IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 31 / 06–1387 

Filed October 3, 2008 

SANDRA K. SCHADENDORF 

f/k/a SANDRA K. WEISHAAR, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION, 

 Appellee. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County, Don E. 

Courtney, Judge. 

 The claimant and the employer appeal a decision awarding the 

claimant penalty benefits under Iowa Code section 86.13 (1999). 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED 

WITH DIRECTIONS. 

 Mark S. Soldat of Soldat & Parrish-Sams, P.L.C., West Des Moines, 

for appellant. 

 Michael S. Roling of Peddicord, Wharton, Spencer, Hook, Barron & 

Wegman, LLP, Des Moines, for appellee. 
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

In this appeal, a claimant and her employer challenge the workers’ 

compensation commissioner’s award of penalty benefits under Iowa Code 

section 86.13 (1999). The district court affirmed the award of penalty 

benefits; however, it remanded the case to the agency to determine 

whether further penalty benefits were due. Because we find the workers’ 

compensation commissioner was correct in awarding penalty benefits to 

the claimant and the claimant is not entitled to further benefits, we 

reverse the judgment of the district court remanding the case for further 

proceedings before the workers’ compensation commissioner and direct 

the district court to affirm the decision of the commissioner. 

 I. Factual Background. 

 This case arises out of a July 26, 1999, decision of the workers’ 

compensation commissioner awarding Sandra K. Schadendorf f/k/a 

Sandra K. Weishaar workers’ compensation benefits from her employer, 

Snap-On Tools Corporation. The July 26 award for back benefits totaled 

$72,166.32. Snap-On was also required to pay interest on the benefits. 

On August 9 Schadendorf’s attorney wrote a letter to Snap-On advising 

Snap-On of his calculations as to the amount owed on the judgment 

including interest and costs as of August 25. The interest on the award 

was calculated to be $43,796.26, making the total amount due to 

Schadendorf $115,962.58. In the same letter, the attorney asked SnapOn to advise him if it did not agree with his calculations. Finally, the 

attorney said, 

please be advised that if we cannot agree by 8/18/99 on 

whether these amounts will be paid and whether all parties 

agree not to seek judicial review, I will have to file a judicial 

review, as well as a motion for judgment, just to protect my 

client’s rights. 
3

On August 16 Snap-On made the decision not to appeal the award 

and to pay the amount as calculated in the August 9 letter. Snap-On 

communicated this decision telephonically to Schadendorf’s attorney. 

On August 18 Schadendorf’s attorney confirmed by letter that Snap-On 

was going to pay the award. In the same letter the attorney advised 

Snap-On that if payment was not received by August 24, he would file a 

judicial review action to protect his client’s rights. 

Because Schadendorf did not receive payment, she filed a petition 

for judicial review and a motion for judgment in the district court. On 

September 7 the court entered a judgment against Snap-On for the total 

amount of the award plus interest. 

On September 8 Snap-On mailed a check in the amount of 

$115,962.58 to Schadendorf’s attorney. Snap-On’s attorney 

acknowledged in his transmittal letter that because the check was late he 

was requesting an additional check to cover the remaining balance. 

Schadendorf’s attorney received the check for $115,962.58 on September 

9. On September 14 Schadendorf’s attorney wrote another letter to 

Snap-On indicating that they still owed $2442.76. The attorney also 

indicated that the per diem interest rate was $.70. 

