NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DAVID O. KEEL,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7007

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-2436, Judge Coral Wong 

Pietsch.

______________________ 

Decided: March 10, 2015 

______________________ 

DAVID O. KEEL, Kingman, AZ, pro se. 

EMMA BOND, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC for respondent-appellee. Also represented by JOYCE R.

BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR, MARTIN F. HOCKEY,

JR.; Y. KEN LEE, CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, Office of General 

Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Washington, DC.
2 KEEL v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

DECISION

David O. Keel appeals from a decision of the Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the Veterans Court”)

denying what Mr. Keel characterized as a request “for 

reinstatement of extraordinary relief.” We dismiss the 

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Keel served on active duty with the United States 

Army from May to December 1980.1 Beginning in 1981, 

he repeatedly sought disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”), claiming that he suffers 

from service-connected disabilities. His claims have been 

repeatedly rejected, either because the DVA concluded 

that he does not suffer from some of the complained-of 

conditions, or because he has not shown that those conditions were incurred or aggravated during the time he was 

on active duty.

In 2004, the Board of Veterans Appeals upheld the 

denial of Mr. Keel’s claims, finding that he had not offered 

any new and material evidence with regard to his previously rejected claims and that his new claims were not 

shown to be related to his service. The Veterans Court 

affirmed the Board’s decision in 2006 in a detailed opinion. The court first explained that Mr. Keel was not 

1 Mr. Keel contends that he served on active duty 

for longer than that. At various points he has argued that 

he served until 1986 or 1990. In an earlier proceeding, 

the Board and the Veterans Court ruled that he left active 

duty in December 1980. 

 
KEEL v. MCDONALD 3

entitled to service connection for disabilities incurred 

during the time between 1980 and 1986 that he was in 

the Ready Reserves. The court then upheld the Board’s 

conclusion that no new and material evidence had been 

submitted to justify reopening his previously denied 

claims, and it upheld the Board’s finding that he was not

entitled to service connection for his new claims, as he 

had not introduced any evidence linking those claims to 

his active duty service. 

Mr. Keel appealed that decision to this court, which 

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Keel v. 

Nicholson, 241 F. App’x 702 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Among Mr. 

Keel’s claims in that proceeding were that the Veterans 

Court had erroneously found that his period of active duty 

ended in December 1980 and that the DVA had tampered 

with his medical and service records. We held that Mr. 

Keel’s appeal did not present a challenge to the Veterans 

Court’s interpretation of a statute or regulation, but only 

challenged factual determinations. Those challenges, we 

noted, are not within our jurisdiction to review. Id. at 

704-05 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)).

 In July 2011, Mr. Keel filed a new claim for benefits, 

seeking service connection for several of his original 

claims, seeking to reopen certain previously denied 

claims, and seeking benefits for total disability based on 

individual unemployability (“TDIU”). A DVA regional 

office denied his original claims for lack of showing of 

service connection; it denied the request to reopen other 

claims for lack of a showing of new and material evidence; 

and it denied his TDIU claim because he lacked any 

service-connected disabilities. Mr. Keel has filed a Notice 

of Disagreement with that decision, and those claims are

currently pending before the regional office.

In July 2014, Mr. Keel filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the Veterans Court. In the petition, he 

sought relief from the August 2004 Board decision that 
4 KEEL v. MCDONALD

was the subject of the Veterans Court’s 2006 affirmance 

and this court’s 2007 dismissal. He claimed in his petition that he had been granted extraordinary relief on all 

eight of his claims, but that his claims had subsequently 

been improperly denied. The Veterans Court denied the 

petition, holding that there was no evidence that the 

Veterans Court had ever granted him extraordinary

relief. Treating his petition as a request for mandamus, 

the Court held that he had failed to demonstrate a clear 

and indisputable right to extraordinary relief. The court 

therefore denied the petition. Mr. Keel then took this 

appeal.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Keel’s appeal must be dismissed. This court 

enjoys only limited jurisdiction over appeals from the 

Veterans Court. In particular, except to the extent that 

an appeal presents a constitutional issue, this court is not 

authorized to review a challenge to a factual determination or a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the 

facts of a particular case. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 

The claims that Mr. Keel seeks to raise before this 

court are purely factual. His contentions that the Board 

incorrectly determined his discharge date and that the 

DVA has destroyed his files are distinctly factual matters 

over which this court has no jurisdiction. Moreover, even 

if we had jurisdiction to address those contentions, they

would be barred by principles of res judicata, as those 

contentions were all decided adversely to Mr. Keel in the 

proceeding that ended with the 2007 decision of this 

court.

As for Mr. Keel’s claim that he was granted extraordinary relief by the Veterans Court but that his relief was 

improperly taken away from him, that claim, besides 

being wholly unsupported by any evidence, is also a 

factual contention that is outside our jurisdiction to 
KEEL v. MCDONALD 5

review. As we did in our 2007 ruling, we therefore again 

dismiss Mr. Keel’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED