Opinion issued February 25, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00133-CR

———————————

MERIA JAMES BRADLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 183rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1328927

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Meria James Bradley was charged by indictment with possession 

of more than four grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. The jury found Bradley 

guilty of the lesser offense of simple possession, and the trial court assessed 
2

punishment at 35 years’ imprisonment.1 In his sole point of error, Bradley 

contends that the trial court erred in permitting improper jury arguments by the 

State in closing argument of the guilt-innocent phase. We affirm. 

Background

After observing Bradley sell crack cocaine to known drug users and 

conducting a controlled buy at the home, Officer Nash of the Houston Police 

Department obtained a search warrant for the house at 7844 Sandy Street. When 

they executed the search warrant and entered the home, police officers found 

Bradley running to the back of the house. Bradley’s son was also present at the 

house at the time. 

Officer Nash testified that Bradley told him that “everything” in the house 

was his and that his son had nothing to do with anything illegal. Officer Nash told 

Bradley to show him where everything was, and Bradley showed him marijuana 

and crack cocaine located inside of a desk in the house. Police found a plate with a 

razor blade, used for cutting crack cocaine, and individually-cut crack cocaine 

rocks inside of the desk. The cocaine rocks altogether weighed 4.2 grams and

were sized for sale. Police also found numerous weapons and “over a hundred 

documents,” such as mail and awards on the wall, bearing Bradley’s name. 

 1 Bradley has prior convictions for aggravated robbery and tampering with 

identification numbers. 
3

Bradley testified that he owned the home at 7844 Sandy, but that he lived

across the street and rented the home at 7844 Sandy to Alexander Guidroz. 

Bradley testified that on the day he was arrested, he and his son had walked across 

the street from their home to 7844 Sandy—carrying a briefcase containing 

paperwork—to collect rent from Guidroz and give his son a car that was located at 

7844 Sandy. According to Bradley, he and his son were sitting on the porch and 

he was going through documents in the briefcase when the police arrived. And

Bradley claimed that he showed the police the hidden drugs only after Guidroz told 

Bradley where the drugs were located. Bradley testified that there were no 

documents with his name in the house and that police actually found the 

documents in his briefcase. 

During the State’s closing argument, Bradley complained about several of 

the prosecutor’s comments. The jury found Bradley guilty of the lesser-included 

offense of simple possession. 

Discussion

In his sole point of error, Bradley contends that the State made improper 

arguments to the jury during closing, and that he is entitled to a new trial. 

A. Applicable Law

“The law provides for, and presumes, a fair trial free from improper 

argument by the State.” Thompson v. State, 89 S.W.3d 843, 850 (Tex. App.—
4

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 267 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)). The approved areas of jury argument are 

(1) summation of the evidence, (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence, 

(3) answer to the argument of opposing counsel, and (4) plea for law enforcement. 

Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc); Andrade 

v. State, 246 S.W.3d 217, 229–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. 

ref’d). A prosecutor may argue his opinion concerning a witness’s credibility or 

the truth of witness’s testimony only if the opinion is based on reasonable 

deductions from the evidence and does not constitute unsworn testimony. McKay 

v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc). Wide latitude is 

allowed in drawing inferences from the evidence, so long as the inferences drawn 

are reasonable, fair, legitimate, and offered in good faith. Gaddis v. State, 753 

S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In examining challenges to a jury 

argument, a court considers the remark in the context in which it appears. Id.

An argument exceeding the permissible bounds of the four approved areas of 

argument constitutes reversible error only if an analysis of the record as a whole 

shows the argument is extreme or manifestly improper, violates a mandatory 

statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceeding. 

Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115; see also Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2004) (en banc). In assessing the harm of an improper argument, an 
5

appellate court considers three factors: “(1) severity of the misconduct (the 

magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks); (2) measures 

adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the 

judge); and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of 

the evidence supporting the conviction).” Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).

A party may present on appeal a complaint that a jury argument was 

improper only if the record shows that (1) he timely and properly objected to the 

trial court and (2) the trial court (a) overruled the objection, either expressly or 

implicitly, or (b) refused to rule on the objection, and the party objected to the 

refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Gutierrez v. State, 36 S.W.3d 509, 510–11 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2001); Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

(en banc). A trial court implicitly rules on a matter if “its actions or other 

statements otherwise unquestionably indicate a ruling.” Gutierrez, 36 S.W.3d at 

511 n.1.

In cases where the trial court sustained the defense objection and granted the 

requested instruction to disregard, the only adverse ruling to be reviewed is the 

trial court’s denial of the motion for mistrial. Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 76–77. “A 

mistrial is the trial court’s remedy for improper conduct that is ‘so prejudicial that 

expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.’” Id. at 77 
6

(quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). A mistrial is 

required only in extreme circumstances where the prejudice is incurable. Id.

(citing Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). We 

review the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Id.

B. Analysis

Bradley complains about eight comments the prosecutor made during 

closing argument. Bradley objected to some of them, and the trial court sustained 

some of Bradley’s objections, but denied Bradley’s request for a mistrial. We 

review the comments in turn.

1. Bradley failed to preserve error with regard to four of the 

complained-of comments.

(a) “Stay in the record”

To challenge a jury argument on appeal, a party must have timely objected

at trial, and obtained an adverse ruling from the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). 

Bradley first objected to the following comment: 

Now, according to the Defense, [there are] no documents inside that 

house that link Mr. Bradley to anything in there to show that he was in 

7844 because he lived at 7855 Sandy. What about his certificate 

that’s in there?

Bradley’s counsel objected, “It was in the briefcase, your Honor. I object to 

that.” The trial court said, “Stay in the record.” 

Bradley also objected when the prosecutor commented: 
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“In direct response to what Defense has been arguing about, all these 

exhibits, they have rights. He had the right to say, please, someone do 

fingerprints on these guns.” 

Bradley’s counsel responded, “Excuse me, Judge. I asked that yesterday. 

He said—it’s improper. I asked him yesterday to print the guns. It’s a 

misstatement. I asked him yesterday. They had all night to print the guns.” The 

trial court said, “Stay in the record, please.” 

In response to both objections, the trial court instructed the prosecutor to 

“stay in the record.” A judge’s instruction to stay within the record, in response to 

an objection, does not constitute a ruling on the objection. Washington v. State, 16 

S.W.3d 70, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). Because Bradley 

did not obtain an adverse ruling on these two objections, he did not preserve his 

challenges to these two comments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. 

(b) Request to mention CSI

The State contends that Bradley’s complaint about the prosecutor’s comment 

regarding CSI was not preserved for our review. We agree. The prosecutor said:

What about his certificate that the officers said were in the house? 

The Defendant said it was in his briefcase. So, you know what that 

means? That means either Officer Nash or Robertson or even Officer 

Chapman took this certificate that the Defendant’s carrying around in 

his briefcase on December 1st, 2011, this certificate which was given 

to him on March 18th, 2003. He carries this in a briefcase. Carrying 

this certificate in a briefcase, these officers are going to take it out. 

And it’s laminated. They’re going to go inside the house. They’re 

going to tack it onto a wall because you can see it’s tacked to the wall. 

They’re going to put it on the wall the same certificates that you can 
8

see on the entry point of the house just to say now we’ve got him. 

We’ve got something on him at this point in time. Talk about science 

fiction. “That’s better than ‘CSI.’” 2

Bradley’s counsel interjected: “[Y]ou instructed me I couldn’t mention 

‘CSI.’ He mentions ‘CSI.’ Can I get back up and talk about ‘CSI,’ Judge?” The 

trial court responded, “no.”3

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a timely 

objection to the trial court stating “the grounds for the ruling . . . with sufficient 

specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific 

grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Here, 

Bradley did not object that the State’s reference to CSI was irrelevant, or otherwise 

improper. Rather, he requested permission to mention CSI himself. Because 

Bradley does not complain on appeal that the trial court denied his request to refer 

to CSI, we conclude that his argument on appeal does not comport with his

objection at trial. Accordingly, he did not preserve this complaint. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)); Curiel v. State, 243 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. App.—Houston 

 2 “CSI” was a reference to a television show. See The Honorable Donald E. 

Shelton, CSI: Criminal Scene Investigation, a popular television show. Juror 

Expectations for Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Perceptions and Reality 

About the “CSI Effect” Myth, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1–2 (2010) (citing BBC 

News (July 31, 2006) http:// news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/entertainment/5231334.stm; CSI 

Earth's No. 1 Show, N.Y. POST (June 17, 2008) available at http:// 

www.nypost.com/p/entertainment/tv/item_WKDOqHHYXBgcnKFGWy2xa P).

3 During direct examination of Bradley, Bradley’s counsel mentioned CSI twice. 

Both times the trial court sustained the State’s objections to relevance. 
9

[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that argument raised on appeal must comport 

with specific objection made at trial, or error is waived). 

(c) No request for instruction to disregard

The State contends that Bradley also failed to preserve his objection when 

the prosecutor commented that Bradley could have but did not call his wife and 

son to testify in Bradley’s defense:

[T]he wife and the Defendant’s son could easily disprove everything 

they’ve said. Because the wife could come in and say, “My husband 

lives with me. My husband of 30-plus years lives with me. Have live 

[sic] at 7855 Sandy. He does not live at 7844. Guidroz lives there.”

He could have brought his son that was there that night who could 

have said, “I was sitting on the porch with my dad . . . We were just 

there to collect the check and get a car for being such a good person.” 

His son could miss one day from high school. I know hair is 

important. But his wife couldn’t miss one day from going to Sally 

Beauty Supply.

Bradley’s counsel objected:

Judge, I’m going to object to that. If his son was here, they wouldn’t 

give him an excuse that he was here and he would have been docked 

for that. He was here. I object to that. The State knows it.

The State responded, “That’s outside the record.” The trial court said, 

“Sustained.” 

If a trial judge sustains an objection to improper jury argument, the 

defendant must request an instruction to disregard and move for a mistrial in order 

to preserve error. McGinn v. State, 961 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 
10

The failure to request such an instruction waives error unless an argument is so 

inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not have been alleviated by an 

instruction to disregard. Id.; Parr v. State, 606 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. Crim. App.

1980). 

Here, Bradley did not ask for an instruction to disregard, and the State’s 

comment about Bradley’s son’s absence was not so inflammatory that the 

prejudicial effect, if any, could not have been alleviated by an instruction to 

disregard. See Baines v. State, 401 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (holding that prosecutor’s comments that appellant could have 

called two witnesses to support his defensive theory “went to the credibility of 

appellant’s defense and did not shift the burden of proving the elements of the 

offense”); Harris v. State, 122 S.W.3d 871, 884 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. 

ref’d) (holding that prosecutor’s comment on appellant’s failure to produce 

testimony from sources other than himself and “about the subpoena power of a 

defendant is proper if it refers to the defendant’s failure to produce evidence from 

other sources”).

2. Overruled Objections

The trial court overruled Bradley’s objections to two of the prosecutor’s

comments. Bradley contends on appeal that these comments were improper

because they were intended to shift the ultimate burden of proof to the defense and 
11

encourage the jury to consider matters outside the record. We consider the 

comments in turn.

(a) Burden of Proof Objection

Bradley contends that the prosecutor made a comment that improperly

shifted the burden of proof to Bradley. The prosecutor commented:

Officer Nash gave you a very good scenario. If there’s a crime 

committed and no one is there to be a witness, they’re probably going 

to dust for prints to see if they can generate some type of profile. But 

if someone witnesses someone break inside their car, calls him and he 

arrives and sees the person breaking into the car, why do you need to 

have fingerprints? Why do you need to do a DNA swab? They knew 

who Mr. Bradley was. Why do you need to fingerprint? There’s no 

[need] to fingerprint. Furthermore, part of those rights that the 

Defense has, they can request this evidence be fingerprinted at any 

point in time.

Bradley objected, “That’s just a burden of proof to the Defense. That’s 

improper.” The trial court overruled his objection. 

Our review of the record reveals that the prosecutor’s comment about 

Bradley’s failure to request fingerprinting was intended to rebut defense counsel’s 

argument condemning the State’s failure to take fingerprints. During closing 

argument, Bradley’s counsel made numerous comments about the police officers’ 

failure to fingerprint items from the house and match them with Bradley’s 

fingerprints. In this context, the prosecutor’s comment that Bradley could have 

requested fingerprints was not improper because it was a response to the defense’s

claim that the State’s evidence was lacking. See Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234, 
12

249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that prosecutor’s reference to absence of 

documentary evidence did not constitute shifting of burden of proof); Jackson v. 

State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding State may comment on 

appellant’s failure to present evidence in his favor regarding DNA evidence when 

argument was “merely a response to the defense’s assertions that the State’s 

scientific evidence was lacking”); Caron v. State, 162 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that during jury argument, 

State may comment on appellant’s failure to present evidence in his favor); Doty v. 

State, 820 S.W.2d 918, 923–24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref’d) (holding 

that the State’s comment that if there was any evidence to support the defense’s 

theory, “don’t you think that they might have brought it to you,” was a summation 

of the evidence). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by overruling 

Bradley’s objection to the prosecutor’s fingerprint comment. 

(b) Proper plea for law enforcement

Bradley contends that the prosecutor continued to “stretch the limits of 

permissible advocacy” in suggesting that the jury consider matters outside the 

record, when the prosecutor commented: 

I’m about to give you this evidence. It’s your job now. Y’all are the 

conscience of this community. You decide what is allowed in this 

community. You decide is this the type of person you want roaming 

the streets[?] At some point in time, you’ll be able to talk about this 

trial. Your friends and family will ask you about this case and they 

will ask you what you did.
13

Bradley objected, “Improper breach [sic] of law enforcement. I object to it.” 

The trial court overruled Bradley’s objection. 

When the State’s argument is designed to induce the jury to convict the 

defendant because the community demands or expects such a result, the argument 

is improper. Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en 

banc). However, the State may present pleas for law enforcement by reminding 

jurors that they may be called upon by family and friends to explain both the case 

and the verdict. Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 801–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en 

banc).

Here, the prosecutor’s comment did not pressure the jury to reach a 

particular verdict based upon the demands or expectations of the community. On 

the contrary, the prosecutor argued that the jury represented the community. The 

complained-of comment properly asks the jury to act as the voice of the 

community, and therefore, it constitutes a proper plea for law enforcement. See id.

(comment urging jury to “remember and think about how [friends and neighbors] 

will ask you at the end of case when it’s all over” did not “assert or imply that the 

community demands a conviction”); York v. State, 258 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d) (comment asking jury “what it is that you want the 

newspaper to say when you open up the newspaper tomorrow and you get to tell 

your friends or family” about the result was proper plea for law enforcement); 
14

Harris v. State, 122 S.W.3d 871, 888 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d)

(holding that prosecutor arguing that jury represented community and asking jury 

to send message by its verdict was proper plea for law enforcement). Accordingly, 

we hold that the trial court did not err by overruling Bradley’s objection to the 

conscience of the community comment. 

3. Sustained Objections and Denials of Mistrial 

Bradley objected to two of the prosecutor’s comments on the grounds that 

they referenced the prosecutor’s personal opinions. The trial court sustained both 

objections but denied Bradley’s motions for mistrial. Bradley argues that the 

improper comments were “clearly harmful” and the court’s instructions to 

disregard were insufficient to cure them. 

The prosecutor’s first motion for mistrial was made when the prosecutor 

argued:

And he’s carrying these documents in his briefcase. A briefcase that 

you’re carrying, my argument wasn’t that he couldn’t walk across the 

street? My argument is how much sense does it make if you live right 

across the street that you need to carry a briefcase to go collect rent? 

What sense in the world does that make?

As the officer testified, these documents were found inside the home, 

not inside of a briefcase. See, the whole briefcase comes in because 

it’s another little fabrication to say if I could just pull one over on 

them and say it’s a briefcase, then these dirty crooked cops just 

opened up my briefcase, then decided we want to put this case on you. 

So, we’re going to throw your documents in the house and hang them 

up and start taking photos of them, wow, that makes sense in my head. 

I don’t think it makes sense in anybody else’s head. 
15

Bradley’s counsel objected “to what the Prosecutor thinks,” and the trial 

court sustained the objection. Bradley’s counsel asked the trial court to instruct the 

jury to disregard the statement, and the trial court instructed the jury, “[d]isregard 

that last statement and don’t consider it for any purpose.” Bradley moved for a 

mistrial, which the trial court denied. 

The prosecutor again commented on his personal opinion when arguing: 

At this time here, you’re going to the back. You can ask for the 

evidence with the exception of the guns and the crack and the weed. 

And keep in mind the offense report does not come in, also. Outside 

of that, you can ask for the photos. If you want the specific other 

evidence, you can ask to inspect it. But it’s probably going to be in 

the presence of the bailiff. I don’t think it should take that long.

Bradley’s counsel again objected “to what the Prosecutor thinks,” and the 

trial court sustained the objection. Bradley’s counsel asked that the jury be 

instructed to disregard the statement. The trial court instructed the jury “Disregard 

that last statement. Don’t consider it for any purpose.” Bradley moved for a 

mistrial, which the trial court denied. 

When the trial court sustains an objection and instructs the jury to disregard 

but denies a defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the issue is whether the trial court 

erred in denying the mistrial. Faulkner v. State, 940 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g). We review a denial for mistrial 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. 
16

Generally, an instruction to disregard impermissible argument cures any 

prejudicial effect. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115. In assessing the curative effect of 

the court’s instruction to disregard, the correct inquiry is whether, in light of the 

record as a whole, the argument was extreme, manifestly improper, injected new 

and harmful facts into the case, or violated a mandatory statutory provision and 

was thus so inflammatory that the instruction to disregard was ineffective. Id. at 

115–16. If the instruction cured any prejudicial effect caused by the improper 

argument, a reviewing court should find that the trial court did not err. Faulkner, 

940 S.W.2d at 312. We determine whether a trial court abused its discretion by 

denying a mistrial by balancing the three Mosley factors: (1) the severity of the 

misconduct or the magnitude of the prejudicial effect, (2) the measures adopted to 

cure the misconduct, and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct.

Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. 

Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s comments were improper, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Bradley’s 

two motions for mistrial. Under the first Mosley factor, we evaluate the severity of 

the misconduct. Id. “I don’t think it makes sense in anybody else’s head,” and “I 

don’t think it should take that long,” although expressing the prosecutor’s opinions, 

are not so extreme, manifestly improper, or prejudicial as to render them incurable 
17

by instruction. The complained-of comments were brief, constituted only a small 

part of the State’s argument, and were not repeated. 

Under the second factor, we consider the measures adopted to cure the 

misconduct. Id. The trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard both 

statements and to not consider them for any purpose. The law generally presumes 

an instruction to disregard and other cautionary instructions will be obeyed by the 

jury. Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In cases 

involving direct statements of personal belief as to the credibility of a witness, 

instructions to disregard have been considered effective to cure any harm. See, 

e.g., McDonald v. State, 148 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2004) (instruction cured prosecutor’s statement that he thought victim was “very 

believable”), aff’d on other grounds, 179 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); 

Nauert v. State, 838 S.W.2d 328, 329–30 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref’d) 

(instruction to disregard cured harm from prosecutor’s suggestion that jury should 

believe witnesses because prosecutors and investigators believed her). 

Under the third factor, we consider the certainty of conviction without the 

misconduct. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. Officer Nash testified that he 

observed Bradley selling drugs and that Bradley admitted to him that everything in 

the house was his. Moreover, there was evidence that the police found numerous 

documents with Bradley’s name in the house, refuting Bradley’s defense that he 
18

did not live there. And, it is undisputed that Bradley showed Officer Nash where 

the drugs were located in the house. This is strong evidence of guilt. 

Balancing the Mosley factors, we hold that the prosecutor’s comments about 

his personal opinions did not render ineffective the instructions to disregard, and 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bradley’s motions for 

mistrial. 

Accordingly, we overrule Bradley’s sole point of error. 

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Rebeca Huddle

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle.

Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).