On September 24 Snap-On made a payment of $2442.76, which 

was acknowledged by Schadendorf’s attorney. In addition to 

acknowledging receipt of the check, Schadendorf’s attorney informed 

Snap-On that there was another $10.04 due. On September 29 Snap-On 

mailed a check in the amount of $10.07 to Schadendorf’s attorney. On 

September 30, 1999, Schadendorf dismissed her petition for judicial 

review and satisfied the judgment she had transcribed to the district 

court. We will set out additional facts as they relate to the issues. 
4

II. Prior Proceedings.

Schadendorf filed a review-reopening petition claiming penalty 

benefits under Iowa Code section 86.13 for Snap-On’s delay in payment 

of benefits as originally awarded on July 26, 1999. On May 15, 2001, a 

deputy workers’ compensation commissioner filed her decision. The 

deputy determined Schadendorf was entitled to a penalty benefit of 

$36,083.16. The deputy found the delay in paying the award was 

unreasonable. She determined that the penalty benefit should be the 

maximum allowed by law, fifty percent of the amount of benefits that 

were unreasonably delayed. She limited the fifty percent penalty benefits 

award to the principal amount of the July 26, 1999, award because in 

Davidson v. Bruce, 594 N.W.2d 833, 840 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999), the court 

of appeals held penalty benefits were not available for delayed payments 

of interest. This decision was appealed within the agency. 

On January 30, 2002, the commissioner issued a final decision. 

The commissioner determined as a matter of law there can be no penalty 

benefits awarded while a petition for judicial review is pending because 

there can be no delay in payment during the pendency of the judicial 

review decision. Alternatively, the commissioner found if the benefits 

were payable, the delay was not unreasonable because of the pending 

judicial review petition. Schadendorf filed a petition for judicial review. 

On October 28, 2002, the district court reversed that part of the 

commissioner’s decision holding the filing of a petition for judicial review 

excuses a party from paying benefits because the Code provides for a 

stay during the appeal process. This decision was appealed to the 

supreme court. We assigned the case to our court of appeals. The court 

of appeals found the payments due to Schadendorf were due long before 

the July 26, 1999, decision. It held that a penalty benefit could be 
5

assessed if there was unreasonable delay in making payments under 

Iowa Code section 86.13. The court of appeals determined the delay was 

reasonable until the July 26 decision was filed because the amount due 

prior to that date was fairly debatable. The court of appeals remanded 

the decision back to the commissioner to determine whether the delay 

after July 26 was unreasonable under the evidence. 

On August 25, 2005, the commissioner issued a remand decision. 

The commissioner held that there was no unreasonable delay until 

August 25, 1999, the date used in Schadendorf’s August 9 letter to 

calculate the amount of benefits and interest due under the decision. 

The commissioner held the delay was unreasonable after August 25. 

Accordingly, the commissioner found an unreasonable delay for fourteen, 

twenty-nine, and thirty-five days respectively. The commissioner 

awarded a $10,000 penalty benefit for the delay. In determining the 

amount of penalty benefits to award Schadendorf, the commissioner only 

considered the benefits awarded and not the interest due on the benefits. 

Schadendorf filed a petition for judicial review. Snap-On filed a crosspetition for judicial review. 

On July 28, 2006, the district court entered its judicial review 

decision. The district court found no evidence to support the finding that 

the delay in paying benefits was reasonable prior to August 25, 1999. It 

remanded the case to the commissioner for determination of the 

reasonableness of the delay from July 27 until August 25. The district 

court affirmed the $10,000 penalty benefit for the delay after August 25. 

Schadendorf argued in the district court that interest on the penalty 

benefit should begin to run from the May 2001 decision of the deputy, 

the date the deputy first awarded a penalty benefit, rather than from the 

remand decision. The district court determined interest ran from 
6

August 25, 2005, the date of the remand decision. Finally, the district 

court held penalty benefits are not available on delayed payments of 

interest even if the interest payments were unreasonably delayed. Both 

Schadendorf and Snap-On have appealed this decision. 

III. Issues. 

To decide this appeal, we need to address the following issues 

raised by the parties: (1) whether the district court was correct to remand 

the case to the commissioner to determine whether penalty benefits were 

due prior to August 25, 1999; (2) whether substantial evidence supports 

the award of penalty benefits after August 25, 1999; (3) whether 

Schadendorf is entitled to penalty benefits on the interest due on her 

benefits if the payment of this interest has been unreasonably delayed; 

and (4) whether interest on the penalty benefit award runs from the date 

of the deputy’s decision or from the date of the commissioner’s remand 

decision. 

