ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (Second Chamber)

26 June 2008

Case F-108/07

**Bart Nijs**

**v**

**Court of Auditors of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Officials – Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance – Summary of the pleas in law in the application – No prior administrative complaint – Manifest inadmissibility)

**Application:**brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Nijs seeks annulment of the decision of the Court of Auditors to renew
the mandate for its Secretary General for a period of six years starting on 1 July 2007 and, alternatively, of the decision
of 8 December 2006 of the Secretary General, as the appointing authority, not to promote the applicant for the 2004 promotion
exercise following the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 3 October 2006 in Case T-171/05 *Nijs* v *Court of Auditors* [2006] ECR-SC I‐A‐2‐195 and II‐A‐2‐999, as well as of the appointing authority’s decision of 12 July 2007 rejecting his complaint.

**Held:**The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant is ordered to pay all the costs.

**Summary**

1.      *Procedure – Admissibility of actions – Assessment by reference to the rules in force when the application was lodged*

*(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 76)*

2.      *Procedure – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements*

*(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, third para., and Annex I, Art. 7(1) and (3); Rules of Procedure of the Court of
First Instance, Art. 44(1)(c))*

1.      Although the rule laid down in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal that the Tribunal may, by
way of an order, dismiss an action which appears manifestly bound to fail is a procedural rule which, as such, applies to
all proceedings pending before the Tribunal at the time when it enters into force, the same is not true of rules on the basis
of which the Tribunal may, under that article, regard an action as manifestly inadmissible, and which may only be those applicable
on the date when the action is brought.

(see para. 25)

See:

F-60/07 *Martin Bermejo* v *Commission* [2007] ECR-SC I-A-1-0000 and II-A-1-0000, para. 25

2.      Under Article 44(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the application initiating proceedings must,
in particular, state the subject-matter of the dispute and contain a summary of the pleas in law on which it is based. Those
particulars must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his defence and to enable the Civil
Service Tribunal to give judgment in the action, if appropriate, without having to seek further information. In order to guarantee
legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, for an action to be admissible, that the basic legal
and factual particulars relied on are indicated, at least in summary form but coherently and intelligibly, in the text of
the application itself.

That is *a fortiori* the case since, under Article 7(3) of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice, the written stage of the procedure
before the Tribunal comprises, in principle, only one exchange of written pleadings, unless the Tribunal decides otherwise.
Furthermore, under the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute, which applies to the procedure before the Tribunal in
accordance with Article 7(1) of Annex I to the Statute, the official must be represented by a lawyer. The main role of the
latter, as a legal representative, is to ensure that the heads of claim of the application are based on sufficiently intelligible
and coherent arguments, specifically in view of the fact that the written stage of the procedure before the Tribunal comprises,
in principle, only one exchange of written pleadings.

An application in which the facts are expressed in a confused and disorganised manner, preventing the reader from properly
associating them with a head of claim in the application or with one of the pleas raised in support of it, does not satisfy
the requirement for clarity and precision.

(see paras 28-31)

See:

T-85/92 *De Hoe* v *Commission* [1993] ECR II‐523, para. 20; T‐154/98 *Asia Motor France and Others* v *Commission* [1999] ECR II‐1703, para. 42; T-277/97 *Ismeri Europa* v *Court of Auditors* [1999] ECR II-1825, para. 29