*

 The Honorable Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by

designation. 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0359p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

DANIEL ALBERT NEWMAN,

 Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

LINDA METRISH, Warden,

 Respondent-Appellant.

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No. 07-1782

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.

No. 04-74582—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.

Argued: July 24, 2008

Decided and Filed: October 6, 2008 

Before: MOORE and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas C. Cameron, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Bradley R. Hall, FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE, Detroit,

Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Raina I. Korbakis, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN

ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Bradley R. Hall, Andrew N. Wise,

FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. Daniel Albert Newman,

Kincheloe, Michigan, pro se.

ALDRICH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MOORE, J., joined. SUTTON,

J. (pp. 6-9), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION _________________

ANN ALDRICH, District Judge. The State of Michigan appeals a judgment granting Daniel

Albert Newman’s application for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction. Because there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence

placing Newman at the scene of the crime, we affirm.

1
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 2

1

 Although the strength of some of this evidence was called into question by other testimony, at this stage of

review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Accordingly, such testimony is not

discussed here.

I. Background

A. The crime

In February of 1992, Henry Chappelear (“Chappelear”) was fatally shot during the robbery

of his home. Chappelear, a known drug dealer, regularly stored marijuana in his freezer. On the day

of the murder, one of Chappelear’s friends came to his house, noticed a porch lightbulb removed and

smashed on the ground, and entered the house. Inside, the friend saw the open freezer door,

discovered Chappelear’s dead body, and called the police. (J.A. 707.) Evidence recovered from the

scene established that Chappelear was shot by a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9-millimeter handgun. 

The day after the homicide, two men found a gym bag by the side of the road that contained

a jean jacket, a 9-millimeter handgun, a sawed-off shotgun with tape wrapped around the grip, a skimask-type hat, two walkie-talkies, and some gloves. (J.A. 131-37.) The bag and its contents were

turned over to the police. Subsequent analysis of the items strongly suggested that they belonged

to Newman and had been used in Chappelear’s murder. 

B. Trial

Newman was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury for first-degree premeditated murder

and felony firearm. 

At trial, the prosecution sought to prove that Newman had planned to rob and kill Chappelear

by introducing evidence that Newman had intended to rob drug dealers for drugs or money, that

Chappelear was a known drug dealer who stored drugs in his freezer, that Newman may have

ordered drugs from Chappelear in the past, and that Chappelear’s freezer was open and empty after

the homicide. In addition, the prosecution attempted to establish a motive by offering testimony that

Newman had previously seen Chappelear make a pass at his girlfriend.

The prosecution also introduced evidence supporting an inference that Newman had

possessed the murder weapons. First, hairs found on the ski-mask were found to match all visual

characteristics of Newman’s hair and the hair of one of his dogs. Second, evidence was introduced

that a hacksaw had been seized from Newman’s home, and there were markings on the shotgun

barrel and stock that were not inconsistent with markings that could have been created by a hacksaw.

Third, twine found in the gym bag was similar to twine seized from Newman’s house. Fourth,

debris found inside the gym bag and on the jean jacket chemically and visually matched a container

of drywall seized from the car of Newman’s girlfriend. Fifth, a firearms expert testified that the

spent cartridges and bullet recovered from Chappelear’s body matched the 9-millimeter handgun

found in the gym bag. Last, testimony established that the gun used in the homicide had been

purchased by Newman in 1991, and that a friend of his had seen a similar gun in Newman’s home

a couple of weeks prior to the homicide. However, the friend could not say for sure that the murder

weapon was the same one that she had seen because it was dark and the gun was in a laundry bin.1

Although the prosecution offered ample evidence to support an inference that Newman had

previously possessed at least one of the murder weapons, the prosecution did not offer any evidence

that Newman had used or possessed the weapons on the day of the murder. There was no

eyewitness testimony, nor were the police able to recover any latent fingerprints from the crime

scene or the items in the gym bag.
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 3

2

 Newman raised other arguments before the Michigan Court of Appeals which are not at issue here.

3

 Newman’s application raised other grounds for relief that are not at issue here.

Newman did not testify. Instead, he called several witnesses to establish an alibi. 

Newman’s conviction for first-degree murder was subsequently vacated, and an order of

second-degree murder was entered in its stead.

