alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Crailar Technologies Inc.: Exhibit 10.39 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com







REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF RIGHT TO EXERCISE OPTIONS


	TO: 	[Name of Option Holder] (“Option
      Holder”) 
	  	[Address of Option Holder] 
	  	  
	FROM: 	CRAILAR TECHNOLOGIES INC.
      (“Crailar”). 
	  	Suite 305, 4420 Chatterton Way, Victoria,
      British Columbia, Canada, V8X 5J2 
	  	  
	DATE: 	July 29, 2014



This Request for Waiver of Right to Exercise Options (this
“Request for Waiver”) is being provided by Crailar to you, a holder of the
following options to purchase common shares of Crailar (the “Options”): 


	Issue Date 	Number of Options 	Exercise Price 	Expiration Date 
	[Month/Date/Year] 	[#] 	[US$] [CDN$] [XX] 	[Month/Date/Year] 
	[Month/Date/Year] 	[#] 	[US$] [CDN$] [XX] 	[Month/Date/Year]
    




Crailar filed a registration statement on Form S-1 with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 25, 2014 (as
amended on Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 1) filed with the SEC on July 7, 2014, and
as may be further amended, the “Registration Statement”), pursuant to which
Crailar proposes to issue units (consisting of shares and warrants) in a
registered offering (the “Offering”). In order to ensure that Crailar has
sufficient authorized share capital available at the time of closing (“Closing
Time”) of the Offering, Crailar has provided this Request for Waiver to you.

By signing below, you agree to waive your right to exercise the
Options, as follows: 

1. In the event that Crailar completes the Offering, you hereby
agree, effective as of the Closing Time, to waive your right to exercise the
Options (on a pro rata basis based on the number of shares Crailar requires to
have sufficient authorized share capital to issue the securities purchased in
such Offering, including the shares underlying the units and the shares issuable
upon exercise of the warrants issued as part of the units) until such time as
Crailar has increased its authorized share capital or otherwise has sufficient
authorized share capital to issue shares to you and all other holders of
convertible or exercisable securities, including all other option holders who
provide such a waiver to Crailar. 

2. For the avoidance of doubt, such waiver will have no force
or effect until the Closing Time and Crailar requires such waiver to have
sufficient authorized sha are capital to issue the securities purchased in the
Offering, including any shares issuable upon exercise of such securities. 

CRAILAR TECHNOLOGIES INC. 

By: ___________________________
Name:
Title: 




- 2 - 

Acknowledged and Agreed: 

OPTION HOLDER 

By: _________________________
Name: 
Date:

__________
IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

HANDDOWN LIST OF JUNE 30, 2015

WESTERN DISTRICT

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 84.16(b)

AND ISSUED PER CURIAM

------------------------------------------------------------------

WD76787 James J. Mahone vs. State of Missouri

WD77354 Tyler Toomay vs. State of Missouri

WD77397 Alphonse D. Jackson vs. State of Missouri

WD77486 Fulton Housing Authority vs. Alicia R. Dailey

WD77516 Phillip D. Martin vs. State of Missouri

WD77907 L.C.M. vs. Jerry Wayne Douglas

WD78204 St. Joseph Medical Center vs. John and Leslie Humphrey

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 30.25(b)

AND ISSUED PER CURIAM

------------------------------------------------------------------

WD77368 State of Missouri vs. John M. Griffin

WD77415 State of Missouri vs. Jeffery S. Coleman

WD77429 State of Missouri vs. Keith Aaron Lancaster
HUGHES v. RIVERA-ORTIZ, M.D., et al.

No. 611A07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 23, 2008.

S. Luke Largess, Charlotte, for Hughes.

Harvey L. Cosper, Lori Keeton, Leigh A. Kite, Charlotte, for Rivera-Ortiz.

