COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judge McClanahan and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

SAMUEL GOCHEZ 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1178-07-3 JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 

OCTOBER 7, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PATRICK COUNTY 

Martin F. Clark, Jr., Judge 

 James R. McGarry (Young, Haskins, Mann, Gregory, McGarry & 

Wall, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Samuel Gochez appeals his conviction of involuntary manslaughter. He argues the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On appeal, we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003) (citation omitted). 

That principle requires us to “‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and 

all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.’” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 

254, 584 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 

335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998)). See also Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 

147-48, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008); Molina v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 666, 671, 636 S.E.2d 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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470, 473 (2006); Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005); Walton 

v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 425-26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998).1

Gochez drove his car to Ashley Martin’s home and picked up Martin and Billy Jo Angel 

to take them to a friend’s house to retrieve personal items Martin and Angel left there the 

previous night. After they left the Martin house, Gochez ran out of gas. Martin’s mother drove 

by, picked them up, and took them back to the Martin house. Angel described Gochez as being 

in a “really ill mood” and “really aggravated” at that time. Martin’s mother gave Gochez a jug 

of gas, and Gochez, Martin, and Angel returned to the Gochez vehicle where Gochez put the gas 

in his tank. Gochez, along with Martin and Angel, drove to a convenience store/gas station 

where Gochez purchased additional gas that he put in his car. Gochez left the convenience store 

spinning his tires loudly enough for a store employee inside to hear the squealing. Angel told 

Gochez to take them back to Martin’s house because “he was in just such an ill mood [she] 

didn’t even want to go get [their] stuff.” According to Angel, they “left the store and [Gochez] 

was mad.” As they headed south back to the Martin house, Gochez was driving seventy to 

seventy-five miles per hour on the winding two-lane road with a posted speed limit of fifty-five 

miles per hour. Along that route, a sign was posted showing a maximum safe speed of 

thirty-five miles per hour indicating several curves ahead in the road. There were additional 

“chevron” signs posted along the route indicating the road made a significant right hand turn. 

As Gochez was driving south to Martin’s home, Anthony Trent was driving a rescue 

squad vehicle in the northbound lane. Trent and his passenger, Lester Harrell, had just come 

through a curve in the road and crossed a bridge as they topped a knoll where Gochez drove 

 1

 Gochez contended at oral argument the trial court’s “personal experience [with the 

road] colored his hearing of the evidence.” Gochez did not make this argument in his brief and 

did not object to the trial court’s questioning of the witnesses regarding the location in the road 

where the accident occurred. Therefore we do not consider this argument on appeal. See Rules 

5A:20(e) and 5A:18. 
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across the center line about two feet and ran them off the road. Gochez then “jerked” his vehicle 

back into his own lane. Kenneth Charles Marshall was also driving his vehicle in the northbound 

lane and met Gochez as Gochez was coming around a curve after having run the rescue squad 

vehicle off the road. Gochez began to slide sideways causing Marshall to hit his brakes as 

Gochez slid toward Marshall. Gochez then ran off the road to the right, attempted to “jerk it 

back on the road,” ran up onto a bank on the right, flipped several times over and down the 

embankment, finally hitting and knocking off a portion of a bridge.

The accident took place approximately one-half mile from the convenience store. No one 

in the Gochez vehicle was wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident, and all three occupants 

were ejected from the vehicle. Gochez and Angel suffered serious injuries, and Martin was 

killed. The trial court convicted Gochez of involuntary manslaughter and reckless driving.2

II. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, Gochez contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 

because his conduct did not exhibit a conscious disregard of human life. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the judgment of the trial court sitting 

without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.” Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242 

Va. 107, 113, 406 S.E.2d 39, 42 (1991). “The trial court’s judgment will not be set aside unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Hunley v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 556, 

559, 518 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1999). “The credibility of a witness and the inferences to be drawn 

from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s determination.” Marable v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). “This Court does not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Hunley v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. at 

559, 518 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220 

 2

 Gochez only challenges the manslaughter conviction. 
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(1992)). The only relevant inquiry is “whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 7, 602 

S.E.2d 402, 405 (2004) (citation and footnote omitted); Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 

250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc). 

Involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor vehicle is an “‘accidental killing 

which, although unintended, is the proximate result of negligence so gross, wanton, and culpable 

as to show a reckless disregard of human life.’” Greenway v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 147, 154, 

487 S.E.2d 224, 228 (1997) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 607, 231 S.E.2d 312, 

316 (1977)). A “violation of the statutes defining reckless driving and prescribing motor vehicle 

traffic regulations is insufficient” to constitute manslaughter “unless it is so flagrant, culpable, 

and wanton as to show utter disregard of the safety of others under circumstances likely to cause 

injury.” King, 217 Va. at 605-06, 231 S.E.2d at 316. 

