IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 34377 NADENE R. CARTER, NORMA R. BENNETT, LAREE LARSON, MELVIN S. ROBERTS, Beneficiaries of the Norman H. Roberts Famil y Revocable Trust, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

FLORA and DONOVAN ZOLLINGE R, )

Defendants-Respondents. ) ) ) Idaho Falls, September 2008 Term

2009 Opinion No. 23

Filed: February 11, 2009

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixt h Judicial District of the State of Idaho, for Franklin County. Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge. Honorable Mark A. Beebe, Magistrate Judge.

District court decision dismissing the unlawful detainer action, affirmed

. Daines & Wyatt, LLP, Ephraim, for a ppellant. Jonathan Jenkins argued.

Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Michael Wheiler argued.

_____________________ BURDICK, J. This appeal concerns whether ownership of property can be determined in an unlawful detainer summary proceed ing under Idaho Code § 6-303. We affirm the magistrate court’s ruling that the unlawful detainer ac tion should have been dismissed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Norman and Afton Roberts were the parents of the appellants: Nadene Carter, Norma Bennett, LaRee Larson, and Melvin Roberts (collectively Appellant s), as well as of Respondent Flora Zollinger, and of Ellis Roberts, who is not a party to this case. Norman and Afton Roberts created the Norman H. Roberts Family Revocab le Trust (the Family Revocable Trust) on September 25, 1981. Appellants, Respondent Zollinger and Roberts are the beneficiaries of the

1Family Revocable Trust. The corpus of the Fa mily Revocable Trust in cluded the real property located at 129 West 4800, Preston, Idaho (h ereinafter the Fairview property). When Norman Roberts died on Septem ber 25, 1995, the property in the Family Revocable Trust was divided between two trusts: the irrevocable Family Trust and the revocable

Marital Trust. Afton Roberts was the trustee of both trusts, but had the pow er to administer and

distribute the assets in the revocable Marital Trust only. The parties dispute whether the Fairview property went into th e irrevocable Family Trust or whether each trust had a partial interest in the property. By a letter dated December 20, 1995, Afton Roberts expresse d her wish that Flora and Donovan Zollinger (collectively Respondents) receive the Fairview property upon her passing. On September 18, 1996, Afton Roberts signed a docu ment setting forth her wishes regarding the distribution of assets upon her death. The doc ument provides that each beneficiary would receive the equivalent of approximately $100,000 upon Afton Roberts’s death. The document provides Respondents would receive the Fairview pr operty as their inheritance, of which Afton Roberts stated $40,000 worth of equity had alr eady been transferred to Respondents. The Fairview property was valued at approxi mately $95,000 in 1995. Since November 1995, Respondents have collected rents from other renter s, paid all taxes, and made all improvements on the Fairview property. Respondents moved ont o the Fairview property in March of 2001 with the understanding that they were to receive the Fairview property as their inheritance. Afton Roberts died on May 14, 2002. Respondents curre ntly live on the Fairview property. On September 10, 2005, Nadene Ca rter, acting as trustee, draf ted a Notice of Termination of Tenancy at Will which the Franklin County Sheriff then served upon Respondents. When Respondents failed to vacate the Fair view property, Appellant s filed this unlawful detainer action to evict Respondents from the premises. 1 The magistrate court dismissed the unlawful detainer action on Respondents’ motion for summary judgment because it deci ded the uncontroverted facts befo re the court de monstrated as

a matter of law that no landlord- tenant relationship exists betw een Respondents and the Trust.

1 Appellants brought this action as beneficiaries of the No rman H. Roberts Family Revo cable Trust. According to the trust documents, upon Afton Roberts’s death, all remain ing property went into one trust, but the documents do not give this trust a name.

2The district court upheld the magistrate court’s grant of summary judgme nt on the same grounds. Appellants timely filed this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the district court has rendered a d ecision on an appeal from the magistrate division,this Court reviews the di strict court decision di rectly. The Court has free review of the legal issues analyzed by the district court acting in its appellate capacity. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008).

III. ANALYSIS

The district court affirmed a summary judgment issued by th e magistrate judge finding that an unlawful detainer action was inappropriate . Appellants disagree with the district court’s opinion and appeal. Appellants brought the action for unlawf ul detainer and rely upon dicta in Robertson v. Swayne , 85 Idaho 239, 378 P.2d 195 (1963). Appellants argue that Respondents are tenants at will of the trust thereby validating the unlawful detainer action. See Robertson , 85 Idaho at 244, 378 P.2d at 198 (“A cestui que trust in possession of trus t realty is in law regarded as a tenant at will of the trustee. . . .”). However, Robertson is distinguishable in that it was not an unlawful detainer action. Also, the language Appellants rely on was not determinative in Robertson

, rather, it was used to support the conclusion that because that particular trus t beneficiary’s possession of the property began as permissive and the tenancy was never terminated, the beneficiary did not hold adve rsely to the trustee. In Robertson there were facts showing that the plaintiff lived on the trust property with permissi on of the trustee and that he was accountable to the trust for his management of the property.

The statement this Court made in Robertson does not establish that, for the purposes of an unlawful detainer action, a trust beneficiary in possession of property held in legal title by the trustee is always necessarily a tenant at will. The question pr esented in an unlawful detainer

action is whether a conventional landlord-tenant relationship exists, which is determined based

on the individual facts of the case. See Coe v. Bennett , 39 Idaho 176, 183–84, 226 P. 736, 738 (1924) (implicitly requiring a determination of f act by requiring a conventional landlord-tenant relationship). Thus, there is no support for Appe llants’ argument that Re spondents are tenants at

will as a matter of law.

3The resolution of this case was an swered in the 1 932 case entitled Richardson v. King , 51 Idaho 762, 766–67, 10 P.2d 323, 324–25 (1932), which states as follows: This court has four separate times held that, in an action for unlawful detainer, the sole question involved is righ t of possession, and no other issues may be injected. While, perhaps, it was proper as a defense, for the respondent to set up the matters in his answer, under the above authorities construing th e nature of an action for unlawful detainer, the judgment went be yond the issues, since it should have merely determined whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed, and, if so, whether the respondent was in default. If either, or both, of the two propositions should be answered in the negative, the proper judgment was merely to deny appellants relief.

“If, in order to determine the right of possession, the court must determine which party has the paramount legal or equitable title, then the rights of the parties cannot be determined in an acti on of forcible entry and detainer.”

“Being thus limited in its scope and pur pose, a judgment rendered in such an action (unlawful detainer) can have no broader application than the proceeding itself, and, the latter being confined solely to the one issue of possession, judgments rendered therein cannot be ex tended to include other matters.”

. . . In view of this solution, we should not , and need not, examine the testimony further than to determine, as we do, that the evidence was suffi cient to justify the trial court in concluding that the relation of landlord a nd tenant did not exist, and, since no rental was alleged or proved, the court of course could not find that the respondent was in default in the payment of rent, or, as a tenant, obligated to give over possession of the property, or the, or any, amount due. (Citations omitted). Although Richardson and Coe answer the legal question as to the analysis and parameters of an unlawful detainer action, there remain issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel concerning other facts found by the magi strate or district court. As stated previously the critical language in Richardson is the following statement: [T]he judgment went beyond the issues, si nce it should have merely determined whether the relation of landlord and te nant existed, and, if so, whether the respondent was in default. If either, or both, of the two propositions should be answered in the negative, the proper judgment was merely to deny appellants relief. 51 Idaho 762, 766–767, 10 P.2d 323, 324 (1932) (citations omitted). This Court has subsequently emphasized the limited relief that may be afforded in an

unlawful detainer action. In Fry v. Weyen , 58 Idaho 181, 190–91, 70 P.2d 359, 363 (1937), this

