This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper ve rsion filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 LARRY V. LAUGHLIN, 2 Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 32,074 4 CONVENIENT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 5 INC. and ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, 6 Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 7

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 8 Gregory D. Griego, Workers Compensation Judge 9 Gerald A. Hanrahan 10 Albuquerque, NM 11 for Worker-Appellee/Cross-Appellant 12 Maestas & Suggett, P.C. 13 Paul Maestas 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Employer/Insurer-Appellants/Cross-Appellees 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 WECHSLER, Judge. 182 {1} Worker Larry Laughlin appeals from a compensation order entered pursuant to 1 the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 to -70 (1929, 2 as amended through 2007). Worker makes eight arguments relating to the factual 3 findings made by the Workers Compensation Judge (the WCJ). We affirm the WCJ 4 on seven issues but hold that the WCJ’s de termination that Worker had a whole body 5 impairment rating of 11% is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we 6 remand for the entry of a modified compensation order. 7 BACKGROUND 8 {2} Worker suffered accidents on August 22, 2008 and September 14 or 30, 2008 9 while working for Employer. Worker suffere d injuries to both his lower back and left 10 testicle. He filed a comp laint with the Workers’ Compensation Administration (the 11 WCA) on March 3, 2009, reque sting temporary total disability benefits until he 12 reached maximum medical improvement, and permanent partial disability benefits 13 upon reaching maximum medical improvement. 14 {3} The parties entered a recommended re solution on May 7, 2009 that provided 15 a $5000 payment to Worker and named Dr. Benito Gallardo as Worker’s authorized 16 treating physician. Dr. Gallardo examinedWorker on May 6, 2009 and found a causal 17 connection between Worker’s injuries and the accidents on August 22, 2008 and 18 September 14 or 30, 2008. When Employer refused to provide any temporary total 193 disability after Dr. Gallardo’s report, Work er filed a second workers’ compensation 1 complaint. Employer rejected a second reco mmended resolution on September 29, 2 2009, and the claim entered the adjudication process. After a trial on the merits on 3 December 22, 2011, the WCJ entered a compensation order on March 14, 2012. 4 Employer appealed, and Worker filed this cross-appeal. 5 {4} In this cross-appeal, Worker challenge s several factual findings: (1) Dr. Basel 6 Aswad was an unauthorized healthcare prov ider; (2) Worker was at maximum medical 7 improvement from September 10, 2010 through December 21, 2011; (3) Worker’s 8 impairment rating for his back injury wa s 8%; (4) Worker was not entitled to a point 9 for training or vocational pursuit pursuant to Section 52-1-26.3(D); (5) Worker’s loss 10 of physical capacity from his injuries was from heavy to light duty; and (6) Worker’s 11 whole body impairment rating was 11%. Worker also argues that he was entitled to 12 specific findings and conclusions that (1 ) he is entitled to an updated MRI and 13 psychological evaluation, and (2) Worker was entitled to treatment by a urologist in 14 Las Cruces. 15 STANDARD OF REVIEW 16 {5} “All workers’ compensation cases are re viewed under a whole record standard 17 of review.” Moya v. City of Albuquerque , 2008-NMSC-004, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 258, 175 18 P.3d 926. When our review c onsists of reviewing a “WCJ’s interpretation of statutory 194 requirements, we apply a de novo standard of review.” DeWitt v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. , 1 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341. We review the WCJ’s 2 application of the law to the facts de novo. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett , 2005- 3 NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320. “After we determine the meaning of 4 the statutes, we review the whole record to determine whether the WCJ’s findings and 5 award are supported by substantial evidence.” DeWitt , 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 14 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d). “Where the testimony is conflicting, 7 the issue on appeal is not whether there is evidence to support a contrary result, but 8 rather whether the evidence supports th e findings of the trier of fact.” Tom Growney 9 Equip. Co. , 2005-NMSC-015, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 10

