**Case T-235/07**

**Bavaria NV**

**v**

**European Commission**

(Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Netherlands beer market – Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC – Evidence of the infringement – Access to the file – Fines – Principle of equal treatment – Reasonable time)

Summary of the Judgment

1.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Agreements between undertakings – Concept – Joint intention
as to the conduct to be adopted on the market*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

2.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Concerted practice – Concept – Contact incompatible with the
obligation for each undertaking to determine independently its conduct on the market – Exchange of information – Presumption
– Conditions*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

3.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Means of proof – Reliance on a body
of evidence*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

4.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Means of proof – Documentary proof*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

5.      *Community law – Principles – Fundamental rights – Presumption of innocence – Procedure in competition matters – Applicability*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

6.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Use of statements submitted in the
context of the Leniency Notice by other undertakings which have participated in the infringement, as a means of proof – Whether
permissible – Conditions*

*(Arts 81 EC and 82 EC)*

7.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Agreements between undertakings – Burden of proving the infringement
borne by the Commission – Limits*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

8.      *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Concerted practice – Adverse effect on competition – Criteria
for assessment – Anti-competitive purpose – Sufficient finding*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

9.      *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Burden of proving the infringement
and its duration on the Commission – Probative value of evidence provided voluntarily against an undertaking by the main participants
in an unlawful agreement in order to benefit from the application of the Leniency Notice*

*(Art. 81(1) EC; Commission Notice 96/C 207/04)*

10.    *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Complex infringement comprising elements both of an agreement
and of a concerted practice – Classified singly as ‘an agreement and/or concerted practice’ – Whether permissible*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

11.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement in respect of an undertaking, adopted
after another Commission decision referring to that undertaking only in the context of the statement of the facts but not
as an addressee and not penalising it – Breach of the ne bis in idem principle – None*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

12.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Burden of proving the infringement
and its duration on the Commission – Extent of the burden of proof*

*(Art. 81(1) EC)*

13.    *Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Proof – Undertaking’s response to the request for information
from the Commission – Probative value – Assessment*

*(Council Regulations No 17, Art. 11, and No 1/2003, Art. 18)*

14.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission decision finding an infringement – Duty of the Commission to examine carefully
and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case*

15.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Commission’s premature display of its belief as to the existence of an infringement*

16.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Observance of the rights of the defence – Access to the file – Scope – Refusal to
communicate a document – Consequences – Need to draw a distinction with regard to the burden of proof on the undertaking concerned
between incriminating documents and exculpatory documents*

*(Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 27(2))*

17.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Access to the file – Documents not contained in the investigation file and not retained
by the Commission to be used as evidence – Documents capable of assisting the defence of the parties*

*(Arts 81(1) EC and 82 EC; EEA Agreement, Arts 53, 54 and 57; Council Regulation No 139/2004; Commission Notice 2005/C 325/07,
Section 27)*

18.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Commission’s margin of discretion – Limits – Compliance with the Guidelines
adopted by the Commission – Judicial review*

*(Art. 81 EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03)*

19.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement – Actual impact on the market taken
into account – Scope*

*(Art. 81 EC; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 1A)*

20.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Criteria – Gravity of the infringement – Discretion of the Commission*

*(Council Regulations Nos 17 and 1/2003; Commission Notice 98/C 9/03)*

21.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Division of the undertakings concerned into different categories – Conditions*

*(Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 1A, sixth and seventh paras)*

22.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Division of the undertakings concerned into different categories – Turnover
taken into consideration*

*(Commission Notice 98/C 9/03, Section 1A, sixth and seventh paras)*

23.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Obligations of the Commission – Duty to act within a reasonable time – Criteria for
assessment – Infringement – Consequences*

*(Council Regulation No 1/2003)*

24.    *Competition – Fines – Amount – Determination – Possibility to raise the level of fines in order to increase their deterrent
effect*

*(Art. 81 EC)*

25.    *Competition – Administrative procedure – Obligations of the Commission – Duty to act within a reasonable time – Infringement
– Consequences – Equitable reduction in the amount of the fine*

*(Art. 81 EC)*

1.      In order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, it is sufficient that the undertakings in question
should have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way. An agreement within the
meaning of Article 81(1) EC can be regarded as having been concluded where there is a concurrence of wills on the very principle
of a restriction of competition, even if the specific features of the restriction envisaged are still under negotiation. The
existence of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81 EC is not called into question either by the likelihood that the
consensus between the undertakings did not extend to the practical arrangements for implementing the price increase or the
fact that that increase never actually took place on the market.

(see paras 34-35, 175)

2.      The concept of a concerted practice refers to a form of coordination between undertakings which, without being taken to the
stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition practical
cooperation between them. In this respect, Article 81(1) EC precludes any direct or indirect contact between economic operators
of such a kind as either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to reveal to such
a competitor the conduct which the operator concerned has decided to follow itself or contemplates adopting on the market,
where the object or effect of those contacts is to restrict competition.

Subject to proof to the contrary, which the economic operators concerned must adduce, the presumption must be that the undertakings
taking part in the concerted action and remaining active on the market take account of the information exchanged with their
competitors for the purposes of determining their conduct on that market. That will be all the more true where the undertakings
concert together on a regular basis over a long period.

(see paras 36-37, 178)

3.      As regards establishing an infringement of Article 81(1) EC, the Commission must prove the infringements which it has found
and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence of the facts constituting an infringement.
Thus, the Commission must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to establish the existence of the infringement.

However, it is important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy
those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the
institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement.

As anti-competitive agreements are known to be prohibited, the Commission cannot be required to produce documents expressly
attesting to contacts between the operators concerned. The fragmentary and sporadic items of evidence which may be available
to the Commission should, in any event, be capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant circumstances
to be reconstituted. The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be inferred from a number of
coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence
of an infringement of the competition rules.

(see paras 38-41)

4.      Where the Commission has relied on documentary evidence in support of its finding of the existence of an anti-competitive
agreement or practice, the burden is on the parties who are contesting that finding before the Court not only to put forward
a plausible alternative to the Commission’s view but also to allege that the evidence relied on in the contested decision
to establish the existence of the infringement is insufficient.

(see para. 42)

5.      As regards the scope of review by the Court, where the Court is faced with an application for the annulment of a decision
applying Article 81(1) EC, it must undertake in a general manner a comprehensive review of the question whether or not the
conditions for the application of Article 81(1) EC are met.

Any doubt of the Court must benefit the undertaking to which the decision finding an infringement was addressed, in accordance
with the principle of the presumption of innocence, which, as a general principle of European Union (‘EU’) law, applies in
particular to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules applicable to undertakings that may result
in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments.

(see paras 43-44)

6.      No provision or any general principle of EU law prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an undertaking, on statements
made by other incriminated undertakings. If that were not the case, the burden of proving conduct contrary to Article 81 EC
and Article 82 EC, which is borne by the Commission, would be unsustainable and incompatible with the task of supervising
the proper application of those provisions which is entrusted to it by the EC Treaty.

Admittedly, an admission by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the accuracy of which is contested
by several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate proof of an infringement committed
by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence. Such a statement cannot therefore be sufficient, in itself, to establish
the existence of the infringement, but must be corroborated by other evidence. Nevertheless, the degree of corroboration required
is lesser, in terms both of precision and of depth, than would be the case if that statement were not particularly credible.

Thus, it must be concluded that, if a body of consistent evidence corroborated the existence and certain specific aspects
of the practices mentioned in that statement, that statement might be sufficient in itself, in such a case, to constitute
evidence of other aspects of the Commission’s decision.

Moreover, provided that a document does not manifestly contradict the statement as to the existence or the essential content
of the contested practices, the fact that it provides evidence of significant elements of the practices which it described
is sufficient to endow it with corroborative value within the body of inculpatory evidence.

(see paras 60, 79-81)

7.      The Commission often has to prove the existence of an infringement under conditions which are hardly conducive to that task,
in that several years may have elapsed since the time of the events constituting the infringement and a number of the undertakings
covered by the investigation have not actively cooperated with the Commission.

Whilst it is necessarily incumbent upon the Commission to establish that an illegal market-sharing agreement was concluded,
it would be excessive also to require it to produce evidence of the specific mechanism by which that object was attained.
Indeed, it would be too easy for an undertaking guilty of an infringement to escape any penalty if it was entitled to base
its argument on the vagueness of the information produced regarding the operation of an illegal agreement in circumstances
in which the existence and anti-competitive purpose of the agreement had nevertheless been sufficiently established. Undertakings
are able properly to defend themselves in such circumstances provided that they have an opportunity to comment on all the
evidence relied on against them by the Commission.

(see para. 69)

8.      It follows from the text of Article 81 EC that agreements and concerted practices between undertakings are prohibited, regardless
of their effect on the market, when they have an anti-competitive object. Thus, because the Commission has established the
existence of agreements and concerted practices which have an anti-competitive object, this finding cannot be refuted by information
relating to the non-application of cartel arrangements or the absence of any effect on the market.

(see paras 70-71)

9.      Even if some caution as to the evidence provided voluntarily by the main participants in an unlawful agreement is generally
called for, considering the possibility that they might tend to play down the importance of their contribution to the infringement
and maximise that of others, the fact of seeking to benefit from the application of the Leniency Notice in order to obtain
a reduction of the fine does not necessarily create an incentive for the other participants in the offending cartel to submit
distorted evidence. Indeed, any attempt to mislead the Commission could call into question the sincerity and the completeness
of the cooperation of the person seeking to benefit, and thereby jeopardise his chances of benefiting fully under the Leniency
Notice.

(see para. 78)

10.    Given such a complex factual situation, the dual characterisation of anticompetitive conduct as a ‘complex of agreements and/or
concerted practices’, in so far as that conduct involved at one and the same time elements to be characterised as ‘agreements’
and elements to be characterised as ‘concerted practices’, must be understood not as requiring, simultaneously and cumulatively,
proof that each of those factual elements presents the constituent elements both of an agreement and of a concerted practice,
but rather as referring to a complex whole comprising a number of factual elements some of which were characterised as agreements
and others as concerted practices for the purposes of Article 81 EC, which lays down no specific category for a complex infringement
of this type.

(see para. 183)

11.    The *ne bis in idem* principle, which constitutes a general principle of EU law, whose observance the Courts ensure, prohibits the same person
from being penalised more than once for the same unlawful conduct in order to protect one and the same legal interest. The
application of that principle is subject to three cumulative conditions: the identity of the facts, the unity of offender
and the unity of the legal interest protected.

When the Commission penalises an undertaking for anticompetitive conduct, that principle is in no way breached by the fact
that the conduct referred to has already been the subject of an earlier decision of the Commission, since the undertaking
was not penalised by that earlier decision, nor was it among the addressees of that decision nor the addressees of the statement
of objections adopted in the procedure leading to the adoption of that decision, and that its participation in the unlawful
conduct was only referred to in the context of the statement of fact, without being the subject of any legal assessment whatsoever
by the Commission.

(see paras 186-188)

12.    The duration of the infringement is an intrinsic element of an infringement under Article 81(1) EC, the burden of proof of
which is borne principally by the Commission. In this regard, according to the case-law, if there is no evidence directly
establishing the duration of an infringement, the Commission should adduce at least evidence of facts sufficiently proximate
in time for it to be reasonable to accept that that infringement continued uninterruptedly between two specific dates.

(see para. 198)

13.    The probative value of a statement given on behalf of the undertaking in reply to the request for information from the Commission
under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 and Article 18 of Regulation No 1/2003 carries more weight than that of an employee of
the undertaking, whatever his individual experience or opinion.

(see para. 217)

14.    The rights guaranteed by the EU legal order in administrative procedures include, in particular, the duty of the competent
institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case.

(see para. 222)

15.    The existence of an infringement must be assessed having regard only to the evidence gathered by the Commission. Where the
substance of an infringement is actually established following the administrative procedure, evidence of a premature manifestation
by the Commission, during that procedure, of its conviction that the infringement exists is not of such a kind as to deprive
the actual evidence of the infringement itself of its reality.

(see para. 226)

16.    The right of access to the file is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence and means that the
Commission must provide the undertaking concerned with the opportunity to examine all the documents in the investigation file
that may be relevant for its defence. Those documents include both incriminating and exculpatory evidence, save where the
business secrets of other undertakings, the internal documents of the Commission or other confidential information are involved.

As regards incriminating evidence, the failure to communicate a document constitutes a breach of the rights of the defence
only if the undertaking concerned shows, first, that the Commission relied on that document to support its objection concerning
the existence of an infringement and, second, that the objection could be proved only by reference to that document. It is
thus for the undertaking concerned to show that the result at which the Commission arrived in its decision would have been
different if that uncommunicated document had to be disallowed as evidence.

By contrast, where an exculpatory document has not been communicated, the undertaking concerned must only establish that its
non-disclosure was able to influence, to its disadvantage, the course of the proceedings and the content of the Commission’s
decision. It is sufficient for the undertaking to show that it would have been able to use the exculpatory documents for its
defence, by showing, in particular, that it would have been able to invoke evidence which was not consistent with the Commission’s
assessments at the stage of the statement of objections and therefore could have had an influence, in any way at all, on its
assessments in the decision.

(see paras 236-239)

17.    The statement of objections is a document whose aim is to delimit the scope of the procedure initiated against an undertaking
and to ensure that the rights of the defence may be exercised effectively. It is from that aspect that the statement of objections
is subject to procedural safeguards, pursuant to the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, one of which is the
right of access to documents in the Commission’s file.

The replies to the statement of objections are not part of the investigation file proper. Since they are documents which are
not part of the file compiled at the time of notification of the statement of objections, the Commission is required to disclose
those replies to other parties involved only if it transpires that they contain new incriminating or exculpatory evidence.
Similarly, under paragraph 27 of the Commission notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to
Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Regulation No 139/2004, as a general rule, the parties
do not have access to the replies to the statement of objections of the other parties involved in the investigation. A party
is granted access to such documents only where they may constitute new evidence, whether of an incriminating or of an exculpatory
nature, pertaining to the allegations concerning that party in the Commission’s statement of objections.

In this respect, concerning, first, new incriminating evidence, it is settled case-law that, if the Commission wishes to rely
on evidence from a reply to a statement of objections in order to prove the existence of an infringement, the other undertakings
involved in that proceeding must be placed in a position in which they can express their views on such new evidence.

As regards new exculpatory evidence, the Commission is not obliged to make it available of its own initiative. If, during
the administrative procedure, the Commission has rejected an applicant’s request for access to documents which are not in
the investigation file, an infringement of the rights of the defence may be found only if it is proved that the outcome of
the administrative procedure might have been different if the applicant had had access to the documents in question during
that procedure.

(see paras 241-246, 249)

18.    The Commission enjoys a broad discretion as regards the method for calculating fines. That method, set out in the Guidelines
on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty,
displays flexibility in a number of ways, enabling the Commission to exercise its discretion in accordance with Regulation
No 1/2003.

In addition, in areas such as determining the amount of a fine under Regulation No 1/2003, where the Commission has such a
discretion, review of the legality of its assessments is limited to determining the absence of manifest error of assessment.
The discretion enjoyed by the Commission and the limits which it has imposed in that regard have no bearing, however, on the
exercise by the EU judicature of its unlimited jurisdiction, which empowers it to annul, reduce or increase the fine imposed
by the Commission.

(see paras 265-267)

19.    The gravity of an infringement is assessed in the light of numerous factors, such as the particular circumstances of the case,
its context and the deterrent effect of fines, in respect of which the Commission has a margin of discretion.

In particular, according to the first paragraph of Section 1.A of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant
to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, in assessing the gravity of the infringement, account
must be taken of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant geographic
market. In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court must nevertheless consider whether the amount of the fine
imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the infringement and must weigh the seriousness of the infringement with the circumstances
invoked by the undertaking.

Within the meaning of the third indent of the second paragraph of Section 1.A of those guidelines, very serious infringements
are ‘generally horizontal restrictions such as price cartels and market‐sharing quotas’. Agreements of this kind constitute
one of the most serious forms of damage to competition, in that their aim is quite simply to eliminate competition between
the undertakings which implement them, and therefore run counter to the fundamental objectives of the EU. Horizontal price
or market sharing agreements may be classified as very serious infringements solely on account of their nature, without the
Commission being required to demonstrate an actual impact of the infringement on the market.

Whilst the existence of an actual impact of the infringement on the market is a factor to be taken into account in assessing
the gravity of the infringement, it is one of a number of criteria, such as the nature of the infringement and the size of
the geographic market. Likewise, it is apparent from the first paragraph of Section 1.A of those guidelines that that impact
is to be taken into account only where this can be measured.

(see paras 270-272, 275-276, 280-281)

20.    Within the framework of Regulation No 17 and of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission has a margin of discretion when fixing
the amount of fines, in order that it may direct the conduct of undertakings towards compliance with the competition rules
and that it may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy.

The Commission’s practice in previous decisions does not itself serve as a legal framework for the fines imposed in competition
matters.

The decisions in other cases can give only an indication for the purpose of determining whether there is discrimination, since
the facts of those cases, such as markets, products, the undertakings and periods concerned, are not likely to be the same.

The Commission assesses the gravity of infringements by reference to numerous factors, which are not based on a binding or
exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied and it is not, moreover, bound to apply a precise mathematical formula,
either for the total amount of the fine or where it is broken down into different elements. In these circumstances, a direct
comparison of the fines imposed on the addressees of the two decisions concerning distinct infringements is likely to distort
the specific functions performed by the different stages in the calculation of a fine. The final amounts of the fines reflect
the specific circumstances of each cartel.

(see paras 288, 290, 293-294)

21.    Under the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5)
of the ECSC Treaty, where there are infringements involving a number of undertakings, the Commission may weight the starting
amounts to take account of the specific weight of each undertaking by dividing the members of the cartel into groups particularly
where there is considerable disparity between the sizes of the undertakings committing infringements of the same type. These
guidelines further state that the principle of equal punishment for the same conduct may, if the circumstances so warrant,
lead to different fines being imposed on the undertakings concerned without that differentiation being governed by any arithmetic
calculation.

In determining the gravity of the infringement, the Commission is not required to ensure, where fines are imposed on a number
of undertakings involved in the same infringement, that the final amounts of the fines resulting from its calculations for
the undertakings concerned reflect any distinction between them in terms of their overall turnover. However, it may divide
them into groups.

A division of the undertakings concerned by categories must, however, comply with the principle of equal treatment, according
to which it is prohibited to treat similar situations differently and different situations in the same way, unless such treatment
is objectively justified. Moreover, the amount of the fines must, at least, be proportionate in relation to the factors that
entered into the assessment of the seriousness of the infringement.

(see paras 298-300)

22.    Despite its approximate nature, turnover is regarded as an adequate criterion, in competition law, for assessing the size
and the economic power of the undertakings concerned.

With regard to the use of turnover including excise duties for the calculation of the individual basic amounts, it should
be emphasised that, in so far as that calculation involved the relative weighting of the other participants in the cartel
on that market, the non-inclusion of taxes or excise duties do not alter the Commission’s final conclusion. Only if the Commission
had calculated the individual basic amounts of the other parties involved on the basis of turnover not including excise duties
could there be a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

(see paras 304, 306)

23.    Compliance with the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative procedures relating to competition policy
constitutes a general principle of EU law whose observance the EU judicature ensures.

For the purposes of the application of that principle, a distinction must be drawn between the two stages of the administrative
procedure, namely the investigation stage preceding the statement of objections and the stage corresponding to the remainder
of the administrative procedure. The first stage, covering the period up to notification of the statement of objections, begins
on the date on which the Commission, exercising the powers conferred on it by the legislature, takes measures which imply
an accusation of an infringement and must enable the Commission to adopt a position on the course which the procedure is to
follow. The second stage covers the period from notification of the statement of objections to adoption of the final decision.
It must enable the Commission to reach a final decision on the infringement concerned.

The length of the first phase of the procedure of 65 months must be regarded, in the absence of further explanation or information
from the Commission regarding the measures of inquiry undertaken during that period, as excessive. However, a finding that
there has been a breach of the reasonable time principle may result in the annulment of a decision establishing an infringement
only where the length of the proceedings affected their outcome.

(see paras 316-318, 320, 322, 325)

24.    The fact that the Commission has, in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not
mean that it is estopped from raising that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 1/2003 if that is necessary
to ensure the implementation of competition policy. On the contrary, the proper application of the competition rules requires
that the Commission may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy.

(see para. 335)

25.    A procedural irregularity, even though it is not capable of resulting in the annulment of a decision adopted by the Commission
in respect of an undertaking for an infringement of the competition rules, may justify a reduction of the fine. Failure to
adjudicate within a reasonable time can justify the Commission’s decision to reduce, in equity, the amount of a fine, since
the possibility of granting such a reduction falls within the scope of the Commission’s powers.

(see paras 337-338)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition)

16 June 2011 (*)

(Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Dutch beer market – Decision finding an infringement of Article 81 EC – Evidence of the infringement – Access to the file – Fines – Principle of equal treatment – Reasonable time)

In Case T‐235/07,

**Bavaria NV,**established in Lieshout (Netherlands), represented initially by O. Brouwer, D. Mes and A. Stoffer, and subsequently by O. Brouwer,
A. Stoffer and P. Schepens, lawyers,

applicant,

v

**European Commission,**represented initially by A. Bouquet, S. Noë and A. Nijenhuis, and subsequently by A. Bouquet and S. Noë, acting as Agents,
and by M. Slotboom, lawyer,

defendant,

APPLICATION for partial annulment of Commission Decision C (2007) 1697 of 18 April 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article
81 [EC] (Case COMP/B/37.766 – Dutch beer market) and, in the alternative, for reduction of the fine imposed on the applicant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition),

composed of V. Vadapalas (Rapporteur), acting for the President, A. Dittrich and L. Truchot, Judges,

Registrar: J. Plingers, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 24 March 2010,

gives the following

**Judgment**

**Facts**

1        The applicant, Bavaria NV, is a company whose business is to produce and market beer and soft drinks.

2        It is one of the four main operators on the Dutch beer market. The other leading brewers on that market are, first, the Heineken
group (‘Heineken’), which is managed by Heineken NV and whose production is managed by the subsidiary Heineken Nederland BV,
second, the InBev group (‘InBev’), which, prior to 2004, was known under the name Interbrew, which is managed by InBev NV
and whose production is the responsibility of the subsidiary InBev Nederland NV, and, third, the Grolsch group (‘Grolsch’),
which is managed by Koninklijke Grolsch NV.

3        The applicant and the other three leading brewers on that market sell their beer to end-customers, using two distribution
channels in particular. A distinction should thus be drawn between the on-trade establishment channel, that is to say, hotels,
restaurants and cafes, where drinks are consumed on the premises, and the off‐trade channel of supermarkets and off-licences,
where beer is sold for home consumption. This latter sector also includes the private label beer segment. Of the four brewers
concerned, only InBev and Bavaria are active in that segment.

4        The four brewers are members of the Centraal Brouwerij Kantoor (Central Brewery Office (CBK)). This is an umbrella organisation
which, according to its statutes, represents the interests of its members and is composed of a general assembly and various
working parties, such as the Working Party for on-trade matters and the Working Party on finance, which has become its steering
committee. For meetings which take place within the CBK, its secretariat sends the participating members invitations and sequentially
numbered official minutes.

*Administrative procedure*

5        By letters of 28 January 2000 and of 3, 25 and 29 February 2000, InBev made a series of statements providing information on
restrictive business practices on the Dutch beer market. Those statements were made during an investigation conducted by the
Commission of the European Communities, in particular in 1999, into cartel activities and a possible abuse of a dominant position
on the Belgian beer market. In conjunction with these statements, InBev made a leniency application in accordance with the
Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 1996 C 207, p. 4; ‘the Leniency Notice’).

6        On 22 and 23 March 2000, following the statements by InBev, the Commission carried out inspections at the premises of the
applicant and of the other undertakings concerned. In addition, other requests for further information were sent to the applicant
between 2001 and 2005.

7        On 30 August 2005, the Commission sent a statement of objections to the applicant and to the other undertakings concerned.
By letter of 24 November 2005, the applicant submitted its written observations on that statement. None of the parties concerned
requested an oral hearing.

8        By letters of 7 March and 8 May 2006, additional documents were brought to the applicant’s attention by the Commission. These
included requests for information sent to InBev and the replies to those requests, and an internal memo from Heineken.

9        On 18 April 2007, the Commission adopted Decision C (2007) 1697 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] (Case COMP/B/37.766
– Dutch beer market) (‘the contested decision’), a summary of which was published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*of 20 May 2008 (OJ 2008 C 122, p. 1), which was notified to the applicant by letter of 24 April 2007.

*The contested decision*

The infringement at issue

10      Article 1 of the contested decision states that the applicant and InBev NV, InBev Nederland, Heineken NV, Heineken Nederland
and Koninklijke Grolsch participated, during the period from 27 February 1996 to 3 November 1999, in a single and continuous
infringement of Article 81(1) EC by entering into a complex of agreements and/or concerted practices the object of which was
to restrict competition within the common market.

11      The infringement consisted, first, in coordinating prices and price increases for beer in the Netherlands, in both the on-trade
and the off-trade sector, including with regard to private label beer, and, second, in occasionally coordinating other commercial
conditions offered to individual customers in the on-trade sector in the Netherlands, such as loans to businesses, and, third,
in occasionally coordinating customer allocation, in both the on-trade and the off-trade sector in the Netherlands (Article
1 of and recitals 257 and 258 to the contested decision).

12      According to the contested decision, the anti-competitive conduct of the brewers took place during a cycle of unofficial multilateral
meetings which regularly brought together the four main operators on the Dutch beer market and at additional bilateral meetings
involving different combinations of the same brewers. According to the contested decision, these meetings took place secretly,
intentionally, because the participants knew that they were not permitted (recitals 257 to 260 to the contested decision).

13      Thus, firstly, a series of multilateral meetings known as ‘Catherijne overleg’ (Catherijne consultation) or ‘agendacommissie’
(Working Group on agenda) were held between 27 February 1996 and 3 November 1999. The contested decision finds that the main
object of these meetings, which focused on the on-trade sector, but could also deal with the off-trade sector, was to coordinate
prices and price increases for beer, to discuss limiting the amount of discounts and customer allocation and to consult on
certain other commercial conditions. Prices of private label beer were also discussed in these meetings (recitals 85, 90,
98, 115 to 127 and 247 to 252 to the contested decision).

14      Secondly, as far as bilateral contacts between the brewers are concerned, the contested decision states that on 12 May 1997
InBev and the applicant met and discussed the price increase for private label beer (recital 104 to the contested decision).
Furthermore, according to the Commission, Heineken and the applicant met in 1998 to discuss restrictions relating to points
of sale in the on-trade sector (recital 189 to the contested decision). The Commission states that bilateral contacts also
took place in July 1999 between Heineken and Grolsch on the subject of compensation granted to customers in the off-trade
sector who made temporary price reductions (recitals 212 and 213 to the contested decision).

15      Lastly, according to the contested decision, bilateral contacts and exchanges of information took place between InBev and
the applicant in 1997 consisting in general discussions on beer prices and discussions dealing more with private labels. Bilateral
contacts, in the form of exchanges of information, on the subject of private labels also involved the Belgian brewers in June
and July 1998 (recitals 105, 222 to 229 and 232 to 236 to the contested decision).

The fine imposed on the applicant

16      Article 3(c) of the contested decision imposes on the applicant a fine of EUR 22 850 000.

17      In order to calculate the amount of that fine, the Commission applied Article 23(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of
16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC] (OJ 2003 L 1,
p. 1) and the methodology set out in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation
No 17 and Article 65(5) [CS] (OJ 1998 C 9, p. 3; ‘the Guidelines’) (recitals 436 and 442 to the contested decision). In accordance
with that methodology, the fine imposed on the applicant was determined according to the gravity and duration of the infringement
(recital 437 to the contested decision).

18      In particular, the infringement was categorised as ‘very serious’ in so far as it essentially consisted in regularly coordinating
prices, price increases, other commercial conditions and customer allocation (recital 440 to the contested decision). The
Commission also took account of the secret and intentional character of the anti‐competitive conduct and the fact that the
entire territory of the Netherlands and the entire beer market, both the on-trade sector and the off‐trade sector, were affected
by the infringement (recitals 453 and 455 to the contested decision). In addition, the Commission stated that the actual effect
on the Dutch market of the anti‐competitive conduct was not taken into account in the present case, as it was impossible to
measure (recital 452 to the contested decision).

19      Furthermore, the Commission applied differential treatment to the applicant in order to take account of its effective economic
capacity and its individual weight in the anti-competitive conduct established. To that end, the Commission used the sales
figures for beer sold by the applicant in the Netherlands in 1998, the last full calendar year of the infringement. On that
basis, the applicant was placed in the third of three categories, in respect of which the starting amount of the fine was
EUR 17 million (recitals 462 and 464 to the contested decision).

20      In addition, as the applicant had taken part in the infringement from 27 February 1996 to 3 November 1999, that is to say,
for a period of three years and eight months, that starting amount was increased by 35% (recitals 465 and 469 to the contested
decision). The basic amount was therefore fixed at EUR 22 950 000 (recital 470 to the contested decision).

21      Lastly, the Commission granted a reduction of EUR 100 000 in the amount of the fine since it acknowledged that in the present
case the length of the administrative procedure had been unreasonable (recitals 495 to 499 to the contested decision).

**Procedure and forms of order sought**

22      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 4 July 2007, the applicant brought the present action.

23      By decision of 10 February 2010, the Court referred the case to the Sixth Chamber (Extended Composition) in accordance with
Article 14(1) and Article 51(1) of its Rules of Procedure.

24      By way of measures of organisation of procedure of 12 February 2010, the Court sent a number of written questions to the Commission,
which replied within the period allowed.

25      The parties presented oral argument and replied to the questions put by the Court at the hearing on 24 March 2010.

26      Since the Judge-Rapporteur was prevented from sitting after the oral procedure was closed, the case was reassigned to a new
Judge‐Rapporteur and the present judgment was deliberated by the three judges whose signatures it bears, in accordance with
Article 32 of the Rules of Procedure.

27      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul in whole or in part the contested decision, to the extent to which it concerns the applicant;

–        in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on the applicant;

–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

28      The Commission contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the application;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

**Law**

29      In support of its action, the applicant relies on six pleas, alleging, first, a breach of the principle of sound administration,
second, an infringement of Article 81 EC, disregard for the presumption of innocence, and a breach of the principle of legality
and of the obligation to state reasons, third, an error of law and of fact in the determination of the duration of the infringement,
fourth, an infringement of Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 and of the Guidelines and breaches of the principle of equal
treatment and the principle of proportionality in determining the amount of the fine, fifth, a breach of the reasonable time
principle and, sixth, a breach of essential procedural requirements, of the principle of sound administration and of the rights
of the defence, consisting in the refusal to grant access to the replies of other parties involved to the statement of objections
and to a document forming part of the file.

30      The Court considers that the second and third pleas, which seek, in essence, to challenge the finding of the infringement,
should be examined first, then the first and sixth pleas, which allege procedural defects, and lastly, the fourth and fifth
pleas, which concern, respectively, the determination of the amount of the fine and the length of the administrative procedure.

*The second plea, alleging an infringement of Article 81 EC, disregard for the presumption of innocence, and a breach of the
principle of legality and of the obligation to state reasons*

Arguments of the parties

31      The applicant essentially claims that the Commission has misinterpreted and misapplied the concepts of ‘agreement’, ‘concerted
practice’ and ‘single and continuous infringement’ and has erred in law and in the assessment of the facts in respect of the
finding of the infringement in both the on-trade sector and the off‐trade sector, including the private label beer segment.

32      The Commission contests the applicant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

33      Article 81(1) EC provides that the following are to be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.

34      In order for there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC, it is sufficient that the undertakings in question
should have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific way (Case T‐7/89 *Hercules Chemicals* v *Commission* [1991] ECR II‐1711, paragraph 256, and Case T‐9/99 *HFB and Others* v *Commission* [2002] ECR II‐1487, paragraph 199).

35      An agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) EC can be regarded as having been concluded where there is a concurrence
of wills on the very principle of a restriction of competition, even if the specific features of the restriction envisaged
are still under negotiation (see, to that effect, *HFB and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 34 above, paragraphs 151 to 157 and 206).

36      The concept of a concerted practice refers to a form of coordination between undertakings which, without being taken to the
stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition practical
cooperation between them (Case C‐49/92 P *Commission* v *Anic Partecipazioni* [1999] ECR I‐4125, paragraph 115, and Case C‐199/92 P *Hüls* v *Commission* [1999] ECR I‐4287, paragraph 158).

37      In this respect, Article 81(1) EC precludes any direct or indirect contact between economic operators of such a kind as either
to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to reveal to such a competitor the conduct
which the operator concerned has decided to follow itself or contemplates adopting on the market, where the object or effect
of those contacts is to restrict competition (see, to that effect, *Commission* v *Anic Partecipazioni*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraphs 116 and 117).

38      It should be borne in mind that, as regards establishing an infringement of Article 81(1) EC, the Commission must prove the
infringements which it has found and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard the existence
of the facts constituting an infringement (Case C‐185/95 P *Baustahlgewebe* v *Commission* [1998] ECR I‐8417, paragraph 58, and *Commission* v *Anic Partecipazioni*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraph 86).

39      Thus, the Commission must produce sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to establish the existence of the infringement
(see, to that effect, Case T‐62/98 *Volkswagen* v *Commission* [2000] ECR II‐2707, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

40      However, it is important to emphasise that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy
those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the
institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (Joined Cases T‐67/00, T‐68/00, T‐71/00 and T‐78/00 *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission* [2004] ECR II‐2501, paragraphs 179 and 180 and the case-law cited).

41      As anti-competitive agreements are known to be prohibited, the Commission cannot be required to produce documents expressly
attesting to contacts between the operators concerned. The fragmentary and sporadic items of evidence which may be available
to the Commission should, in any event, be capable of being supplemented by inferences which allow the relevant circumstances
to be reconstituted. The existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement may therefore be inferred from a number of
coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence
of an infringement of the competition rules (Joined Cases C‐204/00 P, C‐205/00 P, C‐211/00 P, C‐213/00 P, C‐217/00 P and C‐219/00 P
*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission* [2004] ECR I‐123, paragraphs 55 to 57).

42      Where the Commission has relied on documentary evidence in support of its finding of the existence of an anti-competitive
agreement or practice, the burden is on the parties who are contesting that finding before the Court not only to put forward
a plausible alternative to the Commission’s view but also to allege that the evidence relied on in the contested decision
to establish the existence of the infringement is insufficient (*JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 187).

43      As regards the scope of review by the Court, according to settled case‐law, where the Court is faced with an application for
the annulment of a decision applying Article 81(1) EC, it must undertake in a general manner a comprehensive review of the
question whether or not the conditions for the application of Article 81(1) EC are met (see Case T‐41/96 *Bayer* v *Commission* [2000] ECR II‐3383, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

44      Any doubt of the Court must benefit the undertaking to which the decision finding an infringement was addressed, in accordance
with the principle of the presumption of innocence, which, as a general principle of European Union (‘EU’) law, applies in
particular to the procedures relating to infringements of the competition rules applicable to undertakings that may result
in the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments (*Hüls* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraphs 149 and 150, and Joined Cases T‐44/02 OP, T‐54/02 OP, T‐56/02 OP, T‐60/02 OP and
T‐61/02 OP *Dresdner Bank and Others* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐3567, paragraphs 60 and 61).

45      The question whether, in the present case, the Commission has established to the requisite legal standard that the applicant’s
conduct amounted to an infringement of Article 81(1) EC must be examined in the light of those considerations.

–       The statement by InBev

46      It should be noted, first of all, that the Commission relies to a large extent (see, in particular, recitals 40 to 62 to the
contested decision) on the statement made by InBev, in connection with its leniency application, by letters of 28 January
and 3, 25 and 29 February 2000, supplemented by the annexed statements made by the five managers from InBev (recitals 34 and
40 to the contested decision; together ‘the statement by InBev’).

47      According to the contested decision, the statement by InBev indicated the existence of ‘various forms of concerted action
... between the brewers on the Dutch beer market’, drawing a distinction between the official meetings of the CBK general
assembly, the informal meetings of the CBK Working Party on finance and the ‘other meetings’ held in parallel and known as
the ‘Catherijne consultation’, whose composition varied and for which, InBev states, it has not found any written records.
The ‘other meetings’ could be subdivided, inter alia, into: ‘(i) meetings of the on-trade managers of the four main brewers
(Heineken, Interbrew, Grolsch and Bavaria) ...; (ii) joint meetings of the on-trade managers and the off-trade managers (two
in 1998) and (iii) meetings of the off-trade managers (one in 1999 ...)’ (recitals 41 to 46 to the contested decision).

48      According to the statement by InBev, the Working Party on finance ‘had an official agenda, but was also a forum for discussions
on fixing prices for the off‐trade sector and the on-trade sector [; t]hose discussions were not recorded at all’ (recital
43 to the contested decision).

49      According to the same statement, the subjects discussed at the ‘other meetings’ also covered both the on-trade sector and
the off-trade sector and private label beer (recital 47 to the contested decision).

50      With regard, firstly, to the on-trade sector, two main subjects were discussed: ‘[T]here was an agreement in principle on
setting maximum discounts by volume for the on-trade sector ... another subject of consultation was the investments made in
the on-trade [; t]he idea was to maintain the status quo in the sector and to avoid taking customers from other brewers’ (recital
48 to the contested decision).

51      One manager from InBev claims that he does not know the precise content of that agreement and another manager describes it
as ‘a very complex and vague agreement on sliding scales (discounts granted to the on-trade), in which we have never been
involved’, stating that ‘[t]he consultation consisted in a bimonthly meeting of the on-trade managers, at which they discussed
known infringements of the “rule” (although this was vague; they talked about market excess)’ (recital 48 to the contested
decision).

52      With regard, secondly, to the off-trade sector, according to the statement by InBev, the discussions concerned both price
levels in general and the specific subject of private label beer.

53      As regards price levels in general, one of the managers from InBev states that ‘it was normal for a brewery to increase its
prices after informing its fellow brewers in advance ...; the initiative always came from one of the big breweries, and generally
from Heineken [; i]n such cases, the other breweries had the necessary time to take a position [; w]hilst the breweries broadly
aligned their prices with one another, they each had and maintained their own pricing policy’ (recital 51 to the contested
decision).

54      As regards private label beer, InBev states that the discussions on prices had been conducted between the Dutch operators
in the segment (Bavaria and Oranjeboom, subsequently acquired by Interbrew) since 1987. It adds that ‘[t]he two parties understood,
after discussing the matter together, that they would not accept any intrusion in their respective customer bases for private
labels which resulted in a loss of volume’ (recital 52 to the contested decision).

55      With regard to the involvement of Heineken and of Grolsch in this sector, according to the statement by InBev, ‘[t]he Dutch
market is characterised by a significant gulf between prices for private label beer (“B brands”) and [other brands (“A brands”);]
Heineken, which is not present in the private labels segment, has always rejected price increases for A brands as long as
the price of private label beer did not increase [; i]n this way, it exerted indirect pressure, in particular on private label
producers such as Bavaria and Interbrew’ (recital 53 to the contested decision).

56      InBev states that prices for private labels were also discussed by the four brewers, in other words also in the presence of
Grolsch, in the context of the more general topic of the price gaps to be maintained between prices for beer brands. According
to the statement by InBev, ‘Heineken and Grolsch did not increase their prices for years and the prices of other brewer’s
label beers and private label beers did not increase either [; i]n recent years, Bavaria and Interbrew have increased their
prices, followed by Grolsch’ (recital 54 to the contested decision). It is also pointed out that ‘[t]hree to four years ago,
these informal consultations had been incorporated into the Catherijne consultation on the on-trade, in which representatives
of the CBK also participated [; a]fter a few meetings, it was decided to split these meetings back into off-trade meetings
and on-trade meetings’ (recital 54 to the contested decision).

57      In addition, InBev states that for the Belgian brewer Martens to obtain a certain market share since 1996 to 1997 it had been
necessary for ‘an agreement between Belgian and Dutch brewers operating on the private labels market [; t]wo meetings took
place [in a hotel in] Breda in 1998 [...; i]t was agreed to respect the relevant volumes for private labels sold to customers
established in the Netherlands and in Belgium’ (recital 55 to the contested decision).

58      According to the statements by the managers from InBev, the ‘other meetings’ were organised to give each other reassurance
as to a ‘limited aggression’ on the market (recital 46 to the contested decision).

59      In its reply to the request for information, dated 19 December 2001, InBev states that ‘agendas for the previous years and
notes taken at the informal meetings were destroyed at the end of November 1998 [; i]t was at about that time that the existence
of concerted action between Dutch brewers started to be revealed on the market and fears began of an inspection by the Dutch
competition authority [; a]gendas were also destroyed in the following years’ (recital 61 to the contested decision).

60      It must be noted from the outset that there is no provision or general principle of EU law that prohibits the Commission from
relying, as against an undertaking, on statements made by other incriminated undertakings. If that were not the case, the
burden of proving conduct contrary to Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, which is borne by the Commission, would be unsustainable and
incompatible with the task of supervising the proper application of those provisions which is entrusted to it by the EC Treaty
(see *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

61      In the present case, the applicant does not contest the information given in the statement by InBev to the effect that meetings
took place between representatives of the Dutch beer producers. Nor does it contest that it was represented at most of those
meetings or that, at the meetings, discussions were held on price levels on the Dutch market and on the application of discounts
to customers in the on-trade sector.

62      In those circumstances, the Commission was entitled to find that the meetings mentioned in the statement by InBev took place
and that representatives of the applicant actually participated in at least some of those meetings.

63      The applicant nevertheless disputes that the discussions which were held at the meetings in question led to the conclusion
of an agreement or an undertaking to engage in an anti-competitive concerted practice. It claims that those meetings dealt
with legitimate subjects and that, in so far as the situation on the market was discussed, this was not for anti‐competitive
purposes. In this regard, the applicant contests the reliability of the statement by InBev, claiming that it is vague, incoherent
and inherently contradictory.

64      In particular, as regards the contradictory character of the statement by InBev, the applicant points out that it contains
a number of exculpatory statements.

65      First, there are passages in the supplementary statement by InBev of 3 February 2000 which state: ‘“[W]e talked above all
to give each other the impression that we would remain calm on the market. There was little or no discussion of sliding scales
or points of sale. In fact, everyone was taking everyone else for an idiot.” In recent years, these meetings increasingly
lost their substance and the consultation took on a more vague character’ (recital 46 to the contested decision).

66      Second, the applicant refers to certain passages of the statements by managers from InBev according to which: ‘there was no
agreement for the food sector’; ‘price increases were not, however, applied under agreements’; ‘I am not aware of agreements
in the “private labels” sector’; ‘that meeting did not have much substance. It was more a pleasant meeting without a specific
agenda. General comments were made about discounts. I had the impression that there had already, for some years, been a sort
of sliding scale system or a rule on discounts, but that was never explicitly stated. We only spoke about overall discount
levels in very general terms, which was an opportunity to point out certain incidents’; ‘[Interbrew] did not participate in
any agreement on prices’; ‘nor was there any concerted action. We acted completely independently and, when there were price
increases for all beers in 1999, we increased A brands (after Bavaria and Grolsch had done so a few months previously) and
there was strong resistance from our customers in favour of private labels ... we therefore acted perfectly lawfully’.

67      The applicant claims that the abovementioned statements are incompatible with the Commission’s conclusions as to the existence
of an infringement of Article 81 EC. According to the applicant, it follows that the price increases applied in the off-trade
sector were not agreed or coordinated, that Interbrew determined its selling prices completely independently, that the Dutch
brewers have always been in healthy competition, and that there has been no agreement between the brewers on reductions granted
to the on-trade sector.

68      It should first be stated that the inferences made by the applicant on the basis of certain information in the statement by
InBev, indicating the general nature of the discussions, the absence of any agreement for certain sectors and the absence
of effect of the discussions on the conduct of the brewers on the market, cannot in themselves call into question the Commission’s
finding relating to the existence of the infringement.

69      As regards the allegedly general character of that statement, it must be pointed out that the Commission often has to prove
the existence of an infringement under conditions which are hardly conducive to that task, in that several years may have
elapsed since the time of the events constituting the infringement and a number of the undertakings covered by the investigation
have not actively cooperated therein. Whilst it is necessarily incumbent upon the Commission to establish that an illegal
market-sharing agreement was concluded, it would be excessive also to require it to produce evidence of the specific mechanism
by which that object was attained. Indeed, it would be too easy for an undertaking guilty of an infringement to escape any
penalty if it was entitled to base its argument on the vagueness of the information produced regarding the operation of an
illegal agreement in circumstances in which the existence and anti-competitive purpose of the agreement had nevertheless been
sufficiently established. Undertakings are able properly to defend themselves in such circumstances provided that they have
an opportunity to comment on all the evidence relied on against them by the Commission (*JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 203; see also, to that effect, Joined Cases C‐403/04 P and C‐405/04 P *Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel* v *Commission*[2007] ECR I‐729, paragraph 50).

70      Second, as regards the allegedly contradictory character of the statement by InBev, in that it purportedly contains information
on the absence of any effect of the conduct at issue on the market, it follows from the actual text of Article 81 EC that
agreements and concerted practices between undertakings are prohibited, regardless of their effect on the market, when they
have an anti-competitive object (*Hüls* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraphs 163 to 166, and Case C‐8/08 *T-Mobile Netherlands and Others*[2009] ECR I‐4529, paragraph 29).

71      Thus, because the Commission has established the existence of agreements and concerted practices which have an anti-competitive
object, this finding cannot be refuted by information relating to the non-application of cartel arrangements or the absence
of any effect on the market.

72      As regards the purported information regarding the absence of any agreement in the off-trade sector or in the on-trade sector,
it should be noted that the passages relied on by the applicant, read in context, certainly do not rule out the existence
of an agreement or of a concerted practice in the sectors concerned.

73      With regard to the off-trade sector (retail sales), the assertion made by one of the managers from InBev to the effect that
‘[t]here was no agreement for [that] sector’, is followed by a specific description of the price coordination mechanism applied
by the brewers. The relevant passage reads as follows (recital 51 to the contested decision):

‘There was no agreement for the retail sales (“food”) sector. As regards the price increases for beer, it was normal for a
brewery to increase its prices only after informing its fellow brewers in advance. When one of the parties made such an announcement,
there would be a debate on the impact of such an increase on the market; the price increase for beer had taken place after
all. The initiative always came from one of the big breweries and generally from Heineken. In such cases, the other breweries
had the necessary time to take a position. Whilst the breweries broadly aligned their prices with one another, they each had
and maintained their own pricing policy.’

74      Against this background, the simple fact that the manager from InBev made reference to the absence of any ‘agreement’ cannot
constitute a valid argument in so far as it is for the Commission and, if appropriate, the Court to undertake the legal categorisation
of the conduct described in the statements made by the officers of the undertakings concerned.

75      As regards the alleged absence of an agreement and of respect for an agreement in the on-trade sector, the passages of the
supplementary statement by InBev of 3 February 2000 and of the statements by the managers from InBev, cited in paragraphs
65 and 66 above, clearly do not have the effect of ruling out the existence of an agreement on the discounts granted to customers
in that sector. In pointing out that the discussions were general in nature and rarely related to sliding scales or specific
points of sale, those passages concern the level of detail of the discussions, without refuting the existence of an agreement
within the meaning of Article 81 EC. They cannot therefore be considered to refute the information given in the statement
by InBev to the effect that ‘[t]here was an agreement in principle on setting maximum discounts by volume for the on-trade
sector’ (recital 48 to the contested decision).

76      In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments concerning the allegedly vague and contradictory character of the
statement by InBev and, consequently, the supposedly selective way in which the Commission used that statement are not valid.

77      Lastly, as regards the general assessment of the reliability of the statement by InBev, the appropriate view, contrary to
the applicant’s contention, is that the Commission was entitled to attribute to the statement by InBev particularly great
probative value, since it is an answer given on behalf of an undertaking which as such carries more weight than that of an
employee of the undertaking, whatever his individual experience or opinion. It should also be noted that the statement by
InBev represented the outcome of an internal investigation carried out by the undertaking and that it was submitted to the
Commission by a lawyer, who was under a professional obligation to act in the interests of that undertaking. He could not
therefore lightly admit the existence of an infringement without evaluating the consequences of so doing (see, to that effect,
Case T‐23/99 *LR AF 1998* v *Commission*[2002] ECR II‐1705, paragraph 45, and *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 206).

78      Furthermore, according to case-law, even if some caution as to the evidence provided voluntarily by the main participants
in an unlawful agreement is generally called for, considering the possibility that they might tend to play down the importance
of their contribution to the infringement and maximise that of others, the fact of seeking to benefit from the application
of the Leniency Notice in order to obtain a reduction of the fine does not necessarily create an incentive for the other participants
in the offending cartel to submit distorted evidence. Indeed, any attempt to mislead the Commission could call into question
the sincerity and the completeness of the cooperation of the person seeking to benefit, and thereby jeopardise his chances
of benefiting fully under the Leniency Notice (Case T‐120/04 *Peróxidos Orgánicos* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐4441, paragraph 70).

79      Admittedly, it must be borne in mind that an admission by one undertaking accused of having participated in a cartel, the
accuracy of which is contested by several other undertakings similarly accused, cannot be regarded as constituting adequate
proof of an infringement committed by the latter unless it is supported by other evidence (see, to that effect, Case T‐337/94
*Enso-Gutzeit* v *Commission*[1998] ECR II‐1571, paragraph 91, and *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 219).

80      The statement by InBev cannot therefore suffice, in itself, to establish the existence of the infringement, but must be corroborated
by other evidence.

81      Nevertheless, in view of the reliability of the InBev statement, the degree of corroboration required in this case is lesser,
in terms both of precision and of depth, than would be the case if that statement were not particularly credible. Thus, it
must be concluded that, if it were to be held that a body of consistent evidence corroborated the existence and certain specific
aspects of the practices mentioned in the statement by InBev and referred to in Article 1 of the contested decision, that
statement might be sufficient in itself, in such a case, to constitute evidence of other aspects of the contested decision.
Moreover, provided that a document does not manifestly contradict the statement by InBev as to the existence or the essential
content of the contested practices, the fact that it provides evidence of significant elements of the practices which it described
is sufficient to endow it with corroborative value within the body of inculpatory evidence (see, to that effect, *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 220 and the case‐law cited).

82      In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s arguments concerning other evidence relied on by
the Commission in the contested decision in order to corroborate the findings relating to the statement by InBev.

–       Other evidence

83      In the contested decision, the Commission asserts that the statement by InBev is corroborated by a number of internal documents
from the applicant and the three other Dutch brewers, handwritten notes from meetings, expense reports and copies of agendas
obtained following investigations and requests for information.

84      In recital 67 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes by a commercial manager from Grolsch
relating to the meeting held on 27 February 1996, the subject of that meeting being indicated by the note ‘CBK cie HOR cath’.
Those notes include the following passage: ‘Guarantees/financing: fin[ancing] for ... in excess of needs of specific points.
So ... mil[lions]’.

85      According to the Commission, it is clear from this passage that the four brewers in question discussed, at a ‘Catherijne’
meeting, the financial conditions applied or to be applied to certain on-trade customers (recital 72 to the contested decision)
and, more specifically, to establishments run by a proprietor of multiple on-trade establishments in the Netherlands.

86      In recital 76 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes by an on-trade manager for Bavaria
concerning the meeting held on 19 June 1996. The notes are reproduced as follows:

‘– adapt prices

off-trade high – low

Bavaria – Interbrew consultation

... and ... -> problem ...

Martens

Schultenbrau!! 89 ct

– increase only of cask price

arguments

only Hein + Grolsch fully

Friesland US Heit

Interbrew \

|               increase together

Bavaria /

-> ... also

increase bottom more than top

– air

– agreements

stabilise discount for bars 7.5 per cask Heineken

prepare representatives vis-à-vis possible agreements

Interbrew \

|      air can be used

Grolsch /’.

87      According to the Commission, these notes show that the brewers present had detailed discussions of prices, both for private
label beer and for beer sold in casks, and the price of cheaper beers, produced by Interbrew and Bavaria, was to increase
more than the price of more expensive beers, produced by Heineken and Grolsch (recital 85 to the contested decision).

88      In recital 89 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a letter which the managing director of Interbrew Nederland
sent to InBev’s head office in Belgium on 25 March 1997:

‘There is now a consensus between the main brewers to implement a price increase before 1998. This will enable the brewers
to increase their buffer for the necessary additional promotional budgets. The A brand operators are trying to differentiate
the price increase between the A brands (+ 2 NLG/hl) and the B brands (+ 4 NLG/hl). This seems highly unrealistic to me –
we must all support a full increase of NLG 4. I would exclude our special beers “which are easy to drink” (DAS, Hoegaarden,
Leffe) from the price increase. Negotiations have begun.’

89      The Commission concluded on the basis of that letter that a price increase was planned before 1998 following price negotiations
between the main producers. In addition, the same letter confirmed the existence of a distinction between more expensive and
cheaper beer producers and brands (recital 90 to the contested decision).

90      In recital 92 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes by a member of the board of directors
of Bavaria concerning the meeting held on 1 May 1997. It cites the following passages:

‘Catherijne Club 1/5 – 97

“internal” transfers within the group

must also respect the “sliding scale”

... “The Hague”

Monster ZH [southern Holland] higher competing offer’.

91      According to the Commission, these notes confirm that the brewers were discussing a ‘sliding scale’ for the commercial conditions
granted to individual points of sale, in the case of transfers from one group to another, but also in cases of transfers within
a single group (recital 99 to the contested decision).

92      In recital 100 to the contested decision, the Commission states that the abovementioned notes also contain the names ‘Heineken/Amstel/Brand/Grolsch’
on the first line and the names ‘Interbrew/Bavaria’ on the second line, with the two lines being linked by a bracket followed
by the words ‘no price increases’. The Commission infers that the distinction between the A brands, owned by Heineken and
Grolsch, and the B brands, owned by Interbrew and Bavaria, was the focus for the discussions between the brewers concerning
the price increases for beer (recital 103 to the contested decision).

93      In recital 117 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes by a member of the board of directors
of Bavaria concerning the meeting held on 17 December 1997. It cites the following passage:

‘(2) Price situation:      March/April

one-stage rocket/two-stage rocket

(a) Heineken expects little fuss!! Heineken 18.59

(b) in the event of increase: very negotiable; wholehearted; there will be support’.

94      The Commission infers that the brewers present at the meeting held on 17 December 1997, including Bavaria, Grolsch and Heineken,
were discussing price increases and possible reactions to price increases (recital 127 to the contested decision).

95      In recital 129 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a passage from the handwritten notes by an on-trade manager
for Bavaria concerning the meeting held on 12 March 1998:

‘– Not much happened since 1 January

– A brands no panic in relation to price      Hein

9.95 reduction from 11.49 little point      Int

9.75      9.36 Bavaria

2x      4.95 4.75 }→

private labels

prices in the lower market segment

... mid-March Bavaria something

below Amstel (17) Bavaria (15)

from 9.75 to 10.75 if nothing

happens, then Grolsch and Hein

increases pocket brewery

→ fix agreement ... and Dick

This must be “demonstrable” via Nielsen otherwise

nothing will happen’.

96      According to the Commission, it is clear that the brewers present at the meeting held on 12 March 1998 discussed reductions
granted to Dutch supermarkets (recital 137 to the contested decision) and that the price increases implemented by Bavaria
should be demonstrable in the supermarket cash register data compiled by AC Nielsen (recital 133 to the contested decision).

97      In recital 138 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a second passage from the abovementioned handwritten notes:

‘Bav      interest      4%?            6 1/2

unless

there is an advertising commission’.

98      According to the Commission, this passage proves that a discussion was held on the level of interest rates applied to loans
granted to on-trade points of sale (recital 142 to the contested decision).

99      In recital 143 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a third passage of the abovementioned handwritten notes:

‘Football clubs concert halls theatres

Student associations

...

Grolsch

above/outside sliding scale

130

...                        (125) 124.5’.

100    According to the Commission, it is clear that the brewers held a specific discussion on precise on-trade customers in relation
to a ‘sliding scale’, corroborating the statement by InBev as to the existence of an agreement known as the ‘sliding scale’
(recital 147 to the contested decision).

101    In recital 156 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a passage from the handwritten notes by a member of the
board of directors of Bavaria relating to the meeting held on 3 July 1998:

‘... Heineken increased

... >> Heineken cask beer’.

102    The Commission infers from this passage that the brewers discussed the prices applied both to customers in the off-trade sector
and to an on‐trade customer (recitals 162 to 164 to the contested decision).

103    In recital 165 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions another passage from the abovementioned handwritten notes:

‘Cafe...      1800      ...

...      400   ...

60 per hl

650.000,- V.B.K.’.

104    According to the Commission, it is clear from this passage that the brewers discussed a discount given and/or a commission
in respect of the reduction applied or to be applied to specific on-trade points of sale (recital 171 to the contested decision).

105    In recital 174 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a document dated 30 June 1998 and a Heineken price list
announcing new prices applicable to bottled beer and draft beer (beer in tanks and beer in casks) from 1 June 1998, discovered
in the office of an off-trade sales manager for Grolsch, with the note ‘agenda c[ommiss]ie CBK’ (CBK Working Party on agenda).
According to the Commission, these documents corroborate the statement by InBev to the effect that both off-trade prices and
competition on the on-trade market were discussed at the meetings in question (recital 175 to the contested decision).

106    In recital 179 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a Heineken internal memo dated 14 October 1998, addressed
to Heineken’s management team, which reads: ‘the price increase promised by Bavaria in the CBK is not apparent in the [figures]
from Nielsen’. According to the Commission, that memo reinforces the conclusion that, at the meeting held on 12 March 1998,
Bavaria had announced its intention to be the first to increase its prices in the off‐trade sector, the other brewers were
to follow subsequently and the increases implemented by Bavaria were to be ‘demonstrable’ in the figures from Nielsen (recital
180 to the contested decision).

107    In recital 184 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a letter sent to a manager of Heineken’s Netherlands on-trade
unit by a marketing and off-trade manager from the Heineken’s Brand BV brewery, regarding his discussion with a member of
Bavaria’s board of directors:

‘At the Noordwijk food fair on 9 September [1998], [a member of Bavaria’s board of directors] spoke to me about the matter
... and Heineken’s reaction. In short, he thought that Heineken could have sat down at the negotiating table with the top management
at Heineken and Bavaria on the Netherlands on-trade market much earlier. The hectolitres lost could then have been compensated
for in some other way. Furthermore, he added that in the long term Bavaria perhaps had its sights on other potential customers
in the on-trade sector who wished to switch voluntarily (with the emphasis on “voluntarily”, as in the case of ..., in his view)
to Bavaria [first name of a Heineken on-trade manager for the Netherlands], it goes without saying that these comments are
part of the well-known rhetoric of ... . I did not want to keep this information from you. All the best for your discussion.’

108    The Commission takes the view that this letter confirms the statement by InBev according to which the brewers were discussing
not only restrictions on reductions, but also restrictions concerning points of sale which opted for another brewer, and not
only at multilateral meetings, but also during bilateral meetings (recital 189 to the contested decision).

109    In recital 193 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes by a managing director of Grolsche
Bierbrouwerij Nederland on the invitation to the meeting held on 8 January 1999:

‘– sales ‘98

– beer price →

– pin-partition crates            |      actions/cat II

– crates                        |      bottom

|      cask

|      NMA’.

110    Accordingly, in the view of the Commission, the discussions on beer prices focused on four aspects: first, promotional measures
in the off‐trade market, second, the price of cheaper and private label beers, third, the price of cask beer, the large containers
used in the on-trade sector of the Dutch beer market and, fourth, the Dutch competition authority, the NMA (recital 194 to
the contested decision).

111    In recitals 197 and 199 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the list of subjects for discussion at the meeting
held on 8 January 1999, on which a representative of Grolsch had noted the abbreviation ‘BP’, which is interpreted by the
Commission as ‘beer price’ (bierprijs) or ‘floor price’ (bodemprijs), and ‘P[rivate] L[abel] 50 ct. more’. The Commission
infers from these notes that, as far as cask beer is concerned, the brewers had detailed discussion of prices (recital 203
to the contested decision).

112    In recitals 212 and 213 to the contested decision, the Commission refers to a document which contains a reference to three
contacts at management level between Heineken and Grolsch on around 5 July 1999, mentioning a ‘price war’ between the two
brewers. The Commission infers that Heineken made direct contact with Grolsch about reductions, one and a half months before
temporary reductions, made by a chain of shops to which Grolsch refused to grant compensation, failed to be actually implemented
(recital 213 to the contested decision).

113    In recital 224 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a number of documents included in its administrative file
which show the subjects discussed at the bilateral meetings between Bavaria and InBev on 8 March 1995, in the second half
of March 1997, on 12 May 1997, on 19 June 1997 and on 8 September 1997. It cites the following passages:

–        meeting on 8 March 1995: ‘[Bavaria] and [Interbrew Nederland] both said that they had serious problems with Mr ... in the
Netherlands’ (footnote 491 to the contested decision);

–        meeting on 12 May 1997: mention was made of the ‘price increase’ and ‘private labels as a sword of Damocles ... psychological
pressure from Grolsch and Heineken in particular to increase prices of private label beer’ (footnote 493 to the contested
decision);

–        meeting on 19 June 1997: there was discussion of ‘the conduct to be adopted in the private labels segment and, in this connection,
Interbrew’s position vis-à-vis Martens (regarded as an unwelcome guest in the world of Dutch beer[)]’ (footnote 494 to the
contested decision);

–        meeting on 8 September 1997: mention was made of ‘the situation on the private labels market in the Netherlands and the fact
that Bavaria had taken a customer from Interbrew ... lower limit offer made to [customer] ... Bavaria changing the status
quo ...’ (footnote 495 to the contested decision).

114    The Commission interprets these documents as proof that the bilateral consultations between Bavaria and InBev made it possible
to maintain an ‘armed peace’ or a ‘non-aggression pact’ as regards private label beer (recital 223 to the contested decision).

115    In recital 227 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the letter dated 26 September 1997, sent by an exports manager
for Interbrew Nederland to an exports manager at Interbrew’s head office regarding ‘beer sales in Germany and private labels’:

‘I recently spoke about this with our main competitor in the Netherlands and on that occasion I learnt that they were to meet
... on whether or not to increase the volume of TIP beer for 1998. I asked about the price level towards which they expected
to work and he confirmed to me exactly the same price, minus a contribution earmarked for the head office of ..., and the
fact that he would accept a volume of around 200 000 hl at that price.’

116    According to the Commission, it is clear that Interbrew requested and obtained from Bavaria detailed information on prices
and volumes relating to the possible supply, by Bavaria, of private label beer to a major German retail chain. The Commission
takes the view that this confirms the statement by InBev according to which Interbrew and Bavaria exchanged information on
the price levels offered to customers of private label beer. In addition, the Commission asserts that this fact was acknowledged
by InBev in a letter dated 21 February 2006 (recital 228 to the contested decision).

117    In recital 234 to the contested decision the Commission mentions the following statement by the Haacht brewery regarding the
meeting held on 14 or 15 June 1998 between Bavaria, Interbrew Nederland and the Belgian brewers Interbrew Belgique, Alken‐Maes,
Haacht and Martens:

‘In the course of that meeting, the Dutch breweries were told about the content of the exchange of information between the
Belgian participants. The Dutch breweries consented to an exchange of information on volumes, types of packaging, the length
of contracts and possible renewal dates, and customers. With regard to prices, the participants agreed in principle not to
exchange information on this subject ...

The participants [in] the meeting considered that a neutral party should be given the job of centralising the exchange of
information. This request was made because the parties present on the Netherlands market did not trust the other parties.
Haacht was invited to centralise the information since it was not active on the Netherlands market.’

118    The Commission takes the view that, on this point, that statement confirms the statement by InBev (recital 235 to the contested
decision).

119    In recital 236 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes from the abovementioned meeting held
on 14 or 15 June 1998, which were discovered in the office of the secretary of a chair of Bavaria’s management board:

‘Martens → nothing has ever taken shape in the Netherlands

→ bottom – market – price breaker

|→ price offers are made

Interbrew Nederland – Martens -> offer made to a major private label customer

...

7.68 [circled]

Martens – “price drop Belgium”

now NL → ...

Interbrew Belgique has made the first move concerning P[rivate] L[abels]

only for                  ...

Pilsener                            ...

/ \             /       \

multiple single

... – “decided” |→ at Interbrew

CAT I+II’.

120    According to the Commission, these notes confirm that Interbrew Belgique took the initiative at a meeting on private label
beer during which it decided that the contract with a retail purchasing organisation ‘would go to Interbrew in the Netherlands’
(recital 237 to the contested decision).

121    As regards this latter meeting, the Commission also mentions the following statement by an off-trade manager for InBev, submitted
by InBev on 21 February 2006 in response to a request for information (recital 238 to the contested decision):

‘At one point ..., Mr ... from ... disclosed a low price which Martens had offered him. He told me that he had obtained a
price of NLG 0.32 per bottle. This corresponds to the amount of NLG 7.68 per crate of 24 bottles mentioned in the notes by
Mr ... [manager for Bavaria]. During those discussions, which took place from April to the beginning of June 1998, I suggested
to him moving to category II and thereby benefiting from lower excise duties. Eventually, at the beginning of June 1998, we
concluded an agreement with ... on the supply of a new ... category II beer ... Following the reduction in excise duties as
a result of the move to a category II beer, we were able to propose an amount of NLG 6.36 (including the excise reduction
of NLG 0.84), thus fending off the offer from Martens.

...

At the time of the meeting held on 14 or 15 June 1998, ... Interbrew had reached agreement with ... on supplies of category
I ... and category II beer. In the course of that meeting, I reported on the discussions and on the agreement reached with
... for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to confront Martens with the offer which it had made to ..., since it had always denied
having made price offers in the Netherlands. Secondly, I was keen to inform the other participants that they should no longer
make offers to ..., in view of the agreement concluded between Interbrew and ... . Line n of the [document referred to in
recital 236 to the contested decision] bears witness to my communication relating to the conclusion of the contract for the
supply of category I and category II beers between ... and Interbrew. The existence of that agreement ... is evident from
the fax of 24 June 1998.’

122    In recital 240 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a statement by the Belgian brewer Haacht regarding the second
Belgian-Dutch meeting held on 7 July 1998, according to which:

‘This was the last meeting which was organised between the parties. At the meeting, Haacht circulated the information collected
on the Netherlands market.

The parties then changed subjects and discussed certain less important points, but the representative [of] Haacht did not
take part in that discussion. Whatever the case, no important information was exchanged on these subjects. This meeting gave
the impression of not producing anything concrete.’

123    According to the Commission, the statement by an off-trade manager for Interbrew confirmed the statement by Haacht according
to which this was the last Belgian-Dutch meeting. The Commission takes the view that the decision to put an end to these meetings
was taken for a specific reason, namely the fear that the Dutch competition authority would make an incursion into one or
more breweries, which is confirmed by the statement by InBev (recital 241 to the contested decision).

124    In recital 248 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions a Heineken internal statement according to which ‘the extremely
low prices currently applied by the Belgian brewery Martens ... are frustrating the policy of taking the bottom of the market
to a higher price level’.

125    Lastly, in recital 249 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the statement made during its inspection on 23 March
2000 and signed by a managing director of Grolsche Bierbrouwerij Nederland, who became chair of the board of directors at
Koninklijke Grolsch:

‘He took the document ... entitled “Price scenarios based on a net increase in wholesale prices of NLG 2.00 per hl”, which
includes the annotation “CBK – Fie – always take away” to the meetings of the CBK Working Party on finance. He used that document
to draw the attention of Interbrew and Bavaria (the producers of private label beer in the Netherlands) on price determination,
in his view unjustifiable, for private label beer (less than 10 florins per crate).’

126    In the same recital to the contested decision, the Commission also mentions the following statement by a managing director
of Heineken Nederland:

‘I had already been present at a meeting of the CBK where others spoke about price determination for private labels. Such
comments will have been made to express a concern. I did not react because in principle Heineken is not involved in the production
of private labels.’

127    The Commission infers from the passages cited in recitals 248 and 249 to the contested decision that the producers of private
label beer (Interbrew and Bavaria) revealed their price strategy to Heineken and to Grolsch, which are not active in that
sector (recital 248 to the contested decision). It concludes that the bilateral discussions between Interbrew and Bavaria
seeking to increase the price of private label beer formed part of the general discussions held between the four brewers (recital
252 to the contested decision).

128    It should be stated that the evidence set out above corroborates the statement by InBev and justifies the finding that representatives
of Heineken, Grolsch, Interbrew and Bavaria met regularly in a cycle of informal meetings known as the ‘Catherijne consultation’
or ‘Working Party on agenda’, whose composition varied (statement by InBev cited in recital 45 to the contested decision;
other evidence examined in recitals 65 to 222 to the contested decision). The 18 meetings mentioned in the contested decision,
which are part of that cycle, took place on 27 February 1996, 19 June 1996, 8 October 1996, 8 January 1997, 1 May 1997, 2
September 1997, 16 December 1997, 17 December 1997, 12 March 1998, 9 April 1998, 3 July 1998, 15 December 1998, 8 January
1999, 4 March 1999, 10 May 1999, 11 August 1999, 19 August 1999 and 3 November 1999.

129    As far as the content of the discussions held in those meetings is concerned, the abovementioned evidence corroborates the
statement by InBev and proves the following:

–        with regard to the off-trade sector:

–        the four brewers were discussing prices (statement by InBev cited in recital 51 and other evidence cited in recitals 76, 129,
156, 174, 193, 212 and 213 to the contested decision) and increases in the price of beer in the Netherlands (statement by
InBev cited in recital 51; other evidence cited in recitals 76, 89, 117 and 179 to the contested decision);

–        discussions on prices were also pursued through bilateral contacts, including between Grolsch and Heineken in July 1999 (document
cited in recitals 212 and 213 to the contested decision);

–        concrete price proposals were discussed (Interbrew internal letter mentioned in recital 89 to the contested decision) and
information exchanged was sometimes quite detailed (documents mentioned in recitals 129 and 174 to the contested decision);

–        in 1997 and 1998 there was a consensus between the brewers on implementing a price increase before or during 1998 (documents
mentioned in recitals 89, 174 and 179 to the contested decision);

–        the producers of ‘A brand’ beer (Heineken and Grolsch), unlike the producers of ‘B brands’ (private label beer) (Interbrew
and Bavaria), which were opposed, insisted that the price increase be implemented ‘in two phases’, first for B brands and
then for A brands, and that the rate of increase be differentiated between A brands and B brands (statement by InBev cited
in recital 53; other evidence mentioned in recitals 76, 89, 100, 117 and 193 to the contested decision);

–        Bavaria announced (probably at the meeting held on 12 March 1998) its intention to increase its prices (evidence mentioned
in recitals 129 and 179 and statement by InBev cited in recital 51 to the contested decision). The other brewers would probably
follow Bavaria by increasing their prices subsequently (statement by InBev cited in recital 51 to the contested decision);

–        as far as the monitoring mechanism was concerned, it was agreed that the increases made by Bavaria should be demonstrable
in the figures from the supermarkets’ database compiled by AC Nielsen (documents mentioned in recitals 129 and 179 to the
contested decision);

–        there is no evidence that the price increase planned for 1998 took place;

–        in the consultations on prices, the brewers discussed the situation of certain specific supermarkets (handwritten notes mentioned
in recitals 76 and 156 to the contested decision);

–        during discussions, the participants indicated specific price figures (documents mentioned in recitals 76, 89, 117, 129 and
174 to the contested decision);

–        with regard to private label beer:

–        from 1995, the two Dutch producers of private label beer (Interbrew and Bavaria), on several occasions, expressed their concerns
over the plans by the Belgian brewer Martens to penetrate the Dutch market in that sector (statement by InBev cited in recital
55; other evidence cited in recitals 224, 236, 238 and 248 to the contested decision);

–        these concerns were discussed in the bilateral consultations between Bavaria and InBev (statement by InBev cited in recital
52; Interbrew internal letter cited in recital 227 to the contested decision) and five bilateral meetings (on 8 March 1995,
in the second half of March 1997, on 12 May 1997, 19 June 1997 and 8 September 1997) on the subject of this problem (documents
mentioned in recital 224 to the contested decision);

–        two ‘Belgian-Dutch’ meetings took place in Breda on 14 or 15 June 1998 (documents mentioned in recitals 234, 236 and 238 to
the contested decision) and on 7 July 1998 (statement by Haacht cited in recital 240 to the contested decision) between Interbrew
Nederland, Bavaria and the Belgian brewers Interbrew Belgique, Alken-Maes, Haacht and Martens (statement by InBev cited in
recital 55 to the contested decision);

–        subjects connected with private label beer were also discussed in the presence of Heineken and Grolsch (which are not active
in that segment) as part of the general discussion (statement by InBev cited in recital 54; other evidence mentioned in recitals
156, 193, 248 and 249 to the contested decision);

–        the brewers discussed prices of private label beer (statement by InBev cited in recital 54; other evidence mentioned in recitals
193, 199, 227, 236, 238 and 249 to the contested decision);

–        Heineken and Grolsch exerted ‘psychological pressure’ on Bavaria and Interbrew to increase prices of private label beer (documents
mentioned in recital 224, in footnote 493 and in recital 248 to the contested decision) by refusing to increase the prices
of A brands (statement by InBev cited in recital 53 to the contested decision);

–        it was agreed both at bilateral level between Interbrew Nederland and Bavaria and at multilateral level between the Dutch
and Belgian brewers active in the sector not to attempt to poach customers and to respect the respective volumes of private
labels in the Netherlands and in Belgium; it was decided, among other things, that the contract with a retail purchasing organisation
would go to Interbrew Nederland (statement by InBev cited in recital 55; documents mentioned in recitals 224, 236 and 238
to the contested decision);

–        the brewers exchanged information on the commercial conditions offered to certain specific customers (letter mentioned in
recital 227 to the contested decision and documents mentioned in recitals 236 and 238 to the contested decision);

–        during discussions, the participants indicated specific price figures (documents mentioned in recitals 236, 238 and 249 to
the contested decision);

–        with regard to the on-trade sector:

–        the four brewers discussed prices (documents mentioned in recitals 174, 193 and 197 to the contested decision) and price increases
(handwritten notes mentioned in recital 76 to the contested decision) in the on-trade sector;

–        there was an agreement between the brewers known as the ‘sliding scale’, which concerned the amount of the discounts to be
granted to on-trade customers (statement by InBev cited in recital 48; handwritten notes mentioned in recitals 92, 143 and
165 to the contested decision) and which the brewers should ‘respect’ (handwritten notes mentioned in recital 92 to the contested
decision); respect for that agreement was monitored and known infringements were discussed in the ‘Catherijne’ meetings (statement
by InBev cited in recital 48 to the contested decision);

–        the consultations also related to the introduction of restrictions seeking to maintain the status quo in the sector by avoiding
stealing customers from other brewers (statement by InBev cited in recital 48; Heineken internal letter concerning Bavaria’s
poaching of a student association, cited in recital 184 to the contested decision);

–        the discussions on such restrictions were also pursued through bilateral contacts; for example, on 9 September 1998, managers
from Heineken and from Bavaria discussed Bavaria taking an on-trade customer from Heineken (Heineken internal letter cited
in recital 184 to the contested decision);

–        the brewers exchanged information on certain customers and specific points of sale (documents mentioned in recitals 92, 143,
156, 165 and 184 to the contested decision);

–        during discussions, the brewers mentioned precise figures concerning the level of discounts and commissions for reductions
(handwritten notes mentioned in recitals 143 and 165 to the contested decision).

