SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5708-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GEORGE J. HOLIDAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Argued September 16, 2021 – Decided September 28, 2021

Before Judges Haas and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 16-04-

0680.

Nakea J. Barksdale, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). 

Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the 

cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex 

County Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of 

counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-5708-18

PER CURIAM

Defendant George J. Holiday appeals from a December 19, 2018 order 

denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

This matter arises from a drug transaction at the Cheesequake Service 

Area on the Garden State Parkway. A plain clothes State Police detail, including 

Detective Shawn Bracht, was assigned to patrol the service area. Judge Colleen 

M. Flynn conducted a two-day hearing, during which the State called Bracht to 

testify, and the defense called Juan Tenreiro and John McMahon—both 

investigators for the Public Defender. 

Following the hearing, Judge Flynn summarized the relevant facts in a 

sixteen-page written opinion as follows:

[Detectives Miguel] Guarda and Bracht were 

conducting surveillance in the main lot in an unmarked 

car. Det[ective Troy] Hedberg and Det[ective Thomas] 

Holmes were conducting surveillance of the main lot in 

. . . Hedberg's unmarked troop car. While conducting 

surveillance they observed a silver Cadillac CTS 

circling the lot. The vehicle was occupied by two 

individuals who were unknown at the time. The driver 

was later identified as Cameron London and the 

passenger was later identified as Burudi London. 

Officers observed Cameron using his cellular phone 

while driving and looking around the lot. More 

particularly, [Bracht] testified that Cameron appeared 

to be scanning the lot and looking for someone. . . . 

The vehicle eventually parked two rows ahead of 

Guarda and Bracht and the defendants sat in the vehicle 
3

A-5708-18

for an indeterminate amount of time. . . . Bracht did not 

recall the exact amount of time, but during the time 

while parked, they were in and out of the car, and on 

and off their cellular phones. . . . 

Detectives then observed a black Ford Ranger 

circling the parking lot. After circling, the vehicle 

pulled into a parking spot near Cameron's vehicle, but 

then quickly relocated to a spot two rows behind 

Guarda and Bracht. The Ford was driven by [Robert] 

Applegate and riding with passenger Holiday. Holiday 

was observed talking on his cellphone when he exited 

the vehicle[] and started walking toward Cameron's car. 

The detective described him as looking confused and 

nervous, and appearing to be looking for someone. 

Holiday then hung up his phone, changed directions and 

started walking towards the main building. 

. . . Bracht exited his vehicle and followed 

Holiday into the building to continue observation. . . . 

Guarda observed Cameron exit his vehicle and walk 

towards the main building, which he relayed to Bracht 

by calling him.

. . . Bracht followed Holiday into the main 

building and into the men's bathroom. Holiday entered 

a stall near the end of the row . . . . Bracht went to a 

urinal which was in a row of urinals across from a row 

of stalls, pretending to use the urinal. The rows of stalls 

and urinals were between eight and twelve feet apart. 

Bracht's urinal was left of center when facing the 

urinals, at an angle across from the stall containing 

Holiday. In "less than a minute," Bracht observed 

Cameron enter the men's restroom and enter the stall 

adjacent Holiday. Holiday and Cameron then engaged 

in conversation, but . . . Bracht could not make out what 

was being said because they were whispering. Bracht 

continued to monitor their actions while facing the 
4

A-5708-18

urinal, by turning his head and looking over his 

shoulder. He testified that he observed Cameron pass 

Holiday a clear plastic baggy under the bottom of the 

bathroom stall. He could see the entire plastic bag, in 

other words, it was not bunched up in defendants' 

hands. Bracht testified that "at the time, I didn't know 

what it was . . . [but] suspected it to be some sort of 

CDS . . . based on prior experience and training." Both 

defendants then exited the stall and left the restroom 

within a few seconds of each other.

. . . .

