MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 3 ME 30 Docket: Yor

- 22

- 206 Argued : January	12,	2023 Decided: May	23,	2023 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS ,	and	LAWRENCE , JJ.

RICHARD TOMINSKY

v. TOWN	OF	OGUNQUIT et	al.

CONNORS ,	J. [¶1] This	is	an	appeal brought by	Richard	Tominsky pursuant	 to M.R.
Civ. P

. 80B challenging the	 issuance	 of building	 permits by	 the	 Town	 of Ogunquit’s	code	enforcement	officer	(CEO) to	477	Shore	Road	LLC

. Because	the Town’s	 Board	 of	 Appeals	 erred	 in concluding	 that	 good	 cause	 existed	 for Tominsky’s	 untimely	 appeal,	its	 decision	 denying	 Tominsky’s administrative appeal	on	the	me rits	must	be	vacated	and	his	appeal	to	the	Superior Court	must be	dismissed. I n	so	ruling,	we	resolve	t horny	questions	regarding the interface
among standing	requirements, M.R.	Civ.	P. 80B , and M.R. App.	P. 2C (a ) (1)

. I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The LLC owns a	parcel	 of property	located	at 477	Shore	Road in Ogunquit .	 	 Between	 December	 2020	 and	 January	 2021,	 the	 CEO	 issued	 six2 building	 permits	 to	 the	 LLC	 for	 construction relating	 to six	 single

- family dwelling	 units.	 	 The	 permits	 allowed	 for	 renovations and width	 and	 height changes	to four existing units and	the	demolition	and	rebuild	of	a	“barn”	into two	separate	units. [¶ 3 ] Tominsky owns	 property	 abutting	 the	 LLC’s parcel

. When	 th e permits	were	issued,	 Tominsky was	living in	 Florida ;	 he only	learned	 of	 the project	 when	 he	 returned	 to	 Ogunquit	 in	 May	 2021.	 	 Tominsky’s	 counsel contacted	the	CEO	on	May	27 ,	2021, requesting	information	about	the	project but	did	not	receive	a	response. [¶ 4 ] In	 June	 2021, having	 not	 received	 a	 response	 from	 the	 CEO , Tominsky	 filed	a	complaint in	 the	Superior	Court requesting	an	injunction,	a writ	of	mandamus,	and	a declaratory	judgment against	the	Town,	the	CEO,	and the	 LLC .	 	 That	 matter	 was	 dismissed	 in early August 2021 because	 of Tominsky’s fail ure to exhaus t his	 administrative	 remedies. O n August 8, 2021

— roughly seven	 months	 after	 the CEO’s issuance	 of	 the	 final building permit and three	 months	 after Tominsky learned of	 the	 project

— Tominsky	 filed	 an	 administrative	 appeal	 with	 the	 Board requesting	 that	 it overturn	the	CEO’s	issuance	of	the	permits.3 [¶ 5 ] The	 Board	 held	 a hearing	 on	 Tominsky’s	 appeal on September 9, 2021 ,	and,	as	a	threshold	matter, debated whether it	could hear Tominsky’s	appeal given	its	untimeliness .		The O rdinance	provides	 that	once the	CEO has “render [ed] a	written	decision	to	a	party,	any	aggrieved	party	may file	 an	 administrative	 .	 .	 .	 appeal	 within	 30	 calendar	 days	 of	 the	 date	 of	 the official,	 written	 decision.” Ogunquit,	 Me., Zoning	 Ordinance	 §	 225

- 5.3

. A (Apr. 1, 2009)

. The	Board	may	“grant	exception s	to	this	30

- day	rule ”	but “ only where,	in	its	 sole	and	exclusive	judgment,	extraordinary	 circumstances	 have
been	shown	which	would result in	a	flagrant	miscarriage	of	justice	unless	the
said	30

- day	time	period	is	extended.” Id. The	Board	referred	to this language

as	a “good	cause” exception. [¶ 6 ] After	debate,	t he	Board unanimously agreed	to	apply	the	exception to	hear	Tominsky’s	appeal on	the	merits

. 1 Its	decision “was	based,	in	part,	on [Tominsky’s	counsel’s]	assertion	that	he	received	no	response	from	the	[CEO] to	his	May	27,	2021	request	 for	information;	and	by	 the	delay	caused	by	.	.	.

