### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 00 80 -C V

______________________________ HO ME R F EA RS, L OU I SE F EA RS, TE RRY F EA RS A

ND TE RES A F EA RS, A pp e lla nts V. TEXAS B ANK, Appe llee

On Appea l from the 4th J udicial District Court

Rusk Count y , Texas Trial Court No. 2001-295

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte rThey s o u g h t 1 ) to h a v e th e f ir s t d e e d s e t a s id e , 2 ) d e c la r a ti o n th a t th e s e c o n d deed w as 1 invalid, 3) judgme nt decla ring the boundar ies of their r ealty , 4) per manent injunction to preve nt the Ba nk or code fenda

nts, Tommy

and Wanda, f

rom convey

ing the proper

ty owned by

them, and 5) a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s. Ho me r, L ou ise , T e rr

y , a nd Te re sa F e ars wi ll c oll e c tiv e ly

be re fe rr e d to a s th e F e ars e s. 2 I n the orig inal petition, i t i s al l ege d that Terr y Fe ars a nd wife, Te resa

Fe ars, owne d the 3 tw e nty -a c re tr a c t. Th ere is no su ppor t f or that c on te nti on

in t he re c or d. I n th e br ie f f

ile d in thi s Court , the F e ars e s ar g ue that "l e g a l and e qu ita ble tit le to the pr op e rt

y is s til l in Ho me r a nd L ou ise 2 O P I N I O N Tommy an d Wan d a F e ar s b o r

r o w e d mo n e y f r o m t h e T e xa s B an k

an d f a il e d to ma k e the pay ments in a timely

manner . Tommy ' s pare nts, Homer and L ouise Fe ars, convey ed fifty acr es of their prope rty

to the Ba nk to avoid fore closure or other leg al conse quence s to Tommy . The B ank g ave H omer a

nd L ouise written assur ance that it would return their proper ty on pay ment of the note. The note w as neve r satisfied a nd the B ank wa s prepa

ring to sell the fi ft y ac res whe n Homer a nd L ouise, joined by

their other son, Te rry , and his wife, T ere sa, sued the B ank alleg ing the y had bee n

coer ced a nd wer e under

duress whe n they

executed the de ed; they

reque sted the trial cour

t to find the conve y ance void. Tommy also conve y ed a twe nty -ac re tra ct t o t h e Ba n k which Homer and L ouise had previously

convey ed to him. Homer and L ouise claim t heir deed t o Tommy violated t he statute of fra uds and wa s void. Ultimately , the Ba nk filed summary judgme nt motions which the tria l court 1 g rante d finding the B ank wa s the owner of both t ra ct s . T h e F ear ses appea l from a summary 2 jud g me nt t a ke n in

fa vo r o f t he B ank , a

nd To mmy a nd Wan da F e ars . 3Fe ars." I t is unclear w hy Terr y and Te resa

are included as a

ppellants. A counter claim is asserte d ag ainst the oppos ing party

. A cr oss-claim is a plea ding a sserted 4 ag ainst a copa

rty . T EX . R. C IV . P. 97(a), ( b), (e ). Sum mary jud g me nt m ay

be g ra nte d o n late r- ple a de d c a

us e s of a c tio n if

the g ro un ds a c tua lly 5 a s s e rte d s h o w th a t th e p la in ti f f c o u ld n o t r e c o v e r o n th e late r - p le a d e d c a u s e o f a c tion. Or tiz v. Colli ns , 2 03 S.W. 3d

41 4, 42 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t h Di st. ] 200 6, no pe t.) ; Es pe c he v . R itz e ll , 123 S.W .3d 657, 664 (T ex . Ap p . —Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (" I f a motion for summary judgme nt is sufficiently

broad to e ncompass later -filed c laims, the movant need not amend his mot ion ." ). I n thi s c a se , the la te -f ile d ple a din g s are e sse nti a lly e xpans ion s o f t he or ig ina l c la ims

