### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 13, 200 3 S es sio n
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN ’S S ER V IC ES v. SA RA H OWEN S, ET A L 

### ., IN TH E MA TTER

OF S. L.O
. App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Appe als , Ea st e r n Se c ti on

Circuit Courtfor Hayw ood Coun ty No. 3533 Clayburn L . P eeples, Judge

No. W2002-00905-SC- R11-CV - F iled March 11, 2004

This c ase prese nts a

n issue of jurisdiction–whether the circ uit c ourt or the Court of Appea ls has the authority to hear and dec ide this a

ppeal from the juvenile court. We hold that the Circ uit Court for Ha y wo od County ha s juri sd ic tio n to hea

r thi s app e a l. Ac c or din g ly , we re mand the c a se to t he Cir c uit Court f or Hay wood County to c onduct an appea l de novo pursuant to T ennesse e Cod e A n n o t ated
se c tio n 3 7- 1- 15 9( a ). Th e pa rt ie s have a lso c ha lle ng e d the c ir c uit c ourt ’s a uth or ity to tr ans fe r t

he c a se to t he Court of Ap pe a ls. B e c a

us e we ho ld t

hat th e c ir c uit

c ourt ha s juri sd ic tio n to he ar t

he a pp e a l, we do not conside r the tra nsfer issue. Tenn. R. App . P . 11 Appeal by Per m ission ; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Ap peals Rever sed

and Case Rem anded to the Circuit Court for Haywood County

A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of t h e co u rt , i n which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY ANDE R S ON , J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Michae l E

. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; and Do ug la s E arl Di mon d, As si stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, N a shvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Te nn e sse e De pa

rtme nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s.
Jame s S. Ha

y wo od , Jr. , B ro wn sv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or th e app e lle e s, F ra

nk A. Ma dd ox and

B ur ne tt M a d d o x. Opin ion

I. F acts and P roce dural Hi storyC o nsist en t wit h thi s C o urt’ s p o l i cy, we re f er to ch i l d ren i n c usto d y case s b y t he i r i nit i als. 1

A l t houg h i t i s not cl ear l y s t at ed i n t he r ecor d, we as s ume t hat S. L. O

. an d t he O wen s es r es i ded i n T enn es s ee. 2

It ap p ea rs t ha t S .L.O .’ s si b l i ng s we re re t urn ed t o Ind i an a b ec au se they ha d no t b ee n a d o p t ed b y t he O w en ses. 3

B u rn e tt M a d d o x is Jo h n n y O w e n s’s siste r. 4

A cco rding to L e a n n R i al , A ss i st ant G eneral C o unsel wi t h T D C S, t he d ep art m ent was unaware of t he 5 M addo xes ’ ex i s t enc e.

A l t ho ugh t he C o urt of A p p eal s, as well as t he p art i es, ref er t o t he d ep end ency and n e g le c t p ro ceed i ng, t he 6

re c o rd b e fo re us d o e s n o t co n ta in t h e d e p e n d e n c y a n d ne g le c t p e tit io n o r a n y o rd e rs e n te re d . T h u s, w e a re un a b le to d et erm i ne t he specif

i cs of i t s f i l i ng.

A ga i n, t he re is no t ran scrip t o f t his hea ring i nc l ud ed i n the re co rd b efo re u s. 7
-2- S.L .O., the child at the cente r of this dispute, was born in G ary , Indiana, on Ma rch 3, 1994. 1 She lived in T ennesse e with he r seven biologica l sibling s and foster pare nts, John n y an dS ara h 2 Ow e ns . O f t

he e ig ht c hil dr e n, the Ow e ns e s a do pte d only S.L .O . In 1 99 9, a s a re su lt o f c hil d a

bu se a lle g atio ns lod g e d a g a ins t th e Ow e ns e s, the Te nn e sse e De pa rtme nt of Chi ldr e n’ s Se rv ic e s ( TD CS)
remove d the eig ht children fr om the Owe n s es’ home. While S.L .O. re mained in Tenne ssee, he r s e v e ns ib li n g s w e r e r e tu

r n e d to In d ia

n a , w h e r e th e y w e r e late r

a d o p te d b y ana un t, B ur n e tt M a d d o x, 3 4 and her husband, F rank Ma ddox . Appar ently unbekn o wns t to the Maddox es, TDCS removed 5 S.L .O. from the O wense s’ home in Dec ember 1999 and plac ed her with foster pa

rents, with whom she has r esided e ver since

. Followingthe fili n g o f a petiti on to declar e S.L .O. a de pendent a nd neg lected c hild in the Hay wood County

