J-S25003-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.E., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 333 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at 

No(s): CP-02-AP-0000251-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: October 4, 2022

S.E. (“Mother”) appeals from the order dated February 28, 2022, and 

entered on March 2, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans’ Court, which granted the petition of Allegheny County Office of 

Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) for termination of Mother’s parental 

rights to her minor daughter, B.S. (“Child” or “the Child”), pursuant to sections 

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.1 

After careful review, we affirm. 

The orphans’ court provided the following factual background and 

procedural history in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

The Child was born [i]n December [of] 2012, at which time CYF 

received its first referral on the Child and family. The report was 

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of the natural father, J.S. (“Father”), were also 

terminated by order of court on the same date; however, Father did not appeal 

the termination. 
J-S25003-22

- 2 -

regarding Mother’s behavior, potential drug use, and concerns 

about how Mother intended to address her substance abuse and 

care for a newborn. CYF met with Mother at the hospital, noting 

that her behavior was somewhat erratic. Mother was discharged 

from [UPMC] Magee[-Womens Hospital] into Family Links, a 

residential drug and alcohol treatment center, with the Child in 

her care. At their follow up visit, Mother reassured the agency 

that she intended to complete the program. Without any 

immediate safety concerns for the Child, CYF closed out the 

referral in July 2013. 

Less than a year later, CYF received another referral in June 2014, 

where it was reported that the Child, while in the care of ... 

[F]ather and paternal grandmother, was found outside wandering 

around by herself. The Child was not yet two years old. Upon 

investigation, CYF learned that Mother was incarcerated. Father 

indicated he would take full responsibility for the [C]hild and 

without any additional concerns, CYF closed out the referral.

In August 2016, CYF received a referral involving an incident that 

occurred between Father’s then-paramour and the Child. Father’s 

then-paramour was named as a perpetrator of an alleged assault 

on the [C]hild. Between that point and October 2017, CYF 

received a few additional calls about the Child, which were 

screened out “because there wasn’t [sic] any safety concerns, 

[and] nothing that we can do.” 

CYF was referred to the family on October 3, 2017, because 

Mother was allegedly seen in public under the influence of an 

unknown substance and was calling the Child names. CYF made 

efforts to provide assistance to Mother by offering an emergency 

POWER3 evaluation and referrals for treatment. On December 22, 

2017, CYF received a referral that Mother was arrested for 

allegedly using and selling drugs in the presence of the [C]hild, 

and that Father was also arrested and unavailable to care for the 

[C]hild. 

3 POWER stands for [“]Pennsylvania Organization for 

Women in Early Recovery[,”] and the organization provides, 

inter alia, drug and alcohol evaluations and referrals for 

treatment.

CYF removed the [C]hild via an emergency custody order on 

December 29, 2017[,] and filed a dependency petition pursuant 

to 42 Pa.C.S.[] §[]6302, “Dependent Child[,”] (1). At the

adjudication hearing, Mother was incarcerated and[,] after 
J-S25003-22

- 3 -

testimony, the [C]hild was adjudicated dependent and ordered to 

remain in placement. Included within the findings, this court 

noted that “Mo[ther] has a lengthy drug and alcohol history. Child 

was very happy to see ... [M]other in the court room but [it] was 

also very clear that she was not happy with her [M]other[’s]

decision to steal and use drugs.” Mother’s goals included 

addressing her substance abuse issues, parenting and visitation, 

resolving her criminal matters, and locating housing. Mother was 

released from incarceration and reunited with ... Father on or 

about February 22, 2018. 

After the adjudication proceeding, the court held permanency 

review hearings on February 28, 2018[,] May 9, 2018[,] and July 

11, 2018. During this time, the court found Mother to be making 

moderate progress while the [C]hild remained in care. At the July 

hearing, the court’s findings noted that Mother said she had some 

medical issues, had been discharged from a drug and alcohol 

treatment center for non-compliance, was not attending urine[] 

screens through CYF, and had established housing with a 

roommate with a questionable criminal history. 

In early October 2018, the South Strabane Police Department 

[was] called to Rack Room Shoes, which is a part of the Tanger 

Outlets located within their jurisdiction. Detective Michael 

Schielmeier responded to the report of an adult male and female 

that took twenty-six pairs of shoes and left the store without 

payment. Mother was identified as one of the perpetrators and 

she was charged with a felony of the third degree, retail theft, and 

a felony of the third degree, conspiracy. Detective Schielmeier 

testified at the contested termination proceeding that Mother had 

an outstanding bench warrant from those charges, over four years 

earlier, after failing to appear for proceedings after the preliminary 

hearing. 

At the permanency review hearing on October 10, 2018, Mother 

was incarcerated and was no longer in regular contact with CYF. 

At the following permanency review hearing on February 13, 

2019, the court made a finding that, “[t]his court is VERY 

concerned for the Child,” as the Child’s concerning behaviors were 

escalating. By the March 27, 2019[] permanency review hearing,

Mother was at the Program for Female Offenders.5 Mother 

continued to reside at this program at the following permanency 

review hearing on July 3, 2019. 
J-S25003-22

- 4 -

5 The Program for Female Offenders is a residential program 

that provides counseling, work experience, life skills, clerical 

training[,] and job search services for female offenders as 

they resolve their criminal matters. 

By the October 8, 2019 permanency review hearing, Mother was 

reincarcerated, this time in Butler County and the court ordered 

that the [C]hild’s concurrent goal in the case was adoption. 

Mother continued to be incarcerated when the court presided over 

the permanency review hearing on January 15, 2020. 

In March 2020, Officer A.J. Yonek[] from the Harmar Township 

Police Department[] responded to an incident at the Days Inn 

Hotel for a female that overdosed. Upon arrival, Father told 

Officer Yonek that the Child was playing outside on the sidewalk 

and returned to the room only to start screaming that Mother was 

dead. Officer Yonek testified that EMS administered Narcan, 

reviving Mother, while he conducted an immediate search around 

the area where Mother had overdosed. Officer Yonek testified that 

“there was a powdered substance, several empty stamp bags of 

heroin, and numerous snorting straws” located on the back of the 

toilet. These items, according to the officer, were within reach of 

the Child. Charges were not filed at that time; however, the 

officer made a referral to CYF. The officer testified that Mother 

had an outstanding warrant out of the City of Pittsburgh for 

prohibited acts (drug paraphernalia), and EMS transported her to 

a local hospital for follow up. At the time of this incident, the Child 

was in the care of her paternal grandmother, who against court 

order, allowed unsupervised contact with Mother. 

A goal change and permanency review hearing was held on July 

29, 2020, at which time the court ordered no unsupervised contact 

between the Child and Mother, and directed CYF to explore all 

options for placement. Included in the findings, the court stated 

that, “Child recently made a disclosure that she has seen IPV[,6] 

drug use[,] and sexual abuse while with her parents.” The order 

reflects that Mother was not in compliance with any of her family 

service plan goals and had made no progress towards alleviating 

the circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

6

IPV stands for [“]intimate partner violence,[”] also referred 

to as domestic violence. 

Officer Kevin Cooney[] of the Shaler Township [P]olice 

[D]epartment[] responded to an incident involving Mother in July 

2020. The officer conducted a traffic stop where Mother was 
J-S25003-22

- 5 -

driving. Mother was not forthcoming with her name and gave an 

alias.... [D]uring the stop, the officer observed Mother tossing a 

crack pipe outside of the driver[’s] side and was standing on a 

syringe. Officer Cooney testified that Mother provided correct 

information for an alias, and ... he had no reason to believe she 

was being untruthful. He advised her that she would be charged 

with possession and tampering with evidence. He sent the 

summons to the alias, and that individual appeared in person at 

the police station after receiving said summons, at which point it 

was apparent that this was not the same individual that the officer 

had stopped. Upon obtaining the correct information for Mother, 

Officer Cooney sent the summons to Mother and made a referral 

to CYF. Officer Cooney testified that Mother later plead guilty to 

identity theft, false reports, and driving under suspension. 

On October 28, 2020, the court’s findings indicated that Mother 

had obtained new charges, was currently detained in the 

Allegheny County Jail, and that she was not in compliance with 

her family service plan goals and had not made any progress in 

remedying the conditions. The court order also noted that Mother 

had obtained new charges and was currently detained in the 

Allegheny County Jail. Mother’s incarceration continued through 

the next permanency review hearing, on January 20, 2021; 

however, Mother was released by the following permanency 

review hearing on July 7, 2021. 

Officer Peter Churberko[] from the Ross Township [P]olice 

[D]epartment[] responded to a reported theft at Sheetz on 

Babcock Boulevard in October 2021. Officer Churberko testified 

that he reviewed the video surveillance footage of a white female 

wearing a mask, who picked up and concealed two fidget spinners, 

and left the store entering a vehicle registered to Father. The 

investigation determined that the individual in the footage was 

Mother. As Sheetz wished to pursue charges against Mother, 

Officer Chuberko [sic] testified that he filed one count of retail 

theft, a felony 3, because of the dollar amount and the fact that 

[M]other’s criminal history check found her to have thirty-four 

prior convictions for retail theft. Officer Chuberko [sic] testified 

that those charges had been adjudicated via a guilty plea. 

At the permanency review hearing on October 6, 2021, the court 

found that the Child was doing well in the foster home[,] and she 

was in the 3rd grade with an Individualized Education Plan. 

Additionally, the court made findings that Mother had outstanding 

warrants from Butler [County] and Washington County. 
J-S25003-22

- 6 -

CYF filed petitions to terminate the birth parents’ rights on 

November 19, 2021. At a hearing on December 3, 2021, the court 

appointed conflict counsel to represent the Child in the termination 

proceedings[] and scheduled a contested termination of parental 

rights proceeding on February 28, 2022. At the time of the 

termination proceeding, the Child was nine years old, had been 

adjudicated dependent and out of the care of Mother and Father 

for forty-eight months, and had resided in her pre-adoptive foster 

home for over a year and a half. Mother did not appear for the 

in-person contested termination of parental rights proceeding, 

instead appearing remotely. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO”), 5/2/22, 2-10 (unnecessary capitalization, 

citations to record, and some brackets and footnotes omitted). 

On March 2, 2022, the orphans’ court entered an order granting CYF’s 

petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to 

Child pursuant to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. 

On March 22, 2022, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i). She now raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(a)(2), 

(5), and (8)?

2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving 

by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

[C]hild pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 6. 

We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the 

following standard:
J-S25003-22

- 7 -

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights 

is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under [s]ection 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 
J-S25003-22

- 8 -

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination 

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

With regard to section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts 

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the trial 
J-S25003-22

- 9 -

court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b), 

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under section 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent. 

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 
J-S25003-22

- 10 -

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical and mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied. 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted). 

In the case of an incarcerated parent, this Court has stated:

[T]he fact of incarceration does not, in itself, provide grounds for 

the termination of parental rights. However, a parent’s 

responsibilities are not tolled during incarceration. The focus is 

on whether the parent utilized resources available while in prison 

to maintain a relationship with his or her child. An incarcerated 

parent is expected to utilize all available resources to foster a 

continuing close relationship with his or her children.... Although 

a parent is not required to perform the impossible, he must act 

affirmatively to maintain his relationship with his child, even in 

difficult circumstances. A parent has the duty to exert himself, to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life. 

Thus, a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and 

rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his ... 

parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and 

fulfillment of his ... potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment. A parent cannot protect his parental rights by 

merely stating that he does not wish to have his rights terminated. 

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855-56 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “Thus, the fact of incarceration alone neither 

compels nor precludes termination of parental rights. Parents must still 

provide for the emotional and physical well-being of their children.” In re 
J-S25003-22

- 11 -

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2010). Moreover, we note that “[t]he 

cause of incarceration may be particularly relevant to the [s]ection 2511(a) 

analysis, where imprisonment arises as a direct result of the parent’s actions 

which were ‘part of the original reasons for the removal’ of the child.” Id.

(quoting In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 

Here, Mother claims that CYF failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence to support termination of her parental rights under section 

2511(a)(2). Mother’s Brief at 15-16. For instance, she contends there was 

insufficient evidence to conclude that Mother had not remedied her drug use. 

