alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
f8k120210ex10ii_celsius.htm


Exhibit 10.2


ADDENDUM TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT







This Addendum to Employment Agreement is made on this 2nd day of December, 2010, between Celsius Holdings, Inc. (“Employer”) and Geary W. Cotton (“Employee”).







WHEREAS, Employer and Employee entered into an Employment Agreement on January 20, 2010; and,







WHEREAS, Employer wishes to continue employing Employee and Employee wishes to continue to be employed pursuant to the terms of this Employment Agreement.







NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained in this Addendum to Employment Agreement, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:







Section 4.1. Base Salary, shall be modified as of December 3, 2010, to an annual base salary of $96,000; provided that, upon the closing of a change of control event, as defined in section 9.4. (a), or at closing of a transaction whereby the Employer sells all material intellectual property, Employer shall pay Employee the difference between Employee’s prior annual base salary of $120,000.00 and the $96,000.00 annual base salary agreed to herein, multiplied by the full and partial years from December 3, 2010 to the date of any such closing.







No other terms will be modified and remain the same







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Employment Agreement in duplicate on the date and year first above written.












EMPLOYEE:












_____/s/ Geary Cotton________________


Geary W. Cotton












EMPLOYER:







CELSIUS HOLDINGS, INC.












By: __/s/ Stephen Haley_______________


       Stephen C. Haley, Chief Executive Officer
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00436-CR

Christian ROSAS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CR-5501B

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 22, 2008

DISMISSED

Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, Christian Rosas pled nolo contendere to aggravated

robbery and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment in accordance with the terms of his pleabargain agreement. On May 19, 2008, the trial court signed a certification of defendant’s right to

appeal stating that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX.

R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). After Rosas filed a notice of appeal, the trial court clerk sent copies of the
04-08-00436-CR

-2-

certification and notice of appeal to this court. See id. 25.2(e). The clerk’s record, which includes the

trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See id. 25.2(d). 

“In a plea bargain case ... a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by

written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to

appeal.” Id. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record, which contains a written plea bargain, establishes the

punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor

and agreed to by the defendant. See id. The clerk’s record does not include a written motion filed and

ruled upon before trial; nor does it indicate that the trial court gave its permission to appeal. See id.

The trial court’s certification, therefore, appears to accurately reflect that this is a plea-bargain case

and that Rosas does not have a right to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that

shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” Id. 25.2(d). 

We, therefore, warned Rosas that this appeal would be dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), unless an amended trial court certification showing that he had the right

to appeal was made part of the appellate record. See TEX.R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; Daniels v. State,

110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, order). No such amended trial court certification

has been filed. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed pursuant to Rule 25.2(d). 

 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
SCWC-28958

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

_________________________________________________________________

C. BREWER AND COMPANY, LTD., Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

MARINE INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee,

and

INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY; INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF

HAWAII, LTD.; NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF

PITTSBURGH; UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; LIBERTY

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; TIG INSURANCE COMPANY; COLUMBIA

CASUALTY COMPANY; JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY; THE HOME

INSURANCE COMPANY; RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY; LEXINGTON

INSURANCE COMPANY; CIGNA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.;

PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO., INC.; SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE

COMPANY; FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY; FIRST STATE INSURANCE

CO.; KILAUEA IRRIGATION CO., INC.; KEHALANI HOLDINGS CO., INC.;

STATE OF HAWAI#I; HAWAII INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,

Respondents/Defendants-Appellees, et al.

_______________________________________________________________

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(ICA NO. 28958; CIV. NO. 06-1-0140)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

(By: McKenna, J.)

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant C. Brewer and Company,

Ltd.’s “Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Responses

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-28958

24-DEC-2013

02:00 PM
to Applications for Writ of Certiorari” filed on December 20,

2013, is hereby denied. 

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, December 24, 2013.

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

 Associate Justice

Kenneth R. Kupchak,

Tred R. Eyerly, and

Mark M. Murakami,

for respondent/

plaintiff-appellant
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the amended Quarterly Report of Triangle Petroleum Corporation
      (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the period ending April 30, 2007, as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
      I, Shaun Toker, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
      to my
      knowledge that:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      Triangle Petroleum Corporation and will be retained by Triangle Petroleum
      Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
      staff
      upon request.





/s/
                SHAUN TOKERShaun
                TokerChief
                Financial OfficerApril
                30, 2008
STATE v. Lequan FOX

72P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 24, 2017

Lequan Fox, for Fox, Lequan.

*303Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 8th of March 2017 by Defendant for Petition for Writ of Prohibition:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of March 2017."
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-40071 Conference Calendar

KELVIN B. MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus T. C. FORD, Dr. Coffield Unit; TDCJ-ID, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:93-CV-647

- - - - - - - - - - October 24, 1996 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Kelvin B. Morgan (#559701) appeals from the denial of his postjudgment motion requesting relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) based on excusable neglect for not filing a timely appeal. Morgan argues that his failure to file a timely notice of appeal was caused by excusable neglect. We have reviewed the record and briefs of the parties and AFFIRM the magistrate judge’s denialNo. - 2 - because the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion. Morgan v. Ford , No. 6:93-CV-647 (Dec. 5, 1995).
AFFIRMED.
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH 

NO. 2-08-131-CV

JOHNETTA LAMPKIN APPELLANT

V.

LARRY LAMPKIN, JR. APPELLEE

----------

FROM THE 233RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

----------

On September 29, 2008, we notified appellant that her brief had not been

filed as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.6(a). Tex. R. App.

P. 38.6(a). We stated we could dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution

unless appellant or any party desiring to continue this appeal filed with the

court within ten days a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal.

We have not received any response.
2

Because appellant’s brief has not been filed, we dismiss the appeal for

want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 42.3(b).

Appellant shall pay all costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and LIVINGSTON, J.

DELIVERED: October 23, 2008
# C_2008128EN.01001501.xml

| 24.5.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 128/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.5.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 128/15

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 3 April 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic

(Case C-289/07) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2004/17/EC - Coordination of the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors - Failure to transpose within the period prescribed)

(2008/C 128/24)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: A. Caeiros and D. Kukovec, acting as Agents,)

Applicant:

Defendant: Portuguese Republic (represented by: L. Fernandes and F. Andrade de Sousa, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations — Failure to adopt, within the period prescribed, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 1)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the period prescribed, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 71 of that directive; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the period prescribed, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 71 of that directive;

| 2. | Orders the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 183, 4.8.2007.

1

---
STATE v. Michael Eugene REED, II

232P01-4

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2017

Michael Eugene Reed, II, for Reed, Michael Eugene II.

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, David Learner, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 24th of February 2017 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."

Hudson, J. recused
# C_2008183EN.01002101.xml

| 19.7.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 183/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.7.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 183/21

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 19 May 2008 — Transports Schiocchet — Excursions v Commission

(Case T-220/07) (1)

1

(Action for damages - Limitation period - Article 46 of the Statute of the Court - Inadmissibility)

(2008/C 183/43)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Transports Schiocchet — Excursions SARL (Beuvillers, France) (represented by: D. Schönberger, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: J.-F. Pasquier and N. Yerrell, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Application for damages for the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of various alleged illegal acts complained of against the Community institutions.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | Transports Schiocchet — Excursions SARL shall bear the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Transports Schiocchet — Excursions SARL shall bear the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 199 of 25.8.2007.

1

---
Keith S. Henry

TDCJ No. 1465852

Stiles Unit

3060 FM 3514

Beaumont, TX. 77705

June 29, 2015

Abel Acosta

Court of Crim. App.

P.O. Box 12308

Austin, TX. 77705

RE: The State of Texas vs. Keith Stuart Henry

Trial Cause Nos. 1048519 & 1045670

Dear Mr. Acosta:

JUL 0127*3

I am in the process of filing my 11.07 writ of habeas corpus. As you can

see above, I have two separate cause numbers. I know that when I file my

application in the District Court that I was sentenced in, I have to file two

separate applications. According to the applications, besides the trial cause

numbers, they require the appeals and PDR numbers.

I need to find out what the appeals and PDR numbers are that correspond

with each cause number. I need to make sure I put the appropriate numbers with

the right cause number on each application. Can you please give me this

information? I have already wrote my district court, but they will not respond

to my letter.