130    It is in the light of this evidence that it is necessary to examine the applicant’s arguments relating to the three aspects
of the conduct in question, consisting, first, in coordinating prices and price increases for beer in the Netherlands, in
both the on-trade and the off-trade sector, including with regard to private label beer, second, in occasionally coordinating
other commercial conditions offered to individual customers in the on-trade sector in the Netherlands and, third, in occasionally
coordinating customer allocation, in both the on-trade and the off‐trade sector in the Netherlands (Article 1 of and recitals
257 and 258 to the contested decision).

–       The facts relating to the findings, first, of coordination of prices and price increases for beer and, second, occasional
coordination of customer allocation

131    The applicant claims, in essence, that the handwritten notes produced by the representatives of the brewers at the meetings
in question are interpreted by the Commission in a partial and even highly tendentious manner on several occasions.

132    In particular, it contests the interpretation of the evidence mentioned in recitals 76, 89, 92, 100, 117, 129, 143, 156, 179,
184, 193, 199, 227, 228, 236 and 238 to the contested decision (see paragraphs 86 to 95, 99 to 101, 106 to 111, 115, 116,
119 and 121 above).

133    Before examining the applicant’s arguments concerning the abovementioned evidence, it should be noted that the majority of
the factual findings set out in paragraphs 128 and 129 above are based on several pieces of evidence.

134    Firstly, in various parts of the application, the applicant refers to the documentary evidence mentioned in recitals 76, 100,
117, 156, 193 and 199 to the contested decision to claim, in essence, that that evidence cannot prove coordination of prices
in both the off-trade sector, including the private label beer segment, and the on-trade sector.

135    With regard to this point, it should be noted, first of all, that the fact that the brewers discussed prices and possible
price increases in those sectors is also shown by the documents mentioned in recitals 174, 212, 213 and 249 to the contested
decision. Whilst it is true that those documents primarily concern the discussions between Heineken and Grolsch, the fact
remains that the applicant knew about those discussions, at least some of which took place in its presence (see the document
cited in recital 249 to the contested decision and in paragraph 125 above), and that it can therefore be held responsible
(see, to that effect, *Commission* v *Anic Partecipazioni*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraphs 80 to 83).

136    It should also be noted that, contrary to the claims made by the applicant, it is clear from the documents cited in recitals
76, 100, 117 and 156 to the contested decision that there was much more than mere discontent among the brewers over off-trade
price levels. These documents prove that in their discussions they touched on the situation of certain customers and specific
points of sale and mentioned precise figures for prices and discounts.

137    Secondly, the applicant claims that the Heineken internal letter concerning Bavaria’s poaching of a student association (recital
184 to the contested decision) is the only piece of evidence which specifically bears witness to discussions between the brewers
(in this instance Heineken and Bavaria) on the subject of on‐trade customers being stolen (see paragraph 107 above). According
to the applicant, it can be inferred from that letter, at the very most, that the representative of Heineken expressed his
discontent at the loss of a very big on-trade customer. The applicant denies, moreover, the existence of a system of compensation
between the brewers in the event of customers being poached, claiming that the existence of such a system would be incompatible
with the existence of the alleged concerted action on customer allocation.

138    These claims made by the applicant are not plausible. In the contested decision, the Commission rightly notes that the sentence
‘[t]he hectolitres lost could then have been compensated for in some other way’, in the text of the letter in question, indicates
that there was no discussion between Heineken and Bavaria on the need for compensation, but only on the means of obtaining
compensation (recital 185 to the contested decision), and that the use of the words ‘well-known rhetoric’, ‘emphasis’ and
‘voluntarily’ signifies that, according to the author, who comes from Heineken, Bavaria is suspected of failing to respect
a rule that brewers must not actively solicit on-trade customers from other brewers (recital 188 to the contested decision).

139    Consequently, the evidence mentioned in recitals 184 to 188 to the contested decision corroborates the statements contained
in the statement by InBev, cited in recital 48 to the contested decision, regarding the existence of an arrangement not to
steal on-trade customers.

140    Thirdly, the applicant claims that, despite the mention of a ‘consensus’ in the letter of 25 March 1997 (cited in recital
89 to the contested decision), of a promise by Bavaria in the Heineken internal memo of 14 October 1998 (cited in recital
179 to the contested decision) concerning the price increase in the off-trade sector and the exact level of such an increase
in the handwritten notes made by an on-trade manager for Bavaria (cited in recital 129 to the contested decision), and the
discussion of discounts granted to the on-trade sector, reflected in the handwritten notes cited in recitals 92 and 143 to
the contested decision, the brewers continued to apply their strategies on the market independently.

141    With regard to the statement in the Heineken internal memo (mentioned in recital 179 to the contested decision) according
to which ‘the price increase promised by Bavaria in the CBK is not apparent in the [figures] from Nielsen’, the applicant
comments that the use of the term ‘promise’ to describe its price increase announcement, which had been known about on the
market for some months, does not constitute convincing proof of a cartel.

142    However, it should be noted that, as the Commission rightly states in recital 182 to the contested decision, to interpret
the word ‘promise’ as simply ‘mentioning’ a price increase is a departure from its ordinary meaning. The existence of a commitment
by the applicant to increase its prices is corroborated by the mention of the fact that the increase ‘is not apparent in the
[figures] from Nielsen’. The supermarket cash register data in question were used as a monitoring tool through which the price
increase by Bavaria was to be made ‘demonstrable’ (recital 133 to the contested decision). The reference to those data, which
also appears in the handwritten notes by the on-trade manager for Bavaria (cited in recital 129 to the contested decision),
falls more logically into the context of monitoring the implementation of a commitment than verifying a simple mention.

143    In addition, the existence of a consensus to increase prices before 1998 is very clear from the Interbrew internal letter
of 25 March 1997 (cited in recital 89 to the contested decision). With regard to the applicant’s argument relating to the
fact that no price increase was actually implemented before 1998, it is sufficient to note that the simple failure to execute
an agreement on prices does not in itself mean that the agreement itself never existed.

144    The fact that the price increase mentioned in the letter was to happen ‘before 1998’, when the abovementioned evidence was
produced in 1998, also cannot refute the existence of a link between those documents. It is perfectly conceivable that, on
account of the difficulties connected with the negotiation of the arrangements for implementation (in particular, the differentiated
price increase for A and B brands referred to in the Interbrew internal letter), the price increase initially planned for
a date in 1997 was first put back to the following year and then abandoned by the brewers.

145    With regard to the applicant’s claim that, despite the discussion of discounts granted to the on-trade sector, the brewers
continued to apply their own strategies on the market independently, subject to proof to the contrary, which the economic
operators concerned must adduce, the presumption must be that the undertakings taking part in the concerted action and remaining
active on the market take account of the information exchanged with their competitors for the purposes of determining their
conduct on that market. That will be all the more true where the undertakings concert together on a regular basis over a long
period, as was the case here (see, to that effect, *Hüls* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraph 162).

146    Fourthly, with regard to its bilateral consultation with Interbrew in the private label beer segment, first of all, the applicant
claims that the Interbrew internal letter dated 26 September 1997 (cited in recital 227 to the contested decision) and the
statement by InBev of 21 February 2006 (cited in recital 228 to the contested decision) concern a customer established in
Germany and cannot therefore, in themselves, constitute evidence of an infringement concerning the Dutch market. Second, as
regards the evidence relating to the meeting held on 14 or 15 June 1998, namely the handwritten notes by one of the applicant’s
managers (cited in recital 236 to the contested decision) and the passage from the statement by InBev of 21 February 2006
(cited in recital 238 to the contested decision), according to which it was decided that a contract with a retail purchasing
organisation would go to Interbrew in the Netherlands and the manager from InBev informed the other participants that they
should no longer make offers to that organisation, the applicant claims that it is clear from the evidence in question that
that decision had already been taken at the time of the meeting. According to the applicant, that evidence does not therefore
show concerted action between itself and the other brewers on the future supplier for the organisation in question.

147    It should be noted in this regard that the evidence relied on by the Commission to demonstrate bilateral concerted action
between the applicant and Interbrew is not limited to that mentioned in paragraph 146 above, but also includes the documents
mentioned in recital 224 to the contested decision, concerning a series of bilateral meetings between the applicant and Interbrew,
the interpretation of which is not contested by the applicant. It is apparent from those documents in particular that the
subjects discussed included ‘the situation on the private labels market in the Netherlands and the fact that Bavaria had taken
a customer from Interbrew ... [and the] lower limit offer made to [the customer]’ (recital 224 and footnote 495 to the contested
decision).

148    In addition, even though the evidence mentioned in recitals 227 and 228 to the contested decision concerns a customer established
in Germany and the evidence mentioned in recitals 236 and 238 addresses a fait accompli, the fact remains that that evidence
provides a pertinent indication as to the existence of a practice between the applicant and Interbrew of exchanging sensitive
information on the market and thus corroborates the evidence mentioned in recital 224 to the contested decision in support
of the finding of bilateral concerted action between those undertakings in the private label beer segment.

149    Fifthly, with regard to its participation in the meetings in Breda with Interbrew Nederland and the Belgian brewers Interbrew
Belgique, Alken-Maes, Haacht and Martens, the applicant points out that those meetings were organised on the initiative of
Interbrew and makes reference to the following statements by the Belgian brewer Alken‐Maes and Groupe Danone SA, cited in
recitals 160 and 177 to Commission Decision 2003/569/EC of 5 December 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC]
(Case IV/37.614/F3 PO/Interbrew and Alken‐Maes) (OJ 2003 L 200, p. 1):

–        Alken-Maes: ‘As regards the Dutch market, any exchange of information was refused’;

–        Groupe Danone: ‘In addition, the private label market was not mapped out in its entirety, as the foreign brewers refused to
take part’.

150    However, those statements must be interpreted in the light of the evidence mentioned by the Commission in recitals 234, 240
and 241 to the contested decision.

151    First of all, according to the statement by Haacht regarding the first meeting on 14 or 15 June 1998, the refusal to exchange
information applied only to prices: ‘with regard to prices, the participants agreed in principle not to exchange information
on this subject ...’ By contrast, the Dutch brewers ‘... consented to an exchange of information on volumes, types of packaging,
the length of contracts and possible renewal dates, and customers’. That statement also asserts that ‘the participants [in]
the meeting considered that a neutral party should be given the job of centralising the exchange of information [; t]his request
was made because the parties present on the Netherlands market did not trust the other parties[;] Haacht was invited to centralise
the information since it was not active on the Netherlands market’.

152    Next, according to the statement by Haacht on the subject of the second meeting on 7 July 1998, at that meeting, ‘Haacht circulated
the information collected on the Netherlands market’.

153    Lastly, according to the statement by an off-trade manager for InBev (recital 241 to the contested decision), ‘Bavaria and
Interbrew communicated only the volumes for each private label and for each customer, since the [Belgian] breweries had also
indicated the reductions [; t]his overview was produced by the commercial manager for Haacht [; h]e sent it to the private
addresses of those present’.

154    In the light of this evidence, the applicant’s arguments regarding the absence of an agreement with the other participants
in the meetings with a view to exchanging confidential business information cannot be accepted.

155    In the light of all the foregoing, in the contested decision the Commission set out a body of specific consistent evidence
to demonstrate, to the requisite legal standard, the factual findings relating to the aspects of the infringement in question
concerning the coordination of prices and price increases and customer allocation. Moreover, the validity of those findings
is not called into question by the applicant’s arguments concerning the evidence set out in paragraph 132 above.

156    Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging an error of assessment of the facts relating to these two aspects of the
infringement in question must be rejected.

–       The facts relating to the finding of occasional coordination of other commercial conditions offered to individual customers
in the on-trade sector

157    The applicant claims that the Commission did not establish that the undertakings concerned coordinated commercial conditions,
other than prices, granted to customers in the on-trade segment.

158    The Commission takes the view that the handwritten notes mentioned in recitals 67 and 138 to the contested decision contain
proof of occasional coordination, between the four brewers, of certain commercial conditions, such as conditions for loans,
offered to individual on-trade customers (recital 258 to the contested decision).

159    The handwritten notes cited in recital 67 to the contested decision include the following: ‘Guarantees/financing: fin[ancing]
for ... in excess of needs of specific points. So ... mil[lions]’.

160    According to the Commission, this quotation therefore means that, at the meeting held on 27 February 1996, the brewers discussed
the guarantees and financing granted or to be granted by one or more brewers to specific sales outlets (recital 68 to the
contested decision).

161    However, it should be noted that the applicant proposes another plausible interpretation of the passage mentioned by the Commission,
stating that it was part of a discussion on ‘bad debtors’.

162    In recital 138 to the contested decision, the Commission mentions the handwritten notes by an on-trade manager for Bavaria
relating to the meeting held on 12 March 1998, containing the following passage: ‘Bav interest ...%? unless there is an advertising
allowance’. According to the Commission, this passage proves that a discussion was held concerning the level of interest rates
applied to loans granted to on‐trade points of sale (recital 142 to the contested decision).

163    However, even supposing that the Commission has correctly interpreted the handwritten notes, the isolated and laconic nature
of such a reference and the absence of any specific information concerning participation by the other brewers in a discussion
on the subjects in question do not allow those notes to be regarded as sufficient proof of the existence of collusion in relation
to occasional coordination of certain commercial conditions.

164    In its answers to the questions asked by the Court, the Commission claims that the handwritten notes, mentioned in recitals
67 and 138 to the contested decision, are corroborated by the statement by InBev, according to which, first, the ‘Catherijne’
meeting on 12 March 1998 was devoted both to on-trade and off-trade matters and, second, the participants in the ‘Catherijne’
meetings consulted on investments in the on-trade sector in order to avoid taking customers.

165    It must nevertheless be stated that the two passages cited by the Commission and the reference made by the Commission to ‘the
spirit of the statement by InBev’ do not offer a specific indication as to the existence of discussions between the brewers
concerning the coordination of loan conditions and cannot therefore support the conclusion to that effect drawn by the Commission.

166    Consequently, it should be noted that the finding by the Commission relating to occasional coordination, between the brewers,
of the loan conditions offered to individual on-trade customers is based on fragmentary and imprecise evidence.

167    In view of the isolated and laconic nature of the references made in the handwritten notes mentioned in recitals 67 and 138
to the contested decision and the alternative plausible interpretation suggested by the applicant and the absence of specific
indications in this regard in the statement by InBev, it should be stated that the Commission did not demonstrate, to the
requisite legal standard, that the infringement in question included ‘occasional coordination of other commercial conditions
offered to individual consumers in the on-trade segment in the Netherlands’.

168    The finding made to this effect, in recital 258 to and in Article 1 of the contested decision, cannot therefore be regarded
as established.

169    Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging an error of assessment of the facts relating to occasional coordination of
other commercial conditions offered to individual customers in the on-trade sector must be accepted.

–       The alleged error of law and in the treatment of the facts

170    The applicant claims that the finding by the Commission as to the existence of a complex of agreements and/or concerted practices
between undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC stems from an error relating to the interpretation and the application
of that provision (recitals 337 and 341 to the contested decision).

171    It should be stated, first of all, that, in the multilateral meetings and their bilateral contacts, on several occasions the
four brewers exchanged sensitive information on the market (prices, the amount of discounts and specific offers to certain
customers), which were sometimes fairly detailed (documents mentioned in recitals 129 and 174 to the contested decision) and
included specific figures for prices (documents mentioned in recitals 76, 89, 117, 129 and 174 to the contested decision),
discounts and commissions for reduction (documents mentioned in recitals 143 and 165 to the contested decision), as well as
information on customers and points of sale both in the on-trade sector (documents mentioned in recitals 92, 143, 156, 165
and 184 to the contested decision) and in the off-trade sector (documents mentioned in recitals 76 and 156 to the contested
decision).

172    Certain specific proposals concerning conduct on the market were also discussed, in particular the proposal to implement a
two-phase price increase in the off-trade sector (document mentioned in recital 89 to the contested decision).

173    In addition, the fact that no official minutes were ever taken for the ‘Catherijne’ meetings, that the substance of the discussions
was almost never reflected in an internal memo and that agendas and notes from those meetings were destroyed in November 1998
(statement by InBev cited in recital 61 to the contested decision) indicates that, contrary to the claims made by the applicant,
the discussions were secret and that the participants were aware that their conduct was unlawful and attempted to conceal
it.

174    Contrary to the claims made by the applicant, it is apparent from the documentary evidence examined by the Commission that
a consensus was reached on certain proposals, such as on awarding a contract with a retail purchasing organisation to Interbrew
(document mentioned in recital 236 and footnote 531 to the contested decision) and on the concerted price increase before
or during 1998 (document mentioned in recital 89 to the contested decision).

