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IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.

Cite as 312 Neb. 827

In re Interest of Jordon B., a child 

under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska and Nebraska Department of 

Health and Human Services, appellees, v. Allen B. 

and Leah B., appellees, Christina Boydston, 

guardian ad litem for Jordon B., appellee 

and cross-appellant, Jason D. on behalf 

of J.D. and L.D., intervenor-appellee, 

and Andrew Todd and Alicia Todd, 

appellants and cross-appellees.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed November 4, 2022. No. S-22-019.

1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independently 

of the juvenile court’s findings.

2. Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional question that does not involve 

a factual dispute is a question of law.

3. Interventions. Whether a party has the right to intervene is a question 

of law.

4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an 

appellate court resolves the questions independently of the conclusions 

reached by the trial court.

5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of 

law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

6. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, 

as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for 

review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction over the matter before it.

7. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing relates to a court’s power, that is, 

jurisdiction, to address issues presented and serves to identify those 

disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

12/02/2022 01:03 AM CST
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IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.

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8. Juvenile Courts: Standing: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal 

in a juvenile case in Nebraska is purely statutory, and Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-2,106.01 (Reissue 2016) controls who has the right to appeal from 

a juvenile court’s placement order.

9. Juvenile Courts: Parent and Child. Foster parents who were never 

awarded custody are not “custodians” or “guardians” for purposes of 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01(2)(c) (Reissue 2016).

10. Parent and Child: Standing: Appeal and Error. Foster parents do not 

have a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of 

the controversy that gives them standing to appeal from an order changing a child’s placement.

11. Parent and Child: Statutes: Interventions. Although foster parents 

have a statutory right to participate in review hearings, their ability to 

participate is less than that of a party, and foster parents are not entitled 

to intervene as a matter of right.

12. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Statutes: Parent and Child: 

Interventions: Equity. A juvenile court, as a statutorily created court 

of limited jurisdiction, has only the authority which the statutes confer 

on it, and therefore, a juvenile court cannot allow foster parents to equitably intervene independently of the statutes.

13. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. The fact that a person has two 

different relationships to a child does not confer that person with a 

right to appeal when neither is a relationship listed in Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-2,106.01(2) (Reissue 2016).

14. Jurisdiction: Interventions: Standing: Final Orders: Appeal and 

Error. An appellate court exercises jurisdiction over an appeal from an 

order denying intervention even if the appellant would not have standing 

to appeal from the court’s final order or judgment on the merits.

15. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

16. Minors: Words and Phrases. “Sibling,” under the Foster Care Review 

Act generally and under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1311.02(9) (Cum. Supp. 

2020) specifically, means a person with whom one shares a common 

parent or parents.

17. Appeal and Error. An issue not presented to or decided by the trial 

court is not appropriate for consideration on appeal.

Appeal from the County Court for Dodge County: Kenneth 

J. Vampola, Judge. Affirmed.
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IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.

Cite as 312 Neb. 827

Linsey A. Camplin and Sam Baue, of McHenry, Haszard, 

Roth, Hupp, Burkholder, Blomenberg & Camplin, P.C., L.L.O., 

for appellants.

Leslie E. Remus and Trevor J. Rogers, Senior Certified 

Law Student, for appellee Nebraska Department of Health and 

Human Services.

Brianna L. McLarty, Deputy Dodge County Attorney, for 

appellee State of Nebraska.

Timothy E. Sopinski, of Sopinski Law Office, for appellee 

Allen B.

Adam R. Tripp, of Tripp Law Office, for appellee Leah B.

Pamela Lynn Hopkins, of Hopkins Law Office, L.L.C., for 

guardian ad litem.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Miller-Lerman, J.

