Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

September 26, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135594 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

JAMES A. BECKES,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 135594 

 COA: 270791 

WCAC: 03-000210 

DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION 

and NATIONAL UNION FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

______________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 27, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in 

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals opinion in part with 

regard to its application of Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144 (2002), and the 

Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission’s determination that Sington is 

inapplicable, and we REMAND this case to the Board of Magistrates for further 

proceedings regarding disability consistent with the standards set forth in Stokes v 

Chrysler LLC (Docket No. 132648), 481 Mich 266 (2008). In all other respects, leave to 

appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented 

should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

MARKMAN, J. (concurring). 

I concur in this Court’s order vacating the Court of Appeals opinion in part and 

remanding to the magistrate in light of Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich 266 (2008). I 

write separately only to reaffirm what I stated in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 

477 Mich 197 (2007) (Markman, J., concurring), in response to the incessant criticisms of 

the dissenting justices concerning the majority justices’ alleged lack of regard for 

precedent. See, e.g., Rowland, supra at 257 n 13 (Kelly, J., dissenting). As I observed in 

Rowland, that the majority justices have overruled precedent more often than the 

dissenting justices is less a function of the former respecting precedent any less than the 

latter, than it is a function of the reality that the dissenting justices, unlike the majority 

justices, believe that these precedents were rightly decided. This point is once again 
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reinforced by what the dissenting justices are doing in the instant case, as well as in 

Bessinger v Our Lady of Good Counsel (Docket No. 128870), __ Mich __ (2008); Diot v 

Dep’t of Corrections (Docket No. 130702), __ Mich __ (2008); Kohler v Mercy Mem 

Hosp Corp (Docket No. 135949), __ Mich __ (2008); Malloy v DSI Acoustical Co 

(Docket No. 136561), __ Mich __ (2008); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp (Docket 

No. 134805), __ Mich __ (2008); Innes v Allied Automotive Group, Inc (Docket No. 

134319), __ Mich __ (2008); and Jones v Comerica, Inc, 482 Mich 890 (2008).

 CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., would deny leave to appeal. 

WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 

I dissent from the order partially vacating the Court of Appeals judgment with 

regard to Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144 (2002), and the Workers’ 

Compensation Appellate Commission’s determination that Sington is inapplicable, and 

remanding this case to the magistrate for further proceedings regarding disability 

consistent with the standards set forth in Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich 266 (2008). 

Because I dissented from the majority opinion in this Court’s decision in Stokes v 

Chrysler LLC, I vote to grant leave to appeal in this case to consider whether a majority 

of this Court reached the correct decision in Stokes. 

d0923 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 26, 2008 

Clerk