* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-11201

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CURTIS DEWAYNE WESLEY

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:99-CR-247-1

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

Curtis Dewayne Wesley appeals his sentence following the revocation of

the three-year term of supervised release that was imposed for his conviction of

being a felon in possession of a firearm. In revoking Wesley’s supervised release,

the district court sentenced Wesley to 23 months of imprisonment and 13

months of supervised release. This sentence was above the guidelines range for

his revocation.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 9, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-11201

2

Wesley argues that his revocation sentence was either unreasonable or

plainly unreasonable because (1) his conduct did not distinguish him from others

in his sentencing range, (2) the district court focused too heavily on his need for

drug treatment, and (3) the district court did not explicitly mention the 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in sentencing him. Because Wesley did not object to his

sentence in the district court, review is for plain error only. See United States

v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Wesley admitted the facts supporting the revocation of his supervised

release. Those admitted facts included repeated violations of the prohibition on

using and possessing narcotics. Wesley also failed to submit to mandatory urine

tests and failed to turn himself in after agreeing to do so voluntarily. While he

contends that his conduct was “average,” the number of violations, some

occurring almost immediately after his release, supports a finding that his

conduct was considerably worse than the “average.” The district court expressly

stated in the judgment that the revocation and sentence were based upon the

government’s presentation and the defendant’s admissions. At the sentencing

hearing, the district judge stated clearly that he considered “the range of

punishment provided by the policy statement,” and concluded that the guidelines

range was not “adequate in this case when I consider all of the factors the Court

is to consider under 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).” “Examining the full

sentencing record reveals the district court’s reasons for the chosen sentence and

allows for effective review by this court.” United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647,

659 (5th Cir. 2008). As in Bonilla, “our task would have been easier” if the

district court had more clearly spelled out its reasoning. Id. However, we

cannot find on this record that the district court plainly erred in stating its

reasoning and in imposing a sentence above the guidelines given the facts

admitted by the defendant. 

In sum, Wesley has not shown that the district court failed to consider the

factors enumerated in § 3553(a) or the policy statements found in Chapter Seven
No. 07-11201

3

of the Sentencing Guidelines, and thus he has not shown that the district court

plainly erred in imposing a sentence that was within the statutory maximum.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 90-93 (5th Cir.

1994).

AFFIRMED.