Filed 5/24/21 P. v. Ochoagomez CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE

,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JULIO OCHOAGOMEZ

,

Defendant and Appellant. B 304504

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA467555 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Se r gio C. Tapia, Judge. Affirmed

. Richard B. Lennon and Melissa L. Camacho

- Cheung,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorney s General , for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Defendant Julio Ochoa G omez challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop that ultimately resulted in OchoaGomez’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance. OchoaGomez argues that the police unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time in which a reasonably diligent office r w ould have completed the
mission of the stop, thereby violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizure under Rodriguez v.
United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348 ( Rodriguez )

. We hold that, based on the factual findings supported by substantial evidence in the record, the detai ning officer was diligent in his efforts

to complete the mission of the traffic stop and had not yet completed that mission at the time his police dog alerted him

to the presence of drugs in OchoaGomez’s vehicle. As such, the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
OchoaGomez al so challenges the court’s use of his prior juvenile adjudication to increase his sentence under California’s

“ Three Strikes ” l aw (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. ( b)

− (i), 1170.12, subds. (a)

− (d))

. He acknowledges that Peop le v. Nguyen (200 9 )
46 Cal.4th 1007 ( Nguyen ) permits use of a juvenile adjudication as a prior strike, but argues Nguyen is no longer controlling law

, because its reasoning has been fatally undermined by subsequent
U nited States and California Supreme Cour t decisions regarding judicial factfinding and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. (See Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. ___ [ 136 S.Ct.
2243 , 195 L.Ed.2d 604] ( Mathis ) ; Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 254 ( Descamps ) ; People v. Gallardo (2017) 4
Cal.5th 120 ( Gallardo ) .) We disagree that these decisions are
inconsistent with Nguyen , as they address judicial factfinding on previously unadjudicated facts, an issue implicated neither in3

Nguyen , nor in the instant appeal. As such, t he trial court
did not err in its application of OchoaGomez’s prior juvenile adjudication as a strike at sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Traffic Stop Resulting in OchoaGomez ’s Arrest The following facts related to the traf fic stop leading to
OchoaGomez’s arrest are reflected in the police body camera footage from the stop , as well as the detaining officer’s
uncontradicted testimony at the prelimi nary hearing

. At about 9:30 in the morning o f April 24, 201 9 , California Highway Patrol Officer Richard Cheever initiated a traffic stop
of OchoaGomez’s vehicle based on OchoaGomez following a tractor trailer too closely and having tinted front windows,
both violations of the Vehicle Code. (See Veh. Code

, §§ 21703
, 26708, subdivision (a)(1)

. ) Cheever is a K

- 9 handler and had his
trained police dog in the car with him. After both Cheever and
Ochoa Gomez exited the freeway and parked, Cheever approached the right front passenger side door of the car. Cheever told
O choaGomez the reason for the stop and asked for his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance. Cheever noticed
that OchoaGomez ’s hands were trembling as he hand ed over his
documents and noticed a “ strong odor of air freshener emitting
from th e interior of the vehicle

. ” Cheever later testified that , in his experience, most indi v i duals have trembling hands or other signs of nervousness at the beginning of a traffic stop , and that “air freshener is commonly used by drug traffickers to mask the
odor of a substance that they may be transporting in the vehicle.”4 Three minutes and 44 seconds into the body camera footage of the traffic stop

, Cheever returned to his patrol car
with OchoaG omez’s documents

. Approximately two minutes later, he initiated a check of the vehicle registration. A Bell
Gardens police officer then arrived as standby , but did not
interact with OchoaGomez

. Approximately a minute after Cheever had requested the regi stration check, he also requested
a check on OchoaGomez ’s license. Approximat e ly a minute after
that

— and approximately eight minutes and 30 seconds into the
traffic stop

— Cheever also requested a check for any outstanding

warrants. Cheever later testified he requested the warrant check because it is what he “normally [does ] in a traffic stop.” While in the car, Cheever filled out a consent to search fo rm. He did not
write a traffic citation at that time, because he “ inten[ded] to
wait for the completion of the warrant check before [he] started writing anybody a ticket

. ”
Around three minutes after he requested the warrant
check

— and approximately 11 minutes and 20 seconds into the traffic stop

— Cheever returned to OchoaGomez ’s car, directed him to exit, and frisked him. He then led Ochoa Gomez back toward his patrol car and asked him what he was doing in Bell Gardens, if he had any firearms, and whether he was on probation.
OchoaGomez said he had been on probation for a gun cha rge when he was younger. Cheever then asked OchoaGomez if he would consent to a search of his vehicle with the police dog.
Ochoa Gomez replied

, “whatever . . . go ahead.” This occurred approximately 12 minutes and 15 seconds into the stop , at which point Cheever “was still waiting for the warrant check to return.”
Cheever then confirmed OchoaGomez could read and understand English, and asked him to review the consent form

, and stated “if5

you have any [ sic ] understanding you can ask me some questions. ” O choaGomez indicated that he had read and understood the form, but refused to si gn. Cheever wrote “

‘ declined to sign the consent form ’ ” across the form.
Cheever then retri e ved his dog from the patrol car and began an exterior sniff of the car

. He walked the dog around the car, and the dog looked in the open right front window and sat
down. Based on the dog’s training and Cheever’s experience with him, Cheever understood sitti ng to mean the dog detected the presence of dr ugs. At this point

— approximately 15 minutes into the traffic stop and approximately six and a half minutes after
Cheever had asked dispatch to check for outstanding warrants

— the body camera footage does not re flect that Cheever had received a response to the warrant check. Cheever let the dog into the interior of the car, then opened the trunk. Inside the trunk, Cheever found a duffel bag, which contained twenty packages of what appeared to be methamphetamine. Cheever ultimately arrested OchoaGomez

. The body camera footage does not reflect a response to Cheever’s request for a warrant check.

B

. Preliminary Hearing and Motion to Suppress

OchoaGomez moved to suppress all physical evidence
obtained as a result of the traffic stop, pu rsuant to Penal Code
section 1538.5. The court heard the motion at the preliminary hearing, during which Cheever testified and the court watched
the body camera footage of the traffic stop

. No other evidence was offered rega rding the motion to suppress.
The court denied the motion. The court found Cheever’s testimony credible and more specifically stated it believed Cheever’s testimony that he was “ still waiting for the return of6

the warrant check” approximately 15 minute s into the traffic stop when the police dog alerted Cheever to the presence of drugs . The court concluded Cheever had conducted the dog
sniff within the time reasonably necessar y to complete the
initial purpose of Cheever’s traffic stop, and thus that the dog
sniff had not prolonged the stop in a manner that would violate OchoaGomez’s federal constitutional rights

. Following the preliminary hearing, OchoaGomez was charged with possession for s ale of a controlled substance in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 (count 1 )

, and sale/offer to sell/transporta tion of a controlled substance in
violation of Health and Safety Cod e section 11379, subdivision (a) (count 2 )

. The information further alleged that, as to both counts, the substance containing methamphetamine exceeded
10 kilograms within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.4, subdivision (b)(3). The information also alleged a juvenile adjudication ( see Pen. Code, § 211) as a strike under
Califo rnia’s Three Strikes l aw.

C

. Plea Agreement and Sentencing Pursuant to a plea agreement, OchoaGomez wa ived his right to a jury trial, pleaded guilty to count 1 , and admitted to having a prior juvenile adjudicatio n

. Also pursuant to the plea agreement, the second count in the information was dismissed

. The court sentenced appellant to a total of six years in state prison, calculated as follows: the middle term of three years for the single count, doubled to six y ears for the strike prior. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal based on the denial of his motion to suppres s evidence and the sentence imposed by
the trial court

.7 DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress OchoaGomez first challenges the court’s denial of his motion to suppress. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we must accept all facts in favor of the ruling, including all reasonable inferences and deductions, if supported by
substantial ev idence. ( People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227 .) “[T] he ‘ “ reasonableness in all the circumstances
of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen ’ s personal security” ’ is the guiding principle. ” ( P eople v. Gra n t (1990) 217 Cal.App. 3d 1451, 1458 .)

1. Applicable l aw
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures the right of all “people to be secure in their persons

. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S. Const. , 4th
Am end .) Temporary detention of individuals during the stop
of an automobile by the police constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ( Whren v.
United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809

− 810.) “[T]he tolerable
duration of police in quiries in the traffic

- stop context is determined by the [stop’s] ‘mission [,] ’ ” which is “ to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop

, [ c itation] and attend to related safety concerns

, [ c itations]

. . . Authority for the seizure
thus ends whe n tasks tied to the traffic infraction are

— or reasonably should have been

— completed.” ( Rodriguez , supra, 575 U.S. at p. 354.) In Rodriguez , the United States Supreme Court expressly identified task s that serve the mission of a traffic stop as follows: “ Beyond determining whether to iss ue a traffic ticket, an officer’ s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to8