NATURE OF CASE

Andrew Todd and Alicia Todd appeal the order of the juvenile court for Dodge County which granted a change of placement for Jordon B. They claim that they have certain rights as 

foster parents, and they claim error in, inter alia, the juvenile 

court’s determination that Andrew did not have standing to 

intervene as an adult sibling of Jordon. In addition, Christina 

Boydston, Jordon’s guardian ad litem, cross-appeals and claims 

that the juvenile court erred when it found that Andrew was a 

“sibling” of Jordon and when it failed to appoint counsel to 

represent her or new counsel to represent Jordon after Andrew 

challenged the credibility and veracity of her guardian ad 

litem report.

We determine that as foster parents, the Todds do not have 

standing to appeal the juvenile court’s placement order or the 
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right to intervene as parties. We further determine that Andrew 

is not a “sibling” to Jordon, and for that reason, the juvenile 

court did not err when it denied Andrew’s petition to intervene. 

We further determine that the record does not show the guardian ad litem requested appointment of counsel for herself or 

new counsel for Jordon and that therefore, the juvenile court 

did not err when it failed to make such appointments. We 

therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Jordon was born in September 2020, and his biological 

parents were Leah B. and Allen B. The Nebraska Department 

of Health and Human Services (DHHS) removed Jordon from 

Leah and Allen’s home on September 25. The juvenile court 

for Dodge County granted temporary custody of Jordon to 

DHHS based on concerns that Leah and Allen were not able to 

care for him and provide an accurate feeding schedule. Such 

concerns were based in part on the fact that two older sons of 

Leah and Allen had been removed from their custody for similar reasons. The court appointed Boydston as Jordon’s guardian 

ad litem.

Jordon was initially placed with Jason D. and Lesley D. 

Jason is Leah’s father, and Lesley is Leah’s stepmother by 

virtue of her marriage to Jason. Jason and Lesley had adopted 

Jordon’s two older brothers after Leah’s and Allen’s parental 

rights to the two were terminated.

After Jason and Lesley advised DHHS that they could not 

provide permanency or long-term care to Jordon, DHHS placed 

Jordon with the Todds. Andrew is Lesley’s adult biological 

son. Andrew is not biologically related to Leah, but he is her 

stepbrother by virtue of his mother Lesley’s marriage to Leah’s 

father, Jason. Andrew is also a sibling to Jordon’s two older 

brothers by virtue of Lesley’s adoption of the two boys.

In an order filed December 9, 2020, the court adjudicated 

Jordon to be a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2016). The court later approved a case 
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plan with a primary permanency plan of reunification, but the 

court determined that custody should remain with DHHS and 

that Jordon should remain in out-of-home placement.

On July 14, 2021, Leah filed a motion for change of 

placement in which she requested that Jordon’s placement 

be changed to the residence of Rita Pospishil, who is Allen’s 

cousin. On the same day, Jason, as biological grandfather and 

adoptive father, filed a complaint on behalf of Jordon’s two 

older brothers requesting that they be allowed to intervene 

in this case to seek a joint-sibling placement of Jordon with 

them in Jason and Lesley’s home. The court allowed Jason to 

intervene on behalf of the brothers, and it set a hearing on the 

request for joint-sibling placement and on Leah’s motion to 

change placement to Pospishil. The court ordered submission 

of reports prior to the hearing, including, inter alia, a home 

study with regard to Pospishil and a guardian ad litem report. 

The hearing was set for September 16.

On September 9, 2021, the Todds filed a motion to intervene 

in the case. They sought to intervene as Jordon’s foster parents, and they alleged that Jordon had been placed with them 

for most of his life and that it was in Jordon’s best interests 

to continue placement with them. Andrew also alleged that he 

was a relative of Jordon. He alleged that he was a stepuncle 

to Jordon based on his stepsibling relationship with Leah and 

that he was also a stepbrother to Jordon based on his mother 

Lesley’s adoption of Jordon’s two older brothers. Andrew 

alleged that he was a sibling of Jordon under the Foster Care 

Review Act (the Act) and that as a sibling he had an interest 

in the case.

After the hearing, the juvenile court filed an order on 

October 27, 2021, in which it ruled on pending motions. The 

court first addressed the Todds’ motion to intervene. The 

court determined that the Todds did not have standing to 

intervene on the basis that they were Jordon’s foster parents. 

The court cited In re Interest of Enyce J. & Eternity M., 291 

Neb. 965, 870 N.W.2d 413 (2015), for the proposition that 
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although foster parents have a statutory right to participate 

in review hearings, their ability to participate was less than 

that of a party, and that foster parents do not have an interest 

that entitles them to intervene in a juvenile case as a matter 

of right.

The court then turned to Andrew’s request to intervene 

on the basis that he was a sibling of Jordon. The court 

defined the issue as being “whether Andrew . . . has standing to intervene as an adult stepbrother to Jordon pursuant to 

Neb. Rev. Stat. [§] 43-1311.02.” The court cited Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 43-1311.02(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2020), which provides 

as follows:

Reasonable efforts shall be made to place a child and 

the child’s siblings in the same foster care placement or 

adoptive placement, unless such placement is contrary 

to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings. This 

requirement applies even if the custody orders of the siblings are made at separate times and even if the children 

have no preexisting relationship.

The court cited In re Interest of Nizigiyimana R., 295 

Neb. 324, 889 N.W.2d 362 (2016), in which we held that the 

duty to make reasonable efforts to implement a joint-sibling 

placement existed even if a court had terminated a parent’s 

relationship with each child and even if the siblings had not 

previously lived together and that the duty extended to jointsibling placements with unadjudicated siblings. The court 

also referenced § 43-1311.02(9), which generally provides 

that a sibling of a juvenile has a right to intervene for limited 

purposes. The court noted that § 43-1311.02(1)(a) referred 

specifically to situations in which the “children” have no preexisting relationship. The court read this reference to mean 

that § 43-1311.02 applied only to siblings who were children, 

and it noted that the statute made no reference to adult siblings. The court therefore concluded that “the limited right 

to seek ‘joint-sibling placement, sibling visitation, or ongoing interaction with their sibling’ in subsection (9) belongs 
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to minor siblings only.” The court therefore denied Andrew’s 

motion to intervene as a sibling of Jordon.

In its October 27, 2021, order, the court next addressed 

Leah’s motion to change Jordon’s placement to Pospishil and 

the older brothers’ request for placement with them in Jason 

and Lesley’s home. The court noted that DHHS had complied 

with § 43-1311.02(1)(a) when it initially placed Jordon in 

Jason and Lesley’s home. The court, however, further noted 

the testimony of a DHHS caseworker that Jordon’s placement 

had been changed because Jason and Lesley were “incapable 

or unwilling to provide care for Jordon” and that therefore, “it 

was not in Jordon’s best interest to put him in a home . . . that 

was unable to provide for his basic needs due to the reported 

issues of the other children in the home.” The caseworker further testified that Jason and Lesley had not subsequently asked 

that DHHS place Jordon back in their home and that the caseworker did not become aware they were interested in taking 

placement until the motion in this case was filed.

The court found that the primary permanency plan in this 

case was reunification of Jordon with Leah and Allen and that 

Leah and Allen were making progress toward reunification. 

The court noted that the caseworker had testified that it was 

in Jordon’s best interests to be in a placement that was more 

conducive to the plan of reunification and that the caseworker 

opined that Pospishil’s relationship with Leah and Allen was 

conducive to that goal although Jason and Lesley’s relationship was less conducive and could negatively affect the goal 

of reunification.

The court stated that another witness who had supervised 

Leah and Allen’s visitations with Jordon agreed that they were 

making good progress and that it was in Jordon’s best interests 

to be in a placement with Pospishil, who would be conducive 

to the goal of reunification. The court further noted that the 

home study showed that Pospishil had a good relationship 

with Leah and Allen and that placement with her was recommended. Based on this evidence, the court found that it was 
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in Jordon’s best interests to grant Leah’s motion for change 

of placement to Pospishil, and it ordered DHHS to prepare a 

transition plan to effectuate the change. The court overruled 

motions to reconsider that were subsequently filed by the 

Todds and by Jason on behalf of Jordon’s older brothers.

