2024 UT App 125

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LUTISHA MERRILL,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN RICHARD MERRILL,

Appellant.

Amended Opinion∗

No. 20210785-CA

Filed September 6, 2024

Third District Court, Silver Summit Department

The Honorable Teresa L. Welch

No. 194500031

Luke A. Shaw and Jill L. Coil,

Attorneys for Appellant

Julie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 John Richard Merrill appeals from the district court’s final 

order resolving issues related to his divorce from Lutisha Merrill. 

∗ This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion in Case No. 

20210785-CA issued on July 11, 2024. After that opinion issued, 

the appellee filed a petition for rehearing, and we called for a 

response. We grant the petition and issue this revised opinion to 

reflect our conclusion on rehearing that the issue addressed in 

part II.C of our Analysis was not preserved for appellate review.
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John1 challenges several of the court’s decisions related to its 

calculation of the parties’ incomes, its determination of Lutisha’s 

reasonable expenses, its alimony award, and its valuation and 

division of the marital estate. We affirm most of the district court’s 

challenged decisions. On the issue of Lutisha’s tax rate, however, 

we vacate the district court’s decision and remand the case for 

additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

The Marriage

¶2 Lutisha and John were married in 2001 and had twins

together in 2007. Lutisha filed for divorce in 2019.

The Parties’ Employment and Incomes

¶3 During their marriage, the parties were able to sustain a 

comfortable standard of living through their substantial incomes. 

Lutisha has significant experience in advertising and radio 

advertising sales. From 2011 to 2014, she worked as the vice 

president of sales for a large media company, earning an average 

of $168,730.00 annually. In 2014, she left that position and formed

her own business, 360 Touch LLC (360 Touch), a “full-service 

advertising agency.” As part of her business practice, Lutisha paid 

for expenses, including advertising for her clients, on a business 

credit card that earned frequent flyer miles, which resulted in her 

earning between 1.5 million and 1.8 million miles during both

2019 and 2020. In the years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic, 

360 Touch grew significantly; however, with the onset of the 

pandemic in 2020, the business “experienced a 37% decline in 

1. As is our practice, because the parties share the same last name, 

we refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended 

by the apparent informality.
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revenue,” and Lutisha’s income “declined 42%” from the prior 

year.

¶4 John was employed at the time of trial as the chief financial 

officer of a publicly traded software company. He had a base 

annual salary of $225,000.00, with quarterly bonuses of up to 50% 

of his salary. His contract at the time of trial also provided for 

nearly $100,000.00 worth of restricted stock shares, a third of 

which was set to vest in each of May 2020, May 2021, and May 

2022.

The Family Homes

¶5 The parties owned two homes that were purchased during 

their marriage—their primary home in Park City (the Park City 

property) and a vacation home in Coalville (the Coalville 

property). Upon separation, Lutisha remained in and maintained 

the Park City property while John maintained the Coalville 

property, although he also rented an apartment in Park City to 

live closer to the children. According to Lutisha, at the time John 

moved out of the Park City property, the parties “knew that the 

home desperately needed a new roof . . . , new carpet . . . , [and] 

new interior paint . . . and that the exterior wood was rotted and 

needed to be replaced.” The court found that Lutisha paid for the 

roof to be replaced in May 2020 at a cost of $18,380.00.

The Parties’ Financial Declarations

¶6 As the parties prepared for trial, they provided various 

financial declarations. Lutisha’s final amended financial 

declaration listed current monthly expenses totaling $26,489.57 

and marital monthly expenses of $27,183.89. Relevant to this 

appeal, these expenses included line items for minimum credit 

card payments ($1,322.50), additional credit card payments 

($2,000.00), personal loan payments ($970.00), real estate 

maintenance ($1,792.84), food and household expenses 

($4,580.70), clothing expenses ($229.83), entertainment/travel 
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expenses ($696.84), health care expenses ($1,054.67), and divorce 

legal fees ($5,375.20). John’s final amended financial declaration 

listed his current monthly expenses at $21,518.85 and marital 

monthly expenses of $30,973.02. His declaration included a line 

item for monthly legal expenses of $3,233.66.

The Divorce Trial

¶7 Trial was held remotely in May and June of 2021.2 The 

parties agreed to rely on prepared declarations from Lutisha and 

John in place of direct examination, while still allowing for a realtime opportunity for cross-examination of each party.

Lutisha’s Testimony

¶8 Lutisha’s testimony was presented first. As to her income, 

she testified regarding the pandemic’s negative impact on 360 

Touch and some of the steps she had taken to try to mitigate that 

impact. She testified, “[A]ny time that’s not taken by a client with 

a specific project, I now spend cold-calling and working on the 

business.” She estimated that at the time of trial she was “coldcalling 30 minutes to an hour every day.” She also explained that 

shortly before the pandemic, her full-time assistant reduced her 

hours to part time and that although Lutisha had intended to hire 

a second part-time assistant, she did not do so. Additionally, she 

identified the following actions she took to mitigate the impact of 

the pandemic on her business: “I also closed my office, which was 

very difficult for me. I enjoyed having an office. And I worked 

with my different vendors to decrease what I was paying them as 

2. Prior to trial, in September 2020, the parties entered into a 

stipulation that “resolved the issues of child custody, parent time, 

number of overnights for purposes of calculating child 

support . . . , payment of the children’s expenses, the claiming of 

the children on taxes, and other more minor issues.” None of these 

issues are relevant to this appeal, and we therefore do not discuss 

them further.
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far as subscription services, those types of things. I’ve done 

everything possible to create revenue while managing my 

expenses.” As to the possibility of returning to a radio sales 

manager position similar to the position she had before forming 

360 Touch, Lutisha said that such jobs “don’t exist anymore.” She 

explained, “I have spoken to all of the general managers of the 

different radio companies in town, and their current situation is 

they’re actually getting rid of sales managers. They are 

terminating people because of the situation their companies are in 

due to COVID.”

¶9 Lutisha testified that she had struggled to pay her expenses 

during the pandemic and that her economic situation had forced

her to take out a personal loan of $100,000.00 to make ends meet. 

She testified, “That money went to pay my personal expenses. My 

mortgage, my car, my food, utilities. It went to pay for 

everything.”

John’s Testimony

¶10 John’s testimony was presented next. Regarding his 

income, John testified about his employment agreement. He 

acknowledged his $225,000.00 base annual compensation as well 

as the potential for quarterly bonuses. And he said that although 

he considered the stock shares to be part of his compensation 

package, he did not “rely on those numbers in planning [his] life,” 

explaining, “I know that . . . whether it’s stock options or restricted 

shares, there is a vesting period and a holding period and you 

can’t sell those shares until sometime in the future.”

Lutisha’s Expert Evidence

¶11 Each party also presented the testimony of a financial 

expert, along with prepared financial expert reports, to help 

establish income amounts for the parties. Lutisha’s expert had 

determined Lutisha’s income from 360 Touch by calculating her

average monthly incomes for both 2019 and 2020, “presenting the 
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two calculations . . . to show the impact of the COVID-19 

pandemic on [Lutisha’s] earnings.” Those calculations showed an 

average monthly income in 2019 of $19,555.00 and an average 

monthly income in 2020 of $10,316.00. Lutisha’s expert concluded:

COVID-19 has had a significant negative impact on 

360 Touch and the Advertising Agencies industry. 

360 Touch’s sales in 2020 decreased by 37.43 percent 

compared to 2019. Our analysis of 360 Touch’s 2020 

sales shows that many of the Company’s clients 

have significantly decreased their marketing 

spending compared to historical expenditures. 

[Lutisha] informed us that this decrease is caused by 

decreased demand caused by uncertainty from the 

impacts of COVID-19. [Lutisha’s] assertion is 

consistent with industry data . . . .

