In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 07-1965

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PIOTR KRASINSKI,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 03 CR 251—John W. Darrah, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 25, 2008—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 19, 2008

Before ROVNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Piotr Krasinski raises several

challenges to the sentence he received for conspiring to

distribute Ecstasy and conspiring to launder monetary

instruments. We find none persuasive. First, we reject

his challenge to the enhancement he received under

U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) because the transfer of money

from the United States to Canada to pay for the pills he

supplied “promoted the carrying on” of the drug conspir-
2 No. 07-1965

acy. Next, the district court did not clearly err when it

estimated the number of pills attributable to Krasinski

by performing a calculation based on the range he admitted in his plea agreement. In light of Krasinski’s admissions that he threatened a cooperating witness and his

family, the district court was also justified in imposing an

obstruction of justice enhancement and denying an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Finally, Krasinski’s

sentence at the low end of the advisory guidelines range

was reasonable. As a result, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Piotr Krasinski, a Canadian citizen and resident, pled

guilty to conspiring to distribute 3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as “MDMA” or

“Ecstasy,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He

also pled guilty to conspiring to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). Krasinski

admitted in his plea agreement that from 1999 through

March 2003, he agreed with Piotr Misiolek, Andrzej

Ogonowski, and others to distribute Ecstasy pills. He

further admitted that he generally brokered deals

ranging from 5,000 to 30,000 pills per delivery, that he

delivered pills to the others on approximately eight to

ten occasions, and that on March 5, 2003, he delivered

7,000 pills.

Krasinski typically sold the pills at a cost of $3.50 to

$6 per pill knowing that the pills would be resold for at

least $8 to $10. Krasinski’s co-conspirators sometimes
No. 07-1965 3

brought United States currency into Canada to pay him

for the pills. At other times, Krasinski received payment

in United States currency while in the United States and

then brought the money back to Canada with him, and on

some occasions, Krasinski’s co-conspirators in the United

States sent him money in Canada after the pills had

been delivered.

After his arrest, Krasinski learned that Ogonowski had

provided information to the government concerning

Krasinski’s involvement in the Ecstasy scheme. Krasinski

told another inmate to tell Ogonowski that Krasinski knew

people in Poland who would hurt him if he did not help

Krasinski, and he provided a false story for Ogonowski

to tell. Later, while Krasinski and Ogonowski were transported to court together, he told Ogonowski that if anyone

testified against him, that person would have his throat

cut. He also made a slashing motion across his throat. The

next month, in a conversation recorded by the government, Krasinski suggested he would harm Ogonowski if

he did not follow through with Krasinski’s false story.

Using the United States Sentencing Guidelines in effect

at the time of the sentencing hearing on October 26, 2004,

the district court concluded that Krasinski’s guidelines

range, although he had no criminal history, was 292 to

365 months. The district court imposed a sentence of

292 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, in light of the

United States Supreme Court’s decision its opinion in

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we vacated and

remanded Krasinski’s sentence because it was unclear

whether the district court had applied the guidelines in a
4 No. 07-1965

Despite the seemingly clear language of U.S.S.G. 1

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), a conviction under section 1956 does not always

end the inquiry. Application Note 3(C) to the guideline provides that the section 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement does not

apply “if the defendant was convicted of a conspiracy under

18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and the sole object of that conspiracy was

to commit an offense set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1957.” See also

United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 842-44 (7th Cir. 2005)

(discussing Application Note 3(C)). The sole object of Krasinski’s

(continued...)

mandatory or advisory manner. After a new sentencing

hearing, the district again imposed a sentence of 292

months’ imprisonment. Krasinski appeals and raises

multiple challenges to his sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement

Krasinski maintains he should not have received an

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), which

provides for a two-level enhancement in money

laundering cases “if the defendant was convicted under

18 U.S.C. § 1956.” He did not object to this enhancement

before the district court, so our review is for plain error.

See United States v. Wainwright, 509 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir.

2007).

Krasinski pled guilty to conspiring to launder monetary

instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). That might

seem to end matters, as he was “convicted under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956,” but the government does not argue that it does.1
No. 07-1965 5

(...continued) 1

conspiracy was not to commit a section 1957 money laundering

offense, however, so this exception does not apply.

Instead, although Krasinski does not challenge his conviction itself in this proceeding, the dispute on appeal concerns whether Krasinski’s conduct was enough to support his money laundering conviction. Krasinski maintains

that it was not, and, therefore, that the U.S.S.G.

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement cannot stand.

The federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956,

contains distinct provisions pertaining to domestic and

international activity. The section pertinent here, section

1956(a)(2), has two subsections, and each criminalizes a

type of international monetary transfer. Krasinski was

charged with violating subsection (a)(2)(A), which prohibits transport, transmittal, or transfer of funds out of the

country “with the intent to promote the carrying on of

specified unlawful activity”; it does not referto “proceeds”

of the activity. The elements of a conspiracy to violate

section 1956(a)(2)(A) are thus that the defendant:

(1) conspired; (2) to transport funds between the United

States and another country; (3) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. See

United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2000).

Other provisions in the statute, in contrast, specifically

refer to “proceeds.” For example, section 1956(a)(2)(B)

criminalizes certain international transfers that “represent
6 No. 07-1965

Section 1956(a)(2) begins: 2

Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts

to transport, transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or

funds from a place in the United States to or through a

place outside the United States or to a place in the United

States from or through a place outside the United States—

(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of

specified unlawful activity; or

(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds

involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer

represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful

activity and knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part—

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,

the source, the ownership, or the control of the

proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement

under State or Federal law,

shall be sentenced . . . .

the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.” The 2

domestic provisions require a showing of “proceeds” as

well. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (a)(3).

Pointing to our decision in United States v. Malone, 484

F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2007), Krasinski maintains that he did

not “promote the carrying on” of any illegal activity. In

Malone, the defendant made cash deliveries that served

as the final step in a drug operation, and a jury convicted

him of conspiring to sell the drugs and conspiring to

commit money laundering. We considered whether
No. 07-1965 7

The defendant in Malone was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 3

§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), which makes it a crime when a person,

. . . knowing that the property involved in a financial

transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial

transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified

unlawful activity—

(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified

unlawful activity.

merely making these deliveries constituted transactions

in the “proceeds” of unlawful activity under the money

laundering statute. Concluding they were not, we said that

“unlike the act of reinvesting a criminal operation’s net

income to promote the carrying on of the operation, the

act of paying a criminal operation’s expenses out of gross

income is not punishable as a transaction in proceeds under

§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).” Id. at 921 (emphasis added); accord 3

United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2008) (plurality

opinion) (“proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) means

“profits,” not “receipts”).

Malone does not help Krasinski because unlike the

provision at issue in Malone, the section Krasinski was

charged with conspiring to violate (section 1956(a)(2)(A))

contains no “proceeds” requirement. See United States v.

Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1994) (”. . . § 1956(a)(2)

contains no requirement that ‘proceeds’ first be generated by unlawful activity, followed by a financial transaction with those proceeds, for criminal liability to attach.”). In fact, Malone actually hurts Krasinski. We ex-
8 No. 07-1965

plicitly noted in Malone that “the promotion element [of

the money laundering statute] can be met by ‘transactions

that promote the continued prosperity of the underlying

offense,’ i.e., that at least some activities that are part and

parcel of the underlying offense can be considered to

promote the carrying on of the unlawful activity.” 484 F.3d

at 921 (quoting United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 790 (7th

Cir. 2000)). The absence of a “proceeds” requirement in

section 1956(a)(2)(A) reflects that Congress decided to

prohibit any funds transfer out of the country that promotes the carrying on of certain unlawful activity.

The plurality opinion in the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, supports our circuit’s

reading of the “promotion” element. In the course of its

discussion of “proceeds” under the money laundering

statute, the plurality noted that dissenting opinions in

the case posited that one way to address an issue concerning the meaning of “proceeds” would be to interpret

narrowly the statute’s “promotion” requirement. Id. at

2027. The plurality characterized such an argument as

follows: “A defendant might be deemed not to ‘promote’

illegal activity ‘by doing those things . . . that are needed

merely to keep the business running,’. . ., because promotion (presumably) means doing things that will cause a

business to grow. See Webster’s 2d, p. 1981 (giving as

one of the meanings of ‘promote’ ‘[t]o contribute to the

growth [or] enlargement’ of something).” Id. The plurality

discounted the argument for a narrow interpretation of

the promotion requirement, stating: 

The federal money-laundering statute, however,

bars not the bare act of promotion, but engaging in
No. 07-1965 9

certain transactions “with the intent to promote

the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.” 18

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). In that

context the word naturally bears one of its other

meanings, such as “[t]o contribute to the . . . prosperity” of something, or to “further” something.

See Webster’s 2d, p.1981. 

Id.

In this case, the international transport and transfer of

funds contributed to the drug conspiracy’s prosperity

and furthered it along. Krasinski was one of Misiolek’s

Ecstasy suppliers in Canada. Krasinski’s co-conspirators

in the United States brought or sent him money in

Canada, and, in return, he supplied them with Ecstasy pills

that were sold in the United States. At other times,

Krasinski received money in the United States and brought

it back with him to Canada to pay for the pills that were

eventually resold in the United States as part of the

conspiracy. That was enough to satisfy the statute’s

promotion requirement, see United States v. Garcia Abrego,

141 F.3d 142, 163 (5th Cir. 1998), and the district court

made no error when it imposed the U.S.S.G.

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement.

B. Drug quantity calculation

Krasinski also challenges the district court’s calculations

of both the number of pills attributable to him and the

weight of those pills, calculations that were used to set

Krasinski’s base offense level under the guidelines. The
10 No. 07-1965

government has the burden of proving the quantity of

drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.

Soto-Piedra, 525 F.3d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 2008). We review

the district court’s factual findings regarding drug quantity

for clear error. Id. We also note that although Krasinski

argues to the contrary, the district court properly used

the version of the guidelines in effect at the time of his

sentencing, instead of an earlier edition, to calculate his

advisory guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 961 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008); United States

v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006).

Krasinski maintains that the district court erred when

it found him responsible for the sale of 112,000 pills. He

contends he was only responsible for 30,000 pills and

that any amount above that lacks sufficient indicia of

reliability. A defendant has a due process right to be

sentenced on the basis of reliable information, United States

v. Bautista, 532 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2008), and a district

court may not base its drug quantity calculation on pure

speculation or “nebulous eyeballing,” United States v.

Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 530 (7th Cir. 1998). A seizure of the

drugs involved in the offense, of course, provides

reliable information regarding drug quantity. See Bautista,

532 F.3d at 672. Admissions in a plea agreement also

conclusively establish the admitted facts. United States v.

Warneke, 310 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2002) (“An admission

is even better than a jury’s finding beyond a reasonable

doubt; it removes all contest from the case.”).

A district court may use a reasonable estimate of the

quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for guide-
No. 07-1965 11

lines purposes. United States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 582

(7th Cir. 2008); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.12 (“Where

there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not

reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate

the quantity of the controlled substance.”). Here, Krasinski

admitted in his plea agreement that he delivered between 5,000 and 30,000 Ecstasy pills on approximately

eight to ten separate occasions. He also admitted delivering

7,000 pills on March 5, 2003. With these statements in

mind, the district court first found that Krasinski delivered

Ecstasy pills on seven occasions, a conservative figure in

light of Krasinski’s admission that he made eight to ten

deliveries. The district court then took note of Krasinski’s

specific admission that he delivered 7,000 pills on one

occasion. For the other six deliveries, the district court

estimated that he delivered 17,500 pills each time, a figure

he calculated by averaging the 5,000- and 30,000-pill

figures. The result was a total of 112,000 pills.

As we have recognized before, arriving at sentencing

determinations through averaging can be problematic. See

United States v. Johnson, 185 F.3d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1999).

“[A]t some point a court’s estimation will seem less like a

restrained approximation and more like unsupported

conjecture.” United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145, 1152

(7th Cir. 1995). A calculation based on a wide range of

endpoints, for example, is cause for concern. Compare

United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1197 (1st Cir. 1993)

(using midpoint between four ounces and one kilogram

to determine drug quantity erroneous) with United States

v. Webster, 54 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding use
12 No. 07-1965

of two ounces for circumstances where witness testified

that one to three ounces supplied and eight ounces in

instances where witness stated six to twelve ounces

supplied). Extrapolating from a small number of known

quantities also raises a red flag, especially when the

maximum and minimum amounts are unknown. See

Johnson, 185 F.3d at 769 (vacating sentence where amount

carried on fourth trip determined only by looking to

amount carried on three others); United States v. Shonubi,

998 F.2d 84, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding error in assumption that quantity of heroin possessed on one trip represented typical quantity on eight trips).

The calculation employed by the district court in this

case was not the most conservative one it could have

performed. The district court could have held Krasinski

responsible for a one-time delivery of 7,000 pills, one

delivery of 30,000 pills, and six deliveries of 5,000 pills, a

calculation also consistent with the plea agreement. See

Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 530-31 (approving conservative drug

quantity approximation based on five months of undercover purchases and defendant’s admissions). The result

would have been a total of 67,000 pills, and, notably, a

lower offense level for Krasinski. See Presentence Report

at 6 (deeming Krasinski responsible for 80,000 to 240,000

Ecstasy pills).

Nonetheless, we cannot say that the district court’s

decision to hold Krasinski responsible for 112,000 pills was

clearly erroneous. The district court based the number of

deliveries and the range for the quantity of pills in those

deliveries on numbers supplied by Krasinski himself.
No. 07-1965 13

Significantly, unlike in Johnson, we know the maximum

and minimum quantities involved. Cf. Johnson, 185 F.3d

at 765. Moreover, Krasinski states in his sentencing memorandum that according to Misiolek, Ogonowski said

Krasinski was responsible for about 100,000 pills, so a

second source supported the decision to hold Krasinski

responsible for between 80,000 and 240,000 pills, the range

of pills in Krasinski’s advisory guidelines range. And

although Krasinski claims that Ogonowski would testify

that Krasinski supplied only 30,000 pills, Krasinski cites

nothing in support of his claim, and Krasinski admitted

to supplying more than that in his own plea.