AUTHORIZED HEALTHCARE PROVIDER 11 {6} Worker argues that the WCJ erred in finding that Dr. Aswad was an 12 unauthorized healthcare provider and in denying payment of Dr. Aswad’s bill. 13 Worker specifically challenges the WCJ’ s findings numbers 20-22, which provided 14 that Dr. Aswad was an unauthorized health care provider and denied payment of his 15 bill. In support, Worker points to testimony that he complained to a WCA 16 ombudsman about the lack of medical treatment that Employer provided and that the 17 omsbudman contacted the claim adjuster, who then authorized Worker to receive 185 treatment from Dr. Aswad. Worker therefore contends that Employer was required 1 by the Act to pay Dr. Aswad’s bill. See § 52-1-49(A) (requiring that “the employer 2 . . . provide the worker in a timely manner reasonable and necessary health care 3 services from a health care provider”). 4 {7} However, Worker, in challenging the finding that Dr. Aswad was not an 5 unauthorized healthcare provider, fails to point out other evidence supporting the 6 finding. Employer initially selected Dr . James Skee as Worker’s authorized 7 healthcare provider, and the record does not contain any indication Dr. Skee referred 8 Worker to Dr. Aswad. Worker testif ied that Archbishop Thaddeus Standford 9 recommended Dr. Aswad and that he decided to seek treatment from Dr. Aswad based 10 on this recommendation. Based on this testimony, the WCJ’s finding that Dr. Aswad 11 was an unauthorized healthcare provider under the Workers Compensation Act is 12 supported by substantial evidence. See § 52-1-49(G) (“If the worker continues to 13 receive treatment or services from a healthcare provider rejected by the employer and 14 not in compliance with the workers’ comp ensation judge’s ruling, then the employer 15 is not required to pay for any of the additional treatment or services provided to that 16 worker by that health care provider.”) ; 11.4.4.11(C)(1) NMAC (12/31/2012) (“A 17 referral by an authorized [healthcare provider] to another [healthcare provider] shall 18 be deemed a continuation of the selection of the referring [healthcare provider].”). To 196 the extent that Worker’s testimony that th e claims adjuster au thorized Dr. Aswad as 1 an authorized healthcare provider provi des conflicting testimony supporting Worker’s 2 position, it is the role of the factfi nder to weigh conflicting evidence. See Rodriguez 3 v. La Mesilla Constr. Co. , 1997-NMCA-062, ¶ 13, 123 N.M. 489, 943 P.2d 136 4 (stating that “we will not reweigh the evid ence, even under the whole record standard 5 of review” if there is conflicting evidence). 6 UPDATED LUMBAR MRI AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 7 {8} Worker next argues that the WCJ erred in not including specific findings or 8 conclusions ordering that Worker is entitled to an updated lumbar MRI and a 9 psychological evaluation. Worker points to evidence supporting his position. The 10 independent medical examination (IME) panel recommended an updated lumbar MRI 11 in order to evaluate Worker’s backinjury and his need for surgery. Dr. Jose Reyna, 12 the only orthopaedic physician to evaluate Worker’s back injury, requested the MRI, 13 and Dr. Gallardo concurred with the need for the updated MRI. The IME panel also 14 stated that Worker was in need of a ps ychological evaluation due to depression and 15 thoughts of suicide. Dr. Gallardo also concurred that Worker needed a psychological 16 evaluation. 17 {9} Employer does not dispute that the IME panel recommended an updated MRI 18 scan of Worker’s lower back and that Worker’s back injury arose out of his 197 employment. However, Employer points out that the WCJ did find that Worker has 1 a continuing need for medical care and treat ment for his injuries, including his back 2 injury. Under these findings and conclu sions, Worker’s authorized healthcare 3 provider, Dr. Gallardo, could order an MRI scan of Worker’s back if he deems that 4 it is reasonable and necessary for Wo rker’s medical care and treatment. See § 52-1- 5 49(A) (“[A]s long as medical or related treatment is reasonably necessary, the 6 employer shall . . . provide the worker in a timely manner reasonable and necessary 7 health care services from a health care provider.”). Wo rker did not present any 8 evidence that Dr. Gallardo submitted a re quest for an MRI to Employer or that 9 Employer denied such a request. Additionally, the WCJ did not issue any findings or 10 conclusion that would affirmatively bar Dr. Gallardo from submitting a request for 11 Worker to receive an updated lumbar MRI. Under these circumstances, the lack of 12 a specific finding or conclusion ordering an updated MRI on Worker’s back is not 13

error. 14 {10} Employer also does not dispute th at the IME panel recommended a 15 psychological evaluation of Worker. Howe ver, Employer contends that Worker’s 16 depression did not become an issue until the IME on August 25, 2011 and has not 17 been causally linked to any work-related condition. Indeed, the IME panel report 18 concluded that “[s]ince our specialty is neither psychology nor psychiatry, the 198 causation of [Worker]’s possible depression needs to be addressed by the specialist.” 1 At the formal hearing, Worker testified thathe disclosed that hewas depressed at the 2 IME to Dr. Julianna Garcia and said that the cause of his depression was the recent 3 death of his dog, without mentioning any other cause including his work-related 4 injuries. Dr. Gallardo testified that a referral to a psychologist would be appropriate 5 to determine how much of Worker’s depressi on is work-related. Worker testified that 6 Dr. Gallardo has not referred Worker to a psychologist, and Worker has never asked 7 Dr. Gallardo for a referral to a psychologist. 8 {11} The WCJ did not err in not ordering a psychological evaluation in its findings 9 and conclusions. First, Worker did not pr esent any evidence that his depression was 10 causally linked to his work-related injuries. See § 52-1-9(C) (stating that the right of 11 compensation requires that “the injury or death is proximately caused by accident 12 arising out of and in the course of his empl oyment”). Second, as we have discussed, 13 the WCJ did find that Worker has a continuing need for medical care and treatment 14 for his injuries and nothing in the compensation order or findings and conclusions bars 15 Dr. Gallardo from seeking authorization fo r a psychological evaluation if he deems 16 it reasonably necessary for Worker’s con tinuing need for medical care and treatment 17 for Worker’s work-related injuries. See § 52-1-49(A) (“[A]s long as medical or 18 related treatment is reasonably necessary, the employer shall . . . provide the worker 199 in a timely manner reasonable and necessary health care services from a health care 1 provider.”). 2 UROLOGIST IN LAS CRUCES 3 {12} Worker argues that he should be entitled to treatment by a urologist in Las 4 Cruces, New Mexico and that, if necessary , Employer should be required to pay the 5 urologist at his regular rates and in advance of treatment. Worker asserts that “due to 6 the nature and extent of his scrotum injuri es . . .; his residence in Deming, NM; his 7 disability and resulting poverty; and his rather old and unre liable motor vehicle; it was 8 unreasonable for [Employer] to provide urological treatment only in Albuquerque, 9 NM.” Worker contends that he has beenunable to get urological treatment in Las 10 Cruces “[d]ue to the unwillingness of urol ogists [in Las Cruces] to accept injured 11 workers as patients due to [Workers’ Co mpensation] insurers untimely and reduced 12 payments[.]” However, Worker fails to cite to the record for any of these factual 13 assertions, including that there are no ur ologists in Las Cruces that accept the 14 Workers’ Compensation fee sc hedule, untimely payments by insurers, or the age and 15 condition of Worker’s motor vehicle. Onthis basis alone, we reject Worker’s 16 contention. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 17 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to address an argument that relied on several factual 18 assertions that were made without citati on to the record). Additionally, Worker’s 1910 half-page conclusory argument fails to address or cite to the regulations governing 1 allowable fees, reimbursements, billing dispute procedures, and cost containment 2 under the Act. See 11.4.7.6 NMAC (8/30/2002). This Court will not address 3 undeveloped or underdeveloped arguments on appeal. Zhao v. Montoya , 2012- 4 NMCA-056, ¶ 17, 280 P.3d 918. 