* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10873

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SHERRY MATHEWS; EDMOND WRIGHT

Defendants-Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:06-CR-252

Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sherry Mathews and Edmond Wright (“Defendants”) appeal from their

convictions following a jury trial of offenses relating to a scheme to smuggle

contraband into the Federal Correctional Institution at Seagoville, Texas (“FCI

Seagoville”). Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support

their convictions. Wright also claims the district court abused its discretion by

admitting out-of-court statements made by one of his alleged co-conspirators and

argues the district court erroneously applied a leadership-role enhancement in

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 25, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10873

2

calculating his sentence. We disagree, and for the reasons set forth below, we

AFFIRM. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Wright was an inmate at FCI Seagoville, a minimum security federal

prison, and worked as the inmate clerk for the prison’s Interlibrary Loan

Program (“ILL Program”). The ILL Program allowed inmates to request books

from other libraries. Wright worked alone in his position, and was responsible

for processing incoming boxes of books and distributing the books to other

inmates. Mathews was Wright’s long-term girlfriend and was not incarcerated

during the periods relevant to this case.

In early 2005, Ramon Rentas (“Rentas”) and Steve Salazar (“Salazar”),

who were inmates at FCI Seagoville, conspired to smuggle contraband into the

prison using books and false-bottom boxes. Rentas instructed Salazar on how

to hide contraband in the spine of the books and in false-bottom boxes. Rentas

also directed Salazar to have a family member send the packages to the ILL

Program and provided him with mailing labels to use on the packages. The

labels were addressed to the FCI Seagoville ILL Program and bore the return

address of the Arlington Public Library. During family visitation, Salazar

convinced his mother, Armadina Salazar (“Nina”), to participate in the scheme

and gave her the labels he received from Rentas. 

In mid-April 2005,the mail room intercepted Nina’s first shipment, which

was a false-bottom box containing four books but no contraband. Lieutenant

David Munoz of the prison’s Special Investigations Section concluded the box

was a test and permitted it to reach the ILL Program. On April 30, 2005, the

mail room intercepted Nina’s second shipment, a box of books in which Lt.

Munoz found creatine, a nutritional supplement that the prison considered

contraband. Because the box contained contraband, Lt. Munoz did not permit

it to reach the ILL Program. 
No. 07-10873

1 The indictment also charged Steve Salazar on counts one and two, and Armandina

“Nina” Salazar on counts one and three. Both entered guilty pleas pursuant to written plea

agreements. 

3

In early July 2005, Wright directed Mathews to give Nina $300.00.

Mathews did so, and Nina used that money (and other sums) to purchase two

ounces of methamphetamine. The mail room intercepted Nina’s third shipment

on July 12, 2005. This shipment was two large envelopes with labels addressed

to the ILL Program with the return address of the Arlington Public Library.

Inside the envelopes, Lt. Munoz found small bags containing two ounces of

methamphetamine hidden in the spines of four hardcover books. Lt. Munoz

contacted the FBI, which began an investigation in conjunction with the prison.

Lt. Munoz started monitoring Wright’s phone calls because he was the ILL

Program’s only inmate-employee. On July 28, 2005, the mail room intercepted

a fourth shipment, a false-bottom box of four books. Inside the false bottom, Lt.

Munoz found contraband including a cell phone, a cell-phone charger, a cellphone earpiece, creatine, and pornography. 

The indictment contained three counts. The first count charged both

Wright and Mathews with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more

than fifty grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(B), and 846. The second count charged Wright with attempt to

possess, and aiding and abetting the attempt to possess, contraband in prison

(methamphetamine) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(2), 1791(b)(1), and

1791(b)(2). The third count charged Mathews with aiding and abetting the

attempted provision of a prohibited object (methamphetamine) to a federal

prisoner in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1791(a)(1), 1791(b)(1), and 1791(b)(2).1

At trial, the parties generally agreed on the facts as described above.

Mathews acknowledged that she sent the fourth shipment. She also admitted

giving Nina $300.00. Mathews claimed, however, that she was not involved in
No. 07-10873

4

the scheme to smuggle methamphetamine into the prison and had no knowledge

that Nina was going to use the $300.00 to purchase methamphetamine. Wright

also argued he had no involvement in the scheme, and claims he only directed

Mathews to give to Nina $300.00 in order to settle a gambling debt. The

Government, however, argued that Wright orchestrated the scheme and

recruited Rentas, provided Rentas with the mailing labels, and discussed the

scheme with Mathews through coded telephone conversations. The Government

also argued that Mathews, contrary to her assertions, was a knowing participant

in the scheme. 

The jury found Mathews and Wright guilty on all three counts. Mathews

and Wright filed motions for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 29, both at the close of the Government’s case and at the

close of the evidence, which the district court denied. Defendants appeal those

rulings, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. 