Lutisha’s expert then quoted from a nationwide report stating that 

“[r]evenue for the Advertising Agencies industry is anticipated to 

decline 10.2 percent in 2020 due to reductions in ad spending” and 

that “[h]igh levels of uncertainty tend to reduce consumer and 

business spending.” Lutisha’s expert’s report also included 

calculations showing growth projections for 360 Touch. The 

calculations showed a 25% loss in 2021, 20% growth in 2022, and 

2.4% growth thereafter.

¶12 Lutisha’s expert also calculated an average monthly 

income for John in both 2019 and 2020. In addition to John’s 

wages, this calculation relied on various company-related 

benefits, such as 401(k) contributions, health savings account 

contributions, and vested common stock. Lutisha’s expert

testified that it was important to include the vested stock in John’s 

income “[b]ecause it’s wealth that’s generated through his work 

effort.” The result was an average monthly income of $25,922.00

in 2019 and $27,708.00 in 2020.
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¶13 Lutisha’s expert testified generally as to the type of stock 

issued to John, unregistered restricted common stock shares 

(RSUs): 

They have additional limitations on trading when 

the shares are held by an affiliate or an insider like 

[John]. So in order to sell those shares, you have to 

hold them for a certain period of time, but you also 

have to submit forms that indicate your intent to 

sell, and then . . . depending on what the limitations 

are on selling shares of a particular company that 

you own shares in, you may have to hold those 

shares for additional periods.

However, when asked, Lutisha’s expert was not able to elaborate 

on the specific restrictions applicable to John’s stock, responding,

“Well, it really varies significantly from one company to another 

and one stock program to another. And so . . . there aren’t general 

parameters that I could give you. But RSUs that I’ve seen vary 

dramatically as to how the insiders can trickle shares into the 

stock market.”

¶14 During cross-examination, Lutisha’s expert was 

questioned as to whether, “based upon standard practice in [his] 

profession,” he counts frequent flyer miles “as a monetary value 

when computing income.” Lutisha’s expert responded, “I don’t, 

no.”

John’s Expert Evidence

¶15 John also retained a financial expert. In March 2020, John’s 

expert had conducted a valuation analysis of 360 Touch. This 

analysis had projected that for 2020, 360 Touch “would have over 

$2,000,000 in revenue . . . and would generate $176,000 in salary 

to [Lutisha], plus another $37,000 in net income to [Lutisha].” 

However, John’s expert acknowledged at trial that by the 2021 

trial dates, actual 2020 numbers were known and instead showed 
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that the real “results for 360 Touch in 2020 were just under $1.6 

million in revenue,” a “$121,000 payroll to [Lutisha],” and “a 

small net loss.” He conceded that “in hindsight,” it appeared that 

his projection for 2020 was probably “overstated by over 43 

percent.”

¶16 John’s expert provided another report in March 2021,

which specifically addressed Lutisha’s earning potential. This 

analysis relied on an industry research report3 of advertising 

agencies in 2020—a report “related to the advertising industry as 

a whole”—to project a “monthly net income after taxes . . . of 

$13,774 for 2020, and $14,466 for 2021.” Upon cross-examination, 

John’s expert acknowledged that his information was “not 

specific to 360 Touch’s customer base,” that he was not “aware of 

the impact political advertising had on the advertising world in 

2020” (a factor with potential to have had an outsized impact on 

such data in an election year, like 2020), and that he did not “have 

any data on single-person advertising agencies in Utah and the 

impacts the pandemic ha[d] had on those agencies.”

¶17 Unlike Lutisha’s expert, John’s expert did include Lutisha’s 

frequent flyer miles in his analysis of her earnings, explaining that 

although frequent flyer miles may not have “an actual cash 

value,” they “could be turned into . . . personal spending or 

business spending so they actually have a value.” He also 

considered the level of rewards in this case to not be “typical”

because he had not previously “seen this level of rewards . . . 

where someone is able . . . to amass this amount of $1.5 million in 

spending on a credit card.” However, when questioned as to the 

standard in his profession, he conceded that monetizing frequent 

3. This report was created by IBISWorld, which describes itself as 

a global company that “provides trusted industry research on 

thousands of industries worldwide.” IBISWorld’s Story, 

IBISWorld, https://www.ibisworld.com/company/our-story/

[https://perma.cc/N3PY-Z77A].
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flyer miles as income was “typically . . . not done.” And on crossexamination he also conceded that he usually follows this 

standard and does not “typically include rewards points in the 

valuation of income.”

The Post-trial Proceedings

¶18 After the conclusion of the trial, the district court issued its 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. Lutisha 

thereafter filed a motion to reconsider and amend the findings, 

requesting changes to the court’s order to address alleged 

inconsistencies therein and requesting additional findings 

regarding the court’s property division. John responded to that 

motion and also counter-requested “correction or 

reconsideration” of a number of items, highlighting various 

“other discrepancies” in the court’s order. After holding a 

clarification hearing, the court entered an Amended Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. The court then entered 

its Decree of Divorce.

¶19 The district court’s amended order was forty-two pages 

long and addressed a multitude of issues. We confine our 

recitation here to only those issues relevant to this appeal.

The Court’s Determination of the Parties’ Incomes

¶20 First, the court determined the gross monthly income for 

each party. The court reviewed the testimony presented by both 

experts and then found that “[Lutisha’s expert’s] analysis and 

opinion regarding [Lutisha’s] income [was] more credible than 

[was John’s expert’s].” The court explained that this was because 

John’s expert had relied on national projections as opposed to 

more localized data, had made projections based on data from an 

election year without knowing the impact of political advertising 

on such data, had relied on financial information compiled by 

John as opposed to the actual financial records of Lutisha and 360 

Touch, and had made extrapolations predicting Lutisha’s income 
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that ultimately significantly overstated Lutisha’s actual income 

for 2020. Thus, the court adopted Lutisha’s expert’s income 

calculation and set Lutisha’s monthly gross income at $10,316.00.

¶21 As to John’s argument that a higher income should be 

imputed to Lutisha based on her historical earnings, the court 

determined that John had not shown that Lutisha was voluntarily 

underemployed or that, with reasonable effort, she could be 

earning more. The court found that John did not present 

testimony regarding what jobs were locally available to an 

individual with Lutisha’s background, and the court found 

credible Lutisha’s assertions that the type of marketing positions 

she had held previous to starting her own business were no longer 

available and that she had made reasonable efforts to maintain 

her income in the face of pandemic-related challenges. 

¶22 As to John’s gross income, the district court again relied on 

Lutisha’s expert’s testimony, “which was based on [John’s] 

wages, bonuses, 401(k) contributions, Section 125 Benefits,[4]

Health Savings Account Contributions, Group Term Life 

Insurance Benefit and Vested Common Stock” to determine a 

monthly gross income amount of $27,708.00. Although John had 

argued that, at least for purposes of calculating child support, the 

stock should not be considered as part of his gross monthly 

income, the court disagreed. The court reasoned that John’s 

“employment contract and work/payment history indicate[d] that 

[John] regularly receives stock options and bonuses as part of his 

regular income/compensation” and that “including [John’s] 

bonuses and regularly received stock options as part of his income 

is consistent with the sources of income as outlined in Utah Code 

4. Lutisha’s expert explained these benefits as follows: “They are 

generally the purchased cafeteria plan benefits. They’re just a 

selection of benefits that the IRS allows employers to offer to their 

employees on a pretax basis.”
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§ 78B-12-203(1).” See generally Utah Code § 78B-12-203(1) (defining 

“gross income” for purposes of the Utah Child Support Act).

The Alimony Order

¶23 Next, the district court addressed alimony. The court 

initially recognized that the following facts were indicative of the 

parties’ standard of living during the marriage: “the family 

traveled regularly, they maintained a second home, they enjoyed 

outdoor activities (and had recreational vehicles to do so), they

dined out regularly, they had a nanny to care for the children, they 

skied at Deer Valley and Park City Mountain Resort, and they 

contributed to retirement savings.” As a result, the court accepted 

John’s marital monthly expenses figure of $30,973.02. Based on 

these facts, the court determined that, with the exception of the 

line items for monthly legal expenses, the parties’ listed expenses 

were “reasonable in light of the marital standard of living and in 

light of [the other party’s] monthly needs.” With the removal of 

the attorney fees expenses (and an adjustment to John’s child 

support expense due to a change in the ordered child support 

amount), Lutisha was left with a total monthly expense amount 

of $21,114.80, and John was left with a total monthly expense 

amount of $19,118.19.

