alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(First Chamber)

8 April 2008

Case F-134/06

**Giovanni Bordini**

**v**

**Commission of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Officials – Pensions – Weighting – Member State of residence – Concept of residence – Concept of principal residence – Documents in support)

**Application:**brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Bordini seeks, first, annulment of the decision of 25 January 2006 by
which the Commission appointing authority refused to apply the weighting for the United Kingdom to his pension, and annulment,
in so far as is necessary, of the decision of 18 August 2006 rejecting his complaint lodged on 19 April 2006, and, secondly,
an order for the Commission to pay interest – on the basis of a rate two points higher than the rate fixed by the European
Central Bank, and applicable during the period concerned, for major refinancing operations – on the amounts payable by virtue
of retroactive application of the United Kingdom weighting to the applicant’s pension with effect from 1 April 2004.

**Held:**The action is dismissed. The Commission is to bear its own costs and to pay half of the costs which the applicant incurred
in respect of the informal meeting of 5 June 2007. The applicant is to bear his own costs, save in respect of half of the
costs which he incurred in respect of the informal meeting of 5 June 2007.

**Summary**

*Officials – Pensions – Weighting*

*(Staff Regulations, Art. 82)*

The concept of residence within the meaning of Article 82 of the previous version of the Staff Regulations, which provides
for the application to pensions of the weighting fixed for the country in which the recipient proves he has established his
residence, refers to the place where the former official has actually established his centre of interests, in other words
the place in which the person concerned has established, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character, the
permanent or habitual centre of his interests and where he is deemed to incur his expenditure. Furthermore, irrespective of
the purely quantitative element of the time spent by the person in a particular country, residence implies not only the actual
fact of living in a given place, but also the intention of thereby achieving the continuity which stems from a stable way
of life and from the course of normal social relations . This concept of residence is peculiar to the Community civil service
and does not necessarily coincide with national meanings of the term.

(see paras 69, 86)

See:

T‐124/01 and T‐320/01 *Del Vaglio* v *Commission* [2003] ECR-SC I‐A‐157 and II‐767, paras 70 and the case-law cited therein, 71 and the case-law cited therein, and 72; judgment
of 12 September 2005 in T-320/04 *Dionyssopoulou* v *Council*, not published in the ECR, para. 39; T-416/04 *Kontouli* v *Council* [2006] ECR-SC I‐A‐2‐181 and II‐A‐2‐897, para. 71
State of North Carolina v. Wendy Sue Blodgett, Defendant.

No. COA16-376

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 4, 2016

NO ERROR.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements on Form
S-3 (Nos. 333-41989, 333-31351 and 333-20007) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-31341,
333-34027, 333-16741 and 33-00074) of FPA Medical Management, Inc., of our
report dated March 20, 1998, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
FPA Medical Management, Inc., for the year ended December 31, 1997.


/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP


San Diego, California
March 27, 1998
State of North Carolina v. Ramon A. Black

No. 292P16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 8, 2016

Marilyn G. Ozer, Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, for Black, Ramon A.

Mary Carla Babb, Assistant Attorney General, N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 8th of August 2016 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

*327"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."
State v. Dakota Covington

127P16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 9, 2016

Mr. Dakota Covington, Pro se.

Mr. Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Trey Robison, District Attorney, For State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 4th of April 2016 by Defendant for Appropriate Relief:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of June 2016."
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    Exhibit 16.1


                [LOGO OF MCGLADREY & PULLEN, LLP APPEARS HERE]

                            McGLADREY & PULLEN, LLP
                            -----------------------
                 Certified Public Accountants and Consultants



Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C. 20549


Gentlemen:

We were previously the independent accountants for McLeodUSA Incorporated. On 
March 27, 1997, we were dismissed as independent accountants of McLeodUSA 
Incorporated. We have read McLeodUSA Incorporated's statements included under
Item 9 of its Form 10-K filed March 9, 1998 and we agree with such statements.

                                  /s/ McGladrey & Pullen, LLP

                                  McGLADREY & PULLEN, LLP

Cedar Rapids, Iowa
March 9, 1998
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3982 

To provide that the rules of the Federal Communications Commission relating 

to preserving the open Internet and broadband industry practices shall 

be restored to effect until the date when the Commission takes final 

action in the proceedings on such rules that were remanded to the 

Commission by the United States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 3, 2014 

Mr. WAXMAN (for himself, Ms. ESHOO, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. DOYLE, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. CAPUANO, Ms. DELBENE, and Mr. PALLONE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To provide that the rules of the Federal Communications 

Commission relating to preserving the open Internet and 

broadband industry practices shall be restored to effect 

until the date when the Commission takes final action 

in the proceedings on such rules that were remanded 

to the Commission by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3982 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Open Internet Preser3 vation Act of 2014’’. 

4 SEC. 2. RESTORATION OF OPEN INTERNET RULES DURING 

5 REMANDED PROCEEDINGS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The rules adopted by the Federal 

7 Communications Commission in the Report and Order in 

8 the matter of preserving the open Internet and broadband 

9 industry practices (FCC 10–201; adopted on December 

10 21, 2010) that were vacated by the United States Court 

11 of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Verizon 

12 v. Federal Communications Commission (No. 11–1355; 

13 decided on January 14, 2014) shall be restored to effect 

14 during the period beginning on the date of the enactment 

15 of this Act and ending on the date when the Commission 

16 takes final action in the proceedings remanded to the 

17 Commission in that decision. 

18 (b) ADJUDICATION AUTHORITY.—After the end of 

19 the period described in subsection (a), the Federal Com20 munications Commission may continue to adjudicate cases 

21 regarding violations of the rules described in such sub22 section that occurred during such period. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60586

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LIONEL M ARNOLD

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:00-CR-130-1

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lionel M. Arnold, federal prisoner # 05854-043, appeals the district court’s

denial of his motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

Arnold’s notice of appeal was timely filed only as to the denial of his motion for

reconsideration; that motion, however, was not timely filed so as to toll the

notice of appeal period. United States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir.

2000); United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1995). There is

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 30, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-60586

2

no jurisdictional impediment to reaching the merits of the case, however. See

United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2000). We need not

resolve whether the timing of Arnold’s filings in the district court limits him

from obtaining relief because, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that

his appeal fails on the merits. 

Arnold requested that the district court reduce his sentence pursuant to

Amendment 599 to the Sentencing Guidelines. “Section 3582(c)(2) permits a

district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when it is based upon a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by an amendment to the

Sentencing Guidelines, if such a reduction is consistent with the policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” See United States v. Boe,

117 F.3d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Arnold’s motion because

Amendment 599 was enacted before Arnold’s sentence was imposed. United

States v. Millsaps, 235 Fed. App’x 990 (5th Cir. 2007). A § 3582(c)(2) motion is

not the appropriate vehicle to raise an issue that an appellant admittedly failed

to bring up at sentencing. United States v. Shaw, 30 F.3d 26, 29 (5th Cir. 1994).

Arnold argues that the case should be remanded for reconsideration by a

different districtjudge because the district court has demonstrated “deep seated

animus” against him. This argument is without merit. See Nethery v. Collins,

993 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5th Cir. 1993). We decline to consider Arnold’s other

arguments because he did not raise them in the district court, United States v.

Smith, 915 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir. 1990), and they are beyond the scope of relief

provided by § 3582.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                   EXHIBIT 11

                 STATEMENT RE COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE


                                                                                  Year Ended
                                                                              December 31, 1998
                                                                            ----------------------
                                                                            (Dollars in Thousands
                                                                            except per share data)
<S>                                                                             <C>
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE

  Net Income available to common shareholders                                   $    8,668
                                                                                ==========
  Weighted average common shares outstanding                                     5,436,541

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE                                                       $     1.59
                                                                                ==========

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ASSUMING DILUTION

  Net Income available to common shareholders                                   $    8,668
                                                                                ==========

  Weighted average common shares outstanding                                     5,436,541

  Add: Dilutive effects of assumed exercises of stock options and warrants         591,308

  Weighted average common and dilutive potential common shares outstanding       6,027,849

EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE ASSUMING DILUTION                                     $     1.44
                                                                                ==========

</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 179 (Friday, September 16, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 54768]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18457]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[WY-920-1310-01; WYW149420]


Notice of Proposed Reinstatement of Terminated Oil and Gas Lease

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of proposed reinstatement of terminated oil and gas 
lease.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of 30 U.S.C. 188(d) and (e), and 43 CFR 
3108.2-3(a) and (b)(1), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received a 
petition for reinstatement of oil and gas lease WYW149420 from Beard 
Oil Company for lands in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. The petition was 
filed on time and was accompanied by all the rentals due since the date 
the lease terminated under the law.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bureau of Land Management, Pamela J. 
Lewis, Chief, Branch of Fluid Minerals Adjudication, at (307) 775-6176.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The lessees have agreed to the amended lease 
terms for rentals and royalties at rates of $5.00 per acre or fraction 
thereof, per year and 16\2/3\ percent, respectively. The lessees has 
paid the required $500 administrative fee and $166 to reimburse the 
Department for the cost of this Federal Register notice. The lessees 
have met all the requirements for reinstatement of the lease as set out 
in section 31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 (30 
U.S.C. 188), and the Bureau of Land Management is proposing to 
reinstate lease WYW149420 effective December 1, 2004, under the 
original terms and conditions of the lease and the increased rental and 
royalty rates cited above. BLM has not issued a valid lease affecting 
the lands.

