# FILED
August 30, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T ENNESSEE

AT JA CKSON

SCHERING-PLOUGH HEALTHCARE ) FOR PUBLICA TION PRODUCTS, INC. ) ) Filed: August 30, 1999 Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) Shelby Chancery v. ) ) Hon. Floyd Peete, STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) Chancellor ) ) Defendant/Appellant. ) Appeal No. ) 02S01-9810-CH-00096

Defendant/Appellant : Plaintiff/Appellee John Knox Walkup Fred M. Ridolphi, Jr. Attorney General & Repor ter Humphreys, Dunlap, Wellford,

Acuff & Stanton, P.C. Memphis, Tennessee Michael E. Moore Solicitor General Michael W. Catalano Associate Solicitor Gener al Nashville, Tennessee

Amicus Curiae Shelby County and Shelby County Assessor Donnie E. Wilson Shelby County Attorney Robert B. Rolwing Assistant County Attorn ey 

## O P I N I O N

AFFIRMED. DROWOTA, J.1 W e do no t inclu de a s um ma ry of th e fac ts rela ting to the a sse ssm ent o f Sch ering -Plou gh’s prop erty sin ce th e app ropr iaten ess of the ass ess me nt is n ot an issue in this a ppe al. -2- This case presents for review the decision of the C ourt of Appeals which
re versed the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the petition of Schering-P loug h Healthcare Products, Inc. (“Schering-Plough”) whic h so ught ju dicial revie w of a decision of the State Board of Equalizati on (“Board”). The Chancery Court dismi ssed the petition after concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdic tion over the

action because Schering-Plough had fail ed to name Shelby County as a party in the petition and had failed to serve Shelby County witha copy of the petition wi thin sixty days

of the final decision of the Board. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b) (1998 Repl. ) does not require that all parti es to the contested case be named in the petition for review or that copies of the petition be served upon all parties to the contest ed case within the six

ty-day time limitation. We agree and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

BACKGROUND The facts relevant to the legal question in this ap peal are undisputed. 1 Schering-Plough owns property located in Shelby County. The Shelby County Board of Equalization prepare d a tax assessment

of the property. On September 1, 1994, Schering-Plough appealed the assessment. On Octob e r 18, 1994, fo llowing a hearing, the administrative law judge issued an initial

decision and order affirming the assessment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1505 (1998 Re pl.). S chering-Pl ough appealed this decis ion to the As sessment Appe

als Commiss ion (“Comm issi on”), which issued its final decision affirming the assessment on April 10, 1995. See Tenn.-3-

Code Ann. § 6 7-5-1506 (1998 Repl.). The Boar d declined to review the C ommission’s decision on May 25, 1995 and thereby rendered the acti on of the Commission final. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67 -5-1502(j )(1) (1998 Repl.). It is undisputed that Shelby County through its Assessor’s office participated as a party in the contested case before the administrative law judge and the Commission.

On July 2 1, 1995, withi n sixt y days of the a gency’s final deci sion, ScheringPlough filed in theShelby County ChanceryCourt a “Petition for Rev iew of the Action of the S tate Board of Equalization.” On Se ptember 25, 1995, the Board moved to d ismiss the action because Schering-Plough had not named Shelb y County as a party in the petition and because Scher ing-Plough had not served a copy of the petition upon Shelby County within sixty days of the agency’s final order.

Two days later, on September 27, 1995, Schering-Plough mov ed to amend its petition to add as p arty defe ndants S helby Coun ty, the Shelby County Ass essor, and the Shelby County

Trustee. After these motions were filed, Schering-Ploug h served
a copy of thepetition upon these additional parties. Thereaf ter, Shelby County, the Assessor, and the Trustee filed a joint motion to quash service, or

in the alternative, to dismiss, relying

upon the same g rounds alleged by the B oard: failur

e to nameall p arties to the contested case and failure to serve a copy of the petition upon all parties t o the con tested ca se within si xty days of t he final order of the agenc y.
Followinga hea ring , the Chancellor granted the Board’s motion to dismiss,
s tating “Schering-Plough’ s failure to name Shelby County as a defendant and to serve upon the County . . . a copy of the Petition renders this Court without subject2 At the tri al level , the Board al leged and the Chancellor ci ted a thi rd basis i n support of dismissal--failure to serve p rocess on all parties of recor d. In light of this Cour

t’s deci sion in JACO v. Department of H ealth , Bure au of Med icaid , 950 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tenn. 1 997), the Boar d has aband oned this position on appea l. -4- mat terjurisd iction over this acti on.” 2 The Court of Appeals revers ed the dismissal and held that Schering-Ploug h had properly preserv ed its right

to judicial review

of the adminis trative decision simply by filing its petition for

review with the Chancery Court within sixty

days of the final agency decision. Relying upon this Court’s decision in JACO v. Departme nt of Health, Bureau of Medicaid , 950 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tenn. 1997), the Court of Appeals also concl uded that the sixty-day ti me limitation does not applyto the statutory prov ision which requi res thatall parties of record be served with
a copy of the petition. Thereafter, this Court granted the Boar d’s applic ation for permission to appeal and now affirms the decis ion of the Court of A ppeals for the reasons t hat foll ow.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In resolving the issues in this appeal, we are guided by the following general rules of statutory construction. The role of this Court in construi ng statutes is to ascertain and give effect to legisl ative intent. Cronin v. Ho we , 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995). Legislative intent is to be asce rtai ned whenever possible from the natural and ordinary meaning of the l anguage u sed, wit hout forced or subtle construction thatwould limit or ex tend the meaning of the language. Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Stat e, Dep’t of Revenue , 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). If the legislative intent is expressed i n a manner devoid of contradicti on and ambiguit y, there is no room for interpretation or constructions, and courts are not at liberty to3 Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 4-5-101 through 4-5-325 (1998 Repl.).
4 At the ti me of the fil ing of Scheri ng-Plough’ s petit ion for r eview on July 21, 1995, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1 511 (19 94 Re pl.) permitted t he fil ing of a pet iti on for re view o f a de cisio n of th e Bo ard in “Davidson County or the chancery court of the county where the disput ed assessment was mad e.” In this case, the disputed assessment was in Shelby County, and Schering-Pl ough fil ed its pet iti on in the Shelby C ounty Ch ancery C ourt. -5- depart from the words

of the statute. Id. Where the language contained within the fourcorners of a statute is plai n, cle ar, and unambiguous, the duty of the courts is simple and obvious, “to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.” Id. , quoting Miller v. Childress , 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 319, 321-22 (1841).

With these pri nciples in mind, we next consider the statute that is the focus of this appeal. Under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 3 a party aggrievedby a final decision of an adm inistrat ive agency may seek judi cial review of the contested case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 5-322(a) (1998Repl.). Theprocedure for obtaining review is deli neated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1998 Repl.), which provides, in pertinent part: (1) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition for rev iew in the chancery court of Davidson County, unless another court is specified by statute. 4 Such petition shall be filed within sixty (6 0) days after the entry of the agency ’s final order thereon

. . . . (2) In a case in which a petition for judicial review is s ubmitted within the sixty-day period but is filed with an inappropriate court, the case shall be transferred to the appropri ate court.
. . . Copies ofthe petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of

record, including the attorney general and reporter, in accordance w ith the provisions of the Tennessee R ules o f Civil Procedure pertaining to service of process.
(Emphasis added

. ) We agree with the Court of Appeals that the plain language of this statute imposes only two requirements upon a pa rty seeking j udicial revie w of a contested case. First, the statute requires an aggr

ieved party to file a petition for5 The Board’s rel iance upon Tenn. Code Ann. 67-5-1511(b) ( 1998 Repl.) i s mi splaced . T his statute governs the scope of evidenc e admissible at a chance ry court hearing on a petition for j udicial revi ew of a de cision of the Board. I t does not del ineate t he procedure requi red for obtaining j udicial review i n chancery court in the f irst i nstance. -6- review in an appropriate chancery court within sixty days after entry of the agency’s final order. The sixty-

day time limitation upon fil ing of the pe ti tion is jurisdictional. Bishop v. Department of Correcti on , 896 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. App. 1994) ( perm. app. denied March 20, 1995). The second requirement of the statut e is that a copy of the petition be served “upon the agenc y and all parties

of record, including the attorney general and reporter, in accordance with the prov isions of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to service of process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b) (1998 Repl.).
Contrary to th e Board’s assertions, thes e are the only two pr ocedural requirements

under Section 322 for obtaining judicial review

of a con tested case. 5 Nothing in th e statu te mandates that the petition itsel f name all the parties to the contested ca se. So long as a copy of the peti tion is served upon the “parties of record”to the contested case, the unambiguous dictates of the statute are satisfied. Though we base our decision on the plain language of the statut e, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a petition for review is comparable to a notice of appeal. As we stated in JACO , a petition for judic ial review is t he contin uation o f an adm inistrat ive p roceeding in much the same way that an appeal can be characterized as a continuation of the u nderlyin g action. The part ies to the conteste d case ha ve previouslybeen determined and are “of record.” JACO , 950 S.W.2d at 352. As the Court of Appeals noted, failure to name a party in a caption of a notice of appeal is not a reason for dismissal of the appeal

. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f). Similarly, failure-7-

to name a party in a petition for judicial review is not gro unds for dismissal of the proceeding.

Moreover, we reject the Board’s argument that dismissal i s requiredunless a copyof t he petition for review is served withi n sixty days after entry of the fina l agency order. While the statute clearly requir

es that the petition for review be filed within th e sixty-day

time period, the statute does not mandate that service occur within that sam e time pe riod. The sixty-day lim itation appears in the statutory subsection relating to filing not service of the petition for review. In fact, the statute does not designate a definite time per iod within which servicemust be accomplished. It provides only that s

ervice of a copy

of the petition be accomplished in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to s ervice of process. As

we stated in JACO , this portion of th e statute refers only to the method and means of service set forth in the rules. JACO , 950 S.W .2d at 35 3. Judici ally applyi ng the sixtyday per iod to service of the pe tition is not app ropriate in light of the plain langua ge of the statute.

The Board’s assertions that an aggrievedparty

must name all the parties to the contested case in the petition for revi ew and serve the petiti on for review within the sixty- day time period simply are n ot supported by the plain l anguage of the statute. As previously stated, where the language contained within the four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, courts are not at liberty to d epart from the language of the statute. Judicial construction simply is not appropriate. Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. , 865 S.W.2d at 2. Moreover, the Board’s proposed
con s truction is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s expressed intent that the6 To the exten t inconsis tent with ou r decision herein all pre vious ap pellate court decisions are overruledincludi ng HRA, Inc. v. Department of Commerce & Ins. , 914 S.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Tenn. App. 1995). W e also expressly disappr ove the dict

a statement of

this Court

in JACO which characte rized the result

in HRA, Inc. as “clearly correct.” JACO , 950 S.W.2d at 353. -8- UAPAbe “given a liberal construction and any doubt a s to the existence or the ext ent of a power conferred shall be resolved in favor of the existence of the power.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-103 (1998Repl.). The clear lang uage of the statute confers upon certain chancery courts the jurisdictional power to consider petitions for review which
are filed within sixt

y days after entry o

f the final agency order. The B oard’s proposed construction would divesta chancery court of jurisdiction even though an aggri eved party has satisfied all the explicit statutory requireme nts for o btainin g judicial review. We decline to adopt such a construction.

For the reasons d iscuss ed above, we reject the Board’s proposed construction of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b) ( 1998 Repl .). The plain language of the statute does not require an aggrieved party to name all part ies of record to the contested
case in the pet ition fo r judicial review, nor d oes it require serv ice of a copy of the petition within the

sixty-day ti me period. 6 The plain language of the statute requires onlythat a petition for review be filed within sixty days after entry of the final agency order an d that a c

opy of th e petiti on be ser ved upon

the age ncy and

all par ties of-9-

record, including the

Attorney General and Reporter, in accordance with the method and manner prescribed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Pro cedure for service of process.

CONCLUSION Applying these principle s to the facts o f this case, it is c lear that Scheri ngPlough has satisfied both statutory requisites. Scheri ng-Plough’s petition for review was filed within the sixty-day time limitation. The parties of record to the contes ted
case have been served with a copy of the petition. Accordingl y, the decision of the Court of Appeals reversi ng the Chancery Court ’s dismissal is affirmed.

_____________________________________ FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, JUSTICE

Concur: Anderson, C. J. Birch, Holder, Barker, JJ.