Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

October 3, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136380 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellant, Justices 

v SC: 136380 

 COA: 283801 

Calhoun CC: 06-003642-FH;

06-003993-FH 

RUSSELL LEE WILLIS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 1, 2008 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that 

the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

CORRIGAN, J., (dissenting). 

I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave 

granted for a more thorough analysis. The panel disposed of the case in an order that 

affords no guidance to trial courts concerning the panel’s reasoning. The order, 

providing no reasoning whatsoever, merely remands the case to the trial court “to afford 

defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea or for the trial court to impose a two-year 

minimum sentence in accordance with People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 

(1993).” Unpublished amended order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 1, 2008 

(Docket No. 283801). 

The defendant pleaded no contest to the charges against him and received a 

sentence evaluation from the trial judge as provided in Cobbs. The defendant failed to 

appear for the subsequent sentencing hearing, however, and was later arrested pursuant to 

a bench warrant. Upon finally sentencing him, the court declined to give him the benefit 

of the Cobbs evaluation and imposed a higher minimum sentence within the minimum 

guidelines range prescribed by statute. The court denied the defendant’s request to 

withdraw his plea, concluding that withdrawal was not warranted in light of the 

defendant’s misconduct. In rendering its decision, the trial court specifically relied on 
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2 

People v Garvin, 159 Mich App 38 (1987). The Court of Appeals reversed, presumably 

citing Cobbs for the general proposition that a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest 

in reliance on a sentence evaluation has an “absolute right” to withdraw the plea if the 

judge later concludes that the sentence should exceed the preliminary evaluation. See 

Cobbs, supra at 283. 

But the trial court here reasonably posited that a defendant forfeits his right to 

withdraw if he absconds from sentencing. The panel did not discuss the precedent cited 

by the trial judge and the prosecutor, in which appellate courts declined to permit plea 

withdrawal under similar factual circumstances. See People v Kean, 204 Mich App 533, 

536 (1994) (By walking away from a treatment program specified in the plea deal and 

then absconding, the “defendant had violated the plea agreement and, 

consequently, . . . he was not entitled to the benefit of the bargain.”); Garvin, supra at 43 

(the defendant “implicitly waived” the right to withdraw his plea by escaping from 

custody and failing to appear for sentencing); People v Acosta, 143 Mich App 95, 99 

(1985) (A defendant may not benefit from a plea bargain “irrespective of [his] bad faith 

in failing to comply with the bargain by failing to appear.”). Although these cases did not 

involve Cobbs pleas, the prosecutor reasonably argues that their rationale extends to 

cases involving Cobbs pleas. 

Further, allowing withdrawal under these circumstances permits a defendant to 

manipulate the proceedings and benefit from his misconduct. Indeed, it may encourage 

misconduct. A defendant who becomes dissatisfied with a Cobbs evaluation may 

abscond in order to induce the judge to impose a higher sentence and then take advantage 

of the right to withdraw. Moreover, under the Court of Appeals ruling in this case, a 

defendant may apparently abscond from custody for as long as he wishes but then still 

benefit from the plea deal. This Court explicitly prohibits a defendant from “assert[ing] 

‘rights’ that came into existence because of his own misconduct.” People v Washington, 

461 Mich 294, 299-300 (1999) (A defendant could not claim violation of his Double 

Jeopardy rights because “[i]f he had not breached his agreement to return to court for 

sentencing, there would have been no possibility of a violation . . . ”). 

p0930 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 3, 2008 

Clerk