Upon defendants' exit from the restroom, Bracht 

contacted his colleagues via cell phone and advised 

them of his observations. . . . Guarda then proceeded 

to the Cadillac to speak with the Londons, while Bracht 

and Holmes approached Holiday and Applegate at the 

Ford Ranger. Bracht knocked on the driver's side 

window, while Holmes knocked on the passenger 

window, and each announced himself as New Jersey 

State Police. Applegate was sitting in the driver's seat, 

with Holiday in the passenger seat, and both of them 

opened their windows. Both Bracht and Holmes 

smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the 

interior of the vehicle. Applegate and Holiday were 

removed from the vehicle, placed under arrest, 

handcuffed, and read Miranda[

1

] rights. The troopers 

then searched the vehicle, and found a plastic bag 

containing suspected marijuana in the glove 

compartment. The search of Holiday recovered a clear 

plastic bag containing four bricks of heroin (200 wax 

folds) wrapped in rubber bands, from his coat pocket. 

. . . Bracht recognized that the bag recovered appeared 

to be the same as the bag that he observed in the 

bathroom. . . . 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5

A-5708-18

Tenreiro testified he photographed and measured the bathroom stall where 

Bracht observed the transaction. McMahon visited the bathroom and with the 

help of other investigators attempted to re-enact the transaction. The thrust of 

the defense witnesses' testimony was Bracht could not have observed the 

transaction by peering over his shoulder while standing at the urinal. The judge 

reached the opposite conclusion. 

She noted Tenreiro conceded it could be possible 

to see a hand-to-hand exchange under the stall while 

standing . . . . For example, he admitted that one would 

be able to see under the stall door and divider in some 

of his pictures, that the exact location of the bag being 

passed within the stall was unknown, and that he could 

not be sure if his view was the same as he did not know 

exactly where Bracht was standing.

The judge noted McMahon "provided a very detailed description of the 

layout of the bathroom" but found

[t]here were several variables that were unknown by 

this witness. First, it was not known how close to the 

stall divider the hands of the assistants were placed 

relative to the floor, where there was an approximate 

[fourteen and one-half] inch gap from floor to the 

bottom of the stall divider. The same measurement 

from stall divider to the floor as to the defendants and 

the bag that was allegedly passed was also unknown. 

Additionally, McMahon could not say where along the 

divider from front to back of the stall the actors and the 

defendants placed their hands. . . . Of note, if the 

exchange occurred closer to the front of the stall rather 
6

A-5708-18

than the rear or rather than the apparent placement of 

the actors' hands, the court finds that it could have been 

visible to Bracht from his vantage point. . . . Without 

knowing the actors' squatting capabilities . . . , this 

measurement is difficult to determine. 

The court also notes that while the actors held 

hands under the stall, based upon the testimony, they 

did not pass an object. . . . Bracht indicated that he saw 

the entire bag when it was passed, such that it could 

have been visible even below the hands (i.e., hanging 

down from their hands). While the court finds both of 

the defense witnesses credible and the efforts made to 

recreate the scene to be laudable, they could not and did 

not cover every potential line-of-sight from which . . . 

Bracht made his observations. In cross-examination, 

McMahon admitted that there were multiple variables 

relative to line-of-sight that were not known. 

Defendant raises the following point on appeal:

POINT I — DEFENDANT'S FOURTH 

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 

WAS VIOLATED WHEN TROOPER BRACHT 

FOLLOWED DEFENDANT INTO A PUBLIC REST 

ROOM AND PEERED AT HIM FROM BENEATH 

AN ENCLOSED BATHROOM STALL. AS A 

RESULT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

EVIDENCE BECAUSE TROOPER BRACHT'S 

OBSERVATIONS WERE ILLEGAL AND DID NOT 

GIVE RISE TO THE REASONABLE SUSPICION 

THAT WAS NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE STOP 

OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
7

A-5708-18

Our review of a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress is limited. 

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). In reviewing a motion to suppress 

evidence, we must uphold the judge's factual findings, "so long as those findings 

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford, 

213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). Additionally, we 

defer to a trial judge's findings which are "substantially influenced by [the trial 

judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the 

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. (alteration in original) 

(quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15). We do not, however, defer to a trial judge's 

legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Ibid.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey State Constitution, provide "[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. Const.

amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "[A] warrantless search is presumptively 

invalid" unless the State establishes the search falls into "one of the 'few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 

requirement.'" State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 90 (2016) (citation omitted). One 

such exception is an investigatory stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
8

A-5708-18

(1968); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) (finding police 

officers may stop a motor vehicle and detain its occupants temporarily while

they investigate a criminal offense). 

To subject a person to an investigatory stop and detention, however, the 

police must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of conduct which violates 

the law. State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 371-72 (App. Div. 2011). 

"The United States Supreme Court has defined reasonable suspicion as 'a 

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal 

activity.'" State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002) (quoting Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). The reasonable suspicion standard is far 

lower than probable cause, ibid., and is determined by objective "cumulative 

factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis[.]" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 

224, 250 (2007). Therefore, a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop

if, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is reasonable "suspicion to 

believe an individual has just engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal 

activity." State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 487 (2001) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 

at 21).

Defendant argues the judge erred because Bracht lacked reasonable 

suspicion to follow him into the restroom and peer at him from beneath the 
9

A-5708-18

bathroom stall door, and later stop and search defendant at the vehicle. 

Defendant asserts he had an expectation of privacy in the bathroom stall.

In State v. Boynton, we held:

It is generally accepted that individuals are due 

some degree of privacy in a public rest room. Due to 

the nature of the events that take place there, this 

finding is axiomatic. However, the design and use of 

the rest room has an effect on the degree of privacy 

accorded. . . .

. . . .

The use of a stall in a public restroom affords a 

greater degree of privacy but not an absolute one. 

When a stall is equipped with a door, the general rule 

seems to be that individuals in the stall are accorded a 

reasonable expectation of privacy, unless they are 

engaged in illegal activity that is apparent to the casual 

observer who is rightfully in a common area of the rest 

room. E.g., United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1012 (8th 

Cir. 1989), (no reasonable expectation of privacy for 

illegal activity that could be viewed under the stall 

door)[,] cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990) . . . .

[297 N.J. Super. 382, 388-89 (App. Div. 1997)

(citations omitted).]

In Boynton, we adopted factors developed by the Washington Court of 

Appeals which we found "instructive" to discern the level of privacy accorded 

to a public restroom, namely,

(1) society's belief that certain areas are ordinarily 

understood to afford personal privacy; (2) the character 
10 A-5708-18

of the area in which the claimed privacy interest is 

asserted; (3) the way in which the area is used; and (4) 

the method, means, or manner by which the government 

agents intrude in the area.

[Id. at 390-91 (quoting State v. Berber, 740 P.2d 863 

(Wash. Ct. App. 1987)).]

Pursuant to these principles and our limited scope of review of a trial 

court's factual findings, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in 

Judge Flynn's thorough opinion. We add the following comments. 

At the outset, we note Bracht was lawfully in the restroom. Pursuant to 

Boynton, once defendant entered the restroom stall, we have little doubt he had 

an expectation of privacy. However, the expectation that defendant would 

utilize the stall for toileting, changing his clothes, or some other personal reason 

did not credibly extend to engaging in an illegal drug transaction, including the 

passing of a baggie of heroin from one stall to another. Bracht gave credible 

testimony explaining how he observed the transaction by peering over his 

shoulder without leaving the urinal or peering under the stall in a manner one 

might consider objectively intrusive. 

Therefore, Bracht's observations provided ample reasonable suspicion to 

stop and search defendant in the parking lot. The judge's findings were 

supported by the sufficient, credible evidence in the record. 
11 A-5708-18

Affirmed.