1 The	LLC	filed	a n	appeal	pursuant	to M.R.	Civ.	P. 80B challenging the	Board’s	granting	of the	good cause exception .		The	Superior	Court	(York	County, Mulhern,	J. )	denied	the	appeal , and	the	LLC	then appealed	to	us. Simultaneously	with	this	decision,	w e are	vacating the Superior	Court’s judgment with	 instructions	 to dismiss	 the	 appeal , 477	 Shore	 Road	 LLC	 v.	 Town	 of Ogunquit ,	 Mem

- 23

- 61 ( May 23 , 2023), because ,	as	discussed below, see infra ¶ ¶ 16

- 20 , the	LLC lack s standing	to	challenge the	Town’s	decision in	a	separate	appeal

.4 Tominsky’s	case	in	[the]	Superior	Court	which	he	asserted	he	was	forced	to	do because	of	the	Town’s	lack	of	response.” [¶ 7 ] In	the	same hearing ,	t he	Board addressed the	merits	of Tominsky’s appeal. Tominsky	raised multiple arguments,	focus ing primarily on	the manner in	which the	permits	were	issued	and whether	 the sections	in	 the	Ordinance concerning nonconformities were appli cable

. The	CEO	respond ed to	each	of Tominsky’s	arguments. Th e	LLC	was	also	permitted	to address	the	Board and asserted ,	inter	alia, that	 the	Board	could	still	decline	 to grant the	good	cause exception. Ultimately,	t he	Board	voted	4

- 1	to	deny	Tominsky’s	appeal on	the
merits and	i ssued	its	written	decision	shortly	thereafter

. [¶ 8 ]	 	 Tominsky	 timely	 appealed	 to	 the	 Superior	 Court	 ( Tominsky	 I ).
S ee Ogunquit,	Me.,	 Zoning	Ordinance § 225

- 5.3

. K (Apr.	 1,	 2009) ; 30

- A	M.R.S. § 2691(3)(G) (202 3 )

. His	complaint contained	multiple	counts and	named	the Town, the Board, the CEO,	and the LLC as defendants

. On a	motion	to	dismis s filed	by	all	named defendants ,	the	court ( York	County, Mulhern,	J. ) dismissed all
but one count and treat ed the	 remaining	 count as an	 a ppeal pursuant	 to Rule 80B

. It	also	dismissed	T o minsky’s	claims	against	the	Board	and	the	CEO and	ordered	that	the	LLC	remain	as	a	party in interest.5 [¶ 9 ]	 	 While Tominsky	 I was	 pending,	 the	 CEO	 issued	 a	 certificate	 of occupancy	for	one	of	the	dwelling	units.		Tominsky	appealed	the	issuance	of	the
certificate	to	the	Board.		At a hearing held	in	December 2021 ,	the	Board	had	a “lengthy	discussion	regarding	whether	it	had	jurisd iction	to	hear	the	appeal,	in light	of	 the	 fact	 that	it	recently	heard	an	appeal	by	 the	same	appellant	of	 the same	 building	 permit

. ” Citing Salisbury	v.	Town	 of	Bar	Harbor ,	 2002	ME	 13, ¶ 14,	788	A.2d	598 ,	the	Board	unanimously	voted	not to hear	the	appeal. [¶1 0 ]	 	 Tominsky then filed	 a	 second	 complaint containing	 multiple

counts against	the	Town	and	the	LLC ( Tominsky	II ) .		The	Town	moved	to	dismiss the	complaint pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	12(b)(6) , arguing	t hat	the	action	was an attempt	to	litigate	the	underlying	building	permits	in	violation	of Salisbury .		The LLC	joined	the	Town’s	motion. [¶1 1 ] I n	 June	2022,	 the	court	denied	Tominsky’s	appeal	in Tominsky I and dismissed his appeal	 in Tominsky	 II .	 	 Tominsky	 timely	 appealed both
decisions , and we consolidated the	two appeals for our review.
II.		DISCUSSION
A. Although t he c omplaint s	 in Tominsky	 I and Tominsky	 II contain multiple	 counts,	 they each assert	 only an appeal pursuant	 to Rule 80B

. [¶1 2 ] T h e	 complaints	 in	 both	 actions	 originally	 contained	 multiple6
counts. 2 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 Superior	 Court	 granted	 a	 motion	 to	 dismiss
various counts in Tominsky	 I and	 treated	 the	 remaining	 count	 as an	 appeal pursuant	to	Rule	80B .		In Tominsk y II ,	the	Superior	Court	disposed	of	all	four counts	in	one	order. [¶1 3 ] I t	 is	 unclear	 whether in	 the	 appeals	 to	 us Tominsky	 seeks	 to challenge	the	rejection	of	his	complaint s as	containing	anything	but Rule	80B appeal s . In	 any	 event, the	 exclusive avenue	 to challenge a	 municipality’s adjudicative	 decision	 is	 a	 Rule	 80B	 appeal unless	 that	 avenue	 is	 somehow inadequate or	a	statute	provides	otherwise

. See	Cayer	v.	Town	of	Madawa ska , 2016	ME	143,	¶ 24 ,	148 A.3d	707 ; Fisher	v.	Dame ,	433	A.2d	366,	372	(Me.	1981). Here,	 t he	 only	 relief	 Tominsky	 seeks	 is	 that	 obtainable	 under	 Rule	 80B. In addition,	to	the	extent that Tominsky	claim s a	violation	of	his	procedural	due process	 rights, the judicial review provided	 by	 Rule	 80B bestows all	 the post
- deprivation process that	is due. Cf. Moreau	v.	Town	of	Turner ,	661	A.2d 677,	680	(Me.	1995)

.

