55492 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 121 

[Docket No. FAA–2005–22449; Notice No. 

05–07] 

RIN 2120–AI16 

Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew 

Discreet Alerting Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation 

Administration proposes to require 

passenger-carrying transport category 

airplanes used in domestic, flag, and 

supplemental operations to have a 

means to allow the flightcrew to 

visually monitor the door area outside 

the flightdeck. This means would allow 

the flightcrew to identify persons 

requesting entry into the flightdeck, and 

to detect suspicious behavior or 

potential threats. Second, the FAA 

proposes that, for operations requiring 

the presence of flight attendants, the 

flight attendants have a means to 

discreetly notify the flightcrew of 

suspicious activity or security breaches 

in the cabin. The proposed changes 

address standards adopted by the 

International Civil Aviation 

Organization following the September 

11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before November 21, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments 

[identified by Docket Number FAA– 

2005–22449] using any of the following 

methods: 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to http:// 

dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions 

for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590– 

0001. Due to the suspension of paper 

mail delivery to DOT headquarters 

facilities, we encourage commenters to 

send their comments electronically. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

For more information on the rulemaking 

process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section of this document. 

Privacy: We will post all comments 

we receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. For more 

information, see the Privacy Act 

discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION section of this document. 

Docket: To read background 

documents or comments received, go to 

http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to 

Room PL–401 on the plaza level of the 

Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, 

SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

Comments that you may consider to 

be of a sensitive security nature should 

not be sent to the docket management 

system. Send those comments to the 

FAA, Office of Rulemaking, ARM–1, 

800 Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington DC 20591. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe 

Keenan, Air Carrier Operations Branch, 

Flight Standards Service, 800 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–8166, facsimile (202) 267–9579, email: joe.keenan@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. We also invite comments relating 

to the economic, environmental, energy, 

or federalism impacts that might result 

from adopting the proposals in this 

document. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposal, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning this proposed rulemaking. 

The docket is available for public 

inspection before and after the comment 

closing date. If you wish to review the 

docket in person, go to the address in 

the ADDRESSES section of this preamble 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

You may also review the docket using 

the Internet at the Web address in the 

ADDRESSES section. 

Anyone is able to search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

comment (or signing the comment, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 

65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you 

may visit http://dms.dot.gov. 

Before acting on this proposal, we 

will consider all comments we receive 

on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change this proposal in light of the 

comments we receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it to you. 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

You can get an electronic copy using 

the Internet by: 

(1) Searching the Department of 

Transportation’s electronic Docket 

Management System (DMS) Web page 

(http://dms.dot.gov/search); 

(2) Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http:// 

www.faa.gov/regulations Web page at; 

or 

(3) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/ 

aces140.html. 

You can also get a copy by submitting 

a request to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to 

identify the docket number or notice 

number, of this rulemaking Authority 

for this Rulemaking. 

Background 

Activities Leading to This Proposal 

Besides the steps the FAA took 

immediately after the terrorists’ acts on 

September 11, 2001, the Office of the 

Secretary of Transportation (OST), 

Congress, and the FAA, took several 

longer terms actions to prevent 

hijackings on passenger-carrying 

airplanes used in air carrier service. 

• On September 16, the Secretary of 

Transportation announced the creation 

of two rapid-response teams (RRT) to 

develop recommendations for 

improving security within the national 

aviation system. One team was tasked to 

develop recommendations to improve 

security at the Nation’s airports; the 

other team was tasked to develop 

recommendations for aircraft integrity 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 55493 

and security, with a specific focus on 

cockpit access. 

Members of the aircraft integrity and 

security RRT included representatives 

from American Airlines, The Boeing 

Company, Association of Flight 

Attendants, and the Air Line Pilots 

Association. Members of the 

Department of Transportation and the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

supported the RRT. In addition to 

regular team meetings, the RRT met 

with representatives from the airline 

operators, pilot and flight attendant 

associations, and parts manufacturers. 

The RRT also received numerous 

recommendations from the public as the 

result of an e-mail address setup on the 

FAA Web site. 

