alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Fred M. Powell, Chief Financial Officer of Beijing Med-Pharm Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certify that, based on my knowledge:

|   | (1) | The Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| /s/ FRED M. POWELL                                                                                                    |   |   |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
|  

 

 

Fred M. PowellChief Financial Officer

November          14, 2006

 

 

 

27 |
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-6943

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

RODRICKUS ANTONIO JAMISON, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior 

District Judge. (4:05-CR-00025-jlk-mfu-1; 4:08-cv-80030-jlkmfu) 

Submitted: October 14, 2008 Decided: October 17, 2008 

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Rodrickus Antonio Jamison, Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Andrew 

Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, 

for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Rodrickus Antonio Jamison seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2008) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the 

constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or 

wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district 

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); 

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have 

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jamison has 

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a 

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
QUOTATION	6/30/14


 


 


We are confident
we can be instrumental in the San Jose initiative. We are pleased to quote you the following services over the next 30 days:


 


1.                  
Financial Fund Raising would remain at the standard of 45% of donations generated by PMG Call
Center(s).


 


2.                  
PMG will raise funds for the initiative while simultaneously granting education and support
throughout the community. $2.00/successful call (defined as a connection that lasts >60 seconds). Call results can be submitted
daily or weekly.


 


3.                  
Our CSR's will rally people to fill out petition supplied by you on line and bring in to a
local shop. $2.00 I per person signing.


 


4.                  
Obtain Call List and subsequent modeling for best performance for San Jose, CA voters and
surrounding county for fund raising support .


This would be at
10% above costs.


 


	Submitted by:	/s/ Scott Plantinga
		Scott Plantinga: President, PMG Inc.
		
	Accepted by:	/s/ Dave Hodges
		Dave Hodges: Director, Control & Regulate San Jose
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

336 KA 08-02090 PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DERYL BROWN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 2.)

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KIMBERLY F. DUGUAY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
MICHAEL C. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY A. GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (John R. Schwartz, A.J.), rendered June 23, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Same Memorandum as in People v Brown ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d ___ [Mar. 16, 2012]).

Entered: March 16, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
1626.

#### COOPER *et al. v.*THE STATE.

Accusation of trespass, from city court of Springfield — Judge Smith. October 20, 1908.

Argued February 9,

Decided February 20, 1909.

Russell, J.

The evidence showing, without contradiction, that the defendants acted in good faith, and there being, therefore, no evidence of criminal intent, the conviction of the defendants was unwarranted and a new trial should have been granted. *Judgment reversed.*

*698Cooper and Ponder pulled down a plank fence erected as a street boundary on land alleged to be a part of Mrs. Guyton’s lot in the town of Guyton; they were convicted of trespass, and they excepted to the overruling of their motion for a new trial. From the evidence it appears that they were laborers working-for the town, under the supervision of the town marshal, who, by order of the mayor, directed them to pull down the fence,, the mayor contending that it encroached upon the street. They did this on the day on which it was erected. Before its erection there had been no street fence to the lot. Evidence of title in. Mrs. Giyyton to the land in question was introduced; but it was-contended, in behalf of the defendants, that land enclosed by the fence had been dedicated to the public as a sidewalk, andr according to some of the testimony, it had been for many years, used for that purpose, though on this point there was conflict in the evidence. The defendants stated to the jury that they thought it was right for them to take the fence down, as the town marshal had directed them to do so. Cited by counsel for plaintiffs in error, as to the point decided by this court: *Shrouder*v. *Stale,.*121 *Ga.*615 (3); *Wiggins*v. *State,*119 *Ga.*216 (2); *Hateley*v. *State,*118 *Ga.*79.

*II. B. Strange,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Clarence T. Guyton, solicitor pro tem.,*contra.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed May 

16, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00174-CV

IN RE RIG QA INTERNATIONAL, INC., Relator 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

 152nd District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-22186 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

On March 4, 2019, relator RIG QA International, Inc. filed a petition for writ 

of mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (Supp.); see also 

Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable 

Robert Schaffer, presiding judge of the 152nd District Court of Harris County, to 
2 

vacate his June 11, 2018 order denying relator’s “Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non 

Conveniens.”

To obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 

2004) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. 

proceeding) (per curiam). Relator has failed to show that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion. We therefore deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Hassan, and Poissant.
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-07-00819-CR

Willie Damone FIELDS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-CR-9564

Honorable Maria Teresa Herr, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 15, 2008

AFFIRMED

Willie Fields pleaded nolo contendere to the offense of possession of cocaine, and was placed

on six years deferred adjudication probation for the offense. The State subsequently filed a motion

to revoke Fields’s probation and proceed to final adjudication, alleging Fields had violated the terms

of his probation by failing to perform his community service hours and abide by his 10:00 p.m. to

6:00 a.m. curfew. After a hearing on the State’s motion, the trial court adjudicated Fields guilty and

sentenced him to six years imprisonment and fined him $1,500. We affirm.
04-07-00819-CR

-2-

Fields’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief containing a professional evaluation of the

record in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel concludes that the

appeal is frivolous and without merit. Counsel provided Fields with a copy of the brief and informed

him of his right to review the record and file his own brief. See Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 85-

86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no pet.); Bruns v. State, 924 S.W.2d 176, 177 n.1 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Fields did not file a pro se brief.

After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree that the appeal is frivolous and

without merit. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. Furthermore, we grant appellate

counsel’s motion to withdraw. Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d at 86; Bruns 924 S.W.2d at 177 n.1.

No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Fields wish to seek further review of this case by

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Fields must either retain an attorney to file a petition for

discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary

review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion

for rehearing that was overruled by this court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for

discretionary review must be filed with this court, after which it will be forwarded to theTexas Court

of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, 68.7. Any petition for discretionary review should

comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX.R.

APP. P. 68.4. 

Catherine Stone, Justice

Do Not Publish
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-83,757-01

EX P ARTE CHADRICK OTIS HAVEN, Appli cant

ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. W13-06734-N(A) IN THE 195 DISTRICT COURT T H F ROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisi o n s o f Ar t icle 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant wa s co n v i cted of murder and
sentenc ed to forty

year s’ imprisonment. Applicant contends t h at his counsel rende red ineffe ctive assistance beca use he failed to timely file a notice of appea l. The trial court has deter mined that co u n sel failed to timely file a notice of appea l. We find that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appea l of the judgme nt of conviction in Cause No. W13-06734-N(A) from the 195 District Court of Dallas t h County

.2

Applicant is order ed returne d to that time at which he may g ive a written notice of appea l so that he may then, wi t h t he aid of counsel, obtain a meaning ful appea l. Within ten day s of the issuance of this opinion, the trial court shall deter mine whether Applicant is indige nt. I f Applicant i s i ndige nt and wishes to be repr esente d by counsel, the trial court shall immediately ap p o i n t an attorney to repr esent Applicant on direc t appea l. All time limit s shall be calc ulated as if the sentenc e had been imposed on the date on which the mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should Appl icant desire to prosec ute an appeal, he must take aff irmative steps to file a written notice of appea l in the trial court within 30 day s after the mandate of this Court issues. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Dep a r tm ent of Criminal J ustice-Corr ectional Institut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Deliver ed: September

16, 2015 Do not publish
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3982 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3982

  To provide that the rules of the Federal Communications Commission 
    relating to preserving the open Internet and broadband industry 
     practices shall be restored to effect until the date when the 
  Commission takes final action in the proceedings on such rules that 
 were remanded to the Commission by the United States Court of Appeals 
                 for the District of Columbia Circuit.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 3, 2014

Mr. Waxman (for himself, Ms. Eshoo, Ms. Matsui, Mr. Doyle, Ms. Lofgren, 
 Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Capuano, Ms. DelBene, and Mr. Pallone) introduced 
 the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
                                Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To provide that the rules of the Federal Communications Commission 
    relating to preserving the open Internet and broadband industry 
     practices shall be restored to effect until the date when the 
  Commission takes final action in the proceedings on such rules that 
 were remanded to the Commission by the United States Court of Appeals 
                 for the District of Columbia Circuit.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Open Internet Preservation Act of 
2014''.

SEC. 2. RESTORATION OF OPEN INTERNET RULES DURING REMANDED PROCEEDINGS.

