FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DIRECTV, INC., 

Nos. 04-56847 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 04-56913

v.  D.C. No.

SCOTT WEBB, CV-03-03399-SVW

Defendant-Appellant/Cross- OPINION Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 16, 2006—Pasadena, California

Filed September 25, 2008

Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Harry Pregerson, and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

13713
COUNSEL

Albert A. Zakarian (argued); Robert S. Apgood (argued),

CARPELAW, PLLC; for the appellant/cross-appellee Scott

Webb. 

Howard Rubin (argued); Joshua G. Berman, Marc J. Zwillinger, Jacqueline Sadker, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal

LLP; for the appellee/cross-appellant DirecTV, Inc. 

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge: 

Scott Webb appeals the district court’s civil bench trial

judgment against him for piracy of satellite television signals

and modification of equipment used for unauthorized interception and decryption of satellite television signals. Based on

evidence of Webb’s purchase of satellite television hardware

and so-called “pirate access devices” used to enable the unauthorized reception of television programming, the district

court held that Webb intercepted the broadcast signal of

DirecTV, Inc. (“DTV”) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)

and 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). In addition, the district court held that

Webb’s use of a pirate access device called an “emulator” to

modify legitimate DTV access cards for the purpose of unauthorized decryption constituted a violation of 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(e)(4). 

Regarding the violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4), our

court’s recent decision in DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d

847 (9th Cir. 2007), resolved some of the issues raised in this

case. Huynh held that § 605(e)(4) does not apply to personal

use. Since Webb was held liable under that statute for modification of equipment which he used himself, the portion of the

judgment holding him responsible for one violation of

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13717
§ 605(e)(4) must be reversed. Other violations of that statute

alleged by DTV were held by the district court to be barred

by the application of a one-year limitations period borrowed

from California law. DTV challenges the district court’s

selection and application of that one-year limitations period,

but we agree with the district court that the limitations period

is appropriately drawn from California law, such that other

potential claims against Webb for violation of § 605(e)(4) are

barred as untimely. 

That leaves the violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) and 47

U.S.C. § 605(a), which Webb challenges with several arguments. We hold, among other things, that circumstantial evidence of signal interception can be sufficient, and was

sufficient in this case, to sustain the claims, but that possession of multiple pirate devices does not in itself constitute

multiple violations of these statutes. 

Applying those conclusions to this judgment, we affirm in

part and reverse in part, and we remand the action to the district court.

I. Background

DTV is a provider of direct-to-home satellite broadcast programming. Unlike cable television providers, which transmit

signals through fixed optical fibers or coaxial cables, DTV

delivers its signals via satellite directly into its customers’

homes. Customers pay for this service on a subscription or

pay-per-view basis. Like conventional radio and television

broadcasting, DTV’s signals are broadcast through the air and

can be received—or intercepted—by anyone with the proper

hardware. Thus, DTV encrypts its signals to protect against

signal theft. 

To receive DTV’s signals in unscrambled form, an individual must have a hardware system consisting of a satellite dish,

a signal processor known as an “integrated receiver/decoder,”

13718 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
and an “access card.” The access card is a “smart card” that

contains an embedded computer chip and memory, which,

when authorized, allows the integrated receiver/decoder to

process DTV’s signals for television viewing. The access card

is therefore critical to receiving usable signals from DTV. In

theory, the other hardware is of little use without an authorized access card because that hardware cannot unscramble

DTV’s encrypted signals. In reality, so-called “pirate access

devices” exist that will simulate authorization. By using such

a device, a signal pirate can circumvent DTV’s encryption

technology and obtain unpaid access to DTV programming. 

In December 1999, Scott Webb purchased a DTV television hardware system. Webb received a “pending” account at

that time, which was legally incapable of decrypting DTV’s

transmissions because its access card was unauthorized pending account activation. Webb never activated this account and

did not pay DTV for its service. Instead, he bought fifty-seven

pirate access devices between August 31, 2000, and December 31, 2001. 

DTV first learned of Webb in May 2001 as part of an

investigation into Internet purveyors of pirate access devices.1

The company filed suit against him on May 15, 2003, alleging

numerous acts of signal piracy and pirate access device modification and distribution in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a), 47

U.S.C. § 605 (e)(4), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2512.2 Following

1Webb claims for the first time on appeal that DTV learned of his signal

interception as early as January 25, 2001. That is the date Webb’s girlfriend called DTV customer service to report a system malfunction linked

directly to signal piracy. We do not address the merits of this claim, however, because Webb failed to raise it before the district court. See United

States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003). 

2Although these statutes provide criminal penalties, this is a civil suit.

Both the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000), and the

Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2521 (2003), authorize civil remedies for

parties harmed by statutory violations. 18 U.S.C. § 2529(a); 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(3)(A). 

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13719
a bench trial, the district court found that Webb was liable for

committing one act of unlawful signal reception in violation

of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a), fifty-seven acts of signal interception

in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), and one act of access

card modification in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4). The

court awarded DTV statutory damages of $1,000 for Webb’s

§ 605(a) violation, $10,000 for his § 605(e)(4) violation, and

$123,700 for 1,237 days (at $100 per day) of signal interception in violation of § 2511(1)(a). The court also held that a

one-year statute of limitations barred other § 605 claims by

DTV against Webb. The court ordered equitable relief in the

form of an injunction prohibiting Webb from further violations, and awarded costs and attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$69,681.20. Webb moved to amend the findings and the

award of damages, or alternatively to receive a new trial, but

the court denied this motion. Both parties appealed. 

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo

and its factual findings for clear error. Idaho Potato Comm’n

v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425 F.3d 708, 718 (9th

Cir. 2005). Under the clearly erroneous standard, the district

court’s findings must be upheld unless on review of all the

evidence we are “left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Twentieth Century Fox

Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir.

2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

A. The Statutory Framework

Two federal statutes govern television signal piracy: the

Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications

Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000), and the Wiretap Act, 18

U.S.C. §§ 2511-2521 (2003). Neither Act originally addressed

television signal piracy, but amendments made to both statutes in the 1980’s extended their reach to the unauthorized

reception or interception of television programming. 

13720 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
Concerned with “the theft of cable service,” Congress in

1984 amended and supplemented the Communications Act

with the Cable Communications Policy Act. See H.R. Rep.

No. 98-934, at 83 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

4655, 4720. The 1984 legislation retained § 605’s original

prohibitions without amendment in what became § 605(a).

Congress then added §§ 605(b)-(e) to curb “the growing practice of individuals taking down satellite delivered programming for private, home viewing by means of privately owned

backyard earth stations.”

3

 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4745. In

1988, Congress again amended the Communications Act in

order “to deter piracy practices.” See The Satellite Home

Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 205, 102 Stat.

3959-60. These amendments stiffened applicable civil and

criminal penalties, expanded civil standing to sue, and added

the provision now identified as § 605(e)(4), which prohibits

the manufacture, sale, modification, and distribution of pirate

access devices. H.R. Rep. No. 100-887(II) (1998), at 28,

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5657. 

The Wiretap Act underwent a similar evolution. While the

statute originally covered just “wire and oral communications,” Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) in 1986 to extend the Wiretap Act’s

protections to “electronic communications.” See Konop v.

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848). Unlike the Communications Act, it appears that Congress did not amend the

3

In § 605(a), Congress retained “the types of unauthorized publication

or use of electronic communications that ha[d] been prohibited since the

Communications Act first became law.” Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v.

Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 911 (6th Cir. 2001). Section 605(b) provides

for limited exceptions to § 605(a). Section 605(c) prohibits the encryption

of “satellite delivered programs included in the National Program Service

of the Public Broadcasting Service and intended for public viewing by

retransmission by television broadcast stations.” Section 605(d) contains

definitions for the purposes of § 605, and finally, § 605(e) authorizes penalties and remedies for statutory violations. 

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13721
Wiretap Act with signal piracy specifically in mind. See

United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1992)

(noting that “nothing in the legislative history of the ECPA

indicates particular concern about satellite pay television piracy”). Nevertheless, since the passage of the ECPA amendments courts have generally held that satellite television

transmissions are “electronic communications” within the

meaning of the Wiretap Act. See id.; DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe,

431 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Herring,

993 F.2d 784, 786-87 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United

States v. One Macom Video Cipher II, 985 F.2d 258, 261 (6th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Splawn, 982 F.2d 414, 414-15

(10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Shriver, 989 F.2d 898, 904

(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Davis, 978 F.2d 415, 417-20

(8th Cir. 1992).

B. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)

The first two statutory sections under which the district

court found Webb liable were 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and 18

U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). These sections of the Communications

Act and Wiretap Act both address satellite television signal

piracy. Such piracy is illegal. We conclude that the district

court did not clearly err in finding that Webb violated these

sections. 

[1] Section 605(a) of the Communications Act prohibits the

unauthorized receipt and use of radio communications for

one’s “own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled

thereto.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). That section does not specifically reference satellite communications because, as discussed

previously, Congress put the prohibitions originally contained

in § 605 into § 605(a) without changing the substance of the

provision when it amended the Communications Act in 1984.

See Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900,

911 (6th Cir. 2001). When the original provision was written,

DTV and the business of direct-to-home satellite broadcasting

did not exist. Still, it is clear from the case law since the 1984

13722 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
amendments that the “communications” protected by § 605(a)

include satellite television signals. See, e.g., Sosa v.

DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 2006) (“By using

specialized smart card programming equipment, an individual

can gain unauthorized access to DIRECTV’s signal, in violation of . . . 47 U.S.C. § 605.”); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc., 253

F.3d at 911-12. 

[2] Section 2511(1)(a) of the Wiretap Act also prohibits

signal piracy. That section makes it illegal to intercept “electronic communications,” including satellite television signals.

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); Lande, 968 F.2d at 913 (acknowledging that § 2511(1)(a) prohibits “the unauthorized viewing of

satellite pay television”). 

Webb argues that the evidence was insufficient to support

the district court’s finding that he pirated DTV’s signals in

violation of these statutes. He points first to the lack of direct

evidence that he intercepted DTV’s signal and second to his

own testimony denying such a violation. Even under the clear

error standard that applies to findings of fact, he contends, a

finding that he intercepted signals cannot be sustained. We

disagree. 

[3] The law does not require direct evidence to support a

factual finding. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently

persuasive. Signal piracy is by its nature a surreptitious venture and direct evidence of actual interception may understandably be hard to come by. See Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d

1573, 1578 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Direct evidence may not have

been available based on the stealthiness of the invasion.”)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). For this reason,

courts have correctly concluded that direct evidence of signal

piracy is not required to prove unlawful interception. See, e.g.,

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 2005)

(“Circumstantial evidence can support a finding that a communication was intercepted, even absent direct evidence.”);

Walker, 911 F.2d at 1578.

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13723
[4] Evidence that a person possessed a pirate access device,

by itself, may not be enough to infer actual interception of a

signal. See DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124, 1129

(11th Cir. 2004) (finding no “private right of action against a

person who possesses a device” in violation of the Wiretap

Act); Robson, 420 F.3d at 540-42 & nn.36-37 (collecting

cases). These devices may assist in the unauthorized interception of signal, but they are not capable of interception by

themselves. 

[5] In this case, however, the evidence demonstrated that

Webb had more than a pirate access device. He possessed

everything else he needed to intercept DTV’s signals. He purchased multiple DTV receivers, but never activated any with

DTV. He admittedly kept a DTV hardware system at his

house. He purchased not just one or two pirate access devices,

but fifty-seven of them. Cf. Robson, 420 F.3d at 542 (in which

the court was unwilling to infer interception from the “mere

purchase and possession of . . . two pirate access devices”

without any evidence of the “other DTV components required

for interception”). He denied unlawful interception of DTV’s

signal, but he failed to explain why else he would buy and

possess pirate access devices and unauthorized DTV hardware for several years. The district court was not persuaded

by his bare denials, and understandably so. 

Moreover, there was evidence from DTV customer service

records that Webb’s girlfriend called DTV once from his

home to complain of a system “malfunction.” This “malfunction” occurred the day after DTV deployed its “Black Sunday” electronic countermeasure (“ECM”), an electronic signal

broadcast by DTV to detect and incapacitate unauthorized

pirate access cards. It is difficult to avoid the inference that

Webb’s girlfriend was accustomed to watching DTV signals

on a system enabled for unauthorized reception. 

[6] Faced with this evidence, the district court did not

clearly err in finding that Webb engaged in signal piracy. See

13724 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 429 F.3d at 879. To the

contrary, the evidence was compelling. We affirm the district

court’s determination that Webb violated 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)

and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). 

[7] Webb also challenges the number of violations found

by the district court. In particular, the court found Webb liable

for fifty-seven violations of § 2511(1)(a) based on his possession of fifty-seven pirate access devices. On that subject, we

agree with Webb, though not in a way that significantly

affects the outcome of the case. As we have discussed, the

mere possession of pirate access devices is insufficient to

create an inference of signal interception in violation of

§ 2511(1)(a). In order to intercept a signal, a defendant must

also possess the hardware needed to capture and process satellite broadcast signals. Robson, 420 F.3d at 542. 

[8] The district court found that Webb had one DTV hardware system in his possession. This system was capable of

just one signal interception no matter how many devices

Webb attached to it. Section 2511 offers no indication that

statutory violations should be counted by the number of

devices used to engage in signal interception. Cf. 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(e)(4) (providing expressly that the number of violations

is established by the number of devices). Similarly, the statute

itself suggests that use of a system to intercept a signal multiple times does not constitute a separate violation each time.

Statutory damages for violation are authorized in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2520(b)(2)(B) as “the greater of $100 a day for each day of

violation or $10,000,” contemplating a single violation that

stretched over many days. Whether Webb used one or fiftyseven devices to steal DTV’s signal, his personal use of

devices in conjunction with his DTV hardware constituted

one violation of § 2511(1)(a). The same logic should apply to

§ 605(a). 

[9] Nevertheless, the error here was harmless. The district

court found Webb liable for only one violation of § 605(a)

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13725
and awarded statutory damages of $1,000. The amount of

statutory damages awarded by the district court under

§ 2511(1)(a) would be the same if it was based on a single

violation, because it was based on counting the number of

days Webb was in violation, not the number of violations.