. New c auses of

action we re a lleg ed that mig ht not fall within the scope of the pre viously -filed 3 I n a pl eadi ng whic h th e B ank e nti tle s a s a

c ro ss- a c tio n, bu t w hic h a pp e ars to b e a

c la ssi c counter claim, the B ank cla imed that the Fe arse s' law s u i t had clouded its title to the proper ty and 4 reque sted a de clar atory

judgme nt establishing its title to the fifty - and twe nty -ac re tra cts. Th e B ank fi le d it s in iti a l mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt in J un e 2005 . T he mot ion is a traditional one a lleg ing the re w as no g enuine issue of materia l fac t. I t contains a leng thy exposi tion of the course of events leading up to the foreclosure and is supported by an af fidavit by the pre sident of the B ank. The Fe arse s filed a r esponse August 17, 2005. I n Fe bruar

y 2006, the B ank then filed a supplemental motion for summary judgme nt (a noe vid e nc e mot ion

a g a ins t th e c la ims of

dure ss) and

the Fearse s f

ile d a su pp le me nta l r e sp on se Fe bruar y 6, 2006. A hea

ring on the motion wa s conducte d Fe bruar y 23; the trial court a dvised the attorney s by

letter dated Fe bruar

y 27 that the B ank' s motions for summary judgme nt were g rante d. On Fe bruar

y 28, the Fe arse s filed a supplemental complaint which, on Marc h 2, the B ank filed a motion to strike. The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt by

order signe d April 6, 2006. 5mot ion s f

or su mma ry jud g me nt. 4 Th a t summa

ry jud g me nt w a s n ot t

he n f ina l, a s it did no t di sp os e of

the cros s-a cti on . Th e c ro ssaction wa s disposed of by a later judgme nt sig ned Fe bruar y 8, 2007, and this a

ppeal f ollowed in due

course . I. Contentions of

the F earse s On appe al, the F ear ses complain that the summary judgme nt reg arding t h e p roper ty was

err oneous. F irst, the Fe arse s argue ther e wa s some evidenc e this w as a s h am t ransaction which should be set aside; that the fifty -ac re trac t was a home stead a nd it could not be fore closed on for a non-purc hase- money

lien. The F ear ses ar g ue their de ed to the B ank was nothing more than a n artful

wa y to a vo id th e home ste a d p ro vis ion s o f t he Te xas C on sti tut ion

—a nd the y on ly a g re e d to thi s proce dure be cause the B ank thre atene d to have their son jailed should they

ref use. Second, the F ear ses asser

t that there was some evidenc e the deed wa s obtained by fra ud and extorti on by

the B ank and that there w as some evide nce no c onsideration wa s received f or the transfe r. I n their third poi nt, the Fear ses arg ue the trial court erre d by ref using to g rant their motion for summary

judgme nt asking the court to set aside the 1995 deed to Tommy beca use it did not meet the re quirements of the statute of fra uds—beca

use it did not adequately

identify the prope rty

being transfe rre d.5

I n a four th point, the Fea

rses a rg ue that the c ourt err ed by g ranting summary

judgme nt on attorney ' s fee s beca

use they contested the amount in their response to the summary judgme nt motion and bec ause the summary judgme nt ag ainst them was improper ly rende red. II. The Bank 's R e spo nse The B ank addr esses the F ear ses' first argument as complaining the court err ed beca use there

was a n issue about whethe r the prope rty was a homestead, a

nd submits t hat t h e i s s u e was not prese rved be cause that matter wa s not alleg ed until the Fe arse s' first supplemental complaint, filed afte r the summary

judgme nt hear ing. The B ank conte nds that "f raud and extorti on," as now argued by the Fe arse s, was not bef ore the trial cour

t—the only

tort claims wer e dure ss and coe rcion, whic h wer e b ef o re t h e cour

t and proper ly subject to the B ank' s no-evidenc e summary judgme nt motion. I t a lso a rg ues there was no evidenc e to controve rt its al l ega t i o n s that cre dit was g iven to the notes of Tommy and Wanda a s

c o n s i d e r a t i o nf

o r t h e t r an s f

e r o f t h e p r o p e rt y. The B ank ar g ues the de ed of the twenty -ac re tra ct suffic iently descr ibes the prope rty

to meet the re qu ir e me nts of

the statut e of

fr a ud s. Finally , the B ank argues there is no summary judgme nt evidence to controver t its claims for attorney ' s fee s—only

leg al conc lusions that thos e fe es we re e x cessive.6

III . Di sc uss ion A . St a nd a r d o f R e v ie w When review ing a

summary

judgme nt, we take as true a ll evidence favor able to the nonmovant and indulg e ever y rea sonable infere nce and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant' s favor

. Lim esto ne Pr od

s. Di str ib. , Inc . v. Mc

Nam ara , 71 S.W .3d 308, 311 (Tex. 2002); Rhone-P oulenc, I nc. v. Stee l , 997 S.W .2d 217, 223 (Tex. 199 9). On a ppeal, the mova

nt must show that there is no materia l fac t i s sue and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. Mc Nam ara , 71 S.W. 3d a t 31 1; Steel , 997 S.W .2d at 223. B. Hom e st e ad The Ba nk corr ectly states that the homestead defe nse now advocated by the Fe arse s was not prese nted to the trial cour t by pleadingor by

summary judgme nt response. No pleadingraising the homestead issue w as filed until afte r the trial c ourt had c onducted a hear i n g o n t h e m otions for summary judgme nt a

nd advised the attorney s in w riting of its de cision. There is no showingthat the trial court wa s ev er presente d with or consider ed this argument. Havingnot timely prese nted the issue to the trial court, it ca nnot now be conside red. C. Dur e ss, Co e r c ion , a nd F r aud The next serie s of complaints is ge nera lly direc ted at the por

tion of the summary

judgme nt in which the cour

t found the B ank conc lusively prove d it had not eng ag ed in a se ries of misdee ds7

in order to obtain the rig hts to the Fea rses' proper

ty —or, alter

natively , that the Fe arse s had provided

no e vid e nc e to s up po rt

tho se a lle g a tio ns . I n the Fe arse s' orig inal response to the first motion for summary judgme nt, they

claimed that an issue of fact ex isted on its document-r elated claims, and on their claims of lack of consideration, fra ud, duress, illeg al coe rcion, a nd extorti on—all of which wer e based on the appe ndices attached to their response . The appendice s consist of t he depositi ons of Homer (for ty -five pag es of content), L ouise (eig ht pag es of c ontent), and Tommy (thirty -five pa g es of c ontent). Th e B ank ' s so le de fe ns ive argume nt i n th is c on te xt is th a t th e re sponse is s tr uc tur a lly inadequate bec ause the Fe arse s' counsel did not ade quately direc t the trial court' s at t en t ion to any particula r portion of these depositions as support. Homer' s deposition contains alleg ations that the Ba nk threatened to " send my son to prison," and to avoid that, Homer

and his wife e x ecute d the fifty -ac re deed to the Ba nk. Homer f

urther stated he and his wife rec eived nothing for g ranting the dee d to the Ba nk. L ouise testified she ha d been upse t a bout the possibili ty of convey ing the fifty

acr es to the Ba nk, but Tommy

stated the B ank wa s to take eve ry thing he had and se nd him to prison and that he had tried to shoot himself, but the g un misfired. She stated they only ag ree d to gr ant the B ank the deed be cause the B ank off icer told her that Tommy

could g o to prison. Tommy testified about the history of his notes with the Ba nk— an d h i s subsequent bankruptc y , and about a

number of other matter s, including the death of his son at about the time ofSimi larly , see Lee v. P alacios , N o . 1 4

- 06-004 2 8

- CV , 2 0 0 7 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 8 1 9 3 ( T e x. 6 App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] Oct. 11, 2007, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (ten months bet we en fi rs t and second motions, and first motion had bee n denied)

. 8 the B ank' s activities. Tommy also stated there was a trailer confiscated by the Ba nk that was not part of the c oll a te ra l f

or any no te —a nd wh ic h in fa c t di d n ot b e lon g to h im. The B ank ar g ues that none of this can be c ons i d er ed as evidenc e in re sponse to its noe vid e nc e mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt be c a us e it wa s f

ile d in re sp on se to t

he B ank ' s fir

st motion for summary

judgme nt, rather

than the second (no-e vidence ) m otion. The B ank dire cts our attention to Saenz v. Southern Union Gas Co. , 999 S.W .2d 490 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied) , as support for its position. I n Saenz , the plaintiff filed a summa ry j u d gm en t response to a traditional motion in 1995. On Novembe r 25, 1997, t he def endant f iled a no-e vidence motion, which was hea rd in Dec ember

. Although Sae nz filed a response , it was untimely , and the El Paso cour t h el d t h at it would not consider the 1995 response as pr o v i d i n g evidenc e. The El Paso cour t stated that, eve n though a 6 nonmovant is not required to " needle ssly duplicate evidenc e alr eady found in the cour

t's f ile," he or sh e is r e qu ir e d to make sure the e vid e nc e is p ro pe rl y be fo re the tr ia l c ourt

fo r i ts c on sid e ra

tio n in ruling on the motion for summary judgme nt. Id . at 494. As in Saenz , here , the Fe arse s did not request the trial c ourt take ju d i ci al n o t i ce of the evidenc e pre sented in the a nswer to t h e previous motion for summary judgme nt, nor did they incorpora te that re sponse or e ven re fer to it. See Kalyanaram v. Burck , 2 2 5 S. W. 3 d

2 9 1 , 3 0 1 ( T e x.9

App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.) (a ffidavit date d J uly 28, 2004, not attache d to or ref ere nced in 2005 response to motion fo r s u mmary judgme nt, thus not considered by the cour t); Steinkamp v

. Car e ma rk, 3 S.W .3d 191, 195 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied) (incorpor ation by ref ere nce to pr e vio us ans we r fo un d to pro pe rl y pr e se nt suc h e vid e nc e to t he tr ia l c ourt ); McM

illan v. Hillman Int'l Brands, L td. , N o. 14 -0 3- 01 39 2- CV , 2 00 4 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 67 38 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist.] J uly

27, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The re sult is t his: Even if we c oncluded that we should review the entiret y o f t he depositions—which is questionable, see Roge rs v. Ricane Enters., Inc. , 772 S. W. 2 d 7 6 , 8 1 ( T e x. 19 89 ) ( ho ldi ngg e ne ra l r e fe re nc e s to vo lum ino us re c or d d o n ot d ir e c t tr ia l c ourt s and pa rt ie s to

e vid e nc e on

wh ic h mo va

nt r e lie s) ; Guthrie v. Suiter , 9 34 S.W. 2d 82 0, 82 6 ( Te x. Ap p.

—

H o u s ton [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)—th ey we re not filed in response to the no- evidenc e motion and wer e not otherwise pr esente d, by

incorporatio n o r refere nce, to the tr ial court. F urther, ove r eig ht months elapse d betwee n the Ba

nk' s filing of its tra ditional motion and its no-evidenc e motion. The summary judgme nt on those issues was thus proper ly rende red. D. F ailure or Lack of Cons ideration As pa rt of the ir se c on d p oin t of

e rr or , th e F e ars e s a lle g e that, wh e n the y c on ve y e d th e fi ft

y

a c re s to the B ank , th e y

re c e ive d n o c on sid e ratio n a nd it i s th e re for e vo ida

ble . H ow e ve r, it i s

un dis pu te d th a t, at th e tim e of the c on ve y anc e , the B ank c re dit e d the no te of To mmy and Wan da in the amount of $36,000.00. A va luable and le g al consider ation may consist either of a

benef it to the10

promissor or a loss or detriment to the promissee. Minton v. Rive rside State Bank , 399 S.W .2d 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. Ap p . —For t Worth 1966, no writ). W e find the e vidence shows conclusively that consideration was g iven for the conveyance . E. St at ut e of F r auds

