Filed 11/30/20 Minkovitch v. Mansouri CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

YAN MINKOVITCH,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PEDRAM MANSOURI et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B299820

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19STCV06902)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Gregory Keosian, Judge. Affirmed.

Yan Minkovitch, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, Barry Z. Brodsky and Jodi L. 

Girten for Defendants and Respondents.

_________________________________
2

Yan Minkovitch appeals from the trial court’s order 

granting a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 

425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.1 Respondents Pedram 

Mansouri, Christine Otero and The Mansouri Law Offices 

(collectively Respondents) were the lawyers for Minkovitch’s exwife in their marital dissolution proceedings. Minkovitch claims

that during those proceedings: (1) Mansouri physically assaulted 

him with rolled-up motion papers; (2) the Mansouri firm made 

false allegations against him in a contempt proceeding; 

(3) Mansouri threatened him in an email; and (4) Mansouri 

falsely reported Minkovitch’s child support obligations to the 

Department of Child Support Services. The trial court struck all 

but the first category of claims under section 425.16.

We affirm. The claims that the trial court struck all arise 

out of protected litigation and other protected petitioning 

conduct. Except for Minkovitch’s cause of action for malicious 

prosecution, each of those claims is also barred by the litigation 

privilege. And the malicious prosecution claim could not have 

succeeded because such a claim cannot be predicated on 

unsuccessful motions in a marital dissolution action.

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 

Code of Civil Procedure. “SLAPP” is an acronym for “[s]trategic 

lawsuit against public participation.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for 

Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1109, fn. 1.)
3

BACKGROUND

1. The Dissolution Action

Respondents represent Minkovitch’s ex-wife, Lina, in the 

former couple’s dissolution action (Dissolution Action).

2

On January 11, 2018, Respondents filed an Order to Show 

Cause re Contempt in the Dissolution Action (Contempt OSC). 

The Contempt OSC claimed that Minkovitch had failed to pay 14 

months of court-ordered spousal support and child support for the 

couple’s two children, resulting in payment arrears of $15,266.

Pursuant to a court order, Lina had previously received 

$13,000 in child and spousal support payments from an escrow 

account containing funds from the sale of the couple’s house. The 

court had authorized the use of such funds for support payments

when Minkovitch was more than 5 days late in paying support. 

Lina claimed that the house had been her separate property and 

that the funds in the escrow account therefore belonged to her

rather than to Minkovitch.

The Dissolution Action was tried in November and 

December 2018. After trial, the court ruled that the couple’s 

house had in fact been Lina’s separate property. The court found 

that the support payments that Lina received from the escrow 

account were therefore from her separate property, and gave 

Minkovitch no credit toward his outstanding support obligations 

from those payments.

The court found that Minkovitch had paid nothing in 

spousal support and only $550 in child support between March 6, 

2016, and November 14, 2018. The court consequently found that 

2 For clarity, we refer to Lina Minkovitch using her first 

name. No disrespect is intended.
4

Minkovitch owed Lina a total of $20,638 in child and spousal 

support arrears, which the court ordered him to pay at a rate of 

$500 per month.

The court ordered future child support payments by 

Minkovitch in the amount of $131 per month. However, the court 

concluded that the “parties have the same or similar net 

spendable incomes,” and therefore did not award any ongoing 

spousal support.

On the morning of December 20, 2018, the day after trial 

had concluded, Minkovitch sent Mansouri an e-mail informing 

him that Minkovitch intended to file a lawsuit against Mansouri 

and his firm and demanding that Mansouri preserve relevant 

documents. Minkovitch’s e-mail said that the lawsuit would 

include claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, embezzlement, 

theft, malpractice, perjury, malicious prosecution, intentional 

inflicting of emotional distress, and “other claims.”

Mansouri responded with the following e-mail (the 

December 20 email):

“Hi Yan- [¶] I’m confused. Weren’t you celebrating outside 

the courtroom yesterday? I thought you won a big victory 

yesterday? What happened? You seem disregulated this 

morning (I know that’s a tough word for you – look it up). Did 

you wake up this morning and reality hit you like a ton of bricks? 

[¶] Lina and I also want to thank you for producing all of the 

evidence that carried the day for us. We could not have done it 

without the profit and loss you created or even the deeds and the 

loan applications that we did not have until you produced them! 

Not to mention your unbelievable testimony! You were our star 

witness. You literally would have won if you didn’t do anything. 