2 Specifically,	t he c omplaint	in Tominsky	I contained five counts, captioned	“Constitutional	Due Process	 violations”	 by	 the CEO,	 the	 Board,	 and	 the	 T own; “Violation	 of	 Purposes	 and	 Policies Underlying	 Limited	 Allowance	 of	 Nonconformities,	 and	 the	 Existence	 of	 Grandfather	 Clauses” ; “Violation	 of	 Ordinance	 Article	 3	 Provisi ons	 on	 ‘Nonconformance’ ”; “ Ordinance	 Violations Concerning	Incomplete	B ui lding	Permit	Applications A nd	Failure	to	Follow	SLR	Requirements” ;	and “Variance.” The	 complaint	 in Tominsky	 II contained	 four	 counts,	 captioned	 “Constitutional	 Due Process	 Violation s” ; “MR	 Civ	 P	 80 B ” ; “Administrative	 Procedure,	 5	 MRS	 sec.	 8001	 et.	 seq

. ” ; and “Variance

. ”7 B. The	appeal to	the	Board in Tominsky	I was untimely.
1. If	a	municipal	body grants	the	good	cause	exception and	hears an untimely	 administrative	 appeal and subsequently rejects th at appeal	on	the	merits	and the	objecting party appeals	th e merits	 decision	 pursuant	 to	 Rule	 80B,	 the party	 that has obtained	municipal	approval need	not , and	should	not , file its own Rule 80B	 appeal or	 a	 cross - appeal	 pursuant	 to	 M.R. App. P. 2C(a) to	challenge the application	of	the	exception , but instead may argue in	its	briefs	to	the	Superior	Court	and	to	this Court that	the exception	should	not	have	been	granted
. [¶1 4 ] T he	procedural	posture	of Tominsky	I presents	a	question	of	first impression	regarding	what	steps	a party that has	obtained	municipal	approval
must	take in	a	Rule	80B	appeal	of	a	municipal	body’s	decision	on	the	merits	in
order to	preserve	an	argument	that	its	opponent’s	administrative	appeal	was fatally	 tardy. Here,	 covering nearly all	 possibilities,	 the	 LLC rai sed	 the untimeliness	argument	in	its	own	Rule	80B	appeal;	as	the	Rule	80B

- appellee	in the	Superior	Court;	and	again	to	us	as	an	alternative	argument pursuant	to	M.R. App.	P.	 2C(a)(1)	 (“An	appellee	may,	without	 filing	a	 cross

- appeal,	argue	 that
alternative grounds	support	th e judgment	that	is	on	appeal.”)

. [¶1 5 ]	 	We	 conclude	 that	a party that	 has	 obtained municipal	approval ( e.g.,	the	permittee ) need	not , and	should	not , file	its	own	Rule	80B	appeal to
assert that	the	Board	improperly	granted a good	cause	exception.		R ather ,	when

a n	objecting party appeals a municipal	body’s	ruling	on	the	merits	pursuant	to8 Rule	80B,	the permittee may	raise	the good	cause issue	in its brief. Similarly,	if the	 Superior	 Court	 rejects	 the objecting party’s	 appeal on	 the	 merits, the permittee need	not	file	a	cross

- appeal	should	its	opponent	appeal	t o	us . Rather, the permittee may ,	 pursuant	 to M.R.	 App.	 P.	 2C(a)(1),	 7A(b) , raise	 the good

cause issue	in	its brief

. We reason	as	follows. [¶1 6 ] A party	lacks	standing	to	appeal a	judgment that grants	the	relief the	party	sought simply	because the	party would	prefer	to	have the	judgment

rest on different reasoning

. 3 Hence,	b ecause	the	LLC	prevailed	on	the	merits before	 the	 Board,	 i.e.,	 it	 obtained a	 determination	 that	 the	 building	 permits were	 valid, the	LLC was	not	aggrieved	and lacked standing	 to	 file an appeal.
See Witham	Fam.	Ltd. P’ship v .	Town	of	Bar	Harbor ,	2011	ME	104,	¶¶	7,	15

- 16, 30	A.3d	811; Brooks	v.	Town	of	N.	Berwick ,	1998	ME 146,	¶	10,	712	A.2d	1050 (“Although	[the	abutter]	might	have	preferred	that	the	ZBA	base	its	decision	on the	 alternative	 rationale	 that	 the	 property	 was	 no	 longer	 grandfathered,	 he
nonetheless	receive d exactly	what	he	asked	for	from	the	ZBA:	an	invalidatio n of	the	CEO’s	decision.”).

3 We	have	noted	an	exception	to	this	principle	that	applies	“when	an	essential	finding	on	which the	judgment	is	based	might	otherwise	prejudice	the	party	through	the use	of	collateral	estoppel	in the future	proceeding.” See	Witham	Fam.	Ltd.	P’ship	v.	Town	of	Bar	Harbor ,	2011	ME	104,	¶	16,	30 A.3d	811	(quotation	marks	omitted).		This	exception	does	not	apply	here;	the	LLC	does	not	contend that	the	Board’s	finding	of	g ood	cause	might	prejudice	the	LLC	in	some	future	proceeding.9 [¶1 7 ] Th e requirement that	a	party	must	have	standing	to	appeal does not	disappear	when	another	party	appeals	first.		A	cross

- appeal	must	meet	the same	justiciability	requirements	as	an	initial	appeal. See Nat’l	Union	Fire	Ins.
Co.	v

. West	Lake	Aca d. , 548	F.3d	8,	23	( 1st Cir.	2008)	(“ A	cross	appeal	is	generally not	proper	to	challenge	a	subsidiary	 finding	or	conclusion	when	the ultimate judgment	is	favorable	to	the	party	cross

- appealing.”); Matter	of	Sims ,	994	F.2d 210,	214	(5th	Cir.	1993) (“A	cross

- appeal	fi l ed	for	the	sole	purpose	of	advancing additiona l arguments	 in	 support	 of	 a	 judgment	 is ‘ worse	 than	 unnecessary ’, because	it	disrupts	the	briefing	schedule,	increases	the	number	(and	usually	the length)	 of	 briefs,	 and	 tends	 to	 confuse	 the	 issues.	 	 Such	 arguments	 should, instead,	be	included	in	the	appell ee’s	answering	brief

. ”	(citation	omitted ) ). [¶1 8 ] T his	 case is further complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 whether	 a

cross - appeal	 is	 necessary	 is	 normally	 determined	 by	 whether	 the	 argument
that	the	cross

- appell ant seeks	to	advance	would	result	in	different	reli ef	than that	 granted	 by	 the	 judgment. See M.R. App. P.	 2C(a)	 Advisory	 Committee
Note

— July	 2022.	 	A	 timeliness	argument	 differs	 from	 the	argument	 that	 the merits	were	incorrectly	decided	in	terms	of	applicable	relief. See	id. A	ruling
on	the	merits	is	a judgment	on	th e merits, whereas a	ruling	that	an	appeal	is untimely	results	in	a	dismissal ,	i.e., a	“change to the	judgment

. ” I d.10 [¶1 9 ]		But	Rule	80B	includes	no	provision	for	cross

- appeals.		Indeed,	it
also does not specifically	permit a	motion	to	dismiss. Rule	80B	is	designed	“to afford	 prompt,	 effective,	 expeditious	 and	 direct	 judicial	 review	 of administrative	 action.” Colby	 v.	 York Cnty

. Comm’rs ,	 442	 A.2d	 544 , 547 (Me. 1982). It	 would	 promote	 form	 over	 substance,	 undermine	 the	 goal	 of expedition	 of	 administrative	 appeals,	 and	 lead	 to	 “worse	 than	 unnecessary” procedural	complications	to	r equir e a permittee to	appeal municipal approval under	Rule 80B	if	an	opponent	files	a separate Rule	80B	appeal	simply	because the	permittee seeks	to	preserve	its	ability	to	advance	an	argument	that	would result	in	a	dismissal	of	its	opponent’s	appeal	instead	of	a	judgment affirming
th e	municipal	decision

. See Matter	of	Sims ,	994	F.2d	at	214 (quotation	marks omitted) .	 	 Moreover,	 the rules	 of	 civil	 and	 appellate	 procedure	 are	 to be construed	 to	 secure	 “ the just,	 speedy [,] and	 inexpensive	 determination of
every ” action and	appeal. M.R. Civ. P.	1;	M.R.	App. P.	1. [¶ 20 ]		For	these	reasons,	the	LLC did	not	need	to	file a	separate	Rule	80B appeal

. 4 N or	did	it	need	to	file	a	cross

- appeal	to	Tominsky’s	appeal. Raising	the good	cause	issue	as	an	alternative	argument	pursua nt	to	M.R.	App.	P.	2C(a)(1) was	appropriate in	this	context

.

