alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, PETER J. RICE, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of MRO Software, Inc.,
a Massachusetts Corporation;

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)      Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)      Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)      Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5.    The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)      All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b)      Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: December 29, 2003

By: /s/ Peter J. Rice
---------------------------------
Peter J. Rice
Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4030 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.4030

                     One Hundred Thirteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

           Begun and held at the City of Washington on Friday,
           the third day of January, two thousand and fourteen

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
18640 NW 2nd Avenue in Miami, Florida, as the ``Father Richard Marquess-
                      Barry Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FATHER RICHARD MARQUESS-BARRY POST OFFICE BUILDING.
    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 18640 NW 2nd Avenue in Miami, Florida, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Father Richard Marquess-Barry Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Father 
Richard Marquess-Barry Post Office Building''.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
*Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30013

WILLIAM THOMAS FORLANDER

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 07-CV-1135

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff William Thomas Forlander (“Forlander”) brought this action

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States Probation

Office for the Western District of Louisiana (“USPO”). He sought to define his

registration responsibilities under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety

Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16981, and to prevent the USPO from enforcing

its allegedly overzealous interpretation of the Walsh Act. We have reviewed the

record and the parties’ briefs and conclude that Forlander no longer has

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 23, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30013

1 Forlander also claims that he faces prosecution if he violates the Walsh Act. While

true in the abstract, Forlander has not identified any specific threat, apart from the USPO’s

letter threatening reports to the court if he violated the terms of his release, of such

prosecution. These threats are too speculative and hypothetical to support an actual

controversy. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974).

2 For the first time at oral argument, the government raised the issue of sovereign

immunity. The government’s letter brief on this issue overlooks 5 U.S.C. § 702. Because we

affirm dismissal based on threshold questions of justiciability, however, we do not directly

consider this issue. See Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564, 566 (5th

Cir. 2008).

2

standing to pursue this case because his term of supervised release ended on

May 28, 2008, completing his sentence. The USPO thus has no supervisory

authority over him. Insofar as his claims were predicated on threats of the

USPO to report him for violating the special conditions of his release,1there is

no longer an actual controversy under Article III, and we must dismiss this case

for lack of jurisdiction. Motient Corp. v. Dondero, 529 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir.

2008). We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.2
STATE of North Carolina v. Gyrell Shavonta LEE

No. 335PA16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

Paul M. Green, Assistant Appellant Defender, for Lee, Gyrell Shavonta.

Kimberly D. Potter, Special Deputy Attorney General, R. Andrew Womble, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 6th of September 2016 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 15(g)(2).
STATE of North Carolina v. Raymond Alan GRIFFIN.

No. 322P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 18, 2015.

Raymond Alan Griffin, for Griffin, Raymond Alan.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the application filed by Petitioner on the 17th of September 2015 in this matter for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Wake County:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 18th of September 2015."
STATE of North Carolina v. Damario Montreal COXTON.

No. COA15-575-2.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Aug. 2, 2016.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

No Error.
State v. Calvin Renard Carter

193PA16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 22, 2016.

Mr. Richard J. Costanza, Attorney at Law, For Carter, Calvin Renard.

Ms. Kristin Jo Uicker, Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James R. O'Neill, District Attorney, For State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 19th of December 2016 by State of NC :

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of December 2016."

State of NC shall have up to and including the 8th day of February 2017 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen

Kurtis T. Wilder,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

Octo ber 1 3 , 2017 

# Order

Clerk September 12, 2017

154716 (19)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

SC: 154716

v COA: 333566

Wayne CC: 11

- 005203

- FC

KEVIN LAMAR HILL,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the C hief Justice

, the motion of former defense counsel to extend the

time for filing a response pursuant to this Court’s order of September 12, 20 17, is

GRANTED. The response will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before

October 24, 2017.
Exhibit 32.1
                                                                ------------

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Trans Energy,  Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-KSB/A for the period  ending  December  31, 2005,  as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report ), I, James K.
Abcouwer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Sec. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
     material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of the
     Company.


/s/   JAMES K. ABCOUWER
----------------------------
James K. Abcouwer
Chief Executive Officer
June 21, 2006



     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906, or
     other document  authenticating,  acknowledging,  or otherwise  adopting the
     signature that appears in typed form within the electronic  version of this
     written  statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
     the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange  Commission or its
     staff upon  request.  The foregoing  certifications  are  accompanying  the
     Company's   Form   10-KSB/A   solely   pursuant   to  section  906  of  the
     Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002  (subsections  (a) and  (b) of  section  1350,
     chapter 63 of title 18,  United States Code) and is not being filed as part
     of the Form 10-KSB/A or as a separate disclosure document.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       3,477,236
<SECURITIES>                                 3,970,137
<RECEIVABLES>                                  482,092
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (39,492)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,288,868
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,289,239
<PP&E>                                       5,865,404
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,744,786)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,738,093
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,690,786
<BONDS>                                        110,997
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          2
<COMMON>                                       232,658
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,975,731
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,738,093
<SALES>                                      4,393,197
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,393,197
<CGS>                                        6,431,411
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,431,411
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            12,646,236
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              33,532
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (14,498,453)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (14,498,453)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (14,498,453)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (1.035)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (1.035)
        

</TABLE>
STATE of North Carolina v. Bobby JOHNSON

No. 57PA17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2017

Marilyn G. Ozer, Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, for Johnson, Bobby.

