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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. TED J. GRIMES, Appellant. No. 73696-5-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION


### FILED: January 9, 2017 Schindler, J. — Representing himselfpro se, Ted J. Grimes appeals the court order extendingjurisdiction over restitution and legal financial obligations (LFOs) from the date of his release from prison inAugust 2005. Grimes argues the court may extendjurisdiction from only the date of his judgment and sentence in September 1999. Under the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 6.17.020(4), RCW 9.94A.753(4), and RCW 9.94A.760(4), the court has the authority to extendjurisdiction over an offender's restitution and LFOs from the date of his release from prison. We affirm. FACTS In 1998, the State charged Ted J. Grimes with eight counts oftheft inthe first degree and one count oftheft inthe second degree. Thejury found Grimes guilty of
seven counts oftheft inthe first degree and one count oftheft inthe second degree.No. 73696-5-1/2 

### InSeptember 1999,1 the court sentenced Grimes to a concurrent 60-month 

### exceptional sentence and ordered Grimes to pay restitution of$616,102 to the victims. Grimes appealed and we affirmedthejudgment and sentence. State v. Grimes. 111 

### Wn. App. 544, 547-48, 46 P.3d 801 (2002). Grimes began serving his prisonsentence in March 2003 and the Departmentof Corrections released Grimes from prison in August 2005.2 

### On August 17, 2009, the court entered an orderextendingjurisdiction over restitution payments and legal financial obligations (LFOs) from 2009 to 2019. The August 17, 2009 order states, in pertinent part: 

### The court considered the Plaintiffs motion for an order extending jurisdiction overthe legal financial obligations inthe above criminal judgmentfor an additional ten years under RCW §6.17.020(4), 9.94A.753(4) and 9.94A.760(4). ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT jurisdiction overthe criminaljudgment is extended an additional ten-years 

### from the date ofthis order, during which an execution may be issued for restitution, crime victim's assessment and other legal financial obligations imposed pursuant to the above-entitled cause number. On June 5, 2015, the State filed a motion requesting the court modify the August 2009 order and extendjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs until 2025. The State argued the King County Superior Court Clerk's Office requested the 2009 order based
on an erroneous assumption thatjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs began on entry ofthejudgment and sentence in September 1999. The State argued that under RCW 6.17.020(4), the court'sjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs began on the date the Department of Corrections released Grimes from prison inAugust 2005.
1Grimes does not provide documentation of hisjudgmentand sentence inthe record, but he states in his "Revised Brief of Appellant" that his "Judgmentand Sentence is dated September 10, 1999." 2Grimes does not provide documentation of his release from prison inthe record, but he states in his Revised Brief ofAppellantthat he "was released from total confinementon August 28, 2005."No. 73696-5-1/3 

### Grimes opposed the motion to modify the August 2009 order arguing the court's jurisdiction over restitution and LFOs began upon entry of the judgment and sentence. On June 15, 2015, the court entered an order modifying the August 17, 2009 orderto extendjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs from 2015 to 2025. The order states, in pertinent part: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT the court's 

### August 17, 2009, orderextendingjurisdiction is modified to reflect that jurisdiction overthe criminaljudgment inthe above case is extended an 

### additional ten-years from the date ofAugust 1, 2015. During the additional ten-year period an execution may be issued for restitution, 

### crime victim's assessment, and other legal financial obligations imposed pursuant to the above-entitled cause number.
ANALYSIS Grimes appeals arguing the court did not have the authority to extendjurisdiction 

### to enforce the restitution and LFOs imposed in the judgment and sentence.3 Interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010). Ourfundamental goal in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intent ofthe legislature. State v. Larson, 184 Wn.2d 843, 848, 365 P.3d 740 (2015). We look first to the plain language of the statute. State v. Armendariz, 160Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). In 

### determining the plain meaning of a statute based on statutory language, we look at the context ofthe statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). Statutes on the same subject must 

### be read togetherto harmonize and give effect to the statutory scheme and maintain the
3This is the second appeal challenging the restitution order. In State v. Grimes, 190 Wn. App. 1004, 2015 WL 5346379, at *5, review denied. 185 Wn.2d 1011, 368 P.3d 171 (2016), we affirmed the order setting monthly restitution payments of $700. We rejected the argumentthatthe court erred in considering state and federal pension benefits when calculating monthly restitution payments. Grimes, 2015 WL 5346379, at *4.No. 73696-5-1/4 integrity ofthe respective statutes. State v. Jones, 172 Wn.2d 236, 243, 257 P.3d 616 (2011).Under the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 9.94A.753(4), the court has jurisdiction over restitution payments for a period of 10 years following an offender's release from total confinement. Under RCW 9.94A.753(4), the court also has the 

### authority to extendjurisdiction over restitution payments an additional 10 years. RCW 9.94A.753(4) states, in pertinent part: [F]or an offense committed priorto July 1, 2000, the offender shall remain under the court'sjurisdiction for a term often years following the offender's release from total confinement orten years subsequentto the 

### entry ofthejudgment and sentence, whichever period ends later. Prior to the expiration ofthe initial ten-year period, the superior court may extend jurisdiction underthe criminaljudgment an additional ten years for 

### payment ofrestitution.141 Similarly, the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 9.94A.760(4) states that 

### the court hasjurisdiction over LFOs for a period of 10 years following an offender's release from total confinement and that the court has the authority to extendjurisdiction


### over LFOs an additional 10 years. RCW 9.94A.760(4) states, in pertinent part: 

### [Ljegalfinancial obligations for an offense committed prior to July 1, 2000, may be enforced at any time during the ten-year period following the offender's release from total confinement or within ten years ofentry ofthe 

### judgment and sentence, whichever period ends later. Prior to the 

### expiration of the initial ten-year period, the superiorcourt may extend the 

### criminaljudgment an additional ten years for payment of legalfinancial 

### obligations including crime victims' assessments.151 Relying on RCW4.56.210, Grimesargues the court did not have the authorityto extendjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs beyond September2019. RCW

4Emphasis added. 5Emphasis added.No. 73696-5-1/5 

### 4.56.210(1) states that except as provided insubsection (3), ajudgment lienexpires after 10 years from entry ofthejudgment. RCW 4.56.210(1) states: Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) ofthis section, afterthe 

### expiration often years from the date ofthe entry of anyjudgment heretofore or hereafter rendered in this state, it shall cease to be a lien or 

### charge against the estate or person ofthejudgment debtor. No suit, action or other proceeding shall ever be had on anyjudgment rendered in this state by which the lien shall be extended or continued inforce for any greater or longer period than ten years. 

### RCW 4.56.210(3) states, "A lien based upon an underlyingjudgment continues inforce for an additional ten-year period ifthe period of execution for the underlying judgment is extended under RCW 6.17.020." Under the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 6.17.020(4), the court has the authority to extendjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs under a criminaljudgment and sentence any time within 10 years after entry ofthejudgment and sentence or 10 years following the offender's release from total confinement. RCW 6.17.020(4) states: 

### A party who obtains ajudgment or orderfor restitution, crime victims' assessment, or other court-ordered legal financial obligations pursuant to 

### a criminal judgment and sentence, or the assignee or the current holder thereof, may execute, garnish, and/or have legal process issued upon the 

### judgment or order any time within ten years subsequent to the entry ofthe 

### judgment and sentence or ten years followingthe offender's release from total confinement as provided in chapter 9.94A RCW. The clerk of 

### superior court, or a party designated by the clerk, may seek extension under subsection (3) of this section for purposes ofcollection as allowed 

### under RCW36.18.190, provided that nofiling fee shall be required.'61 Because the court extendedjurisdiction over restitution and LFOs within 10 years following Grimes' release from prison inAugust 2005, the court did not err inextending jurisdiction over restitution and LFOs to 2025.

6Emphasis added.No. 73696-5-1/6 

### Grimes also cites RCW 6.17.020(7) to argue thejudgment and sentence is unenforceable 20 years after entry ofthejudgment and sentence. But RCW 6.17.020(7) does not apply to criminal cases. RCW 6.17.020(7) states: Except as ordered in RCW 4.16.020 (2) or (3), chapter 9.94A RCW, or chapter 13.40 RCW, no judgment is enforceable for a period exceeding 

### twentyyears from the date of entry in the originating court.171
We affirm. 

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WE CONCUR: 

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7Emphasis added.