Reverse and Remanded and Opinion Filed June 5, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-21-00904-CV

ROGER CORNELL FOX, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE 

ESTATE OF KAREN NASINE FOX, Appellant

V.

THE REHABILITATION & WELLNESS CENTRE OF DALLAS, LLC 

AND BRIUS, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-01019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Molberg

In this wrongful death and survival action, appellant Roger Cornell Fox, 

individually and on behalf of the Estate of Karen Nasine Fox, his late wife, appeals 

the trial court’s order dismissing Fox’s claims and granting the “Motion to Dismiss, 

Motion to Compel Arbitration, or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings” filed by 

appellees The Rehabilitation & Wellness Centre of Dallas, LLC (TRWCD) and 

Brius, LLC. On appeal, Fox argues the trial court erred in finding a valid arbitration 

agreement existed because Mrs. Fox did not sign the arbitration agreement and 
–2–

appellees failed to prove she conferred authority on him to sign on her behalf. In 

this memorandum opinion, see TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4, because we conclude appellees 

failed to meet their initial evidentiary burden to prove the existence of a valid, 

enforceable arbitration agreement, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the 

case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In their motion, appellees asked the trial court to dismiss or stay Fox’s claims 

pending arbitration of their dispute because (1) Fox signed a valid arbitration 

agreement on Mrs. Fox’s behalf, and (2) the claims in the lawsuit are within the 

agreement’s scope. Fox opposed the motion and argued appellees failed to establish 

the existence of a valid arbitration agreement because they presented no proof of any 

actions by Mrs. Fox authorizing Fox to sign on her behalf. Fox made no argument 

regarding the agreement’s scope. 

Both parties attached various unauthenticated documents to their filings. 

Appellees attached only one item to their motion—a two-page, unauthenticated

“Resident and Center Arbitration Agreement” (“the Agreement”), that states, in part:

RESIDENT AND CENTER ARBITRATION

AGREEMENT - READ CAREFULLY

It is understood and agreed by (“Center”) and (“Resident,” or 

“Resident’s Authorized Representative”, hereinafter collectively 

“Resident”)

[1]

that they shall use their best efforts to resolve any legal 

 

1 The Agreement’s text does not name Fox, Mrs. Fox, TRWCD, or Brius, LLC or identify the parties 

to the Agreement, as it does not define “Center,” “Resident,” or “Resident’s Authorized Representative.” 

Though the Agreement’s text later refers to it, no “Resident Admission Agreement” is in the record.
–3–

dispute . . . that arises out of or relates to the Resident Admission 

Agreement or any service or health care provided by Center to 

Resident, and that they will consult and negotiate with each other in 

good faith to attempt to reach a fair solution satisfactory to both. If 

Center and Resident do not reach a solution within a period of sixty 

(60) days, upon written notice by either party to the other, the claim 

shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. . . .

This agreement to arbitrate includes, but is not limited to, any claim 

for . . . negligence, gross negligence, malpractice, or any other claim 

based on any departure from accepted standards of medical or health 

care or safety whether sounding in tort or in contract. . . .

. . . .

It is the intention of the parties to this arbitration agreement that it shall 

inure to the benefit of and bind the parties, their successors and assigns, 

including . . . any parent, spouse . . . or heir of Resident.

. . . .

The parties understand and agree that by entering this arbitration 

agreement they are giving up and waiving their constitutional right 

to have any claim decided in a court of law before a judge and a 

jury.

. . . .

This arbitration agreement shall be governed and interpreted under the 

Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.

By virtue of Resident’s consent, instruction and/or durable power of 

attorney, I hereby certify that I am authorized to act as Resident’s agent 

in executing . . . on his/her and my behalf the arbitration agreement.
–4–

Fox attached various unauthenticated items to his response, including, but not 

limited to, a power of attorney form purportedly signed by Mrs. Fox on August 1, 

2019, over five months after the handwritten date reflected in the Agreement

appellees attached to their motion. 

The trial court held a hearing on appellees’ motion, but it was not evidentiary. 

The appellate record contains a hearing transcript. During the hearing, the parties’ 

counsel made arguments, but neither party called witnesses or made any attempt to 

authenticate, offer, or admit any items into evidence. After counsel’s arguments, the 

court stated:

THE COURT: All right. I am going to go ahead and abate for the 

purposes of the mediation, or whatever is the term of art used in the 

Agreement. If no agreement is reached, then I’m going to send it to

arbitration.

The court later signed an order granting appellees’ motion. The order required 

the parties, for a period of sixty days following the order’s entry, to consult and in 

good faith attempt to reach a fair solution satisfactory to both sides; ordered the 

parties, if they did not reach a solution within that period, to proceed to binding 

arbitration on any and all claims, issues, complaints and causes of action raised or 

that could have been raised against appellees in Fox’s original petition; and stated,

“all matters and proceedings between [the parties] in this cause of action shall be 

DISMISSED following the sixty (60) day negotiation period, pending resolution of 

the arbitration of [Fox’s] claims.” 
–5–

II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

Fox timely appealed.

2

In his sole issue on appeal, Fox argues the trial court 

erred in finding a valid arbitration agreement existed because Mrs. Fox did not sign 

the arbitration agreement and appellees failed to prove Mrs. Fox conferred authority 

on Mr. Fox to sign on her behalf. As explained below, we conclude appellees failed 

to establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and thus agree the trial 

court erred.

In their response on appeal, appellees dispute Fox’s position and raise other

issues as well, including, but not limited to, twice asking us to dismiss the appeal—

first in a letter brief arguing we lack jurisdiction, and second in their appellate brief, 

arguing we should dismiss the appeal because Fox had not yet filed a docketing 

statement. We already considered the parties’ letter briefs regarding our jurisdiction 

and concluded we have it, for the same reason we include below. 

We need not consider appellees’ argument on the docketing statement, as it is 

moot.

3

 We also need not consider new issues appellees raise for the first time on 

appeal, such as whether Fox signed the arbitration agreement in his personal capacity 

and whether Fox’s claims should be arbitrated based on an equitable estoppel theory, 

 

2

In their letter briefs regarding jurisdiction, Fox stated, and appellees did not dispute, that his claims 

were dismissed on October 24, 2021, at the conclusion of the negotiation period and the sixtieth day after 

the trial court signed its order. While Fox filed his notice of appeal before that date, his notice is appeal is 

effective and deemed filed on that date—the day of, but after, the dismissal of his claims. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 27.1(a) (“In a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, 

but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal.”). 

3 Fox filed a docketing statement in our Court on February 15, 2022, over eight months before the 

appeal was submitted to us without oral argument. 
–6–

as these issues could not have formed the basis for the trial court’s decision, when 

they were not raised below. See Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 

n.4 (Tex. 2014) (stating the court does not consider issues not presented in the trial 

court but noting parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues 

properly before the court). 

A. Jurisdiction Over the Appeal

Before we address Fox’s issue, we first explain our conclusion that we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal. Because we initially questioned it, we asked Fox to 

submit a jurisdictional letter brief and allowed appellees to submit a letter brief in 

response. After reviewing those letters, we informed the parties it appears we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal. Neither party has asked us to reconsider that view.

Although it is not authenticated, the Agreement attached to appellees’ motion 

states it “shall be governed and interpreted under the Federal Arbitration Act”

(FAA). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code states, 

In a matter subject to the FAA, a person may take an appeal or writ of

error to the court of appeals from the judgment or interlocutory order 

of a district court, county court at law, or county court under the same 

circumstances that an appeal from a federal district court’s order or 

decision would be permitted by 9 U.S.C. Section 16.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.016. 

While the FAA “makes no provision for an interlocutory appeal from an order 

compelling arbitration,” such an order “can clearly be reviewed on appeal from a 

final judgment.” Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)
–7–

(stating, “The United States Supreme Court has said that orders compelling 

arbitration can be reviewed after final judgment in the case.”) (citing Green Tree 

Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)); see 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (stating an 

appeal may be taken from “a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is 

subject to this title”). Thus, “[c]ourts may review an order compelling arbitration if 

the order also dismisses the underlying litigation so it is final rather than 

interlocutory.” In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 839 n.14 (Tex. 2009) 

(quoting Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 586 n.13 (Tex.2008)). 

Here, in their motion and in the hearing, appellees asked the trial court to 

either stay or dismiss the proceedings. The trial court did the latter,4compelling and 

ordering the parties to arbitration if they did not reach a solution after a sixty-day 

negotiation period, and stating in its order, “all matters and proceedings between [the 

parties] in this cause of action shall be DISMISSED following the sixty (60) day 

negotiation period”), pending resolution of the arbitration of [Fox’s] claims.” 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court’s order dismissed 

the proceedings. See In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d at 839 n.14.

B. Validity of the Agreement

We turn to Fox’s sole issue, in which he argues the trial court erred in finding 

there was a valid arbitration agreement because Mrs. Fox did not sign the arbitration 

 

4 We do not decide the propriety of dismissal rather than a stay, as neither party has raised the issue. 
–8–

agreement and appellees failed to prove Mrs. Fox conferred authority on Mr. Fox to 

sign on her behalf.

Under the FAA, a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the 

existence of a valid arbitration agreement and show that the disputed claims fall 

within the scope of that agreement. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 

732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). A trial court’s determination of the 

arbitration agreement’s validity is a legal question subject to de novo review. J.M. 

Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003).

In Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992), the court 

described how trial courts are to review disputes regarding arbitration, explaining: 

Because the main benefits of arbitration lie in expedited and less 

expensive disposition of a dispute, and the legislature has mandated that 

a motion to compel arbitration be decided summarily, we think it 

unlikely that the legislature intended the issue to be resolved following 

a full evidentiary hearing in all cases. We also envision that the hearing 

at which a motion to compel arbitration is decided would ordinarily 

involve application of the terms of the arbitration agreement to 

undisputed facts, amenable to proof by affidavit. With these 

considerations in mind, we hold that the trial court may summarily 

decide whether to compel arbitration on the basis of affidavits, 

pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. However, if the material facts 

necessary to determine the issue are controverted, by an opposing 

affidavit or otherwise admissible evidence, the trial court must conduct 

an evidentiary hearing to determine the disputed material facts.

Id. at 269 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted). We discussed these and 

other standards in Constant v. Gillespie, No. 05-20-00734-CV, 2022 WL 1564555, 
–9–

*4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).5 We also reaffirmed 

that a party moving to compel arbitration “is required to put forth competent, prima 

facie evidence of the arbitration agreement itself.” Id. at *6.

 

5

In Constant, which involved a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, we stated:

A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish two things: (1) the existence of a 

valid, enforceable arbitration agreement and (2) that the disputed claim falls within the 

scope of that agreement. See Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tex. 2021). 

When deciding whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate, we do not resolve doubts or 

indulge a presumption in favor of arbitration. Emery v. Hilltop Sec., Inc., No. 05-18-00697-

CV, 2019 WL 4010775, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Although there is a strong presumption favoring arbitration, that presumption arises only 

after the party seeking to compel arbitration proves that a valid arbitration agreement exists. 

VSR Fin. Servs., Inc. v. McLendon, 409 S.W.3d 817, 827 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no 

pet.).

After the party seeking to compel arbitration satisfies its initial evidentiary burden, the 

burden then shifts to the party seeking to avoid arbitration to raise an affirmative defense 

to the enforcement of the otherwise valid arbitration provision. See Haddington Fund, LP 

v. Kidwell, No. 05-19-01202-CV, 2022 WL 100111, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 11, 

2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In the absence of a valid defense, the trial court has no 

discretion—it must compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings. Id.

A motion to compel arbitration is initially presented to the trial court in a summary 

proceeding on the basis of affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. See Jack B. 

Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); GJ 

Partners, Ltd. v. Cima Contractors, LLC, No. 05-18-01412-CV, 2020 WL 400180, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The summary disposition of a 

motion to compel arbitration is governed by the same evidentiary standards as a motion for 

partial summary judgment. See Tex. Health Res. v. Kruse, No. 05-13-01754-CV, 2014 WL 

3408636, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

A trial court, however, must forgo summary disposition and hold an evidentiary hearing 

on a motion to compel arbitration when there is a genuine question of material fact 

concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement. See id. Specifically, the Supreme 

Court of Texas has stated: “[I]f the material facts necessary to determine the issue [of 

whether to compel arbitration] are controverted, by an opposing affidavit or otherwise 

admissible evidence, [then] the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 

the disputed material facts.” Jack B. Anglin, Co., Inc., 842 S.W.2d at 269. . . . 

We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration for abuse of 

discretion. Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 283. Under this standard of review, we defer to the 

trial court’s factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, but we review the 

trial court’s legal determinations de novo. Redi-Mix, LLC v. Martinez, No. 05-17-01347-

CV, 2018 WL 3569612, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
–10–

Appellees, the movants, failed to do this. Rather than submitting with their 

motion any “affidavits, pleadings, discovery, or stipulations” to support their motion, 

see Tipps, 842 S.W.2d at 269, appellees attached to their motion only the two-page 

unauthenticated Agreement, and they submitted no evidence at the later nonevidentiary hearing. 

Constant involved the same problem, as the movant in that case merely 

attached to his motion exhibits containing arbitration provisions but did not submit 

any affidavits from a witness to authenticate any of his exhibits. 2022 WL 1564555 

at *6. Because “[s]imply attaching a document to a motion does not make the 

document admissible as evidence, dispense with proper foundational evidentiary 

requirements, or relieve a litigant of complying with other admissibility 

requirements[,]” we concluded that, as a matter of law, the movant’s mere 

attachment of the purported arbitration agreement as an exhibit to his motion, 

without more, “submitted no evidence of a valid arbitration agreement to the trial 

court[,]” id. at *6, and “was insufficient to meet [the movant’s] initial evidentiary 

 

Whether disputed claims fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement is a question of 

law that we review de novo. Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 283.

Where . . . the trial court makes no written findings of fact or conclusions of law in support 

of its ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are 

implied. Redi-Mix, LLC, 2018 WL 3569612, at *2. We affirm the ruling if it can be upheld 

on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. We reverse a trial court for abusing its 

discretion only when we determine the court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, 

meaning that it acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id.

2022 WL 1564555, at *4–5. 
–11–

burden to prove the existence of a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement.” Id. at 

*1, 4; see id. at *9 (stating similar conclusion). 

Although the record before us justifies the same conclusion, both parties 

ignore this problem, just as the trial court did. Even if we, too, ignore the problem 

and assume, as we do, that appellees properly authenticated the Agreement, another 

fundamental problem exists: the lack of any evidence that Fox signed the Agreement 

on Mrs. Fox’s behalf. 

“[A] party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed 

to submit to arbitration.” Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 

624, 631 (Tex. 2018) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 

945 (1995)). “Whether parties have agreed to arbitrate is a gateway matter ordinarily

committed to the trial court and controlled by state law governing ‘the validity, 

revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.’” Id. (quoting Arthur 

Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009)). “The question of ‘[w]ho is 

actually bound by an arbitration agreement is [ultimately] a function of the intent of 

the parties, as expressed in the terms of the agreement.’” In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 

220, 224 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 

347, 355, 358 (5th Cir.2003)). Generally, parties must sign arbitration agreements 

before being bound by them, id., but an obligation to arbitrate not only attaches to 

one who has personally signed the written arbitration agreement but may also bind 
–12–

a non-signatory under principles of contract law and agency. Id.; see In re Kellogg

Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 738.

Here, even assuming the Agreement was properly authenticated, the nonsignatory is Mrs. Fox, Fox’s late wife. As Fox’s wrongful death and survival claims 

are all derivative of Mrs. Fox’s claims, see Prestonwood Tradition, LP v. Jennings, 

653 S.W.3d 436, 441–43 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.), the central dispute

before us is whether appellees established the existence of a valid arbitration 

agreement with Mrs. Fox, under principles of contract law and agency. 

In the trial court, appellees argued they did so, on the theory that Fox signed 

the Agreement on Mrs. Fox’s behalf. Appellees’ motion states, “On February 18, 

2019, Karen Fox’s husband Roger Fox, acting as Mrs. Fox’s legal representative, 

signed the [Agreement] as evidenced by his signature on the document. . . . The 

document was also signed by a [TRWC] facility representative.”

In Gaines v. Kelly, 235 S.W.3d 179, 182–83 (Tex. 2007), the Court stated: 

An agent’s authority to act on behalf of a principal depends on some 

communication by the principal either to the agent (actual or express 

authority) or to the third party (apparent or implied authority). . . .

