1

Filed 8/24/21 (unmodified opinion attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Noah S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law

___________________________________

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NOAH S., 

Defendant and Appellant.

 

 A158575

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J1800250)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

AND DENYING REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the partially published opinion filed on August 3, 

2021, be modified as follows:

On page 9, in the first full paragraph, change the first part of the 

sentence that begins “Also after the incident, and for the week or so before 

she testified, . . . .” to “For the week or so before she testified, . . . .”

There is no change in the judgment.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts A, B, C, and D 

of the Discussion.
2

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

Dated: 8/24/201 Fujisaki, Acting P.J.
3

In re Noah S. (A158575)

Trial Court: Contra Costa

Trial Judge Hon. John C. Cope

Attorneys:

Amanda K. Roze, under appointment by the First District 

Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General, Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
1

Filed 8/3/21 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Noah S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NOAH S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

 A158575

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J1800250)

Noah S. (Minor) appeals after a juvenile court sustained wardship 

allegations that he committed attempted robbery and elder abuse. On 

appeal, he argues the evidence fails to support the allegations, the court 

erroneously failed to specify a maximum term or calculate custody credits

and to stay punishment on one of the counts under section 654, and the court 

erred in concluding the attempted robbery offense fell within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).

In the published portion of this opinion, we reject Minor’s contention 

that his attempted robbery adjudication does not fall within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). In the unpublished portion of 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts A, B, C, and D 

of the Discussion.
2

this opinion, we reject Minor’s remaining contentions. We affirm the orders 

of the juvenile court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2018, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition 

charging Minor with over a dozen crimes, such as motor vehicle burglaries

and vandalism, in San Mateo County. Minor entered a plea admitting one 

felony motor vehicle burglary count. (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b).1) The

Superior Court of San Mateo County adjudged him a ward and transferred 

his case to Contra Costa County prior to his disposition hearing. 

While Minor’s wardship was ongoing, the People filed a supplemental 

juvenile wardship petition alleging Minor, who was then 14 years old,

committed attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211) and caused or permitted an elder 

or dependent adult to suffer (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)). As to both offenses, the 

People alleged Minor personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim 

who was 70 years old or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)). The People also added an 

allegation that the attempted robbery offense fell within section 1203.09, 

subdivision (b)(2). The following is a summary of the evidence presented at 

the contested jurisdiction hearing in August 2019.

Philippe E. testified that on the afternoon of July 26, 2019, he and his 

wife, Jacqueline E., went to a restaurant to have lunch. Afterwards, he 

loaded his walker into the back of his car, and his wife indicated to him there 

was a young man in front of their car. Phillippe E. saw the young man, who

looked around 15 years old, talking to his wife. When Jacqueline E. did not 

get into the car, Phillippe E. got out and found her on the ground. She raised 

her hand to him, not for help getting up, but just wanting to hold his hand.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
3

She asked him what happened in English, which was strange because the 

two always spoke to each other in French. Philippe E., thinking his wife was 

“not in her natural state,” called 911. 

Jacqueline E. testified she was 88 years old at the time of the incident. 

She recalled walking to the passenger side of her car after lunch but had no 

memory of what happened thereafter, even after viewing surveillance video of 

the incident. She could only recollect being in an ambulance en route to the

hospital. Jacqueline E. said she was “out completely,” though she returned

home from the hospital the same day and received no further medical

treatment. She also got her purse back the same day and had not lost

anything. After the incident, she had a “huge” hematoma on the side of her 

head, bigger than a baseball. At the time of the hearing, the hematoma was 

still there, though it was the size of a quarter or dollar coin. The hematoma 

was sensitive to the touch, and Jacqueline E. could not sleep on that side of 

her head. After the incident, she had to lie down and rest several times 

throughout the day for about a week, because she could not stay on her feet 

for more than 15 minutes to half an hour. This was not the case prior to the 

incident. She also had a headache “for the last week or so,” and she had neck 

pain, though she was not sure the neck pain was connected to the incident.

