FILED

August 30, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

SCHERING-PLOUGH HEALTHCARE ) FOR PUBLICATION

PRODUCTS, INC. )

) Filed: August 30, 1999

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Shelby Chancery

v. )

) Hon. Floyd Peete,

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) Chancellor

)

)

Defendant/Appellant. ) Appeal No.

) 02S01-9810-CH-00096

Defendant/Appellant: Plaintiff/Appellee

John Knox Walkup Fred M. Ridolphi, Jr.

Attorney General & Reporter Humphreys, Dunlap, Wellford,

Acuff & Stanton, P.C.

Memphis, Tennessee

Michael E. Moore

Solicitor General

Michael W. Catalano

Associate Solicitor General

Nashville, Tennessee

Amicus Curiae Shelby County and Shelby County Assessor

Donnie E. Wilson

Shelby County Attorney

Robert B. Rolwing

Assistant County Attorney

O P I N I O N

AFFIRMED. DROWOTA, J.
1W e do no t include a s um ma ry of the fac ts rela ting to the assessm ent of Sch ering -Plou gh’s

prop erty sin ce the app ropriateness of the assessme nt is not an issue in this a ppeal.

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This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals which

reversed the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the petition of Schering-Plough

Healthcare Products, Inc. (“Schering-Plough”) which sought judicial review of a

decision of the State Board of Equalization (“Board”). The Chancery Court dismissed

the petition after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action

because Schering-Plough had failed to name Shelby County as a party in the petition

and had failed to serve Shelby County with a copy of the petition within sixty days of

the final decision of the Board. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and held

that Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b) (1998 Repl.) does not require that all parties to

the contested case be named in the petition for review or that copies of the petition

be served upon all parties to the contested case within the sixty-day time limitation.

We agree and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the legal question in this appeal are undisputed.1

Schering-Plough owns property located in Shelby County. The Shelby County Board

of Equalization prepared a tax assessment of the property. On September 1, 1994,

Schering-Plough appealed the assessment. On October 18, 1994, following a

hearing, the administrative law judge issued an initial decision and order affirming the

assessment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1505 (1998 Repl.). Schering-Plough

appealed this decision to the Assessment Appeals Commission (“Commission”),

which issued its final decision affirming the assessment on April 10, 1995. See Tenn.
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Code Ann. § 67-5-1506 (1998 Repl.). The Board declined to review the

Commission’s decision on May 25, 1995 and thereby rendered the action of the

Commission final. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1502(j)(1) (1998 Repl.). It is

undisputed that Shelby County through its Assessor’s office participated as a party

in the contested case before the administrative law judge and the Commission.

On July 21, 1995, within sixty days of the agency’s final decision, ScheringPlough filed in the Shelby County Chancery Court a “Petition for Review of the Action

of the State Board of Equalization.” On September 25, 1995, the Board moved to

dismiss the action because Schering-Plough had not named Shelby County as a

party in the petition and because Schering-Plough had not served a copy of the

petition upon Shelby County within sixty days of the agency’s final order.

Two days later, on September 27, 1995, Schering-Plough moved to amend its

petition to add as party defendants Shelby County, the Shelby County Assessor, and

the Shelby County Trustee. After these motions were filed, Schering-Plough served

a copy of the petition upon these additional parties. Thereafter, Shelby County, the

Assessor, and the Trustee filed a joint motion to quash service, or in the alternative,

to dismiss, relying upon the same grounds alleged by the Board: failure to name all

parties to the contested case and failure to serve a copy of the petition upon all

parties to the contested case within sixty days of the final order of the agency.

Following a hearing, the Chancellor granted the Board’s motion to dismiss,

stating “Schering-Plough’s failure to name Shelby County as a defendant and to

serve upon the County . . . a copy of the Petition renders this Court without subject
2At the trial level, the Board alleged and the Chancellor cited a third basis in support of

dismissal--failure to serve p rocess on all parties of recor d. In light of this Court’s decision in JACO v.

Department of Health, Bure au of Med icaid, 950 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tenn. 1997), the Board has

aband oned this position on appea l. 

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matter jurisdiction over this action.”2

 The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal

and held that Schering-Plough had properly preserved its right to judicial review of the

administrative decision simply by filing its petition for review with the Chancery Court

within sixty days of the final agency decision. Relying upon this Court’s decision in

JACO v. Department of Health, Bureau of Medicaid, 950 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tenn.

1997), the Court of Appeals also concluded that the sixty-day time limitation does not

apply to the statutory provision which requires that all parties of record be served with

a copy of the petition. Thereafter, this Court granted the Board’s application for

permission to appeal and now affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals for the

reasons that follow.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

In resolving the issues in this appeal, we are guided by the following general

rules of statutory construction. The role of this Court in construing statutes is to

ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912

(Tenn. 1995). Legislative intent is to be ascertained whenever possible from the

natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle

construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. Carson Creek

Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). If

the legislative intent is expressed in a manner devoid of contradiction and ambiguity,

there is no room for interpretation or constructions, and courts are not at liberty to
3

Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 4-5-101 through 4-5-325 (1998 Repl.).

4At the time of the filing of Schering-Plough’s petition for review on July 21, 1995, Tenn. Code

Ann. § 67-5-1 511 (19 94 Re pl.) permitted the filing of a petition for re view o f a de cision of th e Board in

“Davidson County or the chancery court of the county where the disputed assessment was mad e.” In

this case, the disputed assessment was in Shelby County, and Schering-Plough filed its petition in the

Shelby C ounty Ch ancery C ourt.

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depart from the words of the statute. Id. Where the language contained within the

four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the duty of the courts is

simple and obvious, “to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.” Id., quoting Miller v.

Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 319, 321-22 (1841).

With these principles in mind, we next consider the statute that is the focus of

this appeal. Under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),3

 a party

aggrieved by a final decision of an administrative agency may seek judicial review of

the contested case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a) (1998 Repl.). The procedure for

obtaining review is delineated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b) (1998 Repl.), which

provides, in pertinent part: 

(1) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition for review

in the chancery court of Davidson County, unless another court is

specified by statute.4 Such petition shall be filed within sixty (60) days

after the entry of the agency’s final order thereon. . . .

(2) In a case in which a petition for judicial review is submitted within

the sixty-day period but is filed with an inappropriate court, the case

shall be transferred to the appropriate court. . . . Copies of the petition

shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record, including the

attorney general and reporter, in accordance with the provisions of the

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to service of process.

 

(Emphasis added.) We agree with the Court of Appeals that the plain language of

this statute imposes only two requirements upon a party seeking judicial review of a

contested case. First, the statute requires an aggrieved party to file a petition for
5

The Board’s reliance upon Tenn. Code Ann. 67-5-1511(b) (1998 Repl.) is misplaced . This

statute governs the scope of evidenc e admissible at a chance ry court hearing on a petition for judicial

review of a decision of the Board. It does not delineate the procedure required for obtaining judicial

review in chancery court in the first instance.

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review in an appropriate chancery court within sixty days after entry of the agency’s

final order. The sixty-day time limitation upon filing of the petition is jurisdictional.

Bishop v. Department of Correction, 896 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. App. 1994) (perm. app.

denied March 20, 1995). The second requirement of the statute is that a copy of the

petition be served “upon the agency and all parties of record, including the attorney

general and reporter, in accordance with the provisions of the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Procedure pertaining to service of process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)

(1998 Repl.).

Contrary to the Board’s assertions, these are the only two procedural

requirements under Section 322 for obtaining judicial review of a contested case.5

Nothing in the statute mandates that the petition itself name all the parties to the

contested case. So long as a copy of the petition is served upon the “parties of

record” to the contested case, the unambiguous dictates of the statute are satisfied.

Though we base our decision on the plain language of the statute, we agree with the

Court of Appeals that a petition for review is comparable to a notice of appeal. As we

stated in JACO, a petition for judicial review is the continuation of an administrative

proceeding in much the same way that an appeal can be characterized as a

continuation of the underlying action. The parties to the contested case have

previously been determined and are “of record.” JACO, 950 S.W.2d at 352. As the

Court of Appeals noted, failure to name a party in a caption of a notice of appeal is

not a reason for dismissal of the appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f). Similarly, failure
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to name a party in a petition for judicial review is not grounds for dismissal of the

proceeding.

Moreover, we reject the Board’s argument that dismissal is required unless a

copy of the petition for review is served within sixty days after entry of the final

agency order. While the statute clearly requires that the petition for review be filed

within the sixty-day time period, the statute does not mandate that service occur

within that same time period. The sixty-day limitation appears in the statutory

subsection relating to filing not service of the petition for review. In fact, the statute

does not designate a definite time period within which service must be accomplished.

It provides only that service of a copy of the petition be accomplished in accordance

with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to service of process. As we

stated in JACO, this portion of the statute refers only to the method and means of

service set forth in the rules. JACO, 950 S.W.2d at 353. Judicially applying the sixtyday period to service of the petition is not appropriate in light of the plain language

of the statute.

The Board’s assertions that an aggrieved party must name all the parties to

the contested case in the petition for review and serve the petition for review within

the sixty-day time period simply are not supported by the plain language of the

statute. As previously stated, where the language contained within the four corners

of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, courts are not at liberty to depart from

the language of the statute. Judicial construction simply is not appropriate. Carson

Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 2. Moreover, the Board’s proposed

construction is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s expressed intent that the
6

To the exten t inconsis tent with ou r decision herein all pre vious ap pellate court decisions are

overruled including HRA, Inc. v. Department of Commerce & Ins., 914 S.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Tenn. App.

1995). W e also expressly disapprove the dicta statement of this Court in JACO which characterized

the result in HRA, Inc. as “clearly correct.” JACO, 950 S.W.2d at 353.

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UAPA be “given a liberal construction and any doubt as to the existence or the extent

of a power conferred shall be resolved in favor of the existence of the power.” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 4-5-103 (1998 Repl.). The clear language of the statute confers upon

certain chancery courts the jurisdictional power to consider petitions for review which

are filed within sixty days after entry of the final agency order. The Board’s proposed

construction would divest a chancery court of jurisdiction even though an aggrieved

party has satisfied all the explicit statutory requirements for obtaining judicial review.

We decline to adopt such a construction.

For the reasons discussed above, we reject the Board’s proposed construction

of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b) (1998 Repl.). The plain language of the statute

does not require an aggrieved party to name all parties of record to the contested

case in the petition for judicial review, nor does it require service of a copy of the

petition within the sixty-day time period.6

 The plain language of the statute requires

only that a petition for review be filed within sixty days after entry of the final agency

order and that a copy of the petition be served upon the agency and all parties of 
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record, including the Attorney General and Reporter, in accordance with the method

and manner prescribed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for service of

process.

CONCLUSION

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is clear that ScheringPlough has satisfied both statutory requisites. Schering-Plough’s petition for review

was filed within the sixty-day time limitation. The parties of record to the contested

case have been served with a copy of the petition. Accordingly, the decision of the

Court of Appeals reversing the Chancery Court’s dismissal is affirmed.

_____________________________________

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III,

JUSTICE

Concur:

Anderson, C. J.

Birch, Holder, Barker, JJ.