# FILED
September 17, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ex rel., ) SHERRY McAL

LISTER, )

) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) Sumner C ircuit ) No. 3846-C VS. ) ) Appeal N o. ) 01A01-9510- CV-00452 DANNY GOODE, ) ) Defenda nt/Appella

nt. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR SUMNER COUNTY

AT GALLATIN, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE THOMAS GOODALL, JUDGE

For the Plaintiff/Appellee : F or the Defen dant/Appe llant : John Knox Wa

lkup Anita M. Holden Attorney General and Reporter Lebanon, Tennessee James H. Tucker, Jr. Assistant Attorney General



## AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART

AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE-2- 

## O P I N I O N
This appe al involves a non-custo dial pare nt’s liabil ity for a s izeable child support arrearage accumulated over eight years. The State of Tennessee petitioned the Ci rcuit Cour t for Sumn er County to require the non-cus todial par

ent to pay the ar

rearage and to find t

he non-cust

odial parentin contempt. The noncustodial parent responded by requesting a reduction in his child support obligation

and by asserting that he was not in arr ears bec ause of

a side agr

eement with the custodia

l parent toreduce hi s child suppor t obligation. The tria

l cour t de clined to give effect to the side agreement or to reduce the non-custodial parent’s child support obligation. It determined that the non-custodial parent was in willful c ivil contem

pt and order

ed him to pa

y t he $42,700 a

rreara ge to the custodial parent. The non-c ustodial par ent takes i ssue on this a

ppeal wit h the conclusions that he ow ed $42,700 i n child suppor t, tha t he was no t entitled t o a prospectiv e reduction in his chil d su pport obliga tion, and t

hat he wa s in willf

ul civil contempt . W e have deter mined that the judgment for the a rreara ge should be affirmed but that the judgment for contempt should be revers ed and that the
case should be remanded for the computation of the non-custodial parent’s prospectiv e child suppo rt obligati on.
I.
Sherry McAllist

er (for merly Go ode) and

Danny Goode marriedin October 1979. Their m arriage

foundered six years l ater. They negot iated the fi rst of two propertysettleme nt agreem ents in June 1986 in which Mr. Goode agreed to give custody of the parties’ three children to Ms. McAllister and to pay $250 per week in child su pport. On October 21, 1986, t he Circui t Court for

Sumner C ounty entered a final di vorce dec ree incor porating the partie s’ agree ments. Even thoug h the decree directed

Mr. Goo de to pay $250 per wee k in chil d support, M s. McAllist er signed a

notarize d document i n October 27, 1986, s tating: I, Sherry Goode have reduced the payment of Ch i ld support, from Da

nny Goode, to 15 0.00 dollars per w eek, as apposed [sic] to t he 250.00 pe

r week, he ha s1 The S tate’s pe tition doesnot speci fically e xplain the basis of it s standing

to se ek Ms

. McAllister’s child supp ort; however, state and federal law require custodial pare nts of children receiving public sup

port to as sign their

rights to support from third-parties to the State. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1988); Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-3-124 (Supp. 1996). -3- been paying. This is in effect beg i nning Octob er 25, 1985.
Neither party sought to modify the final divorce de cree to r eflect t his agree ment. Mr. Goode simply began paying Ms. McAllister $150, instead of $250, per wee k.

In August 1994 the State of Tennessee, on Ms. McAllister’s relat ion, 1 sought to hold Mr. G oode in contempt for fa iling to pay the $2 50 per we ek child support required by the October 1986 order. The tria

l court con ducted a he aring in October

1994 and dire cte d Mr. Go ode to continue paying $150 pe r week i n childsupport pend

ing another

hearing. Followinga December 1994 hearin g, the trial court entered an order in January 1995, findi ng that Mr. Goode ow ed $42,700 in past due child support and directing him to pay $250 per week in child support and $50 per week toward the arrearage. T he trial court dec lined to consider reducing Mr. Goo de’s child support bec ause he had not filed a petition seeking a reduction.

In Fe bruary 1995 , Mr. G oode petitio ned for a r eduction in c hild sup port
. Followinga hearingin July 1995, the trial court de nied Mr. Goo de’s petit ion to reduce his child

support, reaffirmed its earlier order directing him to pay $250 per week in child suppo rt, and i ncrease d Mr. Go ode’s arr earage p ayment

to $100 per week. A s a result of this dec ision, Mr . Goode’ s payments f or child supp ort and the arrearage, including the trial court clerk’s five per cent commission, amounted to $367.50 per week . The tr ial court denied Mr. Goode’s p ost-trial motion on September

6, 1995. I

t also modif

ied its Janu ary 1995 ord e r to find speci fically that Mr. Goode was in “willful civil contempt” for failing to pay child suppor t but declined to incarcerate Mr. Goode.

II.

T HE E FFECT OF THE O CTOBER 27, 1986 A GREEMENT2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(h) (1996) now requires marital d issolution a

greeme nts to “affir matively acknowledge

that no action by the parties will be effective to reduce child support after the due date of each payment, and that they understand that c ourt approval must be obtained before child supp ort can b e reduc ed, unles s such pay ments are

automatic ally reduced or terminated under the terms of the agreement.” -4- Mr. Goodefirst asserts that the trial court should have excused his failure to pay $250 per wee

k in child supp ort from O ctober 1986through Aug ust 1994 because Ms. McAllister ha

d agreed t o accept $150 in wee

kly child support rather than the $250

per wee k ordered by the trial co urt. This agre ement is no t legally enforce able because p arties c annot alte r or amend a c hild support o rder by pr ivate agreementonce it has been entere d. Conner v. Parrish , No. 89-282-II, 1990 WL 7461, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1990) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed); Rasnic
v. Wy nn , 625 S. W.2d 278, 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). 2 Accordi ngly, the agreementcan only af

fect Mr. Goode’s c ourt-orde red child s upport obliga

tion if itsupplies the

basi s for a reco gnized equitable defense to the demand for back child suppor

t. Equitable defenses that would have the effect of retro actively modifying a childsupport oblig ation are no longer a

vailable i n cases such as this one b ecause of the Tennessee Supreme Court ’s constru ction of T enn. Code Ann. § 36- 5- 101(a)(5). Rutledge v. Barre tt, 802 S.W. 2d 604, 607 ( Tenn. 199 1); see also Brown v. Heggie, 876 S.W. 2d 98, 101 (T enn. Ct. App. 1993) . While refusing to permit Mr. Goode to raise equitable defenses may seem har sh, the General Assembly

and the Tennessee S upreme C ourt h ave de cided that the aggre gate public good derived f

rom requiringall obligor

parents tocomply ful ly with law ful childsupport orde

rs outwei g hs the se eming harsh results in any particular case. Accordi ngly, the trial

court cor rectly de clined to r

ecognize the Octob er 27, 1986 agreementas a basis for

excusing Mr. Goo de from hi s child suppor t obligation.

III. T HE C ONSTITUTIONALITY OF T ENN . C ODE A NN . § 36-5-101(a) (5)

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(5), as construed by the Tennessee Supreme Court, clearly undermines Mr. Goo de’s eff orts to avoi d paying the $4 2,700 child3 At the time , Tenn. Co de Ann. § 3 6-5-101( a)(1) p rovided, in part, th at: Any such modification of an allowanceshall be made retroactively only upon a specific finding that the obligor was unable to pay the full amount of such allowance through no intentional fault of his or her own and that the facts of the case require such a modification retroactively in order to meet the ends of justice. -5- support arrearage. Accordingly, he asserts that the statute is unconstitutional because i t re troactive ly impairs both his contractual ag reement with Ms. McAllister

and his ability to request a retroactive modification of his child support obligation. We have determined that Mr. Goode has no constitutionally protected interest in his agre ement wi th Ms. Mc Allis ter o r in his unex ercised o pportunity to seek a r

etroacti ve modific ation of his child suppor t.

A.

The authority o f the cour ts to make r

etroacti ve changes in a non-custodial parent’s child suppor

t obligation c hanged appr oximately f

ive months a

fter the entry of Mr. G oode’s and M s. McAl lister’s final divor ce decre e. At th e time of the negotiation

of the par ties’ prop erty settl ement agr eements a nd the entr

y of the divorce decree, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( a)(1) ( Supp. 1986) (amende d 1987) permitted trial courts to make re troactive modifica tions in chil d support in c ertain limited circumst ances. 3 Accordi ngly, it was generally understood at that time that obligor parents c ould assert

equitabl e defense s to claims for past du e child support. See Smith v. Smit h, 643 S.W. 2d 320, 323 ( Tenn. 1982); Nissen v. Miller, 642 S.W.2d 428, 430-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
During its 1987 session, the General Assembly removed T enn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a

)(1)’s r etroacti ve modific ation fea ture in order to avoid losin g million s of dolla rs in federal welfare funds . Act of March 27 , 1987, ch. 39 , § 1, 1987 Tenn. P

ub. Acts 47; Rutledge v. Barre tt, 802 S.W.2 d at 606. A s a result of this amendmen

t, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101 (a)(5) specific ally provide s that a childsupport judgm

ent “shall not be subject

to modific ation as toany time pe riod
or any amounts due prior t

o the date t hat an act

ion for modi fication i s filed and notice of the ac tion has been mail ed to the la st known add ress of the

opposing parties.”-6- B. V IOLATION OF T ENN . C ONST . ART . I, § 20

Our consid eration of Mr . Goode’ s attack on the constit

utionality of

the 1987
ame ndment

to Tenn. C ode Ann. § 36-5-101( a)(1) mu st be guided by the recognitio n that the Gen eral As s embly has complete control over judicial remedies subject only to the limitat ions in the st ate and fe deral con stitutions. Alamo Dev. C

orp. v. Thomas, 186 Tenn. 631, 640, 2 12 S.W.2d 606, 610 (1948); Pacific Eastern C

orp. v. G ulf Life H

olding Co., 902 S.W.2 d 946, 955 (T enn. Ct. App. 1995). One of these constitutional limitations can be found in T enn. Const

. art. I, § 20 w hich state s “[t]hat no retrosp ectiv e law, or law impa

iring the obligations of contract s, shall be made.” Rather t han proscr

ibing all retrospecti ve laws, this provision proscribes legislation that impairs contractual or vested legal rights. Dark Tobac co Growe rs’ Co-op. Ass’n v. Dunn, 150 Tenn. 614, 632, 266 S.W. 308, 312 (19 24); Shields v. Cli fton Hill Land Co., 94 Tenn. 123, 148, 2 8 S.W. 668, 674 (18 94). Thu s, to be suc cessful w ith his Tenn. Const . art. I, § 20 claim, M r. Goode must demonstra

te that he possesses a

n actual c ontract r

ight or a vested le gal right.

I MPAIRMENT OF C ONTRACT

We consider first whether Mr. Goo de has demo nstrated t hat the 1987 amendmentto Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(a)( 1) interfe res with a contrac t right. In or der to be pr

otected by Tenn. C onst. art . I, § 20 , a contract right m ust b e legally enforce able and m ust not conflict w ith the constit

ution, the statutes, or the
common law. Spiegel v . Thomas, Ma nn & Smit h, P.C. , 811 S.W .2d 528, 53 0 (Tenn. 1991); Lazenby v. Universa l Underwr iters Ins. Co. , 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (196 4) (recogni zing that contracts that confl ict wi th constitution s, statutes, or the common law violate public policy and are unenfo rceable). The October 27, 1986 agree ment

signed by Ms. McAllister contravened positive law when it was sig ned becaus e, even t hen, the partie s did not have

the author

ity to
a lter the trial court’s c hild support d ecree by private a

greement
. Conner v

. Parrish, supra , 1990 WL 74 61, at *2; Rasnic v. Wynn, 925 S.W. 2d at 281.-7-

Accordi ngly, Mr. Goode never had an enforceable contractual right en titled to constitution al protec tion.