Surveillance video of the incident was admitted into evidence. It shows 

Philippe E. and Jacqueline E. leaving the restaurant. Jacqueline E. has a 

purse in her hand. The couple load Philippe E.’s walker into the trunk and, 

as Jacqueline E. opens the front passenger door, a young man runs up and 

talks to her. The young man moves closer as Philippe E. begins to get into

the driver’s seat. The young man gestures to Jacqueline E. that he wants to 

walk past her. When she steps aside to let him pass, he grabs her purse and 

breaks into a run. Jacqueline E., however, does not let go of the purse and 
4

neither does the young man. Instead, he pulls or drags her from the front 

passenger side of the car to the rear trunk area on the driver’s side, where 

she falls, slams into the ground, and rolls on the pavement (somehow still 

holding the purse). Per the clock embedded in the surveillance video, two to 

three seconds elapses from the grabbing to the fall. After the fall, the young 

man turns toward Jacqueline E., but keeps running. Once Jacqueline E.

stops rolling, she lays completely still on the pavement; the video ends about 

10 seconds later. During this time, Philippe E.—who was getting into the 

driver’s seat of the car—does not appear to have noticed the commotion. 

A police officer took fingerprints from where the young man touched

the car. The fingerprints matched Minor’s. That officer testified that 

Jacqueline E. was still on the ground when he arrived at the scene. Though 

she was conscious, she was confused and could not tell him what happened. 

The officer saw that Jacqueline E. had a head injury and blood in her hair; he

also saw a bloodspot on the ground near her head about four inches long and 

three inches wide. 

After considering the evidence, the juvenile court sustained the 

allegations in the supplemental petition in their entirety and found the 

attempted robbery adjudication qualified as an offense under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). At the disposition hearing, the 

court continued Minor’s wardship, and committed him to a ranch facility for 

12 months with a 180 day “aftercare period.” Minor appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Attempted Robbery 

Adjudication

Minor contends there was insufficient evidence showing his intent to 

rob Jacqueline E., an element of attempted robbery. At most, he argues, the 
5

evidence shows an intent to commit a petty theft by purse snatching without 

use of force or fear.

“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it 

discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could find the [minor] guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears 

‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to 

support [the juvenile adjudication].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 

331.)

“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession 

of another, from his [or her] person or immediate presence, and against his 

[or her] will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) The 

perpetrator must exert “some quantum of force in excess of that ‘necessary to 

accomplish the mere seizing of the property.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 989, 995.) “ ‘But the force need not be great: “ ‘ “[a]ll the force that is 

required to make the offense a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient to 

overcome the victim’s resistance . . . .” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Joseph (2019) 33 

Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) “An attempted robbery requires a specific intent to 

commit robbery and a direct, ineffectual act (beyond mere preparation) 

toward its commission.” (People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 694; see 

§ 21a.)

Here, there is ample evidence Minor intended to rob Jacqueline E. by 

use of force. When Minor grabbed the purse, Jacqueline E. did not let go. 

Minor then tried to wrest the purse from her as he pulled her around the car

where he finally caused her to fall. Minor’s conduct clearly evidences intent 
6

to use force to overcome the victim’s resistance. (See People v. Jones (1992) 2 

Cal.App.4th 867, 872.)

Minor’s various contentions—that he did not arm himself, use threats 

or commands, strike or shove Jacqueline E., succeed in getting the purse, or 

go back and take the purse after Jacqueline E. fell—are of no moment. None 

of this was necessary to establish an intent to rob.

Relying on a statement made by the juvenile court just before it found 

the elements of attempted robbery true beyond a reasonable doubt, Minor 

argues the court applied an incorrect legal standard regarding the specific 

intent required for attempted robbery. Specifically, in discussing the 

difference between robbery and a purse snatching, the court observed:

“robbery requires that you take the property from the person or presence of 

the person by force or fear. If the purse was snatched and she released it 

immediately and you ran away, that would not be a robbery. That would 

have been a grand theft person, I believe. But that is not what happened. 