Specifically, the court awarded statutory damages of

$123,700 under § 2520(b)(2)(B), based on its finding that

Webb engaged in signal interception for 1,237 days. We

affirm those awards. 

[10] Webb challenges the computation, arguing that even if

it is assumed he engaged in piracy, the record does not support the district court’s finding that he engaged in piracy for

each of the 1,237 days. That time period represented the number of days between August 31, 2000, when Webb first

acquired the equipment necessary for signal piracy, and the

first day of his trial on January 20, 2004. The district court

found that evidence that Webb possessed DTV hardware and

a pirate access device as of August 31, 2000, was enough to

establish unlawful interception as of that date. We agree. See

Robson, 420 F.3d at 537; see Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127; see

Walker, 911 F.2d at 1578. 

[11] Webb suggests that he could not have intercepted

DTV’s signal after DTV deployed its Black Sunday ECM in

January 2001. Webb offered no evidence, however, to prove

that the ECM irreparably damaged his equipment. He never

discarded or otherwise disposed of his fifty-seven pirate

access devices or his DTV hardware. The district court

inferred continued piracy from his continued possession of the

equipment, and that inference was not clearly erroneous.

C. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4)

Webb was charged by DTV and held liable by the district

court for more than signal piracy in violation of 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). He was also found by

13726 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
the district court to be liable for one violation of 47 U.S.C.

§ 605(e)(4), which provides that: 

Any person who manufactures, assembles, modifies,

imports, exports, sells, or distributes any electronic,

mechanical, or other device or equipment, knowing

or having reason to know that the device or equipment is primarily of assistance in the unauthorized

decryption of satellite cable programming, or directto-home satellite services, or is intended for any

other activity prohibited by subsection (a) of this

section, shall be fined not more than $500,000 for

each violation, or imprisoned for not more than 5

years for each violation, or both. 

Other alleged violations of § 605(e)(4) were held by the district court to be barred by the statute of limitations applicable

to this section, as will be discussed in more detail below. The

one violation that was sustained by the district court was

based on Webb’s modification of a device for his own personal use. 

[12] In DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 855 (9th Cir.

2007), our court held that 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) does not

apply to end-users, meaning persons who employ pirate

access devices for their own personal use, rather than for sale

or distribution to others. Since the one violation found by the

district court was for modification of a device Webb used

himself, the portion of the judgment holding him liable for

that one violation of § 605(e)(4) must be reversed. 

D. Statute of Limitations

While the district court held Webb liable for violating

§ 605(e)(4), it concluded that he could be held liable for only

one violation under that statute—“for improper modification

of . . . access cards for the purpose of decrypting [DTV]’s

signals”—because other claimed violations of § 605(e)(4) did

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13727
not survive the applicable statute of limitations. DTV challenges the district court’s decision regarding the limitations

period. We consider that argument because some or all of the

other alleged violations of § 605(e)(4) arguably involved ultimate use of the devices by other persons, not by Webb himself as an end-user. DTV’s claims against Webb involving

ultimate use by other persons would not necessarily be barred

by our interpretation of the statute in Huynh. We conclude

that the district court was correct in its treatment of the statute

of limitations, however, such that the other alleged violations

by Webb are barred. 

[13] Section 605 does not contain or reference its own statute of limitations. Accordingly, the district court borrowed a

limitations period from an analogous state law: the California

Piracy Act (“Piracy Act”), Cal. Penal Code §§ 593d-593e. On

cross-appeal, DTV contends that the district court incorrectly

applied the Piracy Act’s one-year statute of limitations to its

claims under § 605. DTV argues instead that the two-year

limitations period of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-

2522, should govern its claims under § 605. 

[14] When a federal statute does not have its own statute

of limitations, we are directed to borrow a period from the

forum state’s analogous state law “as a matter of interstitial

fashioning of remedial details under the respective substantive

federal statute[ ].” DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462

U.S. 151, 160 n.13 (1983); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (noting that “when Congress has not

established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the

settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation”),

superceded by statute on other grounds, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5114, 369,

377-80 (2004), as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &

Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-80 (2004). State-law borrowing

is a “longstanding” and “settled” practice when federal statutes do not provide for their own limitations periods. North

Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (quotations

13728 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
and citations omitted). This practice is rooted in the expectations of Congress and, as such, constitutes a general rule that

“may not be lightly abandoned.” Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501

U.S. 350, 356 (1991). 

