NO. 5-98-0338

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,		)  Appeal from the

								)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,					)  White County.	

								)

v.								)  No. 96-CF-192

								)

JEFFREY BLANEY,					)  Honorable

								)  George W. Timberlake,

     Defendant-Appellant.					)  Judge, presiding.

________________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

	Jeffrey Blaney (defendant) was convicted after a jury trial in the circuit court of White

County of attempted murder, armed violence, and aggravated battery with a firearm.  He was

sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment for attempted murder.  Defendant appeals, contending

that he was denied both a fair trial and his right to appointed counsel.  Defendant also

contends that his convictions for armed violence and aggravated battery with a firearm must

be vacated and the mittimus must be amended to reflect that defendant is eligible to receive

good-time credit.  The State concedes these last two issues (see People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838 (1977); People v. Damico, 309 Ill. App. 3d 203, 722 N.E.2d 194 (1999)), and accordingly they will not be discussed further.  As for the first two issues, we

find no merit in defendant's contentions and therefore affirm defendant's conviction for

attempted murder.

	On November 9, 1996, at approximately 8:30 in the morning, Virginia Beach,

Virginia, police officer Johnson, while patrolling the resort area of Virginia Beach, was

informed that a vehicle registered to defendant was parked at the Holly Kove Motel.  Because there was an outstanding warrant on defendant, Officer Johnson drove toward the

motel to watch defendant's car.  As she approached the motel, she spotted defendant's car

exiting the parking lot.  The physical characteristics of the driver of the car matched the

description of defendant.  Officer Johnson followed the car for less than a block and

activated her vehicle's lights to pull defendant's car over.  Officer Johnson stopped and

called her dispatcher.  As she did so, both the driver and the passenger of the stopped vehicle

exited the car.  The passenger, a male juvenile, stood by the car; the driver began to walk

away from Officer Johnson.  Officer Johnson caught up to defendant in her vehicle and

instructed him to return to his car.  Defendant continued to run away.  Officer Johnson

attempted to block defendant with her car, but he was able to escape through an alley. 

Officer Johnson exited her vehicle and chased defendant on foot.  Defendant eventually

stopped running, turned around, and shot at Officer Johnson.  Officer Johnson saw

something silver in defendant's hand, heard a bang, and saw smoke.  Officer Johnson

dropped to the ground, and when she got back up, defendant was gone.  She returned to the

location where defendant abandoned his car, but the car was gone.  Later that day the

passenger was apprehended.  Four days later, a jacket the passenger had been wearing was

found in an alley a block away from where defendant's car had been pulled over.  A .357-

caliber handgun and a gray tote sock were found in the jacket.

	Two days later, on November 11, 1996, Illinois State Police Trooper Ernie Johnson

was patrolling Interstate 64 in a marked police vehicle.  At approximately 1 p.m. he pulled

over for speeding a maroon Honda Civic with Virginia dealer plates.  Trooper Johnson

exited his vehicle and waited between his vehicle and the Honda for traffic to clear.  He

observed only one individual in the car.  As Trooper Johnson reached the rear bumper of the

Honda, the driver leaned out of his car and raised his arms.  Trooper Johnson saw a piece

of gray material and then the driver's hand fly up from the recoil of a weapon.  Trooper Johnson was shot in the abdomen, below his bulletproof vest.  Trooper Johnson fell between

the cars, and the driver drove away.  Trooper Johnson shot at the Honda and called for help. 

He later identified defendant as the driver of the Honda.

	The call went out that an officer was down.  Numerous law enforcement members

began searching for the shooter.  Wayne County Deputy Larry Eckelberry, responding to the

call, spotted a maroon Honda with Virginia plates on Route 45 being followed by law

enforcement vehicles.  Eckelberry watched the Honda run into a ditch and a man run from

the car.  He stopped his vehicle, looked in the Honda to see if anyone else was in the car, and

then pursued the man on foot.  When Eckelberry caught up to the driver, two other officers

already had him at gunpoint and were telling him to get on the ground.  The man threw a

gun down and eventually dropped to the ground.  Eckelberry picked up what turned out to

be a gun inside a gray sock.  Two rounds had been fired from the revolver.  Defendant was

identified as the man being chased.  In searching the Honda, the officers found a loaded .22-

caliber double-barrel derringer and ammunition for a .357-caliber weapon and a .38-caliber

"spear shot."  Once in custody, defendant told the police that he thought the trooper had on

a bulletproof vest and that he would not have shot him otherwise.  He claimed that he just

wanted to knock the trooper down so he could get away.  He also told the officers that if he

wanted to kill the trooper, he would have gotten out of the car and "finished the job."  The

jury did not believe defendant's claims and found him guilty of attempted murder.

