NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 13a0509n.06 No. 12-4062 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

KARRI E KI RKL AND, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. COMMI SSI ONER OF SOCI AL SECURI TY, Def endant- Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL

FROM THE U

NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE NORTHE RN DI STRI CT OF OHI O

Be fore : ROGERS and KETHL EDGE, Circuit Judges; and B ORMAN, District J udg e. *

KETHL EDGE, Circuit J udg e. Kar rie Kirkland appea ls the district court’s decision to aff irm

an administrative law judge ’s denial of Kirkland’s application for social-se curity disability benef its. We affir m. Kirkland worke d as a nurses’ aide for approximately twenty y ear s, stopping in Fe bruar y 2002 when she develope d osteoarthr itis in h er l eft knee. She filed an application for disability benef its shortly there afte r. An AL J found t hat Kirkland’s osteoarthr itis was disabling, b u t al s o found that Kirkland had underg one surg ery that “allow[ed] her to return to substantial gai n fu l activity as of April 19, 2005.” The AL J thus g rante d benef its to Kirkland for a closed period that ran from Fe bruar y 2002 to April 2005.
The Honor able Paul D. B orman, United States District Judge for the E astern D istrict of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation.No. 12-4062

Kirkland v. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. Kirkland later filed a second application for disability benef its for a period that beg an in J une 2005. I n that application, Kirkland alleg ed t h at her left knee had develope d ref lex sy mpathetic dy strophy sy

n d ro m e, wh i ch is a “chronic pain sy ndrome” that cause s “per sistent, burning , aching

or sear ing pain[.] ” Soc. Sec. Ruling No. 03-2p, 2003 WL 22399117. Kirkland said that she could sit or stand for only twenty minutes at a time beca use of the pain, and that, approximately twice per
we ek , she would fall beca use her knee g ave out. Kirkland also alleg ed that she had rh eu m at o i d arthritis in both of her ha

nds. A differ ent AL J considere d Kirkland’s second application. The A L J in itially deter mined that Kirkland suffe red from “disorder s of the lower extremity , ref lex sy mpathy dy strophy , and aff ective disorders[,]” all of which qualified as sever e impairments under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. The AL J also deter mined that Kirkland suffere d from ca rpal tunnel sy

ndrome; which did not qualify as a se vere impairment beca

use “ther e [was] no evidence t h at [i t] lasted, or was expected to last, for 12
mont h s [

. ] ” S

ee 4 2 U.S.C. § 423(d)( 1)(A)

. The AL J then held that Kirkland was not disabled beca use she could perf

orm “simple” sedenta

ry work, provided that she could alterna te betwee n sitti ng and st anding

. I n rea ching t h i s co n cl u sion, the AL J cited Kirkland’s lack of cre dibilit y and

sever al phy sicians’ opinions. Ba sed on t h ese finding s, the AL J reje cted Kirkland’s reque st for disability benef its. The Appea ls Council denied revie w of the AL J ’s decision. Kirkland then soug ht revie w in fede ral court. The parties consente d to trial befor e a mag istrate judge , who aff irmed the AL J ’s decision. This appe al followed.

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Kirkland v. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. We revie w only whether the AL J applied the corr ect legal s t an d ard and made finding s supported by substantial evidenc e in the rec ord. See Gayhe art v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2013). Substantial ev i d en ce is evidenc e that “a rea sonable mind might acc ept as adequate to support a conc lusion.” Id. Kirkland’s primary arg ument on appea l is that the AL J improperly discredited Kirkland’s testimony “solely ” beca

use “her statements wer e not supported by the objective medical evidenc e.” Appellant’s B r. at 24–25. I t is true that a n AL J may

not “re ject [an individual’s] s tatements about the intensity and persistenc e of [her] pain

. . . solely beca use the available objective medical evidenc e does not substantiate [t hose] statements.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (2). But the AL J did not base the

cre dibilit y finding solely on a lack of objective medical evidenc e; rathe r, the AL J considere d medical opinions as well. Specifica lly , the AL J cit ed the finding s of Dr. I ssam Al-Turk, who examined Kirkland in J anuar

y 2007. Dr. Al-Turk found that Kirkland “would have diff iculty in perf

orming

wo rk re l ated activities that demand prolong ed walking [,] ” but that “[s] itting, standing , lifting,

car ry ing, handling objects, hear ing, speaking , and t ra veling are not aff ecte d.” The AL J also considere d the finding s of two ag ency phy sicians—Dr. Dimitri Tea g ue and Dr. Paul Morton—who

eac h conclude d that Kirkland could perf orm light wor

k. These me dical opini ons, plus the l ack of objective medical evidenc e, provide substantial e vidence for the AL J ’s cre dibilit y finding

. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (1). Kirkland also arg ues that the AL J err ed in finding that Kirkland’s car pal tunnel sy

ndrome

was a non-seve re impairme nt. But any err or along these lines would be harmless. B efor e an A L J

can find that an individual i s d i s abled, the AL J must find that the individual has a “seve re” -3-No. 12-4062

Kirkland v. Comm’r of Soc. Se c. impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4)( ii). I f the individual has at least one sever e impairment, the AL J will then assess how much work the individual c an still do. See id. § 404.1520(a) (4)( iv). When making tha t assessment, “the A L J must consider limitations and r estrictions imposed by all of [t he] individual’s impairments, even those that are not sever e.” Fisk v. Astrue , 253 F. App’x 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Thus, so long

as the AL J considers all of the individual’s impairments, the “fa ilure to find additional sever e impairments

. . . does not constitute rev er s i b l e er ror.” Fisk , 253 F. App’x at 583 (bra ckets and internal quotation marks omitted). Her e, the AL J expressly considere d Kirkland’s car pal tunnel sy

ndrome when assessing her ability to work. I n particula r, the AL J conclude d that Kirkland “should avoid extensive lifting and

car ry ing to preve nt further ag g rava tion of her alleg ed ca rp al t unnel sy ndrome.” Thus, the AL J ’s failure to classify Kirkland’s car pal tunnel sy

ndrome as a “seve re” impairment cannot be reve rsible

err or. See id. Finally , Kirkland arg ues that the AL J err ed in finding that Kirkland could perf orm sedenta

ry work despite her car

pal tunnel sy

ndrome. But Dr. Al-Turk conclude d that Kirkland’s car pal tunnel did not aff

ect her abili ty to “lift[] , car ry [] , [or] handl[e] objects[. ] ” M o re over, Dr. Al-Turk found that Kirkland’s ability to g rasp , manipulate, pinch, and perf orm fine-motor tasks was “norma l.” Substantial evidence there fore supports this finding as we ll. The district cour

t’s judgme nt is affirmed.

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