J-A22024-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.M.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 548 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): 206-OC-2018, 

207-OC-2018, CP-19-DP-0000015-2016, 

CP-19-DP-0000016-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.R.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 549 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-19-DP-0000016-2016

IN RE: H.R.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.B..MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 550 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 207-OC-2018
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IN RE: G.M.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 551 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered February 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 206-OC-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2020

K.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders entered on February 21, 2020, 

that involuntarily terminated her parental rights and changed the permanency 

goals from reunification to adoption with respect to her daughters, G.M.S., 

born in March of 2014, and H.R.S., born in April of 2015 (collectively, “the 

Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows. In 

July of 2015, Columbia County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the 

Agency”) initiated services for this family due to concerns regarding substance 

abuse, housing instability, and the parenting skills of Mother and Father. N.T., 

____________________________________________

1 By the same orders, the court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of 

M.S. (“Father”). Father timely filed notices of appeal, which we address by 

separate memorandum.
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12/4/19, at 10-11. On November 17, 2015, Mother and Father were 

incarcerated on charges involving the possession of methamphetamine. Id.

at 13, 57, 114; CYS Exhibits 11, 13. Mother remained incarcerated until 

February 4, 2016, when she was released on bail.2 CYS Exhibit 11.

Due to Mother’s and Father’s incarceration and substance abuse, CYS 

filed dependency petitions in March of 2016. N.T., 12/4/19, at 14. The 

juvenile court adjudicated the Children dependent on April 6, 2016, and placed 

them in foster care. Id.; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 

2/21/20, at 2, ¶ 5. The court established reunification as the Children’s 

permanency goal. N.T., 12/4/19, at 19. In furtherance of that goal, Mother 

and Father were required to participate in drug and alcohol evaluations and 

follow all recommendations, as well as submit to random drug screens and 

refrain from illegal drug use. Id. at 17. Mother and Father also were required,

inter alia, to complete parenting classes and demonstrate an increase in 

parenting skills and knowledge. Id. at 18.

On March 6, 2017, Mother pleaded guilty to institutional vandalism, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3307(a)(3). CYS Exhibit 11. Mother was sentenced to twelve 

months of probation, with credit given for the days previously served in prison. 

Id. Because Mother violated her probation by failing to maintain contact with 

____________________________________________

2 There is no record evidence that the Children were placed in the legal and/or

physical custody of CYS during Mother’s imprisonment. Rather, as discussed 

infra, the record indicates that the Children were placed after being 

adjudicated dependent. 
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the adult probation office, she was re-incarcerated on September 25, 2017. 

N.T., 12/4/19, at 45–46. Mother was re-sentenced to a period of incarceration 

of not less than five months nor more than twelve months, with credit given 

for the days previously served in prison. CYS Exhibit 11. The court directed 

that Mother be automatically paroled at the end of her minimum sentence and 

remain under the supervision of adult probation for the balance of her 

maximum sentence. Id. The court further directed that Mother shall have 

special parole conditions, including an approved home plan, and that she 

participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all treatment 

recommendations. Id. On May 18, 2018, Mother was released from prison 

to Graniteville House of Recovery (“Graniteville”), where she remained until 

July of 2018. N.T., 12/4/19, at 46. 

Both before and after Mother’s stay at Graniteville, she failed to 

complete an outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law and Order, 2/21/20, at 3, ¶ 21; N.T., 12/4/19, at 26–31; 

N.T., 1/8/20, at 39–40. Throughout the history of this case, Mother relocated 

multiple times, and she failed to maintain consistent contact and promptly 

advise CYS of her new addresses. N.T., 12/4/19, at 31, 57–69, 113. As a 

result, CYS was able to conduct only nine random drug screens prior to filing 

the subject petitions. In 2015, Mother tested positive for amphetamines, 

methamphetamine, and marijuana. CYS Exhibit 8. Mother tested positive for 

marijuana in April of 2016 and in February, May, and September of 2017. Id. 
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In 2018, CYS did not conduct random drug screens because Mother was 

incarcerated or in Graniteville until July of that year. CYS Exhibit 8; N.T., 

12/4/19, at 45–46. Thereafter, from July through the end of December of 

2018, Mother moved on three occasions, and CYS had difficulty locating her. 