Pamela J. Lewis,
Chief, Branch of Fluid Minerals Adjudication.
[FR Doc. 05-18457 Filed 9-15-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-22-P
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
March 31, 2009 (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
  
 43
----

(2004/C 78 E/0530)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3286/03

by Anne André-Léonard (ELDR) to the Commission

(5 November 2003)

Subject:   Harmonisation of European legislation in respect of boatmasters' certificates for recreational craft

Parliament and the Council recently amended Directive 94/25/EC (1) on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to recreational craft.

This directive is centred on the establishment of environmental and safety standards for the construction of such craft.

However, a further aspect that should not be overlooked is the need for Community harmonisation in the area of boatmasters' certificates for recreational craft.

In this connection, does the Council envisage the introduction of a European boatmaster's certificate? If so, what measures does it intend to take to ensure effective regulation in this area?

Answer given by Ms de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(15 December 2003)

Rules on boatmaster's certificates for recreational craft are not the subject of Community legislation and fall exclusively within the competence of the Member States. The only Community legislation on recreational craft is Directive 94/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 1994 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to recreational craft (2). This Directive ensures compliance with minimum standards, including safety standards, for the construction of such craft.

However, it should be noted that in 1998 the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe adopted Resolution (ECE) 40 on an international certificate for operators of pleasure craft. The Resolution sets up a harmonised system for obtaining, from the authorities in the country of which the applicant is a national or where he/she is resident, an international certificate on the basis of the national certificate. The international certificate allows the holder to sail on the inland and coastal waters of countries which have adopted the Resolution.

The Commission is examining the implementation of this international certificate and will take the required measures if need be. At this stage, the matter has not been included in the Commission's work programme.

----

(1)OJ L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 15.

(2)OJ L 17, 21.1.1997.

----
Charles M. Mitchell, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

August 4, 2016

**111*16ORDER

Petitioner filed a motion on December 16, 2014 for resentencing pursuant to Aiken v. Byars , 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2014). Now, therefore, pursuant to SC CONST. Art. V, § 4,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable R. Knox McMahon be vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the Petitioner's Motion for Resentencing in the above-captioned matter.

**112Judge McMahon shall at all times be vested with concurrent jurisdiction in all circuits of the state to dispose of matters relating to this case, and shall decide all matters pertaining to the Petitioner's Motion, and shall retain jurisdiction over this matter regardless of where he may be assigned to hold court, and may schedule such hearings as may be necessary at any time without regard as to whether there is a term of court scheduled.

If necessary, to resolve issues related to the appointment of counsel, a hearing shall be conducted within thirty (30) days of this order.

Within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, Judge McMahon shall issue a scheduling order setting forth the schedule that shall be followed in this matter, including the date of the hearing on the merits. The scheduling order may be amended as necessary.

s/Costa M. Pleicones

Costa M. Pleicones

Chief Justice
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

 No. 08-7089 

DWAYNE CURTIS DELESTON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. David C. Norton, District Judge.

(6:07-cv-02531-DCN)

Submitted: September 16, 2008 Decided: September 24, 2008

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dwayne Curtis Deleston, Appellant Pro Se. William Edgar Salter,

III, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
 2 

PER CURIAM:

Dwayne Curtis Deleston seeks to appeal the district

court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge

and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Deleston has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

R.G., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, Page, AZ, 

Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 14-480 

Issued: October 23, 2014 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Steven E. Brown, Esq., for the appellant 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge 

On December 31, 2013 appellant filed an application for review of an Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs’ (OWCP) decision dated December 16, 2013, which affirmed the 

June 7, 2013 OWCP decision finding that the position of information clerk fairly and reasonably 

represented appellant’s wage-earning capacity. 

 The Board has duly considered the matter and finds that the case is not in posture for a 

decision and must be remanded to OWCP. In the case of William A. Couch,1

 the Board held that 

when adjudicating a claim, OWCP is obligated to consider all evidence properly submitted by a 

claimant and received by OWCP before the final decision is issued. Following the June 7, 2013 

decision that found that the position of information clerk fairly and reasonably represented 

appellant’s wage-earning capacity, appellant’s representative requested an oral hearing. 

Appellant subsequently submitted new reports from Dr. Michael Demangone, Board-certified in 

emergency medicine, dated July 8 and September 6, 2013. OWCP received these reports on 

October 21, 2013. In the December 16, 2013 decision, an OWCP hearing representative 

affirmed the June 7, 2012 decision finding that the position of information clerk fairly and 

reasonably represented appellant’s wage-earning capacity. She referenced reports of a second 

opinion physician and noted that there were no current medical reports from a treating physician. 

 1

 41 ECAB 548 (1990). 
2

The hearing representative did not consider the July 8 or September 6, 2013 reports from 

Dr. Demangone. 

For this reason, the case will be remanded to OWCP to enable it to properly consider all 

the evidence submitted prior to the issuance of the December 16, 2013 decision. Following this 

and such further development as OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue an appropriate merit 

decision. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the December 16, 2013 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs be set aside and the case remanded to OWCP for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

Issued: October 23, 2014 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board