[Cite as Stanford v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-3395.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

MICHAEL STANFORD

Appellant

v.

BRUCE WILLIAMS

Appellee

C.A. No. 30839

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. CV-2019-04-1536

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 4, 2024

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Michael Stanford appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common 

Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part and reverses in part.

I.

{¶2} Mr. Stanford filed an action against his attorney, Bruce Williams, alleging legal 

malpractice, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. Specifically, 

Mr. Stanford alleged that Attorney Williams erroneously counseled him to enter no contest pleas 

to charges of assault and falsification and failed to file objections to a magistrate’s decision that 

granted a civil stalking protection order. After the trial court granted Attorney Williams’ motion to 

dismiss the claims of fraud and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the matter proceeded to a 

bench trial before a magistrate on the claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract. The 

magistrate found in favor of Attorney Williams. 
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{¶3} Mr. Stanford objected to the magistrate’s decision, raising 18 objections for the trial 

court’s review. The trial court overruled each of Mr. Stanford’s objections and adopted the 

magistrate’s decision in a general order. It later entered judgment against Mr. Stanford, stating: 

[Mr. Stanford’s] complaint fails for want of proof and is dismissed, with prejudice. 

Attorney Williams did not breach any duty of care owed to [Mr.] Stanford. The 

[c]ourt further finds that Attorney Williams did not breach the terms of the contract 

for legal services with [Mr.] Stanford.

Mr. Stanford has appealed, assigning as error that the trial court incorrectly entered judgment for 

Attorney Williams.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR [ATTORNEY 

WILLIAMS] WHEN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT 

[ATTORNEY WILLIAMS] BREACHED THE DUTY OF CARE OWED TO 

[MR. STANFORD] AND THAT [ATTORNEY WILLIAMS’] 

REPRESENTATION OF [MR. STANFORD] FELL BELOW THE 

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE OF ATTORNEYS IN OHIO. 

{¶4} In his assignment of error, Mr. Stanford argues that the trial court erred when it 

concluded that he did not present sufficient evidence that Attorney Williams’ representation in the 

assault and falsification cases breached a duty of care. He also argues that the trial court erred when 

it concluded there was insufficient evidence that he had an attorney-client relationship with 

Attorney Williams and that Attorney Williams did not breach the duty of care as to his attempt to 

challenge the civil stalking protection order. 

{¶5} “Generally, the decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate’s decision lies 

within the discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Niederst v. Niederst, 2018-Ohio-5320, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting Barlow v. Barlow, 

2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). “In so doing, we consider the trial court’s action with reference 
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to the nature of the underlying matter.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.). 

“In a civil case, in which the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance of the evidence, rather 

than beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each element (sufficiency) and the 

evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of persuasion (weight).” Lubanovich v. 

McGlocklin, 2014-Ohio-2459, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. 

See also Baaron, Inc. v. Davidson, 2015-Ohio-4217, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). Accordingly, we must 

determine whether Mr. Stanford presented evidence sufficient to meet the elements of a legal 

malpractice claim. 

{¶6} “A claim for legal malpractice can be predicated upon negligence, breach of 

contract, or both.” Niepsuj v. Doe, 2015-Ohio-3864, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), citing Perotti v. Beck, 2001 

WL 1198987, *3 (7th Dist. Sept. 24, 2001). “To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove 

three elements: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a professional duty; 

(2) a breach of that duty by the attorney; and (3) damages which were proximately caused by the 

breach.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Barstow v. Waller, 2004-Ohio-5746, ¶ 40 (4th Dist.).

{¶7} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that “an attorney-client relationship need 

not be formed by an express written contract or by the full payment of a retainer. Instead, . . . an 

attorney-client relationship may be created by implication based upon the conduct of the parties 

and the reasonable expectations of the person seeking representation.” Schottenstein Zox & Dunn 

Co., L.P.A. v. Reineke, 2011-Ohio-6201, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. 

Hardiman, 2003-Ohio-5596, ¶ 8; see also New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler, 2011-Ohio2266, ¶ 26. Indeed, “[t]he determination of whether an attorney-client relationship was created 

turns largely on the reasonable belief of the prospective client.” Hardiman at ¶ 10. 
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{¶8} Mr. Stanford has presented different arguments for his assault and falsification 

cases than his civil-stalking-protection-order case, so we will consider the criminal and civil cases 

separately. In overruling Mr. Stanford’s objections to the magistrate’s decision regarding the 

criminal cases, the trial court stated, in relevant part: 

[Mr.] Stanford’s Objection 4 takes issue with the magistrate’s finding that Attorney 

Williams did not breach the duty of care owed to [Mr.] Stanford. [Mr.] Stanford 

cites the testimony of his expert witness, who opined that [Mr.] Stanford’s criminal 

charges would have been dismissed due to the unavailability of the alleged victim 

in the case. Attorney Williams’ expert witness opined that [Mr.] Stanford received 

a favorable plea deal and made the decision to take it based on Attorney Williams’ 

advice. Here, the magistrate found Attorney Williams’ expert’s opinion more 

convincing and based his decision in part, upon it. The court finds that the 

magistrate property determined this factual issue and appropriately applied the law. 

[Mr. Stanford’s] Objection 4 is overruled. 

. . .

[Mr.] Stanford’s Objections 7, 8 and 9 relate to the magistrate’s finding that 

[Attorney] Williams provided advice about the possible outcomes of trial, the 

negotiated plea of his case, and the reasonableness of the plea. [Mr.] Stanford 

argues that the magistrate’s conclusion conflicts with his expert’s testimony that 

the unavailability of the alleged victim could have resulted in [Mr.] Stanford’s 

charges being dismissed. However, the magistrate found the testimony by [Mr.] 

Stanford’s expert to be speculative, and relied instead on other testimony and 

evidence in ultimately concluding that [Attorney] Williams’ advice did not 

constitute a breach of the standard of care. Accordingly, the court overrules [Mr. 

Stanford’s] objections numbers 7, 8 and 9. 

[Mr.] Stanford’s Objections 10, 11 and 12 relate to the magistrate’s finding that it 

would have been speculative to assume that the victim would not appear for trial 

and that it would necessarily follow that the charges against [Mr.] Stanford would 

be dismissed. This Objection is similar to the ones addressed above. While the 

record in this case indicates that the victim may not have appeared for trial, this 

court cannot automatically assume that she would not have done so. Further, her 

failure to appear could have resulted in other court actions, such as a continuance 

of trial. Accordingly, the magistrate properly concluded that [Mr.] Stanford’s 

theory that the victim would fail to appear, and the charges against him would 

necessarily be dismissed, was speculative and not supported by the evidence 

presented at trial. Objections 10, 11 and 12 are overruled. 
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{¶9} Regarding the assault and falsification cases, the parties do not dispute an attorneyclient relationship existed between Mr. Stanford and Attorney Williams. Regarding whether 

Attorney Williams breached the duty of care, the record supports the trial court’s determination that 

he did not breach it. Specifically, there was ample evidence against Mr. Stanford in the criminal 

cases, including Mr. Stanford’s own statements against interest to the police and witnesses other 

than the victim. Attorney Williams relayed the State’s plea offers to Mr. Stanford, and Mr. Stanford 

chose to accept those offers. Moreover, Mr. Stanford relies solely upon speculation to support his 

argument that the State would have dismissed the criminal cases, in their entirety, if the victim did 

not appear in court. As such, the trial court did not err in concluding Mr. Stanford’s malpractice 

claim failed as to the criminal cases because Attorney Williams did not breach any duty of care to 

Mr. Stanford. 

{¶10} Turning to the civil stalking protection order, the trial court stated, in relevant part: 

[Mr.] Stanford’s Objections 14, 15, 17 and 18 take issue with the magistrate’s 

finding that Attorney Williams is not liable for the failure to timely file objections 

to the issuance of the [civil stalking protection order] against him. Following the 

issuance of the [civil stalking protection order], [Mr.] Stanford engaged [J.S.] to 

pursue an appeal. While an attorney-client relationship existed between [Mr.] 

Stanford and [Attorney] Williams with respect to handling the [civil stalking 

protection orders], [Attorney] Williams’ engagement letters all indicated that he 

does not handle appeals and that he was referring the matter to [J.S.] [J.S.] was 

engaged to handle the objection and/or appeal of the [civil stalking protection 

order]. The magistrate properly concluded that the objection and/or appeal of the 

[civil stalking protection order] [was] [J.S.’s] responsibility- not [Attorney] 

Williams. Objections 14, 15, 17 and 18 are overruled. 

{¶11} At trial, Mr. Stanford presented evidence that Attorney Williams represented him 

in a series of criminal and civil cases. There are two fee agreements in the record that identify the 

criminal cases by name – assault and falsification – and identify the civil-stalking-protection-order 

cases by county – Mahoning and Trumbull. The fee agreements do not specify the case numbers 

associated with the description of the matters. The trial court, however, determined “an attorney-
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client relationship existed between [Mr.] Stanford and [Attorney] Williams with respect to handling 

the [civil stalking protection orders].” Neither party challenges this conclusion. 

{¶12} Mr. Stanford testified that Attorney Williams advised him to attend the hearing in 

one of the civil stalking protection order cases on his own because he was too busy and because 

Mr. Stanford had enough evidence to defeat the civil stalking protection order. Attorney Williams, 

on the other hand, denied telling Mr. Stanford he was too busy to attend the hearing. Mr. Stanford 

also testified that Attorney Williams advised him not to incriminate himself at the civil stalking 

protection order hearing as to the assault or falsification charges. Mr. Stanford attended the hearing 

without Attorney Williams, and a magistrate subsequently issued a civil stalking protection order 

against Mr. Stanford. 

{¶13} Mr. Stanford testified that, approximately two days after learning about the issuance 

of the civil stalking protection order, he spoke with Attorney Williams at Attorney Williams’ office, 

regarding his options to challenge the order. Mr. Stanford testified that he believed Attorney 

Williams and J.S. were working together on the matter. In correspondence to Mr. Stanford dated 

October 27, 2016, the other attorney stated, in pertinent part: 

This will confirm our phone discussion today during which I informed you that 

Attorney Williams has asked for my assistance in the appeal of the [c]ivil 

[p]rotection [o]rder. This will confirm that you authorized me to represent you in 

the appeal. Any retainer you paid to Attorney Williams for the appeal will apply to 

my legal representation also. There is no need for any additional retainer at this 

time. 

We have ordered the transcript of the hearing. I expect to have this by early next 

week. As we discussed, I will meet you at Attorney Williams[’] office on 

Wednesday, November 2, 2016[,] at 2 p.m. to discuss the appeal. 

 

(Emphasis added.) Notably, the attorney sent this correspondence to Mr. Stanford one day before 

the expiration of the 14-day period for filing objections to the magistrate’s decision. The 
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correspondence did nothing to dispel Mr. Stanford’s reasonable belief that both Attorney Williams 

and the other attorney represented him in challenging the civil stalking protection order. 

{¶14} The other attorney testified that she misread the magistrate’s decision and believed 

it to be the trial court’s final, appealable order. She indicated that is why she did not file objections 

to the magistrate’s decision before filing an appeal. Both attorneys testified that Attorney Williams 

did not advise the other attorney that objections needed to be filed. Mr. Stanford testified that 

Attorney Williams never discussed having to file objections to the magistrate’s decision to 

challenge the civil stalking protection order. When asked if he advised the other attorney regarding 

the need to file objections to the magistrate’s decision, Attorney Williams testified: “[y]ou know, 

[J.S.] is so smart that I thought that she would have known that and done that. You know what I 

mean? The thought never crossed my mind that this would have ever occurred.” 

{¶15} The record contains sufficient evidence to establish that an attorney-client 

relationship existed between Attorney Williams and Mr. Stanford as to the protection order case 

at the time Mr. Stanford had to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. Although Attorney 

Williams argues that he does not handle appeals, objections to a magistrate’s decision are part of 

the trial court proceedings. Objections are filed in the trial court and are decided by the trial court, 

whether they are filed under Civil Rule 53(D)(3)(b) or 65.1(F)(3)(d), as they would have been in 

the protection order case. “When reviewing a magistrate’s decision, the trial court is not acting as 

an appellate court, but rather views all evidence and testimony de novo.” Kovacs v. Kovacs, 2004-

Ohio-2777, ¶ 6 (6th Dist.). Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to support any other 

meaning of the word “appeal” than that which is specified in the civil, criminal, and appellate rules.

{¶16} The record also supports the fact that Mr. Stanford reasonably believed that 

Attorney Williams would do what was necessary to challenge the magistrate’s decision. Attorney 
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Williams gave Mr. Stanford legal advice regarding the proceedings before the magistrate by telling 

him he had enough evidence to defeat the allegations without counsel present. In addition, 

Attorney Williams advised Mr. Stanford not to incriminate himself at the civil stalking protection 

order hearing, met with Mr. Stanford regarding the matter at his own law office, and accepted a 

retainer. See Sayyah v. Cutrell, 143 Ohio App.3d 102, 111 (12th Dist. 2001) (“An attorney-client 

relationship exists in the traditional sense when ‘an attorney advises others as to their legal rights, 

a method to be pursued, the forum to be selected, and the practice to be followed for the 

enforcement of their rights.’”), quoting Landis v. Hunt, 80 Ohio App.3d 662, 669 (10th Dist. 1992). 

Moreover, the record reflects that Attorney Williams did not disengage from representing Mr. 

Stanford in that or any other matter. Instead, Mr. Stanford sent Attorney Williams a disengagement 

letter approximately one-year after the events occurred. 

{¶17} The trial court determined that Mr. Williams did not owe a duty of care to Mr. 

Stanford at the time Mr. Stanford had to object to the magistrate’s decision because his 

representation of Mr. Stanford did not include appeals. As previously explained, however, filing 

objections to a magistrate’s decision is not an “appeal.” We, therefore, conclude that the trial court 

incorrectly overruled objections 14, 15, 17, and 18. This case must be remanded to the trial court 

for it to determine in the first instance the remainder of Mr. Stanford’s legal malpractice claim as 

it relates to the civil stalking protection order. Accordingly, Mr. Stanford’s assignment of error is 

overruled as to the assault and falsification cases but sustained as to the protection order case.

III.

{¶18} Mr. Stanford’s assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part. The 

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part, 

and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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Judgment affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed equally to both parties.

JENNIFER HENSAL

FOR THE COURT

CARR, J.

CONCURS.
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SUTTON, P. J.

CONCURRING.

{¶19} Although I agree with the majority’s resolution of Mr. Stanford’s assignment of 

error, affirming it in part and reversing it in part, I would clarify that on remand the trial court 

should specifically determine whether the breach of Attorney Williams’ duty to Mr. Stanford, in 

failing to file objections to the magistrate’s decision on the civil stalking protection order, is the 

proximate cause of any damages. 

{¶20} The trial court specifically determined “Attorney Williams did not breach any duty 

of care owed to [Mr.] Stanford[.]” (Emphasis added.) Further, Mr. Stanford’s assignment of error 

framed the question for this Court’s review as whether the trial court erred in granting judgment 

in favor of Attorney Williams when sufficient evidence was presented that Attorney Williams 

breached the duty of care owed to Mr. Stanford. 

{¶21} As such, because the trial court wrongly determined Attorney Williams did not 

breach a duty of care to Mr. Sanford in failing to file objections to the magistrate’s decision 

regarding the civil stalking protection order, I would reverse and remand for the trial court to 

determine, in the first instance, the issues of proximate cause and damages. 

APPEARANCES:

ERIC D. HALL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ANDREW DORMAN, HOLLY MARIE WILSON, and BRIANNA M. PRISLIPSKY, Attorneys 

at Law, for Appellee.