¶24 The court then determined that Lutisha’s net monthly 

income of $7,846.00—the amount left of her gross monthly income 

after considering her tax rate, “[b]ased upon [her] 2020 tax return”

of “19% federal and 4.95% state”—was insufficient to meet her 

reasonable needs and left a monthly shortfall of $13,268.80. And 

the court determined that John’s net monthly income after taxes 

of $19,409.00 was sufficient to cover his expenses, leaving a 

surplus of $290.81. The court then applied that surplus to 

Lutisha’s shortfall and, thereafter, “[e]qualizing the poverty,”

split the remaining shortfall between the two parties. This 

resulted in a monthly alimony amount of $5,529.31, which the 

court ordered John to pay for five years, allowing Lutisha “to 
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20210785-CA 12 2024 UT App 125

maintain the marital standard of living until the [m]inor 

[c]hildren reach the age of majority, and . . . allow[ing] [Lutisha] 

sufficient time to rehabilitate her income.”

The Property Division

¶25 The district court then moved to the task of dividing the 

marital estate, valuing the estate as of the time of trial. As to real 

property, the court awarded the Park City property to Lutisha and 

the Coalville property to John. Regarding the furniture in the 

homes, the court stated that because “credible trial evidence” 

showed that the Park City property and the Coalville property 

had “comparable items that are comparable in value,” it was 

“reasonable and equitable” to award Lutisha the “furniture, 

personal property, and the like” at the Park City property and to 

award John the “furniture, personal property, and the like” at the 

Coalville property.

¶26 The district court then awarded certain accounts and other 

property to Lutisha and John respectively. Relevant to this appeal, 

the court awarded the following to John: (1) two sets of stock 

options received as compensation from his employer, one valued 

at $99,198.00 and another valued at $99,996.75; (2) his 2021 first 

quarter bonus of $28,125.00; (3) a “travel credit” of $15,426.57 for 

a canceled trip to Bora Bora, with the court noting that although 

John “received a refund for the travel, the refund is not reflected 

anywhere else and thus should be included in the division of 

property”; and (4) the furniture that John had somewhat recently 

purchased for his Park City apartment, at a value of $26,318.86. 

¶27 In dividing the marital estate, the district court declined 

John’s request to award him reimbursement for half of the 

$62,304.63 that he contended he spent on maintaining marital 

property and paying related expenses. The court determined that 

John “did not provide credible evidence that these were in fact 

marital expenses,” and it identified examples of listed items that 

“[did] not appear to be marital expenses,” such as “clothing 
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20210785-CA 13 2024 UT App 125

purchases, contact lenses, Weller Recreation, and Marine 

Products.” 

¶28 The district court did, however, determine that the 

$100,000.00 personal loan obtained by Lutisha was part of the 

marital estate because the loan was used “to pay for legitimate 

marital expenses.” In making this determination, the court

pointed to, among other things, Lutisha’s “financial condition at 

that time” (when her income “had dropped significantly” and 

John “was under-paying his child support obligations”) and the 

parties’ “historical spending practices.”

¶29 The district court then divided the remaining marital 

property and debts. Finally, the court ordered an additional 

$102,243.09 equalization payment from John to Lutisha.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶30 John now appeals. He first challenges several components 

of the district court’s calculation of the parties’ incomes. “Courts 

have broad discretion to select an appropriate method of 

assessing a spouse’s income, including determinations of income 

imputation.” Bond v. Bond, 2018 UT App 38, ¶ 6, 420 P.3d 53 

(cleaned up). When challenging an income determination,

“appellants bear a heavy burden, and we can properly find abuse 

[of discretion] only if no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted by the trial court.” Pankhurst v. Pankhurst, 2022 UT App 

36, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 612 (cleaned up).

¶31 John also challenges several of Lutisha’s expenses that the 

district court found to be reasonable, the court’s method of 

calculating alimony, and the court’s division of the marital 

property. “In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such 

orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are 

equitable. The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and 

orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be 
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lightly disturbed.” Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App 296, ¶ 8, 169 P.3d 

765 (cleaned up). “Therefore, we review [property distribution 

and] alimony awards under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. The Parties’ Incomes

A. Imputation of Income to Lutisha

¶32 John argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

determining Lutisha’s gross income. Specifically, he challenges 

the district court’s refusal to impute wages beyond the $10,316.00

monthly income calculated by Lutisha’s expert.

¶33 As an initial matter, we note that in determining Lutisha’s 

income, the district court referenced outdated law when it cited 

Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, 272 P.3d 748, cert. denied, 280 

P.3d 421 (Utah 2012), for the proposition that “[t]he court must 

find that the spouse is voluntarily unemployed or 

underemployed” before it may impute income. Id. ¶ 24. While 

such a finding was a statutory prerequisite to imputing income 

prior to 2007, “the current version of the Utah Code requires only 

that the judge ‘enter[] findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis 

for the imputation.’” Pankhurst v. Pankhurst, 2022 UT App 36, ¶ 14, 

508 P.3d 612 (alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code § 78B-12-

203(8)(a)). “Thus, while voluntary unemployment or 

underemployment may be relevant when considering whether a 

party is concealing income or shirking in his or her efforts to earn 

income, a finding of voluntary unemployment or 

underemployment is not a prerequisite to imputing income.” Id.

(cleaned up). Instead, “the focus of the imputation analysis is on 

the detailed findings of fact necessary to support a decision to 

impute income rather than the ultimate fact or legal conclusion of 

voluntary unemployment or underemployment.” Id. (cleaned 

up). 
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¶34 Notwithstanding the district court’s reference to the 

outdated rule cited in Busche, the court’s analysis was ultimately 

based on the correct concern—whether there was sufficient 

evidence to support imputation of a higher income to Lutisha. The 

court determined there was not because John presented no 

evidence “as to the current salaries or job availability in the 

prevailing market for persons with backgrounds similar to 

[Lutisha’s] or what [Lutisha’s] employment capacity and earnings 

potential would be in the prevailing markets in the community.”

¶35 Although John’s expert testified that Lutisha had a higher 

income potential than what Lutisha’s expert testified to, the court 

determined that John’s expert’s analysis was less credible than 

Lutisha’s expert’s analysis because John’s expert “relied on 

projections at the national level, but he had no data for singleperson advertising agencies in Utah and the impacts of COVID19 on a single-person agency.” The court also noted that the 

national numbers on which John’s expert relied were electionyear numbers and that John’s expert “conceded that he had no 

knowledge of the impact of political advertising on the media 

industry numbers at the national level.” Additionally, the court 

observed that John’s expert “relied on [John’s] self-created 

spreadsheets for his financial analysis rather than on the actual 

billing and financial records for 360 Touch and [Lutisha] from 

2020.” Indeed, the court found that the revenue projections John’s 

expert had made for 360 Touch for 2020 were “overstated by over 

43% compared to the actual numbers” that were available for that 

year.

¶36 The court determined that the income analysis of Lutisha’s 

expert was more credible, as it was based on “income tax returns 

for [Lutisha] and 360 Touch, and on accounting records for 360 

Touch.” After analyzing these records, Lutisha’s expert opined

that “360 Touch has experienced a 37% decline in revenue since 

2019, and that [Lutisha’s] income has declined by 42% from 2019.” 

The district court also found that Lutisha “credibly testified that 
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marketing jobs (like the one she held prior to starting 360 Touch) 

are no longer available” and that she “provided credible 

testimony that she made reasonable efforts to maintain her 

income despite the negative impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic 

on 360 Touch.”

