United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

______

No. 08-6019

______

In re: *

 *

Tony W. Coleman, doing business *

as Superior Investigation Solutions, *

LLC; Stephanie A. Coleman, *

 * Appeal from the United States

Debtors. * Bankruptcy Court for the Western

 * District of Missouri 

Green Tree Servicing, LLC, *

 *

Creditor-Appellant, *

 *

v. *

 *

Tony W. Coleman; Stephanie A. *

Coleman, *

 *

Debtors-Appellees. *

 *

______

Submitted: August 8, 2008

Filed: August 25, 2008

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Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, SCHERMER and MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judges.

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KRESSEL, Chief Judge.
1

The Honorable Arthur B. Federman, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

2

Green Tree Servicing, LLC appeals the bankruptcy court’s1 order of April 22,

2008, confirming Tony W. and Stephanie A. Coleman’s chapter 13 plan. Because we

agree with the bankruptcy court that the debtor could cram down Green Tree’s secured

claim, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Green Tree holds a secured claim in a 1996 Chandaleur 16 x 80 manufactured

home which is owned by Stephanie A. Coleman. She and Tony use the home as their

residence, located on 30- 36 acres in Jasper County, Missouri.

The Colemans’ original chapter 13 plan proposed to bifurcate the manufactured

home claim, limiting the secured claim to the value of the mobile home, which the

Colemans’ plan listed as $6,000.00 and treating the remainder as unsecured. The

original plan proposed to pay $100.00 per month to Green Tree.

Green Tree objected to the Colemans’ plan, arguing primarily that its claim was

not subject to cramdown and secondarily that the debtors had undervalued its

collateral and thus were not paying the secured claim in full. The bankruptcy court

overruled Green Tree’s objection in part, finding that it was subject to cramdown, but

ruling that the debtors had undervalued its collateral. In re Coleman, 373 B.R. 907,

914 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007). The bankruptcy court valued the home at $14,972.58

and directed the Colemans to file a new plan treating the secured claim at $14,972.58.

Id. Green Tree appealed.
3

We dismissed Green Tree’s appeal as interlocutory. The debtors then filed an

amended plan and the bankruptcy court confirmed it. The Colemans’ amended

chapter 13 plan values the manufactured home at $14,972.58 but, like the original

plan, it bifurcates the claim, limiting the secured claim to the value of the mobile

home and treating the remainder as unsecured. Under the confirmed plan, the

Colemans will pay Green Tree $250.00 for 60 months. Green Tree appealed again.

The confirmation order is a final appealable order.

Standard of Review

We review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and its

conclusions of law de novo. DeBold v. Case, 452 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2006); In

re Vondall, 364 B.R. 668, 670 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007). We review issues committed

to the bankruptcy’s court’s discretion for an abuse of that discretion. In re Neal, 461

F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006). “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that

[appellate courts] review de novo.” Minn. Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472 F.3d

524, 537 (8th Cir. 2006). 

DISCUSSION

The sole issue is a legal one which we review de novo. May a chapter 13 plan

modify the rights of a creditor holding a security interest in a manufactured home?

Appellant Green Tree contends that the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and

Consumer Protection Act expanded the scope of the anti-modification provision in 11

U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) to include manufactured homes when it defined “debtor’s

principal residence” and specifically included manufactured homes. Green Tree

argues that because Congress defined “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. §

101(13A)(A)(B) to include manufactured homes, “all mobile and manufactured
2

E.g., In re Davis, 386 B.R. 182 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008); In re Shepherd, 381

B.R. 675 (E.D. Tenn. 2008); In re Lara, No. 07-60188, 2008 WL 961892 (Bankr.

S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2008); Kinder v. Vanderbilt Mortg. and Fin., No. 1:07-cv-564,

2008 WL 2230694 (S.D. Ohio May 28, 2008); In re Williamson, 387 B.R. 914

(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2008); In re Gearheart, No. 07-70232, 2007 WL 4463342 (E.D.

Ky. Dec. 14, 2007); In re Logan, No. 07-70212, 2007 WL 4414784 (Bankr. E.D.

Ky. Dec. 14, 2007); In re Fuller, No. 07-81703, 2007 WL 3244113 (Bankr. M.D.