— Tw enty-Ac re Tr act The F ear ses contend th e j u d gm ent was improper bec ause the twenty -ac re de ed conve y ed from Homer

and L oui s e t o T o mmy

and Wanda did not comply with the statute of fr auds and w as there fore void. Consequently , the twenty -ac re de ed Tommy executed in the Bank' s favor convey ed

no thi ng . T his c omp la int is b a se d o n th e F e ars e s' po sit ion that th e de sc ri pti on

of the pr op e rt

y is insufficient to allow it to be located from the instrument of conveyance . The B ank re sponds by

complaining that the Fe arse s' expert testimony was inade quate. That mis a pp re he nd s the natur e of thi s argume nt. Th e c on te nti on is that the do c ume nt its e lf is legal ly invalid. I f so, that is shown o n t h e face of the document—as a matter of la

w. That pa

rticular question is not an issue susceptible to evidentiar y proof. Ho we ve r, the re is s ome purp os e fo r h a vin g e vid e nc e fr om a surv e y or —it pro vi des so me ind ic a tio n t h e p r o p e rty c o u l d b e i d e n t i f i e d o n t h e g r o u n d

— w h i c h i s o n e o f t h e m a t t e r s t ha t is important in such a re view. The statute of

fra uds require s that all conveyance s of re al prope rty be in writing and sig ned by the party to be char g ed. See T EX . B US . & C OM . C ODE ANN . § 26.01(b)( 4) (Ve rnon Supp. 2007). F or a land sa le s c on tr a c t to me e t th e re qu ir e me nts of the statut e of fr a ud s, it mus t f

ur nis h w ith in i tse lfCf. Ste war t v . Co lla tt , 154 S.W .2d 891, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.—Da llas 1941, no writ) (f inding 7 descr iption adequate w here g ener al lo ca tion specified, a long w ith starting point and mete s and bounds descr iption therefr om). 11 or by re fe re nc e to a

no the r e xisting wri tin g the me a ns or data to i de nti fy

the pa rt ic ula r l and wi th

r e a s o n a b le c e rta in ty

. See P ick v . Bartel , 659 S.W .2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1983); Jones v . Kelley , 614 S

. W

. 2 d 9 5 , 9 9 (T ex . 1 9 8 1 ) ( ci t i n g Mo rro w v . S ho rtw e ll , 477 S.W. 2d 53 8, 53 9 ( Te x. 19 72 ); W ilson v. Fisher , 144 Tex. 53, 188 S .W.2d 150 , 152 (1945)) . The purpose of a de scription in a written conveyance is not to i dentify the land, but to aff

ord a me ans of identific ation. Jones , 614 S.W .2d at 99–100. A desc ription's validity under the statute of fra uds is not aff

ecte d by the knowledg e or intent of the par

ties. See M

orrow , 477 S.W .2d at 540. Fur ther, a plat made from extrinsi c evide nce cannot g ive validity to the descr iption in t he sale s contrac t. Se e id .; Ma y or v . G ar c ia , 104 S.W .3d 274, 276–77 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. dism'd w .o.j.). Th e le g a l de sc ri pti on in the c on ve y anc e mus t no t on ly fu rn ish e no ug h in fo rm a tio n to loc a te the g ener al ar ea, a s in identify ing it by trac t survey and county , it need contain information re g arding the size, shape, and bounda ries. See M

orrow , 477 S.W. 2d

a t 53 9; Matney

v. Odom , 147 Tex. 26, 210 S.W .2d 980, 982 (1948). I f enoug h appea rs in the desc ription so that a person familiar with the are a 7

c an lo c a te the p re mis e s w ithre a so na ble c e rt a int

y , it is s uf fi c ie nt t o s a tis fy

the statut e of

fr a ud s. Gates v. Ashe r , 1 54 Te x. 53 8, 28 0 S.W.2 d 247 , 248 –4 9 (19 55 ). Ev e n whe n " [t]he re c or d le a ve s li ttl e doubt that the partie s knew a nd understood what property was intende d to be conve y ed, . . . the knowledg e and intent of the parties will not g ive validity to the contra ct; and neither will a plat made12

fro m ex tr in si c evi den ce." Morrow , 4 77 S.W. 2d a t 54 0 ( cit ati on s omitt e d) ; Reiland v. Patrick Thomas Props., Inc. , 213 S.W .3d 431, 437 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)

. I f a c onvey ance of an inter est in rea l pro p er t y d o es n o t sufficie ntly descr ibe the land to be convey ed, it is void and unenfor cea ble under the statute of fr auds. See R epublic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Stetson , 390 S.W .2d 257, 261 (Tex. 1965). Such a contract, deed, or conveyance will not support an action for specific perfor mance or a suit for damag es for a breac h of contract. W ilson v. Fisher , 14 4 T e x. 53 , 1 88 S.W. 2d

15 0, 15 2 ( 19 45 ); Reiland , 213 S.W .3d at 437. Th e sp e c if

ic tw e nty -a c re de e d c omp la ine d o f i s atta c he d a s a n e xhibi t to the B ank ' s f

ir st mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. I t pu rp or ts t o tr ans fe r p ro pe rt

y fr om H ome r a

nd L ou ise to T ommy and Wanda, a

nd is dated De cembe r 11, 1995. Ther e is no met es an d b o u n ds descr iption. The de sc ri pti on

re a ds a s f

oll ow s: Be ing 20 a cre s off of the W est end of the foll owing descr ibed one- hundred acr e tra ct, the boundar ies of such 20 a cre s to be locate d so as n o t to include any of the wate rs of

Sha wn e e Cr e e k, sa id o ne -h

un dr e d a c re tr a c t de sc ri be d a s f oll ow s: B e i n g a t r a c t o f 1 0 0 a c r e s , s i tu a t e d i n t h e D an i e l R e e l S u r v e y, R u s k C o u n t y, Te xas a nd be ingthe same land

de sc ri be d a

nd c on ve y e d in

De e d f ro m J. H. Turn e r t o J . L . Fe ars, dated Aug ust 16, 1901, and rec orded in Volume 47, Pag e 620, De ed Re c or ds of

Rus k Co un ty , T e xas. There is a dequate descr iption of the location of the 100 a cre s—by ref ere nce to the of

ficial deed r ecor ds of the county

. The question is whether the desc ription of the twenty -ac re por tion of that 10 0- a c re tr a c t is le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt.13

The B ank attac hed a sur

vey or' s plat made a s the result of a survey co n d ucted by

a Te x as reg istered public surve y or to its first moti on for su mmary judgme nt; this plat purports to descr ibe

a seve nty -ac re tra ct comprised of the fifty -ac re tra ct and the twe nty -ac re tra ct. This plat ref lects the tw e nty a c re s' so uth bo un da

ry to be c omm on wi th the fi ft y a c re s' no rt

h bo un da ry and fo r the tw o tr a c ts to posse ss a common west corne r. There is, how ever , no evidenc e to e x plain how t h e s u rv ey or established the bounda

ry lines of the twenty -ac re trac t show n on his plat. The B ank simply argues the desc ripti o n i s sufficient be cause a surve y or loca ted the prope rty

and pre pare d the " plats and met es an d b ou nd s d escr ip ti on s as refere nced ." Texas courts use a fa irly

strict application of the statute of fr auds and c onvey ance s, y et, the

c ourt s h a ve a lso no te d th a t th e wo rd s o f d e sc ri pti on are g ive n a

lib e ra l c on str

uc tio n in or de r t hat a conveyance may be upheld. Although parol evidenc e may be admitted to ex p l ai n t h e descriptive words and to identify the l and whe re the instrument contains a " nucleus" of desc ription, Gates , 280 S.W. 2d 24 7; Sm ith v . S

or e lle , 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W .2d 703 (1935); Miller v. Hodge s , 260 S.W . 168 (Tex. Comm ' n App. 1924), none appea rs i n this case . We also note t hat even lang uag e stating the land is " my pr op e rt y ," " my land ," or " ow ne d b y

me " " is s uf

fi c ie nt w hen it is show n b y e xtri ns ic evidenc e that the pa

rty to be charg ed and who has signe d the contra ct or memora ndum owns a trac t and on ly on e tr act of lan d answ eri ng th e des cri pt io n i n t he m emo rand um ." Kmiec v . Reagan , 556 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 7 , 5 6 9 (T ex . 1 9 7 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Picke tt v. Bishop , 148 Tex. 207, 223 S .W.2d 222, 223 (1949))

.14

Ne ve rt he le ss, to b e su ff

ic ie nt, the de e d mu st f

ur nis h with in i tse lf

, o r b y re fe re nc e to s ome oth e r w ri tin g , th e me ans or data by wh ic h the land

to b e c on ve y e d ma

y be ide nti fi e d w ithre a so na ble

cer tainty

. Id. a t 56 9; Morrow , 47 7 S.W. 2d a t 53 9; Litt lejohn v. Kariel , 5 6 8 S. W. 2 d 4 5 2 , 4 5 4 ( T e x. Civ. App.—W aco 1978, no w rit) (finding d es cr i p t i o n in deed insuff icient when it re fer

red to " 50

acr es . . . off

the South end" of

a spec ified trac t). I n th is c a se , to sim

ply de sc ri be pr op e rt

y a s " of f o f t he we st e nd," even wh e n th e ma in proper ty is ad eq u at el y identified, is not sufficient, standingalone, to dete rmine whe re, or at what ang le, or ser ies of ang les, the prope rty was divided fr om the main part. See Matney , 210 S.W .2d at 982 (" I f the shape s respe ctively of the two piec es of land ha d been stated and c ourse a nd distances of boundary lines called, and the four acr es had be en desig nated ' off of ' instead of ' out of' the larg er piece , a less diffic ult question would be prese nted. Howeve r, under the established law of this s tate, the desc riptive lang uag e used in thi s lease is vitally lackingin definiteness." ). Even thoug h the surveyor set boundar ies, there is no evidence he was able to loc ate the twenty -ac re tra ct in question with rea sonable c erta inty

based on the data c ontained in the deed or any other writing. The survey appea rs to place the t wenty -ac re tract in the northwest corne r of the 100-acre trac t. We find nothing in the descr iption of the proper ty that would provide data to establish that the prope rty was located in the northwest corne r. The diff iculty with the descr iption is that it refe rs only to "[b]eing 20 ac res off of the West end of the f

o l l o wi n g descr ibed one- hundred a cre trac t." In order to establish the pr e c ise loc a tio n o f t

he tw e nty a c re s, on e mus t e ng a g e in i nf e re nc e and c on

je c tur e to d e te rm ine its15

b o undarie s. This description is somewhat like that in W illiams v. Ellison , 4 9 3 S. W. 2 d 7 3 4, 735 (Tex. 1973), in which the proper ty was descr ibed as: "a

portion of the boundar

y line of the 10 a cre trac t so purchas ed shall be c ontiguous to a por tion of the boundary

line of the 10 a cre s descr ibed above in this contra ct

. . . ." The Te x as Supreme Court he ld the descr iption did no m ore tha n provide a si te of orig in for the option trac t. Id. at 736. L ikewise, he re, the descr iption merely provided that the twenty -ac re tra ct was " off of " the west end of t he 100-acre trac t. I t did not provide any distance that such trac t was to be c ontiguous with the we st end. Theor etically , a twenty -ac re tra ct could have been " off of

the wes t en d " o f t h e 100-acre trac t even if it had a mutual boundary

for a very short d i s t an c e . N e i t h e r d i d t h e d e s c r i p t i o n p r o v i d e an y l e n g t h , b r e a d t h , o r s h a p e o f t h e r e f e r e n c e d t w e n t yacr e tra ct. The writing did not supply sufficie nt inf ormation within itself or by ref ere nce to another do c ume nt t o lo c a te the tw e nty -a c re tr a c t. Th e on ly oth e r re fe re nc e wa s to the or ig ina l 10 0- a c re tr a c t, from which it wa s supposed to be ca rved, a nd that is not sufficient to assi s t in identify ing a nd loc a tin g thi s tw e nty -a c re tr a c t w ithre a so na ble c e rt a int

y . T hu s, the de e d f

a ils to s a tis fy

the statut e of fr auds and is void and une nforc eable

. F . Attor ney's Fe es The trial c ourt awa

r d e d th e B a nk a tt o r n e y ' s fee s on its "cr oss-ac tion" for decla ratory judgme nt

a g a i n s t t h e F e ar s e s an d e s t a b l i s h e d t h e B an k ' s o w n e r s h i p o f

b o t h t h e f i f t y- a c r e t r a c tan d

t h e t w e n t yacr e tra ct. The de clar atory judgme nts statute allows the court to aw ard r easona ble and necessa

ry att orn ey 's fees "as are equ it abl e andju st ." T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 37.009 (Ve rnonNo issue is prese nted t o this Court as t o whether the B ank' s counterc laim asserts a c ause of 8 action indepe ndent of the F ear ses' suit. See BH P Pe tro le um Co. v . M

illar d , 8 0 0 S. W. 2 d

8 3 8 ( T e x. 1990). 16 1997). One of the considerations in determining a rea sonable attorney ' s fee is "the a mount involved andth e res ul ts ob tai ned ." Arthur Andersen &Co. v. Perry E quip. Corp. , 9 4 5 S. W. 2 d

8 1 2 , 8 1 8 ( T e x. 1 9 9 7 ). Fu rt h er , u n d er t h e De cl ar at o ry J u d gm en t s Ac t , t h e at t o rn ey 's fe e i s al s o s u b j ec t t o t h e c o u rt 's deter mination that the f

ee is e quitable and just. When the court a war ded the attorney ' s fee , the B ank had pre vailed in all re spects; we have de termined the judg ment is in error r eg ardingtwenty of the seventy acr es involved. Ther efor e, we cannot be rea sonably cer tain the t ri al co u rt was not sig nif ic antl y inf lue nc e d in aw a

rd ing a tto rn e y ' s fe e s by an er ro ne ou s c on c lus ion

that th e B ank

sh ou ld

rec over the entire se venty acr es. C onsequently , we r ever se the a war d of attorne y ' s fee s and re mand to the trial court for further considera tion in li g ht of our opinion. See B arker v

. Eck man , 213 S.W .3d 30 6, 31 4 ( Te x. 20 06 ); Avc o Corp. v. Interstate Sw., Ltd. , No. 14 -0 5 -0 0 8 60-CV, 2007 Tex. App. L EXI S 8838, at *97 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 14th Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007, no pet. h.). 817

We affir m the judgme nt as t o t h e Fe arse s' claims conc erningthe fifty -ac re tra ct. Having found the c onvey ance of the twe nty -ac re t ra ct v oid and unenf orce able, we reve rse a

nd rende r j u d gm en to nt h at i s s u e. T h e at t o rn ey 's fe e is s u e is re v er s ed an d re m an d edfo r f

u rt h er p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion.

J ack Ca rter J ustice

Date Submitted: Dec ember 10, 2007 Date D ecide d: Fe bruar y 6, 2008