United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

J.S., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Chicopee, MA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 13-2159 

Issued: March 18, 2014 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

PATRICIA HOWARD FITZGERALD, Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On September 23, 2013 appellant filed a timely appeal from a March 29, 2013 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case.2

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant has established an injury in the performance of duty on 

April 29, 2010. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 

2

 The Board notes that appellant submitted evidence after March 29, 2013, the date of the decision on appeal. 

The Board is limited to review of the evidence that was before OWCP at the time of the final decision on appeal. 

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(a). 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On February 15, 2013 appellant filed with OWCP a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) 

alleging that on April 29, 2010 he sustained injuries to his low back, right shoulder, neck and 

elbows. The claim form was dated August 22, 2011 and the reverse of the form indicated that 

his employment as a city carrier was terminated on May 14, 2011. Appellant alleged that on 

April 29, 2010 he was injured while stepping down from his vehicle to report an accident, when 

“the seat belt strap pulled me back against the door.” By letter dated February 25, 2013, OWCP 

requested that he submit additional factual and medical evidence to establish his claim. 

On March 25, 2013 appellant submitted additional evidence. A July 28, 2010 magnetic 

resonance imaging (MRI) scan report stated that he had advanced interstitial partial tear of the 

infraspinatus tendon with a small amount of bursal involvement, as well as infraspinatus, 

subscapularis and supraspinatus tendinopathy. Appellant also submitted an April 29, 2010 note 

diagnosing low back pain and right shoulder contusion. The note contains the name of a referral 

physician but is not signed by a physician. A brief note dated April 29, 2010 from Dr. Michael 

Noonan, an emergency medicine specialist, indicated that appellant was unable to work April 30 

and May 1, 2010. In a note dated September 29, 2010, a physician’s assistant indicated that 

appellant should limit repetitive motion with his right arm for eight weeks. Appellant also 

submitted a motor vehicle accident report (SF-91) dated April 29, 2010. On the form a box is 

checked that the vehicle was “privately owned” and a box checked “injured” without further 

explanation. 

By decision dated March 29, 2013, OWCP denied the claim for compensation. It found 

that the factual and medical evidence was not sufficient to establish the claim. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

FECA provides for the payment of compensation for “the disability or death of an 

employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.”3

 The 

phrase “sustained while in the performance of duty” in FECA is regarded as the equivalent of the 

commonly found requisite in workers’ compensation law of “arising out of and in the course of 

employment.”4

 An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of establishing that 

he or she sustained an injury while in the performance of duty.5 In order to determine whether 

an employee actually sustained an injury in the performance of duty, OWCP begins with an 

analysis of whether “fact of injury” has been established. Generally “fact of injury” consists of 

two components which must be considered in conjunction with one another. The first 

component to be established is that the employee actually experienced the employment incident 

 3

 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). 

4 Valerie C. Boward, 50 ECAB 126 (1998). 

5 Melinda C. Epperly, 45 ECAB 196, 198 (1993); see also 20 C.F.R. § 10.115. 
3

which is alleged to have occurred. The second component is whether the employment incident 

caused a personal injury and generally this can be established only by medical evidence.6

 

With respect to the first component of fact of injury, the employee has the burden of 

establishing the occurrence of an injury at the time, place and in the manner alleged, by a 

preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence.7

 An injury does not have to be 

confirmed by eyewitnesses in order to establish the fact that an employee sustained an injury in 

the performance of duty, but the employee’s statements must be consistent with the surrounding 

facts and circumstances and his subsequent course of action.8 An employee has not met his 

burden of proof to establish the occurrence of an injury when there are such inconsistencies in 

the evidence as to cast serious doubt upon the validity of the claim.9 Such circumstances as late 

notification of injury, lack of confirmation of injury, continuing to work without apparent 

difficulty following the alleged injury and failure to obtain medical treatment may, if otherwise 

unexplained, cast sufficient doubt on an employee’s statements in determining whether a prima 

facie case has been established.10 However, an employee’s statement alleging that an injury 

occurred at a given time and in a given manner is of great probative value and will stand unless 

refuted by strong or persuasive evidence.11 

As to the second component, unless the condition is a minor one which can be identified 

on visual inspection,12 or a clear-cut claim such as a fall resulting in a broken arm, a rationalized 

medical opinion supporting causal relationship is required.13 Rationalized medical opinion 

evidence is medical evidence that is based on a complete factual and medical background, of 

reasonable medical certainty and supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the 

relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by 

the claimant. The weight of medical evidence is determined by its reliability, its probative value, 

its convincing quality, the care of the analysis manifested and the medical rationale expressed in 

support of the physician’s opinion.14

 6 See John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354, 357 (1989). 

7 William Sircovitch, 38 ECAB 756, 761 (1987); John G. Schaberg, 30 ECAB 389, 393 (1979). 

8 Charles B. Ward, 38 ECAB 667, 670-71 (1987); Joseph Albert Fournier, Jr., 35 ECAB 1175, 1179 (1984). 

9 Tia L. Love, 40 ECAB 586, 590 (1989); Merton J. Sills, 39 ECAB 572, 575 (1988). 

10 Samuel J. Chiarella, 38 ECAB 363, 366 (1987); Henry W.B. Stanford, 36 ECAB 160, 165 (1984). 

11 Robert A. Gregory, 40 ECAB 478, 483 (1989); Thelma S. Buffington, 34 ECAB 104, 109 (1982). 

12 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3(d) (June 1995). 

13 Id. 

14 Jennifer Atkerson, 55 ECAB 317, 319 (2004). 
4

ANALYSIS 

In the present case, appellant filed a claim for a traumatic injury on April 29, 2010. 

The evidence that was submitted to OWCP as of March 29, 2013 is not sufficient to 

establish either the factual or medical component of “fact of injury” as noted above. Appellant 

gave only a brief description of an alleged incident on April 29, 2010. The circumstances of the 

injury are unclear, as appellant submitted a motor vehicle accident report involving a private 

vehicle and an injury from the accident. On the CA-1 claim form appellant referred only to 

getting caught in a seat belt strap as he was attempting to report an accident. In addition, there 

was a delay in completing the CA-1 form (signed August 22, 2011) and apparently the form was 

not submitted to OWCP until February 15, 2013. A proper factual statement should clearly 

describe the incident as well as discuss the delay in completing and filing the claim form. 

As to the medical component, the Board notes that any medical evidence must be from a 

physician under FECA.15 In addition, as noted above, there must be a rationalized medical 

opinion as to a diagnosed condition causally related to an April 29, 2010 employment incident. 

Appellant submitted some evidence from a physician’s assistant which is of no probative value 

as a physician’s assistant is not a physician under FECA.16 It is also well established that 

medical evidence lacking proper identification is of no probative medical value.17 Any note or 

report that is not properly signed by a physician is of no probative value. The brief note from 

Dr. Noonan dated April 29, 2010, does not provide a rationalized medical opinion on the issues 

presented. 

The Board accordingly finds that appellant did not meet his burden of proof to establish 

the claim for compensation. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant did not meet his burden of proof to establish an injury in 

the performance of duty on April 29, 2010. 

 15 See 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2). 

16 George H. Clark, 56 ECAB 162 (2004). 

17 Thomas L. Agee, 56 ECAB 465 (2005); Richard F. Williams, 55 ECAB 343 (2004); Merton J. Sills, 39 ECAB 

572 (1988). 
5

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs dated March 29, 2013 is affirmed. 

Issued: March 18, 2014 

Washington, DC 

 

 Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia Howard Fitzgerald, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board