alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.7



 Exhibit 10.7 

BANK OF THE CAROLINAS CORPORATION 

135 Boxwood Village Drive 

Mocksville, North Carolina 27028 

July 15, 2014 
 TFO Financial Institutions
Restructuring Fund II LLC 
 555 5th Avenue, 6th
Floor 
 New York, NY 10017 
 Ladies and Gentlemen: 

Reference is made to that certain Stock Purchase Agreement, dated as of July 15, 2014 (the “Purchase Agreement”), between Bank
of the Carolinas Corporation, a North Carolina corporation (the “Company”) and the purchasers identified on the signature pages thereto (the “Purchasers”). In connection with the execution and delivery of the Purchase Agreement,
the Company and TFO Financial Institutions Restructuring Fund II LLC (“TFO”) are contemporaneously entering into this agreement (the “Side Letter Agreement”) and, as such, the parties hereto acknowledge and agree that this Side
Letter Agreement shall remain in full force and effect notwithstanding the execution and delivery of the Purchase Agreement. Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the
Purchase Agreement. 
 The Company and TFO hereby agree as follows: 

1. Reimbursement for Legal Expenses. The Company shall pay the reasonable legal fees and expenses of counsel to TFO, not to exceed $20,000, incurred by
TFO in connection with the transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents, which amount shall be paid directly by the Company to counsel for TFO at the Closing or paid by the Company to such counsel upon termination of this Agreement so long
as such termination did not occur as a result of a material breach by TFO of any of their obligations hereunder (as the case may be). 
 2. Conflicting
Terms. This Side Letter Agreement constitutes a valid and binding agreement of the Company and TFO and shall survive the execution and delivery of the Purchase Agreement. In the event of any conflict between the provisions of this Side Letter
Agreement and the provisions of the Purchase Agreement, the provisions of this Side Letter Agreement shall prevail and be given effect. 
 3.
Counterparts. This Side Letter Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts and by different parties hereto in separate counterparts, with the same effect as if all parties had signed the same document. All such counterparts will
be deemed an original, will be construed together and will constitute one and the same instrument. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Side Letter Agreement as of the date first
above written. 
  

			
	Very truly yours,
	
	BANK OF THE CAROLINAS CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Stephen R. Talbert

	Name:	 	Stephen T. Talbert
	Title:	 	CEO and President


 ACCEPTED AND AGREED as of 

the date first written above by the undersigned, 
 thereunto duly
authorized 
  

			
	TFO Financial Institutions Restructuring Fund II LLC
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Adel Al Mangour

		 	Name: Adel Al Mangour
		 	Title: Director of the Managing Member
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 25, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

137115 & (69) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

DOUGLAS MOORE,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 SC: 137115 

v CoA: 274157 

 Wayne CC: 04-424554-NO 

DETROIT ENTERTAINMENT, L.L.C., 

d/b/a MotorCity Casino and JOSE OSCAR 

MARTINEZ, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________________________ 

On order of the Chief Justice, a stipulation signed by the attorneys for the 

parties agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered and, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with 

prejudice and without costs. 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 25, 2008 

 Clerk
# C_2008051EN.01004202.xml

| 23.2.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 51/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.2.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 51/42

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 12 December 2007 — Vodafone España and Vodafone Group v Commission

(Case T-109/06) (1)

1

(Action for annulment - Directive 2002/21/EC - Commission's letter of comments - Article 7 of Directive 2002/21 - Act not amenable to review - Applicant not affected directly - Inadmissibility)

(2008/C 51/78)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Vodafone España SA (Madrid, Spain) and Vodafone Group plc (Newbury, Berkshire, United Kingdom) (represented by: J. Flynn QC, E. McKnight and K. Fountoukakos-Kyriakakos, Solicitors)

Applicants:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: M. Shotter and K. Mojzesowicz, Agents)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by M. Muñoz Pérez, abogado del Estado)

Intervener in support of the defendant:

Re:

Application for annulment of the decision allegedly contained in the letter addressed by the Commission on 30 January 2006 to the Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones, on the basis of Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | Vodafone España SA and Vodafone Group plc shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Vodafone España SA and Vodafone Group plc shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the Commission.

| 3. | The Kingdom of Spain shall bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Kingdom of Spain shall bear its own costs.

The Kingdom of Spain shall bear its own costs

---

(1)  OJ C 131, 3.6.2006.

