### IN THE SUP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 3, 200 7 S es sio n
MICH AEL DWAYNE E DWARDS v . STATE O F TENNESSE E, WAYNE BRA ND ON, Warden
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Hickman County No. 06-5020C Je ff

Bivin s, Jud ge

No. M2006- 01043-SC-R11- HC - F iled Septem ber 18, 2008

We gr anted the State’ s application for permi ssion to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals er

red in re mandingthis habeas c orpus ca se to t h e trial c ourt for a hear ing on Michae l Dway

ne Edwa rd’s c laim that his s entence is illeg al. Afte r ca ref ul consideration we conclude that, even a ssuming the tria l court er roneously classified Edw ards a s a per sistent offende r for sentenc ing, this non-jurisdictional er ror r ender s the judg ment voidable, not void, and does not enti t le Edwa

rds to habea s corpus re lief. Ac cording ly , we r ever se the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and r einstate the judg ment of the trial court dismiss ing the habe as cor pus petition. Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Crim inal Ap peals Rever sed; Judgme nt of the Trial Court Re instated

W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , J ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which J A N I CE M. H OL DER , J ., joined.
Rob e rt E. Co op er, J r., At to rney

Gen eral & Rep ort er; Mi chael E. Mo ore, S ol ici to r Gen eral ; an d L eslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellan t , State of Tenne ssee, Way ne B randon, Warden.

Da na Dye , Ce nte rv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , M ic ha e l D wa y ne Ed wa rd s.
OP IN ION

I. BACKG ROUND
O nJ anu ar y 2 4 , 1 9 9 8 , E dw ar d s p art i c i p at e d i na b ur g l ar y o f a c ar d e a l e r s h i p i nH e nr y C o un ty. On Novembe r 4 , 1998, a jury convicted E dwar ds of the off ense. O n Dec ember

9, 1998, the trial court sente nced E dwar ds o n t h e b u rglary conviction, classify

ing him as a

persistent off

ender and imposing a Rang e I I I , nine-year sentenc e. Edwar ds appea led, raising a single issue, the suffic iency of the e vidence to support his c onviction. T he Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d his conviction,A d e ta iled re c itatio n o f t h e fac ts un d e rlying E d w a rd s’ b u rg la ry co n v ic tio n , w h ile no t re le v a n t to the issu e in 1
t his hab ea s co rp us ap p ea l , ap p ea rs i n the d ec i si o n o f t he C o urt o f

C rimina l A p p ea l s.

Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 29- 21- 105 ( 2000) ( pr ov i di n g t h at pe t i t i on s s ee k i n g h abe as c or pu s r el i ef “ s h ou l d be 2

m ad e t o t he co urt or judge m o st co nveni ent i n po i nt of d i st ance t o t he ap p l i cant

. ”).

T he releva nt p o rti o ns o f t he senten cing st atutes cit ed i n thi s o p i nio n ha ve no t ch an g e d sinc e E d w ard s’ 3

se n te n c ing he a rin g ; t h u s, this o p inio n re fer s to the c u rr e n t ve rs io n o f t h e se sta tute s. -2- and this Court denied his application for permission to appea l. See State v. Edwar ds, No. W1999- 00591-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 674671 (Tenn. Crim. App. M ay 16, 2000), per m. app. denied ( Tenn. Dec . 4, 2000). 1

On Marc h 22, 2006, almost six y ear s afte r the c onclusion of his appea l as of right, Edwards filed a ha beas c orpus peti t i o n i n Hickman County , wher e he w as inca rce rate d, challeng ing the

2 j u d gm en tcl as s i fy i n g h i m as a p er s i s t en t o ff en d er

. E dwa rd s ar gu edth at , atth e t i m e o f s en t en ci n g, he lac ked the f

ive prior c onvictions nece ssary to support the persistent off ender cla ssification. Acc ordingto Edwards, one of the c onvictions used to support the classification, felony evading
arr est, occ urre d afte r the burg lary and did not qualify

as a “ prior convic tion” for pur poses of the persistent off

ender statu t e. As a result, Edwards a rgued, the tria l court lac ked jurisdiction and authority to classify

him as a per sistent offende r.
In order to substantiate his claim, Edwar ds at t ac hed seve ral doc uments to his petiti on, including the State’s notice of s en t en ci ngstatus, on which the followinghandwr itten notation appea rs: “He nry

