IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Washington, :

Westmoreland County, :

Pennsylvania, a Second Class :

Township, :

:

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 33 C.D. 2016

: Argued: November 15, 2017

Township of Upper Burrell, :

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, :

a Second Class Township; and :

Burrell School District :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge1

OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: April 11, 2018

This case of first impression concerns a uniquely situated commercial 

property that straddles the boundary between two municipalities, Washington 

Township and Upper Burrell Township, each of which claims a share of the annual 

local services tax of $52 paid by each of the 750 employees who work there. In this 

 

1 This case was argued before an en banc panel of the Court that included former Judge 

Joseph M. Cosgrove. Because Judge Cosgrove’s service on the Court ended January 1, 2018, this 

matter was submitted on briefs to Judge Fizzano Cannon as a member of the panel.
2

appeal, Washington Township contends that the Court of Common Pleas of 

Westmoreland County (trial court) erred and abused its discretion in its 

interpretation of the Local Tax Enabling Act (Act)2 and its unequal allocation of the 

local services tax between the townships based on the specific “place of 

employment” of the employees within the facility on the first day of the payroll 

period. Upon determining that the “place of employment” of an integrated facility 

must be treated as a whole and that the proper allocation of local services taxes must 

reflect the division of property between the townships, we reverse and remand. 

I. Background

Washington Township and Upper Burrell Township are contiguous 

townships of the second class located in Westmoreland County. Welsh Leedsworld 

is a manufacturing and office/call center located at 400 Hunt Valley Road, New 

Kensington, Pennsylvania, which employs approximately 750 people. The Welsh 

Leedsworld facility is located in both Washington and Upper Burrell Townships; the 

township line runs through the facility building. 

Both townships impose a local services tax of $52 per year per 

employee as authorized by Section 301.1(f)(9) of the Act, 53 P.S. §6924.301.1(f)(9),

which provides that the tax “may be levied, assessed and collected only by the 

political subdivision of the taxpayer’s place of employment.” “[T]he situs of the tax 

shall be the place of employment on the first day the person becomes subject to the 

tax during each payroll period.” 53 P.S. §6924.301.1(f)(9)(iv). Although Welsh 

Leedsworld is located in both townships, prior to this action, all the local services 

 

2 Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. §§6924.101-6924.901.
3

tax collected from the Welsh Leedsworld employees were levied, assessed and 

retained by Upper Burrell Township.

On April 29, 2014, Washington Township initiated this action by filing 

a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the trial court to determine the 

parties’ respective rights to claim the local services tax on Welsh Leedsworld 

employees. Washington Township asserted that it was entitled to half the tax. 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The parties presented 

testimony and documentary evidence, including two exhibits depicting the location 

of the boundary line between the two townships relating to the Welsh Leedsworld 

building. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 244a, 273a. Robert Beckwith, Welsh 

Leedsworld’s facility manager (Manager), testified that Welsh Leedsworld’s main 

entrance, reception area, offices, human resources, conference rooms, elevators, 

restroom facilities, cafeteria and parking lot are located in Washington Township. 

The manufacturing facilities and mailroom are located in Upper Burrell Township. 

Manager further testified that, although its 750 employees move back and forth 

between the two townships frequently throughout the day, approximately 180 people 

are primarily employed in Washington Township and 570 are primarily employed 

in Upper Burrell Township. R.R. at 107a-120a. 

In addition, the parties stipulated to the following. Both Washington 

Township and Upper Burrell Township lawfully impose the local services tax in the 

amount of $52 per employee. Burrell School District collects $5 per year per person 

from Upper Burrell Township; Kiski Area School District does not impose the $5 

share. Both townships provide emergency service responses to the Welsh 

Leedsworld facility. Both townships have their own police departments, ambulance 

companies, fire departments, and both respond, depending upon who gets the call. 
4

Although the boundary line between Washington Township and Upper Burrell 

Township goes through the Welsh Leedsworld building, the exact location is not 

able to be determined. Upper Burrell Township acknowledged that Welsh 

Leedsworld employees who work in Washington Township should pay their local 

services tax to Washington Township, even though heretofore all of the taxes have 

been paid to Upper Burrell Township. R.R. at 96a-98a.

Washington Township argued that it was entitled to one-half of the 

local services tax for all employees who work at Welsh Leedsworld because the 

facility is fully integrated and located within both townships. Upper Burrell 

Township and the Burrell School District (collectively, Appellees) countered that 

the tax should be assessed and collected based upon the location within the facility 

where the employee actually performs the majority of his or her work. Significantly, 

Appellees conceded that 180 Welsh Leedsworld employees who primarily work in 

Washington Township should pay their local services tax to Washington Township.

The trial court examined Section 301.1(f)(9)(iv) of the Act in 

determining the priority of the claim. The trial court held that the local services tax 

applicable to those persons employed at Welsh Leedsworld facility at 400 Hunt 

Valley Road “shall be determined based upon their specific place of employment, 

that is, the township and school district within which they are performing the 

functions of their employment on the first day that that person becomes subject to 

the tax for that payroll period.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/15, at 4 (emphasis added). 

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court determined that “570 persons 

performed the functions of their employment within that portion of the Welsh 

Leedsworld facility situated in Upper Burrell Township and the Burrell School 

District, and 180 persons performed the functions of their employment within that 
5

portion of the Welsh Leedsworld facility situated in Washington Township.” Id. at 

4-5. Thus, the trial court held that Welsh Leedsworld must collect and remit taxes 

attributable to each person accordingly. The trial court treated the claim as arising 

on April 29, 2014, when Washington Township filed its petition. The trial court 

directed Appellees to remit all monies assessed and collected from April 29, 2014 to 

the present for those persons performing the functions of their employment in 

Washington Township. From this decision, Washington Township appealed. 

II. Issues

In this appeal,3 Washington Township contends that the trial court acted 

in contravention of the plain language of the Section 301.1(f)(9) of the Act, 53 

P.S. §6924.301.1(f)(9), when it injected the word “specific” in determining “place 

of employment.” Washington Township argues that the trial court then abused its 

discretion by determining that a Welsh Leedsworld employee’s “place of 

employment” was not simply 400 Hunt Valley Road as a whole, but rather the 

specific location within the facility where an employee performed the majority of 

his or her work on the first day that person became subject to the tax for the payroll 

period. 

 

3 Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, 

committed an error of law, or reached a decision not supported by substantial evidence. Melcher 

v. Berks County Board of Assessment Appeals, 93 A.3d 522, 527 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). As to 

questions of law, including questions of statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo, 

and our scope of review is plenary. Newman Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi’s 

Family Markets, Inc., 52 A.3d 1233, 1239 (Pa. 2012); Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 75 A.3d 

453, 466 (Pa. 2011). 
6

III. Contentions

Washington Township asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the Act 

by injecting the word “specific” to determine an employee’s place of employment 

for tax purposes. According to Washington Township, the addition of this word 

results in an overly strict and narrow interpretation of an employee’s place of 

employment not intended by the General Assembly. By adding the word “specific,”

the trial court violated the tenets of statutory construction. A person’s “place of 

employment” does not need the added qualifier “specific.” Washington Township 

contends that the insertion of the word is particularly troublesome in this case 

because Welsh Leedsworld is a fully integrated facility. No portion of the building 

can function as intended without the other portions. The common facilities, such as 

parking lots, the cafeteria, restrooms, administrative offices, and the like, serve

persons working in various sections of the facility. Although an employee may work 

on the factory floor in Upper Burrell Township, that employee parks, eats, and 

utilizes other areas of the building located in Washington Township throughout the 

day as part of his or her employment. There is no “specific” place of employment 

other than “Welsh Leedsworld,” which happens to be located in both townships. 

Therefore, the trial court’s order must be reversed. 

Appellees counter that the plain language of the Act is free of 

ambiguity. It requires that the local services tax be paid to the political subdivision 

where a person maintains his or her “principal office” or is “principally employed,”

in other words, where the person spends the majority of his or her workday. 

Although employees can and do move through the building during the day, the Act 

determines the priority of which municipality gets the tax. The trial court’s use of 

the word “specific” did not alter the Act. Appellees concede that Welsh Leedsworld 
7

employees who spend the majority of their workday in Washington Township 

should pay the tax to Washington Township. Further, Appellees assert that a similar 

scenario was squarely addressed in Octorara Education Association v. West 

Fallowfield Township, 7 Pa. D. & C.4th 209 (C.P. Chester 1990). There, the court, 

applying a former version of the Act, held that the tax was limited to the township 

in which the taxpayer works. Appellees argue the same analysis applies here. For 

these reasons, Appellees maintain that the trial court’s interpretation of the Act and 

allocation of the tax should be affirmed. 

IV. Discussion

“[I]n statutory interpretation, our task is to discern the intent of the 

General Assembly, with the foremost indication being the statute’s plain language.” 

Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 A.3d 960, 965 (Pa. 2011). Where the intent of the 

legislature is clear from the plain meaning of the statute, courts must not pursue 

statutory construction. 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(b); Ramich v. Workers’ Compensation 

Appeal Board (Schatz Electric, Inc.), 770 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. 2001). When the words 

of a statute are free from all ambiguity, we must not disregard the letter of the law 

under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(b); Ramich, 770 A.2d at 

322. Only when the language of the statute is ambiguous or not explicit does 

statutory construction become necessary. 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c); Board of Revision of 

Taxes, City of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 4 A.3d 610, 622 (Pa. 2010).

Where the words of a statute are not defined or not explicit, “we resort 

to considerations other than the plain language to discern legislative intent.” 

Commonwealth v. Kerstetter, 94 A.3d 991, 1001 (Pa. 2014). We may consider “the 

occasion and necessity for the statute; the circumstances under which the statute was 
8

enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the consequences of 

a particular interpretation; the contemporaneous legislative history; and the 

legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.” Id. (quoting Mercury 

Trucking, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 55 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2012)); 

see 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c). Furthermore, “the words of a statute shall be construed 

according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 

Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 

Kerstetter, 94 A.3d at 1001 (quoting Commonwealth v. Zortman, 23 A.3d 519, 525 

(Pa. 2011)). 

We are mindful that when statutory construction is necessary, “the 

General Assembly does not intend an absurd result or one that is impossible of 

execution.” Board of Revision of Taxes, 4 A.3d at 622 (emphasis added). Moreover, 

courts “have no authority to add or insert language into a statute” and should not, 

through interpretation, add a requirement that the General Assembly did not include. 

Summit School, Inc. v. Department of Education, 108 A.3d 192, 199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015); see Vlasic Farms, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 734 A.2d 487, 

490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). With these principles in mind, we examine Section 

301.1(f) of the Act. 

Section 301.1(f)(9)(iv), (vi) of the Act provides, in relevant part: 

(f) Such local authorities shall not have authority by virtue 

of this act:

 (9) To levy, assess or collect any tax on individuals for 

the privilege of engaging in an occupation except that such 

a tax, to be known as the local services tax, may be levied, 

assessed and collected only by the political subdivision of 

the taxpayer’s place of employment. The following apply:

* * *
9

 (iv) With respect to a person subject to the local 

services tax at a combined rate exceeding ten dollars 

($10), the situs of the tax shall be the place of employment 

on the first day the person becomes subject to the tax 

during each payroll period. . . . In the event a person is 

engaged in more than one occupation, that is, concurrent 

employment, or an occupation which requires the person 

working in more than one political subdivision during a 

payroll period, the priority of claim to collect the local 

services tax shall be in the following order: first, the 

political subdivision in which a person maintains the 

person’s principal office or is principally employed;

second, the political subdivision in which the person 

resides and works, if the tax is levied by that political 

subdivision; and third, the political subdivision in which a 

person is employed and which imposes the tax nearest in 

miles to the person’s home.

* * *

 (vi) The local services tax shall be no more than fiftytwo dollars ($52) on each person for each calendar year, 

irrespective of the number of political subdivisions within 

which a person may be employed. A political subdivision 

shall provide a taxpayer a receipt of payment upon request 

by the taxpayer.

53 P.S. §6924.301.1(f)(9)(iv), (vi) (emphasis added). 

However, the Act does not define “place of employment.” The trial 

court determined that the “place of employment” was not “400 Hunt Valley Road”

as a whole, but rather the location within the facility where the employee performs

the majority of his or her work on the first day that person becomes subject to the 

tax each payroll period. To assign each employee to a particular township, the trial 

court added the word “specific” to the phrase “place of employment.” Trial Court 

Opinion at 4. The trial court then allocated the local services tax based on where the 

employee’s specific place of employment was in relation to the dividing line between 
10

Upper Burrell and Washington Township on the first day the employee became 

subject to the tax for that payroll period. In so doing, the trial court erred. 

First, it is a canon of statutory construction that “a court has no power 

to insert a word into a statute if the legislature has failed to supply it.” Vlasic Farms, 

734 A.2d at 490. The insertion of the word “specific” has resulted in an overly 

restrictive and narrow interpretation of an employee’s “place of employment” to 

mean an employee’s specific work station within an employer’s premises, as 

opposed to the premises as a whole. Although the trial court recognized that “[t]here 

are occasions during the work day in which persons employed there will go from 

one township to the other, in order to park their car or leave the premises from the 

parking lot, to have a meal or a snack in the cafeteria, to use the restroom facilities, 

or to attend to personnel matters . . . , [it found] the majority of a person’s work day 

is spent within the area of the facility where they are assigned to work.” Trial Court 

Opinion at 3. 

