alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IB 

House Calendar No. 142 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3678 

[Report No. 113–608] 

To redesignate the lock and dam located in Modoc, Illinois, commonly known 

as the Kaskaskia Lock and Dam, as the ‘‘Jerry F. Costello Lock and 

Dam’’, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 9, 2013 

Mr. ENYART (for himself, Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. SCHOCK, Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois, Mr. RUSH, Mr. ROSKAM, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. GUTIE ́RREZ, Mrs. 

BUSTOS, Mr. SCHNEIDER, Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. QUIGLEY, 

Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. FOSTER, Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois, Ms. 

DUCKWORTH, Ms. KELLY of Illinois, and Mr. HULTGREN) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure 

NOVEMBER 12, 2014 

Additional sponsors: Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee, Mr. TIERNEY, 

Mr. PASCRELL, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. NADLER, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE

JOHNSON of Texas, Ms. NORTON, Mr. DOYLE, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Mr. 

COBLE, and Mr. BISHOP of New York 

NOVEMBER 12, 2014 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 


ebenthall on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3678 RH

A BILL 

To redesignate the lock and dam located in Modoc, Illinois, 

commonly known as the Kaskaskia Lock and Dam, as 

the ‘‘Jerry F. Costello Lock and Dam’’, and for other 

purposes. 


ebenthall on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3678 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION. 

4 The lock and dam located in Modoc, Illinois, author5 ized by the Act entitled ‘‘An Act authorizing the construc6 tion, repair, and preservation of certain public works on 

7 rivers and harbors, and for other purposes’’, approved 

8 July 3, 1930 (46 Stat. 927), and commonly known as the 

9 Kaskaskia Lock and Dam, is redesignated as the ‘‘Jerry 

10 F. Costello Lock and Dam’’. 

11 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

12 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

13 paper, or other record of the United States to the lock 

14 and dam referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be 

15 a reference to the ‘‘Jerry F. Costello Lock and Dam’’. 


ebenthall on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
House Calendar No. 142 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3678 

[Report No. 113–608] 

A BILL 

To redesignate the lock and dam located in Modoc, 

Dam’’, and for other purposes. and Dam, as the ‘‘Jerry F. Costello Lock and Illinois, commonly known as the Kaskaskia Lock 

NOVEMBER 12, 2014 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 


ebenthall on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
# C_2008285EN.01003501.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/35

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 24 September 2008 — M v Ombudsman

(Case T-412/05) (1)

1

(Non-contractual liability - Decision by the Commission to take no action on a complaint calling into question the conduct of a Member State - Decision by the European Ombudsman concerning the handling of the complaint - Errors made by the Commission in its finding of instances of maladministration - Naming of the applicant - Infringement of the right to respect for private life, and of the principles of proportionality and the right to be heard - Non-material damage - Causal link)

(2008/C 285/62)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: M (Brussels, Belgium) (represented initially by G. Vandersanden and A. Kalogeropoulos, then by A. Kalogeropoulos and L. Levi, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Ombudsman (represented by: J. Sant'Anna and G. Grill, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Action under the second paragraph of Article 288 EC for compensation for damage suffered by the applicant as a result of being named in the decision of the European Ombudsman of 18 July 2002 concerning the complaint registered with the reference 1288/99/OV and as a result of the negligent conduct of the Ombudsman concerning the investigation of that complaint and the conclusions he reached in that decision.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Orders the European Ombudsman to pay Mr M compensation of EUR 10 000; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Orders the European Ombudsman to pay Mr M compensation of EUR 10 000;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 48, 25.2.2006.

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6316

LERICO K. KEARNEY,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District

Judge. (2:07-cv-00134-RBS-FBS)

Submitted: August 7, 2008 Decided: August 27, 2008

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Bernard Hargett, HARGETT & WATSON, PLC, Glen Allen, Virginia,

for Appellant. Eugene Paul Murphy, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Lerico K. Kearney seeks to appeal the district court’s

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Kearney has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

September 10, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

135736 & (30)(31)(32) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, 

Justices 

v SC: 135736 

 COA: 277828 

Kalamazoo CC: 00-000751-FC 

FLOYD CLEO CHAMBERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. 

The application for leave to appeal the December 14, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals 

is considered, and is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of 

establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). The motion to stay and the 

motion for miscellaneous relief are DENIED. This order does not prevent the defendant 

from filing a second motion for relief from judgment based on newly discovered 

evidence under MCR 6.502(G)(2). 

p0903 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 10, 2008 

 Clerk
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3676 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3676

 To establish a prohibition on certain cell phone voice communications 
           during passenger flights, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 9, 2013

 Mr. Shuster introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To establish a prohibition on certain cell phone voice communications 
           during passenger flights, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prohibiting In-Flight Voice 
Communications on Mobile Wireless Devices Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN CELL PHONE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 417 of title 49, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 41725. Prohibition on certain cell phone voice communications
    ``(a) Prohibition.--The Secretary of Transportation shall issue 
regulations--
            ``(1) to prohibit an individual on an aircraft from 
        engaging in voice communications using a mobile communications 
        device during a flight of that aircraft in scheduled passenger 
        interstate or intrastate air transportation; and
            ``(2) that exempt from the prohibition described in 
        paragraph (1) any--
                    ``(A) member of the flight crew on duty on an 
                aircraft;
                    ``(B) flight attendant on duty on an aircraft; and
                    ``(C) Federal law enforcement officer acting in an 
                official capacity.
    ``(b) Definitions.--In this section, the following definitions 
apply:
            ``(1) Flight.--The term `flight' means, with respect to an 
        aircraft, the period beginning when the aircraft takes off and 
        ending when the aircraft lands.
            ``(2) Mobile communications device.--
                    ``(A) In general.--The term `mobile communications 
                device' means any portable wireless telecommunications 
                equipment utilized for the transmission or reception of 
                voice data.
                    ``(B) Limitation.--The term `mobile communications 
                device' does not include a phone installed on an 
                aircraft.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 417 of title 49, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 41724 the following:

``41725. Prohibition on certain cell phone voice communications.''.
                                 <all>
```
**Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 6 March 2008 –**

**Commission v Spain**

**(Case C‐196/07)**

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Competition policy – Concentrations – Failure to comply with obligations imposed by the Commission – E.ON/Endesa

1.                     *Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Examination of merits by the Court – Situation to be taken into consideration
– Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 226 EC) (see paras 25-26)*

2.                     *Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Subject-matter of the dispute – Determined by the reasoned opinion – Time-limit
communicated to the Member State – Default subsequently remedied – Interest in continuing the proceedings – Possible liability
of the Member State (Art. 226 EC) (see paras 27-28)*

3.                     *Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Failure to comply with a Commission decision relating to a concentration – Defences
– Absolute impossibility of implementation – Criteria for assessment – Difficulties in implementing – Obligation on the Commission
and the Member State to cooperate in seeking a solution consistent with the Treaty (Arts 10 EC and 226 EC) (see para. 30)*

4.                     *Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Failure to comply with a Commission decision relating to a concentration – Defences
– Legality of the decision called in question – Inadmissibility – Limits – Non-existent measure (Arts 226 EC, 227 EC, 230
EC and 232 EC) (see paras 34-38)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Failure to comply with Article 2 of Commission Decision of 26 September 2006 (Case No COMP/M.4197 – E.ON/Endesa – C(2006) 4279 final) and Article 2 of Commission Decision of 20 December 2006 (Case No COMP/M.4197 – E.ON/Endesa – C(2006) 7039 final). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

1)         declares that by not withdrawing:

–        the conditions 1 to 6, 8 and 17 imposed by the decision of the National Energy Committee which were declared incompatible
with Community law by Article 1 of the Commission Decision of 26 September 2006 (Case No COMP/M.4197 – E.ON/Endesa – C(2006)
4279 final), and

–        conditions 1, 10, 11 and 15, as amended, imposed by decision of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade which were declared
incompatible with Community law by Article 1 of the Commission Decision of 20 December 2006 (Case No COMP/M.4197 – E.ON/Endesa
– C(2006) 7039 final),

the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 of each of those decisions;

2)         Orders the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs*.*
In the Matter of N.F.

No. COA15-774.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Feb. 16, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20
- 1015

LISA MARIE KERR , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. SANDRA BAILEY; TERESA EAGLE; DAVID PITTENGER; JOHN ANDREW HESS; ANDREW PATRICK BALLARD, individual in personal capacity; JEROME GILBERT, an individual in personal and official capacity; MARSHALL UNIVERSITY BOARD OF GOVERNORS, an entity in personal and official capacity , Defendants

- Appellees

.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia , at Huntington

. Robert C. Chambers , District Judge. ( 3:19

- cv
- 00443 )

Submitted : October 27, 2020 Decided: November 6, 2020

Before MOTZ and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Lisa Marie Ke r r, KERR LAW PLLC , Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Ancil G. Ramey, Anders W. Lindberg, Andrew P. Smith, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublis hed opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Lisa Marie Kerr appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing her civil action filed in June 2019 and its order denying
her m otion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1), (3) for reconsideration and to reopen the judgment in her 2014 civil action for fraud on the court or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing. We have reviewed the record and the parties’ brief s and find no reversible error by the district court. Kerr’s 2019 civil action was untimely filed , * and we reject as without
merit her arguments that her claims are timely under West Virginia’s continuing tort
doctrine and that the action was an action for fraud on the court not time

- barred by any statute or rule. The district court also did not reversibly err in denying Kerr’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) mo tion, which did not establish actionable fraud on the court. See Fox ex rel.
Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co. , 739 F.3d 131, 135

- 3 7 (4th Cir. 2014). We therefore affirm the
district court’s orders on these bases. Kerr v. Bailey , No. 3:19

- cv
- 00443 (S.D.W. Va. Dec

. 4 & 16, 2019). We deny Kerr’s motion to disqualify law firm Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC from representing Gene Kuhn and Judith Southard and dispense with oral argument because the

* See Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Att’ys Office , 767 F.3d 379, 388

- 89 (4th Cir. 2014) ; Stanley v. Trs

. of Ca l

. State Univ ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) ; McCausland v. Mason Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1981) ; W. Va. Code § 55

- 2

- 12 ; State ex rel. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Webster , 829 S.E.2d 290, 298, 300 (W. Va. 2019) ; Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n v. Nutter , 795 S.E.2d 530, 545

- 45 & nn.32

- 33 (W. Va. 2016) ; Prieser v. MacQueen , 352 S.E.2d 22, 29 (W. Va. 1985)

.3 facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-72,045-03

IN RE DONALD WILLIAM PUGH, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 1210055-A

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file an application for a writ of mandamus pursuant

to the original jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he filed, on December 21, 2012, an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in the 248th District Court of Harris County, that more than

35 days have elapsed, and that the application has not yet been forwarded to this Court. The district

court entered an order designating issues on April 18, 2013.

Respondent, the Judge of the 248th District Court of Harris County, shall file a response with

this Court by having the District Clerk submit the record on such habeas corpus application. In the

alternative, Respondent may resolve the issues set out in the order designating issues and then have

the District Clerk submit the record on such application. In either case, Respondent’s answer shall
-2-

be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order. This application for leave to file a writ of

mandamus will be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted his response.

Filed: September 17, 2014

Do not publish
CITY OF ASHEVILLE v. STATE of North Carolina, et al.

No. 391PA15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 28, 2016.

I. Faison Hicks, Special Deputy Attorney General.

Robert W. Oast, Jr., City Attorney, for City of Asheville.

Daniel G. Clodfelter, Charlotte, for City of Asheville.

T. Randolph Perkins, Charlotte, for City of Asheville.

Jonathan M. Watkins, Charlotte.

Jason G. Idilbi, Charlotte.

Robert B. Long, Jr., Asheville, for City of Asheville.

Ronald K. Payne, Asheville.

Isham F. Hicks, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Robin T. Currin, City of Ashville Attorney, for City of Asheville.

William Clarke, for State of North Carolina.

Stephen W. Petersen, Raleigh, for State of North Carolina.

Robert F. Orr, Asheville, for City of Asheville.

Matthew W. Sawchak, Raleigh, for City of Asheville.

Allegra Collins, for International Municipal Lawyers Association.

Edward J. Coyne, III, Greenville, for Brunswick Regional Water & Sewer H2GO.

Jeremy M. Wilson, Wilmington, for Brunswick Regional Water & Sewer H2GO.

Gabriel Du Sablon, for City of Wilson.

James P. Cauley, III, Wilson, for City of Wilson.

Gregory F. Schwitzgebel, III, Associate General Counsel, for North Carolina League of Municipalities.

Kimberly S. Hibbard, General Counsel, for North Carolina League of Municipalities.

The following order has been entered on the conditional motion filed on the 7th of December 2015 by NC League of Municipalities for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of January 2016."

Unless already submitted, the Amicus Brief shall be submitted to the court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 28(i).
STATE of North Carolina v. Anton Tolandis SMITH.

No. COA15-921.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 15, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Prejudicial Error.
EXHIBIT
32





Certification
of Chief Executive Officer


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned
officer of Micrel, Incorporated (the “Company”) hereby
certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





(i)           the
accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2008 (the “Report”) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(ii)           the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date:
      August 8, 2008
            By           /s/ Raymond D. ZinnRaymond D. ZinnChief Executive
      Officer











Certification
of Chief Financial Officer


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned
officer of Micrel, Incorporated (the “Company”) hereby
certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:





(i)           the
accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2008 (the “Report”) fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable,
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(ii)           the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date:
      August 8, 2008
            By           /s/ Richard D. Crowley,
Jr.Richard D. Crowley,
      Jr.Chief Financial
      Officer
Brenda E. WRIGHT, Employee, Plaintiff v. WAL-MART, INC., # 1127, Employer, Claims Management, Inc., Carrier, Defendants.

No. COA15-888.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

July 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Vacated and Remanded.