C. Direct appeal and post-conviction relief in state court

Newman appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that there was

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. In an opinion dated July 2, 1999, the Michigan Court

of Appeals denied his appeal because “[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution . . . a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt” all of the

elements of the crimes. (J.A. 679.) 

The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the lack of eyewitnesses was not dispositive,

stating that the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to “support an inference beyond a

reasonable doubt that [Newman] either committed the murder himself or aided and abetted in its

commission.” (J.A. 679.) Accordingly, the court affirmed Newman’s convictions and denied his

motion for a rehearing.2

 

Newman was subsequently denied post-conviction relief in the state trial and appellate

courts.

D. Application for a writ of habeas corpus 

Having exhausted the remedies available to him in state court, Newman filed an application

for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he

participated in the murder, either directly or as an aider and abettor.3 Upon review, the district court

found that the Michigan Court of Appeals had failed to consider three important pieces of evidence,

that the prosecution had failed to establish a solid chain of inferences at trial, and that there was no

evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime. Newman v. Metrish, 492 F. Supp. 2d 721, 730-

31 (E.D. Mich. 2007). Accordingly, the district court determined that the Michigan Court of

Appeals had not reasonably applied the standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, noting that

although the facts relied on by the court of appeals “may have supported a ‘reasonable speculation’

that [Newman] participated in the murder,” they did “not amount to proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 729, 732. Thus, the district court unconditionally granted Newman’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing a district court order granting an application for a writ of habeas corpus relief,

we review legal conclusions de novo. Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 257 (6th Cir. 2005). Although

we generally review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, we review de novo “when

the district court’s decision in a habeas case is based on a transcript from the petitioner’s state court

trial, and the district court thus makes no credibility determination or other apparent finding of fact.”

King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).

Newman’s application is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that his application for a writ of habeas corpus:
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 4

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). 

At issue here is whether the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals involved such an

“unreasonable application” of federal law. A district court may not issue a writ upon concluding

only that the state court applied the law erroneously or incorrectly. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 410 (2000). “Rather, that application must also be unreasonable,” meaning that the state court

“unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 411, 413.

III. Discussion

At issue here is whether the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Under Jackson, habeas relief is warranted “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational

trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324. In considering

whether there was sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable

doubt as to every element of the crime, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution. Id. at 319.

The Jackson standard is as easy to articulate as it is difficult to apply. Where there is only

circumstantial evidence available, as in the instant case, this ineffable standard is especially

challenging, and even more so when that evidence supports a host of permissible inferences.

As a starting point, we note that “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a

conviction, and it is not necessary for the evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except

that of guilt.” Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 992 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). In Johnson, we found Johnson’s conviction to be fully supported by circumstantial evidence where (1) he had

been angry with the victim and was the last known person to see her alive, (2) her body was found

near an off-road trail that Johnson had discovered recently, and was near a piece of carpet from

Johnson’s car, (3) Johnson exhibited a series of erratic and suspicious behaviors after the victim

disappeared, and (4) Johnson confessed to the murder several times. Id. at 991-92.

Although circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction, there are times that it

amounts to only a reasonable speculation and not to sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (evidence that Parker was in a car containing guns with men who

planned a murder was too speculative to support a finding that Parker constructively possessed the

firearm); Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding evidence that Brown was

present at the scene and had some acquaintance with the perpetrator insufficient to support a

conviction of armed robbery and car-jacking under an aiding and abetting theory); Fuller v.

Anderson, 662 F.2d 420, 423-24 (6th Cir. 1981) (verdict for felony murder not supported by

evidence showing only that Fuller was present at the scene of the arson where evidence did not

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuller consciously acted to aid in the arson); Hopson v.

Foltz, No. 86-1155, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6596, at *5 (6th Cir. May 20, 1987) (evidence

insufficient to support conviction of second-degree murder on theory of aiding and abetting where

there was no proof “that Hopson acted in pre-concert with [the shooter] to commit the murder or that

he said or did anything to support, encourage, or incite the commission of the crime.”).

Here, if we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there

remains reasonable doubt because we are limited by what inferences reason will allow us to draw.

