Filed: December 15, 2000

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7520

(CA-98-74-5)

James Quinn,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

William S. Haynes, etc., et al.,

Respondents - Appellees.

ORDER

The court amends its opinion filed December 6, 2000, as

follows:

On page 17, continuation of footnote 11, second full paragraph, line 13 -- the sentence is corrected to begin “Where these

details are independently admissible, however ....”

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JAMES QUINN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM S. HAYNES, Warden,

No. 99-7520

Huttonsville Correctional Center;

DARRELL V. MCGRAW, JR., Attorney

General of the State of West

Virginia,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.

Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CA-98-74-5)

Argued: September 28, 2000

Decided: December 6, 2000

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Wilkins and Judge Traxler joined.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: David Robert Bungard, ROBINSON & MCELWEE, ARGUED: 

L.L.P., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Leah Perry Macia,

Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Charleston, ON BRIEF:

West Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

On October 6, 1994, James Quinn was convicted in the Circuit

Court of Wetzel County, West Virginia of the felony offense of sexual abuse by a custodian, in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-8D-5

(1986). After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction on direct

review in the West Virginia state court system, Quinn filed a petition

for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia against William S. Haynes, Warden of Huttonsville Correctional Center

("Haynes"),1 claiming that the trial court denied Quinn his Sixth

Amendment rights, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, by limiting his ability to present evidence related to impeaching the credibility of the key prosecution witness.2 The district court granted

summary judgment on behalf of Haynes, holding that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals's ruling affirming his conviction neither violated clearly established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence nor

constituted an unreasonable application thereof. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the district court's judgment.

I.

In November of 1992, T.M.3 was five years old and lived with her

mother and several siblings in Wetzel County. James Quinn is the

father of one of T.M.'s siblings. Sometime in early November, Quinn

_________________________________________________________________

1 Quinn also named Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of the 1 

State of West Virginia, as a defendant, but McGraw was dismissed from

the case on September 21, 1999.

2 Throughout both direct and habeas review, Quinn has challenged only 2 

his conviction and has not presented any challenge to his sentence.

3 The minor victim has been called T.M. throughout the proceedings to 3 

protect her identity, and we will preserve this practice.

 2
babysat the children overnight while their mother was away. A couple

of weeks later, T.M. told her aunt that she had been sexually molested

by Quinn during that evening. At trial, T.M. testified that Quinn took

off her panties, touched her between her legs with his hand, tried to

hurt her "between [her] privates" with "[his] private thing," and that

Quinn tried to put his "private thing" in her "private thing." (J.A. at

208). T.M.'s testimony was the State's only evidence of the abuse, as

there were no eyewitnesses, and no medical evidence was admitted

to corroborate T.M.'s testimony.

Prior to trial, Quinn filed a motion seeking permission to crossexamine T.M. about the fact that T.M. had made similar accusations

of sexual abuse against two of her step-brothers and her grandfather.

Quinn sought to impeach the minor victim's general credibility by

attacking the victim's allegations of sexual abuse by others through

cross-examination of the victim as to each alleged specific act and by

presenting the testimony of each alleged perpetrator denying his

alleged conduct (collectively, "proffered impeachment evidence").

The Guardian Ad Litem appointed to represent T.M. opposed Quinn's

motion, arguing that West Virginia's rape shield law, W. Va. Code

§ 61-8B-11 (1986), prohibited the admission of the impeachment evidence offered by Quinn.

During an in limine hearing based upon Quinn's motion to admit

the impeachment evidence, the trial court considered arguments

regarding the relevance of Quinn's proposed line of questioning.

After determining that such evidence only would be admissible if the

allegations were false, the trial court allowed Quinn's attorney to

proffer evidence demonstrating the falsity of T.M.'s other allegations

of sexual abuse.

Quinn's attorney was able only to submit the simple denial testimony of those accused as evidence of falsity of T.M.'s other allegations. As part of his proffer of evidence, Quinn had T.M.'s

psychiatrist testify outside the presence of the jury. During this testimony, the trial court specifically asked the psychiatrist if she had any

reason to disbelieve T.M.'s other allegations, and the psychiatrist

replied, "[N]o." (J.A. at 344). Quinn's proffer revealed that Quinn had

no proof of falsity, other than the mere denials of those accused, and

sought to cross-examine T.M. to uncover evidence that would support

 3
Quinn's speculation that the other allegations were false. Ultimately,

the proffered evidence established only that T.M. had made the other

allegations to several different people and never had recanted the allegations or admitted their untruth.4 Additionally, Quinn's proffered

line of questioning required the introduction of extrinsic evidence as

part of his impeachment of T.M.'s general credibility.

After argument and briefing, the trial court denied Quinn's motion

for the requested presentation of impeachment evidence, ruling that

Quinn failed to produce sufficient evidence of falsity. Without such

a showing, the trial court held that the evidence of other allegations

of sexual assault fell within the protection of West Virginia's rape

shield law.5 As to Quinn's proffered denial testimony, the trial court

_________________________________________________________________

4 T.M. told the stories of the other assaults to at least four people--her 4 

psychiatrist (Mary Elizabeth Hoard), the social worker assigned to the

case (Mickey Hall), the doctor assigned to establish T.M.'s competency

to testify (Dr. Charles Hewitt), and her grandmother (Wilma Coen).

5 Generally, West Virginia's rape shield law prohibits inquiry at trial 5 

into the alleged victim's sexual conduct with other individuals. See W.

Va. Code § 61-8B-11 (1986). The relevant portions of the statute read:

§ 61-8B-11. Sexual offenses; evidence.

(a) In any prosecution under this article in which the victim's

lack of consent is based solely on the incapacity to consent

because such victim was below a critical age, evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence

of the victim's sexual conduct and reputation evidence of the

victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible. In any other

prosecution under this article, evidence of specific instances of

the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant shall be

admissible on the issue of consent: Provided, That such evidence

heard first out of the presence of the jury is found by the judge

to be relevant.

(b) In any prosecution under this article evidence of specific

instances of the victim's sexual conduct with persons other than

the defendant, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct

and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not

be admissible: Provided, That such evidence shall be admissible

solely for the purpose of impeaching credibility, if the victim

first makes his or her previous sexual conduct an issue in the trial

by introducing evidence with respect thereto.

Id.

 4
held that the simple denial testimony did not demonstrate falsity and,

if allowed, would result in mini-trials on the other allegations of sexual abuse, which would ultimately distract the jurors and possibly

result in psychological harm to T.M.6

The jury convicted Quinn of one count of sexual abuse by a custodian in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8B-5 (1986).7 Quinn

was sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration of five to

fifteen years. Quinn timely appealed the denial of his proffered

impeachment evidence to the West Virginia Supreme Court of

Appeals. See State v. Quinn, 490 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1997). That court

upheld the limitation on the scope of Quinn's proffered impeachment

evidence, holding that although false accusations of sexual abuse are

not protected by West Virginia's rape shield law, Quinn had not introduced evidence sufficiently demonstrating the falsity of T.M.'s other

allegations. See id. at 41. In its ruling, the state supreme court developed a standard that requires "strong and substantial proof of the

actual falsity of an alleged victim's other statements" before such

statements will be admissible. Id. at 40. Because it noted that, with

respect to the proposed cross-examination of T.M., Quinn had failed

to "point to any evidence showing that such an admission [of falsity]

might be forthcoming, nor to a substantial impossibility, discrepancy

or other defect in T.M.'s statements that provided a strong indicium

of the statements' falsity," the state supreme court held that the trial

court properly limited the cross-examination. Id. at 41 n.10.

On June 15, 1998, Quinn filed for habeas corpus relief in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. In his petition for habeas relief,

Quinn argued that the exclusion of his proffered impeachment evidence violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The

district court referred Quinn's case to a magistrate judge, who submitted a recommendation that Haynes's motion for summary judgment

_________________________________________________________________

6 In analyzing Quinn's request for the proposed cross-examination, the 6 

trial court noted T.M.'s "tender years and the possibility for further psychological damage." (J.A. at 55.)

7 Quinn also was charged with sexual assault in the first degree in vio- 7 

lation of West Virginia Code § 61-8B-3 (1986), but the jury acquitted

him of this charge.

 5
be granted and Quinn's motion for an evidentiary hearing be denied.

After a de novo review of the magistrate judge's findings, the district

court adopted the recommendation. The district court held that the

state supreme court's exclusion of Quinn's proffered impeachment

evidence regarding T.M.'s other accusations of sexual abuse neither

violated clearly established federal law nor constituted an unreasonable application of such law.

On October 25, 1999, Quinn requested that the district court issue

a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) and

Rule 22(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. On November 3,

1999, the district court granted Quinn's request and issued a certificate of appealability for Quinn's Sixth Amendment claim as it pertained to the state supreme court's limitation on Quinn's right to

present the proffered impeachment evidence. In reviewing the district

court's holding, we must determine whether the state supreme court's

restriction on Quinn's presentation of impeachment evidence through

the application of its rape shield law was objectively unreasonable in

light of controlling Supreme Court precedent.

II.

Before turning to the merits of Quinn's argument, we first must

consider whether we lack jurisdiction to hear Quinn's appeal due to

Quinn's failure to file a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

Although neither party addressed this issue, we are duty-bound to

clarify our subject matter jurisdiction because questions of subject

matter jurisdiction "`concern the court's very power to hear the

case.'" Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 442 n. 4 (4th Cir.

1999) (quoting 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice

§ 12.30 [1] (3d ed. 1998)); see also Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp.,

770 F.2d 1272, 1274 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Although plaintiffs have not

questioned the district court's jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that requires sua sponte consideration when it is

seriously in doubt.").

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which governs appeals

in civil cases, provides that a party has thirty days after the entry of

the district court's final judgment or order to note an appeal. Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1). The district court issued its memorandum opinion

 6
and order on September 21, 1999. Quinn filed a motion for a certificate of appealability on October 27, 1999. Quinn subsequently filed

a notice of appeal on November 10, 1999. Neither his certificate of

appealability nor his notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of

the district court's final order of September 21, 1999, as required by

Rule 4(a)(1).

The timely filing of the notice of appeal is "mandatory and jurisdictional." United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960). Nevertheless, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district

court failed to comply with the "separate document" requirement of

Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58

("Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document."). Instead

of entering judgment on a separate document, the district court issued

only a document styled as a Memorandum Opinion and Order

Accepting and Adopting Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Disposition of Magistrate Judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58

notes to 1963 amendment ("The amended rule eliminates these

uncertainties by requiring that there be a judgment set out on a separate document--distinct from any opinion or memorandum--which

provides the basis for the entry of judgment.").

The consequences of the district court's failure to comply with

Rule 58 are well-established: When a district court does not enter its

final judgment on a separate document, the time to appeal does not

begin to run. See Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585

F.2d 683, 689 (4th Cir. 1978).

While the absence of a properly-entered judgment disposes of the

contention that the appeal was untimely filed, it raises the further

question of whether this Court may consider the merits of the appeal

without first requiring that the State obtain a judgment that formally

complies with Rule 58. In Caperton, we resolved this issue and held

that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal,

despite the lack of conformity with Rule 58, when a three-factor test

is met: "(1) `the District Court clearly evidenced its intent that the

opinion and order from which an appeal was taken would represent

the final decision in the case'; (2) a judgment of dismissal `was

recorded in the clerk's docket'; and (3) the appellees `did not object

to the taking of the appeal in the absence of a separate judgment.'"

 7
Id. at 690-91 (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381,

387-88 (1978)). In this case, the memorandum opinion and order

issued by the district court clearly evidenced the court's intent that it

serve as the final decision in the case, the district court's memorandum opinion and order was entered on the docket on September 21,

1999, and Haynes has not objected to the taking of this appeal in the

absence of the separate document. Therefore, this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of this appeal.

III.

Turning to the merits, Quinn argues that the state court's limitation

of his proffered impeachment evidence violated his Sixth Amendment

right under the Confrontation Clause. The parties agree that the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, governs review of this case. Pursuant to that statute, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas

corpus with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court

proceedings unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States," 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 2000).

Accordingly, we first note that the West Virginia Supreme Court of

Appeals clearly adjudicated Quinn's Sixth Amendment claim on its

merits.8 Therefore, we turn to whether its adjudication is contrary to

_________________________________________________________________

8 Quinn concedes that the state supreme court adjudicated his Sixth 8 

Amendment claim on its merits by his reliance on the standard of review

under § 2254(d)(1) in his briefs presented to this Court. Moreover, at oral

argument, Quinn confirmed that he presented the state supreme court

with the "almost identical" Sixth Amendment argument presented before

this Court. The state supreme court accepted briefing and oral arguments

on that issue. With the Sixth Amendment claim squarely before it, the

state supreme court rejected Quinn's requested relief. See State v. Quinn,

490 S.E.2d 34, 42 (W. Va. 1997). While the state supreme court stated

that its discussion was confined to the applicability and effect of its rape

shield law, it analyzed its falsity standard using cases that squarely

address the federal Confrontation Clause issue. See id. at 42 ("Nor do we

perceive any grounds, under the facts of this case, that would require the

admission of such evidence under our rape shield law." (emphasis

added)); id. at 42 n.13 ("[T]he provisions of West Virginia's rape shield

law are constitutional under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution . . . .").

 8
clearly established federal law. If there is no directly controlling

Supreme Court precedent for purposes of conducting the "contrary to"

prong, we then must analyze whether the precedent is applied in an

objectively reasonable manner. See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1522-23 (2000). We note that under section 2254(d), a writ may

not issue simply because a federal court concludes, in its own judgment, that the state court decision applied federal law "erroneously or

incorrectly." Id. at 1522. Rather, the state court's application must be

objectively unreasonable.

