alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**Certification Pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)**

 

Pursuant to the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 (18 U.S.C. Sections 1350(a) and (b)), the undersigned hereby certify asfollows:

 

1.             Robert Earl is theChief Executive Officer of BH/RE, LLC, a Nevada Limited-Liability Company (the “Company”).

 

2.             The undersignedcertifies to the best of his knowledge:

 

(A)  The Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarterlyperiod ended September 30, 2004 accompanying this Certification, in the formfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934(the “Exchange Act”); and

(B)  The information in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

 

 

Dated:  November 15, 2004

 

 
|   | /s/ Robert Earl |   |
|--------|-----------------|--------|
|   | Robert Earl     |
|   | Manager         |

 

----
In the Matter of: J.S.M.O.

No. COA16-233

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 4, 2016

AFFIRMED.
Shannon Goodwin, Employee, Plaintiff, v. City of Charlotte, Employer, Self-Insured (Allied Claims Administration, Third-Party Administrator), Defendants.

No. COA16-551

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 6, 2016

AFFIRMED.
EASTER-ROZZELLE v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

52PA16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January 10, 2017

Lawrence J. Goldman, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for City of Charlotte.

Steven B. Hayes, Attorney at Law, Vernon Sumwalt, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for Easter-Rozzelle, David.

Edward L. Pauley, Attorney at Law, Salisbury, for N.C. Advocates for Justice.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 9th of January 2017 by North Carolina Advocates for Justice for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 10th of January 2017."

Unless already submitted, the Amicus Brief shall be submitted to the court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 28(i).
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50030

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ALFREDO VELA-ONTIVEROS

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:07-CR-1951-ALL

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Alfredo Vela-Ontiveros (Vela) appeals the 24-month sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of importation of a controlled substance and

possession with intentto distribute a controlled substance. Vela argues that the

sentence is unreasonable in light ofthe 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He contends

that the court did not adequately take into account his personal history, namely

that he had a bachelor’s degree, had worked as a teacher in Mexico, was a legal

permanent resident ofthe United States, and had no criminal record. He asserts

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 21, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-50030

2

that he committed this offense because a series of medical emergencies undercut

his ability to support his family and that he is unlikely to pose any future danger

to the public. 

Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), sentences are

reviewed for reasonableness in light of the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). See

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2005). A sentence

imposed within the properly-calculated guidelines range is entitled to a

presumption of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462

(2007); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Review is for

an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).

At sentencing, the district court stated that it had considered Vela’s

circumstances, the circumstances of the case, the Guidelines, the statutory

factors, and the presentence report in arriving at a sentence that it considered

to be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the purposes of the

statute. The court, noting that it had 40-60 sentencings that week alone,

specifically found that Vela’s reasons for committing this offense were similar

to the reasons offered by others. The court recognized that Vela was well

educated and had been a school teacher, but determined that this was not a

mitigating circumstance because he had had the privilege of being well educated

and was capable of making good choices, but instead had made very bad

decisions and risked putting drugs on the streetthat could have gone to children.

The district court imposed the lowest sentence under the advisory

guidelines range. Vela has not shown that this was an abuse of discretion. See

Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2470. 

AFFIRMED.
In the Matter of J.O.M.

No. COA15-1320.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 21, 2016.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Marlow WILLIAMS v. Frank L. PERRY, in his official capacity as Secretary, North Carolina Department of Public Safety, and Paul G. Butler, Jr., in his official capacity as Chairman of the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission

No. 15P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 16, 2017

*297Marlow Williams, for Williams, Marlow.

Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, for Perry, Frank L., et al.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by Plaintiff on the 6th of January 2017 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30 (substantial constitutional question), the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the notice of appeal is

"Dismissed Ex Mero Motu by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 6th of January 2017 by Plaintiff in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of March 2017."
United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

H.G., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 

NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION 

SERVICE, Maquoketa, IA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 15-1413 

Issued: December 29, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

On June 16, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 23, 2015 nonmerit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). The Board docketed the 

appeal as No. 15-1413. 

The Board has duly considered the matter and finds that the case is not in posture for a 

decision and must be remanded to OWCP. In its March 23, 2015 decision, OWCP denied 

appellant’s request for reconsideration as untimely filed and lacking clear evidence of error. The 

decision was issued under the name of Marla Spriggs, who is identified as a “[c]ommunications 

[s]pecialist.” 