IV. Commissioner’s Award of Penalty Benefits. 

Section 17A.19(10) of the Code governs the standard upon which 

we review a decision of the commissioner. It is well settled that “ ‘[t]he 

interpretation of workers’ compensation statutes and related case law 

has not been clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the 

agency.’ ” Lakeside Casino v. Blue, 743 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 2007) 

(citation omitted). Therefore, when we interpret a workers’ compensation 

statute we will not give the commissioner’s interpretation of the law 

deference and are free to substitute our own judgment. Id.; see also Iowa 

Code § 17A.19(10)(c) (1999 Supp.). 

When reviewing the agency’s factual determinations, we determine 

whether the factual determinations are based on “substantial evidence in 

the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa 
7

Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (1999 Supp.). The Code defines “substantial 

evidence” as 

[T]he quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed 

sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to 

establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting 

from the establishment of that fact are understood to be 

serious and of great importance. 

Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). The factual determinations made by the workers’ 

compensation commissioner are “ ‘clearly vested by a provision of law in 

the discretion of the agency,’ ” together with the application of the law to 

those facts. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 465 (Iowa 2004) 

(citation omitted). When applying the “substantial evidence” standard to 

the agency’s fact-finding, we must give the agency the appropriate 

discretion. Id. We review an agency’s decision to determine whether its 

application of the law to the facts was “ ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly 

unjustifiable.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). This standard of review affords 

appropriate deference to the agency. Id. 

The commissioner may award penalty benefits on benefits that 

were unreasonably delayed or denied. Iowa Code § 86.13. The Code 

provides in relevant part that 

[i]f a delay in commencement or termination of benefits 

occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse, the 

workers’ compensation commissioner shall award benefits in 

addition to those benefits payable under this chapter, or 

chapter 85, 85A, or 85B, up to fifty percent of the amount of 

benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied. 

Id. To receive a penalty benefit award under section 86.13, the claimant 

must first establish a delay in the payment of benefits. Keystone Nursing 

Care Ctr. v Craddock, 705 N.W.2d 299, 307 (Iowa 2005). The burden 

then shifts to the employer to prove a reasonable cause or excuse for the 
8

delay. Christensen v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 554 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Iowa 

1996). 

We will divide our analysis of the commissioner’s award of the 

penalty benefits issue into two sections. In the first section, we will 

discuss the commissioner’s decision not to award penalty benefits for the 

period between July 26, 1999, the date of the decision awarding benefits, 

and August 25, 1999. In the second section, we will discuss whether 

substantial evidence supports the award for penalty benefits for the 

period between August 26, 1999, to the date the benefits were paid, 

September 29, 1999. 

A. Whether the Commissioner Erred by Not Awarding Penalty 

Benefits for the Time Period From July 26, 1999, to August 25, 

1999. The commissioner found Snap-On did not introduce evidence 

providing a reasonable cause or excuse for delaying payment to 

August 25, 1999. However, the commissioner reviewed the entire record, 

including the evidence introduced by Schadendorf, and determined the 

delay until August 25 was reasonable. The district court reversed this 

decision because Snap-On had not provided any evidence that the 

reasonable cause or excuse found by the commissioner was in fact the 

reason for its delayed payment. 

We review the record as a whole to determine if substantial 

evidence exists to support the commissioner’s findings of fact. Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(f). Accordingly, we consider all the evidence introduced, not 

just the evidence introduced by Snap-On, to determine if Snap-On met 

its burden and established that it had reasonable cause or excuse to 

delay the payment of benefits until August 25, 1999. 

The commissioner handed down the decision awarding 

compensatory benefits on July 26, 1999, and mailed it to each party’s 
9

attorney on that date. As testified to by the Snap-On representative, 

Snap-On had to make a decision whether to appeal the award or pay it. 

If Snap-On decided to pay the award, it would have to request the funds 

from its home office. No one disagrees that it would have taken some 

period of time for Snap-On to pay the award if it decided not to appeal. 

Therefore, the question is whether it was reasonable for Snap-on to delay 

paying the award before August 25. On our review of the record, we find 

substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that the delay 

was reasonable. 

Schadendorf’s August 9 letter calculated the amount owed under 

the July 26 decision, including interest and costs as of August 25. The 

letter gave Snap-On until August 18 to make a decision as to whether to 

pay the amount owed, or else Schadendorf would seek judicial review of 

the commissioner’s decision. On August 16 Snap-On informed 

Schadendorf’s attorney that it would pay the award. On August 18 

Schadendorf’s attorney informed Snap-On that if payment was not 

received by August 24, he would file a judicial review action to protect his 

client’s rights. The correspondence between the parties constitutes 

substantial evidence that Schadendorf considered August 25 a 

reasonable time in which to receive payment of her benefits. 

Thus, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the 

commissioner’s finding in its August 25, 2005, remand decision that 

[i]n view of the communication from claimant’s counsel on 

August 9, 1999, that requested payment as of August 25, 

1999, the delay up to August 25, 1999, was reasonable. 

While employer likely should have acted sooner and issued 

payment on its own initiative before receiving the August 9, 

1999, request from claimant’s counsel, its failure to do so 

does not warrant a penalty in view of the totality of the 

circumstances. It is necessary to select a day in the future 

for payment due to the need to calculate interest and process 

payments. That inevitably causes some reasonable delay, 
10

though not unlimited justification. The parties were 

communicating and cooperating regarding determining the 

correct amount owed and delay due to that type of 

interaction was not unreasonable. 

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court remanding 

the case back to the commissioner to determine penalty benefits for the 

period from July 26, 1999, to August 25, 1999, and affirm the decision of 

the commissioner not to award such benefits during that period. 

B. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the Award of 

Penalty Benefits From August 26, 1999, to September 29, 1999. In 

making its findings that the delay in the payment of benefits was 

unreasonably delayed after August 26, 1999, the commissioner found: 

It was not reasonable for employer to ignore the impact of 

interest accruing from August 25, 1999, until it issued 

payment on September 8, 1999. Those adjusting workers’ 

compensation claims are held to know the requirements and 

to be capable of performing routine mathematical 

calculations, including computing interest. While absolute 

perfection is not required, substantial compliance is 

expected. Claimant established that employer did not pay 

the compensation award until September 8, 1999, 

September 23, 1999, and September 29, 1999. The period of 

reasonable delay ended August 25, 1999. Claimant’s 

payments were unreasonably delayed in the amount of 14 

days, 29 days, and 35 days. 

The commissioner then awarded Schadendorf a $10,000 penalty benefit 

for the delay. 

Snap-On argues substantial evidence does not support a finding of 

unreasonable delay. We disagree with Snap-On. We agree with the 

commissioner that there is no evidence in the record supporting SnapOn’s claim its delay was reasonable after August 25. Therefore, Snap-On 

failed to carry its burden to show that the delay after August 25 was 

reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the district court and 

the commissioner on this issue. 
11

 Snap-On further argues if we find substantial evidence supports a 

finding of unreasonable delay, there is not substantial evidence to 

support the amount assessed. On the other hand, Schadendorf argues 

in her brief that the penalty benefit is too small. As of August 26, SnapOn unreasonably delayed the payment of $72,166.32 in benefits. Even 

though Snap-On made substantial payments on September 8 and 24, 

Snap-On did not pay Schadendorf all of her benefits until September 29 

because the payments made by Snap-On were applied first to interest 

and then to unpaid benefits. Christensen, 554 N.W.2d at 259. 