A.

Under § 2254(d)(1), we must address whether the state court's

interpretation of Quinn's Confrontation Clause rights under its falsity

standard is "contrary to" federal constitutional standards, as articulated by Supreme Court precedent. A state court adjudication is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if "the state court arrives at

a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000).

No controlling Supreme Court precedent exists establishing the

parameters of a criminal defendant's Confrontation Clause right to

introduce impeachment evidence in the manner sought by Quinn. The

Supreme Court has, however, addressed the Confrontation Clause

implications of excluding impeachment evidence that tends to show

bias or motive to fabricate charges. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488

U.S. 227, 232-33 (1988); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16

(1974). For the "clearly established" prong to apply, the relevant

Supreme Court precedent need not be directly on point, but must provide a "governing legal principle" and articulate specific considerations for the lower courts to follow when applying the precedent. See

Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523. The issue, therefore, is whether the

Supreme Court cases analyzing the Confrontation Clause implications

of excluding cross-examination on bias and motive to fabricate

charges provide any "governing principles" that resolve this case. For

the reasons that follow, we hold that such cases do not.

In cases involving bias or motive to fabricate charges, the Supreme

Court has held,

 9
[a] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation

Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in

otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a

prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and

thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors

. . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness."

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis,

415 U.S. at 318); see also Olden, 488 U.S. at 231 (citing Van Arsdall

and Davis for the proposition that the exclusion of impeachment evidence related to motive to fabricate charges violates the Confrontation

Clause). The distinction between impeachment evidence proving bias

and impeachment of general credibility is important because generally

applicable evidentiary rules limit inquiry into specific instances of

conduct through the use of extrinsic evidence and through crossexamination with respect to general credibility attacks, see W. Va. R.

Evid. 608,9 but no such limit applies to credibility attacks based upon

motive or bias. See W. Va. R. Evid. 404(b); 4 Jack B. Weinstein et

al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 607.04[1] (2d ed. 2000) ("Since

bias of a witness is always significant in assessing credibility, the trier

of fact must be sufficiently informed of the underlying relationships,

circumstances, and influences operating on the witness to determine

whether a modification of testimony reasonably could be expected as

a probable human reaction.") (footnote omitted); see also Davis, 415

U.S. at 317 ("[T]he jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the

defense theory [of witness bias] . . . so that they could make an

informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the witness's] testimony. . . ."); Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 225 (4th Cir.

1980) (recognizing that Davis stands for the principle that "[o]ne of

the most important factors affecting credibility is the presence of any

bias, prejudice or incentive on the part of a witness to favor one party

to the litigation").

In Davis, one of the leading Confrontation Clause cases regarding

the right to cross-examination for the purpose of impeachment, the

Court noted this distinction between attacks on the general credibility

_________________________________________________________________

9 West Virginia's Rules of Evidence 608 and 404(b) mirror their coun- 9 

terparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence.

 10
of the witness and a more particular attack on credibility "effected by

means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases,

prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate

directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand." Davis, 415 U.S.

at 316. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, emphasized "that

the Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a

right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness

through cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications."

Id. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Hughes v. Raines, 641

F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (drawing the same distinction between

general credibility attacks and attacks on motive or bias and applying

it to distinguish Davis from attempts to introduce prior false allegations of sexual abuse).

The object of Quinn's intended presentation of impeachment evidence was to attack T.M.'s general credibility, rather than her potential bias or motive to fabricate charges. Therefore, Davis does not

control our resolution of whether West Virginia's limitation on

Quinn's presentation of impeachment evidence pursuant to its rape

shield law violated Quinn's Confrontation Clause right.

Davis and its progeny are also distinguishable because they involve

impeachment based upon credibility-impugning facts that were not in

dispute. For example, in Olden v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held

that the trial court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights

when it limited cross-examination of the victim to preclude inquiry

into the victim's motive to fabricate the allegations of sexual assault.

See Olden, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). The defense's theory in Olden

was that the alleged victim, who was white, had consensual sex with

the defendant, who was black, and then fabricated the rape charges

against the defendant to protect her ongoing relationship with her

live-in boyfriend. See id. at 230. The trial court held that the potential

prejudice created by exposing the interracial relationship between the

alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator outweighed its probative

value to the defendant's case. See id. at 230-31. The Supreme Court

reversed the lower court, stating that the "[s]peculation as to the effect

of the jurors's racial biases cannot justify the exclusion of crossexamination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of

[the witness'] testimony." Id.

