No. 92-204 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1993 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vs . - 

SHARON F. YOUNG, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable Robert W. Holmstrom, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Arthur J. Thompson, Thompson Et Sessions, Billings, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Cregg W. 

Coughlin, Assistant, Helena, Montana; Dennis 

Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings; Mark 

J. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, Special 

Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana 
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in the ~hirteenth 

Judicial District convicting Defendant of conspiracy to commit 

felony theft by deception. We affirm. 

We state the issues on appeal as follows: 

1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's 

guilty verdict? 

2. Does collateral estoppel bar the State from prosecuting 

the Defendant for conspiracy to commit felony theft by deception? 

The Defendant Sharon F. Young (Sharon) was charged with 

conspiracy to commit felony theft for obtaining workersf 

compensation benefits by deception. In January 1983, Sharon and 

her husband, co-defendant Robert Young, applied for workersf 

compensation insurance coverage through the State Fund Mutual 

Insurance Company (State Fund) for themselves as owners and 

employees of the West Parrot Creek Properties. The Youngsf 

application for coverage indicated that the nature of their 

business was raising fur animals, and claimed an estimated $42,000 

annual earnings for the business. The coverage began March 1, 

1983. 

Thereafter, Robert Young filed a claim for benefits, claiming 

he had injured himself on March 30, 1983. He reported he was 

rebuilding a set of corrals when cross-ties fell on him. Sharon 

was listed as a witness to the accident and signed the claim form 

as employer. The claim form indicated that Robert Young was 

earning $400 per week, which amount would provide him with the 

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maximum amount of benefits allowable under law. Robert Young began 

receiving biweekly benefits after this alleged injury occurred. 

Subsequently, on May 6, 1983, Sharon filed a claim for 

benefits, claiming that she had injured herself while lifting a 

bale of hay on May 4, 1983. Sharon also reported that she earned 

$400 per week. Sharon began receiving benefits on May 6, 1983. On 

that same day, Robert Young canceled their workerst compensation 

insurance. 

In November 1983, Robert Youngfs doctor advised the State Fund 

that Robertts medical condition had stabilized. The State Fund 

notified Robert Young that his benefits would be terminated on 

December 28, 1983. 

Thereafter, on December 21, 1983, Sharon and Robert Young 

again applied for workerst compensation insurance as partners in 

the West Parrot Creek Properties. The Youngsr application for 

coverage indicated that the nature of their business was raising 

beef and feed, and claimed $41,600 annual earnings for the business 

(or $400 per week per person). The insurance coverage was 

effective on December 21, 1983. Thereafter, Robert Young filed a 

new claim for benefits, stating he was injured on December 31, 

1983, after inhaling the pesticide Furadan 44. Again, Sharon was 

listed as a witness to the accident and signed the claim form as 

employer. The claim form indicated that Robert Young was earning 

$425 per week. 

From April 1983 to December 1988, the State Fund paid Robert 

Young total compensation payments in the amount of $72,426.71. 
From May 1983 to July 1987, the State Fund paid Sharon compensation 

payments. On July 23, 1987, Sharon entered into a Full and Final 

Compromise Settlement with the State Fund. Sharon received total 

benefits in the amount of $116,148.14, plus an additional $21,650 

for medical expenses. 

An investigation into Sharon and Robert Young's 1983 claims 

was initiated after a failed attempt by Robert Young and codefendants Edith and Jack Wilkerson to fraudulently obtain workers' 

compensation benefits in 2988. Subsequently, criminal charges were 

filed against Sharon and Robert Young and Edith and Jack Wilkerson. 

Evidence presented at trial in support of the State's case 

against Sharon was as follows. At the time that the Youngs claimed 

annual earnings of $42,000 and $41,600, the West Parrot Creek 

Properties was an eighty-acre parcel of land near Roundup, Montana. 

In July 1983, a State Fund field examiner went to the Youngst 

property and found no corrals, no livestock, and no farm equipment. 

