J-A02019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

GINA K. JACOBS, FORMERLY GINA K. 

STEPHENS 

Appellant

v.

TIMOTHY L. STEPHENS

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 889 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Civil Division at No(s): 

872-2015

GINA K. JACOBS, FORMERLY GINA K. 

STEPHENS

v.

TIMOTHY L. STEPHENS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 293 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Civil Division at No(s): 

872-2015

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: JANUARY 31, 2022

Gina Jacobs (Jacobs) and Timothy L. Stephens (Stephens) cross-appeal 

from the order denying their post-trial motions and making final the trial 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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court’s judgment entered from a non-jury trial regarding land partition issues.1 

We affirm.

Background

The history of this case begins with Stephens’ prior marriage to 

an individual named Kim Schwab. In January 2001, Stephens and 

Schwab held a wedding ceremony in Jamaica. At the time of their 

wedding, Stephens believed that their marriage was legal. Later 

that year, Stephens purchased a residential property at 174 Carey 

Lane in Cranberry Township. Stephens paid for the property 

entirely with his own money, and the deed did not list Schwab as 

an owner due to her poor credit. Stephens and Schwab separated 

in 2002, and there were no divorce proceedings. In 2005, Schwab 

married another man.

Stephens and Jacobs met in July 2009, and they married on 

September 11, 2009. Before they married, Stephens told Jacobs 

that he previously had a wedding ceremony in Jamaica, but he 

had consulted an attorney and did not believe that the Jamaican 

marriage was valid.

On September 19, 2009, Stephens and Jacobs executed a deed 

conveying the property at 174 Carey Lane from themselves, as 

“husband and wife,” to themselves as “tenants by the entireties.” 

On August 6, 2013, Stephens and Jacobs separated. On February 

7, 2014, the trial court annulled their marriage, finding that 

Stephens’ Jamaican marriage to Schwab was valid and that 

Stephens had failed to divorce Schwab.

____________________________________________

1 The parties’ notices of appeal purport to appeal from the trial court’s July 24, 

2020, order denying post-trial motions. However, “an appeal to this Court 

can only lie from judgments entered subsequent to the trial court’s disposition 

of any post-verdict motions, not from the order denying post-trial motions.” 

Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. 

Super. 1995) (en banc). On October 26, 2020, this Court issued a Rule to 

Show Cause directing Jacobs to praecipe the trial court Prothonotary to enter 

judgment in this matter; Jacobs complied with our order on October 30, 2020. 

Accordingly, we consider the appeal as taken from the entry of judgment. See 

id. at 514-15 (stating appellate courts may “regard as done that which ought 

to have been done”).
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On July 17, 2015, Jacobs filed a complaint seeking partition of the 

Carey Lane property and an award of reasonable rental value of 

the property from the date of separation onward. Stephens filed 

a counterclaim seeking reimbursement for various expenditures 

on the property, including repairs for the garage and kitchen, 

payments on a roof loan, and payment of real estate taxes and 

homeowner’s insurance premiums.

On October 16, 2017, following a non-jury trial, the trial court 

entered an order finding that the parties held the property as 

tenants in common. The court directed partition of the property.

Further, the court determined that Stephens had been in sole 

possession of the property since the date of separation, the value 

of the property was $145,000.00, and the value of each party’s 

share was fifty percent of the total value, or $72,500.00. The

court credited Stephens with $44,773.77 in payments for repairs 

to the premises, real estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance 

premiums. After subtracting this credit from Jacobs’ one-half 

share of the value of the premises, the court entered an order in 

Jacobs’ favor in the amount of $27,726.23.

On October 19, 2017, Jacobs filed post-trial motions. Stephens 

did not file post-trial motions. On October 30, 2017, Stephens 

filed a motion to strike or dismiss Jacobs’ post-trial motions on the 

ground that Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557 did not permit exceptions to an order 

directing partition. On November 1, 2017, the trial court 

dismissed Jacobs’ post-trial motions on the ground that she 

“[could] not file a motion for post-trial relief in response to an 

order directing partition.” Order, 11/1/17, at 1.

Jacobs v. Stephens, 204 A.3d 402, 404-05 (Pa. Super. 2019). Jacobs 

appealed and Stephens cross-appealed. 