Mother avers that she sought treatment as directed and that CYF merely relied 

on her criminal history and the absence of drug screens to prove that she had 

failed to remedy the issue of her drug use. Id. at 16. She further states that 

there was insufficient evidence that her mental health prevented her from 

providing Child with basic care. Id. at 17. In support of her argument, Mother 

makes a vague reference to testimony of “Pressley Ridge witnesses” regarding 

“progress made by Mother and her ability to take redirection.” Id. She 

attempts to minimize CYF’s concerns regarding disclosures of domestic 

violence by Mother, noting that CYF admitted these concerns were based on 

“verbal disputes” or “disagreements” and nothing physical. Id. Finally, 

Mother takes issue with “the court’s psychologist” for criticizing her for having 

a record of theft charges, speculating how that might affect Child, faulting 

Mother for discussing her medication with Child, and characterizing Mother as 

“not pro-social.” Id. Mother argues that “the psychologist met [her] twice 
J-S25003-22

- 12 -

and never reviewed the years of visitation logs prepared by those who 

repeatedly observed Mother and [Child] over longer periods.” Id. 

Mother has failed to convince us that she is entitled to any relief on this 

claim. Contrary to her contention, we deem the record to contain 

overwhelming evidence of Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect, or refusal to parent Child, and that the conditions which led to 

Mother’s incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. 

As the orphans’ court so aptly stated:

Without doubt, ... the record is replete with evidence proving, 

clearly and convincingly, that the statutory grounds to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights existed. Mother did not successfully meet 

a single family service plan goal throughout the forty-eight 

months this case was open. Mother’s goals remained the same 

throughout the case. This Child started life with a referral related 

to Mother’[s] substance abuse, and years later, that very 

substance abuse goal continues to exist. Moreover, Mother’s 

inability to resolve her criminal lifestyle, which continued to exist 

at the time of the termination proceeding, also impacted her 

ability to make any forward progress. This [c]ourt, for the sake 

of the Child, gave Mother an extended period of time to try and 

make progress towards remedying the conditions that led to initial 

placement, and forty-eight months later, Mother is no closer. The 

conditions that existed at the outset continued to exist at the 

termination proceeding, this [c]ourt found Mother’s testimony to 

lack credibility, and this [c]ourt lacked any confidence that Mother 

would be able to make progress on any of her goals in the 

immediate future.

OCO at 12-13. 

More specifically, the orphans’ court indicated Mother had goals to 

address her drug and alcohol use, to address any mental health concerns and 

follow through with recommended treatment, to demonstrate parenting and 
J-S25003-22

- 13 -

visitation with Child, to resolve her criminal matters, and to obtain appropriate 

housing. Id. at 13-17. Concerns about Mother’s drug and alcohol use 

extended as far back as Child’s birth. Despite referrals on the part of CYF, 

Mother failed to successfully address this goal, nor did she “achieve any 

stretch of sobriety during the four years the case was open.” Id. at 13. 

Regarding Mother’s mental health, Mother participated in evaluations with the 

court-appointed evaluator, Dr. Patricia Pepe, “who noted that as recently as 

her April 2021 evaluation, ... Mother was in need of ‘intensive outpatient 

services ... with somebody that has experience addressing antisocial 

personality traits[ a]nd[,] at the same time, it would have to be a dual 

diagnosis treatment to also address her history of addiction.’” Id. at 14 

(quoting N.T. Hearing, 2/28/22, at 108). 

Additionally, the orphans’ court noted that, at the outset of the case, it 

ordered Mother be referred to a coached parenting program, which could 

facilitate both parenting instruction and supervision at visits. Id. Accordingly, 

CYF referred the family to the Arsenal program for these services, 

and visits were scheduled for every other Saturday. Initially, ... 

supervised visitation occurred at the CYF North Regional Office. 

Once [Child was] placed in a Presley [sic] Ridge foster home in 

August 2020, visitation was scheduled and supervised through the 

treatment coordinator, Victoria Johnson. Ms. Johnson testified 

about some of her observations and concerns regarding the 

visitation. Ms. Johnson stated that Mother rarely canceled visits 

but was routinely twenty minutes late. She testified that Mother 

had “a history of making inappropriate comments during visitation 

with the Child, and they’re not age appropriate.” Ms. Johnson also 

explained that the agency established a “gift giving rule” because 

Mother started bringing lots of toys and gifts for the Child during 

visitation and the sheer volume of gifts overwhelmed the Child. 
J-S25003-22

- 14 -

Ms. Johnson explained that the Child is “a very organized person, 

and all of these toys and presents took up so much space that the 

Child would actually have meltdowns after visits. She would panic 

because she had no room for these things. She didn’t know where 

to put it [sic]. She had so much stuff. She started to get very 

overwhelmed.” Ms. Johnson testified that her agency instituted 

this rule to encourage the Child to engage with her Mother with 

quality time during the visits, and not spend the entire visit 

focusing on a toy, and [to] still allow Mother the opportunity to 

provide gifts at appropriate times, such as the holidays or through 

special requests. Despite Mother[’s] being aware of the rule, Ms. 

Johnson stated that Mother would find ways to sneak gifts into the 

Child’s bag, which in turn would “make the Child feel horrible after 

visits because she would see these items in the bag and give them 

to staff, because the Child ... worried she would get in trouble if ... 

she was caught with these items.” Four years into the case, ... 

Mother had not established herself as safe enough for 

unsupervised visitation. At the time of the termination 

proceeding, Ms. Johnson, the CYF caseworker[,] Wayne Noel, and 

the [c]ourt[-]appointed evaluator, Dr. Patricia Pepe, all testified 

that they [would have] significant concern[s] if the Child was to 

have any unsupervised contact with Mother.

Id. at 14-16 (brackets in original and citations to record omitted). 

As for Mother’s goal to resolve her criminal matters, the orphans’ court 

relied on the testimony of Mother’s Butler County Probation Officer, Heather 

Evanko. Id. at 16. 

Ms. Evanko testified that Mother was assigned to her unit shortly 

after a March 2020 sentencing[,] and [that] during her processing 

and background research for Mother[,] ... she “found there were 

over 50 magistrate warrants for her arrest....” Ms. Evanko 

testified that mail sent to Mother came back unclaimed, and that 

Mother was given two opportunities to report, which she failed to 

do. Ms. Evanko reached out to Mother’s Allegheny County 

Probation Officer, Megan St. Joxe, in an attempt to gain 

compliance. At the time of the contested termination proceeding, 

Ms. Evanko testified that Mother had three outstanding warrants, 

two from Butler County and one from Washington County. 
J-S25003-22

- 15 -

Id. (citations to record omitted). The orphans’ court found that “Mother did 

not address this goal with any success....” Id. Moreover, the court determined 

that Mother also failed to reach her housing goal, as any housing she may 

have been residing at during the time of the termination proceeding “lacked 

stability due to Mother’s criminal issues.” Id. at 17. See also id. (indicating 

Mother had outstanding warrants for her arrest at the time of the termination 

hearing). 

Finally, the orphans’ court noted that Child is doing well in the foster 

home. See id. (referencing the testimony of CYF caseworker, Renee Taddy, 

that Child has a “very comfortable relationship” with the foster family and that 

she “is very happy there. She’s comfortable, and she’s safe there”). See 

also id. at 18 (noting that counsel for Child indicated Child “would like to go 

back home if that was possible but that if she could not go back home, she 

would like to be adopted”). The court opined:

Our Superior Court has noted that “a child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary 

to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will 

not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claim of progress and hope for the future.” 

In the Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Mother could not or would not ... remedy the conditions and 

termination was in the best interests of the [C]hild, as ... 

evidenced in the record. Additionally, ... this [c]ourt lacked any 

confidence that Mother could or would quickly progress towards 

remedying the conditions in the foreseeable future.
J-S25003-22

- 16 -

Id. We deem the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) to be well-supported by the record, and 

we discern no abuse of discretion. 

As for its analysis under section 2511(b), Mother claims that the record 

does not support the court’s determination that termination of her parental 

rights best serves the needs and welfare of Child. Mother’s Brief at 21. 

Rather, Mother argues the record clearly established that Child “loves, wants, 

and needs Mother and derives necessary benefits from her relationship with 

Mother.” Id. In support of her argument, Mother points to testimony from 

Dr. Pepe and Ms. Johnson recognizing that Child loves Mother and wants to 

live with her. Id. at 20. Again, Mother has failed to convince us that she is 

entitled to relief on this claim. 

Significantly, the orphans’ court acknowledged:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

Court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-[]36 (Pa. Super. 2008). The 

mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (trial [c]ourt’s decision to terminate parents’ 

parental rights was affirmed where [the c]ourt balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). 

Rather, the orphans’ [c]ourt must examine the status of the bond 

to determine whether its termination “would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 

835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

OCO at 19 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)). 
J-S25003-22

- 17 -

In reaching its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to section 2511(b), the orphans’ court considered the testimony of Dr. Pepe, 

who it notes had the opportunity to evaluate and interact with both Mother 

and Child over several years, allowing Dr. Pepe “a longitudinal view of their 

relationship and the impact Mother had on the Child’s developmental, 

emotional, and physical needs and welfare.” Id. at 19-20. Dr. Pepe indicated 

that throughout her evaluations she saw the implications of “antisocial 

parents.” Id. at 20. She explained: “Basically, it’s very disruptive for children 

because the [antisocial] behavior can help the child be deceitful, irresponsible, 

unreliable, [and] incapable of feeling guilty. So essentially, the child’s 

cognitive and social and emotional development are impacted.” Id. (quoting

N.T. Hearing at 73). Dr. Pepe further stated that, “when she first evaluated 

the Child[,] she had a superior-level IQ but ‘was not exhibiting ageappropriate or developmentally appropriate functioning.’” Id. (quoting N.T. 

Hearing at 78). Dr. Pepe concluded that Child’s functioning was directly 

impacted by the antisocial functioning of her parent, as “her mother was in 

and out of her life.” Id. (quoting N.T. Hearing at 78). 

Based on her individual evaluation of Mother and an interactional 

evaluation between Mother and Child, as well as an interactional evaluation 

between Child and her foster parents, Dr. Pepe testified that

the foster family has provided [Child] with “positive structure” as 

well as “realistic expectations, where positive functioning and 

school was promoted, pro-social skills were promoted[,] and there 

was a clear structure with clearly identified expectations and 

consequences.” ... [I]t was “wonderful to see” the progress that 
J-S25003-22

- 18 -

the Child had made in this foster home and that the Child was 

“finally functioning at an age-appropriate level.” 

Conversely, ... Mother clearly loves Child but Mother’s thirty[-]year 

history of addiction has clearly impacted her ability to prioritize 

Child.... Mother was incarcerated for the first few years of the 

Child’s life, that pattern continued..., and Mother has not been able 

to provide the Child with the stability she needs. 

Id. at 20-21 (citations to record omitted). Additionally, Dr. Pepe testified that 

permanency through adoption is very important for Child and that she would 

be concerned if Mother was to have unsupervised contact with Child because 

of Mother’s inability to model appropriate behavior. Id. at 21. In Dr. Pepe’s 

opinion, the emotional bond between Mother and Child was not beneficial to 

Child and it would be in Child’s best interest to remain in her current foster 

home. Id. at 22. 

The orphans’ court opined:

With the grounds firmly established, this [c]ourt found the 

testimony and evidence clearly and convincingly proved that 

termination best served th[e] Child’s needs and welfare. This 

[c]ourt acknowledges that Mother loves and cares for the Child; 

this is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the Child, in 

her own way, cares for Mother as well. However, this [c]ourt 

agrees with Dr. Pepe’s expert opinion that termination best meets 

the Child’s overall developmental, emotional, and physical needs 

and welfare and any potential harm caused by severing the 

relationship would be mitigated by the stability, safety, and 

consistency within the Child’s foster home.... [S]evering any 

bonds with Mother would not cause extreme emotional 

consequences for the Child. 
J-S25003-22

- 19 -

Id. at 22-23.2 As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the 

orphans’ court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs 

and welfare, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b). See In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (stating that appellate 

courts must defer to the trial court regarding credibility determinations and 

weight assessment, so long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an 

abuse of discretion). 

Accordingly, we affirm the order involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________

2 We note that counsel for Child agrees with the orphans’ court’s assessment 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Child’s Brief at 9. 
J-S25003-22

- 20 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/04/2022