N.C. Nov. 2, 2007); In re Oliveira, 378 B.R. 789 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007); Herrin

v. Green Tree-AL, LLC, 376 B.R. 316 (S.D. Ala. 2007), aff'g In re Herrin, No. 06-

12249-WSS-13, 2007 WL 1975573 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. July 3, 2007); In re

Bartolome, No. 07-10731-DHW, 2007 WL 2774467 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Sept. 21,

2007); In re McLain, 376 B.R. 492 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2007); In re Manning, No. BK

07-70190-CMS-13, 2007 WL 2220454 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 2, 2007); In re

Cox, No. 07-60073, 2007 WL 1888186 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 29, 2007). But see

In re Shepherd, 354 B.R. 505 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (holding that the antimodification provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) is applicable to a mobile home

irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits),

rev’d, In re Shepherd, 381 B.R. 675 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that the definition

of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A) does not operate to

extend the anti-modification provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) to structures that are

not real property); In re Fells, No. 07-80559, 2007 WL 3120113 (Bankr. W.D. La.

Oct. 23, 2007) (holding that a lien on the debtor’s mobile home which was the

debtor’s principal residence as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A) was not

subject to modification under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)); HSBC v. Lunger (In re

Lunger), 370 B.R. 649 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that because the definition

of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A) includes “incidental

property,” a secured interest in incidental property cannot be modified under 11

U.S.C. § 1322(b)); In re Davis, 373 B.R. 46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that

the definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A)

4

homes, regardless of their state law classification as real or personal property, are

protected by the anti-modification provision of § 1322(b)(2).” Appellant’s Brief at

4. We join the majority2

 of courts that have considered the issue, and hold that §
protects holder of secured claim in a mobile home that is debtor’s principal

residence from modification under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)), rev’d, In re Davis, 386

B.R. 182 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (holding that the addition of a definition of

“debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A) did not change the

scope of the 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) anti-modification provision and § 1322(b)

remains applicable only to real property).

5

1322(b)(2) is unambiguous and does not prohibit modification of a manufactured

home security interest where that interest is not real property.

The plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) clearly limits the antimodification provision to a security interest in real property that is also the

debtor’s principal residence.

Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. We

“presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute

what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254, 112 S.Ct.

1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). When a statute’s plain meaning is

unambiguous, “judicial inquiry is complete.” Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424,

430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). “[I]n the absence of ‘a clearly

expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded

as conclusive.’” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20, 104 S.Ct. 296, 299, 78

L.Ed.2d 17 (1983), quoting from United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101

S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), quoting from Consumer Product Safety

Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d

766 (1980). 

11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) states that a chapter 13 plan may “modify the rights of

holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real
6

property that is the debtor’s principal residence.” A plain reading requires that in

order for the anti-modification provision to apply, the claim must both be secured only

by an interest “in real property” and further, that the real property must be the

“debtor’s principal residence.” BAPCPA defines “debtor’s principal residence” as “a

residential structure, including incidental property, without regard to whether that

structure is attached to real property.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(A). Further, it specifies

that “debtor’s principal residence” “includes an individual condominium or

cooperative unit, a mobile or manufactured home, or a trailer.” 11 U.S.C. §

101(13A)(B). No one disputes that the manufactured home is the debtors’ principal

residence. Green Tree argues that the only logical reading of § 1322(b)(2) is that all

manufactured and mobile homes are exempt from cramdown, regardless of their state

law classification as real or personal property. However, Green Tree’s reading is

contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.

In § 1322(b)(2), the word “that” functions as a restrictive pronoun; it limits the

application of the anti-modification provision to types of secured interests in real

property that are used by the debtor as a principal residence. The result is that the

determination of whether a security interest in a debtor’s principal residence may be

subject to cramdown turns on whether that residence is real or personal property.

Green Tree argues that by adding a definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in §

101(13A)(B), Congress eliminated the requirement under § 1322(b) that in order to

be exempt from cramdown, the secured interest must be in real property. Congress

could have easily written the anti-modification provision as Greentree suggests but did

not. See Herrin v. Green Tree–AL, LLC (In re Herrin), 376 B.R. 316 (S.D. Ala. 2007)

(“had Congress truly wanted to remove the ‘real property’ requirement, it could have

done so with exceptional ease by merely redacting the word ‘real’ or adding the words

‘or personal’ in Section 1322(b)(2)”). Therefore, we hold that § 1322(b)(2) is

unambiguous and does not prohibit modification of a manufactured home security

interest where that interest is not real property.
7

Consideration of the legislative history would not change the interpretation of

§ 1322(b)(2).

Because we hold that Section 1322(b)(2) is unambiguous and does not prohibit

modification of a manufactured home security interest where that interest is not real

property, we do not find it necessary to consider the legislative history for evidence

of what Congress might have meant. However, the outcome would be the same even

if we consider the legislative history of BAPCPA. As Green Tree concedes in its

brief, the legislative history is minimal. The only support Green Tree offers is found

in the April 8, 2005, House of Representatives Judiciary Report:

Sec. 306. Giving Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in

Chapter 13. [...] Section 306(c) (1) amends section 101 of

the Bankruptcy Code to define the term "debtor's principal

residence" as a residential structure (including incidental

property) without regard to whether or not such structure is

attached to real property. The term includes an individual

condominium or cooperative unit as well as a mobile or

manufactured home, or a trailer. 