 11
Olden initially is distinguishable from the present case because it

involves impeachment based on evidence of motive to fabricate

charges, rather than an attack on general credibility, as discussed at

length above. See supra at 9-11. Additionally, in Olden, the state

court, in excluding the cross-examination, noted the undisputed fact

that the alleged victim was involved in an interracial relationship and

that such evidence was relevant to prove motive to fabricate the

charges. See Olden, 488 U.S. at 232; see also Davis, 415 U.S. at 313-

15 (involving a situation in which the fact of the juvenile's probationary status, which would arguably lead him to testify in the government's favor, was not in dispute); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679

(noting that the government conceded it had made a promise to drop

public intoxication charges against the witness in exchange for his

testimony).

These cases addressed established, undisputed facts. The only issue

in each case was whether the prejudice of permitting crossexamination outweighed the probative value of the factual evidence.

In Quinn's case, however, the entire crux of the issue is whether the

credibility-impugning fact existed at all. A true allegation of another

sexual assault is completely irrelevant to credibility and offends the

clear language of West Virginia's rape shield law, see W. Va. Code

§ 61-8B-11 (1986), which is why a threshold showing of falsity ultimately is required.

To the extent that the Davis and Olden line of cases leaves open

the issue of a defendant's right to impeach the general credibility of

a witness regarding a contested fact, those cases certainly do not

"clearly establish" Quinn's asserted Sixth Amendment right. See Vick

v. Williams, No. 99-7406 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2000) (noting that when

Supreme Court precedent reserves an issue, that precedent cannot represent "clearly established law" on that issue). As we stated in Green

v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998), to hold that an issue left open

by the Supreme Court represents "clearly established law" as to that

issue "would transform habeas review under amended 2254(d)(1) into

a one-way ratchet whereby a state court must resolve all open questions of federal law in the defendant's favor in order to prevent the

conviction or sentence from being vacated on habeas review." Green,

143 F.3d at 880.

 12
Because there is no Supreme Court precedent that provides a governing legal principle for this case, we turn to the issue of whether

West Virginia's limitation of Quinn's proposed impeachment evidence relating to T.M.'s other allegations of sexual assault, pursuant

to its rape shield law, constituted an unreasonable application of Sixth

Amendment precedent. See id. (holding that if there is no "directly

controlling Supreme Court precedent," this Court must analyze

whether the precedent is applied in a "patently unreasonable way.").

B.

The specific issue that we next must determine is whether the state

supreme court's refusal to allow cross-examination and denial testimony regarding T.M.'s other allegations of sexual assault, pursuant

to West Virginia's rape shield law, is an unreasonable application of

relevant Supreme Court Confrontation Clause precedent. See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). Because Quinn was

able only to produce simple denial testimony in support of his claim

that T.M.'s other allegations of sexual assault were false, we need

only address the question of whether, in light of Quinn's proffer of

simple denial testimony, West Virginia unreasonably applied Confrontation Clause precedent when it applied West Virginia's rape

shield law to limit Quinn's proposed impeachment evidence. We need

not address the broader issue of whether West Virginia's standard of

strong and substantial proof of falsity is objectively reasonable in

light of relevant Supreme Court precedent.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the

right of an accused in a criminal prosecution "to be confronted with

the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme

Court has made clear that the right of confrontation, which is secured

for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, see

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), "means more than being

allowed to confront the witness physically," Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.

308, 315 (1974). Indeed, the Court has noted that "`[t]he main and

essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the

opportunity of cross-examination.'" Id. at 315-316 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)). Accordingly, it is clear

from Supreme Court precedent that the Sixth Amendment guarantees

the right of a criminal defendant to reasonable cross-examination,

 13
when otherwise appropriate, for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of key witnesses. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232

(1988); Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16. It does not follow, however, that

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial

court from imposing any limits on the scope of defense counsel's

cross-examination and presentation of evidence related to the

impeachment of a key prosecution witness's credibility. "On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation

Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v.

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986).

In the exercise of his Confrontation Clause right, Quinn must

"comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to

assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and

innocence." See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).

In other words, the Confrontation Clause does not trump established

rules of evidence, but rather must yield to such rules when their application is reasonable. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11

(1988) ("The principle that undergirds the defendant's right to present

exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on that

right. The adversary process could not function effectively without

adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation

of facts and arguments . . . .").

In accordance with these principles, it is clear that the state

supreme court did not apply federal law in an objectively unreasonable manner merely by relying upon its evidentiary rules to limit

Quinn's right to present evidence in support of his defense. Quinn

argues, however, that Sixth Amendment precedent mandates that a

trial court allow impeachment evidence regarding the victim's other

allegations of sexual assault once the defendant proffers simple denial

testimony of those accused because such simple denial testimony sufficiently proves the falsity of the victim's other allegations.10 We,

_________________________________________________________________

10 Quinn also argues that cross-examination of the victim and the pre- 10 

sentation of simple denial testimony of those accused are the only meth-

 14
therefore, must examine whether the state supreme court's use of its

rape shield law to limit Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence, in

light of the simple denial testimony, is an unreasonable application of

relevant Supreme Court Confrontation Clause precedent.

As its articulated basis for requiring more than simple denial testimony to prove falsity, the state supreme court relied upon the purpose

of its rape shield law, which is to protect victims of sexual abuse from

protracted attacks on their character through evidence of prior sexual

activity. See State v. Quinn, 490 S.E.2d 34, 40 (W. Va. 1997). The

state supreme court noted that a requirement of sufficient proof of falsity "is necessary to reasonably minimize the possibility that evidence

which is within the scope of [West Virginia's] rape shield law, W.

Va. Code 61-8B-11 (1986), and West Virginia Rule of Evidence

404(a)(3) (1994), is not erroneously considered outside of its scope."

Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 40. Therefore, the state supreme court's holding

requiring more than simple denial testimony to establish falsity was

premised on its desire to properly implement its state evidentiary rule.

The United States Supreme Court has held that numerous state procedural and evidentiary rules control the presentation of evidence and

do not offend a defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

right. See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-51 (1991)

(upholding the notice-and-hearing provisions of Michigan's rape

shield law); Taylor, 484 U.S. at 417 (upholding trial court's exclusion

of the testimony of a key witness as a sanction for the defendant's

violation of a state procedural rule requiring the defendant to identify

a particular defense witness in response to a pretrial discovery

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ods whereby Quinn could demonstrate the falsity of the other allegations.

We disagree. As illustrated by United States v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp.

1396 (W.D.N.C. 1991), aff'd 959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992), the falsity of

the other accusations can be established by the alleged victim's own

admission, prior to trial, that she had falsely accused others, or by proof

of a motive to falsify accusations. See id. at 1401. Falsity also can be

established by variations within the stories told to different people, medical evidence that contradicts another allegation, an admission of falsity

during discovery, or proof that the accused was not physically present

during the time of the alleged incident.

 15
request); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975) (upholding the exclusion of a defense witness because of the defendant's violation of a state procedural rule); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("In the

exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must

comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to

assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and

innocence."); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967) (stating that the opinion should not be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges or nonarbitrary rules that disqualify those incapable of

observing events due to mental infirmity or infancy from being witnesses).

In light of the fact that evidentiary rules inevitably limit the scope

and nature of any criminal defense, the Supreme Court has established an analytical framework that courts should use when evaluating

Confrontation Clause challenges based upon the exclusion of evidence. Pursuant to this framework, courts must determine whether the

rule relied upon for the exclusion of evidence is"arbitrary or disproportionate" to the "State's legitimate interests."11 Lucas, 500 U.S. at

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11 Quinn argues that we should not perform the balancing test that 11 

Supreme Court precedent mandates, but we should conclude instead that

Quinn alleges a per se violation of his Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause right because of the uncorroborated nature of the child's allegations of sexual abuse. In other words, Quinn argues that when a sexual

assault claim is uncorroborated, a criminal defendant has an unlimited

right to cross-examine the victim about other sexual assault allegations

and introduce extrinsic evidence related to such.

In response to Quinn's argument, we first note that the Supreme Court

has rejected a per se approach to Confrontation Clause challenges involving the application of state evidentiary rules, instead holding that each

Confrontation Clause issue must be decided upon the basis of the legitimate interests underlying the implementation of that evidentiary rule. See

Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1991); cf. Olden v. Kentucky,

488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988) (listing the lack of corroboration as one element in its harmless error analysis). To treat the absence of corroboration

as dispositive would undermine the Supreme Court's holding in Lucas.

Additionally, such a holding would not afford proper deference to West

Virginia's state law, which allows convictions for sexual offenses to be

obtained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. See State v.

 16
151; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) ("[R]estrictions of a defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its

evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by

a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional

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George W.H., 439 S.E.2d 423, 436 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that a "defendant can be found guilty of a sexually-related crime based upon the

uncorroborated testimony of a victim").

We further note that T.M.'s allegations arguably were corroborated by

her prompt complaints of her sexual abuse to her aunt and a social

worker. See State v. Quinn, 490 S.E.2d 34, 43 (W. Va. 1997) (detailing

the T.M.'s reports to her aunt and a social worker); State v. Golden, 336

S.E.2d 198, 203 (W. Va. 1985) (noting that West Virginia recognizes a

rule, unique to sex offense cases, where the fact that a complaint is made

soon after the alleged sex offense constitutes corroborative evidence of

that offense). Other jurisdictions have noted that the permissible time

frame for children to complain of sexual assault, and still have that count

as a "prompt" complaint, can be quite long. Cf. Commonwealth v. Nurse,

734 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that, "[i]n cases of

complaint of rape by children, the tolerance of what is fresh complaint

has become quite extended in recognition of the child's fear, repression,

threats of coercion, psychological control by the abuser, or lack of understanding of what happened.") (citing Commonwealth v. Souther, 575

N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (nine months); Commonwealth

v. Hyatt, 579 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (1991) (two years)).

The state supreme court held that T.M.'s aunt and the social worker's

testimony did not satisfy the strictures of the prompt complaint exception

to the hearsay rule because the testimony was impermissibly detailed.

See Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 43 n.16. It nevertheless allowed the testimony

as prior consistent statements. See id. at 44. The West Virginia Supreme

Court, however, did not hold that the evidence lacked corroborative

value; rather, it held that the aunt's and social worker's testimony contained too many details of the assault to qualify for the independent

prompt complaint exception to the hearsay rule. See id. at 43 n.16. The

prompt complaint exception allows the admission into evidence of the

bare fact of prompt outcry for corroborative purposes, but it does not

extend to admission of details that would otherwise be barred for hearsay. Where these details are independently admissible, however, it

would be illogical to hold that the fact of prompt outcry loses its corroborative value.

 17
right to testify."). The rule relied upon by the West Virginia state

courts for the exclusion of Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence

was West Virginia's rape shield law. If the state supreme court's

holding, that mere denials are insufficient to prove the falsity of other

allegations of sexual assault under West Virginia's rape shield law,

is arbitrary or disproportionate to the interests the rape shield law was

designed to serve, the state supreme court applied federal law in an

objectively unreasonable way when it limited Quinn's presentation of

impeachment evidence regarding T.M.'s other allegations of sexual

assault.

The Supreme Court has recognized that a state has a valid interest

in protecting victims of sexual abuse from needless harassment,

humiliation and "unnecessary invasions of privacy." Lucas, 500 U.S.

at 150. Haynes notes that the State of West Virginia has a further special duty to implement its rape shield law to protect young children,

like T.M., because harassing questioning could be more psychologically damaging to such a young child. The trial court recognized this

special consideration when it expressed its reluctance to allow an in

camera cross-examination of T.M. along the lines proposed by Quinn

due to her "tender years and the possibility for further psychological

damage." (J.A. at 55). Likewise, Chief Justice Workman's concurring

opinion in Quinn noted, "[a]ny time we permit children to be crossexamined about allegations of prior abuse, the possibility of causing

additional trauma to a child is unfortunately an attendant reality to

any potential for the disclosure of truth." Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 46

(Workman, C.J., concurring). Due to these concerns underlying the

application of the rape shield law, West Virginia has a legitimate

interest in requiring some showing of falsity to ensure that the protection of its rape shield law applies when such protection is warranted.

Upon review of the State's legitimate interests underlying the

implementation of its rape shield law in this case, we do not believe

that West Virginia's rejection of simple denial testimony as proof of

falsity is arbitrary or disproportionate to the interests the rape shield

law was designed to serve. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151; Rock, 483

U.S. at 55-56. In support of this holding, we note that the state

supreme court's rejection of simple denial testimony to prove falsity

did not exclude Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence regarding

T.M.'s other allegations of sexual assault altogether; it merely

 18
required Quinn to prove the relevance and reliability of the proffered

impeachment evidence and the inapplicability of West Virginia's rape

shield law before allowing the interests of the State to cede to those

of the defendant. Contrary to Quinn's position, allowing simple denial

testimony to establish falsity would inadequately take into account

West Virginia's legitimate interest underlying the implementation of

its rape shield law because simple denial testimony is inherently selfserving and unreliable.12

Additionally, Quinn was not denied the right to attack T.M.'s credibility altogether. Quinn was permitted to impeach T.M.'s credibility

by the use of opinion and reputation testimony of other witnesses,

which is the acceptable manner of attacking the witness's credibility

under West Virginia's standard rules of evidence. See W. Va. R. Evid.

608(a). The jury heard T.M.'s grandmother and one of her stepbrothers both testify as to their opinions that T.M. had a reputation for

untruthfulness. Accordingly, Quinn was not denied the right to

impeach T.M.'s credibility; he was merely denied the ability to

impeach by bringing out specific instances of other accusations. The

use of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness's general

credibility is prohibited by West Virginia's standard rules of evidence

unless those instances are probative of truthfulness, and other allegations would only be probative of truthfulness if they were in fact

false. See W. Va. R. Evid. 608(b). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in

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12 Because it is obviously self-serving, jurisdictions that have consid- 12 

ered the probative value of simple denial evidence in similar cases hold

that it is completely insufficient to show probable falsity. See Hughes v.

Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792-793 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that simple

denial and non-prosecution for rape would not suffice to prove falsity);

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 503 N.E.2d 969, 973 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)

(noting that the accused's testimony that he had not committed the rape

was "clearly self-serving" and therefore did not establish falsity); State

v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193, 200 (Mont.1984) (stating that a "mere denial"

does not establish falsity); State v. Kringstad , 353 N.W.2d 302, 311

(N.D. 1984) (holding accusee's proposed testimony denying prior allegation of rape insufficient to show falsity absent proffer of testimony to

corroborate simple denial).

 19
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam).

In light of the concerns underlying the implementation of West

Virginia's rape shield law, the particular concerns accompanying the

cross-examination of a child-victim in a sexual offense case, and the

other means afforded to Quinn to attack T.M.'s credibility, we believe

the state supreme court's limitation of Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence pursuant to West Virginia's standard rules of evidence

is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the State's legitimate interests underlying its implementation of its rape shield law. Because it

is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate, the state supreme court did

not unreasonably apply federal law when it applied the State's rape

shield law to limit Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence.

Our agreement with the district court's holding that the state

supreme court's limitation on Quinn's proposed impeachment evidence, pursuant to its rape shield law, rests upon an objectively reasonable application of federal law is further supported by the fact that

most jurisdictions that have addressed the issue similarly require more

than simple denial testimony as proof that another sexual assault

accusation was false. See Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th

Cir. 1981) (applying a "shown convincingly" standard); United States

v. Stamper, 766 F. Supp. 1396, 1403 n.3 (W.D.N.C. 1991), aff'd 959

F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring "substantial proof of falsity"); see

also Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev.

763, 861 (1986) (noting that "courts uniformly require that there be

a strong factual basis for concluding that the prior accusation was

false."). The fact that reasonable jurists also have required more than

simple denial testimony as proof of falsity undermines a finding that

West Virginia's decision to limit Quinn's proffered impeachment evidence regarding T.M.'s other allegations of assault is objectively unreasonable.13 See Vick, No. 99-7406 ("[I]t would be judicial myopia of

_________________________________________________________________

13 We note that several courts and commentators have stated that other 13 

allegations of sexual assault, regardless of their falsity, are not particularly relevant to impeach a witness's credibility and, therefore, have concluded that the Confrontation Clause never demands the introduction of

 20
the first order to ignore the force of consensus in assessing the objective reasonableness in the particular case.").

IV.

As the district court held, the decision of the West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals to limit Quinn's proffered impeachment

evidence is consonant with Supreme Court precedent interpreting the

Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. Requiring more than

simple denial testimony ensures that West Virginia's rape shield law

and other generally applicable rules of evidence and procedure are

appropriately and consistently implemented. Because the state

supreme court had a strong interest in applying its rape shield law to

protect T.M. from irrelevant, harassing questioning regarding other

allegations of sexual assault and because Quinn was not prohibited

altogether from attacking T.M.'s credibility, the state supreme court's

rejection of simple denial testimony under its rape shield law was proportionate to its legitimate interests underlying the State's adoption of

its rape shield law. Rejection of simple denial testimony as sufficient

proof of falsity in this case constitutes an appropriate balance between

the competing interests of the State and the defendant. Therefore, the

state supreme court's limitation of Quinn's right to present impeachment evidence regarding T.M.'s other accusations of sexual assault is

_________________________________________________________________

such allegations. See United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir.

1986) (stating that allowing cross-examination of a victim about prior

false allegations of sexual assault violates the spirit of the rape shield

law); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that

the rules of evidence generally prohibit drawing an inference that

because a person "may have acted wrongfully on one occasion, he or she

also acted wrongfully on the occasion at issue"); Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at

46 (Maynard, J., dissenting) (stating that he would disallow crossexamination of all prior false allegations because such inquiry is a "brutal

attack on the general credibility of the child"); see also Hon. Denise R.

Johnson, Prior False Accusations of Rape: Falsus in Uno, Falsus in

Omnibus, 7 Yale J.L. & Feminism 243, 243-45 (1995) (arguing that

courts should not automatically assume the relevance of prior false allegations but rather should conduct the type of contextual analysis used in

other types of cases involving false allegations of crimes before admitting such allegations as impeachment evidence).

 21
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court's ruling dismissing Quinn's petition for habeas corpus relief.

AFFIRMED

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