1

---
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Each of the undersigned, in his capacity as an officer of La Jolla Pharmaceutical Company (the "Registrant"), hereby certifies, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





|  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|• | the Annual Report of the Registrant on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2016 (the “Report), which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

|  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
|- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|• | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Registrant at the end of such quarter and the results of operations of the Registrant for such quarter.







Date:April 28, 2017/s/ George F. TidmarshGeorge F. Tidmarsh, M.D., Ph.D.President, Chief Executive Officer and Secretary/s/ Dennis M. MulroyDennis M. MulroyChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)








Note: A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to La Jolla Pharmaceutical Company and will be retained by La Jolla Pharmaceutical Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 23.2





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements No. 333-87176, effective December 7, 1994, File No. 333-09235, effective July 31, 1996, File No. 333-27085, effective May 14, 1997, and File No. 333-125116, effective May 20, 2005, on Form S-8 of TF Financial Corporation of our report dated March 23, 2011, relating to our audit of the consolidated financial statements, which appear in the Annual Report to Shareholders, which is incorporated in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of TF Financial Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2010.





/s/ S.R.SnodgrassWexford, PennsylvaniaMarch 28, 2011
1553.

#### Freeman *v.*The State.

Hill, C. J.

1. Where a defendant was on trial for murder and his sole' defense was that the homicide was justifiable, and there was no contention on his part or by his counsel that the jury could find him.' guilty of the offense of voluntary -ipanslaughter, it was error to charge: as follows: “The defendant claims that he is not guilty of any offense. He also contends that if the jury should not find him guiltless of the: crime of murder, that he is not guilty of any higher crime than that-of voluntary manslaughter.”

*(a)*This charge was an incorrect statement of the contention of the defendant.

*491Conviction of manslaughter, from Lincoln superior court— Judge Worley. November 14, 1908.

Argued January 14,

Decided January 27, 1909.

*W. A. Harnesberger, T. II. Remsen, John T. West,*for plaintiff in error.

*Thomas J. Brown, solicitor-general, David W. Meadow,*contra.

(5) It was calculated to mislead tlie jury, and contained an intimation that the defendant admitted that he might be guilty of voluntary manslaughter, whereas he contended that his act was entirely justifiable.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Powell, J., dissents.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-6567

JAY TIMOTHY LURZ, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

JON P. GALLEY, Warden; C. E. JONES, Ofc.; BUTLER, Capt.; A. 

GONZALES; J. L. MCFARLAND, Ofc., CO 2; J. SHIMKO, Ofc., CO 

2, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. 

(1:07-cv-00070-AMD) 

Submitted: September 30, 2008 Decided: October 9, 2008 

Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Jay Timothy Lurz, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Judith LaneWeber, Assistant Attorney General, Phillip Michael Pickus, 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, 

for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Jay Timothy Lurz appeals the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we deny his motion for appointment of counsel and 

affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Lurz 

v. Galley, No. 1:07-cv-00070-AMD (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2008). We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
STATE of North Carolina v. Gregory MONROE

No. 90P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2017

Gregory Monroe, for Monroe, Gregory.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, Garland N. Yates, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 15th of March 2017 in this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Randolph County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Sterling Gold Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended April 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Allen Collins, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated this 12th day of June, 2006.



| | ALLEN COLLINS                                      
| | ---------------------------------------------------
| | Allen Collins                                      
| | Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer



















---
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4140 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4140

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs to provide per diem payments to eligible entities for 
  furnishing care to dependents of certain homeless veterans, and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 4, 2014

   Mrs. Negrete McLeod (for herself and Ms. Brownley of California) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                           Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs to provide per diem payments to eligible entities for 
  furnishing care to dependents of certain homeless veterans, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Homeless Veterans with Children Act 
of 2014''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF PER DIEM PAYMENTS FOR FURNISHING CARE TO 
              DEPENDENTS OF CERTAIN HOMELESS VETERANS.

    Subsection (a) of section 2012 of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``(4) The Secretary may also provide per diem payments under this 
subsection to a grant recipient or eligible entity to furnish care for 
a dependent of a homeless veteran who is under the care of such 
homeless veteran while such homeless veteran receives services from the 
grant recipient or eligible entity.''.

SEC. 3. IMPROVEMENTS TO GRANT PROGRAM FOR COMPREHENSIVE SERVICE 
              PROGRAMS FOR HOMELESS VETERANS.

    (a) Modification of Authority To Provide Capital Improvement Grants 
for Programs That Assist Homeless Veterans.--Subsection (a) of section 
2011 of title 38, United States Code, is amended, in the matter before 
paragraph (1)--
            (1) by striking ``or modifying'' and inserting ``, 
        modifying, or maintaining''; and
            (2) by inserting ``privately, safely, and securely,'' 
        before ``the following''.
    (b) Requirement That Recipients of Grants Meet Physical Privacy, 
Safety, and Security Needs of Homeless Veterans.--Subsection (f) of 
such section is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
            ``(6) To meet the physical privacy, safety, and security 
        needs of homeless veterans receiving services through the 
        project.''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 5, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40728 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE EPIFANIO ELIZARRARAZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-02-CR-781-ALL

-------------------- Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Jose Epifanio Elizarraraz appeals his jury-trial conviction on four counts of transporting illegal aliens, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). Elizarraraz argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing improper opinion testimony by a law enforcement agent and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.No. 03-40728 -2- Contrary to Elizarraraz’s contentions, the law enforcement agent who testified at his trial did not offer profile evidence or improper opinions regarding his guilty knowledge of thepresence of the illegal aliens in the trailer of his tractortrailer. The agent offered his analysis of the evidence found in Elizarraraz’s case in the light of his special knowledge of alien smuggling. See United States v. Speer , 30 F.3d 605, 610 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1994). Such testimony was admissible and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it. See id. In asserting that the evidence was insufficient, Elizarraraz challenges the guilty-knowledge elements of the crimes of conviction. Elizarraraz’s control of the tractor-trailer, considered together with the evidence of his failure to seal or lock his load, his nervous behavior, his inconsistent statement about his home address, the testimony of the aliens, and the testimony of the agent describing a typical alien-smuggling operation, was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Elizarraraz’s guilty knowledge. See United States v. Pennington , 20 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1994). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and giving the Government the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that Elizarraraz knew that the illegal aliens were in the trailer of his tractor-trailer and that he knowingly participated in and aided and abetted an alien-No. 03-40728 -3- smuggling conspiracy. See id. at 597-99. Because “a reasonable trier of fact could [have] f[ou]nd that the evidence establishe[d] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” Elizarraraz’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fails. See United States v. Bell , 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), aff’d , 462 U.S. 356 (1983). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of National Patent
Development Corporation (the "Company") for the second quarter ended September
30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to such officer's knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date: November 14, 2005





Jerome I. Feldman                                    Scott N. Greenberg
Chief Executive Officer                              Chief Financial Officer
1566.

#### Leonard *v.*The State.

Indictment for vagrancy, from Talbot superior court — Judge Gilbert. November 2, 1908.

Submitted January 13,

Decided January 27, 1909.

*McGehee & McGehee, J.'J. Bull,*for plaintiff in error.

*George C. Palmer, solicitor-general,*contra.

Russell, J.

The circumstantial evidence introduced by the prosecution was purely negative in its character, and the inference of the defendant’s guilt, which might have arisen from this negative testimony,, was so rebutted by positive proof, not inconsistent therewith, that he had earned and had received a sufficient amount of money to maintain himself, that the verdict finding him guilty of vagrancy was not authorized by law, and a new trial should have been granted. Though numerous witnesses, whose testimony is uneontradicted, testified, that they had not seen the defendant work, that he had no visible, means of- support, and that he was always loafing in idleness when they saw him (and all of these witnesses saw him frequently), this evidence, though true, must yield, in a prosecution for vagrancy, to positive evidence, not necessarily in conflict therewith, and equally uncontradicted, that the defendant had earned and had been paid an amount of money sufficient to maintain him honestly, though only in a meager style, even though he were capable of earning much more. Our statute as to vagrancy is intended to enforce *honest*and reputable living, but it does not tend to luxury, nor compel any one to earn more than his necessities require. The case is controlled by *Jacobs*v. *State,*1 *Ga. App.*519 (57 S. E. 1063) ; *Lewis*v. *State,*3 *Ga. App.*322 (59 S. E. 933) ; *Miller*v. *State,*4 *Ga. App.*392 (61 S. E. 494). *Judgment reversed.*
**Exhibit 32.2****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the quarterly report of Town SportsInternational Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the three month period endingSeptember 30, 2005 filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Richard Pyle, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of    section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of    1934; and           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly    represents, in all material respects, the financial condition    and result of operations of the Company.November 11, 2005    /s/ Richard Pyle           Town Sports International Holdings, Inc. *Chief Financial Officer* *Office of the President*