Scott M. Stevenson, Tash L. Winebarger, for Callaway Asso.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 22nd day of April 2008 by Defendant (Rivera-Ortiz, M.D.) for Extension of Time to File Brief:

"Motion Allowed. Defendant (Epifanio Rivera-Ortiz, M.D.) shall have up to and including the 30th day of June 2008 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court. By order of the Court in conference this the 23rd day of April 2008."
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pehong Chen, the Chief Executive Officer of BroadVision, Inc. (the "Company") and William E. Meyer, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify that, to the best of their knowledge:

In Witness Whereof,the undersigned has set his hand hereto as of the 15th day of March, 2004.

|/s/PEHONG CHENPehong Chen Chief Executive
Officer           |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/WILLIAM E. MEYERWilliam E. Meyer Chief Financial Officer |  | 

---

QuickLinks
##### 



CERTIFICATION OF
PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF
INN OF THE MOUNTAIN GODS RESORT AND CASINO
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report
is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this quarterly report based on such
evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
  a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Brian D. ParrishBy:
    
    Brian D. ParrishTitle:
    
    Chief Operating Officer and ManagementBoard Member (Principal Executive Officer)
 35
State v. Antwan Anthony

324A16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January 20, 2017

Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Attorney at Law, for Anthony, Antwan.

Kimberly Robb, Assistant District Attorney, Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, Kimberly S. Robb, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 18th of January 2017 by Defendant for Extension of Time to Prepare Trial Transcript:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of January 2017."

Court reporter shall have up to and including the 20th day of February 2017 to prepare and deliver transcript to counsel.
STATE of North Carolina v. Jeremy TETTERTON

No. COA16-967

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: June 6, 2017

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30244

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

EDDIE L STEPHENS

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CR-235-1

Before REAVLEY, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded for

proceedings on the indictment.

In June of 2007 this court reversed the judgment of conviction of Eddie L.

Stephens on the grounds of violation of the Speedy Trial Act by the time of his

trial in 2003. United States v. Stephens, 489 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2007). The court

left to the district judge the decision of whether that action should be with

prejudice to bar prosecution on a new indictment. The district judge promptly

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 20, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30244

2

and carefully considered the question and ruled on August 21, 2007, that it

would be without prejudice.

Stephens was reindicted the following day and he immediately filed a

motion to dismiss on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds. Judge Brady

granted the motion, holding that the length of delay was the seven years

between the original indictment and the new indictment following the appeal.

Applying the other factors of Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), he held that

Stephens had asserted his rights, that the appeal time should not be held

against him and that the Government had failed to show the absence of

prejudice. We disagree with this holding.

The Government was not responsible for the four years of the appeal. It

merely defended the conviction. We cannot hold that a defendant may challenge

trial on Sixth Amendment grounds by virtue of the delay of an appeal. The

relevant length of delay is therefore that of the pre-trial delay, i.e., three years.

We note that this pre-trial delay resulted in large part from Stephens’s own

extensive motion practice. Stephens did not assert his right to a speedy trial at

any time. He moved to dismiss and not for trial. That was not an assertion of

the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201,

211–12 (5th Cir. 2007). As for prejudice, the district judge presumed prejudice

because of the seven years, but a proper delay time of three years would not

impose the burden to prove the absence of prejudice upon the Government. No

actual prejudice is shown by Stephens.

Judgment REVERSED; cause REMANDED for further proceedings.
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

In re Texas Department of Transportation

, * Original Mandamus Proceeding

No. 11

- 2 3

- 00 112

- C V * August 23 , 20 2 3

* Memorand um Opinion by Bailey, C.J.

(P anel consists of: Bailey , C.J.,

Trotter , J. , and Williams, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that Relator’s

petition for writ of mandamus should be conditionally granted. Therefore, in

accordance with this court’s opinion, the petition for writ of mandamus is

conditionally granted. A writ of manda mus will issue only if the Honorable

Brooks Hagler fails to act on or before September 11 , 2023.
State v. Gregory Lynn Gordon

132P11-10

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 18, 2016

Mr. Gregory Lynn Gordon, for Gordon, Gregory Lynn.

