Filed 6/28/23 P. v. Vaughn CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LEBARON VAUGHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

F084104

(Super. Ct. No. F08908036)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Gregory T. 

Fain, Judge.

Catherine White, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Kari 

Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Meehan, J.
2.

INTRODUCTION

LeBaron Vaughn (appellant) pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was 

sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. Ten years later, he filed a petition for 

resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1section 1172.6.2 The trial court denied the petition, 

concluding appellant failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief 

because the record of conviction established he was the actual killer. 

On appeal, we reject appellant’s contention that the record of conviction did not 

establish he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I. Charges and Conviction

The Fresno County District Attorney’s Office filed an information charging 

appellant with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), alleging he committed the murder 

“unlawfully, and with malice aforethought.” Appellant was also charged with inflicting 

physical punishment on a child (§ 273d, subd. (a); counts 2 and 3). The victim was the 

approximately 10-year-old son of his girlfriend, Rena Antonettee Ireland. Ireland was 

also charged in the information with two counts of child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 

4 and 5). Ireland was not charged with murder. 

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to second degree 

murder. The remaining counts of inflicting physical punishment on a child were 

dismissed. Appellant stipulated the preliminary hearing transcript provided the factual 

basis for his plea. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

2 Appellant brought the petition pursuant to former section 1170.95, which was 

renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive change on June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.) For clarity, we refer to the statute by its current number 

throughout this opinion.
3.

II. Preliminary Hearing Transcript

At the preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated the victim’s cause of death was 

blunt force injuries to the head, occurring on December 29, 2008. The parties further 

stipulated that the victim did not cause his own injuries. 

On that evening, an officer responded to the hospital to investigate a case of 

possible child abuse. There, he saw the victim, who appeared to be approximately 10 

years of age, lying on a gurney and receiving medical attention. The victim had multiple 

visible injuries all over his body. 

A detective interviewed appellant. Appellant identified the victim as the son of his 

girlfriend. He initially told the detective the victim’s injuries resulted from a fall or an 

accident. Later in the interview, he admitted he struck the victim’s head with his elbow 

then stomped on his head as many as 10 times. He also kicked the victim all over his 

body, including in the back of the head. Appellant weighed 162 pounds. The victim 

weighed 82 pounds. Appellant admitted he was upset with the victim’s behavior and 

wanted to “show him discipline” and “teach him a lesson.” He described himself as 

“irritated” and stated he “lost control” and “tussled [the victim] up too hard.” 

Appellant’s codefendant told the detective she witnessed appellant strike the 

victim with his fists, slam him to the ground, and stomp on his head. 

III. Resentencing Petition

In 2021, appellant, in propria persona, filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to 

section 1172.6. In the form petition, appellant checked boxes next to statements that 

information was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory 

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he

pleaded no contest to second degree murder in lieu of going to trial, and that he could not 

now be convicted of murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective 

January 1, 2019. He also requested appointment of counsel. 
4.

The People filed a response contending the record of conviction conclusively 

establishes appellant was the actual killer, and that he was not prosecuted under a theory 

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The 

People’s response included a detailed summary of the preliminary hearing transcript. 

The trial court (Judge Kalemkarian) initially dismissed the petition without 

prejudice for failure to serve the People. It subsequently rescinded its dismissal order, 

concluding the People waived any objection to inadequate service by filing a response. It 

also appointed counsel for appellant. 

Appellant filed a second section 1172.6 resentencing petition, but without the 

assistance of appointed counsel. Like the initial petition, the second petition was on a 

form, with checked boxes next to the same statements claiming eligibility for 

resentencing. It also included a handwritten attachment discussing several legal issues 

unrelated to section 1172.6 resentencing, such as appellant’s pending parole matters. 

The trial court scheduled a hearing to determine if appellant had made a prima 

facie case for relief pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c). The People filed a 

response asking that the court incorporate the arguments from their initial response. 

Appellant filed two replies, each without the assistance of appointed counsel. The replies 

addressed unrelated legal issues, with no discussion of appellant’s claim for resentencing 

under section 1172.6. 

At the prima facie hearing, appellant’s counsel argued appellant had made a prima 

facie showing for relief, but submitted on appellant’s briefs. 

The trial court (Judge Fain) ruled appellant failed to make a prima facie case in a 

detailed written order. Relying on the preliminary hearing transcript, the trial court 

reasoned the record of conviction established appellant was the actual killer and therefore 

was not prosecuted under the theory of felony murder or natural and probable 

consequences. 
5.

DISCUSSION

I. Appellant Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing of Entitlement to Relief 

Under Section 1172.6 

Appellant contends the record of conviction relied upon by the trial court did not 

support its conclusion that he was the actual killer, and therefore ineligible for relief as a 

matter of law. We disagree. The preliminary hearing transcript conclusively established 

appellant was the actual killer, and appellant’s conclusory claims in his resentencing 

petitions and replies did not create a factual dispute necessitating an evidentiary hearing. 

II. Applicable Law 

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-3) made two significant changes to the law of homicide. First, it 

amended the felony-murder rule to narrow the scope of murder liability for participants in 

the felony who are not the actual killer. (§ 189, subd. (e).) Second, it eliminated the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine by requiring that, except for felony-murder 

liability, “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her 

participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)

Senate Bill No. 1437 also added a procedure by which those convicted of a 

qualifying offense may petition the sentencing court for “relief under the two 

ameliorative provisions above.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.) Under 

section 1172.6, a petitioner must first file a petition containing a declaration that he or she 

is eligible for relief, including that he or she “could not presently be convicted of 

murder ... because of changes to Section 188 or 189” effectuated by Senate Bill 

No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(3), (b)(1); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) 

The petition must also include the superior court case number and year of conviction. 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(B).) 

Upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, the court must appoint counsel, if 

requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970 (Lewis).) 
6.

The prosecutor must file a response to the petition, and the petitioner may file a reply. 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court must then “hold a hearing to determine whether the 

petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.) If the petitioner makes a prima 

facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary 

hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) If the court concludes the petitioner has not made a 

prima facie showing, it must explain its ruling in a statement of reasons. (§ 1172.6, subd. 

(c).)

In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, the trial 

court may consider the “record of conviction” to “distinguish petitions with potential 

merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “Like 

the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes 

petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding 

whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were 

proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

The denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage is appropriate only 

if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 966.) This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo. (People v. Ervin 

(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) 

III. Analysis

We conclude appellant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the 

record of conviction conclusively establishes that he was the actual killer. (See People v. 

Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743.) 

Consistent with Lewis, we begin our analysis by assuming appellant’s factual 

allegations are true. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) But appellant made no factual 

allegations to support his claim. Rather, he made only conclusory assertions that he is 

entitled to resentencing under section 1172.6. He did not point to specific facts in 
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support of his claim or articulate how such facts support the conclusion he was 

prosecuted under felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 

Following Lewis’s analogy to habeas corpus proceedings, appellant failed to “state fully 

and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought.” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 

Cal.4th 464, 474.) 

Despite appellant’s failure to articulate a basis for relief, we assess whether the 

record of conviction establishes a prima facie case. Here, the record of conviction relied 

upon by the trial court consisted of the information, appellant’s plea form, and the 

preliminary hearing transcript. In the information, the People charged appellant with 

murder, but did not specify a degree or a theory of murder. The waiver and plea form 

also does not specify a theory of murder liability or include other factual details, but 

states appellant stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis for his 

plea. The preliminary hearing transcript definitively shows appellant was the actual 

killer. Appellant admitted to repeatedly kicking and stomping on the victim’s head, and 

the parties stipulated the victim’s cause of death was blunt force injuries inflicted by 

someone other than the victim. Nothing in the transcript supports an alternative theory of 

liability for murder. 

Appellant claims the trial court’s consideration of the preliminary hearing 

transcript was error because appellant did not “admit to the truth” of any of the evidence 

presented at the preliminary hearing. We disagree. Where, as here, the petitioner 

stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis for his or her plea, the 

transcript is part of the record of conviction and may be considered by the trial court in 

assessing whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case. (People v. Davenport 

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481; see also People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 

1167; People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657–658.)

Appellant’s reliance on People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974 (Flores) and 

People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 (Rivera) is misplaced. In Flores, we held 
8.

the preliminary hearing transcript did not “conclusively establish as a matter of law” that 

the petitioner was ineligible for resentencing. (Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) 

Specifically, the petitioner’s statement to law enforcement on its face left open the 

possibility he was not the actual killer. (Ibid.) Similarly, in Rivera, the court concluded 

the transcript of grand jury proceedings was not dispositive because the petitioner had 

“offered a theory under which the evidence presented to the grand jury was consistent 

with his guilt of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Rivera,

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.) In both cases, concluding the petitioner was ineligible 

for resentencing based on the record of conviction “would [have] require[d] judicial 

factfinding, which is impermissible at the prima facie stage.” (Flores, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 991–992; see Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.) 

Here, on the other hand, the preliminary hearing transcript conclusively establishes 

appellant was the actual killer. It does not leave open the possibility that appellant was 

guilty of murder under some other theory. Moreover, appellant’s conclusory claims of 

entitlement to relief did not create a “factual dispute” by identifying some scenario in 

which he could have been prosecuted for murder under a now-invalid theory. (Rivera,

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.) Thus, the trial court’s reliance on the preliminary 

hearing transcript was not “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the 

exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)

Finally, appellant suggests that the defense “theoretically” could have had 

evidence that his codefendant was the actual killer. But appellant did not articulate this 

theory in any of his numerous filings even after counsel had been appointed. We decline 

to engage in such speculation on appellant’s behalf.

We recognize that “the ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very 

low.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) However, based the record of conviction, 

appellant has not met this threshold. The preliminary hearing transcript conclusively 

establishes appellant is the actual killer, and appellant’s conclusory allegations did not 
9.

create a factual dispute necessitating an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, our de novo 

review reveals the trial court did not err in concluding appellant failed to make a prima 

facie showing of entitlement to relief.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.