We can infer only that Newman intended to rob a drug dealer and knew that Chappelear was a drug
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 5

4

 For example, if the witness had observed the gun in Newman’s house only a day before the homicide and had

been more certain that it was indeed the same gun as that used in the homicide, there would be a stronger inference that

Newman was present. With these hypothetical facts, Newman’s petition would more closely resemble those made in

cases where circumstantial evidence did satisfy the Jackson standard. See, e.g., Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780,

788-89 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a sufficiency challenge brought by a defendant whose murder conviction was based

on circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony placing him near the scene of the crime on the morning of

the murder); Apanovitch v. Houk, 466 F.3d 460, 488-89 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a sufficiency challenge by a defendant

whose murder conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including evidence that the defendant spoke with the

victim about painting her window sills, one of which was used to stab her in the neck approximately eight hours later).

dealer, that a gun previously owned by Newman was used to kill Chappelear, and that a similar

looking gun was seen in Newman’s home approximately two weeks before the murder. However,

the witness who saw the gun said she could not say for sure that it was the same one used in the

homicide because the gun was in a laundry bin and it was dark. Further, even assuming that

Newman’s gun was indeed the one used in the homicide, there was no evidence of what happened

to it between that date and the date of the homicide, and we need not speculate as to what might have

happened.4 Although the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of

guilt, it must be enough for any rational trier of fact to have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. 

Although there is a wealth of information showing that Newman owned the gun,

conspicuously absent is any evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime. There was neither

eyewitness testimony, nor were any fingerprints recovered. Without additional evidence placing

him at the scene of the crime, there is only a reasonable speculation that Newman himself was

present. 

IV. Conclusion

There is no bright line test to determine when facts amount to only a reasonable speculation

and not to sufficient evidence. However, where the evidence taken in the light most favorable to

the prosecution creates only a reasonable speculation that a defendant was present at the crime, there

is insufficient evidence to satisfy the Jackson standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the Michigan

Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and the decision of the district

court granting a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 6

_______________

DISSENT _______________

SUTTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. There is another way to look at this case. The question

at hand is whether, as AEDPA demands, the state courts’ affirmance of this conviction amounted

to “an unreasonable application” of “clearly established” United States Supreme Court precedent.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The clearly established federal rule asks not whether we “believe[] that the

evidence at the trial established guilt,” but “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979) (internal

quotation marks omitted). And in asking whether the state courts reasonably concluded that “any

rational trier of fact” fairly could have convicted this defendant, we may rely on circumstantial

evidence of guilt. See United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 181–82 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Ample evidence showed that Newman was the killer.

Newman Owned One of the Murder Weapons. Start with the uncontradicted fact that

Newman owned one of the two guns used to kill Chappelear. Five months before the murder, he

purchased a Ruger 9-millimeter handgun, which conclusively matched at least one of the cartridges

found at the crime scene and one of the bullets recovered from Chappelear’s body. No evidence

introduced at trial showed, or even hinted, that Chappelear did not still own and possess the gun on

the day of the murder. And the jury heard evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, showed that he still possessed the handgun when Chappelear was murdered. One

of Newman’s girlfriends, Patricia Mueth, saw a “similar” handgun in his laundry hamper just a week

or two before the killing. JA 562–63.

Evidence Connected the Murderer’s Gym Bag to Newman. The day after the murder, two

hunters found an abandoned gym bag that contained all of the tools of the murder. The gym bag not

only contained Newman’s 9-millimeter handgun, but it also contained other items used by the

murderer and linked to Newman: (1) a ski mask with hairs similar to Newman’s and the hair on one

of his two dogs, (2) a jean jacket besmirched with debris that visually and chemically matched a

drywall compound recovered from the car Newman was using on the day police arrested him

(Newman was a drywaller) and (3) twine matching twine found in Newman’s home.

Evidence Connected Newman to the Second Murder Weapon. Inside the gym bag was

another link between Newman and the murder. The murderer, the evidence showed, shot

Chappelear not just with Newman’s handgun but also with a 12-gauge shotgun, and the recovered

bag contained a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun. The murderer had cut the shotgun’s wooden stock and

iron barrel and had wrapped the handle with duct tape. When the police investigated Newman’s

home, they discovered duct tape, a hacksaw with wood in the blade’s teeth and a pile of wood and

iron shavings on a workbench in his garage. 

Newman Knew the Victim. Newman knew Chappelear and had visited his home at least once

in the months before the murder. 

Newman Had a Motive. Newman’s own words offer a plausible motive for the killing or at

the least an explanation for his armed presence in Chappelear’s home. According to Mueth,

Newman told her that he wanted to rob some drug dealers, told her that “he wanted guns, drugs,

money, anything that he could use” and implored her “daily” for the names and addresses of

potential targets. JA 568. Newman knew one such target, as it turns out. Having apparently bought

drugs from Chappelear before, Newman knew that he was a drug dealer, and apparently so did
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 7

Chappelear’s killer, as the hiding place where Chappelear stored drugs (his freezer) had been left

open for some time when his body was found.

Newman’s Alibi Suggested Guilt. In claiming that Newman spent the night of the murder

at the bar where his new girlfriend (Nancy Leat) worked, Newman’s defense team added fuel to the

fire. Several witnesses present at the bar that evening testified that, even though they did not recall

whether Newman was present that night, Leat asked them repeatedly to tell police that Newman was

there. Cf. Apanovitch v. Houk, 466 F.3d 460, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting sufficiency

challenge and reciting the evidence relied on by the state court that included the petitioner’s “variety

of inconsistent stories about his whereabouts on the night of the murder”); Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d

557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). 

In the face of this evidence, I am not sure what to say. Newman owned one of the murder

weapons; the other murder weapon—a sawed-off 12-gauge shotgun—was connected to him based

on the metal and wood shavings found in his house; both weapons were found in a gym bag that also

contained hair, twine and drywall compound that matched items from him, his dog, his house and

his car; he knew the victim; he had a motive for robbing the victim and for doing so in well-armed

fashion (the victim was a drug dealer); and his blundering alibi was far more suggestive of guilt than

innocence. The majority may be right that the evidence at trial “support[ed] a host of permissible

inferences,” Maj. Op. at 4—some indicative of guilt, some perhaps not. But this is the answer to

the wrong question, as Jackson asks only whether the jury reasonably could have convicted, not

whether the evidence supported no other possibility.

At any rate, I am hard-pressed to say what that other possibility is and why this fact pattern

compelled a jury—or reviewing state court—to acquit, or in the future would compel a state or

federal trial judge not even to submit the charge to a jury. What after all are the “permissible

inferences” of innocence or, if you will, non-guilt? Is it problematic that Patricia Mueth testified

only that Newman had a “similar” handgun in his laundry hamper a week or two before the killing?

Once we view the evidence the way Jackson commands, Mueth’s testimony means one of two

things: either that, just before the murder, Newman still possessed the Ruger 9-millimeter murder

weapon he bought five months before the slaying or that, just before the murder, he owned a second

handgun that was not “significantly different” from the murder weapon, JA 563; cf. Arnold, 486

F.3d at 182. It is the rare defense attorney who would implore a jury to acquit on the ground that

his client possessed just two handguns similar to the murder weapon immediately before the murder.

Is it problematic, as the district court concluded, that the prosecution’s expert testified that

ballistics tests comparing the sawed-off shotgun with shells found at the scene were inconclusive?

While the prosecution could not conclusively determine that the shotgun found in the gym bag (and

elsewhere connected to Newman through the metal and wood shavings) fired the shells at the crime

scene, no one needed that evidence to convict. Because the abandoned gym bag, found a day after

the murder, already contained one of the verified murder weapons and a ski mask, it hardly required

a leap of logic to deduce that the shotgun found in the same gym bag was the second murder

weapon. Unless, that is, the murderer possessed not just two handguns but two shotguns as

well—and simply chose to leave the unused shotgun in the gym bag with the used 9-millimeter

Ruger while taking the used shotgun with him. Needless to say, this was not defense counsel’s

theory of the case.

Is it problematic, as the majority notes, Maj. Op. at 5, that the police did not find Newman’s

fingerprints at the crime scene? No. The murderer’s gym bag not only contained two weapons and

a ski mask, but it also contained cotton gloves, which would readily explain why no one found

Newman’s fingerprints at the crime scene. 
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 8

Is it problematic that the prosecution relied on the existence of matching twine (found in the

gym bag) and duct tape (found on the sawed-off shotgun)? Yes, if that had been the only evidence

of guilt introduced by the prosecution. But it was not, and the relevance of this evidence was not

in its isolation but in its cumulative effect with the other far-more-damning evidence.