[¶] You applied force and you dragged that woman behind her car and 

slammed her head into the pavement to get that purse, and she held on for 

dear life. . . . But that is clearly an attempted application of force to obtain 

property from the presence of another with the intent to deprive that person 

of the property, and the elements of attempted robbery have been met beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” 

This passage does not remotely reflect the application of an incorrect 

legal standard or a misunderstanding of the elements of the charged offense. 

Rather, this passage reflects the court’s focus on the amount of force Minor 

actually used, which was entirely appropriate.

Minor also claims the juvenile court erred when it stated he “dragged” 

Jacqueline E. and “slammed her head” into the ground. We see no error. The 
7

court’s characterization of Minor as “dragging” the victim was eminently 

reasonable and supported by the video evidence, and we have no trouble 

adopting that characterization ourselves. The court’s statement that Minor 

slammed Jacqueline E.’s head into the ground reasonably drew from the

video evidence showing that Minor’s forceful attempt to take the purse 

caused Jacqueline E. to fall and slam her head into the ground. 

In sum, substantial evidence supports the attempted robbery

adjudication.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Elder Abuse 

Adjudication

Section 368, subdivision (b)(1) (“368(b)(1)”) makes it a crime for “[a] 

person who knows or reasonably should know that a person is an elder . . . 

and who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily 

harm or death, willfully causes or permits any elder . . . to suffer, or inflicts

thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering . . . .” (Italics added.) 

An “elder” is “a person who is 65 years of age or older.” (§ 368, subd. (g).)

Minor contends insufficient evidence supported his adjudication for 

elder abuse because there was no substantial evidence that he inflicted 

unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering under circumstances likely to 

produce great bodily harm or death. Minor claims the offense was merely an 

attempted purse-snatching, which was “not likely to produce great bodily 

injury or death.” We reject the argument.

As discussed above, Minor tried to overcome Jacqueline E.’s resistance 

to him taking her purse by breaking into a run and pulling her around her 

car. At the time of the incident, Minor was 14 years old, while Jacqueline E. 

was nearly 90 years old. That she was advanced in her years was obvious. 

Breaking into a surprise run and pulling any person around a car is a recipe 

for a rapid, unexpected, and uncontrolled fall, and when the person being 
8

pulled is of an advanced age such as Jacqueline E. was here, such a fall on 

pavement could easily produce great bodily harm or even death. (See, e.g., 

People v. Racy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1333 [“as a matter of common 

knowledge, [74 years old] is an age that carries with it an increased risk of 

bone fractures from a fall”].) Indeed, as will be discussed below, substantial 

evidence establishes that Jacqueline E. did in fact suffer great bodily injury.

Minor cites to People v. Thiel (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1201 and People v. 

Racy, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th 1327, where there was substantial evidence of 

circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, and 

attempts to distinguishes the circumstances in those cases from those at 

hand. (Thiel, at pp. 1217–1218; Racy, at p. 1333.) But these cases bear no 

resemblance to the present case and offer no basis for concluding that the 

circumstances here were unlikely to produce great bodily harm or death.

In sum, substantial evidence supports the elder abuse adjudication.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Great Bodily Injury 

Enhancements

Minor next contends there was insufficient evidence that he inflicted 

great bodily injury to sustain the great bodily injury enhancements 

(§ 12022.7, subdivision (c)) as to both counts. 

“ ‘[G]reat bodily injury’ means a significant or substantial physical 

injury.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (f).) “ ‘It is an injury that is greater than minor or 

moderate harm.’ ” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702; CALCRIM No. 

3162.) “[T]o be significant or substantial the injury need not be so grave as to 

cause the victim ‘ “permanent,” “prolonged,” or “protracted” ’ bodily damage.”

(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64.) “[S]ome physical pain or damage, 

such as lacerations, bruises, or abrasions is sufficient for a finding of ‘great 

bodily injury.’ ” (People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1047.) A 

loss of consciousness that does not require medical treatment can be
9

sufficient to establish “serious bodily injury” under section 243 (People v. 

Wade (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149), and there is abundant decisional 

authority acknowledging that “serious bodily injury” and “great bodily injury” 

are “essentially equivalent.” (People v. Johnson (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 384, 

391–392.) It is well settled that the determination of great bodily injury is a 

question of fact. (People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750.) “In 

determining substantiality, the [factfinder can] consider the effect of severe 

blows upon elderly persons.” (People v. Clay (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 433, 460.)

To recount some of the evidence here, Jacqueline E. testified she 

suffered a “huge” hematoma to her head that was bigger than a baseball. It 

was sensitive to the touch and she could not sleep on that side of her head. 

The police officer who arrived on the scene testified he saw blood in her hair 

and a bloodspot on the ground near her head that was about four inches long 

and three inches wide. Jacqueline E. still had the hematoma at the contested 

jurisdiction hearing, which was held about a month after the incident, though 

by that time it had reduced to the size of a quarter or dollar coin. For about a 

week after the incident, she could not stay on her feet for more than half an 

hour at most, and she had to repeatedly lie down to rest throughout the day, 

which was not the case before the incident. Also after the incident, and for 

the week or so before she testified, Jacqueline E. had a headache that was not 

present before the incident. She also complained of neck pain for about a 

week. The court, acting as factfinder, could reasonably attribute the fatigue, 

headache, and neck pain, to the fall.

Contrary to Minor’s argument, there was also convincing evidence that

Jacqueline E. lost consciousness after the fall. The surveillance video showed

Jacqueline E. falls, rolls to a stop, then remains completely motionless on the 

ground until the surveillance video cuts off about ten seconds later. 
10

Jacqueline E. testified at the hearing that she still had no memory of talking 

to anyone or knowing what happened at her car, and that she could only 

recollect waking up in the ambulance. Philippe E. testified that when he

spoke to Jacqueline E. on the ground after the incident, she asked him what 

happened—i.e., she could not recollect what just transpired. And because she

asked him what happened in English, even though they always speak to each 

other in French, he knew she was “not in her natural state.” The officer who 

arrived on the scene testified that Jacqueline E. was conscious, but she

seemed confused and could not tell him what happened. 

Considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence of 

Jacqueline E.’s hematoma, loss of consciousness (including confusion and loss 

of memory), fatigue, and prolonged pain was more than sufficient to support 

the juvenile court’s determination that Minor inflicted great bodily injury. 

Ultimately, Minor’s various arguments to the contrary amount to a request 

that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

D. Maximum Term of Confinement, Custody Credits, and 

Section 654

In his opening brief, Minor contended the juvenile court failed to 

specify his maximum term of confinement, failed to calculate custody credits, 

and failed to stay punishment for one of the counts pursuant to section 654. 

In his reply brief, however, Minor asserts that these issues are moot. Minor 

has augmented the appellate record with documents showing he successfully 

completed probation and the court dismissed the wardship in January 2021. 

Given Minor’s apparent abandonment of the claims, we will not consider 

them further. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813.)
11

E. The Offense Falls Within Welfare and Institutions Code 

Section 707, Subdivision (b)

Minor contends his attempted robbery adjudication does not fall within 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) (“707(b)”).2 This 

contention presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de 

novo. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)

“ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental 

task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s 

purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them 

a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “When the 

language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.” [Citation.] But where 

a statute’s terms are unclear or ambiguous, we may “look to a variety of 

extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be 

remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous 

administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is 

a part.” ’ ” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1221–1222.)

As relevant here, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) 

provides: “This subdivision is applicable to any case in which a minor is 

alleged to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the violation of 

one of the following offenses,” including “[a]n offense described in 

Section 1203.09 of the Penal Code.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707(b)(16).) In 

turn, section 1203.09 contains two subdivisions pertinent to our review. 

Section 1203.09, subdivision (a), provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, 

probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of 

2 Various consequences arise when an offense falls within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 707(b). For example, such an offense impacts 

whether and when juvenile records can be sealed or destroyed. (See, e.g., 

Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 781, subds. (a)(1)(D), (d) & 786, subds. (a), (d).)
12

sentence be suspended for, any person who commits or attempts to commit 

one or more of the crimes listed in subdivision (b) against a person who is 60 

years of age or older; or against a person who is blind, a paraplegic, a 

quadriplegic, or a person confined to a wheelchair and that disability is 

known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the crime;

and who during the course of the offense inflicts great bodily injury upon the 

person.” (Italics added.) Section 1203.09, subdivision (b), provides that 

subdivision (a) applies to the crime of robbery. (§ 1203.09, subd. (b)(2).) 

Under the plain language of these statutes, an attempted robbery

against the particular types of victims specified in section 1203.09—e.g., a 

victim who is 60 years of age or older, where the perpetrator inflicts great 

bodily injury—is an offense described in section 1203.09 and therefore 

qualifies as an offense falling within Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707(b). 

Minor contends we should read Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707(b)(16)—which explicitly states Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707(b) applies to an “offense described in Section 1203.09 of the Penal 

Code”—as referring only to offenses described in subdivision (b) of 

section 1203.09. We are not persuaded. Had the Legislature intended such a 

limitation, it could easily have included language to that effect. But the 

Legislature did not do so, and we cannot rewrite the statutory language as 

Minor urges. While Minor additionally observes that section 1203.09, 

subdivision (a), mainly concerns probation eligibility, the point has no force 

inasmuch as the entire statute concerns probation ineligibility. At bottom,

Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b)(16) is crystal clear in its 

application to an “offense described in Section 1203.09 of the Penal Code.”
13

Contrary to Minor’s assertion, our conclusion does not render 

superfluous the attempted murder provision in Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707(b)(12). That is because Welfare and Institutions Code section 

707(b)(12) applies broadly to any attempted murder, while any attempted 

crime under section 1203.09, including attempted murder and attempted 

robbery, specifically requires a victim “who is 60 years of age or older; or . . . a 

person who is blind, a paraplegic, a quadriplegic, or a person confined to a 

wheelchair” and whose “disability is known or reasonably should be known to 

the person committing the crime,” plus the infliction of “great bodily injury.” 

Thus, giving effect to the plain terms of the two statutes implicates no 

redundancy or surplusage and does not lead to absurd consequences.

Although we need not go further because the statutory language is 

unambiguous, our examination of the legislative history—particularly 

concerning the 2008 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707(b)(16) and the 1994 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 707(b)(12)—reveals nothing supporting Minor’s position. (Legis. 

Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1498 (2007–2008 Reg. Sess.) [indicating revision 

from “any” to “an” in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b)(16) was a 

“nonsubstantive” change to “maintain the codes”]; Assem. Com. on Pub. 

Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1948 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended 

Jan. 3, 1994 [indicating “assault with intent to commit murder”—previously 

enumerated in Welfare and institutions Code section 707(b)(12)—was being 

replaced with crime of attempted murder because the former offense was “no 

longer found in the Penal Code”].)

Finally, Minor latches onto David P. v. Superior Court (1982) 127 

Cal.App.3d 417, where the court concluded attempted robbery is not an 

enumerated crime in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b). But the 
14

court in David P. did not purport to determine whether attempted robbery

against elderly or disabled victims where the perpetrator inflicts great bodily 

injury could be an enumerated offense by way of section 1203.09. “Cases are 

not authority, of course, for issues not raised and resolved.” (San Diego Gas 

& Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 943.)

Beyond the foregoing, Minor reiterates his challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence of great bodily injury. As already discussed in part C, ante, 

substantial evidence supports the attendant great bodily injury 

enhancement.

In sum, we conclude Minor’s adjudication for attempted robbery is an 

offense described in section 1203.09 and so falls within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 707(b).3

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed. 

3 Given this conclusion, we need not and do not address Minor’s 

argument that he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel because his 

attorney below conceded the attempted robbery fell within Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 707(b).
15

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Petrou, J.

_________________________

Chou, J.*

A158575

* Judge of the Superior Court of San Mateo County, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
16

In re Noah S. (A158575)

Trial Court: Contra Costa

Trial Judge: Hon. John C. Cope

Attorneys: 

Amanda K. Roze, under appointment by the First District 

Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.