FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 07-50245

RAUL VEGA, a/k/a RAUL CAMPOS, D.C. No.

RAUL VEGA CAMPOS, ROBERTO  CR-06-00975-1-

CAMPOS, CHUBS, LIL’ CHUBS, CAS

LITTLE CHUBS, LIL’ CHUBBY, LIL OPINION CHUB, TRAVIESO, MIDGET, LIL’

BEAR,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 2, 2008—Pasadena, California

Filed September 24, 2008

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Dorothy W. Nelson and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

13573
COUNSEL

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Kathryn A.

Young, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant. 

Thomas P. O’Brien, United States Attorney, Christine C.

Ewell, Jeffrey A. Backhus, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

Raul Vega appeals several conditions of supervised release

imposed by the district court after Vega pled guilty to knowing possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The district

court sentenced Vega to a term of five years’ imprisonment

and three years’ supervised release. 

First, Vega challenges the district court’s requirement he

abstain from alcohol during his three-year period of supervised release. Second, he challenges the requirement he perform twenty hours of community service per week when he

is not employed at least part-time or enrolled in an educational or vocational program. Third, Vega challenges the

requirement he not associate with any member of a criminal

street gang. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm the conditions of supervised release.1

1We address Vega’s other contentions on appeal by separate memorandum disposition. 

13576 UNITED STATES v. VEGA
I.

On October 27, 2006, acting on a tip that Vega sold narcotics, an undercover Los Angeles Police Department detective

called Vega and asked him if he would sell the detective a

“ball of crystal”—1/8 ounce of crystal methamphetamine.

Vega agreed, and met the detective in a Los Angeles parking

lot. The undercover detective approached Vega; Vega said he

had brought the methamphetamine but needed to go home and

weigh it. After Vega left the parking lot, officers stopped

Vega’s car and arrested him. During the search of the car,

officers recovered 10.7 net grams of methamphetamine and a

loaded .380 caliber semiautomatic pistol. The officers arrested

Vega for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Vega and the government entered into a plea agreement,

the validity of which Vega does not challenge on appeal.

Vega agreed to plead guilty to a single count of knowing possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 

Vega waived his right to appeal his sentence, so long as the

sentence was for no longer than the statutory minimum of five

years. He retained the right to appeal certain conditions of

supervised release, including those he challenges in this

appeal. 

After Vega pleaded guilty to the single count, the Probation

Office disclosed the presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR

described Vega’s extensive criminal history, beginning when

he was arrested for battery at the age of fourteen. Many of

Vega’s arrests occurred while he was with members of the

Harpys gang, to which he belonged since he was fifteen. The

PSR also described Vega’s numerous arrests between 2000

and 2006 for violations of an anti-gang injunction issued by

the Los Angeles County Superior Court that prohibited Vega

and other named gang members from associating with each

UNITED STATES v. VEGA 13577
other in public within a certain area. The PSR further noted

that Vega had a history of heroin abuse. 

The Probation Office recommended a sentence of five

years, a term of three years’ supervised release, and a fine of

$900. It further recommended various conditions of supervised release, including: 

3. The defendant shall participate in an outpatient

substance abuse treatment and counseling program

that includes urinalysis, saliva and/or sweat patch

testing, as directed by the Probation Officer. The

defendant shall abstain from using illicit drugs and

alcohol, and abusing prescription medications during

the period of supervision; 

. . . 

7. When not employed at least part-time and/or

enrolled in an educational or vocational program, the

defendant shall perform 20 hours of community service per week as directed by the Probation Officer;

. . . 

11. The defendant shall not associate with any

member of any criminal street gang or disruptive

group as directed by the Probation Officer, specifically, any member of the Harpys street gang. 

The district court held Vega’s sentencing hearing on May

14, 2007. At Vega’s request, the district court waived the fine.