While it is not the prosecution’s burden to disprove every reasonable hypothesis other than

guilt, see Apanovitch, 466 F.3d at 488, I cannot identify a coherent theory of acquittal. Did someone

borrow or steal Newman’s handgun, then place a similar handgun in his laundry hamper, then place

a hacksaw and wood and metal shavings matching the other murder weapon in his house, then place

matching human hair, dog’s hair and drywall compound in the murderer’s gym bag and then

convince Newman’s girlfriend to tell others to support an alibi defense that was not true and easy

to contradict? Or perhaps, less nefariously, no one did any of this, and it was all a remarkable string

of coincidences. Whichever way you slice it, I see nothing unreasonable in the state court’s

conclusion that a rational juror could have found Newman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Our most analogous precedents place serious obstacles in front of reaching a contrary

conclusion. In Matthews, we rejected a sufficiency challenge to a murder conviction where the

evidence showed that the defendant knew one of the victims, was seen in the area before the killing

and tried to pawn a unique ring belonging to another victim a week later. See 319 F.3d at 783–84,

788–89. We held that this evidence sufficed despite an eyewitness’s testimony that the person he

saw stooped over one of the victims “as if to check him out” within moments of hearing the fatal

gunshots was not the defendant. Id. at 783–84 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Apanovitch, we held that, even without AEDPA’s additional layer of deference, the prosecution met its burden

of showing that the defendant committed aggravated murder in the course of attempting to rape the

victim. See 466 F.3d at 488–89. Circumstantial evidence showed that the defendant, who had been

hired by the victim to paint her house, was familiar with the victim’s home, “had made statements

to others of his desire to have sexual relations with her,” spoke with her earlier on the day of the

murder, had a scratch on his face after the murder that was “consistent with” being scratched by a

fingernail, offered inconsistent stories instead of an “adequate” alibi and (along with roughly a third

of the male population) had the same blood type as the perpetrator. Id. And although investigators

found fingerprints at the scene, none of them belonged to the defendant, nor did any other physical

evidence identify him as the culprit. Id. at 464.

The majority’s explanations for its decision do not overcome these obstacles. While the

majority offers several reasons why a rational juror might have found the prosecution’s evidence

unpersuasive, Maj. Op. at 4–5, it offers nothing to show why no rational juror could have found guilt

and nothing to show why that conclusion is not just wrong but unreasonable. While the majority

acknowledges that circumstantial evidence may suffice by itself to sustain a conviction, id. at 4, the

only example it offers involved a defendant who repeatedly confessed to the murder. See Johnson

v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000). While the majority says that the prosecution offered

nothing “placing Newman at the scene of the crime,” Maj. Op. at 3, I wonder why “placing

Newman[’s gun] at the scene of the crime” and establishing that it was one of the murder weapons

does not do the trick—particularly in view of the other evidence linking Newman to the killer’s

abandoned gym bag, his acquaintance with the victim and his desire to rob a drug dealer (like the

victim). 

The majority’s other citations simply reaffirm an age-old rule—“mere presence” at the scene

of a crime does not establish guilt in a joint criminal enterprise, see, e.g., Fuller v. Anderson, 662

F.2d 420, 424 (6th Cir. 1981)—but one with no conceivable application here. Cf. Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “evidence [that] suggested only that [the defendant]

was in a car with men who together planned a murder and that guns were in the car” was insufficient

to support felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm and felony-firearm convictions); Brown v. Palmer, 441

F.3d 347, 349, 352–53 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that evidence that the defendant was “present at the
No. 07-1782 Newman v. Metrish Page 9

scene of the crime,” had “a brief relationship with the carjacker” and left the scene after his own car

was taken by others was insufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting a carjacking);

Hopson v. Foltz, No. 86-1155, 1987 WL 37432, at *2 (6th Cir. May 20, 1987) (sustaining a

sufficiency challenge to a conviction for aiding and abetting murder where the evidence established

the defendant’s presence at the scene, that he “may have argued with the victim” the day before,

“may have known that someone else intended to harm” the victim and may have picked up empty

shell casings after the murder). 

Jackson takes for granted that reasonable minds may differ as to what conclusions a given

set of facts will bear. And AEDPA implores federal judges to respect the different reasonable

inferences that state-court judges may uphold in reviewing sufficiency challenges to state-court

convictions. Because this double dose of deference precludes us from second guessing the jury’s

decision to convict on this record, I respectfully dissent.