The field examiner met with Robert Young again in February, 1984, 

regarding the pesticide claim. Robert Young was unable to produce 

the package of pesticide but claimed to have purchased it in 

Hardin. The field examiner was unable to locate any business in 

Hardin which sold any pesticide to Robert Young. 

other evidence presented by the State showed that no game or 

fur farm license was ever issued to either Sharon or Robert Young. 

There were no state tax records which showed that either Young paid 

any taxes on any equipment or machinery. The Montana Department of 

Livestock records indicated that between 1982 and 1989, the Youngs 
owned or shipped only sixteen head of cattle. There was no other 

documentation of any fur animal or cattle business. 

In 1986, Dr. William Shaw, a board-certified physician 

specializing in occupational medicine, examined the Youngs upon the 

State Fund's request. Dr. Shaw indicated that Robert Young had a 

long history of medical problems, but concluded that none of Robert 

Young's preexisting injuries were aggravated by any injuries in 

1983. He also concluded that Robert Young's lung problems were not 

associated with the inhalation of pesticide, but were the result of 

smoking. Dr. Shaw reported that, during the examination, Robert 

Young made the following statements: "That subsidy that Workers' 

Comp is the best thing I've ever had," "All these injuries have 

caused me to be this way," and llCollecting Workers' Comp is better 

than stealing." 

Dr. Shaw also examined Sharon, who also had a long history of 

medical problems. Sharon told Dr. Shaw that her May 4, 1983, 

injury occurred when she fell off the back of a pickup while 

feeding cattle. There were no cattle on the property in May, 1983, 

and Sharon's prior claim to the State Fund did not state that she 

fell from a pickup. 

During Dr. Shawls examination of Sharon, he saw no evidence 

that she had any problems sitting or moving, nor did she exhibit 

any signs of pain or discomfort. Dr. Shaw concluded that Sharon's 

medical problems predated the alleged injury of May, 1983. 

This evidence was presented to a jury on August 19 and 20, 

1992. The jury found Sharon guilty of conspiracy to commit felony 
theft by deception. Sharon was sentenced to five years in prison, 

all suspended, and was ordered to make restitution. From that 

verdict and sentence, she appeals. 

When the issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient 

evidence to support a jury verdict, the standard of review is 

lrwhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.I1 State 

v. McLain, (1991), 249 Mont. 242, 246, 815 P.2d 147, 150. 

I - SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

Sharon was convicted of conspiracy to commit felony theft by 

obtaining unauthorized control of State Fund monies through 

deception. Sharon contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

support her conviction because the State Fund "authorizedrr or 

frconsented" to her actions by entering into a Full and Final 

Compromise Settlement of her workers' compensation claim. Viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we 

hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction. 

The only issue raised by Sharon regarding the sufficiency of 

the evidence is whether or not she obtained the workers' 

compensation benefits by deception. Section 45-2-211, MCA, states 

that "the consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an 

offense or to the result thereof is a defense." Sharon would use 

this statute as a complete defense, and thus a bar to this 

conviction. 

We note that consent is ineffective if it is induced by 
deception. Deception, as defined at 3 45-2-101 (17) , MCA, means 

knowingly to: 

(a) create or confirm in another an impression which is 

false and which the offender does not believe to be 

true ; 

(b) fail to correct a false impression which the 

of fender previously has created or confirmed; . . . 

There are a number of instances in this case where Sharon 

Itdeceivedtt the State Fund. For example, Sharon deceived the State 

Fund into issuing workerst compensation insurance on the West 

Parrot Creek Properties, when the same was not a legitimate, 

ongoing enterprise. She indicated that Robert Young and she both 

earned $400 per week, when she knew the same to be untrue. Sharon 

created or confirmed in the State Fund the impression that she had 

been injured while in the course and scope of her legitimate 

employment with the West Parrot Creek Properties. After the State 

Fund accepted liability for Sharon's purported injury, Sharon 

failed to correct the false impression that she created regarding 

her injury, the nature of her business, and the earnings of that 

business. 

There is no question that the State Fund's consent to 

liability in this case was induced through Sharon's deception. The 

State Fund did not know Sharon's claim for benefits was fraudulent 

at the time it entered into the settlement agreement. Had the 

State Fund received accurate information from Sharon, they would 

not have extended over $135,000 in benefits to her. The State Fund 

did not consent to Sharon's actions in this case. 

Sharon claims that the State Fund could have ascertained the 

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fraudulent nature of her claim if it had exercised due diligence. 

In essence, Sharon would have the State Fund conduct a "merits 

evaluation" of each and every claim filed with the State Fund 

before accepting liability and beginning benefits payments. We 

refuse to impose this burden on the State Fund. The State Fund 

should be able to rely on the truthfulness, completeness, and 

accuracy of the representations made by the claimant and employer. 

Willern Visser, a claims manager for the State Fund, estimated that 

the State Fund has approximately 20,000 claims per year. To force 

the State Fund to thoroughly investigate each claim on its merits 

before providing benefits would cause undue hardship on an alreadyburdened system. In addition, such a requirement would hurt 

claimants, in that it would unreasonably delay benefits payments 

and settlement of legitimate claims. 

We hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to 

support the conviction in this case. 

IT - COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 

Sharon contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars 

the State from prosecuting her in this case. She argues that the 

State is precluded from prosecution by the State Fund's compromise 

settlement of the workers' compensation claim. We disagree, and 

hold that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel is also known as ltissue 

preclu~ion.~ It is similar to res judicata; however, res judicata 

"bars the same parties from relitigating the same cause af action 

while collateral estoppel. bars the same parties from relitigating 
issues which were decided with respect to a different cause of 

action." Boyd v. ~irst Interstate Bank (1992), 253 Mont. 214, 218, 

833 P.2d 149, 151. This Court has previously established a threeprong test to determine if the doctrine of collateral estoppel 

applies to a particular case. Boyd, 833 P.2d at 151. 

1. The identical issue raised has been previously decided in 

a prior adjudication; 

2. A final judgment on the merits was issued in the prior 

adjudication; and 

3. The party against whom the plea is now asserted was a 

party or in privity with a party to the prior 

adjudication. 

m, 833 P.2d at 151. The first prong, identity of issues, is the 

most crucial of the three elements. Anderson v. State (1991), 250 

Mont. 18, 21, 817 P.2d 699, 702. In order to satisfy this element, 

the identical issue or "precise questionw must have been litigated 

in the prior action. Anderson, 817 P.2d at 702. 

Collateral estoppel does not apply in this case, because 

Sharon cannot establish the threshold first element. The Full and 

Final Compromise Settlement reached between the State Fund and 

Sharon on July 23, 1987, dealt solely with the amount of benefits 

thought to be owed to Sharon. Sharon's conspiracy to commit theft 

was not known at the time the compromise agreement was reached, and 

thus the fraud issue was not actually raised or litigated. 

Therefore, the issue in the workers1 compensation case and the 

issue in this criminal prosecution are not identical. 
A party who obtains workers' compensation benefits through 

trick and deception cannot assert the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel against the innocent victim. The State Fund is entitled 

to rely upon facts presented by the employer when applying for 

insurance coverage and by the employee when applying for benefits. 

If it is later discovered that the State Fund provided coverage or 

benefits because of fraud or deception, the State has the right to 

criminally prosecute those individuals to the fullest extent of the 

law. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: 
July 20, 1993 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

Marvin L. Howe, Esq. 

Simonton, Howe & Schneider, P.C. 

P.O. Box 1250 

Glendive, MT 59330 

Gary L. Day, Esq. 

Lucas & Monaghan, P.C. 

P.O. Box 728 

Miles City, MT 59301 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA