PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 07-4386

PRADEEP SRIVASTAVA,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Roger W. Titus, District Judge.

(8:05-cr-00482-RWT)

Argued: March 19, 2008

Decided: September 3, 2008

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and

David R. HANSEN, Senior Circuit Judge of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Senior Judge

Hansen joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stuart A. Berman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
Paula Marie Junghans, ZUCKERMAN & SPAEDER, L.L.P.,

Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellant. P. Andrew Torrez, ZUCKERMAN & SPAEDER,

L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge: 

The government seeks relief, by way of this interlocutory

appeal, from the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered in

the District of Maryland on August 4, 2006, suppressing evidence seized by federal officers from the residence and medical offices of Dr. Pradeep Srivastava pursuant to search

warrants issued by a magistrate judge. See United States v.

Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2006) (the "Suppression Ruling"). The government also appeals from the court’s

order of March 6, 2007, declining to reconsider its Suppression Ruling. See United States v. Srivastava, 476 F. Supp. 2d

509 (D. Md. 2007). Put succinctly, the government contends

that the evidence suppressed was constitutionally seized and

within the scope of the search warrants, and that the court’s

blanket suppression of all seized evidence was erroneous. As

explained below, we agree with the government that the Suppression Ruling was legally unsound, and thus vacate and

remand.

I.

A.

In early 2003, a criminal investigation was initiated by the

Department of Health and Human Services (the "HHS"), the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI"), and the government’s Office of Personnel Management, into an alleged

2 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
health care fraud scheme involving Srivastava, a licensed cardiologist practicing with two associates in Maryland. The federal authorities suspected that Srivastava and his associates

were involved in the submission of false claims to various

health care benefit programs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347.1

As a result, the authorities commenced an investigation into

Srivastava’s billing practices.

In March 2003, the fraud investigation had progressed to

the stage where Jason Marrero, an HHS agent specializing in

the investigation of health care fraud ("Agent Marrero"),

applied to a magistrate judge in the District of Maryland for

three search warrants. By Agent Marrero’s submission to the

judge, the government sought the seizure of the "fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of false claims submissions" from

Srivastava’s medical offices in Greenbelt and Oxon Hill (the

"Greenbelt office" and the "Oxon Hill office," respectively),

and from his residence in Potomac (the "Potomac residence").

J.A. 31.2 The applications for the search warrants were supported by Agent Marrero’s nineteen-page affidavit (the "Affidavit"), in which he specified, inter alia, that Srivastava and

his medical practice group had defrauded health care benefit

programs in various ways: billing for medical services not

1Section 1347 of Title 18 makes it an offense to 

knowingly and willfully execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a

scheme or artifice— 

(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or

(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property

owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care

benefit program, 

in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services. 

18 U.S.C. § 1347 (emphasis added). 

2Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 3
rendered; billing for duplicate medical services through different insurers; specifying inappropriate diagnosis codes for

patient services on medical claims; improperly billing for

incidental services; and altering medical records. The Affidavit also described specific instances of false billing for services not rendered, as well as for duplicate services, including

dollar amounts paid for excess reimbursements. 

Significantly, the Affidavit made factual assertions indicating that documents and records related to Srivastava’s medical practice — constituting possible evidence of health care

fraud — would be found in the Potomac residence: 

• A former employee of Srivastava, who was a

confidential informant in the fraud investigation,

confirmed that Srivastava "directed most of the

billing to health care benefit programs," and that

such programs "sent most payments and Explanation of Benefit letters to Srivastava’s house," J.A.

42;

• Srivastava had the medical practice’s "insurance

billing done from [his] house," and the practice

submitted such billing to insurers both "by mail

and electronically by computer," id.; and 

• Srivastava had "listed and currently lists [the

Potomac] residence . . . as the billing address for

claims submitted electronically to Medicare," id.

at 46.

On the basis of these and other facts spelled out in the Affidavit, Agent Marrero asserted "that there is probable cause to

believe that Srivastava’s [Greenbelt and Oxon Hill] offices

. . . and Srivastava’s [Potomac] residence . . . contain fruits,

evidence and instrumentalities of [health care fraud] and that

the items [sought] are fruits, evidence and instrumentalities of

the violation." Id. at 48.

4 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
On March 20, 2003, the magistrate judge issued three

search warrants, each accompanied by an identical two-page

"Attachment A," captioned "Items To Be Seized Pursuant To

A Search Warrant." J.A. 49-51.3 The warrants "commanded"

the searching officers, inter alia, to search the Greenbelt

office, the Oxon Hill office, and the Potomac residence on or

before March 27, 2003, and, if the property listed in Attachment A "be found there to seize same." Id. at 49. Attachment

A introduced the list of documents and records to be seized

under each warrant as follows: 

The following records including, but not limited to,

financial, business, patient, insurance and other

records related to the business of Dr. Pradeep

Srivastava [and his two associates], for the period

January 1, 1998 to Present, which may constitute

evidence of violations of Title 18, United States

Code, Section 1347. 

Id. at 50. Attachment A then specified in some detail ten categories of things that were to be seized, including personnel

records; health care benefit program manuals and documentation; correspondence between medical office personnel and

health care benefits program personnel; documents relating to

investigations of the medical group’s billing practices; records

of complaints about patient treatment; records of certain specified patients; computer files or programs related to the other

materials identified; plus calendars, appointment books, correspondence, passports, photographs, and other documents indicating Srivastava’s whereabouts during the period under

investigation. Id. at 50-51. Importantly, category 2 of Attachment A commanded the seizure of "[f]inancial records,

including but not limited to accounting records, tax records,

3Only one of the three search warrants — for the Oxon Hill office —

is contained in the Joint Appendix filed by the parties. It is undisputed,

however, that the three warrants, except for describing the place to be

searched, are materially identical. 

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 5
accounts receivable logs and ledgers, banking records, and

other records reflecting income and expenditures of the business." Id. at 50.4

4The other nine categories of documents and records commanded to be

seized were, as described in Attachment A of the search warrants, the following: 

1. Personnel records for all current and former employees,

including but not limited to lists of employee names,

employee resumes, employee time sheets, job applications,

job training records, profession[al] certifications, and payroll records. 

* * *

3. Health care benefit program training manuals, regulations,

bulletins, reports, notices, pamphlets, and correspondence

concerning proper billing and documentation procedures,

and any documentation regarding instructions for billing

health care benefit programs. 

4. Correspondence, memoranda, and notes of conversations,

including but not limited to those relating to communications between medical office personnel and personnel for

health care benefit programs. 

5. Any and all records indicating [Dr.] Pradeep Srivastava’s

[or his associates’] locations and activities during the period

January 1, 1998 to the present, including but not limited to

calend[a]rs, appointment books, correspondence, passports,

visas, photographs and other documents. 

6. Any documents [ ]including but not limited to reports, correspondence, memorandums, work papers, interview notes

and other notes relating to any internal or external investigation, audit, or other review of the billing/medical practice

of Dr. Pradeep Srivastava, to include [his associates]. 

7. Records of complaints, including but not limited to complaints concerning the treatment provided by [Dr.] Pradeep

Srivastava [or his associates]. 

8. All information and/or data, pertaining to records described

in this Attachment above, stored in the form of magnetic or

electrical coding on computer media or on media capable of

being read by a computer or with the aid of computer

related equipment. This media includes but is not limited to

floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, video cassettes, and any

other media which is capable of storing magnetic coding. 

6 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
B.

On March 21, 2003, HHS and FBI agents simultaneously

executed the search warrants at the three specified locations.

Prior to the searches being conducted, Agent Marrero briefed

the executing officers on what was to be done, summarizing

for them the contents of the warrants and the Affidavit. Two

of the searches — those conducted at the Greenbelt office and

the Potomac residence — yielded the seizure of documents

and records that are specifically implicated in this appeal.5

From the Potomac residence, the officers seized, inter alia,

copies of the tax returns of Dr. Srivastava and his wife; stock

brokerage account records; information about the construction

of a second home; bank records relating to several family

financial transactions; travel information; Srivastava’s wallet;

unopened mail; credit cards; Indian currency; a pharmacy

card; and checks from various banks. From the Greenbelt

office, the agents seized, inter alia, copies of bank remittance

9. Computer codes and programs, computer software, instructional manuals, operating instructions and sources of information, to the extent that they are necessary to extract and

copy any of the information set forth in paragraphs 1

through 8 above. 

10. All patient records and documentation relating to the Medicare beneficiaries and private health care insurance subscribers listed below. This includes complete medical files,

patient appointment books, patient billing records, office

sign-in sheets, explanation of benefits (EOBs), and telephone messages in any form. [Several pages of Medicare

beneficiaries and insurance subscribers were thereafter

identified. 

J.A. 50-51. 

5Although a substantial group of documents and records were also

seized in the third search (of the Oxon Hill office), and are also encompassed in the Suppression Ruling, the government does not presently propose to utilize them at trial. 

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 7
records relating to the State Bank of India (collectively, the

"Bank of India Transfers"). The Bank of India Transfers

reflected, inter alia, that Srivastava had, over a period of several months in 1999 and 2000, transferred more than $4 million to the State Bank of India. 

In April 2003, after the searches had been completed, the

government returned to Srivastava approximately 80% of the

documents and records seized from the Potomac residence.6

During the same time frame, Agent Marrero provided the

United States Attorney with a copy of the Bank of India

Transfers, which were also provided to the Internal Revenue

Service (the "IRS"). IRS agents thereafter concluded that the

Bank of India Transfers indicated a likely failure to disclose

a foreign financial account.7 After obtaining other information

relating to the Transfers — for example, that Srivastava had

not acknowledged any foreign bank accounts on his 1999,

2000, and 2001 personal income tax returns — the IRS initiated an investigation of Srivastava for possible reporting violations. This investigation ultimately led to his indictment for

tax fraud. 

6The return to Srivastava in April 2003 of approximately 80% of the

things seized from the Potomac residence resulted from an agreement

between the parties. In returning those records, the government did not

concede that they had been improperly seized. By their agreement in this

regard, the lawyers apparently obviated the need for preindictment proceedings under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

infra note 20. As a result, the suppression issues were not litigated until

early 2006. 

7As mandated by Treasury Department regulations, a report must be

filed with the IRS by any person in and doing business in the United

States, who possesses an interest in or authority over a foreign financial

account exceeding $10,000 during a calendar year. See 31 C.F.R.

§§ 103.24, 103.27(c); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5315(c) (authorizing Secretary

of Treasury to prescribe reporting requirements); id. § 5322 (providing

criminal penalties for willful violations of Treasury Department regulations, such as those mandating foreign financial account reports). 

8 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
C.

On October 12, 2005, Srivastava was indicted by a grand

jury in the District of Maryland on two counts of tax evasion,

in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, plus one count of making

false statements on a tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C.

§ 7206(1).8 According to the indictment, Srivastava had concealed more than $40 million in capital gains on investments

in technology stocks and stock options, and underpaid his

income taxes for tax years 1998 and 1999 by more than $16

million. The indictment alleges, inter alia, that:

• Srivastava invested a substantial portion of

income from his medical practice in stocks and

stock options, but failed to provide important

information relating to his stock and stock

options trading to the accountant who prepared

his tax returns; 

• As a consequence of those omissions, the

accountant prepared, and Srivastava filed, tax

returns that resulted in an underpayment of taxes

in 1998 by approximately $165,000, and in 1999

by more than $16 million; 

• In 2000, Srivastava’s portfolio substantially

declined in value, and he failed to disclose shortterm capital losses of approximately $ 10.8 million. Although nondisclosure of these losses did

not affect his taxes due and owing for 2000, it

served to conceal his unreported short-term capital gains for 1998 and 1999. 

In January 2006, following his indictment, Srivastava filed

a suppression motion challenging the constitutionality of the

seizures that had been made nearly three years earlier, pursu8The indictment is found at J.A. 7-26. 

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 9
ant to the search warrants. In that motion, Srivastava contended, inter alia, that documents and records seized in the

searches were of a personal nature and not subject to seizure,

and that the seized documents and records exceeded the scope

of the warrants.9 Responding to the suppression motion, the

government advised the court that it possessed approximately

twenty-five documents and records — all seized from the

Potomac residence — that it intended to use as trial evidence

(collectively, the "Potomac Documents"). Several of the Potomac Documents had been seized from Srivastava’s bedroom

in the Potomac residence, including:

• An IRS Form 1099 for tax year 1999 found in an

envelope marked as "1999 Final";10

• Several documents from an envelope dated October 15, 1996, including multiple IRS Forms 1099

for tax year 1998, a handwritten document

describing "Bank Interest Payment," and a statement and fax relating to accounts with "Mesirow

Financial Inc./Bentley-Lawrence Securities";11

and

9

In his effort to suppress the evidence seized under the warrants,

Srivastava also sought an evidentiary hearing in the district court, pursuant

to Franks v. Delaware, maintaining that the Affidavit had affirmatively

omitted material information. See 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) ("[W]here

the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,

was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly

false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth

Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.").

At a March 27, 2006 hearing conducted on the suppression motion, the

district court denied Srivastava’s request for a Franks hearing, after determining that the magistrate judge had not been misled by the Affidavit. 

10An IRS Form 1099 is used to report various types of income — other

than wages, salaries, and tips — to the IRS. Such income includes, inter

alia, dividends and distributions, interest, government payments, payments

to independent contractors, and miscellaneous income. 

11Although several Potomac Documents discovered in the Potomac residence were found in folders dated 1996, the Documents seized sufficiently

related to the pertinent time frame. 

10 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
• Several documents from a folder labeled "1996

Tax Info.," including IRS Forms 1099 for tax

years 1997 and 1999, spreadsheets for accounts

variously labeled "Options Transactions" and

"Stock Transactions," a "Schedule of Realized

Gains and Losses" dated October 14, 1999, and

a 1999 "Tax Reporting Statement."12

Several other Potomac Documents that the prosecution seeks

to utilize at trial were found in a shoe box marked "Tax

Return Info 2000," seized from an office on the first floor of

the Potomac residence. The documents from the shoe box

included:

• A fax (dated October 8, 2001) from Srivastava’s

accountant requesting items needed to complete

Srivastava’s 2000 tax return; 

• A spreadsheet labeled "Accounts of Dr. Pradeep

Srivastava/Stock Transactions — 8/25/99 to

12/31/99 By Bentley Lawrence Account"; and

• A handwritten document with information about

various bank accounts and transactions.

In opposing the suppression motion, the government alternatively advised that, if the court suppressed the Potomac

Documents, it intended to utilize at trial the Bank of India

Transfers seized from the Greenbelt office, "to explain the

independent source for [the IRS case agent’s] investigation

and the inevitable discovery of the brokerage, bank and other

evidence supporting the tax charges." J.A. 110. The Bank of

India Transfers included the following:

12Intermingled with the financial records discovered in one of the folders located in the bedroom of the Potomac residence were other records

of Srivastava’s medical practice, including a client master list, employee

time sheets, and a memorandum relating to employee leave and vacation

time. The government does not propose to offer those items into evidence.

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 11
• A letter from Srivastava, dated December 16,

1999, printed on the medical practice letterhead

of "Pradeep Srivastava, M.D., F.A.C.C." and an

associate, and faxed by the Greenbelt office manager to the State Bank of India in New York,

directing a wire transfer of the sum of $150,000

for deposit in Srivastava’s account with the State

Bank of India in New Delhi;

• A fax cover and confirmation sheet dated December 16, 1999, also on the medical practice letterhead; and

• Remittance confirmations of various dates from

the State Bank of India regarding the $150,000

deposit and seven other deposits totalling more

than $4 million.

On June 9, 2006, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Srivastava’s contentions regarding the scope of the

search warrants and the constitutionality of their execution. At

the hearing, the court heard testimony from Agent Marrero

and an IRS agent, as well as argument concerning whether the

seized documents and records were within the scope of the

warrants. Srivastava contended, inter alia, that although such

documents and records may have financial significance, they

did not relate to his medical practice, were not evidence of

health care fraud, and thus were not within the ambit of the

warrants. The government maintained to the contrary, arguing

that the seized documents and records plainly fell within the

scope of the warrants and that the suppression motion should

be denied. 

D.

On August 4, 2006, the district court issued its Suppression

Ruling, ordering the suppression of the Potomac Documents,

the Bank of India Transfers, and all other evidence seized in

12 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
the three searches. In so ruling, the court first determined that

"in order to fall within the scope of the warrant, a financial

record not only had to have some relationship to Dr.

Srivastava’s business, but it also was subject to the requirement that it may constitute evidence that health care fraud had

been committed." United States v. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d

385, 393 (D. Md. 2006). Next, the court analyzed whether, in

view of the foregoing, the seizures of the Potomac Documents

and the Bank of India Transfers were within the scope of the

search warrants issued for the Potomac residence and the

Greenbelt office, respectively. The court then concluded that

the Potomac Documents had been improperly seized, because

they "neither tended to show violations of the health care

fraud statute, nor related to the business of Dr. Srivastava." Id.

at 395. Turning to the Bank of India Transfers seized from the

Greenbelt office, the court determined that, although they "arguably may have related to the business of Dr. Srivastava,"

nothing on their face "connotes or suggests evidence of health

care fraud." Id. The Affidavit, the court emphasized, failed to

discuss the handling of any financial proceeds of a fraud

scheme, which, it observed, is a federal crime (i.e., money

laundering) distinct from the federal offense of health care

fraud. Id. at 396. The court thus concluded that, as with its

suppression of the Potomac Documents, suppression of the

Bank of India Transfers was constitutionally required. 

Finally, the court considered the question of whether a

blanket suppression of all of the seized evidence was warranted, concluding that

[e]ven if . . . some of the documents at issue here

were within the scope of the warrant, these documents would be excluded as well because the conduct of the agents who executed this warrant was so

inappropriate as to warrant the exclusion of all evidence seized on March 21, 2003.

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 13
Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97. The court premised its

blanket suppression ruling on two primary bases: first, its conclusion that execution of the warrants contravened the Fourth

Amendment, specifically with respect to the quantity and

character of the documents and records seized (including

those voluntarily returned to Srivastava by the government);

and, second, the testimony of Agent Marrero at the June 9,

2006 hearing, indicating (in the court’s words) that he "did

not consider himself to be limited to seizing business items

only, or records that tended to show evidence of violations of

the health care fraud statute." Id. at 397.13 The court thus suppressed all of the documents and records seized in the three

searches. In so ruling, the court reasoned that such a blanket

suppression was warranted because of Marrero’s flagrantly

excessive view of the scope of the warrants, and because such

a view was not justified by either practical considerations or

good-faith mistake. See id. at 400.14 The Suppression Ruling

thus barred the government from utilizing at trial (1) the Potomac Documents, (2) the Bank of India Transfers, and (3) all

other documents and records seized under the warrants. 

The government thereafter sought reconsideration of the

Suppression Ruling, which the district court denied on March

13In the Suppression Ruling, the court observed that Agent Marrero had

provided astonishing testimony in which he indicated that he

inserted [the substantive introductory language] merely as a "go

by," and that he did not consider it to limit his actions in any way.

When asked if it was true that he "didn’t give much thought to

what this meant" and whether he "just thought it was some boilerplate that ought to be" in the warrant, [Agent] Marrero agreed

"for the most part," stating only that he "knew it was used before

so it was appropriate language." 

Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 

14The Suppression Ruling also concluded that the documents and

records that the government proposed to utilize at trial were not otherwise

admissible under either the inevitable discovery or independent source

exceptions to a Fourth Amendment violation. See Srivastava, 444 F. Supp.

2d at 401-12. 

14 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
12, 2007. See United States v. Srivastava, 476 F. Supp. 2d

509 (D. Md. 2007). In denying reconsideration, the court reiterated the Suppression Ruling’s interpretation of the scope of

the warrants, its bases for suppressing the Potomac Documents and the Bank of India Transfers, and the reasons for its

blanket suppression of all the seized evidence. See id. at 512-

14. 

The government disagrees with the Suppression Ruling and

the denial of its motion to reconsider, maintaining that those

decisions were erroneous and undermine its effort to prosecute the tax fraud indictment pending against Srivastava. As

a result, the government pursues this interlocutory appeal, and

Srivastava’s trial has been held in abeyance pending the

appeal’s resolution. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to the

provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3731.15

II.

