United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

S.R., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CHICAGO LOOP 

STATION, Chicago, IL, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 14-1408 

Issued: December 4, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Kevin Card, for the appellant 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On June 6, 2014 appellant, through her representative, filed a timely appeal of a May 7, 

2014 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant has established a traumatic injury in the performance of 

duty on December 7, 2011. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On December 29, 2011 appellant, then a 47-year-old letter carrier, filed a (Form CA-1) 

traumatic injury claim alleging that on December 7, 2011 she sustained head/skull injuries due to 

passing out while in the performance of duty. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

By correspondence dated January 20, 2012, OWCP informed appellant that the evidence 

of record was insufficient to establish her claim. Appellant was advised as to the medical and 

factual evidence to submit. 

In a January 21, 2012 report, Dr. Edwin E. Hollins, a treating Board-certified internist, 

stated that on December 7, 2011 appellant was hospitalized for a symptomatic cerebral 

aneurysm. He indicated that she underwent a cooling procedure and was in the critical care unit 

until December 26, 2011. While she was hospitalized, appellant had markedly high blood 

pressure. She was discharged on December 29, 2011 but not allowed to return to work. 

In a February 20, 2012 note, Dr. Bernard R. Bendok, a treating Board-certified 

neurologist, diagnosed subarachnoid hemorrhage. He indicated that appellant continued to be 

totally disabled by this condition and would be unable to work for the next six weeks. 

By decision dated February 24, 2012, OWCP accepted that appellant was in the 

performance of duty at the time of the incident but denied appellant’s claim as the medical 

evidence failed to provide a well-reasoned explanation of whether or how a diagnosed condition 

was due to the work incident. 

On May 11, 2012 appellant requested reconsideration. 

In support of her claim, appellant submitted six witness statements describing the 

December 7, 2011 incident. The witnesses consistently stated that on December 7, 2011 an 

employing establishment field manager had called a meeting with the union stewards and 

assistant stewards to discuss how the vacation schedule would be handled for that location. 

There was some dispute between the employing establishment and the union as to how this 

should occur. Appellant and the manager who called the meeting got into a heated argument 

and, while appellant was attempting to sit in a chair to call an officer of the local union on her 

cell phone, she fell to the floor. 

In an undated statement, appellant described the December 7, 2011 incident. On 

December 7, 2011 she, acting in her capacity as chief steward, attended a meeting with 

management and other union stewards regarding 2012 vacation picks for the bargaining unit. 

During this meeting a heated argument developed between appellant and the manager. She 

claims they were yelling at each other when she felt dizzy, faint, and hot. Appellant reported that 

she passed out while sitting down and fell, hitting her head and neck on the floor. She noted that 

the manager accompanied her in the ambulance and she reported that even while riding in the 

ambulance he continued to yell at her. 

In addition to the witness statements, OWCP received a March 15, 2012 medical report 

from Dr. Alan Shepard, a treating Board-certified neurologist. Dr. Shepard diagnosed ruptured 

aneurysm and coiling with headache, fatigue, and dizziness and noted that she was in the midst 

of an argument at work when it happened. He claimed that the argument at work likely caused 

an elevation in her blood pressure which caused her aneurysm to rupture. 

By decision dated July 23, 2012, OWCP denied modification finding the submitted 

evidence insufficient to establish that appellant’s cerebral aneurysm was due to her federal 

employment. It noted that, while Dr. Shepard suggested an increase in blood pressure caused the 
3

aneurysm to rupture, he provided no history of the claimed condition or an explanation of 

whether appellant had any preexisting blood pressure condition. 

On September 10, 2012 appellant requested reconsideration and submitted an August 27, 

2012 report from Dr. Shepard. Dr. Shepard noted that she had engaged in an argument with a 

coworker in December 2011 and had never exhibited hypertension prior to this incident. He 

claimed that the hypertension was diagnosed, and a bleeding aneurysm was found, which led to 

all of her symptoms. Dr. Shepard diagnosed cerebral aneurysm and headaches. 

In an undated note, Dr. Hollins stated that appellant was a patient of his and that prior to 

the December 7, 2011 employment incident she had not exhibited any headaches, hypertension, 

or seizures. 

By decision dated September 28, 2012, OWCP denied modification. It modified the 

denial of appellant’s claim to reflect that the claim was being denied because she was not in the 

performance of duty and that the aneurysm rupture was her own reaction to an argument and not 

considered part of her normal work duties and not compensable under FECA. 

On September 16, 2013 appellant’s representative requested reconsideration. He argued 

that appellant’s injury had been sustained in the performance of duty as the aneurysm occurred 

while performing her union representation duties. 

By decision dated May 7, 2014, OWCP denied modification. It found the evidence of 

record insufficient to establish that the December 7, 2011 incident was a compensable factor of 

employment as her reaction to the argument was self-generated. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA2

 has the burden of establishing that the 

essential elements of his or her claim including that any disability and/or specific condition for 

which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.3

 These are the 

essential elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is 

predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.4

The Board has held that the mere fact that a condition manifests itself during a period of 

employment does not raise an inference that there is a causal relationship between the two.5

 An 

award of compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation. Neither, the fact 

that appellant’s condition became apparent during a period of employment nor the belief that her 

 2 Supra note 1. 

3 Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989). 

4 Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989). 

5 See Joe T. Williams, 44 ECAB 518, 521 (1993). 
4

condition was caused, precipitated or aggravated by her employment is sufficient to establish 

causal relationship.6 

Appellant has the burden of establishing by the weight of the substantial, reliable, and 

probative evidence, a causal relationship between her claimed bilateral shoulder conditions and 

her federal employment. This burden includes providing medical evidence from a physician who 

concludes that the disabling condition is causally related to employment factors and supports that 

conclusion with sound medical reasoning.7

With regard to union activities in general, the Board has adhered to the principle that 

union activities are personal in nature and are not considered to be within the course of 

employment.8

 The Board has recognized an exception to the general rule in that employees 

performing representational functions, which entitle them to official time, are in the performance 

of duty and entitled to all benefits of FECA if injured in the performance of those functions. The 

rationale for this exception is that activity undertaken in the capacity of a union representative 

may simultaneously serve the interests of the employing establishment.9 

ANALYSIS 

Appellant has alleged that she was involved in a heated argument with a manager on 

December 7, 2011, concerning 2012 vacation picks for the bargaining unit. According to 

appellant, she was on union time and the record indicates that she was a chief steward. There has 

been no evidence submitted to suggest that appellant was not engaged in the official 

representational function of her position as chief union steward. In its February 24 and July 23, 

2012 decisions, OWCP accepted that she was in the performance of duty at the time of the 

incident, but denied the claim as she had not provided sufficient medical evidence to establish 

that the accepted incident on December 7, 2011 caused a medical condition. 

The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s traumatic injury claim because 

the medical evidence of record failed to establish causal connection between the accepted 

incident and the diagnosed conditions of cerebral aneurysm and headaches.10

 6 Id. 

7 See Nicolea Bruso, 33 ECAB 1138, 1140 (1982). 

8 Marie Boylan, 45 ECAB 338 (1994). 

9 Id.

10 In its September 28, 2012 and May 7, 2014 decisions, OWCP modified its reason for the denial of the claim 

suggesting that appellant was not in the performance of duty and, after analyzing the claim as if it had been filed as 

an occupational disease claim, considered appellant’s reaction (cerebral hemorrhage) to the heated argument to be 

“self-generated.” The Board finds, on the contrary that: (1) this claim was submitted as a traumatic injury claim, 

(2) appellant clearly was in the performance of duty at the time of the incident (see Federal (FECA) Procedure 

Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Performance of Duty, Chapter 2.804.16(d) as she was engaged in negotiations with 

management on the how leave would be granted to bargaining unit employees), and (3) the evaluation needed to be 

based simply on whether the medical evidence of record established causal relationship. Both of these OWCP 

decisions, despite their incorrect analysis, denied appellant’s claim. 
5

The medical evidence was reviewed by OWCP. The reports submitted by Dr. Hollins 

and Dr. Bendock provided diagnoses and advised that appellant should remain off work until 

cleared by the neurologists, but they provided no opinion on causal relationship. In addition, the 

undated statement by Dr. Hollins, received into the record on September 18, 2012, stated that 

appellant had no history of hypertension, headaches, or seizures prior to December 7, 2011. He 

also provided no opinion on the cause of the diagnosed conditions. The Board has held that 

medical opinions are of little probative value when they do not offer any opinion regarding the 

cause of an employee’s condition.11 

Appellant also submitted reports from Dr. Shepard dated March 19 and August 27, 2012. 

Dr. Shepard contended that the heated argument at work likely caused the elevation in blood 

pressure which caused the aneurysm to rupture which caused the headaches. While Dr. Shepard 

offered some support for the connection between the accepted incident and the diagnosed 

conditions, his opinion provides little rationale to support his opinion. Dr. Shepard did not 

express an understanding of the situation at the time of the incident in any detail nor did he 

explain how it could have been competent to have caused the high blood pressure which caused 

the cerebral aneurysm which caused the headaches. The Board has held that a medical report is 

of limited probative value on the issue of causal relationship if it contains only a conclusion 

unsupported by medical rationale.12 

Further, Dr. Shepard used the term “likely” in describing the connection between the 

work incident and the diagnosed conditions. The Board has held that medical opinions that are 

speculative or equivocal in character are of diminished probative value.13 An award of 

compensation may not be based on surmise, conjecture, speculation, or upon appellant’s own 

belief that there is causal relationship between her claimed condition and her employment.14

The Board finds that appellant has failed to establish causal relationship between the 

heated argument at work and the diagnosed conditions. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant did not meet her burden of proof to establish a traumatic 

injury on December 7, 2011. 

 11 Linda I. Sprague, 48 ECAB 386 (1997). 

12 C.M., Docket No. 14-88 (issued April 18, 2014). 

13 D.D., 57 ECAB 734, 738 (2006); Kathy A. Kelley, 55 ECAB 206 (2004). 

14 Supra note 6; Robert A. Boyle, 54 ECAB 381 (2003); Patricia J. Glenn, 53 ECAB 159 (2001). 
6

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 7, 2014 decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs is affirmed, as modified.15

Issued: December 4, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 15 James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge, participated in the original decision but was no longer a member of the 

Board effective November 16, 2015.