IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1249

Filed January 25, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF A.S.,

Minor Child,

B.C., Father,

Appellant,

E.S., Mother,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Scott D. 

Strait, District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to a child born in 2021. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Roberta J. Megel of the State Public Defender Office, Council Bluffs, for 

appellant father.

J. Joseph Narmi, Council Bluffs, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena (until 

withdrawal) and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

Eric A. Checketts, Glenwood, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. 

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to a child born in 2021. The mother and father (I) challenge the evidence 

supporting the grounds for termination cited by the district court; (II) contend the 

Iowa Department of Health and Human Services did not engage in reasonable 

efforts to facilitate reunification; and (III) argue the district court should not have 

terminated their parental rights based on the parent-child bond. The mother also 

contends (IV) termination is not in the child’s best interests, (V) she should have 

been afforded additional time to work toward reunification, and (VI) the district court 

should not have terminated her parental rights because the child was placed with 

a relative. 

I. Grounds for Termination

The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to several 

statutory provisions. We may affirm if we find clear and convincing evidence to 

support any of the grounds. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App.

1999). We elect to focus on Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2022), which 

requires proof of several elements, including proof the child cannot be returned to 

parental custody.

The facts triggering department involvement are essentially undisputed. At 

the time of the child’s birth, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine and 

the active ingredient in marijuana. The child also tested positive. The child was 

discharged to the care of a relative, where she remained throughout the 

proceedings.
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The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition naming the mother’s 

husband and another man as possible fathers. The husband eventually divorced 

the mother, and his paternity was disestablished. The other man was served by 

publication, and he appeared through counsel at the adjudicatory hearing and 

personally and with counsel at the remaining hearings.

The mother admitted to ongoing drug use. She refused to submit to drug 

testing and spent a single day in a residential drug treatment program before 

leaving against the advice of staff. Although the department allowed her to 

exercise daily visits with the child under her relative’s supervision, the case 

manager testified the mother would go “several days to around two weeks without 

contacting” the relative or visiting the child. At the time of the termination hearing, 

the mother was staying with her mother, who also used methamphetamine and 

whose house had just been sold, requiring them to move. The case manager who 

oversaw the case from the time of the child’s birth through termination testified the 

child could not be returned to the mother’s custody. 

As for the biological father whose paternity was ultimately established, he 

spent several months in jail. On his release, he commendably made efforts to 

have supervised visits with the child, and those visits went well. But he conceded 

he needed a few more months to be in a position to have the child returned to his 

custody. That concession foreclosed reunification. See W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 313 

(focusing on return “at the time of the termination hearing”). 

On our de novo review, we agree with the district court that the parents were

not in a position to have the child returned to their custody. 
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II. Reasonable Efforts

The department has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to facilitate 

reunification. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). The parents 

generally assert the department failed to fulfill that obligation. On our de novo 

review, we disagree. The department afforded the mother residential drug 

treatment, drug testing, and daily supervised visits with the child. The mother 

minimally availed herself of these services. The department also afforded the 

father the same services, except while he was incarcerated. While the father took 

advantage of these services—placing himself on a wait list for residential 

treatment, testing negative for drugs, and participating in supervised visits—his 

participation came too late. Id. at 495. By his own admission, he used drugs three 

months before the termination hearing and was arrested for a no-contact violation 

around that time. He was only released from jail two months before the termination 

hearing. These circumstances were of his own making. 

We conclude the department satisfied its reasonable-efforts obligation.

III. Parent-Child Bond

The court may grant an exception to termination based on the parent-child 

bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The mother testified to a strong bond with 

the child. The father also testified to a bond but acknowledged he only had three 

months to develop a relationship with his daughter. Given the parents’ insufficient 

progress toward safe, independent parenting, we conclude the district court 

appropriately denied this exception to termination.
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IV. Best Interests

The mother argues termination was not in the child’s best interests. See id. 

§ 232.116(2). We disagree. The mother could not safely parent the child. As the 

department reported, “[she] has minimally participated in services but has not been 

able to meet any of the goals set for her.” We agree with the district court that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

V. Additional Time

The mother contends she should have been afforded additional time to 

reunify. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (“[T]he juvenile court 

may deny termination and give the parent an additional six months for reunification 

only if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional sixmonth period.’” (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b))). The case manager 

recommended against additional time, testifying it was “not really fair” to the child 

that the mother was “unable to address” her “addiction and other behaviors in” the 

“11 months” of the child’s life. We agree. 

VI. Placement with Relative

The mother argues the district court should not have terminated her 

parental rights because the child was placed with a relative. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(a). The relative did not have legal custody of the child. Accordingly, 

the exception was not applicable. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 170 (Iowa 

2021) (“[T]his exception can come into play only when a relative has ‘legal 

custody.’” (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a))). 

We affirm termination of the parents’ rights to the child.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.