A.

Legal determinations made by a district court with respect

to a suppression issue, including interpretations of the scope

of a search warrant, are reviewed de novo on appeal. See

United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 470 (4th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Hurd, 499 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)

("Whether a search is within the scope of a warrant is a question of law subject to de novo review."). In conducting such

a de novo review, we are obliged to assess the contents of a

search warrant and its supporting affidavits "in a commonsense and realistic fashion," eschewing "[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity." United States v. Ventresca,

15In accordance with the jurisdictional predicate of 18 U.S.C. § 3731,

the United States Attorney has certified that this interlocutory appeal "is

not taken for purposes of delay" and that the evidence excluded by the

Suppression Ruling "is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding." J.A. 725. 

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 15
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); see also United States v. Angelos,

433 F.3d 738, 745 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gorman,

104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1996). 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s blanket

suppression of seized evidence. See United States v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245, 246 (4th Cir. 1992). We recognize that a

district court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes

an error of law. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100

(1996); United States v. Ebersole, 411 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir.

2005) ("By definition, a court abuses its discretion when it

makes an error of law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In analyzing the constitutionality of a search warrant’s execution, we must conduct an "objective assessment of the [executing] officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting him at the time," rather than make a subjective

evaluation of "the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the

challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.

463, 470-71 (1985).

B.

This appeal obligates us to assess, in a pretrial context, the

Suppression Ruling made by the district court in connection

with the tax fraud prosecution pending against Srivastava.

The appeal implicates questions related to the warranted

searches of Srivastava’s Potomac residence and Greenbelt

office. Such questions arise under the Fourth Amendment,

which protects individuals against unreasonable searches and

seizures conducted by the authorities, specifying its guarantee

in the following terms: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

16 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized. 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

The review of Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues

in our Court is not an uncommon occurrence. In most of these

instances, however, the issues arise from circumstances where

the authorities have conducted warrantless searches and seizures of private property. As such, we are regularly called

upon to assess an array of constitutional issues that arise from

warrantless searches and seizures, in a wide range of circumstances. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443

(1971) (explaining "plain view" warrantless seizures); Chimel

v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (authorizing warrantless

searches incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

(approving warrantless searches and seizures incident to "stop

and frisk" situations); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294

(1967) (explaining "hot pursuit" principle of warrantless

searches and seizures). 

Our Court — as well as the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies — has consistently encouraged the authorities to

act prudently in the Fourth Amendment context, and, when

the circumstances permit, to seek and secure the authorization

of a judicial officer — in the form of a warrant — before conducting a search or seizure. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106 (in

explaining judiciary’s strong preference for warranted

searches and seizures, observing that, "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where

without one it would fall"); see also United States v. Servance, 394 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[L]aw enforcement officers are encouraged to act pursuant to judicial

sanction, and searches and seizures carried out pursuant to

duly issued search warrants ‘carry a presumption of legality.’"

(quoting Anglin v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 439 F.2d 1342, 1346

(4th Cir. 1971))). In this case, the government contends that

its agents acted both prudently and reasonably. The officers

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 17
first prepared an extensive and detailed Affidavit demonstrating probable cause for the searches and seizures they sought

to carry out and then sought and secured the magistrate

judge’s authorization for the seizures. 

By its Suppression Ruling, the district court determined

that the search warrants authorized the seizure of only those

"documents that related to Dr. Srivastava’s business and that

may show in some way that health care fraud had been committed." United States v. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392

(D. Md. 2006). This conclusion provides the foundation for

the issues presented in this appeal. First, the government

asserts that the court erred in concluding that the Potomac

Documents were not related to Srivastava’s medical practice,

were not likely to constitute evidence of health care fraud, and

thus were not within the scope of the warrants. Second, the

government maintains that the court erred in concluding that

the Bank of India Transfers, although "legitimately appear-

[ing] to be records of the business," were not evidence of

health care fraud, and thus also not within the ambit of the

warrants. Id. at 396. Finally, the government maintains that,

in these circumstances, the warrants were properly executed

and the blanket suppression ruling is legally defective.

III.

In disposing of this appeal, we first assess whether the

scope of the search warrants includes the two groups of documents that the government intends to use at trial: (1) the Potomac Documents and (2) the Bank of India Transfers. We then

analyze whether the court’s blanket suppression of all the

seized evidence was legally justified.

A.

We begin our analysis with the government’s contention

that the district court misconstrued the scope of the search

warrant for the Potomac residence. In this regard, the court

18 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
determined that the Affidavit demonstrated probable cause

that documents and records relating to Srivastava’s medical

practice, and that may constitute evidence of health care

fraud, would be found in the residence. See United States v.

Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392-93 (D. Md. 2006). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the warrant did not authorize the seizure of the Potomac Documents found there,

because they were neither business-related nor evidence of

health care fraud. Id. at 395-96.

1.