J uvenile Court, the Maddoxes, on May 2, 2001, filed a “ Petition to Interve ne and 6 For Tempora

ry C u s t o d y ” in that proc eeding . A month later, in June 2001, while both the depende ncy

and neg lect petition and the Ma ddox es’ pe tition were pe nding, T DCS filed a petition to terminate the O wense s’ par ental rights to S.L .O. The juvenile court c onsidered the termination pe tit ion on Au gus t 22 , 2 00 1, and the Ow e ns e s did no t c onte st the iss ue . Imme diate ly on the he e ls of the ter mination he ar ing, the juvenile cour t took up the Maddox es’ inter veningpetition for
c u s t o dy. 7

In an orde r filed S eptember 5, 2001, the juvenile cour t terminated the O wense s’ par ental ri g hts and awa rd e d gua rd ians hip of

S.L .O . to TD CS. Th ir

ty -f our d ay s a ft e r e ntr

y of the gua rd ians hip order , on October 9, 2001, the j uvenile court denied the Maddoxes’ petition. The c ourt enter ed an order decla ringthe Maddoxes’ custody petition moot on the basis that the t ermination orde r, ente red
ear lier, depr ived the cour t of jurisdiction. The orde r states spec ifi ca l l y t h at t h e ca use ca me to be hear d o n Au gu s t 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 , u p o n p e ti ti o n o f th e M a d d o xe s f o r c u s to dy o f S. L

. O

. , an d it pr ovides fu rt he r a s f oll ow s:
Th e c ourt ’s or de r o f S e pte mbe r 5 , 2 00 1, givi ng th e State of Te nn e sse e fu llIt sh o u ld b e a g a in no te d h e re tha t the re is n e ithe r t ra n sc rip t n o r an a lysis d e m o n stra ting the fac tua l o r le g a l b a sis 8 f o r t he juv en i l e c o urt’ s ruli ng o n S .L.O .’ s b est i ntere st s. -3- guardia nship render s the prese nt petition [ moot] as the c ourt no long er ha s jurisdiction. The petition is therefor e denie d.

In th e int e re st o f jus tic e the c ourt wi ll ru le on the me ri ts i n th e e ve nt t he c ourt is i n err or on the jurisdiction issue.

The c ourt havingg iven full co n s i d er ati on of all re levant fa ctors and statutory presumptions has deter

mined it would not be in the child’s best interest to g rant
c u s to dy to th e M a d d o x[e s ]. 8

On Oc tob e r 1 8, 20 01 , th e Ma dd oxe s f ile d a noti c e statin g the ir

int e nt t o a

pp e a l th e or de r t o the Cir c uit

Court of Ha y wo od County . O ne da

y be yon d th e de a dli ne fo r f ili nga no tic e of a pp e a l,
on No ve mbe r 1 9, 20 01 , T DC S fi le d a motio n to dis mis s f or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n in

the c ir c uit

c ourt

. The motion wa s g rounded on the asser tion that when the Owe nses’ pa renta l rig hts were terminated and guardia

nship of S.L .O. was a

war ded to TDCS, the juvenile cour t l o s t jurisdiction to hear the Maddoxes’ petition to i nterve ne and f or custody

beca use the pe tition becam e mootand wa s superse ded b y th e te r

mi n ati o n o r d e r

. A d d it io n a ll y , T D CS c o n te n d e d th at th e M a d d o xe s h a d no standingto appea l the termination and guardia nship order.

In an order dated Apr il 15, 2002, the circuit cour t gr anted TD CS’s mot ion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction. The Maddoxes appea led t o the C ourt of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, based on
rea soning diff

ere nt than that of the c ircuit court, he ld that the circ uit court did not have jurisdiction to h e ar t he a pp e a l be c a

us e c a ses in vo lvi ngthe te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts are a pp e a le d d ir e c tly to the Court of Appea ls. I t stated:

Whil e the instant ca se starte d as a de pendent a nd neg lect proc eeding , it became a termination of par ental rights which resulted in the final judg ment. The [Maddox es’] petition to int erve ne wa s still pendingin the cause when the petition for termination of pa re nta l rights wa s file d. Thus , it be c ame pa rt of tha t pr oc e e din g , a

nd the juv e nil e court so conside red it.

Neve rtheless, the Court of Appea ls c oncluded that the circ uit court did have the authority to transfe r the ca se to the C ourt of Appe als. Ther efor e, the Court of A ppeals modified the c ircuit court’ s order t o p r o v i d e th atth e a

p p e a l b e tr an s f

e r r e d t o th e C o urto f

Ap p e a l s f

o r p r o c e s s i n gan d

d i s p o s i t i o n

. In the opinion, the C ourt of Appeals stated: “The date of the filingof this order sha ll be considere d the date of the fi lin g of an ame nd e d N oti c e of Ap pe a l, a

nd the a pp e a l, i nc lud inga ll t ime re qu ir e me nts , will be g overne d by

the Rules of Appe llate Proce dure.” TDCS filed a petition to r ehea r the case , contending that the circ uit court could not transfe r wh at it c ou ld n ot e nte rt a in, and

thu s it la c ke d a uth or ity to tr ans fe r t

he a pp e a l. T he Court

of Ap pe a ls-4-

reje cted this contenti o n , fi nding that the transfe r to the Court of Appe als was pr oper. TD CS t hen reque sted that the Court of Appea ls he ar the case immediately based upon the issue alre ady briefe d to the court by

the parties–whe ther the juvenile cour t’s termination order

deprive d the juvenile cour t
and c ir c uit c ourt of jur isd ic tio n to he ar the Ma dd oxe s’ pe tit ion fo r c us tod y
. Th e Court

of Ap pe a ls agree d and set a briefing schedule

. TDCS contempora neously filed an application in which it soug ht permission to appea l the Court of Appea ls’ decision to the Supreme Court pur suant t o Rule 11 of the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure . TDCS soug ht, and was g rante d, a suspension of the briefi n g s chedule set by

the Court of Appe als pendingthe outcome of the application and any
re su lti nga

pp e a l. P ur su ant to TD CS’ s a pp lic atio n un de r Rul e 11 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Procedur e, we g rante d revie w to deter mine which court had jurisdiction to revie w the judg ment of the juvenile cour

t.

II. Stand ard of Review

W e r e v i e wth e j uv e n i l e c o urt ’ s f i n d i n g s o f f a c td e n o v o u

p o nth e r e c o r d , a c c o mp an i e d b y a presumption of cor

rec tness of those finding s, unless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise. Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2003); Kendr ick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002). We re view the juvenile cour

t’s conclusions of lawde novo wit h no presumption of cor rec tness. Kendr ick, 90 S.W .3d at 569. When the j uvenile court does not make any specific finding s of fact, we reviewthe
rec ord to deter

mine wher e the pr eponder ance of the e vidence lies. I d. at 570.

III . A nal ys is

In her you n glife, S.L .O. has be en sepa rate d from her

natura l pare nts, adopted by the Owe nses (w ho los tc u s t o dy

o f h e r w h e na b u s e a l l e g at i o n s s ur f

a c e d ) , an d

p l a c e d w i tha f o s t e r f am i l y w h i le custody of her seven b i o l o gi ca l siblings was e ntrusted to the Maddoxes. Accor dingly , this Court acknow ledg es its obligation to re solve this controversy as expeditiously

as possible.

In it s b ri e f t o th is C ourt , T DC S c onte nd s t hat the c ir c uit c ourt did no t ha ve jur isd ic tio n to he ar t he a pp e a l of thi s c a se . Co ns ist e nt wi th that c on c lus ion , TD CS a sse rt s that the c ir c uit c ourt did
no t ha ve the a uth or ity to t ra ns fe r t his c a se to t

he Court of Ap pe a ls.

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d sec tio n 37- 1- 15 9 g ov e rn s the a pp e a l of jud g me nts of

the juv e nil e court. That statute, in pe rtinent parts, provides that “any appea l f rom any final order

o r j u dg ment in . . . [a] depende nt and neg lect proc eeding. . . may be made to the circ uit court” to be r eviewe d de novo. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-159(a ) (2001) . In co n t ra s t , “all other civil matters hea

rd by the juvenile cour

t shall be g overne d by

the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Proc edure .” I d. § 37-1-159( g ).

After havingrec og nized that this case beg an as a depende ncy and neg lect case , the Court of Appea ls concluded, ne verth e le s s , th at it had bee n conver ted into a termination of pa renta l rig hts case. Thus, the Court of Appeals held t hat t he circuit court had no jur isdiction–a conclusion ac companied
ne ith e r b y re a so nin gno r a

na ly sis

.In s up p o rt of i t s t heo ry t hat t he ap p eal shoul d have b een p erf ect ed t o t he C o urt of A p p eal s, T D C S cit es t o In 9

r e M

. W

. A

. , Jr

. , 980 S. W

. 2d 620 ( T enn

. Ct

. Ap p. 199 8). I n t hat ca s e, T D C S f i l ed a pet i t i on to term i na t e t he pare nt al ri ght s o f bo t h the m o the r a nd f at her. T hree pa t ernal rel at i ves i nt ervened i n t he p roce ed i ng and s o ught cust o d y of t he chi l d ren. I d

. at 62 0

. T he i ss ues p res ent ed t o t he C o urt of A p p eal s were suf f i ci ency and t he b est i nt erest s o f t he chi l d ren. Id. at 62 0

- 2 1

. T he i s s u e of j u r i s di ct i on on a ppea l w as n ei t h er r ai s ed n or a ddr es s ed.

T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 3 7 -1 -1 5 9 (a ) p ro v id e s: 10

T he juveni l e co urt s hal l be a co urt of reco rd; an d any ap p eal f rom any f

i nal ord er or judgm ent i n a del i n qu en cy pr oce edi n g , f i l ed u n der t h i s ch apt er , ex ce pt a proc ee di n g pur s u an t t o § 37- 1- 134, ma y be made t o t h e c r i m i n a l c o u r t o r c o u r t h a v i n g c r i m i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n w h i c h s h a l l h e a r t h e t e s t i m o n y of

w itne sse s a n d try the c a se d e n o v o ; a n d a n y a p p e a l fro m a n y fina l o rd e r o r j u d g m e n t i n a n un ru ly ch ild p ro c e e d ing o r d e p e n d e n t an d ne g le c t p ro c e e d ing , fil e d u n d e r t h is c h a p te r, m a y b e m a d e to the c irc u it
cou r t w h i ch s h al l h ea r t h e t es t i mon y of w i t n es s es a nd tr y t h e ca s e de n ov o. T h e appe al s h al l be p erf ect ed wi t hi n t en (10 ) d ays , excl ud i ng no njudici al d ays , f o l l o wi ng t he juveni l e co urt ' s d i spo si t i o n. If a reheari ng of a m at t er heard b y a ref eree i s no t req uest ed o r p rovided pursuant t o § 3 7

- 1

- 1 0 7 (e), t h e dat e of

t h e e x pi r at i on of

t h e t i me wi t h i n wh i ch t o re qu es t re h ea r i n g s h al l be t h e da t e of di s pos i t i on fo r a p p e a l p u rp o se s, a n d the p a rtie s a n d the ir a tto rn e ys sh a ll b e so no tif ie d b y the re fer e e . If the re is

a re h e a rin g b y the ju d g e , t h e a p p e a l p e rio d sh a ll c o m m e n c e the d a y a fter the o rd e r o f d is p o sitio n is
en t er ed.

T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 (n) (2 0 0 1 ) p ro vid es: 11

A n o rd e r o f gu a rd ia n sh ip o r p a rtia l gu a rd ia n sh ip e n te re d b y the c o u rt p u rs u a n t t o t h is s e c tio n sh a ll
s u per s ede pr i or or der s of c u s t ody or g u ar di an s h i p of t h at c ou r t a n d of

ot h er c ou r t s , e x ce pt t h os e pr i or order s of gu ar di ans hi p or par t i al gu ar di ans hi p of o t her co ur t s ent er ed as t he r es ul t o f val i dl y ex ecu t ed
s u r r en der s or r ev oca t i on s pu r s u an t t o § 36- 1- 111 or § 36- 1- 112, or e x ce pt a s pr ov i ded pu r s u an t t o § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 1 (r )( 4 )( D ) and (E ), or e xcep t an ord er of guardi anshi p or p art i al guardi anshi p of a co urt ent ered pursuant t o § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 6 ; pro vi d ed , t hat ord ers t erm i nat i ng pa re n tal ri ght s ent ered by a court
un der t hi s s ect i on pri or t o t he f i l i ng of an adop t i on pet i t i on s hal l be ef f ect i ve t o t er mi nat e par ent al rights f o r all p urp o ses.

