NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1493, 2009-1048 DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. STECK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,

CORNWELL QUALITY TOOLS COMPANY, MATCO TOOLS, SNAP-ON TOOLS COMPANY, TOOLS USA AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY and MAC TOOLS, Defendants-Appellees, and ATC PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

David L. Hildebrand , of Denver, Colorado, pro se. Charles F. Shane , Bieser, Greer & Landis, LLP, of Dayton, Ohio, for defendantsappellees. Appealed from: United States Distric t Court for the District of Colorado Senior Judge Lewis T. BabcockNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1493, 2009-1048 DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. STECK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.,

CORNWELL QUALITY TOOLS COMPANY, MATCO TOOLS, SNAP-ON TOOLS COMPANY, TOOLS USA AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY and MAC TOOLS, Defendants-Appellees, and ATC PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the District of Colorado in case no.

02-CV-01125, Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock.

__________ ________________ DECIDED: May 7, 2009

__________________________ Before MAYER, LOURIE, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM. David L. Hildebrand appeals orders of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado denying his motions seeking: (1) relief from clerical error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), (2) relief fr om judgment under Fed. R. Ci v. P. 60(b), and (3) pre-judgment interest. See Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co. , No. 02-CV-01125-LTB (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2008); Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co. , No. 02-CV-01125-LTB (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2008); Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co. , No. 02-CV-01125-LTB (D. Colo. July 7, 2008);
Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co. , No. 02-CV-01125-LTB (D . Colo. June 23, 2008). We affirm

. On October 28, 2005, a jury found that Hildebrand’s U.S. Pa tent No. 5,737,981 had been infringed by products manufactured by Steck M anufacturing Company, Inc., Cornwell Quality Tools Company, Matco Tools, Snap-On Tools Company, Tools USA and Equipment Company, and Mac Tools (collect ively “Steck”). The jury determined that Steck’s infringement wa s not willful and awarded Hildeb rand $74,863 in lost profit damages. On appeal this court affirmed, concluding that the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence and that the damages award was adequate to compensate Hildebrand for any ha rm caused by the infringement. See Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc. , 232 Fed. Appx. 985 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (hereinafter “ Hildebrand I ”). We also determined that the dist rict court’s decision not to award pre-judgment interest was not an abuse of its discretion. Id. at 986-87. Subsequently, Hildebrand filed motions in the district court seeking attorney fees, costs and relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). After the district court denied these motions, Hildebrand again appealed to this court. We affirmed, holding that: (1) there were no except ional circumstances warranting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), (2) the district court proper ly rejected Hildebrand’s application for costs since it was untimely f iled, and (3) the distri ct court did not err in refusing to award

2008-1493, 2009-1048 2attorney fees since there was no finding of willful infringement. See Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc. , 292 Fed. Appx. 921 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (hereinafter “ Hildebrand II ”). Hildebrand then returned to the district cour t, this time filing motions seeking prejudgment interest and relief from clerical e rror. After these motions were denied, Hildebrand filed motions under Rule 60(b), ar guing that the distri ct court’s judgments refusing to award attorney fees and pre-ju dgment interest should be set aside. The district court denied the Rule 60(b) motions and imposed sanctions, ordering Hildebrand to pay all attorney fees incurred by Ste ck in responding to the motion for relief from judgment on the decision to deny attorney fees. Hildebrand then timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). We review the denial of post-trial moti ons by applying the law of the appropriate regional circuit. See Koito Mfg. Co., Ltd v. Turn-Key Tech, LLC , 381 F.3d 1142, 1148 (Fed Cir. 2004). In the Tenth Circuit, the denial of a Rule 60 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Morris v. Adams-Millis Corp. , 758 F.2d 1352, 135 7 (10th Cir. 1985). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), a “court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or om ission whenever one is found in a judgment.” According to Hildebrand, the district court made a clerical error when it assigned a docket number to his case. Hildebrand filed his original 1998 infringement acti on in Colorado, but the suit was subsequently transferred to Ohio. After an appeal to this court, however, the case was transferred back to Colorado and assigned a new docket number. Hildebrand contends that the transferred case shoul d have been assigned the same docket number

2008-1493, 2009-1048 3as his original case. Even assuming arguendo that a docketing error occurred, however, Hildebrand fails to est ablish that he suffered prejudice as a result of it. The district court did not limit Hildebrand to dam ages incurred after 2002, the year in which the case was assigned a new docket number in Colorado. Hildebrand, therefore, fails to establish that the district court abused it s discretion in denying his motion for relief from clerical error under Rule 60(a). Hildebrand also argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 60(b) motions seeking relief from t he judgments denying him attorney fees and costs. This argument is frivolous. In Hildebrand II , this court consider ed and rejected Hildebrand’s argument that the district cour t erred in denying him fees and costs. 292 Fed. Appx. at 923-24. Since the judgments denying fees and costs had b een affirmed by this court— and Hildebrand produced no new evidence to justify setting aside these judgments— Hildebrand had no reasonable basis for bringing his Ru le 60(b) motions. As we explained in Hildebrand II , “Rule 60(b) is not designed to allow a litigant to rehash arguments which have previously been considered and rejected.” Id. at 925; see also Servants of the Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 10 12 (10th Cir. 2000 ) (Motions for reconsideration are “inappropriate vehicles to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court.”). The district court also properly deni ed Hildebrand’s motion for pre-judgment interest. On November 4, 2005, the district court entered final ju dgment after a jury trial. Although Hildebrand was awar ded post-judgment interest, he was not awarded prejudgment interest. See Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co. , No. 02-CV-01125-ABJ-OES, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 2005)

. Because Hildebrand failed to bring his motion

2008-1493, 2009-1048 42008-1493, 2009-1048 5 seeking pre-judgment interest until May 29, 2008, approximately two and one-half years after the district court entered fi nal judgment, his motion was untimely. *
We have considered Hildebrand’s re maining arguments but find them unpersuasive.

* In Hildebrand I , this court held that the trial c ourt’s decision to not award prejudgment interest was not an abuse of discretion. 232 Fed. Appx. at 986-987. Hildebrand argues that this court should not have ruled on the pre-judgment interest question since the district court had not made a final determination on that issue. We disagree. As noted previ ously, although the district court awarded post-judgment interest, it did not award pr e-judgment interest, and we ca n therefore assume that the court made a final determination that an award of pre-judgment interest was unwarranted.