IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 18, 2008 Session

JONATHAN BRADFORD DUNN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 16115 Lee Russell, Judge

No. M2007-01322-CCA-R3-CD - Filed October 22, 2008

Appellant, Jonathan Bradford Dunn, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for one count

of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and one count of filing a false

report. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on both counts as stated in the indictment. The

trial court sentenced Appellant to three years as a Range II multiple offender for theft of property and

six years as a Range II multiple offender for filing a false report. The sentences were ordered to run

consecutively to each other and to the sentence in Bedford County Case Number 15560. After the

denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated the appeal herein, presenting the following issues

for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for filing a false

report; and (2) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. We determine that

the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court properly sentenced

Appellant. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.

JERRY L. SMITH,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE and ROBERT

W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined. 

Christopher P. Westmoreland, Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the appellant Jonathan Bradford Dunn.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., AttorneyGeneral andReporter;Clarence E. Lutz, Assistant Attorney General;

Mike McCown, District Attorney General and Michael D. Randles, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On June 13, 2006, a 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee belonging to Corey Cates was burglarized

outside his residence on Rosewood Avenue in Bedford County. Mr. Cates had a number of

specialized equipment pieces installed in his vehicle to support his participation in car stereo
At trial, Mrs. Cates testified that Appellant visited her again on June 20, 2006, to inform her that he had

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purchased the stereo equipment in order to return it to her husband “without involving the police.” Mrs. Cates notified

her husband and the police.

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competitions. Several items were taken from the vehicle, including a Panasonic TV/DVD “head

unit,” two amplifiers, two subwoofers, a “custom box” that was designed to house the subwoofers,

a radar detector with laser band, and 100 to 200 compact discs. Mr. Cates called the local police

upon discovery of the burglary, and they dusted the vehicle for fingerprints.

Police discovered that Brian Andrews, a minor, was responsible for the burglary of the

vehicle. He admitted that he sold some of the stolen items to Appellant for the price of $200. Mr.

Andrews said that the origination of the items was “not necessarily” discussed with Appellant.

According to Mr. Andrews, Appellant acknowledged that he knew Mr. Cates and that he had actually

sold some of this equipment to Mr. Cates. Appellant then offered to purchase the equipment and

told Mr. Andrews that he was going to hide it in his girlfriend’s trunk. The equipment was worth

far more than the purchase price. Mr. Andrews was charged with eleven felonies and served nine

months in a juvenile facility as a result of the incident. 

Detective Brian Crews of the Shelbyville Police Department was assigned to investigate the

burglary. He first talked to Appellant at his place of employment on the morning of June 20, 2006.

During the initial meeting, Appellant denied purchasing any stolen stereo equipment. Appellant

denied knowing Mr. Andrews but admitted that he remembered Mr. Cates. Detective Crews stated

that he did not believe Appellant but had no proof to the contrary. 

Later that day, Detective Crews received a telephone call from Savannah Cates, the wife of

the victim. Mrs. Cates informed Detective Crews that Appellant visited her on June 19, 2006, at her

home. According to Mrs. Cates, Appellant claimed that he knew who had stolen the stereo

equipment from her husband and that he was going to buy the equipment back for Mr. Cates. 

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Detective Crews also received a voicemail from Appellant at some point later on that same

day. As a result of the telephone call, Detective Crews reinterviewed Appellant and advised

Appellant that his previous statement had hindered the investigation into the burglary. At that time,

Appellant took Detective Crews to his trailer and to his girlfriend’s car, where two 15-inch

subwoofers, an SPL amplifier, and the “custom box” were located. One of the speakers and the

amplifier were already installed in Appellant’s girlfriend’s car using the “custom box.”

Once the property was seized, Appellant accompanied Detective Crews to the police station

where he waived his rights and signed a written statement. The statement reads as follows:

I, [Appellant] was going down Simms Road and saw Joseph and Brian [Andrews]

out in the yard. Stopped and was talking to them. Brian asked me if I wanted to buy

a system. I asked what it was and went and looked at it. I told him I would take it.

I gave him $200 and left.
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6-20-2006, I, [Appellant], talked to Detective Crews at about 11:00 a.m. about a

stolen stereo. And I told him I didn’t know nothing [sic]. Then after he left I called

Joseph and asked him why he sold me some hot stuff. He said that was his brother’s

deal. Then I went and seen [sic] Corey, told him I might have his system. And he

said, cool, I just want it back. Then I called Crews back and told him I might have

it. Then he came and picked me up and we went and got it.