¶37 John challenges the district court’s credibility assessments

and evidentiary findings, specifically arguing that Lutisha’s 

testimony regarding the availability of marketing jobs “cannot be 

taken as credible or as a basis for an implication that no jobs exist,” 

that she “had not made good faith or reasonable efforts to mitigate 

the loss of her income,” and that she operates her business 

“without structure or good business practices.” But “[i]t is the 

province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, 

and we will not second-guess the trial court where there is a 

reasonable basis to support its findings.” Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 

1182, 1184 (Utah 1991); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4) (“Findings 

of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set 

aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give 

due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility 

of the witnesses.”); Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 

¶ 27, 176 P.3d 476 (“The trial court considered conflicting 

evidence on this point and rejected [the husband’s] explanation in 

favor of [the wife’s]. We defer to the trial court’s assessment of the 

credibility of this testimony.”). “If there is evidence supporting a 

finding, absent a legal problem—a fatal flaw—with that evidence, 

the finding will stand, even though there is ample record evidence 

that would have supported contrary findings.” Lobendahn v. 

Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 27, 540 P.3d 727 (cleaned up). John 

has shown no such fatal flaw. Instead, our review of the evidence 

reveals a reasonable evidentiary basis supporting the district 

court’s factual findings on this issue, and we therefore see no 

abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to impute a higher 

income to Lutisha.
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¶38 John also argues that the district court should have 

considered “expected growth” of 360 Touch. However, the 

district court was of the opinion that the expected growth asserted 

by John’s expert was not sufficiently supported, which is 

understandable given that John’s expert projected an increase in 

Lutisha’s income for 2020 that ended up being 43% higher than 

the actual growth in Lutisha’s income for that year. And although 

Lutisha’s expert testified that “[i]ndustry-wide the projection is 

for growth,” he emphasized that this projection was, indeed, an

industry-wide projection and “not specific to [Lutisha’s] 

company.”

¶39 John counters that even Lutisha’s expert “projected growth 

of 20% starting in 2022” for 360 Touch and that such growth 

“means that [Lutisha will] regain all her lost income by 2024.” But 

the projection to which John refers first shows a 25% retraction in 

2021. And although the projection does predict a 20% growth in 

2022, it does not support John’s assumption that a 20% growth 

rate would continue each year thereafter. Indeed, that projection’s 

predicted growth rate for the following years was only 2.4%, not

a continued 20%.

¶40 In light of all this, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by declining to base its income calculations on such 

varying and uncertain projections and instead leaving it to the 

parties to seek modification of the court’s orders if either of their 

incomes were to substantially change in the future. See Johnson v. 

Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253–54 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning that 

“if a trial court knows that a party will be receiving additional 

future income[,] it should make findings as to whether such 

additional income will affect the alimony award,” but recognizing 

that if future income is “too speculative at the time of trial,” the 

court may delay that determination and a party can “bring a 

modification proceeding at the appropriate time”). See generally

Utah Code § 30-3-5(11)(a) (“The court has continuing jurisdiction 

to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
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based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 

expressly stated in the divorce decree or in the findings that the 

court entered at the time of the divorce decree.”); id. § 78B-12-

210(9) (“A parent, legal guardian, or the [Office of Recovery 

Services] may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount 

of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in 

circumstances. . . . [A] substantial change in circumstances may 

include . . . material changes of 30% or more in the income of a 

parent . . . .”).

B. Calculation of Lutisha’s Tax Liability

¶41 John contends that the district court’s calculation of 

Lutisha’s tax liability was improper, resulting in a net income for 

her that was lower than it should have been. The district court 

found that “[b]ased upon [Lutisha’s] 2020 tax return, her tax rate 

is 19% federal and 4.95% state.” John correctly observes, however, 

that calculations based on Lutisha’s 2020 tax return show that she 

actually paid an overall federal tax rate of approximately 13% and 

an overall state tax rate of approximately 4.8% in 2020. Thus, John 

asks for a “correction of the numbers to appropriately reflect the 

underlying source” and a resulting correction to “the 

corresponding calculations for alimony.”

¶42 Lutisha, on the other hand, defends the tax rates the district 

court applied to her income. In doing so, she correctly observes

that when the standard federal tax rates for 2020 are applied to 

her current gross monthly income as found by the district court, 

the result is an overall federal tax rate of 19%; that Utah’s singleperson tax rate for 2020 was 4.95%; and that these rates match the 

rates that the district court applied to her income. She also asserts 

that although John is correct in his calculations based on numbers 

derived from her 2020 tax return, the income number on that 

return “included more than just her earnings”—“[i]t also included 

$70,000 she withdrew from an IRA that year.” For these reasons, 
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Lutisha asks us to affirm the district court’s application of a 19% 

overall federal tax rate and a 4.95% state tax rate to her income.

¶43 In short, Lutisha presents a plausible basis for the tax rates 

the district court actually applied to her income, but it is squarely 

at odds with the stated basis for the rates the court said it would 

apply to her income. And we are without a reasoned basis upon 

which to resolve the inconsistency in the court’s ruling. 

Accordingly, we vacate the court’s ruling as to the tax rates to be 

applied to Lutisha’s gross income, and we remand the case for the 

district court to clarify its ruling on this point and, if necessary, to 

adjust its net income and alimony calculations accordingly. See 

generally Wight v. Wight, 2011 UT App 424, ¶¶ 29–30, 268 P.3d 861 

(remanding “for clarification” where an aspect of the trial court’s 

ruling on division of the marital estate “appear[ed] to be 

internally inconsistent” and the court of appeals was “unable to 

determine which result the trial court intended”), cert. denied, 280 

P.3d 421 (Utah 2012).

C. Non-inclusion of Lutisha’s Frequent Flyer Miles

¶44 John argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

failing to account for the large number of frequent flyer miles that 

Lutisha accrues each year. He argues that the court should have 

included the value of the miles in her income or, at the very least, 

used that value to reduce her expenses. We see no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s treatment of the frequent flyer miles.

¶45 As for not including the frequent flyer miles in its 

calculation of Lutisha’s income, this was consistent with the 

testimony of each party’s financial expert. Lutisha’s expert

testified that “based upon standard practice in [his] profession,” 

frequent flyer miles are not counted “as a monetary value when 

computing income.” And while John’s expert did include the 

frequent flyer miles in his earnings analysis, he conceded that he 

does not “typically include rewards points in the valuation of 

income.” Although John believes that the court should have 
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treated Lutisha’s frequent flyer miles differently due to the 

unusually high number of them, we decline to classify as an abuse 

of discretion the court’s decision to adhere to the only generally 

accepted accounting approach for which evidence was received, 

even in this somewhat unusual situation.5

¶46 Moreover, even if the frequent flyer miles were to be 

classified as a source of income, Utah “caselaw directs district 

courts to consider all sources of income when determining 

alimony[;] it does not dictate that all sources of income be counted

as income received by a spouse for that purpose.” Eberhard v. 

Eberhard, 2019 UT App 114, ¶ 21, 449 P.3d 202. A district court 

retains “broad discretion to treat sources of income as the court 

sees fit under the circumstances.” Id. Here, as Lutisha points out, 

the frequent flyer miles were “not used to offset any of the 

expenses [she] reported on her financial declaration or that the 

5. John suggests that the district court improperly “refused to 

allow [his expert to testify] on facts and circumstances of this case 

that would warrant deviating from the standard practice in [the 

expert’s] profession.” This statement mischaracterizes the court’s 

action. The court only refused to allow testimony as to other cases, 

not as to the circumstances of this case: 

I don’t want [John’s expert] talking about other 

cases that are not this case. What I want him to talk 

about, though, is general principles that are applied 

in his profession, in his expertise in terms of how 

travel benefits would be incorporated, how they’re 

incorporated, and how he applied those principles 

to this case. So . . . I am permitting that. . . . But I’m 

not going to permit him to talk about other cases . . . 

because that is outside the scope.

Under this ruling, John’s expert was free to present general 

principles for the treatment of frequent flyer miles when the 

number of miles at issue is unusually high. Yet he provided no 

such principles.
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court found to be her expenses.” The expense category for which 

frequent flyer miles would almost certainly have been used to 

offset expenses was Lutisha’s entertainment/travel expenses 

category, and her declared monthly expenses for that category 

amounted to $696.84. This amount was supported by financial 

statements showing that Lutisha spent $10,452.60 out of pocket 

over a fifteen-month period—for a monthly average of $696.84—

in the entertainment/travel category. Because this expense 

amount accounted only for entertainment/vacation expenses that 

Lutisha paid for out of pocket, her frequent flyer miles were

effectively used to reduce her expenses.

¶47 For both of the foregoing reasons, we determine that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of 

Lutisha’s frequent flyer miles.

D. Inclusion of Stock Grants in John’s Income

¶48 John contends that the district court abused its discretion 

in calculating his gross income as well. The court determined 

John’s monthly gross income to be $27,708.00. The court again 

relied on Lutisha’s expert’s calculations in making this

determination, which calculations included amounts for John’s 

vested RSUs. The court relied on Lutisha’s expert’s testimony that 

“even if the stock received by [John] is restricted stock, it becomes 

income in the year in which it vests.” The court also explained that

it was including the stock in its income calculation because 

“[John’s] employment contract and work/payment history 

indicate that [he] regularly receives stock options and bonuses as 

part of his regular income/compensation.” 

¶49 John contests the inclusion of the vested stock in the 

calculation of his income. He contends that this inclusion was an 

abuse of discretion because the example sources of “gross 

income” listed in Utah Code section 78B-12-203(1) all have values 

that “can be determined,” while the value of unliquidated stock 
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“cannot be determined” until it is liquidated.6 He also argues that 

the inclusion of the vested stock in the calculation of his income 

was an abuse of discretion because the stock “represents income 

not actually realized” since he “does not have free access to trade 

or liquidate the stock at the time of vesting.”

¶50 We first observe that “income” in this context is defined to 

include “all gain derived from . . . labor,” Utah Code § 78B-12-

102(14)(b), and that “gross income” is defined to include

“prospective income from any source,” id. § 78B-12-203(1). Under 

these definitions, the value of vested stock that a person is 

anticipated to receive in exchange for labor falls squarely within 

the statutory definition of gross income. John does not dispute 

this point, as he concedes that the value of vested but 

unliquidated stock “could fit in ‘prospective income from any 

source.’”

¶51 We next observe that John is mistaken in his assertion that 

the example sources of gross income listed in section 78B-12-

203(1) all have values that can be determined, while the value of 

vested but unliquidated stock cannot be determined. One reason 

John’s assertion is not correct is that bonuses and gifts—two 

examples of gross income listed in section 78B-12-203(1)—might 

themselves take the form of vested stock. More importantly, 

“gross income” refers to “prospective income,” id. (emphasis 

added), in other words, income that a person is anticipated to 

6. Specifically, section 78B-12-203(1) says that “‘gross income’ . . . 

may include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, 

rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, 

pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous 

marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, 

workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, 

income replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments 

from ‘nonmeans-tested’ government programs.” Utah Code 

§ 78B-12-203(1).
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receive in the future. Thus, as to every category of income—

wages, commissions, bonuses, dividends, capital gains, vested 

stock, etc.—when a court calculates a person’s prospective 

income, it is making a prediction, based on current data, of the 

value the person will receive in the future. And as to every 

category, the actual future value may end up being different from

the amount predicted. For this reason, the code allows for 

adjusted alimony orders and new child support orders when 

there is a substantial change between a party’s future income as 

anticipated and the party’s future income as it turns out to be. See 

id. §§ 30-3-5(11)(a), 78B-12-210(9). The fact that with stock there is 

uncertainty both as to what its value will be when it is received in 

the future and as to what its value will be when it is liquidated

thereafter does not convince us to require exclusion of stock 

received in exchange for labor from gross income calculations.7

¶52 John’s other assertion is that the inclusion of the vested 

stock as part of his gross income was an abuse of discretion 

because of the stock’s nonliquidity at the time of its vesting. At 

one level, John’s point is well taken: because “the overarching aim 

of a . . . [divorce] decree . . . is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable 

result between the parties,” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 25, 459 

P.3d 276 (cleaned up), if the inclusion of a nonliquid asset as part 

of a party’s income makes it unduly difficult or impossible for that 

party to comply with a payment obligation calculated based on 

his or her income, equity may require the exclusion of that asset 

from the income calculation. But the burden of demonstrating that 

7. John further argues that the stock grants in his case are only 

guaranteed in the current contract term and may not be included 

in future contracts with his employer. But here again, the fact that 

income (in all its sources) might change in the future does not 

impact the district court’s need to determine prospective income 

based on data available at the time of divorce, and if John’s 

compensation substantially changes in the future, modification 

may be sought to address the change.
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20210785-CA 24 2024 UT App 125

the inclusion of a particular form of income in the income 

calculation results in an inequity is on the party challenging the 

income calculation. See Lamb v. Lamb, 2024 UT App 16, ¶ 39, 545 

P.3d 273 (stating that “the party challenging” an award “adjusting 

the financial and property interests of the parties” has the “heavy 

burden” to show “that such a serious inequity has resulted as to 

manifest a clear abuse of discretion” (cleaned up)). And here, John 

has made an insufficient showing of inequity resulting from 

inclusion of his RSUs as part of his gross income.

¶53 Although John points to Lutisha’s expert’s testimony that 

the RSUs are “restricted in trading” and that there are “additional 

limitations on trading when the shares are held by an affiliate or 

an insider like [John],” Lutisha’s expert testified only in general 

terms:

So in order to sell those shares, you have to hold 

them for a certain period of time, but you also have 

to submit forms that indicate your intent to sell, and 

then . . . depending on what the limitations are on 

selling shares of a particular company that you own 

shares in, you may have to hold those shares for 

additional periods.

Thus, his testimony was ultimately unhelpful to a determination 

of what restrictions were in place in this case. In fact, when 

questioned more specifically as to the restrictions generally in 

effect for individuals in John’s circumstances, Lutisha’s expert

responded, “Well, it really varies significantly from one company 

to another and one stock program to another. And so . . . there 

aren’t general parameters that I could give you. But RSUs that I’ve 

seen vary dramatically as to how the insiders can trickle shares 

into the stock market.” To demonstrate a restriction on liquidity

sufficient to render the district court’s inclusion of the RSUs in 

John’s income an abuse of discretion, John would need to direct 

us to evidence showing what particular restrictions were placed
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20210785-CA 25 2024 UT App 125

on the RSUs he received. It is not enough for John to argue, 

without more, that some restrictions apply. Accordingly, John has 

failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 

relying on Lutisha’s expert’s calculation of John’s income,

including the vested restricted stock.

II. Lutisha’s Expenses

¶54 John argues that several of Lutisha’s expenses “are 

unreasonably high, not actually incurred/or paid by other 

resources . . . , or not ongoing after the divorce.” We address each 

of the specifically challenged expenses in turn.

A. Additional Credit Card Payments

¶55 John first challenges Lutisha’s “additional credit card 

payments” expense of $2,000.00. He argues that because Lutisha 

“inferred that all of her expenses are paid via credit card,” this 

“means additional payments on the card each month are going to 

pay for other stated monthly expenses that are charged to that 

card.” But that line item appears to address pre-existing credit 

card debt and therefore would not be duplicative of other listed 

expenses. John has pointed to no evidence to the contrary;

therefore, he has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion in the 

court’s treatment of this expense.

B. Lutisha’s Personal Loan

¶56 As we discuss more fully below, as part of its property 

division, the district court determined that Lutisha’s personal 

loan was part of the marital estate. See infra ¶ 83. John argues that 

because he was therefore “responsible for half the value of 

[Lutisha’s] personal loan,” the court should have halved Lutisha’s 

listed monthly expense for payment on this debt and shifted the 

other half to his monthly expenses. However, it appears that this 

issue was not preserved for our review. We do not see that the 

issue was raised in any of the portions of the record John cites as 
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20210785-CA 26 2024 UT App 125

having preserved it—including his counter-request for 

reconsideration that asks for several other of Lutisha’s expenses 

to “be scrutinized.” See generally Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5) 

(requiring an appellant to provide either “citation to the record 

showing that the issue was preserved for review” or “a statement 

of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved”).

