IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 84 / 07–0315 

Filed September 19, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA, 

Appellee, 

vs. 

TIMOTHY ALLEN WILLARD, 

Appellant. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Russell G. 

Keast (trial and sentencing) and Fae Hoover-Grinde (motion to dismiss), 

Judges. 

 Defendant contends the district court erred by not granting his 

motion to dismiss. AFFIRMED. 

 Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. 

Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant 

Attorney General, Harold L. Denton, County Attorney, and Jason A. 

Burns, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
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STREIT, Justice. 

 Timothy Willard is a sex offender subject to the residency 

restrictions found in Iowa Code section 692A.2A (2005). He bought a 

house within two thousand feet of a school. The sheriff told Willard he 

could not live in the house. After Willard did not move out of the house, 

he was charged with violating section 692A.2A. He filed a motion to 

dismiss, claiming the two-thousand-foot rule was unconstitutional. The 

district court denied his motion, and Willard was convicted. We hold 

section 692A.2A is not a bill of attainder and does not violate equal 

protection or procedural due process. Willard failed to preserve for 

appeal his claim alleging interference with the right to interstate travel. 

We affirm. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings. 

In April 1997, Willard pled guilty to two counts of indecent contact 

with his then twelve-year-old stepdaughter. The girl told her school 

counselor Willard touched her genitals and was pressuring her to have 

sex with him. As a result of his conviction, Willard is subject to the 

residency restrictions found in Iowa Code chapter 692A. A person who 

has committed a sexual offense against a minor may not live within two 

thousand feet of a school or child-care facility. Iowa Code § 692A.2A(2). 

 In February 2004, the federal district court for southern Iowa held 

the two-thousand-foot rule unconstitutional on several grounds and 

enjoined the State from enforcing the law. See Doe v. Miller, 298 

F. Supp. 2d 844 (S.D. Iowa 2004). However, the Eighth Circuit Court of 

Appeals reversed the district court on April 29, 2005. Doe v. Miller, 405 

F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1034, 126 S. Ct. 757, 

163 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2005). A few days later—May 7, 2005—Willard signed 

a contract to purchase a house located at 120 First Street in Alburnett, 
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Iowa. He notified the Linn County Sheriff of his new address. See Iowa 

Code § 692A.2, .3 (requiring a person convicted of a sexual offense to 

register with the sheriff of the county of the person’s residence). 

 In October 2005, the sheriff notified Willard his new house was 

within two thousand feet of a school. The sheriff gave Willard thirty days 

to establish a residence in compliance with section 692A.2A. After 

Willard did not move, the State charged him with violating the residency 

restrictions under section 692A.2A, an aggravated misdemeanor. 

 Willard filed a motion to dismiss, alleging section 692A.2A violated 

his right to procedural due process, constituted a bill of attainder, was 

vague and overbroad, violated his right to equal protection, 

unconstitutionally affected his family relationships, and violated his right 

to travel. The court held a hearing on the motion. Thereafter, the parties 

filed briefs with the district court. Willard briefed only three 

constitutional claims: bill of attainder, equal protection, and procedural 

due process. The district court denied Willard’s motion to dismiss, 

concluding section 692A.2A did not violate Willard’s “constitutional 

rights of equal protection nor procedural due process, and it is not a bill 

of attainder.” 

 Willard waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the 

minutes of evidence. The district court found he violated the residency 

restrictions and imposed a $500 fine. 

 On appeal, Willard challenges the district court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss and contends the two-thousand-foot rule is a bill of 

attainder, violates his constitutional right to equal protection and 

procedural due process, and interferes with his constitutional right to 

travel. We affirm for the reasons that follow. 
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II. Scope of Review. 

Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Naujoks, 637 

N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001). 

III. Merits. 

Iowa’s two-thousand-foot rule has withstood constitutional 

challenge on several occasions. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 704–05; Wright v. 

Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 747 N.W.2d 213 (Iowa 2008); State v. Groves, 742 

N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 2007); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 668 (Iowa 

2005). Willard attempts to distinguish those cases by claiming he 

“contracted for his home during a time when he could legally reside 

there” and then was subsequently “banished.” At the outset, we find this 

statement to be untrue. Willard purchased his house several days after 

the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court decision finding the law 

unconstitutional. Willard places much emphasis on the fact the federal 

district court’s injunction was still in effect at the time he purchased his 

house. On remand, the federal district court recognized an agreement of 

the parties to resume enforcement of the statute on September 1, 2005. 

We conclude Willard was not legally entitled to reside in his house when 

he purchased it. Rather, the State simply agreed to postpone 

enforcement of the statute. Willard should not have been under any 

illusion that he was entitled to live in the house when he purchased it. 

We turn now to his specific claims. 

 A. Bill of Attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act that 

inflicts punishment on a particular individual or readily identifiable 

group without a judicial trial. Atwood v. Vilsack, 725 N.W.2d 641, 651 

(Iowa 2006). A bill of attainder is prohibited under the United States and 

Iowa Constitutions. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass 

any Bill of Attainder . . . .”); Iowa Const. art I, § 21 (“No bill of attainder 
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. . . shall ever be passed.”). Willard claims section 692A.2A is a bill of 

attainder because it (1) identifies a class of individuals, (2) inflicts 

punishment on the individual member of the class, “solely and 

specifically because of their status as members of a class,” and (3) fails to 

provide a judicial trial. We recently rejected this argument in Wright, 747 

N.W.2d at 217–18. 

Certainly, section 692A.2A identifies a class of individuals—sex 

offenders whose victims were minors. However, merely being subject to 

the residency restrictions is not punishment. See Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 

668 (stating “we cannot conclude that the statute imposes criminal 

punishment under this record”). Willard was not punished solely for 

being a member of this group. Instead, he was punished for violating the 

residency restrictions that were enacted for the legitimate purpose of 

protecting children. Id. Moreover, he was afforded all of the protections 

of the judicial process when he was charged with violating section 

692A.2A. His bill-of-attainder argument is therefore without merit. 

B. Equal Protection. Willard claims section 692A.2A denies 

him equal protection under the law. The Fourteenth Amendment 

provides a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 

equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, 

the Iowa Constitution states “the general assembly shall not grant to any 

citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the 

same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const. art. I, 

§ 6. 

The first step of an equal protection claim is to identify the classes 

of similarly situated persons singled out for differential treatment. Ames 

Rental Prop. Ass'n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007). 
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If the statute treats similarly situated persons differently, the 

court must then determine what level of review is required—

strict scrutiny or rational basis. A statute is subject to 

strict-scrutiny analysis—the state must show the 

classification is narrowly tailored to a compelling state 

interest—when it classifies individuals “in terms of their 

ability to exercise a fundamental right or when it classifies or 

distinguishes persons by race or national origin.” All other 

statutory classifications are subject to rational-basis review 

in which case the defendant must show the classification 

bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government 

interest.

Wright, 747 N.W.2d at 216 (citing In re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 

452 (Iowa 2001)). 

Willard fails to identify the classes of similarly situated persons 

singled out for differential treatment by the statute. See State v. Philpott, 

702 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Iowa 2005) (stating “[d]efendant’s equal-protection 

argument must fail because she has identified no similar class of persons 

that is treated more favorably under the act than she was”). In Wright, 

the defendant argued section 692A.2A violated his right to equal 

protection because he claimed the law was more likely to be enforced 

against sex offenders on probation as opposed to sex offenders not 

currently on probation. Wright, 747 N.W.2d at 216–17. We held the two 

groups were not similarly situated because one group is subject to state 

monitoring while the other is not. Id. at 217. We also noted Wright 

failed to show section 692A.2A treated the classes differently. Id. While 

we acknowledged there may be some truth to Wright’s enforcement 

argument, we noted Wright had failed to show sex offenders not on 

probation escaped prosecution for violating section 692A.2A. Id. 

Willard takes a different tack. He attempts to trigger strict 

scrutiny by claiming section 692A.2A “severely impairs his ability to 

make a home with his family,” which he deems a fundamental right. See 

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1935, 
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52 L.Ed.2d 531, 537 (1977) (striking down a zoning ordinance because it 

unconstitutionally interfered with “freedom of personal choice in matters 

of marriage and family life” by “select[ing] certain categories of relatives 

who may live together and declar[ing] that others may not”). We 

disagree. 

“[A]n alleged infringement of a familial right is unconstitutional 

only when an infringement has a direct and substantial impact on the 

familial relationship.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 663. The two-thousandfoot rule does not prevent sex offenders from living with their families. 

Willard’s real complaint is the rule prevents him from living in the house 

of his choosing. However, in Seering, we held “freedom of choice in 

residence is . . . not a fundamental interest entitled to the highest 

constitutional protection.” Id. at 664. Thus, “an interest in choice of 

residency is entitled to only rational basis review.” Id.

Under the rational-basis test, we must determine whether the twothousand-foot rule is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 

interest. Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n, 736 N.W.2d at 259. Under this 

deferential standard, the law is valid unless the relationship between the 

classification and the purpose behind it is so weak the classification 

must be viewed as arbitrary or capricious. Id. A statute is presumed 

constitutional and the challenging party has the burden to “negat[e] 

every reasonable basis that might support the disparate treatment.” Id.

In Seering, we found a reasonable fit between the government 

interest (public safety) and the means utilized by the State to advance 

that interest (the two-thousand-foot restriction). Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 

665. Although the two-thousand-foot rule is not necessarily the perfect 

protection against the danger posed by sex offenders, “perfection is not 

necessary to meet the rational basis standard.” Id. We have previously 
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acknowledged “when applying a rational basis test under the Iowa 

Constitution, changes in the underlying circumstances can allow us to 

find a statute no longer rationally relates to a legitimate government 

purpose.” Groves, 742 N.W.2d at 93. However, Willard has not 

articulated any reason why our conclusion in Seering was incorrect and 

has not developed an evidentiary basis for this court to conclude the 

statute fails to promote a legitimate government interest. Instead, he 

argues he should have an unfettered right to choose his house.1 

Because we rejected that argument in Seering, this claim must fail. 

 C. Procedural Due Process. Willard claims section 692A.2A 

denies him procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 

and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. “ ‘A person is entitled to 

procedural due process when state action threatens to deprive the 

person of a protected liberty or property interest.’ ” Seering, 701 N.W.2d 

at 665 (quoting Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 

682, 690 (Iowa 2002)). Accordingly, the first step in any procedural due 

process inquiry is to determine whether a protected liberty or property 

interest is involved. Id. Such liberty interests have their source in the 

Federal Constitution and “include such things as freedom from bodily 

restraint, the right to contract, the right to marry and raise children, and 

the right to worship according to the dictates of a person’s conscience.” 

Id. Protected property interests “ ‘are created and their dimensions are 

defined’ not by the Constitution but by an independent source such as 

state law.” Id. (citation omitted). 

 1Willard does claim he will “face a huge financial loss if forced to sell his 

property and buy another to replace it.” Even if that were true, he bought his house a 

few days after the Eighth Circuit found the two-thousand-foot rule to be constitutional. 

If he was hoping the court’s panel decision would be reversed en banc, that was a risk 

he chose to accept when purchasing the house. 
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 Once it is determined a protected interest is at issue, we weigh 

three factors to determine what process is due: 

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 

action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 

interest through the procedures used, and the probable 

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 

safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 

the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 

requirement[s] would entail. 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 

18, 33 (1976). At the very least, procedural due process requires “notice 

and opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that is ‘adequate to 

safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked.’ ” 

Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665–66 (quoting Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 691). 

However, “ ‘[n]o particular procedure violates [due process] merely 

because another method may seem fairer or wiser.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 691). 

 Willard contends that, because section 692A.2A interferes with his 

right to contract, he is entitled to a predeprivation hearing. See Bowers, 

638 N.W.2d at 691 (recognizing the right to contract is a protected liberty 

interest). However, his right to contract is not directly affected by the 

two-thousand-foot rule. Nothing prevents him from purchasing the 

house, only from living there. 