At trial, Appellant took the stand in his own defense. Appellant admitted that he knew Mr.

Andrews through his brother Joseph Andrews. According to Appellant, Mr. Andrews offered to sell

him some stereo equipment. Appellant asked for a description of the equipment. He recognized it

as the system he had previously owned and sold. Appellant knew that Mr. Cates had eventually

purchased this system. 

Appellant remembered talking to Detective Crews on the morning of June 20, 2006. At that

time, Appellant had information that he could have passed on to the detective, but he did not divulge

the information so that he would not get into trouble. Appellant talked to his boss, James Farrar,

who encouraged him to tell the police the truth. At that point, Appellant called Detective Crews to

inform him that he knew where the equipment was located. Appellant claimed that he did not know

the equipment was stolen until he talked to the detective. Further, Appellant denied talking to Mr.

Cates or his wife. 

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of both theft of property and filing

a false report. The trial court later held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Appellant

acknowledged his criminal history as stated in the presentence report and admitted that he had

committed two prior probation violations. Further, at the time of the offenses herein, Appellant was

on bond pending the resolution of another unrelated appeal. At the conclusion of the sentencing

hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range II multiple offender to three years for theft

of property and six years for filing a false report. The trial court ordered the sentences to run

consecutively to each other and to the sentence in case number 15560. 

Analysis

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, Appellant contends that “there was no proof presented by the [S]tate that

[Appellant’s] denial [to share information with Detective Crews] interfered with the apprehension

of another person suspected of committing an offense.” In other words, Appellant contends that the

evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for filing a false report. The State argues that

the evidence clearly shows that Appellant “provided [a] false statement to law enforcement to hinder

an investigation” when Appellant lied about his knowledge of the theft, knowingly used the stolen

equipment in his girlfriend’s car, and “attempted to prevent the discovery of the remaining stolen

property.”
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When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged to review

that claim according to certain well-settled principles. A verdict of guilty, rendered by a jury and

“approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the “State’s witnesses and resolves all

conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994);

State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, although the accused is originally cloaked

with a presumption of innocence, the jury verdict of guilty removes this presumption “and replaces

it with one of guilt.” State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the

burden of proof rests with the defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence.

Id. The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any rational trier of fact could

have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn.

R. App. P. 13(e); Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. In making this decision, we are to accord the State “the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may

be drawn therefrom.” See Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this Court is precluded from

reweighing or reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan,

929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substitute our own “inferences for those drawn by the

trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Further, questions of

witness credibility, the weight and value of evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are

entrusted to the trier of fact. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996).

It is a Class D felony to:

(2) Make a report or statement in response to a legitimate inquiry by a law

enforcement officer concerning a material fact about an offense or incident within the

officer’s concern, knowing that the report or statement is false and with the intent to

obstruct or hinder the officer from:

(A) Preventing the offense or incident from occurring or continuing to occur;

or

(B) Apprehending or locating another person suspected of committing an

offense; . . . . 

T.C.A. § 39-16-502(a)(2). 

The proof offered at trial shows that Appellant purchased the stereo equipment prior to his

initial meeting with Detective Crews. During the initial interview, Appellant denied that he even

knew Mr. Andrews. After the interview, Appellant called Mrs. Cates to inform her that he could get

the victim’s equipment back without involving the police. Appellant also contacted Mr. Andrews’s

brother to warn him that the police were coming. Appellant admitted at trial that he did not give

Detective Crews all of the information he possessed about the stolen equipment during the first

interview. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Appellant made

“a report or statement in response to a legitimate inquiry by a law enforcement officer concerning

a material fact about an offense or incident within the officer’s concern, knowing that the report or
In response to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Tennessee Legislature amended Tennessee

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Code Annotated section 40-35-210. Compare T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c) (2003) with T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c) (2006). The

amendment became effective on June 7, 2005. The legislature also provided that this amendment would apply to

defendant who committed a criminal offense on or after June 7, 2005. 2005 Tenn. Pub. Act ch. 353, § 18. Appellant

herein committed the offenses in June of 2006. Therefore, the amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-

210 applies to Appellant. Specifically, the amendment made the sentencing guidelines “advisory” in nature. T.C.A. 40-

35-210(c).