[the traffic] stop.’ [Citation.] Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver ’ s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile ’ s registration and proof of insurance.” ( Id. at p. 355.) The Supreme Court explained that such check s are included
in the scope of an officer’s mission in conducting a traffic stop
be cause they “serve the same o bjective as enforcement of the

t raffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly,” given that, for example, “[a] ‘warrant check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent
traffic viola tor is wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses.’ ” ( Ibid. ) Rodriguez also ties warrant checks to
officer safety concerns during traffic stops by citing authority
it describes as “recognizing [the] officer safety justification
for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks.” ( Id. at

p. 356, citing United States v. Holt (10th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 1215, 12 21

- 1222.) Under these principles

, the scope or duration of a traffic stop “ ‘ become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket
for the [traffic] violation ” leading to the stop ( Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at pp. 350

– 351 ), a mission that includes the tasks
of chec king the driver’s license

, registration , and insurance, checking for outstanding warrants

, and those minimally burdensome measures necessary to assure the officer’s safety

. ( Id. at p. 355; see People v. Vera (2 018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081,
1087

− 1088 ( Vera ) [ o fficer conducting traffic stop “ obtained [defendant] ’s identification documents from his car and performed a warrant check, both of which were within the
mission ” of the stop ] .)9 Rodriguez does not foreclose the police from performing investigative efforts during a traffic stop that are unrelated to
the stop’s mission, however. (See Rodriguez, supra , 575 U.S.

at pp. 355

− 356.) Rather, “[a]n officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop ” as l ong as the officer does “not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. ” ( Id. at p. 355.) For example, a dog sniff
of a vehicle to detect the presence of drugs is not rel ated to the mission of any traffic stop, but “[d] uring the execution of a lawful traffic stop, the police may have a trained dog sniff the driver’s
vehicle

. . . without implicating the Fourth Amendment,” as long as the traffic stop is not “ ‘prolonged’ by the dog sniff ‘ beyond the time reasonably required’ to complete the mission of the traffic stop.” ( Vera, supra , 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1085

– 1086.)

2. Cheever d id n ot p rolong the t raffic s top b eyond the t ime r easonably n ece ssary to c omplete i ts m ission, a s Rodriguez d efines i t OchoaGomez argues that the traffic stop at issue here exceeded the reasonable amount of time necessary for Cheever

to complete the mission of the traffic stop, because ( 1 ) Cheever prolonged the stop beyond the amount of time reasonably necessary to complete its mission by seeking consent to search the vehicle and performing an external dog sniff of the vehicle, and ( 2 ) Cheever did not diligently pursue the mission of the stop. We disagree.
The trial court found Cheever was still waiting for the results of the warrant check when he prepared the consent form, when he asked OchoaGomez questions unrelated to the10

traffic stop mission, and when he had his dog sniff the outside
of the vehicle. Nothing in the record sug gests otherwise; to
the contrary, the body camera footage and Cheever ’s testimony

, which the court deemed credible, constitute subs tantial evidence to support the court’s finding. Because, under Rodriguez

, performing a warrant check is within the proper s cope of an officer’s mission in conducting a traffic stop, Cheever did not prolong the stop by conducting additional investigative activities while still waiting for the re sults of that search to return

—

even absent reasonable suspicion to separately justify those investigative activities

. ( See Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355 ; Vera, supra , 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088

− 1089 [performing a dog sniff of defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop did not violate
Fourth Amendment under Rodriguez because the dog alerted when “ [ t ] he mission of the traffic stop was in fact not finished”
and before it “reasonably should have been” finished , italics
omitted ]. ) OchoaGomez argues that running warrant checks is only
sometimes w ithin the proper scope of a traffic stop, relying on the Supreme Court’s use of the word “typically” to introduce
the list of ancillary efforts involved in such a stop. ( R odriguez,

supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355 [ “ [ A ] n officer’ s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ [Citation.] Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver ’ s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against
the driver, and inspecting the automobile's reg istration and proof of insurance ,” italics added.] .) Under OchoaGomez’s interpretation, however, checking to assure a motorist has

a valid driver’s license would also only sometimes be within
the scope of a traffic stop, and

— perhaps more troubling

— the11

Sup reme Court’s detailed discussion of a traffic stop ’s mission
in Rodriguez would provide no guidance as to when this is
the case. Oc hoaGo mez’s proposed interpretation of Rodriguez
is also inconsistent with the opinion’s clear statement that

warrant checks serve the purpose of a traffic stop (ensuring compliance with the Vehicle Code by checking for outstanding
traffic violations), as we ll as its citation to the proposition that

warrant checks promote officer safety during a traffic stop. ( Id. at pp. 355

− 356. ) We decline to adopt OchoaGomez’s forced interpretation of Rodriguez

. In arguing to the contrary, OchoaGomez argues that Rodriguez ’s discussion of an officer needing to be diligent in pursuing the mission of a traffic stop ( Rodriguez

, supra , 575 U. S.

at p. 357 ), “ breathes new life in[to] a line of pre

- Rodriguez
California cases ,” which hold that all warrant checks reflect investigative activity unrelated to the mission of a traffic stop. (See People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577

, 585

− 587 ( McGaughran ) ; People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493,
498 [ citing McGaughran for the proposition that “ investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop, i ncluding warrant checks, are permissible as long as they do not prolong
the st op ” ] ; see, e.g., People v. Gallardo ( 2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238 [same]; People v. Castaneda

, supra , 35 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1228 [ same] .) But this idea is inherently inconsistent
with Rodriguez ’s express conclusion that warrant checks are

“ typical [ ]” components of a traffic stop. ( R odriguez, supra, at

p. 355.) Post

- Rodriguez

, t hese cases are thus of no assistance

to OchoaGomez in arguing a warrant search is not part of the mission of a traffic stop

.12 We must also consider , however, whether Cheever was diligent in pursuing the mission of the traffic stop , such that the stop did not last longer than the amount of time in which the
mission “reasonably should have been” completed. ( Rodriguez,

supra , 575 U.S. at p. 354 ; see Vera

, supra , 28 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1089 [ that dog sniff occurred before mission of traffic stop completed does not end Fourth Amendment inquiry under Rodriguez ] .) OchoaGomez argues Cheever was not diligent

, because Cheever never even st arted writing a citation during
th e approximately 15 minutes before the dog alerted

. 1 But

t he court credited Cheever’s testimony that he did not want to prepare a citation until he had confirmed whether OchoaGomez had any outstanding warrants. We must d efer to the trial

court on the credibility of this uncontradicted testimony

. ( S ee People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596

– 597)

. I n any event, nothing in the record suggests Cheever’s stated reason for not immediately writing a citation was disingenuous. OchoaGomez
does not cite any authority suggesting that , as a general rule, waiting for the results of a warrant check before writing a citation reflects a lack of diligence in pursuing the mission of a traffic stop. Nor does OchoaGomez cite any authority suggesting
that the amount of time Cheever waited for the results of the
warrant check wa s so long that it might render his decision not

to start writing the ticket unreasonable.

1 OchoaGomez does not dispute that, once the dog alerted Cheever to the possible presence of drugs in the vehicle, Cheever had reasonable suspicion to justify further detention. (See Vera,

supra , 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089 [“ [o] nce the dog alerted to the

ve hicle, there was independent reasonable suspicion for [the officer] to prolong [defendant’s] detention to search for drugs”].)13 OchoaGomez repeatedly notes that the results of the warrant check “ never produced an answer at all

, ” apparently implying that this somehow renders the warrant search pretextual. But it makes sense that law enforcement’s focus shifted away from the warrant search when Cheever found a large quantity of what appeared to be methamphetamine and
arrested OchoaGo mez . Thus, the fact that no response to the
warrant check is reflected in the record

— at least absent some other indication that the warrant search request was pretextual
or that Cheever facilitated such lac k of results

— does not assist OchoaGomez’s arguments. Finally , the overa ll time of the traffic stop

— approximately
15 mi nutes

— is not, absent some other indication of delay or improper motive, inherently too long for a diligent officer to complete the mission of explaini ng a traffic violation, obtaining an individual’s license, registration, and proof of insurance,

run ning checks on these documents as well as a check for outstanding warrants, and executing a citation , all while taking reasonable measures to maintain the o fficer’s safety

.

3. Cheever d id n ot e xceed the p ermissible

s cope of the t raffic s top by o rdering OchoaGomez to e xit the c ar As noted, m inimally burdensome measures that may be necessary to assure the officer’s safety in pursuing the mission
of a traffic stop , such as requesting the individual to exit
the vehicle, are also within the scope of an officer’s mission. ( Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at pp. 350

– 351 ; see Vera , supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 108 8

. ) The United States Supreme Court
has contrasted such precautions taken to complete the traffic
stop safely with “safety precautions taken in order to facilitate”14

“[o]n

- scene investigation into other crimes

, ” noting the
latter variety “detour s from th[e] mission [of th e traffic stop ]. ” ( Rodriguez

, supra , at p. 356

. ) In Rodriguez , for example, the
officer ordered the defendant to exit his car in order to facilitate the dog sniff the court ultimately concluded violated the Fourth Amendment. OchoaGomez argues this ca se presents a similar
situation. But i n Rodriguez, the Fourth Amen dment violation
stemmed from the fact that these efforts investigating other
crimes ( the exit order and dog sniff) prolonged the traffic stop beyond the amount of time necessary to complete th e mission
of the traffic stop (see id. at pp. 356

− 357); indeed, in Rodriguez

, the officer had already issued the citation when he ordered the defendant to exit the car and performed the dog sniff

. ( Id. at

p. 352.) Here, by contrast, even if Cheever ordered OchoaGomez out of the vehicle purely to facilitate the dog sniff, this occurred before Cheever had completed the mission of the traffic stop
and within an amount of time reasonably necessary to complete
th e mission of the traffic stop. (Se e Discussion ante , part A.2.)
I t thus does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment under Rodriguez

. (See Vera, supra , 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088

− 1089.)

B. Use of Prior Juvenile Adjudication as a Strike at Sentencing OchoaGomez also challeng es the court’s sentencing order. He argues that consideration of his prior juvenile adjudication

as a strike violated his right to a jury tria l, because juvenile adjudic ations are not made by a jury. OchoaGomez’s argument presents a purely legal issue, which we review de novo. ( See People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 941.) The California Supreme Court in Nguyen , supra, 46 Cal.4th 1007, held that juvenile adjudications may be used as strikes15

“even though there was no right to a jury trial in the juvenile proceeding

. ” ( I

d. at p. 1010.) The court rejected the defendant’ s claim that Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 46 6 ( Apprendi )
barred the us e of a juvenile adjudication as a strike. Apprendi held that “ [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and p roved beyond

a reasonable doubt. ” ( Id

. at p. 490, italics added.) In Nguyen

, the literal rule of Apprendi had not been violated, and the
defendant had waived his right (under California law) to a jury determination on the question of whether he had suffered
the prior juvenile adjudication

. 2 ( Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th

at p. 1015. ) Nevertheless, the defendant claimed

— as does OchoaGomez in the instant appeal

— that “the lack of a jury

- trial right in the prior juvenile proceeding precludes all use of the resulting adjudic ation to enhance the maximum sentence for his current offense.” ( Id. at p. 1016.) The California Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that “ Apprendi a nd its progeny concern an
adult ’ s right to jury findings, in the adult case, of all previously unadjudica ted facts that bear upon the maximum sentence
for the adult offense.” ( Id. at p. 1024.) Since t he facts of the

2 California law provides that “ [w] henever, for purposes of enhancing the sentence on current charges, the prosecution alleges a prior conviction sustained by the defendant, and the defendant disputes the allegation, the question whether he or she ‘has suffered’ the prior conviction must, unless a jury is waived, b e submitted to a jury in the current proceeding. (§§ 1025, subds.(a), (b), 1158.) This jury

- trial requirement would extend, of course, to a prior juvenile adjudication included within th e Three Strikes law’s definition of a ‘prior felony conviction.’ ” ( Nguyen, supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 1015.)16

adult defendant’ s juvenile offense in Nguyen had been previously adjudicated in the prior juvenile proceedings, the use of the juvenile adjudic ation as a strik e did not violate the defendant’ s Sixth Amendment rights. ( Ibid. ) OchoaGomez argues that Nguyen has been fatally undermined by the United States Supreme Court’ s subsequent
decisions in Descamps , supra, 570 U.S . 254, and Mathis

, supra, 136 S.Ct. 2243 , as well as the California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Gallardo , supra, 4 Cal.5th 120

. Division Two of this court rejected these exact arguments
in People v. Romero (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 381, 389 ( Romero ),
review denied Ap r. 15, 2020 , S260356 , cert. denied sub nom.

, Romero v. California (2020) 141 S.Ct. 633. Romero explained
that Gallardo

, Descamps and Mathis “ do nothing to undermine the premise of

. . . Nguyen because they did not concern the possibility of using the fact that a defendant incurred a juvenile adjudication to enhance a defendant ’ s sentence for a subsequent crime. Instead, those cases strictly prohibited factfinding by the sentencing court beyond the fact of a prior conviction.” ( Romero,

supra , at p. 389 , it alics added .) We agree with our colleagues in Division Two and reject OchoaGomez’s arguments for th is same

reason

.17 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

R OTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

CHANEY , J.

BENDIX , J.