As the Suppression Ruling recognized, the Affidavit made

compelling assertions that documents and records relating to

Srivastava’s medical practice — and that may constitute evidence of health care fraud — would be found in the Potomac

residence. Indeed, Srivastava conducted a substantial part of

his medical practice from the Potomac residence: claims for

medical services were submitted to health care benefit programs from the residence; the residence was used as the billing address for the medical practice; and the practice received

payments from such programs, both electronically and by

mail, at the residence. In these circumstances, the magistrate

judge was unquestionably justified in issuing the search warrant for the Potomac residence, commanding the officers to

seize a broad range of things, "including, but not limited to,

financial, business, patient, insurance and other records

related to the business of Dr. Pradeep Srivastava . . . which

may constitute evidence of [health care fraud]." J.A. 50

(emphasis added). The Affidavit established that documents

and records sought from the residence — specifically (as

identified in category 2 of Attachment A) Srivastava’s

"[f]inancial records, including but not limited to accounting

records, tax records, accounts receivable logs and ledgers,

banking records, and other records reflecting income and

expenditures of the business" — related to his medical practice and constituted evidence of health care fraud. Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the categories of items designated for

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 19
seizure extended to (as identified in Category 5) Srivastava’s

"calend[a]rs, appointment books, correspondence, passports,

visas, photographs and other documents." Id. at 51.

2.

We turn next to the issue of whether the Potomac Documents were within the scope of the search warrant for the

Potomac residence. As the Supreme Court has mandated, and

our sister courts of appeals have recognized, a search warrant

is not to be assessed in a hypertechnical manner. See United

States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (explaining that

"[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity once

exacted under common law pleadings" are not applicable in

Fourth Amendment context); see also United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 745 (10th Cir. 2006) ("We review de novo

the scope of the search warrant at issue, employing a standard

of practical accuracy rather than technical precision." (internal

quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d

272, 275 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is no room in the midst of

a criminal investigation for hypertechnical reading or interpretation of a search warrant." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, as the Supreme Court explained in Ventresca,

we must simply assess such issues "in a commonsense and

realistic fashion." 380 U.S. at 108; see also Gorman, 104 F.3d

at 275 ("Plain reading and common sense are the landmarks

for the execution and interpretation of the language of a

search warrant." (internal quotation marks omitted)).16

16Although our Court has, on many occasions, applied Ventresca’s

"commonsense and realistic fashion" principle in analyzing the sufficiency

of supporting affidavits, we do not appear to have specifically utilized this

principle in assessing the scope of a search warrant. On this point, however, we readily agree with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, see Gorman, 104

F.3d at 275; Angelos, 433 F.3d at 745, and apply the Ventresca principle

to our assessment of the seizures being challenged, eschewing a hypertechnical approach to these issues. 

20 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
As the district court concluded in its Suppression Ruling,

"in order to fall within the scope of the warrant, [the Potomac

Documents] not only had to have some relationship to Dr.

Srivastava’s business," but were also "subject to the requirement that [they] may constitute evidence that health care

fraud had been committed." See Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d

at 393. Accordingly, we analyze whether the Potomac Documents were related to Dr. Srivastava’s medical practice and

whether they may constitute evidence of health care fraud,

beginning with their relationship to his business.

a.

Although Srivastava argues on appeal that the search warrant for the Potomac residence limited the authorized seizures

to those documents and records that are "related to the business" (i.e., the medical practice), this contention does not

undermine the constitutionality of the seizure of the Potomac

Documents. Of note, Srivastava’s medical practice operated

as a "Subchapter S" corporation, under which his portion of

the practice’s income was passed through and taxed directly

to him as an individual.17 In such circumstances, it is difficult

to realistically define a bright line between "personal financial

records" and "business records," as Srivastava implores us to

do. Rather, it is consistent with both common sense and realism to deem the financial records relating to the medical practice as being nearly synonymous with the financial records of

Srivastava individually. By way of example, with respect to

the Potomac Documents seized from Srivastava’s bedroom:

• The IRS Form 1099 for tax year 1999 found in

an envelope marked "1099 Final" constituted a

financial record, as specified in category 2 of

17A corporation that elects to be taxed under Subchapter S, see 26

U.S.C. §§ 1361-63, pays no federal income tax, but passes all its income

and losses through to its shareholders. Those shareholders then report the

income or losses on their individual tax returns. 

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 21
Attachment A. Under law, an IRS Form 1099

reflects income paid to a taxpayer. In this

instance, the Form reflected certain interest

income paid to Srivastava in 1999, which also, in

these circumstances, reasonably related to his

business of practicing medicine; and 

• Additional IRS Forms 1099 for tax year 1998

(found in the envelope dated October 15, 1996)

and for tax years 1997 and 1999 (from the folder

marked "1996 Tax Info.") likewise constituted

financial records related to Srivastava and his

medical practice, specified for seizure under

Attachment A.

Assessed in a de novo context, the balance of the Potomac

Documents also were within the ambit of the financial records

specified for seizure in category 2 of Attachment A. More

specifically, those records — reflecting stock and option

transactions and banking activities — related to the receipt of

Srivastava’s income and, thus, also reasonably related to his

medical practice. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the district court that such documents were outside the scope of the

warrant for being non-business related.

b.

