In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 07-3666

ALI AIOUB,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A97 320 264

____________

ARGUED AUGUST 6, 2008—DECIDED AUGUST 29, 2008

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and KANNE and WOOD,

Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Ali Aioub, a native and citizen of

Bangladesh, was charged with removability for obtaining

permanent residency through marriage fraud, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii), and procuring admission to the

United States through fraud, see id. § 227(a)(1)(A). An

immigration judge found Aioub removable on account of

the marriage fraud, denied his application for asylum
2 No. 07-3666

partly because of that fraud, and denied his application

for withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration

Appeals adopted the IJ’s decision, and Aioub now petitions for review. Because there is substantial evidence

supporting the IJ’s decision, we deny Aioub’s petition.

Aioub entered the United States in June 2001 to attend

college as a non-immigrant student. But he quit school in

March 2003 and married Brandi Hillman, a United States

citizen, that same month. In November 2004, the Department of Homeland Security served Aioub with a Notice to

Appear, alleging that the marriage was fraudulent and

that he committed fraud to gain entry into the United

States. Aioub had been interviewed by a DHS agent and

admitted that his marriage to Hillman was fraudulent, yet

at the removal hearing he claimed that he had made that

admission because at the time he was a “mental disaster.”

The IJ then continued the hearing so that the government could gather further proof that the marriage was

fraudulent.

When the removal hearing resumed, DHS special agent

James Webb testified that he first learned of the case

when he was contacted by Melody Allie in November

2004. Allie was concerned about the legal ramifications

for her son, Frankie DeVille, Jr., when she discovered that

his fiancee—Hillman—already was married to Aioub.

Agent Webb then interviewed Hillman and DeVille, both

of whom confirmed the information provided by Allie.

DeVille said that Aioub had agreed to pay the couple

$15,000 to participate in the scheme, while Hillman stated

that Aioub had given them, not money, but an apartment
No. 07-3666 3

and a vehicle. Based on this information, Agent Webb

arrested Aioub and took a written statement, in which

Aioub admitted that he had entered “into a fraudulent

marriage with Brandi Hillman for the purpose of gaining

permanent resident status in the United States.”

The government then called Hillman, who testified that

she and DeVille moved into Aioub’s apartment with her

daughter in February 2003. A month later she married

Aioub in exchange for the use of his apartment and

vehicle. During their nine months of cohabitation, Hillman

never consummated the marriage with Aioub, slept in a

separate bedroom with DeVille, and became pregnant

with DeVille’s child. When interviewed by Agent Webb,

Hillman had signed a statement revoking the I-130 Immediate Relative Petition she had filed on Aioub’s behalf. In

that statement Hillman explained that she had “entered

into a marriage with Ali Aioub for him to get an immigration benefit.”

Next, Aioub testified that he decided to file for asylum

in November 2004 when he was detained by DHS. He said

that he feared returning to Bangladesh because he had

converted from Islam to Christianity after talking to his

fellow detainees. After he called his parents to share the

news, Aioub said, his father told the local villagers and

became the target of discriminatory “sanctions.” According

to Aioub, his father could not find tenants for his rental

houses, and most of his crops were destroyed. Aioub

testified that he fears retribution for his conversion if he

returns home, including demands for money, vandalism,

and possibly even assault.
4 No. 07-3666

Finally, Professor Kendall Stiles testified on Aioub’s

behalf about conditions in Bangladesh. He agreed with

the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report that a Bangladeshi Christian could “absolutely” practice Christianity openly. And, according to

Stiles, although some villages, including Aioub’s, have a

“phobia” toward non-Muslims, the official government

policy is in reality “quite tolerant.” Professor Stiles added,

however, that conversion was a different matter, and that

Aioub might experience a “harsh” reaction if he was to

inform the local community of his conversion. Still, he

conceded that other Bangladeshis would have no way

of knowing that Aioub had converted to Christianity.

After the hearing, the IJ found Aioub removable for

committing marriage fraud. The IJ noted that Hillman and

Aioub had “no intentions of making a life together at the

time they entered into the marriage.” Next, the IJ held that

Aioub’s asylum application was not barred by the one-year

filing deadline because his conversion constituted changed

circumstances. The IJ concluded, though, that Aioub’s

“fraudulent marriage to obtain permanent residence

status warrants a discretionary denial of his request for

asylum.” The IJ then found that Aioub had failed to meet

his burden of proof with respect to withholding of removal. He reasoned that the danger Aioub faced if deported did not rise to “the level necessary to qualify for

withholding of removal.” The BIA adopted and affirmed

the IJ’s decision.

In his petition for review, Aioub first argues that the IJ

erred in finding him removable for committing marriage
No. 07-3666 5

fraud. Where, as here, the BIA’s opinion adopts and adds

“very little” to the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s decision

as supplemented by the BIA’s “terse opinion.” Hamdan v.

Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 2008). To uphold the

IJ’s decision, we must determine that substantial evidence

supports the IJ’s factual finding that the marriage was a

sham. Haxhiu v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 685, 689-90 (7th Cir.

2008); Fang Huang v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 640, 649 (6th Cir.

2008).

Aioub entered the United States in 2001 on a student

visa. Rather than finish school, he married Hillman just

two years later. Yet, at the time of the marriage, Hillman

was engaged to DeVille. At the removal hearing she

testified that, although she moved into Aioub’s apartment, she never consummated the marriage, slept in a

separate bedroom with DeVille and her daughter, and

married Aioub only to assist him in obtaining immigration benefits. Further, Agent Webb testified that both

Hillman and DeVille, in separate interviews, admitted that

the arrangement had been made in exchange for money

and access to Aioub’s apartment and vehicle. There is

therefore substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s factual

finding that Aioub’s marriage to Hillman was fraudulent.

Aioub next argues that the IJ erred in denying his asylum

application on the basis of his fraudulent marriage. He

contends that the IJ’s analysis ignored evidence that there

was “more to the relationship than a simple business

arrangement.” The Immigration and Nationality Act gives

the Attorney General the discretion to grant or deny

asylum to an alien who qualifies as a refugee. See 8 U.S.C.
6 No. 07-3666

§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1); Alsagladi v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d

700, 701 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Status as a victim of persecution

makes an alien eligible for asylum but does not compel an

exercise of discretion in his favor.”). We review a discretionary denial of asylum for abuse of discretion. Alsagladi,

450 F.3d at 701; Fessehaye v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 746, 751-52

(7th Cir. 2005).

After finding Aioub removable for marriage fraud, the

IJ determined that his actions constituted “a significant

negative factor in his case” and decided not to exercise

discretion in his favor. In doing so, the IJ found that

Aioub’s sham marriage warranted a “discretionary denial

of his request for asylum.” The IJ noted that Aioub had

dropped out of school and faced possible removal shortly

before marrying Hillman. And Aioub himself at first

admitted that his marriage was a sham. Whether or not

Aioub’s arrangement with Hillman constituted more

than a “simple business arrangement” makes no difference.

We have held that immigrants who “take the easy but

dishonest path when a more honorable if more difficult

one is open cannot insist on administrative lenity.”

Alsagladi, 450 F.3d at 702. Accordingly, the IJ did not

abuse its discretion in denying Aioub’s asylum application.

Finally, Aioub argues that the IJ erred in denying his

claim for withholding of removal. To establish his eligibility for withholding of removal, Aioub had to show a “clear

probability” of persecution on account of his religion. See

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Irasoc v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 727,

729-30 (7th Cir. 2008). Because Aioub did not allege past

persecution, he had to prove that it is more likely than not
No. 07-3666 7

that he will suffer future persecution in Bangladesh. See

Tariq v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). To overturn the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal, we must

find that the evidence compels a contrary result. Irasoc, 522

F.3d at 729.

Here, Aioub did not establish a clear probability of future

persecution on account of his conversion to Christianity.

Until his conversion in November 2004, Aioub had intended to return to Bangladesh to live with his family.

Even after his conversion to Christianity while in detention, Aioub’s parents seemed unconcerned with his

decision, telling him only that they would “respect his

decision.” And his father felt secure enough to tell the local

mosque that his son had converted to Christianity. Although his parents experienced some discrimination,

Aioub’s own expert witness and the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report both

noted that Bangladesh is a tolerant nation in which Christianity is “openly” practiced. Finally, Aioub himself

admitted that he could relocate to the largest city in

Bangladesh, find employment, and remain relatively

anonymous. This last argument, like the others, is without merit.

The petition for review is DENIED.

8-29-08