Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ANTHONY C. LAWRENCE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

LARRY D. ALLEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IDOWA HOOD, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A02-1309-CR-828

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT 

The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge

Cause Nos. 48C01-9710-CF-210 & 48C01-9801-CF-8. 

May 28, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge
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Case Summary

A trial court’s sentencing order must include, among other things, the amount of 

credit time a defendant has earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing. In 

this case, the trial court simply estimated Idowa Hood’s pretrial credit time rather than 

calculating the precise amount of pretrial credit time he had earned. We conclude that 

this was error and therefore reverse. 

Facts and Procedural History

Hood pled guilty to Class B felony burglary in April 1998. The trial court 

sentenced Hood to eight years in the Department of Correction, with six years executed 

and two years suspended to probation. 

The State had charged Hood with Class A felony arson just before he pled guilty 

to burglary. In May 2000, a jury found Hood guilty of Class A felony arson, and the trial 

court sentenced Hood to thirty years in the DOC, with twenty-five years executed and 

five years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered Hood’s arson sentence to run 

consecutive to his burglary sentence. 

In September 2009, Hood’s arson sentence was modified to allow him to serve the 

remainder of that sentence in a work-release program. Hood’s placement in the workrelease program was revoked less than a year later when Hood absconded from the 

program. The trial court ordered Hood to serve the remainder of his arson sentence in the 

DOC, with five years suspended to probation. 

Two years later, in August 2011, the trial court found that Hood had violated his 

probation by possessing cocaine. Appellant’s App. p. 20 (CCS). However, the State later 
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notified the court that the substance at issue had been tested and was not, in fact, cocaine. 

Id. at 21. The trial court returned Hood to probation and noted that he would receive

credit for “the time he was incarcerated.” Id.

In March 2013, Hood was arrested and charged with two counts of Class A 

misdemeanor battery. The State filed probation-violation notices in Hood’s arson and 

burglary cases. Hood’s troubles continued: three months later, on June 7, he was charged 

with Class C felony intimidation, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, 

and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The State amended its previously filed 

probation-violation notices to include these three new charges. Hood was incarcerated 

awaiting a hearing on the alleged violations. 

The probation-violation hearing took place on August 27, 2013. At the hearing, 

the trial court concluded that Hood had violated his probation in the arson and burglary 

cases. As a result, the court revoked three years of Hood’s five-year suspended sentence 

in the arson case. The court concluded that once served, those three years would 

complete Hood’s arson sentence, and Hood would then serve probation for his burglary 

conviction:

[T]he Court’s gonna revoke [] three years under the . . . [arson] case to the 

Department of Correction[]. I’m gonna return you to probation—we’re 

gonna close you out on that case. Three [] years, you’re done. The Court’s 

already taken into consideration coming up with the three (3) years, 

potential other credit time that he would have had. Because we had the five 

(5) years, although I think there’s some credit time that he’s afforded. 

Court’s just gonna take—[w]rap all that up into consideration. I’m gonna 

do three (3) years. Close him out. And then you’ve got the two (2) years 

of probation to return to under the . . . [burglary] case. Okay? That’ll be 

the order of the Court.
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Tr. p. 107-08 (emphasis added). In its sentencing order, the trial court stated that Hood 

“receives no credit time as the Court took into account his credit time in determining 

[the] revocation period.” Appellant’s App. p. 43.

Hood filed a pro se motion to correct sentence, seeking credit for the days he was 

incarcerated awaiting the probation-violation hearing. See id. at 49. The trial court 

denied Hood’s motion, noting that “there were some discrepancies . . . as to [] Hood’s 

credit time to be applied under this case primarily due to the fact that [Hood] has 

previously been sanctioned in this case[, and] that was later set aside after lab results 

confirmed a negative test for the presence of cocaine.” Id. at 60. Nonetheless, the court 

stated that it “took into account [Hood’s] credit time, including the credit time [Hood] is 

now requesting be applied[,] in determining [Hood’s] back up time or ‘revocation period’ 

as stated in the [court’s] order.” Id.

Hood now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Hood contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct 

sentence.1 He argues that the court erred when it “failed to give [him] pretrial detention 

credit earned for incarceration . . . and rather stated that it had considered said credit in 

imposing sanctions . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 5. 

 

1 Hood’s use of a motion to correct sentence was appropriate. “When a motion to correct 

sentence presents a claim that may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and the 

applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or extrinsic to the record, such a 

motion may be expeditiously considered and corrections made without invoking post-conviction 

proceedings.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ind. 2004) (motion to correct sentence was proper 

vehicle for appellate challenge where defendant claimed that the trial court failed to comply with Indiana 

Code section 35-38-3-2(a)).
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We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations using the 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An 

abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3(a), 

a person earns one day of credit time for each day the person is imprisoned for a crime or 

confined awaiting trial or sentencing. “Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2(b)(4) 

unequivocally declares that the trial court sentencing judgment ‘must include’ the amount 

of credit earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing.” Robinson v. State, 805 

N.E.2d 783, 791 (Ind. 2004). “This determination serves to memorialize any 

modifications in credit time class or credit time imposed by local prison authorities upon 

a person confined before trial and sentencing.” Id. at 792. Because pretrial credit time is 

a matter of statutory right, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or 

denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) 

(citing Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied). 

Here, there is no dispute that Hood has earned pretrial credit time.

2 At Hood’s

probation-revocation hearing, the trial court stated that it had “already taken into 

consideration coming up with the three (3) years, potential other credit time that [Hood]

would have had. Because we had the five (5) years, although I think there’s some credit 

time that he’s afforded. Court’s just gonna take—[w]rap all that up into consideration.” 

Tr. p. 107. The trial court’s language indicates that it simply estimated Hood’s pretrial 

credit time and incorporated it into his sentence. This technique does not comport with 

 

2 Though the State argues that it is unclear how much pretrial credit time Hood has earned, see

Appellee’s Br. p. 10, it does not dispute that Hood has earned pretrial credit time.
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Section 35-38-3-2(b)(4)’s “unequivocal[] declar[ation] that the trial court sentencing 

judgment ‘must include’ the amount of credit earned for time spent in confinement before 

sentencing.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 791.

Although the precise amount of pretrial credit time Hood has earned may be 

slightly difficult to calculate—particularly in light of Hood’s incarceration for a probation 

violation that ultimately proved not to be a violation—Hood has a statutory right to the 

precise amount of pretrial credit time he has earned. We conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion. We reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to 

resentence Hood and calculate his pretrial credit time in accordance with Indiana Code 

section 35-38-3-2(b)(4).

Reversed and remanded.

NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.