*

  After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted October 2, 2008*

Decided October 7, 2008

Before

        JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

                    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

                               TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐3312

KEVEN L. CARTER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RICHARD A. MEYERS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

No. 04 C 50459

Frederick J. Kapala,

Judge.

O R D E R

In this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Keven Carter claims that the sheriff of

Winnebago County, Illinois, and two of the sheriff’s employees failed to protect him from

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐3312 Page 2

an assault by fellow inmates at the county jail.  The case initially was assigned to Judge

Reinhard, but in May 2007, while the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was under

consideration, the case was reassigned to Judge Kapala.  On August 21, 2007, Judge Kapala

entered an order granting the defendants’ motion.  Almost four weeks later, Carter, by then

in state prison, mailed to the district court a notice of appeal and a “Motion to Reconsider.”

We docketed the appeal, and the district court denied the motion.  Carter did not separately

appeal the adverse ruling on his motion, which because of its timing is properly construed

as a motion to vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  See Talano v.

Northwestern Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001); Hope v. United States,

43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994).  Our jurisdiction is thus limited to the judgment on the

merits.

Carter does not contend that Judge Kapala committed error in analyzing the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Instead of attacking the merits of that ruling,

Carter argues that Judge Kapala should have recused himself because he presided over

Carter’s 1991 state trial and previously served as judge for the judicial circuit encompassing

Winnebago County.  A motion for recusal asserting bias or prejudice must be filed as soon

as the basis for disqualification is known.  Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702, 717 n.15 (7th

Cir. 2001); United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993).  Carter, however, failed to

move for recusal or object to the reassignment until he filed his post‐judgment “Motion to

Reconsider.”  And even assuming, as he claims, that he did not know of the reassignment

until he saw Judge Kapala’s name on the summary judgment ruling, Carter did not allege

that he possesses evidence of actual bias or prejudice.  See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (“Also not subject to deprecatory characterization as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice’

are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings.”); In re

Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There is no rule that requires a judge to recuse

himself from a case, civil or criminal, simply because he was or is involved in litigation with

one of the parties.”); Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The

factual allegations must fairly support the charge of bias or impartiality and must be

specific.”); Tezak, 256 F.3d at 717 (explaining that passage of time undercut contention that

judge was prejudiced on account of events from eight years earlier).  Accordingly, Carter’s

recusal argument is without merit.

AFFIRMED.