Filed 11/4/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY 

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

 Defendants and Respondents;

CHINA SHIPPING (NORTH 

AMERICA) HOLDING CO., LTD.,

et al.,

Real Parties in Interest;

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE 

AND WAREHOUSE UNION, 

LOCALS 13, 63, AND 94,

 Movant and Appellant.

B310783

(Los Angeles County 

Super. Ct. No. 20STCP02985)

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
2

 SR Holguin, Steven R. Holguin and Marcos R. Holguin for 

Movant and Appellant.

Bayron Gilchrist, Barbara Baird, Veera Tyagi, Josephine 

Lee and Kathryn Roberts for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Meyers Nave, Amrit S. Kulkarni, Julia L. Bond, Shaye 

Diveley; Office of the City Attorney of Los Angeles, Michael N. 

Feuer, Janna B. Sidley, Justin M. Houterman and John T. 

Driscoll for Defendants and Respondents.

No appearance for Real Parties in Interest.

____________________

A labor union moved to intervene in an environmental 

dispute about the Port of Los Angeles. The union is the 

International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Locals 13, 63, 

and 94 (the Union). The trial court denied the motion because 

concerns about expanding the case’s scope outweighed the 

Union’s interest. We will introduce the many actors and events

in this multipolar environmental dispute by using the allegations 

of the petition filed by South Coast Air Quality Management 

District (the Air District). Then we explain why denying 

permissive intervention to the Union was proper. Statutory 

references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

I

The Port of Los Angeles is the busiest seaport in the 

Western Hemisphere. It is critical for U.S. trade with Asia, and 

there is a lot of trade with Asia. 

Within the Port is the China Shipping Container Terminal 

(the Terminal). The Chinese government owns China Shipping 

(North America) Holding Co., Ltd. (China Shipping), which leases 

the Terminal long term from various city entities. 
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The Terminal is a significant part of the Port. It and China 

Shipping handled 17 percent of the Port’s cargo in 2019. 

The city entities are parties here. They are the City of Los 

Angeles, the Los Angeles City Council, the Los Angeles Harbor 

Department, and the Los Angeles Board of Harbor 

Commissioners. We label this group the City Entities. 

In 2001, the City Entities issued a permit to China 

Shipping to build the Terminal. 

This project sparked immediate controversy: in the same 

year, environmental and community groups filed a lawsuit to 

challenge whether the City Entities, in approving the Terminal 

project, had complied with the California Environmental Quality

Act (the Act). 

The parties settled that suit. Part of the settlement 

required the City Entities to prepare an environmental impact 

report for the Terminal project. They completed the report in 

2008. This report—the 2008 Report—found the project “would 

have significant and unavoidable adverse environmental impacts 

to air quality, aesthetics, biological resources, geology, 

transportation, noise, and water quality sediments and 

oceanography.” Accordingly, the City Entities adopted more than 

50 mitigation measures and several lease measures to reduce 

these impacts. 

The 2008 Report specified the lease with China Shipping 

would be amended to incorporate the mitigation measures. But 

no one did amend the lease that way. In addition, several 

measures were implemented only partially, while others were 

ignored entirely. 

In September 2015, the City Entities informed the Air 

District they intended to prepare a revised environmental 
4

analysis for the Terminal to evaluate the unimplemented 

mitigation measures and to consider modified measures, among 

other items. After releasing draft reports and holding public 

hearings, the Board of Harbor Commissioners certified the final 

supplemental report in October 2019. The City Council approved 

it in August 2020, so we refer to this report as the 2020 Report. 

This approval let the Terminal operate under revised conditions. 

The 2020 Report eliminated some mitigation measures 

from the 2008 Report. It also recognized that Terminal emissions 

would have significant, unavoidable, and increased impacts on air 

quality, and that the project would exceed a threshold for cancer 

risk. 

Again, nothing enforced the mitigation measures: the City 

Entities did not require a lease amendment. Further, China 

Shipping wrote it did not intend to implement or to pay for the 

new measures. 

In September 2020, the Air District filed a petition for writ 

of mandate claiming the City Entities had not enforced the 

mitigation measures listed in the 2008 Report. The suit likewise 

challenged the decisions to certify the 2020 Report and to allow 

the Terminal to operate under allegedly inferior measures. The 

petition named each of the City Entities as respondents, as well 

as the following real parties in interest: China Shipping (North 

America) Holding Co., Ltd.; COSCO Shipping (North America), 

Inc.; China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited; and West 

Basin Container Terminal LLC. We will call these last four the 

China Shipping Entities. 

