FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADRIANA COSA, 

Petitioner, No. 04-75643

v. Agency No. 

M A95-591-594 ICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

June 11, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed September 15, 2008

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould,

Circuit Judges, and George P. Schiavelli,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

*The Honorable George P. Schiavelli, United States District Judge for

the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 

12861
COUNSEL

Jagdip Singh Sekhon, Oakland, California, for the petitioner.

Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., and Judith Reed, United States

Department of Justice, Civil Division, for the respondent. 

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 

This case highlights the importance of evidence rather than

speculation and conjecture as the basis for an adverse credibility finding in immigration proceedings. Adriana Cosa’s

asylum petition was predicated on her claim of religious persecution in Romania as a consequence of practicing the MilCOSA v. MUKASEY 12863
lenist faith. Millenism is neither a household word nor a

major world religion. And therein lies the rub. The record is

filled with the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) speculation about

the faith — on everything from how Cosa should dress and

wear her hair to comport with her beliefs to what books of the

Bible are most important — and the IJ’s disdain for Cosa’s

religious beliefs. Absent from the record is any evidence supporting the IJ’s perceived view of Millenism. That Millenism

may be an obscure, non-mainstream religion is no basis to

discount a believer’s faith. Whether Cosa suffered religious

persecution has yet to be established. But one thing is for sure

— she is entitled to have her immigration proceedings free of

religious taint and bias. Because substantial evidence does not

support the adverse credibility finding, we grant the petition,

vacate the finding, and remand for further proceedings. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Adriana Cosa fled Romania for the United States in

August 2001. Cosa later sought asylum and withholding of

removal on the grounds of religious persecution. In her application, Cosa alleged that she was harassed, beaten, and raped

by Romanian police for practicing her Millenist faith. Millenism is, according to Cosa, a Christian religion focused on the

second coming of Christ and the end of human history. Cosa,

whose family is Orthodox Christian, converted to Millenism

in May of 2000 and was baptized soon after. 

Millenism is not an officially recognized religion in Romania. As a consequence, the Romanian government does not

allow Millenists to receive state funds or build places of worship. Nevertheless, Cosa and other followers practiced their

faith by hosting and attending weekly religious meetings, and

through evangelical activities, such as going door-to-door to

raise awareness of the religion. Aside from the Bible, Millen1This factual background is based on Cosa’s testimony and the declarations from her fellow Millenist worshipers. 

12864 COSA v. MUKASEY
ists in Romania do not use printed literature when they evangelize. 

Villagers did not always respond favorably to the Millenists’ evangelical efforts. Indeed, Cosa reports that villagers

threw bottles and rocks at them and asked them to leave their

villages forever. Romanian police witnessed these events and

laughed, but offered no protection. In July 2001, Cosa was

holding a religious meeting in her apartment when the police

arrived and broke it up. The police called Cosa and her guests

heretics, accused them of conducting an unauthorized religious gathering, and ordered Cosa to stop holding meetings.

The police returned later that night, threatened Cosa again,

and forced her to pay a fine. A week later, the police interrupted another Millenist meeting at Cosa’s apartment, again

called her a heretic, then beat her guests, and forced them to

leave the apartment. When Cosa refused to pay a second fine,

the police threw her to the ground, kicked, beat, and raped her

until she passed out. As they beat and raped her, the officers

used religious slurs against Cosa, calling her a “heretic

whore.” The police returned the next day and threatened her

with further harm if she told anyone about what happened.

Cosa left for the United States soon after these events. 

Before her first hearing in January 2003, Cosa submitted

declarations from fellow Millenists corroborating her claim of

religious persecution. She also submitted a medical certificate

verifying that she had been raped. Cosa was the only witness

at the hearing. In response to the IJ’s questioning about her

religion, Cosa followed up with a declaration from the leader

of the Millenists in her village. The statement corroborated

the existence of Millenism, verified that Cosa was an active

practitioner of Millenism, and stated that Cosa left Romania

because of trouble with the police. Cosa also submitted information about country conditions in Romania. 

A second hearing was held in April 2003. The IJ expressed

skepticism about Cosa’s religious beliefs and the attacks that

COSA v. MUKASEY 12865
Cosa reported. The IJ made an adverse credibility determination and found that she could not accept Cosa’s testimony as

credible without additional corroborating evidence, deeming

insufficient the declaration from the Millenist leader. The IJ

also found Cosa’s other evidence, including the declarations

from the other Millenists, insufficient to overcome the IJ’s

doubts about Cosa’s testimony. 

On the basis of the adverse credibility determination, the IJ

denied Cosa’s request for asylum and her request for withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding the credibility determination was not clearly

erroneous. 

II. ANALYSIS

[1] It is no surprise that the IJ was not familiar with the

Millenist faith. Millenism is hardly a textbook religion. To her

credit, the IJ undertook independent research and included her

findings as an exhibit in the record. Nonetheless, the IJ put

Cosa in an impossible box. The IJ discounted Cosa’s credibility based on the IJ’s conjectural view of how a Millenist

should act and think, and then faulted Cosa for not providing

corroborating evidence about the religion.2 Though very little

is written about the Millenist faith — indeed, Cosa never

received any published pamphlets or brochures —

“[s]peculation and conjecture cannot form the basis of an

adverse credibility finding, which must instead be based on

substantial evidence.” Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey, No. 06-

72967, 2008 WL 2925124, at *3 (9th Cir. July, 31, 2008)

(internal citations and quotations omitted) (holding IJ’s speculation about how a rape victim would act did not support

adverse credibility finding). 

2Where, as here, the BIA reviews an IJ’s determination under a deferential standard, we review the IJ’s decision. de Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116

F.3d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1997). We review the IJ’s findings of fact for substantial evidence, and must uphold them unless the evidence compels a

contrary result. Id. 

12866 COSA v. MUKASEY
The IJ’s conjecture is best illustrated by examining the

decision itself. At the outset, the IJ criticized Cosa’s dress and

demeanor: 

Respondent’s physical appearance in Court has consistently been severe in terms of her tailored dress,

her hair style, and her manner. 

Continuing, the decision notes that: 

[t]he thing [Cosa] was most impressed with was the

essential softness, love and acceptance and friendliness of the people in the faith. This respondent does

not emote that type of lifestyle or approach that most

attracted herself into this religion. 

[2] The record is bare of any evidence of how a Millenist

might dress, how much one might laugh or smile as a Millenist, or what haircut is appropriate. Indeed, it is not uncommon

for litigants, on advice of counsel, to wear conservative clothing to court. Does the fact that a religion promotes love and

friendliness mean the adherents cannot wear tailored clothing? What dress would be appropriate — a flowing gown, a

tie-dyed shirt, or a suit with soft lines? The IJ’s commentary

was not a credibility finding based on demeanor but instead

stemmed from pure speculation about how a Millenist might

look and act.3 Cf. Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 491-92 (2d

Cir. 2008) (concluding IJ impermissibly relied on preconceived assumptions about homosexuality and homosexuals).

3The lack of evidence about Millenists’ dress and clothing stands in

contrast to the well known identification of some adherents to other religions, such as the Amish, with particular dress. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD CULTURES, VOL. 1, 20 (1994) (“Family and community may therefore overlook . . . young people . . . wearing non-Amish clothes.”); THE

OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 59 (1997) (“The ‘Old Order’

Amish . . . retain[ ] the dress and customs of that early period: beards and

broad-brimmed hats for men, bonnets and aprons for women.”). 

COSA v. MUKASEY 12867
The IJ’s same vision was reflected later in the decision.

Commenting first on Cosa’s testimony, the IJ noted: 

The Respondent described the Millenist organization as believing in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit

and the second coming of Jesus and that there will

be eternal life for believers and internal [sic] punishment for everyone else when the judgment day

comes. Respondent testified for a thousand years

Satan will rule and have no one to test him and that

eventually God will send fire to earth and destroy

everything related to sin and a new earth will be created with a new space for Jesus’ followers. 

[3] Belittling this testimony, the IJ then concluded that

“[t]his vision of the future does not reflect love and acceptance and a warm tolerance that this respondent seems to

believe attracted her to this group.” Again, the IJ supplants the

actual testimony with her vision of the Millenist faith, a religion about which her knowledge comes from her own Internet

research. See Jiang v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir.

2007) (“[A]n IJ’s personal beliefs or some perceived common

knowledge about the religion are not a proper basis for an

adverse credibility finding.”) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Her view amounts to nothing more than skepticism

about the tenets of the Millenist faith. We rejected similar reasoning in Gui v. I.N.S., overturning an adverse credibility

finding based on the IJ’s “own opinions as to how best to

silence a dissident.” 280 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2002). 

This same extrapolation of religious beliefs without foundation is found in yet another example later in the transcript.

Cosa testified “that Millenism is an evangelical faith and what

that means is you go out door to door to spread the word.”

Ignoring that Cosa used the term “evangelical” to mean essentially proselyting door to door, the IJ looked up the term in the

dictionary and found it referenced “the preaching of the gospel, that is Matthew, Mark, Luke, John,” and then faulted

12868 COSA v. MUKASEY
Cosa for not knowing “what evangelism is.” Although Cosa

described Revelation as the most important book in the bible

for Millenists and she identified four passages with particular

reference to the apocalypse, the IJ belittled her credibility

because when the IJ asked her to name the first four books of

the New Testament, Cosa left Luke off of the list. This entire

exchange evidenced the IJ’s misapprehension of Cosa’s testimony about evangelism. 

The IJ also faulted Cosa for her inability to explain the relationship among Millenism and Russellism, Millenialism and

Pre- and Post-Millenialism — references the IJ found on the

Internet — but it is unclear why this academic comparison is

relevant to verifying Cosa’s beliefs. One can certainly adhere

to a religion without understanding or being educated in its

relation to all other religions, even those that are similar to it.

See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Both

history and common sense make amply clear that people can

identify with a certain religion, notwithstanding their lack of

detailed knowledge about that religion’s doctrinal tenets, and

that those same people can be persecuted for their religious

affiliation.”); Jiang, 485 F.3d at 995 (“We have cautioned IJs

against using an applicant’s ignorance of religious doctrine as

evidence that an individual is not a true believer.”) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). 

Remarkably, the IJ set up a Bible quiz and an academic

trivia contest as the foundation for the adverse credibility

finding. Cosa claimed no expertise in Bible study or passages

nor did she claim to have an intellectual’s understanding of

Millenism. See Rizal, 442 F.3d at 90 (explaining the distinction between an adherent and an expert, and that expecting

academic knowledge of the religion from the former is unreasonable). Of course, it is not unfair to test the scope of a petitioner’s understanding of her religion or even to challenge a

preposterous claim, but to do so, as here, without a benchmark other than the IJ’s views is unacceptable. See id. at 90-

91. 

COSA v. MUKASEY 12869
Similarly, based on the IJ’s own views of baptismal practice, the IJ deemed it “preposterous” that Cosa was baptized

after only a short period of association with the religion. This

conclusion, too, appears to be based on the IJ’s personal and

overly narrow conception of baptism, rather than on the

record. 

[4] The IJ’s discussion of Millenism is riddled with skepticism and conjecture about the religion. True, with only 7,000

adherents in Romania, it is not a sizeable religion, nor is it a

faith with which most people have passing familiarity. But the

obscurity of the religion is not a license to speculate. Our precedent is unwavering that “non-evidence-based” assumptions

cannot support an adverse credibility determination. Ge v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004). “Without some

evidence in the record, other than the IJ’s bare personal view,

we have no way of knowing whether the IJ’s suspicions are

simply conjecture or legitimate concerns bearing on” an applicant’s credibility. Lin v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

[5] Ultimately, in example after example, the IJ doubted

Cosa’s credibility, not because of a true demeanor finding and

not because her testimony was incredible or at odds with the

evidence or widely-held facts about Millenism, but simply

because Cosa’s description did not comport with the IJ’s

newly-acquired notion of Millenism. See Chukwu v. Attorney

General, 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The IJ’s conclusions about what facts are or are not plausible must be based

on the record, not on conjecture or unsupported suppositions.”); Jiang, 485 F.3d at 995 (faulting IJ for basing credibility determination on IJ’s personal beliefs about a religion

and its teachings). This adverse credibility assessment

infected the IJ’s entire decision and led the BIA to affirm the

IJ’s demand for independent corroborative evidence. Similarly, the BIA’s determination of the lack of persecution

rested on the faulty credibility foundation. 

12870 COSA v. MUKASEY
[6] The requirement of corroborating evidence imposed by

both the IJ and the BIA does not comport with our precedent.

Corroborating evidence is appropriate when the IJ either

“does not believe the applicant or does not know what to

believe.” Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2000).

Nonetheless, where the basis for an adverse credibility finding

falls out, the lack of corroborating evidence cannot backstop

the decision. We also note that Cosa provided multiple individualized declarations from fellow Millenists describing their

worship routines and police harassment. Whether additional

information would be readily available was not an issue

addressed by either the IJ or the BIA. 

[7] Because substantial evidence does not support the credibility finding, “we accept [Cosa’s] testimony as true.” Singh

v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006). We grant

the petition, vacate the adverse credibility finding, and

remand to the BIA “for a consideration of factual [and other]

questions that may be dispositive of the petition.” Id. at 1112.

GRANTED AND REMANDED. 

COSA v. MUKASEY 12871