NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANDREW B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.B., S.B., A.B., Appellees.

1

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0202

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD509060

The Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa

By Suzanne Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Cathleen E. Fuller

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

 

1 The caption has been amended to safeguard the children’s identities

pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-0001.
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Andrew B. (Father) challenges the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his children, M.B., S.B., and A.B. Finding 

no error, that order is affirmed.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father is the biological father of M.B., born in 2005; S.B., born 

in 2008 and A.B., born in 2009 (the Children). Amanda C. (Mother) is the 

biological mother of the Children; her parental rights have been terminated 

and she is not a party to this appeal.

¶3 In January 2011, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) took 

the Children into custody after receiving reports that Father left the 

Children with a family friend because he was afraid he would hurt them 

and Mother had been hospitalized. When the Children came into care, two 

alleged Father hit them and M.B. reported that a neighbor’s child, M.L., had 

touched her inappropriately. Father generally denied the allegations and 

refused to believe the allegations against M.L. DCS filed a dependency 

petition alleging Father had neglected the Children by not taking care of 

their needs and by failing to protect them from Mother’s substance abuse 

and domestic violence. In February 2011, the Children were found 

dependent after both Mother and Father denied the allegations but 

submitted the matter to the court. The court adopted a family reunification 

case plan.

¶4 DCS provided, and Father participated in, many family 

reunification services. In June 2012, Father filed a motion for change in 

physical custody, asking that S.B. and A.B. be placed in his physical 

 

2 This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the 

superior court’s findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 

205, 207 ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008). 
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

custody; by that time, the dependency had been pending for about a year 

and a half. In August 2012, over DCS’ objection, the superior court granted 

Father’s motion placing S.B. and A.B. in his physical custody. Shortly 

thereafter, S.B. incurred an eye injury and Father and S.B. gave conflicting 

stories as to how the injury occurred. In September 2012, DCS received a 

report that Father had been mugged at the doorway to his hotel room while 

S.B. and A.B. were inside the room. During this time, Father also missed 

three visits with M.B., including a visit on her birthday. Father also refused 

to transport S.B. and A.B. to some visits with M.B., who was not in Father’s 

physical custody.

¶5 In December 2012, Father admitted he was aware of a 

situation where M.L. and S.B. were in a closet and, when Father found 

them, it looked “like [M.L.] was helping with a stuck zipper on her [S.B.’s] 

pants.” S.B. reported inappropriate touching to Father but, despite the fact 

that M.B. had made similar allegations against M.L, Father did not believe 

S.B. Father continued to allow M.L. to be in the home when S.B. was 

present. In February 2013, S.B. made disclosures to a therapist of additional 

inappropriate touching and contact by M.L. Father did not believe S.B. and

his immediate response was to let M.L.’s mother know of the allegations. 

Father also directed S.B. not to discuss any issues of a sexual nature with 

her therapist and instead only bring those issues to him. S.B. also told a case 

aide that Father said she could not tell anyone about the spankings she had 

received from Father. 

¶6 Later in February 2013, S.B. and A.B. were removed from 

Father’s physical custody based on his failure to protect S.B. and to respond 

appropriately to S.B.’s allegations against M.L. By that time, the 

dependency had been pending for more than two years. After S.B. and A.B. 

were removed from his physical custody, Father missed visits with them.

¶7 In September 2013, over Father’s objection, the superior court 

changed the case plan to severance and adoption. DCS’ motion for 

termination alleged Father had been unable to remedy the circumstances 

that had caused the Children to be in an out-of-home placement for more 

than 15 months and there was a substantial likelihood he would be unable 

to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. 

¶8 The superior court held a severance trial over the course of six 

days in the first part of 2014. In June 2014 (reflected in a more formal July 

2014 order), the superior court granted the motion and terminated Father’s 

parental rights to the Children based on 15-months time-in-care. Father 

timely appealed and this court has jurisdiction under Arizona Revised 
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1) (2015) 3 and 

Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103–04. 

DISCUSSION

I. DCS Made Diligent Efforts To Reunify The Family. 

¶9 On appeal, Father claims DCS failed to make diligent efforts 

to reunify the family because it did not provide reunification services other 

than visitation after February 2013, when S.B. and A.B. were removed from 

his care the second time. Father further contends DCS’ failure to make 

diligent efforts is supported by the fact that DCS did not follow its own 

experts’ recommendation for therapeutic visitation between Father and 

M.B.

¶10 As applicable here, before DCS may terminate the parentchild relationship, it must offer appropriate reunification services. See Mary 

Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192 ¶ 34, 971 P.2d 1046, 

1053 (App. 1999). DCS satisfies this requirement if it provides the parent 

with “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help 

[him or] her become an effective parent.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994). 

¶11 DCS provided Father and the Children numerous family 

reunification services, including child and family team meetings, parent 

aide services, a psychological consultation and evaluation, a psychiatric 

evaluation, a psychosexual evaluation, therapeutic visitation, supervised 

visitation, a self-referral for individual counseling and a family 

reunification team. The fact that DCS did not offer services other than 

supervised visitation after S.B. and A.B. were removed a second time is not 

dispositive. In March 2013 and September 2013, the superior court found 

without objection that DCS had made reasonable efforts to secure 

permanency, including providing various services for Father. Moreover, 

futile efforts are not required and DCS “is not required to provide every 

conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service” 

offered. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d

234, 239 (App. 1994); see also Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 

86, 94 ¶ 20, 219 P.3d 296, 304 (App. 2009). 

 

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 Although Father argued that the facts leading to the second 

removal of two of the Children are sufficiently different from the first 

removal and thus DCS was required to offer Father additional services, the 

court disagreed. The range of services offered to Father were designed to 

help him keep the Children safe and promote effective parenting without 

the use of physical force. Father, however, demonstrated that he was 

unwilling or unable to protect the Children and continued to “engage in 

deception to prevent anyone from knowing when his children [had] been 

harmed by him or others.” Father was given “the time and opportunity to 

participate in programs designed to help [him] become an effective parent” 

and, on this record, providing further services would have been futile. See 

Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 

239 (App. 1994). Furthermore, there is no evidence that Father sought 

specific additional services after S.B. and A.B. were removed from his 

physical custody the second time. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,

234 Ariz. 174, 179 ¶18, 319 P.3d 236, 241 (App. 2014) (noting it is 

“incumbent” on parent to raise with superior court concerns about 

reunification services). 

¶13 Similarly, Father argues that DCS should have offered him 

therapeutic visits with M.B. after the suspension of visits in 2012.

Therapeutic visits with M.B. were offered in 2011 but, after a December 2011 

psychological evaluation revealing M.B.’s considerable anxiety regarding 

visits with Father, the psychologist recommended visits cease. In February

2012, based on reports from the earlier therapeutic visits in 2011, the 

psychologist opined that visits could resume “as long as the visits continue 

to be positive and appropriate.” Visits resumed, but in November 2012, 

M.B. continued to express significant anxiety at the prospect of having visits 

with Father and no longer wanted to see him. Father consented to the 

cessation of visits with M.B and there is no evidence Father pursued 

obtaining further visits after this agreement.

¶14 Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding 

that the provision of additional services after the second removal would 

have been redundant and futile given Father’s failure to change his 

behaviors. Accordingly, DCS fulfilled its obligation to make diligent efforts 

to reunify the family. See Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 

185, 192 ¶ 34, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999).
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

II. The Record Supports The Finding That Father Failed To Remedy 

The Circumstances And Was Unable To Parent The Children. 

¶15 The superior court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). This court will reverse an order 

terminating parental rights only if the factual findings are clearly erroneous 

or not supported by the record. See Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 

Ariz. 376, 377, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998). This court views the 

evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s 

findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207 ¶ 2, 181 

P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008).

¶16 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the Children must have 

been in an out-of-home placement for a “cumulative total period of fifteen 

months or longer” and the parent must have been “unable to remedy the 

circumstances that cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home 

placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be 

capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the 

near future.” It is undisputed that the Children were in an out-of-home 

placement for a cumulative total period far exceeding 15 months.

¶17 After Father participated in and completed numerous 

services provided by DCS, both A.B. and S.B. were returned to his care for 

several months before being removed a second time. Despite Father’s 

completion of services, he was unable to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the Children to be in an out-of-home placement. For example, the 

superior court noted that Father allowed M.L. to be in the home, even after 

M.B. and S.B. both accused M.L. of inappropriate sexual conduct. Father 

admitted that the accusations by two of the Children of the same improper 

conduct by the same individual raised a “red flag,” but it did not cause him 

to prohibit contact with M.L. Moreover, Father called S.B. a liar and, instead 

of getting help for S.B. given the disclosures, he informed M.L.’s mother to 

warn her of the allegations. The superior court found, and the record 

supports, that “[t]hroughout the relevant time period, Father has ignored 

or minimized negative situations which put his children in danger.” 

¶18 The superior court also found, and the record also supports, 

that Father’s continued use of physical punishments even after completing 

parent aide and family reunification services and Father’s efforts to conceal 

his use of such punishments, evidenced his failure to change his behaviors. 

Moreover, Father had been given more than two years to participate in 

services designed to improve parenting skills. 
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

¶19 Even if Father and M.B. had participated in more therapeutic 

visitation, Father has not shown how this would have changed the fact that 

he engaged in deception and was unwilling or unable to protect the 

Children. Moreover, DCS “is not required to provide every conceivable 

service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service” offered. 

Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 

239 (App. 1994). Although Father argues the evidence received should have 

been weighed differently, this court does not reweigh the evidence. See Jesus 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 

2002) (citing cases).

¶20 Despite Father’s participation in DCS’ services, Father failed 

to make the necessary changes in his behavior to ensure the Children’s 

safety. Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

order, this record supports the factual findings resulting in the termination 

of Father’s parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). See Manuel M. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207 ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 

2008).

III. The Record Supports The Finding That Terminating The ParentChild Relationship Was In The Children’s Best Interests. 

¶21 DCS was required to show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that severance was in the best interests of the Children. Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). The evidence 

must show either that the Children “would derive an affirmative benefit 

from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship.” 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 6, 100 P.3d 943, 945 

(App. 2004) (citation omitted). 

¶22 The trial evidence shows M.B. was in a potential adoptive 

placement with a relative and that S.B. and A.B. were in a potential adoptive 

placement. In addition, the DCS caseworker testified that termination of 

Father’s parental rights would be in the best interests of the Children 

because they were adoptable, “lovable kids, doing great [] now” and DCS 

had concerns about Father’s use of physical punishment and lack of stable 

housing. The trial evidence supports the superior court’s finding that 

termination of Father’s parental rights would “benefit the children by 

freeing them for adoption and providing them permanency after a lengthy 

time in care.” Furthermore, trial evidence supports the conclusion that it 

would be in the Children’s best interests to “not be placed with a parent 

who refuses to acknowledge dangers and actual harm to the children and 

who encourages them to lie or conceal harm that is inflicted upon them.” 
ANDREW B. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

These findings support the conclusion that severance was in the best 

interests of the Children. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 

P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005).

CONCLUSION

¶23 Because the superior court did not err, the order terminating 

Father’s parental rights to M.B., S.B. and A.B. is affirmed.