alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.3



 Exhibit 10.3 

ACCESSION DEED 
  

	To:	ING BANK N.V., SINGAPORE BRANCH as Agent and Security Agent 

  

	From:	iGATE TECHNOLOGIES (CANADA) INC. and PAN-ASIA iGATE SOLUTIONS 

  

	Dated:	            May 2014 

 Dear Sirs 

Pan-Asia iGATE Solutions – Facilities Agreement 

dated 22 November 2013, as amended and restated from time to time (the “Facilities Agreement”) 

 

	1.	We refer to the Facilities Agreement. This deed (the “Accession Deed”) shall take effect as an Accession Deed for the purposes of the Facilities Agreement. Terms defined in the Facilities Agreement have
the same meaning in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Accession Deed unless given a different meaning in this Accession Deed. 

  

	2.	iGate Technologies (Canada) Inc. agrees to become an Additional Loan Party and to be bound by the terms of the Facilities Agreement and the other Finance Documents as an Additional Loan Party pursuant to
Clause 27.2 (Additional Loan Parties) of the Facilities Agreement. iGate Technologies (Canada) Inc. is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the Province of Ontario, Canada and its Ontario corporation number is 002291344.


  

	3.	iGate Technologies (Canada) Inc.’s administrative details for the purposes of the Facilities Agreement are as follows: 

  

	 	Address:  	        iGATE Technologies Canada Inc. 


	 	                	        2425 Matheson Blvd East, Suite 401 


	 	                	        Mississauga, ON 


	 	                	        L4W 5K4 

  

	 	Fax No.:  	        905-290-3022 

  

	 	Attention:	        Mr. Suresh Nair 

  

	4.	This Accession Deed and any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with it are governed by English law. 


THIS ACCESSION DEED has been signed on behalf of the Security Agent, signed on behalf of the Borrower and executed as a deed by iGate Technologies
(Canada) Inc. and is delivered on the date stated above. 
  

			
	SIGNED as a DEED by	 	)
	iGATE TECHNOLOGIES (CANADA) INC.	 	)
	acting by	 	)
		
	Director
                                         
                     	 	
		
	Witness’s signature
                                         
   	 	
		
	Name
                                         
                         	 	
		
	Address
                                         
                     	 	









			
	The Borrower
	
	PAN-ASIA iGATE SOLUTIONS
		
	By:	 	
	
	The Security Agent
	
	ING BANK N.V., SINGAPORE BRANCH
		
	By:	 	


  
 2
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“W hen denying relief, the court m ay hand down an opinion but 1

is not required to do so.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and m em orandum opinions).

NUMBER 13-08-00548-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN RE SCOGGINS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

1

Relator, Scoggins Construction Company, Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandamus

in the above cause on September 19, 2008. Through this original proceeding, relator

challenges the trial court’s order of August 26, 2008, denying relator’s motion for leave to

join third-party defendants and to designate responsible third parties. The Court requested

and received a response from the real party in interest, Mercedes Independent School

District.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, which is available only when a trial court has
2

clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In

re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)

(citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)); see also In re Team Rocket,

L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus

and response thereto, is of the opinion that relator has not shown itself entitled to the relief

sought. See TEX. R. CIV.P. 37, 38; In re Unitec Elevator Servs. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 64-66

(Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding); In re Martin, 147 S.W.3d 453, 458-

59 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding); In re Arthur Andersen LLP, 121 S.W.3d

471, 485-86 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding); see also In re

Scoggins Constr. Co., No. 13-08-00317-CV, 2008 WL 2721811 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi

June 30, 2008, orig. proceeding [mand. pending]). Accordingly, the petition for writ of

mandamus is DENIED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). 

PER CURIAM

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this 15 day of October, 2008. th
State v. Antwan Anthony

324A16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 16, 2016 As Amended December 19, 2016

Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Attorney at Law, for Anthony, Antwan.

Kimberly Robb, Assistant District Attorney, Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, Kimberly S. Robb, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 16th of December 2016 by Defendant for Extension of Time to Prepare Trial Transcript:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of December 2016."

