alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3913 

To amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to require agencies 

to make considerations relating to the promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation before issuing or modifying certain regulations. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 16, 2014 

Mr. DUFFY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to require agencies to make considerations relating to the 

promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation before issuing or modifying certain regulations. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RULEMAKING CONSIDERATIONS. 

4 Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 

5 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1851) is amended by adding at the end 

6 the following: 

7 ‘‘(i) CONSIDERATION OF PROMOTION OF EFFI8 CIENCY, COMPETITION, AND CAPITAL FORMATION.—In 


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2 

•HR 3913 IH

1 issuing or modifying any regulation under this section, the 

2 appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Commodity Fu3 tures Trading Commission, and the Securities and Ex4 change Commission— 

5 ‘‘(1) shall consider whether the regulation is 

6 necessary or appropriate in the public interest; 

7 ‘‘(2) shall consider whether the regulation will 

8 promote efficiency, competition, and capital forma9 tion; 

10 ‘‘(3) shall consider, among other matters, the 

11 impact the regulation would have on competition; 

12 ‘‘(4) may not adopt the regulation if it would 

13 impose a burden on competition not necessary or ap14 propriate in furtherance of the purposes of this sec15 tion; and 

16 ‘‘(5) shall include in the statement of basis and 

17 purpose incorporated in the regulation adopted 

18 under this section, the reasons for the determination 

19 under paragraph (4) that any burden on competition 

20 imposed by the regulation is necessary or appro21 priate in furtherance of the purposes of this sec22 tion.’’. 

Æ 


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# C_2008285EN.01000901.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/9

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 11 September 2008 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Högsta domstolen — Sweden) — Gävle Kraftvärme AB v Länsstyrelsen i Gävleborgs län

(Case C-251/07) (1)

1

(Environment - Directive 2000/76/EC - Incineration of waste - Classification of an installation for the production of heat and electricity - Concepts of incineration plant and co-incineration plant)

(2008/C 285/13)

Language of the case: Swedish

Referring court

Högsta domstolen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Gävle Kraftvärme AB

Applicant:

Defendant: Länsstyrelsen i Gävleborgs län

Defendant:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Högsta domstolen — Interpretation of Article 3(4) and (5) of Directive 2000/76/EC of 4 December 2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the incineration of waste (OJ 2000 L 332, p. 91) — Classification of a combined power and heating plant comprising a number of furnaces — Incineration plant or co-incineration plant

Operative part of the judgment

| 1. | For the purposes of applying Directive 2000/76/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2000 on the incineration of waste, where a co-generation plant comprises a number of boilers, each boiler and its associated equipment is to be regarded as constituting a separate plant. |
| --- | --- |

1.

For the purposes of applying Directive 2000/76/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2000 on the incineration of waste, where a co-generation plant comprises a number of boilers, each boiler and its associated equipment is to be regarded as constituting a separate plant.

| 2. | It is on the basis of its main purpose that a plant is to be classified as an ‘incineration plant’ or a ‘co-incineration plant’ within the meaning of Article 3(4) and (5) of Directive 2000/76. It is for the competent authorities to identify that purpose on the basis of an assessment of the facts existing at the time at which that assessment is carried out. In the context of such an assessment, account must be taken, in particular, of the volume of energy generated or material products produced by the plant in question in relation to the quantity of waste incinerated in that plant and the stability and continuity of that production. |
| --- | --- |

2.

It is on the basis of its main purpose that a plant is to be classified as an ‘incineration plant’ or a ‘co-incineration plant’ within the meaning of Article 3(4) and (5) of Directive 2000/76. It is for the competent authorities to identify that purpose on the basis of an assessment of the facts existing at the time at which that assessment is carried out. In the context of such an assessment, account must be taken, in particular, of the volume of energy generated or material products produced by the plant in question in relation to the quantity of waste incinerated in that plant and the stability and continuity of that production.

---

(1)  OJ C 170, 21.7.2007.

1

---
1546.

#### Rutherford *v.*The State.

Certiorari, from Ben Hill superior court — -Judge 'Whipple. October 20, 1908.

Submitted January 14,

Decided January 27, 1909.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of an assault. He excepts to the overruling of his petition for certiorari, which' was based on the ground that there was no evidence to support the -verdict,! and upon an additional ground not verified. The evidence for the prosecution, briefly stated, is as follows: The prosecutor testified: “I met the defendant on Pine street in Fitzgerald. When I met him he had a brick in his hand and immediately began cursing me.. He said, ‘You God damn bastard, what, did you-beat and choke me for on the street a while ago, you and that crowd?’ I *483was, of course, surprised at that sort of- conduct, and-told biim-I did not do it. ■ No one was right there except the deféndáiit and myself, and there was no object between us that would have, prevented him from hitting me with the brick. We were within a iew feet of each other. As he cursed me he drew back the brick in his hand as if he intended to strike me'with it.. Just at that time I thrust my hand in my hip-pocket, and told him-,I would shoot. I did not have any pistol, but did that for the purpose -of making him believe I had one, and thus prevented him from •striking me with the brick. When I did this he let his hand down -and did not throw the brick. We talked for,a minute or two, and J kept telling him that I did not beat him and was not 'in the ■crowd that he claimed beat him, and he commenced cursing me again. I reckon by that time he concluded-1 did not have, any pistol, and he drew back his hand in which he held the brick, just as if he meant to strike' me. Just at that time some one across the street hollered at him, or I reckon they hollered at Him; they sounded like they did. He looked around, and I moved off and got out of the way.” ■ ■ ■■■

*482Hill, C. J.

1. While a mere threat or menace to commit a violent injury upon the person of another is not sufficient to constitute an assault, yet where the threat or menace is accompanied by an apparent attempt to commit such an injury, and its consummation is prevented, either by the act of the person upon whom the assault is threatened or by the interposition of a third person, the violence has commenced and- the assault is complete.

2. The evidence in this case is sufficient to authorize the finding of the jury that the defendant apparently intended a present assault upon the person of the prosecutor, and that- he was only prevented from immediately carrying out such intention by the countei;-menaee, of; the prosecutor and by the interference of a third party. *Thomas*v. *State,*99 *Ga.*38 (26 S. E. 748), and citations. *Judgment affirmed.*

*483
      *B. Wall,*for plaintiff in error.

*A. J. McDonald, solicitor, Walter F. George,*contra.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 21, 2022

No. 04-22-00206-CV

MODIVCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC formerly known as LogistiCare Solutions, LLC,

Appellant

v.

Fidencio GALLARDO, Josefina Gallardo, Juliana Gallardo, Maria Doloroes Zertuche, Ana 

Delia Gallardo, Fidencion Gallardo Castillo, Jr., Fermin Gallardo, Individually and as 

Representatives of the Estate of Maria Gallardo Castillo, deceased,

Appellees

From the 341st Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CVA001485D3

Honorable Rebecca Ramirez Palomo, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice 

Irene Rios, Justice

Appellant Modivcare Solutions, LLC, formerly known as Logisticare Solutions, LLC,

filed a notice of interlocutory appeal citing section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code. The statute is reserved for governmental units. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. §§ 51.014, 101.001.

 Based on the record, we conclude Appellant is not a governmental unit under section 

101.001. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001; Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. 

Redus (Redus I), 518 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. 2017); Orion Real Estate v. Sarro, 559 S.W.3d 599, 

602-03 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.); Gonzales Nursing Operations, LLC v. Smith, 

No. 04-20-00102-CV, 2020 WL 5646482, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 23, 2020, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.); AECOM USA, Inc. v. Mata, No. 04-15-00773-CV, 2016 WL 5112222, at *2, 

*4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 21, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ interlocutory 

appeal. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–43 (Tex. 2007).
However, Appellant asked that, if we concluded we do not have appellate jurisdiction for 

an interlocutory appeal, we treat their filing as a petition for writ of mandamus. Appellant’s 

request is granted. We direct the Clerk of the Court to change the designation of appellate cause 

number 04-22-00206-CV from an appeal to an original proceeding, and this court will review the 

petition accordingly. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 453 (Tex. 2011).

Because no petition has yet been filed, this case will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction 

in ten days, unless Appellant files a petition for writ of mandamus that complies with Texas Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 52.3 in the interim.

It is so ORDERED on this 21st day of April 2022.

 PER CURIAM 

 ATTESTED TO: ______________________________

 MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
IN RE: REDMOND

86A16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 21, 2016

Edwin A. Pressly, Attorney at Law, Statesville, Elizabeth M. Haddix, Attorney at Law, Pittsboro, Mark Dorosin, Attorney at Law, for Nicols, Linda (Administratrix), et al.

Marc X. Sneed, Assistant Attorney General, Amar Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorney General, Elizabeth A. Fisher, Assistant Solicitor General, Olga Vysotskaya de Brito, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Johanna Schoen, for Johanna Schoen, Ph.D.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 21st of October 2016 by State of NC for Withdrawal and Substitution of Counsel:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 21st of October 2016."
1324.

#### Kries *&*Chaffin *v.*Fuller E. Callaway Company.

Levy and claim, from city court of LaGrange — Judge Harwell. June 24, 1908.

Argued November 11, 1908.

Decided March 23, 1909.

*F. M. Longley, A. II. Thompson,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Hatton Lovejoy,*contra.

Hill, C. J.

Tlie controlling questions in this casa are issues of fact, and the verdict is clearly and strongly supported by the evidence. If any error of law was committed by the trial court, it was .slight and immaterial, and insufficient to warrant the grant of another trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*
Latausha Renee Pinkney, Plaintiff, v. Joey Pinkney, Defendant.

No. COA15-1362

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: September 20, 2016

DISMISSED.
# C_2009044EN.01001902.xml

| 21.2.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 44/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.2.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 44/19

---

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 22 December 2008 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien (Austria)) — Criminal proceedings against Vladimir Turanský

(Case C-491/07) (1)

1

(Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement - Article 54 - ‘Ne bis in idem’ principle - Scope - Concept of ‘finally disposed of’ - Decision by which a police authority orders the suspension of criminal proceedings - Decision not barring further prosecution and not having a ne bis in idem effect under national law)

Ne bis in idem

ne bis in idem

(2009/C 44/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien

Defendant in the criminal proceedings

Vladimir Turanský

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien — Interpretation of Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19) — Interpretation of ‘ne bis in idem’ principle — Scope — Decision by which a police authority terminates criminal proceedings

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

The ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen (Luxembourg) on 19 June 1990, does not fall to be applied to a decision by which an authority of a Contracting State, after examining the merits of the case brought before it, makes an order, at a stage before the charging of a person suspected of a crime, suspending the criminal proceedings, where the suspension decision does not, under the national law of that State, definitively bar further prosecution and therefore does not preclude new criminal proceedings, in respect of the same acts, in that State.

ne bis in idem

---

(1)  OJ C 22, 26.1.2008.

1

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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 13, 2017

Order 

Clerk

September 12, 2017

154716(19)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

SC: 154716

v COA: 333566

Wayne CC: 11-005203-FC

KEVIN LAMAR HILL,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of former defense counsel to extend the 

time for filing a response pursuant to this Court’s order of September 12, 2017, is 

GRANTED. The response will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before 

October 24, 2017.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

September 23, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

137293 (8) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

GRADY ZODIAC BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 137293 

 COA: 286939 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

___________________________________ 

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it 

is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be 

liable for filing fees. 

Within 21 days of the certification of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the 

Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $36.00, shall submit a copy of this order 

with the payment, and shall refile the copy of the pleadings which is being returned 

with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being 

filed in this Court. 

If plaintiff timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly 

payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in an amount of 50 percent of 

the deposits made to plaintiff’s account until the payments equal the balance due of 

$339.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court.

 Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) plaintiff shall not file further appeals in this 

Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. 

The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and 

return plaintiff’s pleadings with this order. 

jm 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 23, 2008 

Clerk
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40490

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PABLO PEREZ-GONZALEZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CR-633-2

Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Pablo Perez-Gonzalez has moved for

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Perez-Gonzalez has filed a response, requesting that

substitute counsel be appointed or, in the alternative, that counsel be relieved

and counsel’s brief be stricken. Perez-Gonzalez’s requests are DENIED. Our

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 29, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40490

2

independent review ofthe record, counsel’s brief, and Perez-Gonzalez’s response

discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.

The record does reveal a clerical error in the judgment. See FED. R. CRIM.

P. 36. Count three of the indictment charged Gonzalez with using, carrying,

brandishing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a drugtrafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Perez-Gonzalez pleaded

guilty to count three as set forth in the indictment. The written judgment

reflects, however, that Perez-Gonzalez was convicted of possession of a firearm

during the commission of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of § 924(c)(1).

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel

is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. This matter is REMANDED for correction

of the clerical error pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3800 

To name the Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinic in Ewa Plain, 

Oahu, Hawaii, as the ‘‘Daniel Kahikina Akaka Department of Veterans 

Affairs Outpatient Clinic’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 19, 2013 

Ms. HANABUSA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To name the Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinic in Ewa Plain, Oahu, Hawaii, as the ‘‘Daniel Kahikina 

Akaka Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. NAME OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 

4 OUTPATIENT CLINIC, EWA PLAIN, OAHU, HA5 WAII. 

6 The Department of Veterans Affairs outpatient clinic 

7 in Ewa Plain, Oahu, Hawaii, shall after the date of the 

8 enactment of this Act be known and designated as the 


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2 

•HR 3800 IH

1 ‘‘Daniel Kahikina Akaka Department of Veterans Affairs 

2 Outpatient Clinic’’. Any reference to such outpatient clinic 

3 in any law, regulation, map, document, record, or other 

4 paper of the United States shall be considered to be a ref5 erence to the Daniel Kahikina Akaka Department of Vet6 erans Affairs Outpatient Clinic. 

Æ 


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**Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fourth Chamber) of 10 September 2008 – Alcon v OHIM – \*Acri.Tec (BioVisc)**

**(Case T-106/07)**

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for Community word mark BioVisc – Earlier international word marks PROVISC and DUOVISC − Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services
– Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 26, 43)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 8 February 2007 (Case R 660/2006-2) concerning opposition proceedings between Alcon Inc. and \*Acri.Tec AG Gesellschaft für ophthalmologische Produkte. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | \*Acri.Tec AG Gesellschaft für ophtalmologische Produkte |
| Community trade mark sought: | Word Mark BioVisc for goods in Class 5 – Application No 3651809 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Alcon Inc. |
| Marks or signs relied on in support of the opposition: | International work marks PROVISC and DUOVISC for goods in Class 5 |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Opposition upheld in its entirety |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Opposition dismissed in its entirety |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Alcon Inc. to pay the costs. |
STATE v. Travis Taylor DAIL.

No. 174P16-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 11, 2016.

Robert O'Hale, for Dail, Travis Taylor.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*95The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 10th of May 2016 by State of NC for Temporary Stay:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th of May 2016."
No. 81, Orig.

#### Kentucky *v.*Indiana et al.

Accounting of the Special Master is received and ordered filed. The Special *1103Master appointed by the Court is discharged with the thanks of the Court. [For earlier decision herein, see, *e. g.,*474 U. S. 1.]