The Todds appeal the juvenile court’s order, and Boydston 

cross-appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Todds claim that the juvenile court erred when it determined that they did not have the right to intervene as foster 

parents and that Andrew did not have the right to intervene 

because he was an adult sibling and not a child sibling. They 

also claim that the court erred when it (1) granted Leah’s 

motion to change placement to Pospishil, (2) denied the older 

brothers’ motion for placement with them, and (3) overruled 

the motions to reconsider.

Boydston claims on cross-appeal that the juvenile court 

erred when it found that Andrew was a “sibling” of Jordon 

when Andrew and Jordon do not have a common parent. 

Boydston also claims the court erred when it failed to appoint 

counsel to represent her or to appoint new counsel to represent 

Jordon after Andrew challenged the credibility and veracity of 

her guardian ad litem report.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the 

record and reaches a conclusion independently of the juvenile 

court’s findings. In re Interest of Enyce J. & Eternity M., 291 

Neb. 965, 870 N.W.2d 413 (2015).

[2-4] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual 

dispute is a question of law. Id. Whether a party has the right 

to intervene is a question of law. Id. When reviewing questions 

of law, an appellate court resolves the questions independently 

of the conclusions reached by the trial court. Id.
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[5] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an 

appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. In re 

Guardianship of Jill G., ante p. 108, 977 N.W.2d 913 (2022).

ANALYSIS

Standing.

[6,7] In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an 

appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the 

matter before it. In re Interest of Mekhi S. et al., 309 Neb. 529, 

960 N.W.2d 732 (2021). Standing relates to a court’s power, 

that is, jurisdiction, to address issues presented and serves 

to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved 

through the judicial process. In re Interest of Meridian H., 281 

Neb. 465, 798 N.W.2d 96 (2011).

In its brief of appellee, the State argues, firstly, that the 

Todds do not have standing to appeal the juvenile court’s 

placement order as foster parents and, secondly, that even if he 

is a sibling to Jordon, Andrew also would not have standing 

as a sibling to appeal the juvenile court’s placement order. No 

objection is made to the standing of Boydston, the guardian ad 

litem. In support of its position that the Todds lack standing, 

the State cites Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.01 (Reissue 2016), 

which provides as follows:

(1) Any final order or judgment entered by a juvenile 

court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals in the 

same manner as an appeal from district court to the Court 

of Appeals. The appellate court shall conduct its review 

in an expedited manner and shall render the judgment and 

write its opinion, if any, as speedily as possible.

(2) An appeal may be taken by:

(a) The juvenile;

(b) The guardian ad litem;

(c) The juvenile’s parent, custodian, or guardian. For 

purposes of this subdivision, custodian or guardian shall 

include, but not be limited to, [DHHS], an association, or 
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an individual to whose care the juvenile has been awarded 

pursuant to the Nebraska Juvenile Code; or

(d) The county attorney or petitioner . . . .

Under § 43-2,106.01(2)(b), the guardian ad litem may appeal 

a final order or judgment entered by a juvenile court. Therefore, 

Boydston has standing to appeal the juvenile court’s order, and 

we may consider the issues she raises in her cross-appeal. In 

contrast, we must proceed to consider whether, and to what 

extent, the Todds have standing as foster parents and then consider Andrew’s standing as a purported sibling of Jordon.

Foster Parents Do Not Have Standing to 

Appeal Under § 43-2,106.01 and Do 

Not Have a Right to Intervene 

in Juvenile Proceedings.

[8-10] We have stated that in assessing standing, the right of 

appeal in a juvenile case in Nebraska is purely statutory, and 

that § 43-2,106.01 controls who has the right to appeal from 

a juvenile court’s placement order. In re Interest of Joseph C., 

299 Neb. 848, 910 N.W.2d 773 (2018). As set forth above, 

§ 43-2,106.01(2) does not include “foster parent” in the list 

of persons who may take an appeal. We have held that foster 

parents who were never awarded custody are not “custodians” 

or “guardians” for purposes of § 43-2,106.01(2)(c). See In re 

Interest of Jackson E., 293 Neb. 84, 875 N.W.2d 863 (2016). 

Furthermore, in In re Interest of Enyce J. & Eternity M., 291 

Neb. 965, 974, 870 N.W.2d 413, 420 (2015), we determined 

that foster parents “do not have a legal or equitable right, 

title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy that 

gives them standing to appeal from the order changing [a 

child’s] placement.”

[11,12] In In re Interest of Enyce J. & Eternity M., supra, we 

also stated that although foster parents did not have standing 

to appeal the order changing placement, we nevertheless had 

jurisdiction to consider the order dismissing the foster parents’ 

complaint to intervene. We determined that although foster 
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parents have a statutory right to participate in review hearings, 

their ability to participate was less than that of a party, and we 

held that foster parents are not entitled to intervene as a matter of right. Id. We further determined that a juvenile court, as 

a statutorily created court of limited jurisdiction, has only the 

authority which the statutes confer on it and that therefore, a 

juvenile court could not allow foster parents to equitably intervene independently of the statutes. Id.

We conclude that under this authority, the Todds’ status as 

foster parents did not authorize them either to intervene or to 

appeal the placement order. In their brief, the Todds recognize 

this precedent, but they argue that the present case is different 

because they assert that Andrew is both a foster parent and a 

sibling. We next consider the effect of Andrew’s alleged status 

as a sibling with regard to intervention and appeal.

Although Siblings Do Not Have Standing to Appeal 

Under § 43-2,106.01, They Have a Limited Right 

to Intervene Under § 43-1311.02(9).

[13] As noted above, the State argues that even if Andrew 

is a sibling of Jordon, a sibling does not have standing under 

§ 43-2,106.01 to appeal a placement order. As set forth above, 

§ 43-2,106.01(2) does not include “sibling” in the list of persons who may take an appeal. We therefore agree with the State 

that even if Andrew is a sibling of Jordon, Andrew qua sibling 

is not among those listed in § 43-2,106.01 as persons who may 

appeal a juvenile court order. We further reject the Todds’ argument that Andrew may appeal because he is both a foster parent and a sibling. The fact that a person has two different relationships to a child does not confer that person with a right to 

appeal when neither is a relationship listed in § 43-2,106.01(2). 

We conclude that the Todds, and Andrew specifically, do not 

have standing under § 43-2,106.01 to appeal the placement 

order whether as foster parents, a sibling, or both.

[14] However, as stated above, in In re Interest of Enyce J. 

& Eternity M., supra, we stated that although foster parents 
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did not have standing to appeal the order changing placement, 

we had jurisdiction to consider the order dismissing the foster 

parents’ complaint to intervene. Similarly, in In re Interest of 

Nizigiyimana R., 295 Neb. 324, 331, 889 N.W.2d 362, 369 

(2016), in which adoptive parents of a biological sibling of 

the juvenile sought to intervene, we stated that “[w]e exercise 

jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying intervention 

even if the appellant would not have standing to appeal from 

the court’s final order or judgment on the merits.” Under this 

precedent, we understand that even though the Todds may not 

appeal the portion of the juvenile court’s order changing placement, Andrew may appeal the portion of the order in which the 

juvenile court denied him leave to intervene as a sibling.

In considering Andrew’s arguments regarding the denial to 

intervene, we refer to In re Interest of Nizigiyimana R., supra, 

wherein we cited In re Interest of Enyce J. & Eternity M., 291 

Neb. 965, 870 N.W.2d 413 (2015), for the proposition that a 

juvenile court lacks authority to permit an equitable intervention. We further rejected the argument that a sibling had a 

statutory right to intervene pursuant to § 43-1311.02, which 

imposed a duty on DHHS to make reasonable efforts with 

regard to placement with the juvenile’s siblings. We determined that the statute, as it existed at the time, specifically 

limited the right to enforce such duties to parties and that a 

sibling was not considered a party. We concluded that “the only 

persons who can enforce [DHHS’] duties under § 43-131[1].02 

are a guardian ad litem, on behalf of an adjudicated child, or an 

adjudicated child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.” 295 Neb. at 

342, 889 N.W.2d at 375.

However, after our decision in In re Interest of Nizigiyimana 

R., supra, the Legislature amended § 43-1311.02 to add subsection (9), which provides as follows: “A sibling of a child 

under the jurisdiction of the court shall have the right to intervene at any point in the proceedings for the limited purpose of 

seeking joint-sibling placement, sibling visitation, or ongoing 

interaction with their sibling.” Therefore, § 43-1311.02(9) now 
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provides a sibling a limited right to intervene for the specific 

listed purposes.

The juvenile court in this case recognized the limited right 

of intervention under § 43-1311.02(9), but it determined that 

Andrew did not have the right to intervene. The court appeared 

to accept that Andrew was a sibling of Jordon. However, the 

court determined that § 43-1311.02(9) did not apply to an adult 

sibling, like Andrew, and that § 43-1311.02(9) only applied 

to siblings who were children. In their brief of appellants, the 

Todds claim that the juvenile court erred when it determined 

that the right of intervention under § 43-1311.02(9) does not 

apply to an adult sibling.

We note that in her cross-appeal, Boydston, the guardian 

ad litem, does not dispute the decision to deny Andrew intervention, but she claims that the juvenile court erred when it 

concluded that Andrew was a “sibling” regardless of Andrew’s 

age. If Boydston’s argument that Andrew is not a “sibling” 

under § 43-1311.02(9) is correct, then we would not need 

to consider whether the statute applies to adult siblings. We 

therefore consider Boydston’s claim next, because, as will be 

discussed below, our resolution of that question determines the 

intervention issue.

Before moving on, we note that when the Legislature 

amended § 43-1311.02 to give siblings a limited right to intervene, it did not simultaneously amend § 43-2,106.01 to include 

siblings among those who may appeal a juvenile court order. 

The statutes therefore appear to create a situation in which a 

sibling may intervene to advocate on the specified issues but 

does not have a statutory right to appeal an adverse determination on those issues.

Andrew Is Not a “Sibling” of Jordon and Therefore 

Did Not Have a Right to Intervene 

Pursuant to § 43-1311.02(9).

As noted above, Boydston, as Jordon’s guardian ad litem, 

may appeal the juvenile court’s order pursuant to § 43-2,106.01. 
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Boydston claims on cross-appeal that the juvenile court erred 

when it found that Andrew was a “sibling” of Jordon, but that 

as an adult sibling, Andrew could not intervene. Boydston 

argues that Andrew and Jordon are simply not siblings regardless of age because they do not have a common parent. 

We agree.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1301(1) (Reissue 2016) of the Act 

defines “[s]iblings” as “biological siblings and legal siblings, 

including, but not limited to, half-siblings and stepsiblings.” 

The Act also provides in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1311.01(1) 

(Reissue 2016) that “sibling means an individual who is considered by Nebraska law to be a sibling or who would have 

been considered a sibling under Nebraska law but for a termination of parental rights or other disruption in parental rights 

such as the death of a parent.” We note that although these 

definitions set forth the types of siblings that are considered 

“siblings” under the Act—including half siblings, stepsiblings, 

and those who would be considered siblings but for a termination or disruption of parental rights—the definitions are circular in that they use the word “sibling” to define “sibling.” We 

therefore resort to rules of construction to determine the meaning of “sibling” under the Act.

[15,16] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which 

are plain, direct, and unambiguous. In re Guardianship of 

Jill G., ante p. 108, 977 N.W.2d 913 (2022). Black’s Law 

Dictionary defines “sibling” as a “brother or sister,” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1660 (11th ed. 2019), and it defines “brother” 

as a “male who has one parent or both parents in common with 

another person,” id. at 241, and “sister” as a “female who has 

one parent or both parents in common with another person,” id.

at 1667. The plain and ordinary meaning of “sibling” requires 

a common parent or parents. Therefore, we conclude that 

“sibling,” under the Act generally and under § 43-1311.02(9) 
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specifically, means a person with whom one shares a common 

parent or parents.