We next consider the Suppression Ruling’s conclusion that

the Potomac Documents were not within the scope of the

search warrant for the Potomac residence because they failed

to satisfy the magistrate judge’s requirement that things could

only be seized if they "may constitute evidence that health

care fraud had been committed." Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d

at 393. In this regard, we emphasize that the warrant’s mandate was only that seized items "relate[ ] to the business" of

Dr. Srivastava and "may constitute evidence of [health care

fraud]." J.A. 50 (emphasis added). Thus, we must conduct our

de novo assessment with this mandate in mind. Pursuant to

22 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
the warrant, documents or records to be seized were not

required, on their face, to necessarily constitute evidence of

health care fraud — rather, they only potentially had to be

evidence of such fraud. And, in the context of a fraud investigation, the relevant evidence will in many instances be fragmentary, discovered in bits and pieces, and thus difficult to

either identify or secure. Standing alone, a particular document may appear innocuous or entirely innocent, and yet be

an important piece of the jigsaw puzzle that investigators

must assemble. The complexity of a fraud scheme, however,

should not be permitted to confer some advantage on the suspected wrongdoer. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,

481 n.10 (1976) ("The complexity of an illegal scheme may

not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the State has

demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been

committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of this

crime is in the suspect’s possession."). 

Here, the Affidavit demonstrated probable cause that

Srivastava’s medical practice had submitted fraudulent claims

to health care benefit programs from the Potomac residence,

suggesting that the executing officers were likely to encounter

a "paper puzzle" in carrying out the command of the warrant.

For example, a piece of the fraud puzzle in this case included

Srivastava’s financial records, such as IRS Forms 1099

reflecting his income. Cf. United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d

1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that financial

records were pieces of "paper puzzle" verifying fraudulent

kickback scheme). Indeed, a time-honored concept in whitecollar and fraud investigations is simply to "follow the

money." See, e.g., David M. Nissman, Follow the Money: A

Guide to Financial and Money Laundering Investigations

(2005). That principle is particularly applicable here, and it is

deserving of emphasis. The possession or transfer of "large

sums of money, and the manner in which those funds were

acquired [are] highly relevant to proof of [a] scheme to

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 23
defraud." United States v. Shamy, 656 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir.

1981).18

Having made a de novo assessment of the scope of the warrant for the Potomac residence — and having done so in a

non-hypertechnical, common-sense, and realistic manner —

we are satisfied that the Potomac Documents were within the

scope of its specifications. The Affidavit spelled out a complex fraud scheme, and the warrant specified that things

related to Srivastava’s medical practice, and that may constitute evidence of health care fraud, would be discovered in the

residence. In these circumstances, we are simply unable to

rule that the Potomac Documents could not constitute evidence of health care fraud. As a result, the seizure of the Potomac Documents was consistent with the scope of the warrant

and the mandate of the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Turning to the government’s contention that the Bank of

India Transfers were within the scope of the search warrant

issued for the Greenbelt office, we conclude that they were

also erroneously suppressed by the district court. In this

regard, the Suppression Ruling recognized that the Bank of

India Transfers "legitimately appeared to be records of the

business." Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 396. Nevertheless,

the court concluded that the warrant for the Greenbelt office

did not authorize the seizure of the Transfers because they did

not constitute evidence of health care fraud. In so ruling, the

court determined that the Affidavit failed to show probable

cause for seizure of the Transfers as financial proceeds evidence, emphasizing that there had been no discussion in the

18The reasoning underlying this point — that evidence of the possession

and transfer of large sums of money can, in the proper context, be a strong

indicia of fraud — is further emphasized by our analysis of the district

court’s erroneous suppression of the Bank of India Transfers. See infra

Part III.B. 

24 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
Affidavit of "what Dr. Srivastava may have done with the

monies he received as payment for his procedures," or "how

[he] handled his banking." Id. Furthermore, the court

observed that concerns for the proceeds of Dr. Srivastava’s

alleged crimes would involve money laundering activities,

which are "distinct from health care fraud." Id.

To the contrary, in following the money, the financial

records of a suspect may well be highly probative of violations of a federal fraud statute. See Shamy, 656 F.2d at 958

(concluding that, in mail fraud investigation — in the words

of Judge Haynsworth — "large sums of money, and the manner in which those funds were acquired were highly relevant

to proof of the scheme to defraud"). Indeed, the health care

fraud statute provides that it may be violated by a person who

"obtain[s] . . . money or property" by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (emphasis added). In the

context of a fraud investigation, the financial and accounting

records of the suspects — and, as here, records reflecting the

overseas transfer of large sums of money by a prime suspect

— are potentially compelling evidence that the scheme has

been conducted and carried out, and that, in the terms of

§ 1347, "money or property" has been obtained as the result

of false or fraudulent billing practices.19

Consequently, and consistent with our conclusion that the

Potomac Documents were subject to seizure under the search

warrant for the Potomac residence, the Bank of India Transfers were sufficiently designated for seizure by the warrant for

the Greenbelt office. As recognized by the district court, the

19If a false or fraudulent billing scheme has been conducted in connection with a medical practice, multiple federal fraud statutes are potentially

implicated. For example, federal fraud offenses that might be pursued on

the basis of a factual scenario arising from a health care fraud scheme

include, inter alia, mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C.

§ 1343), tax fraud (26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206), and health care fraud (18

U.S.C. § 1347). Health care fraud is simply one species of such a scheme,

which Congress saw fit to combat through its 1996 enactment of § 1347.

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 25
Transfers "legitimately appeared to be records of the business." Srivastava, 444 F.3d at 396. Furthermore, the possession and transfer of large sums of money — more than $4

million transferred overseas by Srivastava to a bank in India

— could readily be deemed evidence of the fraud scheme

described in the Affidavit. Simply put, the possession and

transfer to another country of such large sums was, even when

viewed favorably to Srivastava, very suspicious. And, from

the standpoint of the executing officers, it was compelling

evidence of a potential health care fraud offense (i.e., obtaining, by false and fraudulent pretenses, the money or property

of a health care benefit program). As a result, we also reject

the district court’s restrictive interpretation of the scope of the

warrant for the Greenbelt office, and conclude that the seizure

of the Bank of India Transfers was consistent with the Fourth

Amendment.

C.

Finally, having determined that the Potomac Documents

and the Bank of India Transfers were within the ambit of the

search warrants for the Potomac residence and the Greenbelt

office, we assess the government’s challenge to the blanket

suppression of all the seized evidence. In that respect, the district court found that the warrants had been so flagrantly and

unconstitutionally executed that a blanket suppression was

justified. We have consistently recognized, however, that,

"[a]s a general rule, if officers executing a search warrant

exceed the scope of the warrant, only the improperly-seized

evidence will be suppressed; the properly-seized evidence

remains admissible." United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d

542, 556 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Shilling,

826 F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that "[t]he

exclusionary rule does not compel suppression of evidence

properly covered by a warrant merely because other material

not covered by the warrant was taken during the same

search"). We have also recognized that only extraordinary circumstances — such as when "the warrant application merely

26 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
serves as a subterfuge masking the officers’ lack of probable

cause," or if "the officers flagrantly disregard[ ] the terms of

the warrant" by "engag[ing] in a fishing expedition for the

discovery of incriminating evidence" — will justify the suppression of lawfully seized evidence. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 706 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

By its Suppression Ruling, the district court determined

that a blanket suppression was justified because, inter alia, the

executing officers had "approached the searches of Dr.

Srivastava’s home and offices in a way that flagrantly

exceeded the specific limitations of the warrants, and . . .

grossly exceeded the scope of the warrants in their execution." Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 401. The court also concluded that a blanket suppression was warranted, "[e]ven if

. . . some of the documents at issue . . . were within the scope

of the warrant." Id. at 396. Notwithstanding the court’s explanation, we are unable to identify any extraordinary circumstances that might support this ruling. And, in any event, our

conclusions that the Potomac Documents and the Bank of

India Transfers were constitutionally seized substantially

undercuts the blanket suppression ruling. For example, the

court’s finding that Agent Marrero thought "he had limitless

power to seize virtually anything from Dr. Srivastava’s home

and business" is derived from its understanding that Marrero

"intended to seize personal financial records," id. at 397 — an

intention not inconsistent with our de novo determination on

the scope of the warrants. See supra Part III.A-B. 

Even assuming — as the district court found — that Agent

Marrero believed that the terms of the search warrants were

"meaningless," and did not limit his conduct in any way, such

an assumption does not support the blanket suppression ruling. Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 398-99. Simply put, a constitutional violation does not arise when the actions of the

executing officers are objectively reasonable and within the

ambit of warrants issued by a judicial officer. As a result, the

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 27
subjective views of Agent Marrero were not relevant — the

proper test is an objective one. See Maryland v. Macon, 472

U.S. 463, 470 (1985) ("Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting him at the time, and not on the officer’s actual

state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken."

(internal citations omitted)); see also Martin v. Gentile, 849

F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that executing officer’s actions must be assessed for objective reasonableness

"in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his own subjective intent or motivation").

Although we might sympathize with the court’s view that

Marrero’s testimony was disconcerting, his personal opinions

were an improper basis for the blanket suppression ruling.20

In these circumstances, the district court made errors of law

in its blanket suppression of the seized evidence, necessarily

abusing its discretion in that regard. See Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); United States v. Ebersole,

411 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2005) ("By definition, a court

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." (internal

20The Suppression Ruling also invoked the government’s voluntary

return of approximately 80% of the documents and records seized from

the Potomac residence, see supra note 6, to support its finding that the

officers had flagrantly disregarded the scope of the search warrants. See

Srivastava, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 399 n.16. To the contrary, the voluntary

return of property seized under a valid warrant does not give rise to an

adverse inference or tend to establish that the initial seizure was unconstitutional. Significantly, the return resulted from an agreement of the parties, apparently obviating the need for a court proceeding under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) (authorizing person aggrieved by

unlawful seizure or "by the deprivation of property," to seek property’s

return). And, Rule 41(g) contemplates that returned property may be

admissible in later proceedings, authorizing the court to "impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings." 

28 UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA
quotation marks omitted)). As a result, the blanket suppression ruling also constituted reversible error.21

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the Suppression Ruling and remand for such other and further proceedings as may

be appropriate.

VACATED AND REMANDED

21Because we are satisfied that the Potomac Documents and the Bank

of India Transfers were within the scope of the search warrants, we need

not address the government’s final contention — that the evidence generated during the IRS investigation was derived from an independent source.

UNITED STATES v. SRIVASTAVA 29