* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30420

Summary Calendar

MAPP CONSTRUCTION, LLC

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

M&R DRYWALL, INC.

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 07-907

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant MAPP Construction, LLC (“MAPP”) appeals the district court’s

dismissal of this case for lack of jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we

AFFIRM. 

I.

On August 21, 2003, MAPP contracted with Southgate Residential Towers,

LLC (“Southgate”) to construct a large-scale apartment and condominium

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 24, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30420

2

complex in Baton Rouge called Southgate Towers. The contract between

Southgate and MAPP states that any dispute between the parties arising out of

the construction of the towers will be subject to arbitration.

MAPP subcontracted with Appellee M&R Drywall, Inc. (“M&R”) to

perform stucco and sheet-rock work on the Southgate Towers project. The

subcontract contained a clause that MAPP contends binds M&R to arbitrate any

disputes arising out of the subcontract. Appellee M&R filed suit against

Appellant MAPPin Louisiana state court, alleging breach of contract. That case

was consolidated with a lawsuit by Southgate against MAPP. MAPP filed a

“Motion to Stay, and Order Directing the Parties to Arbitrate” in the

consolidated state court litigation and invoked the Louisiana Arbitration Act.

The trial court denied MAPP's motion and concluded that the contractual

provisions regarding arbitration did not bind M&R to submit disputes with

MAPP to arbitration. 

Appellant MAPP sought review of the trial court’s decision by the

Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. That court denied the writ, finding no

error in the trial court’s conclusion that the contractual provisions regarding

arbitration are ambiguous. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied MAPP’s

application for a supervisory writ. After the denial of its appeals, MAPP brought

suit in federal district court, again asserting that M&R was bound to arbitrate.

MAPP contended that M&R was bound under the provisions of the contract as

interpreted under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The district court

dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, invoking the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, which prevents the federal district court from reviewing the final

judgment of a state court. This appeal followed. 

II.

The district court rightfully dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding in “cases
No. 08-30420

3

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005); see also Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine “provides that ‘a United States

District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in

judicial proceedings.’” Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211F.3d 194, 198 (4th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482). Rooker-Feldman bars direct

review in the lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest state

court, because such authority is vested only in the Supreme Court. Id. at 199.

Rooker-Feldman is a bar not only to claims actually litigated in state court, but

also to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those that were litigated.

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87. Thus, review is precluded by Rooker-Feldman

whenever “success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the

state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Brown & Root, 211 F.3d at 202

(internal citation omitted). 

The Louisiana state court issued a final ruling on the issue of whether

M&R is bound to arbitrate by the subcontract. Appellant argues that

Rooker-Feldman does not bar the instant action because consideration of its

federal petition would not require the federal district court to engage in direct

review of the state court order. Appellant claims to assert an independent

federal claim based on the FAA because the state court decision was based on its

construction of the subcontract in conjunction with the Louisiana Arbitration Act

and did not address the effect of the FAA on the contract. We disagree. 

MAPP’s claims under the FAA are undoubtedly inextricably intertwined

with his state court claims attempting to compel arbitration. See Brown & Root,

211F.3d at 201 (“[W]hen a party sues in federal district courtto readjudicate the
No. 08-30420

4

same issues decided in the state court proceedings, that action is in essence an

attempt to obtain direct review of the state court decision in the lower federal

courts in contravention of Rooker-Feldman.”(citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490

U.S. 605, 622–23 (1989))). Because Appellant asked the district court to address

the exact issue that was decided by the Louisiana state court—whether the

subcontract binds M&R to arbitrate—Rooker-Feldman prohibited the district

court from exercising jurisdiction. MAPP’s newly asserted argument under the

FAA does not salvage his claim. Though Appellant contends that he has a right

for his claims under the FAA to be heard, he had a chance to assert any

argument under the FAA in state court. The fact that he did not assert such

claims does not prevent Rooker-Feldman from barring the instantlitigation. “All

that matters is that [MAPP] undeniably enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to

raise its FAA claim in state court.” Brown & Root, 211 F.3d at 202.

“Rooker-Feldman requires no more.” Id. MAPP had ample opportunity to bring

a claim under the FAA in state court, but failed to do so. 

Appellant’s contention that the federal district court has exclusive

jurisdiction to hear his FAA claim is also misplaced. It is well-established that

state courts “‘have it within both their power and their proper role to render

binding judgments on issues of federal law, subject only to review by [the United

States Supreme] Court.’” Brown & Root, 211 F.3d at 202 (alteration in original)

(quoting ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 622). The Louisiana state court could have

properly adjudicated theFAA issue—had it been brought—and Appellant points

to no contrary law establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction over theFAA claim.

At bottom, Appellant petitioned the district court to do exactly what

Rooker-Feldman aims to prevent, entertain appellate review of a state judgment

in a United States district court. Accordingly, we find that the district court

properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s claim. 

AFFIRMED.