NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRIA MCKNIGHT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LYON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-16888 

D.C. No. 

3:15-cv-00614-MMD-CBC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 6, 2020**

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

Terria McKnight, parent of a child with a disability (“Student”) who 

attended Yerington Elementary School in Lyon County School District (“LCSD”), 

appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment and affirmance of the state 

review officer’s (“SRO”) decision in McKnight’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 8 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the 

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., 

and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794. 

McKnight’s claims stem from disagreements with LCSD about Student’s 

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) planning and special education services, 

among other things, during the 2014-15 school year. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment. Curley 

v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2014). In an IDEA case, we 

review for clear error the district court’s findings of fact and de novo its 

conclusions of law, giving “due weight” to the SRO’s decisions. L.J. by and 

through Hudson v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 

2017). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. 

Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper on McKnight’s claim that LCSD violated 

the Fourth Amendment when a newspaper photographer took Student’s photograph 

in the cafeteria because McKnight failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether 

LCSD deprived Student of any constitutional right. See United States v. Jacobsen, 

466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (for Fourth Amendment purposes, “[a] ‘search’ occurs 

when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is

infringed”); Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (section 
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1983 action requires showing “that (1) the defendants acting under color of state 

law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

statutes”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McKnight’s claim 

that LCSD retaliated against her for filing due process complaints because 

McKnight failed to meet her burden of establishing that LCSD’s proffered reasons 

for its actions were pretextual. See Curley, 772 F.3d at 632 (describing burdenshifting framework applicable to ADA retaliation claims).

The district court properly affirmed the SRO’s determination that LCSD did 

not violate the IDEA when an autism specialist conducted an observation of 

Student because the observation was a “screening of a student by a teacher or 

specialist to determine appropriate instructional strategies” and did not require 

parental consent under the IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (stating that such a 

screening “shall not be considered to be an evaluation for eligibility for special 

education and related services”); id. § 300.310(b) (stating that district should 

obtain parental consent before conducting evaluation for eligibility for special 

education services).

The district court properly affirmed the SRO’s determination that LCSD did 

not deny Student a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) by failing to 

provide him a one-on-one aide in the general classroom because Student’s IEPs 
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were “‘reasonably calculated to enable [him] to achieve passing marks and 

advance from grade to grade.’” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. 

Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996 (2017) (citation omitted) (describing requirements 

for children receiving instruction in the general classroom to receive a FAPE under 

the IDEA); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (adopting a 

valid IEP under the IDEA is sufficient to provide a FAPE under Section 504).

The district court properly affirmed the SRO’s determination that LCSD did 

not deny Student a FAPE by failing to provide McKnight sufficient information

about Student’s progress because Student’s IEPs complied with IDEA 

requirements and LCSD did as they specified and more. See 34 C.F.R. §

300.320(a)(3)(ii) (stating that IEP should indicate when periodic progress reports 

will be provided). The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to 

consider various evaluations obtained after the SRO’s decisions because it is 

unclear how they are relevant to this claim. See Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 

4 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) (district court has discretion whether to admit 

“additional evidence ‘concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the 

administrative hearing’” (citation omitted)).

The district court properly affirmed the SRO’s determination that LCSD did 

not deny Student a FAPE by failing to identify specific measures for Student’s 

progress because Student’s IEPs complied with IDEA requirements. See 34 C.F.R. 
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§§ 300.320(a)(2)(i), (a)(3)(i) (stating that IEP should include “[a] statement of 

measurable annual goals” and “[a] description of [h]ow the child’s progress toward 

meeting the annual goals . . . will be measured”). 

To the extent McKnight contends that LCSD violated the IDEA when a 

newspaper photographer took Student’s photograph, nothing about this allegation 

implicates any IDEA requirement. 

AFFIRMED.