Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

Not for Publication in West’s Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

 

No. 08-1113

ZHOU LU,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

 

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

 

Before

Howard, Baldock, and Selya, Circuit Judge. *

 

Thomas V. Masssuci, on brief, for petitioner.

Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Civil Division, Terri J. Scardon, Assistant Director, and

Manueal A. Palau, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, on brief, for respondent.

 

September 24, 2008

 
 Petitioner also unsuccessfully sought relief under 1

the United Nations Convention Against Torture. That claim

is not before us on the Petition for Review.

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BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. The Department of

Homeland Security charged Petitioner Zhou Lu, a citizen of

the Peoples Republic of China, with unauthorized entry into

the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

Petitioner admitted the charge’s factual allegations

(contained in a Notice to Appear) and filed an application

for asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). In her application, Petitioner 1

alleged a fear of persecution in China related to her

involvement with Falun Gong.

Following a hearing at which Petitioner testified at

length, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found her not credible.

See id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii),(iii) (establishing framework

for credibility determinations). Based on blanket findings,

the IJ first concluded Petitioner was not eligible for

asylum. The IJ explained that Petitioner did not meet her

burden of establishing that she was a “refugee” within the

meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), i.e., having a well

founded fear of persecution based on membership in, among

other things, a religious or particular social group. See

id. § 1158(b) (requiring applicant for asylum to establish

refugee status). The IJ next concluded that Petitioner was
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not entitled to withholding of removal because she did not

meet her burden of establishing her life or freedom would be

threatened on account of religion or membership in a

particular social group if removed to China. See id. §

1231(b)(3). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. See 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

In Jiang v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2007)

we set forth the standard of review applicable to the

present Petition:

This court reviews findings of fact in immigration

proceedings, including findings with respect to

credibility, to determine whether those findings

are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Under that standard, an adverse

credibility determination may stand if it is

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole.

(internal quotations and citation omitted). We need not

repeat Petitioner’s story here. We have carefully reviewed

the entire record and the parties’ briefs, and conclude that

the IJ and BIA reached a permissible result under the

applicable law. We have repeatedly opined that “‘when a

lower court accurately takes the measure of a case and

articulates a cogent rationale, it serves no useful purpose

for a reviewing court to write at length.’” Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005)
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(quoting Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84, 86 (1st

Cir. 2002) (citing cases)). Because the BIA’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence, we deny the Petition for

Review for substantially the reasons set forth in that

decision. See Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.

2008) (“Where the BIA does not [expressly] adopt the IJ’s

findings, we review the BIA’s decision rather than the

IJ’s.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.