4court affirmed an order awarding possession in an unlawful detainer action, but modified the judgment by striking language purportedly quieting title in the plaintiff. In the present case, both the magistrate and the district court went beyond the narrow inquiry appropriate to an unlawful detainer action. The magi strate concluded “that at a minimum the defendants are the owners of an approximate 42% beneficial interest in the property” and that “the plaintiffs are estopped to deny the efficacy of their mother’s gift to the Zollingers.” Although the district court correctly concluded that it was appropriate to vacate “all the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate not . . . necessary to evaluate the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship,” the district court did conclude that “t he Magistrate Court correctly held that estoppel prevents Plaintiffs from denying the inte rest of Defendants in th e Fairview property.” As previously set forth by the Court in Richardson, these holdings are not entitled to preclusive effect. Specifically, the Court stated: Being thus limited in its scope and pur pose, a judgment rendered in such an action (unlawful detainer) can have no br oader application than the proceeding itself, and, the latter being confined solely to the one issue of possession, judgments rendered therein cannot be extended to include other matters. Richardson, 51 Idaho at 767, 10 P.2d at 324. This language was quoted from Bekins v. Trull , 230 P. 24, 25–26 (Cal. 2d. Dist. Ct. App. 1924), in which the California cour t explained why the decision in an unlawful detainer action is not entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent litigation: The only question involved in this app eal is: Were the plaintiffs estopped in the present action from proving thei r case by the judgment rendered in the former action? The first action, as we have already seen; was an action of unlawful detainer, and the present action is one in the nature of an action to quiet title. In the first action the sole question in issue was the right to the possession of the real property described in the complain t. In the present action the question in issue is the title to said real property. It has been repeatedly held in this state that a judgment in an action of unl awful detainer is not a bar to an action to determine the title to the real property involved in the former action.

. . . Respondent relies upon the cases of Williams v. MacDonald , 180 Cal. 546, 182 P. 29, and Estate of Clark , 190 Cal. 354, 212 P. 622. These cases hold in effect that, where the judgme nt roll in the first action shows that a defense, good as to the second action, was passed upon by th e court in the first action, and there determined in favor of one of the parties and against the other, the judgment in the first action is a final and conclusive defense to the sec ond action. This is undoubtedly the general rule, but evidently a distinctio n is made regarding a

5judgment of unlawful detainer. The reason fo r this distinction appears to be that in an action [f]or unlawful detainer the court is without jurisdiction to try any issue, except that involving the possessi on of real property, and therefore any judgment rendered by such a court in such an action cannot affect the title to said real property. Nor is any finding of fact by the court, rendering judgment in the action for the possession of the real propert y, res adjudicata between the parties in a subsequent proceeding wherein the issu e involved is the ti tle to said real property. The action of unl awful detainer is a statutory proceeding, and is governed solely by the provision of the statute creating it. It was designed for the purpose of providing a speedy and summary remedy to determine the right to the possession of real property in the cases specifi ed in the statute. It cannot be used for any other purpose than those enumerated therein.

. . . Being thus limited in its scope and purpose, a judgment rendered in such an action can have no broader applicati on than the proceeding itself, and, the latter being confined solely to the on e issue of possession, judgments rendered therein cannot be extended to include other matters. (Citations omitted.)

Therefore both of the lower court’s findi ngs concerning the nature and extent of Respondents’ interest in the Fa irview property or whether Appe llants are estoppe d from denying any such interest are without legal significance and should not be considered in future proceedings to determine the parties’ respective rights or interests in th e property. We are not implying in any way the findings of those courts are incorrect.

IV. ATTORNEY FEES Both parties have requested attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 6-324. Idaho Code § 6-324

states: In any action brought under the provisions of this chapter, except in those cases where treble damages are awarded, the pr evailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney fees. For attorney f ees to be awarded in cases requiring the three (3) days’ notice as set forth in section 6-303 2., Idaho Code, it shall be necessary that the three (3) days’ notice advi se the tenant that attorney fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party. The proper notice was given in this case. Res pondents are the prevailing parties and therefore attorney fees and costs are awarded to them.

As in Richardson , this Court will affirm the distri ct court’s decision finding that no landlord/tenant relationship exis ted, and therefore no basis exis ted for an unlawful detainer action. Further, all other findings of extent of in terest in the estate of either party or whether

67 estoppel applies are of no legal sign ificance and must be decided in th e trial court. Attorney fees and costs to Respondents. Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.