N.T., 12/4/19, at 67–71.

On November 2, 2018, CYS filed petitions for a goal change to adoption 

and petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b). A hearing on CYS’s 

petitions occurred on December 4, 2019, and January 8, 2020.3 CYS 

____________________________________________

3 During the hearing, an attorney-guardian ad litem (GAL) represented the 

legal and best interests of the Children, then four and five years old. However, 

the orphans’ court had appointed separate counsel to represent the Children’s 

legal interests. The GAL stated on the record in open court that legal counsel 

had previously informed the court that there was no conflict between the 

Children’s legal and best interests. N.T., 12/4/19, at 2-6. Therefore, the 

Children’s legal counsel did not represent the Children at the hearing.

We conclude that the court complied with In re Adoption of L.B.M., 

161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017), which held that, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), 

a child who is the subject of a contested involuntary-termination proceeding 

has a statutory right to counsel, who discerns and advocates for the child’s 

legal interests and which the Court defined as a child’s preferred outcome. 

L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 180. In addition, the court complied with In re T.S., 192 

A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), which held that, in cases where there is no conflict 

between a child’s legal and best interests, a GAL “representing the child’s best 

interests can also represent the child’s legal interests. . . .” Id. at 1092; see 

also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 670 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en 

banc) (citation omitted), appeal granted in part, 221 A.3d 649 (Pa. 2019) 

(holding that this Court:

does not have the authority [to] review sua sponte whether a 

conflict existed between counsel’s representation and the child’s 
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presented the testimony of the Children’s caseworker, Brittany Hacker, and

Mother testified on her own behalf.

By orders dated and entered on February 21, 2020, the orphans’ court 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights and changed the Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption.4 Mother timely filed notices of appeal and 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The orphans’ 

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 1, 2020.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

I. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and misapply the law 

when it granted the Agency’s Petition to Terminate Mother’s 

Parental Rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and § 

2511(b)?

II. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and misapply the law 

when it granted the Agency’s Petition for Goal Change to Adoption, 

where the Agency failed to satisfy its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence that the goal change was in the Children’s 

best interest?

____________________________________________

stated preference in an involuntary termination of parental rights 

proceeding. Rather, . . . this Court’s authority is limited to raising 

sua sponte the issue of whether the orphans’ court violated

Section 2313(a) by failing to appoint any counsel for the [c]hild 

in a termination hearing.).

(emphases in original).

4

 The GAL stated on the record in open court that it is in the Children’s best 

interests that Mother’s parental rights be terminated and their goals be 

changed to adoption. N.T., 12/4/19, at 6.
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Mother’s Brief at 5.

We review Mother’s first issue for an abuse of discretion, as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

The relevant provisions of Section 2511 in this case are as follows:
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, 

the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within 

a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child. 

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 
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efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8), and (b).

We review the termination orders pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). See 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that, 

this Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in 

addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental 

rights).5

This Court has explained, “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a [twelve]-month 

time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the children’s 

removal by the court.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Once the twelve-month period has been established, the court must next 

determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to 

exist, despite the reasonable good-faith efforts of the child welfare agency 

supplied over a realistic time period. Id. The “relevant inquiry in this regard 

is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus 

whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the 

hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Termination under 

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current 

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement 

____________________________________________

5 Based on this disposition, we need not review Mother’s arguments regarding 

Sections 2511(a)(1) and (5). 
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or the availability or efficacy of the agency’s services. In Re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Finally, the court must consider whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1275–1276. The “needs and welfare” analysis is relevant 

to both Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). In In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc), this Court stated:

[W]hile both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to 

evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to 

resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to 

addressing the “needs and welfare” of C.L.G., as proscribed by

Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must 

address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

Id. at 1009 (citations omitted).

With respect to Section 2511(b), we have explained, “Intangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted). 

However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the 

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of 

any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762–763 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted).
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Mother argues that CYS failed to meet its burden of proof with respect 

to the second element of Section 2511(a)(8), i.e., that the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the Children continue to exist. Mother’s 

Brief at 25. Mother contends that she satisfied the objectives of the Children’s 

permanency plans. Specifically, Mother asserts that she completed a drug 

and alcohol evaluation, parenting classes, and that she found stable housing. 

Id. We disagree.

Ms. Hacker, the Children’s caseworker, testified that Mother informed 

her in September of 2016, that she completed a drug and alcohol evaluation. 

N.T., 12/4/19, at 24. In addition, Ms. Hacker testified that Mother told her in 

April of 2017 that “she completed an intake at Gaudenzia,” a drug and alcohol 

rebilitation facility, . . . “and was going to be admitted to outpatient drug and 

alcohol counseling” there. Id. at 25. Ms. Hacker learned that Mother 

completed one session at Gaudenzia in May of 2017, but she never returned. 

Id. Thereafter, while Mother was in Graniteville from May until July of 2018, 

Ms. Hacker testified that Mother participated in treatment at Northeast 

Counseling. Id. at 29. However, there is no record evidence that Mother 

completed that treatment. Id. at 29–30.

During her cross-examination by CYS, Mother testified with respect to 

the drug and alcohol treatment she received after she left Graniteville:

Q. After you left [Graniteville,] do you know if you attended 

Genesis House?
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A. Yes, I went to two of them but then I had to move so I had to 

quit going to them.

Q. Would you agree with me you never completed any outpatient 

treatment at Genesis House?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you do any other outpatient treatment for drug use after 

leaving the Graniteville House of Recovery?

A. I did start going to R.U. Reformers Anonymous. 

* * *

Up in Berwick. But, unfortunately, because of me hopping 

around like I was, I wasn’t able to get up there either.

N.T., 1/8/20, at 39–40. Based on the foregoing testimony of Ms. Hacker and 

Mother, it is clear that Mother completed at least one drug and alcohol 

evaluation, but she never completed any treatment program.

Moreover, Mother did not overcome her addiction to illegal drugs by the 

time of the subject proceeding. Ms. Hacker testified that on August 16, 2019, 

Mother left her a voicemail stating that she was hospitalized for multiple 

injuries.6 N.T., 12/4/19, at 78. On cross-examination by CYS, Mother 

____________________________________________

6 Ms. Hacker learned that Mother allegedly was assaulted by her ex-paramour, 

and that she sustained a brain hemorrhage. N.T., 12/4/19, at 78–79. On

cross-examination by CYS, Mother testified that while camping with her exparamour, her ex-paramour “beat me up and ran me over several times with 

a four wheeler as well as I was being forced to walk around on it, and I got 

my head smacked off of a rock and ended up hemorrhaging in my head.” 

N.T., 1/8/20, at 35–36.
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acknowledged that upon admission to the hospital at that time, she was 

screened for drugs and found positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. 

N.T., 1/8/20, at 37–38. On March 26, 2019, CYS performed a random drug 

screen on Mother, in which she tested positive for marijuana. CYS Exhibit at 

8. On November 25, 2019, approximately one week prior to the 

commencement of the subject proceeding, Ms. Hacker made an unannounced 

visit to Mother’s home to perform a random drug screen, but Mother did not 

answer the door. Id.; N.T., 12/4/19, at 34. Ms. Hacker testified that she left 

a note for Mother “to come into the Agency within 24 hours with a date 

November 26th by 12:45. And Mom did not come in to the Agency to submit 

a drug screen.” N.T., 12/4/19, at 34. Finally, Mother testified on crossexamination by CYS with respect to her drug addiction, as follows:

Q. Would you agree with me that after you completed rehab at 

Graniteville you tested positive for methamphetamine at the 

hospital, and marijuana, last summer, . . . .? That you still haven’t 

maintained staying drug-free?

A. Not completely.

Q. Would you agree that is one of the things the Agency wanted 

you to do to get your kids back?

