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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-1796

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Melissa Miner, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: September 23, 2008

Filed: October 17, 2008

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Melissa Miner pleaded guilty to felony criminal contempt of a lawful court

order, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). She appeals, contending that the district

court abused its discretion in imposing sentence.1

 We affirm. 

Miner was served with a subpoena on February 5, 2007, in United States v.

Saddler. She appeared for a pretrial interview on February 22, 2007, and was

scheduled to testify in federal court on March 6, 2007. When Miner failed to appear
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In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the sentencing range would be

between zero and six months, but that range was based on the erroneous calculation

of Miner’s criminal history category. The parties believed that her criminal history

was category III, but it was scored as category VI. While Miner argued that category

VI overstated the seriousness of her previous offenses, she does not object to the

category VI criminal history assessment. 

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on the given day, the district court granted the government an overnight continuance

to find her. A drug task force officer contacted Miner’s mother, boyfriend, and

employer, but was unable to locate her. The trial reconvened the next day, with the

government completing its case and securing a conviction without the benefit of

Miner’s testimony. 

Miner called the officer during the afternoon of March 7, 2007, telling him that

she knew she was required to appear at the trial, but had stopped taking her

medication, resumed using drugs, and“spaced off” her court appearance. Miner had

personal knowledge of Saddler’s unlawful activities, and her testimony was important

to the government’s case. 

Miner was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of felony criminal

contempt. In the memorandum of the proposed plea agreement, Miner acknowledged

her understanding that the offense was punishable at the discretion of the district court

and that she could be subjected to a term of incarceration in excess of one year, among

other penalties. She further acknowledged that the district court would sentence her

after considering several factors, including “the need for the sentence imposed to

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

just punishment for the offense.” The parties recommended a sentence of drug

treatment, a weekend in jail, and a $500 fine.2

At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that the guidelines range

for Miner’s offense was between six and twelve months, based on Miner’s criminal
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history category VI, a base offense level of six, and a two-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility. The parties urged the district court to accept the sentence

set forth in the plea agreement. Miner also requested a downward departure or

variance, arguing that her criminal history category overstated the severity of her

criminal behavior and thus resulted in an unreasonably harsh sentence. After

weighing the section 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Miner to twelve

months’ imprisonment, a sentence Miner argues is unreasonable. 

We review a sentence for reasonableness in light of the factors in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a), and we reverse only if the district court abused its discretion. Gall v. United

States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596-98 (2007); United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 993

(8th Cir. 2008). On appeal, we may presume a sentence within the properly calculated

guidelines range is reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465

(2007). A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence

when it fails to consider a relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to

an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate factors but commits a

clear error of judgment in weighing those factors. Roberson, 517 F.3d at 993; United

States v. Watson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007).

The district court correctly calculated Miner’s advisory guidelines range, and

the twelve-month sentence falls within it. Miner does not challenge the guidelines

range, but instead argues that the district court failed to properly consider the section

3553(a) factors. We disagree. The district court specifically considered the nature

and circumstances of the offense, rejecting Miner’s drug use as an excuse for her

failure to appear or as a reason to impose a lighter sentence. The district court

explained that Miner’s absence caused Saddler’s trial to be delayed and cost the

government considerable time and money in its search for her. The district court

rejected the parties’ plea agreement because it believed that the recommended

sentence did not reflect the seriousness of the offense, Miner’s lengthy criminal

history, or Miner’s consistent failure on probation. Although Miner argues that the
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court should not have considered the need to vindicate its authority, the guidelines

require the court to consider the need for the sentence imposed “to promote respect

for the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Finally, Miner’s argument that the district

court erred when it termed her criminal history category a “gift” is unavailing.

Regardless of whether that characterization was appropriate, the calculation of

Miner’s criminal history category was accurate. In sum, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Miner as it did.

The judgment is affirmed.

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