County Circuit Court-Mi nutes/entries Judge’ s Docke t Book Doc ket No. 12756 Evading(F /E) 9/ 30/98.” Edwar ds also attache d copies of f ive judg ments of conviction, including a copy of the judgme nt on the felony evadingarr est conviction, which listed the of fense date a s May 19, 1998, five months a fter the burg lary was c ommitt ed. Edwa rds did not attach a

transcr ipt of the
s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. The followingstatutory

provision s p l ac e Edwards’ ha beas c orpus claim in context. “A ‘per sistent offende r’ is a defe ndant who has rec eived: (1) [a] ny combination of five ( 5) or more prior felony convictions within the con viction class or hig her, or within the nexttwo (2) lowe r fe lony classes where applicable .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 107(a) (2006). For purposes of the persistent 3 offe nder statute , “‘ prior convic tion’ means a c onviction for an of fense occur

ringprior to the commission of the offe nse for which the de fenda

nt is being sentenc ed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 107(b)( 1) (2006) ; see a lso St ate v. B louvett, 904 S.W .2d 111, 1 1 3 (T en n

. 1995) (c onstruing the statutory term “prior conviction” to me an “a conviction that has been adjudicate d prior t o the commission of the more re cent of fense for which sentenc e is to be imposed”). Persistent offe nders
rec eive Rang e I I I sentenc es. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-107( c) ( 2006). Sentenc es in Rang e I I Icar ry highe r cr i m i n al penalties a nd require offe nders to ser ve a greater portion of the sentenc e bef ore becomingelig ible for r elea se. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-107 ( 2006), Sentenc ing Comm’n cmts; see Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -5 01 (e ) (2 00 6) . T he punis hme nt r ang e fo r b ur g lary , a Cla ss D fe lony , isA f t er gr ant i ng t he Stat e’ s ap p l i cat i o n, we b ecam e co ncerned that the ap p eal ha d b een rende red m o o t by t he 4
pas s ag e of

t i me. W e r ai s ed t h i s i s s u e at or al a r g u men t a n d t h er ea f t er pe r mi t t ed t h e St at e t o s u ppl eme n t t h e r ec or d on (c o n tinu e d ...)
-3- betwee n two and twelve y ear s, with se ntence s in Ra ng e I I I from eig ht to twe lve y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402( c) ( 2006) (stating that burg lary is a C lass D felony); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112(c) (4) (2006) (providing Rang e I I I sentenc e for Class D fe lonies). “The findingthat a def endant is or is not a persistent offe nder is a ppeala ble by either party .” Tenn. Code Ann

. § 4 0-35-107( d) (2006).
The State moved to dismis s E d wa rd s’ habe as cor pus petition, assertingthat neither the pe tit ion no r t he atta c hme nts e sta

bli sh e d th at th e e va din g arr e st c onvic tio n a c tua lly se rv e d a s a ba sis fo r E dw ard s’ pe rs ist e nt o ff e nd e r c la ssi fi c atio n. Th e State a lso ma int a ine d t h a t , e v e n i f tr ue , E dw ard s’
a sse rt ion s f

a ile d to e sta

bli shg ro un ds fo r ha

be a s c or pu s re lie f. Th e re a ft e r, the tr ia l c ourt summa ri ly dis mis se d th e pe tit ion , c on c lud ing wi tho ut a dd iti on a l c omm e nt, that th e pe tit ion fa ile d to e sta

bli sh g rounds for ha

beas c orpus re lief.
Edwar ds appea led. The Court of Criminal Appe als reve rsed and rema nded to the trial court for the a ppointment of counsel and for an “evide ntiary hear ing.” In so doing, the Court of Criminal Appea ls stated t hat i t could not “asc erta in . . . whether the convictingcourt re lied upon the eva ding
arr est conviction in arr iving at the rang e dete rmination, whether there wer e other

prior fe lonies considere d[,] or whe ther the pe tition er agreed to be se ntence d outside the rang e.” T he Court of Criminal Appeals instructed the Hickma n C ounty habea s corpus c ourt to determine on r emand “whe ther the pe titioner’s rang e cla ssification was imprope r” a nd to remand the case to the convicting court in H enry County “for appropr iate sentenc ing” if it concluded that “the sente nce imposed w as illega l.”
The State filed a

petition for re hear ing in the Court of Criminal Appe als, arguing that the trial
co urtp ro p er l y

d i s m i s s edth e h ab ea s c o r p u s p e t i t i o nb ec au s e, “e v eni f t ru e, th e i l l ega l ra n ge deter mination would render

the petitioner’s se ntence mere ly voidable, not void.” The State re lied upon McConnell v. State, 12 S.W .3d 795 (Tenn. 2000), for the pr oposition t hat non-jurisdictional
err ors in offe nder c lassification do not result in an illeg al sentenc e or pr ovide gro u n d s for habeas corpus r elief. The Court of Criminal Appeals ac kn o wl ed ged that, under McConnell, “off ender classification can be the subject of plea neg otiations and ag ree d to by a def endant pr ovided that the sentenc e imposed is within the statutory authority of the sente ncingact.” However, t h e C ourt of Criminal Appeals limited the rea soning of McConnell to p le a - b a

r g a in e d s e nte nces, e mphasizi ngthat “[u] nlike the situation de scribed in Mc Connell, the challeng ed judgme nt in this case r esulted fr om a sente nce imposed by the trial court afte r a jury conviction.” Citing Mc L aney v. Be ll, 59 S.W .3d 90, 92-95 (Te nn. 2001), the Court of Criminal Appea ls al s o d en i ed the State’ s reque st for clar ification of the r emand f or an “ evidentiar

y hear ing.” Thus, the Court of Criminal Appea ls denied
re h eari n g.
There afte r, the State filed a n applica t i o n for pe rmission to appeal, which w e grante d. 4(

. . . con t i n u ed) 4
ap p ea l w i t h certain p o st

- jud gm en t f

ac t s. W e als o all o w ed t he p arti es to f i l e sup p l em en t al b rief

s ad d ressing the m o o t ne ss i s s u e i n l i g h t of

t h es e pos t

-

j u dg men t f

ac t s

. U pon f

u r t h er con s i der at i on , we dec l i n e t o ba s e ou r de ci s i on on t h i s g r ou n d. E d w a rd s’ se n te n c e c le a rly h a d no t ex p ire d a t t h e ti m e he fi le d h is h a b e a s c o rp u s p e tit io n in M a rc h 2 0 0 6 . In a n a ff id a v it f i l ed b y the S t at e, a D epa r t men t of Cor r ec t i on e mpl oy ee s t at es t h at Edwa r ds ’ bu r g l ar y s en t en ce e x pi r ed on Au g u s t 9, 2007.

S ee T en n. C o d e A nn . § 2 9

- 2 1

- 1 0 1 (2 0 0 0 ) (“A ny p erso n im p ris o ne d o r restrained o f l i b erty, und er a ny p reten se 5

w ha t so ev er, ex ce p t in ca ses sp ec i f i ed in § 2 9

- 2 1

- 1 0 2 , m ay p ro sec ute a w rit o f h ab ea s co rp us, t o i nq uire int o t he ca use o f suc h im p riso n m e n t an d re stra int.” ).
-4- Havingfully

considere d the re cord and the re levant author ities, we conc lude that, taken a s true, Edwar ds’ asser

tions do not establish grounds for habea s corpus re lief.

II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
Whether habe as cor

pus relief should be g rante d is a question of l aw. Thus, we a pply de novo revie w and a ffor d no presumption of cor rec tness to the finding s and conclusions of the c ourts below. Summers v. State, 212 S.W .3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007); Hog an v. Mills, 168 S.W .3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005).

III . A NA LY SIS The right to seek habe as cor pus relief is guara

nteed by article I , section 15 of the T ennesse e Constit ution, which decla res that “ the privileg e of the writ of Ha beas Corpus sha ll not be suspended,
un le ss whe n in

c a se of re be lli on or inv a sio n, the Ge ne ra l Asse mbl y sh a ll de c lare the pu bli c sa fe ty require s it.” Tenn. Const. art. I , § 15. Fur thermore habea s corpus proc edure in Tennesse e has be en regulated by

statute s i n ce t he mid-ninetee nth century . See Code of T ennesse e §§ 3720 to 3765 (Return J

. Meig s & Wi lliam F. Cooper eds., E.G. Ea sterman & Co. 1858); Summ ers, 212 S.W.3d at 255; State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000). Whil e the statutory languag e descr ibing

5 the wr it ap pe ars br oa d, in fa c t, “‘ [h]a be a s cor pu s und e r Te nn e sse e law ha s a lw ay s b e e n, and re ma ins , a ver y narr ow procedure .’” Arc her v. St ate, 851 S.W.2d 157, 162 (Tenn. 1993) ( quoting L uttrell v. State, 644 S.W .2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) ). Indeed, r ecogn i z i n g t h e li mited nature of Tenne ssee’ s habea s corpus proc edure , the L eg islature ena cted the Post-Conviction Procedur e Ac t t o p ro v i d e aco l l at er al p ro ce d ure th atal l o ws s t at e c o urt s t o co n s i d er an d t o re m edy a b ro ad er ra n ge of claims. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 to - 122 (2006); Hickma n v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) ; Luttrell, 644 S.W .2d at 409.

Moreove r, this Court has repe atedly emphasiz ed t h e l imited scope of the r emedy aff orded by habea s corpus proc eeding s. See, e.g ., May v. C arlton, 245 S .W.3d 340, 344 (Tenn. 2008); Fa ulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007); Hickman, 153 S.W .3d at 20. I t is well-settled that “a pe tition for writ of habe as cor pus may not be used to revie w or corre ct er rors of la w or fa ct committed by

a court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Holbrook v. Boma r, 211 Tenn. 24 3, 24 6, 36 4 S. W.2 d 887 , 8 88 (1 96 3) . F ur the rm or e , “ the wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s c ann ot b e us e d to-5-

se rv e the purp os e of

an a pp e a l or wr it o f e rr or .” I d. Rathe r, ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f i s ava ila

ble “ on ly when ‘it appear s upon the fac e of the judgme nt or the re cord of the proc eeding s upon which the judgme nt is render ed’ that a convictingcourt wa s without jurisdi ction or aut h o ri t y t o sentenc e a defe ndant, or that a

defe ndant’s sente nce of imprisonment or ot her restraint has e x pired.” Arc her, 851 S.W .2d at 164 (quoti ng State v. Galloway , 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37 (1868)). “‘When the restra int, from which re lief is soug ht by a wr it of habeas corpus , proce eds fr om a judg ment err oneous but not void, the writ will not l i e. No r, u n der it, ca n the par ty impeach a

judgme nt as contra ry to the fac ts.’” Ar cher , 851 S.W .2d at 161 (quotingSt at e ex rel. Ka rr v. Tax ing D ist. of Shelby County , 84 Tenn. 240, 249 (1886) ). “‘But where the sentenc e is void, not merely voidable, or the t er m o f i m prisonment under it has e x pired, re lief may be had by

the writ.’” I d. Stated dif fe re ntl y , a su c c e ssf

ul h a be a s c or pu s p e tit ion e r m

us t de mon str ate that th e c ha lle ng e d ju dg me nt i s “void” a nd not merely

“voidable.” May , 245 S.W .3d at 344; Fa ulkner, 226 S.W.3d at 361; Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 255; Taylor v. State, 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999); Arc her, 851 S.W.2d at 164; Potts v. State, 833 S.W .2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)

. The de terminative issue, then, in ever y habea s corpus proce eding is whether the cha lleng ed jud g me nt i s v oid . N ot s ur pr isi ng ly , th is C ourt has often atte mpt e d to de fi ne and

to d e sc ri be vo id jud g me nts and

to d ist inguis h th e m f

ro m vo ida

ble j ud g me nts . We have de sc ri be d a vo ida ble jud g me nt a s “ fa c ia lly va lid [re qu ir ing ] pr oo f be yon d the fa c e of the re c or d or jud g me nt t o e sta bli sh its invalidity .” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 256 (citing Dy kes v. Compton, 978 S.W .2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 19 98 )) . In c ontr a st, we have e xpla ine d th at

“[a] void j udg ment is one which shows upon the fa ce of the re cord a
wa nt of jur isd ic tio n in the c ourt a ssumin g to re nd e r the j ud gment, which wa nt of jurisdiction may

be either of the p er son, or of the subject-matter

g ener ally , or of the pa

rticular que stion attempted to be decide d or the re lief assumed to be g iven.”

Ly nch v. State ex rel. Killebre w, 179 Tenn. 339, 166 S.W .2d 397, 398 (1942) ( quoting Ne w York Cas. Co. v. L awson, 160 Tenn. 329, 336, 24 S.W .2d 881, 883 (1930))

. We have e x plained that the question of whethe r a judg ment is v o i d “i s al way s one of jurisdiction, that is, whether the orde r, judgme nt or proce ss unde r attack comes within the lawful authority of the court or judg e re ndering or issuing it.” State e x rel. Ang lin v. Mit chell, 575 S.W .2d 284, 287 (Tenn. 1979) overr uled on other g rounds by

Arc her, 851 S.W .2d at 162-164. Thus, for purposes of habeas corpus proce eding s, the term “jurisdiction” is sy

nony mous with the t erm “authority .” See, e.g., Ly nch, 166 S.W.2d at 398-99 (“B ut he re the Court w as without a uthority to punish by confine ment in the training school for a ny period, a nd [i t] , there fore exceede d [i t’s] j urisdictional authority .”).
These de cisions definingvoid judgments re cognize that the setting of punishment for criminal off

enses is a legislative function. See L avon v. State, 586 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tenn. 1979); Sandfor d v
. Pe ar s o n , 1 9 0 T e n n

. 6 5 2 , 6 6 1 , 2 3 1 S. W. 2 d 3 3 6 , 3 3 9 ( 1 9 5 0 )

. St atute s p r e s c r ib in gand de fi nin gava ila

ble punis hme nts bo th c on fe r a nd lim it t he ju ri sd ic tio n o f t ri a l c ourt s to imp os e sentenc es for

criminal off

enses. See Smit h v. L ewis, 202 S.W. 3 d 1 2 4 , 1 2 7 -28 (Tenn. 2006);M cL aney, 59 S.W

. 3 d at 93 (overrul ed on o t her gro und s b y S um m ers , 2 1 2 S

. W

. 3 d at 25 4 ); C o l em an v. M o rgan, 6 1 5 9 S.W

. 3 d 88 7 , 89 2 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 20 0 4 ) ( q uo t i ng and ap p l y i ng M cL aney’ s “j uri sdi ct i o nal de f ect ” d ef i n iti o n); M cC hri st i an v. Stat e, 15 9 S.W

. 3 d 60 8 , 61 0 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 20 0 4 ).
-6- Mc Conne ll, 12 S.W. 3d

at 79 8. Thus, as we hav e pr e vio us ly he ld, tr ia l c ourt s la c k ju

ri sd ic tio n to imp os e se nte nc e s in

dir e c t c ontr ave nti on of a g ov e rn ing se nte nc ingstatut e . Si mil arl y , tr ia l c ourt s lack jurisdiction to impose sentence s not available unde r the sente ncing statutes g overningthe ca se. Suc h s e nte nc e s are ill e g a l, a mou nti ngto “

jur isd ic ti on al de fe c t[s]” tha t r e nd e r t he jud g me nts 6 imposing them void and subjec t to attack in a ha beas c orpus proc eeding . See, e.g ., May , 245 S.W .3d at 340 (grantinghabea s corpus re lief whe re the judgme nt included a de clar ation o f i n famy for a crime not de clar ed infamous by the statutes in eff

ect whe n the offe nse w as co m mitted and the sentenc e imposed); Smith, 202 S .W.3d at 127-28 (holding a judgme nt void beca u s e i t i n cluded a
re le a se e lig ibi lity

pe rc e nta g e in cl e ar co ntr ave nti on of a statut e re qu ir ing c hil d ra pis ts to s e rv e the ir entire se ntence s); Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W .3d 910, 912 (Tenn. 2000) (g rantinghabea s corpus relief wher e the judg ment included an “ illega l and void” sente nce of life imprisonment without the possibili ty

of par o le which wa s not available unde r the statute in ef fec t at the time the def

endant
c omm itt e d th e of

fe ns e ); Ar c he r, 85 1 S. W.2 d at 16 3 ( de sc ri bin g the jud g me nt in He nd e rs on v. State ex rel. L ance , 2 2 0 T enn. 520, 419 S .W.2d 176 (1967) as “f acia lly void” and statingthat the trial court wa s “without jurisdiction or aut h o ri t y to enter judg ment ag ainst L ance with a provision for
concur rent sente ncing ” bec ause a statute mandated consec utive sentenc ing) ; State v. Burkha rt, 566 S.W .2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978) (desc ribingas illeg al and a “n u l l i t y” a judg ment which imposed
concur rent sentenc es in “dire ct contra vention” of a

statute requir ing c onsecutive se ntence s); Ly nch, 16 6 S. W.2 d at 39 8 ( ho lding a ju dgmen t “vo id” and statin gthat th e tr ia l c ourt a c te d “ be yon d [it s] jurisdiction” in sentencinga minor to the “State Tr ainingand Agricultural School for one year ,” when the r eleva

nt statute only

authorized sentenc ing to the “ workhouse or jail”). Our prior decisions also illustrate that the availability of habeas corpus relief is not dependent up on the mann e r o f i mpo sit ion of th e se nte nc e . In o the r w or ds , h a be a s c or pu s r e lie f i s ava ila

ble whether the t rial court imposed the illeg al sentenc e af ter a jury trial or the pa

rties agree d to the illega l sentenc e in plea ne g o t i ation. This is true beca use a guilty

plea wa ives only

non-jurisdictional defe cts. See State v. McKinney , 74 S.W .3d 291, 306 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Pettus, 986 S .W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) . A guilty plea doe s not waive the jurisdictional de fec ts that constitute gr ounds for habea s corpus re lief, nor doe s a guilty p l ea c onfer jurisdiction upon the trial court to impose a sentenc e not ava ilable under g overningstatutes. See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 215 S.W .3d 776, 780 n.4 (T e nn . 2 00 7) (c a

uti on ing “ that the State may no t con fe r thr ou g h ple a ne g oti atio ns re le a se e lig ibi lity for c riminal offe nses that ar e statutorily ineligible for early rele ase” ); Summers, 212 S.W .3d at 258 (“Acourt lac ks jurisdiction to i mpose an a g ree d sentenc e that is illegal , ev en an illega lly lenient one.”) ; Smi th, 202 S.W .3d at 128 (holding a plea- barg ained sentenc e illeg al bec ause it contra vened
a statute that expressly prohibited ear ly rele ase e ligibility

for the ple a off

ense) ; Carlton, 28 S.W .3d
at 91 2 ( statin gthat “ the pa rt ie s c ann ot b y

a g re e me nt s a lva g e an ill e g a l se nte nc e or oth e rw ise c re ate authority fo r

th e im p o s it io no f

a s e n te n c e th at h a s n o t b e e na u th o r iz e d b y s tatute ” )

. T hu s , h a

b e as corpus relief is available to reme dy truly illega l sentence s whether a trial c ourt imposed the illeg al sentenc e af

ter a jury trial or the pa

rties agree d to it in pl ea ne g otiations. I d.-7-

The dist i n ct i o n lies not in the availability of re lief but in the scope of the re medy

habea s corpus a f f o r d s

. F o r e xamp le , w h e r e a

tr ia l c o urt i mp o s e s anil le g a l s e n te n c e a f te r a ju r y tr ia l, the ill e g a l se nt ence may

be c or re c te d in a ha be a s c or pu s p ro c e e din g , b ut t

he c onvic tio n w ill re ma in intact. See Smith, 202 S.W .3d at 130 (e x plaining that even though this Court gra nted relief for an illega l sentence in Carlton, 28 S.W .3d at 912, the first-de g ree murder conviction rema ined intact);
see a lso St ate v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 593 (Tenn. 2006) (notingthat, althoug h the habe as c or pu s c ourt on re mand in Carl ton e nte re d a fi na l jud g me nt d e c lari ngthe de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e nu ll
an d v o i d , th e d e f

e n d an t ’ s f i r s t d e g r e e mur d e r

c o n v i c t i o n“ r e m a i n e d

v a l i d an d i ne f f e c t ” )

. S i m i l ar l y, wher e an illeg al sentenc e is imposed pursuant to a plea agree ment but is not a material (ba rg ainedfor) ele m en t o f t h e ag ree ment, the illeg al sentenc e may be cor rec ted in habea s corpus, but the conviction will r emain intact. See Smit h, 202 S.W .3d at 128-130. Howeve r, wher e an i l l egal
s en t en ce i s imposed as a mate rial ele ment of a ple a agree ment, “the illeg al sentenc e re nders the guilty plea, includingthe conviction, invalid.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 259. As the State points out, this Court has neve r i n d i ca ted that plea a g ree ments may include illega l sentence s. To the contra ry , Bur khart, one of the l ea d i n g ca s es on t he subjec t of illeg al sentenc es, invo lved a plea -bar g ained se ntence . Bur khart plea ded guilty

to esca pe and r ece ived a
concur rent sentenc e eve n though a statute requir ed conse cutive sente ncing . When the Depa rtment of Corre ction notified Bur khart he would be re quired to ser ve his esca

pe sente nce c onsecutively , he filed a petition seeking relief

. This Court g rante d relief , concluding that the conc urre nt sentence was imposed “in direc t contrave ntion of the expres s [s tatutory ] provisi ons” and de scribingit as “a nullity ,” and a

n “illeg al, as opposed t o a merely err oneous, sentence.” Bur khart, 566 S.W.2d at 873.

More r eleva

nt to the pre sent appe al is the subsequent de cision of State v. Mahler , 735 S.W .2d 226 (Tenn. 1987) , in which the def endant plea ded guilty

to second de g ree murder in e x chang e for a multiple offende r cla ssification and a fifty -year Rang e I I sentenc e. As in this case, Mahle r ar gued that he la c ke d th e pr ior

c onvic tio ns ne c e ssa

ry to s up po rt the mul tip le of fe nd e r c la ssi fi c atio n. Th is Court rea ffirme d Bur

khart, e mphasizi ngthat a “judg ment imposed by a tri al court in direc t contravention of express statutory provisions re gar d i ngsentenc ing is illeg al.” I d. at 228 (c iting B ur kh art , 5 66 S.W. 2d

at 87 3) . H ow e ve r, we de nie d M ahle r r e lie f, e x pl ain ingthat, e ve n if his offe nder c lassification wa s err oneous, hi s s entenc e wa s not ill eg al bec ause it fe ll within t he
a pp lic a ble statut or

y ra ng e of punis hme nt f

or se c on d de g re e mur de r— te n ye ars to l if

e imp ri so nme nt. Mahler, 735 S.W .2d at 228. We a lso note d that Mahler waived a ny non-jurisdictional err ors, such as off ender classification, by

pleadinggu i l t y
. I d

. L ater , in Hicks v. State, 945 S.W .2d 706, 706 (Tenn. 1997), we reje cted a post-conviction challeng e to a “plea barg ained Rang e I Isentenc e” that had bee n “couple d with Ra ng e I rele ase e ligibility .” In doing so, w e re iterate d “that a know ing a nd voluntary guilty plea wa ives any irregularity as t o offe nder classification or rele ase eligibility .” I d. at 709.