“Parties are required to raise and argue an issue in the district 

court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on 

it.” Issertell v. Issertell, 2020 UT App 62, ¶ 21, 463 P.3d 698 (cleaned 

up). “When a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the district 

court, it has failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court 

will not typically reach that issue absent a valid exception to 

preservation.” Id. (cleaned up). Because no such exception is 

argued here, we do not reach this issue.

C. Maintenance of the Park City Property

¶57 John contests Lutisha’s monthly expense of $1,792.84 for 

“real estate maintenance.” He argues that this expense is 

“inflated” because it was calculated based, in large part, on 

$19,086.00 paid to a roofing company, $4,200.00 paid to a 

fabrication and welding company, and $2,443.61 paid to a 

plumbing company over a fifteen-month period—expenditures 

that John contends will not be “ongoing expenses that [Lutisha] 

will incur after the divorce.” Essentially, he contends that using 

apparently one-time expenditures as the basis for a monthly 

expense item is an abuse of discretion.

¶58 This argument, while not without force, also raises an issue 

that was not preserved in the district court. In his post-trial 

briefing, John stated that the amounts Lutisha claimed as monthly 

expenses “should be scrutinized as follows.” He then presented a 

chart that identified for scrutiny six of Lutisha’s monthly expense 

line items, including the one for “Real Estate Maintenance.” As to 

that line item, the chart noted in one sentence that while Lutisha’s 

financial declaration “states that the marital expense or standard 
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20210785-CA 27 2024 UT App 125

for real estate maintenance was [$]284,” it states a monthly real 

estate maintenance expense for Lutisha of $1,792. Following his 

chart, John asserted simply that the line items identified in the 

preceding chart had been “padded for an alimony claim.”

¶59 “In order to preserve an issue for appeal,” the appellant 

must have “presented [it] to the trial court in such a way that the 

trial court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on that issue.” 438 Main St. 

v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (cleaned up). 

“Merely mentioning an issue . . . without introducing supporting 

evidence or relevant legal authority does not give the trial court 

that opportunity.” Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App 27, ¶ 19, 319 P.3d 

770 (cleaned up). “Rather, to sufficiently raise an issue, even if 

indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of consciousness 

such that the trial judge can consider it.” Id. (cleaned up). John’s 

mere mention of the discrepancy between the marital monthly 

real estate maintenance expense and Lutisha’s claimed monthly 

real estate maintenance expense, coupled with the bare assertion 

that this (and five other claimed expenses) had been “padded for 

an alimony claim,” was insufficient to preserve the issue John 

raises on appeal. While John asserts on appeal the legal theory 

that using one-time expenditures as the basis for a monthly 

expense item is an abuse of discretion, he never articulated that 

theory to the district court. And while he has identified for this 

court the specific evidence that supports his argument—i.e., three 

apparently one-time expenses that Lutisha assertedly used to pad 

her monthly real estate maintenance expense—he did not identify 

this evidence for the district court. For these reasons, we conclude 

that John did not preserve for our review the issue he raises 

regarding Lutisha’s claimed monthly real estate maintenance 

expense.

D. Food, Household Expenses, Clothing, and Travel

¶60 John also contests Lutisha’s monthly expense of $4,580.70 

for “food and household supplies.” He argues that the district 
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20210785-CA 28 2024 UT App 125

court’s “adoption of [his] represented marital expenses doesn’t 

support the amounts represented by [Lutisha].” That is, he argues 

that because the court adopted his calculation for total monthly 

marital expenses, and because his calculated marital expense for 

this specific category was $2,945.00, Lutisha’s significantly higher 

asserted expense in this area is suspect and was not “properly 

reviewed and scrutinized by the court.”

¶61 As an initial matter, we observe that John provides no 

authority suggesting that one party’s listed expense for a given 

category is automatically suspect when it is not in line with 

another party’s calculated marital expense for that same category. 

Indeed, our case law instructs that a district court need not make 

a specific finding as to an overall marital expense amount, let 

alone precise marital expense amounts, for various expense 

categories. See Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, ¶ 57, 542 P.3d 

935 (“There is usually no need for a trial court to make a separate 

specific finding regarding the overall ‘marital standard of living’ 

as measured by the total amount of money spent each month by 

the couple while they were married.” (cleaned up)). And although 

the court in this case accepted as “reasonable” John’s monthly 

marital expense amount of $30,973.02, the court made no such 

finding concerning the marital expenses listed for any of the 

specific expense categories. Moreover, we note that there is some 

variation between the expense categories that John and Lutisha

employed and their decisions as to what expenditures belonged 

in which categories. In fact, one of the arguments John raises is 

precisely that—that certain amounts Lutisha categorized as 

household expenses should have instead been categorized as

clothing and travel expenses.

¶62 Yet regardless of these variances between the parties’ 

financial declarations and how they categorized certain 

expenditures, we are ultimately presented with a case where 

(1) the court determined that the parties had enjoyed quite a 

comfortable standard of living during the marriage and 
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20210785-CA 29 2024 UT App 125

ultimately adopted as “reasonable” the overall monthly marital 

expense of $30,973.02 provided by John and (2) Lutisha based her 

declared expenses on fifteen months of actual charges made to her 

accounts, and she provided the court with a document listing all 

those charges and how she had categorized them.8 Against this 

backdrop, the court determined that after deducting the parties’ 

respective temporary legal expenses, their remaining expenses 

($21,114.80 for Lutisha and $19,118.19 for John) were “reasonable 

in light of the marital standard of living.” See id. ¶ 59 (explaining 

that a court should “assess[] a party’s claimed line-item expenses 

in light of” the marital standard of living, and explaining that the 

“marital expenses” column on the parties’ financial declarations 

is “to assist with this process” (cleaned up)). All considered, we 

do not see a lack of supporting evidence for the district court’s 

decision that these challenged expenses were reasonable. Nor do 

we see any merit to John’s assertion that the court failed to 

“properly review[] and scrutinize[]” those expenses.

8. John suggests that the court erred when it did not require more 

evidence supporting Lutisha’s expenses and “did not find that 

[Lutisha] met her burden to prove the marital standard of living 

as required via Dahl v. Dahl, [2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276,] but instead 

used [John’s] financial declaration to find [Lutisha’s] request 

reasonable.” But Dahl does not “automatically require[] a court to 

deny a request for alimony in the absence of documentation.” 

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 101, 507 P.3d 385, cert. 

denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022). “In fact, the [Dahl] court 

explicitly acknowledged that the district court could have 

imputed a figure to determine the wife’s financial need based 

either on the husband’s records of the parties’ predivorce 

expenses or a reasonable estimate of the wife’s needs.” Id. ¶ 102 

(cleaned up). Therefore, we do not consider this argument further.
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20210785-CA 30 2024 UT App 125

E. Lutisha’s Medical Expenses

¶63 John argues that Lutisha’s “expense for health care should 

be scrutinized as she failed to distinguish between what amounts 

were for her and [what amounts were for] the children” and that 

this is problematic because John is already required to reimburse 

her for half of the children’s medical expenses. But again, similar 

to his objection to Lutisha’s personal loan, see supra ¶ 56, this

particular objection to this line item is not even referenced in his 

counter-request for reconsideration that identified several

expenses that he contended should “be scrutinized,” and John 

does not cite any other portion of the record where this argument 

was preserved. Accordingly, we do not reach this issue. See 

Issertell v. Issertell, 2020 UT App 62, ¶ 21, 463 P.3d 698. 

III. Alimony Calculation

¶64 John challenges the district court’s overall alimony award 

as inequitable because the amounts of money left to each party 

after John’s alimony payment are not equal. He argues that “the 

court abused its discretion by awarding [Lutisha] any more than 

half of the disposable income of the parties on a monthly basis.” 

