, Individually and as a Representative of the Heirs and Estate

of David J. Hobbs

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

BAKER HUGHES OILFIELD OPERATIONS, INC.

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:06-CV-97

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:*

Diane Hobbs (“Ms. Hobbs”) appeals the entry of summary judgment

against her on her claim arising under the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”). She also appeals the

district court’s award of costs to defendant Baker Hughes. We affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 29, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-40332

1 All parties agree this plan is governed by ERISA.

2 At one time, Mr. Hobbs had asked Baker Hughes to mail his personal correspondence

to his office address. At some point prior to his termination, he requested that Baker Hughes

2

FACTS

Diane Hobbs’s husband, David J. Hobbs (“Mr. Hobbs”), was employed by

Baker Hughes from 1979 to 2003. As part of its employee benefits plan,1 Baker

Hughes provided Mr. Hobbs with two life insurance policies totaling $195,000

in coverage. Ms. Hobbs was listed as a 50% beneficiary under these policies. In

June 2003 Baker Hughes provided Mr. Hobbs a copy of its Summary Plan

Description (“SPD”), explaining thatif his employment were ever terminated, his

life insurance coverage would end unless he converted it to an individual policy.

Two months later, in August 2003, Baker Hughes terminated Mr. Hobbs’s

employment for cause. On the day of his termination, Baker Hughes handdelivered a letter (“Termination Letter”) to Mr. Hobbs, which reiterated the

conversion policy found in the SPD: “Your company provided Life . . . coverage[]

will end on the date of your termination. You may apply to convert your

coverage to an individual policy. You must apply for the policy within 31 days

after your coverage ends. You will receive a conversion application with your

COBRA enrollment materials.” Mr. Hobbs went home that day and advised his

wife Diane that all his Baker Hughes benefits had ended. Mr. Hobbs never

discussed the benefits situation with his wife again, and he made no attempt or

inquiry with Baker Hughes to convert his life insurance policy.

Several months later, in May 2004, Mr. Hobbs suffered a fatal brain

aneurism. Ms. Hobbs asked Baker Hughes about Mr. Hobbs’s life insurance

benefits and was advised that his coverage had ended the day his employment

was terminated. Around this time, Ms. Hobbs learned that the life insurance

conversion application referenced in the Termination Letter had been mailed to

Mr. Hobbs at his office address, rather than his home.2 Ms. Hobbs filed this
No. 08-40332

change his mailing address to his residence. Baker Hughes, for unknown reasons, never

updated its records accordingly.

3 The district court assumed for the sake of argument, as do we, that Baker Hughes was

acting as a fiduciary at all relevant times. 

3

lawsuit in May 2006, seeking “reinstatement” and payment of Mr. Hobbs’s life

insurance benefits. The district court granted summary judgment to Baker

Hughes, and Ms. Hobbs appeals. Her primary argument on appeal is that Baker

Hughes’s failure to send Mr. Hobbs’s conversion application to his home address

was a breach of fiduciary duty actionable under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)(3). Ms. Hobbs also challenges the district court’s award of $1,351.30

in costs to Baker Hughes.

DISCUSSION

The district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.

Baker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 364 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2004). The

decision to award costs in an ERISA case is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disab.Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 541

(5th Cir. 2007). 

Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA provides, in part, that a civil action may be

brought:

by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or

practice which violates any provision ofthis subchapter or the terms

of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to

redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this

subchapter or the terms of the plan.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The district court granted Baker Hughes summary

judgment on this claim for two reasons. First, the court concluded that Baker

Hughes’s actions in this case — an unexplained failure to deliver a third notice

of Mr. Hobbs’s conversion rights — did not rise to the level of a breach of

fiduciary duty.3 The district court found no evidence that Baker Hughes was
No. 08-40332

4 Ms. Hobbs explained in her response to Baker Hughes’s Motion for Summary

Judgment that the “proper equitable relief” would allow her to convert Mr. Hobbs’s benefits

retroactively, pay any necessary premiums, and collect the balance due on the policies. This

is, in substance, a request for damages. See Amschwand, 505 F.3d at 348 n.7 (“Such attempts

to recharacterize a desired § 502(a)(3) remedy as a purely equitable form of relief, like an

injunction, have been consistently rejected.”).

4

responsible for more than a clerical oversight in this matter. See Bodine v.

Employers Casualty Co., 352 F.3d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that plaintiffs

had made no allegations of “deceptive practices, misrepresentations, or other

behavior typically associated with fiduciary breaches by employers under

ERISA”); see also Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 642 (7th Cir. 2004)

(“[W]hile there is a duty to provide accurate information under ERISA,

negligence in fulfilling that duty is not actionable.”) The district court also held

that Ms. Hobbs had failed to demonstrate a fact issue on the question of

causation; i.e.,the courtfound no evidence indicating that Mr. Hobbs would have

acted differently had he been advised yet again of his conversion rights. See

Ferrer v. Chevron Corporation, 484 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal of an ERISA claim for lack of a causal relationship between

the alleged breach of fiduciary duty and damages).

The district court further noted that there was some dispute whether the

reinstatement Ms. Hobbs seeks is “appropriate equitable relief” available under

§ 502(a)(3). The district court found it unnecessary to reach this question, but

for our purposes the issue is sufficient to resolve the case at hand. See FDIC v.

Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1240 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that summary judgment

may be affirmed on any grounds adequately developed below). Our caselaw

makes it clear that the “reinstatement” of benefits Ms. Hobbs seeks does not

qualify as equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). Amschwand v. Spherion Corp.,

505 F.3d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008). Though

Ms. Hobbs has attempted to cast her prayer for relief as equitable,4in substance
No. 08-40332

5 Southern District of Texas Local Rule 54.2, “Bill of Costs,” provides in relevant part,

“An application for costs shall be made by filing a bill of costs within 14 days of the entry of a

final judgment. . . . Objections to allowance of the bill, the attorney’s fees, or both must be filed

within five days of the bill’s filing.”

5

she is seeking damages in the form of life insurance proceeds. “Obtaining the

lost policy proceeds . . . is simply a form of make-whole damages. This demand

is not equitable in derivation, but is akin to the legal remedies of

extracontractual or compensatory damages.” Id.(citations omitted). These legal

remedies are not available under § 502(a)(3). Thus, even assuming Baker

Hughes did breach its fiduciary duty in failing to update its records and mail Mr.

Hobbs a third notice of his conversion rights, and assuming Ms. Hobbs could

show a causal link between this breach and Mr. Hobbs’s decision not to convert

his benefits, the relief she seeks is not available under § 502(a)(3). 

Ms. Hobbs also challenges the district court’s order affirming the award

of costs to Baker Hughes. She complains that Baker Hughes should have filed

a motion for costs, rather than submitting a bill of costs to the court clerk.

ERISA authorizes a court to award costs “in its discretion.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).

Costs in an ERISA suit may be awarded on a simple “prevailing party” basis.

Wade, 493 F.3d at 542-43. Here, Baker Hughes was the prevailing party, and

it submitted its bill of costs to the court clerk in accordance with Local Rule

54.2.5 Ms. Hobbs filed an objection, which the district court examined and

overruled. Ms Hobbs has not shown this process to be inadequate or an abuse

of discretion.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Ms. Hobbs’s request for

permission to submit supplemental briefing on Amschwand v. Spherion Corp.

is denied as untimely.

AFFIRMED.