Mr. Derrick Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 10th of June 2016 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 18th of August 2016."
State v. Mason White Hyde

88P15-4

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 8, 2016

Mr. Mason W. Hyde, Laurinburg, Pro Se.

*517Mr. James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, For Hyde, Mason White.

Ms. Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, For State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 13th of October 2016 by Defendant for Objection:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."
# C_2008285EN.01000602.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 11 September 2008 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van Beroep te Gent (Belgium)) — Hans Eckelkamp, Natalie Eckelkamp, Monica Eckelkamp, Saskia Eckelkamp, Thomas Eckelkamp, Jessica Eckelkamp, Joris Eckelkamp v Belgische Staat

(Case C-11/07) (1)

1

(Free movement of capital - Articles 56 EC and 58 EC - Inheritance tax - National rules concerning the assessment of duties on the transfer of immovable property which do not allow for mortgage-related charges relating to the immovable property to be deducted from the value of that property on the ground that, at the time of death, the person whose estate is being administered was residing in another Member State - Restriction - Justification - None)

(2008/C 285/09)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Hof van Beroep te Gent

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Hans Eckelkamp, Natalie Eckelkamp, Monica Eckelkamp, Saskia Eckelkamp, Thomas Eckelkamp, Jessica Eckelkamp, Joris Eckelkamp

Applicants:

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Defendant:

Re:

Preliminary ruling — Hof van beroep te Gent — Interpretation of Articles 12 EC, 17 EC, 18 EC, 56 EC and 58 EC — National legislation on the calculation of duty payable in respect of the acquisition, through inheritance, of immovable property which does not allow for deduction, from the value of the immovable property, of mortgage-related charges relating to that property on the ground that the testator, at the time of death, was resident in another Member State

Operative part of the judgment

The combined provisions of Articles 56 EC and 58 EC must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, concerning the assessment of inheritance and transfer duties payable in respect of an immovable property situated in a Member State, which makes no provision for the deductibility of debts secured on such property where the person whose estate is being administered was residing, at the time of death, not in that State but in another Member State, whereas provision is made for such deductibility where that person was, at that time, residing in the first-mentioned Member State, in which the immovable property included in the estate is situated.

---

(1)  OJ C 56, 10.3.2007.

1

---
IDA 6.30.14 Ex. 10.65






Exhibit 10.65


FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE EMPLOYEE SAVINGS PLAN OF 
IDAHO POWER COMPANY




The Employee Savings Plan of Idaho Power Company, as amended and restated effective January 1, 2010 (the “Plan”) is further amended as set forth below.  


1.    Effective June 26, 2013, Section 1.36, definition of Spouse, is amended to read as follows:


“‘Spouse’ means the person to whom a Participant is legally married at a specified time; “surviving Spouse” means the person to whom a Participant is legally married at the time of his or her death.  For the period from June 26, 2013 through September 15, 2013, marriage shall be determined based on the law of the jurisdiction where the Participant is domiciled.  Beginning September 16, 2013, marriage shall be determined based on the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage was performed.”


2.    Effective July 1, 2014, Section 1.10 is amended to allow certain overtime pay to be considered as compensation for shift workers, to read as follows:


“‘Compensation’ with respect to any Participant means the Base Pay of a Participant, plus amounts under any Company approved annual incentive plan of the Employer, paid during the Plan Year for services rendered to his or her Employer.  A Participant’s Compensation shall include Deferral Contributions under this Plan and any deductions under Code section 125 or 129 and shall include amounts that are not includable in an Employee’s gross income by reason of Code section 132(f).


‘Base Pay’ means, for regular full-time employees, the salary established by the wage schedule for each position plus any partial disability payments, less any reductions for time not worked.  For other employees, Base Pay means hours worked times hourly rate.  Payment for compensated time off is included in Base Pay.  Overtime, including restoration overtime, is excluded from Base Pay, provided that with respect to Shift Workers, beginning with the first pay period starting after July 1, 2014, up to 80 hours in each two week pay period shall be included as Base Pay, regardless of whether such hours are considered overtime with respect to the particular workweek in which the hours were worked.


For purposes of this definition, ‘Shift Worker’ means an employee who works in a business unit where shifts are continuously staffed 24-7, who is regularly scheduled to work those shifts, and who regularly works on weekends and traditional holidays.


Compensation will exclude amounts (including but not limited to severance or separation pay or annual incentive compensation) paid after the Participant terminates employment with the Controlled Group, or otherwise ceases to be eligible to participate in the Plan; provided, however, that payments made in the first month after termination relating to pre-termination wages or payoff of unused vacation and/or sick leave will constitute Compensation.”


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Employer has executed this Amendment this 16th day of June, 2014.




IDAHO POWER COMPANY
Employer




By: /s/ Luci K. McDonald
Luci K. McDonald
Its:  VP, Human Resources and Corporate Services
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-08-00069-CV

Michael G. Brown, M.D., Appellant

v.

The Texas State Board of Medical Examiners and

Donald W. Patrick, M.D., J.D., Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-06-001482, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Michael G. Brown, M.D., has informed this Court that he no longer wishes

to pursue his appeal and has filed a motion to dismiss. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a).

__________________________________________

Jan P. Patterson, Justice

Before Justices Patterson, Waldrop and Henson

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: October 16, 2008
**Exhibit      32.1**

**Certification      of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted      pursuant **

**to      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 **

| (i)   | the                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of                1934:and |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (ii)   | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                           |   |   |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| /s/              Louis S.              Slaughter                          |   |   |   |
| Name:              Louis S. Slaughter                                          |   |   |        |
| Chief                Executive Officer Date:                September 10, 2007 |   |   |   |

----
JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Third Chamber)

11 December 2008

Case F-93/07

**Beatriz Acosta Iborra and Others**

**v**

**Commission of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Officials – Promotion – 2006 promotion procedure – Ability to work in a third language)

**Application:**brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Ms Acosta Iborra and nine other Commission officials seek, in particular,
annulment of the decisions not to promote them for the 2006 promotion procedure.

**Held:**The decisions not to promote the applicant and nine other Commission officials for the 2006 promotion procedure is annulled.
The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay the costs of the applicants. The Council of the European Union,
which intervened in support of the Commission, is to bear its own costs.

**Summary**

1.      *Procedure – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Contested act not produced*

*(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, Art. 44(3) to (6))*

2.      *Officials – Promotion – Conditions – Demonstration of ability to work in a third language*

*(Staff Regulations, Art. 45(2); Annexes III, Art. 7, and XIII, Art. 11)*

1.      Where an applicant has failed to attach the contested decision to his application and the Registrar, contrary to Article 44(6)
of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, has not invited him to rectify that omission, the Community judicature
cannot deny him the opportunity to do so by declaring his action inadmissible for failure to comply with the conditions of
Article 44(4) of those Rules of Procedure.

(see para. 18)

See:

F-48/06 *Avanzata and Others* v *Commission* [2008] ECR-SC I‐A‐0000 and II‐A‐0000, paras 49 and 50

2.      Article 45(2) of the Staff Regulations, in the version resulting from Regulation No 723/2004 amending the Staff Regulations
of Officials and the Conditions of employment of other servants, which requires officials to demonstrate, before their first
promotion, their ability to work in a third language, applies only from the entry into force of the joint implementing provisions
adopted by the institutions by mutual agreement.

Since the legislature has, in any event, under Article 11 of Annex XIII to the Staff Regulations, precluded its application
to promotions that take effect prior to 1 May 2006, Article 45(2) cannot be applied prior to the entry into force of those
joint implementing provisions under the terms required by the legislature, that is to say, with a guarantee that it will be
uniformly applied in the different institutions, and with a connection between this new requirement under the Staff Regulations
and the opportunity for officials to have training in a third language. Thus an institution cannot apply that article of the
Staff Regulations according to rules which it alone has laid down.

(see paras 33-36)