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statement is false and with the intent to obstruct or hinder the officer from . . . (B) Apprehending or

locating another person suspected of committing an offense.” Id. 

Sentencing

Next, Appellant complains that his sentence is excessive. The State disagrees. 

At the outset, we acknowledge that Appellant’s entire argument on this issue consists of the

following statement, “[b]ased on the testimony at trial and the Sentencing hearing, the sentence

imposed is excessive because it is greater than that deserved for the offense committed and great

inequalities unrelated to a purpose of this chapter should be avoided.” Ordinarily, this issue would

be waived. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b) (stating “Issues which are not supported by argument,

citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court”).

Despite these deficiencies, we will address Appellant’s issue on the merits.

 

“When reviewing sentencing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduct a de novo review

on the record of such issues. Such review shall be conducted with a presumption that the

determinations made by the court from which the appeal is taken are correct.” T.C.A. §

40-35-401(d). “However, the presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial court’s action

is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the

sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169

(Tenn. 1991). In conducting our review, we must consider the defendant’s potential for

rehabilitation, the trial and sentencing hearing evidence, the presentence report, the sentencing

principles, sentencing alternative arguments, the nature and character of the offense, the enhancing

and mitigating factors, and the defendant’s statements. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103(5), -210(b); Ashby,

823 S.W.2d at 169. We are to also recognize that the defendant bears “the burden of demonstrating

that the sentence is improper.” Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. In making its sentencing determination,

the trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, determines the range of sentence and then

determines the specific sentence and the propriety of sentencing alternatives by considering: (1) the

evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties

on the enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statements the defendant wishes to make in the

defendant’s behalf about sentencing; and (7) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§

40-35-210(a), (b), -103(5); State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). 

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We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s sentencing determinations. Appellant

was convicted of a filing a false report, a Class D felony and theft of property, a Class E felony.

Appellant was classified as a Range II multiple offender for sentencing purposes. The sentencing

range for a multiple offender convicted of a Class D felony is four to eight years. T.C.A. § 40-35-

112(b)(4). The sentencing range for a multiple offender convicted of a Class E felony is two to four

years. T.C.A. § 40-35-112(b)(5). The presentence report shows that Appellant has a criminal history

starting at age fourteen. At the time of sentencing, Appellant was twenty years old and had prior

convictions for public intoxication, violation of “Driver’s License Law,” a traffic offense,

aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, two convictions for assault, two

convictions for theft of property valued at up to $500, and disorderly conduct. He admitted at the

sentencing hearing that he had violated probation at least two times and was out on bond when he

committed the offenses herein. Despite the extensive criminal record, the trial court chose not to

consider, for enhancement purposes, Appellant’s convictions for aggravated assault and reckless

endangerment because they were used to determine Appellant’s range. The trial court applied

enhancement factor (1), that Appellant had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal

behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range. T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1).

The trial court also applied enhancement factor (8), before trial or sentencing, the defendant failed

to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community. T.C.A. § 40-35-

114(8). As stated previously, Appellant admitted at the sentencing hearing that he had violated

probation in the past. The trial court also applied factor (13) because Appellant was on bond at the

time of the commission of the offenses. T.C.A. § 40-35-114(13). In mitigation, the trial court

considered the fact that Appellant’s actions neither caused nor threatened serious bodily harm.

T.C.A. § 40-35-113(1). The trial court also determined that Appellant reluctantly assisted law

enforcement personnel but gave this assistance little weight in mitigation of Appellant’s sentence.

T.C.A. § 40-35-113(9). The trial court also determined that factor (10), “[t]he defendant assisted the

authorities in locating or recovering any property . . . involved in the crime” applied, but gave it little

weight. After sentencing Appellant to the middle of the range for each offense, three years for theft

of property and six years for filing a false report, the trial court found that consecutive sentencing

was appropriate on the basis that Appellant is “an offender whose record of criminal activity is

extensive,” and Appellant was sentenced “for an offense committed while on probation. T.C.A. §

40-35-115(b)(2) & (6). After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court complied with

statutory sentencing procedures and appropriately sentenced Appellant. Appellant is not entitled to

relief on this issue.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________ 

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
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