NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OMARI TAHIR, AKA James C. Garrett,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. MARGARET DELANY, individually and in her official capacity as Managing D irector of Midtown Center, LLC.; MIDTOWN CENTER LLC,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 17

- 35718

D.C. No. 2:15

- cv

- 02017

- JCC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 15, 2018 **

Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Omari Tahir, AKA James C. Garrett, appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment and dismissal order in his action alleging race discrimination

under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”)

. We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 35718

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. , 836 F.3d 987, 989

- 90 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (summary
judgment); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tahir’s Title VI

claim because T ahir failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

defendant s were receiving federal financial assistance at the time the alleged

discrimination occurred

. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting race, color, or
national origin discrimination “under any program or activity receiving Federal

financ ial assistance”); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp. , 29 F.3d 1439, 1447
(9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth pleading requirements for a Title VI claim), overruled
on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. , 241 F.3d 1131
(9th Cir. 2001) ( en banc)

. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Tahir’s state law claims after dismissing his federal

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Tritchler v. County of Lake , 358 F.3d 1150,
1153 (9 th Cir. 20 04) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion

for reconsideration of the order denying defendant s ’ motion to expunge Tahir’s lis
pendens because the remaining claims did not affect title to the real property in this3 17

- 35718

action

. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.325; Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.

ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1262

- 63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for reconsideration).
We lack jurisdiction to r ev iew the district court’s remand order

. See 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d) (an order remanding a case to t he s tate court from which it was

removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 i s not reviewable on appeal ).
We reject as without merit Tahir’s contentions that the district court applied
the wrong standards on summary judgment , or that the district court gave

defendant s legal advice

. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the f irst time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)

.
AFFIRMED.