    (a) In General.--The rules adopted by the Federal Communications 
Commission in the Report and Order in the matter of preserving the open 
Internet and broadband industry practices (FCC 10-201; adopted on 
December 21, 2010) that were vacated by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Verizon v. Federal 
Communications Commission (No. 11-1355; decided on January 14, 2014) 
shall be restored to effect during the period beginning on the date of 
the enactment of this Act and ending on the date when the Commission 
takes final action in the proceedings remanded to the Commission in 
that decision.
    (b) Adjudication Authority.--After the end of the period described 
in subsection (a), the Federal Communications Commission may continue 
to adjudicate cases regarding violations of the rules described in such 
subsection that occurred during such period.
                                 <all>
```
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00129-CV

In the INTEREST OF C.E.R.,

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-PA-01369

Honorable Peter A. Sakai, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 1, 2008

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal of the trial court’s default final order that terminated appellants’ parental

rights to the child, C.E.R., granted an adoption, and created a parent-child relationship between

C.E.R. and appellees. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on August 11, 2008.

Appellants have not responded to the motion. Because the record establishes the notice of appeal

was not timely filed, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

The trial court signed the final order on December 10, 2007. Appellants filed a motion for

new trial on January 8, 2008, and a notice of appeal on February 25, 2008. Appellants subsequently

filed in the trial court a motion for reconsideration and a motion pursuant to Rule 306a of the Texas
1... Because appellant’s motion for new trial was timely filed, we cannot construe the notice

of appeal as a notice of restricted appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c); 30.

2... Appellants have not sought review of the trial court’s order denying their Rule 306a motion. Nevertheless,

we note that the notice of appeal filed on February 25, 2008, would not have been timely even if the time for filing the

notice of appeal had not begun to run until January 7, 2008, the date appellants allege they learned of the judgment. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2; 26.1(b).

-2-

Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants alleged in the Rule 306a motion that neither they nor their

attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment until January 7, 2008, and

sought to extend the beginning of the post-judgment time periods until that date. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 306a4, 5; TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2. The trial court denied all of appellants’ post-judgment motions. 

An appeal from a final order in which termination of the parent-child relationship is in issue

is accelerated. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 109.002(a) (Vernon 2002). Accordingly, the notice of appeal

was due December 31, 2007, or a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due

January 15, 2008. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b); 26.3. Although appellants filed a timely motion for

new trial

1

, a timely-filed motion for new trial does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal

in an accelerated appeal. In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. 2005); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(b).

Because appellants did not file their notice of appeal within twenty days after the trial court signed

the final order and did not file a motion for extension of time under Rule 26.3, their notice of appeal

did not invoke this court’s jurisdiction. See K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 927.2

We therefore dismiss the appeal.

PER CURIAM
Order entered February 14, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-01607-CV

BRUCE B. MCLEOD, III, Appellant

V.

ALFRED GYR, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-11-02708-B

ORDER

The Court has before it appellant’s February 12, 2013 unopposed motion for second 

extension of time to file appellant’s brief. The Court GRANTS the motion and ORDERS

appellant to file his brief by February 26, 2013. No further extensions will be granted absent a 

showing of exceptional circumstances.

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher Scott SHARP.

No. COA15-759.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Feb. 16, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
# C_2008285EN.01003902.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/39

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 17 September 2008 — Prana Haus v OHIM

(Case T-226/07) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Application for registration of the word mark PRANAHAUS - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94)

(2008/C 285/72)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Prana Haus GmbH (Fribourg-en-Brisgau, Germany) (represented by: N. Hebies, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Weberndörfer, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 18 April 2007 (Case R 1611/2006-1) concerning an application for registration of the verbal mark PRANAHAUS as a Community trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the application; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the application;

| 2. | Orders Prana Haus GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Prana Haus GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 211, 8.9.2007.

1

---
Exhibit 32.1
 
 Certification of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 
 In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 by the Company (the Report), the undersigned as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby, certifies that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (i)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: (ii)
and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 
 
 /s/ Louis Slaughter
 Name: Louis Slaughter
 Chief Executive Officer
 Date: November 29, 2004
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22