Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A03-1708-CT-1829 | February 5, 2018 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Matthew J. Elliott

Taylor A. Beaty

Beckman Lawson, LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

David W. Frank

Christopher C. Myers & Associates

Fort Wayne, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Fort Wayne Community Schools

and Jacalyn Butler,

Appellants-Defendants,

v.

Steffanie Haney, for next friend 

and minor daughter, M.H.,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 5, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1708-CT-1829

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable David J. Avery, 

Judge.

Trial Court Cause No.

02D09-1605-CT-270

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Fort Wayne Community Schools and its employee Jacalyn Butler (collectively 

“FWCS”) bring this interlocutory appeal from the Allen Superior Court’s 

partial denial of summary judgment on Steffanie Haney’s (“Haney”) complaint 

alleging battery against her daughter M.H. and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation of 

M.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
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[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the fall of 2015, Jacalyn Butler (“Butler”) was a first-grade teacher at Forest 

Park Elementary School in Fort Wayne, Indiana.1 M.H. was a student in 

Butler’s classroom. On November 12, 2015, the students were taking a spelling

test. While Butler was monitoring the classroom, she noticed M.H. dropping 

erasers and other items onto the floor. As M.H. leaned down to pick up the 

items, she placed her head under the desk which caused her posterior to rise up. 

On one of these occasions, it is undisputed that Butler walked by and touched

M.H.’s posterior to induce M.H. to sit back down into her seat. 

[4] The parties disagree on the level of force Butler exerted on M.H. Butler 

maintains that “she patted M.H.’s rear end with the tips of three fingers, 

attempting to re-direct her into her seat.” Appellants’ App. p. 93. M.H. agreed 

with Butler’s account during deposition testimony. Id. at 88–89.2 Steffanie 

Haney (“Haney”), M.H.’s mother, asserts that Butler spanked or smacked 

M.H.’s behind. Id. at 133–34.

[5] The school corporation investigated the incident, and although it could not 

substantiate the allegation of spanking, Butler was suspended for one day 

 

1

Forest Park Elementary is within the Fort Wayne Community School Corporation, and Butler was a school 

corporation employee at the relevant time.

2 We also note that M.H. testified during her deposition that Haney told M.H. to testify that Butler hit her, 

and that she would be in trouble with her parents if she testified otherwise. Appellants’ App. pp. 77–78.
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without pay for inappropriate and unprofessional behavior in violation of the 

school corporation’s board policy and code of ethics.3Id. at 132. Haney filed a 

complaint on May 25, 2016, which brought state law battery tort claims against 

Butler and the school corporation, and federal § 1983 claims against Butler and 

the school corporation alleging a violation of M.H.’s Fourth Amendment 

rights.4

[6] FWCS filed a motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2017. On July 12, 

2017, the trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The trial 

court denied summary judgment on Haney’s state law tort claim against the 

school corporation and the § 1983 claim against Butler.5 FWCS filed a motion 

to certify the order for interlocutory appeal on August 9 which the trial court 

granted on August 22. We accepted jurisdiction of the appeal under Appellate 

Rule 14(B) on November 1, 2017.

 

3 The applicable board policy states, “The physical striking or touching of a student with the intent to 

produce bodily pain by a school employee or other adult representing the school shall not be permitted as an 

option in disciplining students. Alternative practices shall be utilized.” Appellants’ App. p. 132. And the 

applicable code of ethics section instructs personnel to “[m]ake the well-being of students the fundamental 

value in all decision-making actions.” Id.

4 The complaint also originally argued that Indiana Code section 20-33-8-8(b) is unconstitutional; however, 

Haney later dropped this claim.

5 The trial court held that Butler was entitled to summary judgment on the state law claim because she was 

acting within the scope of her employment and thus could not be sued individually under Indiana’s Tort 

Claims Act. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b). Appellants’ App. p. 18. The court also found that the school 

corporation was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim because it did not have a custom, policy, 

or practice of constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
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Discussion and Decision

[7] FWCS contends that the trial court erred in granting, in part, Haney’s motion 

for summary judgment. We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as the trial court and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the nonmoving party. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). In 

conducting our review, we consider only those matters that were designated at 

the summary judgment stage. Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence 

shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003; 

Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). 

I. State Law Battery Claim against FWCS

[8] FWCS argues that the state law claims against it are barred because Butler’s 

actions were permissible and protected by qualified immunity under Indiana 

Code section 20-33-8-8.

[9] Section 20-33-8-8 states:

(a) Student supervision and the desirable behavior of students 

in carrying out school purposes is the responsibility of:

(1) a school corporation; and

(2) the students of a school corporation.