The Air District’s petition condemned the 2020 Report in 

many ways:
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1. The report used the wrong baseline for 

environmental analysis.

2. Its project description was misleading.

3. Its impact evaluation was inadequate. 

4. Some of the mitigation measures were uncertain and 

unenforceable.

5. The mitigation monitoring and reporting program 

was inadequate.

6. It failed to adopt all feasible mitigation measures.

7. It rejected measures from the 2008 Report and 

alternatives without proper findings.

8. It did not support the Findings and Statement of 

Overriding Considerations with substantial evidence.

9. It did not respond adequately to public comments. 

The petition asked the court to, among other things, set 

aside the approvals for the Terminal project and the permit, 

pending compliance with the Act. It also asked for the City 

Entities to nullify certification of the 2020 Report and to disallow 

continued operation of the Terminal under that permit. 

In November 2020, the California Attorney General and the 

California Air Resources Board (which we call the Board) filed a 

joint motion to intervene in the lawsuit, asserting they were 

entitled to mandatory intervention under section 387, subdivision 

(d)(1). The Board also sought permissive intervention under 

section 387, subdivision (d)(2). The Board was involved in the 

underlying administrative proceedings. It had opposed 

certification of the 2020 Report. 

Later in November 2020, the Union filed a motion seeking 

permissive intervention. The Union claimed up to 3,075 of its 

members stood to lose their jobs should the Air District obtain 
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the relief it sought, which would result in an indefinite closure of 

the Terminal. The Union argued no existing party could protect 

its members’ interests adequately. 

The City Entities filed briefs in the trial court supporting 

the Union’s intervention motion and opposing the Board’s 

intervention motion. No one opposed intervention by the 

Attorney General. 

At a hearing in January 2021, the trial court denied the 

Union’s motion, granted a limited mandatory intervention to the 

Board, and consolidated this action with another led by the 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. All parties agreed to the 

consolidation. 

The court agreed the Attorney General had a statutory right 

to intervene in the case. 

The court observed the Board has primary statutory 

jurisdiction to regulate air pollution emissions from mobile 

sources. It also had a statutory responsibility to implement a 

Community Emissions Reduction Plan for Wilmington, a 

community bordering the Port identified as a disadvantaged 

community. The Wilmington plan includes several measures to 

reduce emissions from the Port and from freight traffic traveling 

to the Port. The court concluded the Board had a particularized 

regulatory interest in the Wilmington plan that the Terminal 

project and the litigation could affect. 

Finally, the trial court ruled the Union’s interest in the 

case was speculative and consequential—not direct and 

immediate, as required for permissive intervention—and the 

prejudice to existing parties outweighed the reasons supporting 

intervention. On the latter point, the court explained: 
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“Union lacks a direct interest in the case and Respondents 

and Real Parties can be counted upon to support the jobs issue. 

Unlike the Attorney General and [the Board], Union has no legal 

interest in the CEQA issues at stake and is only concerned with 

the consequences of a terminal shutdown. [The Air District] also 

is correct that another intervening party would complicate the 

litigation.” 

The Union appealed this ruling. The City Entities filed a 

brief in support of the appeal.

II

The trial court denied the Union a seat at a table. Seating 

at that table already was crowded. The court’s exercise of its 

discretion was proper.

Under the statute for permissive intervention, trial courts 

have discretion to permit nonparties to intervene in a lawsuit, 

provided each of the following four factors are met: 

1. the nonparty follows proper procedures;

2. it has a direct and immediate interest in the action;

3. intervention will not enlarge the issues; and

4. the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition 

by the existing parties. 

(§ 387, subd. (d)(2); Edwards v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc.

(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 725, 736 (Edwards).) 

The trial court must balance the interests of those affected 

by a judgment against the interests of the original parties in 

pursuing their case unburdened by others. (City and County of 

San Francisco v. State of California (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1030, 

1036 (San Francisco).) The trial court has broad discretion to 

strike this balance. (Ibid.) We thus review for abuse of 

discretion. (Edwards, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.) We 
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presume the judgment is correct, affirm if it is correct on any 

theory, and reverse only if the appellant establishes the decision 

results in a miscarriage of justice or exceeds the bounds of 

reason. (Ibid.; San Francisco, at pp. 1036–1037; City of Malibu v. 

California Coastal Com. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 897, 906 

(Malibu).)

Much of the briefing focuses on the second factor of the 

permissive intervention test—that is, whether the Union’s 

interest suffices. 