He points out that the total monthly amount available to Lutisha 

is $15,876.31 (including her net income of $7,846.00, the child 

support award of $2,501.00, and the alimony award of $5,529.31) 

and the amount available to him is $9,571.56 (his net income of 

$19,409.00 minus the amounts he must pay in child support and 

alimony). We do not agree that the district court abused its 

discretion as John contends.

¶65 A proper alimony assessment proceeds as follows: 

First, the court should assess the needs of the 

parties, in light of their marital standard of 

living. . . . Next, the court should determine the 

extent to which the receiving spouse is able to meet 

[his or] her own needs with [his or] her own income. 
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20210785-CA 31 2024 UT App 125

If the court determines that the receiving spouse is 

able to meet all [of his or] her needs with [his or] her 

own income, then it should not award alimony.

If the court finds, however, that the receiving 

spouse is not able to meet [his or] her own needs, it 

should then assess whether the payor spouse’s 

income, after meeting his [or her] needs, is sufficient 

to make up some or all of the shortfall between the 

receiving spouse’s needs and income.

Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶¶ 19–20, 402 P.3d 153 (cleaned 

up). Should the court then encounter the common dilemma that 

“the parties’ combined resources do not stretch far enough to 

meet the legitimate needs of what are now two households rather 

than one,” the court must apply an “equalization of poverty”

approach, ensuring “that when the parties are unable to maintain 

the standard of living to which they were accustomed during 

marriage, the shortfall is equitably shared.” Id. ¶ 20.

¶66 This is precisely the approach followed by the district 

court. It first addressed Lutisha’s financial condition and needs, 

determining that, after removing her temporary legal expenses, 

her remaining expenses of $21,224.80 were “reasonable in light of 

the marital standard of living and in light of [John’s] monthly 

needs.” The court then subtracted from this amount Lutisha’s net 

income and the ordered child support, arriving at a shortfall of 

$10,767.80. The court also addressed John’s financial condition, 

needs, and ability to pay. The court found, after also removing his 

temporary legal expenses, that John’s remaining expenses of 

$19,118.19 were “reasonable in light of the marital standard of 

living and in light of [Lutisha’s] monthly needs.” Then the court 

determined that John’s net income was sufficient to cover all his 

expenses with a surplus of $290.81 to go toward Lutisha’s 

shortfall. Finally, the court calculated the shortfall that would be 

remaining after applying John’s surplus of $290.81 and, 
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20210785-CA 32 2024 UT App 125

“[e]qualizing the poverty,” divided that remaining shortfall by 

two. Thus, the court followed exactly the procedures required by 

Utah law and did not abuse its discretion in arriving at the 

resulting alimony amount. 

¶67 John pushes back, arguing that “[u]nder no circumstances” 

can the district court’s alimony award “be viewed as equitable” 

because Lutisha will be left with a higher net income than he will 

be left with. John argues that the more equitable result would be 

“each party having 50% of the disposable income.” But 

“equalization [of the parties’ standards of living] does not require 

a court to award alimony so that each party is left with an equal 

monthly income. Rather, it requires a court to divide the shortfall 

of income equitably between the parties in light of each party’s 

demonstrated needs as well as the other relevant circumstances in 

the case.” Id. ¶ 21 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Indeed, we have 

previously vacated alimony awards for doing exactly what John 

urges here—equalizing the money each party has at his or her

disposal instead of equalizing the shortfall. See Vanderzon v. 

Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150, ¶ 52, 402 P.3d 219 (“[B]ecause the 

court had already determined that the expenses of each party 

were reasonable, its decision to equalize income rather than 

shortfall—even though [the wife’s] needs were greater than [the 

husband’s]—appears to have left [the wife] to bear significantly 

more of the burden of insufficient resources than [the husband].”); 

Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 12, 80 P.3d 153 

(“Here, the trial court never determined [the wife’s] needs based 

on the parties’ historical standard of living. Instead, the trial court 

engaged in an effort to simply equalize income. In attempting to 

equalize the parties’ income rather than going through the 

traditional needs analysis, the trial court abused its discretion.”).

Thus, John’s argument on this point is unavailing.
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IV. Property Division

¶68 Finally, John challenges the district court’s treatment of 

several pieces of marital property. We address each in turn.

A. John’s Stock Grants

¶69 John argues that because the district court included in 

John’s income the value of the stock he received from his 

employer, the court’s inclusion of that stock in the marital estate 

as well amounted to “double-dipping.” We are unconvinced.

While the court considered the value of one year’s worth of vested 

stock when it calculated John’s income, the purpose of that

calculation was to provide a prospective income number to serve 

as a basis for determining alimony and child support awards

going forward. In contrast, the court included stock in the marital 

estate because there was an existing accrual of stock that had 

previously been given to John by his employer. The court 

including one year’s worth of anticipated future stock receipts in 

John’s prospective income and separately considering alreadyaccrued stock in its division of the marital estate is no different 

from a court including a party’s anticipated salary in that party’s 

prospective income and separately including in the marital estate 

the already-paid salary remaining in the parties’ bank accounts

when it divides the marital estate. The court did not abuse its 

discretion by considering the stock in both contexts.

¶70 John also argues that if any amount of already-received

stock is marital property, it should only be the vested portions of 

stock. Yet John cites no authority indicating that it would be an 

abuse of discretion for the court to treat granted but unvested 

stock as part of the marital estate when the evidence is that the 

stock will vest over a moderate term as a matter of course. “An 

appellate court is not a depository into which parties may dump 

the burden of their argument and research,” and John’s 

inadequate briefing on this point “is by definition insufficient to 

discharge [his] burden to demonstrate trial court error.” Andersen 
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v. Andersen, 2015 UT App 260, ¶ 6, 361 P.3d 698 (per curiam) 

(cleaned up).

¶71 John next argues that the values assigned to the stock 

“were arbitrary and place [an] unreasonable risk on [John].” But 

the values placed on the stock are the “current balance” values 

given to the stock by John himself in his most recent financial 

declaration, making those values anything but arbitrary. John’s 

real point in this regard seems to be that because the value of the 

stock will almost certainly change in the future, the court abused 

its discretion by assigning it a present value for purposes of 

summing and dividing the marital estate. However, the court’s 

approach was no different from the one we routinely allow courts 

to take with other marital assets—such as homes and vehicles—

that are valued as of the time of trial and then awarded to one 

party as part of the division of marital property, despite the fact 

that their value will almost certainly change. “The valuation of 

marital property is necessarily a snapshot in time, and such a 

moment does not consider the myriad situations in which the 

value of the parties’ property might be positively or negatively 

affected in the future.” Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, 

¶ 97, 507 P.3d 385 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 

2022).

¶72 John also argues that the court did not “consider the tax 

consequences of the asset,” if it is ever sold, when valuing the 

stock and awarding it to John as part of the property division. Yet 

it is not clear that John will ever liquidate the stock, and “we do 

not generally expect courts to speculate about hypothetical future 

tax consequences.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶73 Finally, John argues that the court should have mitigated 

the future uncertainty of the stock values by “adopting a different 

form of distribution,” such as dividing the vested stocks or 

ordering John to liquidate the stock as it becomes available and 

provide half the proceeds to Lutisha. But such an approach goes 
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against the district court’s responsibility to “equitably distribute 

[marital property] with a view toward allowing each party to go 

forward with his or her separate life.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 

2019 UT App 38, ¶ 27, 440 P.3d 757 (cleaned up); see also Gardner 

v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988) (“The purpose of 

divorce is to end marriage and allow the parties to make as much 

of a clean break from each other as is reasonably possible. An 

award of deferred compensation which ties a couple together long 

after divorce can frustrate that objective.”). We therefore cannot 

say that the court’s determination to not delay the division of the 

stock was an abuse of its discretion.

¶74 In sum, each of John’s arguments related to the stock grants 

is unavailing. We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s 

treatment of the stock.

