2008 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-21-2008

Combs v. Homer Ctr Sch Dist

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 06-3090

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Recommended Citation

"Combs v. Homer Ctr Sch Dist" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 578.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/578
 PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 06-3090, 06-3091,

06-3092, 06-3093, 06-3094, 06-3095

MR. DARRELL COMBS; MRS. KATHLEEN COMBS

Appellants at No. 06-3090

v.

HOMER-CENTER SCHOOL DISTRICT;

JOSEPH F. MARCOLINE, in his official capacity as

Superintendent of Homer-Center School District;

TITUSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;

BRISTOL TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT;

FRANKLIN REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT

(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1599)

DR. THOMAS PREVISH; TIMARI PREVISH

Appellants at No. 06-3091

v.

NORWIN SCHOOL DISTRICT;
2

RICHARD WATSON, in his official capacity as

Superintendent of Norwin School District

(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-1670)

DR. MARK NEWBORN; MRS. MARYALICE NEWBORN

Appellants at No. 06-3092

v.

FRANKLIN REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT;

STEPHEN VAK, in his official capacity as

Superintendent of Franklin Regional School District

(D.C. Civil Action 04-cv-1932)

MR. THOMAS HANKIN; MRS. BABETTE HANKIN

Appellants at No. 06-3093

v.

BRISTOL TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT;

REGINA CESARIO, in her official capacity as

Superintendent of Bristol Township School District

(D.C. Civil Action 04-cv-1936)

MR. DOUGLAS NELSON; MRS. SHARI NELSON

Appellants at No. 06-3094

v.
3

TITUSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;

JOHN D. REAGLE, in his official capacity as

Acting Superintendent of Titusville Area School District

(D.C. Civil Action 05-cv-0070)

REV. STEVEN WEBER; MRS. MEG WEBER

Appellants at No. 06-3095

v.

DuBOIS AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT;

SHARON KIRK, in her official capacity as

Superintendent of DuBois Area School District

(D.C. Civil Action 05-cv-0203)

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Honorable Arthur J. Schwab)

Argued November 6, 2007

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge,

AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: August 21, 2008 )
4

MICHAEL P. FARRIS, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

JAMES R. MASON, III, ESQUIRE

Home School Legal Defense Association

1 Patrick Henry Circle

Purcellville, Virginia 20132-0000

Attorneys for Appellants

CARL P. BEARD, JR., ESQUIRE

PATRICK J. FANELLI, ESQUIRE

Andrews & Beard

3366 Lynnwood Drive

P.O. Box 1311

Altoona, Pennsylvania 16603

Attorneys for Appellee,

Homer-Center School District

CHRISTINA LANE, ESQUIRE

Andrews & Price

1500 Ardmore Boulevard, Suite 506

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15221

Attorney for Appellees,

Homer-Center School District,

Titusville Area School District,

Bristol Township School District,

Franklin Regional School District,

Stephen Vak, in his official capacity as

Superintendent of Franklin Regional School District,

Norwin School District, DuBois Area School District
5

PATRICIA K. SMITH, ESQUIRE 

Knox McLaughlin Gornall & Sennett

120 West Tenth Street

Erie, Pennsylvania 16501

Attorney for Appellees,

Titusville Area School District,

John D. Reagle, in his official capacity as

Acting Superintendent of Titusville Area School District

PAUL N. LALLEY, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

Levin Legal Group, P.C.

1301 Masons Mill Business Park

1800 Byberry Road

Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania 19006

Attorney for Appellees,

Bristol Township School District,

Regina Cesario, in her official capacity as

Superintendent of Bristol Township School District

MICHAEL L. BRUNGO, ESQUIRE

RONALD R. LUCAS, JR., ESQUIRE

ALFRED C. MAIELLO, ESQUIRE

Maiello Brungo & Maiello, LLP

3301 McCrady Road

One Churchill Park

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15235

Attorneys for Appellees,

Norwin School District,
6

Richard Watson, in his official capacity as

Superintendent of Norwin School District,

DuBois Area School District,

Sharon Kirk, in her official capacity as

Superintendent of DuBois Area School District

CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, ESQUIRE

Dechert LLP

Cira Centre, 18th Floor

2929 Arch Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Attorney for Amicus Curiae-Appellant,

American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania

ANN G. ST. LEDGER, ESQUIRE

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Department of Education

333 Market Street, Suite 911

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126

Attorney for Amicus Curiae-Appellee,

Pennsylvania Department of Education

SEAN A. FIELDS, ESQUIRE

Pennsylvania School Boards Association

400 Bent Creek Boulevard, P.O. Box 2042

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055

Attorney for Amicus Curiae-Appellee,

Pennsylvania School Boards Association
7

JEFFREY I. PASEK, ESQUIRE

Cozen & O'Connor

1900 Market Street, 3rd Floor

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Attorney for Amicus Curiae-Appellee,

Jewish Social Policy Action Network

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

At issue is whether certain parents who home-school

their children must comply with the reporting and review

requirements of Pennsylvania’s compulsory education law.

Compliance, the parents contend, would violate their sincerely

held religious beliefs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

demurs, contending its compulsory education law neither

substantially burdens the free exercise of religion nor

transgresses neutral application to all citizens, and serves an

important state interest in ensuring a minimal level of education

for all children. 

Plaintiffs appeal from the grant of summary judgment for

defendants in an action seeking declaratory relief and an

injunction prohibiting enforcement of 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-

1327.1 (“Act 169”) and prosecution under Pennsylvania’s
 We refer to Homer-Center School District, Joseph F. 1

Marcoline, Norwin School District, Richard Watson, Franklin

Regional School District, Stephen Vak, Bristol Township

School District, Regina Cesario, Titusville Area School District,

John D. Reagle, DuBois Area School District and Sharon Kirk

collectively as the “school districts.”

 The “Parents” are Darrell and Kathleen Combs, Thomas and 2

Timari Prevish, Mark and Maryalice Newborn, Thomas and

Babette Hankin, Douglas and Shari Nelson, and Steven and Meg

Weber.

8

compulsory education laws. Defendants are school districts in

Pennsylvania and superintendents named in their official

capacity. Plaintiffs are six families who home-school their 1

children. 

2

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s education system,

as enacted by the General Assembly, allows parents to satisfy

the compulsory attendance requirement through “home

education programs.” Parents supervising the home education

programs must provide instruction for a minimum number of

days and hours in certain subjects and submit a portfolio of

teaching logs and the children’s work product for review. The

local school district reviews the home education programs for

compliance with the minimum hours of instruction and course

requirements and determines whether each student demonstrates

progress in the overall program. The school district does not
9

review the educational content, textbooks, curriculum,

instructional materials, or methodology of the program. 

Parents, who home-school their children based on their

sincerely held religious beliefs, have sued their respective school

districts and school superintendents. Parents contend the Act

169 record-keeping requirements and the subsequent portfolio

review place a substantial burden on their free exercise of

religion. They seek an exemption from the Act 169

requirements and request declaratory and injunctive relief on the

grounds that the provisions of Act 169 violate the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States

and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act

(“RFPA”), 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2401–2407.

I.

Parents have home-schooled their children for many

years. All six families are Christians, but of different

denominations. They hold in common a religious belief that

“education of their children, not merely the religious education,

is religion” and that God has assigned religious matters to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the family. Accordingly, because God

has given Parents the sole responsibility for educating their

children, the school districts’ reporting requirements and

“discretionary review” over their home education programs

violate their free exercise of religion.

In 2002, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed the

Religious Freedom Protection Act. The statute requires the
 Thomas and Babette Hankin have never complied with Act 3

169. 

 See 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2405(b) (requiring, prior to bringing 4

an action in court, the party to provide the agency with written

notice); § 2405(d) (the agency “may remedy the substantial

burden on the person’s free exercise of religion” within 30 days

of the written notice). Darrell and Kathleen Combs refused to

submit the required affidavits and portfolios, thereby ceasing to

comply with Act 169.

10

Commonwealth to justify substantial burdens on religious free

exercise with a compelling interest and a showing that the least

restrictive means has been employed to satisfy that interest.

Prior to the passage of the Religious Freedom Protection Act,

many of the Parents complied with the Act 169 home education

program requirements. Pre-RFPA, there is no evidence that the 3

school districts ever questioned or interfered with Parents’ home

education programs’ educational content, methodology,

curriculum, or materials. On some occasions, the school

districts required Parents to supplement their logs and portfolios

with additional information. But Parents are unable to identify

an instance in which the school districts rejected any part of

their home education program. 

Nevertheless, post-RFPA, Parents notified the school

districts that Act 169 substantially burdens their free exercise of

religion and sought an exemption from compliance. The school 4
11

districts refused to grant Parents an exemption from Act 169 and

threatened or, in some cases, initiated criminal prosecutions for

truancy.

In response, Parents sued the school districts in various

state and federal courts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and RFPA. Ultimately, the

cases ended up before the United States District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylvania, which consolidated the six

cases for pre-trial and summary judgment purposes. Upon

consent of the parties, discovery was limited to “threshold legal

issues” such as whether Act 169 substantially burdened Parents’

free exercise of religion under the RFPA and the proper standard

of review for Parents’ federal constitutional claims. The District

Court engaged in two rounds of summary judgment motions. 

The first round addressed facial challenges to Act 169.

Parents filed a consolidated motion for summary judgment and

the school districts filed a consolidated opposition, but did not

file a cross-motion for summary judgment. The District Court

denied Parents’ motion. Combs v. Homer Ctr. Sch. Dist., 2005

WL 3338885 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2005). In the second round, the

school districtsfiled a motion for summary judgment addressing

both Parents’ facial and “as applied” challenges to Act 169. The

District Court granted the school districts’ motion, concluding

that (1) Parents failed to prove a “substantial burden” on the free

exercise of religion, as defined by RFPA, Combs v. Homer Ctr.

Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp. 2d 738, 771 (W.D. Pa. 2006), and (2)
 The District Court also rejected Parents’ claims based upon 5

the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Free

Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 778. The

Statement of Issues in Parents’ brief only addresses claims under

RFPA and the Free Exercise Clause. 

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§

1331, 1343(a)(3), 1367 and 1441. We have jurisdiction over the

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court's

grant of summary judgment de novo.” Lighthouse Inst. for

Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 260 (3d

Cir. 2007) (citing Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 56 F.3d 530,

533 (3d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is only appropriate if

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the school

districts are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). “In reviewing the District Court's grant of summary

judgment, we view the facts in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party[:]” Parents. Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 260.

 In a dictum, the District Court stated: “Even if this Court 6

were to apply a ‘hybrid rights’ heightened or strict scrutiny test,

however, Plaintiff’s free exercise challenge to Act 169 on its

face would still fail.” Id. at 777. 

