In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-2670

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DERRIK HAGERMAN and WABASH ENVIRONMENTAL

TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. IP 06-0139-CR-02—David F. Hamilton, Chief Judge.

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 5, 2008—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 26, 2008

Before BAUER, CUDAHY, and POSNER, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. The defendants were convicted

of criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, and Wabash

was ordered to pay $250,000 in restitution to a federal

Superfund account and was placed on probation (18 U.S.C.

§ 3563) for five years. Corporate probation has been

called “a flexible vehicle for imposing a wide range of

sanctions having the common feature of continued judicial control over aspects of corporate conduct.” Richard
2 No. 08-2670

Gruner, “To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization:

Sanctioning Corporate Offenders Through Corporate

Probation,” 16 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 3 (1988); see also id. at 4-6.

The government, contending that Wabash had violated

the conditions of probation by refusing to begin paying

the restitution (and a $4,000 special assessment), that had

been ordered, petitioned the district court for relief,

as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(c). The court dismissed

the petition after the government and Wabash resolved

their differences by Wabash’s agreeing to start paying

restitution and to furnish specified information concerning the company’s finances. Nevertheless, Wabash

has filed an appeal to this court from the order of dismissal, as has its codefendant, Hagerman.

Hagerman’s appeal must be dismissed because he

was not a party to the probation-violation proceeding and

no order naming him was entered. Wabash’s appeal must

also be dismissed, apart from doubts that Wabash was

aggrieved by the dismissal of the probation-violation

proceeding. Wabash has no lawyer in this court (it

was represented in the district court by a lawyer who

has since withdrawn). Hagerman, who is not a lawyer,

claims the right to represent Wabash because he “is not

only a major stockholder [presumably he means ‘member,’

since Wabash is an LLC, not a corporation] but is [also the]

current President of [Wabash].” And it was Hagerman

who filed this appeal on behalf of Wabash as well as

himself. He complains about the deal that Wabash

struck with the government, making this like an appeal by

a party that agrees to a settlement but later thinks better

of his decision and tries to get the appellate court to

rescind it.
No. 08-2670 3

A corporation is not permitted to litigate in a federal

court unless it is represented by a lawyer licensed to

practice in that court. Rowland v. California Men’s Colony,

506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt,

Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985). A limited liability

company is not a corporation, but it is like one in being

distinct from a natural person. “Limited liability companies

are a ‘relatively new business structure allowed by state

statute,’ having some features of corporations and some

features of partnerships . . . . For example, ‘similar to a

corporation, owners have limited personal liability for

the debts and actions of the LLC’ . . . . ‘Other features

of LLCs are more like a partnership, providing management flexibility’, . . . and in some cases affording ‘the

benefit of pass-through taxation.’ ” McNamee v. Department

of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted).

We have not had occasion to rule on whether, like a

corporation, an LLC can litigate only if represented by a

lawyer. We can find only one appellate decision directly

on point: Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2007)

(per curiam), held that an LLC can sue only if represented

by a lawyer, even if as in that case (and possibly in

this one, though when Wabash was created eight years

ago it had two other members) the LLC has only one

member. The same result, as noted in Lattanzio, has been

reached in cases involving one-man corporations, not only

our Scandia Down case but also United States v. High Country

Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam);

National Independent Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista

Distribution Co., 748 F.2d 602, 609-10 (11th Cir. 1984), and
4 No. 08-2670

Capital Group, Inc. v. Gaston & Snow, 768 F. Supp. 264 (E.D.

Wis. 1991). A sole proprietorship may litigate pro se, RZS

Holdings AVV v. PDVSA Petroleo S.A., 506 F.3d 350, 354 n. 4

(4th Cir. 2007); Lattanzio v. COMTA, supra, 481 F.3d at 140;

Lowery v. Hoffman, 188 F.R.D. 651, 653-54 (M.D.Ala. 1999),

because it has no legal identity separate from the proprietor himself. But a partnership may not, Lattanzio v.

COMTA, supra, 481 F.3d at 139-40; Eagle Associates v. Bank

of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1991); New

Hampshire v. Settle, 523 A.2d 124, 129 (N.H. 1987); First

Amendment Foundation v. Village of Brookfield, 575 F. Supp.

1207 (N.D. Ill. 1983); contra, United States v. Reeves, 431 F.2d

1187 (9th Cir. 1970) (pungently criticized in the Settle case);

and as we said, an LLC is a cross between a corporation

and a partnership.

An individual is permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1654 to

proceed pro se in a civil case in federal court because

he might be unable to afford a lawyer, or a lawyer’s fee

might be too high relative to the stakes in the case to

make litigation worthwhile other than on a pro se basis.

Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992) (“most

litigants who sue without a lawyer do so because they

cannot afford one”); DiAngelo v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid,

891 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1989) (concurring opinion)

(“there will always be cases where the stakes are so low,

the plaintiff so reprehensible, or the cause so unpopular

that . . . the case will proceed without the participation of

counsel”). There are many small corporations and corporation substitutes such as limited liability companies. But

the right to conduct business in a form that confers privileges, such as the limited personal liability of the owners
No. 08-2670 5

for tort or contract claims against the business, carries

with it obligations one of which is to hire a lawyer if you

want to sue or defend on behalf of the entity. Pro se

litigation is a burden on the judiciary, e.g., Lattanzio v.

COMTA, supra, 481 F.3d at 139; Capital Group, Inc. v. Gaston

& Snow, supra, 768 F. Supp. at 265, and the burden is not

to be borne when the litigant has chosen to do business

in entity form. He must take the burdens with the

benefits. Lattanzio v. COMTA, supra, 481 F.3d at 140. From

that standpoint there is no difference between a corporation and a limited liability company, or indeed between

either and a partnership, which although it does not

provide its owners with limited liability confers other

privileges, relating primarily to ease of formation and

dissolution. That is why the privilege of pro se representation is, as we noted, denied to partnerships too.

The appeals are

DISMISSED.

9-26-08