[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 177 (Wednesday, September 14, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54412-54416]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18193]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318]


Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Calvert Cliffs Nuclear 
Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Exemption

1.0 Background

    The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. (the licensee) is the 
holder of Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69, 
which authorize operation of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 
Nos. 1 and 2 (CCNPP), respectively. The licenses provide, among other 
things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and 
orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) now 
or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located in 
Calvert County in Maryland.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, 
Section 50.68, ``Criticality accident requirements,'' sets forth 
requirements for which a licensee shall comply in lieu of maintaining a 
monitoring system capable of detecting a criticality as described in 10 
CFR 70.24. In particular, subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.68 requires 
that plant procedures shall prohibit the handling and storage at any 
one time of more fuel assemblies than have been determined to be safely 
subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by 
unborated water.
    By letter dated December 21, 2004, as supplemented on May 31, 2005, 
the licensee submitted a request for an exemption from the requirements 
of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) during the pent fuel pool (SFP) activities 
related to the underwater handling, loading, and unloading of the 
Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] dry shielded canister (DSC), as 
described in its proposed Amendment to Materials License No. SNM-2505, 
dated December 12, 2003, for the plant-specific independent spent fuel 
storage installation (ISFSI) at CCNPP.
    In summary, the licensee is unable to satisfy the above requirement 
for handling of the Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC authorized by 
10 CFR Part 72 at CCNPP. Section 50.12(a) allows licensees to apply for 
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 if the application 
of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of 
the rule and special conditions are met. The licensee stated in its 
application that compliance with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is not necessary 
for handling the Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC system to achieve 
the underlying purpose of the rule.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. Therefore, in determining 
the acceptability of the licensee's exemption request, the NRC staff 
has performed the following regulatory, technical, and legal 
evaluations to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12 for granting 
the exemption.

3.1 Regulatory Evaluation

    The CCNPP Technical Specifications (TSs) currently permit the 
licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in high-density storage racks 
in its SFP. In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4), 
the licensee takes credit for soluble boron for criticality control and 
ensures that the effective neutron multiplication factor 
(k<INF>eff</INF>) of the SFP does not exceed 0.95, if flooded with 
borated water. Subsection 50.68(b)(4) also requires that if credit is 
taken for soluble boron, the k<INF>eff</INF> must remain below 1.0 
(subcritical) if flooded with unborated water. However, the licensee is 
unable to satisfy the requirement to maintain the k<INF>eff</INF> below 
1.0 (subcritical) with unborated water, which is also the requirement 
of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1), during cask handling operations in the SFP. 
Therefore, the licensee proposed an exemption from 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) 
to permit the performance of spent fuel loading, unloading, and 
handling operations related to dry cask storage without being analyzed 
to be subcritical under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible 
by unborated water.
    Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50 provides a list of the minimum design 
requirements for nuclear power plants. According to GDC 62, 
``Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling,'' the 
licensee must limit the potential for criticality in the fuel handling 
and storage system by physical systems or processes. Since CCNPP was 
licensed prior to the issuance of the Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, GDC 
62 is not directly applicable. However, CCNPP was licensed to the 1967 
draft GDC, as discussed in Appendix 1C of the CCNNP Updated Final 
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The comparable draft GDC is Criterion 
66, ``Prevention of Fuel Storage Criticality,'' that states: 
``Criticality in new and spent fuel storage shall be prevented by 
physical systems or processes. Such means as geometrically safe 
configurations shall be emphasized over procedural controls.''

[[Page 54413]]

    Section 50.68 of 10 CFR Part 50 provides the NRC requirements for 
maintaining subcritical conditions in SFPs. Section 50.68 provides 
criticality control requirements that, if satisfied, ensure that an 
inadvertent criticality in the SFP is an extremely unlikely event. 
These requirements ensure that the licensee has appropriately 
conservative criticality margins during handling and storage of spent 
fuel. Section 50.68(b)(1) states, ``Plant procedures shall prohibit the 
handling and storage at any one time of more fuel assemblies than have 
been determined to be safely subcritical under the most adverse 
moderation conditions feasible by unborated water.'' Specifically, 10 
CFR 50.68(b)(1) ensures that the licensee will maintain the pool in a 
subcritical condition during handling and storage operations without 
crediting the soluble boron in the SFP water.
    The licensee is authorized under plant-specific Materials License 
No. SNM-2505 to construct and operate an ISFSI at CCNPP. The ISFSI 
permits the licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in large concrete 
dry storage casks. As part of its ISFSI loading campaigns, the licensee 
transfers spent fuel assemblies to a DSC in the cask pit area of the 
SFP. The licensee performed criticality analyses assuming the DSC fully 
loaded with fuel having the highest permissible reactivity and 
determined that a soluble boron credit was necessary to ensure that the 
DSC would remain subcritical in the SFP. Since the licensee is unable 
to satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) to ensure subcritical 
conditions during handling and storage of spent fuel assemblies in the 
pool with unborated water, the licensee identified the need for an 
exemption from the 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) requirement to support DSC 
loading, unloading, and handling operations without being subcritical 
under the most adverse moderation conditions feasible by unborated 
water.
    The NRC staff evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent 
criticality of the spent nuclear fuel at CCNPP during DSC loading, 
unloading, and handling. The NRC staff has established a set of 
acceptance criteria that, if met, satisfy the underlying intent of 10 
CFR 50.68(b)(1). In lieu of complying with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1), the NRC 
staff determined that an inadvertent criticality accident is unlikely 
to occur if the licensee meets the following five criteria: \1\
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    \1\ The criteria have been used previously in the review of 
similar exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for 
Diablo Canyon Units No. 1 and 2 and Sequoyah Units No. 1 and 2. The 
evaluations for these exemptions are available in the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System under accession numbers 
ML040300693 and ML041540213, respectively.
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    1. The cask criticality analyses are based on the following 
conservative assumptions:
    a. All fuel assemblies in the cask are unirradiated and at the 
highest permissible enrichment,
    b. Only 75 percent of the Boron-10 in the fixed poison panel 
inserts is credited,
    c. No credit is taken for fuel-related burnable absorbers, and
    d. The cask is assumed to be flooded with moderator at the 
temperature and density corresponding to optimum moderation.
    2. The licensee's ISFSI TSs require the soluble boron concentration 
to be equal to or greater than the level assumed in the criticality 
analysis, and surveillance requirements necessitate the periodic 
verification of the concentration both prior to and during loading and 
unloading operations.
    3. Radiation monitors, as required by GDC 63, ``Monitoring fuel and 
waste storage,'' are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to 
detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety 
actions.
    4. The quantity of other forms of special nuclear material, such as 
sources, detectors, etc., to be stored in the cask will not increase 
the effective multiplication factor above the limit calculated in the 
criticality analysis.
    5. Sufficient time exists for plant personnel to identify and 
terminate a boron dilution event prior to achieving a critical boron 
concentration in the DSC. To demonstrate that it can safely identify 
and terminate a boron dilution event, the licensee must provide the 
following:
    a. A plant-specific criticality analysis to identify the critical 
boron concentration in the cask based on the highest reactivity loading 
pattern.
    b. A plant-specific boron dilution analysis to identify all 
potential dilution pathways, their flowrates, and the time necessary to 
reach a critical boron concentration.
    c. A description of all alarms and indications available to 
promptly alert operators of a boron dilution event.
    d. A description of plant controls that will be implemented to 
minimize the potential for a boron dilution event.
    e. A summary of operator training and procedures that will be used 
to ensure that operators can quickly identify and terminate a boron 
dilution event.

3.2 Technical Evaluation

    In determining the acceptability of the licensee's exemption 
request, the NRC staff reviewed three aspects of the licensee's 
analyses: (1) Criticality analyses submitted to support the ISFSI 
license application and its exemption request, (2) boron dilution 
analysis, and (3) legal basis for approving the exemption. For each of 
the aspects, the staff evaluated whether the licensee's analyses and 
methodologies provide reasonable assurance that adequate safety margins 
are developed and can be maintained in the CCNPP SFP during loading of 
spent fuel into canisters for dry cask storage.
3.2.1 Criticality Analyses
    For evaluation of the acceptability of the licensee's exemption 
request, the NRC staff reviewed the criticality analyses provided by 
the licensee in support of its ISFSI license application.
    First, the NRC staff reviewed the methodology and assumptions used 
by the licensee in its criticality analysis to determine if Criterion 1 
of Section 3.1 above was satisfied. The licensee stated that it took no 
credit in the criticality analyses for burnup or fuel-related burnable 
neutron absorbers. Specifically, the licensee stated that its 
criticality analyses did not take credit for integral burnable 
absorbers, integral fuel burnable absorbers, nor control element 
assemblies. The licensee also stated that all assemblies were analyzed 
at the highest permissible enrichment, 4.5 weight percent Uranium-235 
at CCNPP. Additionally, the licensee stated that all criticality 
analyses for a flooded DSC were performed at temperatures and densities 
of water corresponding to optimum moderation conditions. Finally, the 
licensee stated that it credited 90 percent of the Boron-10 content for 
the fixed neutron absorber in the DSC. NUREG-1536, ``Standard Review 
Plan for Dry Cask Storage System,'' states that ``[f] or a greater 
credit allowance [i.e., greater than 75 percent for fixed neutron 
absorbers] special, comprehensive fabrication tests capable of 
verifying the presence and uniformity of the neutron absorber are 
needed.'' As part of an amendment to the Part 72 license for the 
Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[supreg] design, the NRC staff reviewed and 
accepted the results of additional data supplied by the manufacturer 
that demonstrated that a 90-percent credit for the fixed neutron 
absorbers was acceptable. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
exemption, the staff finds a 90-percent credit acceptable on the basis 
that it has previously been reviewed and approved by the NRC. 
Subsequently, based on its review of the criticality analyses and the 
information submitted in its exemption request, the

[[Page 54414]]

NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 1.
    Second, the NRC staff reviewed the proposed CCNPP ISFSI TSs and the 
licensee's criticality analyses credit soluble boron for reactivity 
control during DSC loading, unloading, and handling operations. Since 
the boron concentration is a key safety component necessary for 
ensuring subcritical conditions in the pool, the licensee must have a 
conservative ISFSI TS capable of ensuring that sufficient soluble boron 
is present to perform its safety function. The licensee stated that 
ISFSI TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.2.1.1 requires that 
the NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC cavity be moderated by water with a boron 
concentration greater than or equal to 2450 ppm to accommodate cask 
operations. In all cases, the boron concentration required by the ISFSI 
TS ensures that the k<INF>eff</INF> will be below 0.95 for the analyzed 
loading configuration. Additionally, the licensee's ISFSI TS contain 
surveillance requirements (SRs) that assure it will verify the boron 
concentration is above the required level both prior to and during DSC 
loading, unloading, and handling operations. Specifically, SRs 4.2.1.1 
and 4.2.1.2 require verification of the boron concentration in the SFP 
within 24 hours prior to either insertion of the first spent fuel 
assembly into a DSC for loading operations or flooding the DSC cavity 
for unloading operations. Additionally, both SRs require the licensee 
to reconfirm the boron concentration is above the TS LCO limit at 
intervals not to exceed 48 hours until such time as the DSC is removed 
from the SFP. Based on its review of the CCNPP ISFSI TS, the NRC staff 
finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 2.
    Third, the NRC staff reviewed the CCNPP UFSAR and the information 
provided by the licensee in its exemption request to ensure that it 
complies with GDC 63. GDC 63 requires that licensees have radiation 
monitors in fuel storage and associated handling areas to detect 
conditions that may result in a loss of residual heat removal 
capability and excessive radiation levels and initiate appropriate 
safety actions. As previously described, since CCNPP was licensed prior 
to the issuance of the GDC listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, GDC 
63 is not directly applicable. However, CCNPP is licensed to the 1967 
draft GDC as discussed in its UFSAR, Appendix 1C. The comparable draft 
GDC is Criterion 18, ``Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage,'' that states 
the following: ``Monitoring and alarm instrumentation shall be provided 
for fuel and waste storage and handling areas for conditions that might 
contribute to loss of continuity in decay heat removal and to radiation 
exposure.'' The NRC staff reviewed the CCNPP UFSAR, 1967 draft GDC, and 
exemption request to determine whether the licensee had provided 
sufficient information to demonstrate compliance with the intent of GDC 
63. In its exemption request, the licensee stated that three area 
radiation monitors are provided for detecting high radiation levels in 
the fuel storage areas. Specifically, the monitors are located in the 
SFP area, on the spent fuel handling machine, and in the new fuel 
storage area. At the montors' alarm setpoints, audible and visual 
alarms annunciate locally and in the Control Room. Based on its review 
of the exemption request, the CCNPP UFSAR, and the 1967 draft GDC, the 
NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 3.
    Finally, as part of the criticality analysis review, the NRC staff 
evaluated the storage of non-fuel-related material in a DSC. The NRC 
staff evaluated the potential to increase the reactivity of a DSC by 
loading it with materials other than spent nuclear fuel and fuel 
debris. The approved contents for storage in the NUHOMS-32P[supreg] 
cask design are listed in the CCNPP ISFSI TS LCO 3.1.1 (1), ``Fuel to 
be Stored at ISFSI.'' This ISFSI TS LCO restricts the contents of the 
DSC to only fuels (14 x 14 Combustion Engineering-type pressurized 
water reactor fuel) irradiated at CCNPP. As such, CCNPP is prohibited 
from loading other forms of special nuclear material, such as sources, 
detectors, etc., in the DSC. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that 
the loading limitations described in the CCNPP ISFSI TSs will ensure 
that any authorized components loaded in the DSCs will not result in a 
reactivity increase. Based on its review of the loading restrictions, 
the NRC staff finds that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 4.
3.2.2 Boron Dilution Analysis
    Since the licensee's ISFSI application relies on soluble boron to 
maintain subcritical conditions within the DSCs during loading, 
unloading, and handling operations, the NRC staff reviewed the 
licensee's boron dilution analysis to determine whether appropriate 
controls, alarms, and procedures were available to identify and 
terminate a boron dilution accident prior to reaching a critical boron 
concentration.
    By letter dated October 25, 1996, the NRC staff issued a safety 
evaluation (SE) on licensing topical report WCAP-14416, ``Westinghouse 
Spent Fuel Rack Criticality Analysis Methodology.'' This SE specified 
that the following issues be evaluated for applications involving 
soluble boron credit: the events that could cause boron dilution, the 
time available to detect and mitigate each dilution event, the 
potential for incomplete boron mixing, and the adequacy of the boron 
concentration surveillance interval.
    In its exemption request, the licensee described the criticality 
analyses performed to determine the worst-case bounding 
k<INF>eff</INF>. The CCNPP criticality calculations employed the KENO 
V.a code with the 44-group ENDF/B-V cross section library. The 
calculations determined the minimum soluble boron concentration 
required to maintain subcriticality (k<INF>eff</INF> < 1.0) following a 
boron dilution event in a NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC loaded with fresh 4.5 
weight percent enriched fuel assemblies that bound the CCNPP fuel 
designs (Combustion Engineering (CE) 14 x 14 fuel). The results of the 
calculations for the bounding case indicate that subcriticality is 
maintained with 1650 ppm of soluble boron in the SFP.
    The TS requirements for the NUHOMS-32P[supreg] Cask System include 
a minimum boron concentration requirement of 2450 ppm boron when spent 
fuel assemblies with enrichments less than or equal to 4.5 weight-
percent (wt-percent) U-235 are loaded into a DSC canister. The approval 
of this exemption is limited to the DSC loading, unloading, and 
handling of CE 14 x 14 fuel assemblies enriched to a maximum of 4.5 wt-
percent U-235. The use of fuel-related burnable absorbers is credited 
in the analysis. The NUHOMS-32P[supreg] soluble boron TS requirements 
ensure that k<INF>eff</INF> is maintained less than 0.95. TS SRs 
require the boron concentration in the DSC water to be verified within 
24 hours prior to the insertion of the first spent fuel assembly into a 
DSC and reconfirmed at intervals not to exceed 48 hours until such time 
as the DSC is removed from the SFP.
    The licensee contracted with Transnuclear to perform a criticality 
analysis to determine the soluble boron concentration that results in a 
k<INF>eff</INF> equal to 1.0 for 4.5 wt-percent U-235 fuel enrichments 
using the same methodology as approved in the Standardized NUHOMS Cask 
System Final Safety Analysis. The analysis determined the critical 
boron concentration level for 4.5 wt-percent U-235 enriched fuel was 
1650 ppm. The boron concentration within the canister would have to 
decrease from the TS limit to the critical boron concentration before 
criticality is possible. The licensee based its boron dilution analyses 
and its preventive and

[[Page 54415]]

mitigative actions on dilution sources with the potential to reduce the 
boron concentration from the TS minimum values for the two fuel 
enrichment bands to the respective concentration for criticality.
    During the current analysis the licensee identified all credible 
potential sources that could dilute the SFP to critical conditions. The 
licensee determined that the limiting boron dilution event occurs when 
water from the fire protection system (FPS), with a maximum flow rate 
of 1000 gpm from the most limiting hose (a 3-inch diameter with a 2-
inch nozzle), is added to the SFP. The licensee's calculations show 
that at least 4 hours will be available to terminate the event before 
the DSC water boron concentration decreases from 2450 ppm to the 
critical concentration of 1650 ppm, assuming a straight dilution to the 
SFP overflow limit and a feed and bleed operation thereafter with 
instantaneous complete mixing.
    To demonstrate that sufficient time exists for plant personnel to 
identify and terminate a boron dilution event, the licensee provided a 
description of all alarms available to alert operators, and plant 
controls that will be implemented. There is no automatic level control 
system for the SFP; therefore, the SFP will overflow on an uncontrolled 
water addition. However, a high level alarm in the control room would 
alert personnel of a potential boron dilution event within 15 minutes 
for a 1000 gpm dilution rate. In addition to the SFP high level alarm, 
annunciator alarms for the FPS exist in the Control Room, which would 
alert operators to identify and terminate the worst-case boron dilution 
source. This means that there would be more than 3 additional hours 
before the critical boron concentration of 1650 ppm within the DSC is 
reached. The NRC staff finds that this is acceptable.
    The CCNPP's SFP is a large rectangular structure filled with 
borated water that completely covers the spent fuel assemblies. A 3.5-
foot wall divides the pool, with the north half associated to Unit 1 
and the south half associated to Unit 2. A slot in the dividing wall 
has removable gates, which allow movement of the fuel assemblies 
between the two halves of the pool. The slot is normally open and the 
removable gate stored in the Unit 1 SFP close to the west end of the 
south wall. However, to ensure the applicability of the assumptions in 
its dilution and criticality evaluations, the licensee has committed to 
revise the fuel-handling procedure to include an initial condition that 
requires the slot between the two pools to be open and the gate to be 
stored in its proper storage location when a DSC is present in the Unit 
1 SFP.
    To ensure that operators are capable of identifying and terminating 
a boron dilution event during DSC loading, unloading, and handling 
operations, operator training will be conducted. During training 
activities operators will receive revised alarm manual procedures which 
verify that the SFP boron concentration is in compliance with the new 
ISFSI TS limit prior to the loading of a NUHOMS-32P[supreg] DSC.
    Based on the NRC staff's review of the licensee's exemption request 
dated December 21, 2004, as supplemented on May 31, 2005, and its boron 
dilution analysis, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has provided 
sufficient information to demonstrate that an undetected and 
uncorrected dilution from the TS required boron concentration to the 
calculated critical boron concentration is very unlikely. Based on its 
review of the boron analysis and enhancements to the operating 
procedures and operator training program, the NRC staff finds the 
licensee has satisfied Criterion 5.
    Therefore, in conjunction with the conservative assumptions used to 
establish the TS required boron concentration and critical boron 
concentration, the boron dilution evaluation demonstrates that the 
underlying intent of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is satisfied.

3.3 Legal Basis for the Exemption

3.3.1 Authorized by Law
    This exemption results in changes to the operation of the plant by 
allowing the operation of the new dry fuel storage facility and loading 
of the NUHOMS-32P[reg] DSC. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the 
NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. In 
addition, the granting of the licensee's exemption request will not 
result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or 
the intent of the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is 
authorized by law.
3.3.2 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
    The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is to ensure that 
adequate controls are in place to ensure that the handling and storage 
of fuel assemblies is conducted in a manner such that the fuel 
assemblies remain safely subcritical. Based on the NRC staff's review 
of the licensee's exemption request, the licensee has demonstrated that 
sufficient controls are in place to provide reasonable assurance that 
there is no undue risk to public health and safety given conservative 
assumptions in the criticality analysis (Criterion 1 above); 
surveillances periodically verify the boron concentration before and 
during loading and unloading (Criterion 2 above); radiation monitoring 
equipment is used to detect excessive radiation and initiate 
appropriate protective actions (Criterion 3 above); only fuel 
authorized by the ISFSI TS will be loaded and stored in the ISFSI 
(Criterion 4 above); and boron dilution events have been analyzed, and 
there are sufficient monitoring capabilities and time for the licensee 
to identify and terminate a dilution event prior to achieving a 
critical boron concentration in the cask (Criterion 5 above). 
Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the underlying purpose of the 
rule has been satisfied and that there is no undue risk to public 
health and safety.
3.3.3 Consistent with Common Defense and Security
    This exemption results in changes to the operation of the plant by 
allowing the operation of the new dry fuel storage facility and loading 
of the NUHOMS-32P[reg] DSC. This change to the fuel assembly storage 
and handling in the plant does not affect the national defense strategy 
because the national defense is maintained by resources (hardware or 
software or other) that are outside the plant and that have no direct 
relation to plant operation. In addition, loading spent fuel into the 
NUHOMS-32P[reg] DSC in the SFP does not affect the ability of the 
licensee to defend the plant against a terrorist attack. Therefore, the 
common defense and security is not impacted by this exemption request.
3.3.4 Special Circumstances
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the NRC staff 
reviewed the licensee's exemption request to determine if the legal 
basis for granting an exemption had been satisfied. With regards to the 
six special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the NRC staff 
finds that the licensee's exemption request satisfies 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
``Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would 
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to 
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.'' Specifically, the NRC 
staff concludes that since the licensee has satisfied the five criteria 
in Section 3.1 of this exemption, the application of the rule is not 
necessary to achieve its underlying purpose in this particular case.

[[Page 54416]]

3.4 Summary

    Based upon the review of the licensee's exemption request to credit 
soluble boron during DSC loading, unloading, and handling in the CCNPP 
SFP, the NRC staff concludes that pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) the 
licensee's exemption request is acceptable. However, the NRC staff 
places the following limitations and/or conditions on the approval of 
this exemption:
    1. This exemption is limited to the loading, unloading, and 
handling of the DSC for only the TN NUHOMS-32P[reg] at CCNPP.
    2. This exemption is limited to the loading, unloading, and 
handling in the DSC at CCNPP of Combustion Engineering 14x14 fuel 
assemblies that had maximum initial, unirradiated U-235 enrichments of 
4.5 weight percent.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an exemption from 
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for the loading, unloading, and 
handling of the components of the Transnuclear NUHOMS-32P[reg] dry cask 
storage system at CCNPP. However, since the licensee does not have an 
NRC-approved methodology for evaluating changes to the analyses or 
systems supporting this exemption request, the NRC staff's approval of 
the exemption is restricted to those specific design and operating 
conditions described in the licensee's December 21, 2004, exemption 
request. The licensee may not apply the 10 CFR 50.59 process for 
evaluating changes to specific exemptions. Any changes to the design or 
operation of (1) the dry cask storage system, (2) the SFP, (3) the fuel 
assemblies to be stored, (4) the boron dilution analyses, or (5) 
supporting procedures and controls, regardless of whether they are 
approved under the general Part 72 license or perceived to be 
conservative, will invalidate this exemption. Upon invalidation of the 
exemption, the licensee will be required to comply with NRC regulations 
prior to future cask loadings.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (70 FR 51853).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of September, 2005.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ledyard B. Marsh,
Director, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 05-18193 Filed 9-13-05; 8:45 am]
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