I MPAIRMENT OF A V ESTED R IGHT

Mr. Goode als o asserts t

hat the 1987 a

mendment t

o Tenn. C ode Ann. § 36- 5-101(a)( 1) interfered with his vested legal righ t to seek a retroac tive modifica tion of his child support obligation. Retroactive modifi cations of child support obligations were not commonplace prior to 1987. Obligor par ents coul d obtain
aretroac tive modif

ication only

by demonstr ating that t

hey were unable to pa

y the court-ordered child suppor t through no fault of

their own and that granting them retroac tive relief was requ ired to meet the ends o f justice. Since Mr. Goode had not requested a modific ation of his child supp ort befor

e the enac tment of th e 1987 amendmentto Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1), he had, at most, only an expectat ion that he cou ld seek a r etroacti ve modific ation if ci rcumstanc es eve r warran ted it.

The right Mr. Goode now claims is a remedi al one. A remedia l right cannot be considered vested unle ss it is something more than a n expecta tion based on

the anticipated continu ation of t he present law. Land graf v. USI Fil m Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 , 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499 ( 1994) (holdi ng that a sta tute is not retrospe ctive simply bec ause it upsets expecta tions based o n prior

law); Stratton Claimants

v. Morris Claimant

s, 89 Tenn. 497, 516-17 , 15 S.W . 87, 91 (1891); 2 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatis e on Constitu tional Limitati ons 749 (8th ed. 1927). Thus, for the purpose of constitutional analysis, the Tennessee Supreme Court has heldthat a re medial ri ght become s vested only when a pa

rty files acomplaint or petition seeking to i nvoke it. Dupuis v. Han d, 814 S.W. 2d 340, 343 (T enn. 1991) (holding that Tenn . Const. art. I, § 20 prohibits r etroacti vely applyin g a statute to previously-filed cases); Morris v. Gross, 572 S.W. 2d 902, 905-07 (T enn. 1978).

When the final divorce decree was ente red in 1986, Mr. Goode had only an expe ctation

that he w ould be able

to seek retroactive

modifica tions in his c hild support if the need arose. Since he did not seek such a

modifica tion prior t

o 1987, his expectat

ion never r

ipened into a

vested rig ht prior to t

he 1987 amendm

ent to4 The “law of t he land”clause

in Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8 is synonymous with the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendme nt. Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tenn. 199 6); Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 431, 53 S.W. 955, 957 (1899). -8- Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1). The courts had alre ady been di vested of authorityto modify c hild support o rders retroactive ly by thetime Mr. Goode filed his petition

in February 1995. Thus, as applied to Mr. G oode’s 1995 petition, the 1987 amendment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) did not have a prohibited retrospe ctive eff

ect.
C. V IOLATION OF T ENN . C ONST . ART . I, § 8

Mr. Goode’s final constitution al challe nge to the 198 7 amendme nt to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(1) is based on the Law of the Land Clause of Tenn

. Const. art. I, § 8 that prot ects funda

mental pr operty and l ibe rty interests from abr idgment

under the c olor of sta

te law. Tenn. C onst. art . I, § 8, lik e it s counterpartin the Four

teenth Am

endment to the United States C onstitution, 4 does
n ot prot ect “unilateral expectations” or “abstract needs or desires.” Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 5 77, 92 S. Ct. 27 01, 2709 (1972). R ather, i t protects vested rig hts, Officer v. Young, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 320, 322-23 (1833), that
are create d and define d by existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent

source suc h as state l aw. Mid-Sout h Indoor Horse Racin g, Inc. v. Tennessee

State Rac ing Comm ’n, 798 S.W.2d 53 1, 540 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1990 ).

Since Mr . Goode

did not file a petition se eking a retroactive modifica tion of his child supp ort befor

e the 1987 a

mendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(a)(1), he never acquired a vested right to seek this remedy. By the t ime h e filed a petition t

o modify his c hild su pport oblig ation, the opportunity t

o obtain retroac tive relief had been extinguished for eight years. Accordi ngly, decl ining to permit Mr . Goode t

o benefit i n 1995 from a

provi sion t hat had been repealed since 198 7 was not co ntrary to Ten n. Const. art . I, § 8.