Andrew argues that he is a “stepbrother” to Jordon because 

he and Jordon have siblings in common. Jordon is a sibling to 

his two older brothers because they share common biological 

parents, and although the biological parents’ rights to the older 

brothers have been terminated, pursuant to § 43-1311.01(1), 

they are still considered Jordon’s siblings under the Act. 

Andrew’s mother Lesley adopted Jordon’s older brothers, and 

therefore, Andrew shares a common parent with, and is a sibling to, Jordon’s older brothers under § 43-1301(1) as a legal 

sibling and a half sibling. But although Andrew and Jordon 

share two brothers as common siblings, Andrew and Jordon 

are not siblings. Having a common sibling does not in itself 

make two people siblings to one another. Instead, the two must 

have a common parent or parents, and Andrew and Jordon 

have no common parent. Andrew is a stepbrother to Jordon’s 

mother Leah, which makes him a stepuncle rather than a stepbrother to Jordon, and sharing two brothers in common does 

not make Andrew and Jordon siblings in the absence of a common parent.

Because Andrew is not a “sibling” to Jordon under the 

Act, we need not consider the juvenile court’s reasoning that 

§ 43-1311.02(9) does not apply to Andrew because he is an 

adult sibling rather than a child sibling, and we make no 

comment on that reasoning. The limited right to intervene 

under § 43-1311.02(9) does not apply to Andrew because he 

is not a “sibling” to Jordon. Therefore, based on different 

reasoning, we determine that the juvenile court did not err 

when it denied Andrew leave to intervene as a sibling under 

§ 43-1311.02(9).

Boydston Did Not Request Appointment of Counsel.

Boydston also claims on cross-appeal that the juvenile court 

erred when it failed to appoint counsel to represent her after 

Andrew challenged the credibility and veracity of her guardian 
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

312 Nebraska Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF JORDON B.

Cite as 312 Neb. 827

ad litem report. We determine that because Boydston did not 

request appointment of counsel, the juvenile court did not err 

when it failed to do so.

Boydston’s argument that the juvenile court erred when it 

did not appoint counsel to represent her or different counsel 

to represent Jordon appears to focus on testimony by Andrew 

at the hearing wherein he disagreed with certain aspects of 

her guardian ad litem report. Boydston also notes a portion of 

the Todds’ brief on appeal in which they assert that her guardian ad litem report raises “misleading and baseless concerns” 

regarding their care of Jordon and that such concerns were 

“disproven by the evidence.” See brief for appellants at 16.

[17] However, it does not appear that Boydston asked the 

juvenile court to appoint counsel. Boydston does not assert in 

her brief that she made such request, and the record does not 

appear to include such a request. An issue not presented to or 

decided by the trial court is not appropriate for consideration 

on appeal. In re Trust of Shire, 299 Neb. 25, 907 N.W.2d 263 

(2018). Because the juvenile court was neither presented with 

nor ruled upon a request for appointment of counsel, whether 

such appointment was warranted is not appropriate for consideration on appeal. Therefore, we do not consider this assignment of error raised on cross-appeal.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that as foster parents, the Todds did not have 

the right to intervene as parties and did not have the right 

to appeal the juvenile court’s placement order. As urged by 

Boydston in her cross-appeal, we also conclude that Andrew is 

not a “sibling” to Jordon under the Act and that therefore, he 

did not have a right to intervene pursuant to § 43-1311.02(9). 

We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s order in which it denied 

intervention by the Todds as foster parents or by Andrew as a 

sibling. No party with a right to appeal has challenged the 

juvenile court’s change of placement, and we therefore also 

affirm the juvenile court’s placement order.

Affirmed.