* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-60321

Summary Calendar

PAUL S SILVAS

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

REMINGTON OIL & GAS CORPORATION

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi 

USDC No. 1:02-CV-893

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Paul Silvas appeals on his own behalf the district court’s decision to deny

his Rule 60(b) motion to re-open his case against Remington Oil and Gas

Corporation. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Silvas first contends that the district court misconstrued his Rule 60

motion as a motion for summary judgment. To support his contention, Silvas

points to the fact that the district court’s order appearing on its docket sheet

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-60321

2

provides, in part, the following: “TEXT ONLY ORDER denying Plaintiff’s 56

Motion for Leave to File a Supplement Motion for Review as frivolous.” Silvas

contends that the inclusion of the number 56 meant that the district court

mistreated his motion as a motion for summary judgment since Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. As

Remington observes, however, the “56” on the docket sheet is a cross-reference

to entry 56—the entry immediately preceding the district court’s order

entry—which is the docket entry corresponding to Silvas’s Rule 60 motion. In

other words, by including the “56” in its order, the district court was merely

identifying by docket number the motion that it denied. Silvas, a non-attorney,

was justifiably confused by the docket-sheet jargon. We are confident, however,

that the district court properly considered Silvas’s motion as a Rule 60 motion.

Silvas next contends that, even if the district court properly treated his

motion as a Rule 60 motion, it erred in denying it. We review the denial of a

Rule 60 motion for an abuse of discretion. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech

USA, Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1993). There was no abuse of discretion

here. In 2004, the district court dismissed Silvas’s lawsuit against Remington,

determining that Silvas had failed to include an indispensable third-party. We

subsequently upheld that dismissal. Two years later, the Louisiana Supreme

Courtissued an opinion in Barnhill v. Remington Oil & Gas Corp.that arguably

supports Silvas’s contention that he actually had a valid cause of action in his

initial suit (although Barnhill did not speak to the issue of whether the thirdparty in Silvas’s case was indispensable). 928 So. 2d 539 (La. 2006). It is based

on Barnhill that Silvas now claims that the district court should (under Rule

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) re-open his case against

Remington. But this court has long recognized that a subsequent change in the

law is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify allowing a litigant to re-open a

case under Rule 60. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160
No. 08-60321

3

(5th Cir. 1990). Put simply, even if Silvas is right that he would win in his suit

against Remington under the current state of the law, the district court would

not be required to let him re-litigate this case all of these years later. Moreover,

to the extentthat Silvas claims the district court should have re-opened the case

for another reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

accede to that request. See id. 

AFFIRMED.