Though borrowing from the forum state’s law is the general

rule, the Supreme Court has recognized that state limitations

periods do not always provide the best “vehicles for the

enforcement of federal law,” and that it “may be inappropriate

to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules

at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive

law.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161. As such, a court may

instead apply a limitations period from analogous federal law

when borrowing a state statute of limitations would “frustrate

or interfere with the implementation” of federal law. North

Star, 515 U.S. at 34 (citation omitted). Federal law nonetheless is limited to serving as a “secondary lender” of limitations periods to be used only as a “closely circumscribed”

exception to the general preference for state law. Id. (quotations omitted). Courts must adopt a limitations period from

analogous state law unless federal law “clearly provides a

closer analogy than available state statutes, and . . . the federal

policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that

rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial

lawmaking.” Lampf, 501 U.S. at 356 (quotations and citation

omitted).

As § 605 does not have its own limitations period, the district court properly looked first to analogous state law. The

district court determined that the California Piracy Act was

“most closely analogous” to § 605 and that policy factors did

not support adopting something else. Consequently, the district court applied the one-year statute of limitations applicable to violations of the Piracy Act to DTV’s claims under

§ 605.

[15] We agree with the district court that the Piracy Act

offers the proper source for a limitations period here. To start,

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13729
the California statute is remarkably similar to § 605 in purpose and structure. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 358 (instructing

that “commonality of purpose and similarity of elements” are

relevant when choosing the proper source for a limitations

period). 

Congress originally enacted § 605 in 1933, but it substantially expanded the statute in 1984 in order to address “the

theft of cable service.” See H.R. Rep. No. 98-934 at 83

(1984). As we previously noted, the original prohibitions of

§ 605 are now contained in § 605(a), which makes it unlawful

to “receiv[e], assist[ ] in receiving, transmit[ ], or assist[ ] in

transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire

or radio” without authorization. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Section

605 also prohibits “divulg[ing] or publish[ing]” information

gleaned from unauthorized signal reception, or otherwise

using that information for one’s “own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.” Id. The statute provides for

criminal penalties and a civil cause of action in § 605(e), and,

as discussed above, prohibits “the manufacture[ ], assembl[y],

modifi[cation], import[ ], export[ ], s[ale], or distribut[ion]” of

pirate access devices in § 605(e)(4). 

[16] Like § 605, the Piracy Act prohibits the unauthorized

reception of cable services. See People v. Prevost, 60 Cal.

App. 4th 1382, 1396 (1998) (holding that “the clear purpose

of [the Piracy Act] is to deter the theft of cable”). Section

593d of the Piracy Act prohibits the unauthorized receipt of

“any program or other service carried by a multichannel video

or information services provider” by means of specifically

forbidden conduct.4 Cal. Penal Code § 593d(a)(1)-(a)(4). The

4Conduct specifically prohibited by § 593d(a) includes: making or

maintaining “an unauthorized connection . . . to any cable, wire, or other

component of a multichannel video or information services provider’s system,” Cal. Penal Code § 593d(a)(1); purchasing, possessing, or attaching

“any unauthorized device or devices” to such a system, id. § 593d(a)(2);

modifying or altering “any device installed with the authorization of a

multichannel video or information services provider,” id. § 593d(a)(3);

and modifying or altering “an access device that authorizes services” or

obtaining a modified access device and using it “to obtain services from

a multichannel video or information services provider,” id. § 593d(a)(4).

13730 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
statute also forbids a litany of conduct related to pirate access

devices in § 593d(b), providing that “any person who knowingly and willfully manufactures, assembles, modifies,

imports into this state, distributes, sells, offers to sell, advertises for sale, or possesses” the devices “is guilty of a public

offense.” And, in § 593e, the Act extends to “subscription

television” providers essentially the same protections given

by § 593d to providers of “multichannel video or information

services.”

In sum, the Piracy Act runs entirely parallel to § 605. Both

the federal and state statutes recognize the property interest

inherent in satellite broadcast transmissions and treat the

unauthorized receipt of television signals as theft. See 47

U.S.C. § 605(a); Cal. Penal Code § 593d(a). Both statutes

prohibit the manufacture, modification, and distribution of

decryption devices. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4); Cal. Penal

Code § 593d(b). Both prohibit unauthorized signal transmission as well as reception.5

See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a); Cal. Penal

Code § 593d(c). Finally, the two statutes have “similar remedial structures.”

6 Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 677 (5th

5Section 605(a) provides that no one “transmitting, or assisting in transmitting” a communication covered by the statute “shall divulge or publish

the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof,

except through authorized channels of transmission or reception.” Similarly, the Piracy Act prohibits the transmission or broadcasting of “any

program or other service not intended to be transmitted or broadcast.” Cal.

Penal Code § 593d(c). 

6Both the California and the federal statutes provide for enhanced fines

and longer periods of jail time after a first offense; both provide a civil

right of action to aggrieved parties; both allow civil plaintiffs to recover

actual or statutory damages and injunctive relief; both enhance damages

when the defendant conducted the illegal activities for commercial or private financial gain; and both allow a successful civil plaintiff to recover

attorney’s fees and costs. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e); Cal. Penal Code

§§ 593d-593e. Additionally, under both 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) and Cal.