175    The existence, in this latter case, of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81 EC is not called into question either
by the likelihood that the consensus between the brewers did not extend to the practical arrangements for implementing the
price increase or the fact that that increase never actually took place on the market.

176    Even supposing that an agreement was never reached on specific elements of the planned restriction, the Commission rightly
found that, by regularly holding their discussions, the brewers had clearly shown their common intention to reach an anti-competitive
agreement (recital 341 to the contested decision).

177    All the same, the continued exchange of sensitive information, which was not available to the public and which the representatives
of the four brewers found useful to note on their agendas and to mention in their internal correspondence, certainly had the
effect of reducing, for each of them, uncertainty over the conceivable conduct of their competitors.

178    In this regard, subject to proof to the contrary, which the economic operators concerned must adduce, the presumption must
be that the undertakings taking part in the concerted action and remaining active on the market take account of the information
exchanged with their competitors for the purposes of determining their conduct on that market. That will be all the more true
where the undertakings concert together on a regular basis over a long period, as was the case here (see, to that effect,
*Hüls* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 36 above, paragraph 162).

179    The applicant essentially considers that it has rebutted this presumption by showing that, despite the discussions, the four
brewers determined their conduct on the market autonomously.

180    That argument cannot be accepted. It is certainly true that both the statements by the managers from InBev and the fact that
Heineken did not increase its prices until February 2000 demonstrate that, during the period in question, each brewer pursued
its own policy on the market. Nevertheless, even though this finding may show the absence of formal commitments or actual
coordination between the brewers, it is not sufficient to prove that the brewers never took into account the information exchanged
at the meetings in question in order to determine their conduct on the market as they wished.

181    The applicant has not therefore successfully rebutted the presumption based on the case-law cited in paragraph 178 above.

182    Consequently, it should be stated that the constituent elements of a concerted practice, based on the case-law cited in paragraphs
36 and 37 above, are present in this case in relation to the conduct in connection with, first, coordinating prices and price
increases for beer and, second, occasionally coordinating customer allocation.

183    In these circumstances, it should be noted that the Commission was entitled to characterise the conduct in question as a ‘complex
of agreements and/or concerted practices’ in so far as that conduct involved at one and the same time elements to be characterised
as ‘agreements’ and elements to be characterised as ‘concerted practices’. Given such a complex factual situation, the dual
characterisation by the Commission in Article 1 of the contested decision must be understood not as requiring, simultaneously
and cumulatively, proof that each of those factual elements presents the constituent elements both of an agreement and of
a concerted practice, but rather as referring to a complex whole comprising a number of factual elements some of which were
characterised as agreements and others as concerted practices for the purposes of Article 81 EC, which lays down no specific
category for a complex infringement of this type (see, to that effect, *Hercules Chemicals* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 34 above, paragraph 264).

184    Lastly, the applicant contests, relying on a breach of the *ne bis in idem* principle, that it cannot be held responsible for the alleged concerted action with the Belgian brewers concerning the private
label beer segment.

185    It claims, in particular, that the Belgian-Dutch concerted action had already been the subject of Decision 2003/569 and that,
in that decision, it was not penalised for attending the meetings in Breda with Interbrew Nederland and the Belgian brewers
Interbrew Belgique, Alken-Maes, Haacht and Martens, with the result that the Commission could not penalise it again without
breaching the *ne bis in idem* principle, which prohibits an undertaking being liable for conduct of which it has previously been acquitted.

186    It should be noted that the *ne bis in idem* principle, which constitutes a general principle of EU law, whose observance the Courts ensure, prohibits the same person
from being penalised more than once for the same unlawful conduct in order to protect one and the same legal interest. The
application of that principle is subject to three cumulative conditions: the identity of the facts, the unity of offender
and the unity of the legal interest protected (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraph 338).

187    In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant is not among the addressees of Decision 2003/569 or the addressees
of the statement of objections adopted in the procedure leading to the adoption of that decision. It is clear from recitals
250 to 260 to Decision 2003/569 that the applicant’s participation in the meetings in Breda is mentioned solely in the statement
of facts and is not the subject of any legal assessment by the Commission. It is also apparent that the purpose of that decision
was not to rule on the applicant’s involvement in the Belgian-Dutch concerted action.

188    Consequently, since the applicant was not penalised in Decision 2003/569 for the unlawful conduct in question in the present
case, its arguments alleging a breach of the *ne bis in idem* principle are unfounded.

189    In the light of all the foregoing, the applicant’s arguments alleging an error of law cannot be accepted.

190    Lastly, since the applicant has not demonstrated that the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law in the application
of Article 81(1) EC, it is also necessary to reject its argument, based on essentially the same premiss, that the Commission
misinterpreted that provision, in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, and failed to provide sufficient
grounds in support of the finding of the infringement.

–       Conclusion

191    Following the examination of the second plea above, it should be noted that the Commission’s finding as to the existence of
occasional coordination of commercial conditions, other than prices, offered to individual consumers in the on-trade sector
in the Netherlands is not demonstrated to the requisite legal standard and cannot be accepted (see paragraphs 159 to 169 above).

192    Consequently, Article 1 of the contested decision must be annulled in so far as it establishes that aspect of the infringement
in question and the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant must be adjusted accordingly. The practical consequences of
that adjustment will be set out in paragraphs 344 and 345 below.

193    The remainder of the second plea must be rejected.

*The third plea, concerning the duration of the infringement*

Arguments of the parties

194    The applicant disputes the determination of 27 February 1996 and 3 November 1999 as the start and end dates of the infringement
attributed to it. It considers, among other things, that the start and end of the infringement are subject to a heavier burden
of proof, which is not satisfied in the present case.

195    With regard to the meeting on 27 February 1996, held to be the start date of the infringement, the applicant claims that the
handwritten notes mentioned by the Commission in recital 67 to the contested decision concern a general discussion relating
to ‘bad debtors’ in the on-trade sector, which cannot be regarded as restrictive of competition.

196    With regard to the meeting on 3 November 1999, held to be the end date of the infringement, the applicant claims that the
Commission’s finding relating to the unlawful character of that meeting is refuted by the statements made by the managers
from InBev.

197    The Commission contests the applicant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

198    The duration of the infringement is an intrinsic element of an infringement under Article 81(1) EC, the burden of proof of
which is borne principally by the Commission. In this regard, according to the case-law, if there is no evidence directly
establishing the duration of an infringement, the Commission should adduce at least evidence of facts sufficiently proximate
in time for it to be reasonable to accept that that infringement continued uninterruptedly between two specific dates (see
*Peróxidos Orgánicos* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 78 above, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

199    In the present case, the applicant disputes the determination of both the start date and the end date of the infringement.

–       The determination of the start date of the infringement

200    The Commission held 27 February 1996 to be the start date of the infringement in question, this being the date of the first
‘Catherijne’ meeting for which it had direct proof of the presence of the four brewers.

201    As was stated in paragraphs 159 to 169 above, the handwritten notes concerning that meeting, cited in recital 67 to the contested
decision, do not, in themselves, constitute a body of evidence to justify, to the requisite legal standard, the finding of
the infringement relating to occasional coordination of other commercial conditions offered to individual consumers in the
on-trade sector.

202    However, this consideration does not mean per se that that same evidence cannot be used to determine the start date of the
infringement as a whole.

203    Indeed, the meeting on 27 February 1996 was part of a series of periodic meetings which involved the same participants and
took place in similar circumstances. They were known as the ‘Catherijne consultation’ and the ‘Working Party on agenda’, brought
together representatives of the four Dutch brewers Heineken, InBev, Grolsch and Bavaria, were held in parallel with the official
meetings of the CBK and the discussions held were never recorded in minutes and almost never in internal memos. In the statement
by InBev, these meetings are also presented as forming part of a series and a table showing names, addresses, dates and locations
of the majority of them, including the meeting on 27 February 1996, is annexed (recital 44 to the contested decision).

204    It has already been established, on the basis of both the statement by InBev and a large body of other evidence, that the
meetings forming part of this series had an anti-competitive object (see paragraphs 171 to 176 above). Thus, first, a body
of evidence showing the systematic character of the meetings and their anti‐competitive content and, second, the statement
by InBev, which has high probative value, show that, unless proved otherwise, the anti-competitive object applies to all the
meetings in question, even in the absence of sufficient proof regarding the content of some of them.

205    The applicant essentially considers that this logic cannot be applied to the determination of the start and end dates of the
infringement. It claims, inter alia, that the Commission must demonstrate to the requisite legal standard the precise start
date of the infringement.

206    It should be noted in this regard that, in determining the start date of the infringement, the Commission did not merely rely
on evidence relating to the meeting held on 27 February 1996.

207    In recitals 466 to 469 to the contested decision, the Commission states, with regard to each of the brewers concerned, including
the applicant, that it participated in the infringement ‘at least between 27 February 1996 and 3 November 1999’. In recital
56 to the contested decision, it also states that, according to the statement by InBev, the infringement began well before
1996, namely:

–        ‘in 1990 or even earlier’ with regard to the discussions concerning increases in on-trade prices;

–        in ‘1993-94’ with regard to the discussions concerning discounts and transfers between brewers of on-trade points of sale;

–        in ‘1987’ with regard to the discussions between Oranjeboom-Interbrew and Bavaria concerning private label beer.

208    In view of the considerable probative value of the statement by InBev, the Commission was able to find that the infringement
in question began at least on the date of the first meetings in 1996, set out in the table annexed to the statement by InBev,
at which InBev was represented following its acquisition of Oranjeboom in 1995.

209    Consequently, in so far as, first, it has been shown that the applicant was represented at the meeting held on 27 February
1996 and, second, according to the statement by InBev, the applicant was involved in the ‘Catherijne’ meetings from the beginning
in 1993 or in 1994, the Commission was fully entitled to find that the applicant was involved in the infringement in question
at least from 27 February 1996.

210    The fact that the contested decision did not determine the existence of an infringement before that date actually constitutes
a concession to the addressees of the contested decision. In this regard, it should be noted that the Court is not called
on to rule on the lawfulness or the expediency of that concession (see, to that effect, *JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraphs 340 and 341).

211    In these circumstances, with regard to a meeting forming part of a system of regular meetings whose anti-competitive character
has been demonstrated to the requisite legal standard, the finding of the start date of the infringement cannot be called
into question by the applicant’s arguments alleging that there is insufficient tangible proof as to the content of the meeting
on 27 February 1996.

212    Consequently, the complaint relating to the determination of the start date of the infringement must be rejected.

–       The determination of the end date of the infringement

213    The Commission took 3 November 1999 to be the end date of the infringement for all the brewers concerned (recitals 466 to
469 to the contested decision), this being the date of the last ‘Catherijne’ meeting for which the Commission had direct proof
of the presence of the four brewers. That meeting appears at the bottom of the chronological table annexed to the statement
by InBev. According to a reply by InBev to a request for information from the Commission, the meeting on 3 November 1999 was
a ‘Catherijne meeting (on-trade matters/Working Party on agenda) [; a]s always in the Catherijne consultations, discussions
were primarily about excessive agreements and peaceful coexistence’ (recital 221 to the contested decision).

214    The applicant takes the view that that statement is refuted by the statements of the managers from InBev who attended the
meeting held on 3 November 1999, quoting the following passages:

–        ‘On 19 August 1999, there was a consultation which I attended. On 3 November 1999, there was a meeting which Mr ... and I
attended. We did not speak specifically about conduct on the market in either case. The meeting had a more informal character’;

–        ‘There were meetings of the four on-trade managers (Heineken, Grolsch, Bavaria and Interbrew). I attended just one of those
meetings, on 3 November 1999 in Enschede. Mr ... took me to introduce myself. That meeting did not have much substance. It
was more a pleasant meeting without a specific agenda. General comments were made about discounts. I had the impression that
there had already, for some years, been a sort of sliding scale system or a rule on discounts, but that was never explicitly
stated. We only spoke about overall discount levels in very general terms, which was an opportunity to point out certain incidents.
My feeling is that the sliding scale was not working. Each operator determined its own strategy. There were perhaps some attempts
at intimidation, but everyone still did as they wished’.

215    It should be stated that, contrary to the claims made by the applicant, the statements on which it relies do not refute the
evidence invoked by the Commission. The references to ‘excessive agreements’, ‘peaceful coexistence’, the ‘sliding scale’
and the ‘rule on discounts’ clearly relate to the coordination of discount rates applied to on-trade customers. The only clarification
made in the statements by the managers from InBev concerns the level of detail of the discussions, which were allegedly limited
to ‘general comments’, and the absence of their effect on the market, namely the fact that ‘the sliding scale was not working’.
However, it has already been noted that neither the general nature of the discussions nor the absence of any effect on the
market can refute the fact that the meeting in question constitutes an infringement (see paragraphs 69 to 71 above).

216    The fact that the meeting on 3 November 1999 formed part of a system of anti‐competitive meetings (see paragraphs 203 and
204 above) and that the subjects discussed were connected with previous anti‐competitive discussions also indicates that the
very purpose of calling the meeting was to provide the necessary conditions so that those discussions could continue.

217    In any event, even supposing there is some contradiction between the statements by the employees of InBev relied on by the
applicant, on the one hand, and InBev’s reply to the request for information, on the other, it should be borne in mind that
the probative value of the latter is higher, having regard to the case-law according to which a statement given on behalf
of the undertaking as such carries more weight than that of an employee of the undertaking, whatever his individual experience
or opinion (see, to that effect, *LR AF 1998* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 77 above, paragraph 45).

218    Consequently, the complaint relating to the determination of the end date of the infringement and, therefore, the third plea
in its entirety must be rejected.

*The first plea, alleging a breach of the principle of sound administration*

Arguments of the parties

219    The applicant submits, in essence, that the Commission breached the principle of sound administration in so far as it failed
to conduct a full, careful and impartial investigation. Firstly, the applicant claims that the Commission systematically interpreted
the documents in the investigation file in a partial and tendentious manner. Secondly, it claims that the statements from
InBev’s leniency application, as the fundamental pillar of evidence on which the Commission relies, should have been assessed
with greater reservations. Thirdly, the applicant states that the Commission was manifestly selective in its use of the other
evidence available to it and, in the contested decision, cited only the passages of that evidence which allowed it to establish
the existence of an infringement, whilst deliberately disregarding the arguments of the other parties which would have refuted
its conclusions. Fourthly, the applicant criticises the Member of the Commission responsible for competition for the statements
which he made to the public in a Dutch television programme immediately after the statement of objections was adopted. Those
statements showed, among other things, that, for the Commission, the brewers’ guilt was already established before they had
had an opportunity to defend themselves against the statement of objections.

220    Fifthly, the applicant criticises the Commission for modifying the objections in the course of the investigation. In essence,
it claims that the objection relating to occasional coordination of customer allocation in the on-trade sector and the off‐trade
sector did not appear in the statement of objections. Sixthly, the applicant argues that the Commission did not analyse the
evidence showing that it competed vigorously and set its prices autonomously.

221    The Commission contests the applicant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

222    It is settled case-law that the rights guaranteed by the EU legal order in administrative procedures include, in particular,
the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case
(Case C‐269/90 *Technische Universität München*[1991] ECR I‐5469, paragraph 14).

223    In the present case, firstly, with regard to the allegation that the Commission failed to examine the evidence carefully and
impartially, it must be stated that, as has already been established following the examination of the second plea above, the
Commission set out sufficient proof of the existence of an infringement of Article 81 EC, as far as two aspects of the infringement
in question were concerned (see paragraph 155 above). In the examination of that plea, the Court has already considered the
applicant’s criticisms concerning the assessment of the statement by InBev and of the evidence seeking to establish proof
to the contrary furnished in the administrative procedure.

224    In these circumstances, the applicant’s arguments alleging the absence of a full, careful and impartial investigation merge
with the arguments examined in connection with the second plea above and do not require a separate examination.

225    Secondly, in so far as the applicant’s arguments relating to the statements made by the Member of the Commission responsible
for competition can actually be interpreted as alleging a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, it must
be stated that the argument put forward is not relevant to the outcome of the present dispute.

226    The existence of an infringement must be assessed having regard only to the evidence gathered by the Commission. Where the
substance of an infringement is actually established following the administrative procedure, evidence of a premature manifestation
by the Commission, during that procedure, of its conviction that the infringement exists is not of such a kind as to deprive
the actual evidence of the infringement itself of its reality (Joined Cases T‐25/95, T‐26/95, T‐30/95 to T‐32/95, T‐34/95
to T‐39/95, T‐42/95 to T‐46/95, T‐48/95, T‐50/95 to T‐65/95, T‐68/95 to T‐71/95, T‐87/95, T‐88/95, T‐103/95 and T‐104/95 *Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission*[2000] ECR II‐491, paragraph 726).

227    In any event, the comments made by a Member of the Commission during a Dutch television programme, where he mentioned, in
connection with examples of action taken by the Commission, that Dutch consumers ‘have paid too much for their beer’ as a
result of the brewers’ conduct, though the choice of his words might be unfortunate, cannot show that the Commission prejudged
its decision.

228    The Commission, as a college, deliberates on the basis of a draft decision. In this regard, contrary to the claims made by
the applicant, the comments by the Member of the Commission concerned where he mentioned the action taken by the Commission
certainly did not imply that the Commission considered the brewers’ guilt to be already established.

229    Thirdly, with regard to the arguments alleging a lack of consistency between the statement of objections and the contested
decision, as regards the objection relating to customer allocation in the on-trade and off-trade sectors, the applicant’s
criticisms must be regarded as unfounded.

230    According to the statement of objections, the Commission clearly stated that the parties were guilty of such concerted action.
Thus, on the one hand, in paragraphs 262 to 272 of the statement of objections, it expressly stated that the brewers had consulted
on customer allocation in the on-trade sector. On the other hand, it is clear from paragraphs 311 and 312 of the statement
of objections that the objections set out concerned, among other things, customer allocation between the brewers.

231    In the light of the foregoing, the first plea cannot be upheld.

*The sixth plea, alleging a breach of essential procedural requirements, the principle of sound administration and the rights
of defence of the applicant, consisting in the refusal to grant access to a document in the file and to the replies to the
statement of objections of the other undertakings concerned*

Arguments of the parties

232    Firstly, the applicant complains that the Commission refused it access to the replies to the statement of objections of the
other parties involved in the procedure, thus affecting its rights of defence. It claims, inter alia, that those replies would
have enabled it to rely on other exculpatory evidence in support of the conclusion that the brewers never took concerted action
on the Dutch beer market. In addition, it claims that, in recital 203 to the contested decision, the Commission used as evidence
against it a section of the reply from Heineken in which Heineken acknowledged the existence of discussions on the price of
cask beer, even though that section was not communicated to it.

233    Secondly, the applicant argues that the Commission refused it access to a document in the file which was relevant to its defence,
thereby infringing Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1/2003. It states, in particular, that it did not have access to the summary
of the number of customers in the on-trade sector that the brewers gained and lost in the period between 1997 and 2001. Contrary
to the claims made by the Commission, it takes the view that that information was not confidential and that, with that document,
it could have shown that there were constant changes in the on-trade sector of the Dutch beer market, demonstrating vigorous
competition between the brewers.

234    The Commission contests the applicant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

235    Under Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, ‘[t]he rights of defence of the parties concerned shall be fully respected in
the proceedings [; t]hey shall be entitled to have access to the Commission’s file, subject to the legitimate interest of
undertakings in the protection of their business secrets ...’.

236    According to settled case-law, the right of access to the file, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights
of the defence, means that the Commission must provide the undertaking concerned with the opportunity to examine all the documents
in the investigation file that may be relevant for its defence (see, to that effect, Case C‐199/99 P *Corus UK* v *Commission* [2003] ECR I‐11177, paragraphs 125 to 128, and Case T‐30/91 *Solvay* v *Commission* [1995] ECR II‐1775, paragraph 81).

237    Those documents include both incriminating and exculpatory evidence, save where the business secrets of other undertakings,
the internal documents of the Commission or other confidential information are involved (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraph 68).

238    As regards incriminating evidence, the failure to communicate a document constitutes a breach of the rights of the defence
only if the undertaking concerned shows, first, that the Commission relied on that document to support its objection concerning
the existence of an infringement and, second, that the objection could be proved only by reference to that document. It is
thus for the undertaking concerned to show that the result at which the Commission arrived in its decision would have been
different if that uncommunicated document had to be disallowed as evidence (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraphs 71 to 73).

239    By contrast, where an exculpatory document has not been communicated, the undertaking concerned must only establish that its
non-disclosure was able to influence, to its disadvantage, the course of the proceedings and the content of the Commission’s
decision. It is sufficient for the undertaking to show that it would have been able to use the exculpatory documents for its
defence (Joined Cases C‐238/99 P, C‐244/99 P, C‐245/99 P, C‐247/99 P, C‐250/99 P to C‐252/99 P and C‐254/99 P *Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others* v *Commission* [2002] ECR I‐8375, paragraph 318, and *Hercules Chemicals* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 34 above, paragraph 81), by showing, in particular, that it would have been able to invoke evidence which
was not consistent with the Commission’s assessments at the stage of the statement of objections and therefore could have
had an influence, in any way at all, on its assessments in the decision (*Aalborg Portland and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 41 above, paragraph 75).

240    In connection with this plea, the applicant claims that it did not have access, first, to the replies to the statement of
objections given by other undertakings concerned and, second, to a document in the file which was considered to be confidential
by the Commission.

–       The replies of the other undertakings to the statement of objections

241    It should be pointed out that the statement of objections is a document whose aim is to delimit the scope of the procedure
initiated against an undertaking and to ensure that the rights of the defence may be exercised effectively (see Case T‐69/04
*Schunk and Schunk Kohlenstoff-Technik* v *Commission* [2008] ECR II‐2567, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).

242    It is from that aspect that the statement of objections is subject to procedural safeguards, pursuant to the principle of
respect for the rights of the defence, one of which is the right of access to documents in the Commission’s file.

243    The replies to the statement of objections are not part of the investigation file proper (*Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 226 above, paragraph 380).

244    Since they are documents which are not part of the file compiled at the time of notification of the statement of objections,
the Commission is required to disclose those replies to other parties involved only if it transpires that they contain new
incriminating or exculpatory evidence.

245    Similarly, under paragraph 27 of the Commission notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to
Articles 81 [EC] and 82 [EC], Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ 2005
C 325, p. 7), as a general rule, the parties do not have access to the replies to the statement of objections of the other
parties involved in the investigation. A party is granted access to such documents only where they may constitute new evidence,
whether of an incriminating or of an exculpatory nature, pertaining to the allegations concerning that party in the Commission’s
statement of objections.

246    In this respect, concerning, first, new incriminating evidence, it is settled case-law that, if the Commission wishes to rely
on evidence from a reply to a statement of objections in order to prove the existence of an infringement, the other undertakings
involved in that proceeding must be placed in a position in which they can express their views on such new evidence (*Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 226 above, paragraph 386, and Case T-314/01 *Avebe* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐3085, paragraph 50).

247    In the present case, the applicant claims that, in recital 203 to the contested decision, the Commission used as evidence
against it a section of the reply from Heineken in which Heineken acknowledged the existence of discussions on the price of
cask beer, even though that section was not communicated to it.

248    It should be noted that, in the recital mentioned, the Commission states, in response to the arguments raised by the applicant
and by Heineken, that the existence of unlawful discussions at the meeting held on 8 January 1999 is clear from the evidence
previously set out, namely the statement by InBev and the notes made by representatives of Grolsch and of the applicant. In
this regard, although the Commission adds that Heineken itself acknowledged the existence of discussions on prices, ‘with
certain reservations’, in its reply to the statement of objections, this latter statement is only an accessory element in
a body of evidence relied on by the Commission in relation to the meeting in question, since it cannot constitute new incriminating
evidence against the applicant.

249    Second, as regards new exculpatory evidence, according to the case-law, the Commission is not obliged to make it available
of its own initiative. If, during the administrative procedure, the Commission has rejected an applicant’s request for access
to documents which are not in the investigation file, an infringement of the rights of the defence may be found only if it
is proved that the outcome of the administrative procedure might have been different if the applicant had had access to the
documents in question during that procedure (*Cimenteries CBR and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 226 above, paragraph 383).

250    In so far as an applicant relies on the existence of the alleged exculpatory evidence in replies which have not been disclosed,
it is for the applicant to provide prima facie evidence of the relevance of those documents for its defence.

251    An applicant must, in particular, indicate the potential exculpatory evidence in question or adduce evidence that it exists
and therefore of its relevance for the purposes of the case (see, to that effect, Case T‐43/02 *Jungbunzlauer* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐3435, paragraphs 351 to 359).

252    In the present case, the applicant claims that the replies of the other parties involved in the proceedings would have enabled
it to rely on other exculpatory evidence in support of the conclusion that the brewers never took concerted action on the
Dutch beer market.

253    In so far as the applicant claims that, in their replies to the statement of objections, the other undertakings also put forward
arguments contesting the infringement, it should be pointed out that this is not sufficient in itself to regard those arguments
as exculpatory evidence (see, to that effect, *Jungbunzlauer* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 251 above, paragraphs 353 and 355).

254    In the light of the foregoing, the applicant has not indicated new incriminatory or exculpatory evidence which could be adduced
by the replies relied on in the statement of objections.

255    Consequently, the complaint alleging a refusal to grant access to those replies must be rejected.

–       The allegedly confidential document

256    The applicant criticises the refusal to grant access to the list of customers in the on-trade sector which the different brewers
gained and lost in the period between 1997 and 2001, which was part of the case‐file. It considers that access to that information
was essential for its defence on the ground that it could have shown that there were constant changes in the on-trade sector
in the Netherlands and that the Commission’s conclusion that competition was restricted in that sector was incorrect.

257    However, even though there is no need to determine whether the Commission was right to regard the requested information as
confidential, it should be pointed out that the applicant has not shown that the list of customers in question could have
been useful for its defence.

258    According to recital 259 to the contested decision, the Commission’s conclusion concerning the applicant’s participation in
customer allocation in the on-trade sector is based on a Heineken internal letter which concerns an interview with a member
of the applicant’s board of directors, the text of which is reproduced in recital 184 and interpreted in recitals 187 to 189
to the contested decision. The information concerning the customers gained and lost by the brewers in the period in question
cannot, in any event, be considered likely to provide exculpatory evidence with regard to that finding.

259    Consequently, the complaint alleging a refusal to grant access to the document comprising a list of customers in the on-trade
sector and the present plea in its entirety must be rejected as unfounded.

*The fourth plea, alleging an infringement of Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 and of the Guidelines and breaches of the
principles of proportionality and equal treatment in determining the amount of the fine*

Arguments of the parties

260    Firstly, the applicant disputes the way in which the Commission calculated the amount of the fine, and specifically its analysis
of the gravity of the infringement. In particular, it considers that, since in the contested decision the Commission softened
the very serious criticisms that it had made in the statement of objections, it should have categorised the infringement as
much less serious. In addition, the applicant criticises the Commission for failing to take into account, in assessing the
gravity of the infringement, that it did not have any impact on the Dutch beer market. The applicant also takes the view that,
contrary to the statements made in recital 452 to the contested decision, the effect of the infringement on the market can
be measured.

261    Secondly, the applicant considers that the Commission breached the principle of equal treatment by departing considerably
from its previous decision-making practice and, in particular, the fines imposed under its Decision 2003/569, its Decision
2002/759/EC of 5 December 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] (Case COMP/37.800/F3 – Luxembourg brewers) (OJ
2002 L 253, p. 21), and its Decision 2005/503/EC of 29 September 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] (Case
COMP/C.37.750/B2 – Brasseries Kronenbourg – Brasseries Heineken) (OJ 2005 L 184, p. 57).

262    Thirdly, the applicant submits that the Commission breached the principles of proportionality and equal treatment in so far
as the fine was disproportionate in comparison with the fines imposed on Heineken and on Grolsch. In essence, the applicant
points out that the Commission attached disproportionate importance to its turnover in determining the fine, which seriously
distorted the balance of power between the brewers and the position it holds on the market in question. Moreover, it considers
that, in determining the starting amount of the fine, the Commission should have taken into account its turnover without including
excise duties.

263    The Commission contests the applicant’s arguments.

Findings of the Court

264    It should be noted as a preliminary point that, under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission may by decision
impose fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article
81 EC. Under that same provision, for each undertaking and association of undertakings participating in the infringement,
the fine may not exceed 10% of its total turnover in the preceding business year.

265    Moreover, according to settled case-law, the Commission enjoys a broad discretion as regards the method for calculating fines.
That method, set out in the Guidelines, displays flexibility in a number of ways, enabling the Commission to exercise its
discretion in accordance with Regulation No 1/2003 (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‐322/07 P, C‐327/07 P and C‐338/07 P
*Papierfabrik August Koehler and Others* v *Commission* [2009] ECR I‐7191, paragraph 112).

266    In addition, in areas such as determining the amount of a fine under Regulation No 1/2003, where the Commission has such a
discretion, review of the legality of its assessments is limited to determining the absence of manifest error of assessment
(see, to that effect, Case T‐241/01 *Scandinavian Airlines System* v *Commission* [2005] ECR II‐2917, paragraph 79).

267    The discretion enjoyed by the Commission and the limits which it has imposed in that regard have no bearing, however, on the
exercise by the EU judicature of its unlimited jurisdiction (*JFE Engineering and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 40 above, paragraph 538), which empowers it to annul, reduce or increase the fine imposed by the Commission
(see, to that effect, Case C‐3/06 P *Groupe Danone* v *Commission* [2007] ECR I‐1331, paragraphs 60 to 62).

268    The present plea essentially comprises three limbs, alleging, first, an erroneous assessment of the gravity of the infringement,
second, a breach of the principle of equal treatment in the light of the Commission’s previous decision-making practice and,
third, a breach of the principle of equal treatment and the principle of proportionality in the light of the fines imposed
on the other addressees of the contested decision.

–       The first limb, alleging an erroneous assessment of the gravity of the infringement

269    Under Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, in order to determine the amount of the fine, it is necessary to take into consideration
the gravity and duration of the infringement.

270    According to settled case-law, the gravity of an infringement is assessed in the light of numerous factors, such as the particular
circumstances of the case, its context and the deterrent effect of fines, in respect of which the Commission has a margin
of discretion (Joined Cases C‐189/02 P, C‐202/02 P, C‐205/02 P to C‐208/02 P and C‐213/02 P *Dansk Rørindustri and Others* v *Commission*[2005] ECR I‐5425, paragraph 241, and Joined Cases C‐125/07 P, C‐133/07 P, C‐135/07 P and C‐137/07 P *Erste Group Bank and Others* v *Commission*[2009] ECR I‐8681, paragraph 91).

271    In particular, according to the first paragraph of Section 1.A of the Guidelines, in assessing the gravity of the infringement,
account must be taken of its nature, its actual impact on the market, where this can be measured, and the size of the relevant
geographic market.

272    In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court must nevertheless consider whether the amount of the fine imposed
is proportionate to the gravity of the infringement and must weigh the seriousness of the infringement with the circumstances
invoked by the applicant (Case T‐38/02 *Groupe Danone* v *Commission*[2005] ECR II‐4407, paragraph 136).

273    The applicant put forwards two arguments seeking to call into question the determination by the Commission of the gravity
of the infringement.

274    Firstly, it objects to the categorisation of the infringement as very serious, stating that, in the contested decision, the
Commission abandoned several aspects of the infringement compared with the statement of objections.

275    It is also important to bear in mind that very serious infringements within the meaning of the third indent of the second
paragraph of Section 1.A of the Guidelines are ‘generally horizontal restrictions such as price cartels and market‐sharing
quotas’.

276    Furthermore, it is settled case-law that agreements of this kind constitute one of the most serious forms of damage to competition,
in that their aim is quite simply to eliminate competition between the undertakings which implement them, and therefore run
counter to the fundamental objectives of the EU (see, to that effect, *Groupe Danone* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 272 above, paragraph 147 and the case-law cited).

277    However, since the Commission rightly found that the applicant had participated in an infringement consisting in a complex
of agreements and/or concerted practices the object of which was to restrict competition within the common market, in particular
by coordinating prices and price increases and by customer allocation, the applicant’s argument that the infringement could
not be regarded as very serious cannot be accepted.

278    The finding made in recital 442 to the contested decision, according to which the infringement in the present case, by its
very nature, had to be categorised as very serious in accordance with the Guidelines, is not therefore vitiated by error.
This conclusion cannot be rebutted by the fact that certain aspects of the infringement highlighted in the statement of objections
were not accepted in the contested decision, in so far as that decision set outs the evidence to justify categorisation of
the infringement as very serious.

279    Secondly, the applicant criticises the Commission for its conclusion that the impact of the cartel on the market could not
be measured and for failing to take into account the evidence from the file which showed that the infringement did not have
any impact on the market.

280    It should be pointed out that, while the existence of an actual impact of the infringement on the market is a factor to be
taken into account in assessing the gravity of the infringement, it is one of a number of criteria, such as the nature of
the infringement and the size of the geographic market. Likewise, it is apparent from the first paragraph of Section 1.A of
the Guidelines that that impact is to be taken into account only where this can be measured.

281    Furthermore, the Commission may classify horizontal price or market‐sharing agreements, such as the infringement in question
in the present case, as very serious infringements solely on account of their nature, without being required to demonstrate
an actual impact of the infringement on the market. The actual impact of the infringement is only one among a number of factors
which, if it can be measured, may allow the Commission to increase the starting amount of the fine beyond the minimum likely
amount of EUR 20 million (Case C‐534/07 P *Prym and Prym Consumer* v *Commission* [2009] ECR I‐7415, paragraphs 74 and 75).

282    In the present case, in recital 452 to the contested decision, the Commission states as follows:

‘In this procedure, it is impossible to measure the actual effect on the Netherlands market of the complex of agreements comprising
the infringement and the Commission does not therefore rely on a particular impact, in accordance with the Guidelines, which
state that account must be taken of the actual impact, where this can be measured ... Consequently, the Commission will not
take into account the impact on the market in determining the applicable fines in the present case.’

283    In addition, in recital 455 to the contested decision, which sets out its conclusion on the gravity of the infringement, the
Commission states:

‘In view of the nature of the infringement and the fact that it extended to the entire territory of the Netherlands, the undertakings
to which the present decision is addressed have committed a very serious infringement of Article 81 [EC].’

284    It is clear from these passages that, in determining the gravity of the infringement, the Commission did not rely on the actual
impact of the infringement, but on the nature of the infringement and on the extent of the geographic market in question.

285    In this regard, in view of the nature of the infringement established, the object of which was, among other things, coordination
of prices and price increases and occasional coordination of customer allocation, the Commission could legitimately refrain
from taking into consideration the impact of the infringement on the market.

286    Accordingly, in categorising the infringement in question as very serious, the Commission did not depart from its Guidelines
and did not breach the principles invoked by the applicant.

287    Consequently, the applicant’s arguments alleging that the cartel did not have any impact on the market and the present limb
in its entirety must be rejected as unfounded.

–       The second limb, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment in the light of the Commission’s previous decision-making
practice

288    It should first be pointed out that the Commission’s practice in previous decisions does not itself serve as a legal framework
for the fines imposed in competition matters (Case T‐203/01 *Michelin* v *Commission*[2003] ECR II‐4071, paragraph 292) and that, within the framework of Regulation No 17 and of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission
has a margin of discretion when fixing the amount of fines, in order that it may direct the conduct of undertakings towards
compliance with the competition rules (Joined Cases T‐236/01, T‐239/01, T‐244/01 to T‐246/01, T‐251/01 and T‐252/01 *Tokai Carbon and Others* v *Commission*[2004] ECR II‐1181, paragraph 216) and that it may at any time adjust the level of fines to the needs of that policy (*Dansk Rørindustri and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 270 above, paragraph 169).

289    In the present case, as has already been stated above, the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant was determined, in
accordance with Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003, having regard to the gravity and the duration of the infringement.
In this respect, the applicant cannot derive a legitimate argument solely from the fact that, in its previous decision-making
practice, the Commission has penalised similar conduct by imposing lower fines than the fine imposed in the present case.

290    In these circumstances, the applicant also cannot claim a breach of the principle of equal treatment. The Court of Justice
has repeatedly held that the Commission’s practice in previous decisions does not itself serve as a legal framework for the
fines imposed in competition matters and that decisions in other cases can give only an indication for the purpose of determining
whether there is discrimination, since the facts of those cases, such as markets, products, the undertakings and periods concerned,
are not likely to be the same (see *Erste Group Bank and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 270 above, paragraph 233 and the case‐law cited).

291    In the present case, with regard to the applicant’s arguments invoking the level of the fines imposed by the three previous
Decisions 2003/569, 2002/759 and 2005/503, it should first be noted that, unlike the contested decision, in which the Commission
categorised the infringement in question as ‘very serious’, in Decisions 2002/759 and 2005/503 it held that the infringements
were ‘serious’. The applicant cannot therefore validly rely on those decisions in order to claim alleged discriminatory treatment
against it.

292    With regard to Decision 2003/569, the applicant infers the existence of a breach of the principle of equal treatment from
the fact that the fines imposed on the Belgian brewers involved were much lower than the fines imposed by the contested decision,
whilst neither the nature of the infringements nor the conditions on the markets concerned had differences justifying that
disparity.

293    It should be noted, in this regard, that the Commission assesses the gravity of infringements by reference to numerous factors,
which are not based on a binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied and it is not, moreover, bound to
apply a precise mathematical formula, either for the total amount of the fine or where it is broken down into different elements
(see Case T‐67/01 *JCB Service* v *Commission*[2004] ECR II‐49, paragraphs 187 and 188 and the case‐law cited).

294    In these circumstances, a direct comparison of the fines imposed on the addressees of the two decisions concerning distinct
infringements is likely to distort the specific functions performed by the different stages in the calculation of a fine.
The final amounts of the fines reflect the specific circumstances of each cartel and the particular evaluations in the case
at issue.

295    In the light of all the foregoing, as regards the level of the fines imposed, the applicant’s situation cannot be compared
to the situation of the undertakings concerned in the previous decisions relied on.

296    In the light of these considerations, the complaint alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment in the light of
the Commission’s previous decision‐making practice must be rejected.

–       The third limb, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment and the principle of proportionality in the light of
the fines imposed on the other participants in the cartel at issue

297    By the present limb, the applicant essentially disputes the Commission’s assessment relating to the determination of the starting
amounts of the fines in the context of the differential treatment applied by the Commission (recital 462 to the contested
decision).

298    In this regard, it should be noted that, under the Guidelines, where there are infringements involving a number of undertakings,
the Commission may, as it did in this case, weight the starting amounts to take account of the specific weight of each undertaking
by dividing the members of the cartel into groups ‘particularly where there is considerable disparity between the sizes of
the undertakings committing infringements of the same type’ (sixth paragraph of Section 1.A of the Guidelines). The Guidelines
further state that ‘the principle of equal punishment for the same conduct may, if the circumstances so warrant, lead to different
fines being imposed on the undertakings concerned without this differentiation being governed by arithmetic calculation’ (seventh
paragraph of Section 1.A of the Guidelines).

299    In accordance with settled case-law, in determining the gravity of the infringement, the Commission is not required to ensure,
where fines are imposed on a number of undertakings involved in the same infringement, that the final amounts of the fines
resulting from its calculations for the undertakings concerned reflect any distinction between them in terms of their overall
turnover. However, it may divide them into groups (Case T‐213/00 *CMA CGM and Others* v *Commission*[2003] ECR II‐913, paragraph 385, and Case T‐330/01 *Akzo Nobel* v *Commission*[2006] ECR II‐3389, paragraph 57).

300    However, a division of the undertakings concerned by categories must comply with the principle of equal treatment, according
to which it is prohibited to treat similar situations differently and different situations in the same way, unless such treatment
is objectively justified. Moreover, according to the case-law, the amount of the fines must, at least, be proportionate in
relation to the factors that entered into the assessment of the seriousness of the infringement (Case T‐161/05 *Hoechst* v *Commission*[2009] ECR II‐3555, paragraph 124).

301    In the present case, in order to define the categories for dividing up the undertakings concerned, it should be noted that,
as is clear from recitals 457 and 458 to the contested decision, the Commission opted to take into consideration their relative
weight on the market in question on the basis of a single criterion, beer sales in the Netherlands in the last full calendar
year of the infringement, namely 1998.

302    On that basis, the Commission established three categories of undertakings. The first category comprised Heineken, which made
beer sales in the Netherlands of EUR 450 to 480 million. The second category comprised Grolsch and InBev, which made sales
in the Netherlands of EUR 150 to 180 million. The applicant was placed in the third category, with sales in the Netherlands
amounting to between EUR 100 and 130 million. The amounts of the fines established for each category were, respectively, EUR 65 000 000,
EUR 25 000 000 and EUR 17 000 000.

303    By acting in this way, the Commission opted for a coherent method of dividing the members of the cartel into three categories
which is objectively justified by the difference between the market shares held by each of the undertakings in those three
categories (see, to that effect, *Tokai Carbon and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 288 above, paragraph 220). Furthermore, in doing so, the Commission clearly did not depart from the normal
method laid down in the Guidelines. In addition, whilst the applicant takes the view that, among the undertakings involved
in the cartel, it occupies the weakest position, its inclusion in the third category obviously reflects this consideration.

304    With regard to the applicant’s argument that consideration of turnover alone did not reflect precisely the economic capacity
of the undertakings to damage competition on the Dutch beer market, it should be pointed out that, despite its approximate
nature, turnover is regarded as an adequate criterion, in competition law, for assessing the size and the economic power of
the undertakings concerned (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 *Musique Diffusion française and Others* v *Commission*[1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 121).

305    Since that criterion was properly applied in the present case, there is nothing to suggest that the principle of equal treatment
and the principle of proportionality were breached in relation to the starting amount of the fine.

306    With regard to the applicant’s objection to the use of turnover including excise duties for the calculation of the individual
basic amounts, it should be emphasised that, in so far as that calculation involved the relative weighting of the other participants
in the cartel on that market, the non-inclusion of taxes or excise duties would not have altered the Commission’s final conclusion.
Only if the Commission had calculated the individual basic amounts of the other parties involved on the basis of turnover
not including excise duties could there be a breach of the principle of equal treatment.

307    Consequently, since the applicant has failed to show that the Commission breached the principle of equal treatment and the
principle of proportionality in the differential treatment, the present limb must be rejected as unfounded.

308    In the light of all the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected in its entirety.

*The fifth plea, alleging the excessive length of the administrative procedure*

Arguments of the parties

309    The applicant claims, firstly, that the excessive length of the administrative procedure affected its rights of defence. It
argues inter alia that, despite the inspections conducted by the Commission in 2000 and the applicant’s replies to the requests
for information, the information relating to each meeting was not clarified in such a way that, from that time, it could have
questioned the managers involved.

310    The applicant also submits that the excessive length of the administrative procedure resulted in a disproportionate fine,
since the Commission’s policy on the level of fines became stricter in the meantime.

311    Secondly, it claims that the reduction of the fine by EUR 100 000 on account of the excessive length of the procedure is too
low and disproportionate in relation to the total length of the procedure.

312    The Commission states that, in recitals 497 to 500 to the contested decision, it expressly recognised that the length of the
procedure was excessive and that it had therefore granted an exceptional reduction of the fine imposed on the applicant.

313    In addition, the Commission points out that, although compliance with the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative
procedures is recognised in settled case-law, failure to adjudicate within that time can justify the annulment of a decision
establishing an infringement only where it is shown that the breach of that principle adversely affects the rights of defence
of the undertakings concerned.

314    In this regard, the Commission claims that the inspection decision of 17 March 2000 sent to the applicant made it aware of
the major part of the infringement and the markets and the period to which it related. According to the Commission, that decision
made reference to anti-competitive practices consisting in price fixing, the allocation of markets and/or the exchange of
information in the Dutch beer sector, in both the retail trade market and the on-trade market. The applicant’s argument cannot
be valid because of the detailed nature of the questions which the Commission sent it from 2001.

315    Lastly, the Commission contests the applicant’s argument that the reduction of the amount of the fine on account of the excessive
length of the procedure is not proportionate. It considers that it has a broad margin of discretion in this regard and that
the possibility of granting such a reduction on its own initiative falls within its powers. Furthermore, the Commission points
out that the length of the administrative procedure conducted in the present case was shorter than in other previous cases
in which it nevertheless applied the same reduction.

Findings of the Court

316    According to settled case-law, compliance with the reasonable time requirement in the conduct of administrative procedures
relating to competition policy constitutes a general principle of EU law whose observance the EU judicature ensures (*Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 239 above, paragraphs 167 to 171, and Case C‐113/04 P *Technische Unie* v *Commission*[2006] ECR I‐8831, paragraph 40).

317    For the purposes of the application of that principle, a distinction must be drawn between the two stages of the administrative
procedure, namely the investigation stage preceding the statement of objections and the stage corresponding to the remainder
of the administrative procedure, each corresponding to its own internal logic (*Technische Unie* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 316 above, paragraph 42).

318    The first stage, covering the period up to notification of the statement of objections, begins on the date on which the Commission
takes measures which imply an accusation of an infringement and must enable the Commission to adopt a position on the course
which the procedure is to follow. The second stage covers the period from notification of the statement of objections to adoption
of the final decision. It must enable the Commission to reach a final decision on the infringement concerned (*Technische Unie* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 316 above, paragraph 43).

–       The length of the administrative procedure

319    In the present case, it should first be noted that, in recital 498 to the contested decision, the Commission acknowledged
that the length of the administrative procedure had been excessive and that this fact was attributable to it.

320    As regards the first stage of the administrative procedure, from the notification of the applicant of the inspection decision
in March 2000 until the receipt of the statement of objections in August 2005, a period of 65 months elapsed.

321    Since the inspections during the investigation were conducted in March and April 2000, the total length of that stage of the
administrative procedure cannot be justified solely on the ground that the Commission sent the parties a series of requests
for information between 2001 and 2005.

322    Thus, in the absence of further explanation or information from the Commission regarding the measures of inquiry undertaken
during that period, the length of the first stage of the procedure must be regarded as excessive (see, to that effect, Joined
Cases T‐5/00 and T‐6/00 *Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie* v *Commission*[2003] ECR II‐5761, paragraph 77).

323    The second stage of the administrative procedure, from the receipt of the statement of objections to the adoption of the contested
decision in April 2007, lasted 20 months, thus exceeding, in the absence of further explanation, the time normally needed
for the adoption of the decision.

324    Consequently, it should be held that the length of the administrative procedure in question was excessive and stemmed from
inaction on the part of the Commission, resulting in a breach of the reasonable time principle.

–       The effect on the lawfulness of the contested decision

325    It is settled case-law that a finding that there has been a breach of the reasonable time principle may result in the annulment
of a decision establishing an infringement only where the length of the proceedings affected their outcome (see, to that effect,
*Technische Unie* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 316 above, paragraph 48 and the case‐law cited).

326    In the present case, the applicant claims that the excessive length of the first stage of the administrative procedure impaired
its rights of defence, inevitably affecting the outcome of the procedure.

327    It claims, in essence, that its possibilities of defending itself effectively against the allegations made in the statement
of objections were undermined in so far as, until the receipt of that statement on 30 August 2005, it was not able to identify
precisely the subject-matter of the investigation conducted by the Commission. According to the applicant, when it had the
opportunity to reply to the objections, nearly 10 years had passed since the alleged conduct, which undermined its possibilities
of collecting exculpatory evidence relating to the off-trade segment on account of the departure of some of its employees
who had direct knowledge of the alleged facts.

328    It should be stated in this regard that the applicant wrongly claims that it was not able to identify precisely the subject-matter
of the investigation until the statement of objections.

329    First of all, the inspection decision, sent to the applicant on 17 March 2000, stated that the Commission’s investigation
related to specific anti‐competitive practices such as ‘price fixing, the allocation of markets and/or the exchange of information
in the Dutch beer sector, in both the retail trade market and the on-trade market’. Second, the requests for information sent
to the applicant in October 2001 specified the types of meetings, the dates and the locations being investigated by the Commission.

330    Contrary to the claims made by the applicant, those statements made it aware, with sufficient precision, of the subject-matter
of the investigation, the infringements with which it could be charged and the market segments concerned, and therefore put
it in a position to identify and collect any exculpatory evidence.

331    Moreover, even though the applicant makes an argument alleging difficulties in collecting certain exculpatory evidence, it
failed to support that claim with specific evidence and, in particular, failed to specify the date on which the employees
in question left the undertaking, the reasons why it would have been crucial to obtain information from those persons in order
to exercise its rights of defence, and the circumstances because of which it was no longer possible to obtain information
from them (see, to that effect, *Technische Unie* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 316 above, paragraph 64).

332    In these circumstances, the applicant’s claim that it was not informed, from the beginning of the investigation, of the subject-matter
of the investigation or of any objections raised by the Commission, with the result that it was not able to prepare its defence
or gather the exculpatory evidence available to it, cannot be accepted.

333    In the light of the foregoing, it should be stated that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of an impairment
of its rights of defence as a result of the excessive length of the administrative procedure.

334    Lastly, the applicant’s argument that the penalty imposed on it would have been lower if the Commission had concluded the
administrative procedure earlier must also be rejected.

335    Although the Commission acknowledged, at the hearing, that it increased the general level of fines around 2005, that is during
the administrative procedure in question, this fact cannot be taken into consideration in assessing the effect of the length
of the procedure on the content of the contested decision. It need only be noted in this regard that the fact that the Commission,
in the past, imposed fines of a certain level for certain types of infringement does not mean that it is estopped from raising
that level within the limits indicated in Regulation No 1/2003 if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of competition
policy. On the contrary, the proper application of the competition rules requires that the Commission may at any time adjust
the level of fines to the needs of that policy (*Musique Diffusion française and Others* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 304 above, paragraph 109, and *Dansk Rørindustri and Others*v*Commission*, cited in paragraph 270 above, paragraph 169).

336    Consequently, since there is no effect on the outcome of the procedure in question, the failure to respect the reasonable
time principle cannot result in the annulment of the contested decision.

–       The reduction of the fine

337    With regard to the applicant’s argument concerning the allegedly too small reduction of the fine granted by the Commission
by reason of the excessive length of the procedure, it should be noted that a procedural irregularity, even though it is not
capable of resulting in the annulment of the decision, may justify a reduction of the fine (see, to that effect, *Baustahlgewebe* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 38 above, paragraphs 26 to 48, and *Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied and Technische Unie* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 322 above, paragraphs 436 to 438).

338    Failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time can justify the Commission’s decision to reduce, in equity, the amount of a
fine, since the possibility of granting such a reduction falls within the scope of the Commission’s powers (see, to that effect,
*Technische Unie* v *Commission*, cited in paragraph 316 above, paragraphs 202 to 204).

339    In the present case, the Commission decided to grant the applicant a reduction of the fine by reason of the ‘unreasonable’
length of the administrative procedure (recitals 498 and 499 to the contested decision).

340    The exercise of that power by the Commission does not prevent the Court, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, granting
a further reduction of the amount of the fine.

341    It must be borne in mind that the flat-rate reduction of EUR 100 000 granted by the Commission does not take any account of
the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, which amounted to EUR 22 950 000 before that reduction, and does not therefore
constitute a reduction of the penalty which is likely to give adequate redress for the breach resulting from the failure to
adjudicate within a reasonable time in the administrative procedure.

342    In this regard, the applicant rightly claims that the consequences of the breach of the reasonable time principle were not
sufficiently taken into account by the Commission, as regards the reduction of the amount of the fine.

343    In the light of the circumstances of the case, the Court considers, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, that, in
order to grant the applicant fair satisfaction for the excessive length of the procedure, the reduction in question must be
5% of the amount of the fine.

*Conclusion regarding the fine*

344    Following examination of the pleas raised by the applicant and in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court adjusts
the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, first by fixing the starting amount at EUR 16 150 000, rather than EUR 17 000 000,
as a consequence of the annulment of Article 1 of the contested decision in so far as it accepts the aspect of the infringement
consisting in occasional coordination of commercial conditions, other than prices, offered to individual consumers in the
on-trade sector in the Netherlands (see paragraphs 191 and 192 above), and second by altering the reduction made by reason
of the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time in the procedure to 5% of the final amount of the fine, rather than
EUR 100 000 (see paragraph 343 above).

345    As a consequence of that adjustment, the amount of the fine is calculated by increasing the adjusted starting amount by 35%,
by reason of the duration of the infringement, and by reducing that amount by 5%, by reason of the failure to adjudicate within
a reasonable time in the procedure. Consequently, the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant is set at EUR 20 712 375.

**Costs**

346    Pursuant to Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may order that the costs be shared or that each party bear
its own costs where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads.

347    In the present case, since the form of order sought by the applicant has been upheld in part, the Court will make an equitable
assessment of the circumstances of the present case in holding that the applicant is to bear two thirds of its own costs and
to pay two thirds of the costs incurred by the Commission and that the Commission is to bear one third of its own costs and
to pay one third of the costs incurred by the applicant.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition)

hereby:

1.      **Annuls Article 1 of Commission Decision C (2007) 1697 of 18 April 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 [EC] (Case
COMP/B/37.766 – Dutch beer market) in so far as the European Commission found in it that Bavaria NV had participated in an
infringement consisting in occasional coordination of commercial conditions, other than prices, offered to individual consumers
in the on-trade sector in the Netherlands;**

2.      **Sets the amount of the fine imposed on Bavaria in Article 3(c) of Decision C (2007) 1697 at EUR 20 712 375;**

3.      **Dismisses the remainder of the action;**

4.      **Orders Bavaria to bear two thirds of its own costs and to pay two thirds of the costs incurred by the Commission;**

5.      **Orders the Commission to bear one third of its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by Bavaria.**

| Vadapalas | Dittrich | Truchot |
| --------- | -------- | ------- |

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 June 2011.

[Signatures]

Table of contents

Facts

Administrative procedure

The contested decision

The infringement at issue

The fine imposed on the applicant

Procedure and forms of order sought

Law

The second plea, alleging an infringement of Article 81 EC, disregard for the presumption of innocence, and a breach of the
principle of legality and of the obligation to state reasons

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

– The statement by InBev

– Other evidence

– The facts relating to the findings, first, of coordination of prices and price increases for beer and, second, occasional
coordination of customer allocation

– The facts relating to the finding of occasional coordination of other commercial conditions offered to individual customers
in the on-trade sector

– The alleged error of law and in the treatment of the facts

– Conclusion

The third plea, concerning the duration of the infringement

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

– The determination of the start date of the infringement

– The determination of the end date of the infringement

The first plea, alleging a breach of the principle of sound administration

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

The sixth plea, alleging a breach of essential procedural requirements, the principle of sound administration and the rights
of defence of the applicant, consisting in the refusal to grant access to a document in the file and to the replies to the
statement of objections of the other undertakings concerned

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

– The replies of the other undertakings to the statement of objections

– The allegedly confidential document

The fourth plea, alleging an infringement of Article 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 and of the Guidelines and breaches of the
principles of proportionality and equal treatment in determining the amount of the fine

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

– The first limb, alleging an erroneous assessment of the gravity of the infringement

– The second limb, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment in the light of the Commission’s previous decision-making
practice

– The third limb, alleging a breach of the principle of equal treatment and the principle of proportionality in the light
of the fines imposed on the other participants in the cartel at issue

The fifth plea, alleging the excessive length of the administrative procedure

Arguments of the parties

Findings of the Court

– The length of the administrative procedure

– The effect on the lawfulness of the contested decision

– The reduction of the fine

Conclusion regarding the fine

Costs

---

- **** Language of the case: Dutch.