Docket Nos. 104854, 104871 cons.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re A.W. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee and

Cross-Appellant, v. Eugene W., Appellant and Cross-Appellee). 

Opinion filed September 18, 2008.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The circuit court of Peoria County found A.W., a minor,

neglected and made him a ward of the court. Eugene W., the minor’s

father, appealed. The appellate court upheld the neglect and unfitness

findings, but vacated and remanded the cause, finding a violation of

Eugene’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination because he

was not allowed to complete sex offender counseling without

admitting he committed a sex offense. 373 Ill. App. 3d 574.

We allowed and consolidated the petitions for leave to appeal

filed by both Eugene and the State. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. On appeal,

Eugene contends the circuit court erred by finding: (1) the doctrine of

collateral estoppel barred him from relitigating whether he is a sexual
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offender based on a prior court’s ruling in another juvenile

proceeding; (2) A.W. was neglected; and (3) Eugene was unfit to care

for A.W. The State contends in its appeal that the appellate court

erred in holding the circuit court violated Eugene’s fifth amendment

right against self-incrimination. We affirm the circuit court judgment

and reverse that part of the appellate court judgment vacating the

circuit court judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, the State filed a petition alleging neglect of A.W., a

minor. The petition stated the minor’s environment was injurious to

his welfare because: (1) Eugene was found unfit in a 2004 case

involving A.W.’s sibling; (2) DCFS “indicated” Eugene for sexual

molestation in 1998 and 2002; and (3) Eugene failed to complete

court-ordered sex offender counseling. The petition also alleged

A.W.’s mother was previously found unfit in 1999, she was found to

remain unfit in 2001, and there was no subsequent order finding the

mother fit.

At the adjudicatory hearing on January 4, 2006, the State

submitted certified copies of the 2004 neglect adjudication of the

minor’s older sibling. Eugene did not object. The 2004 petition

included sexual abuse allegations of the 1998 and 2002 DCFS

indicated findings. The circuit court in the 2004 case found the State

proved the allegations of the 1998 and 2002 sexual molestations by

a preponderance of the evidence, and found the minor sibling

neglected and both parents unfit. As a result of the disposition,

Eugene was assigned a permanency goal of completing sex offender

counseling.

Also atthe adjudicatory hearing in this case, Eugene’s caseworker

testified the mother did not complete individual counseling after five

years. The mother admitted she did not comply with required testing

for illegal drug usage. The caseworker noted that Eugene completed

drug and alcohol assessments and no treatment was recommended.

Eugene also completed a sex offender assessment, domestic violence

classes, and random drug drops.

Eugene testified and confirmed that he completed successfully a

domestic violence class. Eugene also acknowledged the DCFS
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“indicated reports” of sexual molestation and the referral to sex

offender counseling, but insisted he was not convicted of any sex

crimes. Based on collateral estoppel, the circuit court prohibited

Eugene from presenting evidence to refute the DCFS indications of

sexual abuse proved in the 2004 case. The circuit court found the

1998 and 2002 reports of sexual abuse in the sibling’s 2004 neglect

proceeding were identical to the 1998 and 2002 reports of sexual

abuse in this proceeding. The court noted that, in the 2004 sibling’s

case, the juvenile court judge found the allegations of sexual

molestation in 1998 and 2002 were proven by a preponderance of the

evidence and the findings were affirmed on appeal. Eugene was

permitted to make an offer of proof consisting largely of previous

testimony denying he sexually abused anyone in 1998 and 2002.

The circuit court determined Eugene had not overcome the

finding of unfitness from the sibling’s prior case because he failed to

complete sex offender counseling. The circuit court concluded the

State proved A.W. was living in an injurious environment and both

parents “remain unfit.”