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 10.125(b), “OWCP claims staff apply the law, the regulations, 

and its procedures to the facts as reported or obtained upon investigation” with regard to the 

entitlement to benefits. OWCP procedures do not designate signature authority to 

communications specialists but rather to claims examiners, senior claims examiners, and district 

directors.1

 OWCP’s procedures contemplate that a senior claims examiner should deny untimely 

 1 See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Disallowances, Chapter 2.1400 Exhibit 1 

(February 2013). 
2

applications for reconsideration which do not present clear evidence of error.2 As Ms. Spriggs is 

not a senior claims examiner or other OWCP official with signature authority, she cannot be 

considered “claims staff.” Consequently, OWCP has issued an inadequate decision with respect 

to the requirements of its regulations and procedures. For this reason, the case will be remanded 

to OWCP to issue an appropriate decision. Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 23, 2015 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further action 

consistent with this order of the Board. 

Issued: December 29, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 2 See id. at 2.1602.2(b); 2.1602.5(b) (October 2011). Section 2.1602.5(b) also states that the decision shall 

include a brief evaluation of the evidence submitted. The Board notes that OWCP’s decision did not evaluate any of 

the evidence submitted by appellant in finding that clear evidence of error was not established.
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(First Chamber)

6 March 2008

Case F-55/07

**Giuseppe Tiralongo**

**v**

**Commission of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Former temporary agent – Actions – Action for damages – Non‐renewal of a fixed-term contract – Manifest inadmissibility)

**Application:**brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Tiralongo seeks, in particular, an order requiring the Commission to
compensate the material and non-material damage he allegedly suffered as a result of a series of unlawful actions which he
claims the Commission committed in connection with the renewal of his contract.

**Held:**The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. Each party is to bear its own costs.

**Summary**

1.      *Procedure – Admissibility of actions – Assessment by reference to the rules in force when the application was lodged*

*(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 76)*

2.      *Officials – Actions – Actions for damages – Pleas in law*

*(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)*

1.      Although the rule laid down in Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal that the Tribunal may, by
way of an order, dismiss an action which appears manifestly bound to fail is a procedural rule which, as such, applies to
all proceedings pending before the Tribunal at the time when it enters into force, the same is not true of rules on the basis
of which the Tribunal may, under that article, regard an action as manifestly inadmissible, and which may only be those applicable
on the date when the action is brought.

(see para. 26)

2.      An official who has failed to bring, within the periods laid down in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, an action
for annulment of a measure alleged to have adversely affected him cannot repair that omission and thus obtain further time
for bringing proceedings by lodging a claim for compensation for the damage caused by that measure, whatever the material
or non-material nature of that damage.

(see paras 31, 33, 40, 41)

See:

T-27/90 *Latham* v *Commission* [1991] ECR II‐35, para. 38; T-20/92 *Moat* v *Commission* [1993] ECR II‐799, para. 46; T-147/04 *Ross* v *Commission* [2005] ECR-SC I‐A‐171 and II‐771, para. 48
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136879 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 136879 

 COA: 275085 

Wayne CC: 06-008307-01

ERIC DAVID LACKEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 26, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

0915 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 22, 2008 

 Clerk
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Fred M. Powell, Chief Financial Officer of BMP SUNSTONE Corporation (the Company),
hereby certify that, based on my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ FRED M. POWELL     
|Fred M. Powell         
|Chief Financial Officer
|August 10, 2009
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 95-10869

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARIO ESTEBAN MORENO, Sr.,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CR-56-Y

- - - - - - - - - -

June 27, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mario Moreno appeals his conviction for illegal reentry into

the United States after previous deportation. Acknowledging that

controlling authority is contrary to his position, Moreno argues

that his sentence was imposed in violation of the law because the

indictment did not contain an allegation that he committed a

prior felony. See United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943,

945-46 (5th Cir. 1993)(the charging instrument need not contain
No. 95-10869

- 2 -

an allegation that the defendant committed a prior felony if he

is to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)), cert. denied,

114 S. Ct. 889 (1994). 

This panel will not overrule the decision of another panel

of this circuit. United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 313 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991). The district court did

not err by following Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d at 945-46. 

Moreno failed to address the procedural problem that he

waived all nonjurisdictional errors that preceded the plea. See

United States v. Owens, 996 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1993). To

raise the Vasquez-Olvera issue, Moreno must show that the issue

is jurisdictional, i.e. that the indictment was so flawed that

the district court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case or

that the indictment did not charge a crime. See United States v.

Barksdale-Contreras, 972 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 1084 and cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993). We

do not reach this waiver question because, even if we presume

that this issue is not waived, Vasquez-Olvera controls. 

