Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-655 | September 3, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of J.L. (Minor 

Child)

 and

T.L. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

September 3, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-655

Appeal from the Clay Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Joseph Trout, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

11C01-1803-JT-87

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-655 | September 3, 2019 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary

[1] T.L. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.L. (“Child”), 

upon the petition of the Vigo County Department of Child Services (“the 

DCS”). We affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother presents a single issue for review: Whether the DCS established, by 

clear and convincing evidence, the requisite statutory elements to support the 

termination decision.

 Facts and Procedural History

[3] In May of 2016, Mother, then pregnant with her third child, called police to 

report that her boyfriend had battered her. He allegedly retaliated by reporting 

to the DCS that Mother was mentally unstable. In June of 2016, the DCS 

entered into an informal adjustment with Mother, who agreed to submit to 

random drug screens and complete a drug assessment. Mother then relocated 

with her children to her mother’s residence in Clay County and the Clay 

County DCS (“Clay DCS”) began supervising the case.

[4] Mother did not complete her drug assessment but submitted to drug screens. 

On two occasions in July of 2016, Mother’s drug screens yielded positive results 

for methamphetamine. In August of 2016, Mother gave birth and both she and 

her newborn child tested positive for methamphetamine. Clay DCS removed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-655 | September 3, 2019 Page 3 of 11

all three children and placed them in foster care. The eldest and youngest were 

later placed with their respective fathers; J.L. remained in foster care. Mother 

admitted that J.L. was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother was 

ordered to, among other things, complete psychological assessments, maintain 

suitable housing and employment, refrain from using illegal substances, take all 

mental health medications as directed, attend child visitation sessions, and 

successfully complete substance abuse treatment recommendations.

[5] In February of 2017, Mother was jailed for punching her eldest child’s father 

during a supervised visitation session. Her visitation was suspended, but was 

restored after she demonstrated partial compliance with reunification services. 

However, Mother articulated threats against a caseworker, the Court Appointed

Special Advocate (“CASA”), and one or more of her children’s fathers. Clay 

DCS personnel obtained a protective order barring Mother from appearing at 

their offices and supervision of Mother’s case was again transferred. 

[6] Mother underwent a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed as having 

bipolar disorder, cannabis dependency, and panic disorder. She had a 

provisional diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. She was briefly 

hospitalized after expressing suicidal and homicidal ideations. Mother 

participated in some individual and group therapy but elected not to take her 

prescribed psychiatric medications.

[7] Mother was on probation stemming from a Montgomery County conviction for 

conversion when she failed a drug screen and was returned to jail in January of 
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2018. On March 29, 2018, the DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to J.L. Mother was released from jail in May of 2018 and became 

significantly more compliant with services.

[8] On August 28 and September 18, 2018, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing. On February 19, 2019, the court issued its order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to J.L. Mother now appeals.1 

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] When we review whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we 

will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 

1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). We will consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. In so doing, we give 

“due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010) (citing Indiana 

Trial Rule 52(A)). We will set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it is 

clearly erroneous. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 

(Ind. 2013). In order to determine whether a judgment terminating parental 

rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine 

whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the 

 

1

J.L.’s father agreed to termination of his parental rights and he is not an active party on appeal.
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findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 

1132. 

Requirements for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

[10] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re 

Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972 (Ind. 2014). Although parental rights are 

of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of those 

rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 

147 (Ind. 2005). The State is required to prove that termination is appropriate 

by a showing of clear and convincing evidence, a higher burden than 

establishing a mere preponderance. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1144.

[11] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out the elements that the DCS must 

allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a parent-child 

relationship:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six 

(6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not 

required, including a description of the court’s finding, the date 

of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been 

under the supervision of a local office or probation department 
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for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) 

months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of 

services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

[12] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, and 

therefore the court need only to find that one of the three requirements of 

subsection (b)(2)(B) was established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied.

Analysis

[13] Mother argues that three factual findings supporting the trial court’s 

conclusions as to removal conditions and best interests are erroneous and, 

without the erroneous findings, the evidence is deficient. Specifically, Mother 

challenges the factual findings that she has a “severe untreated mental illness,” 
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failed to participate in services, and has had a pattern of instability. Appellant’s 

Brief at 11. 

[14] A claim of insufficient evidence as to likelihood of remedying conditions

invokes a “two-step analysis.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). First, 

we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we must determine 

whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be 

remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as 

of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of 

changed conditions. Id. (citing Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152). The trial court is 

entrusted with balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual 

patterns of conduct. Id. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior 

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. 

“Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not 

preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of 

their future behavior.” Id.

[15] Child was removed from Mother’s care when a DCS informal adjustment 

failed. At that time, Mother and her newborn had tested positive for 

methamphetamine. Mother had not completed a drug assessment, as agreed 

upon as part of the informal adjustment. She did not have employment or 

stable housing. Over the next two years, Mother participated in some services 

but did not ever progress to having unsupervised visits with Child. Nor did she 

maintain long-term sobriety, obtain independent housing, retain employment, 

or comply with recommended psychiatric treatment. 
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[16] Although Mother regularly visited with Child, the visits were marked by 

inappropriate speech and conduct. For example, Mother threatened to kill the 

fathers of her children. She struck one of the fathers during a visit and the 

police were called. At times, Mother appeared for visits “scattered” and 

“jumpy,” and one visit ended when Mother fell into a wall. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 

16.) On another occasion, Mother began screaming while holding her 

newborn. She “didn’t seem stable” and the services were “put on hold.” Id. at 

18. Ultimately, Mother participated in some group and individual therapy, but 

she rejected any prescribed medication in favor of attempts to “cope like a 

normal person.” Id. at 186.

[17] Mother claims that the trial court mischaracterized the severity of her mental 

illness. She does not contest her bipolar diagnosis, but asserts that she suffers 

from a milder type that is not marked by dramatic shifts between depression 

and mania. The testimony of service providers indicates that, although Mother 

may not suffer from the most severe form of bipolar disorder, she suffers from 

multiple forms of mental illness, and has frequently displayed lack of impulse 

control in interpersonal interactions. She was subject to a protective order to 

bar her from contacting or threatening Clay DCS caseworkers. She has 

received in-patient treatment after threats to harm herself and others. Critically, 

although Mother was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, cannabis disorder, and 

panic disorder, and provisionally diagnosed with borderline personality 

disorder, she rejected all prescribed medication. The trial court’s factual finding 
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that Mother has severe untreated mental illness is not lacking evidentiary 

support.

[18] Mother also claims the trial court erred in finding that she was non-compliant 

with services. She points to testimony that, since her release from jail on the 

probation violation, she has consistently participated in home-based therapy 

and provided drug screens that were negative for substances other than THC. 

But the testimony of record also discloses that Mother’s earlier participation in 

services had been sporadic. She had failed to attend a scheduled psychological 

evaluation, had not appeared for drug screens on numerous occasions, and had 

failed to complete a six-month program at the Hamilton Center. Numerous 

drug screens were positive for methamphetamine and THC. Mother’s

visitation had been suspended on more than one occasion due to her disruptive 

behavior. Again, the factual finding that Mother was non-compliant is not 

lacking evidentiary support.

[19] The final factual finding challenged by Mother is that she has a pattern of 

instability. At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she was living with 

her mother and did not consider that residence to be a suitable place for Child. 

She further testified that she had lost her job at the time of her last incarceration 

but was doing some work for cash and selling her plasma and had hopes of 

being rehired by a temporary agency. On appeal, she concedes her lack of a 

permanent job or residence, but argues that finding full-time employment was 

highly unlikely in light of her participation in time consuming services spanning 

both first and second shifts. We do not minimize the challenges or time 
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constraints that Mother faced. However, her argument is at bottom a request to 

reweigh the evidence. This we cannot do. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143. 

[20] Mother also contends that the DCS did not present clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in Child’s best interests. In determining what is in 

a child’s best interests, the court must look to the totality of the evidence. In re 

A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We have 

previously held that recommendations by the case manager and CASA to 

terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in 

removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 1158-59.

[21] Child had been removed from Mother’s care for over two years. She had spent 

two-thirds of her life with her foster parents, who wished to adopt her. Child’s 

caseworker and CASA both recommended termination of Mother’s parental 

rights. Commendably, Mother had a recent history of sobriety from 

methamphetamine and active participation in services. That said, a court has 

discretion to weigh historical conduct more heavily than recent efforts. In re 

E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. Mother’s contention that the trial court failed to

adequately consider the impact of severing Child’s relationship with her siblings 

is simply a request to reweigh the evidence. There is not insufficient evidence 

that termination of parental rights is in Child’s best interests.
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Conclusion

[22] The DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the requisite elements to 

support the termination of parental rights. 

[23] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and May, J., concur.