* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 2, 2008*

Decided October 2, 2008

Before

         FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

         DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

Nos. 08‐1819 & 08‐1872

VERNIE L. DAVENPORT, JR.,

           Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Western Division.

Nos. 07 C 50141 & 07 C 50246

Frederick J. Kapala,

Judge.

O R D E R

Vernie Davenport, dissatisfied with how the Illinois court system was handling his

divorce, filed two suits in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The first was against the

State of Illinois and Judge Michael Mallon, the first judge involved in the divorce

proceeding.  The second included those two defendants as well as Judge Stephen

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
Nos. 08‐1819 & 08‐1872 Page 2

Pemberton—he heard Davenport’s motion to disqualify Judge Mallon—and the clerk of the

Ogle County court, where the divorce proceedings were heard.  The district court

dismissed both suits based on the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine, under which a federal district

court lacks jurisdiction to review state court judgments.  See D.C. Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415‐16 (1923);

Hemmer v. Ind. State Bd. of Animal Health, 532 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2008).

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and, for the purpose

of our review, we accept as true the allegations in Davenport’s complaints.  See Evers v.

Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 2008).  In October 2005 Judge Mallon dissolved

Davenport’s marriage, but reserved the issues of property, support, and maintenance.

About five months later, the attorney for Davenport’s wife moved to vacate the order

dissolving the marriage, and Judge Mallon granted the motion over Davenport’s objection.

Judge Mallon later entered a second judgment of dissolution, and Davenport appealed.

The appeals court affirmed, holding that Judge Mallon had the power to vacate the first

order, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Davenport’s petition for leave to appeal.

While the case was on appeal, the wife’s attorney moved to transfer title of a car and

sought attorneys fees.  Davenport argued that Judge Mallon lacked jurisdiction while the

case was before the appeals court, but Judge Mallon granted the motion to transfer title.

Davenport appealed that ruling, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal.  Davenport

moved unsuccessfully to substitute another judge for Judge Mallon, and Judge Mallon later

granted the motion for attorneys fees.  Davenport responded with his first federal lawsuit

charging that Judge Mallon misapplied the law and was not impartial.

After he filed his first suit in federal court, Davenport moved in state court to

disqualify Judge Mallon.  The clerk entered the following into the court’s docket:

“Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute Judge is granted.  Case given to Judge Pemberton.”

Davenport appeared before Judge Pemberton and asked that Pemberton also be

disqualified.  Before ruling, Judge Pemberton determined that the docket should not have

shown that the motion to disqualify Judge Mallon was granted; instead, it should have

shown that Pemberton was assigned to hear the motion.  The clerk corrected the docket,

and Davenport launched another motion to disqualify Judge Pemberton, which Judge

Pemberton reviewed himself and denied.  Davenport responded with another federal

lawsuit against the same defendants as the first one as well as Judge Pemberton and the

clerk of Ogle County Circuit Court, accusing them of misapplying the law and denying him

a fair trial.

On appeal Davenport argues that the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine does not apply to any

of his claims, but he is largely incorrect.  The Rooker‐Feldman doctrine bars Davenport’s
Nos. 08‐1819 & 08‐1872 Page 3

request that a federal district court review or revise a preexisting state‐court judgment (the

second dissolution of the marriage).  See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006).  The

appellees assume that the postdissolution orders on title transfer, fees, and disqualification

are interlocutory and therefore not subject to Rooker‐Feldman, see TruServ Corp. v. Flegles,

Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005), but that premise may be incorrect.  See In re Marriage of

Gaudio, 857 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (identifying split among appellate courts on

finality of postdissolution orders when other postdissolution issues remain pending).  They

are correct, though, that Rooker‐Feldman does not bar jurisdiction over the claim against the

clerk regarding the questionable docket entry, see Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 289 n.10

(7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).  In any event, Davenport’s claims that are not barred by Rooker‐

Feldman are barred for other reasons.

First, the district court properly dismissed all claims against the State of Illinois

because a state is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).  Second, the court correctly dismissed the claims

against the judges because they are absolutely immune.  Although Davenport asserts that

the judges acted without jurisdiction while the state case was on appeal, he does not

dispute that his controversy was justiciable within the state courts and the adverse rulings

were judicial in nature; absolute judicial immunity therefore defeats his claims.  See Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11‐12 (1991); Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 660‐61 (7th Cir. 2005);

Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1989).  Finally, judicial clerks enjoy

absolute immunity when they take administrative acts at the direction of a judicial officer.

Snyder, 380 F.3d at 286‐87.  As Davenport explains in his complaint, he objects to the clerk’s

making a docket entry “solely on the face of a letter from Judge Pemberton.”  Thus, the

clerk is entitled to immunity as well.

Because Davenport’s claims are all barred, the district court’s dismissal of his

complaints is

AFFIRMED.