Assuming arguendo a protected liberty or property interest is at 

stake, Willard has failed to prove the procedures in place are 

constitutionally inadequate. Willard contends he is entitled to an 

individualized hearing to determine whether he is dangerous before being 

subjected to the residency restrictions. This argument was rejected in 

Miller. There, the Eighth Circuit said “ ‘due process does not entitle [a 

person] to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the 
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[state] statute.’ ” Miller, 405 F.3d at 709 (quoting Conn. Dep't of Pub. 

Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 

104 (2003)). 

The [residency] restriction applies to all offenders who have 

been convicted of certain crimes against minors, regardless 

of what estimates of future dangerousness might be proved 

in individualized hearings. Once such a legislative 

classification has been drawn, additional procedures are 

unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a 

potential exemption for individuals who seek to prove that 

they are not individually dangerous or likely to offend 

against neighboring schoolchildren. 

Id. The court concluded, 

[u]nless the [sex offenders] can establish that the substantive rule 

established by the legislative classification conflicts with some 

provision of the Constitution, there is no requirement that the 

State provide a process to establish an exemption from the 

legislative classification. 

Id. 

In Seering, we rejected a similar argument for a hearing to request 

“an exemption based on difficulty of finding a suitable place to live 

outside the two-thousand-foot restriction.” Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 666. 

We said “[b]ecause there are no exemptions in the statute, Seering was 

not entitled to a hearing before he was charged under the statute to 

attempt to persuade the court that the statute should not be applied to 

him.” Id. Moreover, we found “the minimum protections necessary 

under due process would be met by the notice under the statute and the 

trial.” Id. We see no reason to revisit our conclusion in Seering. Section 

692A.2A does not violate procedural due process.

 D. Right to Travel. Finally, Willard claims section 692A.2A 

violates the right to interstate travel by limiting the ability of sex 

offenders to establish residences in towns or cities. He states section 

692A.2A deters sex offenders from immigrating to Iowa from other states. 
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The fundamental right to interstate travel recognized by the Supreme 

Court protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: “the 

erection of actual barriers to interstate movement” and “being treated 

differently” from intrastate travelers. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 

Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 276–77, 113 S. Ct. 753, 763, 122 L. Ed. 2d 34, 51 

(1993). 

There are at least three problems with this claim. First, Willard 

did not preserve error on his right to travel claim. He failed to brief that 

ground to the district court and failed to obtain a ruling on that basis. 

See Kimm v. Kimm, 464 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding 

“the trial court may not be put in error unless the issue was presented 

for ruling, and the failure to obtain a ruling is inexcusable unless the 

court refuses or fails to rule after a ruling is requested”). 

 Second, he has failed to mention how his right to interstate travel 

has somehow been impinged. A “litigant cannot ‘borrow the claim of 

unconstitutionality of another.’ ” State v. Hepburn, 270 N.W.2d 629, 631 

(Iowa 1978). 

Finally, Willard fails to recognize the Eighth Circuit considered and 

rejected this claim in Miller. There, the court said section 692A.2A 

imposes no obstacle to a sex offender’s entry into Iowa, and 

it does not erect an “actual barrier to interstate movement.” 

There is “free ingress and regress to and from” Iowa for sex 

offenders, and the statute thus does not “directly impair the 

exercise of the right to free interstate movement.” Nor does 

the Iowa statute violate principles of equality by treating 

nonresidents who visit Iowa any differently than current 

residents, or by discriminating against citizens of other 

States who wish to establish residence in Iowa. 

Miller, 405 F.3d at 712 (citations omitted). For these reasons, Willard’s 

right to travel claim must also fail. 
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 IV. Conclusion. 

We conclude Iowa Code section 692A.2A is not a bill of attainder 

and does not violate equal protection or procedural due process. Willard 

failed to preserve for appeal his right to travel claim.

AFFIRMED.