We affirm based on the fourth factor: the trial court 

reasonably concluded the Air District’s interest in litigating the 

case without Union involvement outweighed the Union’s reasons 

for intervening. Even if the interest is direct, denying permissive 

intervention in such circumstances is proper. (See People v. 

Superior Court (Good) (1976) 17 Cal.3d 732, 737.)

This consolidated environmental case is complex. It has an 

impressively large cast of characters. The trial court aptly noted 

this case “already has a lot of lawyers in it.” With the addition of 

the Attorney General and the Board, we count eight petitioners, 

four respondents, and four real parties in interest. 

The Union admits its position on the merits is duplicative: 

it supports the City Entities, seeks to defend their actions 

concerning the Terminal, and has no concerns with the 

challenged environmental analysis in the 2020 Report. Beyond 

this, the Union says it is acutely and uniquely interested in the 

consequences of a “potential remedy” should the petitioners 

prevail: the possible shutdown of the Terminal and the loss of 

Union jobs that could flow from rescinding the relevant permits 

and approvals. Thus the Union seeks to intervene in this 
9

litigation to “advocate for a remedy that does not shut the 

terminal down . . . .” 

The City Entities want the same thing. 

The Union is not the only one seeking to maintain 

operations—and thus jobs—at the Terminal. Both the Union’s 

and the City Entities’ briefs make this plain.

The evidence also shows that existing parties support 

continuing the Terminal’s operation. The Los Angeles Harbor 

Department prepared findings for the Terminal project. These 

findings conclude the benefits of the project outweigh its 

unavoidable adverse environmental effects and would justify 

adopting the project and certifying the 2020 Report. This report 

identifies “continued operation of the [China Shipping] Terminal 

under feasible mitigation measures, providing economic benefits 

to the Port and the community” as one benefit. The report 

specifically discusses jobs provided by the Terminal. The report 

says this consideration alone would be sufficient to outweigh the 

adverse environmental impacts of the project. 

There is no claim the City Entities lack motivation to 

defend their approval of the Terminal project and its continued 

operation. Nor is there any suggestion the City Entities or the 

China Shipping Entities might carve out Union jobs as 

unimportant or indefensible while fighting to maintain 

operations at the Terminal. 

It thus was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that 

Union participation would be largely cumulative and would 

unduly complicate an already complicated case. 

A Union declaration underscores this risk of undue 

complexity. The declaration says the income of approximately 

3,075 Union members depends on operations at the Terminal, 
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and the Terminal also “provides approximately 80,000 indirect 

jobs in the Los Angeles region.” The trial court reasonably could 

conclude that permitting Union intervention in the lawsuit would 

spur representatives of the other tens of thousands of jobs 

connected to the Terminal to enter the fray. That result would be 

unmanageable. (See Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified 

School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1270, fn. 17 [whether 

to permit intervention requires a fact-specific inquiry focused on 

practical considerations].)

The Union’s logic reveals the weakness of its position. The 

Union has an interest in the Port’s operation, but so do 

consumers affected by whether this commercial hub is 

functioning smoothly. 

The ripples from this pebble in the pond extend yet further. 

All people within breathing distance of the Port also have 

interests in the controversy. 

The trial court had no mandatory obligation to open the 

gate to every potentially affected interest that might mobilize 

itself to appear. Experienced trial judges must balance the 

practical realities of trial court management against the claims of 

all wishing to be heard directly. This trial court’s decision was 

sound.

The Union emphasizes no party other than the Air District 

opposed its intervention. This point does not diminish the Air 

District’s valid concerns, which the trial court shared. (See 

Malibu, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 901.)

The Union also says the trial court acted arbitrarily by 

denying the Union’s motion but by allowing the Board to 

intervene. The Union argues its interest in the litigation is more 

direct and immediate than the Board’s. 
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This argument overlooks the difference between mandatory 

and permissive intervention. Regarding the Board, the court’s 

lengthy analysis focused on the requirements for mandatory 

intervention. The court ultimately granted the Board a limited 

mandatory intervention: the court confined the Board’s 

intervention to the mitigation measures in the 2020 Report that 

could affect the Wilmington emissions plan. No one appealed 

that ruling, which is not before us. 

A footnote in the court’s decision did note, without 

explanation, that the Board was entitled to permissive 

intervention for similar reasons. This alternative ruling does not 

show the court should have allowed the Union into the case solely 

on permissive grounds.

Because it was reasonable to conclude the reasons opposing 

Union intervention were weightier than those supporting it, 

denying permissive intervention by the Union was proper.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order and award costs to the 

South Coast Air Quality Management District.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

GRIMES, Acting P. J. STRATTON, J.