J-A13008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

PETRA DINENNA N/K/A PETRA 

THOMAS

v.

DAVID DINENNA, SR. 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 312 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 

2002-6087C

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023

David DiNenna, Sr. (“Husband”) appeals from the order denying (1) his 

petition for special relief requesting that the trial court determine the amount 

of his military pension to be distributed to Petra DiNenna n/k/a Petra Thomas 

(“Wife”), and (2) his exceptions filed in response to a master’s report

concerning the same issue. We affirm.

We glean the following facts from the certified record. Husband began 

serving in the military in 1987. He and Wife married in 1992 and separated 

in 2002, and thereafter initiated divorce proceedings. In 2005, the trial court 

appointed a master to address, inter alia, equitable distribution of marital 

property and alimony. The master held a hearing wherein the sole issue to 

be addressed was equitable distribution of Husband’s military pension. 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A13008-23

- 2 -

Husband and Wife reached an agreement at the hearing, and thus no 

testimony was taken. The terms of the agreement were put on the record 

and the transcript was attached as “Exhibit A” to a report prepared by the 

master.

As articulated by Wife’s counsel on the record, the agreement 

concerning the military pension, in its entirety, stated “Wife to receive [fortyfive] percent of [H]usband’s military pension, as of his retirement date. If a 

quatro[1]is necessary, it is to be prepared by pension analysis with the parties 

sharing the costs of preparation.” N.T. Master’s Hearing, 11/16/06, at 8. 

Counsel for both Husband and Wife expressed their consent to this language 

on the record. See id. The master then memorialized the agreement within 

his report as follows:

vi. The Plaintiff, Petra DiNenna, the former spouse is awarded 

[forty-five percent] of the service member’s disposable retirement 

pay as of his retirement date. If a [QDRO] were necessary, it was 

to be prepared by pension analysis with the parties sharing the 

cost of preparation. The master researched the issue of the 

necessity of a QDRO and recommends that the Uniform Services 

Former Spouses’ Protection Act does not require a QDRO. Since 

military retirement pay is a federal entitlement and not a qualified 

pension plan, there is no such requirement that a QDRO be used. 

As long as the award is set forth in the divorce decree or other 

court order in an acceptable manner, that is sufficient. The Master 

recommends that the expense of a QDRO not be incurred. 

Attached to this master’s report is a copy of the Uniform Services 

Former Spouses’ Protection Act and a treatise titled Dividing 

____________________________________________

1 The word “quatro” appears to be an erroneous transcription of the 

abbreviation “QDRO,” short for Qualified Domestic Relations Order. As we will 

discuss in the body of this memorandum, Husband points to this error as 

evidence of an ambiguity in the contract.
J-A13008-23

- 3 -

Military Retired Pay Under the Uniformed Services Former 

Spouse’s Protection Act and they are marked are Exhibits “B” and 

“C” respectively.

vii. The language to be used in this Divorce Decree is 

recommended as follows: “The former spouse (Plaintiff, Petra 

DiNenna) is awarded [forty-five percent] of the member’s 

(Defendant, David DiNenna’s) disposable retirement pay as of his 

retirement date[.]”

Master’s Report, 4/23/07, at ¶ 8(B) (cleaned up). Subsequently, a divorce 

decree was entered in 2007 which stated “[i]t is further ordered, adjudged, 

and decreed that pursuant to the settlement terms as described in the 

Master’s Report, [Wife] is awarded [forty-five percent] of [Husband]’s 

disposable retirement pay as of his retirement date.” Divorce Decree, 7/5/07

(cleaned up). 

Husband continued serving in the military until he retired in 2017. There 

was no further activity in the divorce portion of this action until 2020, when 

Husband filed a petition to determine the appropriate division of his pension,

arguing that Wife was only entitled to forty-five percent of the marital portion 

of the pension, not of the entire pension. The trial court appointed another 

master, Susan A. Maza, Esquire, to address the issues raised in the petition 

for special relief. Both Husband and Wife participated in an evidentiary 

hearing before Master Maza and filed memoranda prior to and after the 

hearing.