 The maximum penalty benefit allowed is fifty percent of the 

amount of benefits that were unreasonably delayed. Iowa Code § 86.13. 

Thus, the maximum penalty benefit allowed by law was $36,083.16. The 

factors the commissioner should consider when awarding penalty 

benefits are “the length of the delay, the number of the delays, the 

information available to the employer regarding the employee’s injuries 

and wages, and the prior penalties imposed against the employer under 

section 86.13.” Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 238 

(Iowa 1996). 

 The record establishes that on July 26, 1999, the commissioner 

determined the amount of benefits Schadendorf was due for her workrelated injury. The August 9 letter from Schadendorf’s attorney 

calculated the amount due with interest as of August 25. On August 16, 

Snap-On agreed with the calculations and informed Schadendorf that it 

would be paying Schadendorf the amount as calculated. Without any 

explanation as to the delay, Snap-On did not make its payment until 

September 8. When it made its payment, it failed to include all of the 

amounts due. It took two more letters from Schadendorf’s attorney to get 

Snap-On to pay Schadendorf all of her benefits. The record also 
12

disclosed this was not the first time Snap-On failed to pay benefits. As 

the commissioner noted in his decision, Snap-On has been the subject of 

several cases where a penalty benefit was imposed for its unreasonable 

delay in paying benefits. 

Just because the interpretation of the evidence is open to a fair 

difference of opinion does not mean the commissioner’s decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence. ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of 

Natural Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2004). An appellate court 

should not consider evidence insubstantial merely because the court 

may draw different conclusions from the record. Fischer v. City of Sioux 

City, 695 N.W.2d 31, 33–34 (Iowa 2005). Balancing the short delay in 

payment of benefits with Snap-On’s repeated conduct of unreasonably 

delaying benefits in this and other cases, substantial evidence supports 

the amount of the penalty benefit awarded by the commissioner. 

Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the district court and the 

commissioner on the amount of the penalty benefit awarded after 

August 25, 1999. 

V. Whether Schadendorf is Entitled to Penalty Benefits on the 

Interest Due on Her Benefits if the Payment of This Interest has 

Been Unreasonably Delayed. 

To decide this issue we must interpret section 86.13. Thus, we will 

not give the commissioner’s interpretation of the law deference and are 

free to substitute our own judgment as to the interpretation of the 

statute. Lakeside Casino, 743 N.W.2d at 173; see also Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(c). 

The Code provides for a penalty benefit to be assessed against the 

employer if the “commencement or termination of benefits occurs without 

reasonable or probable cause or excuse.” Iowa Code § 86.13. To resolve 
13

whether Schadendorf is entitled to penalty benefits for an unreasonable 

delay in the payment of the interest due on her benefits, we must 

determine whether the word “benefits” in section 86.13 includes interest 

due on the benefits awarded. 

When confronted with the task of determining the meaning of a 

statute, we have stated: 

The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative 

intent. We determine legislative intent from the words 

chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have 

said. Absent a statutory definition or an established 

meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their 

ordinary and common meaning by considering the context 

within which they are used. Under the guise of 

construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge 

or otherwise change the meaning of a statute. 

Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) 

(citations omitted). The interpretation of a statute requires an 

assessment of the statute in its entirety, not just isolated words or 

phrases. State v. Young, 686 N.W.2d 182, 184–85 (Iowa 2004). Indeed, 

“we avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that portions of it become 

redundant or irrelevant.” T & K Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 593 

N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted). We look for a reasonable 

interpretation that best achieves the statute’s purpose and avoids absurd 

results. Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1989). 

 The first indication that the legislature did not intend the word 

“benefits” in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of 

compensation can be seen from the plain meaning of the words “benefit” 

and “interest.” A “benefit” is defined as “[f]inancial assistance that is 

received from an employer, insurance, or a public program (such as 

social security) in time of sickness, disability, or unemployment.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 151 (7th ed. 1999). “Interest” is defined as “[t]he 
14

compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for the use or 

detention of money, or for the loss of money by one who is entitled to its 

use. . . .” Id. at 816. 