On October 1, the RRT for aircraft 

integrity and security presented its final 

report to the Secretary of 

Transportation. The report made 17 

recommendations. One 

recommendation recognized the need 

for (i) reinforced flightdeck doors and 

(ii) severe limitations to flightdeck 

entry. Anticipating the new severe 

limitations to flightdeck entry, the RRT 

made four recommendations for 

flightdeck access. As part of one 

recommendation, the RRT addressed the 

flightcrew’s need for notification of a 

potential threat in the cabin by stating: 

With the flightdeck no longer readily 

accessible to flight attendants, they must 

have a method for immediate notification to 

the flight deck during a suspected threat in 

the cabin. On receipt of such a warning, the 

pilot would check to make sure that the flight 

deck door is secure and begin immediate 

landing procedures. Consideration should be 

given to systems that might be installed in 

the aircraft as well as a device that could be 

carried by a crew member. In those aircraft 

equipped with an automated evacuation 

alarm system, it may in the near term be an 

effective tool for such notification. 

The RRT recommended that the 

‘‘industry develop a plan of feasible 

alternatives for emergency warnings 

within 30 days.’’

A second flightdeck access 

recommendation addressed the value of 

monitoring the area outside the 

flightcrew’s compartment door. The 

RRT stated: 

There is a consensus that cameras to 

monitor and view the area outside the flight 

deck door may add value. There should be 

continuous lighting outside the flight deck 

door for visibility, as well as to provide 

lighting for cameras. However, placement of 

a monitor in the limited space on the flight 

deck is a challenge. While there may be value 

in video or audio systems which provide 

information about activities throughout the 

cabin, we have no consensus on whether or 

how to proceed with this technology. 

The RRT recommended that the 

‘‘industry evaluate the use of cameras 

and lighting outside the flight deck door 

within 6 months.’’

• On November 19, Congress passed 

the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107–71). 

Section 104(b) of the ATSA states that 

the FAA Administrator may develop 

and implement methods—

(1) To use video monitors or other devices 

to alert pilots in the flight deck to activity in 

the cabin, except that use of such monitors 

or devices shall be subject to nondisclosure 

requirements applicable to cockpit video 

records under [49 U.S.C. 1114(c)], * * * and 

(3) To revise the procedures by which 

cabin crews of aircraft can notify flight deck 

crews of security breaches and other 

emergencies, including providing for the 

installation of switches or other devices or 

methods in an aircraft cabin to enable flight 

crews to discreetly notify the pilots in the 

case of a security breach occurring in the 

cabin. 

• On November 25, 2002, Congress 

passed the Homeland Security Act 

(HSA) to create the Department of 

Homeland Security (Pub. L. 107–296). 

Section 1403(b) of the HSA amended 

the ATSA to state that the Under 

Secretary of Transportation for Security, 

may ‘‘Require that air carriers provide 

flight attendants with a discreet, handsfree, wireless method of communicating 

with the pilots.’’

International Standards 

At the time of the terrorists’ attack, 

the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), an international 

body consisting of 188 member 

countries, was reviewing proposed 

changes to Annex 6 of the Convention 

on International Civil Aviation. Annex 

6, Part I contains requirements for the 

operation of airplanes involved in 

international commercial air transport. 

In light of the attack and comments 

received from its members States, ICAO 

proposed new provisions with a 

particular focus on security of the 

flightcrew compartment (also known as 

the flightdeck). Those provisions 

contained requirements for a flightdeck 

door and related requirements for 

locking, unlocking, and monitoring the 

area outside the door, and discreet 

notification of the flightcrew in the 

event of security breaches in the cabin. 

ICAO adopted the provisions in Chapter 

13, Security, on March 15, 2002. 

Standard 13.2, Security of the flight crew 

compartment, states: 

13.2.1 In all aeroplanes which are 

equipped with a flight crew compartment 

door, this door shall be capable of being 

locked, and means shall be provided by 

which cabin crew can discreetly notify the 

flight crew in the event of suspicious activity 

or security breaches in the cabin. 

13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all 

passenger-carrying airplanes of a maximum 

certificated take-off weight mass in excess of 

45500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity 

greater than 60 shall be equipped with an 

approved flight crew compartment door that 

is designed to resist penetration by small 

arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist 

forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. 

This door shall be capable of being locked 

and unlocked from either pilot’s station. 

13.2.3 In all aeroplanes which are 

equipped with a flight crew compartment 

door in accordance with 13.2.2: 

(a) This door shall be closed and locked 

from the time all external doors are closed 

following embarkation until any such door is 

opened for disembarkation, except when 

necessary to permit access and egress by 

authorized persons; and 

(b) Means shall be provided for monitoring 

from either pilot’s station the entire door area 

outside the flight crew compartment to 

identify persons requesting entry and to 

detect suspicious behaviour or potential 

threat. 

The deadline for implementation of 

the ICAO standards was November 1, 

2003. 

Discussion of the Proposal 

The FAA proposes to amend part 121 

by requiring a means for the flightcrew 

to monitor the area outside the 

flightdeck door and a means for the 

cabin crew to discreetly notify the 

flightcrew of a suspicious activity or 

security beach in the cabin. For 

purposes of this rule, flightcrew refers to 

pilots and flight engineers, and cabin 

crew refers to crewmembers. The 

purpose of monitoring is to identify 

anyone requesting entry to the 

flightdeck and to detect suspicious 

behavior or potential threats. The 

proposal would set forth a standard that 

would allow industry to consider 

various options to comply with the final 

rule. 

The proposed rule addresses the 

ICAO standard. The ICAO standard 

applies to all passenger-carrying 

airplanes of a maximum certificated 

take-off mass in excess of 45,500 kg 

(approximately 100,309 lbs) or with a 

passenger seating capacity greater than 

60 involved in international commercial 

air transport. This proposed rule applies 

only to passenger-carrying operations 

conducted under part 121 that require a 

lockable door between the cockpit and 

passenger compartment. Neither the 

ICAO standard nor this proposed rule 

will apply to all-cargo operations. 

Additionally, part 121 operations do not 

encompass all passenger-carrying 

airplanes with a maximum certificated 

take-off mass in excess of 45500 Kg (the 

ICAO standard) operated in the U.S. 

55494 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

Accordingly, since some airplanes may 

operate both domestically and 

internationally under other operational 

rules (e.g., parts 91, 125 and 135), the 

U.S. will not fully comply with the 

ICAO standard. 

The FAA’s proposed rule will require 

passenger-carrying part 121 operators to 

retrofit their aircraft with a means to 

monitor the area on the cabin side of the 

flightdeck door and adopt measures to 

comply with the flightcrew notification 

requirement. Since there is a retrofit 

requirement, the FAA proposes to give 

industry 2 years to comply from the 

time a final rule is adopted. This time 

should be sufficient for industry to 

consider various options, rather than 

requiring the industry to focus solely on 

one possible option in order to meet a 

more immediate implementation date. 

In proposed § 121.313(k), the use of 

the phrase ‘‘a means to monitor from the 

flightdeck side of the door’’ permits at 

least two methods to comply with the 

proposed rule, covering monitoring 

from the flightdeck. The first method is 

a video system. The video system would 

transmit video images to a monitor or 

monitors appropriately situated on the 

flightdeck to allow viewing of the area 

outside the flightdeck (herein referred to 

the ‘‘door area’’) from the flightdeck side 

of the door. A crewmember would 

provide audio confirmation to the 

flightcrew that the door area is clear, 

including confirmation that the lavatory 

is clear. A second method would 

involve visual identification of the door 

area, coupled with an audio 

confirmation procedure. Through a 

viewing device installed in the 

flightdeck door, one person on the 

flightdeck would view the door area and 

identify the person seeking access. Then 

a crewmember would provide audio 

confirmation that the door area is clear 

while viewing the outside door area. For 

example, before providing audio 

confirmation to the flightdeck, the 

crewmember would (1) assure that no 

passengers are standing near the door 

area, and (2) that no passenger is in any 

forward lavatory. 

The FAA believes both methods 

comply with the intent of ICAO’s 

requirement that the door area outside 

the flightdeck must be monitored. The 

purpose of monitoring is to identify 

people requesting access to the 

flightdeck. Prior to opening the 

flightdeck door, identifying people by a 

properly designed video camera system 

and audio confirmation or through 

operational procedures using audio and 

other visual identification means are 

both appropriate. Since the FAA’s 

proposed rule is a performance 

standard, other methods may be 

developed to comply with this rule and 

the FAA seeks input from industry for 

other means of compliance. 