	Defendant first argues on appeal he was deprived of a fair trial by the admission of

other-crimes evidence, including photographs of all the weapons and ammunition recovered

both in Illinois and in Virginia.  We disagree.  Evidence of prior wrongful acts is not

admissible to show a propensity to commit crimes, but it is admissible for any other reason

if relevant to establish material matter.  People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 62, 656 N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (1995); People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364-65, 583 N.E.2d 515, 520 (1991).  Evidence is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that

is of consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.  Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 365-66, 583 N.E.2d at 520; People v. Turner, 240 Ill. App. 3d 340, 352, 608 N.E.2d 141, 150 (1992).  When other-crimes evidence is

offered, the trial court must weigh the relevance of such evidence to establish the purpose

for which it is offered against the prejudicial effect the introduction of that evidence may

have upon the defendant.  Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 63, 656 N.E.2d at 1094; People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 62, 473 N.E.2d 840, 860 (1984).  The decision of the trial court regarding the admissibility of other-crimes evidence will not be disturbed on review absent

a clear showing of abuse of discretion.  Turner, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 353, 608 N.E.2d at 150.

	The trial court, in this instance, ruled that the other-crimes evidence the State wished

to present was admissible to show motive, intent, and identity.  The trial court specifically

found the similarity of the shootings to be quite high.  Contrary to defendant's contentions,

we agree with the ruling of the trial court.  Defendant argues that the incidents are different

because of such factors as where they occurred (rural or urban) and whether there was a

passenger in the car.  Dissimilarities will always exist between independent offenses,

however.  Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 373, 583 N.E.2d at 524.  What defendant fails to recognize is that each time he was stopped and confronted by police authority, he attempted to flee by

shooting at the officer with a gun in a gray sock.  Mere general areas of similarity will

suffice when evidence of the defendant's involvement in another offense is offered to prove

the absence of an innocent frame of mind or the presence of criminal intent.  Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 373, 583 N.E.2d at 523.  The evidence was relevant to explain why a person stopped

for a mere traffic violation would improbably shoot the approaching officer without

warning.  The evidence also tends to disprove defendant's lack of intent to harm or kill the

officer.  Evidence which shows that an event was not caused by accident tends to show that it was caused intentionally.  Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 366, 583 N.E.2d at 520.  Moreover, the requisite mental state may be inferred from defendant's conduct and the circumstances

surrounding his commission of the crime.  People v. Bailey, 265 Ill. App. 3d 262, 273, 638 N.E.2d 192, 199 (1994).  We agree that the evidence of the shooting in Virginia did not

make a mere showing of propensity toward violence; rather, it was highly probative of

identity, as well as defendant's intent and motive in committing the shooting.  Clearly, the

evidence's probative value to explain otherwise improbable behavior far outweighed any

prejudice to defendant.  We therefore find no abuse of the court's discretion in admitting

evidence pertaining to the incident in Virginia.  We, likewise, find no abuse of discretion

with respect to the admission of evidence pertaining to the ammunition and the loaded .22-

caliber derringer found in the Honda after defendant's arrest.  Both of the loaded weapons

were in defendant's possession in the car when he shot Trooper Johnson, and neither weapon

was eliminated as the gun used to shoot him.  We agree there was a sufficient connection

between the weapons and the crime for their admission as evidence at the trial.

	Defendant also argues on appeal that he was denied his right to appointed counsel

when the trial court refused to appoint counsel for his sentencing.  Defendant is correct in

asserting that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings, in which a defendant has

a constitutional right to representation by counsel.  See People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 90, 440 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1982).  On the other hand, a defendant also has a constitutional right

to proceed without counsel when he or she voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. 

Baker, 92 Ill. 2d at 90, 440 N.E.2d at 858.  The right of self-representation does not carry with it a corresponding right to legal assistance, and one choosing to represent himself or

herself must be prepared to do just that.  People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 38, 670 N.E.2d 583, 601 (1996); People v. Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d 530, 556-57, 599 N.E.2d 501, 519-20 (1992).  Absent significantly changed circumstances or a later request for counsel, an intelligently and knowingly made waiver of counsel applies to all phases of the trial.  Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 24, 670 N.E.2d at 595; Baker, 92 Ill. 2d at 91-92, 440 N.E.2d at 859.  More importantly, the constitutional right to self-representation does not require a court to permit

a "hybrid" representation in which a defendant alternates between proceeding pro se and being represented by counsel.  Redd, 173 Ill. 2d at 38, 670 N.E.2d at 601; Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 557, 599 N.E.2d at 520.  A defendant has no right to select from or experiment

with counsel appointed to him or her to the detriment of the orderly process of law.  People v. Rivers, 61 Ill. App. 3d 376, 384, 377 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (1978); People v. Leman, 95 Ill. App. 2d 212, 218, 238 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1968).

	On November 12, 1996, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent defendant. 

On April 17, 1997, defendant filed a written motion to represent himself.  He withdrew that

motion later the same day.  On April 21, 1997, jury selection began.  On April 22, after the

lunch recess, defendant filed a motion to waive appointed counsel.  After advisement,

defendant was permitted to proceed pro se.  After being convicted, defendant, on May 12, 1997, filed a motion for appointment of counsel for sentencing, as well as a motion for a

new trial.  On May 13, 1997, the trial court appointed defendant a new attorney.  The court

explained to defendant that appointed counsel was not to be his advisor but was to represent

him at the sentencing hearing and for any posttrial motions.  This attorney subsequently was

permitted to withdraw because of ties to the victim.  On May 20, another attorney was

appointed to represent defendant.  This attorney filed a motion to continue the sentencing

hearing and requested an extended time limit for filing a motion for new trial.  His motion

for new trial was filed on August 11, 1997.  On August 19, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file an amended motion

for new trial.  On September 23, 1997, defense counsel argued a motion in arrest of

judgment and had begun to argue the motion for new trial when defendant informed him that he wished to dismiss him.  Defendant told the court that his posttrial motion counsel was

ineffective.  The court informed defendant that he could choose to proceed pro se or with counsel but that defendant's lawyer-shopping was over and that the court would no longer

appoint another attorney because defendant was dissatisfied with particular rulings. 

Defendant replied he wanted an "effective" attorney and not the one appointed to him.  He

then requested a continuance to prepare a defense and again asked for the appointment of

another attorney.  When his requests were denied, defendant asked to proceed pro se.  The court granted defendant's request and set the sentencing hearing date for October 8, 1997. 

Defendant asked if he could request counsel for that hearing.  The court answered no and

granted his requests for access to the law library and transcripts.  Two days before the

sentencing hearing, defendant again requested the appointment of a public defender who

would provide effective assistance of counsel.  The court denied this request, explaining that

defendant had already dismissed two attorneys and could not choose at which hearings he

would be represented and at which hearings he would not be.  We agree that the court had

provided defendant enough in the way of representation.  Defendant's refusal to accept

appointed counsel operated as a waiver of counsel.  See Rivers, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 386, 377 N.E.2d at 1252.  His request for "effective" counsel was nothing more than a request to

select from or experiment with appointed counsel to the detriment of the orderly process of

law.

	For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the conviction for attempted murder, we

vacate the convictions for armed violence and aggravated battery with a firearm, and we

correct the mittimus to reflect that defendant is eligible to receive day-for-day good-conduct

credit against his sentence (see People v. Bashaw, 304 Ill. App. 3d 257, 259, 710 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1999)).  

	Affirmed in part and vacated in part; mittimus corrected.

	MAAG and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.

                                     	NO. 5-98-0338

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,		)  Appeal from the

								)  Circuit Court of

     Plaintiff-Appellee,					)  White County.	

								)

v.								)  No. 96-CF-192

								)

JEFFREY BLANEY,					)  Honorable

								)  George W. Timberlake,

     Defendant-Appellant.					)  Judge, presiding.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:		August 1, 2001	

___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices:	Honorable Philip J. Rarick, J.

	Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J., and

	Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.,

	Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Paige Clark Strawn, Assistant Defender, Office

for	of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Route 15 East, P.O. Box 2430, 

Appellant	Mt.b Vernon, IL 62864-0047

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Hon. Kerry Sutton, State's Attorney, White County Courthouse, Carmi, IL 62821;

for	Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Rebecca E.

Appellee	Etherton, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Route

 	15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________