Krasinski also takes issue with the district court’s use of

the typical weight table in U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1, Application

Note 11, to estimate that each Ecstasy pill weighed 250

milligrams. The guidelines provide that “[u]nless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance . . .

refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance

containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance.” Id. (emphasis added). The guidelines do not list

Ecstasy or MDMA as substances for which actual drug

weight should be used. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(B). As a

result, as we have recognized before, a defendant who

sells Ecstasy pills “is responsible for the weight of the

whole pill, not just the active ingredient.” United States v.

Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2005).

Krasinski emphasizes that the typical weight table

should not be used “if any more reliable estimate of the

total weight is available from case-specific information.”

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11; see also United States v. Gaines,
14 No. 07-1965

7 F.3d 101, 102-03 (7th Cir. 1993). In this case, he maintains,

a more reliable estimate of the total weight exists—that

of the 9,000 pills the government confiscated. Krasinski

asserts that these pills weighed a total of 342 grams, or 38

milligrams per pill. The lab reports in the record, however,

indicate that the seized pills weighed an average of 323

milligrams per pill. Krasinski’s figures appear to be

based on the weight of the active ingredient in the pills

instead of the correct measure, the weight of the entire

pill. Not only was the district court’s decision to use the

typical weight table proper, then, but it also benefitted

Krasinski. The “typical” weight of an Ecstasy pill according

to the guidelines (250 milligrams) is lower than the

average weight of the recovered pills. Accordingly, the

district court’s drug quantity calculations were not

clearly erroneous.

C. Obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility

Krasinski also maintains that the district court should

not have imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement

and that it should have granted a reduction for

acceptance of responsibility. We review de novo whether

the district court made appropriate findings to support

the obstruction enhancement, and we examine any underlying factual determinations for clear error. United States

v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2007). Whether a

defendant accepted responsibility is a factual determination that we also review for clear error. United States v.

Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 817 (7th Cir. 2008).
No. 07-1965 15

The guidelines call for a two-point obstruction of justice

enhancement when the defendant “willfully obstructed or

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or

sentencing of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Examples include “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise

unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror,

directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a).

Krasinski argues that the district court should not have

relied on a translation of a recorded February 26, 2004

conversation between Krasinski and another inmate (not

Ogonowski), as he contends the translation is inaccurate.

But the district court did not rely on the February 26,

2004 conversation when it imposed the enhancement.

Instead, it pointed to the conduct Krasinski admitted in

the plea agreement and found that those admissions

warranted the enhancement. Krasinski admitted in his

plea agreement and confirmed during his change of plea

hearing that he attempted to persuade Ogonowski to

change his testimony. He further admitted that he threatened to have others harm Ogonowski if he testified against

Krasinski, including a specific threat that anyone testifying

against him would have his throat cut in Poland. These

admissions were more than sufficient to support the

obstruction of justice enhancement.

The guidelines also provide for a two-level reduction, at

the district court’s discretion, if the defendant “clearly

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.”

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). “When a sentencing court properly
16 No. 07-1965

enhances a defendant’s offense level under § 3C1.1 for

obstructing justice, ‘he is presumed not to have accepted

responsibility.’ ” United States v. Ewing, 129 F.3d 430, 435

(7th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Larsen, 909 F.2d

1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 n.4

(“Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1

(Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice)

ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted

responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under

both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.”). The district court

recognized that it could find Krasinski accepted responsibility even after it imposed an obstruction of justice

enhancement, and we do not find its decision not to do

so clearly erroneous. Krasinski’s threats against Ogonowski were serious. And even though they took place

before he pled guilty, a defendant is not entitled to an

acceptance of responsibility reduction merely for pleading

guilty. See United States v. Jones, 52 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir.

1995). Krasinski pled guilty only after his attempts to

obstruct justice failed, and the district court was justified

in concluding that his case was not an extraordinary one.

D. Reasonableness

Finally, Krasinski maintains that his 292-month sentence

is unreasonable. We presume that a sentence within the

properly calculated guidelines range is reasonable, United

States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005), and

Krasinski’s sentence is at the low end of this range. In

arriving at the sentence it did, the district court acknowl-
No. 07-1965 17

edged Krasinski’s character letters and lack of criminal

history. In light of the scale of the scheme and Krasinski’s

threats against a witness, however, the district court

decided that the 292-month sentence was appropriate to

meet the goals expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. That decision

was not unreasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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