5 MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT 6 {13} Worker argues that the WCJ erred by de termining that Worker was at maximum 7 medical improvement from September 10, 2010 through December 21, 2011, because 8 Worker’s injuries have not been timely and fully evaluated. Worker relies on the 9 IME panel’s recommendation of an update d MRI on Worker’s back on August 25, 10 2011 to support his argument that Worker’s back injury was not at maximum medical 11 improvement. Additionally, without citati on to the record and without arguing how 12 it relates to the WCJ’s determination of maximum medical improvement, Worker 13 contends that Employer refused to provide treatment at Deming Urology Services, that 14 all urologists in Las Cruces refuse to accept injured worker s as patients, that he was 15 forced to get urological treatment in Albuquerque, and that his first urologist 16 terminated his services after Employer failed to pay the bill. 17 {14} The IME panel did not believe that Worker had reachedmaximum medical 18 improvement for either his testicle inju ry or his back injury. However, when 1911 reviewing a WCJ’s factual findings, this C ourt “will not . . . substitute [its] judgment 1 for that of the [WCJ]; although the evidence may support inconsistent findings, [this 2 Court] will not disturb the [WCJ’s] findi ngs if supported by substantial evidence on 3 the record as a whole.” Herman v. Miners’ Hosp. , 111 N.M. 550, 552, 807 P.2d 734, 4 736 (1991). Dr. Gallardo placed Worker at maximum medical improvement as of 5 March 4, 2010 from his back injuries and assigned an 8% whole person impairment 6 rating. Additionally, Dr. Gallardo testified at his deposition that Worker reached 7 maximum medical improvement as of March 4, 2010 on his testicle injury if Worker 8 was not going to have a surgical procedure to address the problem. At his second 9 deposition, Dr. Gallardo testified that Worker’s left testicle injury had reached 10 maximum medical improvement on January 25, 2011, or that Worker reached 11 maximum medical improvement on the date he decided not to have surgery to address 12 the testicle injury or when he last saw a urologist. The WCJ found that Worker 13 reached maximum medical improvement on September 10, 2010, which coincided 14 with the last date Worker saw a urologist. Based on the evidence in the record, this 15 determination was supported by substantial evidence. 16 WHOLE BODY IMPAIRMENT RATING 17 {15} Worker next challenges the WCJ’s fi nding of an 8% whole body impairment 18 as a result of his back injury. Worker bases his argument on American Medical 1912 Association guidelines that provide animpairment range of 15-23% for disk 1 herniations at multiple levels and with documented residual radiculopathy. Dr. 2 Gallardo testified that Worker has two le vels of disc herniations and a likely L5 3 residual radiculopathy. Worker therefore contends that the 8% impairment rating is 4 not supported by the record. 5 {16} However, again, Worker overlooks s ubstantial evidence that supports the 6 WCJ’s determination. The pr e-trial order contained the s tipulation that Dr. Gallardo, 7 as the authorized healthcar e provider, assigned an 8% whole body impairment rating 8 for the back injury. Although Dr. Gallardo believed th at Worker had a residual 9 radiculopathy on L5, he testified that hewould need an electrodiagnositc study on 10 Worker in order to definitely determine if Worker suffered from residual 11 radiculopathy and that electrodiagnostic studies are needed to objectively show a 12 radiculopathy. Dr. Gallardo testified that Worker never underwent an 13 electrodiagnostic study to diagnose the radiculopathy. 14 {17} Worker does not point us to any evid ence presented at the formal hearing 15 contrary to Dr. Gallardo’s impairment rating that would support a finding other than 16 an 8% impairment rating or that Worker had been sufficiently diagnosed with a 17 residual radiculopathy that would support a higher impairment rating. Under this 1813 circumstance, we cannot say that the finding of an 8% impairment as a result of the 1 back injury was unsupported by substantial evidence. 2 VOCATIONAL PURSUITS 3 {18} Worker next argues that he is entitled to one point for “training” or “vocational 4 pursuit” pursuant to Section 52-1-26.3(D) because there are countless vocational 5 pursuits that Worker cannot perform due to his work-related injuries and restrictions. 6 The WCJ determined that Worker was cap able of performing a specific vocational 7 pursuit. Worker appears to argue that the proper construction of Section 52-1-26.3(D) 8 only requires a worker to demonstrate that the worker can no longer perform the 9 worker’s pre-injury occupation or show th at there is a reduction of job opportunities. 10 However, Worker misconstrues Section 52-1-26.3. 11 {19} In Medina v. Berg Construction, Inc. , 1996-NMCA-087, ¶ 22, 122 N.M. 350, 12 924 P.2d 1362, this Court held that “the ordinary meaning of [Section 52-1-26.3] is 13 that a worker who, at the time of his disability rating, is unable to return to any of his 14 former occupations due to his disability s hould receive one point .” Therefore, our 15 inquiry becomes whether the evidence was sufficient to s how that Worker “could no 16 longer perform any of his prior occupations at or af ter the date of the hearing.” 17 Rodriguez , 1997-NMCA-062, ¶ 24. 1814 {20} Initially, we note that the WCJ was not specific regarding which of Worker’s 1 previous occupations he believes Worker is presently capable of performing, and the 2 failure to include such specificity hinders appellate review. The WCJ determined that 3 Worker demonstrated a specific vocation prep aration level of five in the ten years 4 prior to the formal hearing. Employer submitted evidence that Worker worked in a 5 real estate job in the ten years preceding the formal hearing and that the job has a 6 specific vocational preparation level of five and is classified as light duty. This 7 evidence is sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Worker is not 8 entitled to one point for training or vo cational pursuit under Section 52-1-26.3. 9 LOSS OF PHYSICAL CAPACITY 10 {21} Worker next argues that the WCJ erre d by determining that Worker could 11 perform light duty work and by not determining that Worker could only perform 12 sedentary work. The WCJ found that Worker had a physical loss of capacity from 13 heavy duty to light duty and assigned five modifier points pursuant to Section 52-1- 14 26.4. Worker contends that the IME panel opined that Worker was only capable of 15 performing sedentary work. Worker acknowledges that Dr. Gallardo testified that 16 Worker was capable of performing light duty work, however, he contends that Dr. 17 Gallardo’s opinion is against logic and reas on because Dr. Gallardo also stated that 1815 Worker is unable to perform work that requires frequent bendi ng, twisting, stooping, 1 or squatting. 2 {22} Worker accurately summarizes the testimony and evidence presented to the 3 WCJ, including (1) the conflicting testim ony between the IME panel’s opinion that 4 Worker can only perform sedentary work and Dr. Gallardo’s opinion that Worker 5 could perform light duty work; and (2) Dr . Gallardo’s opinion that Worker could not 6 perform work that requires frequent bending, twisting, stooping, or squatting. When 7 reviewing for substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 8 to the WCJ’s findings, and it is the excl usive province of the WCJ to resolve 9 inconsistencies in the testimony. See Rodriguez , 1997-NMCA-062, ¶ 23. Therefore, 10 the WCJ was entitled to resolve the incons istency between Dr. Gallardo’s opinion and 11 the IME panel. 12 {23} Further, Worker’s argument that Dr. Gallardo’s opinion should not have been 13 given credence because he also limited Worker from frequent bending, twisting, 14 stooping, or squatting and these limitations are inconsistent with an opinion that 15 Worker can perform light duty is not supported by the definition of light duty in the 16 Act. The Act defines light as 17 the ability to lift up to twenty pounds occasionally or up to ten pounds 18 frequently. Even though the weight lifted may be only a negligible 19 amount, a job is in this category wh en it requires walking or standing to 2016 a significant degree or when it involves sitting most of the time with a 1 degree of pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls or both[.] 2 Section 52-1-26.4(C)(3). This definition is not inconsistent with Dr. Gallardo’s 3 restriction that Worker cannot bend, twist, stoop, or squat frequently and therefore 4 does not render Dr. Gallardo’ s opinion invalid. Substantial evidence supports the 5 WCJ’s finding that Worker could perform light duty work. 6 IMPAIRMENT RATING 7 {24} Worker argues that the WCJ erred in finding that Worker’s combined whole 8 person rating impairment was only 11%. Worker contends that Dr. Gallardo is the 9 only authorized healthcare provider to assign an impairment rating and that he 10 assigned Worker a 14% impairment rating. Employer concedes the issue and agrees 11 that the only combined impairment rati ng assigned was by Dr. Gallardo and that it 12 should have been 14%. We therefore remand this case to the WCJ to enter a modified 13 compensation order reflecting a 14% impairment rating for Worker. 14 CONCLUSION 15 {25} The WCJ’s determination that Worker had a whole body impairment rating of 16 14% is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we remand for an entry 17 of a modified compensation order. 18

{26} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1917 1 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 2 WE CONCUR: 3

_________________________________ 4 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 5

_________________________________ 6 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 7