IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 24S-CR-150 

Dustin A. Lane,

Appellant (Defendant below)

–v–

State of Indiana, 

Appellee (Plaintiff below)

Argued: November 8, 2023 | Decided: May 2, 2024 

Appeal from the Lawrence Superior Court

No. 47D01-2201-CM-113 

The Honorable John M. Plummer, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 

No. 22A-CR-2276 

Opinion by Justice Goff

Chief Justice Rush and Justice Slaughter concur.

Justice Molter dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Massa joins. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024 Page 2 of 18

Goff, Justice. 

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits reviewing courts to revise a 

criminal sentence that is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.” The defendant in this case 

received an aggregate sentence of more than eight years for ten 

misdemeanors he committed by sending letters from prison to his former 

partner, while serving time after a domestic battery and in violation of a 

no-contact order. Generally, we encourage Indiana trial courts to use the 

full range of rehabilitation options when sentencing defendants for 

misdemeanors and low-level felonies. However, we defer to a trial court’s

decision that a lengthy sentence of incarceration for such offenses is 

necessary to protect victims and the community from an offender with a 

history of violence. Such deference is due here and, accordingly, we affirm 

the sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

Dustin Lane was convicted in 2019 of Level 6 felony domestic battery 

resulting in moderate bodily injury to his ex-wife, A.N., who had suffered 

years of domestic and emotional abuse at Lane’s hands.1 Lane’s criminal 

record also includes a Level B felony for dealing methamphetamine; Class 

D felonies for sexual misconduct with a minor, maintaining a common 

nuisance, and criminal recklessness; a Level 5 felony for criminal 

confinement resulting in bodily injury; and a Level 6 felony for possession 

of methamphetamine.2

As a result of Lane’s domestic-battery conviction, the trial court 

sentenced him to a term in the Department of Correction (or DOC) and 

entered a no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting A.N. directly 

1 See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(3) (2016). 

2 See, respectively, I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1) (2006); I.C. § 35-42-4-9(b) (1998); I.C. § 35-48-4-13(b)(2) 

(2001); I.C. § 35-42-2-2(c)(2) (2003); I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(C) (2013); I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(a) (2014). 
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or indirectly.3 Despite these measures, Lane sent a series of letters to A.N. 

from prison between March 2020 and September 2021. A.N. initially sent 

several letters to Lane in response but eventually stopped responding. The 

content of these written communications often involved family matters, 

with Lane giving input on raising their children and asking that their 

daughter take driving lessons and pick him up on his day of release. The 

emotional tone of Lane’s letters oscillated, conveying sometimes love, 

apologies, commitment, forgiveness, and promises of reform, but other 

times criticism and accusations of abuse. These letters, A.N. later testified, 

were part of a “cycle” of “manipulation tactics” that she had “seen 

through the years of the domestic abuse.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 41. This history of 

abuse included Lane threatening to kill A.N. and her family.

Several months after Lane’s last letter, A.N. reported his violations of 

the no-contact order to the police. The State, in response, charged Lane 

with ten counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy—one count 

for each of ten letters he sent to A.N. (although there are fourteen letters in 

the record).4 Lane pled guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The 

trial court—though not required to—identified Lane’s history of violent 

criminal behavior as an aggravating factor and his acceptance of 

responsibility as a mitigating factor. It then sentenced Lane to ten 300-day 

sentences, each to run consecutively for an aggregate 3,000-day, fully 

executed, sentence.5 Because Lane admitted to violating his domesticbattery probation by committing his new offenses, the trial court revoked

the 730 days of Lane’s suspended sentence in that case, which Lane must

serve consecutively to the 3,000-day sentence. Lane is serving the 

misdemeanor sentence in the DOC pursuant to a request from the county 

sheriff under Indiana Code section 35-38-3-3(b)(3)(A).

3 See I.C. § 35-38-1-30 (2008). 

4 See I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(12) (2019). 

5 Each of the ten sentences fell below the one-year maximum for a single count. See I.C. § 35-

50-3-2 (1977). 
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Lane received permission to file a belated appeal, then challenged his 

3,000-day sentence, claiming it was inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and his character. In a published opinion, a majority of the 

Court of Appeals panel agreed. Lane v. State, 211 N.E.3d 551, 553 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2023). Despite finding nothing in Lane’s character to warrant relief, 

the majority deemed the sentence inappropriate considering the nature of 

his offenses. Id. at 554. Lane’s letters were “nonthreatening and primarily 

revolved around” the children, the majority explained, adding that A.N. 

encouraged a dialogue by responding to Lane’s letters and that she failed

to report Lane’s violations of the no-contact order until several months 

after his last letter. Id. at 555. Characterizing the sentence as “an outlier 

that simply cannot stand,” the court remanded with instructions to 

impose fully concurrent sentences for an aggregate 300-day term. Id. at 

556. 