At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court took judicial notice

of the appellate court decision in the 2004 case. The court also

reviewed the social history report, the counseling summary report,

and the foster-care progress report prepared for the case. These

reports disclosed the mother and Eugene denied being romantically

involved. The mother has four other children in state care. She has

been in and out of substance abuse treatment for several years and she

has difficulty maintaining employment. The reports showed the

mother failed to comply with drug testing. She struggled with anger.

She was not making significant progress in counseling and she has a

history of unstable housing. The mother admitted putting her kids at

risk and in jeopardy.

The reports indicate that during sex offender counseling Eugene

made minimal progress because he failed to attend regularly and

continued to deny the reported incidents of abuse. After being

assigned a counselor in 2005, Eugene missed six scheduled

appointments. Eugene also attended sessions with a different sex

abuse counselor, but he was discharged in March 2006 for “being

uncooperative.”Eugene’s caseworker encouraged him to return to sex
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abuse counseling “to at least learn something from the sessions” even

if he did not admit any sexual offenses.

Eugene testified that he attended sex offender counseling, but the

counselor would not continue the program unless he admitted to

committing a sex offense. According to Eugene, he was unwilling to

incriminate himself and the therapist discharged him unsuccessfully

from the program. Thus, based on the prior adjudication of unfitness

continuing into 2006, the circuit court found Eugene unfit to care for

A.W.

The appellate court found the trial court properly ruled that the

doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Eugene from introducing

evidence to rebut the sexual abuse allegations. The appellate court

also upheld the circuit court’s neglect and unfitness determinations.

The appellate court, however, concluded that Eugene’s constitutional

right against self-incrimination was violated when he was prevented

from completing sex offender counseling based on his refusal to

incriminate himself. The appellate court vacated the judgment of the

circuit court and remanded the cause to reopen the dispositional

hearing for the limited purpose of allowing Eugene to propose his

own service plan that would allow him to complete sex offender

counseling without incriminating himself.

We allowed Eugene’s petition for leave to appeal the neglect and

unfitness determinations. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. We also allowed the

State’s petition for leave to appeal the reversal of the dispositional

order (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), and consolidated both appeals. We

permitted the office of the Cook County public guardian to file an

amicus curiae brief. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

I. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Eugene challenges the circuit court’s collateral

estoppel ruling, as well as its neglect and unfitness findings. In its

appeal, the State contends the appellate court erred in concluding that

Eugene’s fifth amendment rights were violated.

A. Collateral Estoppel

Eugene contends the circuit court erred in ruling that collateral

estoppel bars him from introducing evidence to refute the State’s
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allegation that he is a sex offender. Specifically, Eugene’s brief states

he “sought to introduce evidence pertaining to the DCFS indicated

reports relating to his alleged sexual molestation in November of

1998 and September of 2002.” The State counters that the circuit

court properly refused to allow Eugene to relitigate the issue of the

1998 and 2002 sexual abuses decided in the 2004 case.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel “bars relitigation of an issue

already decided in a prior case.” People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381,

396 (2002). We review de novo the applicability of the collateral

estoppel doctrine as a question of law. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.

2d 187, 197 (2006).

There are three requirements for application of collateral estoppel:

“(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical

with the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a

final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3)

the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in

privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” Gumma v.

White, 216 Ill. 2d 23, 38 (2005).

Additionally, “[f]or purposes of applying the doctrine of collateral

estoppel, finality requires that the potential for appellate review must

have been exhausted.” Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107,

113 (1986).

Here, Eugene sought to introduce evidence to refute the DCFS

“indicated reports”of alleged sexual molestations in November 1998

and September 2002. The record does not show that Eugene sought

administrative decision review, administrative decision appeal, or

judicial review of the DCFS “indicated” findings. See 325 ILCS

5/7.16 (West 2004); 735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq. (West 2004); 89 Ill.