B. John’s 2021 Bonus

¶75 John next argues that the district court should not have 

included his bonus of $28,125.00 from the first quarter of 2021 as 

a separate item in the marital estate. He asserts that the bonus had 

already been deposited into his bank accounts that were subject 

to equitable division and, therefore, that the bonus was essentially 

counted twice. But as Lutisha points out, the total value of those 

other accounts combined (approximately $3,400.00) was far less 

than the bonus amount, suggesting that John had either spent the 

bonus or not deposited it into those accounts as claimed. And 

John has not shown that, if spent, the bonus was applied to marital 

costs. Thus, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for 

the court to count the bonus as a separate item in the marital estate 

and award it to him.9

9. John raises a separate plain error argument with regard to his 

bonus; however, “plain error review is not available in ordinary 

civil cases unless expressly authorized by rule.” Kelly v. Timber 

(continued...)
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20210785-CA 36 2024 UT App 125

C. John’s Travel Credit

¶76 In the fall of 2020, John booked travel to Bora Bora for

himself and the parties’ children for April 2021. The trip later had 

to be canceled when Bora Bora was closed due to the COVID-19 

pandemic. The court included the resulting travel credit of 

$15,426.57 as part of the marital estate and awarded it to John as 

part of the property division. The court’s reasoning was as 

follows: “The [c]ourt notes that while [John] provided updated 

bank statements at trial showing he received a refund for the 

travel, the refund is not reflected anywhere else and thus should 

be included in the division of property.”

¶77 John contests this award, arguing that the court’s reasoning 

“does not make sense on its face.” He asserts that “the evidence 

supports this credit being to an account [that] was subject to 

equitable division at the time of trial”; in other words, because the 

travel credit served to reduce the marital debt on the credit card, 

the travel credit was already accounted for when the reduced 

credit card debt was included in the equitable property division.

We disagree that this is what happened.

¶78 Although the district court could have provided a clearer 

explanation, we understand the court to have recognized that 

although John had provided an updated credit card statement at 

the time of trial showing travel refunds, those refunds were not 

reflected on the prior statements before the court, which the court 

used to determine the assets and debts of the parties. Thus, it was 

not the case that these travel refunds reduced the marital debt that 

was before the court when it determined the assets and debts of 

Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 44, 507 P.3d 357; see 

also Duffin v. Duffin, 2022 UT App 60, ¶ 36 n.7, 511 P.3d 1240

(applying this rule in a divorce case), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1262 

(Utah 2022). We therefore do not address this argument—or any 

other plain error arguments—further.
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the parties. The numbers support this interpretation: the marital 

debt on the credit card that was allocated to John was $44,484.00

on the statement that the court used when determining the assets 

and debts of the parties, and the balance on that card as reflected 

on the more recent statement, provided at trial, showed an 

outstanding debt of only $29,202.72—a difference quite close to 

the amount of the travel-related refund. Because the travel refund 

was not reflected in the documents on which the court based its 

property division, and because John received the refund after the 

date of those documents, the court did not abuse its discretion by 

separately including the amount of the travel-related refund as 

marital property and allocating it to John.

D. John’s Furniture

¶79 John argues that the furniture at the Park City property 

was worth more than the furniture at the Coalville property and,

therefore, that the district court abused its discretion in not 

treating the $26,318.86 that John spent on new furnishings for his 

primary residence (an apartment in Park City) as rectifying this 

imbalance. Instead, the court determined that because “credible 

trial evidence” showed that the Park City property and the 

Coalville property had “comparable items that are comparable in 

value,” it was “reasonable and equitable” to award Lutisha the 

“furniture, personal property, and the like” at the Park City

property and to award John the “furniture, personal property, 

and the like” at the Coalville property. The court thus considered 

the $26,318.86 value of the newer furniture as a separate item of 

marital property subject to division. John argues, however, that 

“evidence presented to the court supports an equitable finding 

that the property in each [party’s] possession and residences 

awarded to them equally offset the other,” that is, that including 

the value of the new furniture in John’s apartment “would be 

sufficient to offset the difference in value” of the furniture located 

at the other two properties.
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20210785-CA 38 2024 UT App 125

¶80 “Generally, district courts have considerable discretion 

concerning property distribution in a divorce proceeding and 

their determinations enjoy a presumption of validity.” Dahl v. 

Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 119, 459 P.3d 276 (cleaned up). “[A]n appellate 

court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence presented at trial but 

only to determine whether the court’s decision is supported by 

the evidence.” Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 24, 334 P.3d 

994. Here, John has provided no citation or argument showing 

how the court’s decision was not supported by the evidence. 

John’s briefing simply points out that the court was provided with 

photographs “of both properties and the furniture therein” and 

then asserts that “[t]he evidence presented to the court” was

sufficient to support a different finding. This bald assertion does 

not convince us that the court’s decision was not supported by the 

evidence before it. Thus, we see no abuse of discretion on this 

point. 

¶81 Additionally, John argues that even if the new furniture is 

subject to division as marital property, there was no evidence that 

the furniture “maintains the same value as it had at the time of 

purchase more than eighteen months prior to trial.” Given, 

however, that the court was presented with evidence that this

furniture was only eighteen months old and slightly used, and 

given that John presented no evidence of its depreciated value, we 

see no abuse of discretion in the court’s reliance on the purchase 

price amounts to assess the value of the furniture. 

E. John’s Requested Reimbursement of Marital Expenses

¶82 The district court refused to award reimbursement to John 

for half of $62,304.63 that he claimed to have spent “maintaining 

the marital property and expenses,” explaining that John “did not 

provide credible evidence that these were in fact marital 

expenses” and citing a few examples of listed expenses that were 

non-marital, such as “clothing purchases, contact lenses, Weller 

Recreation, and Marine Products.” John contests this 
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20210785-CA 39 2024 UT App 125

determination, arguing, among other things, that his 

documentation also showed payments toward maintenance of 

marital property such as the mortgage, HOA fee, and insurance 

on the Coalville property, as well as insurance on the parties’ boat 

and certain ATVs. But each of John’s arguments on this point asks

us to reassess credibility and reweigh the evidence, something 

that, again, we will not do, see Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, 

¶ 24, 334 P.3d 994. And John’s general assertions do not 

demonstrate that the court’s finding that the evidence John 

provided was not “credible evidence” of marital expenses was not

supported by the evidence. We therefore see no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s refusal to award the requested 

reimbursement. 

F. Lutisha’s Personal Loan

¶83 John contests the inclusion in the marital estate of the 

$100,000.00 personal loan that Lutisha obtained to pay expenses 

while the parties were separated. He argues that because “the 

majority of the debt incurred and paid off with that loan were for 

[Lutisha’s] attorney fees,” including the loan in the marital estate 

is contrary to the district court’s requirement that the parties be 

responsible for their own attorney fees. Although John overstates 

Lutisha’s admission that her monthly expenses, including her 

legal fees, may have been paid, in part, by the loan, the real issue

here is that John overstates the district court’s ruling on attorney 

fees. The court’s order was as follows: “[B]oth [Lutisha] and [John] 

are awarded financial and property assets in the division of the 

marital estate in this divorce action . . . . Thus, because both 

[p]arties have access to financial and property resources, the 

[c]ourt now orders that each [p]arty shall pay for their own 

attorney fees and costs.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the court’s 

requirement that each party bear his or her own legal fees was in 

relation to those fees moving forward. We therefore see no conflict 

in the court’s actions with regard to Lutisha’s personal loan and, 

thus, no abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION

¶84 The district court enjoys broad discretion in addressing 

issues of income, alimony, and property distribution. And, with 

just one exception, John has not shown an abuse of that discretion. 

That exception is the uncertainty regarding the tax rates to be 

applied to Lutisha’s gross income. Thus, we generally affirm the 

order but vacate the district court’s determinations on that one

issue. We remand that issue to the district court for clarification 

and, if necessary, adjustment, recognizing that any adjustment to 

that item may also necessitate adjustments to the ultimate 

alimony award and child support award.