Filed 6/10/15 P. v. Carranza CA4/3 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

EDGAR GIOVANI CARRANZA, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 G049866 

 (Super. Ct. No. 12WF0666) 

 O P I N I O N 

 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Joanne 

Motoike, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Paul Stubb, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent. 
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 Edgar Giovani Carranza appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him 

of first degree residential burglary and receiving stolen property. Carranza argues the 

trial court erred in admitting his extrajudicial statements in violation of Miranda v. 

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We disagree and affirm the judgment. 

FACTS 

 One evening about 8:00 p.m., Duc N. (Duc) pulled into his driveway. Duc 

saw three figures walk out of the side gate of his home. He did not see their faces, but he 

thought they were males with short hair. The three men left the area. Duc went into his 

home and found the upstairs master bedroom had been ransacked. Several items were 

gone, including American, Canadian, and Vietnamese currency, jewelry, a camera, a 

wallet containing credit cards, and a pillow case. The backdoor to the home showed 

signs of forced entry. 

 About 9:25 p.m., the same evening, Officers Rodolfo Ledesma and 

Brandon Walthers were on patrol in a marked patrol car when they saw a car with tinted 

front windows. They conducted a traffic stop. There were three men in the car, 

including Carranza, who drove. Walthers asked Carranza for his driver’s license, 

registration, and proof of insurance. Officers learned Carranza’s driver’s license was 

suspended. 

 The officers asked the men to get out of the car, handcuffed them, and 

placed them in the back of the patrol car. Ledesma searched the car’s passenger 

compartment and found a flashlight, crowbar, and three pairs of gloves. Walthers 

searched the car’s trunk and found a pillow case containing jewelry, a wallet, credit 

cards, and foreign currency. Walthers asked Carranza who the items belonged to, and 

Carranza answered his girlfriend. When Walthers asked for her contact information, 

Carranza did not answer. 

 Officers transported the men to the police station. Carranza was arrested 

for receiving stolen property, and the property was inventoried. About one week later, 
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Duc and his wife went to the police station and indentified the property as theirs. Some 

of the credit cards were in Duc’s wife’s name. 

 An information charged Carranza with first degree residential burglary 

(Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a) (count 1), all further statutory references are to the 

Pen. Code), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a) (count 2)). 

 Before trial, Carranza, relying on Miranda, moved to exclude his 

statements to officers at the scene regarding his girlfriend. Ledesma and Walthers 

testified at an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Ledesma and Walthers conducted a 

traffic stop of a car with tinted windows. There were three male Hispanics in the car; 

Carranza was driving. Officers stopped the car near the home of one of the passengers. 

Officers determined Carranza’s driver’s license was suspended. At some point, the 

parents of one of the passengers came out of their house and in a “boisterous” manner 

questioned what the officers were doing. Because the officers were outnumbered, 

officers ordered the men out of the car, conducted a patdown search, handcuffed them, 

and put them in the back of the patrol car. Ledesma explained they did so for officer 

safety, to control the situation, and to conduct an inventory search of the car. Officers did 

not tell the men they were under arrest, but they were not free to leave. In the trunk, 

officers found a pillow case containing jewelry, wallets, foreign currency, and credit 

cards in an Asian female’s name. Ledesma and Walthers believed further investigation 

was necessary. 

 Walthers asked Carranza who the items belonged to, and Carranza replied 

the jewelry belonged to his girlfriend. Walthers asked Carranza for his girlfriend’s 

contact information, but he refused to give any information and then refused to answer 

any additional questions. Ledesma stated that at that time, he and Walthers were unaware 

of any residential burglaries. He and Walthers were calm and not accusatory. The 

questioning lasted a minute or two, and the entire encounter lasted 5 to 10 minutes. 
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They took the men to the police station. Officers learned one of the credit cards had been 

stolen and arrested Carranza. 

 After hearing argument and reviewing the relevant authority, the trial court 

denied Carranza’s motion to exclude his statements. The court agreed Carranza was in 

custody because he was handcuffed and not free to leave. However, the court concluded 

Walther’s questions were not an interrogation for purposes of Miranda because the 

questions were investigatory and not accusatory. 

 At trial, Ledesma and Walthers testified concerning the incident. Walthers 

testified concerning Carranza’s statements. 

 The jury convicted Carranza of both counts. After the trial court denied 

Carranza’s motion for a new trial, the court suspended sentence on count 1 and placed 

Carranza on three years formal probation. As to count 2, the court imposed a sentence of 

365 days in jail and stayed that sentence pursuant to section 654. 

DISCUSSION 

Miranda warnings are required only when a person is subjected to 

“custodial interrogation.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) “Custody” includes both 

actual custody and any situation in which a person has been deprived of his freedom of 

action in any significant way. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.) 

 Interrogation, for purposes of Miranda, “refers not only to express 

questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those 

normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this 

definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of 

the police.” (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, fn. omitted.) 

 “Not every question directed by an officer to a person in custody amounts 

to an ‘interrogation’ requiring Miranda warnings. The standard is whether ‘under all the 

circumstances involved in a given case, the questions are “reasonably likely to elicit an 
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incriminating response from the suspect.”’ [Citation.] This is an objective standard. 

‘The subjective intent of the [officer] is relevant but not conclusive. [Citation.] The 

relationship of the question asked to the crime suspected is highly relevant. [Citation.]’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 637.) Custodial interrogation does 

not occur where an officer detains a suspect for investigation and the questioning is 

limited to identifying the suspect or confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. 

(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180.) 

 When conducting our review of Miranda claims, we are required to 

“‘accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of 

credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine from the 

undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged 

statement was illegally obtained.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 

476.) People v. Milham (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 487 (Milham), is instructive. 

 In Milham, defendant was involved in a car accident that resulted in the 

death of two of his passengers. (Milham, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at pp. 492-493.) At the 

scene, an officer approached defendant and asked whether he was involved in the 

accident. (Id. at p. 499.) Defendant stated he had been driving the car and he was 

worried he had killed his wife. (Ibid.) The officer asked how the accident had happened. 

(Ibid.) Defendant answered he thought he had “blacked out.” (Ibid.) A jury convicted 

him of driving under the influence. (Id. at p. 492.) On appeal, defendant argued the trial 

court should have excluded his statements to the officer because the officer did not advise 

him of his Miranda rights. (Id. at p. 499.) The Milham court disagreed, explaining the 

“[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning” did not present a Miranda violation. (Id. at p. 500.) 

The court noted the responding officer had no indication that a crime had been 

committed. (Ibid.) The court also reasoned that although the officer asked defendant 

questions, the officer’s “suspicion of criminality” had not yet focused on defendant. (Id. 
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at pp. 500-501.) Finally, defendant was not in police custody at the time of the 

questioning. (Id. at p. 501.) 

 Here, although Carranza was in custody, a point the Attorney General 

concedes, Walthers’ very brief “[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning” did not present a 

Miranda violation. The evidence established the entire encounter lasted no more than 

10 minutes and the questioning lasted no more than two minutes. Like in Milham, the 

questioning occurred at the scene in an area where Carranza and his confederates were 

familiar. The men were in front of the home of one of the passengers. This was not a 

situation where officers transported Carranza to the police station and subjected him to a 

harsh interrogation. Additionally, both Ledesma and Walthers testified they approached 

and engaged the men in a calm and non-confrontational manner. 

 Most importantly, neither officer was aware a crime had been committed. 

Neither Ledesma nor Walthers were aware of the residential burglary when they stopped 

and questioned Carranza. Officers conducted a traffic stop because of a Vehicle Code 

violation, and it was not until they learned Carranza was driving on a suspended license 

and officers felt outnumbered that they placed the men in custody. The evidence 

demonstrated officers handcuffed the men not because they suspected they had 

committed a crime but instead because they felt outnumbered and wanted to control the 

situation. It was not until officers searched the trunk and found credit cards in an Asian 

woman’s name did they begin investigating. Based on all the circumstances, we 

conclude Walthers’ very brief on-the-scene questioning did not implicate Miranda 

because its purpose was to dispel the officers’ suspicions. Similar to Milham, the 

questioning was investigatory and did not cross the line into the accusatory. Thus, the 

trial court properly denied Carranza’s motion to exclude his statements. 
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DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 

 O’LEARY, P. J. 

WE CONCUR: 

RYLAARSDAM, J. 

MOORE, J.