Adm. Code §§316.90, 316.100 (2002). An “indicated report” is a

report of abuse or neglect supported by credible evidence following

a DCFS investigation. 325 ILCS 5/3 (West 2004); 89 Ill. Adm. Code

§300.20 (2002). “Credible evidence” means “the available facts when

viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances would cause a

reasonable person to believe that a child was abused or neglected.” 89

Ill. Adm. Code §300.20 (2002); Lyon v. Department of Children &

Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 267 (2004).
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The circuit court in this case also reviewed certified copies of the

2004 adjudication of neglect of the minor’s older sibling based on the

State proving the allegations of the 1998 and 2002 “indicated reports”

of sexual molestations by a preponderance of the evidence. The

record indicates the circuit court allowed Eugene to make an offer of

proof. The offer of proof reiterated Eugene’s 2004 testimony denying

sexual abuse of anyone in 1998 and 2002.

Eugene admits the threshold requirements for collateral estoppel

were met. First, the issue decided in the 2004 prior

adjudication–whether Eugene is a sex offender based on the 1998 and

2002 DCFS “indicated reports”–is identical with the issue presented

in this case. Second, there was a final judgment on the merits in the

2004 prior adjudication and the court determined the State proved

that Eugene is a sex offender based on the 1998 and 2002 sexual

abuses. Finally, Eugene is the party against whom estoppel is asserted

and he was a party to the prior 2004 adjudication. Additionally,

Eugene had the opportunity to litigate fully the 1998 and 2002 sex

abuse allegations in the 2004 juvenile adjudication and the appellate

court affirmed that determination. Therefore, it cannot be seriously

disputed that the trial court properly ruled the doctrine of collateral

estoppel barred Eugene from introducing evidence to refute the prior

determination of sexual abuse of the 1998 and 2002 “indicated

reports.” We agree with the circuit court that collateral estoppel

applied to Eugene’s proffered testimony.

Eugene urges this court to hold the application of collateral

estoppel was inequitable in this case because juvenile cases employ

the lower “preponderance of the evidence standard” and subsequent

findings are predicated on previous decisions. This would, however,

be contrary to the legislative directive of section 2–18(3) of the Act,

providing:

“proof of the abuse, neglect or dependency of one minor

shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse, neglect

or dependency of any other minor for whom the respondent is

responsible.” 705 ILCS 405/2–18(3) (West 2006).

Eugene also argues it was inequitable to apply collateral estoppel

to bar him from introducing evidence that he did not pose a risk to

this particular child. The collateral estoppel ruling did not prevent

Eugene from presenting evidence that later events overcame the
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inferences arising from the prior sexual abuse. Eugene was not

prohibited from introducing evidence that he did not pose a risk to the

child at issue in this case. Accordingly, we find no unfairness in

applying collateral estoppel in this case. We therefore affirm the

appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not err in applying

collateral estoppel to prevent Eugene from relitigating the prior

determination that the State proved the 1998 and 2002 sexual abuses.

B. Neglect Finding

Eugene also contends the circuit court erred in finding the minor

neglected by reason of an injurious environment. Eugene claims there

was no evidence he actually neglected the minor in this case and it

was inappropriate to apply a theory of anticipatory neglect, based on

a finding that he abused other children. The State argues the evidence

supported the circuit court’s finding that the minor was neglected due

to an injurious environment.

We will reverse a juvenile court’s finding that a minor is

neglected only if it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 464 (2004). “A finding is against the

manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is

clearly evident.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. In In re D.F., 201

Ill. 2d 476, 499 (2002), this court explained:

“Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, we give

deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in

the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the

parties and the witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with

the evidence that a reviewing court cannot possibly obtain. A

reviewing court, therefore, must not substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses,

the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be

drawn.” In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99, citing In re A.P.,

179 Ill. 2d 184, 204 (1997).

Section 2–3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705

ILCS 405/2–3(1)(b) (West 2006)) defines neglect to include being

subjected to an environment injurious to the minor’s welfare. Section

2–18(3) of the Act provides:
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“proof of the abuse, neglect or dependency of one minor

shall be admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse, neglect

or dependency of any other minor for whom the respondent is

responsible.” 705 ILCS 405/2–18(3) (West 2006).

This court has recognized there is no per se rule that abuse or

neglect of one minor “conclusively establishes the neglect of another

child.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. As stated in In re Arthur

H., “[e]ach case concerning the adjudication of minors, including

those cases pursued under a theory of anticipatory neglect based upon

the neglect of a child’s sibling must be reviewed according to its own

facts.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468-69.

The issue here is whether the minor is neglected, not whether one

or both of the minor’s parents are responsible for the neglect. In re

Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 467. The State’s petition alleged anticipatory

neglect, based on evidence concerning both the minor’s mother and

Eugene. The record indicates both Eugene and the minor’s mother

stipulated each was previously found unfit and there was no

subsequent finding of fitness. Eugene does not contest the evidence

of the mother’s neglect or her failing to ensure a safe and nurturing

environment for the minor. This alone was sufficient to support the

circuit court’s finding of neglect.

Nonetheless, the circuit court’s finding of neglect is also

supported by the State’s evidence establishing Eugene’s history of

sexually abusing minors in his care. In addition, the record indicates

the minor’s mother and Eugene continued to have a relationship and

the minor would not be adequately protected from the injurious

environment if placed in either parent’s care.

Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court’s finding of neglect

due to an injurious environment was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence. We affirm the circuit court’s neglect finding.

C. Unfitness Finding

Eugene also contends the circuit court erred in finding him unfit.

Eugene argues the circuit court improperly relied on a past finding of

unfitness and the State presented no evidence proving he continued

to pose a risk to any child. Specifically, Eugene asserts that even

assuming he previously sexually abused female children, there was no
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evidence he would ever sexually abuse male children. Further,

Eugene submits, even assuming any past sexual offenses, the absence

of any criminal charges against him suggests he has acquired the

capacity to avoid behavior that put him at risk of reoffending. The

State responds that Eugene’s history of sexually abusing minor

relatives in his care justified the circuit court’s finding that Eugene is

unfit.

Upon finding the parents of a neglected child “unfit,” section

2–27 of the Act authorizes the court to place the child in the custody

of a legal guardian when it is in the child’s best interest. 705 ILCS

405/2–27 (West 2006). We will reverse a circuit court’s finding of

unfitness only if the finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence.In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498. We will conclude “[a] finding

is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite

conclusion is clearly evident.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. We

give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact, and will not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on the credibility of

witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or inferences drawn from

the evidence. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99.

Here, the circuit court found Eugene unfit to care for the minor

based on the 2004 prior adjudication of unfitness and his failure to

correct the conditions that led to the 2004 unfitness determination.

Specifically, the circuit court reviewed the appellate court decision

from Eugene’s prior adjudication of unfitness. The trial court noted

that in the prior adjudication:

“The State introduced investigative files of two DCFS

reports indicating that respondent sexually molested and

exploited young girls who were members of his own family

in ’97 and ’98. The record shows that the Respondent never

appealed the indicated reports, no showing he pursued any

counseling, treatment or other remedial services to ensure that

another child in his care would be safe.”

The circuit court acknowledged the appellate court’s prior

determination that “[t]he material in the investigative file gave rise to

a reasonable inference that a young child placed in Respondent’s care

would be at risk of being abused by him.” The circuit court found

Eugene unfit because he failed to overcome the main hurdle that led

to these cases by not completing sex offender counseling.
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As the State correctly points out, this court has concluded:

“evidence of neglect toward one child may be relevant to the question

of a parent’s fitness with respect to another child.” In re D.F., 201 Ill.

2d at 501. Based on the previous finding of unfitness, affirmed on

appeal, together with Eugene’s failure to produce any evidence of

correcting the behavior that led to the prior finding of unfitness, we

conclude the trial court did not err in finding Eugene unfit in this

case. Although given the opportunity, Eugene did not offer any

evidence that he has even attempted to seek out or complete any

alternative sex offender counseling.

Based on our review of the record, we cannot say the circuit

court’s determination was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s finding of unfitness.

D. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination

Finally, we address the State’s argument that the circuit court did

not violate Eugene’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination

when the court relied on Eugene’s failure to complete sex offender

counseling as a reason for finding Eugene unfit. The State contends

the appellate court erroneously concluded that the circuit court

required Eugene to admit to committing a sex offense when the

circuit court never imposed such a requirement.

Eugene argues he was unsuccessfully discharged from sex

offender counseling because he would not admit past sexual offenses.

Eugene claims he was deprived of custody of the child in this case as

a sanction for exercising his constitutional right against selfincrimination.

“The standard of review for determining whether an individual’s

constitutional rights have been violated is de novo.” In re Robert S.,

213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004). The fifth amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V.

This provision applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment

(U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 92 L.

Ed. 2d 296, 303, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2991 (1986). The fifth amendment

privilege against self-incrimination gives a person the right to refuse

to testify against himself or herself when the person is a defendant in
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a criminal trial, or any other civil or criminal proceeding when the

testimony may incriminate the person in future criminal proceedings.

Allen, 478 U.S. at 368, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 303-04, 106 S. Ct. at 2991.

“[W]hen a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent

sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that

testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment ***.”

Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7, 97 S.

Ct. 2132, 2135 (1977).

The appellate court here relied on In re L.F., 306 Ill. App. 3d 748

(1999). In that case, the State petitioned to have the respondent

mother’s minor children adjudicated neglected based on the death of

the mother’s foster child. The trial court in In re L.F. changed the

permanency goal to “substitute care pending termination of parental

rights” of the mother’s biological children when she would not admit

responsibility for maltreatment that caused the foster child’s death.

The mother argued her fifth amendment right against selfincrimination was violated. 

The appellate court in In re L.F. reviewed case law from other

state courts that have found it constitutionally impermissible to order

a parent to choose between losing parental rights or waiving the right

against self-incrimination. In re L.F., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 753 (citing

In re Clifford M., 6 Neb. App. 754, 765, 577 N.W.2d 547, 554

(1998), Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250, 268, 647 A.2d 714, 724-25

(1994), In re Welfare of J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn. 1989),

and In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. 1987)). The

appellate court recognized:

“there is a very fine but important distinction between taking

steps to terminate a parent’s rights based specifically on a

refusal to waive a right against self-incrimination and doing

so based upon a parent’s failure to comply with an order for

meaningful therapy.” In re L.F., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 753.

The appellate court rejected the trial judge’s ruling that the fifth

amendment was not implicated because the juvenile permanency

review hearing was civil in nature. In re L.F., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 754.

The appellate court held the trial court violated the mother’s right

against self-incrimination by asking her to admit to a crime that could

be used against her in a subsequent criminal proceeding and changing
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the permanency goal when she exercised her right. In re L.F., 306 Ill.

App. 3d at 754.

In the instant case, the appellate court relied on In re L.F. in

finding a violation of Eugene’s fifth amendment right. The appellate

court concluded Eugene “was forced to make the same choice as the

respondent in L.F.: he had to admit to having committed a sex offense

in order to complete the last task or risk losing his child.” 373 Ill.

App. 3d at 579.

We agree with the rationale ofIn re L.F., that the fifth amendment

right against self-incrimination applies to juvenile proceedings. See

Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 7, 97 S. Ct. at 2135

(holding that the fifth amendment is violated when the State compels

a surrender of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination

by threatening “potent sanctions”). We agree with those courts that

have held a juvenile court may not compel a parent to admit to a

crime that could be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal

proceeding by threatening the loss of parental rights. See In re

Clifford M., 6 Neb. App. at 765, 577 N.W.2d at 554; Mullin, 162 Vt.

at 268, 647 A.2d at 724-25; In re Welfare of J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d at

886; In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 883. Such an action would

clearly violate the fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination. Accordingly, a trial court may order a service plan that

requires a parent to engage in effective counseling or therapy, but

may not compel counseling or therapy requiring the parent to admit

to committing a crime. See In re L.F., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 754.

Nevertheless, we find this case distinguishable from In re L.F. As

the State points out, it is undisputed that the circuit court did not

specifically require Eugene to admit any wrongdoing. The circuit

court did not order Eugene to complete a specific program requiring

him to admit abuse.

We have examined the Iowa Supreme Court case of In re E.H.,

578 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 1998), and find its reasoning persuasive. In

that case, the court reviewed a father’s claim that a court order

requiring him to undergo sex offender therapy effectively required

him to incriminate himself because any sex offender treatment

program requires an admission of sexual abuse. The court rejected his

claim for a failure of proof. In re E.H., 578 N.W.2d at 250. The court

reasoned:
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“The juvenile court did not require a particular type of

program, nor did it specify where [the father] should obtain

treatment. *** Finally, there is no evidence in the record,

other than the assertions of [the father] that all treatment

programs would require an admission of sexual abuse ***.

The existence of such a universal requirement is not a matter

appropriate for judicial notice. [Citation.] Therefore, the

father’s failure of proof is fatal to his constitutional claim.” In

re E.H., 578 N.W.2d at 250.

The Iowa Supreme Court reached a similar result in In re C.H.,

652 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 2002). There, the court found no evidence the

State required the father to complete any particular sex offender

treatment program or that the State did not approve of his

participation in a program that would not require admission of guilt.

The court stated:

“The permanency plan merely required treatment. *** Under

such facts, we find [the father] failed to prove the State’s case

permanency plan effectively constituted a requirement that

[the father] must incriminate himself.” In re C.H., 652

N.W.2d at 150.

Additionally, a federal court has rejected a similar claim in Doe

v. Sauer, 186 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 1999). In Doe, a prisoner argued he

was denied parole based on his refusal to enter a sex offender

treatment program that he alleged would require him to admit to

sexual offenses other than the offense of his conviction. The court

found there was no evidence in the record to support the prisoner’s

allegation. Doe, 186 F.3d at 905.

Here, Eugene presented no evidence that there are no other

treatment programs available offering sex offender counseling

without requiring an admission of sexual abuse. Moreover, the record

in this case fails to support the appellate court’s conclusion that the

circuit court’s order had the effect of requiring Eugene to incriminate

himself. Additionally, the record contains no evidence that Eugene

informed the circuit court in the sibling’s case that he was having

difficulty with the sex offender counseling, or that he asked the court

to assist him in locating alternative counseling.
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Eugene’s caseworker urged him to return to sex offender

counseling to see if progress was possible without making any

admission of past abuse. Yet Eugene refused to do so. Instead,

Eugene waited until the dispositional hearing in this case to argue the

circuit court should disregard his failure to comply with the sex

offender counseling requirement. As the Iowa Supreme Court held in

In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 148, “voicing complaints regarding the

adequacy of services to a social worker is not sufficient. A parent

must inform the juvenile court of such challenge.”

Under the facts of this case, we find Eugene failed to prove a

violation of his constitutional rights. Further, the record fails to

support the appellate court’s holding that the circuit court order

required Eugene to incriminate himself. We hold the circuit court did

not violate Eugene’s fifth amendment right againstself-incrimination.

We therefore reverse the appellate court’s contrary holding.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the circuit court rulings that: (1) the doctrine of

collateral estoppel barred Eugene from relitigating prior DCFS

indicated reports of sexual abuse and the 2004 adjudication; (2) A.W.

was neglected; and (3) Eugene was unfit to care for A.W. We reverse

that part of the appellate court decision holding that the circuit court

violated Eugene’s fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.

Appellate court judgment affirmed in part

 and reversed in part;

 circuit court judgment affirmed.