Proposed § 121.582 would heighten 

security requirements by giving the 

cabin crew a means to discreetly notify 

the flightcrew of suspicious activity or 

security breaches in the cabin. The FAA 

agrees with the ICAO position that 

discreet notification of the flightcrew 

should be provided. The FAA believes 

that current, on board communication 

crew alert systems could, along with 

FAA-approved operator-developed 

procedures, meet this requirement. For 

example, subtly keying the interphone 

in a specific manner could be used. The 

rule would also allow the use of more 

sophisticated technology, such as 

hands-free, wireless method as 

considered by Congress in the 

Homeland Security Act. However, any 

installed system must protect against 

false alarms or nuisance alerts that 

would make the system unreliable. 

While an airplane is moving for 

purposes of a flight segment, proposed 

§ 121.584 requires part 121 operators to 

keep the flightdeck door locked and 

closed unless an authorized person uses 

a device and procedure required by 

§ 121.313(k) to view the area outside the 

flightdeck compartment door. In 

proposed § 121.584(a), the phrase 

‘‘airplane moves in order to initiate a 

flight segment’’ includes movement 

under its own power or if the airplane 

is being moved by another device for 

example, a tug. In proposed 

§ 121.584(a)(1), the phrase ‘‘a person 

authorized to be on the flightdeck’’ is 

anyone who obtained access to the 

flightdeck pursuant to § 121.547. 

Proposed § 121.584(a)(2) requires that 

the procedures in § 121.584(a)(1)(i) and 

(ii) be satisfactorily accomplished before 

the crewmember in charge of the 

flightdeck authorizes the door to be 

unlocked and opened. In proposed 

§ 121.584(a)(2), the phrase ‘‘the 

crewmember in charge’’ means the 

flightcrew member in charge of the 

flightdeck at the time the door is 

opened, which may be the first officer 

if the pilot-in-command is not on the 

flightdeck. It is the FAA’s intent to meet 

the ICAO standard that requires 

monitoring the area outside the 

flightdeck door by permitting the use of 

a peep hole to view a large area outside 

the flightdeck door in conjunction with 

the audio confirmation, for example, 

from a crewmember who is outside the 

flightdeck and who can observe that the 

flightdeck door area is secure. 

Proposed § 121.584(a) requires every 

certificate holder operating under part 

121 to implement this rule at the time 

the final rule is published if the operator 

already has the means to monitor the 

area outside the flightdeck door as 

required by proposed § 121.313(k) (such 

as a peephole). The FAA has 

determined there is no reason to delay 

the security benefits of this operating 

rule for operators that can meet the rule 

at the time of final rule publication. 

Operators of airplanes that currently do 

not have a means to monitor the area 

outside the flightdeck door, have 2 years 

from the date the final rule is published 

to install such devices (such as a video 

system). But during that 2-year period, 

once an airplane is equipped with a 

means to monitor the area outside the 

flightdeck, then the certificate holder 

and the crewmembers must comply 

with proposed section 121.584(a) when 

operating that airplane. 

The U.S. filed a difference with ICAO 

for Annex 6, Part 1, Chapter 13, 

provision 13.2.3 on November 6, 2002. 

The FAA will significantly alter its 

filing concerning the difference 

associated with this provision to reflect 

the rule that is finally adopted. This 

proposed rule does not meet ICAO 

standards in the following areas. 

• The proposal in this action will not 

be implemented before the November 1, 

2003, ICAO deadline. 

• Any passenger-carrying airplanes 

operated under parts 91, 125, and 135 

including international commercial air 

transport operations with a maximum 

certificated takeoff mass in excess of 

45500 kg or with a seating capacity of 

greater than 60 (as ICAO requires), are 

not covered by this proposed rule. 

• The proposed rule will permit an 

alternative means to monitor the area 

outside the flightdeck door from the 

flightdeck side of the door, instead of 

from either pilot station, as ICAO 

requires. 

Harmonization Effort 

The FAA considers adopting and 

maintaining coordinated standards 

between the United States and its 

counterparts to be a high priority. The 

FAA is working informally with the 

Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and 

Transport Canada Civil Aviation to 

ensure the proposed rulemakings on 

flightdeck door monitoring and crew 

alerting systems are similarly worded 

and have the same requirements. On 

August 1, 2003, the JAA published 

Amendment 6 to JAR–OPS 1, 

Commercial Air Transportation 

(Aeroplanes). This amendment requires 

a means or procedure by which the 

cabin crew can notify the flightcrew in 

the event of suspicious activity or 

security breaches in the cabin. 

Additionally, the JAA is finalizing a 

separate amendment to JAR–OPS 1 that, 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 55495 

like this proposed rule, requires 

monitoring of the door area outside the 

flight crew compartment. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

In accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 

3507(d)), the FAA has determined that 

there are no requirements for 

information collection associated with 

this proposed rule. 

Economic Assessment, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact 

Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates 

Assessment 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 directs 

each Federal agency to propose or adopt 

a regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. sections 

2531–2533) prohibits agencies from 

setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, this Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, use them as the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually adjusted 

for inflation, which makes the 2004 

value about $120,700,000. 

In conducting these analyses, FAA 

has determined this proposed rule (1) 

would have benefits that justify its 

costs; (2) would be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and 

would be ‘‘significant’’ as defined in 

DOT’s Regulatory Policies and 

Procedures; (3) would not have a 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entities; (4) would 

move toward existing and potential 

international standards as the basis of 

U.S. standards; and (5) would not 

impose an unfunded mandate on State, 

local, or tribal governments, or on the 

private sector. The FAA has placed 

these analyses in the docket and they 

are summarized in the following 

sections. 

Regulatory Evaluation Summary 

Costs—The FAA requests comments 

on the methodology, assumptions, and 

results of the economic analysis and 

asks commenters to provide supporting 

data, documentation, and rationale for 

their comments. 

If the operators decide to develop 

appropriate procedures to comply with 

the proposed rule, the FAA estimates 

that there could be minimal compliance 

costs. Although not required to do so, 

operators may decide to comply by 

installing a video camera surveillance 

system. Thus, the following FAA’s 

estimated costs of installing a video 

camera surveillance system represent 

the high-end cost of complying with the 

proposed rule. 

Based on numbers developed at the 

end of 2003, the proposed rule would 

affect 6,190 airplanes (4,487 turbojets, 

1,203 regional jets, and 500 large (>20 

seats) turboprops). If a final rule were 

issued on January 1, 2004, the 2-year 

compliance period would allow 550 of 

these airplanes to be retired in 2004 and 

2005 and not be retrofitted, resulting in 

5,640 retrofitted airplanes. Further, 

4,360 airplanes that are projected to be 

manufactured between 2004 and 2013 

would have these systems installed as 

original operating equipment. 

Certificate holders that choose to 

install a video camera system to comply 

with this rule, would incur the 

following costs. Some turbojets would 

need a two- or three-camera system 

while regional jets, including turbojets 

and turboprops, would need a onecamera system. AirWorks, AEI/AD 

Aerospace, and Goodrich are the only 

vendors currently supplying these 

systems for airplanes. Many of their 

systems have Supplemental Type 

Certificates (STCs) issued by the FAA. 

These vendors are selling their systems 

to several European and Asian airlines 

as a result of United Kingdom (UK) 

Department for Transport Directive 

21(a), issued on January 27, 2003, which 

strictly follows the ICAO requirements 

including the November 1, 2003 

deadline. Thus, the FAA bases its 

estimated average costs on the vendors’

reported costs. 

Using the systems we examined 

produced the following costs. For a 

future production airplane, this system 

would cost $16,000 for a turbojet and 

$9,000 for a regional jet or turboprop. It 

would take 16 labor hours ($1,280) to 

install on a turbojet and 12 labor hours 

($960) on a regional jet. The total cost 

would be $17,280 for a turbojet and 

$9,960 for a regional jet or turboprop. 

Production schedules would not be 

disrupted. 