AFFIRMED.
V 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3823 

For the relief of John Cheruiyot Kemboi and Winnie Njeri Kemboi. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 8, 2014 

Mr. TIBERI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of John Cheruiyot Kemboi and Winnie Njeri 

Kemboi. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR JOHN 

4 CHERUIYOT KEMBOI AND WINNIE NJERI 

5 KEMBOI. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

7 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

8 Act, John Cheruiyot Kemboi and Winnie Njeri Kemboi 

9 shall each be eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa 

10 or for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully 

11 admitted for permanent residence upon filing an applicaVerDate Mar 15 2010 03:13 Jan 09, 2014 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3823.IH H3823

jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3823 IH

1 tion for issuance of an immigrant visa under section 204 

2 of such Act or for adjustment of status to lawful perma3 nent resident. 

4 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If John Cheruiyot 

5 Kemboi or Winnie Njeri Kemboi enters the United States 

6 before the filing deadline specified in subsection (c), he 

7 or she shall be considered to have entered and remained 

8 lawfully and shall, if otherwise eligible, be eligible for ad9 justment of status under section 245 of the Immigration 

10 and Nationality Act as of the date of the enactment of 

11 this Act. 

12 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

13 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap14 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica15 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

16 within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

17 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

18 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res19 idence to John Cheruiyot Kemboi and Winnie Njeri 

20 Kemboi, the Secretary of State shall instruct the proper 

21 officer to reduce by 2, during the current or next following 

22 fiscal year, the total number of immigrant visas that are 

23 made available to natives of the country of the aliens’ birth 

24 under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 

25 Act or, if applicable, the total number of immigrant visas 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3823 IH

1 that are made available to natives of the country of the 

2 aliens’ birth under section 202(e) of such Act. 

3 (e) DENIAL OF PREFERENTIAL IMMIGRATION

4 TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN RELATIVES.—The natural 

5 parents, brothers, and sisters of John Cheruiyot Kemboi 

6 and Winnie Njeri Kemboi shall not, by virtue of such rela7 tionship, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under 

8 the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7255

SA’ID ABDULLAH AL’RASHID, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus DOUG CATOE; LAURIE F. BESSINGER; JOYCE BROWN;SAMUAL K. LEWIS; JOHN NORRIS; MARY SELF; SERGEANT PARKER, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge. (CA-99-459-3-19BC) Submitted: January 18, 2001 Decided: January 25, 2001 Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Sa’id Abdullah Al’Rashid, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Frederick Lindemann, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Sa’id Abdullah Al’Rashid appeals the district court’s orderdenying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Al’Rashid v. Catoe , No. CA-99-459-3-19BC (D.S.C. filed July 27, 2000; entered July 28, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
State v. Terril Courtney Battle

464P16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 22, 2016.

Mr. Nicholas C. Woomer-Deters, Assistant Appellate Defender, For Battle, Terril Courtney.

Ms. Kristin Jo Uicker, Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Ernie Lee, District Attorney, For State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 22nd of December 2016 by State of NC for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of December 2016."
**Order of the Court of First Instance (Sixth Chamber) of 20 October 2009 – Lebard v Commission**

**(Case T-89/06)**

Action for annulment – No legal interest in bringing proceedings – Inadmissibility

1.                     *Actions for annulment – Interest in bringing proceedings – Natural or legal persons – Action capable of securing a benefit
for the applicant (Art. 230 EC) (see paras 35-40)*

2.                     *Procedure – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements – Identification of the subject-matter of the dispute
– Brief summary of the pleas in law on which the application is based – Action for compensation for damage caused by a Community
institution (Statute of the Court of Justice, Arts 21 and 53, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance,
Art. 44(1)(c)) (see paras 47-51)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | APPLICATION for, inter alia, annulment of the decisions of the Commission rejecting, first, the request for a review as to whether the company Aventis had complied with the commitments entered into in connection with the Commission’s decision of 9 August 1999 in Case IV/M.1378 – Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc, and, second, application for withdrawal of the Commission’s decision of 13 July 1999 in Case IV/M.1517 – Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright & Wilson. |

**Operative part**

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Mr Daniel Lebard is ordered to bear his own costs and pay those incurred by the Commission of the European Communities. |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 3. | | There is no need to adjudicate on the application for leave to intervene submitted by Valauret SA. |
State v. Mason White Hyde

88P15-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 19, 2016

Mason W. Hyde, James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Hyde, Mason White.

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 18th of July 2016 by Defendant to Allow Applicant the Opportunity to Correct/Amend Any Defects, Errors, Flaws in the Application:

"Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 19th of July 2016."
STATE v. Tony Robert JONES

669P03-4

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 8, 2016.

Mr. Tony Robert Jones, Pro Per.

Ms. Amy Kunstling Irene, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Tom Horner, District Attorney, For State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 26th of October 2016 by Defendant to Dismiss:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."