In that appeal, Jacobs raised four questions:

1. Did the trial court err in giving [Stephens] credit for the 

payment of real estate taxes in the sum of $8,352.39 and 

credit for the payment of homeowners’ insurance premiums in 

the amount of $3,779.48?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion 

in failing and/or refusing to award [Jacobs] for her fair and 
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reasonable rental value claim, in the amount of $325.00 per 

month, plus utilities from August 6, 2013 through October 16, 

2017 and monthly thereafter, when the evidence was clear and 

uncontroverted that [Jacobs] was not in possession of the 

premises and [Stephens] enjoyed exclusive possession of the 

subject premises at all times relevant to the claim?

3. Did the trial court err in its November 1, 2017 [order] in 

granting [Stephens’] motion to strike/dismiss [Jacobs’] motion 

for post-trial relief without conducting a hearing on [Jacobs’] 

motion?

4. Did [Stephens’] failure to file a post-trial motion for relief 

constitute a waiver of all of the issues in his cross-appeal?

Id. at 405. Stephens raised three issues in his cross-appeal:

1. Given that the sole reason for the transfer of the subject 

property from [ ] Stephens to [ ] Stephens and [ ] Jacobs was 

the erroneous belief that the [p]arties were legally married, did 

the trial court err when it failed to find said transfer was void 

under the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, conditional 

gift, [or] gift made in reliance on a relation?

2. Did the trial court err when it failed to credit [ ] Stephens, as 

an offset to partition, the amount expended by him for the 

initial purchase price of the subject property?

3. Did the trial court err when it failed to credit [ ] Stephens, as 

an offset to partition, the value of the labor expended by him

for the necessary repairs, maintenance and preservation of the 

subject property?

Id. at 405-06.

This Court affirmed the portion of the order finding that the parties 

owned the property as tenants in common and directing partition of the 

property in equal shares. However, relying on our recent decision in Kapcsos 

v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), we vacated the order 
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in all other respects because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide those 

issues. 

In Kapcsos, this Court mandated that partition actions be divided into 

two distinct parts, each with its own appealable order. 

The first order, under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557, directs partition of the 

parties’ legal interests into severalty ...

The second order, under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1570, does one of three 

things. A Rule 1570 order may (1) divide the partitioned property 

among the parties, (2) force one or more of the parties to sell 

their interest in the land to one or more of the parties, or (3) sell 

the land to the general public and distribute the proceeds among 

the parties.

In Part 1, the court must determine whether the property is 

partitionable under law. In other words, Part 1 is to ascertain:

I. Do the parties jointly own the real estate in 

question?

II. If so, what fractional legal interests in the 

property does each party hold?

. . .

After a Part 1 order of partition becomes final (either because no 

one appeals or an appellate court affirms it), only then may parties 

proceed to Part 2, where the actual division, award, or sale of the 

partitioned property occurs ....

Therefore, the entry and recording of a Part 1 order directing 

partition is essential to terminate a joint tenancy. Following that, 

Part 2 is purely an equitable proceeding where the trial judge or 

master balances the equities to decide what form the partitioning 

will take. If the property were a pie, the trial court must decide 

how best to serve it to the parties.

Id. at 141-43.
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Constrained by Kapcsos, this Court concluded the trial court erred 

combining Part I and Part II rulings into a single order. Jacobs, 204 A.3d at 

409. Accordingly, we affirmed the order insomuch as it determined the parties 

owned the property as tenants in common and directing partition of the 

property in equal shares. Id. at 411. However, we vacated the portion of the 

order with respect to the precise division of the property and directed the trial 

court to retry the Part II issues de novo. Id.

Procedural History After Remand

On remand, Stephens filed a motion for status conference, which the 

trial court held on December 3, 2019. Following the conference, the parties 

stipulated the de novo proceeding would be conducted on the transcript of the 

prior proceeding without further testimony or evidence. On December 10, 

2019, the trial court entered a final order with respect to Part I of the partition 

and the parties jointly filed a waiver of appeal rights.

On April 17, 2020, the trial court issued an order and opinion addressing 

Part II of the partition. The trial court found:

(1) [Stephens] has been in sole actual physical possession of 

the property since the parties separated on August 6, 2013. 

[Stephens] has paid all costs associated with the 

acquisition, care, and maintenance of the property since he 

purchased it on February 28, 2001. [Jacobs] made no 

financial contributions to the property whatsoever.