Alvin William Keller, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Derrick Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, R. Andrew Murray, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the conditional petition filed on the 28th of February 2017 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 15(g)(2).
# C_2008037EN.01001001.xml

| 9.2.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.2.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/10

---

Action brought on 23 November 2007 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Case C-521/07)

(2008/C 37/12)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: P. van Nuffel and R. Lyal, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of the Netherlands

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | Declare that, by not exempting dividends paid to companies established in Norway or Iceland from withholding tax on dividends under the same conditions as dividends paid to Netherlands companies, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 40 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, by not exempting dividends paid to companies established in Norway or Iceland from withholding tax on dividends under the same conditions as dividends paid to Netherlands companies, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 40 of the EEA Agreement.

| — | order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

According to Netherlands tax law, tax on dividends is not withheld when a Netherlands company pays a dividend to another company established in the Netherlands which holds at least 5 % of the shares of the company which pays the dividend; by contrast the tax on dividends is withheld when the company which receives the dividend is established in Norway or Iceland, unless the receiving company owns at least 25 % (Norway) or 10 % (Iceland) of the shares in the Netherlands company which pays the dividend.

The Commission takes the view that Netherlands tax law thus gives rise to discrimination between companies established in Norway or Iceland and those established in the Netherlands. That constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital between the Netherlands and Norway and Iceland, contrary to Article 40 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1) (‘the EEA Agreement’) concerning the free movement of capital, a provision which, in essence, corresponds to Article 56 EC. The situation of Norwegian and Icelandic companies which have stakes in the capital of a Netherlands company is in fact objectively comparable to that of a Netherlands company holding such a stake. The Netherlands rules cannot be justified. Whilst it true that Member States may take measures to prevent abuse, those measures must none the less be proportionate to the objective pursued, which is not the case here.

1

---

(1)  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994.

1

---
State of North Carolina v. Jason C. Johnson

No. 2P13-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 8, 2016

Jason C. Johnson, for Johnson, Jason C.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, Michael Bonfoey, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 29th of September 2016 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Swain County, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court of that County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."

Ervin, J. recused

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 29th of September 2016 by Defendant to Appoint Counsel:

"Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."

Ervin, J. recused
1403.

#### Bendross *v.*The State.

Accusation of cheating, etc., from city court of Miller county— •Judge Bush. September 12, 1908.

Submitted October 27,

Decided November 10, 1908.

Powell, J.

1. A contract between employer and laborer that the laborer will work in the employer’s regular business is void if made on Sunday.,

'2. Such a Sunday contract will not support a prosecution under the act of August 15, 1903 (Georgia Laws, 1903, p. 90), especially where no novation of it has come about by affirmative action under it on any secular day. A contract with a minor is not void, but is binding until repudiated; an illegal Sunday contract is void, and is not enforceable until its terms have become binding by something affirmatively done by way of novation on a secular day. See *Calhoun*v. *Phillips,*87 *Ga.*483 (13 S. E. 593). By this difference this case is distinguished from *Vinson*v. *State,*124 *Ga.*19 (52 S. E. 79), and *Anthony*v. *State,*126 *Ga.*632 (55 S. E. 479).

•3. It is error to charge the jury that the defendant admits an essential element of the State’s case which he has not in fact admitted.

4. Except as herein indicated, the conviction is sustainable.

*Judgment reversed.*

*176
      *William I. Geer,*for plaintiff in error.

*N. L. Stapleton, solicitor,*contra.
STATE of North Carolina v. Laurice D. BOSTON

No. 73P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2017

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, Kimberly S. Robb, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Laurice D. Boston, for Boston, Laurice D.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 8th of March 2017 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Pitt County, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court of that County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."

*50The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 8th of March 2017 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 8th of March 2017 by Defendant to Appoint Counsel:

"Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."
James TOWNSEND and Lucretia Townsend v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

No. 21P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

Lisa G. Godfrey, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, Mark C. Tanenbaum, Attorney at Law, for Townsend, James, et al.

Melody R. Hairston, Special Deputy Attorney General, for N.C. Department of Transportation

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 12th of January 2017 by Plaintiffs in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-51481

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE TRINIDAD RAMIREZ-ROJAS, also known as Trinidad Ramirez-Rojas

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:07-CR-124-ALL

Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgmentin a Criminal Case, Jose Trinidad Ramirez-Rojas

raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty

provision and not a separate criminal offense. United States v. PinedaArrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 872 (2008).

The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 8, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk