UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4032

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RONALD R. BROADNAX,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:01-cr-00225-REP-1)

Submitted: July 15, 2010 Decided: July 27, 2010

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Research 

and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. John 

Donley Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a hearing, the district court revoked Ronald 

R. Broadnax’s supervised release and sentenced him to twentyfour months in prison. Broadnax now appeals. His attorney has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but claiming that the district court erroneously found Broadnax 

guilty of violating the terms of his release and that the 

sentence is unreasonable. Broadnax has filed a pro se brief, 

also arguing that the sentence is unreasonable. We affirm. 

At the revocation hearing, the United States dismissed 

two of the charged supervised release violations. A written 

stipulation, in which Broadnax admitted that he had committed 

the remaining violations, was admitted into evidence. After 

hearing testimony, the district court found Broadnax guilty of 

the violations by a preponderance of the evidence. 

We review the district court’s decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. 

Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). In light of the 

stipulation and testimony, we conclude that revocation of 

release was not an abuse of discretion.

Counsel and Broadnax argue in their respective briefs 

that the sentence is unreasonable. A sentence imposed following 
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revocation of supervised release will be affirmed if it is 

within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly 

unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 

(4th Cir 2006). Here, our review of the record reveals that the 

sentence falls within the statutory maximum of twenty-four 

months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). Further, the 

sentence is procedurally reasonable: in sentencing Broadnax, the 

district court considered both the Chapter 7 policy statements 

and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors that it is permitted 

to consider. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. Finally, the 

sentence is substantively reasonable, for the court adequately 

explained its reasons for imposing the sentence. See id. at 

440. In this regard, the court mentioned the need to protect 

the community and to deter similar conduct, as well as 

Broadnax’s demonstrated lack of respect for the judicial 

process.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel 

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the 

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 
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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served 

on his client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED