*

 The Honorable Robert H. Cleland, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting

by designation.

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0350p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL SHANK,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 07-3544

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.

No. 03-00120—Walter H. Rice, District Judge.

Argued: June 12, 2008

Decided and Filed: September 19, 2008 

Before: SILER and COLE, Circuit Judges; CLELAND, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael H. Dzialowski, LAW OFFICE, Kalamazoo, Michigan, for Appellant.

Benjamin C. Glassman, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, Ohio, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael H. Dzialowski, LAW OFFICE, Kalamazoo, Michigan, for

Appellant. Benjamin C. Glassman, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cincinnati,

Ohio, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION _________________

CLELAND, District Judge. Michael Shank (“Shank”) was arrested after Dayton, Ohio

police officers found a firearm and crack cocaine in a car he had been driving in a neighborhood

well known for drug distribution and firearm violence. The car, which Shank did not own and for

which he had no documents or other indication of lawful possession, had been stopped because it

had illegally tinted windows; officers carried out a protective search after they became aware that

Shank – increasingly nervous and able to identify himself only verbally – had been contacted at least

twice previously by Dayton police, each contact apparently associated with significant “dealer

quantities” of crack cocaine.

1
No. 07-3544 United States v. Shank Page 2

Shank entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count 2, Use of a Firearm During and in

Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He appeals the district court’s denial of

his motion to suppress evidence, including the subject firearm. On appeal, Shank alleges that:

(1) the officers lacked probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop; (2) his detention in the back of the

police cruiser continued too long and violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) the search of

the vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion

that he was armed. For the reasons stated below, we reject each argument and AFFIRM.

I.

Late in the afternoon on May 2, 2003, police officers James Mullins (“Mullins”) and Rodney

Barrett (“Barrett”) were patrolling near the Desoto Bass housing complex in Dayton, Ohio. This

complex, the officers knew, is a high-crime area well known for its drug distribution activity and

shootings. The officers noticed a tan Cadillac with unusually darkened windows. Ohio law requires

that tinted windows allow at least fifty percent of the light to pass through the window, and the

officers estimated that the Cadillac’s tinted windows would permit only about a third of the light to

pass through. Although they could see through the tint well enough to tell that the driver seemed

to be male and was the only occupant, the tint was sufficiently dark to obscure whether furtive or

dangerous gestures were present. The officers activated the cruiser’s overhead lights. The driver

of the Cadillac turned onto the one-way, horseshoe shaped drive serving the Desoto Bass complex,

and stopped the car in the middle of the roadway rather than pulling over to a curb.

The two officers approached the vehicle, one from each side. As Barrett reached the driver’s

side of the car, he could more positively identify the driver as a man and as the window was lowered

he could also see that the driver was not wearing the seat belt. When Barrett asked the driver for

his license and registration, he replied that he did not own the vehicle and that he did not have

identification, but claimed that his name was Michael Shank. Intending to have the driver sit in the

patrol car, the officers asked him to step out of the car and patted him down. They found a large

lump in one pocket, but determined that it was a wad of cash and not a weapon. They replaced the

cash and directed Shank to sit in the back of the police cruiser so that they could verify his identity.

Shank had been relatively calm and cooperative until this point, but soon became argumentative and

nervous. He did, nonetheless, eventually comply, and after he was seated Barrett entered Shank’s

proffered information into the patrol car’s portable computer system. He found that there was a

person named Michael Shank who had a valid driver’s license, but also found that this person had

twice previously been in contact with Dayton police during which distribution-quantity cocaine had

been found. 

During this time, Mullins was using a “tint meter” to more specifically measure the vehicle’s

windows in support of the ticket Barrett was writing, and found that the tint prevented sixty-eight

percent of the light from passing through. Barrett was continuing to process written traffic citations

for Shank’s seat belt, driver’s license and window tint violations when a resident of the Desoto Bass

complex walked up and requested of Mullins that the two vehicles be moved because they were

blocking vehicle access. Mullins then went back toward the cruiser to retrieve a camera to record

the window tint measurements, and was met by Barrett who had alighted from the patrol car. Barrett

informed Mullins of what he had learned about Shank’s previous contacts with Dayton police

involving “large quantities of crack cocaine in his possession.” Mullins well knew that drug dealers

often carry weapons, and now suspected that drugs, weapons or both might be involved in this

encounter. After retrieving the camera from the police car, Mullins entered Shank’s car to move it.

While in the car, he checked the “lunge area,” which is “the space immediately accessible” to a

person seated in the car. He first opened the glove box, and found a semi-automatic handgun shoved

in as though someone had “reached across with the right hand and pushed into it, the glove box.”

He also found a small quantity of crack cocaine in the front console. At this point, the officers

placed Shank under arrest.
No. 07-3544 United States v. Shank Page 3

II.

When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, we use a de novo standard

for the district court’s legal determinations, but will not set aside the district court’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Long, 464 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006). “A

factual finding is clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support it, the

reviewing court, utilizing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

III.

Shank first argues that there was no probable cause to order him to stop the car he was

driving. Police officers “may briefly stop an individual for investigation if they have ‘reasonable

suspicion’ that the person has committed a crime.” Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John

Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1999). 

Reasonable suspicion is “more than an ill-defined hunch; it must be based upon a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of criminal

activity.” Houston, 174 F.3d at 813 (alterations in original) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). It requires “‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together

with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ an investigatory stop.”

Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

Moreover, reasonable suspicion “can arise from evidence that is less reliable than

what might be required to show probable cause.” Id.

Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Here, the officers observed the dark tinting on the Cadillac and estimated that the tinting

would permit only about thirty-three percent of the light to pass through the windows, despite

applicable law requiring window tinting to allow at least fifty percent of the light to pass through.

See Ohio Rev. Code § 4513.241; Ohio Admin. Code § 4501-41-03(A)(3). The officers were aware

that the tinting was illegally dark based on their substantial prior experience enforcing this traffic

regulation; indeed, the traffic stop that they just concluded before stopping Shank was for the same

infraction. Due to the officers’ familiarity with window tinting and their estimate that the vehicle

was tinted substantially darker than permitted by law, we agree with the district court’s

determination that the officers had a proper basis to initiate the traffic stop.

Shank complains, in part, that his arrest may represent an example of “selective

enforcement,” implying that he was improperly singled out for some ulterior, presumably improper

purpose. First, there is no evidence here that even hints at an improper or invidious targeting of

Shank. Second, the propriety of stopping Shank for this traffic violation is unaffected by the fact

that officers admittedly do not ticket, or even pull over, every vehicle they suspect has violated the

window tint regulation. The law does not require police officers to stop every person suspected of

illegal activity, and the officers’ actual subjective motivations in effectuating the stop are irrelevant

to the validity of the stop. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1966). “[T]he

constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal

Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 813. 

IV.

Even if an initial stop is constitutionally permissible, any subsequent detention must also

comply with the Constitution and may not, therefore, “be excessively intrusive and must be

reasonably related in time to the investigation.” United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th
No. 07-3544 United States v. Shank Page 4

Cir. 1999). Shank argues that after Mullins had measured the window tint and after Barrett had

determined that a valid driver’s license existed, the purpose of the stop was complete and he should

have been released.

Shank does not contest, however, that Barrett was still writing up and issuing the seat belt,

tinted window and no-license-in-possession citations by the time that the local resident approached

the officers complaining about the Cadillac and the patrol car blocking the one-way drive. Nor does

he contest that it was only after Shank’s previous association with drug trafficking incidents became

known to Mullins that he entered, moved and briefly searched the Cadillac. It is clear that the

purpose of the initial stop had not yet been completed when Mullins began the search. Because an

officer may detain an individual in a police cruiser until the officer has finished issuing a citation,

Shank’s detention did not exceed the scope of the stop and was therefore constitutionally

permissible. See id. (quoting United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1996) (“This

court has ruled that an officer can lawfully detain the driver of a vehicle until after the officer has

finished making record radio checks and issuing a citation, because this activity ‘would be well

within the bounds of the initial stop.’”). 

V.

Shank’s third, and more substantial argument challenges the constitutionality of Mullins’s

search of the Cadillac, arguing that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that their safety

was in danger. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983), the Supreme Court “recognized

that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to

police officers.” Accordingly, the Court determined that “the search of the passenger compartment

of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible

if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which,

taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer believing

that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” Id. at 1049

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21); see also United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2004)

(stating “the authority to conduct a Terry stop is ‘narrowly drawn’ so as to ‘permit a reasonable

search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he

is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to

arrest the individual for a crime.’”) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Interestingly, the Court in Long

was dealing with a factual setting reminiscent of the one before us, in that Long was not seated in,

but only approaching his car before it was searched, just as Shank would presumably have

approached the Cadillac to leave only moments after the traffic violation tickets had been completed

and issued to him. The Court pointed out particularly that “the officers did not act unreasonably in

taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within Long’s immediate

grasp before permitting him to reenter his automobile.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1051 (emphasis added).

We determine if officers had a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of danger based upon an

examination of “the individual factors, taken as a whole,” and whether they “give rise to reasonable

suspicion, even if each individual factor is entirely consistent with innocent behavior when

examined separately.” United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 588 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989)). We often examine individual facts in an “orderly fashion”

and include “a brief discussion of each factor and its weight in the analysis.” Id. at 591 (citing

Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 495 (3rd Cir.1995)). In doing so, however, we must take care not

to artificially isolate them and mistakenly subvert a legitimate totality-of-the-circumstances review.

Cf. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (warning that, in examining a challenged jury

instruction, each instruction must be viewed “in the context of the overall charge,” and that it is

important to avoid judging separate instructions “in artificial isolation.”). Artificially isolated

factual review distracts from being able to discern “rational inferences [to be drawn] from those

facts.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
No. 07-3544 United States v. Shank Page 5

1

 When officers are searching the entire vehicle for contraband — e.g., the trunk — they need “probable cause

to believe that a vehicle they have stopped contains evidence of a crime.” United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th

Cir. 1999). But as Long indicates, officers need only a “reasonable suspicion” that the suspect may be armed or

dangerous to search the areas of the vehicle immediately accessible to the driver, as Mullins did here. Long, 463 U.S.

at 1049. 

2

 As noted above, the factual findings made by the district court are not clearly erroneous and must therefore

be adopted. See Long, 464 F.3d at 572. Additional uncontroverted facts evident in the record may be noted as well.

Police officers are permitted “to draw on their own experience and specialized training to

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might

well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 2002). We

do not, however, permit reliance on mere hunches or unsupported and passing notions. Rather, a

reasonable suspicion is more than an ill-defined hunch; it must be based upon “a particularized and

objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).1

 “[T]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is

armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in

the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 

We examine here whether, based on articulable facts taken as a whole, Smith, 263 F.3d at

588, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Shank presented a danger and might be able to gain

immediate control of a weapon from the “lunge area” of the Cadillac.2

 The record shows that the

officers’ suspicion was based on at least the following facts: (1) a man was observed driving a car

with windows tinted so as to make it extremely difficult to detect movement of any occupants

within, a violation of Ohio law; (2) the immediate area, notably the housing development the car was

entering, was well-known for violent crime including shootings and considerable drug distribution

activity; (3) the driver, when approached, was found not wearing a seatbelt, a second violation of

Ohio law; (4) the car the man was driving did not belong to him; (5) the man had no driver’s license

nor any other form of personal identification or vehicle registration, a third violation of Ohio law;

(6) the man verbally identified himself with a name that was soon recognized as belonging to a

person having past association with cocaine dealing activities; (7) the officers knew that the

distribution of drugs often involves weapons possession and use; and (8) the man appeared

increasingly nervous, agitated and uncooperative upon being frisked and asked to sit briefly in the

police vehicle.

Shank argues his mere presence in the high-crime area, as found by the district court, is

insufficient to justify the officers’ attention being drawn to him because he “can not be held

accountable for the nature of the neighborhood he was stopped in.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has

explained, that an “individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone,

is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a

crime.” The Court stressed, however, that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant

characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to

warrant further investigation.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (emphasis added); see

also United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008) (“When combined with the fact that

Johnson was engaged in such behavior in an area known for criminal activity and on a street where

a crime-related homicide had recently occurred, Officer Shaughnessy’s observations provided a

sufficient basis for temporarily detaining Johnson to determine whether he was actually engaged in

wrongdoing.”); United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).

Here, Shank was found in the immediate vicinity of a “specific, circumscribed location where

particular crimes occur with unusual regularity,” Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 468, specifically, one

housing complex known by the officers for drug distribution activity and firearm-related crime, and
No. 07-3544 United States v. Shank Page 6

3

 The district court’s finding of fact that the Desoto Bass housing complex constituted a “high crime” area –

based upon and limited to the facts present in these circumstances – is not contested on appeal. Further, there is neither

an argument nor any indication in the record that the finding runs afoul of our caution in Caruthers that high-crime area

designations not be permitted to “serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.” Even so, we pause to point out the difficulties

inherent in too broadly categorizing a locale as “high crime.” See Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 467-468 (noting “labeling an

area ‘high-crime’ raises special concerns of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic profiling.”). This danger can be assuaged

when the labeled “area is circumscribed to a specific intersection rather than an entire neighborhood,” and if “the crimes

that frequently occur in the area are specific and related to the reason for which [a defendant] was stopped.” Id.

4

 In an apparent attempt at the hearing to point out the staleness of the earlier cocaine contacts, Shank’s trial

counsel marked as exhibits physical printouts of two field interview cards illustrating two occasions that Shank had been

contacted by police in association with drugs about eight years earlier in 1995. One, in fact, appears to have been related

not to cocaine, but to marijuana. It was, however, only the electronically stored information upon which Barrett relied

in the field, not printed cards, and only Barrett’s oral statements related to Mullins that gave Mullins any information

about the apparent nature of Shank’s prior contacts related to distribution-quantities of crack cocaine. In the light of the

specifications in the indictment listing 1997 and 1998 events, it is fairly obvious that the printed 1995 contact cards are

neither the only nor the most recent records of Dayton police contact with Shank, and do not appear to refer to the same

contacts relied upon by Barrett and Mullins.

that fact legitimately may be taken into account as a factor in explaining the officers’ subsequent

acts. Id. 3

Although the “high-crime area” observation stands as nothing more than one appropriate

ingredient, there was, ultimately, a cascading series of additional factors that soon came to the

awareness of the officers, as listed above, which together provide sufficient context. In addition to

the dangerous nature of the area, and the illegal and potentially unsafe tinting on the car windows,

Shank was not able to provide identification or vehicle registration, leaving the officers to search

computer records based only on a proffered name and social security number. 

Barrett’s database review showed that Shank had at least two previous contacts with Dayton

police officers, each involving a quantity of crack cocaine indicative of distribution rather than mere

possession for personal use. Based mainly upon the testimony of Barrett, the district court found

that Shank was known to have “had two previous contacts with Dayton police officers, when crack

cocaine had been discovered. On one occasion, slightly less than 30 grams had been discovered,

while 40 grams had been found on the other.” Indeed, the indictment details Shank’s arrests and

convictions for cocaine possession or distribution, specifically a 1998 conviction for two separate

counts of trafficking of crack cocaine in the vicinity of a school in 1997 and another 1998

conviction, carried on a different 1997 case number, for possession of crack cocaine.4

Drug distribution, the officers knew, very often involves firearm possession and use and the

obvious attendant danger. The district court credited the officers’ testimony that they knew “those

involved in the drug trade often carry weapons.” Shank’s apparent prior association with crack

cocaine distribution, and the known dangerous nature of that activity, constituted additional

articulable facts contributing to the officers’ suspicion that Shank may have been similarly engaged

in drug related activity when he was stopped. See Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 446 (6th Cir.

2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30); United States v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1999).

In addition to the foregoing, Shank displayed increasing nervousness and agitation upon

being asked to sit in the back of the officers’ vehicle. The Supreme Court has “recognized that

nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Although, as is true with each other factor when taken in

artificial isolation, a certain fundamental level of nervousness may be common in police encounters

with citizens, and is “not a ground sufficient in and of itself” for finding reasonable suspicion,

United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), but “nervousness is

generally included as one of several grounds.” Id. The district court found that Shank was not
No. 07-3544 United States v. Shank Page 7

5

 On occasion, a court’s unmistakable obligation to review the facts in their totality seems somehow dampened.

E.g., United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997) (cited prominently by Appellant). The court acknowledged

that the “the totality of the circumstances” must be examined, but apparently looked upon the expression of that standard

as a “mantra” of questionable substance. Id. at 948. The court – on its way to concluding that there existed no

reasonable inference of suspicion – isolated, examined and discounted each proffered fact: the defendant’s statement

that he had rented the car in San Francisco while the rental paper showed Sacramento; the strangeness of a travel plan

that involved an unemployed painter flying with his sister to California, she returning by air and he apparently foregoing

the flight, renting a car to “enjoy the scenery” while driving – speeding, actually – back to Kansas; that the rental car

when stopped in Kansas was designated for return the next day in Sacramento; debris in the car indicative of a fevered

and continuous cross-country trip; the defendant’s “extremely nervous” and trembling appearance; and the officers’

knowledge of the defendant’s earlier narcotics convictions. Id. The court held that reasonable suspicion was not

justified, explaining and dismissing in turn each fact as “innocuous,” or otherwise susceptible of an innocent explanation.

Id. (stating, for example, that “there is nothing criminal about traveling by car to view scenery;” “his [unemployment]

permitted him the luxury of time [for a lengthy return];” “he may have been the donee of a wealthy relative or

acquaintance;” “he might have won the lottery....”); but cf. Smith, 263 F.3d at 588 (“reasonable suspicion” may be

present “even if each individual factor is entirely consistent with innocent behavior when examined separately.”)

(emphasis added).

initially upset, but became “nervous and argumentative” after being asked to sit in the cruiser. The

court credited the officers’ testimony that “such a change in demeanor indicates that the suspect

fears that the officers will discover that he is involved in criminal activity.” 

There is, to be sure, no magic numerosity of facts, a minimum of which must be gleaned in

sifting the circumstances in order to “total up” and justify a court’s confidence that the officer had

reasonable suspicion to frisk or search pursuant to Terry. Indeed, we have found reasonable

suspicion – albeit often in unpublished cases – even where very few relevant facts existed. See, e.g.,

United States v. Madison, No. 96-3970, 1997 WL 608639 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997); United States v.

Boyd, No. 93-5202, 1993 WL 533501 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993). 

By contrast, reasonable suspicion can been found lacking although quite a number of facts

are pointed out when those facts are simply unconvincing either individually or collectively. See,

e.g., Karnes, 62 F.3d at 496 (holding that the numerous factors “were insufficient to provide

reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was not an innocent traveler” because it is “impossible for

a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there

are concrete reasons for such an interpretation”).5

The seminal question, taking all the facts and circumstances as a whole, examining the facts

as needed “in [an] orderly fashion,” Smith, 263 F.3d at 291, but avoiding the error of doing so “in

artificial isolation,” Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47, is whether a “reasonably prudent man in the

circumstances” could have believed “that his safety and that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392

U.S. at 27. We are satisfied, as was the district court, that the combined circumstances here

permitted the officers to reasonably suspect that Shank presented a danger and might have gained

immediate control of a weapon if he approached the car. Shank’s Fourth Amendment rights were

not violated in this search, and the firearm was properly ruled admissible.

VI.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.