(2) The purchase price paid by [Stephens] for the property on 

February 28, 2001 was $140,000,00, as set forth on the 

deed issued on that date.
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(3) [Stephens] has made the following necessary expenditures 

to preserve and maintain the property:

a. Garage repair materials: $14,822.31

b. Kitchen repair materials: $8,400.00

c. Roof repair materials: $8,019.52

d. Barn repair materials: $1,400.00

e. Real estate taxes: $8,352.39

f. Homeowner’s insurance: $3,779.48

(4) The fair market rental value of the property is $650.00 per 

month.

We allocate the credits between the parties as follows:

(1) [Stephens] is entitled to a credit for his payment of the full 

purchase price of the property, reduced by one-half to 

reconcile this amount with [Stephens’] one-half interest in 

the property. The total credit to which [Stephens] is entitled 

for payment of the purchase price is $70,000.

(2) [Stephens] is entitled to credits for materials purchased to 

preserve and maintain the property, reduced by one-half to 

reconcile this amount with [Stephens’] one-half interest in 

the property. [Stephens] is also entitled to a credit of onehalf of the amount of the insurance payments. However, 

the Superior Court’s holding in Bednar precludes a credit

for the payment of property taxes. The total credit to which 

[Stephens] is entitled for these expenditures is 

$18,210.69.

[FN] 6

[FN] 6 The Court calculated this as follows: $14,822.37 

÷ 2 = $7,411.19; $8,400.00 ÷ 2 = $4,200.00; 

$8,019.52 ÷ 2 = $4,009.76; $1,400.00 ÷ 2 = 

$700.00; $3,779.48 ÷ 2 = $1,889.74.

The sum of these totals is as follows: $7,411.19 + 

$4,200.00 + $4,009.76 + $700.00 + $1,889.74 = 

$18,210.69.

(3) [Jacobs] is entitled to a credit in the amount of one-half of 

the fair rental value for the time period commencing with 

the parties’ separation and her departure from the property

on August 6, 2013 and concluding on October 16, 2017. For 
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this period of 50 months and 10 days, [Jacobs] is entitled to 

a credit in the amount of $16,356.85.

As discussed above, [Stephens] will retain possession and sole 

title to the property and he will pay [Jacobs] an amount equal to 

the value of her one-half share of the property, adjusted by the 

credits awarded to each party. The calculation of [Stephens’]

payment to [Jacobs] for her share is as follows: $88,856.85 (the 

value of [Jacobs’] one-half share plus her credit for the fair rental 

value) - $88,210.69 (the value of [Stephens’] credits for the 

acquisition and necessary maintenance costs) = $646.16.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/20, at 7-9 (some footnotes and citations omitted).

On April 27, 2020, Jacobs filed a timely motion for post-trial relief and 

Stephens filed his post-trial motion on May 13, 2020, which the court treated 

as timely filed.

2

 On July 24, 2020, the trial court denied both motions. Jacobs 

timely appealed and Stephens cross-appealed.3 

Issues

On appeal, Jacobs raises three issues:

1. Did the Trial Court err in granting [Stephens] credits totaling 

$18,120.69 as credits for materials purchased to repair the 

garage, the kitchen, roof, and barn?

2. Did the Trial Court err in granting [Stephens] the entire value 

of [Jacobs’] one-half share, to-wit, the sum of $72,500.00?

3. Did the Trial Court fail to award [Jacobs] a monthly fair rental 

value claim of $325.00 per month for the entire time frame 

____________________________________________

2 Jacobs failed to properly serve Stephens with her motion for post-trial relief. 

Stephens first received actual notice of the motion during a conversation with 

Jacobs’ counsel on May 6, 2020.

3 Jacobs, Stephens, and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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from the date of the Trial Court decision, August 6, 2013 

through August 17, 2020, a period of 80 months and 10 days?

Jacobs’ Brief at x.

In his cross-appeal, Stephens raises one issue for our review:

1. Did the Trial Court err when it failed to award credit to 

[Stephens] for real estate taxes paid by him, pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 1570(a)(5)?

Stephens’ Brief at 40.

Jacobs’ Claims4

Preliminarily, we note “[t]he purpose of partition is to afford those 

individuals who no longer wish to be owners the opportunity to divest 

themselves for a fair consideration.” Beall v. Hare, 174 A.2d 847, 849 (Pa. 

1961). An action seeking partition of property is an equitable proceeding. 

Appeal of Kelsey, 5 A. 447, 449 (Pa. 1886), aff’d sub. nom. Church v. 