Master Maza then filed a report on July 6, 2021, recommending that the 

agreement was clear and unambiguous, and that Wife was entitled to forty-
J-A13008-23

- 4 -

five percent of the entire military pension based on the agreement of the 

parties. Husband filed exceptions to the report. The trial court held oral 

argument on the exceptions but did not take any additional testimony. On 

January 14, 2022, the court entered an order that (1) denied Husband’s 

exceptions; (2) found that the parties, in the presence of their attorneys, 

agreed and consented that Wife is to receive forty-five percent of Husband’s 

military pension, as of his retirement; (3) the agreement was the result of a 

contractual agreement between the parties, not a court order; and (4) the 

phrase “Petra Di[N]enna n/k/a Petra Thomas is to receive 45 percent of David 

Di[N]enna’s military pension, as of his retirement date” is clear and 

unambiguous. See Order, 1/14/2022.

This timely appeal followed. Husband and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Husband raises the following issue on appeal: 

Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or an abuse 

of discretion in finding the contractual terms of the parties[’] 

November 16, 2006 agreement stating [Wife] to receive [fortyfive] percent of [Husband]’s total military pension, as of his 

retirement was clear and unambiguous when there were both 

patent and latent ambiguities in the agreement? 

Husband’s brief at 2.

Our review is governed by the following principles:

A marital support agreement incorporated but not merged into the 

divorce decree survives the decree and is enforceable at law or 

equity. A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by 

the law of contracts unless the agreement provides otherwise. 

The terms of a marital settlement agreement cannot be modified 

by a court in the absence of a specific provision in the agreement 

providing for judicial modification.
J-A13008-23

- 5 -

When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court

is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion, 

we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal 

from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we 

must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or 

abused its discretion.

Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is 

not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of 

review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent 

necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the appellate 

court may review the entire record in making its decision.

However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility 

determinations.

Rosiecki v. Rosiecki, 231 A.3d 928, 932-33 (Pa.Super 2020) (cleaned up). 

“An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear and convincing 

evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal 

procedures.” Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa.Super 2005) 

(citation omitted). “Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses 

should be bound by the terms of their agreements.” See id. at 1065 (citation 

omitted). 

Husband’s assertion that the marital settlement agreement is 

ambiguous necessarily requires us to interpret a contract. The “paramount 

goal of contractual interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent 

of the parties. In determining the intent of the parties to a written agreement, 

the court looks to what they have clearly expressed, for the law does not 

assume that the language was chosen carelessly.” Wiley v. Brooks, 263 

A.3d 671, 676 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). While “construing 

agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, this Court need only 
J-A13008-23

- 6 -

examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding.” 

Rosiecki, supra at 933 (cleaned up). “In other words, the intent of the 

parties is generally the writing itself.” Id. (citation omitted). “The language 

of a contract is unambiguous if we can determine its meaning without any 

guide other than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature 

of the language in general, its meaning depends.” Riverview Carpet & 

Flooring, Inc. v. Presbyterian SeniorCare, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 

4412195 at *32 (Pa.Super. 2023).

A contract “is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different 

constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.”

Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted). “A 

contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on its 

construction.” Pass v. Palmiero Automotive of Butler, Inc., 229 A.3d 1, 

5 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted). “Nor does an ambiguity exist if it 

appears that only a lawyer’s ingenuity had made the language uncertain.” Id. 

(cleaned up).

When an ambiguity exists, “the court considers the parties’ outward and 

objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and 

subjective intentions.” Rosiecki, supra at 933 (citation omitted). The court 

may take into consideration the “surrounding circumstances, the situation of 

the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the nature of the 

subject-matter of the agreement.” Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 

1258 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “The court will adopt an 
J-A13008-23

- 7 -

interpretation that is most reasonable and probable bearing in mind the 

objects which the parties intended to accomplish through the agreement.” Id. 

(citation omitted).

The contested provision before us, as transcribed at the hearing in front 

of the master on November 16, 2006, is as follows: “Wife to receive [fortyfive] percent of [H]usband’s military pension, as of his retirement date. If a 

quatro is necessary, it is to be prepared by pension analysis with the parties 

sharing the costs of preparation.” N.T. Master’s Hearing, 11/16/06, at 8. The 

agreement was then ultimately memorialized in the divorce decree, which 

stated: “It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that pursuant to the 

settlement terms as described in the Master’s Report, [Wife] is awarded [fortyfive percent] of [Husband]’s disposable retirement pay as of his retirement 

date.” Divorce Decree, 7/5/07. We note that the oral agreement utilized the 

term “military pension,” whereas the decree used “disposable retirement pay.” 

Additionally, the decree did not contain a reference to either a “quatro” or a 

QDRO because, prior to entry of the decree, the master determined that a 

QDRO is not required for distribution of federal entitlements like the military 

pension in question. See Master’s Report, 4/23/07, at ¶ 8(B)(vi). 

With this background in mind, we turn to the positions of the parties. 

Husband first argues that the agreement concerning his military pension is 

patently ambiguous, and that the intent of the parties was for Wife to receive 

forty-five percent of the marital portion of the military pension, not fortyfive percent of the entire pension. See Husband’s brief at 14-17. Specifically, 
J-A13008-23

- 8 -

he contends that the language “[forty-five] percent of husband’s military 

pension” is not clear since it “does not indicate [the] value of the pension 

which [Wife] is to receive [forty-five] percent of.” Id. at 16. He highlights 

that the total value of the pension was different when the agreement was 

made in 2006 than when he retired in 2017, and similarly, the value of the 

marital portion in 2006 was different than the total value at the same time. 

See id. at 16-17. He believes that other provisions in the agreement, such 

as a cash distribution to Wife, specified both a known value and timing of 

payment, unlike the pension provision, supporting the notion that it is 

ambiguous. See id. at 16. He also accuses the court of failing to review the 

whole agreement, and instead focusing on a single term. See id. at 22, 27. 

He argues that had the court considered the additional language from the 

verbal agreement referencing “pension analysis” preparing a “quatro,” it 

would be compelled to find an ambiguity because it is unclear (1) that “quatro” 

actually meant “QDRO,” (2) under what circumstances preparation of a QDRO 

would be necessary, or (3) how a QDRO might impact Husband’s pension. 

See id. at 24-26. 

Relatedly, Husband maintains that even if the agreement concerning his 

military pension is seemingly clear on its face, there is nonetheless a latent 

ambiguity based on the collateral circumstances surrounding the agreement. 

See id. at 18. He states that the purpose of the hearing before the master 

was to dispose of marital assets, which would include only the part of his 

pension earned during the marriage. See id. at 18. He believes that a 
J-A13008-23

- 9 -

pension valuation report prepared at the time of the agreement, as well as 

the fact that the parties understood Husband would continue serving in the 

military after the divorce, support the intention that Wife receive only fortyfive percent of the marital portion of the pension. See id at 16, 18. Since 

there is an ambiguity, he avers that the trial court committed an error of law 

or abused its discretion by failing to conduct its own hearing concerning these 

issues, rather than relying on a report from the hearing officer without the 

benefit of the record developed therewith. See id. at 20-21. He notes that 

although the court had access to Master Maza’s 2021 report and 

recommendation, it did not review the transcript or exhibits, as they were not 

filed by the master.2 Id. As such, Husband asks this Court to find an 

ambiguity as a matter of law and independently review the record to 

determine that the intent of the parties was for Wife to receive only forty-five 

percent of the marital portion of his pension. See id. at 27-28.

In considering this issue, the trial court found that the provision 

regarding Husband’s military pension was clear and unambiguous on its face. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/22, at 13. It held that the provision “awards 

[Wife] forty-five percent (45%) of [Husband]’s disposable retirement pay” and 

that the phrase “as of his retirement date” is the point at which Wife would be 

____________________________________________

2 Our review of the record supports Husband’s assertion that Master Maza did 

not file the record developed before her. The certified record on appeal does 

not include a transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on April 14, 2021, nor 

does it contain any exhibits introduced at that hearing. However, given our 

disposition that the contract in question is clear and unambiguous, infra, this 

omission from the certified record does not hinder our review.
J-A13008-23

- 10 -

entitled to begin receiving the distribution. Id. at 14. It noted that nowhere 

in the record is the word “marital” used, nor does the agreement utilize any 

formula to determine Wife’s award. See id. The court further stated that just 

because Husband has a different interpretation of the agreement, that does 

not constitute an ambiguity. See id. at 14-16. Finally, the court reviewed 

Exhibit “B” to the master’s report filed in 2007, which contained a handout 

from the United States Department of Defense website addressing division of 

military retired pay pursuant to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ 

Protection Act. It found that this article provided Husband and Wife with 

examples of both acceptable and unacceptable language for military pensions 

under the act. See id. at 16-17. The court highlighted that none of the 

parties objected to the language of the verbal agreement after it was 

incorporated into the divorce decree, and therefore it is presumed that their 

intentions were clearly expressed as set forth. See id.

Wife agrees with the trial court that the contested agreement regarding 

Husband’s military pension is “clear and unambiguous.” Wife’s brief at 9. She 

also challenges the assertion that there is a latent ambiguity, arguing that no 

consideration should be given to the pension analysis discussed by Husband 

because it was not incorporated into the agreement or the master’s report. 

See id. at 10. She further states that the intent of the parties was for her to 

receive forty-five percent of Husband’s whole military pension, as the military 

pay was only one asset amongst others considered in the negotiations 

involving the marital estate. See id. at 11. She indicates that the parties 
J-A13008-23

- 11 -

were aware that Husband intended to continue serving in the military, which 

would impact the pension, and the parties negotiated with that in mind and 

with the benefit of independent counsel. See id. at 10-11. She claims that, 

at the time of and in consideration of the agreement, she entered into the 

agreement bearing the risk of receiving nothing in the event Husband died 

before payout. See id. at 6. 

After careful review of the certified record, the arguments of the parties, 

and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not commit an 

error of law in finding the agreement between Husband and Wife 

unambiguous. First, we reject Husband’s arguments that there was a patent 

ambiguity on the face of the contract. Like the lower court, we can determine 

the agreement’s meaning “without any guide other than a knowledge of the 

simple facts on which, from the nature of the language in general, its meaning 

depends.” See Riverview Carpet, supra at *32. Whether reviewing the 

agreement as memorialized in the transcript from the master’s hearing or the 

decree itself, the phrase “Wife to receive [forty-five] percent of [H]usband’s 

military pension” or “[Wife] is awarded [forty-five percent] of [Husband’s] 

disposable military pay,” means the same thing. The value of the award is 

forty-five percent of the entire pension. As the trial court correctly identified, 

there was no use of the word “marital” or phrase “marital portion” in the 

agreement concerning the pension. Nothing in the language used indicates 

any intent to limit the obligation to only the marital portion. Without use of 

such a qualifier, the phrase “[forty-five] percent of [H]usband’s miliary 
J-A13008-23

- 12 -

pension” is clearly understood to mean forty-five percent of the whole pension. 

We further agree with both the trial court and Husband that the phrase “as of 

his retirement date” refers to when payments to Wife were to begin, and also 

indicates the triggering event for determination of the amount of payment. 

Additionally, review of other portions of the contract do not create an 

ambiguity concerning the military pension distribution. Use of the word 

“quatro” in the sentence immediately following that provision does not create 

an ambiguity as to the value of the pension or its timing of payment. We note 

that neither this term nor the word “QDRO” were contained within the decree, 

as the master determined that a QDRO is not applicable to military pensions. 

Thus, this ancillary provision has no bearing on the distribution or valuation 

of the military pension whatsoever. Husband does not argue that a QDRO is 

in fact required to be prepared for distribution of the pension, and he did not 

challenge the special master’s recommendation in 2007 that one was not 

needed. In the same vein, we are not persuaded by Husband’s assertion that 

the specific cash payment to Wife identified in the agreement somehow casts 

doubt on the meaning of the provision concerning the military pension. The 

fact that the language concerning the cash distribution contained both a 

certain sum and schedule of payments does not prevent us from 

understanding the agreement as it pertains to the military pension.

In short, there is nothing contained within the language of the 

agreement itself supporting Husband’s argument that the parties intended to 

limit Wife’s entitlement to the marital share of the pension. The contract’s 
J-A13008-23

- 13 -

meaning can be ascertained by its plain language. The fact that Husband does 

not agree with the court’s interpretation does not create an ambiguity. See

Pass, supra at 5. 

Next, we address and reject Husband’s arguments that there is a latent 

ambiguity in the agreement concerning his military pension. The crux of this 

contention is that, since it is beyond cavil that only the marital portion of the 

pension was subject to equitable distribution, Husband’s apparent agreement 

to give Wife a larger portion of his pension is illogical absent some extrinsic 

explanation. Although the concept of a latent ambiguity has been discussed 

by this Court in matters involving interpretation of contracts in family law 

cases,3the doctrine has largely been considered and developed in cases 

involving challenges to wills and insurance contracts. Nonetheless, the 

principles articulated in those matters guide us in determining whether there 

is a latent ambiguity in situations involving marital settlement agreements. 

“Generally speaking, an ambiguity in a will must be found without 

reliance on extrinsic evidence; extrinsic evidence is admissible only to 

resolve, not create, an ambiguity.” In re Estate of Cassidy, ___ A.3d 

___, 2023 WL 3910447 at *4 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted) (emphasis 

added). “A latent ambiguity arises from collateral facts which make the 

meaning of a written document uncertain, although the language appears 

clear on the face of the document.” Id. 