Court reporter shall have up to and including the 20th day of January 2017 to prepare and deliver transcript to counsel.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of
Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), each of the undersigned
officers of Inn of the Mountain Gods Resort and Casino (the "Company") does
hereby certify with respect to the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q
for the period ended July 31, 2004 (the "Report") that:


1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


Dated: September 14, 2004                   By: /s/ Michael French
                                                --------------------------------
                                                    Michael French
                                                    Chief Executive Officer


Dated: September 14, 2004                   By: /s/ Richard Williams
                                                --------------------------------
                                                    Richard Williams
                                                    Chief Financial Officer


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure document.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      Exhibit 23


                        Independent Auditors' Consent


The Board of Directors
Dime Bancorp. Inc.:


We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements(Nos.
33-88552, 33-88554, 33-88556, 33-88558, 33-88560, 33-88564, 33-88566, 333-04477,
333-26609, 333-26777, 333-35565, 333-48127, 333-51941, 333-54306, 333-64509,
333-75103, 333-77317, 333-88071 and 333-89901) on Form S-8 of Dime Bancorp, Inc.
of our report dated January 19, 2001 relating to the consolidated statements of
financial condition of Dime Bancorp, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31,
2000 and 1999, and the related consolidated statements of income, changes in
stockholders' equity, cash flows and comprehensive income for each of the years
in the three-year period ended December 31, 2000, which report appears in the
December 31, 2000 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Dime Bancorp, Inc.



/s/ KPMG LLP


New York, New York
April 10, 2001
*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

After examining Plaintiff’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument..

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 8, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MARTIN VASQUEZ ARROYO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL SEBES,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-3132

(D.C. No. 08-CV-03099-SAC)

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

Pro se Plaintiff Martin Vasquez Arroyo appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. We review the court’s dismissal of his complaint de

novo. See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1996). 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed perjury when
-2-

testifying against Plaintiff, apparently in Plaintiff’s criminal trial. However, “all

witnesses enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under § 1983 for their

testimony in a prior trial.” Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)). We therefore agree with the district

court that Plaintiff’s § 1983 action did not state a claim on which relief could be

granted, and we accordingly AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s

complaint. 

We advise Plaintiff that the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for

failure to state a claim counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and

we remind him that, upon incurring three strikes, he will no longer be able to

proceed in forma pauperis in a civil action in federal court unless he is “under

imminent danger of serious injury,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We also remind

Plaintiff of his obligation to continue making partial payments until his filing fee

has been paid in full.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay

Circuit Judge
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 32


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CPI Holdco, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending July 2, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, O. Joe Caldarelli,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ O. Joe Caldarelli


O. Joe Caldarelli
Chief Executive Officer
August 13, 2004


<PAGE>





                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CPI Holdco, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ending July 2, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Joel Littman, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Joel Littman


Joel Littman
Chief Financial Officer
August 13, 2004
# C_2008022EN.01003401.xml

| 26.1.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.1.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/34

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) (United Kingdom) made on 22 November 2007 — Afton Chemical Limited v The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs

(Case C-517/07)

(2008/C 22/61)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

High Court of Justice (Chancery Division)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Afton Chemical Limited

Applicant:

Defendant: The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs

Defendant:

Questions referred

| 1. | Do fuel additives such as those at issue, which are not intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel but which are added to motor fuel for purposes other than powering the vehicle in which the fuel is used, fall to be taxed under Article 2(3) of Directive 92/81/EC? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do fuel additives such as those at issue, which are not intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel but which are added to motor fuel for purposes other than powering the vehicle in which the fuel is used, fall to be taxed under Article 2(3) of Directive 92/81/EC?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is affirmative, do such additives fall within the scope of the exemption under Article 8(1) of Directive 92/81/EC (1)? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is affirmative, do such additives fall within the scope of the exemption under Article 8(1) of Directive 92/81/EC (1)?

1

| 3. | Do fuel additives such as those at issue, which are not intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel but which are added to motor fuel for purposes other than powering the vehicle in which the fuel is used, fall to be taxed under the second paragraph of Article 2(3) of Directive 2003/96/EC (2)? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Do fuel additives such as those at issue, which are not intended for use, offered for sale or used as motor fuel but which are added to motor fuel for purposes other than powering the vehicle in which the fuel is used, fall to be taxed under the second paragraph of Article 2(3) of Directive 2003/96/EC (2)?

2

| 4. | If the answer to the third question is affirmative, are such additives excluded from the scope of Directive 2003/96/EC by virtue of the first indent of Article 4(b) of that Directive? |
| --- | --- |

4.

If the answer to the third question is affirmative, are such additives excluded from the scope of Directive 2003/96/EC by virtue of the first indent of Article 4(b) of that Directive?

| 5. | Is the duty imposed by the UK on the above fuel additives precluded by Community law and in particular, by Article 3 of Directive 92/12/EEC (3)? |
| --- | --- |

5.

Is the duty imposed by the UK on the above fuel additives precluded by Community law and in particular, by Article 3 of Directive 92/12/EEC (3)?

3

---

(1)  OJ L 316, p. 12.

1

(2)  OJ L 283, p. 51.

2

(3)  OJ L 76, p. 1.

3

---
STATE v. Jamie RIESON.

No. 415P15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 13, 2016.

Jamie Rieson, Asheboro, for Rieson, Jamie.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Craig Blitzer, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 11th of December 2015 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of April 2016."
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD–1539–07

ROBERT HUFFMAN, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S AND STATE’S PETITIONS 

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

BEXAR COUNTY

MEYERS, J., filed a concurring opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

What does the State have to prove under this statute? Does the State have to prove

that the defendant failed to either stop and remain or return and remain? Or does the

State just have to show that the defendant failed to stop and then the defendant can use as

a defense that he returned and remained?

I agree with the majority that there are not three separate offenses in this statute. 
Huffman concurrence–Page 2

However, I feel that rather than alternate methods of committing the same offense, there

is only one method of committing the offense–failing to stop. The other two subsections

under Transportation Code Section 550.021 (a) are defense issues–the defense can

present evidence that, although the defendant initially failed to stop, he did return to and

remain at the scene of the accident.

Either way, the presentation of this issue to the jury in the disjunctive did not

violate Appellant’s right to a unanimous verdict in this case because there was no

evidence presented regarding either returning to or remaining at the scene. The facts

show that the defendant did not stop at all–ever, meaning that he did not stop and he did

not return, so he clearly could not have remained. Therefore, the jury could not have

possibly found the defendant guilty unless the jurors agreed that he was guilty of failure

to stop. 

And, since they were not raised by the evidence, the issues of returning to and

remaining at the scene of the accident should not have been included in the charge at all.

If the facts raise the issue of returning to the scene and remaining there, then those

subsections of the statute should be included in the charge, but the jury should not be

instructed on those issues if they are not raised by the facts. Therefore, returning to the

scene and remaining there should not have even been presented to this jury for their

consideration.

Because I agree with the majority that presenting this issue to the jury in the
Huffman concurrence–Page 3

disjunctive did not violate Appellant’s right to unanimous verdict, I concur in the decision

to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Meyers, J.

Filed: October 1, 2008

Publish
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND AS OF
MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                  0000919601
<NAME> VENDALUX CORP
<MULTIPLIER>                    1
<CURRENCY>                      US dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Mar-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 Apr-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,388
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1274
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,483)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   5
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  110
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (110)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (110)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (110)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.00)


</TABLE>
# C_2008183EN.01000501.xml

| 19.7.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 183/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.7.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 183/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 5 June 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany

(Case C-395/07) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2004/48/EC - Enforcement of intellectual property rights - Failure to transpose within the prescribed period)

(2008/C 183/08)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: W. Wils and H. Krämer, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: M. Lumma, Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Failure to adopt, within the prescribed period, all the provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45, and — Corrigendum — OJ 2004 L 195, p. 16)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the period prescribed, all the provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the period prescribed, all the provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

| 2. | Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 247, 20.10.2007.

1

---