COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER RYAN PIGGOTT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*BY 

v. Record No. 1797-07-1 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

 SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OFWILLIAMSBURG 

AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY 

Samuel Taylor Powell, III, Judge 

Stephen A. Hudgins (Cope & Olson, P.L.C., on brief), for appellant. 

Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

The trial court found Christopher Ryan Piggott guilty of various offenses, including 

attempted capital murder of a police officer in violation of Code §§ 18.2-25 and 18.2-31(6). On 

appeal, Piggott argues that the evidence failed to prove his guilt as a matter of law. We disagree 

and affirm. 

I. 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). This principle 

requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, 

and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair 

inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 

759 (1980) (emphasis and citation omitted). 

 

*

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
 At trial, Officer Jason Shadrix testified that about 4:00 p.m. on July 22, 2006, a police 

dispatcher directed him to a gas station convenience store to arrest Piggott on several outstanding 

arrest warrants. When Shadrix arrived, he saw Piggott driving away. Shadrix displayed his 

emergency flashing lights in an effort to stop Piggott. Piggott ignored the lights, abruptly 

accelerated, and ran a stop sign. Piggott then slowed to a rolling stop to allow his passenger to 

jump out of the vehicle. 

 Piggott again accelerated to about 60 miles per hour and entered the left-hand lane of 

oncoming traffic, passing multiple stopped cars. Several orange construction barrels had been 

placed alongside the road to cordon off a 30-foot-wide “construction area” of mixed blacktop 

material and loose gravel. Piggott drove between the barrels into the construction zone. 

Another officer, Lieutenant Jeremy Barnett, had positioned himself further ahead in a 

place where he could deploy “stinger spike strips” to blow out Piggott’s tires. Barnett saw 

Piggott approaching in a straight line between the cones. When Piggott was within about 30 

yards of Barnett, Piggott “abruptly jerked” his vehicle to the right and “veered” directly toward 

Barnett at a 45-degree angle to the curb. Piggott’s vehicle struck Barnett at a speed of about 40 

to 50 miles per hour, knocked him to the ground, and ran over his foot. After striking Barnett, 

Piggott fishtailed his vehicle to the left and continued to speed away. Piggott later got out of his 

vehicle, brandished a firearm at Officer Shadrix, and then shot himself under his chin. 

The trial court found Piggott guilty of various charges, including an attempt to kill a 

police officer in violation of Code §§ 18.2-25 and 18.2-31(6). 

II. 

 SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE — ATTEMPT TO KILL

“Sufficiency-of-the-evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the 

evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable 

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doubt.” United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). As an appellate court, we rely “on the 

adversarial process to sort out the contested and the uncontested aspects of the case,” Logan v. 

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172, 622 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2005) (en banc), and then review 

the trial court’s factfinding “with the highest degree of appellate deference,” Thomas v. 

Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 605, 608, 633 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2006). 

It follows that a reviewing court does not “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence 

at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original and citation omitted). Instead, we ask only “whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maxwell v. 

Commonwealth, 275 Va. 437, 442, 657 S.E.2d 499, 502 (2008) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319) (emphasis in original). These principles recognize that an appellate court is “not permitted 

to reweigh the evidence,” Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 408, 641 S.E.2d 494, 507 (2007), 

because appellate courts have no authority “to preside de novo over a second trial,” Haskins v. 

Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 11, 602 S.E.2d 402, 407 (2004).1

The trial court found Piggott guilty of attempting to kill a police officer. Under Code 

§ 18.2-31(6), the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a law-enforcement officer” for 

the purpose of “interfering with the performance of his official duties” constitutes capital murder. 

Code § 18.2-25 provides that any person who “attempts to commit an offense which is 

punishable with death” shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony. 

 

1

 This deferential standard of review “applies not only to the historical facts themselves, 

but the inferences from those facts as well.” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 663 

n.2, 588 S.E.2d 384, 387 n.2 (2003). Thus, a factfinder may “draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts,” Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 10, 602 S.E.2d at 406 (citations omitted), 

unless doing so would push “into the realm of non sequitur,” Thomas, 48 Va. App. at 608, 633 

S.E.2d at 231 (citation omitted). 

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Criminal attempt requires a specific intent to commit the crime coupled with a direct, 

though ineffectual, act towards its commission. Coles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 585, 589, 621 

S.E.2d 109, 111 (2005). An elusive concept, intent is “formed in a person’s mind and may be, 

and frequently is, shown by circumstances.” Holley v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 228, 234, 

604 S.E.2d 127, 130 (2004) (citations omitted). “Such intent may be inferred from the actor’s 

conduct and the attendant circumstances.” 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 695, 

at 589-91 (15th ed. 1996). To be sure, “in criminal attempt cases, ‘the fact finder is often 

allowed broad latitude in determining the specific intent of the actor.’” Siquina v. 

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 694, 700, 508 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1998) (citation omitted). 

“A motor vehicle, wrongfully used, can be a weapon as deadly as a gun or a knife.” 

Coles, 270 Va. at 590, 621 S.E.2d at 111 (citation omitted).2

 Homicidal intent can be inferred 

when the evidence proves a fleeing suspect “swerved” his vehicle and aimed “directly toward” a 

police officer, Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 276, 281, 645 S.E.2d 433, 435 (2007) 

(quoting Coles, 270 Va. at 590-91, 621 S.E.2d at 112), particularly when the suspect deviates “at 

an angle” from his path of travel despite having “plenty of room” to travel “straight ahead” to 

continue his escape, id. (citing Coles, 270 Va. at 590-91, 621 S.E.2d at 112).3

 

2

 An intent to kill “needs to exist only for a moment.” Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 

203, 242, 661 S.E.2d 415, 435 (2008) (citations omitted). Homicidal intent, therefore, “need not 

exist for any specified length of time . . . .” Kirby v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 691, 700, 653 

S.E.2d 600, 604 (2007) (quoting Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 352, 551 S.E.2d 

620, 632 (2001) (citation omitted)). ‘“The ordinary suggestion of the words deliberate and 

premeditated is of a reflective process,’ Professor Costello explains, ‘a weighing of pros and 

cons which continues over time. That ordinary meaning is not part of the law of first degree 

murder.’” Id. (quoting John L. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law & Procedure § 3.4-4, at 50-51 

(3d ed. 2002)). 

3 See, e.g., Holley, 44 Va. App. at 228, 604 S.E.2d at 127 (holding that specific intent to 

kill could be inferred from the fact that the defendant accelerated toward police officer standing 

in defendant’s path); Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 567 S.E.2d 537 (2002) 

(finding evidence sufficient where the defendant turned his vehicle toward police officer, who 

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Like Coles, this case involves a fleeing suspect targeting a police officer with his 

speeding vehicle. Though traveling in a straight line up to that point, Piggott “abruptly jerked” 

his vehicle to the right and “veered” directly toward Officer Barnett at a speed of 40 to 50 miles 

per hour. When he struck Barnett, Piggott’s vehicle was at a 45-degree angle to the curb. 

Afterwards, Piggott fishtailed his vehicle back into the straight-line path of escape. In short, 

Piggott had to deviate from his route of escape (which would have been a straight line through 

the construction cones) to hit Barnett. Because “an intent to kill seldom can be proved by direct 

evidence,” a factfinder must rest his judgment on a “combination of circumstantial factors” 

suggesting such an intent. Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 486, 384 S.E.2d 95, 98 

(1989) (citation omitted). A rational factfinder, under the combined circumstances of this case, 

could reasonably conclude that Piggott attempted to kill Officer Barnett. 

Piggott objects to this reasoning, claiming his hypothesis of innocence — that he was 

merely trying to get away, not to kill anyone — was plausible and thus should have resulted in 

his acquittal. When examining an “alternate hypothesis of innocence in a circumstantial 

evidence case,” however, the question is not whether “some evidence” supports the hypothesis, 

but whether a rational factfinder could have rejected it as unreasonable. Emerson v. 

Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277, 597 S.E.2d 242, 249 (2004) (citing Hudson, 265 Va. at 

513, 578 S.E.2d at 785). “Whether the hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is itself a ‘question 

of fact,’ subject to deferential appellate review.” Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 9, 602 S.E.2d at 406 

(citations omitted). 

“Merely because defendant’s theory of the case differs from that 

taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that every reasonable 

hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded. 

What weight should be given evidence is a matter for the 

[factfinder] to decide.” Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 

 

was riding a motorcycle, and accelerated rapidly); Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 

508 S.E.2d 354 (1998) (affirming conviction where the defendant accelerated toward pedestrian). 

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467, 138 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1964); see also Lyons v. City of 

Petersburg, 221 Va. 10, 13, 266 S.E.2d 880, 881 (1980) 

(“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict if it excludes 

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This occurs when the 

trier of facts has an abiding conviction of the guilt of the accused.” 

(emphasis added)). By finding the defendant guilty, therefore, the 

factfinder “has found by a process of elimination that the evidence 

does not contain a reasonable theory of innocence.” 

Id. (other citations omitted); see also Blow v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 533, 665 S.E.2d 254 

(2008). 

III. 

 Ample evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Piggott attempted to kill Officer 

Barnett. We thus affirm Piggott’s conviction of attempted capital murder of a police officer in 

violation of Code §§ 18.2-25 and 18.2-31(6). 

 Affirmed.