Also in response to Vega’s request, the district court struck

from condition 11 the term “disruptive groups” and added an

exception to allow Vega to associate with his brother, a member of the Harpys gang. Thus, as imposed, condition 11 prohibits Vega from associating with any member of any

criminal street gang as directed by the Probation Officer, spe13578 UNITED STATES v. VEGA
cifically any member of the Harpys street gang, with the

exception of Vega’s brother. The district court then imposed

a sentence of five years, and a three-year term of supervised

release. The district court imposed the conditions of supervised release recommended by the Probation Office, subject

only to the modification to condition 11. 

Vega’s timely appeal followed. 

II.

When the district court imposes a term of supervised

release, it must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), which include among others: the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of

the defendant; adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

the provision of training, medical care, or other correctional

treatment to the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a),

3583(c). The conditions must “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes

set forth” in the sentencing statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). 

We review conditions of supervised release properly challenged in the district court for abuse of discretion. United

States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1240 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). “In

applying this standard of review, we give considerable deference to a district court’s determination of the appropriate

supervised release conditions, recognizing that a district court

has at its disposal all of the evidence, its own impressions of

a defendant, and wide latitude.” United States v. Stoterau, 524

F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

As to conditions not challenged in the district court, we

review such forfeited claims for plain error. United States v.

Maciel-Vasquez, 458 F.3d 994, 996 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006).

Before we will correct a forfeited error, there must be

UNITED STATES v. VEGA 13579
(1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) affects substantial rights. Id.

“If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then

exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if

(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

III.

Vega challenges condition 3, which requires him to abstain

from using alcohol during the three-year period of supervised

release. Because Vega raised his claim as to this supervised

release condition before the district court, we review for abuse

of discretion. See T.M., 330 F.3d at 1240. 

[1] Vega contends the alcohol abstention condition is unrelated to his relevant history. To the contrary, the record

reflects Vega has misused alcohol in the past. Vega admitted

to drinking at the age of fourteen. At age sixteen, he was

arrested at least twice for loitering with Harpys gang members

drinking beer. In 2006, Vega was ordered by a California state

court to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly for

one year.2 Finally, there is a family history of alcohol abuse:

Vega’s father was an alcoholic who died of liver cirrhosis

when Vega was twelve, and Vega’s mother abused alcohol for

five years after his father’s death. 

[2] Moreover, the alcohol abstention condition is reasonably related to the goal of furthering Vega’s rehabilitation.

2After being found in contempt of court in February 2006 for violating

the anti-gang injunction, Vega was given probation and ordered to attend

Narcotics Anonymous meetings. In July 2006, probation was revoked and

then later reinstated with an order that Vega attend Alcoholics Anonymous

meetings. Although Vega contends this was merely a “venue” change for

the Narcotics Anonymous meetings, the district court reasonably could

conclude, based on the order to attend Alcoholics Anonymous, that Vega

had a history of alcohol abuse which a prior court had found required

counseling. 

13580 UNITED STATES v. VEGA
Vega has a well-documented history of drug abuse as

reflected in the PSR, letters to the court from Vega’s friends

and family, and Vega’s request to the court for drug counseling. Vega and his friends and family told the district court

they thought his drug addiction led to the offense for which

he was here convicted. “[I]t is hardly a secret that there is a

tie between drug abuse and alcohol abuse.” United States v.

Brown, 235 F.3d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (upholding under plain

error review a condition that defendant abstain from alcohol

and all intoxicants because it was related to defendant’s history of alcohol abuse, to his drug offense because there is a

tie between drugs and alcohol, and to defendant’s goal of

remaining drug-free). A condition that requires Vega to stay

completely sober by prohibiting him from using any intoxicating substance—whether drugs or alcohol—is “part of an integrated rehabilitative scheme.” United States v. Gementera,

379 F.3d 596, 606 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States

v. Sales, 476 F.3d 732, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding

under plain error review an alcohol abstention condition

where defendant had no history of alcohol abuse and his

offense did not involve alcohol, but the record revealed a history of drug abuse and need for drug treatment). 

[3] Vega has a history of drug abuse and misuse of alcohol,

he asked for drug treatment, and he claimed his offense was

caused by his drug addiction. Thus, the condition that Vega

stay completely sober and abstain from all intoxicating substances was reasonably related to Vega’s history and the goals

of rehabilitation and protection of the public. The district

court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed this condition.3

3Contrary to Vega’s contention, his case is readily distinguishable from

United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007), where we held a district court abused its discretion when it imposed an alcohol abstention condition where neither alcohol nor drugs played a role in the defendant’s

offense, the defendant had no history of alcohol or drug abuse, and the district court expressly stated it imposed the condition in an effort to change

the public defender’s office policy of instructing defendants not to answer

probation officers’ questions about drugs and alcohol. Id. at 879-80. 

UNITED STATES v. VEGA 13581
IV.

Vega also challenges condition 7, which requires him to

perform twenty hours of community service per week, as

directed by the Probation Officer, when Vega is not employed

at least part-time or enrolled in an educational or vocational

program. Vega raised this claim before the district court;

accordingly, we review it for abuse of discretion. See T.M.,

330 F.3d at 1240. 

[4] We have not previously addressed a challenge to a condition of supervised release that requires community service.

The Sentencing Guidelines, however, expressly provide that

“[c]ommunity service may be ordered as a condition of probation or supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.3.4

 We agree with

the Seventh Circuit that “the imposition of education, employment and community service conditions will further the statutory goal of providing ‘the defendant with needed educational

or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional

treatment in the most effective manner.’ ” United States v.

McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)) (upholding on plain error review a

condition requiring the defendant to perform at least twenty

hours of community service per week as directed by the Probation Office until gainfully employed). Community service

is another opportunity for a defendant to obtain education and

vocational training. Id. at 725. 

[5] Moreover, Vega has a history of gang membership and

scattered employment. Condition 7 encourages Vega to use

4The commentary to § 5F1.3 states, “[c]ommunity service generally

should not be imposed in excess of 400 hours” to avoid heavy administrative burdens of selection of placements and monitoring of attendance. Neither the comment nor the Guidelines, however, prohibits the imposition of

more than 400 hours. In any event, whether Vega might have to perform

more than 400 hours of community service is speculative and will depend

on whether he is working or in a training program during his period of

supervised release. 

13582 UNITED STATES v. VEGA
his time productively—in work, education, or community

service—rather than revert to gang activity. Thus, the condition is reasonably related to Vega’s rehabilitation, prevention

of recidivism, and protection of the public from future crimes.

Vega also contends the community service requirement is

“unreasonable under the circumstances.” Vega has worked in

the past as a day laborer. He contends that as a day laborer he

might have to spend hours waiting for work; if he is unsuccessful in securing employment, he then will be compelled to

spend additional hours performing community service to

comply with this requirement. His fear is based on speculation. Vega has held jobs other than day laborer. Moreover, the

condition applies only if Vega is not working “at least parttime”; thus, it will not apply if Vega is successful in securing

work at least some of the time. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it imposed condition 7.5

V.

Finally, Vega challenges condition 11, which prohibits him

from association “with any member of any criminal street

gang as directed by the Probation Officer, specifically, any

member of the Harpys street gang.” Before the district court

Vega challenged only “the portion of the condition prohibiting association with ‘disruptive groups’ ” and association with

his brother. Vega did not challenge those aspects of condition

11 he now challenges on appeal. Accordingly, we review

5We reject Vega’s contention the district court abused its discretion by

failing to give a “justification” for the community service requirement. See

United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] sentencing

judge is not required to articulate on the record at sentencing the reasons

for imposing each condition of supervised release, where we can determine from the record whether the court abused its discretion.”) (footnote

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

UNITED STATES v. VEGA 13583
these new claims for plain error. See United States v. MacielVasquez, 458 F.3d 994, 996 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). 

[6] A defendant “has a separate due process right to conditions of supervised release that are sufficiently clear to inform

him of what conduct will result in his being returned to prison.” United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir.

2002) (per curiam). Vega contends condition 11 violates due

process because it uses the impermissibly vague terms: “associate,” “any criminal street gang,” and “Harpys street gang.”

Vega’s contention is foreclosed by our decision in United

States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

[7] In Soltero, we held the district court did not abuse its

discretion when it imposed the following condition, which is

nearly identical to condition 11: “The defendant shall not

associate with any known member of any criminal street gang

. . . as directed by the Probation Officer, specifically, any

known member of the Delhi street gang.” Soltero, 510 F.3d

at 865. We held the term “associate” was not impermissibly

vague: “The Supreme Court has held that ‘incidental contacts’

—such as those Soltero fears he would be punished for inadvertently engaging in—do not constitute ‘association,’ . . . and

we hold that, with this limitation, ‘men of common intelligence’ need not guess at the meaning of ‘association’ in the

context of” this condition. Id. at 866-67 (internal citation

omitted). 

[8] Further, we held the term “Delhi street gang” was “sufficiently clear”: the district court was “entitled to presume that

Soltero—who has admitted to being a member of this gang—

is familiar with the Delhi gang’s members . . . .” Id. at 866.

Here too the district court was entitled to presume Vega was

familiar with the Harpys street gang: there was ample undisputed evidence in the record that Vega had been a Harpys

member since at least 1995. 

13584 UNITED STATES v. VEGA
[9] Finally, in Soltero we held the meaning of the term

“criminal street gang” was sufficiently clear: the term is

“slightly more ambiguous [than “Delhi street gang”]—but not

unconstitutionally so.” Id. at 866. Moreover, “[a]lthough . . .

not crucial to our finding that the meaning of ‘criminal street

gang’ would be apparent to the average person,” we noted

that 18 U.S.C. § 521(a) defines “criminal street gang.”

6

Id. at

866 n.8. 

[10] Accordingly, under Soltero, the terms “associate,”

“any criminal street gang,” and “Harpys street gang,” in condition 11 are not impermissibly vague. 

As Vega correctly notes, however, the supervised release

condition in Soltero expressly stated the defendant shall not

associate with any known member of a criminal street gang,

whereas condition 11 here is not expressly limited to known

members. Vega contends he could face revocation of supervised release for unknowingly violating the condition by associating with someone whom he does not realize is a member

of the Harpys or another criminal street gang. 

[11] We construe condition 11 consistent with wellestablished jurisprudence under which we presume prohibited

criminal acts require an element of mens rea. See Staples v.

6

18 U.S.C. § 521(a) defines “criminal street gang” as: 

an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 5 or more

persons— 

(A) that has as 1 of its primary purposes the commission of 1

or more of the criminal offenses described in subsection (c) [e.g.,

felony involving controlled substance for which the maximum

penalty is not less than 5 years]; 

(B) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the

past 5 years, in a continuing series of offenses described in subsection (c); and 

(C) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. 

UNITED STATES v. VEGA 13585
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1994). Applying this

presumption, we read the condition to prohibit knowing association with members of a criminal street gang. See also

United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 2006)

(“Generally, supervised release provisions are read to exclude

inadvertent violations.”). So construed, the condition is not

impermissibly vague. 

Further,“[i]f and when [supervised release] is revoked, we

will examine the findings to insure that [defendant’s] due process right to notice of prohibited conduct has been observed

and to protect him from unknowing violations.” United States

v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting as

premature defendant’s contention that a condition of probation that prohibited him from association with any person

convicted of any drug offense or who is unlawfully involved

with drugs was vague and overbroad because it might permit

revocation of probation for unknowing association). 

AFFIRMED.

13586 UNITED STATES v. VEGA