A. Yes.

____________________________________________

Ms. Hacker testified that Mother was discharged from the hospital to a 

rehabilitation center on September 3, 2019, where she remained for 

approximately one week. N.T., 12/4/19, at 80.
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Id. at 40–41. Thus, Mother failed to satisfy her permanency objective 

regarding illegal drugs.

With respect to her parenting objective, Ms. Hacker testified that Mother 

“attended minimal parenting classes.” N.T., 12/4/19, at 42. Specifically, she 

testified on direct examination:

Q. Do you know when [Mother] first began to attend any parenting 

classes?

A. In June of 2017 it was reported that Mother initially met with 

a worker from the Columbia County Family Center in regard to 

parenting classes. But at that point Mom didn’t follow through 

with services. And then Mother attended a parent class on August 

17th of 2017 and September 21st of 2017.

Q. Do you know if she actually finished the course of parenting 

classes requested by the Agency?

A. She did not finish all ten classes, no.

Id. at 42–43. Ms. Hacker testified that while incarcerated, Mother attended 

an “intake” appointment for parenting classes on March 26, 2018, and she 

participated in four classes while incarcerated. Id. at 43–44. In addition, 

while residing in the Graniteville, Mother attended an intake appointment for 

parenting classes on May 25, 2018, at “Bridges in Luzerne County.” Id. at 

46. Ms. Hacker testified, “[Bridges] did report that Mom attended the intake[,]

and Mother attended a couple classes before being discharged from 

Graniteville House of Recovery.” Id. at 46–47. Ms. Hacker testified that 

Mother did not advise that she attended any other parenting classes during 

the Children’s dependencies. Id. at 48. On cross-examination by Mother’s 
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counsel, Ms. Hacker testified that Mother never completed the requisite ten 

parenting classes. N.T., 1/8/20, at 8–9.

With respect to visitation, Mother testified on cross-examination by CYS:

Q. Would you agree that you have not maintained consistent 

regular visits with the [Children] since they have been placed in 

foster care?

A. Right.

Q. Why not?

A. Stuff would come up[,] and I would not be able to make it.

N.T., 1/8/20, at 51. In 2016, CYS scheduled a total of eleven visits between 

Mother and the Children, and Mother attended four. CYS Exhibit 15. In 2017, 

CYS scheduled twenty-five visits, and Mother attended seventeen, four of 

which occurred while she was incarcerated. Id. In 2018, CYS scheduled 

twenty visits, and Mother attended sixteen, eight of which occurred while she 

was incarcerated. Id. In 2019, CYS scheduled twenty-one visits, and Mother 

attended four. Id. On re-direct examination by CYS, Ms. Hacker testified that 

Mother has seen the Children a total of five hours in 2019. N.T., 1/8/20, at 

18.

In summary, Ms. Hacker testified on direct examination:

Q. Have the parents met the minimum standards required in the 

Agency’s view for reunification with the [C]hildren?

A. No.

Q. When you say “no,” what is that based on?
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A. It is based on the fact that parents have not completed all 

objectives and tasks identified in the permanency plan. Although 

they have made efforts to do so on some occasions over the past 

three years or so, none of the objectives or tasks have been fully 

completed which would allow for reunification.

Q. Do you believe at this point in time that the parents have 

stable housing?

A. No.

Q. Why do you believe they don’t?

A. [Mother] has reported that she is residing at [an address in 

Wapwallopen7] but during my unannounced visit nobody 

answered. I’m also not able to confirm that that is an appropriate 

or stable house for [Mother].[8]

Q. Do you believe Mom has had a history of bouncing from various 

houses while you have had the case?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a concern for the Agency?

A. It is a concern, yes.

Q. Does the Agency believe that Mother is able to meet the 

[C]hild[ren]’s basic needs?

A. No.

N.T., 12/4/19, at 100–101.

____________________________________________

7

 Mother later testified that the address Ms. Hacker identified on December 

4, 2019, was located in Wapwallopen, Pennsylvania. N.T., 1/8/20, at 32.

8 Mother testified on cross-examination by CYS that she has resided at her 

current address with her boyfriend since June of 2019. N.T., 1/8/20, at 33. 

Mother testified that her boyfriend pays her living expenses. Id. at 42.
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Based on the foregoing testimonial evidence, we reject Mother’s 

argument that the orphans’ court abused its discretion with respect to the 

second element of Section 2511(a)(8), that the conditions that led to the 

Children’s removal continue to exist. The record evidence demonstrates that 

Mother’s illegal drug addiction, insufficient parenting, and housing instability 

continue to exist. Therefore, at the time of the subject proceeding, 

reunification of Mother and the Children was not imminent. In re I.J., 972 

A.2d at 11.

We also review whether the record supports the court’s finding 

regarding the third element of Section 2511(a)(8): that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

Children. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009. The record supports 

the court’s finding insofar as the Children have been in placement since April 

of 2016, which amounted to three years, nine months by the conclusion of the 

subject proceeding. As discussed above, the conditions which led to the 

Children’s placement continue to exist, and reunification of Mother and the 

Children was not imminent. Ms. Hacker testified on direct examination as 

follows:

Q. One of the objectives of the child permanency plans was 

assurance of the child’s safety. Do you think that the [C]hildren’s 

safety could be assured if they were returned to their parents?

A. No.

Q. Specifically why is that?
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A. I think that it would be a concern if they continued to bounce 

around home to home, . . ., if parents are continuing to use [illegal 

drugs], I don’t believe that the [C]hildren’s safety would [be] 

assured.

N.T., 12/4/19, at 104.

In addition, the record indicates that although the Children may love 

Mother, they also love their foster mother, with whom they have resided,

along with their foster father, since December of 2016. N.T., 12/4/19, at 107–

108. On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, Ms. Hacker testified:

Q. When [Mother] would show up to the visitation would you 

agree she was appropriate with the girls?

A. Yes.

Q. They had a good time together?

A. Yes.

Q. They would call her Mom?

A. They would, yes.

Q. You agree with me that the girls love her?

A. I would agree that their actions during visitations may show 

that.

Q. You agree with that?

A. Yes.

N.T., 1/8/20, at 12–13.

With respect to whether the Children love their foster mother, Ms. 

Hacker, who observed the Children monthly in their foster home, testified, 

“Yes, absolutely. There are plenty of times I am there and [H.R.S.] and 
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[G.M.S.] are running up to [their foster mother] and giving hugs and saying[,] 

‘I love you, Mommy.’” N.T., 12/4/19, at 107, 112. Moreover, on re-direct 

examination by CYS, Ms. Hacker testified that she believes it would be in the 

best interests of the Children to be adopted by their foster parents. Id. at 

111. She explained:

[The Children] have been there the past three years. They are 

bonded with the foster family. [T]hey have grown within that 

home and with the foster family. Their needs are being met. 

[G.M.S.] is in school. She seems to be doing well. [The foster 

mother] ensures they go to every medical appointment and they 

have everything they need.

Id. at 111–112.

Based on the totality of the record evidence, we discern no abuse of 

discretion by the orphans’ court in terminating Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). The record clearly demonstrates that the 

Children have been removed from Mother’s care far in excess of the statutory 

twelve-month minimum; the conditions which led to their removal continue to 

exist, and terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the Children. Mother’s issue regarding Section 2511(a)(8) fails.

With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the court abused 

its discretion because it is not in the Children’s best interest to terminate her 

parental rights. Specifically, Mother argues that insofar as Ms. Hacker testified 

that the Children love Mother, the court “provided little to no consideration 

[of] the bond between the Children and Mother.” Mother’s Brief at 27. We 

disagree.
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The following case law is relevant:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533–536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental 

rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond 

against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the 

orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine 

whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 

397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 

473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 

also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court 

should consider the importance of continuity of relationships 

and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “Common sense dictates 

that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children 

are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that in weighing 

the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court 

observed, “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 
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obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail[,] . . .

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

We discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in concluding 

that terminating Mother’s parental rights serves the developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare of the Children. We reject Mother’s assertion 

that the court failed to adequately consider the bond between her and the 

Children insofar as the record is devoid of any evidence that a beneficial bond 

exists between them. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (citation omitted) 

(providing that the extent of any bond analysis “depends on the circumstances 

of the particular case.”).

We also emphasize the court’s finding that CYS Exhibit 15 “shows a lack 

of consistency in Mother’s visitations with the Children and demonstrates that 

such visitations have been sporadic and inconsistent. This inconsistency is 

not only not in the best interest of the Children, but it is emotionally injurious 

to them.” Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 2/21/20, at 4, ¶ 

41. The documentary and testimonial evidence supports this finding. Mother 

acknowledged that she has not maintained consistent visitation with the 

Children since they have been placed in foster care. N.T., 1/8/20, at 51. Ms. 

Hacker testified as follows on cross-examination by the GAL with respect to 

the effect on the Children when Mother or Father did not appear for visitations:

Q. Are you present with the [C]hildren when the parents don’t 

appear?

A. Typically, yes.
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Q. To your knowledge, how did the [C]hildren act out or react?

A. They do, actually. They have had meltdowns because they are 

anticipating to go in and have an hour to spend with them and 

play. I have to go out and tell foster [m]om and [d]ad they’re not 

coming and the visit is canceled. And foster [m]om will tell the 

girls “come on we have to go.” And it is just a meltdown. 

Sometimes they are on the floor kicking, screaming not wanting 

to leave.

Q. It is not a pretty scene?

A. No, it is not.

Q. Have you ever, you personally, told the parents “look you can’t 

schedule these visits and then not show?”

A. That is why we made the rule of them confirming for the visits 

because prior to confirmation parents were scheduled and they 

were not showing up. So they were made to confirm. There only 

has been a couple visits I believe since putting that in place that 

parents had confirmed and not shown up. . . .

N.T., 1/8/20, at 14–15. Based on the foregoing, Mother’s argument regarding 

Section 2511(b) fails.

We now turn to Mother’s argument that the court abused its discretion 

in changing the Children’s permanency goals from reunification to adoption. 

Mother asserts she “was ready and willing to provide the Children with a stable 

home. She had satisfied the majority of the goals the Agency required of her. 

Additionally, her bond with her Children is strong.” Mother’s Brief at 19. 

Further, Mother contends that the court’s “consideration regarding the bond 

between Mother in the Children was, for the most part, not existent, and 
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therefore, inadequate to determine whether a goal change was appropriate 

and in the best interest of the Children.” Id. We disagree.

We review this issue for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 

1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6301, et seq., provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the 

permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

* * *

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months . . . whether the county agency has 

filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental 

rights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a 

qualified family to adopt the child . . . .
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42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)–(6), (9). “These statutory mandates clearly place the 

trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973 

978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “Safety, permanency, and wellbeing of the child must take precedence over all other considerations.” Id.

(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the burden is on the child 

welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best 

interest.” In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Mother’s assertions are belied by the record. With regard to whether 

Mother was ready and willing to provide the Children with a stable home, Ms. 

Hacker testified that she was unable to confirm whether Mother’s current 

housing is appropriate or stable. N.T., 12/4/19, at 100–101. Likewise, Ms. 

Hacker’s testimony directly contradicts Mother’s assertion that she satisfied 

the majority of her permanency goals. Ms. Hacker testified that “none of the 

objectives or tasks have been fully completed which would allow for 

reunification.” Id. at 100. Finally, contrary to Mother’s assertion, there is no 

record evidence that a strong bond exists between her and the Children. 

Rather, Ms. Hacker’s testimony demonstrates that a strong bond exists 

between the Children and their foster parents. N.T., 12/4/19, at 111–112. 

Because the evidence supports the court’s decision to change the Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption, Mother’s issue fails. Accordingly, we affirm 

the orders granting CYS’s petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights and to change the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. 
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Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/26/2020