In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1104

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Noah Lawal,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 98 CR 651--Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

Argued June 6, 2000--Decided November 1, 2000

 Before Bauer, Manion, and Williams, Circuit

Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. Noah Lawal, a

Nigerian citizen who had been in the

United States for ten months/1 prior to

his arrest, was indicted for conspiracy

to possess with intent to distribute

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 846

and attempting to possess heroin with the

intent to distribute it in violation of

18 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1). Lawal moved

tosuppress several self-incriminating

statements he made to authorities after

his arrest, but the district court denied

the motion without an evidentiary

hearing. A jury later convicted Lawal on

both counts and the district judge

sentenced him to 78 months in prison.

Lawal appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Background

 The facts of this heroin smuggling

operation begin in Nairobi, Kenya where

Pamela Matagaro obtained heroin from

James Bukana and agreed to transport it

to the United States. Matagaro boarded an

airplane in Nairobi and flew to Boston,
Massachusetts. Although Matagaro usually

wears women’s size seven shoes, this day

she donned a roomy pair of men’s size

nine. Her unusually large shoes concealed

some 800 grams of heroin.

 When Matagaro deplaned in Boston, agents

from the United States Customs Service

arrested her and seized the heroin-laden

shoes. Following her arrest, Matagaro

agreed to cooperate with law enforcement.

Matagaro told officials that Bukana had

instructed her to fly from Boston to Chi

cago, Illinois, check into a hotel, and

notify him of her arrival. According to

the plan, Bukana was then to contact

someone named "Moses" who would pick up

the heroin from Matagaro. Federal agents

accompanied Matagaro to Chicago where she

checked into a hotel. The agents set up

telephonic recording equipment in the

room and recorded her phone calls over

the next two days. 

 Matagaro called Bukana to tell him where

she was staying. Bukana’s brother later

told Matagaro that "Moses" had been

contacted and given the phone number to

her hotel room. Shortly thereafter,

Matagaro received two telephone calls

from an individual whose voice the agents

later identified as Lawal’s. Lawal told

Matagaro that he would come to the hotel

very soon. Twenty minutes later, Lawal

arrived at the hotel accompanied by Tunji

Soetan. Lawal waited in the car while

Soetan went to Matagaro’s room to pick up

the shoes. Outside the hotel, agents

waited for Soetan to return, and arrested

both Soetan and Lawal and took them to a

local police station.

 While Lawal was in a holding cell, an

agent handed him a waiver of Miranda

rights form. The agent read it to Lawal

and asked Lawal if he understood it.

After stating that he understood each

provision of the Miranda waiver form,

Lawal signed it and made several

incriminating statements. Lawal explained

that a man named Lekan contacted him the

previous day and instructed him to meet a

woman at a local hotel to pick up a pair

of shoes. He was told that the shoes

contained heroin. Lawal confessed that he

went to the hotel to pick up the shoes

and that he planned to deliver the heroin

to Lekan. Lawal also admitted that he had

made several drug deliveries in the past

for both Lekan and his wife.
 Before his trial, Lawal moved to

suppress his statements on two grounds.

First, he argued that the failure to

advise him of his right to contact the

Nigerian consul violated Article 36 of

the Vienna Convention on Consular

Relations ("Article 36"), and that the

only appropriate remedy was to suppress

his statements. Second, Lawal maintained

that his confessions were involuntary

because he did not knowingly waive his

Miranda rights. The district court

rejected both arguments and allowed the

government to introduce Lawal’s

confessions at trial. Having been

convicted and sentenced, Lawal now

challenges the denial of his motion to

suppress.

Discussion

 Because Lawal’s appeal of the district

court’s denial of his motion to suppress

raises only questions of law, we apply a

de novo standard of review. See United

States v. Williams, 209 F.3d 940, 942

(7th Cir. 2000). As to Lawal’s first con

tention, the government admits that it

did not advise Lawal that he could

contact the Nigerian consul until after

he had confessed. The provision of the

Vienna Convention on which Lawal relies

states:

(1) With a view to facilitating the

exercise of consular functions relating

to nationals of the sending State:

* * *

(b) if he so requests, the competent

authorities of the receiving State shall,

without delay, inform the consular post

of the sending State if, within its

consular district, a national of that

State is arrested or committed to prison

or to custody pending trial or is

detained in any other manner. Any

communication addressed to the consular

post by the person arrested, in prison,

custody or detention shall also be

forwarded by the said authorities without

delay. The said authorities shall inform

the person concerned without delay of his

rights under this sub-paragraph[.]

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,

Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77,

100, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. While some courts,
including ours, have had the opportunity

to decide whether Article 36 creates

individual rights enforceable in judicial

proceedings, all have sidestepped the

issue. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.

371, 376 (1998) (per curiam); United

States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, No. 99-2721

& 99-2874, 2000 WL 1182450, at *7 (7th

Cir. Aug. 21, 2000); United States v.

Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196

(11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United

States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d

882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc);

United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st

Cir. 2000). Likewise, we need not decide

the issue today because it does not

affect our disposition of this case.

 Even assuming Lawal has an enforceable

right and that his right was violated, we

have previously held that the

exclusionary rule is not an appropriate

remedy for an Article 36 violation. Our

recent opinion in United States v.

Chaparro-Alcantara is dispositive of this

issue. See 2000 WL 1182450, at *8; accord

Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d at 1195-96;

Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886; Li,

206 F.3d at 60. In Chaparro-Alcantara, we

determined that since there is no general

exclusionary rule for international law

violations, suppression of evidence is

appropriate "only when the treaty

provides for that remedy." See 2000 WL

1182450, at *7. We read Article 36 as not

providing such an extraordinary remedy.

See id. at *8. Accordingly, we conclude

that the district court properly admitted

Lawal’s confessions into evidence even if

the government failed to observe Article

36 because suppression of that evidence

would have been inappropriate.

 Lawal next argues that the district

court should have suppressed his

statements because they were not made

knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently, as required by the Fifth

Amendment. According to Lawal, his

statements were involuntary because his

unique personal characteristics made it

impossible for him to fully understand

his rights or the implications of waiving

those rights. Lawal explains that he did

not comprehend his rights because he is

not familiar with the American legal

system, he was not informed of his right

to contact his consul, he suffers from

paranoia, and he comes from a country

where he would have been beaten or
tortured if he did not comply with police

demands. The government counters by

pointing out that Lawal does not claim

any improper or coercive conduct by the

law enforcement officials and without

such an allegation his confession cannot

be viewed as involuntary.

 "A confession is voluntary if the

totality of the circumstances

demonstrates that it was the product of

rational intellect and not the result of

physical abuse, psychological

intimidation, or deceptive interrogation

tactics calculated to overcome the

defendant’s free will." Watson v.

DeTella, 122 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir.

1997) (citations omitted). In Colorado v.

Connelly, the Supreme Court stated: "[w]e

hold that coercive police activity is a

necessary predicate to the finding that a

confession is not ’voluntary’ within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause . . .

." 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). In Watson,

we interpreted this to mean that

"[a]bsent a showing of some type of

official coercion . . . a defendant’s

personal characteristics alone are

insufficient to render a confession

involuntary." 122 F.3d at 453.

 In this case, there is no factual basis

for a finding that Lawal involuntarily

incriminated himself. Lawal fails to

allege any misconduct, abuse, or physical

or mental coercion by the police who

questioned him; instead, Lawal builds his

entire argument on his unique personal

characteristics. Without showing some

official coercion, Lawal’s argument

fails. Because there was no suggestion of

police coercion, the district court

correctly denied Lawal’s motion to

suppress his confessions as

involuntary./2 

Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment

of the district court is affirmed.

/1 Lawal came to the United States on a temporary

worker’s visa and overstayed the visa. Lawal was,

therefore, illegally in the United States at the

time of his arrest.

/2 Lawal also claims that the district court erred

by not holding an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether his statements were voluntary. There

was no error here because without a claim of

official misconduct his argument fails as a

matter of law. In any event, the record illustrates that Lawal knowingly waived his right to

an evidentiary hearing after consulting with his

attorney.