For an existing airplane, the 

retrofitting kit would cost $17,000 for a 

turbojet and $10,000 for a regional jet or 

turboprop. If the retrofit were completed 

during a regularly scheduled 

maintenance check, it would take 48 

labor hours ($3,840) for a turbojet and 

36 hours ($2,880) for a regional jet or 

turboprop. The per airplane retrofit cost 

would be $20,840 for a turbojet and 

$12,880 for a regional jet or turboprop. 

If the retrofit must be completed during 

a dedicated maintenance session, labor 

time would increase to 96 hours 

($7,680) for a turbojet and 72 hours 

($5,760) for a regional jet or turboprop. 

In addition, the airplane would be out 

of service for 1 day resulting in lost net 

revenue ranging from $7,850 to $21,550 

for a turbojet depending upon its type 

and size and from $1,600 to $4,850 for 

a regional jet or turboprop. 

However, the FAA believes the 

airlines have sufficient compliance time 

to complete the retrofit during a 

scheduled maintenance check. For the 

most popular airplane models, several 

video camera surveillance system STCs 

already exist. In addition, the FAA 

anticipates all remaining airplane 

models will have STCs issued by mid2004. Thus, airlines will have from 18 

to 24 months to comply with the rule. 

During that time the FAA believes each 

airplane will have an overnight 

maintenance check during which the 

retrofit could be accomplished without 

loss of revenue time. To the extent these 

retrofits could not be completed during 

regularly scheduled maintenance, the 

FAA underestimated the potential 

compliance costs. The FAA specifically 

requests comments on this particular 

assumption. 

The total cost to install this system on 

future production airplanes between 

2004 and 2014 would be $64 million, or 

a present value of $44 million. The total 

cost to retrofit this system on existing 

airplanes during 2004 and 2005 would 

be $102 million ($34 million in 2004 

and $68 million in 2005), which has a 

present value of $91 million. 

The FAA estimates an average of 1 

hour per year to inspect and maintain 

the system, resulting in a total 

maintenance expenditure of $5.5 

million between 2004 and 2014, which 

has a present value of $3.5 million. As 

the mean times between failures for the 

components would be longer than 10 

years, the FAA calculates no 

replacement costs during the time frame 

of this analysis. 

The system would add between 12 

and 17 pounds to an airplane’s weight, 

which would increase average annual 

per airplane fuel consumption between 

68 and 328 gallons. Using a price of 

55496 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

$0.80 per gallon, the FAA calculates the 

total additional fuel cost to be $14 

million between 2004 and 2014, which 

has a present value of $9 million. 

As shown in Table 1, the total costs 

between 2004 and 2014 of installing 

video camera surveillance systems 

would be $185 million, which has a 

present value of $148.5 million. 

TABLE 1.—TOTAL AND PRESENT VALUES OF COSTS TO INSTALL VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS IN PART 121 

AIRPLANES (2004–2014) 

[In 2003 $millions] 

Source of cost Total cost Present value 

total cost 

Install on Future Production Airplanes ................................................................................................................ $64.0 $44.0 

Retrofit on Existing Airplanes .............................................................................................................................. 102.0 92.0 

System Maintenance ........................................................................................................................................... 5.5 3.5 

Fuel Consumption ................................................................................................................................................ 14.0 9.0 

Total .............................................................................................................................................................. 185.5 148.5 

As shown in Table 2, the largest 

annual expenditures would be in 2004, 

$40 million, and, in 2005, $76 million. 

The present value of the costs in 2004 

and 2005 would be about 70 percent of 

the total present value costs. The annual 

costs thereafter would be about $6.5 

million to $9 million for the new 

airplanes and for fuel and maintenance. 

