J-S33021-16 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

THOMAS J. SCHRAM 

 Appellant No. 1267 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 15, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000045-2013 

CP-33-CR-0000046-2013 

CP-33-CR-0000047-2013 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 25, 2016 

Appellant, Thomas J. Schram, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on July 15, 2015, following revocation of his probationary sentences 

for technical violations. In addition, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed 

both a petition to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that Appellant’s counsel 

complied with the procedural requirements necessary for withdrawal. 

Moreover, after independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the 

instant appeal is wholly frivolous. We therefore grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 
J-S33021-16 

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 We summarize the factual and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On April 17, 2013, Appellant entered guilty pleas to three counts of 

issuing bad checks, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4105(a)(1), at docket numbers 

CP-33-CR-45-2013, CP-33-CR-46-2013, and CP-33-CR-47-2013. Each 

offense constituted a misdemeanor of the second degree. Thereafter, the 

trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’ probation at each count and 

ordered that all sentences should run concurrently.

While serving his sentences, Appellant violated the terms of his 

probation on four separate occasions. Appellant twice committed technical 

violations by using drugs and was re-sentenced on January 7, 2015 and April 

15, 2015. On May 20, 2015, after Appellant admitted to a third technical 

violation stemming from his use of heroin, the trial court modified his 

probationary sentence at CP-33-CR-45-2013 to include 30 days’ 

incarceration in the Jefferson County jail. Appellant’s other sentences at 

CP-33-CR-46-2013 and CP-33-CR-47-2013 remained unaltered. On July 15, 

2015, following a fourth admission to the ingestion of heroin in violation of 

his probationary terms, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation at all 

three dockets and re-sentenced him to an aggregate term of 32 to 72 

months in state prison.1

____________________________________________ 

1

 At CP-33-CR-45-2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one to two 

years in state prison, with credit for time served. At CP-33-CR-46-2013, the 

trial court sentenced Appellant to one to two years in state prison, with 

credit for time served, consecutive to the punishment ordered at 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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On August 4, 2015, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence 

nunc pro tunc, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 

too severe a punishment. The trial court denied relief on August 5, 2015. 

On August 10, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Thereafter, in 

response to an order of court, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and the trial court 

issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 29, 2015. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/29/15. 

On appeal, Appellant’s counsel included one issue in his Anders brief: 

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked 

Appellant’s probation and re-sentenced him to serve a sentence 

of incarnation in the [s]tate [c]orrectional [i]nstitution 

aggregating to a minimum of two (2) years eight (8) months to 

a maximum of six (6) years with credit for time served and a 

recommendation of Motivational Boot Camp at all three dockets 

for [A]ppellant’s violations of probation/parole[?]

Anders Brief at 3. 

Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, however, this Court must 

first determine whether counsel fulfilled the necessary procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. 2013). To withdraw under 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

CP-33-CR-45-2013. At CP-33-CR-47-2013, the court sentenced Appellant to 

serve eight months to two years in state prison, with credit for time served, 

consecutive to the punishment imposed at CP-33-CR-46-2013. The court 

recommended Appellant for Motivational Boot Camp at all three dockets and 

declared Appellant’s eligibility for the Recidivist Risk Reduction Incentive 

Program at 24 months. 
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Anders, court-appointed counsel must satisfy certain technical 

requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for leave to withdraw 

and state that after making a conscientious examination of the record, he 

has determined that the appeal is frivolous.” Commonwealth v. 

Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 947 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting Commonwealth 

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Second, counsel must file an 

Anders brief, in which counsel: 

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record; 

(2) refer[s] to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and 

(4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Washington, 63 A.3d at 800, quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. 

Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his client 

and “advise[] him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise 

any additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s attention, and 

attach[] to the Anders petition a copy of the letter sent to the client.” 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). 
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If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the 

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the 

appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5 (citation 

omitted). It is only when both the procedural and substantive requirements 

are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to withdraw. In the case at bar, 

counsel has met all of the above procedural obligations.2 We now turn to 

the issue raised in the Anders brief. 

The Anders brief contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing too severe a punishment under the circumstances of the case and 

in view of the nature of Appellant’s probation violations. Anders Brief at 6. 

This claim does not challenge the revocation of Appellant’s probation or the 

fact that the trial court imposed a sentence of total confinement upon 

Appellant. Rather, Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 

2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011). 

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 

manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Appellant does not have an 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Appellant has not filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. 
J-S33021-16 

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automatic right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for 

permission to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.

As this Court has explained: 

To reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we 

conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; 

(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in 

a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; 

(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also 

Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“when 

a court revokes probation and imposes a new sentence, a criminal defendant 

needs to preserve challenges to the discretionary aspects of that sentence 

either by objecting during the revocation sentencing or by filing a 

post-sentence motion”). As previously noted, Appellant filed a timely notice 

of appeal and his claim was properly preserved in a post-sentence motion. 

Counsel’s Anders brief also contains a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f). Thus, we turn to whether the appeal presents a substantial 

question. 

As we have explained: 

The determination of whether a particular case raises a 

substantial question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Generally, however, in order to establish that there is a 

substantial question, the appellant must show actions by the 

sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or 
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contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process. 

Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 Appellant’s position in his Rule 2119(f) statement is that “[his] 

sentences are manifestly unreasonable in that they constitute too severe of 

a punishment under the circumstances of the case and the probation/parole 

violations, and the [trial c]ourt’s reasons for the sentences do not justify the 

severity.” Anders Brief at 6. “[T]his Court has [] determined that such an 

assertion, in combination with allegations that a sentencing court did not 

consider the nature of the offenses or provide adequate reasons for its 

sentence, presents a plausible argument that the length of the sentence 

violates fundamental sentencing norms.” Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 

A.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

 In sentencing Appellant, the trial court was required to “consider the 

general principles and standards of the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth 

v. Russell, 460 A.2d 316, 322 (Pa. Super. 1983). Section 9721 expresses 

these general principles in the following manner: 

the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of 

the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the 

victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant. 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). In addition, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c) permits the 

trial court to impose a sentence of total confinement in order to vindicate its 

authority. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 

 We also note that when the trial court has the benefit of a presentence 

investigation (PSI) report, “we presume the court was aware of and weighed 

information concerning Appellant’s character when making its sentencing 

decision.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 175 (Pa. Super. 

2010). 

 Here, the trial court offered the following explanation for the sentence 

imposed in this case: 

As he frankly acknowledged, [Appellant] was a drug addict who 

had been in front of the [trial c]ourt many times and did not 

know how to get the help he knew he needed. He had been 

given multiple breaks in the past, one of which was to serve his 

revocation sentence in the local jail rather than state prison. He 

did not respond to leniency, however, but repeatedly flouted the 

[trial c]ourt’s attempts to show mercy and directives to comply 

with the law and its orders. As a result, even [Appellant] was 

expecting a state sentence on July 15, 2015. All he asked was 

that the [trial c]ourt send him with a boot camp 

recommendation, which is what it did. 

[Appellant] complained, nonetheless, because he was hoping for 

a lower minimum. The [trial c]ourt explained exactly why it was 

imposing a higher minimum, however, and that was as an 

incentive for him to actually complete the boot camp program 

rather than decide he would rather serve his minimum in prison 

and get paroled sooner. 

What the record clearly conveys, then, is that the [trial c]ourt 

deliberately fashioned a sentence with [Appellant’s] particular 

needs and circumstances in mind. To that end, it was fully 

aware of his background and other information it needed to 

appropriately do so. [The trial court stated on the record that it 
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reviewed Appellant’s PSI report and considered Appellant’s age, 

his background, his prior record, and everything necessary for 

sentencing. The record] further reflects that the [trial c]ourt did 

indeed articulate its reasons for the sentence. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/15, at 1-2 (record citations omitted). 

 Based upon the foregoing, we discern the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. The trial court had the benefit 

of a PSI report, so we presume the trial court was aware of Appellant’s 

individual circumstances, including his rehabilitative needs. Moury, 992 

A.2d at 175. The trial court went further, however, and before imposing a 

sentence of total confinement carefully considered the need to protect the 

public, the gravity of Appellant’s conduct and its potential impact on the 

community, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Ultimately, the trial court 

concluded that Appellant’s continued use of narcotics, despite supervision, 

posed an ongoing risk of his continued involvement with criminal activity and 

that a shorter state sentence would fail to ensure that Appellant received the 

rehabilitative programming that he needs. The record firmly supports these 

assessments. 

After an independent review of the entire record, we see nothing that 

might arguably support this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, wholly 

frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant 

counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw. 

Petition for leave to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of 

sentence affirmed. 
J-S33021-16 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/25/2016