alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.38

                                PROMISSORY NOTE


$1,000,000                                                        April 11, 1997


     As hereinafter stated, for value received Jayhawk Medical Acceptance
Corporation promises to pay to the order of Carl Westcott in Dallas, Texas the
sum of One Million Dollars, payable on demand with interest at the rate of prime
per annum from the date of this Promissory Note.   This Promissory Note may be
prepaid at any time without penalty.  Amounts due under this Promissory Note
from and after it is due shall bear interest at the highest lawful rate.

     We, the makers, sureties, endorsers and guarantors of this Promissory Note,
hereby severally waive presentment for payment, notice of nonpayment, protest
and notice of protest and diligence of bringing suit for collection, and consent
that time of payment may be extended without notice thereof to any of the
makers, sureties, endorsers or guarantors of this Promissory Note.  It is
further expressly agreed that if this Promissory Note is placed in the hands of
an attorney for collection, or suit is brought on same, or is collected through
the Probate Court, then, and in that event, the makers, sureties, endorsers and
guarantors will pay the holder of this Promissory Note the costs of collection,
including but not limited to the attorney's fees, incurred by the holder of this
Promissory Note.

     MAKER:                                      /s/ Douglas Theodore
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             By: Douglas Theodore for
                                             Jayhawk Medical Acceptance
# C_2009267EN.01008503.xml

| 7.11.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 267/85 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.11.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 267/85

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal of 15 September 2009 — Perez Santander v Council

(Case F -32/05) (1)

1

2009/C 267/156

Language of the case: French

Language of the case: French

The President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 193, 6.5.2008, p. 32 (Case initially registered before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities under number T-201/05 and transferred to the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union by order of 15.12.2005).

1

---
113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3802 

AN ACT 

To extend the legislative authority of the Adams Memorial 

Foundation to establish a commemorative work in honor 

of former President John Adams and his legacy, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 3802 EH

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY FOR 

2 MEMORIAL ESTABLISHMENT. 

3 Section 1 of Public Law 107–62 (40 U.S.C. 1003 

4 note), as amended by Public Law 111–169, is amended— 

5 (1) by striking ‘‘2013’’ and inserting ‘‘2020’’ in 

6 subsection (c); and 

7 (2) by amending subsection (e) to read as fol8 lows: 

9 ‘‘(e) DEPOSIT OF EXCESS FUNDS FOR ESTABLISHED

10 MEMORIAL.— 

11 ‘‘(1) If upon payment of all expenses for the es12 tablishment of the memorial (including the mainte13 nance and preservation amount required by section 

14 8906(b)(1) of title 40, United States Code), there 

15 remains a balance of funds received for the estab16 lishment of the commemorative work, the Adams 

17 Memorial Foundation shall transmit the amount of 

18 the balance to the account provided for in section 

19 8906(b)(3) of title 40, United States Code. 

20 ‘‘(2) If upon expiration of the authority for the 

21 commemorative work under section 8903(e) of title 

22 40, United States Code, there remains a balance of 

23 funds received for the establishment of the com24 memorative work, the Adams Memorial Foundation 

25 shall transmit the amount of the balance to a sepa26 rate account with the National Park Foundation for 
3 

•HR 3802 EH

1 memorials, to be available to the Secretary of the In2 terior or the Administrator (as appropriate) fol3 lowing the process provided for in section 8906(b)(4) 

4 of title 40, United States Code, for accounts estab5 lished under section 8906(b)(2) or (3) of title 40, 

6 United States Code.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives July 22, 2014. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3802 

AN ACT 

To extend the legislative authority of the Adams 

Adams and his legacy, and for other purposes. tive work in honor of former President John Memorial Foundation to establish a commemora-
<PAGE>   1


EXHIBIT II

                    UNIVERSAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES, INC.
                      COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                              Three Months Ended March 31,
                                              ----------------------------
                                                   1998           1997
                                                   ----           ----   
<S>                                             <C>             <C>
BASIC NET INCOME (LOSS) PER COMMON 
SHARE

Net Income (Loss)                                  $42,132      $ (493,743)
                                                 ---------      ----------
Weighted average Common Shares outstanding       6,769,425       6,729,425
                                                 ---------       ---------
Basic Net Income (Loss) Per Common Share             $0.01         $ (0.07)
                                                     =====         =======
                                                               
                                                               
DILUTED NET INCOME (LOSS) PER COMMON                           
SHARE                                                          
                                                               
Net Income (Loss)                                  $42,132      $ (493,743)
                                                   -------      ----------
Weighted average Common Shares outstanding       6,769,425       6,729,425
                                                               
Options and warrants assumed to be Common Stock                
    equivalents using Treasury Stock Method          3,087               0
                                                 ---------      ----------
Weighted average common shares                                 
    outstanding, as adjusted                     6,772,512       6,729,425
                                                 ---------       ---------
Diluted Net Income (Loss) per Common Share           $0.01         $ (0.07)
                                                     =====         =======
</TABLE>


                                      9
### MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04

- 10

- 00792

- CV Willie MAZON and Deborah Mazon, Appellants

v. HOMEQ SERVICING CORPORATION , Appellee From the County Court at Law No

. 2 , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 358,991 Honorable Irene Rios , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Rebecca S immons , Justice Steven C. Hilbig, Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Delivered and Filed: December 1, 2010
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Appellants’ notice of appeal states their intention to appeal the trial court’s order signed on October 15, 2010, denying appellants’ motion for default judgment. Because the trial court’s order did not dispose of all pending claims and, therefore, was not final and appealable, this court ordered appellants to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants’ response asserts that the trial court initially entered a final default judgment on August 9, 2010; therefo re, the trial court’s October 15, 2010 order was signed04

- 10

- 00792

- CV

- 2

- outside its plenary power and was void. The trial court’s August 9, 2010 order; however, did not address the damages issue in the underlying cause. Because the order did not dispose of the damages i ssue, it was not a final order. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc. , 167 S.W.3d 827, 830

- 31 (Tex. 2005) ; Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals , 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. 1986); see also T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 241, 243 (providing for final default judgment to be rendered after damages are assessed). Because the trial court in the underlying cause has not signed a final, appealable order, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
PER CURIAM
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Douglas J. Kelley, certify that:1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Fentura Financial, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.Date: March 15, 2007                                                       /s/Douglas J. Kelley   Douglas J. Kelley   Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with this Yearly Report of Freedom Resources Enterprises, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ending December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Neil Christiansen, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 

*/s/ Neil Christiansen              *

Neil Christiansen

Chief Executive Officer and

Chief Financial Officer

 

April 21, 2008
<PAGE>
 
                                                                Exhibit 23.1


                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the inclusion as Exhibit
99 in this Form 10-K of our report dated February 12, 1999, except with respect 
to the matter discussed in Note 18 to the consolidated financial statements, as 
to which the date is March 19, 1999, included in Form 10-K of Petro Stopping
Centers, L.P. (the "Company"). It should be noted that we have not audited any
financial statements of the Company subsequent to December 31, 1998 or performed
any audit procedures subsequent to the date of our report.




                                                             ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP

Dallas, Texas,
  March 31, 1999
Bartlett v. Barber

91P16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 9, 2016

Robert Andrew Bartlett, Sr., Pro Se.

Grady L. Balentine, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, For Barber, David.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 14th of March 2016 by Plaintiff to Appoint Counsel:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of June 2016."
NO. 07-08-0354-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

OCTOBER 1, 2008

______________________________

DAVID SINCHES, APPELLANT

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 31 DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY; ST

NO. 7595; HON.STEVEN RAY EMMERT, PRESIDING

_______________________________

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant David Sinches attempts to appeal from his conviction of the offense of

forgery by passing and the resulting sentence of twenty-four months in the State Jail

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Sentence was imposed on July 29,

2008. On that same day, the trial court certified appellant had no right of appeal and that
 No motion for new trial was filed. Appellant did not file a motion for extension of 1

time to file his notice of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.

2

appellant had waived the right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2. Appellant filed his notice

of appeal on September 8, 2008.1

By a September 16 letter, this Court notified appellant that his notice of appeal

appeared late and directed him to file any documents or matters considered necessary for

the Court to determine its appellate jurisdiction. By the same letter, this Court advised

appellant that his appeal was subject to dismissal unless the Court received an amended

certification under Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2 providing that appellant has the right

of appeal or he demonstrated other grounds for continuing the appeal, on or before

October 16, 2008. Appellant has corresponded with the Court, but his correspondence

does not provide information permitting us to conclude we have jurisdiction over his appeal.

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the sentence is

imposed or suspended in open court or within 90 days after that date if a motion for new

trial is filed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a). Appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.

A timely notice of appeal is essential to invoke our appellate jurisdiction. State v.

Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522

(Tex.Crim.App. 1996). If it is untimely, we can take no action other than to dismiss the

proceeding. Id. at 523. See also Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.Crim.App.

1998). Further, the rules we must follow require us to dismiss an appeal in a criminal case
 Permission for an out-of-time appeal must be granted by the Court of Criminal 2

Appeals. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2007).

3

in the absence of a certification showing the appellant has the right of appeal. Tex. R. App.

P. 25.2(d).

 Accordingly, appellant’s appeal is dismissed.2

James T. Campbell

Justice

Do not publish.
original jurisdiction in this matter. See NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330.

Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.



## / Hardesty Parraguirre

cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge Percy Lavae Bacon Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

2 !-7,771.M.YEMESSWEr - - --/ T - - J. J.
# C_2008008EN.01000501.xml

| 12.1.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 8/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.1.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 8/5

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 17 October 2007 — M. and N. Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie

(Case C-465/07)

(2008/C 8/08)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Raad van State/Netherlands

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: M. Elgafaji, N. Elgafaji and Staatssecretaris van Justitie

Appellants:

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 15(c) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (1) on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted to be interpreted as offering protection only in a situation on which Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, also has a bearing, or does Article 15(c), in comparison with Article 3 of the Convention, offer supplementary or other protection? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 15(c) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC (1) on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted to be interpreted as offering protection only in a situation on which Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, also has a bearing, or does Article 15(c), in comparison with Article 3 of the Convention, offer supplementary or other protection?

1

| 2. | If Article 15(c) of the Directive, in comparison with Article 3 of the Convention, offers supplementary or other protection, what are the criteria in that case for determining whether a person who claims to be eligible for subsidiary protection status runs a real risk of serious and individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence within the terms of Article 15(c) of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(e) thereof? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If Article 15(c) of the Directive, in comparison with Article 3 of the Convention, offers supplementary or other protection, what are the criteria in that case for determining whether a person who claims to be eligible for subsidiary protection status runs a real risk of serious and individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence within the terms of Article 15(c) of the Directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(e) thereof?

---

(1)  OJ L 304, p. 12.

1

---
# C_2009153EN.01003601.xml

| 4.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 153/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 153/36

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 20 May 2009 — VIP Car Solutions v Parliament

(Case T-89/07) (1)

1

(Public service contracts - Tendering procedure concerning a chauffeur driven car and minibus service for Members of the European Parliament during sessions in Strasbourg - Rejection of a tender - Obligation to state reasons - Refusal to disclose the price proposed by the successful tenderer - Action for damages)

2009/C 153/68

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: VIP Car Solutions SARL (Hoenheim, France) (represented by: G. Welzer and S. Leuvrey, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: D. Petersheim and M. Ecker, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

First, annulment of the decision of the Parliament to refuse to award to the applicant the public contract which was the subject of tendering procedure PE/2006/06/UTD/1 concerning a chauffeur-driven car and minibus service for Members of the European Parliament during sessions in Strasbourg and, second, a claim for damages.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision by which the European Parliament refused to award to VIP Car Solutions SARL the public contract which was the subject of tendering procedure PE/2006/06/UTD/1; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision by which the European Parliament refused to award to VIP Car Solutions SARL the public contract which was the subject of tendering procedure PE/2006/06/UTD/1;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders the Parliament to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Parliament to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 117, 29.5.2007.

1

---