IV. P ROSPECTIVE R EDUCTION OF M R . G OODE ’ S C HILD S UPPORT5 $250/week × 4.3/weeks/month = $1,075/month.

6 The calculation concerning whether a signific ant devia

tion existsmust be based on the amount of the pr eviously ordered support and theamount cu rrently r equired by the guid

elines. See Hannah v. Lipps, App. No. 03A01-9504-CV-00114, 1996 WL 10234, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct

. App. Jan. 11, 1 996) (No

Tenn. R. A

pp. P. 11 ap

plication filed). T he diffe rence b etw een Mr

. Goode’s current child support and theamount of support required by the guidelines is $140, and this amount deviates from the amount of support required by the guidelines by 14.97%. When rounded to next full percent, the amount of deviation is 15%. -9- Mr. Goode als o takes issue with the t

rial cour t’s denial of his requ est

for a prospectiv e modifica

tion of his c hild support obligation. The uncontroverted evidence shows that

at the tim e of the July 1995 hearin g, Mr. G oode was ear ning
agross income of approxima tely $3,000 per month as a t

ruck drive

r for Av eritt Express in Nashvil le. The cur rent child support guide lines requ ire obligor parents withthree chi ldren to pa

y forty-one

percent o f the “netincome” a s defined i n the gu ideline s for child s upport. See Tenn. C omp. R. & Regs. r . 1240-2-4 -.03(5) (1994 ). The net monthly incom e of a per son earning$3,000 per month is $2,280.96, and thus an ob ligor parent’s child support obligation for three children is $935 per month. This amount is less than Mr. Goode’s curren t childsupport obligation of

$1,075 per

month. 5

The mer e fact th at Mr. G oode’s cur rent child support exc eeds the a

mount of support re quired by the

guidelines does not

necessarily mean that the trial court shouldhave lowe

red Mr. Goode’s monthly child s upport payments. T rial cour ts
are required

to modify c hild support obligations on ly when the re is a “s ignificant variance” betw e en the amo unt of suppor t require d by the guide lines and th e amount cu rren tly ordere d. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( a)(1). When the c hild support obli gati on exceeds $100 per mon th, the gui delines def

ine a “significant variance” as one of

at least fifteen percent. See Tenn. C omp. R. & Regs. r . 1240- 2-4-.02(3).

Mr. Goode’s c urrent $1, 075 per mont h child suppor

t obl igation is fifteen perce nthigher tha

n the amount

he is required to pay u nder the c urrent chil d support guidelines. 6 He is, therefo re , entitle d to a prospe ctive red uction in his childsupport unle ss the curr ent varia nce is the r

esult of Mr . Goode’ s vo l untary unemploym ento r underem ployment or

is due to a p revious dec ision to devia te from the guid elines. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 1240-2-4-.02(3). The record-10-

contains no evidence that Mr. Goode is purposely underemployed or that the trial courtever made specificfindings tha t Mr. G oode’s chil d support shoul d not be consist ent with th e amount req uired by t he guidel ines. Accordi ngly, on remand the trial court should

either set Mr. G oode’s chil d support in a ccordanc e with

the guidelines or set out s pecifica lly in wri ting pursuantto Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e)(1) the reas ons why the applicati on of the gui delines w ould be unjust or inappropriate in this case.

V.

T HE C ALCULATION OF THE A RREARAGE

Mr. Goo de raises a final is sue concer ning the amount of his child support arrearag e. He asse

rts that the

trial cour

t erred b y including th e mont hs o f November

and December 1994 in

its arre arage ca

lculation be cause the

payments made during these months were in accordance with the trial court’s November 1, 1994 order dir

ecting him to continue pa ying child support at the rate of $150 per week pending a hearingon the mer its. Thi s argument

overlooks th e fact tha

t the November

1, 1994 orde

r was an interim or

der, not a final judgm

ent.