-5- We c on c lud e that the or de r that the Ma dd oxe s atte mpt e d to a pp e a l de no vo to th e C irc uit Court was conne cted to the de pende n cy an d n egl ect pr ocee ding. T he natur e and substanc e of a proce edingcannot be transfor med s imply by the fil ing of a petiti on with a diffe rent c aption. Her e, despite TDCS’s later- filed petition and the subseque nt order te rminat i n g p ar ental rights, the M ad d ox es’ inter

veningpetition for custody was prope rly

befor e the juvenile c ourt in S.L .O.’s depend en cy an d neg lect hea ring . Although T DCS corre ctly notes that “c ustody

decisions ar ising from juvenile court ter

minations of pare ntal rig hts are a ppeale d direc tly

to the Court of Appea ls,” 9
we co n cl u d e t h at th e o rd er ap p ea l ed i n th i s ca s e aro s e o u to f ad ep en d en cy an d n egl ec tp ro ce ed i n g, rathe r t ha n f ro m a te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g . T hu s, the Ma dd oxe s’ a pp e a l w a s p ro pe rl y pe rf

e c te d to the circ uit court pursuant to sec tion 37-1-159(a ). 10
TDCS, relying upon Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 36-1-113( n), also asser ts “that the 11 Ma dd oxe s’ pe tit ion

fo r c us tod

y wa s r e nd e re d

m o o t wh e n T D C S w a s awa

rd e d c omp le te gua

rd ians hipT e n n e sse e R u le o f C ivil P ro c e d u re 2 4 .0 1 p ro v id e s: 12

U p o n t i m el y ap p l i cat i o n anyone shal l b e p erm i t t ed t o i nt ervene i n an act i o n: (1) when a s t at ut e co nf ers
a n un c o n d iti o n a l righ t t o inte rv e n e ; o r (2 ) w h e n the a p p lica n t cla im s a n inte re st re la ting to the p ro p e rty
or t r an s ac t i on w h i ch i s t h e s u bj ec t of t h e ac t i on a n d t h e a ppl i ca n t i s s o s i t u at ed t h at t h e di s pos i t i on of the a c tio n m a y a s a p ra c tica l m a tter im p a ir o r im p e d e the a p p lica n t’s ab ili ty t o p r o te c t th a t i n te re st,
u n le ss th e a p p lica n t’s in te re st is a d e q u a te ly r e p re se n te d b y e x isting p a rtie s; o r (3 ) b y stip u la tio n o f all t he p arti es. -6- of S.L .O .” Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 36- 1- 11 3( n) pr ov ide s th at “ [a]n or de r o f gua

rd ians hip or par tial gua rdianship enter ed by the cour t pursuant to this section shall supersede prior orde rs of custody or gu ar d i an ship . . . .” The or der which TDCS alleg es is superse ded is not an orde r of guardia nship, but rathe r, a pending custody petition. See I n re K.A.Y., 80 S.W .3d 19, 25 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holdingthat a pendingcustody matter wa s not supersede d by the juvenile cour

t’s g rant of f ull gua rdianship t o TDCS because the custody petition had not been a djudicated whe n TD CS ob ta ine d th e or de r gra nti ngit gua

rd ians hip of th e c hil dr e n) . T he re fo re , th e statut e is ina pp lic a ble un de r i ts o wn

te rm s. The jurisdictional issue aside, our under standingis that the Maddoxes also contend that, as leg al re latives of S .L .O. at the t ime of t he juvenile court proce eding s and as pa rents of S.L .O.’s seve n bio log ic a l si bli ng s, th ey we re de nie d a fa ir he ari ngof

the ir pe tit ion fo r c us tod

y . T his is a

mos t serious conte ntion, and all involved have a substantial interest in the fair resolution of this matter. Th is C ourt

is b ound , b y

law a nd tr a dit ion , to pr omo te that inte re st.
Whe n re vie wi ng a c a se on a pp e a l, the a

pp e llate c ourt s re ly up on the re c or d wh ic h se ts f or th the fa c ts e sta

bli sh e d a s e vid e nc e in t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 13 (c ) (2 00 3)

. Th is C ourt “ ‘i s a cour t of appe als and e rror s, and we are limit ed in authority to the ad j u d i ca t i on of issues that ar e presented and decide d in the t rial courts, and a rec ord t here of pre serve d as pre scribed in the statutes and Rules of this Cour t

. ’” I n re Ad o ption of E.N.R., 42 S.W .3d 26, 31-32 (Te nn. 2001) (quoting Dorrie r v. Da

rk, 537 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1976)) ( emphasis adde d).