4 Thus , as	noted above , supra n. 1 , the	matter is dismissed. 477	Shore	Road	v.	Town	of	Ogunquit , Mem

- 23

- 61 ( May 23 , 2023).11 2
. The meaning	 of	 the O rdinance ’s	 good	 cause	 exception is determined by	the c ourt	de	novo. [¶ 2 1] There	are	two	types	of	“good	cause” exceptions to	the	deadline	for filing	an appeal	to	a	municipal	body. First, there	is	a	judicially	crafted	exception:

a deadline	contained	an	ordinance	or	established	by	statute may	be	extended

“ when a court ‘ finds	 special	 circumstances	 which	 would	 result	 in	 a	 flagrant miscarriage	of	justice

. ’ ” Vile s v.	Town	of	Embden ,	2006	ME	107 , ¶ 8 , 905	A.2d
298 (quoting Keating	v.	Zon ing	Bd

. of	Appeal s ,	325	A.2d	521,	524	(Me. 1974) )

. With	respect	to	this judicially	crafted exception, on	appeal	to	us, we	review	the Superior	Court’s	application and apply	an	abuse	of	discretion	standard	to	the court’s determination	of	 the	existence	of	good	cause	and	a	clearly	erroneous standard	to	the	court’s	factual	findings

. See	id. ¶	9. [¶ 22 ] Second,	as is	the	case here, a	deadline	may	be	extended	pursuant to	an	applicable	ordinance	when	a	municipal	entity	finds	good	cause	to	hear	an appeal	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 deemed	 late	 under	 the	 ordinance. In	 th is
context, the	Superior	Court	act s in	an	intermediate	appellate	capaci ty , and we review	 directly	 the	 operat ive decision	 of	 the	 municipality. See Tomasino	 v. Town	of	Casco ,	2020	ME	96,	¶	5,	237	A.3d	175. As	to	the	standard	of	review,
l anguage	in Otis v.	Town	of	Sebago ,	645	A.2d 3, 5 (Me.	1994) suggests	that	we give	deference	 to	a	board’s	determination	whether	 the	good	cause	exception12 has	 been	 met .	 	 More	 precisely,	 our	 standard	 of	 review	 for	 municipal adjudicative	decisions	is to	give great	deference	to	a	b oard’s	findings	of	fact ,	i.e.,
to	 sustai n	 the	 findings	 unless the	 evidence	 compels	 a	 contrary	 conclusion,

see Tomasino ,	 2020	ME	 96 , ¶	5 ,	 237	A. 3 d	 175 ,	and	 to	give no	 deference	 to	a board’s	 interpretation	 of an ordinance because such interpretation is	 a question	of	law that we	review	de	novo , Jade	Realty	Corp.	v.	Town	of	Eliot ,	2008 ME	80, ¶ 7,	946	A.2d	408; Gensheimer	v.	Town	of	Phippsburg ,	2007	ME	85, ¶ 8, 926	A.2d	1168; Isis	Dev.,	LLC	v.	Town	of	Wells ,	2003	ME	149, ¶ 3,	836	A.2d	1285. As	 to	 mixed	 questions	 of	 law	 and	 fact,	 we	 afford	 a	 board ’s ultimate
characterization “substantial	deference.” Jord an	v.	City	of	Ellsworth ,	2003	ME 82,	 ¶¶	 8

- 9 ,	 828	 A.2d	 768 .	 	 The	 test	 for affording substantial	 deference	 is whether	 the	 issue	 involves	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 legal determination is “greatly	 informed”	 by	 the board’s factual findings. See	 Lane	 Constr.	 Corp.	 v. Town	of	Washington ,	2008	ME	45,	¶	13 ,	942	A.2d	1202. [¶ 23 ] Applying	these	p rinciples	here,	we	defer	to	the Board’s fact finding regarding why	 the	 appeal	 was	 filed	 more	 than thirty days	 after	 the	 CEO’s issuance	 of	 the	 permits .	 	 B ut whether those facts present “ extraordinary
circumstances

.	.	. which would	result	in	a flagrant	miscarriage	of	justice	unless
the	said	30

- day	 time	period	is	extended ” is	a	question	of	law that	we	review13 de novo. See Zoning	Ordinance	§ 225

- 5.3

. A. Indeed,	because	the	language	used
in	the O rdinance	to	define	when	the	good	cause	exception	shou ld	apply	mirrors
the	test we	crafted in Keating ,	th e meaning	of	the	test is	squ a rely	a	legal	one	for

our reso l ution

. 5
3. Tominsky did	 not	 qualify	 for	 the O rdinance’s	 good	 cause exception because	 a	 mistaken	 belief	 of	 law	 is	 not	 an

“ extraordinary	circumstance ” that would	result	in	a “ flagrant miscarriage	of	justice. ” [¶ 24 ] When	interpreting	a zoning ordinance,		“we	first	evaluate the	plain meaning	of	the	Ordinance	and,	if	the meaning	is	clear , we	need	not	look	beyond
the	 words	 themselves. W e	 construe	 the	 terms	 of	 an	 ordinance	 reasonably, considering	its	purposes	and	structure	and	to	avoid	absurd	or	illogical	results.” Olson	v.	Town	of	Yarmouth ,	2018	ME	27,	¶	11,	179	A.3d	9 2 0 ( alterations	and quotation	marks	omitted)

. Here,	w e conclude	 that ,	given	 the	purpose	of	 the
O rdinance	provision	and	the	choice	of	words	mirroring	our	language	in Keating , the O rdinance’s good	 cause	 exception is	 intended to adopt	 the	 test	 we
announced in Keating

. It	follows	that	our	decisions	interpreting	the	contours of	the	judicial	test	can	be	applied	to	the	analogous O rdinance	exception.

5 It	is	clear	from	the	language	in	the O rdinance	providing	that	the	Board	may	grant	the	exception only	 when it	 concludes “in	 its	 sole	 and	 exclusive	 judgment” th at	 the t est	 has	 been	 met	 that	 the O rdinance	intends	to	give	a	wide	berth	to	the	Board when	assessing	whether	to	grant	the	exception. That	said,	it	is	the	court s’ job	to	interpret	the language	of	the	Ordinance in	order	to	conclude	whether the	facts	as	found	by	the	Board establish	a	predicat e	to apply that	test.14 [¶ 25 ]		“The	need	for	a	good	cause	exception	primarily	stems	from	the	lack of	notice	of	the	issuance	of	the	building permit	to	abutting	landowners	or	other persons	who	may	be	aggrieved	by	its	issuance.” Viles ,	2006	ME	107, ¶	12 ,	905 A.2d	298

. “Therefore,	when	[ a fact finder]	examines	whether	the	good	cause exception	is	applicable	 to	a	situation,	it	starts	with	determin ing	whether	 the appellant	received	notice	of	the	issuance	of	the	permit. ” Id. ¶	13. Importantly ,

“ lack	of	notice	is	a	key	factor , but	it	is	not	a	determinative	factor.		Another	factor is	 the	amount	 of	 time	 the	appellant	waited	 to	 file	 the	appeal	after	 obtaining actual	knowledge	of	the	permit.” Id. (citation	omitted). Other	factors	may	be relevant	 because	 “all	 the	 equities	 of	 the situation”	 should	 be	 considered	 in deciding	 whether	 to	 grant the	 exception. Id. ¶¶	 11,	 13 (quotation	 marks omitted). [¶ 26 ] T he	first	question	is	whether	Tominsky	lacked	notice. See	i d. ¶	13. The building permits	were	issued between	December	2020	and January 2021 , b ut the	Board	found	that Tominsky did	not	learn	of	the	project	until	he	returned to	Ogunquit	in	May	2021 because	he	was	living	in	Florida

. Thus, Tominsky’s failure	to	appeal b etween	January	and	May based	on	lack	of	notice c ould trigger application	of	the	exception.15 [¶ 27 ] After	allowing	 for	Tominsky’s	inaction	owing	to	a	lack	of	notice,
there	is	no	viable	excuse	for	the eighty

- one	day delay	that followed. The record
reflect s that	 Tominsky	 had	 actual knowledge of	 the	 project as	 early	 as May 19 , 2021, yet	he	did	not	file	his	appeal with	the	Board until August 8

. One of	 his stated	 reasons

— that	 he	 did	 not	 receive	 a	 response	 to	 his counsel’s May 27	letter to	the	CEO

— is	untethered	to	the	lack	of	notice	that	can	 form a predicate	to	the	application	of	the	good	cause	exception.		Indeed,	regarding	the CEO’s	lack	 of	 response, the	letter	 sent	 to	 the	 CEO	 by Tominsky’s	 counsel on May 27	states , “It	seems	to	me	that	such	a	mass ive	proposal	should	at	least	have gone	 to	 the	ZBA	 .	 .	 .	 .”		Although	a	municipal	officer’s	 failure	 to	 respond	 to	a
citizen inquiry is	 concerning,	 the	 CEO’s	 lack	 of	 response	 did	 not	 prevent Tominsky	 from	 filing	 an administrative appeal	 with	 the	 Board.	 	 Ther e	is	 no prerequisite	in	the	Ordinance	that	an	appellant	must	speak	with	the	CEO	before filing	an	appeal. [¶ 28 ]		Even	if	the CEO’s lack	of	a	response	could	support	a	short	delay after	May	27,	Tominsky	did	not	file	his	appeal	until	August	8. See Wilgram	v. Sedgwick ,	 592	 A.2d	 487,	 488	 (Me.	 1991)	 ( determining	 that	 the	 good	 cause exception	 could	 not	 save	 an	 abutter’s	 untimely	 appeal	 that	 was	 filed	 seven months	after	the	issuance	of	the	building	permit	and	seventy

- six	days	after the16 abutter obtained	 actual	 notice	 of	 the	 project ). The	 reason	 for	 Tominsky’s further	delay cited	by	the	Board was Tominsky’s decision	to	file	a complaint	in the	Superior	Court and waiting	until	that case was	dismissed before	appealing to	 the	 Board .	 	 But	 delay	 based on	 ignorance	 of	 the	 law	 cannot	 establish	 a n extraordinary	 circumstance that would	 result	 in	 a flagrant	 miscarriage	 of justice. Cf.	Alley	v.	Alley ,	2004	ME	8,	¶ ¶	1

- 2 ,	840	A.2d	107 (affirming	the	denial
of	relief	under	M.R. Civ. P.	60(b)	because “[a] n	attorney’s	mistaken	belie f as	to the	 law	 does	 not	 rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 excusable	 neglect ” (quotation	 marks omitted)); Young	 v.	 Sturdy	 Furniture	 Co .,	 441	 A.2d	 320,	 321

- 22 (Me. 1982) ( compiling	cases and discussing	whether	mistake	of	l aw can	satisfy	the “ strict ”
standard	of excusable	neglect ). [¶ 29 ]		As	we	noted	in Young , in	determining whether excusable	neglect
exist s ,	 the	 standard	 is	 “strict ,”	 and extensions	 of	 time	 “should	 be	 limited	 to extraordinary	cases.” 441	A.2d at	321.		The	text	of	the O rdinance	referencing the	 need	 for	 “extraordinary	 circumstances ” underscores	 that	 the Ordinance exception	does	not	excuse	delay	based	on	mistaken	belief of the	law. [¶ 30 ] Nor	was	this even a	mistaken	belief	as	to	a	difficult	issue	of	law. We	have	long	required parties to exhaust	their administrative remedies	before turning to	the	courts	for	relief. See,	e.g. , Bryant	v.	Town	of	Camden, 2016	ME	27,17 ¶ ¶ 10, 12 ,	132	A.3d	1183 ; Town	of	Levant	v.	Seymour ,	2004	ME	115 , ¶	13 ,	855
A.2d	1159 ; Ne.	Occupational	Exch.,	Inc.	v.	Bureau	of	Rehab. ,	473	A.2d	406,	408

- 09 (Me.	1984); Cushing	v.	Smith ,	457	A.2d	816,	821	(Me.	1983) ; Levesque	v. Town of Eliot ,	448	A.2d	876, 878	(Me. 1982)

. [¶ 3 1]		 In	sum,	 the	Board misapprehended	 the	scope	of the	good	cause exception , and the	exception	does not	apply to the factual	predicate reflected	in the	Board’s	findings	as	to	the	cause	of	Tominsky’s	delay	in	appealing

. 6

6 Even	 if	 the	 appeal had	 been timely	 and we	 could have review ed the	 Board ’s merits determination,	the	Board’s decision	would have	been affirmed. Tominsky’s	arguments	can	be	divided	into	 two	categories: challenges	 to the	application of	 the Ordinance ’s	 substantive	 provisions and procedural challenges

. Beginning	 with	 the	 relevant Ordinance	provisions , we	note	that Tominsky argues that the	Ordinance	b ars six	dwelling	units	on 477	Shore	Road .		But	if	there	were	six	units	there	prior	to	the	enactment	of	the O rdinance,	then	the units are not	only	grandfathered	but	can also be “repaired,	maintained,	improved,	enlarged,	changed or	 relocated ” in	 conformity with	 all	 other	 dimensional	 requirements	 besides lot	 area or	 street frontage

. Ogunquit,	Me., Zoning	Ordinance	§	225

- 3.4

. C (Apr.	1,	2009). Although Tominsky argues that	there	was	insufficient	evidence	in	the	record	to	support the	finding that six	units	pre

- existed	the O rdinance , according	 to	 the Board’s	meeting minutes, he conceded	 that	 six units pre - existed the Ordinance

. Additionally,	 a lthough the	 record	 shows	 that the	 LLC’s	 alterations	 to	 the	 units	 were substantial , given	that the	issue	wh ether	the construction met	Ordinance	standards is a	fact

- intensive question,	 the	 Board’s	 determination	 that	 the	 changes were	 permissible was	 reasonable. See id. ; Bizier v.	Town	of	Turner ,	2011	ME	116,	¶	8, 32	A.3d	1048. Finally,	t o	the	extent that Tominsky	claims that	the	project	violated	shoreland	zoning	requirements,	the	Board	did find, and	could	reasonably find	on	the	evidence	before	it , that	no	construction	occurred	“within”	that	zone	as	required	for	the shoreland	zon e provisi ons	to	apply. See Ogunquit , Me., Zoning	Ordinance	§	225