What distinguishes a speeding violation from the misdemeanor of 

reckless driving, and the misdemeanor from the felony of 

involuntary manslaughter, is the likelihood of injury to other users 

of the highways. And the degree of the hazard posed by a 

speeding automobile depends upon the circumstances in each case. 

Mayo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 644, 648, 238 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1977). In analyzing the level 

of disregard to others, we must consider the cumulative effect of the defendant’s negligent acts. 

In determining whether or not one is guilty of gross and 

culpable negligence, it is important to consider the cumulative 

effect of a series of connected, or independent negligent acts, out 

of which arise the injuries, as showing the attitude of the offender. 

All of the immediate acts and actions of the offender presenting a 

causal relation to the injury and a part of the res gestae are 

pertinent to the inquiry. A disregard of all, or of several simple 

and primary rules of conduct prescribed by law for the benefit of 

society becomes the more aggravated as the disregard increases in 

extent. 

Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597, 609, 195 S.E. 675, 680 (1938). 
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 The record supports the trial court’s judgment. Gochez left the convenience store 

spinning his tires in an angry state of mind as evidenced by witness testimony. His ill mood 

influenced his conduct as he drove fifteen to twenty miles per hour over the speed limit and 

thirty-five to forty miles per hour over the posted maximum safe speed on a narrow and curvy 

two-lane road in the face of warning signs indicating the approaching turns. Gochez continued 

driving in this reckless manner despite the posted warning signs and even after running another 

vehicle off the road – hardly “keeping a proper lookout” as he contends in his “question 

presented.”3

 Instead of heeding these warnings, Gochez continued on in this manner without 

decreasing his speed, thus increasing the likelihood of injury to others using the roadway and his 

own passengers.

4

 All of these actions caused Gochez to lose control of his vehicle resulting in 

the accident and death of Martin. 5 Viewed in the context of these circumstances, the evidence 

3

 The “question presented” states: 

Did the Trial Court err in not granting the Appellant’s Motion to 

Strike and in finding the Appellant guilty of Involuntary 

Manslaughter when the Commonwealth’s evidence showed that 

the Appellant, although exceeding the speed limit, was keeping a 

proper lookout, corrected his steering when faced with an 

oncoming hazard, and actively tried to avoid the crash that killed 

the decedent, so that the cumulative effect of his actions did not 

amount to a conscious disregard for human life? 

4

 Though Gochez contends he was “actively trying to avoid the crash” in bringing his 

vehicle back into his lane after running the rescue squad vehicle off of the road, this argument 

ignores his own culpability in bringing about the chain of events that resulted in the accident. As 

the trial court aptly noted, after losing control of a vehicle, there is probably not a “single case 

where people just throw up their hands and say, ‘I’m just gonna let it go,’” without trying to gain 

back control of the vehicle. 

5

 Gochez claims the trial court did not correctly recollect the evidence when it stated the 

“chevron” signs were posted at a location after the point at which Gochez ran the rescue vehicle 

off of the road. The location of the signs – whether before or after the near miss with the rescue 

vehicle – does not affect our analysis. Gochez also contends the trial court did not correctly 

recollect the evidence when it found the near miss with the rescue squad vehicle occurred in a 

“straight stretch” rather than a curve. Harrell testified Gochez ran him and Trent off the road as 

they topped a knoll in the road at which point there is a straight stretch before entering the curve 
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supports the conclusion that Gochez “showed a reckless disregard for human life constituting 

criminal negligence sufficient to support the conviction[] for involuntary manslaughter.” 

Greenway, 254 Va. at 155, 487 S.E.2d at 229. 6

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.

 

at the bridge. Thus, the trial court’s finding in this regard is supported by witness testimony. 

Nevertheless, the contour of the road at this precise location also has no bearing on our analysis. 

6

 Gochez argues his conduct does not constitute a “persistent” course of conduct 

necessary to show the level of criminal negligence needed to support an involuntary 

manslaughter conviction because the accident occurred only one-half mile from the convenience 

store. But the Supreme Court of Virginia has not limited criminal negligence to cases involving 

conduct taking place over a specified period of time or distance. To the contrary, the Court has 

found the existence of criminal negligence when a defendant has engaged in a single negligent 

act showing a reckless disregard of life. See, e.g., Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 415 

S.E.2d 218 (1992); Fadely v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 198, 156 S.E.2d 773 (1967); Richardson 

v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 55, 63 S.E.2d 731 (1951).