Apparent authority, we have said, is based on estoppel, arising “either 

from a principal knowingly permitting an agent to hold [himself] out as 

having authority or by a principal’s actions which lack such ordinary 

care as to clothe an agent with the indicia of authority, thus leading a 

reasonably prudent person to believe that the agent has the authority 

[he] purports to exercise.” Baptist Mem. Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 

S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.1998). We have further noted that the principal’s 

full knowledge of all material facts is essential to establish a claim of 

apparent authority based on estoppel. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 

794, 803 (Tex.1975) (citing Hallmark v. United Fid. Life Ins. Co., 155 
–13–

Tex. 291, 286 S.W.2d 133 (1956)). Moreover, when making that 

determination, only the conduct of the principal is relevant. 

NationsBank, N.A. v. Dilling, 922 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex.1996) (per 

curiam). Finally, the standard is that of a reasonably prudent person, 

using diligence and discretion to ascertain the agent’s authority. 

Chastain v. Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex. 322, 257 S.W.2d 422, 427 

(1953). Thus, to determine an agent’s apparent authority we examine 

the conduct of the principal and the reasonableness of the third party’s 

assumptions about authority.

No such evidence exists in the record before us. Even assuming the 

Agreement was properly authenticated, the record lacks evidence of the conduct of 

Mrs. Fox, the alleged principal; appellees’ assumptions about Fox’s authority, if any; 

and any circumstances from which we could determine whether such assumptions, 

if any, are reasonable. 

We agree with Fox that, despite his signature on the Agreement under 

language purportedly “certifying” that he was acting as her agent, the record lacks 

any evidence showing that an agency relationship did, in fact, exist between Fox and 

Mrs. Fox at the time he signed the Agreement. Appellees argue, in essence, that the 

Agreement itself evidences Mrs. Fox’s granting of authority to Fox because Fox

signed the Agreement below language stating, “By virtue of Resident’s consent, 

instruction and/or durable power of attorney, I hereby certify that I am authorized to 

act as Resident’s agent in executing . . . on his/her and my behalf the arbitration 

agreement.” We disagree. Fox’s signature on the Agreement fails to establish Fox
–14–

did, in fact, have Mrs. Fox’s consent or authorization to sign it on her behalf and 

constitutes, at most, no more than a scintilla of evidence that Fox was her agent.

6

 

Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court erred in compelling 

arbitration and dismissing Fox’s claims because appellees failed to meet their initial 

evidentiary burden to prove the existence of a valid, enforceable arbitration 

agreement. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 737 (establishing 

burden is appellees’, as movants); Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 

S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. dism’d) (noting the party 

alleging agency has the burden to prove its existence and that absent actual or 

apparent authority, an agent cannot bind a principal). We sustain Fox’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s August 25, 2021 order and remand the case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

210904f.p05

 

6 Though not directly on point, as the case did not involve arbitration and involved an appeal following 

a bench trial in which the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, appellees’ position is 

similar to the position taken by the lender in Tong v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, No. 05-19-01558-CV, 2023 

WL 2422482 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 9, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). In Tong, we were unpersuaded 

by the lender’s argument that the husband’s signature on a home equity affidavit signed at the loan’s closing 

constituted proof of the wife’s consent to the home equity loan, even though the affidavit stated, in part, 

“The Extension of Credit is secured by a voluntary lien on the Property created under a written agreement 

with the consent of all owners and all spouses of owners and execution of this [affidavit] is deemed evidence 

of such consent.” Id. at *10. We stated that we did not believe such evidence “would allow one to 

reasonably conclude the wife consented to the lien,” and concluded that, “[t]o the extent the affidavit is any 

evidence at all of [the wife’s] consent to the lien . . . it is nothing more than a scintilla.” Id.

/Ken Molberg/

KEN MOLBERG

JUSTICE
–15–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ROGER CORNELL FOX, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON 

BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF 

KAREN NASINE FOX, Appellant

No. 05-21-00904-CV V.

THE REHABILITATION & 

WELLNESS CENTRE OF 

DALLAS, LLC AND BRIUS, LLC, 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 298th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-01019.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Molberg. Justices Partida-Kipness 

and Carlyle participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s August 

25, 2021 order is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ORDERED that appellant ROGER CORNELL FOX, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF KAREN NASINE 

FOX recover his costs of this appeal from appellees THE REHABILITATION & 

WELLNESS CENTRE OF DALLAS, LLC AND BRIUS, LLC.

Judgment entered this 5

th day of June, 2023.