In a sixteen-page dissent, Judge Kenworthy disagreed with the 

majority’s assessment of the offenses, noting Lane’s “relentless” violence 

and intimidation towards A.N. and the cycle of manipulation perpetuated 

by the letters. Id. at 556–57. In Judge Kenworthy’s view, the majority 

focused too much on A.N.’s conduct without appreciating “the protective 

effect of a no-contact order in these emotionally fraught scenarios.” Id. at 

560. 

We now grant transfer, thus vacating the opinion of the Court of 

Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

The core principles of 7(B) review are well settled. We recognize 

sentencing as “principally a discretionary function in which the trial 

court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 

895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). This deference prevails “‘unless 

overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature 

of the offense’ and ‘the defendant’s character.’” Oberhansley v. State, 208 

N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 

122 (Ind. 2015)). Our role is primarily to “leaven the outliers” and identify 
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“guiding principles” for sentencers, rather than to achieve the “perceived 

‘correct’ result” in each case. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. As such, we

“focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—

consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on 

any individual count.” Id. Ultimately, we rely on our “collective judgment 

as to the balance” of all the relevant considerations involved, which 

include “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the 

damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a 

given case.” Id. at 1224, 1226. 

Discussion and Decision

Article Seven, Section Four of the Indiana Constitution grants this 

Court the power “to review and revise the sentence imposed” in all 

criminal appeals.6 This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 

7(B), allows an appellate court, “after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision,” to find “that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender.” 

Our Rule 7(B) jurisprudence reflects a continuing effort to define the 

proper role for appellate sentence review within Indiana’s criminal-justice 

system. In Serino v. State, we noted that judicial discretion to deviate from 

a standard sentence based on aggravating or mitigating factors produced

“widely varying sentences for similar crimes.” 798 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ind. 

2003). Accordingly, we cast Rule 7(B) as a “chance to review the matter in 

a climate more distant from local clamor” and work toward a goal of 

“similar sentences” for “perpetrators committing the same acts who have 

the same backgrounds.” Id. at 854, 856–57. And, in Cardwell, we likewise

envisioned Rule 7(B) as a tool to address “perceived unfairness” between 

sentences in a system that, unlike the federal sentencing guidelines, did 

not proceed by the “mechanical application of an array of factors.” 895 

6 The Indiana Court of Appeals exercises similar authority in criminal cases, “to the extent 

provided by rule.” Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6.
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N.E.2d at 1223. Today, we advance our 7(B) jurisprudence by setting 

sentence review in the context of the policies and sentencing options that 

emerged from recent reforms to Indiana’s criminal-justice system.

This opinion proceeds in three stages. First, we set out the broad policy 

context of sentence review, explaining the range of options trial courts 

have for sentencing a misdemeanor or low-level felony offender. Second, 

we clarify that defendants may argue that their sentences are 

inappropriate based on either the nature of their offenses or their 

character alone. Finally, we evaluate Lane’s sentence and decline to find it 

inappropriate, considering his violent criminal history and the risk he 

poses of perpetuating the cycle of domestic abuse against A.N. 

I. Trial courts have a broad range of options for 

sentencing low-level offenders in light of the 

danger they may pose to the community.

We begin Part I by summarizing the recent reforms to Indiana’s 

criminal-justice system. For sentence-review purposes, we draw two 

principal conclusions from these reforms: First, sentencing courts should 

consider the full range of available options, including community-based 

rehabilitation programs, for defendants who commit low-level offenses 

but pose little continuing danger to others. Second, to ensure public 

safety, courts should consider extended jail sentences for low-level 

offenders with a history of violence who pose a continuing threat to

others. Consequently, we will defer to a trial court’s considered 

assessment that a person is too dangerous to receive anything but a 

lengthy executed sentence. 

A. Indiana’s reformed criminal-justice system 

distinguishes between offenders the community is 

“mad at” and those the community is “afraid of.”

In 2014, when much of the nation was moving in the same direction, 

Indiana undertook major criminal-justice reforms. The motivations were 
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varied but significantly driven by the cost of mass incarceration. See Drew 

Kirages, Note, Reentry Reform in Indiana: HEA 1006 and Its (Much Too 

Narrow) Focus on Prison Overcrowding, 49 Ind. L. Rev. 209, 209 (2015). 

Indeed, from 2000 to 2010, Indiana’s spending on prisons had risen by 

seventy-six percent, as the number of people incarcerated had grown by 

forty-one percent. Hon. Randall T. Shepard, The Great Recession as a 

Catalyst for More Effective Sentencing, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 146, 146 (2010). 

The increase in inmate numbers came largely from imprisoning drug 

offenders. Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern 

States: Origins and Trends, 47 Val. U. L. Rev. 709, 729, 733 (2013). Prisons 

are an expensive proposition that became unsustainable as millions of 

Americans became addicted to opioids. By the 2010s, more than eighty 

percent of the nation’s prisoners had substance-use disorders. Leo 

Beletsky, et al., Fatal Re-Entry: Legal and Programmatic Opportunities to Curb 

Opioid Overdose Among Individuals Newly Released from Incarceration, 7 Ne. 

U. L.J. 149, 151 (2015). Simple possession of less than three grams of 

opioids—potently addictive drugs mass-produced and over-prescribed at 

unprecedented levels—was punishable by up to three years in the DOC. 

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a) (2006); I.C. § 35-48-2-4(b) (2013); I.C. § 35-50-2-7(a) 

(2013); James G. Hodge, et al., Exploring Legal and Policy Responses to 

Opioids: America's Worst Public Health Emergency, 70 S.C. L. Rev. 481, 485–

90 (2019).7

In Indiana, the General Assembly saw the writing on the wall and took 

action. The 2014 reforms, largely embodied in House Enrolled Act 1006 

(HEA 1006),8 aimed to “reduce crime by promoting the use of evidence 

based best practices for rehabilitation of offenders in a community 

setting.” I.C. § 35-32-1-1(5) (2014). The flipside of this coin was to “keep 

dangerous offenders in prison by avoiding the use of scarce prison space 

for nonviolent offenders.” I.C. § 35-32-1-1(6).

7 Simple possession of up to five grams of opioids today carries a maximum of two and a half 

years. I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a) (2014); I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019).

8 Pub. L. No. 168-2014, 2014 Ind. Acts 2030.
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HEA 1006 and subsequent reform measures restructured sentencing, 

tied probation funding to the development of evidence-based programs 

for reducing recidivism, and required the detention of most Level 6 felony 

offenders in local county jails rather than the DOC. Kirages, supra, at 218–

19, 222. The reforms also resulted in more graduated penalties for drug 

offenses, depending on the quantity of drugs involved and the presence or 

absence of enhancing circumstances, such as possession of a firearm. Joel 

M. Schumm, Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 48 

Ind. L. Rev. 1241, 1242–43 (2015). 

On the ground, these changes meant that most low-level felons, 

including those who possessed opioids, were no longer eligible for 

placement in the DOC. See I.C. § 35-38-3-3(d) (2015).9 Instead, they would 

serve community-based sentences—whether in the county jail, on

probation, or under the supervision of a problem-solving court with 

medically assisted treatment and connection to peer-support groups.10

Beyond the response to drug offenses, our criminal-justice overhaul 

resulted in deinstitutionalization and community-based sentencing for 

most other low-level felons, including some who had been violent. 

Persons convicted of various offenses—e.g., strangulation, stalking, and 

domestic battery with a prior conviction or in the presence of a child—

were also now, for the most part, ineligible for placement in the DOC. I.C. 

§ 35-42-2-9(b) (2014); I.C. § 35-45-10-5(a); I.C. §§ 35-42-2-1.3(b)(1), (2). 

These offenders instead became the responsibility of their local criminaljustice systems.

9 Under a 2022 amendment, low-level felons are eligible for direct commitment to the DOC, 

although discretion lies with the trial court. Pub. L. No. 45-2022, § 9, 2022 Ind. Acts 393, 402–

03 (codified at I.C. § 35-38-3-3(c) (2022)).

10 At last count, Indiana boasts fifty adult drug courts, twenty-eight veterans’ courts, and 

twenty-one family-recovery courts. Ind. Crim. Justice Inst. & Justice Reinv. Advisory Council, 

Annual Evaluation: Indiana’s Criminal Code Reform 7 (2023), https://www.in.gov/cji/grantopportunities/files/1006-Report-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AP-JF26]. The Justice 

Reinvestment Advisory Council (JRAC) was created in 2015 to assist communities with 

developing best practices and obtaining grants for recidivism-reduction programs. See I.C. § 

33-38-9.5-3 (2021). 
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In considering sentences imposed on such offenders, policymakers

described Indiana’s “smart-on-crime” reforms with a phrase that captured 

its two contrasting faces: separating “‘the people we’re mad at from the 

people we’re afraid of.’” Dewees v. State, 180 N.E.3d 261, 266 (Ind. 2022) 

(quoting Tom Davies, Ind. House Panel Backs Sentencing Laws Overhaul, 

Dubois County Herald (Jan. 17, 2013) (in turn quoting Rep. Greg 

Steuerwald)). Indeed, many serious offenses involving violence, sex, and 

drug-dealing received more severe penalties after the overhaul than they 

had before. See Schumm, supra, at 1241–42 (explaining that the actual time 

served could increase for murder and those felonies classified at Levels 1, 

3, and 5). 

The dichotomy between “mad at” and “afraid of” has helped local 

justice professionals understand the need to prioritize the use of a 

community’s most expensive and scarce resource—jail beds—for people 

who present credible and continuing threats to public safety. But the 

overriding message remained the promotion of public safety.

B. Trial courts should consider the full range of sentencing 

options for offenders who pose a continuing danger to 

the community.

The distinction between offenders the community is “mad at” or 

“afraid of” influences our approach to sentence review, including the 

review of lower-level offenses.

Most crimes are, like the offenses at issue here, misdemeanors or lowlevel felonies. In 2023, 70.9 percent of new felony filings were for Level 6 

felonies. Ind. Crim. Justice Inst. & Justice Reinv. Advisory Council, 

Annual Evaluation: Indiana’s Criminal Code Reform 17 (2023), 

https://www.in.gov/cji/grant-opportunities/files/1006-Report-2023.pdf 

[https://perma.cc/F8AP-JF26] (Annual Evaluation). Because persons 

convicted of these crimes will often serve out their sentences at the local 

level (rather than at the DOC), a trial judge must usually rely on local 

resources. The county jail, the probation department, the communitycorrections office, the community mental-health center, problem-solving 
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courts, and no-contact orders make up the primary tools available for trial 

courts to craft a community-based sentence. Any one tool, or some 

combination, may be an appropriate sentencing option in a particular 

case. Knowing which tools, or combination of tools, to employ is a skill 

that our trial judges must develop—and have developed—to ensure 

public safety and public trust. Our respect for the trial courts’ local 

knowledge, skill, familiarity with their own cases, and primary role as 

sentencers remains paramount. 

At the same time, we have a responsibility to ensure a degree of 

uniformity. Across our state, ninety-one county-based systems11 operate 

on the criminal-justice frontlines relatively independent of each other. But

trial judges in each county impose sentences for the same classes of crime, 

within the same penalty ranges, and with opportunities to develop the 

same community-based programs outside of jail. These programs are even 

more important to use wisely, considering the expense and difficulty of 

holding offenders in county jails. The latter are “not intended to be ‘small 

prisons,’” yet many operate beyond their capacity. Bre Robinson, Note, 

Who Are We Afraid of? Indiana's Criminal Reform and How It Fails to Address 

Those with Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorder, 54 Ind. L. Rev. 635, 

640–42 (2021); see also Annual Evaluation, supra, at 53–54. We thus expect 

the trial courts in each county to take advantage of the full range of 

options for dealing with offenders who are not destined for DOC custody.

Cf. Kellams v. State, 198 N.E.3d 375, 376 (Ind. 2022) (Rush, C.J., dissenting 

from denial of transfer) (noting the “justice-by-geography anomaly” that 

some counties still lack problem-solving courts).

