# CE2004088EN.01063101.xml

| 8.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 88/631 |
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8.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 88/631

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(2004/C 88 E/0649)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2992/03

by Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(6 October 2003)

Subject:   Drugs production in Afghanistan

Subject:

The UN committee responsible has officially reported record drugs production figures in Afghanistan over the past year, double the production figures under the Taliban regime, since the new administration has been unable to secure favourable conditions for wheat and maize growers or guarantee a market for their produce.

In answer to my previous question on the same subject (E-3357/01 (1)), Commissioner Nielson indicated that under Article B7-302 (2) the Commission was giving priority to financing alternative crops and sources of income in the provinces most affected by the ban on opium production, the amount earmarked for this purpose being around EUR 90 million.

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Has the Commission kept a record of funding provided to date (period 2001-2004) and what the effect has been for farmers? To what does it attribute their lack of success? Will it continue to provide funding and, if so, what basic guidelines will apply? What additional measures will it take to remedy the disastrous situation caused by drugs production and marketing?

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(4 November 2003)

(4 November 2003)

Context

In 1999, Afghanistan was the largest producer of opium poppy in the world, with an estimated production of 4 600 tons of opium accounting for 70 % of the world total. Following the Taliban imposed poppy ban (main objective of this ban was to keep prices high rather than to limit the opium production), production fell dramatically in 2001. However, in 2002 production again reached the high levels seen in 1999.

A bumper harvest is expected for 2003 coinciding with very high farm gate prices for raw opium (according to informal sources from USD 100 to 300 a kilogramme (kg) for an average harvest of about 35 to 40 kg of raw opium per hectare). This makes opium-poppy production extremely profitable to farmers and farm workers (non-governmental organisations (NGOs) report that up to USD 9 are paid per day to farm workers in poppy production where as USD 1 to 2 are normal farm labour wages). The very high prices together with the expected bumper harvest indicate increasing demand for opium outside Afghanistan.

Under these circumstances it is almost impossible to identify crops or to develop off-farm activities which could be competitive to opium-poppy production in the short run. The fact that the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) has only limited control over the country hampers effective law enforcement, which constitutes another reason why no progress in the fight against opium poppy cultivation was achieved so far.

Regulatory interference like price subsidies or purchasing programmes of the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) to secure markets for grain farmers would not be an alternative. First of all, poppy is grown mostly on very small plots whereas the grain, which faces marketing problems is produced mainly on large-scale farms. Second, regulatory interference would contradict the declared objective of the ATA to ensure a private and liberal economy. Besides this, regulatory interference requires important infrastructure and purchasing capacity, which are currently not available with the ATA.

Actions of the Commission and other donors

The Commission, the entire donor community and the ATA consider the increase in opium poppy cultivation as a major risk to the socio-economic and political reconstruction process of Afghanistan since it constitutes a major source of income to forces not supporting the ATA (local commanders and Al Qaida mainly). Meanwhile it became obvious that alternative livelihoods (very difficult to introduce under the current situation) constitute only one element in the fight of illegal opium-poppy production. Law enforcement but also education of the population to make them aware that opium-poppy production is illegal and that opium consumption has very negative health and social consequences are of equal importance.

In response to the complex nature of the fight against illegal opium poppy production the ATA elaborated the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (developed with technical support provided by the United Kingdom — lead donor in the drug control sector — and the Commission). Within the frame of this strategy, which is based on the elements mentioned above, the Commission is providing support to the reconstruction of rural production systems, which have been destroyed by the civil war and the recent drought. For this purpose about EUR 140 million will be provided in 2002/2003. Details of actions are provided in the table which is sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

But this support would be pointless if the Law enforcement side of the strategy would not be addressed too. Therefore the Commission has decided to contribute more than EUR 70 million (funded by the budget line B7-300 and B7-305 in 2002 and 2003) to the re-enforcement of law and order ensuring payment of salaries, equipment and training to the national police. This complements directly the involvement of Germany which is the lead donor for re-establishing the national police force.

Impact so far and future action of the Commission

Eradication of opium-poppy production requires a fairly long period of time (in Pakistan and Thailand for example it took 15 year to achieve satisfactory results). The prevailing insecurity and the fact that the ATA has only limited control over the country set up a conducive environment for illegal crop cultivation. In addition, the growing demand for opium in neighbouring countries which do have weak governments, makes eradication in Afghanistan even more difficult. These, together with the tremendous rural poverty and the widespread unawareness of the population regarding the illegal production and danger of consumption are the main reasons that the programme supported by the Commission and the international community has had little impact so far. However, the Community and other partners (especially the United Kingdom and Germany) will continue their support to government in this area, as it is only through a sustained commitment that the Afghan Government will be able to realize the goals set out in the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy which will remain the basic guidelines for all interventions.

Since more understanding of the socio-economic determinants of drug production is required, the Commission is currently preparing a project to assess these issues and to incorporate the findings into projects.

Further to this, the Commission intends to continue its commitment to fight against rural poverty, which is considered as a main reason for opium-poppy cultivation. Rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure and support to horticulture production (Afghanistan was a very important exporter of fruits and nuts before the civil war) are key elements to re-establish efficiency of other farming systems providing more attractive alternatives to farmers. The Community is identified as lead agency for this aspect of alternative livelihoods with the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. The Commission together with other donors (World Bank and the United States) is supporting delivery of health services to the rural population as a complementary action.

A further key condition for the anti-drugs strategy is that the ATA gains more control over the country and that security is re-established quickly to end the anarchy prevailing in some regions. In this regard, support is provided by Germany (training and re-establishing the national police) and the Community via the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) ensuring payment of salaries and equipment to the police and on helping to strengthen border police capacity to tackle drug smuggling. The extension of ISAF to the provinces and the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams recently decided by the United Nations Security Council together with the rebuilding of the National Army supported by France and the United States may also improve the security situation in future.

A copy of the table providing overview of Commission programmes to Afghanistan is being forwarded direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

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(1)  OJ C 277 E, 14.11.2002, p. 2.

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(2)  B7-302: ‘Aid to uprooted peoples in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America’. Around EUR 90 million earmarked for activities in Afghanistan over the period 2001-2004.

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