TABLE 2.—TOTAL COSTS BY YEAR FOR PART 121 OPERATORS OF HAVING VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

[In 2003 $millions] 

Year 

Future 

production 

airplanes 

cost 

Retrofitting 

airplanes 

cost 

Fuel and 

maintenance 

cost 

Total cost 

Present 

value 

total cost 

2004 ................................................................................................................... $5.675 $33.750 $0.481 $39.906 $37.295 

2005 ................................................................................................................... 6.290 68.523 1.089 75.902 66.309 

2006 ................................................................................................................... 6.126 0.000 1.616 7.742 6.343 

2007 ................................................................................................................... 6.863 0.000 1.824 8.687 6.656 

2008 ................................................................................................................... 6.379 0.000 1.889 8.268 5.922 

2009 ................................................................................................................... 6.192 0.000 1.949 9.141 5.452 

2010 ................................................................................................................... 5.766 0.000 2.007 7.773 4.867 

2011 ................................................................................................................... 6.089 0.000 2.066 8.155 4.772 

2012 ................................................................................................................... 5.462 0.000 2.130 7.592 4.153 

2013 ................................................................................................................... 4.542 0.000 2.196 6.738 3.449 

2014 ................................................................................................................... 4.399 0.000 2.261 6.660 2.812 

Total ............................................................................................................ 63.783 102.273 19.508 186.564 148.030 

The cost of instituting a flightdeck 

alerting system for crewmember could 

be met by a variety of measures such as 

special signals through the interphone 

system or modifying existing crew 

notification devices or procedures. As 

such, the FAA determines that this 

proposed requirement would impose 

minimal costs. 

Benefits—The proposed rule is one of 

a series of rulemaking actions aimed at 

preventing or deterring an occurrence 

similar to the September 11 terrorist 

attacks. It is designed to ensure that 

pilots do not open the flightdeck door 

and admit a potential hijacker because 

the pilots will be able to recognize who 

is trying to gain entry. It is also designed 

to alert the pilots to problems in the 

cabin through the crew discreet 

monitoring system and allow them to 

take the appropriate actions. 

As witnessed on September 11, 2001, 

terrorist acts can result in the complete 

destruction of an airplane with the loss 

of all on board and with huge collateral 

damage far exceeding that of the 

airplane and passengers. The economic 

and social costs of the September 11 

attacks have been measured in the 

billions of dollars. While the FAA 

cannot predict the frequency and 

severity of future terrorist acts against 

aviation, it does expect that there will 

be such attempts. The value of 

preventing a single loss of an average 

flight is estimated to be about $375 

million, without consideration of 

collateral damage. However, the 

potential benefits from preventing the 

destruction of an operating airplane 

cannot be precisely quantified nor 

specifically allocated to each of the 

multiple parallel regulatory actions 

being taken by the FAA and other 

Federal agencies. The FAA concludes 

that there is a high probability that the 

benefits of this proposed rule would 

exceed its costs. In addition to 

preventing the extraordinary costs of 

another attack, this proposed rule 

responds to the interest of the U.S. 

Congress as specified in the ATSA. 

Further, the need for this proposed rule 

is illustrated by the fact that ICAO has 

made flightdeck surveillance a 

requirement for airplanes with more 

than 60 seats that travel internationally. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 55497 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations, 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule would have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the agency determines that it 

would, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the RFA. However, if an 

agency determines that a proposed or 

final rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the RFA provides that 

the head of the agency may so certify 

and a regulatory flexibility analysis is 

not required. The certification must 

include a statement providing the 

factual basis for this determination, and 

the reasoning should be clear. 

As a proxy for the operator’s ability to 

afford the cost of compliance, the FAA 

calculated the ratio of the total cost of 

the rule as a percentage of annual 

revenue. The FAA determined that the 

maximum percentage would be 1.7 

percent for one small airline while only 

two other airlines would have 

percentages greater than 1 percent. It 

should be emphasized that these 

estimated costs are for the high cost 

method of compliance, which would 

not be required by the proposed rule. 

The FAA does not believe that such 

costs represent a significant economic 

impact. 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 

605(b), the Administrator of the Federal 

Aviation Administration certifies that 

this proposed rule would not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

Trade Impact Assessment 

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 

prohibits Federal agencies from 

engaging in any standards or related 

activities that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. Legitimate domestic 

objectives, such as safety, are not 

considered unnecessary obstacles. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA assessed the 

potential effect of this proposed 

rulemaking and determined that the 

proposed amendment is largely 

consistent with JAA and ICAO 

standards. However, the international 

standards are being reviewed and they 

may be moving closer to the FAA 

position. Therefore, the FAA 

determined that this proposed rule 

would be in compliance with the Trade 

Agreement Act. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among 

other things, to curb the practice of 

imposing unfunded Federal mandates 

on State, local, and tribal governments. 