One of the most important tasks for a trial judge is to determine which 

low-level offenders are not good candidates for community corrections or 

problem-solving courts. Our standard of review offers deference to a trial 

court’s considered decision on this score, as on all sentencing matters. Of 

course, our criminal code does not require a trial judge to use the same 

11 Ohio and Switzerland Counties operate largely as one system, sharing a judge, a jail, and 

other critical personnel and infrastructure.
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degree of formality in imposing a penalty for a misdemeanor as for a 

felony. See I.C. § 35-38-1-1.3 (2014) (requiring courts to issue statements

only in felony cases when explaining any deviation from the advisory 

sentence). Still, it is important for a reviewing court to consider all the 

facts that confronted the sentencing judge. After all, the General Assembly 

intends trial judges to enjoy “maximum discretion to impose sentences 

based on a consideration of all the circumstances related to the offense.” 

I.C. § 35-32-1-1(7). When determining whether a misdemeanant’s lengthy 

sentence of imprisonment may be inappropriate, we find it helpful when 

trial courts, as here, explain their sentencing considerations in some detail 

on the record. 

Given the context and general principles described above, we can 

properly frame the issue that lay before the trial judge in this case: How 

does a judge craft an appropriate sentence when a repeat misdemeanor

offender has been undeterred by DOC placement, has demonstrated 

unwillingness to comply with a no-contact order, has threatened before to 

kill the victim and her family, and has a history of violent offenses? In 

such a case, it might well be appropriate to craft a sentence that 

incapacitates the offender from harming others for as long as possible.

And it would behoove us to defer to a trial court’s sound discretion in 

imposing such a sentence on a dangerous, violent offender.

II. A defendant may seek to show that their sentence 

is inappropriate in light of either the nature of 

their offense or their character.

Before returning to the facts of Lane’s appeal, we lay out one additional 

clarification of our standard of review in 7(B) claims. 

In Connor v. State, the Court of Appeals explained that the two prongs 

of Appellate Rule 7(B)—the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender—are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in 

determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2016). Reviewing courts “must consider” both factors, but the 

defendant need not “necessarily prove” that the sentence is inappropriate 
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on both counts. Id. at 219. Revision may be warranted “where only one of 

the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of the defendant. Id. By contrast, the 

panel in Davis v. State held that both “conditions” must be satisfied. 173 

N.E.3d 700, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). 

We adopt the Connor court’s understanding as a faithful expression of

the flexibility of our 7(B) case-law. See, e.g., State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 

1185, 1195 (Ind. 2020) (calling the claimant’s crimes “horrific” yet granting 

relief based on his youth and “positive steps toward rehabilitation” before 

conviction); Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Ind. 2018) (granting 

relief to a defendant who, despite the “serious” drug offenses involved,

had “dedicated her time” and resources to “helping others who suffer 

from addiction”); Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 494 (Ind. 2015) (deciding 

that the nature of the claimant’s offenses “far outweigh[ed] his otherwise 

favorable character”); Carpenter v. State, 950 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind. 2011) 

(taking the “adverse character of the offender and the unaggravated 

nature of the offense as a whole” in granting relief). 

As the Connor court appreciated, “7(B) review is a holistic approach.” 

58 N.E.3d at 219. We assess a sentence in light of the whole picture before 

us. Allowing a strong showing on one prong to outweigh a weak showing 

on the other promotes the ideal of “similar sentences” for “perpetrators 

committing the same acts who have the same backgrounds.” See Serino, 

798 N.E.2d at 854. We reiterate, however, that, to the extent the evidence 

on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong 

must be all the stronger to justify relief. See Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220. 

III. The sentence here was not inappropriate.

The principles announced above inform our evaluation of Lane’s 3,000-

day sentence, which we ultimately affirm. In short, Lane’s crimes and 

character indicate that he poses a continuing danger of restarting a cycle 

of physical and emotional abuse towards A.N. We defer to the trial court’s 

decision that a lengthy term of imprisonment was warranted for the safety 

of A.N. and the community.
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We begin with Lane’s character. Unfortunately, his record of seven 

felony convictions demonstrates a highly concerning disregard for the law 

and a risk to the public. His varied rap sheet includes a sex crime, drug

dealing, and domestic violence against A.N. Moreover, Lane committed 

his invasions of privacy while in prison, indicating an ongoing and 

stubborn willingness to break the law. At the sentencing hearing, A.N. 

laid out a history of intimidation and violence—a history that includes a 

threat to kill A.N. and her family, and Lane giving his own mother a 

concussion as his daughter watched. Because the evidence of Lane’s 

character is so unfavorable, only a highly persuasive claim based on the 

nature of his offenses could render his sentence inappropriate. 

A considerable amount of evidence was placed before the trial court 

concerning the nature of the offenses. First, we consider the letters 

themselves, then the context in which they were written.

We acknowledge that a letter is not the most intrusive way of violating 

a no-contact order. We note, too, that Lane’s letters were not openly 

threatening and often discussed run-of-the-mill family matters. However, 

the series of letters also contained a noticeable oscillation in tone. They

began with the aspiration to be released on Valentine’s Day, assurances 

that Lane would take “full responsibility” towards the children, several 

apologies, and a realization that “[w]e’re all God’s creatures.” Ex., pp. 9, 

11. But concerning remarks started to creep in over time, with Lane 

reminding A.N. that he was “not going anywhere,” telling her he hoped 

she could “find it within” herself “to make it as peaceful as can be,” and 

asking her not to keep the children from him out of anger or resentment. 

Id. at 12, 14, 15. Eventually, Lane openly criticized A.N., telling her that 

he’d “forgiven” her “for everything besides the bad mouthing” him “in 

front of the kids” and referring to her as “an emotionally and 

psychologically abusive person and when drunk, physical.” Id. at 15–16. 

The later letters then expressed love for others and gratitude to A.N. Id. at 

16–17. 

A.N. testified to the context of these letters at the sentencing hearing. 

She explained that, after being “entangled” with Lane for eighteen years, 

she was facing her “biggest battle” with him. Tr. Vol. II, p. 41. Lane had in 
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the past attacked her, told her he would always be watching her, and 

twisted words from the Bible to suit himself. While Lane had been looking 

ahead to release from prison, he knew he would have “nowhere to go.” Id.

at 41. The letters set out “his expectations of how things would be” once 

he got out, including what A.N. “needed to be doing,” making her feel 

like everything was her “fault.” Id. She described Lane as “his family’s 

dictator.” Id. at 42. She feared “the same exact cycle” repeating “again and 

again.” Id. at 44. 

The trial court carefully parsed the facts and circumstances before 

determining that Lane’s offenses might be an exercise in regaining control 

over A.N. In the trial court’s own words, what appeared superficially to 

be “very ‘nice talking’” in Lane’s letters could have been an effort “to lure 

the victim back in.” Id. at 56. On the other hand, the trial court allowed 

A.N.’s responses to Lane’s letters to alleviate his blame somewhat. 

Overall, however, the length of Lane’s sentence indicates to us that the 

trial court deemed him to be a person whom the community may justly be 

“afraid of.”

We agree with that assessment. As the State argued at the sentencing 

hearing, Lane’s conduct is consistent with aspects of the “Power and 

Control Wheel,” a representation of common, yet somewhat 

counterintuitive, patterns of domestic abuse developed by researchers at 

the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project. See Debra Pogrund Stark & 

Jessica Choplin, Seeing the Wrecking Ball in Motion: Ex Parte Protection 

Orders and the Realities of Domestic Violence, 32 Wis. J. L. Gender & Soc’y 13, 

24–25 (2017). Even more so, Lane’s conduct aligns with the often-observed 

“Cycle of Violence.” See id. at 25. Typically, as abusers increase their 

control over their victims, the latter “develop feelings of love and loyalty,” 

as well as “extreme dependence,” towards them. Id. at 26. Once physical 

violence begins, the abuser uses emotional abuse “calculated to demean 

the targets,” leading them to “question themselves” and “wonder if they 

were to blame for their partner’s statements and actions.” Id. After each 

violent incident, the abuser follows up with a “‘honeymoon’ period” of 

“apologies and promises.” Id. Critically, even after victims achieve the 

difficult task of getting away, abusers “do not stop trying to control” their 

victims, but try to get them back by “promising to change” or coercing a 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024 Page 15 of 18

return to the relationship. Id. It takes an average of seven attempts to 

successfully leave a domestic abuser. Id. Victims suffer the “quandary” of 

not knowing whether it is safer to stay or to go as abusers typically 

threaten their victims—even threatening to kill them and their children. 

Id. at 27. 

Understood in light of the cycle of violence, the apologies, promises, 

criticism, and blame-shifting in Lane’s letters demonstrate his intent to 

reestablish his control of A.N.’s life. The no-contact order was supposed to

make this impossible. As Judge Kenworthy explained in her dissent in this 

case, Lane’s strategy initially worked in terms of getting A.N. to re-engage 

with him. Lane, 211 N.E.3d at 560. But A.N. managed to break the cycle. 

Much is at stake in ensuring that it never restarts. In A.N.’s words, “I fear 

that if he gets out, not only will someone get hurt, but it could possibly be 

much worse.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 43. 

The trial court was faced, then, with sentencing Lane on offenses 

committed by a habitually violent, repeat felon, while serving a prison 

sentence, against the same victim whom he had been imprisoned for

battering, in contravention of a no-contact order issued by the same 

sentencing judge to prevent the continuation of his violence and abuse. 

Because the current offenses were misdemeanors, the trial court did not 

have the option of lengthy concurrent sentences. The trial court settled 

instead on less-than-maximum sentences for each of the ten letters 

charged, which could lawfully run consecutively without regard to 

whether they constituted a “single episode” of criminal conduct (which 

we doubt in any case). See Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2022) 

(focusing the “single episode” analysis on “the simultaneous and 

contemporaneous nature of the crimes, if any”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted); Dunn v. State, 900 N.E.2d 1291, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009) (holding that a former version of code section 35-50-1-2(c), the 

“single episode” statute, did not limit consecutive misdemeanor-only 

sentences). Given the options before the trial court to protect A.N. and 

others, it was not inappropriate to impose the sentence here, thereby 

incapacitating Lane from perpetuating the cycle of violence and abuse. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024 Page 16 of 18

In coming to this conclusion, we note the contrasts between this case 

and another, Livingston v. State, which is emblematic of our 7(B)

jurisprudence. 

In Livingston, the defendant was charged with two Class A felony 

counts of dealing methamphetamine and various possession offenses, as 

well as with being a habitual substance offender. 113 N.E.3d at 612. While 

out on bond, the defendant lived in the Bliss House substance-abuse 

recovery home before moving into its transitional house. Id. She became 

chair of Bliss House’s alumni community and served on the Bliss House 

committee. Id. at 612–13. She started both a business and a recovery home 

for women. Id. at 613. She voluntarily placed herself in a communitycorrections program and tested negative on all her random drug screens. 

Id. She eventually pled guilty as charged. Id. At the sentencing hearing, 

she presented supportive testimony from her arresting officer and a 

community-corrections manager. Id. Nevertheless, the trial court imposed 

a thirty-year sentence. Id. For our part, we recognized that this was an 

“exceptional case,” that the defendant had committed no offenses since 

her arrest, and that she had “dedicated her time to becoming a productive 

member of her community and helping others who suffer from 

addiction.” Id. at 614. We revised the sentence to the mandatory minimum 

twenty-three years and directed the remaining time to be served in 

community corrections. Id.

Unlike the defendant in Livingston, Lane has continued to commit 

offenses even while in prison, rather than demonstrating he is becoming a 

productive and law-abiding citizen. The evidence suggests that he may 

revert to an established pattern of domestic abuse. Lane does not present 

an “exceptional case” calling for revision of the trial court’s sentence.

Finally, we are aware that such a long aggregate sentence for 

misdemeanors as Lane’s is uncommon. We are conscious, too, that the 

proposal and adoption in 1970 of our constitutional review-and-revise 

power was inspired by the “‘efficacious’” use made of the revising power 

by the English Court of Criminal Appeals. McCullough v. State, 900 N.E.2d 

745, 748 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Text of the ABA Model State Judicial Article, 

reprinted in 47 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 6, 9 (June 1963)); see also Hon. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024 Page 17 of 18

Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How British Is 

Indiana?, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 672 (2009). As the Indiana Public Defender 

Council (IPDC) explains in its informative amicus brief, the English court

at that time recognized the principle that concurrent sentences were 

required in the case of “a series of related and similar offences committed 

closely together in time.” IPDC Amicus Br. at 7 (quoting D.A. Thomas, 

Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development of Sentencing Policy: The 

English Experience, 20 Ala. L. Rev. 193, 202–03 (1968)). Furthermore, the 

English court indicated that “completely separate offenses” should not be 

punished “far in excess” of the appropriate sentence for the most serious 

individual offense. Id. (quoting same).

Admittedly, Lane’s sentence does not follow these principles—

although we note that Lane was neither convicted for every letter he sent 

nor sentenced to the maximum available on each conviction. At any rate, 

we decline to adopt hard-and-fast directives under Rule 7(B) for sentences

on multiple offenses. As we have explained, the essence of today’s

criminal-justice system in Indiana is to distinguish dangerous, violent 

offenders from the rest and to provide for sentences that reflect all the 

pertinent circumstances. We assess an aggregate sentence against the 

myriad factors appearing in the individual case. See Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d 

at 1224. 

Here, Lane committed repeated, similar offenses. But that is not all. The

offenses reflected his longstanding pattern of domestic abuse and he failed

to stop committing crimes against the same victim despite imprisonment. 

Sometimes, as in this case, there is good justification for a sentence that 

looks at first glance like an outlier.

Conclusion

The trial court carefully considered all the circumstances and 

determined that Lane’s crimes and character warranted a lengthy 

aggregate sentence for his repeated misdemeanors. The sentence is 

consistent with the aim of Indiana’s criminal-justice system to separate 

dangerous, violent offenders from the community to protect public safety. 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024 Page 18 of 18

We defer to the trial court’s assessment of the options before it in this case

and, accordingly, affirm the sentence. 

Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, J., concur. 

Molter, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Daniel A. Dixon

Lawrence County Public Defender Agency

Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNE Y S FOR APPEL L E E

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Steven J. Hosler 

Ellen H. Meilaender

Angela Sanchez

Office of the Indiana Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

A MICUS C URI A E INDI ANA P UBL I C DE F ENDE R C OUNC I L 

Bernice Corley, Executive Director

Suzy St. John, Staff Attorney 

Indiana Public Defender Council 

Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐150 | May 2, 2024 Page 1 of 2

Molter, J., dissenting.  

I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to decline any Appellate

Rule 7(B) relief. Leading up to Part III, the Court’s opinion eloquently

explains Rule 7(B)’s constitutional grounding, history, and guiding

principles. And Part III helpfully identifies guideposts for misdemeanor

sentencing: (1) related and similar misdemeanor offenses committed close

in time generally warrant concurrent rather than consecutive sentences,

and (2) separate misdemeanor offenses generally should not be punished

far in excess of the appropriate sentence for the most serious individual

offense. I agree with much of that discussion, but on balance, the

considerations the Court outlines compel revising the sentence here.  

To be sure, Lane’s character does not warrant any revision, but the

nature of his offense does. As Part III acknowledges, “a letter is not the

most intrusive way of violating a no‐contact order,” “Lane’s letters were

not openly threatening and often discussed run‐of‐the‐mill family

matters,” and “such a long aggregate sentence for misdemeanors as

Lane’s is uncommon.” Ante, at 13, 16.  

By any measure, Lane’s sentence is an extreme outlier. For the

underlying Level 6 felony battery that led to the no‐contact order, Lane

received a two‐year suspended sentence (plus one year of probation). So

his 3,000‐day executed sentence for sending nonthreatening letters is more

than four times longer than his suspended sentence for battery. That is on

top of the trial court revoking the suspended sentence and requiring that

it be executed.  

If instead of sending nonthreatening letters, Lane had committed

battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, his maximum sentence would

be two and a half years with an advisory sentence of one year. Ind. Code

§ 35‐42‐2‐1.3(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7) (battery provisions); id. § 35‐50‐2‐7(b)

(Level 6 felony sentencing). And as the Court of Appeals’ majority opinion

explained, the sentence here is much longer than other sentences that

panel recently approved for more egregious conduct, including aiding the

rape of a child and Level 6 felony domestic violence resulting in injury.

Lane v. State, 211 N.E.3d 551, 556 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The State
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐150 | May 2, 2024 Page 2 of 2

concedes it is unaware of any sentences in other cases reflecting that

Lane’s sentence is not an outlier.

Nevertheless, the Court concludes no relief is warranted because the

trial court’s sentence was a carefully considered one, and Lane’s letters

present the risks reflected in the Power and Control Wheel. Those are

certainly compelling reasons not to reduce Lane’s sentence too far. But the

nature of the offense still warrants appellate relief to “leaven” the outlier

sentence. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).  

Mindful that for sentencing there is no one “right answer in any given

case,” I would revise Lane’s sentence for sending the nonthreatening

letters at least to the extent the sentence would not exceed the two‐and‐a‐

half‐year maximum sentence for battery resulting in moderate bodily

injury. State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1197 (Ind. 2020) (quotations

omitted).

Massa, J., joins.