Lol. [¶] Btw we are now in the process of having DCSS revoke 
5

your agent and loan broker license, as well as your passport and 

drivers license due to your arrears. Once you lose Your license 

you will then lose custody because you can’t drive the girls 

anywhere. [¶] Also, you contact me again or come to my office I 

will call the police and/or get a restraining order. [¶] Govern 

yourself accordingly. [¶] Pedram.”

The trial court entered judgment in the Dissolution Action 

on April 2, 2019.

2. Minkovitch’s Complaint

Minkovitch filed his complaint in this action on March 1, 

2019. The complaint’s first two causes of action—for assault and 

battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress—are 

based on an alleged incident that occurred in court on November 

13, 2018. Minkovitch claimed that, after checking in with the 

court clerk, Mansouri “approached the plaintiff and rolled up 

Plaintiff’s motion and Mr. Mansouri’s responsive declaration and 

hit plaintiff across the face.”

The complaint’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of 

action were for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, 

respectively. Each of these causes of action was based on the 

Contempt OSC, which Minkovitch alleged was “false.” The 

complaint alleged that Mansouri had falsely claimed in the 

Contempt OSC that “he did not receive any support payment” 

even though Mansouri had actually received spousal and child 

support payments on behalf of Lina from the escrow fund. The 

complaint alleged that, after the hearing on the Contempt OSC, 

“the case was dismissed.”

The complaint’s seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of 

action—for civil harassment, intentional infliction of emotional 
6

distress, and abuse of process—were based upon Mansouri’s 

December 20 e-mail. Minkovitch alleged that, after trial, 

Mansouri started threatening Minkovitch with “physical harm,” 

and that Mansouri’s “verbal threats continued via email.” The 

complaint cited Mansouri’s statement in the December 20 e-mail 

that he was “in the process” of reporting Minkovitch to the 

“department of children services,” to “get plaintiff’s license and 

children taken away.” Minkovitch alleged that Mansouri 

“fulfilled his threats by giving [the] department of children 

services the wrong information where they then implemented the 

wrong wage garnishment order.”

3. The Anti-SLAPP Motion

Respondents filed an anti-SLAPP motion, seeking to strike 

Minkovitch’s entire complaint. Respondents argued that each of 

Minkovitch’s claims arose from conduct that is protected under 

section 425.16, subdivision (e), because those claims concerned 

Respondents’ “role as counsel for Lisa . . . and would have no 

basis in the absence of their protected activities in that role.”

Respondents supported the motion with declarations from 

Mansouri and Otero. Otero’s declaration explained the 

circumstances and proceedings surrounding the Contempt OSC. 

Mansouri’s declaration responded to Minkovitch’s allegations 

concerning the November 13, 2018 incident in court and the 

December 20 e-mail.

Mansouri denied ever physically striking Minkovitch or 

“physically or verbally” threatening him. Mansouri stated that, 

while in court on November 13, 2018, he tried to locate 

Minkovitch’s counsel. He did not see her, but he did see 

Minkovitch. Mansouri attempted to hand Minkovitch the

opposition papers to an ex parte application that Minkovitch had 
7

filed, but Minkovitch refused to take the papers. Mansouri said 

that he therefore “lightly tossed the papers on [Minkovitch’s] lap 

and walked away.”

Mansouri acknowledged stating in his December 20 e-mail 

that his client would seek enforcement of the court-ordered child 

support, “which could include a revocation of [Minkovitch’s] 

driver’s license and real estate license by the Department of 

Child Support Services [DCSS].” However, Mansouri testified 

that he “had no involvement in any actions or inactions that 

might or were taken by the DCSS to enforce the child support 

order.”

Minkovitch opposed the anti-SLAPP motion and filed his 

own declaration in support of his opposition.3

The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in 

part. The trial court denied the motion with respect to 

Minkovitch’s claims concerning the alleged assault in court, 

finding that the claims did not arise from protected litigation 

activity. The court concluded that “striking someone with rolled 

up papers is not litigation-related activities under the antiSLAPP statute,” and the fact that the incident occurred in a 

courthouse was merely incidental.4

However, the trial court granted the motion with respect to 

Minkovitch’s remaining claims. The court found that the 

3 Although the trial court’s order refers to Minkovitch’s 

declaration, Minkovitch did not include a copy of the declaration 

in the appellate record.

4 Respondents did not appeal from this portion of the trial 

court’s ruling, and Minkovitch’s first and second causes of action 

are therefore not at issue in this appeal. We refer to Minkovitch’s 

remaining claims as the “Appealed Claims.”
8

Contempt OSC and the December 20 e-mail were both protected 

litigation communications. The court concluded that the 

December 20 e-mail “concerns the subject matter of the litigation 

and informs Minkovitch of Mansouri’s next steps in the litigation, 

which Minkovitch alleges he ‘fulfilled’ by obtaining a wage 

garnishment order.”

With respect to the merits of Minkovitch’s Appealed 

Claims, the court found that each of those claims except for 

Minkovitch’s third cause of action for malicious prosecution was 

barred by the litigation privilege established by Civil Code 

section 47, subdivision (b). Quoting Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 

Cal.App.4th 27, 37 (Bidna), the court concluded that Minkovitch 

also could not prevail on his malicious prosecution cause of action 

because “ ‘no malicious prosecution action may arise out of 

unsuccessful family law motions or OSC’s.’ ”

DISCUSSION

1. The Anti-SLAPP Procedure

Section 425.16 provides for a “special motion to strike” 

when a plaintiff asserts claims against a person “arising from any 

act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition 

or free speech under the United States Constitution or the 

California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” 

(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Such claims must be stricken “unless the 

court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a 

probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Ibid.)

Thus, ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step 

procedure. First, the “moving defendant bears the burden of 

identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for 

relief supported by them.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 

396 (Baral).) At this stage, the defendant must make a 
9

“threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from 

protected activity. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 

1056 (Rusheen).) “A claim arises from protected activity when 

that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. 

Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 

1057, 1062 (Park).)

Second, if the defendant makes such a showing, the 

“burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each 

challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient 

and factually substantiated.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) 

Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court determines 

“whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, 

would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.” (Ibid.) The 

plaintiff’s showing must be based upon admissible evidence. 

(HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 

204, 212.)

Section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines the categories of acts

that are in “ ‘furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free 

speech.’ ” Those categories include “any written or oral 

statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or 

judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by 

law,” and “any written or oral statement or writing made in 

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 

legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 

proceeding authorized by law.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(2).)

An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of an antiSLAPP motion under the de novo standard. (Park, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
10

2. Minkovitch’s Appealed Claims All Arise From 

Protected Conduct

The trial court correctly concluded that Minkovitch’s 

Appealed Claims all arise from protected petitioning conduct. 

Those claims are based upon statements that were either made 

in the course of litigation or in connection with official 

proceedings by a government agency.

Minkovitch’s third through sixth causes of action all arise 

from Respondents’ filing and prosecution of the Contempt OSC. 

Regardless of how it is labeled, each of these causes of action is 

based upon Respondents’ alleged false statements in the 

Contempt OSC. (See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 

[“The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of 

the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity 

that gives rise to his or her asserted liability”].)5 Pleadings filed 

in litigation are a paradigmatic example of protected petitioning 

conduct. (See Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 [an act in 

furtherance of the right to petition under section 425.16 “includes 

communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and 

prosecution of a civil action”].)

Minkovitch’s seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action 

also arise from litigation conduct. Each of those causes of action 

is based upon Mansouri’s statements in the December 20 e-mail. 

As the trial court correctly observed, the contents of the e-mail 

5 No exception exists under the anti-SLAPP statute for 

actions for malicious prosecution or for abuse of process. (Jarrow 

Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 734–735; 

Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
11

concern prior court proceedings and Mansouri’s intended next 

steps on behalf of his client.

Like pleadings, communications by counsel concerning 

ongoing litigation are protected petitioning conduct. “ ‘Under the 

plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), as 

well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all 

communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their 

representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other 

petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by 

the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 

Cal.App.5th 394, 408–409 [attorney’s letter to opposing counsel 

was “unquestionably protected activity”], quoting Cabral v. 

Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 479–480; see Rusheen, 

supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 [protected conduct “includes 

qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in 

litigation”].)6

6 Minkovitch’s complaint contains a vague allegation that 

Mansouri “started threatening” him with “physical harm.” 

However, the complaint does not contain any specific allegation of 

a threat other than the December 20 e-mail. The appellate 

record also does not contain any evidence of physical threats. The 

trial court stated in its ruling that it “cannot locate the alleged 

physical threat that Minkovitch refers to in his Complaint.” 

Because Minkovitch did not include his declaration opposing the 

anti-SLAPP motion in the appellate record, we must presume 

that the trial court was correct in this characterization of the 

evidence. (See In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102 [appellant 

has the “burden of showing error by an adequate record”].) Thus, 

there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that 

Mansouri allegedly made threats outside the context of litigation.
12

Minkovitch’s claim that Mansouri gave false information to 

DCSS also arises from protected litigation conduct. Mansouri 

allegedly gave DCSS information about Minkovitch’s child 

support obligations as determined by the court in the Dissolution 

Action. Minkovitch’s claim therefore challenged statements 

made “in connection with” the issues in that action. (See Kenne 

v. Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 967 (Kenne) [allegedly 

false police reports “dealt with efforts at service of papers in an 

existing litigation and thus were ‘made in connection with an 

issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body’ ”], 

quoting § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)

Mansouri also made his challenged statements in 

anticipation of official proceedings by DCSS. “Communications 

that are preparatory to or in anticipation of commencing official 

proceedings come within the protection of the anti-SLAPP 

statute.” (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569–

1570 (Siam) [reports of child abuse to mandatory reporters were 

protected under section 425.16, as they were “designed to prompt 

action by law enforcement or child welfare agencies”].)

Minkovitch argues that his Appealed Claims did not arise 

from conduct that is protected under section 425.16 because 

Respondents’ challenged conduct was not actually “in 

furtherance” of any constitutional rights. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

Minkovitch claims that Respondents’ challenged statements were 

not “valid” exercises of any constitutional right because they were 

false and unlawful and were intended to intimidate rather than 

further any legitimate purpose.

Minkovitch’s argument confuses the first and second step of 

the anti-SLAPP analysis. To show that a claim arises from 

protected conduct under the first step of the anti-SLAPP 
13

procedure, a defendant need not prove that his or her conduct 

involved the valid exercise of a constitutional right. “That the 

Legislature expressed a concern in the statute’s preamble with 

lawsuits that chill valid exercise of First Amendment rights does 

not mean that a court may read a separate proof-of-validity 

requirement into the operative sections of the statute.

[Citations.] Rather, any ‘claimed illegitimacy of the defendant’s 

acts is an issue which the plaintiff must raise and support in the 

context of the discharge of the plaintiff’s [secondary] burden to 

provide a prima facie showing of the merits of the plaintiff’s 

case.’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94, quoting 

Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1367.)

Our Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this 

rule when “either the defendant concedes, or the evidence 

conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or 

petition activity was illegal as a matter of law.” (Flatley v. Mauro 

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320 (Flatley).) However, in Flatley the 

court emphasized that a plaintiff’s mere allegation of illegality is 

not sufficient to preclude a defendant from showing that his or 

her challenged conduct is protected under section 425.16: “If,

however, a factual dispute exists about the legitimacy of the 

defendant’s conduct, it cannot be resolved within the first step [of 

the anti-SLAPP procedure] but must be raised by the plaintiff in 

connection with the plaintiff’s burden to show a probability of 

prevailing on the merits.” (Id. at p. 316; see Birkner v. Lam 

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 285 [“ ‘[C]onduct that would 

otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute does 

not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged to have been 

unlawful or unethical’ ”], quoting Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 

Cal.App.4th 892, 910–911.)
14

Thus, where the alleged illegality of the defendant’s 

conduct is disputed, claims that the defendant made false 

statements in litigation or to government agencies in connection 

with official proceedings will support an anti-SLAPP motion. 

(See Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 118, 

123 [protection under section 425.16 applied “even against 

allegations of fraudulent promises made during the settlement 

process”]; Kenne, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 966–967 [alleged 

false police report was within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute 

where defendants denied that the report was false or illegal].)

Respondents did not concede that they engaged in any 

unlawful conduct. They also submitted evidence that, at a 

minimum, created factual disputes as to whether they had made 

any false statements. The exception under Flatley for conduct 

that is illegal as a matter of law therefore does not apply here.

3. Minkovitch Failed to Show a Probability of 

Success on His Appealed Claims

a. The litigation privilege bars Minkovitch’s 

fourth through ninth causes of action

The trial court correctly found that the litigation privilege 

precludes each of Minkovitch’s Appealed Claims except for his 

third cause of action for malicious prosecution. “Pursuant to 

[Civil Code] section 47[, subdivision] (b), the [litigation] privilege 

bars a civil action for damages for communications made ‘[i]n any 

(1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other 

official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or 

course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable 

pursuant to [statutes governing writs of mandate],’ with certain 

statutory exceptions . . . . The privilege established by this 

subdivision often is referred to as an ‘absolute’ privilege, and it 
15

bars all tort causes of action except a claim for malicious 

prosecution.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 350, 360 (Hagberg), quoting Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).)

The litigation privilege applies to communications that 

further the objects of litigation, even if those communications 

include false claims or perjurious evidence. (Hagberg, supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 361; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1058.) The 

privilege also protects communications “ ‘to or from governmental

officials which may precede the initiation of formal proceedings.’ ” 

(Hagberg, at p. 362, quoting Slaughter v. Friedman (1982) 32 

Cal.3d 149, 156, italics omitted.)

The litigation privilege therefore clearly applies to 

Minkovitch’s claims relating to the Contempt OSC (other than 

his cause of action for malicious prosecution). Those claims are 

based upon pleadings filed during the Dissolution Action.

The privilege also applies to the statements in Mansouri’s 

December 20 e-mail. That e-mail directly related to issues in the 

Dissolution Action and concerned Respondents’ next steps with 

respect to those issues. (See Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 

205, 212 [the litigation privilege applies to “any publication

required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial 

proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though 

the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of 

the court or its officers is involved”].)

Minkovitch cites Siam in support of an argument that the 

privilege did not protect Mansouri’s allegedly false statements to 

DCSS. That decision does not apply here. The court in that case 

concluded that the privilege under Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (b) did not protect the defendant’s alleged knowingly

false report of child abuse to police and to mandated reporters of 
16

such abuse. (Siam, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1567–1568, 

1577.) The court relied on Penal Code section 11172, subdivision 

(a), which expressly permits damage claims against voluntary 

reporters who knowingly or recklessly make false reports of child 

abuse to the authorities. Agreeing with a prior decision, the 

court concluded that this specific statute overrides the litigation 

privilege with respect to the particular communications that the 

statute makes actionable. (Siam, at p. 1577, citing Begier v. 

Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 885.)

Penal Code section 11172 thus falls within the category of 

statutes whose provisions permitting a specific legal remedy 

(such as criminal sanctions for perjury and filing a false police 

report) prevail over the general privilege in Civil Code section 47. 

(See Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 

41 Cal.4th 1232, 1246 [the court’s recognition of crimes 

constituting exceptions to the litigation privilege “has been 

guided by the ‘rule of statutory construction that particular 

provisions will prevail over general provisions’ ”].) Minkovitch 

does not cite any statute permitting a claim for damages for false 

statements to the DCSS concerning child support obligations. 

The exception to the litigation privilege recognized in Siam 

therefore does not apply to Mansouri’s alleged statements to 

DCSS. (See Kenne, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 972 [the holding 

in Siam did not apply to the defendant’s alleged conduct in 

making false police reports because Penal Code section 11172, 

subdivision (a) did not apply to such reports].)
17

b. Minkovitch could not prevail on his third 

cause of action for malicious prosecution 

because such actions may not be based on 

family law proceedings

The court in Bidna recognized a “bright line” rule barring 

any claim for malicious prosecution based upon unsuccessful 

motions or OSC’s in family law proceedings. (Bidna, supra, 19 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 29–30, 37.) The court concluded that such a 

rule is justified because of (1) the “unique propensity for 

bitterness” in family law litigation; (2) the sanctions available in 

such litigation to deter improper litigation conduct; and (3) the 

need for sensitivity and flexibility in imposing family law 

remedies. (Id. at p. 35.)

Minkovitch acknowledges this holding but argues that it 

does not apply to contempt proceedings. Minkovitch cites the fact 

that the contempt remedy is governed by the Code of Civil 

Procedure rather than the Family Code. We reject the argument.

The source of the authority for a contempt remedy is 

immaterial. The pertinent fact is that the remedy is sought in a 

family law proceeding. A motion or OSC seeking a contempt 

order in a family law case, like other types of remedies sought in 

such a case, is subject to the concerns the court identified in 

Bidna. Family law actions may include remedies that are also 

available outside the family law context. (See L.G. v. M.B. (2018) 

25 Cal.App.5th 211, 224.) But it is the family law context, not 

the statutory source of the remedy, that is the important factor.

The court in Bidna clearly intended to include contempt 

motions within the scope of the bright line rule that it created. 

The court cited with approval several prior decisions revealing an 

“abiding judicial reluctance to entertain malicious prosecution 
18

actions which arise either out of motions or OSC’s, or originate in 

family law proceedings,” including contempt motions. (See 

Bidna, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 32–34, citing Twyford v. 

Twyford (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 916; Chauncey v. Niems (1986) 182 

Cal.App.3d 967; Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112.)

We also conclude that a malicious prosecution action may 

not be predicated on an unsuccessful OSC re contempt in a family 

law action. Minkovitch therefore could not show a probability of 

success on his third cause of action for malicious prosecution.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondents are

entitled to their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.