Wright also challenges the district court’s calculation of his sentence

under the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, Wright argues the district court

erred by applying a two-level leadership-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. §

3B1.1(c). The PSR applied a base offense level of 26. The PSR added a two-level

enhancement pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(3) because the offenses involved

distribution of controlled substances in a correctional facility and a two-level

enhancement pursuantto U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) because Wright was a leader ofthe

scheme. Receiving no credit for acceptance of responsibility, Wright’s offense

level would have been 30. However, the PSR found Wright was a career offender

and assigned a higher offense level of 37 pursuant to § 4B1.1(a), which

supersedes the lower offense level that would have included the leadership-role

enhancement. The district court adopted the PSR’s findings and application of

the career-offender enhancement, and therefore found Wright’s objection to the

leadership-role enhancement moot. Wright’s counsel agreed that Wright was
No. 07-10873

2 The district court sentenced Mathews to a term of 60 months’ imprisonment as to

count one and a concurrent term of 60 months’ imprisonment as to count three. Mathews does

not appeal the district court’s sentencing decisions. 

3 We apply this standard of review because defendants properly preserved their

insufficiency-of-the-evidence claims through motions for judgment of acquittal. See United

States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2007). 

5

eligible for the career-offender enhancement and that the district court therefore

did not need to address the leadership-role enhancement. The district court

sentenced Wright to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment on count one and a

concurrent term of 240 months’ imprisonment on count two, a sentence at the

bottom of the Guidelines range.2

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

While we review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal de novo, United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2001),

our review is “narrow,” United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir.

1999).3“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether,

viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light

most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. PrunedaGonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992). We accept the jury’s credibility

determinations “[u]nless a witness’s testimony is incredible or patently

unbelievable.” United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1996); see also

United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting the jury “is free

to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence” and “retains the sole

authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the

witnesses”). 

Count one alleged that Wright, Mathews, and others engaged in a

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of
No. 07-10873

6

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Accordingly, as to count one,

the Government was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the

existence of an agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws,

(2) knowledge of the conspiracy and intent to join it, and (3) voluntary

participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Peters, 283 F.3d 300, 307 (5th

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 866 (5th Cir.

1995)). Because the indictment included a specific quantity amount, the

Government was also required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

conspiracy involved more than fifty grams of methamphetamine. See United

States v. DeLeon, 247 F.3d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 2001). As to count two, the

Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright, as

an inmate of a prison, possessed or attempted to possess a prohibited object

(methamphetamine). See 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2). Finally, as to count three, the

Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mathews

provided or attempted to provide a prohibited object (methamphetamine) to an

inmate of a prison in violation of a statute or rule. See 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1).

We first discuss the evidence against Wright. The shipments, including

the envelopes containing methamphetamine, were all addressed to FCI

Seagoville’s ILL Program, where Wright was the only prisoner-employee.

Mathews admitted sending a box of contraband, which was addressed like the

packages containing methamphetamine, to Wright, further establishing his

connection to the scheme. That box contained the same four books prison

officials discovered in the first “test” box sent by Nina. The jury could infer that

Wright, as the only prisoner-employee of the ILL Program, arranged for

Mathews to use those books in the fourth shipment. Salazar testified that the

scheme’s purpose was to smuggle methamphetamine into FCI Seagoville and

distribute the drug to inmates. Salazar further testified that while he primarily

interacted with Rentas, Rentas told him that Wright was orchestrating the
No. 07-10873

7

scheme. Salazar described Rentas as only a “messenger” who relayed

communications from Salazar to Wright, further implying that Wright was

leading the scheme. Rentas also told Salazar that he received the labels from

Wright, and Salazar then passed them to his mother who used them on the

shipments to the prison. The evidence also shows Salazar provided his mother’s

phone number to Rentas, who gave it to Wright, who then gave the number to

Mathews -- thus enabling the cash transaction between Mathews and Nina.

Indeed, there is no dispute that Wright directed Mathews to give $300 to Nina,

which Nina used to purchase methamphetamine for the scheme. Finally, the

testimony of FBI Agent Jason Preece established that Wright had multiple,

coded conversations with Mathews in which he discussed the scheme and

directed her to take actions in furtherance of the conspiracy.

That evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict against Wright on

counts one and two. The prison’s interception of packages containing

methamphetamine, along with Salazar’s testimony, supports the jury’s finding

that there was an agreement between two or more persons to violate the

narcotics laws. Given the evidence and testimony that Wright not only

participated in but orchestrated the scheme, the jury was entitled to find that

he knew of the conspiracy, had the intent to join it, and voluntarily participated

in it. The parties also stipulated that the intercepted packages had a total of

approximately 50.4 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine,

meaning there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the Government

met its burden of proving the quantity alleged in the indictment. Finally, that

same evidence supports the jury’s finding that Wright attempted to possess a

prohibited object (methamphetamine). 