Kelsey, 136 U.S. 633 (1890). When considering such a decision, our review 

is guided by the following:

[T]he scope of appellate review of a decree in equity is particularly 

limited, and ... the findings of the [trial court] will not be reversed 

unless it appears that the [court] clearly committed an abuse of 

discretion or an error of law. Where credibility of witnesses is 

important to a determination, the findings of the [trial court] are 

entitled to particular weight because the [court] has the 

opportunity to observe their demeanor.

We can review freely conclusions of law or factual determinations 

that merely are derived from facts supported by the evidence. 

____________________________________________

4

In the argument section of her brief, Jacobs reordered her issues on appeal. 

For consistency, we will address Jacobs’ issues as they were presented in her 

statement of questions presented.
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Thus, we are limited to a determination of whether there was an 

error of law, and the trial court’s conclusions will not be disturbed 

unless they are not supported by the evidence or unless the court 

clearly abused its discretion.

Marchetti v. Karpowich, 667 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations 

omitted).

In her first claim, Jacobs contends the trial court erred when it awarded 

owelty to Stephens for repairs he made to the property during his time of

exclusive possession. Jacobs’ Brief at 4. Specifically, Jacobs asserts Stephens 

failed to establish the repairs “[m]aterially enhance[d] the value of the 

common property.” Id. at 2. In support, Jacobs notes Stephens purchased 

the property for $140,000 in 2001 and it had an appraised value of $145,000 

in 2017. Jacobs thus contends it “defies logic” to conclude $36,421.31 in 

repairs only resulted in a $5,000 appreciation value. Id. at 2-3. 

This Court has explained:

“As a general rule, where a cotenant places improvements on the 

common property, equity will take this fact into consideration on 

partition and will in some way compensate him for such 

improvements, provided they are made in good faith and are of a 

necessary and substantial nature, materially enhancing the value 

of the common property.” 68 C.J.S. Partition, § 139(a), see also 

Weiskircher v. Connelly, 248 Pa. 327, 93 A. 1068 (1915) 

(contribution allowed in partition action where “it was necessary 

to remodel, improve and alter the building erected upon the land 

so conveyed to [the parties].”); and Appeal of Kelsey, 113 Pa. 

119, 125, 5 A. 447, 449 (1886) (“[A] tenant in common is liable 

to his co-tenant for repairs absolutely necessary[.]) (emphasis 

added).

Bednar v. Bednar, 688 A.2d 1200, 1205 (Pa. Super. 1997). 
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In Bednar, this Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which 

declined to give co-tenants credit for certain improvements they made to the 

residence. See id. at 1204-06. We concluded the claim failed for several 

reasons: (1) the co-tenants’ counterclaim did not include a demand for 

improvements; (2) the co-tenants failed to prove the improvements were 

made within the statute of limitations; and (3) the co-tenants “failed to 

provide any evidence concerning the degree to which the improvements 

enhanced the property value.” Id.

Conversely, in the present case, the trial court, sitting as fact finder, 

determined Stephens was entitled to credit for certain improvements he 

made, which “were necessary to preserve the property,” including repairs to 

the garage, kitchen and barn, and a new roof. Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20, 

at 15. The trial court’s finding is supported by the record. Stephens testified 

regarding the necessity of these repairs and provided detailed documentation 

of the costs. See generally N.T., 12/13/16, at 50-91, 96-127. We detect no 

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in crediting Stephens’ 

testimony, and finding these repairs were made in good faith, and were 

necessary to preserve the value of the property.5 See Bednar, 688 A.2d at 

1205.

____________________________________________

5

 In fact, the record reflects that Stephens also requested credit for lawn 

maintenance, chimney cleaning, pest control, and snow removal, but the trial 

court declined his request. See generally Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20, at 

15 n.19.
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In her second issue, Jacobs argues the trial court erred in crediting

Stephens “for his payment of the full purchase price of the property, reduced 

by one-half to reconcile this amount with Stephens’ one-half interest in the 

property.” Jacobs’ Brief at 10 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/20, at 11). 

Jacobs contends a “property must be partitioned between the parties without 

regard to their respective contributions towards its acquisition.” Jacobs’ Brief 

at 16. She suggests any contribution made by Stephens for the purchase of 

the property was a “gift” given without expectation of future compensation. 

Id. at 14-16.

This claim is waived because Jacobs failed to preserve the issue in her 

post-trial motion. It is well-established that Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 “requires parties 

to file post-trial motions in order to preserve issues for appeal,” and “[i]f an 

issue has not been raised in a post-trial motion, it is waived for appeal 

purposes.” Board of Supervisors of Willistown Twp. v. Main Line 

Gardens, Inc., 155 A.3d 39, 44 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Lane Enterprises, Inc. 

v. L.B. Foster Co., 710 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1998)). 

