alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 97-40413 Summary Calendar

_______________

MARIA CRUZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PROTECTIVE AND REGULATORY SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

(C-95-CV-514)

_________________________

November 25, 1997 Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The plaintiff, Maria Cruz, claims that she was fired by the

Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory services in violation

of th e Americans with Disabilities Act. Cruz's job was to drive

children to foster care. She received multiple convictions for

driving while intoxicated ; these incidents were not job-related.2

A departmental rule, however, required employees with primary

responsibilities as drivers to report DWI violations to their

supervisors. Cruz failed to do so and, upon discovery of her

undisclosed DWI offenses, the department terminated her employment.

The district court entered summary judgment for the

department, noting that it need not decide whether alcoholism is a

disability covered by the Act, because Cruz was fired not for

alcoholism or any other disability, b ut because she violated the

disclosure rule. As the district court noted, the department was

not even aware that Cruz ha d any alcohol-related problems.

Instead, as the district court explained, “defendant fired

plaintiff because she was arrested and convicted of DWI, failed to

report her arrest or conviction, lied about her prior arrests and

convictions, missed work due to a DWI arrest, and lied about the

reason she missed work.”

The district court correctly concluded that, in opposing

summary judgment, Cruz failed to raise an issue of fact as to

whether these reasons were a pretext. We affirm, essentially for

the reasons set forth in the district court's comprehensive Order

Granting Motion for Summary Judgment entered on March 7, 1997.

We also note that in the only appellate brief filed on Cruz's

behalf in this court, her attorney manages never to mention that

this case involves a professional driver who received num erous

convictions for DWI. This is an apparent effort to hide these

salient facts from this court. As an officer of the court, this3

attorney has an obligation, i n the course of his professional

a dvocacy, to serve as an officer of the court by informing the

court as to what this case is all about. Cruz's lawyer failed to

fulfill that responsibility here.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.2


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection  with this Quarterly  Report of Sew Cal Logo, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending May 31, 2006, as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Judy Songer, Chief
Financial  Officer  of the  Company,  certifies  to the  best of her  knowledge,
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  Sec.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to Sec.  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.    Such  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ending May 31, 2006,
      fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section  13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.    The information  contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the
      period  ending  February  28,  2006,  fairly  presents,  in  all  material
      respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of Sew Cal
      Logo, Inc.

Dated: July 24, 2006

                                        SEW CAL LOGO, INC.

                                        By: /s/ Judy Songer
                                            -----------------------------------
                                            Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Mark
S. Hiltwein, the Chief Financial Officer of Cenveo, Inc. (the ‘‘Company’’),
certify pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:





(1) the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended January 2,
2010 (the ‘‘Report’’) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
and





(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
      March 3, 2010
              /s/ Mark S. HiltweinMark
      S. HiltweinChief
      Financial
Officer
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 6477

RONNIE LEE CASH , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. WARDEN JOSEPH MCFADDEN , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Rock Hill

. Mary G. Lewis , District Judge. ( 0:16

- cv - 00716

- MGL )

Submitted : August 24, 2017 Decided: August 29, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Ronnie Lee Cash, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublishe d opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Ronnie Lee Cash seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order i s not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322,
336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that t he petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at
484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Cash has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealabil ity, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# C_2008037EN.01002301.xml

| 9.2.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 37/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.2.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 37/23

---

Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 11 October 2007 — MB Immobilien v Commission

(Case T-120/07 R)

(Interim measures - State Aid to the new Länder - Obligation to recover aid - Application for suspension of operation of a measure - Urgency - Weighing up of interests)

(2008/C 37/34)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: MB Immobilien Verwaltungs GmbH (Neukirch, Germany) (represented by: G. Brüggen, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: K. Gross and T. Scharf, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Application for suspension of operation of Commission Decision 2007/492/EC of 24 January 2007 on State Aid No C 38/2005 (ex NN 52/2004) implemented by Germany for the Biria-Gruppe (OJ 2007 L 183, p. 27)

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The costs are reserved.

---
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-10197

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Fernando Rodriguez-Macedo, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:20-CR-260-1

Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Fernando Rodriguez-Macedo appeals the 36-month prison sentence 

and three-year term of supervised release imposed on his guilty plea 

conviction for illegal reentry following removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He

argues that because his indictment did not specify the prior felony conviction 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 19, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-10197 Document: 00515985517 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/19/2021
No. 21-10197

2

that formed the basis of his sentencing enhancement, his sentence, imposed 

under § 1326(b)(1), exceeded the two-year maximum sentence under 

§ 1326(a) and therefore violated his due process rights. The Government has 

filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance and, alternatively, seeks 

an extension of time to file its brief.

As the Government correctly argues and Rodriguez-Macedo correctly 

concedes, this appeal is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 

U.S. 224 (1998). See United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 497 (5th Cir. 

2014); United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 492 F.3d 624, 625-26 (5th Cir. 

2007). Because the issue is foreclosed, summary affirmance is appropriate. 

See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 

Consequently, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is 

GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The 

Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file its brief is 

DENIED as unnecessary.

Case: 21-10197 Document: 00515985517 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/19/2021
STATE of North Carolina v. Eric Alan SANCHEZ

No. 373P16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 8, 2016

Mark Montgomery, Attorney at Law, For Sanchez, Eric Alan.

Josephine N. Tetteh, Assistant Attorney General, Scott E. Thomas, District Attorney, For State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 10th of October 2016 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of December 2016."
Exhibit 31.1

Certifications

I, J.A. Cardwell, Sr., certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Petro Stopping Centers, L.P.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure
controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: March 30, 2006



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|/s/ J.A. Cardwell, Sr.              
|(J.A. Cardwell, Sr.)                
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Mason White HYDE v. Katie POOLE

No. 88P15-5

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 12, 2016

Mason W. Hyde, for Hyde, Mason White.

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, for State of N.C.

**ORDER**

Upon consideration of the application filed by Petitioner on the 12th of December 2016 in this matter for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Davie County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 12th of December 2016."

Ervin, J. recused.
**Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 16 September 2009 – JanSport Apparel v OHIM (BUILT TO RESIST)**

**(Case T-80/07)**

Community trade mark – Application for the Community word mark BUILT TO RESIST – Absolute ground for refusal – Descriptive character – Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Absolute grounds for refusal – Marks composed exclusively of signs or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of goods (Council Regulation
No 40/94, Art. 7(1)(c)) (see paras 24-29, 41-47)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of 12 January 2007 of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM (Case R 1090/2006-2) concerning an application for registration of the word mark BUILT TO RESIST as a Community trade mark. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | JanSport Apparel Corp. |
| Community trade mark sought: | National word mark ‘BUILT TO RESIST’ for goods and services in Classes 16, 18 and 25 – Application No 2937522 |
| Decision of the examiner: | Registration refused |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Appeal dismissed |

**Operative part**

The Court:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders JanSport Apparel Corp. to pay the costs.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

_________________________________________ 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136488 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. DAVID KIMMELMAN, Stephen J. Markman, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, Justices 

v SC: 136488 

 COA: 277201 

Monroe CC: 07-022739-CD 

HEATHER DOWNS MANAGEMENT 

LIMITED and LEGACY GOLF 

COURSE, LLC,

 Defendants-Appellees. 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 15, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

l0915 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 22, 2008 

 Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6175

SAM BARTLEY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-95-976-0-20BD)

Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: July 30, 1996

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sam Bartley, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy

Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order dismissing his petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), as amended

by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217. Appellant's case was referred to a

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1988). The

magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised

Appellant that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order

based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Appellant

failed to object to the magistrate judge's recommendation.

The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge's

recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the

substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned

that failure to object will waive appellate review. Wright v.

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985). See generally Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Appellant has waived appellate review

by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal and

dismiss. To the extent that a certificate of appealability is

required, we deny such a certificate and dismiss. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
1... See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-368-CV

PHILLIP AMBURN AND ALL OCCUPANTS OF 7220 APPELLANT

RAGAN PLACE, THE COLONY, TEXAS

V.

HSBC BANK USA, N.A. APPELLEE

----------

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF DENTON COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT 1

------------

On September 16, 2008 and September 26, 2008 we notified appellant,

in accordance with rule of appellate procedure 42.3(c), that we would dismiss

this appeal unless the $175 filing fee was paid. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c).

Appellant has not paid the $175 filing fee. See Tex. R. App. P. 5, 12.1(b).
2... See Supreme Court of Tex., Order Regarding Fees Charged in Civil

Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals and Before the Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 07-9138 (Aug. 28, 2007)

(listing fees in courts of appeals).

2

Because appellant has failed to comply with a requirement of the rules of

appellate procedure and the Texas Supreme Court’s order of August 28, 2007,

2

we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c), 43.2(f).

Appellant shall pay all costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ. 

DELIVERED: October 16, 2008.
##### 



EXHIBIT 21
 SUBSIDIARIES
 NAME OF CORPORATION
    
    STATE OF INCORPORATIONAdvocat Ancillary Services, Inc.
    
    TennesseeAdvocat Distribution Services, Inc.
    
    TennesseeAdvocat Finance, Inc.
    
    DelawareDiversicare Afton Oaks, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Assisted Living Services, Inc.
    
    TennesseeDiversicare Assisted Living Services NC, LLC
    
    TennesseeDiversicare Assisted Living Services NC I, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Assisted Living Services NC II, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Briarcliff, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Chisolm, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Good Samaritan, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Hartford, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Hillcrest, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Lampasas, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Leasing Corp.
    
    TennesseeDiversicare Management Services Co.
    
    TennesseeDiversicare Pinedale, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Rose Terrace, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Windsor House, LLC
    
    DelawareDiversicare Yorktown, LLC
    
    DelawareSenior Care Florida Leasing, LLC
    
    DelawareSenior Care Cedar Hills, LLC
    
    DelawareSenior Care Golfcrest, LLC
    
    DelawareSenior Care Golfview, LLC
    
    DelawareSenior Care Southern Pines, LLC
    
    DelawareSterling Health Care Management, Inc.
    
    Kentucky
In the Matter of: Barbara Hedrick

No. COA16-256

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 20, 2016

VACATED AND REMANDED.
ex1018.htm


Exhibit 10.18


 



TERMINATION AGREEMENT


 


This termination agreement dated as of July 21, 2014 (the “Agreement”) is between YA GLOBAL MASTER SPV LTD., a Cayman Islands exempt limited partnership (the “Investor”), and OMAGINE, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware (the “Company”). Each of the Investor and the Company are sometimes referred to herein as a "Party" or collectively as the "Parties".


 


This Agreement is a further amendment to that certain Stand-By Equity Distribution Agreement between the Parties dated as of the 4th day of May 2011, as amended (the “2011 SEDA”).


 


WHEREAS, on April 22, 2014, the Parties entered into a new Standby Equity Distribution Agreement (the "2014 SEDA"), and


 


WHEREAS, the Company is preparing to file a registration statement with the SEC to register the shares of the Company’s common stock which may be sold to the Investor pursuant to the 2014 SEDA.


 


NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereby agree as follows:


 


Notwithstanding the scheduled September 1, 2014 expiration date of the 2011 SEDA, the Parties hereby agree that pursuant to Section 10.02 of the 2011 SEDA, the 2011 SEDA is hereby terminated as of July 21, 2014 by this mutual written consent of the Parties.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement as of the date first above written.


 



	  	
COMPANY:


 

	 
	  	
Omagine, Inc.

	 
	  	  	 
	  	
By: /s/  Charles P. Kuczynski                                                                

	 
	  	
Name:  Charles P. Kuczynski

	 
	  	
Title:  Vice-President

	 
	  	  	 
	  	  	 
	  	
INVESTOR:


 

	 
	  	
YA Global  Master SPV Ltd.

	 
	  	  	 
	  	
By:  Yorkville Advisors Global, LP

	 
	  	
Its: Investment Manager

	 
	  	  	 
	  	
By:  /s/ Mark Angelo                                                      

	 
	  	
Name: Mark Angelo

	 
	  	
Title: Managing Member