12

Act 169 is a neutral law of general applicability, satisfying

rational basis review, id. at 777. As a result, the District Court 5

did not decide issues of compelling governmental interest or

least restrictive means.6
 As noted by the District Court, “[a]n educated citizenry has 7

been recognized as critical to the success and well-being of the

Nation and its people from the time of its creation.” Combs, 468

F. Supp. 2d at 740-41. Pennsylvania’s commitment to public

education is firmly rooted in its history. See id. at 741-43. In

1682, the “Great Law” passed by the First General Assembly of

Pennsylvania “included a provision for the creation of schools

across Pennsylvania.” Id. at 742. Furthermore, the various

Pennsylvania constitutions have included provisions for public

education. Id. (citing the 1776 provisional Pennsylvania

Constitution, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, and Art. II,

§ 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in its current form). The

current Pennsylvania Code describes the purpose of public

education as “prepar[ing] students for adult life” and creating

“self-directed, life-long learners and responsible, involved

citizens.” 22 Pa. Code. § 4.11(b) (2008).

13

II.

A.

The Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that the General

Assembly “provide for the maintenance and support of a

thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the

needs of the Commonwealth.” Pa. Const., Art. III, § 14. The

General Assembly has carried out its constitutional charge by

enacting the Public School Code. See 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-

101 to 27-2702.7
 A child may satisfy the compulsory attendance requirement 8

by attending a public day school. 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-

1327(a). “In lieu of such school attendance” any child fifteen

years of age who receives approval of the district superintendent

and the Secretary of Education, or any child sixteen years of age

who receives approval of the district superintendent, may enroll

in a trade or business school. Id. Attendance at either public

day school or a trade or business school satisfies the mandate

14

The Public School Code requires “every child of

compulsory school age having a legal residence in this

Commonwealth . . . to attend a day school in which the subjects

and activities prescribed by the standards of the State Board of

Education are taught in the English language.” 24 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-1327(a). “Compulsory school age” is defined as “the

period of a child’s life from the time the child’s parents elect to

have the child enter school, which shall be not later than at the

age of eight (8) years, until the age of seventeen (17) years.” Id.

§ 13-1326. See also 22 Pa. Code § 11.13 (2008). A student

who “holds a certificate of graduation from a regularly

accredited senior high school” satisfies the compulsory

attendance requirement and is no longer of compulsory school

age. 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1326.

The Pennsylvania General Assembly currently permits

parents to choose among four alternative categories of education

to satisfy the compulsory attendance requirement: (1) a public

school with certain trade school options, id. § 13-1327(a); (2) 8
that “every parent, guardian, or other person having control or

charge of any child or children of compulsory school age is

required to send such child or children to a day school in which

the subjects and activities prescribed by the standards of the

State Board of Education are taught in the English language.”

Id.

 A child may satisfy the compulsory attendance requirement 9

by attending “an accredited or licensed private school,” 22 Pa.

Code § 11.32 (2008), “in which the subjects and activities

prescribed by the standards of the State Board of Education are

taught in the English language.” 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327(a).

“The certificate of any principal or teacher of a private school,

or of any institution . . .” must “set[] forth that the work of said

school is in compliance with the provisions of this act.” Id.

Also, regular daily instruction in the English language by a

properly qualified private tutor satisfies the compulsory

attendance requirement. Id. The Pennsylvania Administrative

Code enumerates minimum hours of instruction and the required

subjects at both the elementary and secondary school levels. 22

Pa. Code § 11.31 (2008).

A child may enroll in a day school “operated by a bona fide 10

church or other religious body.” 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327(b).

15

a private academic day school or private tutoring, id.; (3) a day 9

school operated by a “bona fide church or other religious body,”

id. § 13-1327(b); or (4) a “home education program,” id. § 13- 10
The school must meet minimum standards for hours of

instruction and teach the subjects enumerated in the statute. See

id. (“[A] minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days of

instruction or nine hundred (900) hours of instruction per year

at the elementary level or nine hundred ninety (990) hours per

year of instruction at the secondary level . . . .”); id. § 13-

1327(b)(1) (requiring at the elementary school level, the

following courses: “English, to include spelling, reading and

writing; arithmetic; science; geography; history of the United

States and Pennsylvania; civics; safety education, including

regular and continuous instruction in the dangers and prevention

of fires; health and physiology; physical education; music; and

art”); id. § 13-1327(b)(2) (“At the secondary school level, the

following courses [must be] offered: English, to include

language, literature, speech and composition; science, to include

biology and chemistry; geography; social studies, to include

civics, economics, world history, history of the United States

and Pennsylvania; a foreign language; mathematics, to include

general mathematics and statistics, algebra and geometry; art;

music; physical education; health and physiology; and safety

education, including regular and continuous instruction in the

dangers and prevention of fires.”).

Further, the principal must file a notarized affidavit with

the Department of Education setting forth that the required

subjects are offered in the English language, whether the school

is a nonprofit organization, and that the school is otherwise in

16
compliance with the provisions of the Public School Code. Id.

§ 13-1327(b). 

Although the statute requires religious schools to teach

certain subjects, “[i]t is the policy of the Commonwealth to

preserve the primary right and the obligation of the parent or

parents . . . to choose the education and training for such child.”

Id. Thus, “[n]othing contained in this act shall empower the

Commonwealth, any of its officers, agencies or subdivisions to

approve the course content, faculty, staff or disciplinary

requirements of any religious school referred to in this section

without the consent of said school.” Id.

 Act 169 enumerates the following “minimum courses in 11

grades nine through twelve” as a requirement for graduation

from a home education program: four years of English; three

years of mathematics; three years of science; three years of

17

1327.1. 

Significant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania General

Assembly permitted the fourth alternative in 1988. See Act 169

of 1988, P.L. 1321, No. 169, December 21, 1988, 24 Pa. Stat.

Ann. § 13-1327.1. Under Act 169, a child instructed under a

“home education program” satisfies the compulsory attendance

requirement. Id. A home education program must satisfy the

same minimum hours of instruction requirements and almost all

of the same subject matter requirements as a school operated by

a bona fide church or religious body. Id. §§ 13-1327(b), 13- 11
social studies; two years of arts and humanities. 24 Pa. Stat.

Ann. § 13-1327.1(d). But, in contrast to § 13-1327(b), Act 169

leaves the decision whether to teach certain secondary level

subjects – economics, biology, chemistry, foreign languages,

trigonometry, or other age-appropriate courses as contained in

22 Pa. Code Ch. 4 – to the discretion of the supervisor of the

home education program. 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327.1(c)(2).

 

18

1327.1(c).

Prior to the commencement of a home education

program, and thereafter on August 1 of each year, the parent or

guardian of the child must file an affidavit with the district

superintendent setting forth:

the name of the supervisor of the home education

program who shall be responsible for the

provision of instruction; the name and age of each

child who shall participate . . . ; the address and

telephone number of the . . . site; that such

subjects as required by law are offered in the

English language, including an outline of

proposed education objectives by subject area . .

. ; and that the home education program shall

comply with the provisions of this section . . . .
 In addition, the affidavit must provide evidence that the 12

child has been immunized and has received the health and

medicalservicesrequired forstudents of the child’s age or grade

level. 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327.1(b)(1). Further, “[t]he

affidavit shall contain a certification to be signed by the

supervisor that the supervisor, all adults living in the home and

persons having legal custody of a child or children in a home

education program have not been convicted of the criminal

offenses enumerated in subsection (e) of section 111 within five

years immediately preceding the date of the affidavit.” Id.

“Supervisor” is defined by Act 169 as “the parent or guardian or

such person having legal custody of the child or children who

shall be responsible for the provision of instruction, provided

that such person has a high school diploma or its equivalent.”

Id. § 13-1327.1(a).

19

Id. § 13-1327.1(b)(1).12

The superintendent of the public school district of the

child’s residence is charged with ensuring that each child is

receiving “appropriate education,” which is defined by Act 169

as “a program consisting of instruction in the required subjects

for the time required in this act and in which the student

demonstrates sustained progress in the overall program.” Id. §

13-1327.1(a). In order to demonstrate to the superintendent that

“appropriate education” is taking place, at the end of each public

school year the supervisor of the home education program must
 “In addition, if the superintendent has a reasonable belief 13

that, at any time during the school year, appropriate education

may not be occurring in the home education program, he may .

. . require documentation . . . to be submitted to the district . . .

.” 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327.1(h). 

20

submit a file with two types of documentation. First, the file 13

must contain a portfolio of records and materials:

The portfolio shall consist of a log, made

contemporaneously with the instruction, which

designates by title the reading materials used,

samples of any writings, worksheets, workbooks

or creative materials used or developed by the

student and in grades three, five and eight results

of nationally normed standardized achievement

tests in reading/language arts and mathematics or

the results of Statewide tests administered in these

grade levels. The department shall establish a list,

with a minimum of five tests, of nationally

normed standardized tests from which the

supervisor of the home education program shall

select a test to be administered if the supervisor

does not choose the Statewide tests. At the

discretion of the supervisor, the portfolio may

include the results of nationally normed

standardized achievement tests for other subject

areas or grade levels. The supervisor shall ensure
 Act 169 permits evaluation by “a licensed clinical or school 14

psychologist or a teacher certified by the Commonwealth or by

a nonpublic school teacher or administrator.” 24 Pa. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-1327.1(e)(2). “Any such nonpublic teacher or

administrator shall have at least two years of teaching

experience in a Pennsylvania public or nonpublic school within

the last ten years.” Id. Further, any nonpublic teacher or

administrator or certified teacher must have the required

“experience at the elementary level to evaluate elementary

students or at the secondary level to evaluate secondary

students.” Id. 

A teacher or administrator who evaluates a

portfolio at the elementary level (grades

kindergarten through six) shall have at least two

years of experience in grading any of the

following subjects: English, to include spelling,

reading and writing; arithmetic; science;

geography; history of the United States and

21

that the nationally normed standardized tests or

the Statewide tests shall not be administered by

the child's parent or guardian.

Id. § 13-1327.1(e)(1). 

Second, the supervisor of the home education program

must obtain an annual written evaluation of the child’s work. Id.

§ 13-1327.1(e)(2). The supervisor may choose any person

qualified under Act 169 to make the evaluation. The 14
Pennsylvania; and civics.

Id. § 13-1327.1(e)(1)(i).

A teacher or administrator who evaluates a

portfolio at the secondary level (grades seven

through twelve) shall have at least two years of

experience in grading any of the following

subjects: English, to include language, literature,

speech, reading and composition; science, to

include biology, chemistry and physics;

geography; social studies, to include economics,

civics, world history, history of the United States

and Pennsylvania; foreign language; and

mathematics, to include general mathematics,

algebra, trigonometry, calculus and geometry.

Id. § 13-1327.1(e)(1)(ii). “[T]he term ‘grading’ shall mean

evaluation of classwork, homework, quizzes, classwork-based

tests and prepared tests related to classwork subject matter.” Id.

§ 13-1327.1(e)(1)(iii). 

“At the request of the supervisor, persons with other

qualifications may conduct the evaluation with the prior consent

of the district of residence superintendent. In no event shall the

evaluator be the supervisor or their spouse.” Id. § 13-

1327.1(e)(2).

22

evaluation measures:

the student's educational progress . . . . The

evaluation shall also be based on an interview of
 The superintendent may not rely upon the outline of 15

proposed educational objectives provided at the beginning of the

year when making his “appropriate education” determination.

24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327.1(b)(1). 

23

the child and a review of the portfolio required in

clause (1) and shall certify whether or not an

appropriate education is occurring.

Id.

Based upon the entire file – the portfolio of records and

materials and the third-party evaluation – the superintendent

determines whether the home education program provides the

child with an “appropriate education.”15

If the superintendent . . . determines, based on the

documentation provided . . . that appropriate

education is not taking place for the child in the

home education program, the superintendent shall

send a letter . . . to the supervisor of the home

education program stating that in his opinion

appropriate education is not taking place for the

child in the home education program and shall

return all documentation, specifying what aspect

or aspects of the documentation are inadequate.

Id. § 13-1327.1(i). Upon receipt of the letter, the supervisor has

twenty days “to submit additional documentation demonstrating

that appropriate education is taking place for the child in the
 The “hearing examiner” “shall not be an officer, employe 16

[sic] or agent of the Department of Education or of the school

district or intermediate unit of residence of the child in the home

education program.” Id. § 13-1327.1(a).

 In lieu of rendering a decision, the hearing examiner may 17

“require the establishment of a remedial education plan mutually

agreed to by the superintendent and supervisor of the home

education program which shall continue the home education

program.” 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 13-1327.1(k). 

24

home education program.” Id. § 13-1327.1(j). If the additional

documentation is not timely submitted, the home education

program “shall be out of compliance” with the compulsory

attendance requirements and the student must promptly enroll in

either a public school, a nonpublic religious school, or a licensed

private school. Id.

If the superintendent concludes that a timely amended file

still fails to demonstrate appropriate education, he or she will

notify the supervisor of his or her determination. Further, the

supervisor will be given a “proper hearing by a duly qualified

and impartial hearing examiner” within thirty days. Id. § 13-

1327.1(k). “If the hearing examiner finds that the 16

documentation does not indicate that appropriate education is

taking place in the home education program,” the student must

be promptly enrolled in either a public school, a nonpublic

religious school, or a licensed private academic school. Id. § 17
25

13-1327.1(l). “The decision of the [hearing] examiner may be

appealed by either the supervisor of the home education

program or the superintendent to the Secretary of Education or

Commonwealth Court [of Pennsylvania].” Id. § 13-1327.1(k).

In practice, the school districts engage in a limited level

of oversight. The school districts require a minimum of two

contacts with the State during the calendar year – the submission

of an affidavit at the beginning of the year and the submission

of the portfolio and evaluation at the end of the year. Deposition

testimony reveals that school officials do not check in on the

progress of home education programs during the school year.

Furthermore, all school officials deposed acknowledged that

they never disagreed with or rejected an independent evaluator’s

assessment of the home education program. School officials

reviewed the disclosures for compliance with the statute and, if

all the required disclosures were presented, the home education

program would be approved. 

B.

As noted, in 2002 the Pennsylvania General Assembly

enacted the Religious Freedom Protection Act. 71 Pa. Stat.

Ann. §§ 2401–2407. Titled “[a]n Act protecting the free

exercise of religion; and prescribing the conditions under which

government may substantially burden a person's free exercise of

religion,” Id. § 2401, the RFPA was based on two legislative

findings:

(1) Laws and governmental actions which are
26

facially neutral toward religion, as well as laws

and governmental actions intended to interfere

with religious exercise, may have the effect of

substantially burdening the free exercise of

religion. However, neither State nor local

government should substantially burden the free

exercise of religion without compelling

justification.

(2) The General Assembly intends that all laws

which it has heretofore enacted or will hereafter

enact and all ordinances and regulations which

have been or will be adopted by political

subdivisions or executive agencies shall be

construed so as to avoid the imposition of

substantial burdens upon the free exercise of

religion without compelling justification.

Id. § 2402.

Under RFPA, “an agency shall not substantially burden

a person’s free exercise of religion, including any burden which

results from a rule of general applicability,” id. § 2404(a), unless

“the agency proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

burden” is “[i]n furtherance of a compelling interest of the

agency” and is “[t]he least restrictive means of furthering the

compelling interest,” id. § 2404(b).

The General Assembly provides definitions for several

key terms in section 2404. First, “free exercise of religion”
Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 18

provides:

All men have a natural and indefeasible right to

worship Almighty God according to the dictates

of their own consciences; no man can of right be

compelled to attend, erect or support any place of

worship, or to maintain any ministry against his

consent; no human authority can, in any case

whatever, control or interfere with the rights of

conscience, and no preference shall ever be given

by law to any religious establishments or modes

of worship.

Pa. Const., Art. I, § 3. 

27

means “[t]he practice or observance of religion under section 3

of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.” Id. § 2403. 18

Second, “person” is defined as “[a]n individual or a church,

association of churches or other religious order, body or

institution which qualifies for exemption from taxation under

section 501(c)(3) or (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986

(Public Law 99-514, 26 U.S.C. § 501).” 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §

2403. Third, RFPA defines “substantially burden” as “[a]n

agency action which does any of the following:”

(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or

expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held

religious beliefs.

(2) Significantly curtails a person’s ability to
28

express adherence to the person’s religious faith.

(3) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to

engage in activities which are fundamental to the

person’s religion.

(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates

a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.

Id.

RFPA allows a “person whose free exercise of religion

has been burdened or likely will be burdened in violation of [§

2404]” to bring a claim in a judicial proceeding. Id. § 2405(a).

Prior to bringing a claim, the “person” must notify the agency,

describing the agency action and the manner in which it burdens

religion. Id. § 2405(b). A “person” who “proves, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the person’s free exercise of religion

has been burdened . . . in violation of [§ 2404]” may receive

declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. § 2405(f). Monetary

damages are not available. Id.

With limited exceptions, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2406(a)–(b),

RFPA applies “to any State or local law or ordinance and the

implementation of that law or ordinance, whether statutory or

otherwise and whether adopted or effective prior to or after the

effective date of this act,” id. § 2406(a). Thus, RFPA applies to

the Public School Code, 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-101 to 27-2702.

III.

We address Parents’ federal constitutional claim. Parents
 The Free Exercise Clause applies to states and local 19

governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v.

Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

29

contend Act 169 imposes a substantial burden on the free

exercise of religion as protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. The Commonwealth asserts Act 169 is a neutral 19

law of general applicability that is rationally related to the

legitimate governmental interest in ensuring a minimal level of

education for all children. Applying rational basis review, the

District Court concluded that “Act 169 passes constitutional

muster as a neutral law of general applicability and effect.”

Combs, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 777. Accordingly, the District Court

denied Parents’ motion for summary judgment as to the facial

challenge to Act 169 as a violation of the First Amendment of

the United States Constitution and granted the school districts’

motion for summary judgment as to Parents’ as-applied

challenges.

A.

In Employment Division, Department of Human

Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), the

Supreme Court held “a law that is neutral and of general

applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental

interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a

particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu

Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); see also Smith,

494 U.S. at 879 (“[T]he right to free exercise does not relieve an
30

individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral

law of general applicability on the ground that the law

proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or

proscribes).”). The District Court concluded that “Act 169 is a

neutral law of general applicability to all Pennsylvania home

schoolers and their home education programs, with no reference

or special impact on religious practices . . . .” Combs, 468 F.

Supp. 2d at 772. As a result, the District Court applied the

rational basis test to Parents’ challenge of Act 169 and upheld

the provision. Id. at 777. 

In Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir.

2004), we applied the standards for a neutral law of general

applicability articulated by the Court in Hialeah. First, a law

must be both facially and actually neutral. “A law is ‘neutral’ if

it does not target religiously motivated conduct either on its face

or as applied in practice.” Blackhawk, 381 F.3d at 209; see also

Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534 (“Official action that targets religious

conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere

compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free

Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which

is masked, as well as overt.”). Second, the government cannot

advance its interests solely by targeting religiously motivated

conduct. Instead, the regulation must be generally applicable.

A law fails the general applicability requirement

if it burdens a category of religiously motivated

conduct but exempts or does not reach a

substantial category of conduct that is not
31

religiously motivated and that undermines the

purposes of the law to at least the same degree as

the covered conduct that is religiously motivated.

Blackhawk, 381 F.3d at 209; see also Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 543

(“The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate

interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on

conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the

protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise

Clause.”). 

Act 169 is a neutral law of general applicability. It

neither targets religious practice nor selectively imposes burdens

on religiously motivated conduct. Instead, it imposes the same

requirements on parents who home-school for secular reasons as

on parents who do so for religious reasons. Furthermore,

nothing in the record suggests Commonwealth school officials

discriminate against religiously motivated home education

programs (e.g., denying approval of home education programs

because they include faith-based curriculum materials). 

Parents contend Act 169 is not a law of general

applicability and is tantamount to a licensing scheme for homeschooling. They cite Blackhawk, 381 F.3d at 209-10, for the

proposition “that a statute with a waiver mechanism creates a

regime of individualized, discretionary exemptions that triggers

strict scrutiny.” Parents Reply Br. at 8-9. Parents’ depiction of

Act 169 is mistaken and their reliance on Blackhawk is

misplaced. 
32

As noted, there are four ways to fulfill the compulsory

education requirement. None of the options is an exemption

from the compulsory education law. All four require that a child

be educated in the required subjects for the required period.

Furthermore, all parents who choose the home education

program alternative, whether for religious or secular reasons, are

required to fulfill the Act 169 requirements. Parents cite no

statutory waiver mechanism that gives the school districts the

authority to waive or exempt some parents from the disclosure

and review requirements.

In Blackhawk, the Pennsylvania Wildlife Code contained

specific statutory exemptions authorizing the director of the

Game Commission to waive a permit fee “where hardship or

extraordinary circumstance warrants.” Id. at 205. Further, the

court stated: “[w]e are not presented here with a neutral and

generally applicable [provision] that is uniformly imposed

without allowing individualized exemptions. Under Smith, such

a scheme . . . would not trigger strict scrutiny, and a person

seeking to be excused [from the provision’s requirements] on

religious grounds would be unlikely to prevail.” Id. at 212. Act

169 is a neutral law of general applicability and does not allow

individualized exemptions. Blackhawk is distinguishable. 

Since Act 169 is a neutral law of general applicability, we

will apply rational basis review unless an exception to the Smith

rule applies. “[R]ational basis review requires merely that the

action be rationally related to a legitimate government

objective.” Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144,
33

165 n.24 (3d Cir. 2002). “Under rational basis review, ‘a statute

is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the one

attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every

conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not that

basis has a foundation in the record.’” Lighthouse Inst., 510

F.3d at 277 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)).

The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in ensuring

children taught under home education programs are achieving

minimum educational standards and are demonstrating sustained

progress in their educational program. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v.

Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-47 & n.7 (1968) (“[A] substantial body

of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that

attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsoryattendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum

hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and

cover prescribed subjects of instruction . . . . [I]f the State must

satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of

private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which

those schools perform their secular educational function.”);

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,

268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (acknowledging the “power of the

State reasonably to regulate allschools, to inspect, supervise and

examine them, their teachers and pupils”). In Brown v. Board

of Education, the Supreme Court noted the importance of

education and the meaningful role the state plays in preparing a

child for citizenship and adult life:

Today, education is perhaps the most important
34

function of state and local governments.

Compulsory school attendance laws and the great

expenditures for education both demonstrate our

recognition of the importance of education to our

democratic society. It is required in the

performance of our most basic public

responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.

It is the very foundation of good citizenship.

Today it is a principal instrument in awakening

the child to cultural values, in preparing him for

later professional training, and in helping him to

adjust normally to his environment. In these days,

it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be

expected to succeed in life if he is denied the

opportunity of an education.

347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Act 169's disclosure requirements

and corresponding school district review rationally further these

legitimate state interests. Accordingly, Act 169 survives rational

basis review.

B.

Parents assert their claim falls within a “hybrid-rights”

exception the Supreme Court discussed in Smith:

The only decisions in which we have held that the

First Amendment bars application of a neutral,

generally applicable law to religiously motivated

action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
35

alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction

with other constitutional protections, such as

freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell

v. Connecticut, [310 U.S., at 304-307]

(invalidating a licensing system for religious and

charitable solicitations under which the

administrator had discretion to deny a license to

any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v.

Pennsylvania, [319 U.S. 105 (1943)] (invalidating

a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the

dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v.

McCormick, [321 U.S. 573 (1944)] (same), or the

right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v.

Society of Sisters, [268 U.S. 510 (1925)], to direct

the education of their children, see Wisconsin v.

Yoder, [406 U.S. 205 (1972)] (invalidating

compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to

Amish parents who refused on religious grounds

to send their children to school).

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. Parents contend Act 169 substantially

burdens both their free exercise of religion and their

fundamental right as parents, under the Fourteenth Amendment,

to direct the education and upbringing of their children.

Accordingly, they invoke the hybrid-rights exception of Smith,

seeking strict scrutiny review. Alternatively, Parents contend

that, notwithstanding our hybrid-rights determination, Wisconsin

v. Yoder remains good law and the same constitutional test
36

applies here.

1.

Although we have discussed the Smith hybrid-rights

theory in prior opinions, its meaning and application remains an

open question in our circuit. See Blackhawk, 381 F.3d at 207

(noting, while discussing Smith, “the Court did not overrule

prior decisions in which ‘hybrid claims’ . . . had prevailed

against ‘neutral, generally applicable laws,’” but deciding case

on other grounds); Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 165 n.26 (noting “[s]trict

scrutiny may . . . apply when a neutral, generally applicable law

incidentally burdens” hybrid rights); Salvation Army v. Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding

“[b]ecause the present controversy does not concern any state

action directly addressed to religion, [The Salvation Army]

cannot receive protection from the associational right derived

from the free exercise clause”). We have never decided a case

based on a hybrid-rights claim, let alone the type of a hybridrights claim invoked here – one based on the Free Exercise

Clause and the companion right to direct a child’s upbringing.

Smith’s hybrid-rights theory has divided our sister

circuits. Some characterize the theory as dicta and others use

different standards to decide whether a plaintiff has asserted a

cognizable hybrid-rights claim. The United States Courts of

Appeals for the Second and Sixth Circuits have concluded the

hybrid-rights language in Smith is dicta. See Leebaert v.

Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Knight v.
 Justice Souter, concurring in Hialeah, also criticized the 20

hybrid-rights theory:

[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as

ultimately untenable. If a hybrid claim is simply

one in which another constitutional right is

implicated, then the hybrid exception would

probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule,

and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the

situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech

and associational rights are certainly implicated in

the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in

which a litigant would actually obtain an

exemption from a formally neutral, generally

applicable law under another constitutional

provision, then there would have been no reason

37

Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir.

2001)); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v.

Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other

grounds, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio

State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.

1993). Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit views the hybrid-rights exception as “completely

illogical,” Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180, and the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit “can think of no good reason

for the standard of review to vary simply with the number of

constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been

violated,” Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144. Accordingly, when faced 20
for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases

to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.

Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).

38

with a neutral law of general applicability, both appellate courts

decline to allow the application of strict scrutiny to hybrid-rights

claims and instead apply Smith’s rational basis standard. See

Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144 (“‘[A]t least until the Supreme Court

holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary

depending on whether other constitutional rights are implicated,

we will not use a stricter legal standard’ to evaluate hybrid

claims.” (quoting Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180)). 

The United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit

and District of Columbia have acknowledged that hybrid-rights

claims may warrant heightened scrutiny, but have suggested that

a plaintiff must meet a stringent standard: the free exercise claim

must be conjoined with an independently viable companion

right. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (rejecting the “hybrid claim” argument that “the

combination of two untenable claims equals a tenable one”);

E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (finding that the EEOC’s violation of the Establishment

Clause triggered the hybrid-rights exception); Gary S. v.

Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing

Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111, 121

(D.N.H. 2003)) (affirming, for the same reasons, the district

court’s rejection of a hybrid-rights claim because the free
 In Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), the United 21

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected plaintiff

parents’ claims that they must be given prior notice by a public

school and an opportunity to exempt their young children from

reading books the parents find religiously repugnant. In

discussing hybrid-rights claims, the court stated that the strength

of the companion constitutional claim required to establish a

hybrid situation remains unsettled in the First Circuit because

the Brown opinion did not “explicitly” decide the issue. Id. at

98 n.9. It also noted that “the parental rights claim asserted in

that case was found to be so weak that it was not a colorable

claim, much less an independently viable one.” Id. The Parker

court chose not to “enter[] the fray over the meaning and

application of Smith’s‘hybrid situations’ language,” and instead

“approach[ed] the parents’ claims as the Court did in Yoder. In

that case, the Court did not analyze separately the due process

and free exercise interests of the parent-plaintiffs, but rather

considered the two claims interdependently, given that those two

sets of interests inform one other.” Id. at 98. The court

ultimately found that plaintiffs did not describe “a constitutional

burden on their rights” and affirmed the district court’s dismissal

39

exercise claim was not conjoined with an independently viable

companion claim); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68

F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting a hybrid-rights claim

because “[plaintiff’s] free exercise challenge is . . . not

conjoined with an independently protected constitutional

protection”).21
for failure to state a claim. Id. at 99. 

 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the 22

Seventh Circuit has not definitively articulated its approach, it

has approvingly quoted the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v.

Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller v.

Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1999)); but see id.

40

This stringent approach requiring an independently valid

companion claim has received criticism, most notably that such

a requirement would make the free exercise claim superfluous.

See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]f a

hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an

exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law

under another constitutional provision, then there would have

been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases

to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.”); AxsonFlynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 2004)

(“[I]t makes no sense to adopt a strict standard that essentially

requires a successful companion claim because such a test would

make the free exercise claim unnecessary. If the plaintiff’s

additional constitutional claim is successful, he or she would

typically not need the free exercise claim and the hybrid-rights

exception would add nothing to the case.”). 

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and

Tenth Circuits recognize hybrid rights and require a plaintiff 22
(citing Brown, 68 F.3d at 539 and Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has

recognized the existence of hybrid rights but has not defined the

contours of the analysis. See Cornerstone Bible Church v.

Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 474 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing and

remanding to district court to consider hybrid-rights claim). 

 

41

to raise a “colorable claim that a companion right has been

violated.” San Jose Christian Coll. v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d

1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at

1297. They define colorable as “a fair probability or a

likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits.” San

Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1032; Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d

at 1297. They characterize this fact-driven, case-by-case inquiry

as “a middle ground between two the extremes of painting

hybrid-rights claims too generously and construing them too

narrowly.” Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295. A plaintiff cannot

“simply invoke the parental rights doctrine, combine it with a

claimed free-exercise right, and thereby force the government to

demonstrate the presence of a compelling state interest.”

Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700

(10th Cir. 1998). Nor is one required to establish that the

challenged law independently violates a companion

constitutional right alone, without any recognition of the Free

Exercise Clause. 

By requiring a “colorable claim” that a companion right
 As noted, Justice Souter, concurring in Hialeah, criticized 23

the hybrid-rights theory. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 566-67 (Souter,

J., concurring). Furthermore, in Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S.

507 (1997), the Court noted, without further discussion or

explanation, that Yoder “implicated” the right to free exercise of

religion and the right of parents to control their children’s

education. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514. 

42

has been violated, the United States Courts of Appeals for the

Ninth and Tenth Circuits examine “the claimed infringements

on the party’s claimed rights to determine whether either the

claimed rights or the claimed infringements are genuine.”

Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699. Thus, in order to trigger heightened

scrutiny, a hybrid-rights plaintiff must show a fair probability or

likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits of his

companion constitutional claim. 

In Smith, the Court asserted that the case before it “[did]

not present . . . a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim

unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”

 494 U.S. at 882. The criterion applicable to a free exercise

claim combined with a companion constitutional right was left

undefined. See, e.g., Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180 (noting that the

Smith Court “did not explain how the standards under the Free

Exercise Clause would change depending on whether other

constitutional rights are implicated”). Since Smith, a majority of

the Court has not confirmed the viability of the hybrid-rights

theory. Until the Supreme Court provides direction, we 23
43

believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta. 

2.

Even if we were to apply the approaches used by our

sister circuits – “colorable” claim approach and independently

viable claim approach – we would find Parents’ arguments

unconvincing. Under either approach, we must determine

whether Parents can establish a hybrid-rights claim by asserting

combined violations of the Free Exercise Clause and the

companion right of a parent under the Fourteenth Amendment

to direct a child’s education. Parents have not presented an

independent or colorable companion claim and, accordingly,

cannot establish a valid hybrid-rights claim.

“The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair

process . . . . The Clause also provides heightened protection

against government interference with certain fundamental rights

and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,

719-20 (1997). In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court articulated

the fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.

at 719-20. Included in the list was the right “to direct the

education and upbringing of one’s children.” Id. at 720 (citing

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Soc’y of

Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510

(1925)); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)

(plurality opinion) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
44

children.”). 