An interim order is one that adjudicates an issue preliminarily; while a final order fully and completely defi ne s the parties’ rights with regard to the issue, leaving nothing else for the trial court to do. Vineyard v. Vineyard , 26 Tenn. App. 232, 241, 170 S. W.2d 917, 920 (19 42); Restatemen t of Judg ments § 41 , cmt. a (1942). Until a ju dgment bec omes fina l, it remains within the

court’s c ontrol and may be modifie d any time prior t o the entry of a final ju dgment. Stidham v. Fickle Heirs , 643 S.W.2d 32 4, 328 (Tenn . 1982).

The November

1, 1994 orde

r was int ended to pres erve the s tatus quo temporar ily until the tr

ial court c ouldconduct a h earing on the merit s. It did n ot purport to adjudica

te Mr. G oode’s chil d support obli gation beca use at the t

ime it
was entered, the trial

court had h eard no pr

oof on the issue. In fact, the trial court couldnot have altered Mr. Goode’s child support oblig ation at tha t time bec ause Mr. Goode had not yet file d a motion seeking a r

eduction. Accordingly, the trial-11-

courtdid not err by including the months of November and December 1994 in its final calculation of Mr. Goode’s arrearage.

VI. T HE W ILLFUL C IVIL C ONTEMPT F INDING

As afinal mat

ter, Mr . Goode t akes issue with the trial cour t’s deter mination that he had committe d “willf ul civilcontempt” by failing t o pay the fu ll amount of his court- ordered child suppo rt for al most eight ye ars. H e asserts that he did not willfully disregard the final divorce de cree bec ause he be lieved in goo d faith th at Ms. Mc Allister ’s Octobe r 27, 1986 a

greement controlle d the amount

of his child suppor

t obligation.

A contemptuo us act is a

willful, purposeful

failure or refus al to compl y with
a court o rder. Haynes v . Hayne s, 904 S.W. 2d 118, 120 ( Tenn. C t. App. 1995) (holding that a finding of willful conduct must precede a judgment for contempt). On at least two occasion s, t his court ha s held that t he existenc e of a side agreementbetween

the partie s with

regard to child suppor

t may provi de a defe nse to a contemp t petition, even though t he agree ment itsel f is unenforceable. Laird
v. Laird, App. No. 86-21 2-II, 198 6 WL 14042, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. Dec . 12, 1986) ( No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 appl ication fi led) (hold ing that an a

greement precluded a finding th at a fath er was w ilfully re fusing to p ay child support); Federico v. Worley, App. No. 87-5-II, 1987 WL 11765, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 1987 ), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 31, 1987) (holdi ng that a fi nding of contempt in the fac e of an agr

eement “ would amou nt to a gross mis carriag e of justice”).

Mr. Goode and Ms. McAllister e n tered intoa side agr eement on October

27, 1986 that Mr. Goode would pay $150 per week in ch ild support de spite the October 21, 1986 order dir

ecting him to pay $250 per week. The rec ord contain s no evidence

that the pa

rties did no tenter intothis agreement in good faith and at arms’ length or th at either party knew

that the agreement

was lega

lly unenforceable. With the e vidence in this posture, the trial court should not have foundthat Mr. Goode was in contempt for willfully disregarding the trial court’s-12-

childsupport order from October 1986 through August 19 94. Accordin gly, we
reverse the trial court’s f inding that Mr. Goode

was in w illful civi l contempt and, on remand, direct tha

t the clai m for cont

empt be dis missed.

VII.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mr. Goode owes $42,700 in back childsupport and that heshould pay $100 per week toward this arrearage. We
reverse the trial court’s f inding that Mr. Goode

is in wil lf

ul civil contempt and
re mandthe case for furt her proce edings to set

Mr. Goo de’s prospe ctive chi l d support in accord ance wit h this opinion. W e tax the c osts of this appeal in equal proportions against D anny Goode and his surety and to the

State of Tennessee for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

_ _________________

_________

_ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE CONCUR:

_________________

_______________ SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE

_________________

_______________ BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE