[Cite as In re E.S., 2012-Ohio-1363.] 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in C-110490; Reversed and Cause Remanded 

 in C-110163 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 30, 2012 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee State of Ohio, 

Office of the Ohio Public Defender and Sheryl Trzaska, Assistant State Public 

Defender, for Appellant E.S. 

Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

IN RE: E.S. :

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-110163 

 C-110490 

TRIAL NO. 07-11052 

 O P I N I O N.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

DINKELACKER, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant E.S. was adjudicated delinquent for committing an act on 

July 28, 2007, that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the sexuallyoriented offense of sexual imposition, a third-degree misdemeanor. At the 

November 13, 2007 dispositional hearing, the magistrate, applying Ohio’s former 

sex-offender registration statutes, determined that the statutory presumption that 

E.S.’s offense was exempt from sex-offender registration should be lifted and that 

E.S. should be classified as a juvenile sex-offender registrant. The magistrate found 

that E.S. was not a sexual predator or a habitual sexual offender. The magistrate also 

informed E.S. that as of January 1, 2008, he would be classified as a Tier I sex 

offender under Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“Senate Bill 10”). The trial court overruled E.S.’s 

objections to the magistrate’s decision. E.S. appealed his initial sex-offender 

classification in the case numbered C-110490. 

{¶2} On December 7, 2010, the magistrate conducted the end-ofdisposition review of E.S.’s sex-offender classification. The magistrate “continued” 

E.S.’s classification as a Tier I juvenile sex-offender registrant under Senate Bill 10. 

E.S. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, which the trial court overruled after 

a hearing. E.S. appealed his end-of-disposition sex-offender classification in the case 

numbered C-110163. 

{¶3} On July 13, 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Williams, 

129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, which held that Senate Bill 

10’s classification, registration, and community-notification provisions could not 

constitutionally be retroactively applied to sex offenders who had committed their 

sex offenses prior to its enactment. Senate Bill 10 was enacted June 27, 2007. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Senate Bill 10 repealed Ohio’s former sex-offender classification, registration, and 

community-notification provisions (“Megan’s Law”), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio 

Laws, Part II, 2560, enacted in 1996, amended in 2003 by Am. Sub.S.B. No. 5, 150 

Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6556, effective July 1, 2007. Senate Bill 10’s registration, 

classification, and community-notification provisions, including those regarding the 

classification of juveniles as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offenders, became effective 

January 1, 2008. 

{¶4} E.S.’s first assignment of error alleges that the juvenile court had no 

authority to classify him as a juvenile sex-offender registrant because at the time he 

committed his sex offense, July 28, 2007, Megan’s Law had been repealed and 

Senate Bill 10 had not yet become effective. 

{¶5} The repealing clause of a statute does not take effect until the 

amended provisions of the act come into operation. In re Bruce S., 1st Dist. No. C110042, 2011-Ohio-6634, ¶ 5, citing Cox v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 510, 

508, 424 N.E.2d 597; see also State v. Brown, 8th Dist. No. 90798, 2009-Ohio-127, 

reversed in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Sexual Offender Classification 

Cases, 126 Ohio St.3d 322, 2010-Ohio-3753, 933 N.E.2d 801; In re Carr, 5th Dist. 

No. 08 CA 19, 2008-Ohio-5689; In re Marcio A., 5th Dist. No. 2007 CA 00149, 

2008-Ohio-4523. Senate Bill 10’s classification, registration, and communitynotification provisions became effective on January 1, 2008. Prior to that date, 

including the period from Senate Bill 10’s enactment to its January 1, 2008 effective 

date, Ohio’s former sex-offender classification, registration and communitynotification provisions were in effect. Id.

{¶6} E.S. committed his offense on July 28, 2007, prior to the effective 

date of Senate Bill 10’s registration, classification, and community-notification 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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provisions, and during the time that Megan’s Law was in effect. Therefore, the 

juvenile court had the authority to classify E.S. under Megan’s Law. The first 

assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed 

in the case numbered C-110490. 

{¶7} The second and third assignments of error, which allege that Senate 

Bill 10’s registration, classification, and community-notification provisions may not 

constitutionally be applied to E.S., are sustained on the authority of State v. 

Williams, supra, and In re Bruce S., supra. We do not address E.S.’s argument that 

Senate Bill 10’s registration, classification, and community-notification provisions 

may never be applied to juveniles. 

{¶8} The fourth assignment of error alleges that the juvenile court erred in 

failing to remove E.S. from the sex-offender registry at the end-of-disposition 

hearing. The end-of-disposition hearing was held pursuant to Senate Bill 10. 

Because Senate Bill 10’s registration, classification, and community-notification 

provisions may not be applied to E.S., the judgment of the juvenile court classifying 

him as a Tier I juvenile sex offender under Senate Bill 10 must be reversed, and this 

cause must be remanded for the juvenile court to hold an end-of-disposition hearing 

under Megan’s Law. The fourth assignment of error is sustained solely on that basis. 

{¶9} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in the case numbered C110490. In the case numbered C-110163, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and 

this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with law and this opinion. 

Judgment accordingly. 

CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and FISCHER, J., concur.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.