In other contexts where “place of employment” is relevant, courts do 

not give a comparably narrow read to the concept. For example, in workers’

compensation, an employer’s place of employment includes any area integral to the 

employer’s business. ICT Group v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Churchray-Woytunick), 995 A.2d 927, 931 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (parking lot held to 

be part of premises because it provides access to the workplace); see also, e.g., 

Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hines), 913 

A.2d 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (public sidewalk adjacent to plant gate deemed to be 

on employer’s premises); Fashion Hosiery Shops v. Workmen’s Compensation 

Appeal Board, 423 A.2d 792 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (entranceway to lessor’s building 

that was a means of ingress and egress to employer’s shop). 
11

Moreover, such a narrow reading of “place of employment” creates an 

exacting standard that is extraordinarily burdensome to apply. Under the trial court’s 

construction, Welsh Leedsworld personnel office will have to pinpoint an

employee’s specific location within the building, right down to a person’s desk or 

work station, at the beginning of every payroll period. This exercise may be 

impossible in certain areas of the building where the boundary line agreed to by the 

parties appears to bisect employee work stations. See R.R. at 244a. The General 

Assembly could not have intended such an exacting and problematic standard. See 

Board of Revision of Taxes, 4 A.3d at 622.

In defense of the trial court’s interpretation, Appellees rely on 

Octorara. Therein, the Chester County Court of Common Pleas confronted a similar 

issue. The school district had four school buildings, three of which were in West 

Fallowfield Township and one that was in Highland Township. The school district’s 

administrative offices were located in West Fallowfield Township, while the 

elementary school building where the teachers taught was located in Highland 

Township. Octorara, 7 Pa. D. & C.4th at 210. West Fallowfield Township 

attempted to impose its “occupational privilege tax”

4 on the teachers who taught in 

the Highland Township building on the basis that they were “administratively 

governed” out of the main office in West Fallowfield Township. Id. at 211. The 

teachers challenged the tax on the basis that their place of employment was in 

Highland Township, where they taught school, not West Fallowfield Township. The 

Octorara court, applying the former version of the Act,5 held that the tax was limited 

 

4 Now known as the “local services tax.” 53 P.S. §6924.301(f)(9).

5 The former provision of the Act similarly provided: “To levy, assess or collect any tax on 

individuals for the privilege of engaging in an occupation (occupational privilege tax) except that 
12

to the township in which the taxpayer works. Id. at 212. The Octorara court 

reasoned, “Section 6902(9) does not state that the situs of the tax is the location 

where the paychecks originate, but rather where the taxpayer is employed, i.e. where 

he or she works.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court held that the teachers who 

worked in the Highland Township building were not subject to the West Fallowfield 

Township tax. Id. 

Although we are not bound by the Octorara decision,6it is readily

distinguishable. In Octorara, the teachers and the administrative staff performed 

separate functions in separate buildings located in different townships. The school 

building where the teachers worked each day was located in a different township 

from the building where the administrative staff worked. The teachers did not work 

in both locations. According to the record, the teachers had few contacts with the 

administrative offices. 

By contrast, the Welsh Leedsworld facility involves a single building 

that houses fully-integrated administrative and manufacturing divisions, where, on 

any given day, the employees move freely throughout the building and use space 

and resources in both townships. R.R. at 116a-17a. Therefore, Octorara is not

persuasive. 

Appellees also rely on the priority of claim language in Section 

301.1(f)(9)(iv) to support the trial court’s allocation of taxes based on where 

 

such a tax may be levied, assessed and collected only by the political subdivision of the taxpayer’s 

place of employment. . . . The situs of such tax shall be the place of employment . . . .” Former

Section 2(9) of the Act, 53 P.S. §6902(9). 

6

“[D]ecisions of the Court of Common Pleas are not binding precedent” but “they may be 

considered for their persuasive authority.” Hirsch v. EPL Technologies, Inc., 910 A.2d 84, 89 n.6 

(Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 920 A.2d 833 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
13

employees are “principally employed.” Such reliance is misplaced.7 The priority of 

claim language applies to persons “engaged in more than one occupation” or “an 

occupation which requires the person working in more than one political subdivision 

during a payroll period.” 53 P.S. §6924.301.1(f)(9)(iv). Where a person works for 

more than one employer or where an employer has more than one office, we then 

examine where the person maintains a “principal office” or is “principally 

employed.” Id. (emphasis added). The point of the priority scheme is to ensure that 

a taxpayer, who is engaged in more than one occupation or an occupation which 

requires him or her to work in more than one political subdivision will not be forced 

to pay the local services tax to more than a single municipality. It is intended to 

protect traveling salespeople, union hall workers, or persons working for employers 

with multiple locations. 

However, Welsh Leedsworld’s employees are not working for more 

than one employer or in more than one office location during a payroll period. 

Rather, they are working for a single employer at a single location, which location 

happens to span two political subdivisions. What causes Welsh Leedsworld 

employees to work in more than one political subdivision is not the occupation itself, 

but the situs of the place of employment. Consequently, we do not prioritize claims 

based on “principal office” or where a person is “principally employed.” Rather, in 

the situation of a fully-integrated facility such as Welsh Leedsworld, the analysis 

begins and ends with the “place of employment.” 

Applying the foregoing analysis here, we conclude that the place of 

employment for Welsh Leedsworld is a single location -- 400 Hunt Valley Road. 

The place of employment must be treated as a whole, not a collection of individual 

 

7 We note that the trial court properly determined that Appellees’ reliance on this provision 

was misplaced. See Trial Court Opinion at 4.
14

workstations within the facility. Such an interpretation is logical where, as here, the 

place of employment is an integrated facility in which each part of the facility 

supports and correspondingly depends on the other parts and employees move freely 

throughout the building and use space and resources in both townships. R.R. at 

116a-17a. Considering the interdependence of all portions of the facility, employees 

work in both townships, not just the specific location where the employee is standing 

or sitting on the first day of the payroll period. Consequently, the “place of 

employment” encompasses the building, including cafeterias and conference rooms, 

the parking areas, and the land used in connection therewith. Treating the whole

facility as the “place of employment” also comports with the purpose of the local 

services tax, which is to defray the cost of providing emergency and other municipal 

services. Indeed, the parties stipulated that both townships provide such services to 

Welsh Leedsworld. 

The question remains as to what is the appropriate standard for tax 

allocation under the Act for integrated facilities that span more than one political 

subdivision. In other words, how should the local services tax be shared between 

them? 

Washington Township argues that the taxes should be shared equally 

between the taxing authorities. Washington Township explains that, because the tax 

itself has been designated by each township for the provision of emergency services, 

road construction and maintenance, reduction of real estate taxes and property relief 

through Homestead and Farmstead exclusions, those common purposes should 

require the equal sharing of the tax revenues. 

However, an equal division allocation has no relation to the actual 

“place of employment.” Although the place of employment is located in two 
15

townships, the dividing line between Washington and Upper Burrell Township is 

not equal. See R.R. at 244a, 247a. Because the place of employment encompasses 

the whole facility, not just the building, the proper tax allocation must relate to the 

division between the townships. 

The Welsh Leedsworld parcel is divided for real estate tax purposes. 

The dividing line is clearly shown on the recorded subdivision plan. R.R. at 99a; 

Original Record (O.R.), Trial Exhibits, Defendant’s Exhibit A. Moreover, “[t]he 

specific boundary line between the townships herein has been established in 

previous litigation regarding real estate taxes, by the consent of the townships. In 

re: Welsh Leedsworld PA, L.L.C., appeal filed by Township of Washington, 

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, tax map number 62-09-00-0-060 at No. 8789 

of 2007.” Trial Court Opinion at 2. According to the order, 28 percent of the 

property of Welsh Leedsworld is located in Washington Township and 72 percent is 

located in Upper Burrell Township. O.R., Trial Exhibits, Defendant’s Exhibit G; 

see R.R. at 88a-89a. 

Applying this formula here, Washington Township is entitled to taxes 

levied for 28 percent of the Welsh Leedsworld employees and Upper Burrell 

Township is entitled to taxes levied for 72 percent of the Welsh Leedsworld 

employees. 

V. Conclusion

In sum, where, as here, an integrated facility straddles two (or more) 

townships, the proper allocation of local services taxes must reflect the division of 

property between (or among) them. Therefore, the proper assessment is based on 

the percentage of the property within a particular township. Such an allocation along 
16

boundary lines is not only consistent with the intent and purpose of the Act, but is a 

manageable standard that is inherently fair to both townships, which provide services 

to Welsh Leedsworld. 

For these reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for 

an allocation of local services taxes between Washington Township and Upper 

Burrell Township based on the foregoing standard.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Washington, :

Westmoreland County, :

Pennsylvania, a Second Class :

Township, :

:

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 33 C.D. 2016

: 

Township of Upper Burrell, :

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, :

a Second Class Township; and :

Burrell School District :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2018, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (trial court), dated September 28, 2015, is 

REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the trial court for an allocation of 

local services taxes between Washington Township and Upper Burrell Township in 

accordance with the foregoing opinion. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge