alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Innocap, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended October 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Paul Tidwell, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  1. The Report fully complies with requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.  /s/ Paul Tidwell Paul Tidwell Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer  June 27, 2011
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

March 24, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135469 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 135469 

 COA: 273181 

Wayne CC: 05-011715-01

TYRONE DORSEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 25, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0317 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 24, 2008 

 Clerk
# C_2008209EN.01006701.xml

| 15.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 209/67 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 209/67

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 30 June 2008 — Ryanair v Commission

(Case T-433/07) (1)

1

(2008/C 209/120)

Language of the case: English

Language of the case: English

The President of the Sixth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 22, 26.1.2008.

1

---
The NC STATE BAR v. SUTTON

426A16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

David C. Sutton, Greenville, Erika Sutton, for Sutton, David C.

David R. Johnson, Deputy Counsel, Carmen Bannon, Deputy Counsel, for N.C. State Bar.

Mary D. Winstead, Deputy Counsel.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of January 2017 by Defendant to Amend Notice of Appeal:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6477

RONNIE LEE CASH,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN JOSEPH MCFADDEN,

 Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock 

Hill. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (0:16-cv-00716-MGL)

Submitted: August 24, 2017 Decided: August 29, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronnie Lee Cash, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General,

William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie Lee Cash seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Cash has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
# C_2008051EN.01002602.xml

| 23.2.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 51/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.2.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 51/26

---

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 18 December 2007 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden

(Case C-257/07) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations - Directive 2004/17/EC - Coordination of the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors - Failure to transpose within the period prescribed)

(2008/C 51/43)

Language of the case: Swedish

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: D. Kukovec and K. Nyberg, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of Sweden (represented by: A. Falk, Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Failure to adopt, within the period prescribed, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 1)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, the Kingdom of Sweden has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, the Kingdom of Sweden has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive;

| 2. | Orders the Kingdom of Sweden to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Kingdom of Sweden to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 183, 4.8.2007.

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-01-1996
<CASH>                                           7,982
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         154,747
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,641
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 162,352
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         11,475
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           157
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   162,352
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,369
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,268
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,574
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  5,297
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,297
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,297
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.52
        

</TABLE>
STATE v. Delton MAYNOR.

No. 241P11-5.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 13, 2016.

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Delton Maynor, Smithfield, for Maynor, Delton.

Todd Williams, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 4th of March 2016 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review of Writ of Certiorari:

> "Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of April 2016."
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                             578
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           8,100
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                         47
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           1,855
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             1,871
<LOANS>                                         36,300
<ALLOWANCE>                                        293
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  47,992
<DEPOSITS>                                      37,997
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                581
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             8
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,406
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  47,992 
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  2,996
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  275
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   248
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 3,519
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               1,715
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,715
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,804
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  1,266
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    670
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         670
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       408
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .68
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.02
<LOANS-NON>                                        827
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   293
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  293
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               293
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certification Pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Thomas J. McCartney, asPresident and Chief Executive Officer of BH/RE, L.L.C. (the “Company”), certifypursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(A)  the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Qfor the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(B)  the information in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

 

 

Dated: November 16,  2009

 
|   | /S/  Thomas J. McCartney                                             |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Thomas  J. McCartney                                                 |
|   | President  and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer) |

 

----
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCT 17, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-16015

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 07-00134-CR-T-17EAJ

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDUARDO GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(October 17, 2008)

Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Eduardo Gonzalez appeals his 188-month sentence for possession of 500 or
more grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii). His sole contention is that the district court enhanced his

sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment because it relied on past convictions

that were neither included in the indictment nor proven to a jury. Specifically,

Gonzalez argues that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2346

(2000), any consideration of his prior convictions violates his Sixth Amendment

rights. He also argues that, under Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127

S.Ct. 856 (2007), most judicial fact-finding that increases a sentence based on prior

convictions violates the Sixth Amendment.

The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the government need not allege

in its indictment nor prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that a defendant

had prior convictions in order for a district court to use those convictions to

enhance a sentence. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27,

118 S.Ct. 1219, 1222 (1998). Further, in United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325,

1329 (11th Cir. 2005), we held that the decision in Almendarez-Torres was “left

undisturbed” by the decisions in Apprendi, Blakey v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,

124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005),

so that “a district court does not err by relying on prior convictions to enhance a

defendant’s sentence.”

2
The Supreme Court’s Cunningham decision does not support Gonzalez’s

position. The Court did reiterate there that “the Federal Constitution’s jury-trial

guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence

above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not

found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.” Cunningham, 549 U.S. at __, 127

S.Ct. at 860 (emphasis added). The “other than” language preserves the

Almendarez-Torres rule. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has reminded lower

courts, its “decisions remain binding precedent until [it] see[s] fit to reconsider

them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their

continuing vitality.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53, 188 S.Ct. 1969,

1978 (1998).

AFFIRMED.

3
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10830

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CHARLES HOWARD FRENCH

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:01-CR-12-4

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Charles Howard French pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess and

conceal counterfeit obligations of the United States and was sentenced to 60

months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. In June 2007,

French pleaded guilty in Texas state court to possession with intent to deliver

methamphetamine, resulting in a sentence of six years of imprisonment to be

served concurrently with sentences rendered in federal court. The Government

sought revocation of French’s supervised release based on French’s June 2007

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 21, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10830

2

Texas conviction and a number of other grounds. French admitted all of the

allegations. The district court revoked French’s supervised release and

sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment to be served consecutively to his

state sentence.

French argues that the district court should have credited the time he

spent in the custody of Texas authorities against the sentence he received on

revocation of his supervised release. A district court is not authorized to

compute service credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585; credit awards are to be made by

the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons. United States v. Wilson,

503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992); United States v. Dowling, 962 F.2d 390, 393 (5th

Cir. 1992). Prior to seeking judicial review of credits under §3585(b), prisoners

are required to exhaust their administrative remedies. See Dowling, 962 F.2d

at 393. Accordingly, the district court did not err by not calculating credit

towards French’s sentence.

The Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance or dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, the Government requests an

extension of time in which to file a brief on the merits. Because the issue raised

by French is clearly without merit under circuit precedent, the district court’s

judgment is AFFIRMED, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, and the Government’s motions for dismissal and an extension of

time are DENIED.
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of ADESA, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the periodending March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), I, Cameron C. Hitchcock, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 USC 1350), that:

 

(1) The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Cameron C. Hitchcock |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Chief Financial Officer  |

 

*This certification accompanies the Report pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to theextent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Companyfor purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.*

 

1

----
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-72533,
333-80721, 333-80725, 333-55848, 333-63382 and 333-63712) of First Virtual Communications, Inc. (formerly, FVC.COM, Inc.) of our report dated
January 30, 2002 except for Note 13 for which the date is March 29, 2002, relating to the consolidated financial statements of First Virtual Communications, Inc., which
appears in this Form 10-K. We also consent to the incorporation by reference of our report, dated January 30, 2002, relating to the financial statement schedules, which
appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
San Jose, California
March 29, 2002

---

QuickLinks
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-08-364-CV

IN RE OLSHAN FOUNDATION REPAIR 				         RELATORS

COMPANY, LLC AND OLSHAN FOUNDATION

REPAIR COMPANY OF DALLAS, LTD.	

	------------

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	The court has considered relators’ petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency relief and is of the opinion that relief should be denied.  Accordingly, relators’ petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency relief are denied.

	Relators shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL:  GARDNER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

DELIVERED:  October 2, 2008
BOGER v. MCGEE

158P06-10

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

Derrick D. Boger, For Boger, Derrick D.

Mary Carla Babb, Assistant Attorney General, Roxann L. Vaneekhoven, District Attorney, For State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 30th of January 2017 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

HENRY D. BRIODY,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 

DIVISION OF LICENSING,

Appellee.

No. 2D21-644

September 24, 2021

Appeal from the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 

Division of Licensing.

Henry D. Briody, pro se.

Michael T. McGuckin, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

VILLANTI, BLACK, and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.
2

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.