Penal Code § 593e, each unauthorized device constitutes a separate violation for which damages may be imposed. 

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13731
Cir. 2001) (describing this factor as relevant for the borrowing

of a limitations period). 

[17] The Piracy Act and 47 U.S.C. § 605 are so similar that

the California courts have expressly characterized the Piracy

Act as a state-law analogue to § 605. In Prevost, for example,

the California Court of Appeal stated: 

[T]he clear purpose of [the Piracy Act] is to deter the

theft of cable by requiring the customers who receive

cable transmissions and the entities who distribute

equipment to receive those transmissions to obtain

authorization from the cable operator. The federal

law achieves that aim in [47 U.S.C. § 553a] . . .

while the state achieves it in [the Piracy Act]. 

60 Cal. App. 4th at 1396-97; see also People v. Patton, 194

Cal. Rptr. 759, 762 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1983) (“We

find that [Piracy Act § 593e] is a state law which attempts to

regulate the same subject as [47 U.S.C. § 605].”). 

DTV also argues that the Piracy Act cannot provide a statute of limitations for § 605 because it does not contain its own

limitations period but merely incorporates the “catchall” limitations period of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340. While the

Supreme Court has “rejected the [borrowing] of a ‘catchall’

statute of limitations,” this means only that a catchall limitations period is not itself substantively analogous. See, e.g.,

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483

U.S. 143, 152-53 (1983) (hereinafter “Malley-Duff”) (rejecting the borrowing of a Pennsylvania catchall period because

While the court in Prostar ultimately chose to borrow a federal limitations period, the closest state analogue to the federal act in that case was

much less analogous than the Piracy Act is to § 605. Prostar, 239 F.3d at

669; Cf. KingVision Pay-Per-View v. 898 Belmont, Inc., 366 F.3d 217,

223-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Prostar on that ground). 

13732 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
this period was not analogous to the federal RICO claim at

issue). Unlike the catchall Pennsylvania limitations period in

Malley-Duff, the Piracy Act is substantively parallel to § 605.

The fact that the statute derives its one-year limitations period

from Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340 is irrelevant. 

Despite the clear similarities between the Piracy Act and

§ 605, DTV argues that the Wiretap Act offers a closer analogue to § 605 and should provide the statute of limitations

for its § 605 claims. The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-

2522, creates “a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of

wiretapping and electronic surveillance.” Gelbard v. United

States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972). It authorizes the electronic

surveillance by law enforcement under “stringent conditions,”

but flatly prohibits “[u]nauthorized interceptions and the disclosure or use of information obtained through unauthorized

interceptions.” Id. 

Most relevant here are §§ 2511 and 2512 of the Wiretap

Act. Section 2511 prohibits the intentional interception of

“electronic communications” and the use of “any electronic,

mechanical, or other device” for that end, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2511(1)(a)-(b), as well as the disclosure or use of intercepted information. Id. § 2511(1)(c)-(e). Section 2512 prohibits the manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising

of pirate access devices through the mail or in interstate commerce. Id. § 2512(1)(a)-(c). 

The Wiretap Act does plainly overlap to some degree with

47 U.S.C. § 605, as signal piracy creates causes of action

under both statutes. See Lande, 968 F.2d at 912-13 (implying

that the “two criminal statutes apply to the same conduct”).

Even so, these statutes are not truly uniform in purpose or

scope. Whereas § 605 and the Piracy Act both focus on signal

interception as theft—the precise issue at stake here—the

Wiretap Act is aimed largely at privacy protection. Compare

47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (prohibiting the unauthorized receipt of

signal “for [one’s] own benefit or for the benefit of another”)

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13733
with Konop, 302 F.3d at 874 (holding that Congress added

protection of “electronic communications” to the Wiretap Act

in order “to afford [them] privacy protection”). This emphasis

on privacy is evident in both the legislative history of the

Wiretap Act and in the breadth of its prohibitions. See Lande,

968 F.2d at 913 (noting that “nothing in the legislative history

of the [Wiretap Act] indicates particular concern about satellite pay television piracy”); Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708-

10 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that videotaping sex without consent and sending the footage over the Internet presents a cause

of action under § 2511). 

[18] Given the Wiretap Act’s focus on privacy, we cannot

say that it “clearly provides a closer analogy” to § 605 than

the Piracy Act. North Star, 515 U.S. at 35 (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court directs that where a suitable state

counterpart exists, it is “simply beside the point that even a

perfectly good federal analogue [also] exists.” North Star, 515

U.S. at 37. 