Under these definitions, the benefits awarded in this case were for 

temporary partial permanent disability, healing period compensation, 

and permanent partial disability. The amount of these benefits total 

$72,166.32. Any additional sums due and owing Schadendorf were for 

the loss of use of these benefits or interest on the benefits. A “benefit” is 

distinct and separate from “interest” due on a benefit. Therefore, the 

plain meaning of the terms “benefit” and “interest” leads us to believe 

compensation due for loss of use of a benefit due by the employer is not 

a “benefit” under section 86.13. 

 The second indication that the legislature did not intend the word 

“benefits” in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of 

compensation is the statutory scheme of the workers’ compensation 

statutes. Chapter 85 lists the various benefits due to an injured worker. 

See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 85.27 (providing medical benefits); 85.28 

(providing burial expenses); 85.31 (providing benefits in death cases); 

85.33 (providing temporary total and temporary partial disability 

benefits); and 85.34 (providing permanent disability benefits). On the 

other hand, chapter 85 has a separate provision for interest. Id. § 85.30. 

Section 85.30 provides “if [compensation payments are] not paid when 

due, there shall be added to the weekly compensation payments, interest 

at the rate provided in section 535.3 for court judgments and decrees.” 

Id. This separate treatment of benefits and interest by the legislature 

indicates that it did not intend the word “benefits” in section 86.13 to 

include the interest due on an award of compensation. 
15

 Finally, the legislative history of a statute is instructive of 

legislative intent. State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 431–32 (Iowa 

2006). The legislative history of section 86.13 indicates the legislature 

did not intend the word “benefits” in section 86.13 to include the interest 

due on an award of compensation. In the explanation to the bill enacting 

section 86.13, the committee on labor and industrial relations of the 

senate stated “section [86.13] gives the commissioner the authority to 

award penalty benefits if regular benefits were unreasonably delayed or 

denied.” S.F. 539 Explanation, 77th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 

1982). The explanation does not include any provision for penalty 

benefits on interest due on regular benefits. 

 Based on the plain meaning of the word “benefit,” the statutory 

scheme used by the legislature to award benefits and interest on those 

benefits, and the legislative history of section 86.13, we find the 

legislature did not intend the word “benefits” in section 86.13 to include 

the interest due on an award of compensation. Consequently, the 

commissioner was correct in not awarding a penalty benefit on the 

interest due on the benefits he awarded Schadendorf in his July 26, 

1999, decision. 

VI. Whether Interest on the Penalty Benefits Award Runs 

From the Date of the Deputy’s Decision or From the Date of the 

Commissioner’s Remand Decision. 

Schadendorf claims interest on her award of penalty benefits 

should have started to run from the May 15, 2001, decision by a deputy 

workers’ compensation commissioner awarding her penalty benefits. We 

disagree. 

 The decision of the commissioner is the final agency action. Iowa 

Code § 86.24(5). The commissioner overturned the May 15 decision of 
16

the deputy awarding penalty benefits. Thus, as of May 15, there was no 

final agency action awarding Schadendorf penalty benefits. Because 

nothing was due, we cannot assess interest from May 15. Final agency 

action awarding penalty benefits did not occur until the commissioner 

issued his remand decision on August 25, 2005. Therefore, the district 

court and the commissioner were correct in awarding interest on these 

penalty benefits from August 25. 

VII. Disposition. 

Because the claimant is not entitled to any further penalty 

benefits, we reverse the district court’s remand of the case to the 

workers’ compensation commissioner to determine if further penalty 

benefits should be awarded. We affirm the remainder of the district 

court’s decision. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court to 

enter judgment affirming the August 25, 2005, remand decision of the 

workers’ compensation commissioner. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 

 All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.