The woe fully

inadequate re cord befor e us indicates that this c ase orig inated as a de pendenc y and neg lect proc eedingfiled in the juvenile court ag ainst S.L .O.’s adoptive pare nts. The Maddoxes then filed, pursua

nt to Tennessee Rule of Civil P roce dure 24.01 ( 2003), their petition to int erve ne 12 in the depende n cy an d n eglect proce edingand for custody of S.L .O. While both of these above

descr ibed matters wer e pending , TDCS f iled a petition to terminate the pare ntal rig ht s o f t he Owense s as to S.L .O. This petition was filed in the same court in which the other two matter s were p en d i n g. Although the juvenile cour t hear d and dec ided the petition for the t ermination of pa renta l rig hts first, this procee d i n g b ega n as a de pendenc y and neg lect proc eedingwhich included the Maddoxes’ timely

filed petition to intervene. T hroug h the juvenile cour t’s fortuitous shufflingof paper , the Maddoxes’ petition for custody was immediately

deeme d moot, and the cause at once wa s transfor med from a depende ncy and negle ct case t o a termination of parental rights ca se. Se e Na le-7-

v. Rob e rt so n, 87 1 S. W.2 d 674 , 678 (T e nn . 199 4) (h old ing that the natur a l rights of the fathe r s ho uld have be en dec ided bef

ore the court proce eded with the issue of adoption and agree ing with the Court of Appe als that “[b] iologica l bonds should not be so li g htly brushed aside, a

nd the cour

ts should not b e g iv e na li c e n s e to e n g a g e in s o c ia l e n g in e e r in g b y inv o k in gth e ‘ b e s t i n te r e s ts o f th e c h il d ’ ” )

. We have se arc hed this sparse r ecor d befor e us, and w e ar e unable to identify any finding of fa ct, re ason, rationale , or basis that supports the proce dure employ ed in this case

. This pr o ce du re , wh ether
a c c o mp l i s h e d

i n a dv e rt e n t l y o r

i n t e n t i o n a l l y, e ff

e c tiv e ly ensnar ed the Ma ddox es in a jurisdictional tr a p. De sp ite the ir

tim e ly and pr op e r e ff

or ts, the y we re de nie d th e op po rt

un ity to p rese nt t

he ir custody case and re ceive a rulingon the merits. They wer e, as may be ver nacula rly stated, “c ut off at the pass.” In view of a ll the circumstanc es, this result is unacc eptable.

Tenne ssee Rule of A

ppellate Proc edure 36(a) (2003) pr ovides that our Court “may g rant a ny relief , including the g iving of any judgme nt and making of any order ; provided, howe ver, r elief ma y not be grante d in contrave ntion of the province of the trier of fa ct.” B ased on “ the clea r policy of this state favoringthe adjudication of disputes on their merits,” Nor ton v. Everha

rt, 895 S.W .2d 317, 322 (Tenn. 1995) , the fa ct th at t h e M addoxes properly pursued their

rig hts, see id., and the sc ant
re c or d ava ila

ble to t his Court , w e de e m th is a n a pp ro pr iate c a se to i nv ok e our a uth or ity purs ua nt t o Tenne ssee Rule of A

ppellate Proc edure 36(a)

.

IV . C onc lusi on
We r e ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he Court of Ap pe a ls an d re mand the c a us e to the c ir c uit

c ourt , which shall re g ard the cause as i nvolving dependenc y and negle ct and sha ll concurr ently consider and dec ide all petitions within t hat context. The costs of appe al ar e taxed to the appellant, State of T e nn e s s e e D e p artm e n to f C h i l dr e n ’ s S e r

v i c e s , f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AD OL PHO A. B I RCH , JR., JUSTI CE