Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Goodwyn, 

JJ., and Stephenson and Russell, S.JJ. 

JAMES GREGORY LOGAN 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 072342 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 September 12, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the Court 

of Appeals erred in holding that the exclusionary rule never 

applies to evidence submitted in probation revocation 

proceedings, regardless of the searching officer's conduct or 

bad faith. 

I 

 The facts relevant to the issue presented are not in 

dispute. In 2002, James Gregory Logan was convicted of 

selling cocaine as an accommodation under Code § 18.2-248(D). 

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with three years 

and seven months suspended upon condition that he be of good 

behavior for three years and six months from the date of his 

release from probation. On August 22, 2003, Logan, while on 

probation, was arrested for possession of cocaine. He was 

convicted and appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, 

contending that the search and seizure that yielded the 

contraband had violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals, 
sitting en banc, reversed Logan's conviction on Fourth 

Amendment grounds, Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 

173, 622 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2005), and the Commonwealth did not 

appeal that decision. 

 The Commonwealth then sought to have Logan's probation 

revoked because he had violated the requirement that he be of 

good behavior. The Commonwealth argued that Logan's conduct 

in possessing cocaine while on probation was proved and that 

the exclusionary rule did not apply at a probation revocation 

hearing. Logan argued that the evidence obtained as a result 

of an unlawful search and seizure should be excluded from the 

probation revocation hearing because the police officer who 

made the warrantless search and seizure had acted in bad 

faith. 

 At the probation revocation hearing, Danville police 

officer Jerry Lee Pace, Jr. testified that he saw a man whom 

he thought was wanted for a felony. Officer Pace followed the 

man into a rooming house and up the stairs where he saw the 

man and a woman on the landing. The man, who possessed a 

piece of crack cocaine, was Logan. Logan was not the wanted 

felon. 

 The trial court conducting the probation revocation 

hearing found that the police officer had not acted in bad 

faith and that the evidence obtained from the officer's search 

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and seizure should not be excluded. The court, therefore, 

revoked Logan's probation. Logan filed an appeal with the 

Court of Appeals. 

II 

 In the Court of Appeals, Logan contended, as he had done 

in the trial court, that the evidence obtained by Officer Pace 

should have been suppressed because the officer, in entering 

the rooming house, had acted in bad faith. The Court of 

Appeals did not consider Logan's bad-faith argument, finding 

irrelevant the question whether the officer had acted in bad 

faith and holding that the exclusionary rule never applies in 

a probation revocation proceeding. Logan v. Commonwealth, 50 

Va. App. 518, 524, 651 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2007). 

 This holding by the Court of Appeals is contrary to 

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 437, 440, 470 S.E.2d 862, 

863 (1996), in which we held that "the exclusionary rule is 

not applicable in a probation revocation proceeding absent a 

showing of bad faith on the part of the police." (Emphasis 

added.) The Court of Appeals ruled that the United States 

Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. 

Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998), had nullified any reason to 

apply the exclusionary rule in a probation revocation 

proceeding, irrespective of the circumstances that led to the 

discovery of the evidence. Logan, 50 Va. App. at 523-24, 651 

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S.E.2d at 405. The Court of Appeals, by rejecting the 

possible application of the "bad faith" exception, therefore 

found that Scott had overruled Anderson by implication. The 

Court of Appeals found that it was "governed by the principles 

set forth in Scott" and "constrained to find that the 

exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation 

hearings." Id. at 524, 651 S.E.2d at 406. 

 We conclude that the Court of Appeals' reliance on Scott

is misplaced based upon three relevant distinctions between 

Scott and the present case. First, Scott involved a parolee, 

rather than a probationer, 524 U.S. at 360, and parolees "have 

fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because 

parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to 

imprisonment," Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). 

Second, the parolee in Scott had explicitly consented to a 

search of the house and his person as a condition of parole. 

524 U.S. at 360. Third, a parole revocation hearing is an 

administrative proceeding, and "[a]pplication of the 

exclusionary rule would . . . alter the traditionally 

flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation 

proceedings." Id. at 364. Therefore, we reaffirm our holding 

in Anderson and rule that the Court of Appeals erred in 

holding that the exclusionary rule never applies in probation 

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revocation proceedings and in failing to consider Logan's badfaith argument. 

III 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a 

review of Logan's challenge to the trial court's determination 

that the police officer's actions did not constitute bad 

faith. 

Reversed and remanded.