More r ece ntly

in McConnell, we conside red a post-conviction challeng e to the leg ality of a guilty plea that ha d been struc tured pursua nt to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1982, even though the plea of

fense had bee n comm i t t ed af t erthe Criminal SentencingReform Ac t of 1989 beca me ef fec tive. 12 S.W .3d at 797. We r eaf firmed the principle that offende r cla ssification and-8-

re le a se e lig ibi lity

may be “ su bje c ts of ple a ba

rg a in ne g oti atio ns ,” e mph a sizi ng that “ the se e le me nts of plea barg aining have been and still are proper ly char acte rized as non-jurisdictional.” I d. at 798. Howeve r, we held the judg ment in McConnell void beca use t he plea -bar g ained se ntence had bee n structure d pursuant to a statute that was not in eff ect whe n McConnell committed the offe nse. I d. at 8 0 0

. W e h el d th at s u ch a j uri s d i ct i o n al d ef ec t co u l d n o t b e wa i v ed b y a p l eaagr ee m en t , ex p l ai n i n g:
Whil e it i s tr

ue that a ple a ba rg a in a g re e me nt i s c ontr a c tua l, contra ct principles e x tend onl y so far . The 1989 Ac t establishes the
outer limits wi thi n whic h th e State and a de fe nd ant a

re fr e e to neg otiate, and the courts are bound to respec t those limi ts. I f we
a c c e pte d th e State ’s argume nt t hat the 19 89 Ac t is no t juri sd ic tio na l,
we could easily be left with the logic al corollar y to the matter be fore us: a plea ba

rg ained se ntence l es s tha n th e statut or

y min imum. Sentence s beneath the minim um provided for by statute, howeve r, have be en consistently

reje cted a s illega l. Yet the re asoningadvan c ed by the State would permit t his very result and would be an expansion of the trial c ourt’s jurisdicti o n b y t h i s Court. Such an expansion
wo u l d be an obvious a nd impermissible intrusion on t he cle ar Constitutional prerog ative of the L eg islature to define the contours of a trial c ourt’s jurisdiction.

I d. at 799 (c itations and footnotes omitted).

In Ho ov e r, the mos t r e c e nt d e c isi on a dd re ssi ngthe natur e of

of fe nd e r r ang e c la ssi fi c atio ns , we d en i edh ab ea s co rp u s re l i ef , s t at i n g:
Whil e Ho o v er’s plea-ba

rg ained thirty -five- y ear

sentenc e is outside the pa ra me te rs of Rang e Iof

fe nd e rs , th e ple a -b arg a ine d s ent enc e is
we ll w ith in t

he ov e ra ll p un ishme nt range autho ri zed fo r C la ss A fe lony of fe ns e s, su c h a s se c on d d e g re e mur de r. A r e vie w o f t his Court ’s de c isi on s e sta

bli sh e s th at it

is th is latte r r ang e -- the ov e ra ll punishment rang e author ized for the plea offe nse-- that contr ols the de te rm inatio n o f whe the r a n a g re e d s e nte nc e is l e g a l.

21 5 S.W. 3d at 77 9. B e c a

us e Ho ov e r’ s se nte nc e did no t e xce e d the maximum punis hme nt s tatut or ily authorized for the plea offe nse of second degree murder, we r efuse d to gr ant habe as cor pus relief

. We “re iterate [d] that offe nder c lassification and r elea se elig ibilit y are non-jurisdictional” a nd that Hoover ’s guilty

plea “ waived any irregularity conce rninghis offende r cla ssification.” I d. at 780-81 (empha sis added).

Fr om the preceding discussion of our prior decisions, the foll owing controll i n g p ri nciples
e me rg e . H a

be a s c or pu s ma y no t be us e d a s a su

bs tit ute fo r a pp e a l. Rathe r, ha

be a s c or pu s r e lie f i s limit ed to re medying jur isdictional defe cts that are appar ent on the face of the judg ment or the re cord“T he f i nd i ng t hat a d ef

end ant i s o r i s no t a p ers i st ent off end er i s ap p eal ab l e b y ei t her part y
. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. 7 § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 7 (d ) (2 0 0 6 ).
-9- of the proc eeding s on which the judg ment is render ed. F or pu rp o s es of habe as cor pus challeng es to sentencing , jurisdictional defe ct means ei t h er a sentenc e that dire ctly contravenes a

g overning statute or a se ntence that was not ava ilable under g overningstatutes. Howeve r, habe as cor pus relief is not available to r emedy non-jurisdictional err ors, i.e., fac tual or leg al err ors a c ourt makes in the exercise of

its jurisdi ction. Whil e the sc ope of the reme dy differs as previously

explained here in, the ava ilability

of habe as cor

pus relief does not depe nd upon wh et h er the trial cour t imposed an illega l sentence afte r a jury conviction or the p arties a g ree d to an illeg al sentenc e as pa rt of a ple a ag ree ment. Guilty

pleas wa ive only

non-jurisdictional err ors. Guilty pleas do not waive the jurisdictional defe cts that constitute g rounds for ha beas c orp u s relief