- 4.5

. E (Apr.	1,	2009). Turning to	his	procedural	arguments, we	conclude	 that Tominsky	misconstrue s the	applicable burden	of	proof.		He	argues	that	the	project	proponents	were	required	to	prove	that	the	proposal complied	with	the O rdinance.		Although	a	project	proponent	“shall	have	the	burden	of	proving	that the	proposed	land	use	activity	is	in	conformity	with	the	pur poses	and	provisions	of	th [e] Ordinance,” i d. § 225

- 4.5

. D,	that	burden	applies	at	the	permitting	stage.		On	appeal	to	the	Board,	“[t]he	person filing	 the	 appeal	 shall	 have	 the	 burden	 of	 proof.” Ogunquit,	 Me. , Zoning	 Ordinance §	 225

- 5.3 .F (Apr. 1, 2009 )

. Hence,	 it	 was	 Tominsky’s	 burden	 to	 prove why	 the	 project	 did	 not	 meet	 the requirements	of	the	Ordinance. To	the	extent that he	is	complaining	that	he	did	not	understand	how the	CEO	could	have	issued	the permits prior	to	the	hearing	before	the	Board ,	the	C EO’s	decision	was subject	 to	 de	 novo	 review	 before	 the	 Board , Ogunquit,	 Me.,	 Zoning	 Ordinance § 225

- 5.2

. A18 C
. The	appeal	in Tominsky	II fails	because	the	issuance	of	a	certificate of	occupanc y is	not	an	appealable	event except	to	challenge	whether the	certificate	holder	adhered	to	the	terms	of	the	permit
. [¶ 32 ] Finally,	 Tominsky	 challenges	 the	 dismissal of	 his	 appeal	 in Tominsky II

. But Salisbury ,	 2002	 ME	 13, 788	 A.2d	 598 , is directly on	 point. There,	we	stated:
An appeal of a certificate of occupancy may not, however, substitute for an appeal of the underlying permit. If the permittee has complied with the terms of a valid permit, an abutter may not challenge the issuance of the cer tificate of occupancy based on a defect in the permit. If,	however,	the	permittee	has	meaningfully exceeded	 the	 authority	 contained	 in	 the	 permit,	 or	 otherwise violated	conditions	of	the	permit,	the	issuance	of	the	certificate	of occupancy	may	be	challeng ed.
Id. ¶	14 (citation	omitted). [¶ 33 ]		Tominsky	does	not	allege	that	the	LLC failed	to comply	with	the permits;	rather,	he	seeks	 to	reassert	arguments	raised	in Tominsky	 I that	the permits	should	not	have	been	issued. Thus, Tominsky	 II falls	well	within	 the type	of	challenge	prohibited	by Salisbury , and	the	court	did	not	err	in	dismissing
his	action	for	failure	to	state	a	claim.

(Apr. 1, 2009) , and the CEO	 explained during the	 hearing	 how	 the	 permits	 met	 the Ordinance’s requirements. Moreover, Tominsky does	not	explain	how he	suffered	any	specific	prejudice	from	not having	heard	the	CEO’s	explanation	prior	to	the	hearing

. Cf.	Fitanides	v.	City	of	Saco ,	2015	ME	32, ¶ 22,	113	A.3d	1088.
T o	the	extent that Tominsky s eeks to	raise	any	other	basis	to	challenge	the	permits,	his arguments are	not	adequately	developed	and are	therefore deemed waived. See Me h lhorn	v.	Derby ,	2006	ME 110,	¶ 11,	905	A.2d	290

.19 III.		CONCLUSION [¶ 34 ] For	the	reasons	given	above, the	appeal	in Tominsky	I befo r e	the Board	was	untimely,	and	the	appeal	in Tominsky	II fail ed to	allege	a	viable	claim for	relief. The	entry	is:
The	 judgment	 in Tominsky	 I ,	 AP

- 21

- 023 , is vacated .		The	matter	is remanded	to	the	Superior Court	 for	 entry	 of	 a	 judgment	 vacating	 the Board’s	 decision	 and	 remanding	 the	 matter	 to the	 Board	 with	 instructions	 to	 the	 Board	 to dismiss	the	matter	for	want	of	jurisdiction.		The j udgment	in Tominsky	II ,	AP

- 22

- 002 , is	affirmed.

William	A.	Hahn,	Esq. (orally) ,	Hahn	&	Matkov,	Boston,	 for	app ellant	Richard Tominsky Mary	E.	Costigan,	Esq.,	and	Zachary	B.	Brandwein,	Esq. (orally) ,	Bernstein	Shur, Portland,	for	appellee	Town	of	Ogunquit Matthew	J.	Williams,	Esq. (orally) ,	Hodson	&	Ayer,	Kennebunk,	for	appellee	477 Shore	Road	LLC

York	County	Superior	Court	docket	numbers AP

- 2021

- 023	& AP

- 2022

- 002 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY