IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1257

Filed June 17, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ROY ALLEN DOORENBOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Shawn R. 

Showers, Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions for assault with intent to commit sexual 

abuse and simple-misdemeanor assault. AFFIRMED.

Matthew M. Boles and Adam C. Witosky of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles 

Gribble Gentry Brown & Bergmann LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

The State charged Roy Doorenbos with one count of sexual abuse in the 

third degree and two counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The 

trial information alleged each offense occurred on a different day but against the 

same victim. A jury acquitted Doorenbos on the sexual abuse count but convicted 

him of assault with intent and the lesser-included offense of simple-misdemeanor 

assault. He appeals the two convictions, alleging he is entitled to a new trial 

because the verdicts were inconsistent. He also contends his trial was unfair 

because the court did not permit him to view his accuser’s mental-health records, 

declined to strike two jurors for cause, and granted the State’s motion to amend 

the dates in the trial information. Finally, Doorenbos alleges he should be 

resentenced because the court considered improper information. 

On the first issue, we find no inconsistency in the verdicts. Likewise, we 

see no error in the court’s rulings on the privilege issue, jury selection, or the 

amendment of the trial information. On the sentencing claims, we discern no 

abuse of discretion. Thus, we affirm the convictions.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Graduated from college and somewhat at loose ends, M.A.—then twentyfive years old—moved in with Doorenbos1 and his wife in Grinnell in May 2016. 

They had been long-time family friends to the point M.A. considered them to be 

surrogate parents. M.A. was slow to unpack, considering the stay to be temporary 

until she landed what she considered her “career job” as a teacher. A few months 

 

1 Doorenbos is a medical doctor who had a family practice in Grinnell for more than 

three decades. His career is most pertinent to the sentencing issues he raises.
3

later, she started teaching at a Christian school. But because the pay was low, 

M.A. continued to live in the Doorenbos home.

Also that summer, M.A. started seeing therapist Brandon Davis. She was 

feeling “a bit of instability” and thought he could help her develop greater strength 

in her emotions and relationships. After several months of therapy, M.A. felt like 

Dr. Davis had “opened up some conflicts” she had been holding inside.

2

 In her 

terms, “it’s kind of like when you clean the house, and it get messy before it gets 

cleaned.” That winter, M.A. confided in Doorenbos that she was struggling with 

thoughts of suicide. In response, he “put his arm around [her] and was crying a 

little bit and prayed with [her].”

Starting then, their relationship changed. Doorenbos sought her out all over 

the house for prayer sessions. During these interactions, he would drape his arm 

over her shoulders or squeeze her hand, which evolved into holding her thigh. 

M.A. testified, “I was a newish Christian, and he’s a well-established Christian and 

he’s a Catholic, and I wasn’t a Catholic. So I sort of was wondering for a long 

time . . . if the touching was like a part of prayer that I didn’t know about yet.” On 

occasion, he would come into her bedroom in the early morning hours, ostensibly 

to pray with her.

By March 2017, according to M.A., the visits grew more invasive. She told 

the jury that just after midnight on March 9, Doorenbos came into her bedroom. 

His wife was out of town. At first he sat on the edge of M.A.’s bed. He asked her 

 

2 Before trial, defense counsel moved for access to M.A.’s privileged records kept 

by Dr. Davis. After an August 2018 hearing, the district court reviewed the records 

in camera. The court found no basis for disclosure.
4

if she liked hugs. She said yes. Doorenbos then asked M.A. to tell him something 

she had never told her therapist. She felt uneasy about his commanding tone. 

When she hesitated to answer, he said: “As of right then I was officially an adopted 

member of the Doorenbos family, and as such, daughters obey their fathers, and 

he wanted me to tell him something that I had never told my therapist.” 

She eventually shared some personal information with him. In response, 

he climbed under the covers with her. M.A. said she “froze” and pulled her body 

away. He scooted her back to the center of the mattress. Then he started to slide 

his hands under her pajamas. She started to cry. When Doorenbos finally left her 

bed that morning, M.A. grabbed her phone from the dresser and texted her 

therapist to schedule an appointment.

After going to work and attending her late afternoon therapy appointment, 

M.A. was reluctant to return to the Doorenbos home. She did so after midnight on 

March 10. As she feared, Doorenbos returned to her room and said: “We forgot 

to pray for you.” They went downstairs to the living room where she settled into 

an armchair. Doorenbos perched on the ottoman. He grabbed her wrists and 

pulled her forward. After the prayer, he told her, “Okay back to bed.” He continued 

to pull her upstairs by the wrists. At her bedroom door, she broke away and went 

to shower. After her shower, she went to the attic and dressed. It was still too 

early in the morning to leave for work so she laid down on a twin bed shoved 

against a dormer. The attic was cold, so she burrowed under a stack of blankets.

She testified Doorenbos followed her to the attic and pinned her under the 

covers. She tried to push him off the bed and told him to stop. She described his 

actions as more aggressive than the night before. She testified he was on top of 
5

her and grabbed her inner thigh with his hand. As she struggled to breathe under 

his weight, he shifted off her body and started snoring. When the sun started to 

rise, he walked out of the attic without saying anything. Terrified by what 

happened, M.A. skipped work but went for another therapy session.

M.A.’s testimony did not end there. She told the jury Doorenbos came to 

her bedroom again five days later. She testified she had not been sleeping well 

and felt exhausted. She recalled wearing layers of clothes to bed as a defense 

mechanism. She alleged Doorenbos kneeled beside her bed and prayed the 

rosary. After that, according to M.A., Doorenbos forced her to engage in two 

different sex acts before leaving the room. M.A. testified that she went to therapy 

the next day and then moved out of the Doorenbos home.

The State offered evidence that Doorenbos contacted M.A. the next day. 

At 1:53 a.m. on March 16, he texted, “You ok? Out late on a school night!” She 

responded that she had let his wife know that she was staying with friends. He 

texted back, “Ok. We miss you and love you! Running away—Running away, 

huh?” At 10:20 a.m. Doorenbos texted, “[M.A.] don’t refuse me! Your Heavenly 

Father.” He sent two more texts that day saying “I’ll be at your side” and “I will be 

with you always! Jesus.” She finally responded: “These aren’t helping me; please 

don’t.” In his final message, he told her, “I’ll shut up but I won’t give up.”

M.A. waited until August before reporting Doorenbos’s assaults to police. 

She went to the station with Dr. Davis, her therapist. After the police took her 

complaints, she received an email from Doorenbos. He wrote: “I am sorry for 

having hurt you. You trusted me and I failed you. Please forgive me.” M.A. sent 
6

an email of her own, asking Doorenbos questions about his conduct. A few days 

later, he responded:

[M.A.] my clearest understanding is that I gave in to temptation. You 

were distressed with thoughts of suicide, and, believe it or not, I was 

actually praying for you, but there was something ugly working inside 

me at a deeper, unacknowledged level which sexualized my 

behaviors, completely overriding any good intentions. It is obvious,

looking back on it now, but at the time I hid that ugliness from myself. 

God (and I) condemn my behavior. Being with God is not a onceand-done thing. God’s presence is sometimes close and sometimes

distant. Evil is always lurking, ready to fracture the Kingdom, and 

I’ve been given the task of resisting it. My failure to do so is fully my

responsibility.

He sent a third email asking her to forgive him.

Doorenbos took the stand in his own defense. He was sixty-four at the time 

of trial in April 2019. He admitted having an encounter with M.A. in February 2017 

when he “stretched out beside her on the bed” and gave her a hug. He 

acknowledged being “under the covers” and touching “her thigh” and “her belly.” 

He testified that he did not intend to make M.A. feel uncomfortable and didn’t 

consider the contact inappropriate at the time. Doorenbos testified the events M.A. 

recounted from March “simply didn’t happen.” On cross examination, he 

acknowledged going into M.A.’s bedroom to pray with her when she was “restless” 

or having nightmares. He also admitted having “sexual thoughts” toward M.A. 

Recalling the time he got under the covers with M.A., he testified, “[I]t’s one of 

those things you look back on and say oops.”

The jury considered three offenses: two counts of assault with intent to 

commit sexual abuse for the March 9 and 10 incidents and one count of sexual 

abuse in the third degree for the March 15 encounter. The jury returned a verdict 

of not guilty on the sexual-abuse charge. The verdict was guilty for the March 9
7

offense of assault with intent and guilty of the lesser-included offense of simple 

assault for the March 10 offense. The defense moved for a new trial, alleging—

among other things—that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts. The defense also 

renewed its call for access to M.A.’s mental-health records. 

The district court denied the new trial motion. In doing so, it declined to 

reverse an earlier ruling denying release of M.A.’s privileged records. The court

imposed a term of incarceration not to exceed two years on the assault with intent 

and thirty days on the simple assault, to run concurrently. Doorenbos now appeals 

those two convictions and his prison sentence.

II. Analysis

A. Inconsistent Verdicts

Doorenbos claims his acquittal on the count of third-degree sexual abuse 

amounts to “an inherent finding by the jury that [M.A.] was not credible.” From 

there, he contends the jury reached inconsistent verdicts in believing M.A.’s 

testimony and convicting him on the other two counts. Because his claim of 

inconsistent verdicts “is affected by strong constitutional currents,” it calls for de 

novo review. See State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa 2010).

Doorenbos alleged inconsistent verdicts in his motion for new trial. The 

State contends that was too late. In the State’s view, Doorenbos had an obligation 

to flag any apparent inconsistency before the district court dismissed the jury so 

the court could have sent the case back for more deliberations. See State v. 

Merrett, 842 N.W.2d 266, 273 (Iowa 2014) (noting procedure under Iowa Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 2.22(6) for asking jury to reconsider its verdict). Against the

State’s position, our supreme court has reached the issue of inconsistent verdicts 
8

when raised in a motion for new trial. See Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 807 n.1 (noting 

State conceded error preservation). We do the same here, opting to reach the 

merits of Doorenbos’s claim.

When we examine jury verdicts for inconsistency, we ask whether the 

verdicts are “so logically and legally inconsistent as to be irreconcilable within the 

context of the case.” See State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Iowa 2004). In 

context, the verdicts here addressed three separate offenses alleged to have 

occurred on three different days. Unlike many inconsistent verdict challenges, 

these offenses had no overlapping elements and did not involve any predicate 

crimes or special interrogatories. See, e.g., Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 807–08. The 

only common denominator among these three offenses was M.A.’s testimony. 

Doorenbos seizes on that testimony, asserting if the jury disbelieved her about the 

sexual abuse, it could not believe her about what happened on the other two days. 

While it may be surprising for jurors to credit only part of a witness’s

testimony, that is their function. See State v. Phanhsouvanh, 494 N.W.2d 219, 

223 (Iowa 1992) (holding “jury could believe all, some, or none of the testimony of 

the witnesses”). We cannot speculate why the jury believed M.A.’s version of the 

March 9 incident and to some extent her account of the March 10 event but 

rejected her allegations about March 15. See Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815 

(declining to open “Pandora’s box by probing into the sanctity of jury 

deliberations”). Because it was possible for Doorenbos to commit two assaults on 

two different days but not commit sexual abuse on a later date, the jury’s verdicts 

were neither factually nor legally inconsistent. 
9

B. M.A.’s Therapy Records

Doorenbos next challenges the district court’s denial of his request to 

discover M.A.’s therapy records. This challenge calls for a hybrid standard of 

review. We review de novo those issues resting on a due process right to present 

a defense; we review any nonconstitutional challenges to discovery rulings for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013).

In June 2018, Doorenbos sought disclosure of M.A.’s privileged records 

under Iowa Code section 622.10(4)(a)(1) and (2) (2017). The motion asserted that 

M.A. “waived the confidentiality privilege to certain treatment records maintained 

by her psychologist, Brandon Davis.” It also alleged “a reasonable probability that 

the treatment records of Davis may be exculpatory to [Doorenbos] on the present 

charges.” The State resisted disclosure. In September 2018, the district court 

ruled M.A. had not waived the confidentiality in her privileged counseling records.3 

But the court did order the State to produce M.A.’s mental health records for an in 

camera review. After the in camera review, the court ruled “the records submitted 

could fairly be characterized as incriminatory, rather than exculpatory.” Thus, the 

court declined to disclose the records to Doorenbos under 

section 622.10(4)(a)(2)(d).

We turn to that statute. Generally, a “mental health professional” cannot 

“disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to the person in the 

person’s professional capacity” that was “necessary and proper to enable the 

person to discharge the functions of the person’s office according to the usual 

 

3 The court did find M.A. waived privilege “as to what was actually said to the police” 

when Dr. Davis was present and in statements M.A. made to another third party.
10

course of practice or discipline.” Iowa Code § 622.10(1). This statutory privilege 

“shall be absolute with regard to a criminal action.” Id. § 622.10(4)(a). This means 

the district court cannot “authorize or require the disclosure of any privileged 

records to a defendant in a criminal action.” Id.

That said, two exceptions exist. First, a defendant may discover privileged 

records upon showing the privilege holder voluntarily waived confidentiality. Id. § 

622.10(4)(a)(1). Second, a defendant can discover privileged records upon 

“demonstrating in good faith a reasonable probability that the information sought 

is likely to contain exculpatory information that is not available from any other 

source and for which there is a compelling need for the defendant to present a 

defense in the case.” Id. § 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a). If the defendant satisfies the 

threshold showing for the second exception, the district court must “conduct an in 

camera review of such records to determine whether exculpatory information is 

contained in such records.” Id. § 622.10(4)(a)(2)(b). “If exculpatory information is 

contained in the records, the court shall balance the need to disclose such 

information against the privacy interest of the privilege holder.” Id. 

§ 622.10(4)(a)(2)(c).

As a prelude, Doorenbos renews his claim of waiver. See Iowa Code 

§ 622.10(4)(a)(1) (allowing defendant access in a criminal case when the “privilege 

holder voluntarily waives the confidentiality privilege); State v. Leedom, 938 

N.W.2d 177, 189 (Iowa 2020). He contends any communication between 
11

Dr. Davis and M.A. about her plans to involve police are outside their therapeutic

relationship.4 Doorenbos cites no authority for that contention.

5

We see no reason why a discussion between a patient and a mental health 

professional about reporting a crime would act as an implicit waiver of privilege. 

For privilege purposes, the definition of mental health professionals includes 

psychologists, like Dr. Davis. See Iowa Code § 622.10(7). The practice of 

psychology means “the application of established principles of learning, 

motivation, perception, thinking, and emotional relations” to the problems of 

behavior adjustment and includes “counseling and the use of psychological 

remedial measures” with persons who have adjustment or emotional problems in 

personal relationships. See id. § 154B.1(6). Nothing in that definition forecloses 

a psychologist from promoting the cathartic or protective value of a patient 

contacting law enforcement as a part of the counselor’s efforts to remedy the

patient’s emotional problems. 

Doorenbos also claims M.A. waived privilege by testifying that she told her 

therapist about being assaulted. But his claim is not well developed. That 

 

4 These therapy records are distinct from statements M.A. made to the police in 

Dr. Davis’s presence. As noted above, the district court aptly determined those 

statements were not privileged. See State v. Randle, 484 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1992) (reiterating “information communicated to a third party who is not 

within the scope of the privilege destroys the confidential nature of the disclosures 

and renders them admissible”).

5

 Doorenbos refers only to the general proposition that courts strictly construe 

privileges under section 622.10 because they impede the “full and free discovery 

of the truth.” See In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d 365, 373 (Iowa 2014). Yet even that 

proposition is wobbly. See Slaughter v. Des Moines U. College of Osteopathic 

Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2019) (citing case law construing section 622.10 

liberally to carry out the purpose of promoting “free and full communication” 

between a patient and therapist).
12

testimony did not reveal the substance of M.A.’s diagnosis or the therapist’s 

treatment advice. Nor did it place her mental health at issue in the prosecution. 

We thus conclude that testimony did not reveal any intent by the witness to forsake 

her right to confidentiality in her therapy records. See generally Leedom, 938 

N.W.2d at 189 (finding accuser did not waive privilege by giving deposition 

testimony); see also People v. Silva, 782 P.2d 846, 850 (Colo. App. 1989) (holding 

victim’s testimony during direct examination by prosecutor did not waive her 

privilege). We will not find a right “as valuable as a psychotherapist privilege” to 

be “waived by implication except under the clearest of circumstances.” See State 

v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 560 (Iowa 2006), superseded by statute on other 

grounds as stated in Leedom, 938 N.W.2d at 190. M.A.’s testimony was not such 

a clear circumstance.

Having rejected Doorenbos’s waiver argument, we turn to his suspicion that 

M.A.’s therapy records contain exculpatory evidence. The legislature did not 

define “exculpatory” in section 622.10. So our supreme court stepped into the 

breach, giving the term its “ordinary” meaning: “Exculpatory evidence tends to 

‘establish a criminal defendant’s innocence.’ Exculpatory Evidence, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).” Leedom, 938 N.W.2d at 188 (entertaining notion that 

“exculpatory” includes impeachment evidence). 

On appeal, Doorenbos argues: “Any divergence between what [M.A.] told 

Dr. Davis on the days she claims abuse and what she testified to during trial is an 

avenue to impeach her credibility.” To advance that argument, Doorenbos 

appears to agree with the State that we should perform our own in camera review 
13

of the therapy records released by Dr. Davis.6 See State v. Retterath, No. 16-

1710, 2017 WL 6516729, at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (noting our appellate 

review of confidential information as provided for in section 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a)). 

Like the district court, we reviewed progress notes recorded by Dr. Davis, 

spanning M.A.’s therapy sessions from March 2017 until June 2018. And like the 

district court, we find that privileged information is not exculpatory for Doorenbos. 

We thus affirm the district court’s denial of his request for access to M.A.’s therapy 

records.

C. Jury Selection

Doorenbos moved to strike two potential jurors for cause because they 

revealed that they had close relatives who had been victims of sexual abuse. The 

district court denied those motions. “The district court is vested with broad 

discretion in such rulings.” State v. Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa 2017). We 

reverse only upon finding an abuse of that discretion. Id.

The first motion to strike was against panelist F. He revealed during jury 

selection that his teenaged granddaughter recently reported a sexual assault to 

Grinnell police. Panelist F. was not a witness in his granddaughter’s case. 

Defense counsel asked panelist F., “Are you able to sit in a case that is a sex 

assault case—does not involve a minor, but is a sex assault case in your current 

 

6 Doorenbos also disparages the statute’s reliance on judges, rather than 

advocates, to “keep their eyes peeled for exculpatory material” in the mental health 

records—echoing sentiments in our unpublished decision in State v. Barrett, 

No. 17–1814, 2018 WL 6132275, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018). But our 

supreme court found the structure of section 622.10 met constitutional standards. 

See Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 490. And we have no authority to detour from the 

statutory scheme.
14

state of mind, as you say that this has happened two weeks ago?” He answered, 

“I believe I can, yes.”

The second motion involved panelist B. During jury selection, he told the 

lawyers, “I believe you asked a question about knowing people that have been 

sexually [abused], and both my mother-in-law was sexually abused by her father 

and my wife was sexually assaulted by a church worker at one of her previous 

jobs.” He then described those situations. The prosecutor asked, “Do you feel like 

you could be fair and impartial and kind of put those incidents aside and evaluate 

the evidence as it comes in in this case?” Panelist B. responded it would be “hard” 

and he did not know what his opinion would be. The prosecutor followed up, “Do 

you think you could at least evaluate this case and then render your verdict based 

upon that, not based on what happened with your wife or your mother-in-law?” He 

answered, “I believe I probably could.”

Doorenbos challenged those two panelists for cause. See Iowa R. Crim. 

P. 2.18(5)(k) (allowing party to lodge challenge for cause if panelist formed or 

expressed “an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as would 

prevent the juror from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the 

trial”). The district court denied the challenges. Later, the court refused the 

defense request for additional peremptory challenges to replace those used on 

panelists B. and F.7

 

7 On appeal, the State and Doorenbos filed a joint stipulation clarifying the record 

on the parties’ exercise of peremptory strikes. Because the record did not include 

the sheet where the parties recorded their strikes, they compared notes and 

agreed the defense exercised its first peremptory strike against panelist F. and its 

seventh strike against panelist B. The stipulation states that panelist F. would have 
15

Now Doorenbos argues the district court abused its discretion in not striking 

these panelists for cause. As to panelist F., Doorenbos claims the grandfather’s 

situation qualifies as a for-cause challenge.8 See State v. Hatter, 381 N.W.2d 370, 

372 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (holding district court should have sustained challenge 

for cause to panelist who was rape victim in jury selection for sexual abuse 

prosecution). As to panelist B., Doorenbos contends the details of the assaults on 

his family members “overlap” with the circumstances of the case. Plus, he urges

the prosecutor’s attempts to rehabilitate panelist B. did not succeed. The defense 

insists panelist B. equivocated too much in his response that he “probably could” 

render a verdict based on the evidence and not his personal experiences.

In response, the State takes a two-prong approach. First, the State 

contends the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying the 

challenges for cause. The State disputes the applicability of Hatter, because 

panelist F. was not himself a rape victim. See id. Addressing the other challenge, 

the State asserts panelist B. did not express a fixed opinion on the merits of the 

case. See State v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 1993). Second, the State

argues—in any event—Doorenbos cannot show he was prejudiced by the rulings. 

In support of that second argument, the State points to the requirement that a 

defendant must “specifically ask for an additional peremptory challenge of a 

 

been a juror and panelist B. would have been an alternate if not removed by 

peremptory strikes.

8 Doorenbos draws analogies to rule 2.18(5)(d) and (m) in his appellant’s brief. 

Paragraph (d) allows a challenge for cause if the panelist is related to the 

complainant in the prosecution. Paragraph (m) allows a challenge for cause if the 

panelist is a complainant against this defendant or another person indicted for a 

similar offense. These analogies, raised for the first time on appeal, do not show 

the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions to strike for cause. 
16

particular juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges under the rule.”

9

 Jonas,

904 N.W.2d at 583. In a separate argument, the State contends Doorenbos 

suffered no prejudice from the denial of his motion to strike panelist B. because he 

would have been seated as an alternate if not removed by a peremptory strike.

We need not reach the State’s second argument on prejudice because we 

find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of these challenges for cause. 

Foremost, neither panelist expressed an opinion about Doorenbos’s guilt. And 

unlike the potential jurors in Jonas, these panelists did not express bias against 

Doorenbos based on his race, ethnicity, sex, or sexual orientation. See id. at 575. 

At most, these panelists revealed their relatives had experienced sexual abuse, 

the subject of the prosecution. Familiarity with the trial topic is different from a bias 

against the defendant or a preconceived view of his guilt. See State v. Marcus, 34 

N.W.2d 179, 181 (Iowa 1948) (holding “juror is not disqualified from trying a person 

accused of a particular crime by the fact that he has a prejudice against such crime, 

if the prejudice is not such as to influence his verdict”). 

Here, neither panelist articulated a firm belief their family’s exposure to 

sexual abuse would prevent them rendering their verdict based on the evidence 

presented. The record did not show heavy-handed efforts to rehabilitate these 

panelists. Instead, the prosecutor appropriately asked the panelists if they could 

set aside their own experiences to do their jobs as jurors. See State v. Walters, 

 

9

In reply, Doorenbos points out the State did not make this argument in response 

to his motion for new trial. Without that argument, he asserts the State did not 

preserve this argument for appeal. See DeVoss. v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 

2002). Because we don’t reach the prejudice question, we need not consider the 

effect of DeVoss on the State’s position.
17

426 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Iowa 1988) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) 

(holding it sufficient that juror “can lay aside his impression or opinion and render 

a verdict based on the evidence presented in court”)). The district court properly 

exercised its discretion in denying the challenges for cause.

D. Amended Trial Information

In his next assignment of error, Doorenbos seeks a new trial based on the 

district court’s grant of the State’s motion to amend the timeframes alleged in its 

trial information. A court may order such an amendment “to correct errors or 

omissions in matters of form or substance.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4(8). But the court 

must deny the motion to amend “if substantial rights of the defendant are 

prejudiced by the amendment, or if a wholly new and different offense is charged.” 

Id. According to State v. Maghee, the rule suggests two levels of review,

The first part of the rule is discretionary: the district court may order 

amendment so as to correct errors or omissions that either are or are 

not substantive. Iowa Code § 4.1(30) (provides that word “may” in 

statute confers a power). Our review up to this point of the rule is 

therefore for abuse of discretion . . . .

The second part of the rule limits the district court’s discretion: 

[t]he district court must not allow the amendment if the amendment 

prejudices substantial rights of the defendant or the amendment 

charges a wholly new or different offense. Thus, our review is for 

correction of errors at law for this part of the rule.

573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997). Doorenbos floats a third standard of review. He 

claims our review is de novo because the amendment violated his right to due 

process. Doorenbos did not frame the issue in constitutional terms at trial. So we 

review for legal error on whether the amendment prejudiced his substantial rights. 

See id. 
18

In its original trial information, the State alleged that count 1, third-degree 

sexual abuse, occurred “on or about March 15, 2017.” The date for count 2, 

assault with intent, was “on or about March 9, 2017.” The date for count 3, assault 

with intent, was “on or about March 10, 2017.” Those charges went before a jury 

in December 2017. But the district court declared a mistrial after M.A. referred to 

the “felony” charge being filed first. In April 2019, six days before the retrial, the 

State moved to amend the dates in the trial information. Doorenbos objected.10

But the court approved the amendment. The amended trial information alleged all 

three counts occurred “on or between March 1, 2017, and March 31, 2017.”

“An amendment prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant if it 

creates such a surprise that the defendant would have to change trial strategy to 

meet the charge in the amended information.” Id. at 6. The district court held the 

State’s amended trial information did not prevent Doorenbos from receiving a fair 

trial. The court noted he did not ask for a continuance. It also found “the range of 

dates did not affect the elements of the offense.” We find no error in the district 

court’s calculus. 

Doorenbos did not assert an alibi or similar defense, which depended on 

proof that he could not have committed the alleged assaults on specific dates. See 

State v. Young, 172 N.W.2d 128, 129–30 (Iowa 1969) (finding no error in amending 

dates in indictment). Plus, M.A. testified to the specific dates when she alleged 

the assaults occurred. Given her specificity, the record does not support 

Doorenbos’s claim that the amendment hindered his defense. See State v. Bell, 

 

10 The State insists Doorenbos did not preserve error on this claim. The record 

shows otherwise.
19

223 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Iowa 1974) (explaining dates fixed in indictment are not 

material).

E. Sentencing

In his final claim, Doorenbos alleges the district court abused its discretion 

in imposing an indeterminate two-year prison sentence. Doorenbos believes he is 

entitled to a deferred judgment. He also asks for resentencing because the

presentence investigation (PSI) report contained two improper influences: 

(1) information about the sexual abuse count that led to an acquittal and 

(2) interjections from M.A.’s victim impact statement of “unproven allegations, 

hearsay, speculation,” and a sentencing recommendation. 

The district court’s sentencing decisions are “cloaked with a strong 

presumption in their favor.” State v. Phillips, 561 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Iowa 1997). 

We review them for an abuse of discretion. State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 30 

(Iowa 2018). An abuse occurs if the sentencing court exercises its discretion 

based on untenable reasons. Id. If the sentencing court misapplies the law, its 

ruling is untenable. Id. If the evidence supports the sentence, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion. Id.

We start with the claim of improper sentencing considerations. To be sure, 

Doorenbos’s counsel made extensive arguments at the sentencing hearing 

outlining what the defense believed were impermissible considerations in the PSI 

and victim impact statement. In response, the sentencing court said it would “only 

consider information as it relates to the charge of assault with intent to commit 

sexual abuse and assault. The Court is not considering any unproven offenses or 

risk assessment tools used by the Department of Corrections.” We take the 
20

sentencing court at its word that it did not consider the unproven offense. See

State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). 

As for the victim impact statement, Doorenbos claims that the form filled out 

by M.A. and her letter to the court went beyond the limits outlined in Iowa Code 

section 915.21(2). That provision allows victims to file a statement describing the 

impact of the crime, including their economic loss, physical injury, change in their 

personal welfare or family relationships, and psychological services sought. Iowa 

Code § 915.21(2)(a)–(d). The section closes with a catch-all provision, permitting 

“any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.” Id. 

§ 915.21(2)(e). 

Doorenbos asserts M.A.’s impact statement included information outside

the statutory bounds.11 In particular, he points to her “speculation as to abuses by 

Dr. Doorenbos against hypothetical patients.” He also contends the statement 

impermissibly recommended that Doorenbos “should be punished for continuing 

to assert his innocence” and presenting himself as the victim. On this last point, 

Doorenbos highlights the following passage from the sentencing court:

I have considered the immense harm that you have done to the 

victim in this case, and I just want to make the record clear because 

it would be confusing if I didn’t for anybody at this hearing. You are 

not the victim in this case. The victim in this case is [M.A.]. You 

assaulted her.

 

11 In his appellant’s brief, Doorenbos cites federal authority holding it is improper 

for a victim impact statement to offer a sentencing recommendation. See, e.g., 

Williams v. Norris, 612 F.3d 941, 952 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 

501 U.S. 808, 830 n.2 (1991)). Those cases involve capital sentencing hearings 

and alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They do 

not apply to Doorenbos’s state statutory challenge to his indeterminate two-year 

prison sentence.
21

Faced with these assertions, we must decide whether Doorenbos has made 

an affirmative showing that the district court relied on improper considerations in 

determining his sentence. See State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998) 

(placing burden on defendant to overcome presumption the sentencing court 

properly exercised its discretion). After reviewing the sentencing hearing, we 

“discern no reliance on improper factors.” See Phillips, 561 N.W.2d at 359 

(upholding sentence despite reference by victim’s father to “sexual predators” in 

his oral victim impact statement). In fact, as discussed above, the district court 

made clear it was only considering information related to the two crimes for which 

the jury convicted Doorenbos. 

As for the court’s reminder that Doorenbos was not the victim, we do not 

read that passage as a direct reflection on M.A.’s victim impact statement. Rather, 

the defense presented information to the sentencing court portraying Doorenbos 

as the aggrieved party. For instance, defense counsel argued Doorenbos had 

faced enough consequences, including the inability to continue his medical 

practice: “For two years he has suffered that fate.” Similarly, in his allocution, 

Doorenbos said, “It has been a hard couple of years for me.” 

And the defense presented two dozen character-reference letters to the 

sentencing court. The letters included opinions such as his “career has been 

completely destroyed by these accusations,” “these accusations and guilty 

conviction have resulted in him losing his medical career,” “he has suffered more 

than enough,” “he has already paid a hefty price,” “it makes my heart hurt that a 

person could spread lies about another person and be able to get away with it,” 

and he “has already suffered the public humiliation of the one-sided press 
22

coverage of this situation.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by 

refocusing the attention on the harm suffered by M.A. See Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 

761 (declining to “further victimize the victim, by forcing his or her impact statement 

to conform to a rigid legal standard instead of allowing an unabridged expression 

of the impact of the offense”).

Having found no affirmative showing that the district court relied on 

impermissible factors, we turn to Doorenbos’s contention that the prison sentence 

was unreasonable under the prescribed statutory factors. Those factors include 

the defendant’s age, prior record, employment circumstances, family 

circumstances, mental-health and substance-abuse history, the nature of the 

offense, and other appropriate factors. Iowa Code § 907.5(1). In our review, we 

recognize the sentencing court may not focus on the nature of the offense alone 

in determining the appropriate punishment. State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 

555 (Iowa 2015). “On the other hand, the seriousness and gravity of the offense 

is an important factor.” Id. 

Let’s look at the district court’s reasoning:

Mr. Doorenbos, I have considered all of the sentencing options 

provided for in Chapters 901 and 907 of the Iowa Code. My 

judgment relative to sentence is based on what will provide maximum 

opportunity for your rehabilitation and at the same time protect the 

community from further offenses by you and deter others and 

yourself in the future from committing these sexually-motivated 

offenses and the simple assault offense. In selecting a sentence for 

you, I have considered your age. I have considered your prior 

criminal history, which you are first-time offender, but you are not a 

youthful offender, and in that distinction I make the distinction that

you were experienced in life to know the difference between right and 

wrong.
23

The court also stated it was considering Doorenbos’s employment history. 

From there, the court addressed his need for rehabilitation. The court noted 

Doorenbos has “obviously done a lot of good things” in his life. Against those 

“honorable things,” the court balanced Doorenbos’s conduct as determined by the 

jury’s verdicts. “A father figure, a doctor, and a religious mentor to this young 

woman, you took advantage of her, and this is the sort of behavior that has to be 

deterred.” The court told Doorenbos, “Your position in the community and letters 

of support don’t give you the license to do this.” 

Sentencing courts may appropriately consider a defendant’s professional 

status. See State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Iowa 1983). And a sentencing 

court may refuse probation when it would “unduly depreciate the seriousness of 

the crime.” State v. Morrison, 323 N.W.2d 254, 256–57 (Iowa 1982). Melding 

those two concepts, we have long held “the punishment must fit the particular 

person and circumstances under consideration.” See State v. McKeever, 276 

N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979). The court’s reasons here comply with that mandate. 

Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s rejection of Doorenbos’s request 

for a deferred judgment and imposition of a prison sentence. 

AFFIRMED.