Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

 

No. 08-1330

CHUKRI RIZKALLAH GERGES RABBAT,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

 

Before

Torruella, Baldock, and Howard, Circuit Judges. *

 

Joan M. Altamore, on brief, for petitioner.

Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Attorney General, Civil

Division, Alison Marie Igoe, Senior Litigation Counsel, and

Ada E. Bosque, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,

on brief, for respondent.

 

September 24, 2008

 
-3-

BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. The Department of

Homeland Security charged Petitioner Chukri Rizkallah Gerges

Rabbat, a citizen of Lebanon, with overstaying his nonimmigrant visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Petitioner

admitted the charge’s factual allegations (contained in a

Notice to Appear) and filed an application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the United

Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. In his

application, Petitioner alleged a fear of persecution at the

hands of Syrians based upon his Christian religion.

Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at

length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) first found Petitioner’s

application for asylum untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2).

Subsection (a)(2)(B) provides that, absent changed or

extraordinary circumstances, an alien is not eligible for

asylum “unless the alien demonstrates by clear and

convincing evidence that the application has been filed

within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the

United States.” Based on blanket findings, the IJ

alternatively concluded that Petitioner was not eligible for

asylum because his testimony was not credible. See id. §

1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(iii) (establishing a framework for
-4-

credibility determinations). The IJ explained that

Petitioner did not meet his burden of establishing he was a

“refugee” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42),

i.e., one having a well-founded fear of persecution

based on, among other things, religion. See id.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (requiring applicant for asylum to

establish refugee status). The IJ further concluded

Petitioner was not entitled to withholding of removal

because he did not meet his burden of establishing his life

or freedom would be threatened on account of religion if

removed to Lebanon. See id. § 1231(b)(3). Finally, the IJ

concluded Petitioner had not proven “more likely than not”

that he would be tortured upon returning to Lebanon as

required for protection under CAT. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

agreed with the IJ’s decision in all respects and dismissed

Petitioner’s appeal. In doing so, the BIA explained that

Petitioner’s application for asylum was time-barred, and the

IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not clearly

erroneous. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

At the outset, we note our lack of jurisdiction to

review Petitioner’s asylum claim. Subsection (a)(3) of 8

U.S.C. § 1158 plainly states “[n]o court shall have

jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney
-5-

General under paragraph (2),” relating to time limits for

filing an application for asylum. See Guillaume v.

Gonzales, 504 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, we possess

jurisdiction only to review the BIA’s denial of relief based

on withholding of removal and CAT. In Jiang v. Gonzales,

474 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2007) we set forth the standard of

review applicable to those claims:

This court reviews findings of fact in immigration

proceedings, including findings with respect to

credibility, to determine whether those findings

are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Under that standard, an adverse

credibility determination may stand if it is

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole.

(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also

Settenda v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 2004)

(explaining the substantial evidence standard “applies both

to the asylum and withholding claims as well as to claims

brought under CAT”).

Applying this standard, we need not repeat Petitioner’s

story here. We have carefully reviewed the entire record

and the parties’ briefs, and conclude the BIA reached the

correct result under the applicable law. We have repeatedly

opined that “‘when a lower court accurately takes the

measure of a case and articulates a cogent rationale, it

serves no useful purpose for a reviewing court to write at

length.’” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119,
-6-

120 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish,

300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing cases)). Because

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, we deny

the Petition for Review for substantially the reasons set

forth in that decision. See Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26

(1st Cir. 2008) (“Where the BIA does not [expressly] adopt

the IJ’s findings, we review the BIA’s decision rather than

the IJ’s.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART, AND DISMISSED IN

PART FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.