Next, we turn to the evidence against Mathews. Mathews admitted that

she sent the fourth shipment, which like some of the other shipments was a

false-bottom box of books. Like all of the shipments, it had a mailing label
No. 07-10873

8

addressed to the ILL Program with a return address of the Arlington Public

Library. Moreover, the fourth shipment contained the same books found in the

first shipment, which is strong circumstantial evidence that she was connected

to the overall scheme. Mathews also testified that she gave Nina $300, even

though Mathews claimed at trial she did not know that Nina would use it to

purchase drugs. Mathews admitted that she made labels for Nina to use. There

was also substantial evidence that Mathews discussed the scheme with Wright,

including discussions where Wright asked Mathews about methamphetamine

that had been intercepted or lost in the mail. There was also a phone

conversation in which Wright directed Mathews to destroy evidence and, if

asked, admit sending the fourth shipment but deny knowledge of the other

shipments. 

The evidence is sufficientto supportthe jury’s verdict against Mathews on

counts one and three. As discussed above, there is evidence supporting the jury’s

finding that there was an agreement between two or more persons to violate

narcotics laws and that the conspiracy involved more than 50 grams of

methamphetamine. There is also circumstantial evidence that Mathews knew

of the conspiracy, and that she intentionally and voluntarily joined the

conspiracy. In particular, the jury could infer from the circumstantial evidence

that Mathews knew the aim ofthe conspiracy was to smuggle methamphetamine

into the prison. Mathews admitted in her testimony that she intentionally and

voluntarily undertook acts that furthered the conspiracy by providing money and

labels to Nina. Finally, given that evidence, the jury could conclude that she

provided or attempted to provide a prohibited object (methamphetamine) to

someone in prison, or aided and abetted another in doing so. 

B. Admission of Salazar’s Testimony

Wright next argues that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting out-of-court statements made by Rentas because that testimony is
No. 07-10873

9

inadmissible hearsay. The Government argues, as the district court ruled, that

the statements are not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)

because they are statements made by Wright’s co-conspirator. 

“We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2007). “To introduce a coconspirator statement, the government had to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence: (1) the existence of the conspiracy; (2) the statement was made by a coconspirator of the party; (3) the statement was made during the course of the

conspiracy; and (4) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

Id. “The court may consider the content of the statement at issue as a factual

basis for these elements.” Id.; see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,

180 (1987) (“We think there is little doubt that a co-conspirator’s statements

could themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the

participation of both the defendant and declarant in the conspiracy.”). 

Salazar’s testimony provided the factual predicate for applying Rule

801(d)(2)(E) to Rentas’ statements. There was considerable evidence, even

putting aside Salazar’s testimony, of a conspiracy. Salazar testified that Wright

and Rentas were working together to smuggle methamphetamine into the

library, establishing that Rentas was a co-conspirator of Wright’s. Salazar’s

testimony also shows that Rentas’ statements were made to Salazar in an effort

to recruit him to join the scheme or in providing instructions to him for executing

the scheme. Accordingly, there was a basis for concluding the Rentas made the

statements in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly,

we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s evidentiary ruling.

C. Leadership Role Enhancement

We review the district court’s interpretation ofthe Guidelines de novo and

its factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Medina-Argueta, 454
No. 07-10873

4 The district court used the 2006 Guidelines Manual. “Although Booker rendered the

Guidelines advisory, district courts are still required to properly calculate the advisory

guidelines range prior to imposing a sentence.” United States v. Williams, 520 F.3d 414, 422

(5th Cir. 2008). 

10

F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2006).4 Wright argues the district court erroneously

enhanced his base offense by applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f

the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal

activity” involving four or fewer participants or that was not “otherwise

extensive.” Wright asserts there was insufficient evidence for the district judge

to find that he was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal

activity. Although Wright challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

application of the leadership-role enhancement, the district court did not apply

that enhancement. The court instead chose to apply the career-offender

enhancement. 

Wright does not address the district court’s application of the careeroffender enhancement, but to the extent he challenges the district court’s finding

that his objection to the leadership-role enhancement was moot, we disagree.

Wright qualifies as a career offender because (1) he was at least eighteen at the

time he committed the instant offenses, (2) at least one of the instant offenses

is a felony controlled substance offense, and (3) he had at least two prior felony

convictions for controlled substance offenses when he committed the instant

offenses. See U.S.S.G § 4B1.1(a). His conviction on count one of conspiracy with

intent to distribute more than fifty grams of methamphetamine carried a

maximum statutory penalty of life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

Wright therefore received an offense level of 37 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

4B1.1(b)(A). Because Wright’s offense level as a career offender was higher than

it otherwise would have been,the leadership-role enhancement did not affect his

sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (“[I]f the offense level for a career offender
No. 07-10873

11

from the table in this subsection is greater than the offense level otherwise

applicable, the offense level from the table in this subsection shall apply.”).

Thus, we affirm the district court’s ruling on Wright’s objection to the

leadership-role enhancement.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Defendants’ convictions and

Wright’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED.