alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3804 

To repeal the annual adjustment of retired pay and retainer pay amounts 

for retired members of the Armed Forces under age 62. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 23, 2013 

Ms. BROWNLEY of California introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To repeal the annual adjustment of retired pay and retainer 

pay amounts for retired members of the Armed Forces 

under age 62. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF ANNUAL ADJUSTMENT OF RETIRED 

4 PAY AND RETAINER PAY AMOUNTS FOR RE5 TIRED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES 

6 UNDER AGE 62. 

7 Section 403 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 

8 is hereby repealed. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
1493.

#### Mangum *v.*The State.

Accusation of larceny, from city court of Fitzgerald — Judge' Jay. October 26, 1908.

Submitted December 8, 1908.

Decided January 27, 1909.

*E. S. Fuller,*for plaintiff in error.

*O.*H. *Elhins, solicitor,*contra.

Russell, J.

1. The evidence authorized the verdict of guilty, and there was no error in refusing a new trial.

2. While in every criminal case, where it is sought to show the guilt of the defendant by circumstantial evidence alone, the jury should be instructed and cautioned that he should not be convicted on circumstantial evidence, unless the proven facts exclude every possible reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, still it is immaterial what language is employed to convey this instruction. If all possible hypotheses arising from the circumstantial evidence which are favorable to the defendant be presented in concrete statement to the jury, and the jury are told that if they believe any one of these hypotheses the defendant should be acquitted, the principle above referred to would be sufficiently presented. And where, as in the present ease, only two inferences can be drawn from the evidence, — the one of innocence, and the other of guilt, — -and the hypothesis consistent w'ith innocence is fully and fairly stated to the jury, and the jury are instructed that if they are satisfied that the hypothesis consistent with innocence is true, or if they have a reasonable doubt as to its truth, the defendant should be acquitted, the rule above stated is substantially complied with.

S. The omission of the court to charge that no inference that the accused was the thief could be drawn from the possession of stolen goods by him, if his possession was satisfactorily explained, was harmless, because the jury were instructed that if they found the explanation offered by the defendant to be the truth, they should acquit him.

*Judgment affirmed.*
**Exhibit 32.3**

 

**Certification Pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)**

 

Pursuant to the requirements of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 (18 U.S.C. Sections 1350(a) and (b)), the undersigned hereby certify asfollows:

 

1.             Douglas P.Teiltelbaum is the Chief Executive Officer of BH/RE, LLC, a NevadaLimited-Liability Company (the “Company”).

 

2.             The undersignedcertifies to the best of his knowledge:

 

(A)  The Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarterlyperiod ended September 30, 2004 accompanying this Certification, in the formfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934(the “Exchange Act”); and

(B)  The information in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

 

 

Dated:  November 15, 2004

 

 
|   | /s/ Douglas P. Teiltelbaum |   |
|--------|----------------------------|--------|
|   | Douglas P. Teitelbaum      |
|   | Manager                    |

 

----
In the Matter of: J.W. and K.M.

No. 215P15

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 20, 2015

Sydney Batch, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for Morgan, Jessika.

Amanda Armstrong, Attorney at Law, for GAL.

Hanna Honeycutt, Attorney at Law, Newland, for Buncombe County DSS.

Dwayne Wilkins, for Wilkins, Dwayne.

Charles Morgan, Charlotte, for Morgan, Charles.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 23rd of June 2015 by Respondent (Mother) in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
1576.

#### Clark *v.*The State.

Hill, C. J.

1. Where, on the trial of one charged with the offense of selling intoxicating liquors, several bottles found in his home, containing, according to the testimony, whisky, were introduced in evidence, it was not error for the court to instruct the jury as follows: “In criminal cases the jury are judges of both the law and the facts. In this case you get the facts from the witnesses as they appear before you on the stand and testify, and from the bottles and their contents that are introduced in evidence in this case, giving such weight and credit as you see fit to the statement of the defendant.” The character of the bottles and of their contents was a relevant and material fact, which the jury had a right to determine from a consideration of ihe bottles and their contents, in connection with the other evidence in the ease.

2. A charge that “a witness may be impeached by disproving the testimony testified to by him” is not erroneous because of the use of the words “testimony testified to by him,” instead of the words “facts testified to by him.” “Testimony,” in legal as well as in common usage, signifies a statement of facts by witnesses; and to disprove the testimony of a witness is to disprove the “facts testified to by him.”

3. It is the duty of police officers to enforce the law and to try to detect violations of law; and the fact that a witness is shown to have been working for police officers in the detection of crime is no reason for disregarding his testimony, but is a fact to be considered by the jury *606in determining as to his credibility. A charge to this effect was not erroneous.

Accusation of unlawful sale of liquor, from city court of Americus — Judge Crisp. November- 18, 1908.

Argued January 13,

Decided February 9, 1909.

*J. B. Hudson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Zach. Childers, solicitor,*contra.

4. The charge is a full, fair, and accurate exposition of the law applicable to the issues; and the assignments of error in the excerpts therefrom are wholly without merit.

5. The alleged newly discovered evidence is cumulative and impeaching in character, and does not authorize the grant of a new trial.

>6. The evidence supports the verdict. *Judgment affirmed.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6175

DANIEL WATLINGTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DEBBIE CARTER; MARSHAL GEORGE BENYA,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

SHARON L. JOHNSON; SERGEANT BAILEY,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief

District Judge. (5:05-ct-00761-FL)

Submitted: September 11, 2008 Decided: September 16, 2008

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel Watlington, Appellant Pro Se. E. Holt Moore, III,

Wilmington, North Carolina; Steve R. Matheny, Assistant United

States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Watlington appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on his complaint filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). He contends that Defendant

Carter failed to timely file her motion for summary judgment, so

the district court erred in considering that motion. However, the

motion was timely in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Similarly, Defendant Benya’s motion to dismiss or for summary

judgment was filed within the extension period granted by the

district court, and thus is deemed timely. Accordingly, we affirm.

Watlington v. Johnson, No. 5:05-ct-00761-FL (W.D.N.C. Jan. 8,

2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

October 8, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 136925(96)(97) Marilyn Kelly
 

Maura D. Corrigan
 

Robert P. Young, Jr.
 

TRACY NEAL, on behalf of herself and Stephen J. Markman,
 Justices all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v SC: 136925 

 COA: 285232 

Washtenaw CC: 96-006986-CZ 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

KENNETH MCGINNIS, JOAN YUKINS,

SALLY LANGLEY, CAROL HOWES,

ROBERT SALIS, CORNELL HOWARD,

MARTIN TATE, THOMAS PORTMAN, 

WILLIAM ELLISON, CHRISTOPHER

GALLAGHER, RODERICK ROBEY, WILLIAM

OVERTON, CLARICE STOVALL, NANCY 

ZANG, JOHN ANDREWS, JAN BALDWIN,

WES BONNEY, DAVID CRUKSHANK,

JOSEPH DURIGON, DAVID HABITZ,

EDWARD HOOK, JACK HUTCHINS,

DENNIS IFORD, DERLE JONES, 

ART LANCASTER, ERIN RICHARDSON, 

ANTHONY SIMMONS, FRED WELCH,

LYNN WILLIAMS, CHARLES WILLIAMS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. 

The motion for reconsideration of this Court’s September 17, 2008 order is considered, 

and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously. 

TAYLOR, C.J., not participating. 

d1007 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 8, 2008 

Clerk
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JAMES RYAN PILARCIK,

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 Appellee. 

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-08-00120-CR

Appeal from

195th District Court

of Dallas County, Texas

(TC # F-0754910-N)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James Ryan Pilarcik appeals his conviction of delivery of methamphetamine. We dismiss

the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

On February 22, 2008, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and entered a non-negotiated

plea of guilty. The trial court assessed punishment at a fine of $500 and imprisonment for a term

of twenty years. Appellant filed notice of appeal that same day and he filed a motion for new trial

on March 4, 2008. On April 27, 2008, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for a new trial on

the issue of punishment, but did not permit him to withdraw his plea of guilty. On June 26, 2008,

the trial court conducted a new punishment hearing and sentenced Appellant to a fine of $1,000 and

imprisonment for a term of fifteen years. 

A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Olivo v. State, 918

S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal following his

sentencing on February22, 2008. However, the trial court subsequently granted Appellant’s request

for a new trial on the issue of punishment only. On June 26, 2008, the trial court conducted a new
 The judgment signed by the trial court on June 26, 2008 is erroneous in that it reflects on its first page in the 1

section labeled “Date Judgment Entered” the date of “2/22/2008.”

punishment hearing and re-sentenced Appellant. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal following 1

the imposition of sentence.

The Rules of Appellate Procedure permit a party in a criminal case to file a premature notice

of appeal where the notice of appeal is filed after a finding of guilt has been made but before

sentencing. See TEX.R.APP.P. 27.1(b)(“In a criminal case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is

effective and deemed filed on the same day, but after, sentence is imposed or suspended in open

court, or the appealable order is signed by the trial court. But a notice of appeal is not effective if

filed before the trial court makes a finding of guilt or receives a jury verdict.”). The notice of appeal

filed on February 22, 2008 does not constitute a premature notice of appeal because it was filed after

sentence was imposed in open court. The trial court then granted Appellant’s motion for new trial

and conducted a new punishment hearing. Appellant was required to file a new notice of appeal after

the trial court re-sentenced him on June 26, 2008. That notice of appeal was due to be filed on

July 26, 2008, thirty days after the day sentence was imposed in open court. See TEX.R.APP.P.

26.2(a)(1). Because Appellant did not file notice of appeal within this time-frame, we dismiss the

appeal for want of jurisdiction.

October 2, 2008 

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice

Before Chew, C.J., McClure, and Carr, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
mine_ex101.htm


Exhibit 10.1


 


Public Relations Agreement


 


 





 


 


 



 




 



	 	 /s/ Dan Spelling                                                                               7/7/2014	 
	 	 Spelling Communications, Inc.                                                        Date	 
	 	 	 
	 	/s/ V. Scott Vanis                                                                              7/7/2014	 
	 	Accepted and Agreed to: Minerco Resources, Inc.                    Date
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 FORM 10-Q/A
 
 (AMENDMENT NO. 2)
 
 þ
    
    QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED March 31, 2008
 OR
 o
    
    TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 FOR
THE TRANSITION PERIOD FROM

TO
 
 Commission file number 001-32980
 
 BMP SUNSTONE CORPORATION
 (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
 Delaware
    
    20-0434726(State or other jurisdiction of
    
    (I.R.S. Employerincorporation or organization)
    
    Identification No.)600 W. Germantown Pike, Suite 400Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania
    
    19462(Address of principal executive offices)
    
    (Zip Code)
 (610) 940-1675
 (Registrants telephone number, including area code)
 þ o
  Large accelerated filer o
Accelerated filer þ
Non-accelerated filer o
Smaller Reporting Company o o þ




---



##### 



EXPLANATORY NOTE
 
  
 
 ITEM 4. Controls and Procedures
 
 
 (a) Evaluation of Disclosure Controls and Procedures
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 (b) Changes in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
 
 
  
 
 PART
II  Other Information
 
 
 ITEM 6. EXHIBITS
 
  ExhibitNumber
    
    Description31.1
    
    Certification of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)31.2
    
    Certification of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)




---



##### 



SIGNATURES
  BMP SUNSTONE CorporationDate: January
23, 2009

/s/
David GaoDavid GaoChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)Date: January 23, 2009

/s/
Fred M. PowellFred M. PowellChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)




---



##### 



EXHIBIT INDEX
 
  
 ExhibitNumber
    
    Description31.1
    
    Certification of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)31.2
    
    Certification of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4075 

To provide funding to the National Institute of Mental Health to support 

suicide prevention and brain research, including funding for the Brain 

Research Through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 25, 2014 

Mr. BARBER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To provide funding to the National Institute of Mental 

Health to support suicide prevention and brain research, 

including funding for the Brain Research Through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Suicide Prevention Re5 search INnovaTion Act’’ or the ‘‘SPRINT Act’’. 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4075 IH

1 SEC. 2. SUICIDE PREVENTION AND BRAIN RESEARCH. 

2 Subpart 16 of part C of title IV of the Public Health 

3 Service Act (42 U.S.C. 285p et seq.) is amended by adding 

4 at the end the following: 

5 ‘‘SEC. 464U–1. SUICIDE PREVENTION AND BRAIN RE6 SEARCH. 

7 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National In8 stitute of Mental Health shall use the funds made avail9 able to such Institute pursuant to subsection (b) exclu10 sively for the purpose of conducting and supporting— 

11 ‘‘(1) research on the determinants of self-di12 rected and other violence associated with mental ill13 ness, including studies designed to reduce the risk of 

14 self-harm, suicide, and interpersonal violence, espe15 cially in rural communities with a shortage of men16 tal health services; and 

17 ‘‘(2) brain research through the Brain Research 

18 Through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies 

19 (BRAIN) Initiative. 

20 ‘‘(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In ad21 dition to amounts otherwise made available to the Na22 tional Institute of Mental Health, including amounts ap23 propriated pursuant to section 402A(a), there are author24 ized to be appropriated to such Institute $40,000,000 for 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4075 IH

1 each of fiscal years 2015 through 2019 to carry out this 

2 section.’’. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5                     
                                
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS             
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1999       
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-1999       
<CASH>                                     998,520
<SECURITIES>                                     0    
<RECEIVABLES>                            1,497,131
<ALLOWANCES>                               (9,520)
<INVENTORY>                              2,910,539
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         5,941,560
<PP&E>                                   1,633,875
<DEPRECIATION>                           (865,750)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           8,562,231
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      610,374
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                    34,100
<OTHER-SE>                               7,917,757
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             8,562,231
<SALES>                                  1,083,791
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         1,083,791
<CGS>                                      536,754
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            1,691,170
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          (698,822)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      (698,822)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                             (698,822)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               (0.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                               (0.22)

                                
                                
















</TABLE>
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 406 

To provide discretionary authority to an immigration judge to determine 

that an alien parent of a United States citizen child should not be 

ordered removed, deported, or excluded from the United States. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 23, 2013 

Mr. SERRANO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To provide discretionary authority to an immigration judge 

to determine that an alien parent of a United States 

citizen child should not be ordered removed, deported, 

or excluded from the United States. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT 

4 TO REMOVAL, DEPORTATION, OR EXCLUSION 

5 OF PARENTS OF CITIZEN CHILDREN. 

6 Section 240(c)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act (8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)) is amended by adding at the 

8 end the following: 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 406 IH

1 ‘‘(D) DISCRETION OF JUDGE IN CASE OF

2 CITIZEN CHILD.—In the case of an alien subject 

3 to removal, deportation, or exclusion who is the 

4 parent of a child who is a citizen of the United 

5 States, the immigration judge may exercise dis6 cretion to decline to order the alien removed, 

7 deported or excluded from the United States if 

8 the judge determines that such removal, depor9 tation, or exclusion is clearly against the best 

10 interests of the child, except that this subpara11 graph shall not apply to any alien who the 

12 judge determines— 

13 ‘‘(i) is described in section 212(a)(3) 

14 or 237(a)(4); or 

15 ‘‘(ii) has engaged in conduct described 

16 in paragraph (8) or (9) of section 103 of 

17 the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 

18 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102).’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Loan
Agreement


    


    Party A
(Borrower) :
Harbin Humankind Biology Technology Co., Limited

     

    Party B
(Lender)
: Xin Sun

     

    ID Number
: 23010219660523161X

     

    On the
basis of equality, voluntariness and negotiation, both Party A and Party B enter
into this agreement about the loan.

    
       

      I. Party
B loans RMB 250,000 to Party A and provides the loan before November 1,
2008.

    

    II.
Interest: No Interest.

    III. Life
of Loan: No fixed terms of repayment.

    IV. Date
and Method of Payments: Party A will make the repayments in cash according to
the operation of its company.

    V. Settlements
of Diputes: apply for arbitration in local arbitration committee.

    VI. This
contract is taken into effect since signing date. This contract is executed in
two copies with the same legal effect. Both parties hold one copy
respectively.

     

    
      
        
          
            
              	
                      Party
      A (Seal) :

                    	
                      Party
      B:

                    
	
                      Harbin
      Humankind Biology

                    	 
      
	
                      Technology
      Co. Limited

                    	
                      /s/
      Xin Sun

                    
	 	 
	
                      Date:

                    	
                      Date:
      November 1,
2008