Rule 227.1(b)(2) provides that the grounds for post-trial relief 

must be “specified in the motion,” and that any grounds not so 

specified are deemed waived unless leave is subsequently granted 

upon cause shown to specify additional grounds. Pa.R.C.P. 

227.1(b)(2). The Explanatory Comment to Rule 227.1(b)(2) 

makes clear that specification of the grounds for relief requires 

more than mere “boilerplate” language, and that the motion must 

instead provide the theories in support “so that the lower court 

will know what it is being asked to decide.” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2) 

(Explanatory Comment–1983) (quoting Frank v. Peckich, 257 

Pa. Super. 561, 391 A.2d 624, 632–33 (1978)).
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Main Line Gardens, Inc., 155 A.3d at 44.

In this case, our careful review of the record reveals that Jacobs made 

no attempt to preserve this claim in her post-trial motion. See Jacobs’ Motion 

for Post-Trial Relief, 4/27/20, at 4-7. Rather, she raised this issue for the first 

time in her statement of matters complained of on appeal. Accordingly, this 

claim is waived.6 See Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1)-(2).

In her final issue, Jacobs asserts the trial court erred in limiting its award

of fair market rental value from the date of the parties’ separation (August 6, 

2013) through the date of the trial court’s initial partition order (October 16, 

2017). Jacobs’ Brief at 4. Notably, Jacobs does not dispute the monthly rental 

value assigned by the trial court. Rather, she contends the trial court should 

have awarded fair market rental value of the property through the date of the 

trial court’s Part II order (April 17, 2020), which the trial court entered 

following remand from this Court. Jacobs argues she is entitled credit for this 

additional period of 30 months and 1 day because, beyond the parties’ 

stipulation that the trial court should rely on the prior record in making its Part 

____________________________________________

6

In the absence of waiver, Jacobs’ claim lacks merit. Upon partition, a tenant 

in common is entitled to a credit for half of their share of the costs paid to 

acquire the subject property. See Weiskircher v. Connelly, 93 A. 1068 (Pa. 

1915) (awarding a co-tenant in a partition action credit for “one-half of the 

aggregate sum ... paid by said [co-tenant] on account of the purchase of the 

property, costs, and interest”); see also Thierry v. Yamulla, 523 EDA 2021, 

at 10 (Pa. Super. Jan. 14, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (“The court 

calculates owelty based on the equities of what each person invested in the 

subject real property.”).
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II decision, “there is no evidence explicit, or implicit that [she] agreed to 

forego her stated claim for the rental value limited to the date of the vacated 

Part 2 Order.” Id. at 8.

Conversely, Stephens asserts:

[Jacobs] has submitted no legal authority for her proposition that 

credit should have been given [to] her for the time-period 

between the trial . . . through her first Appeal to Superior Court, 

through the subsequent remanding of the case on February 8, 

2019, through the period of time in which no activity occurred on 

the docket, through the Status Conference held on December 3, 

2019, through the entering of the Lower Court’s Part 2 Order on 

April 17, 2020.

Stephens’ Brief at 34. Stephens emphasizes that Jacobs, the moving party, 

allowed the case to languish for over eight months following remand from this

Court7 but now seeks the fair market rental value for this period of time. Id. 

at 34-35. Moreover, Stephens notes that at the status conference, Jacobs 

“entered into an agreement to not pursue a de novo hearing, but instead 

stipulated that the case would be decided on the evidence” previously 

admitted. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). Stephens argues Jacobs is bound 

by her prior agreement and cannot now seek credit for additional time. Id.

Pursuant to 68 P.S. § 101, a co-tenant not in possession is granted a 

cause of action against a co-tenant in possession to recover “his or their 

proportionate part of the rental value of said real estate for the time such real 

____________________________________________

7 Stephens eventually petitioned the trial court for a status conference after 

Jacobs delayed in acting.
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estate shall have been in possession” of the co-tenant. 68 P.S. § 101. 

Accordingly,

[t]wo requirements must be satisfied before recovery of the fair 

rental value of the premises will be permitted: (1) the complaining 

party must show he is not in possession of the premises; and (2) 

it must be shown that the remaining tenant in common occupies 

exclusive possession of the premises.

Sciotto v. Sciotto, 288 A.2d 822, 823–24 (Pa. 1972). 

In denying Jacobs additional credit for the fair market rental value of 

the property, the trial court reasoned:

As discussed above, at the December 3, 2019 status conference 

following remand from the first appeal, the parties stipulated that 

the de novo proceeding would be conducted on the record of the 

prior proceedings. Put differently, the Court would confine its 

analysis to the record as it existed at the time of the prior order, 

which was entered October 16, 2017. [Jacobs] would have the 

Court depart from that solely to adjust the end-date for calculation 

of [Jacobs’] rental value credit.

Pursuant to the parties’ joint stipulation, the Court disregarded 

any material offered by either party relating to events after the 

October 16, 2017 order, which included, among other things, 

evidence of additional expenses incurred by [Stephens]. Part 2 

partition proceedings are, as the Superior Court articulated in 

Kapcsos, “purely an equitable proceeding where the trial judge 

or master balances the equities” to reach an equitable result given 

the circumstances. 194 A.3d at 142-43. To allow [Jacobs] the 

benefit of a credit for an additional 30 months and 1 day worth of 

rental value – which would result in an increase of $9,653.84, 

totaling $26,010.69 – while simultaneously denying [Stephens] 

the opportunity to introduce further evidence or make any

argument with regard to the same would be patently inequitable. 

Furthermore, in order to achieve equity, the Court included in its 

calculation periods when the evidence indicated that the 

property’s state of relative disrepair could have rendered it 

unrentable altogether.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/20, at 16-17 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
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We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court. At the December 

3, 2019, status conference hearing, Jacobs represented that she saw “no 

reason to have another hearing[,]” and wished for the court to issue its Part 

II order based on the transcript (and evidence presented) from the prior 

hearing. N.T., 12/3/19, at 3. Based on the stipulation, the parties presented 

no evidence regarding the fair market rental value of the property from 

October 16, 2017 through April 17, 2020. Consequently, there is no record 

support for an award of fair market value during that time period. See 

Capuano v. Capuano, 823 A.2d 995, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding “in a 

hearing de novo, the complainant has the initial burden of going forward with 

the evidence, as he must prove his case as if for the first time”). Accordingly, 

because the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, Jacobs’ final 

claim fails. 

Stephens’ Claims

In his cross-appeal, Stephens argues “he be given credit for real estate 

taxes paid by him in the amount of $4,176.19, which represents one-half of 

the taxes paid by him to preserve the property.” Stephens’ Brief at 46. 

Stephens acknowledges Bednar is dispositive of his claim, but nonetheless 

asks this Court to revisit its holding in Bednar decision. Id.

In Bednar, this Court initially explained, “[t]o entitle one to contribution 

[for amounts paid toward real estate taxes], the payment must be compulsory 

in the sense that the party paying was under legal obligation to pay.” Bednar, 
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688 A.2d at 1203 (citation omitted). The appellants claimed the proportionate 

real estate tax obligations that they had paid on behalf of their fellow joint 

tenant constituted a legal obligation, in that the parties were required under 

the mortgage to pay the full amount of real estate taxes on the property. Id. 

at 1203–04. This Court disagreed, determining the mortgage did not 

constitute a legal obligation to pay real estate taxes. Id. at 1204. The Court 

went on to hold that “a cotenant who assumes the tax obligations of his fellow 

tenant does so as a volunteer. [S]uch a volunteer is not entitled to 

contribution.” Id. (citing 72 P.S. § 5511.12 (provision of Pennsylvania’s Local 

Tax Collection Law providing that a joint tenant is only responsible for his or 

her proportionate share of real estate taxes due on a property)).

Upon review, we conclude Bednar is on point and controlling, and the 

trial court properly applied it to this case. In both Bednar and the instant 

case, the parties claiming contribution for paying the proportionate real estate 

tax obligations of their fellow joint tenant were under no legal obligation to do 

so, and were thus not entitled to contribution for those payments. See 

Bednar, 688 A.2d at 1204. Further, we have long held that “as long as [a]

decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court, a decision by our 

Court remains binding precedent.” Marks v. Nationwide Ins., 762 A.2d 

1098, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2000); see also Commonwealth v. Beck, 78 A.3d 

656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013) (acknowledging that a three-judge panel of the 

Superior Court “is not empowered to overrule another panel of the Superior 
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Court” where the facts of the two cases are indistinguishable). Thus, even 

assuming arguendo we were inclined to agree with Stephens’ position, we 

nevertheless must affirm the order on the basis of Bednar, supra.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/31/2022