[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 182 (Wednesday, September 21, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55492-55498]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18806]



[[Page 55491]]

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Part IV





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 121



Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems; Proposed 
Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 182 / Wednesday, September 21, 2005 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 55492]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 121

[Docket No. FAA-2005-22449; Notice No. 05-07]
RIN 2120-AI16


Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to require 
passenger-carrying transport category airplanes used in domestic, flag, 
and supplemental operations to have a means to allow the flightcrew to 
visually monitor the door area outside the flightdeck. This means would 
allow the flightcrew to identify persons requesting entry into the 
flightdeck, and to detect suspicious behavior or potential threats. 
Second, the FAA proposes that, for operations requiring the presence of 
flight attendants, the flight attendants have a means to discreetly 
notify the flightcrew of suspicious activity or security breaches in 
the cabin. The proposed changes address standards adopted by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization following the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before November 21, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments [identified by Docket Number FAA-2005-
22449] using any of the following methods:
    <bullet> DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
    <bullet> Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
    <bullet> Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001. Due to the suspension of paper mail delivery 
to DOT headquarters facilities, we encourage commenters to send their 
comments electronically.
    <bullet> Fax: 202-493-2251.
    <bullet> Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For more information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to 
http://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. For 
more information, see the Privacy Act discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of 
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Comments that you may consider to be of a sensitive security nature 
should not be sent to the docket management system. Send those comments 
to the FAA, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington DC 20591.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe Keenan, Air Carrier Operations 
Branch, Flight Standards Service, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166, facsimile (202) 267-
9579, e-mail: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#2b41444e05404e4e454a456b4d4a4a054c445d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5c36333972373939323d321c3a3d3d723b332a">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also 
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written 
comments.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public 
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to 
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section 
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the 
Internet at the Web address in the ADDRESSES section.
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit 
http://dms.dot.gov.
    Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we 
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments 
we receive.
    If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations Web page at; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number or notice number, of this rulemaking 
Authority for this Rulemaking.

Background

Activities Leading to This Proposal

    Besides the steps the FAA took immediately after the terrorists' 
acts on September 11, 2001, the Office of the Secretary of 
Transportation (OST), Congress, and the FAA, took several longer terms 
actions to prevent hijackings on passenger-carrying airplanes used in 
air carrier service.
    <bullet> On September 16, the Secretary of Transportation announced 
the creation of two rapid-response teams (RRT) to develop 
recommendations for improving security within the national aviation 
system. One team was tasked to develop recommendations to improve 
security at the Nation's airports; the other team was tasked to develop 
recommendations for aircraft integrity

[[Page 55493]]

and security, with a specific focus on cockpit access.
    Members of the aircraft integrity and security RRT included 
representatives from American Airlines, The Boeing Company, Association 
of Flight Attendants, and the Air Line Pilots Association. Members of 
the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation 
Administration supported the RRT. In addition to regular team meetings, 
the RRT met with representatives from the airline operators, pilot and 
flight attendant associations, and parts manufacturers. The RRT also 
received numerous recommendations from the public as the result of an 
e-mail address setup on the FAA Web site.
    On October 1, the RRT for aircraft integrity and security presented 
its final report to the Secretary of Transportation. The report made 17 
recommendations. One recommendation recognized the need for (i) 
reinforced flightdeck doors and (ii) severe limitations to flightdeck 
entry. Anticipating the new severe limitations to flightdeck entry, the 
RRT made four recommendations for flightdeck access. As part of one 
recommendation, the RRT addressed the flightcrew's need for 
notification of a potential threat in the cabin by stating:

    With the flightdeck no longer readily accessible to flight 
attendants, they must have a method for immediate notification to 
the flight deck during a suspected threat in the cabin. On receipt 
of such a warning, the pilot would check to make sure that the 
flight deck door is secure and begin immediate landing procedures. 
Consideration should be given to systems that might be installed in 
the aircraft as well as a device that could be carried by a crew 
member. In those aircraft equipped with an automated evacuation 
alarm system, it may in the near term be an effective tool for such 
notification.

    The RRT recommended that the ``industry develop a plan of feasible 
alternatives for emergency warnings within 30 days.''
    A second flightdeck access recommendation addressed the value of 
monitoring the area outside the flightcrew's compartment door. The RRT 
stated:

    There is a consensus that cameras to monitor and view the area 
outside the flight deck door may add value. There should be 
continuous lighting outside the flight deck door for visibility, as 
well as to provide lighting for cameras. However, placement of a 
monitor in the limited space on the flight deck is a challenge. 
While there may be value in video or audio systems which provide 
information about activities throughout the cabin, we have no 
consensus on whether or how to proceed with this technology.

    The RRT recommended that the ``industry evaluate the use of cameras 
and lighting outside the flight deck door within 6 months.''
    <bullet> On November 19, Congress passed the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107-71). Section 104(b) of 
the ATSA states that the FAA Administrator may develop and implement 
methods--

    (1) To use video monitors or other devices to alert pilots in 
the flight deck to activity in the cabin, except that use of such 
monitors or devices shall be subject to nondisclosure requirements 
applicable to cockpit video records under [49 U.S.C. 1114(c)], * * * 
and
    (3) To revise the procedures by which cabin crews of aircraft 
can notify flight deck crews of security breaches and other 
emergencies, including providing for the installation of switches or 
other devices or methods in an aircraft cabin to enable flight crews 
to discreetly notify the pilots in the case of a security breach 
occurring in the cabin.

    <bullet> On November 25, 2002, Congress passed the Homeland 
Security Act (HSA) to create the Department of Homeland Security (Pub. 
L. 107-296). Section 1403(b) of the HSA amended the ATSA to state that 
the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, may ``Require that 
air carriers provide flight attendants with a discreet, hands-free, 
wireless method of communicating with the pilots.''

International Standards

    At the time of the terrorists' attack, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), an international body consisting of 188 
member countries, was reviewing proposed changes to Annex 6 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. Annex 6, Part I contains 
requirements for the operation of airplanes involved in international 
commercial air transport.
    In light of the attack and comments received from its members 
States, ICAO proposed new provisions with a particular focus on 
security of the flightcrew compartment (also known as the flightdeck). 
Those provisions contained requirements for a flightdeck door and 
related requirements for locking, unlocking, and monitoring the area 
outside the door, and discreet notification of the flightcrew in the 
event of security breaches in the cabin. ICAO adopted the provisions in 
Chapter 13, Security, on March 15, 2002.

    Standard 13.2, Security of the flight crew compartment, states:
    13.2.1 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew 
compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked, and 
means shall be provided by which cabin crew can discreetly notify 
the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security 
breaches in the cabin.
    13.2.2 From 1 November 2003, all passenger-carrying airplanes of 
a maximum certificated take-off weight mass in excess of 45500 kg or 
with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped 
with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to 
resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to 
resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door shall 
be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot's station.
    13.2.3 In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew 
compartment door in accordance with 13.2.2:
    (a) This door shall be closed and locked from the time all 
external doors are closed following embarkation until any such door 
is opened for disembarkation, except when necessary to permit access 
and egress by authorized persons; and
    (b) Means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot's 
station the entire door area outside the flight crew compartment to 
identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behaviour 
or potential threat.

    The deadline for implementation of the ICAO standards was November 
1, 2003.

Discussion of the Proposal

    The FAA proposes to amend part 121 by requiring a means for the 
flightcrew to monitor the area outside the flightdeck door and a means 
for the cabin crew to discreetly notify the flightcrew of a suspicious 
activity or security beach in the cabin. For purposes of this rule, 
flightcrew refers to pilots and flight engineers, and cabin crew refers 
to crewmembers. The purpose of monitoring is to identify anyone 
requesting entry to the flightdeck and to detect suspicious behavior or 
potential threats. The proposal would set forth a standard that would 
allow industry to consider various options to comply with the final 
rule.
    The proposed rule addresses the ICAO standard. The ICAO standard 
applies to all passenger-carrying airplanes of a maximum certificated 
take-off mass in excess of 45,500 kg (approximately 100,309 lbs) or 
with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 involved in 
international commercial air transport. This proposed rule applies only 
to passenger-carrying operations conducted under part 121 that require 
a lockable door between the cockpit and passenger compartment. Neither 
the ICAO standard nor this proposed rule will apply to all-cargo 
operations. Additionally, part 121 operations do not encompass all 
passenger-carrying airplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass 
in excess of 45500 Kg (the ICAO standard) operated in the U.S.

[[Page 55494]]

Accordingly, since some airplanes may operate both domestically and 
internationally under other operational rules (e.g., parts 91, 125 and 
135), the U.S. will not fully comply with the ICAO standard.
    The FAA's proposed rule will require passenger-carrying part 121 
operators to retrofit their aircraft with a means to monitor the area 
on the cabin side of the flightdeck door and adopt measures to comply 
with the flightcrew notification requirement. Since there is a retrofit 
requirement, the FAA proposes to give industry 2 years to comply from 
the time a final rule is adopted. This time should be sufficient for 
industry to consider various options, rather than requiring the 
industry to focus solely on one possible option in order to meet a more 
immediate implementation date.
    In proposed Sec.  121.313(k), the use of the phrase ``a means to 
monitor from the flightdeck side of the door'' permits at least two 
methods to comply with the proposed rule, covering monitoring from the 
flightdeck. The first method is a video system. The video system would 
transmit video images to a monitor or monitors appropriately situated 
on the flightdeck to allow viewing of the area outside the flightdeck 
(herein referred to the ``door area'') from the flightdeck side of the 
door. A crewmember would provide audio confirmation to the flightcrew 
that the door area is clear, including confirmation that the lavatory 
is clear. A second method would involve visual identification of the 
door area, coupled with an audio confirmation procedure. Through a 
viewing device installed in the flightdeck door, one person on the 
flightdeck would view the door area and identify the person seeking 
access. Then a crewmember would provide audio confirmation that the 
door area is clear while viewing the outside door area. For example, 
before providing audio confirmation to the flightdeck, the crewmember 
would (1) assure that no passengers are standing near the door area, 
and (2) that no passenger is in any forward lavatory.
    The FAA believes both methods comply with the intent of ICAO's 
requirement that the door area outside the flightdeck must be 
monitored. The purpose of monitoring is to identify people requesting 
access to the flightdeck. Prior to opening the flightdeck door, 
identifying people by a properly designed video camera system and audio 
confirmation or through operational procedures using audio and other 
visual identification means are both appropriate. Since the FAA's 
proposed rule is a performance standard, other methods may be developed 
to comply with this rule and the FAA seeks input from industry for 
other means of compliance.
    Proposed Sec.  121.582 would heighten security requirements by 
giving the cabin crew a means to discreetly notify the flightcrew of 
suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin. The FAA agrees 
with the ICAO position that discreet notification of the flightcrew 
should be provided. The FAA believes that current, on board 
communication crew alert systems could, along with FAA-approved 
operator-developed procedures, meet this requirement. For example, 
subtly keying the interphone in a specific manner could be used. The 
rule would also allow the use of more sophisticated technology, such as 
hands-free, wireless method as considered by Congress in the Homeland 
Security Act. However, any installed system must protect against false 
alarms or nuisance alerts that would make the system unreliable.
    While an airplane is moving for purposes of a flight segment, 
proposed Sec.  121.584 requires part 121 operators to keep the 
flightdeck door locked and closed unless an authorized person uses a 
device and procedure required by Sec.  121.313(k) to view the area 
outside the flightdeck compartment door. In proposed Sec.  121.584(a), 
the phrase ``airplane moves in order to initiate a flight segment'' 
includes movement under its own power or if the airplane is being moved 
by another device for example, a tug. In proposed Sec.  121.584(a)(1), 
the phrase ``a person authorized to be on the flightdeck'' is anyone 
who obtained access to the flightdeck pursuant to Sec.  121.547. 
Proposed Sec.  121.584(a)(2) requires that the procedures in Sec.  
121.584(a)(1)(i) and (ii) be satisfactorily accomplished before the 
crewmember in charge of the flightdeck authorizes the door to be 
unlocked and opened. In proposed Sec.  121.584(a)(2), the phrase ``the 
crewmember in charge'' means the flightcrew member in charge of the 
flightdeck at the time the door is opened, which may be the first 
officer if the pilot-in-command is not on the flightdeck. It is the 
FAA's intent to meet the ICAO standard that requires monitoring the 
area outside the flightdeck door by permitting the use of a peep hole 
to view a large area outside the flightdeck door in conjunction with 
the audio confirmation, for example, from a crewmember who is outside 
the flightdeck and who can observe that the flightdeck door area is 
secure.
    Proposed Sec.  121.584(a) requires every certificate holder 
operating under part 121 to implement this rule at the time the final 
rule is published if the operator already has the means to monitor the 
area outside the flightdeck door as required by proposed Sec.  
121.313(k) (such as a peephole). The FAA has determined there is no 
reason to delay the security benefits of this operating rule for 
operators that can meet the rule at the time of final rule publication. 
Operators of airplanes that currently do not have a means to monitor 
the area outside the flightdeck door, have 2 years from the date the 
final rule is published to install such devices (such as a video 
system). But during that 2-year period, once an airplane is equipped 
with a means to monitor the area outside the flightdeck, then the 
certificate holder and the crewmembers must comply with proposed 
section 121.584(a) when operating that airplane.
    The U.S. filed a difference with ICAO for Annex 6, Part 1, Chapter 
13, provision 13.2.3 on November 6, 2002. The FAA will significantly 
alter its filing concerning the difference associated with this 
provision to reflect the rule that is finally adopted. This proposed 
rule does not meet ICAO standards in the following areas.
    <bullet> The proposal in this action will not be implemented before 
the November 1, 2003, ICAO deadline.
    <bullet> Any passenger-carrying airplanes operated under parts 91, 
125, and 135 including international commercial air transport 
operations with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 45500 
kg or with a seating capacity of greater than 60 (as ICAO requires), 
are not covered by this proposed rule.
    <bullet> The proposed rule will permit an alternative means to 
monitor the area outside the flightdeck door from the flightdeck side 
of the door, instead of from either pilot station, as ICAO requires.

Harmonization Effort

    The FAA considers adopting and maintaining coordinated standards 
between the United States and its counterparts to be a high priority. 
The FAA is working informally with the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) 
and Transport Canada Civil Aviation to ensure the proposed rulemakings 
on flightdeck door monitoring and crew alerting systems are similarly 
worded and have the same requirements. On August 1, 2003, the JAA 
published Amendment 6 to JAR-OPS 1, Commercial Air Transportation 
(Aeroplanes). This amendment requires a means or procedure by which the 
cabin crew can notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious 
activity or security breaches in the cabin. Additionally, the JAA is 
finalizing a separate amendment to JAR-OPS 1 that,

[[Page 55495]]

like this proposed rule, requires monitoring of the door area outside 
the flight crew compartment.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), the FAA has determined that there are no requirements for 
information collection associated with this proposed rule.

Economic Assessment, Regulatory Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact 
Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency to 
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination the 
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. sections 2531-2533) prohibits agencies 
from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade 
Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where 
appropriate, use them as the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies 
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other 
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate 
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually adjusted for inflation, which makes the 2004 
value about $120,700,000.
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this proposed rule 
(1) would have benefits that justify its costs; (2) would be a 
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866 and would be ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (3) would not have a significant 
impact on a substantial number of small entities; (4) would move toward 
existing and potential international standards as the basis of U.S. 
standards; and (5) would not impose an unfunded mandate on State, 
local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector. The FAA has 
placed these analyses in the docket and they are summarized in the 
following sections.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    Costs--The FAA requests comments on the methodology, assumptions, 
and results of the economic analysis and asks commenters to provide 
supporting data, documentation, and rationale for their comments.
    If the operators decide to develop appropriate procedures to comply 
with the proposed rule, the FAA estimates that there could be minimal 
compliance costs. Although not required to do so, operators may decide 
to comply by installing a video camera surveillance system. Thus, the 
following FAA's estimated costs of installing a video camera 
surveillance system represent the high-end cost of complying with the 
proposed rule.
    Based on numbers developed at the end of 2003, the proposed rule 
would affect 6,190 airplanes (4,487 turbojets, 1,203 regional jets, and 
500 large (>20 seats) turboprops). If a final rule were issued on 
January 1, 2004, the 2-year compliance period would allow 550 of these 
airplanes to be retired in 2004 and 2005 and not be retrofitted, 
resulting in 5,640 retrofitted airplanes. Further, 4,360 airplanes that 
are projected to be manufactured between 2004 and 2013 would have these 
systems installed as original operating equipment.
    Certificate holders that choose to install a video camera system to 
comply with this rule, would incur the following costs. Some turbojets 
would need a two- or three-camera system while regional jets, including 
turbojets and turboprops, would need a one-camera system. AirWorks, 
AEI/AD Aerospace, and Goodrich are the only vendors currently supplying 
these systems for airplanes. Many of their systems have Supplemental 
Type Certificates (STCs) issued by the FAA. These vendors are selling 
their systems to several European and Asian airlines as a result of 
United Kingdom (UK) Department for Transport Directive 21(a), issued on 
January 27, 2003, which strictly follows the ICAO requirements 
including the November 1, 2003 deadline. Thus, the FAA bases its 
estimated average costs on the vendors' reported costs.
    Using the systems we examined produced the following costs. For a 
future production airplane, this system would cost $16,000 for a 
turbojet and $9,000 for a regional jet or turboprop. It would take 16 
labor hours ($1,280) to install on a turbojet and 12 labor hours ($960) 
on a regional jet. The total cost would be $17,280 for a turbojet and 
$9,960 for a regional jet or turboprop. Production schedules would not 
be disrupted.
    For an existing airplane, the retrofitting kit would cost $17,000 
for a turbojet and $10,000 for a regional jet or turboprop. If the 
retrofit were completed during a regularly scheduled maintenance check, 
it would take 48 labor hours ($3,840) for a turbojet and 36 hours 
($2,880) for a regional jet or turboprop. The per airplane retrofit 
cost would be $20,840 for a turbojet and $12,880 for a regional jet or 
turboprop. If the retrofit must be completed during a dedicated 
maintenance session, labor time would increase to 96 hours ($7,680) for 
a turbojet and 72 hours ($5,760) for a regional jet or turboprop. In 
addition, the airplane would be out of service for 1 day resulting in 
lost net revenue ranging from $7,850 to $21,550 for a turbojet 
depending upon its type and size and from $1,600 to $4,850 for a 
regional jet or turboprop.
    However, the FAA believes the airlines have sufficient compliance 
time to complete the retrofit during a scheduled maintenance check. For 
the most popular airplane models, several video camera surveillance 
system STCs already exist. In addition, the FAA anticipates all 
remaining airplane models will have STCs issued by mid-2004. Thus, 
airlines will have from 18 to 24 months to comply with the rule. During 
that time the FAA believes each airplane will have an overnight 
maintenance check during which the retrofit could be accomplished 
without loss of revenue time. To the extent these retrofits could not 
be completed during regularly scheduled maintenance, the FAA 
underestimated the potential compliance costs. The FAA specifically 
requests comments on this particular assumption.
    The total cost to install this system on future production 
airplanes between 2004 and 2014 would be $64 million, or a present 
value of $44 million. The total cost to retrofit this system on 
existing airplanes during 2004 and 2005 would be $102 million ($34 
million in 2004 and $68 million in 2005), which has a present value of 
$91 million.
    The FAA estimates an average of 1 hour per year to inspect and 
maintain the system, resulting in a total maintenance expenditure of 
$5.5 million between 2004 and 2014, which has a present value of $3.5 
million. As the mean times between failures for the components would be 
longer than 10 years, the FAA calculates no replacement costs during 
the time frame of this analysis.
    The system would add between 12 and 17 pounds to an airplane's 
weight, which would increase average annual per airplane fuel 
consumption between 68 and 328 gallons. Using a price of

[[Page 55496]]

$0.80 per gallon, the FAA calculates the total additional fuel cost to 
be $14 million between 2004 and 2014, which has a present value of $9 
million.
    As shown in Table 1, the total costs between 2004 and 2014 of 
installing video camera surveillance systems would be $185 million, 
which has a present value of $148.5 million.

   Table 1.--Total and Present Values of Costs To Install Video Camera
         Surveillance Systems in Part 121 Airplanes (2004-2014)
                           [In 2003 $millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Present value
            Source of cost                 Total cost       total cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install on Future Production Airplanes            $64.0            $44.0
Retrofit on Existing Airplanes........            102.0             92.0
System Maintenance....................              5.5              3.5
Fuel Consumption......................             14.0              9.0
                                       ------------------
    Total.............................            185.5            148.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As shown in Table 2, the largest annual expenditures would be in 
2004, $40 million, and, in 2005, $76 million. The present value of the 
costs in 2004 and 2005 would be about 70 percent of the total present 
value costs. The annual costs thereafter would be about $6.5 million to 
$9 million for the new airplanes and for fuel and maintenance.

        Table 2.--Total Costs by Year for Part 121 Operators of Having Video Camera Surveillance Systems
                                               [In 2003 $millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Future
                                                   production  Retrofitting    Fuel and                 Present
                       Year                         airplanes    airplanes   maintenance  Total cost     value
                                                       cost        cost          cost                 total cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004.............................................      $5.675      $33.750        $0.481     $39.906     $37.295
2005.............................................       6.290       68.523         1.089      75.902      66.309
2006.............................................       6.126        0.000         1.616       7.742       6.343
2007.............................................       6.863        0.000         1.824       8.687       6.656
2008.............................................       6.379        0.000         1.889       8.268       5.922
2009.............................................       6.192        0.000         1.949       9.141       5.452
2010.............................................       5.766        0.000         2.007       7.773       4.867
2011.............................................       6.089        0.000         2.066       8.155       4.772
2012.............................................       5.462        0.000         2.130       7.592       4.153
2013.............................................       4.542        0.000         2.196       6.738       3.449
2014.............................................       4.399        0.000         2.261       6.660       2.812
                                                  -------------
    Total........................................      63.783      102.273        19.508     186.564     148.030
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cost of instituting a flightdeck alerting system for crewmember 
could be met by a variety of measures such as special signals through 
the interphone system or modifying existing crew notification devices 
or procedures. As such, the FAA determines that this proposed 
requirement would impose minimal costs.
    Benefits--The proposed rule is one of a series of rulemaking 
actions aimed at preventing or deterring an occurrence similar to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. It is designed to ensure that pilots do 
not open the flightdeck door and admit a potential hijacker because the 
pilots will be able to recognize who is trying to gain entry. It is 
also designed to alert the pilots to problems in the cabin through the 
crew discreet monitoring system and allow them to take the appropriate 
actions.
    As witnessed on September 11, 2001, terrorist acts can result in 
the complete destruction of an airplane with the loss of all on board 
and with huge collateral damage far exceeding that of the airplane and 
passengers. The economic and social costs of the September 11 attacks 
have been measured in the billions of dollars. While the FAA cannot 
predict the frequency and severity of future terrorist acts against 
aviation, it does expect that there will be such attempts. The value of 
preventing a single loss of an average flight is estimated to be about 
$375 million, without consideration of collateral damage. However, the 
potential benefits from preventing the destruction of an operating 
airplane cannot be precisely quantified nor specifically allocated to 
each of the multiple parallel regulatory actions being taken by the FAA 
and other Federal agencies. The FAA concludes that there is a high 
probability that the benefits of this proposed rule would exceed its 
costs. In addition to preventing the extraordinary costs of another 
attack, this proposed rule responds to the interest of the U.S. 
Congress as specified in the ATSA. Further, the need for this proposed 
rule is illustrated by the fact that ICAO has made flightdeck 
surveillance a requirement for airplanes with more than 60 seats that 
travel internationally.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals

[[Page 55497]]

and to explain the rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-
range of small entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit 
organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it would, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the RFA. However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule 
is not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the 
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis 
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing 
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    As a proxy for the operator's ability to afford the cost of 
compliance, the FAA calculated the ratio of the total cost of the rule 
as a percentage of annual revenue. The FAA determined that the maximum 
percentage would be 1.7 percent for one small airline while only two 
other airlines would have percentages greater than 1 percent. It should 
be emphasized that these estimated costs are for the high cost method 
of compliance, which would not be required by the proposed rule. The 
FAA does not believe that such costs represent a significant economic 
impact.
    Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 
605(b), the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
certifies that this proposed rule would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate 
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary 
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international 
standards and where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. 
standards. The FAA assessed the potential effect of this proposed 
rulemaking and determined that the proposed amendment is largely 
consistent with JAA and ICAO standards. However, the international 
standards are being reviewed and they may be moving closer to the FAA 
position. Therefore, the FAA determined that this proposed rule would 
be in compliance with the Trade Agreement Act.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended, 
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal 
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act 
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing 
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule 
that may result in a $100 million or more expenditure adjusted annually 
for inflation, which is about $120,700,000 in 2004, in any one year by 
State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant 
regulatory action.''
    This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do 
not apply.

Regulations Affecting Interstate Aviation in Alaska

    Section 1205 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 
3213) requires the Administrator, when modifying regulations in Title 
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in a manner affecting 
interstate aviation in Alaska, to consider the extent to which Alaska 
is not served by transportation modes other than aviation, and to 
establish such regulatory distinctions as he or she considers 
appropriate. Because this proposed rule would apply to the 
certification of future designs of transport category airplanes and 
their subsequent operation, it could, if adopted, affect interstate 
aviation in Alaska. The FAA therefore specifically requests comments on 
whether there is justification for applying the proposed rule 
differently in interstate operations in Alaska.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this proposed rulemaking action qualifies for the 
categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no 
extraordinary circumstances.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of this proposal has been assessed in accordance 
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, 
as amended (42 U.S.C. Section 6362) and FAA Order 1053.1. It has been 
determined that this proposal is not a major regulatory action under 
the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 121 is revised to read:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 46105.

    2. Section 121.313 is amended by adding new paragraph (k) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  121.313  Miscellaneous equipment.

* * * * *
    (k) Except for all-cargo operations as defined in section 119.3 of 
this subchapter, after (insert date 2 years after final rule 
publication date) for all passenger-carrying airplanes that require a 
lockable flightdeck door in accordance with paragraph (f) of this 
section, a means to monitor from the flightdeck side of the door the 
area outside the flightdeck door to identify persons requesting entry 
and to detect suspicious behavior and potential threats.
    3. Add new Sec.  121.582 as follows:


Sec.  121.582  Means to discreetly notify a flightcrew.

    Except for all-cargo operations as defined in section 119.3 of this 
subchapter, after (insert date 180 days after final rule publication 
date), for all passenger carrying airplanes that require a lockable 
flightdeck door in accordance with 121.313(f), the certificate holder 
must have an approved means by which the cabin crew can discreetly 
notify the flightcrew in the event of suspicious activity or security 
breaches in the cabin.
    4. Add new Sec.  121.584 as follows:


Sec.  121.584  Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck 
door.

    (a) From the time the airplane moves in order to initiate a flight 
segment through the end of that flight segment,

[[Page 55498]]

no person may unlock or open the flightdeck door unless:
    (1) A person authorized to be on the flightdeck uses an approved 
audio procedure and an approved visual device to verify that:
    (i) The area outside the flightdeck door is secure, and;
    (ii) If someone outside the flightdeck is seeking to have the 
flightdeck door opened, that person is not under duress, and;
    (2) After the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) have been 
satisfactorily accomplished, the crewmember in charge on the flightdeck 
authorizes the door to be unlocked and open.
    (b) Before (insert date 2 years after final rule publication date) 
paragraph (a) applies only to the operation of an airplane that is 
equipped with a means to monitor the flightdeck door area as required 
by Sec.  121.313(k).

    Issued in Washington, DC on September 14, 2005.
John M. Allen,
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 05-18806 Filed 9-20-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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