(b) In all matters relating to the discipline and conduct of 

students, school corporation personnel:

(1) stand in the relation of parents to the students of the 

school corporation;
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(2) have the right to take any disciplinary action 

necessary to promote student conduct that conforms 

with an orderly and effective educational system, 

subject to this chapter; and

(3) have qualified immunity with respect to a 

disciplinary action taken to promote student 

conduct under subdivision (2) if the action is taken 

in good faith and is reasonable.

A teacher may also “take any action that is reasonably necessary to carry out or 

to prevent an interference with an educational function that the individual 

supervises.” Ind. Code § 20-33-8-9(b). FWCS points to three cases from our 

court to support its argument that Butler’s alleged battery of M.H. is protected 

by section 20-33-8-8(b)(3)’s qualified immunity as a matter of law. We agree. 

[10] In State v. Fettig, 884 N.E.2d 341, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), a student in a high 

school gym class went over to check on her friend who had appeared to injure

her ankle. Fettig, the gym teacher, approached the two students and allegedly 

slapped the assisting student on the face with an open hand and told her to go 

play. Fettig was charged with misdemeanor battery and filed a motion to 

dismiss the charge which the trial court granted stating: 

Here we have a classroom disturbance wherein the teacher uses 

some measure of touching to restore order and redirect the focus 

of the class. No weapons; no closed fist[;] no repeated blows; no 

verbal abuse; just an open handed touching to the face of a 

[fifteen-year-old] student which caused her face to sting.

Id. at 345. The State appealed, arguing in part that because the justification for 

teachers to corporally punish students under Indiana Code section 20-33-8-8(b) 
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is limited by notions of reasonableness, then the issue should have been 

presented to a jury. A panel of this court disagreed explaining, “this is the very 

issue which our appellate courts have removed from the discretion of the jury 

by reversing verdicts finding battery by teachers who have hit students to inflict 

punishment.” Id. Thus, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it dismissed the information charging Fettig with battery. Id. at 

346.

[11] In Barocas v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), Barocas, a 

special education teacher, flicked the tongue of a ten-year-old Down syndrome 

student after twice telling the student to put her tongue back in her mouth. The 

student proceeded to let out a wail and began crying. Barocas was convicted of 

misdemeanor battery during a bench trial. On appeal, a panel of this court 

reversed Barocas’s conviction because the State failed to negate her claim of 

parental privilege under section 20-33-8-8. Id. at 1261. Our court also explained, 

“in addition to the presumption of innocence shared by all criminal defendants, 

we presume teachers do their duty when punishing a student.” Id. at 1258.

[12] And in Littleton v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), a sixth-grade 

student who was diagnosed with autism and other disorders had to be 

physically restrained in a Rifton chair6 after he began striking himself with his 

 

6

“A Rifton chair is designed for children with orthopedic disorders . . . . [It] is made of wood, has arms and a 

curved back and seat, and may be used with an orthopedic belt around a child’s waist to prevent the child 

from falling from the chair. The chair may also be used to [confine] a student in a particular location.” 

Littleton v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
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hands. Littleton, the student’s special education teacher, directed one of her 

aides to restrain the student in the Rifton chair. The student’s legs were 

strapped to the chair, a belt was wrapped around his waist, and the chair was 

tipped back so that its back lay flat on the ground with the student’s legs up in 

the air. Littleton was charged with felony criminal confinement, felony neglect 

of a dependent, and misdemeanor battery. The trial court denied Littleton’s 

motion to dismiss, and she appealed arguing that her acts were entitled to

qualified immunity under § 20-33-8-8(b). 

[13] We reversed the trial court’s denial of Littleton’s motion to dismiss holding “it 

is apparent to us that Littleton’s conduct comes within the scope of her 

statutory qualified immunity as a teacher managing a classroom[.]” Littleton, 

954 N.E.2d at 1080. The Littleton panel also noted “what is educationally 

appropriate and what is reasonable under the circumstances are not one and the 

same.” Id.

[14] Here, the trial court acknowledged that section 20-33-8-8(b) provides for 

qualified immunity of a teacher if the discipline is undertaken in good faith and 

is reasonable; but, the court determined that what constitutes “good faith” and 

what form of discipline is “reasonable” is a question of fact, making summary 

judgment improper. Appellants’ App. pp. 17–18. However, our court in Fettig

addressed this exact argument and found otherwise. 884 N.E.2d at 345. Most 

importantly however, the prior cases interpreting section 20-33-8-8 make it clear 
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that, even if we assume that Butler smacked or spanked M.H., her actions are 

protected by the statute.7

[15] It is undisputed that the physical contact occurred when the first-grade students 

were taking a test, and it is undisputed that M.H. was dropping items on the 

ground and reaching under her desk to pick them up, causing her posterior to 

rise into the air. Taking action to require that M.H. remain in her seat while the 

class is taking part in an educational activity falls squarely within section 20-33-

8-8(b)(2)’s grant of a teacher’s right “to take any disciplinary action necessary to 

promote student conduct that conforms with an orderly and effective 

educational system.” Further, Butler’s alleged conduct here is far less egregious 

than the alleged behavior of the teachers in Fettig, Barocas, and Littleton. Indeed, 

these cases show Butler’s actions were taken in good faith and were reasonable,

as a matter of law.

[16] Moreover, section 20-33-8-8(b)(1) states that with respect to school matters, 

teachers “stand in relation of parents to the student of the school corporation.” 

 

7 Haney’s allegation that M.H. was smacked or spanked is not credible. M.H. testified under oath that Haney 

told her to say that Butler hit her, conduct on Haney’s part that might amount to subornation of perjury.

Appellants’ App. p. 77. Additionally, M.H. testified that Butler touched M.H.’s behind with three fingers, 

that she was embarrassed, and that she did not cry. Id. at 88–90. We acknowledge that Haney produced a 

handwritten document stating that Butler “spanked [M.H.’s] butt” and “made her cry.” Id. at 133. Typed 

investigation notes also indicate that Butler smacked M.H. on her butt with a hard hit that made her cry. Id.

at 134. However, the same investigation notes show that another student in the class said that M.H. did not 

cry. Id. Additionally, Haney’s proffered exhibit from the school corporation’s head of human resources notes 

that “the allegation of spanking is unsubstantiated.” Id. at 132. Although FWCS moved to strike these 

exhibits on the basis that each constituted inadmissible hearsay, the trial court declined to rule on the motion. 

Id. at 18. Thus, while we think Haney’s description of the incident is, at best, dubious, and most likely a lie,

in light of the designated evidence and the sworn deposition testimony, we are aware of the summary 

judgment standard, and we will proceed as if Butler did in fact “spank” or “smack” M.H. on the behind.
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Therefore, if Butler were allowed to be held civilly liable for allegedly spanking 

a student at school, then Haney could be held civilly liable for spanking M.H. at 

home, an action she does frequently. Appellants’ App. pp. 71–74, 79–82. As 

FWCS points out, “this would represent a rather dramatic shift in Indiana law.” 

Reply Br. at 16. Our supreme court explained in Indiana State Personnel Board v. 

Jackson, 244 Ind. 321, 192 N.E.2d 740, 743–44 (1963): 

[T]he law of Indiana clearly accords to the public school teacher 

in proper cases the same right over a child in his or her school as 

is possessed by the parent, and this includes the right to 

administer corporal punishment when it is appropriate. The law 

is well settled in this state that the teacher stands in loco parentis 

to the child, and his authority in this respect is no more subject to 

question than is the authority of the parent. The teacher’s 

authority and the kind and quantum of punishment employed to 

meet a given offense is measured by the same rules, standards 

and requirements as fixed and established for parents.

[17] Thus, viewing the facts most favorable to Haney, we find that Butler’s conduct 

here fell well within the range of permissible conduct by parents, and hence 

teachers, under section 20-33-8-8(b). Because Butler’s conduct comes within the 

scope of her statutory qualified immunity as a teacher managing a classroom, 

FWCS was entitled to summary judgment on the state law battery claim.8 

 

8 Haney also argues that the qualified immunity conferred by Indiana Code section 20-33-8-8(b)(3) only 

serves as a defense in a criminal prosecution. Appellee’s Br. at 19–21. We disagree. Nothing in the statute 

itself or the case law interpreting it imposes or has implied such a limitation. And further, qualified immunity 

is traditionally understood to be a civil law concept. See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) 

(explaining that qualified immunity exists to shield government officials from civil damages); Cantrell v. 

Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ind. 2006); Earles v. Perkins, 788 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
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II. Section 1983 Claim against Butler

[18] FWCS also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Haney’s § 1983 

claim against it because the alleged constitutional violation of M.H.’s Fourth 

Amendment rights was not clearly established. The Fourth Amendment 

protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 

unreasonable . . . seizures.” It does not create a private right of action. When a 

person believes her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, the proper 

claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which “creates a species of tort liability 

. . . for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). Haney asserts that the contact applied to M.H. 

by Butler “was unreasonable, unnecessary, and inappropriate,” Appellee’s Br. 

at 15, and therefore violated M.H.’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

an unreasonable seizure.

[19] Before reaching the merits of Haney’s § 1983 claim, “the trial court must 

exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified 

immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so that officials are not subject 

to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.” Crawford-El v. 

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1998). “Whether a government official is entitled 

to qualified immunity is a legal question for resolution by the court, not a jury.” 

 

Therefore, the qualified immunity provision in section 20-33-8-8(b)(3) applies equally to civil cases as it does 

in criminal prosecutions.
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Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has held 

that when making a decision on qualified immunity, “the court must determine 

whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, the official’s conduct 

violated clearly established law.” Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598. If the relevant 

facts of a case show that there is no violation of clearly established law, then 

there is no constitutional violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 

(2009).

[20] This well-established inquiry asks whether in light of the pre-existing law the 

unlawfulness of the alleged inappropriate conduct was apparent. Purtell, 527 

F.3d at 621. And the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the violation of a 

clearly established right. Id. To meet this burden, Haney “may point to closely 

analogous cases demonstrating that the conduct is unlawful or demonstrate that 

the violation is so obvious that a reasonable state actor would know that what 

he is doing violates the Constitution.” Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689, 700 (7th 

Cir. 2005).

[21] Haney cites to four cases when she asserts that Butler had “reasonable notice 

that in November 2015 [M.H.] clearly had the right to be free from 

unreasonable, inappropriate, unnecessary, excessive force in public school.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 17. However, three of the cases that Haney cites in support are 

quite different than the case before us, and clearly distinguishable. See Safford 

Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378–79 (2009) (finding that a

strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl was unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment, but three school officials were protected from liability through 
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qualified immunity); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347–348 (1985) (finding 

no Fourth Amendment violation where school officials searched a fourteenyear-old student’s purse); Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1017–18 (7th

Cir. 2008) (holding that child caseworkers in a private school who conducted 

under-the-clothes examinations of children’s bodies violated the children’s 

Fourth Amendment rights and were not entitled to qualified immunity because 

there were clearly established doctrines at the time as to what actions a 

caseworker must take when conducting an investigation). 

[22] We find the fourth case that Haney cites, Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia School 

Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995), instructive. In that case, teacher James 

Cliffe (“Cliffe”) returned to his classroom to find two sixteen-year-old female 

students screaming at each other. Cliffe attempted to diffuse the situation, 

ultimately instructing one of the students, Wallace, to take her books and leave 

the classroom. Wallace was slow to gather her things, so Cliffe grabbed her by 

the left wrist and then the right elbow to hasten her exit. Wallace claimed Cliffe 

caused injury to her elbow, and through her mother, she sued Cliffe and the 

school corporation under § 1983 for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. 

The district court granted Cliffe’s and the school district’s motion for summary 

judgment, and Wallace appealed.

[23] On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment and explained, “in seeking to maintain order and discipline, a teacher 

or administrator is simply constrained to taking reasonable action to achieve 

those goals. Depending on the circumstances, reasonable action may certainly 
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include the seizure of a student in the face of provocative or disruptive 

behavior.” Id. at 1014. And in the context of an alleged Fourth Amendment 

violation, “[the standard] does not ask what the teacher’s intentions were, and it 

does not ask if the particular student thought the conduct was out of bounds. It 

asks, at bottom, whether under the circumstances presented and known the 

seizure was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1015. The court affirmed summary 

judgment because it found that Cliffe was merely attempting to quell the 

disruption caused by the yelling, obscenities, and invitation to fight; and 

therefore, his conduct could not be seen as unreasonable. Id. at 1016. 

[24] In the case before us, M.H. was causing a disruption in class while students 

were taking a test. Moreover, similar to the actions of the teacher in Wallace, 

Butler used reasonable force to induce M.H. to sit back down in her seat in an 

effort to manage and maintain order over her classroom. The court in Wallace

noted, “Public school teachers and administrators must have considerable 

latitude in performing their educational responsibilities, including maintaining 

order and discipline by reasonably restraining the liberty of students.” Id.

[25] Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Haney, she has failed to 

establish that Butler violated clearly established law when she spanked or 

smacked M.H.’s posterior to require her to sit back down in her seat. See Phillips 

v. Community Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Objective 

reasonableness of force is a legal determination rather than a pure question of 

fact for the jury to decide.”). In fact, because Indiana has authorized the use of 

moderate corporal punishment by teachers in schools, Butler’s conduct clearly 
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falls within the range of what our legislature has deemed permissible. Cole by 

Cole v. Greenfield-Central Community Schools, 657 F. Supp. 56, 59 (S.D. Ind. 

1986). As the Seventh Circuit aptly stated in Wallace, “the only thing 

unreasonable in this scenario is that Wallace has made a federal case out of a 

routine school disciplinary matter.” 68 F.3d at 1015. This is what has happened

here, as well. Under the facts and circumstances in the case before us, as well as 

all applicable law, FWCS was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 

claim.

Conclusion

[26] Based on the facts and circumstances before us, FWCS was entitled to 

summary judgment on the state law battery tort claim because as a matter of 

law, Butler’s alleged conduct falls within the scope of her statutory qualified 

immunity as a teacher managing a classroom. Additionally, FWCS was entitled 

to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim because, as a matter of law, Haney 

failed to show that Butler’s conduct could have violated a clearly established 

right. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.