____________________________________________

3 See, e.g., Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638 (Pa.Super. 1993); 

Kohn v. Kohn, 364 A.2d 350 (Pa.Super. 1976).
J-A13008-23

- 14 -

The most ordinary instance of a latent ambiguity is where an 

instrument of writing contains a reference to a particular person 

or thing and is thus apparently clear on its face, but it is shown by 

extrinsic evidence that there are two or more persons or things to 

whom or to which the description in the instrument might properly 

apply.

Koplin v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 44 A.2d 877, 879 

(Pa.Super. 1945) (cleaned up). For example, this Court has stated:

A latent ambiguity in an insurance contract may be one in which 

the description of insured property is clear on face of instrument, 

but there is more than one estate to which the description applies, 

or it may be one where property is imperfectly or in some respects 

erroneously described, so that description does not refer with 

precision to any particular object, and if such an ambiguity 

develops, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show intent of 

parties.

Id. (cleaned up). In the context of challenges to wills, we have stated that 

“[w]here a latent ambiguity exists, the court may resort to parol evidence 

(such as testimony of the scrivener) to determine the decedent’s true intent.” 

Estate of Cassidy, supra at *4.

We find that by his arguments, Husband attempts to use extrinsic 

circumstances to create, rather than resolve, any latent ambiguity. See id. 

The clear and unambiguous language of the agreement references with 

precision the entirety of Husband’s pension in describing the property subject 

to Wife’s forty-five-percent share. Nonetheless, Husband devotes a significant 

portion of his brief to identifying collateral matters to explain why he would 

not have agreed to give Wife forty-five percent of his entire pension. Put 

another way, he tries to convince us of the parties’ subjective intent, and why 

it is contrary to the express language used in the contract. However, it is not 
J-A13008-23

- 15 -

the role of the courts to focus on subjective intent in interpreting clear 

agreements. See Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle, PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 1248, 

1260 (Pa. 2015) (“[W]here language is clear and unambiguous, the focus of 

the interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as manifestly 

expressed rather than as, perhaps, silently intended[.]” (emphasis in 

original)). 

The case sub judice is distinguishable from other matters where we have 

found a latent ambiguity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schultheis, 747 A.2d 

918 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding that the phrase “I give my shares of stock . . . 

as follows” in a will was latently ambiguous when the will specifically 

bequeathed 2,045 shares to named beneficiaries, yet it was determined that 

the decedent in fact owned 3,288 shares); Kohn, supra (ruling that the term 

“alimony” was latently ambiguous in a marital settlement agreement when (1) 

numerous express provisions in the agreement implied that “alimony” meant 

child support payments, (2) the definition of “alimony” typically did not 

concern payments for purposes of child support, and (3) there existed a 

supplemental agreement between the parties expressly reducing “alimony” 

payments if federal regulations permitting a tax deduction for such payments 

were changed); Koplin, supra (holding there was a latent ambiguity in a 

contract disparately insuring two chicken houses on a property, where the 

agreement only labelled them as Chicken House No. 1 and Chicken House No. 

2 and where the parties disputed which provision applied to the single chicken 

house that burned down). 
J-A13008-23

- 16 -

The common thread in these cases is that some external fact is required 

to clarify a provision because a description was inadequate, or a term was 

used in contravention to its ordinary meaning or definition. However, that is 

not what Husband advocates for in the instant matter. This is not an instance 

where the marital settlement agreement inadequately described the military 

pension so that there was confusion as to what was being addressed. 

Similarly, the parties here did not use some distinct term in contravention to 

its customary meaning, triggering a need for information to be found outside 

the four corners of the contract. Husband’s position really amounts to an 

attempt to re-write the agreement, one we find clear and unambiguous, to 

include new terms that were never identified therein. That we cannot do. See 

Vaccarello v. Vaccarello, 757 A.2d 909, 914 (Pa. 2000) (“When the terms 

of a written contract are clear, this Court will not re-write it to give it a 

construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language 

used.”). 

Since the trial court correctly determined that the marital settlement 

agreement is clear and unambiguous, it did not err in denying Husband’s 

petition for special relief or his exceptions to the master’s report and 

recommendation. 
J-A13008-23

- 17 -

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2023