IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 78 / 08–0176 

Filed September 12, 2008 

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

 Appellant, 

vs. 

TODD BUCHANAN,

 Appellee. 

 Appeal from the report of the Grievance Commission. 

 Board appeals from Grievance Commission report issuing private 

admonition. ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED. 

 Charles L. Harrington and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for 

appellant. 

 David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for 

appellee. 

 
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TERNUS, Chief Justice.

 The appellant, Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board, 

charged the appellee, Todd Buchanan, with violations of the Iowa Code of 

Professional Responsibility for Lawyers based on Buchanan’s offer to settle a 

client’s dispute by destroying evidence of a possibly forged document and by 

promising his client’s agreement not to cooperate with any criminal 

investigation. Although the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission 

concluded Buchanan engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice in violation of DR 1–102(A)(5), it did not recommend any discipline 

and instead issued a private admonition. We permitted the Board to appeal 

the Commission’s disposition. After reviewing the record, we conclude 

Buchanan committed ethical infractions that warrant a public reprimand. 

I. Scope of Review. 

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dull, 713 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa 2006). “Under 

this standard of review, we give weight to the factual findings of the 

Commission, especially with respect to witness credibility, but we find the 

facts anew.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Beckman, 

674 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Iowa 2004). The Board must establish the charged 

violations by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Dull, 713 N.W.2d 

at 201. “This quantum of proof is ‘something less than required in a 

criminal prosecution, and is something more than is required in a civil 

proceeding.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 

N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1996)). 

II. Factual Findings.

 Attorney Todd Buchanan was retained by Scott Miller to represent 

Miller in a dispute over a shower installation project. Miller had contracted 
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with Flooring Gallery to install shower tile in a new home. A disagreement 

arose between Flooring Gallery and Miller when problems developed in the 

shower that required extensive repairs. Miller denied responsibility for the 

problems, prompting Flooring Gallery to refuse payment of a bill for 

approximately $1000 submitted by Miller on an unrelated job. 

 Attorney Michael Reck, on behalf of the owners of Flooring Gallery, 

Dan and Teri Stalzer, made a written settlement demand on Miller for 

payment in excess of $4600. This demand was based upon a claim that 

Miller had warranted his work for one year. Miller denied that a one-year 

warranty existed, so Buchanan requested a copy of the purported warranty. 

Reck then sent a copy of a written warranty signed by Miller to Buchanan. 

Miller denied signing the warranty and told Buchanan the document was a 

forgery. Miller also threatened to file criminal charges against the Stalzers. 

Based on these assertions by his client, Buchanan sent a letter to Reck, in 

which he stated the following: 

Thank you for sending the copy of the Warranty Agreement that 

is “purportedly a copy of an original” document signed by Scott 

Miller (See Iowa Code Section 715A.2). I would appreciate you 

obtaining the original document and making that available for 

inspection. Once you obtain custody of the original document I 

ask that you preserve it so the document may be examined by 

Roland Dippold, a document and handwriting analyst. I am 

assuming at some point we will want handwriting samples from 

Terry [sic] Stalzer and possibly other employees of Flooring 

Gallery. 

My client has authorized me to make an offer to settle this 

matter. Upon the Stalzers’ payment to Scott Miller of the sum of 

$1,000, he will sign a reciprocal release of claims that would 

include an affirmation that all evidence of the warranty 

agreement, that allegedly has Scott Miller’s signature on it, will 

be destroyed. Furthermore, Scott Miller will agree to not 

cooperate with any criminal investigation against the Stalzers 

relating to that document. Last, he will agree that the terms of 

the settlement will remain confidential. 
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Iowa Code section 715A.2, referenced in Buchanan’s letter, is an Iowa 

statute defining the crime of forgery. 

 Upon receipt of Buchanan’s letter, Reck informed Buchanan that he 

could not ethically respond to the offer. Reck forwarded Buchanan’s letter to 

the disciplinary board. 

After investigating the matter, the Board filed a disciplinary complaint 

against Buchanan, alleging violations of (1) DR 1–102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall 

not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), (2) 

DR 1–102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects 

on the fitness to practice law), (3) DR 7–102(A)(1) (in the representation of a 

client, a lawyer shall not take various actions that would serve merely to 

harass or maliciously injure another), (4) DR 7–102(A)(8) (in the 

representation of a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly engage in other illegal 

conduct or conduct contrary to a disciplinary rule), and (5) DR 7–105(A) (a 

lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present 

criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter). A hearing 

was held before a division of the Grievance Commission. The Commission 

concluded Buchanan violated DR 1–102(A)(5). It was divided (2–3) on 

Buchanan’s alleged violation of DR 7–105(A), and it reported no conclusion 

on the remaining charges. The Commission did not recommend any 

discipline; it issued a private admonition. See Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Liles, 430 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa 1988) (stating private 

admonition is “something less than actual discipline”). See generally Iowa 

Ct. R. 35.9 (stating the Commission may “dismiss the complaint, issue a 

private admonition, or recommend to the supreme court that the attorney be 

reprimanded or the attorney’s license to practice law be suspended or 

revoked”). The Board was granted permission to appeal from the 

Commission’s decision to impose no discipline. See generally Iowa Ct. R. 
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35.11(2) (providing mechanism for Board to appeal from Commission’s 

decision to issue a private admonition). 

III. Ethical Violations. 

The Board claims Buchanan’s offer on behalf of his client to destroy 

evidence of a purported forgery and to withhold evidence in a criminal 

prosecution was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and that 

it adversely reflected on Buchanan’s fitness to practice law in violation of 

DR 1–102(A)(5), (6).1 We agree. 

Whether conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice is not 

subject to a precise test. Actions that have commonly been held to violate 

DR 1–102(A)(5) “have hampered ‘the efficient and proper operation of the 

courts or of ancillary systems upon which the courts rely.’ ” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 

Steffes, 588 N.W.2d at 123). When considering whether conduct reflects 

adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law within the scope of DR 1–

102(A)(6), we have held the term “fitness” embraces more than legal 

competence. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 

625 N.W.2d 672, 683 (Iowa 2001). Conduct that lessens public confidence 

in the legal profession is an adverse reflection on an attorney’s fitness to 

 1The Board also asserts Buchanan violated DR 7–105(A), which provides that “[a] 

lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges 

solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.” This prohibition is not found in this form in 

the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, which became effective shortly after the conduct at 

issue here. See generally Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. Bar v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 

722–23 (W. Va. 1992) (discussing differences between model code and model rules with 

respect to threatening to pursue criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil 

proceeding). We have said “we prefer not to impose a potentially serious sanction based 

upon an ethical norm that is no longer applicable.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Kress, 747 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Iowa 2008). In Kress, we declined to consider whether an 

attorney had violated DR 1–102(A)(6) because the new rules of professional conduct had 

materially altered that provision. Id. at 539–40. For the same reason, we decline to 

consider whether Buchanan violated DR 7–105(A). 
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practice law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Marcucci, 

543 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Iowa 1996).

Turning to the facts of this case, we think Buchanan clearly implied in 

his letter to Reck that Miller’s signature on the warranty agreement was a 

forgery in violation of section 715A.2, a criminal statute. In the same letter 

Buchanan agreed to participate in the destruction of “all evidence of the 

warranty agreement[] that allegedly has Scott Miller’s signature on it.” He 

also assured Reck that Miller would “not cooperate with any criminal 

investigation against the Stalzers relating to that document.” Although 

Buchanan argues this conduct was not illegal, “conduct may be unethical, 

measured by the minimum requirements of the Code of Professional 

Responsibility, even if it is not unlawful.” Gunter v. Va. State Bar, 385 

S.E.2d 597, 600 (Va. 1989). 

It cannot be disputed that the destruction and withholding of evidence 

hampers the efficient and proper operation of the courts. See People v. 

Kenelly, 648 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Colo. 1982) (“[I]f the legal system in this 

country is to survive, courts of law must have the testimony of necessary 

witnesses.”); Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind. 

2005) (noting “attorneys involved in destruction or concealment of evidence 

face penalties including disbarment”); In re Williams, 23 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Minn. 

1946) (“The willful participation by an attorney in the destruction or 

suppression of evidence which he knows may be required upon a trial, 

hearing, or other legal proceedings constitutes a breach of professional duty 

and subjects such attorney to discipline.”); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008) (holding 

attorney’s failure to fully cooperate with disciplinary board was conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice). The fact Buchanan’s offer to 

destroy and withhold evidence was not accepted or acted upon does not 
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mitigate the wrongfulness of his attempt to engage in conduct prejudicial to 

the administration of justice. See Kenelly, 648 P.2d at 1066 (“An attorney, 

who is sworn to uphold the law and to aid in the administration of justice, 

has a high duty as an officer of the court to never participate in any scheme 

to obstruct the administration of justice or the judicial process.”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Gallner, 621 N.W.2d 183, 188 

(Iowa 2001) (holding “the failure to achieve the ultimate goal does not 

mitigate the wrongful attempt”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 

345 A.2d 616, 621–22 (Pa. 1975) (holding attorney who agreed to supposedly 

arrange for the destruction of nonexistent evidence engaged in conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice). 

Buchanan’s conduct also reflects adversely on his fitness to practice 

law. The public expects attorneys “to uphold the law and to aid in the 

administration of justice.” Kenelly, 648 P.2d at 1066. Buchanan’s conduct 

indicated he was amenable to obstructing the criminal investigation of a 

forgery, and therefore, it reflected adversely on his fitness to serve as an 

officer of the court. See Campbell, 345 A.2d at 621–22 (holding attorney’s 

agreement to supposedly arrange for the destruction of nonexistent evidence 

reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law); cf. Ireland, 748 N.W.2d at 

502 (holding attorney’s failure to fully cooperate with disciplinary board 

adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law). 

In summary, we agree with the commission that Buchanan violated 

DR 1–102(A)(5) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice. In addition, we conclude his actions also reflected adversely on his 

fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1–102(A)(6). We turn now to the 

appropriate discipline. 
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IV. Sanction. 

 Buchanan’s conduct violated our code of professional responsibility, 

and he is, therefore, subject to discipline. In determining an appropriate 

sanction, 

“we consider the nature and extent of the respondent’s ethical 

infractions, his fitness to continue practicing law, our obligation 

to protect the public from further harm by the respondent, the 

need to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar 

misconduct, our desire to maintain the reputation of the bar as 

a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” 

Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa 2003)). 

In addition to the fact that a private admonition of an attorney is not 

discipline, it is also significant that a private admonition is not made public. 

See Iowa Ct. Rs. 35.9 (requiring commission to file report only if it 

recommends a reprimand or a suspension or revocation of attorney’s 

license), 35.11(3) (providing that appeal from commission’s issuance of a 

private reprimand shall remain confidential unless and until supreme court 

reverses or modifies commission’s report). Therefore, the issuance of a 

private admonition for an ethical infraction does not deter other attorneys 

from engaging in similar misconduct. Moreover, the failure to impose 

discipline for an ethical violation diminishes the reputation of the bar as a 

whole because it sends a message that attorneys may shirk their ethical 

responsibilities with impunity. Finally, we are also mindful that one of the 

underlying purposes of attorney discipline is “ ‘to protect the integrity of and 

public confidence in our system of justice.’ ” Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 378 

(quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Vesole, 400 N.W.2d 591, 593 

(Iowa 1987)). To fail to discipline an attorney who offers to engage in 

conduct that undermines the integrity of our court proceedings through the 

destruction and suppression of evidence would weaken the public’s 
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confidence in the courts, contrary to the purpose of our disciplinary system. 

For these reasons, we agree with the Board that the Commission’s issuance 

of a private admonition was an insufficient sanction. 

 On the other hand, we do not think Buchanan’s conduct warrants the 

suspension or revocation of his license. Buchanan has no prior disciplinary 

history. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 

205, 212 (Iowa 2007) (stating attorney’s lack of prior ethical violations was a 

mitigating circumstance that supported issuance of a public reprimand). In 

addition, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the public would be 

at risk of further harm if we allow Buchanan to continue to practice law. 

Therefore, we conclude the goals of the attorney disciplinary system will be 

adequately addressed through the imposition of a public reprimand. 

V. Conclusion.

 We publicly reprimand Todd Buchanan for his ethical violations and 

tax the costs of this proceeding against him. 

ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.