Parents rely on three Supreme Court cases to generally

identify a parent’s constitutional right to direct a child’s

education. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923)

(holding state law prohibiting foreign language instruction

violated the “power of parents to control the education of their

own”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-36 (holding state compulsory

education law requiring students to attend solely public schools

“unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents . . . to direct

the upbringing and education of children under their control”);

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 234-36 (1972) (finding

a compulsory education system, as applied to the Amish, to

violate the Free Exercise Clause and the “traditional interest of

parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children

so long as they, in the words of Pierce, ‘prepare (them) for

additional obligations’”). But the particular right asserted in this

case – the right to be free from all reporting requirements and

“discretionary” state oversight of a child’s home-school

education – has never been recognized. 

Although Parents assert the fundamental nature of their

general right, it is a limited one. We have noted “[t]he Supreme

Court has never been called upon to define the precise

boundaries of a parent’s right to control a child’s upbringing and

education. It is clear, however, that the right is neither absolute

nor unqualified.” C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d

159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005). “The case law in this area establishes

that parents simply do not have a constitutional right to control
 Federal courts addressing the issue have held that parents 24

have no right to exempt their child from certain subjects, reading

assignments, community-service requirements or assembly

programs they find objectionable. See, e.g., Parker, 514 F.3d at

107 (reading assignment); Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 144 (health

education class); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of

Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996) (community-service

requirement); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454,

461-62 (2d Cir. 1996) (community-service requirement); Brown,

68 F.3d at 539 (sexual education assembly); see also Blau v.

Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395-96 (6th Cir.

2005) (finding that a parent “does not have a fundamental right

to exempt his child from the school dress code”). 

45

each and every aspect of their children’s education and oust the

state’s authority over that subject.” Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699.24

Furthermore,

[t]he Court has repeatedly stressed that while

parents have a constitutional right to send their

children to private schools and a constitutional

right to select private schools that offer

specialized instruction, they have no

constitutional right to provide their children with

private school education unfettered by reasonable

government regulation.
 Parents who home-school their children may be subjected 25

to standardized testing to ensure the children are receiving an

adequate education. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039,

1044 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding state standardized test

requirement over home-schooling parents’ First and Fourteenth

Amendment objections). 

46

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).25

In addition to Yoder, discussed infra, Parents rely on

Meyer and Pierce for foundational support. Read together, the

cases 

evince the principle that the state cannot prevent

parents from choosing a specific educational

program – whether it be religious instruction at a

private school or instruction in a foreign

language. That is, the state does not have the

power to “standardize its children” or “foster a

homogenous people” by completely foreclosing

the opportunity of individuals and groups to

choose a different path of education.

Brown, 68 F.3d at 533; see also Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177

(stressing the “limited scope” of Meyer and Pierce). In the

present case, Parents are given the freedom to choose a

“different path of education” – home-schooling – subject only

to the Act 169 requirements. The school districts do not have

any role in selecting the program Parents wish to follow.
47

Parents are unable to point to a single instance in which the

school districts have limited or interfered with their religious

teachings and/or materials. 

In her deposition, Shari Nelson acknowledged that her

local school district never questioned or rejected her affidavits

and did not interfere with her religious content choices. Mrs.

Nelson noted she was never concerned that the local school

district would reject her children’s portfolio if it contained work

product with a religious subject matter. Similarly, Maryalice

Newborn acknowledged that her local school district never

questioned the appropriateness of her home education program

or its content.

Parents nevertheless contend that the Commonwealth’s

“subjective” and “discretionary” review over the Act 169

disclosures violates their right to control their children’s

education. They insist any review of the home education

programs must be purely “objective.” In other words, they

contend the Commonwealth usurps the religious and parental

rights of parents when an official makes a limited determination

of whether a child has “sustained progress in the overall

program.” Parents have not articulated their definition of

“objective” in their brief. When questioned during oral

argument, Parents’ counsel was unable or unwilling to provide

a concrete explanation or example of an “objective” review.

Furthermore, it is difficult to accept Parents’ assertion that

review of a child’s educational progress can truly be objective.

The grading of an essay, even on a pass/fail scale, will always
 In a different context, the Supreme Court stated: 26

Since Pierce, a substantial body of case law has

confirmed the power of the States to insist that

attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy

state compulsory-attendance laws, be at

institutions which provide minimum hours of

instruction, employ teachers of specified training,

and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.

Indeed, the State’s interest in assuring that these

standards are being met has been considered a

sufficient reason for refusing to accept instruction

at home as compliance with compulsory

education statutes. These cases were a sensible

corollary of Pierce v. Society of Sisters: if the

State must satisfy its interest in secular education

48

be imbued with some element of subjectivity. 

As noted, there is no recognized right for parents to

educate their children “unfettered by reasonable government

regulation.” Runyon, 427 U.S. at 178. The Court in Pierce

expressly acknowledged “‘the power of the State reasonably to

regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them,

their teachers and pupils.’” Id. (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at

534); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 (noting “[t]he power of

the state to compel attendance at some school and to make

reasonable regulations for all schools . . . [was] not questioned”

by the parties). Furthermore, there is “a distinction between 26
through the instrument of private schools, it has a

proper interest in the manner in which those

schools perform their secular education function.

Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,

245-47 (1968) (examining validity of a New York statute

requiring school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to

students enrolled in parochial schools). 

49

actions that strike at the heart of parental decision-making

authority on matters of the greatest importance and other actions

that . . . are not of constitutional dimension.” C.N., 430 F.3d at

184. Parents identify the general right to control the education

of one’s child. But Parents do not have a constitutional right to

avoid reasonable state regulation of their children’s education.

Act 169's reporting and superintendent review requirements

ensure children taught in home education programs demonstrate

progress in the educational program. The statute does not

interfere, or authorize any interference, with Parents’ religious

teachings and/or use of religious materials. Parents’ claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment is of insufficient constitutional

dimension to state either an independently viable or colorable

claim. Accordingly, under both the stringent and colorable

hybrid-rights approaches of our sister circuits, Parents have not

asserted a “hybrid-rights claim.”

3.

Parents also contend that, notwithstanding the different

standards articulated by the circuits regarding hybrid-rights
50

claims, they raise the same type of claim as the parents in Yoder.

They contend that since Yoder is still good law, parents claiming

a religious-parental exemption to a neutral law of general

applicability get the benefit of the traditional Free Exercise test.

Parents assert that “it is beyond legitimate question that the same

constitutional tests employed in Yoder must be used here to

evaluate these Parents’ religious-parental claims.” Parents Br.

at 27. 

In Yoder, the Court granted a religious-based exception

to a regulation of general applicability. C.f. John E. Nowak &

Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 17.6 (7th ed. 2004)

(“Yoder stands out as the one instance in which the Court

required the government to grant to persons who could not

comply with the law due to their religious beliefs an exemption

from a law regulating the conduct of all persons . . . .”). But the

unique burden suffered by the Amish, combined with the

Supreme Court’s limiting language, distinguish Yoder from this

case.

In response to objections by Amish citizens, the Yoder

Court held that the First Amendment required a partial

exemption from a Wisconsin compulsory high-school education

law requiring children to attend public or private school until

age 16. The Amish refused to send their children, ages 14 and

15, to school after completion of the eighth grade of schooling.

The Court noted the Amish’s “convincing showing:”

the Amish in this case have convincingly
 This “mode of life” reference in Yoder has been interpreted 27

to refer to a distinct community and way of life, not simply the

centrality of one’s belief to his or her faith. See Parker, 514

F.3d at 100. 

51

demonstrated the sincerity of their religious

beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their

mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily

conduct play in the continued survival of Old

Order Amish communities and their religious

organization, and the hazards presented by the

State’s enforcement of a statute generally valid as

to others.

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. The Court applied a heightened level of

scrutiny and found the State’s interest lacking. Id. at 235-36. 

Parents favor a broad reading of Yoder and insist that it

applies to all citizens. But Yoder’s reach is restricted by the

Court’s limiting language and the facts suggesting an

exceptional burden imposed on the plaintiffs. In Yoder, the

religious beliefs of the Amish were completely integrated with

their community and “mode of life.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. 27

As a result, compulsory attendance would “substantially

interfer[e] with the religious development of the Amish child

and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith

community.” Id. at 218. Accordingly, the Wisconsin law

carried “a very real threat of undermining the Amish community

and religious practice,” id., and placed the continued survival of
52

Amish communities in “danger,” id. at 218 n.9. Compulsory

attendance “prevented these Amish parents from making

fundamental decisions regarding their children’s religious

upbringing and effectively overrode their ability to pass their

religion on to their children, as their faith required.” Parker,

514 F.3d at 99-100 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-35). 

Before applying a heightened level of scrutiny, the Court

wanted to ensure that the “Amish religious faith and their mode

of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent.”

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. Recognizing the exceptional nature of

the Amish’s showing, the Court held: “when the interests of

parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the

nature revealed by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable

relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is

required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under

the First Amendment.” Id. at 233; see also Mozert v. Hawkins

County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987)

(“Yoder rested on such a singular set of facts that we do not

believe it can be held to announce a general rule . . . .”). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit has interpreted the central underpinning of Yoder to be

the “threat to the Amish community’s way of life, posed by a

compulsory school attendance statute.” Leebaert, 332 F.3d at

144. In Leebaert, a parent alleged a violation of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments because a school refused to excuse his

son from a mandatory health and education course. While not

questioning the sincerity of the parent’s beliefs, the Second
As noted, New Life Baptist Church Academy was decided 28

before Smith. Accordingly, the First Circuit applied the

Sherbert test, New Life Baptist Church Acad., 885 F.2d at 944

(citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), and analyzed

Yoder within the “less restrictive alternative ” context. New Life

53

Circuit found the claims were not governed by Yoder. See id.

(plaintiff did not allege that “his community’s entire way of life

is threatened;” plaintiff “does not assert that there is an

irreconcilable Yoder-like clash between the essence of

[plaintiff’s] religious culture and the mandatory health

curriculum that he challenges”); see also Brown, 68 F.3d at 539

(distinguishing Yoder because a one-time compulsory

attendance at a health program did not threaten “their entire way

of life”).

In the pre-Smith case New Life Baptist Church Academy

v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989), a religious

school asserted a remarkably similar claim to Parents’ claim.

The New Life Baptist Church Academy refused to comply with

state rules and procedures for determining the adequacy of the

secular education provided by the school because it believed “it

is a sin to ‘submit’ [its] educational enterprise to a secular

authority for approval.” Id. at 941. Finding that “the weight of

legal precedent is strongly against the Academy’s position,” id.

at 950, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

concluded that “this case differs significantly from [Yoder],” id.

at 951. It noted that the state’s procedures 28
Baptist Church Acad., 885 F.2d at 948-52. Despite this, we find

the First Circuit’s discussion of Yoder to be informative. 

54

do not threaten interference with religious

practices, prayer, or religious teaching; and the

record, while indicating a sincere religious

scruple, does not suggest that enforcement of the

[state] procedures would destroy a religious

community’s way of life. Nor does the record

support the view that the Academy, left on its

own, would provide “ideal” or even adequate

secular education. All these factors make this

case quite unlike Yoder.

Id. (citations omitted).

Similarly, the claim raised by the Amish parents in Yoder

can be distinguished from the claim raised by Parents here. Act

169 does not threaten Parents’ or their community’s entire mode

of life. Even though Parents are required to keep records and

submit them for review, they are in complete control of the

religious upbringing of their children. In fact, Parents are

unable to point to even one occasion in which the school

districts have questioned their religious beliefs, texts, or

teachings. 

The dispute in Yoder involved an additional one or two

years of education at public schools versus “vocational”

education at home. The Amish allowed their children to attend
 In Duro v. Dist. Attorney, Second Judicial Dist., 712 F.2d 29

96 (4th Cir. 1983), plaintiffs, who home-schooled their children,

alleged that the state compulsory school attendance law

infringed upon their religious beliefs. The district court, relying

heavily upon Yoder, found the state law unconstitutional as

applied to the plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit reversed,

distinguishing Yoder. Duro, 712 F.2d at 98-99.

[I]n Yoder, the Amish children attended public

school through the eighth grade and then obtained

informal vocational training to enable them to

assimilate into the self-contained Amish

55

public schools until eighth grade and sought only a partial

exemption from the state’s compulsory school attendance law.

Furthermore, the Court in Yoder assumed the state would

regulate the Amish’s home education to ensure the satisfaction

of educational standards. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (“The

States have had a long history of amicable and effective

relationships with church-sponsored schools, and there is no

basis for assuming that, in this related context, reasonable

standards cannot be established concerning the content of the

continuing vocational education of Amish children under

parental guidance . . . .”). In contrast, Parents request a full

exemption from Act 169, seeking to administer their children’s

entire primary and secondary education without any review by

the Commonwealth. They cite Yoder to challenge the

government’s authority to engage in the regulation and

discretionary review of their home education programs.29
community. However, in the present case,

[plaintiff] refuses to enroll his children in any

public or nonpublic school for any length of time,

but still expects them to be fully integrated and

live normally in the modern world upon reaching

the age of 18.

Id. at 98.

Although Parents contend they can “readily demonstrate”

that their children will be self-sufficient even if they do not

submit their children’s work on an annual basis to a government

official for his review, Parents Br. at 31, their claim remains

distinguishable. The Amish allowed their children to attend

public schools until the completion of 8th grade. Therefore, the

State was assured that the Amish children received a state

approved education and the Court found an additional one or

two years of compulsory formal education to be insufficient to

overcome the Amish’s interests. In this case, Parents seek to

home-school their children for their entire primary and

secondary education. 

56

Parents’ claim is distinguishable from the Amish parents’ claim

in Yoder.

C.

Since Act 169 survives rational basis review and since

Parents have failed to establish that an exception to Smith’s

neutral law of general applicability rule applies, Parents’ federal

constitutional claims fail.
 Section 2404 states: 30

(a) General rule. Except as provided in

subsection (b), an agency shall not substantially

burden a person’s free exercise of religion,

including any burden which results from a rule of

general applicability.

(b) Exceptions. An agency may substantially

burden a person’s free exercise of religion if the

agency proves, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the burden is all of the following:

(1) In furtherance of a compelling

interest of the agency.

(2) The least restrictive means of

furthering the compelling interest.

Id. § 2404 (emphases added).

57

IV.

In addition to their federal constitutional claims, Parents

assert a state statutory claim under the Religious Freedom

Protection Act, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2401–2407. In order to

obtain relief under RFPA, Parents must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that their “free exercise of religion has

been burdened or likely will be burdened in violation of [§

2404].” Id. § 2405(f). If Parents satisfy this burden, the 30

school districts are required to prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Act 169 furthers a compelling interest and is the

least restrictive means of furthering the interest. 71 Pa. Stat.
 As noted, RFPA defines “substantially burden” as: 31

An agency action which does any of the

following: (1) Significantly constrains or inhibits

conduct or expression mandated by a person’s

sincerely held religious beliefs. (2) Significantly

curtails a person’s ability to express adherence to

the person’s religious faith. (3) Denies a person

a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities

which are fundamental to the person’s religion.

(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates

a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.

71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2403.

58

Ann. § 2404(a)–(b). Thus, as a threshold matter, Parents must

prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that their free exercise

of religion has or will likely be “substantially burdened.”31

The District Court concluded Parents failed to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that Act 169 substantially

burdens their free exercise of religion. Combs, 468 F. Supp. 2d

at 771. It granted the school districts’ motion for summary

judgment on both the facial and as-applied challenges based on

the RFPA. Id. Parents assert error, contending the District

Court either failed to review or misapplied the actual text of the

statute. Further, they argue that because the fourth definition of

“substantially burden” is clear and unambiguous, the District

Court improperly resorted to extraneous sources like legislative

history and federal cases interpreting the federal Free Exercise
In 2007, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 32

interpreted the third definition of substantially burden –

“[d]enies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in

activities which are fundamental to the person’s religion.”

Ridley Park United Methodist Church v. Zoning Hearing Bd.

Ridley Park Borough (Ridley Park), 920 A.2d 953, 957-61 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2007). The court concluded that because “daycare

is not a fundamental religious activity of a church,” the Zoning

Hearing Board erroneously applied RFPA. Id. at 960.

59

Clause and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 

Parents invoke the fourth definition of “substantially

burden” – “[c]ompels conduct or expression which violates a

specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.” 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §

2403. Parents contend Act 169 compels “conduct or

expression” by requiring them to submit the content and records

of their children’s educational progress to the school districts.

Because these submissions are subject to review and approval

by the school districts, Parents contend Act 169 violates a

“specific tenet” of their religious faith – that “education of their

children, not merely the ‘religious education,’ is ‘religion’ and

is assigned by God to the jurisdiction of the family.” Parents Br.

at 64. 

The construction and application of RFPA’s fourth

definition of “substantially burden” is an issue of first

impression and a matter of Pennsylvania law. As noted, the 32

District Court’s jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
60

1343(a)(3), 1367 and 1441. Because we affirm the District

Court’s grant of summary judgment on all of Parents’ federal

claims, only their state law claim remains. Under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c), “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction” over a state law claim if “the claim raises a novel

or complex issue of State law . . . [or] the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id.

Section 1367(c) provides courts “the discretion to refuse to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction when ‘values of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’ counsel that the

district court remand state claims to a state forum.” Hudson

United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 157 (3d

Cir. 1998) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)). A decision to remand under section

1367 “reflects the court’s judgment . . . that at the present stage

of litigation it would be best for supplemental jurisdiction to be

declined so that state issues may be adjudicated by a state

court.” Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 158 (citing United

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)).

Parents’ only remaining claim involves the interpretation

of a state statute on which there is no Pennsylvania precedent.

Because all federal issues have been decided on summary

judgment and since Parents’ RFPA claim raises a novel and

potentially complex issue of State law, we will decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Parents’ pendent state
 Shaffer v. Board of School Directors of Albert Gallatin 33

Area School District, 730 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1984), a pre-section

1367 decision, supports this conclusion. In Shaffer, we found

that “where the underlying issue of state law is a question of

first impression with important implications for public education

in Pennsylvania, factors weighing in favor of state court

adjudication certainly predominate.” Id. at 913.

61

law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).33

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school

districts on Parents’ federal constitutional claims, vacate the

District Court’s holding regarding the pendent RFPA claim, and

remand the case to the District Court with instructions to remand

the RFPA claim to state court.
62

SCIRICA, Chief Judge, concurring. 

Section 1367(c) provides: “The district courts may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law . . .

[or] (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The

District Court here exercised supplemental jurisdiction over

Parents’ state law Religious Freedom Protection Act claim. The

claim was fully presented to and adjudicated by the District

Court. I would decide the issue. 

As noted, in order to obtain relief under RFPA, Parents

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that their free

exercise of religion has been substantially burdened or likely

will be substantially burdened. Id. § 2404, 2405(f). If Parents

satisfy this burden, the school districts are required to prove, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that Act 169 furthers a

compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of

furthering the interest. 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2404(a)–(b). Thus,

as a threshold matter, Parents must prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, that their free exercise of religion has or

will likely be “substantially burdened.” 

Parents have made conflicting claims as to what conduct

or review by the school districts constitutes a substantial burden.

In their complaint, Parents challenge all state review of their
 See, e.g., Combs Compl. ¶ 12 (“Mr. and Mrs. Combs’ 34

religious beliefs acknowledge that the civil government may

require them to educate their children, but, according to their

religious belief, the civil government lacks jurisdiction to

approve or administratively supervise the education they

provide.”); Combs Compl. ¶ 14 (“It is a specific tenet of Mr. and

Mrs. Combs’ religious faith, rooted in their understanding of the

Bible, that it would be sinful for them to engage in conduct or

expression that would grant control over their children’s

education to the civil government.”); Hankin Compl. ¶ 20 (“It is

a specific tent of Mr. and Mrs. Hankin’s religious faith, rooted

in their understanding of the Bible, that it would be sinful for

them to have any association with the public school system.”).

 See, e.g., Maryalice Newborn Dep. at 49, Aug. 30, 2005 35

(“Q: What level of state review would be acceptable to you? A:

None.”); Thomas Hankin Dep. at 55, Sept. 6, 2005, (“I

personally believe that if the discretion of the school district

were removed, there would be a lot less trouble religiously with

my beliefs; that is, if I submitted to the school district a

statement that said . . . I am educating my children and this is

what I’m teaching them this year.”).

63

home education programs. But deposition testimony reveals 34

some variance by Parents on the permissible level of state

oversight. Nevertheless, in their District Court briefs, Parents 35

again contended that “placing of authority in any state agency

violates their sincerely held religious beliefs” and that “it is a
 See also Parents Br. Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 10, 36

Apr. 14, 2006 (“Because Plaintiffs believe that all education is

inherently religious, Caesar has no jurisdiction over it at all.”);

id. at 11 (citing Herbert W. Titus, founding dean of Regent

University School of Law, for the proposition that “[b]oth the

Establishment and the Free Exercise clauses preclude the civil

government from exercising jurisdiction over the education of

the people.”). 

64

specific tenet of their religious faith that the State lacks the

jurisdiction over education and the family that Act 169 asserts.”

Parents Br. Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 9-10, Apr. 14,

2006. At oral argument, however, Parents’ counsel again 36

shifted the focus of their claims and appeared to concede that

the objectionable portion of Act 169 was not the record keeping,

testing, or third party evaluation, but the school districts’

independent, “discretionary” review of their children’s

educational progress. But assuming a proper concession, this

possible alteration of the claim was not made before the District

Court. 

I.

As noted, the construction and application of RFPA’s

fourth definition of “substantially burden” is an issue of first

impression. Because this is a matter of Pennsylvania law, “we

must predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, if faced with

the identical issue, would construe the statute.” Prudential

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pendleton, 858 F.2d 930, 934 (3d Cir.
 The Commonwealth’s rules of statutory construction, 37

codified at 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1901–1978, “shall be observed,

unless the application of such rules would result in a

construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General

Assembly.” Id. § 1901. “The object of all interpretation and

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the

intention of the General Assembly.” Id. § 1921(a). 

Words and phrases are construed “according to their

common and approved usage,” whereas technical words which

are defined will be construed according to their peculiar

definitions. Id. § 1903. “When the words of the statute are clear

and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. §

1921(b). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has repeatedly

recognized that rules of construction, such as consideration of

a statute’s perceived ‘object’ or ‘purpose,’ are to be resorted to

only when there is an ambiguity.” Commonwealth v. Taylor,

841 A.2d 108, 112 (Pa. 2004). However, 

[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit,

the intention of the General Assembly may be

ascertained by considering, among other matters:

(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute. (2)

The circumstances under which it was enacted.

(3) The mischief to be remedied. (4) The object

to be attained. (5) The former law, if any,

including other statutes upon the same or similar

65

1988).37
subjects. (6) The consequences of a particular

interpretation. (7) The contemporaneous

legislative history. (8) Legislative and

administrative interpretations of such statute.

1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1921(c). 

66

In construing the meaning of “substantially burden,” the

District Court relied on the plain language of the statute, the

analysis of “substantially burden” in the “context of Free

Exercise Clause and similar freedom of religion restoration

acts,” and the intent of the General Assembly to restore the

“traditional (pre-Smith) free exercise of religion standards.”

Combs, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 771. As noted, Parents contend the

District Court either ignored or misapplied the plain language of

the statute and improperly included legislative history and preSmith decisions in its analysis.

II.

Parents rely exclusively upon the RFPA’s fourth

definition of “substantially burden” – “an agency action which

. . . [c]ompels conduct or expression which violates a specific

tenet of a person’s religious faith.” 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2403.

Parents contend they are compelled, under threat of truancy

charges, to submit the portfolio of their children’s work product

to the school districts for discretionary review. Parents describe

the act of turning over the portfolio for discretionary review as

“conduct or expression.” They point to the exercise of editorial

judgment and creativity on the part of the home education
 I assume, without deciding, that Parents’ actions are 38

“conduct or expression” within the meaning of the RFPA. 

67

supervisor as evidence of this expression. Moreover, Parents 38

assert a “specific tenet” based upon certain religious beliefs. 

First, Parents maintain their faith teaches that “education

of their children, not merely the ‘religious education,’ is

‘religion.’” Parents Br. at 64. Parents cite, inter alia,

Deuteronomy 6:5-7 (NIV) (“Love the Lord your God with all

your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength.

These commandments that I give you today are to be upon your

hearts. Impress them on your children. Talk about them when

you sit at home and when you walk along the road, when you lie

down and when you get up.”), Psalms 145:4 (NIV) (“One

generation will commend your works to another; they will tell

of your mighty acts.”), Ephesians 6:4 (NIV) (“Fathers, do not

exasperate your children; instead, bring them up in the training

and instruction of the Lord.”), and Proverbs 22:6 (“Train up a

child in the way he should go and when he is old, he will not

depart from it.”), for the proposition that God has directly called

upon them to home educate their children. 

Second, Parents contend God has assigned religious

matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of the family, citing, inter

alia, Luke 20:25 (“Then render to Caesar the things that are

Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”), Pslams 127:3

(NIV) (“Sons are a heritage from the Lord, children a reward

from him.”), Matthew 7:6 (“Don’t give what is holy to unholy
 The Previshes also cite the Catechism of the Roman 39

Catholic Church. See, e.g., Catechism 2223 (“Parents have the

first responsibility for the education of their children. They bear

witness to this responsibility first by creating a home where

tenderness, forgiveness, respect, fidelity, and disinterested

service are the rule. The home is well suited for education in the

virtues. This requires an apprenticeship in self-denial, sound

judgment, and self-mastery – the preconditions of all true

freedom. Parents should teach their children to subordinate the

‘material and instinctual dimensions to interior and spiritual

ones.’”); Catechism 2229 (“As those first responsible for the

education of their children, parents have the right to choose a

school for them which corresponds to their own convictions.

68

people.”), 1 Corinthians 10:31 (“Whatever you do, do it all for

the glory of God.”), 2 Timothy 2:15 (“Be diligent to present

yourself approved to God.”), 1 Thessalonians 2:4 (“We are not

trying to please men but God, who tests our hearts.”), and Acts

5:29 (“We must obey God rather than men.”). Parents contend

Act 169 replaces the headship of Christ over the family, and

their headship over their children, with the headship of the state

over the family, citing, inter alia, 1 Corinthians 11:3 (NIV)

(“Now I want you to realize that the head of every man is Christ,

and the head of the woman is man, and the head of Christ is

God.”), Ephesians 5:23 (NIV) (“For the husband is the head of

the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of which

he is the Savior.”), and Ephesians 6:1 (NIV) (“Children, obey

your parents in the Lord, for this is right.”). As a result of this 39
This right is fundamental. As far as possible parents have the

duty of choosing schools that will best help them in their task as

Christian educators. Public authorities have the duty of

guaranteeing this parental right and of ensuring concrete

conditions for its exercise.”).

 Section 1991 defines words and phrases for “any statute 40

finally enacted on or after September 1, 1937.” 

69

“specific tenet,” Parents assert a sincerely held religious belief

that the school districts have no authority to compel reporting or

to engage in discretionary review of their home education

program.

The term “specific tenet” is not defined in the Religious

Freedom Protection Act or 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1991. The 40

Oxford English Dictionary defines “specific” as “precise or

exact in respect of fulfilment, conditions, or terms; definite,

explicit” and “exactly named or indicated, or capable of being

so; precise, particular.” 2 Oxford English Dictionary 2949

(Compact ed. 1971); see also Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary

1132 (9th ed. 1990) (defining “specific” as “sharing or being

those properties of something that allow it to be referred to a

particular category” or as “free from ambiguity”). “Tenet” is

defined as “[a] doctrine, dogma, principle, or opinion, in

religion, philosophy, politics or the like, held by a school, sect,

party, or person.” 2 Oxford English Dictionary 3260 (Compact

ed. 1971); see also Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary 1215 (9th ed.
 The words “specific,” “specificity,” and “particularity” are 41

familiar terms in Pennsylvania and federal procedural law, and

in that context, denote a heightened pleading standard as

opposed to a more general (notice) standard. See, e.g.,

Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod &

Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Pa. 1991) (“Both Rule 1019(b)

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and case law

require that fraud be plead with specificity. The appellees’

complaint does not rise to the level of specificity that we

require.” (citation omitted)); c.f. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.,

180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting, in the Private

Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) fraud context, that

the PSLRA “echoes precisely Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and therefore

requires plaintiffs to plead ‘the who, what, when, where, and

how . . . .” (citation ommitted)). 

70

1990) (defining “tenet” as “a principle, belief, or doctrine

generally held to be true; especially: one held in common by

members of an organization, group, movement, or profession”).

In the religious context, the term “specific tenet” is

difficult to define. Even though a religious concept may be 41

stated generally, it may, in the believer’s mind, be a specific

religious tenet. At one end of the spectrum, specificity may be

relatively straightforward and easy to identify because the

“specific tenet” is observed as an outward manifestation of a

particular religious belief. For example, in Fraternal Order of

Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir.
71

1999), two Sunni Muslim officers successfully challenged an

internal order requiring all police officers to shave their beards.

Plaintiffs articulated a religious commandment to grow and

wear a beard. Id. at 360-61; see also Deveaux v. Philadelphia,

No. 3103 Feb. Term 2005, 2005 WL 1869666, at *1-2 (Pa.

Com. Pl. July 14, 2005) (granting a preliminary injunction

preventing the city from suspending a practicing Muslim

firefighter without pay for refusing to shave his beard). In

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), a member of the

Seventh-day Adventist Church challenged state unemployment

compensation rules that conditioned the availability of benefits

upon her willingness to work under conditions forbidden by her

religion. The Court acknowledged that “the prohibition against

Saturday labor is a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist

creed, based upon that religion’s interpretation of the Holy

Bible.” Id. at 399 n.1. 

Furthermore, religious dietary laws would appear to

qualify as specific tenets. In Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186

(3d Cir. 2006), a Muslim inmate assigned to kitchen duty was

disciplined for refusing to aid others in the consumption of pork.

Citing the Koran (“He has forbidden you . . . the flesh of

swine”) and Chapter Eleven of Leviticus in the Old Testament,

Williams averred that handling and serving pork would violate

his religious faith. Id. at 187. Our court held that “prison

officials must respect and accommodate, when practicable, a

Muslim inmate’s religious beliefs regarding prohibitions on the

handling of pork” and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity.
72

Id. at 194. See also DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 272-75 (3d

Cir. 2004) (discussing a Buddhist prisoner’s Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act claim based upon his request

for a special diet). 

At the other end of the spectrum are claims similar to

Parents’. These claims cite more general and less obviously

manifested concepts. This is not to undervalue these tenets

which, as revelations, may be fundamental to one’s religious

beliefs. In these situations, however, it may be difficult to

determine whether a litigant’s citations to scripture or to general

religious concepts articulate a “specific tenet.” Also

problematic in this analysis are religious tenets that may be

viewed as both general and specific. See, e.g., Exodus 20:7

(“Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain,

for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in

vain.”); Exodus 20:12 (“Honor thy father and thy mother that thy

days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God

giveth thee.”).

Furthermore, the RFPA definition of “substantially

burden” appears to create some tension between state and

federal law. The United States Supreme Court has cautioned

against making religious interpretations in the First Amendment

context. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in

many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not

presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion

or the plausibility of a religious claim.”); id. at 886-87 (“It is no

more appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of
73

religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in

the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine

the ‘importance’ of ideas before applying the ‘compelling

interest’ test in the free speech field.”); Thomas v. Review Bd. of

the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)

(“Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs . . .

because [the believer’s] beliefs are not articulated with the

clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might

employ.”); id. at 716 (“Courts are not arbiters of scriptural

interpretation.”). Additionally, the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc

to 2000cc-5, “does not permit a court to determine whether the

belief or practice in question is ‘compelled by, or central to, a

system of religious belief.’” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272,

277 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). 

Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s

statutory definition of “substantially burden” appears to require

courts to inquire into, inter alia, whether an activity is

fundamental to a person’s religion or whether a person is

compelled to violate a specific tenet of their religious faith. See

71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2403 (defining substantially burden as “an

agency action which . . . [d]enies a person a reasonable

opportunity to engage in activities which are fundamental to the

person’s religion [or c]ompels conduct or expression which
As noted, in Ridley Park the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 42

Court examined the third definition of “substantially burden” –

“denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities

which are fundamental to the person’s religion” – and concluded

that while daycare “aided in carrying out the Church's religious

mission, [it] is not a fundamental religious activity of a church.”

Ridley Park, 920 A.2d at 960. “For example, ministering to the

sick can flow from a religious mission, but it is not a

fundamental religious activity of a church because a hospital

may be built to satisfy that mission.” Id. 

74

violates a specific tenet of a person’s religious faith.”).42

Arguably, a violation of a general tenet might substantially

burden one’s religious faith. But that was not what the

Pennsylvania General Assembly proscribed. The statutory

language shifts the burden of establishing a compelling interest

and least restrictive means to the state actor only after the

violation of a specific tenet, which must mean something

different from a general tenet. As noted, the dilemma is

especially striking because, in the view of the believer, the

violation of a general tenet may very well substantially burden

one’s religious faith. 

Nevertheless, given the normal usage of the term, it is

difficult to see that Parents have cited a specific tenet that would

prohibit reporting requirements and discretionary school district

review of their children’s educational progress. Instead, they

reference general, but nonetheless important, religious tenets,
 Although it is not entirely clear, I understand Parents’ 43

argument to mean that the natural consequence of their asserted

specific tenet is that the state has no jurisdiction over homeschooling. 

75

see, e.g., Luke 20:25 (“Then render to Caesar the things that are

Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”); 2 Timothy

2:15 (“Be diligent to present yourself approved to God.”), to

assert that local school districts have no authority to conduct a

limited review of their children’s educational progress. In

addition, under RFPA’s fourth definition of “substantially

burden,” a party must establish a nexus between the specific

tenet and the compelled violation, a nexus that Parents have not

established here.

Furthermore, the inconsistencies in Parents’ complaints,

depositions, briefs and appellate oral argument suggest the

difficulty in identifying a specific tenet (as opposed to a general

tenet) and its attendant consequences. In their complaints, briefs

to the district court, and some deposition testimony, Parents

asserted a “specific tenet” that the state “lacks the jurisdiction”

over their children’s education, i.e., that no level of state review

would be permissible. See Parents Br. Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. 43

Summ. J. at 9-10, Apr. 14, 2006. But at oral argument, Parents

implied that their asserted “tenet” might allow non-discretionary

review of their home education programs. See also Parents

Reply Br. at 8 (“Parents do not contend that the government may

not establish any standards to govern home education. Rather,
 As noted, those factors include, but are not limited to: “(1) 44

The occasion and necessity for the statute. (2) The

circumstances under which it was enacted. (3) The mischief to

be remedied. (4) The object to be attained. (5) The former law,

if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.

(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation. (7) The

contemporaneous legislative history. (8) Legislative and

76

the Parents’ core objection . . . is that their religious beliefs

forbid them from submitting their religious education of their

children to the discretionary review of a governmental

official.”). Yet it is problematic whether this interpretation of

“non-discretionary” review would amount to any review at all.

Based upon the plain language of the RFPA, Parents have

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they have

been compelled or will likely be compelled to violate a specific

tenet of their religious faith. Accordingly, Parents cannot

sustain their cause of action under the Pennsylvania RFPA.

III.

Even finding the term “specific tenet” in the RFPA to be

ambiguous, the decision would be the same. As noted, the

purpose of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate

the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

1921(a). Under section 1921(c), when a statute’s words are

ambiguous, the intention of the General Assembly “may be

ascertained” by considering an array of factors. 

44
administrative interpretations of such statute.” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 1921(c).

77

The historical background and legislative history of

Pennsylvania’s RFPA places it in context and assists in

interpreting the statute. Much of this depends on the

development of federal First Amendment jurisprudence and its

influence on Pennsylvania law. Prior to 1990, legislation and

government regulation burdening the free exercise of religion

was subject to the Sherbert test. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374

U.S. 398 (1963). Under this rule, if the government

substantially burdened a person’s constitutional free exercise

rights, then it was required to justify the burden with a

compelling state interest and with proof that the least restrictive

means was employed. Id. at 402-04. See also Jimmy Swaggart

Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of California., 493 U.S. 378,

384-85 (1990) (“Our cases have established that ‘the free

exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a

substantial burden on the observation of a central religious

belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental

interest justifies the burden.’” (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r,

490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))).

In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise

Clause did not prohibit enforcement of a neutral law of general

applicability supported by a rational basis. Employment Div.,

Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890

(1990). The Court concluded that the state could deny
78

unemployment benefits due to work-related misconduct based

upon an employee’s religiously motivated ingestion and use of

a drug; specifically, in that case, the ceremonial use of peyote.

Id. Declining to apply the Sherbert balancing test, the Court

noted that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an

individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral

law of general applicability on the ground that the law

proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or

proscribes).’” Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.

252, 263 n.3 (1982)). Thus, Smith and its progeny “establish the

general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general

applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental

interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a

particular religious practice.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu

Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (citing Smith).

The Smith Court noted that religious exemptions, while

not constitutionally required, could be created through the

political process. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citing several state

statutes making “an exception to their drug laws for sacramental

peyote use”). In 1993, Congress accepted the Court’s invitation

by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),

107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (amended

2000). Congress sought to restore the compelling interest test

articulated in Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205

(1972), “and to guarantee its application in all cases where free

exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000bb. Applicable to “all Federal and State law,” Pub. L. No.
 At the time of enactment in 1993, “Government” was 45

defined as “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and

official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United

States, a State, or a subdivision of a State.” Pub. L. No. 103-

141, § 5, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993). As amended,

“Government” is defined as “a branch, department, agency,

instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color

of law) of the United States, or of a covered entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb-2(1). “Covered entity meansthe District of Columbia,

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and

possession of the United States.” Id. § 2000bb-2(2). 

 RFRA continues to be enforced against the federal 46

government. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente

Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (applying RFRA to

regulations by the federal government under the Controlled

Substances Act).

79

103-141, § 6, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993), RFRA prohibited

both the federal and state governments from “substantially 45

burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion” except through the

least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. 42

U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. In 1997, the Supreme Court struck down

RFRA as applied to the states because RFRA exceeded the 46

scope of Congress’ enforcement power under section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,

536 (1997). RFRA lacked a “congruence and proportionality

between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-1493; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47

52-571b; Fla. Stat. § 761.01 to 761.05; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 73-

401 to 73-404; 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 35/1 to 35/99; Mo. Ann.

Stat. §§ 1.302 & 1.307; N.M. Stat. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5; Okla.

Stat. tit. 51 §§ 251 to 258; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-80.1-1 to 42-

80.1-4; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60; Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code Ann. §§ 110.001 to 110.012; Va. Code Ann. §§

57-1 to 57-2.02; Utah Code Ann. §§ 63L-5-101 to 63L-5-403;

see also Ala. Const. Art I, § 3.01. The Pennsylvania RFPA

became effective December 9, 2002. Missouri, Utah and

Virginia passed legislation after 2002. 

80

adopted to that end.” Id. at 520, 529-36.

In part a reaction to City of Boerne, Congress enacted the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5, which addresses only land use

regulations and the religious rights of institutionalized persons.

Id. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1. RLUIPA prohibits both state and

federal governments from imposing a “substantial burden” on

the religious exercise of an institutionalized person unless it is

the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Also, several

states in addition to Pennsylvania passed their own religious

freedom restoration or protection legislation.47

Although there are differences among the various federal

and state religious protection statutes, most contain, at their

core, the same fundamental structure and purpose. They
 Alabama and Connecticut do not modify “burden.” Ala. 48

Const. Art I, § 3.01 (“Government shall not burden a person’s

freedom of religion . . . .”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b (“The

state . . . shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion . . . .”).

Missouri, New Mexico, and Rhode Island prohibit the

government from “restrict[ing] a person’s free exercise of

religion.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.302; N.M. Stat. §§ 28-22-3; R.I.

Gen. Laws §§ 42-80.1-3. 

81

recognize that neutral laws of general applicability may burden

religious exercise as significantly as laws intended to interfere

with religious exercise. The federal statutes, Pennsylvania’s

RFPA, and a majority of the state statutes also acknowledge the

government need not justify every action having some effect on

religious exercise. Under those statutes, only substantial

burdens trigger heightened scrutiny. RFPA’s four definitions 48

of “substantially burden” emphasize the importance of this

threshold. See 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2403 (“significantly

constrains or inhibits”; “significantly curtails”; “denies . . . a

reasonable opportunity to engage in activities . . . fundamental

to the person’s religion”; “violates a specific tenet of a person’s

religious faith.”) (emphasis added). 

In our modern regulatory state, virtually all legislation

(including neutral laws of general applicability) imposes an

incidental burden at some level by placing indirect costs on an

individual’s activity. Recognizing this, legislatures have sought

a balance between protecting free exercise of religion and
 To illustrate, for the purposes of RLUIPA, we recognize 49

that a “substantial burden” exists where:

1) a follower is forced to choose between

following the precepts of his religion and

forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to

other inmates versus abandoning one of the

precepts of his religion in order to receive a

benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial

pressure on an adherent to substantially modify

his behavior and to violate his beliefs.

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007). Under

the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act, “a substantial

burden on the free exercise of religion is one that either compels

the religious adherent to engage in conduct that his religion

forbids or forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion

requires.” Warner v. Boca Raton, 887 So.2d 1023, 1033 (Fla.

2004). “A plaintiff who claims that a governmental regulation

constitutes a substantial burden must ‘prove that a governmental

regulatory mechanism burdens the adherent’s practice of his or

her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden

by the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in

conduct or having a religious experience which the faith

mandates.’” Id. at 1035 (citations omitted).

82

preserving an effective police power. The federal government,

Pennsylvania, and several other states have identified a

substantiality threshold as the tipping point for requiring

heightened justifications for governmental action.49
83

Furthermore, by requiring proof of a “substantial burden” by

clear and convincing evidence, Pennsylvania appearsto have set

a higher threshold than other religious restoration statutes.

Compare 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2404, 2405 (requiring “clear and

convincing evidence” of substantial burden), with 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-2(b) (“plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on

whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice

. . . substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion”),

Warner, 887 So.2d at 1034 (“[T]he plaintiff bears the initial

burden of showing that a regulation constitutes a substantial

burden . . . .”), Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ill. App. Ct.

2002) (requiring, under the Illinois Religious Freedom

Restoration Act, plaintiff “to make a threshold showing” of

substantial burden).

As noted, Parents have not cited a specific tenet that

would prevent adherence to the reporting requirements or

prohibit discretionary School District review of their children’s

educational progress. Instead, they reference general, but

important, religious tenets to support their claim that local

school districts have no authority to conduct limited review of

their home education programs. Such a broad interpretation of

the term “specific tenet” would appear to read “specific” out of

the statute. 

The occasion, necessity, and purpose of the RFPA do not

support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Parents

are compelled or will likely be compelled to violate a specific
84

tenet of their religious faith. Accordingly, Parents cannot

prevail on their cause of action under the Pennsylvania RFPA.