Your help is greatly appriciated. Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,

CC:

Henry File

Keith S. He

Pro Se Repr on
---

---

EXHIBIT 13.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Pointer Telocation Ltd. (the Company) on
Form 20-F, as amended by Amendment No. 1 on Form 20-F/A, for the year ended December 31,
2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Danny Stern, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

| | 1. | the
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the
               Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
               respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|July 31, 2007 |  | /S/ DANNY STERN
Danny SternChief Executive Officer
|------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.



---

---
1561.

#### Rosette *v.*The State.

Indictment for misdemeanor under Penal Code, § 82, from Chat-ham superior court — Judge Charlton. November 21, 1908.

Argued January 14,

Decided January 27, 1909.

*Twiggs &' Gazan,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. O. Hart,ridge, solicitor-general, W. W. Osborne,*contra.

Powell, J.

Upon a careful review of the whole record, the court finds that the testimony, though largely circumstantial, is legally sufficient to support the conviction. ' *Judgment affirmed*.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-41198

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NARCISO GUEVARA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

No. 2:07-CR-585-ALL

Before SMITH, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Narciso Guevara appeals the 24-month sentence imposed after revocation

of his supervised release. He argues that the decision to sentence him above the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 20, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-41198

2

advisory guideline range and the extent of the departure are unreasonable. He

speculates that the court improperly recalculated his criminal history in order

to impose the sentence and failed to state reasons for its departure from the recommended range of 4-10 months. Because Guevara did not object in the district

court, review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783,

791 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2959 (2008). 

The district court did not recalculate the criminal history. The court considered the recommendations of the probation officer and defense counsel and

the guidelines or policy statements of chapter 7 before determining thatthe facts

warrant a sentence of 24 months, which, though in excess of the 4-10 month

range indicated by the policy statements, is within the 36-month statutory maximum the court could have imposed. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(2), 3583(e)(3); 21

U.S.C. §§ 841, 846; U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Therefore, the sentence is neither unreasonable nor plainly unreasonable, and there is no plain error. See Jones, 484

F.3d at 786, 792. 

Further, the district court provided specific reasons for the sentence. The

court stated that Guevara had received a “very big break,” which was unjustified

by his subsequent criminal actions;that his personal history and characteristics

require the sentence imposed; and that the sentence is in line with the goal of

deterrence. The court’s statement is sufficient and does not constitute plain error. See United States v. Teran, 98 F.3d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1996). 

AFFIRMED.
United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

___________________________________________

H.H., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, 

New York, NY, Employer 

___________________________________________

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 14-2079 

Issued: April 14, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record 

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

On September 30, 2014, appellant filed an application for review of a September 9, 2014 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) which denied his claim for 

a traumatic injury. 

The Board has duly considered the matter and finds that the case is not in posture for a 

decision and must be remanded to OWCP. In the case of William A. Couch,

1

 the Board held that 

when adjudicating a claim, OWCP is obligated to consider all evidence properly submitted by a 

claimant and received by OWCP before the final decision is issued. In this case, in a decision 

dated September 9, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for a traumatic injury, finding that the 

evidence did not establish that the claimed events occurred as described. It found that he had not 

responded to its questions regarding the factual portion of his claim. 

 1

 41 ECAB 548 (1990). 
2

The Board finds that OWCP did not review the evidence received on September 9, 2014.2

 

In that submission, appellant provided a response to OWCP’s request for factual information 

regarding his claim. 

As OWCP did not review this evidence, the case will be remanded to OWCP to enable it 

to properly consider all the evidence submitted at the time of the September 9, 2014 decision. 

Following such further development as OWCP deems necessary, it shall issue an appropriate 

merit decision on the claim. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 9, 2014 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside. The case recorded is remanded to OWCP for 

further proceedings consistent with this order of the Board. 

Issued: April 14, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 2 See Linda Johnson, 45 ECAB 439, 440 (1994) (where the Board held that it is necessary that OWCP review all 

evidence submitted by a claimant and received by OWCP prior to issuance of its final decision and noted that this 

principle applies with equal force when evidence is received by OWCP the same day a final decision is issued).