Even if the California Piracy Act offers the closest analogue to § 605, DTV argues that the two-year period under the

federal Wiretap Act should be applied because borrowing a

limitations period from state law will, in the words of North

Star, “stymie the policies underlying [its] federal cause of

action.” See id. at 34. Specifically, DTV contends that concerns for “uniformity” and the “geographic character” of its

claims counsel for the application of a federal limitations

period. See, e.g., Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357 (identifying uniformity and geographic character as concerns relevant to the borrowing inquiry). According to DTV, the case law suggests

that we must adopt a uniform federal limitations period

because the geographic character of its business is such that

it needs to pursue signal pirates in multiple jurisdictions

across the nation. 

DTV is correct that uniformity and geographic character

are relevant concerns. Yet it misconstrues the meaning and

13734 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
the significance of these terms. “Uniformity,” for example,

does not speak to a litigant’s preference for a single limitations period in multiple lawsuits across multiple jurisdictions.

Rather, it is a threshold question concerning how best to characterize a single federal cause of action for borrowing purposes. Id.; KingVision Pay-Per-View v. 898 Belmont, Inc.,

366 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that uniformity is

“used to characterize the claim for which a statute of limitations period is then to be applied”). The need for uniformity

arises when the complexity of a federal action is “such that a

single state limitations period may not be consistently applied

within a [single] jurisdiction.” Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357; DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165-66 (holding that a hybrid § 301/fair

representation claim required uniformity because the § 301

claim essentially was a contract claim while the fair representation claim had no state analogue). The need for uniformity

does not dictate whether state or federal borrowing is appropriate, and it does not counsel against application of the

Piracy Act’s one-year statute of limitations. See Lampf, 501

U.S. at 357 (holding that when “a uniform limitations period

is appropriate, the court must [still] decide whether this period

should be derived from a state or a federal source”). 

DTV also misconstrues the nature and relevance of “geographic character.” This term refers to whether the multistate

nature of a single claim subjects that claim to the limitations

periods of multiple states, creating confusion and encouraging

forum shopping. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 153-54 (noting that

“conceivably the statute of limitations of several States could

govern” RICO claims because the RICO predicate acts can

occur in many states). Accordingly, it is irrelevant that DTV

broadcasts nationally or has, as it claims to have done, filed

“thousands of lawsuits in district courts across the nation.” Cf.

KingVision, 366 F.3d at 224 (finding that the multistate nature

of the cable industry did not raise geographic concerns in a

statute of limitations analysis under 47 U.S.C. § 553). DTV’s

piracy claims against the defendant in this case, Webb, do not

stem from predicate acts spanning multiple jurisdictions but

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13735
from a localized violation in a single jurisdiction. We are not

faced with the geographic considerations raised by cases such

as Malley-Duff. In any event, geographic considerations do

not counsel for the adoption of a federal limitations period

less analogous than a state counterpart. Lampf, 501 U.S. at

357 (holding that geographic considerations may overcome

the presumption for state borrowing only if the “analogous

federal source truly affords a ‘closer fit’ with the cause of

action at issue than does any available state-law source”)

(emphasis added); North Star, 515 U.S. at 35. 

DTV’s contention that one year is too short a time to investigate signal piracy claims is also unpersuasive. While the

Supreme Court held in DelCostello that a state limitations

period of between ten days and ninety days was insufficient

to bring a LMRA § 301/fair representation hybrid action, 462

U.S. at 166, 167-69, we are not convinced that one year is too

short a limitations period for § 605 actions. Cf. Prostar, 239

F.3d at 675-76, 676 n.47 (refusing to hold that “one year is

too short as a matter of law for investigation and detection of

[cable theft] violations” under 47 U.S.C. § 553). 

Finally, DTV argues under McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), that applying the Piracy Act’s

one-year limitations period to § 605 impermissibly deprives it

of its rights under the Wiretap Act. McAllister involved an

injured seaman who filed an unseaworthiness action against

his employer joined with a Jones Act action for negligence.

Id. at 222. The unseaworthiness claim had a shorter limitations period than the Jones Act claim, but the Supreme Court

held that the shorter period could not be applied because it

effectively barred the Jones Act claim and prevented the seaman from the full benefit of federal law. Id. at 225-26 (“Since

the seaman must sue for both unseaworthiness and Jones Act

negligence in order to make full utilization of his remedies for

personal injury, and since that can be accomplished only in a

single proceeding, a time limitation on the unseaworthiness

13736 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
claim effects in substance a similar limitation on the right of

action under the Jones Act.”). 

In light of McAllister, DTV argues that application of the

Piracy Act’s one-year statute of limitations deprives it of the

benefit of the longer, two-year statute of limitations applicable to its Wiretap Act claims. McAllister, however, involved

two claims so intertwined that they essentially comprised a

“single cause of action.” Id. at 229; see also DelCostello, 462

U.S. at 165 (in which the plaintiff had to prevail on both his

LMRA § 301 claim against his employer and his fair representation claim against his union to prevail against either

defendant). Signal piracy may give rise to liability under both

18 U.S.C. § 2511 and 47 U.S.C. § 605, but these remain separate and distinct causes of action. DTV does not need to prevail on both before it can prevail on either. McAllister does

not govern here. 

[19] Since we conclude that the district court properly borrowed the Piracy Act’s one-year limitations period for DTV’s

claims under § 605, we must consider whether the district

court properly applied this limitations period. Case law and

the relevant statutes provide little direct guidance on when the

applicable limitations period accrues for DTV’s § 605 claims.

The accrual of federal rights generally remains a matter of

federal law even when a limitations period is borrowed from

a state source. See, e.g., Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091,

1095 (2007) (holding that “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause

of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by

reference to state law” even if state law determines the length

of the limitations period) (emphasis in original); Stanley v.

Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir.

2006) (“Although Title IX borrows a state statute of limitations period, federal law governs the ‘determination of the

point at which the limitations period begins to run.’ ”) (citation omitted). Section 605 does not speak directly to that

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13737
issue, though, and the applicable California statute contains

no accrual provision, either.7

[20] Under federal law, “a cause of action generally accrues

when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of his action.” Stanley, 433 F.3d at 1136

(internal quotations and citation omitted). The district court

found that DTV “had a reasonable opportunity” to discover its

§ 605 causes of action against Webb in May 2001. Because

DTV filed its action in May 2003, the court held that the oneyear statute of limitations barred all but two of DTV’s § 605

claims. According to the district court, DTV had one timely

claim under § 605(a) relating to Webb’s “personal use of

pirate access devices to intercept DirecTV’s signal,” and one

timely claim under § 605(e)(4) relating to Webb’s use of an

emulator “for improper modification of DirecTV’s access

cards.” Other claims under § 605 were held to have been filed

too late. 

[21] We agree with the district court that DTV had one

timely claim under § 605(a). As we have discussed, DTV had

only one cognizable claim under § 605(a) in any event: the

one claim resulting from Webb’s own use of pirate access

devices in conjunction with his DTV hardware for the unauthorized reception of DTV’s signal. The district court found

that Webb used his pirate access devices for the unauthorized

receipt of signal from August 31, 2000, until January 20,

2004. This wrongful conduct is no different from the kind of

continuing tort for which the limitations period does not start

7Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(a) provides only that a one-year statute of

limitations applies to “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture,

if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state,

except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.” Cf. Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 340(e) (providing that an “action by a good faith

improver for relief under Chapter 10 . . . . begins to run from the date upon

which the good faith improver discovers that the good faith improver is

not the owner of the land upon which the improvements have been

made”). 

13738 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB
running until the conduct ends. See Flowers v. Carville, 310

F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (“When a tort involves continuing wrongful conduct, the statute of limitations doesn’t

begin to run until that conduct ends.”). So long as Webb continued to violate § 605(a), the limitations period for DTV’s

claim under that section did not start. For this reason, DTV’s

one cognizable claim under § 605(a) was timely when filed in

May 2003.8

[22] DTV’s claims under § 605(e)(4) are another matter.

The district court held that DTV had one timely claim under

that section based on Webb’s use of an emulator. Although

the court found that DTV had reason to know of Webb’s conduct for more than one year before filing suit, it held that one

claim under § 605(e)(4) remained timely since the emulator’s

continuing “modification” of DTV access cards tolled the

applicable limitations period. Webb challenges this tolling

based on Webb’s continuing personal use of the modified

device, but we do not reach that issue, because under Huynh

the personal use by Webb does not in any event constitute a

violation under § 605(e)(4). Thus, we hold that DTV has no

timely claims against Webb under § 605(e)(4) and reverse the

portion of the judgment which found one violation of that

statute. 

III. Conclusion 

Ample evidence indicates that Webb unlawfully intercepted

DTV’s broadcast signals in violation of 15 U.S.C.

§ 2511(1)(a) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). He can properly be held

liable for only a single violation of each of those statutes, but

8Because we determine that DTV’s § 605(a) claim was timely, we do

not need to consider the district court’s application to this claim of the

continuing violations doctrine. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,

536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (holding that the continuing violations doctrine

may toll a limitations period when the “very nature” of the injury at issue

“involves repeated conduct” rather than “discrete acts”). 

DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB 13739
the reduction in the number of violations of § 2511(1)(a) does

not require revision of the amount calculated for statutory

damages. We reverse with respect to the one violation of

§ 605(e)(4) found by the district court, because our interpretation of that statute in Huynh bars the claim. 

The case is remanded to the district court for entry of an

appropriate judgment. Each party is to bear its own costs on

appeal. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;

REMANDED.

13740 DIRECTV, INC. v. WEBB