alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, McClanahan and Senior Judge Willis 

BERNARD L. DINICOLA, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0689-08-4 PER CURIAM 

SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 

TARGET CORPORATION 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Bernard L. DiNicola, Jr., pro se, on brief). 

 (Joseph F. Giordano; Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Bernard L. DiNicola, Jr. (claimant) appeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation 

Commission finding that (1) the deputy commissioner did not abuse his discretion in granting 

Target’s (employer) motion for protective order, not granting the motion to compel, and not 

striking employer’s defenses; (2) claimant’s claim, filed on April 17, 2007, alleging an injury by 

accident occurring on January 21, 2003, or on another day between February 15, 2003 and 

February 20, 2003, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in Code 

§ 65.2-601; (3) the tolling provisions contained in Code § 65.2-602 did not apply; (4) employer 

was not estopped from defending the claim on statute of limitations grounds; (5) the doctrine of 

imposition did not apply to save the claim from the bar of the statute of limitations; and (6) in the 

alternative, even if the claim was determined to be timely filed, it was not compensable, as 

claimant failed to prove his injury was caused by an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating 

event resulting in an obvious, sudden mechanical or structural change in the body. The 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

commission also denied claimant’s petition to re-open the record for receipt of an October 30, 

2007 medical report.1 We have reviewed the record and the commission’s opinion and find that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the commission in 

its final opinion. See DiNicola v. Target, VWC File No. 215-13-49 (Feb. 27, 2008). We 

dispense with oral argument and summarily affirm because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.

 1

 Claimant presents fourteen questions in his opening brief. The “Argument & 

Authority” section of his brief does not address each question separately, rendering it difficult to 

ascertain the specific supporting argument for each such question. “We will not search the 

record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a 

brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Accordingly, 

in summarily affirming the commission’s decision, we have considered only those issues 

properly before the commission and ruled upon in its February 27, 2008 opinion.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERICK OSWALDO OSORIO LIMA,

Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 13-73555

Agency No. A072-536-295

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 14, 2016** 

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

Erick Oswaldo Osorio Lima, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro

se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to reopen deportation

proceedings conducted in absentia. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. 

FILED

DEC 23 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, and

review de novo claims of due process violations and questions of law. Mohammed

v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in

part the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying

Osorio Lima’s motion to reopen as untimely. Osorio Lima filed his motion more

than 17 years after his final order of removal, and the record reflects that he was

personally served the Notice of Hearing, which contained the date and location of

his June 26, 1995 hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) & (b)(4)(iii)(A)(2); 8

U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994) (notice of hearing shall be given in person or, if

personal service is not practicable, sent by certified mail); Matter of M-S-, 22 I. &

N. Dec. 349, 356-57 (BIA 1998) (a motion to reopen an in absentia order to apply

for new forms of relief is subject to the 90-day motion to reopen deadline); Lata v.

INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail

on due process claim).

Osorio Lima’s contention that the agency relied on factual and legal errors in

denying the motion is not supported by the record.

Osorio Lima’s contention that the agency violated due process by denying

his motion before he could file supplemental documentation fails for lack of

2 13-73555
prejudice, where he did not represent what evidence he intended to submit. See

Lata at 1246.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Osorio Lima’s unexhausted contention

regarding his eligibility for an I-130 visa petition. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d

1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (this court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims not

raised before the agency in administrative proceedings).

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Osorio Lima’s remaining

contentions regarding his prima facie eligibility for relief.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

3 13-73555
Opinion issued April 2 , 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 1 8
- 0 107 7
- CR

——————————— MARCUS ROBINSON , Appella nt

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appell e e
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 1 5 7 4031

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Marcus Robinson , pleaded guilty to the felony offense of assault against a peace officer

. 1 The trial court found appellant guilty, and, i n accordance

1 See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE § 22.0 1

.2

with the terms of a ppellant’s plea bargain agreement with the State, sentenced appellant to twelve years in prison

. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal. In a plea bargain case, a defendant may only appeal those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or after getting the trial court’ s permission to appeal. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN . art. 44.02; T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2). An appe al must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal has not been m ade part of the record. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2 (d). Here, the trial court’ s certification is included in the record on appeal. See id

. T he trial court ’s certification states t hat this is a plea bargain case and that the defendant has no right of appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25.2(a)(2). The record supports the trial court’ s certification. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Because appellant has no right of appeal , we must dismiss this appeal

. See Chavez v. State , 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea

bargained is permitted to app eal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardl ess of the basis for the appeal.”)

. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.3 PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Goodman and Countiss

. Do not p ublish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b).
# C_2010288EN.01003002.xml

| 23.10.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 288/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.10.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 288/30

---

Judgment of the General Court of (Fifth Chamber) of 9 September 2010 — Usha Martin Ltd v Council of the European Union and European Commission

(Case T-119/06) (1)

(Dumping - Imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in India - Breach of an undertaking - Principle of proportionality - Article 8(1), (7) and (9) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (now Article 8(1), (7) and (9) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009))

(2010/C 288/57)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Usha Martin Ltd (Kolkata, India) (represented by: K. Adamantopoulos, lawyer, and J. Branton, Solicitor, V. Akritidis and Y. Melin, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by J.-P. Hix and B. Driessen, acting as Agents, and by G. Berrisch, lawyer); and European Commission (represented by: P. Stancanelli and T. Scharf, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application for annulment of Commission Decision 2006/38/EC of 22 December 2005 amending Commission Decision 1999/572/EC accepting undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of steel wire ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in India (OJ 2006 L 22, p. 54), and Council Regulation (EC) No 121/2006 of 23 January 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 1858/2005 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in India (OJ 2006 L 22, p. 1)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Usha Martin Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Usha Martin Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 154, 1.7.2006.

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 22, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

136630 & (71) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices 

v SC: 136630 

 COA: 276455 

Macomb CC: 2005-004732-FC 

HUGO MORAN-DOPICO,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 13, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to 

remand for evidentiary hearing is DENIED. 

p0915 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 22, 2008 

 Clerk
Exhibit 10.3.5.1

FIRST AMENDMENT  TO  EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT  BY AND BETWEEN  WESTAFF SUPPORT, INC. AND DIRK A. SODESTROM

The Employment Contract dated as of January 1, 2001 by and between Westaff Support, Inc. ("Westaff") and Dirk A. Sodestrom ("you") is hereby amended
as follows effective June 30, 2003:





All
other terms and conditions of the above-referenced Employment Contract shall remain in full force and effect unless otherwise amended herein.

|EMPLOYEE:                             |  |                                        
|------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------
|/s/DIRK A. SODESTROMDirk A. Sodestrom |  |                                        
|WESTAFF SUPPORT, INC.                 |  |                                        
|By:                                   |  | /s/DWIGHT S. PEDERSENDwight S. Pedersen
|Title:                                |  | President and Chief Executive Officer  

---

EXHIBIT 1  TO  FIRST AMENDMENT  TO  EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT  BY AND BETWEEN  WESTAFF SUPPORT, INC. AND DIRK A. SODESTROM

---



QuickLinks
In the Matter of B.J.L.

No. COA15-576.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 3, 2015.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
No. D-542.

#### In re Disbarment of Bowles.

Disbarment entered. [For earlier order herein, see 474 U. S. 1079.]'
# C_2023173EN.01002302.xml

| 15.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 173/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 173/23

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 3 March 2023 — Müller Reisen GmbH v Stadt Olsberg

(Case C-128/23, Müller Reisen)

(2023/C 173/32)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: Müller Reisen GmbH

Defendant and respondent: Stadt Olsberg

Other party: Tuschen Transporte

Question referred

Having regard to Article 14 TFEU, must Article 32(2)(c) of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) be interpreted restrictively as meaning that, in cases of extreme urgency, a public service contract for services of general interest may be awarded by competitive procedures with negotiation without prior publication even in the case where the event is foreseeable by the contracting authority and the circumstances invoked to justify extreme urgency are attributable to that contracting authority?

---

(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

---
STATE of North Carolina v. David Lee NUNLEY.

No. COA15-840.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 15, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
<PAGE>

                                                                     EXHIBIT 3-4


                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                  OF BYLAWS OF
                              CKE RESTAURANTS, INC.
                             a Delaware corporation

The undersigned, Hilary B. Burkemper, certifies as follows:

         1.       She is the duly elected and acting Assistant Secretary of CKE
                  Restaurants, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation").

         2.       Article III, Section 3.2 of the Bylaws of the Corporation is
                  hereby amended to read as follows:

                  "SECTION 3.2 NUMBER AND TERM OF OFFICE. "The authorized number
                  of directors of the Corporation shall be twelve (12) until
                  this Section 3.2 is amended by a resolution duly adopted by
                  the Board. Directors need not be stockholders. Each of the
                  directors of the Corporation shall hold office until such
                  director's successor shall have been duly elected and shall
                  qualify or until such director shall resign or shall have been
                  removed in the manner provided in these Bylaws."

         3.       The foregoing amendment of the Bylaws was duly approved by
                  resolution of the Board of Directors of the Corporation on
                  March 3, 2004.

         I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the matters set forth in this Certificate are true and correct
of my own knowledge.

Dated: March 3, 2004


  /s/ Hilary B. Burkemper
----------------------------------------
Hilary B. Burkemper, Assistant Secretary
# C_2009129EN.01001301.xml

| 6.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/13

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 22 April 2009 — CESD-Communautaire v Commission

(Case T-289/06) (1)

1

(Public procurement - Declaration of a serious breach of contract - Article 93(1)(f) of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 - Action for annulment - Error of fact and law - Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance - Legal interest in bringing proceedings - Admissibility - Misuse of powers - Manifest error of assessment - Statement of reasons - Right to a fair hearing)

2009/C 129/21

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Centre européen pour la statistique et le développement ASBL (CESD-Communautaire) (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: D. Grisay and D. Piccininno, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: G. Wilms and J.-F. Pasquier, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of the Commission’s letter of 11 August 2006 by which it informed the applicant that it had taken the decision to declare, as regards three contracts referred to in that letter, that there had been a serious breach of contract under Article 93(1)(f) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1)

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

dismisses the action;

| 2. | orders Centre européen pour la statistique et le développement ASBL (CESD-Communautaire) to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders Centre européen pour la statistique et le développement ASBL (CESD-Communautaire) to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 310, 16.12.2006.

1

---
In the Matter of N.J.D.

No. COA16-24.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

July 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed in part; Vacated and Remanded in part.
STATE v. Mario Andrette McNEILL.

No. 446A13-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 24, 2016.

Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for McNeill, Mario Andrette.

Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Appellate Defender, for McNeill, Mario Andrette.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

William West, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

G. Glenn Gerding, Attorney at Law, for McNeill, Mario Andrette.

William R. West, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 23rd of March 2016 by Defendant-Appellant:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of March 2016."

Defendant-Appellant shall have up to and including the 13th day of April 2016 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
**Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 10 January 2008 – Commission v Finland**

**(Case C‐387/06)**

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Telecommunications sector – Article 8(1), (2)(b) and (3)(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC (‘Framework’ Directive) – Article 8(1) and (4) of Directive 2002/19/EC (‘Access’ Directive) – Electronic communications networks and services – Fixed and mobile telephone networks – Termination of calls – Incoming traffic – Limit on the powers of the national authority for communications regulation

1.                     *Procedure – Application initiating proceedings – Formal requirements (Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(c))
(see para. 14)*

2.                     *Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Proof of failure – Burden of proof on the Commission (Art. 226 CE) (see paras
24-25)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Action for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations – Failure to fulfil obligations under Article 8(1), (2)(b) and (3)(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33) and under Article 8(1) and (4) of Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (‘Access’ Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 7). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders the Commission of the European Communities and the Republic of Finland to bear their own costs. |
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00556-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.W., W.M., II and T.D-FW., Children

From the 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 06-2134-CV

Honorable Gary L. Steel, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 17, 2008

DISMISSED

Appellant April Williams appealed the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to

her three children and now moves to dismiss the appeal. The motion contains a certificate of service

to the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services and to the fathers of the three children,

who have not opposed the motion. Therefore, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See TEX.

R.APP.P. 42.1(a)(2). No costs shall be assessed against appellant because she is indigent. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 20.1. 

PER CURIAM
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 9, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135960 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 135960 

 COA: 279002 

Oakland CC: 2004-194379-FC 

ROBERT ANTHONY BURGESS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 23, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

s0828 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 9, 2008 

 Clerk
**Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Eighth Chamber) of 26 November 2008 – Rajani v OHIM – Artoz-Papier (ATOZ)**

**(Case T-100/06)**

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for Community word mark ATOZ – Earlier international word mark ARTOZ – No requirement to provide evidence of genuine use – Starting point for the five-year time-limit – Date of registration of the earlier mark – Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 – Obligation to state the reasons on which the decision is based – Articles 73 and 79 of Regulation No 40/94 and Article 6 of the ECHR

1.                     *Community trade mark – Observations of third parties and opposition – Examination of the opposition – Proof of use of the
earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 43(2) and (3)) (see paras 35, 43-45, 49)*

2.                     *Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition
by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood
of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 65-66)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 11 January 2006 (Case R 1126/2004-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Artoz Papier AG and Deepak Rajani. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | Deepak Rajani |
| Community trade mark sought: | Word mark ATOZ for services in Classes 35 and 41 – Application No 1319961 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Artoz-Papier AG |
| Mark or sign cited in opposition: | International word mark ARTOZ for services in Classes 35 and 41 |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Opposition upheld |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Appeal dismissed |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Deepak Rajani to pay the costs. |