Title II of the Act requires each Federal 

agency to prepare a written statement 

assessing the effects of any Federal 

mandate in a proposed or final agency 

rule that may result in a $100 million or 

more expenditure adjusted annually for 

inflation, which is about $120,700,000 

in 2004, in any one year by State, local, 

and tribal governments, in the aggregate, 

or by the private sector; such a mandate 

is deemed to be a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action.’’

This proposed rule does not contain 

such a mandate. Therefore, the 

requirements of Title II of the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not 

apply. 

Regulations Affecting Interstate 

Aviation in Alaska 

Section 1205 of the FAA 

Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 

3213) requires the Administrator, when 

modifying regulations in Title 14 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in a 

manner affecting interstate aviation in 

Alaska, to consider the extent to which 

Alaska is not served by transportation 

modes other than aviation, and to 

establish such regulatory distinctions as 

he or she considers appropriate. 

Because this proposed rule would apply 

to the certification of future designs of 

transport category airplanes and their 

subsequent operation, it could, if 

adopted, affect interstate aviation in 

Alaska. The FAA therefore specifically 

requests comments on whether there is 

justification for applying the proposed 

rule differently in interstate operations 

in Alaska. 

Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this proposed 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312f and involves no 

extraordinary circumstances. 

Energy Impact 

The energy impact of this proposal 

has been assessed in accordance with 

the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 

(EPCA) Public Law 94–163, as amended 

(42 U.S.C. Section 6362) and FAA Order 

1053.1. It has been determined that this 

proposal is not a major regulatory action 

under the provisions of the EPCA. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend part 121 of Title 14 

of the Code of Federal Regulations, as 

follows: 

PART 121—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, 

AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS 

1. The authority citation for part 121 

is revised to read: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 

41706, 44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–

44711, 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 46105. 

2. Section 121.313 is amended by 

adding new paragraph (k) to read as 

follows: 

§ 121.313 Miscellaneous equipment. 

* * * * * 

(k) Except for all-cargo operations as 

defined in section 119.3 of this 

subchapter, after (insert date 2 years 

after final rule publication date) for all 

passenger-carrying airplanes that 

require a lockable flightdeck door in 

accordance with paragraph (f) of this 

section, a means to monitor from the 

flightdeck side of the door the area 

outside the flightdeck door to identify 

persons requesting entry and to detect 

suspicious behavior and potential 

threats. 

3. Add new § 121.582 as follows: 

§ 121.582 Means to discreetly notify a 

flightcrew. 

Except for all-cargo operations as 

defined in section 119.3 of this 

subchapter, after (insert date 180 days 

after final rule publication date), for all 

passenger carrying airplanes that require 

a lockable flightdeck door in accordance 

with 121.313(f), the certificate holder 

must have an approved means by which 

the cabin crew can discreetly notify the 

flightcrew in the event of suspicious 

activity or security breaches in the 

cabin. 

4. Add new § 121.584 as follows: 

§ 121.584 Requirement to view the area 

outside the flightdeck door. 

(a) From the time the airplane moves 

in order to initiate a flight segment 

through the end of that flight segment, 

55498 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

no person may unlock or open the 

flightdeck door unless: 

(1) A person authorized to be on the 

flightdeck uses an approved audio 

procedure and an approved visual 

device to verify that: 

(i) The area outside the flightdeck 

door is secure, and; 

(ii) If someone outside the flightdeck 

is seeking to have the flightdeck door 

opened, that person is not under duress, 

and; 

(2) After the requirements of 

paragraph (a)(1) have been satisfactorily 

accomplished, the crewmember in 

charge on the flightdeck authorizes the 

door to be unlocked and open. 

(b) Before (insert date 2 years after 

final rule publication date) paragraph (a) 

applies only to the operation of an 

airplane that is equipped with a means 

to monitor the flightdeck door area as 

required by § 121.313(k). 

Issued in Washington, DC on September 

14, 2005. 

John M. Allen, 

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–18806 Filed 9–20–05; 8:45 am] 

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