H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, at 72 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 140. The

report simply reiterates that the term “debtor’s principal residence” has been defined

to include manufactured homes; it does not indicate, explicitly or implicitly, that the

anti-modification provision of § 1322(b)(2) must be extended all security interests in

manufactured homes, whether or not state law treats them as realty or personalty.

With such a scant record, we see no reason to question the plain meaning of §

1322(b)(2).
8

State law controls the determination of whether a debtor’s principal residence

is real or personal property.

Green Tree argues that the application of state law in the present case would

violate the Supremacy Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, and

wreak havoc on the uniformity of bankruptcy proceedings by requiring bankruptcy

courts “to look to the mobile home classification statutes from each state to determine

the rights of the parties in a mobile home lending situation, potentially leading to fifty

(50) different interpretations of the statutes involved.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Green

Tree’s analysis directly conflicts with a central tenet of bankruptcy law that state law

creates property rights and that those rights are to be respected in bankruptcy, even

though the results may vary among the states. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,

54-55 & n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (determining property

interests by reference to state law does not violate the Bankruptcy Clause); Stellwagen

v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613, 38 S.Ct. 215, 217, 62 L.Ed. 507 (1918) (“the Bankruptcy

Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the states [...]. Such recognition in the

application of state laws does not affect the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act,

although in these particulars the operation of the act is not alike in all the states”);

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 128, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819) (“state

laws are thus suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided

by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress”). 

Green Tree asserts that the plain meaning of the statute creates a conflict with

state law. In support, it cites a decision which has been reversed. In re Shepherd, 354

B.R. 505 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006), rev’d, 381 B.R. 675 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding

that § 101(13A)(A) “does not alter the requirement that the property in question be

real property in order for the anti-modification provision to apply”). We see no

conflict between the statute and state law. “In the absence of a controlling federal

rule, we generally assume that Congress has ‘left the determination of property rights
9

in assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law,’ since such ‘property interests are created

and defined by state law.’” Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329, 113 S.Ct.

2106, 2110 (1993) (quoting Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 54-55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918

(1979)). The definition of “debtor’s principal residence” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)(B)

includes manufactured and mobile homes, but is silent as to whether manufactured

and mobile homes are real or personal property. Therefore, we look to the applicable

state law to determine whether the debtors’ property is real or personal.

The debtors’ manufactured home is personal property under Missouri law.

Lastly, we consider whether the Colemans’ manufactured home is “real

property” under applicable state law. Under Missouri law, manufactured and mobile

homes are generally classified as personal property but may be converted to real

property by both “(1) Attaching the manufactured home to a permanent foundation

situated on real estate owned by the manufactured home owner” and “(2) The removal

or modification of the transporting apparatus including but not limited to wheels, axles

and hitches rendering it impractical to reconvert the real property thus created to a

manufactured home.” Mo. Rev. Stat § 700.111; Housley v. Mericle, 57 S.W.3d 360,

364 (Mo. App. 2001) (“A manufactured home is considered personal property until

converted to real property, pursuant to § 700.111.”); In the Estate of Parker, 25

S.W.3d 611, 615-16 (Mo. App. 2000) (“A person converts his mobile home from

personal to real property by causing the mobile home to become a fixture.”). See also

In re Thornton, 269 B.R. 682, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (finding that a

manufactured home had been converted to real property, where the manufactured

home’s wheels and tires had been removed, skirting had been installed, the structure

had been placed on blocks, and the structure had been attached to its own well and

septic system).

Green Tree does not contend that the Colemans’ manufactured home has been

legally converted from personal to real property and presented no evidence at the
10

confirmation hearing on July 25, 2007. Green Tree states generally, “The facts of this

case are simple and uncontested.” Appellant’s Brief at 2.

The only evidence presented to the bankruptcy court was the testimony of Ms.

Coleman. Coleman at 911. Ms. Coleman testified that she and her husband own the

land on which the manufactured home sits. She testified that the wheels had been

taken off and bricks put underneath, but that there was no foundation and nothing to

secure the home to the land. She testified that the home is only secured to the land by

“standard tie downs,” which she said are “basically poles that they hammer into the

ground.” Tr. at 29. She testified that in order to move the home, one would only need

to “get a truck, come out there, jack it up, put the wheels back on it and drive it off.”

Id. The bankruptcy court found, based on Ms. Coleman’s testimony, that the home

had not been permanently attached to the land and therefore was not real estate under

Missouri law. Coleman at 911. Because the court’s finding is supported by the

record, we do not disturb it.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.