SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0341-20

DSFC CHARLES ALLEN #5331,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF

LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY,

Respondent-Respondent.

_____________________________

Argued May 2, 2022 – Decided June 30, 2022

Before Judges Fisher and Smith.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Law and 

Public Safety.

Charles P. Allen, Jr. argued the cause for appellant.

Stephanie D. Trotter, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting 

Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephanie D. 

Trotter, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant Detective Sergeant First Class Charles T. Allen (Allen), a 

twenty-four-year veteran of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP), appeals the 

Attorney General's denial of a recommendation for his promotion to lieutenant. 

Allen, now retired, seeks a retroactive promotion to lieutenant effective June 19, 

2020, the date of the recommendation letter. Among other things, he argues that 

the Attorney General had no statutory authority to deny his promotion under 

N.J.S.A. 53:1-5.2, but if we find the Attorney General did have such authority, 

it was exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner. We affirm the denial of 

Allen's recommended promotion for the reasons set forth below. 

Allen was employed as a state trooper with the NJSP from December 1995

through his retirement in January 2021. The NJSP Superintendent 

recommended him for promotion to lieutenant on June 19, 2020. On August 25, 

2020, the Attorney General informed Allen via letter that his promotion was not 

approved. The denial letter read in pertinent part:

Pursuant to my authority under N.J.S.A. 53:1-5.2, I did 

not approve your promotion. This denial is based on a 

review of your promotional package and disciplinary 

history, which includes two substantiated [Equal 

Employment Opportunity] matters and five 

substantiated misconduct investigations. 
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In the denial letter, the Attorney General detailed the separate 

substantiated charges against Allen, which resulted in a negotiated plea to 

resolve them. Allen received a ten-day suspension and two written reprimands 

as a part of the plea deal. On October 20, 2020, Allen appealed the denial, 

alleging the Attorney General did not have the statutory authority under N.J.S.A. 

53:1-5.2 to reject the Superintendent's promotion recommendation. 

Alternatively, Allen argues that if we find the Attorney General has statutory 

authority to deny the promotion, the denial was arbitrary, capricious, and 

unreasonable. In addition to opposing Allen's arguments on the merits, the 

Attorney General argues that Allen's retirement on January 1, 2021 renders the 

appeal moot.

We first address the Attorney General's mootness argument. "An issue is 

considered 'moot when our decision . . . can have no practical effect on the 

existing controversy.'" Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 518 (App. 

Div. 2018) (citations omitted). Mootness may occur because the controversy 

lacked "concreteness from the outset" or it may result "by reason of 

developments subsequent to the filing of suit . . . ." Ibid. (quoting State v.

Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 584 (App. Div. 2016)). We do not "resolve issues 

that have become moot due to the passage of time or intervening events." Ibid.
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We find that the appeal before us is not moot. Allen was denied a 

promotion on August 25, 2020. He did not retire until January 1, 2021. The 

relief that he seeks is retroactive appointment to the position of lieutenant with 

corresponding back pay. He further seeks recalculation of his Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS) pension benefit if he is successful. Our 

decision can have a "practical effect on the existing controversy." Ibid. 

We turn to Allen's argument that the Attorney General did not have the 

statutory authority to deny his promotion. He contends that the Attorney 

General's authority to approve the Superintendent's actions is limited to 

budgetary matters under N.J.S.A. 53:1-5.2. The statute reads:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the rank 

and grade of any member of the State Police may be 

changed from time to time, and the number of personnel 

increased, by the superintendent of State Police where 

such change or increase is necessary for the efficient 

operation of the Division of State Police in the 

Department of Law and Public Safety; provided, the 

action of the said superintendent in making any such 

change or increase, shall be approved by the head of 

said department. No such change or increase shall be 

made unless it can be effected within the limitations of 

the appropriations for the said division.

[N.J.S.A. 53:1-5.2 (emphasis added).]

Allen relies upon the last sentence of the statute to make the argument that the 

Superintendent has the exclusive power to make promotions within the NJSP. 
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We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Verry v. Franklin

Fire Dist. No. 1, 230 N.J. 285, 294 (2017). Our ultimate "task in statutory 

interpretation is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent." Bosland 

v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009). Courts "look first to the 

plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the 

Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen." 

McGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 108 (2012) (quoting Bosland, 197 N.J. at 

553). "The Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute

and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language." 

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citing Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177

N.J. 250, 280 (2003)). Thus, any analysis to determine legislative intent begins

with the statute's plain language. Id. at 493. 

Our reading of N.J.S.A. 53:1-5.2's plain language reveals clear direction

from the Legislature that the Attorney General1"shall . . . approve[]" the actions

of the Superintendent in changing "the rank and grade of any member of the

State Police." The Superintendent's power to make personnel decisions are

subject to two limiting factors in the statute: (1) the approval of the "head of

1

 The NJSP is a division within the Department of Law and Public Safety. 

N.J.S.A. 52:17B-6. The Attorney General is the head of the Department of Law 

and Public Safety. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-51. 
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[the] department," the Attorney General; and (2) personnel decisions must be

"effected within the limit[s] of" the NJSP budget appropriations. We are not

persuaded by Allen's argument and find N.J.S.A. 53:1-5.2 imposes no

constraints on the Attorney General's authority to approve or deny the

Superintendent's promotion recommendations. In fact, the statutory language

show that the administrative and financial constraints enumerated in the statute

are imposed on the Superintendent, not the Attorney General.

Allen next argues that the Attorney General was arbitrary and capricious

in the denial of his promotion. He argues that the Attorney General: failed to 

consider Allen's "exemplary career"; mistakenly referenced another state

trooper in its supporting documents; based the denial on "flawed" facts; and also

based the denial on allegations which were "discredited and discarded." Allen

also raises an allegation of age discrimination in his appeal.2"The person 

challenging an agency action has '[t]he burden of showing that an action was 

arbitrary, unreasonable[,] or capricious.'" In re M.M., 463 N.J. Super. 128, 136 

(App. Div. 2020) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 

2

 We consider only the issue on appeal, whether the Attorney General's denial 

of Allen's promotion was arbitrary and capricious. Any separate cause of action 

for age discrimination that Allen alleges against the Attorney General or the 

NJSP is not before us. We make no comment on the merits or timeliness of such 

a claim. 
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The record shows that Allen was involved in five separate internal affairs 

investigations between 2012 and 2016, which led to seven substantiated charges 

against him, including: inappropriate actions – on duty; improper use of division 

computer; improper supervision; failure to notify the division of information 

(twice); inappropriate attitude and demeanor; inappropriate social media 

posting; and providing false information on any log, report, or transmittal. The 

record also shows that in 2013, the NJSP EEO office substantiated two separate 

allegations of sexual harassment against Allen. The allegations were 

consolidated into one case file and disciplinary action was taken against him. 

The record further shows that some of the investigations which led to 

substantiated charges were merged, and some of those charges were dismissed 

as part of a negotiated plea agreement between Allen and the NJSP. Allen 

suggests that the facts contained in the record are "flawed," "discredited," or 

"discarded" because of these procedural issues, and that the Attorney General 

was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in relying on them. We disagree. 

Allen had a full and fair opportunity to contest any disputed facts during the 

NJSP internal investigative process, an administrative process within the NJSP 

that consumed four years, between 2012 and 2016. He was made aware of the 

charges against him and admitted to some of them. Allen ultimately resolved 
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the remaining charges by reaching a global settlement, which resulted in 

discipline against him. 

We note the detailed and confidential record reviewed by the Attorney 

General regarding Allen's disciplinary history reveals a wide range of 

concerning conduct, including but not limited to: substantiated sexual 

harassment charges; substantiated attempts to conceal his own improper actions; 

and substantiated attempts to conceal the improper actions of others under his 

command. Understanding that Allen seeks promotion to lieutenant, a position 

which requires the supervision of other state troopers, we cannot conclude on 

the record before us that the Attorney General's decision to deny Allen's 

promotion was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We observe that Allen 

has made various other arguments. Each of them lacks sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.