, nor do guilty

pleas c onfer jur isd ic tio n u

po n a tr ia l c ourt

to imp os e an il le g a l se nte nc e . H ow e ve r, of fe nd e r c la ssi fi c atio n is a non-jurisdictional eleme nt of sentenc ing. T hus, err ors and/or irr egularities in offe nder c lassification
are waived by a guilty plea, and are not grounds for habea s corpus r elief if the sentenc e is imposed by a trial c ourt afte r a jury

conviction. Simply stated, habe as cor pus relief is not available to cor

rec t err ors or irr egularities in offe nder c lassificati o n

. Rather, r elief f or such non-

jurisdictional error s must be obtained, if at a ll, in a timely filed appe al as of r ight or in a timely filed petition seeking post-conviction re lief. Ap ply ing the se pr inc ipl e s to the fa c ts of thi s c a se , we c on c lud e tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y dismiss ed Edw ar d s ’ h a

b e a s c o r p u s p e ti ti o n

. Wh il e E dw ar d s a ll e g e s th at t h e tr ia l c o urt e r

r e d by classifying him as a

p er s i s t ent offender , Edwar ds does not dispute that the persistent off ender classification was ava ilable under the statutes g overninghis sentencing

. Cf. May , 245 S.W .3d at 340 (g rantinghabea s corpus re lief whe re the judgme nt included a decla ration of infamy for a crime not decla red infa mous by the statutes in eff

ect whe n the offe nse wa s committed); Carlton, 28 S. W

. 3d at 912 (grantinghabea s corpus relief wher e the judgme nt imposed a sentenc e not ava ilable under the statutes in effe ct when the offe nse wa s co m m i tted). F urthermor e, Edwa rds does not and c annot asser t that his nine-y ear

sentenc e excee ds the statutory maxi mum available f

or per sons convicted of the Class D felony

of burglar

y
. As previously

stated, burg lary

car ries a two- to-twelve- y ear

statutory sentenc ing r ang e. Cf. Hoover , 215 S.W .3d at 779 (holdingthe sentenc e leg al bec ause it did not exceed the ove rall punishment rang e auth o ri z ed for the plea of fense ); Mahler , 735 S.W .2d at 228 (holdingthe sentenc e leg al bec ause it fe ll within the statutory rang e of punishment f or sec ond deg ree murder a pplicable at the time the offe nse wa s committed). Edwar ds’ asser tions amount to no m ore than a cl aim that the trial cour t erre d in exercising the jurisdiction it clearly possessed under

the g overningsentenc ing statutes. Admittedly , Edwar ds may have obtained relief on his c laim that the trial court e rre d had he e x erc ised his statutory rig ht and cha lleng ed the pr opriety of his persistent offe nder c lassification i n an appeal as of right. Additionally , Edwar ds could have raised this issue 7 in suppor t of a claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel in a timely filed petition for post-c onviction relief . Howeve r, Edwa

rds i s not entitled to habea s corpus re lief on this claim, which, at most, rende rs his jud g me nt v oid a

ble and no t vo id. Thus , w e ho ld t hat, t ake n a s tru e , the a lle g atio ns of Ed wa rd s’ habea s corpus pe tition do not establish g rounds for habea s corpus r elief. F urthermor e, we note that our holdingis c onsistent with sever al decisions of the Court of Criminal Appea ls affirmingsummarySe e, e

. g

. , V i ck v
. St at e, N o. W 2006- 02172- CC A- R3- H C, 2008 W L 80580 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. J an

. 8, 2008) 8 (descri b i ng pe t i t i o ner’ s chal l enge t o hi s m ul t i p l e o f f end er cl ass i f

i ca t i on a s not co gni zab l e i n a hab eas corp us p roce ed i ng); H i gg s v. St at e, N o. E 20 05

- 02 71 2- C C A

- R 3- H C , 200 6 W L 36 28 07 4 ( T enn

. C r i m. A pp

. D ec. 14, 200 6), per m. app. deni ed ( T en n

. M ar

. 12, 2007) ( af f i r mi n g s u mmar y di s mi s s al of H i g g s ’ pet i t i on ch al l en g i n g h i s pe r s i s t en t of f en der c l as s i f

i ca t i on o n t he ground s t hat he l acked t he requis i t e num b er o f p ri o r convi ct i o ns t o qua l i f y as a p ers i st ent off

end er); A nd ers o n v. B el l , N o

. M 2 0 0 6

- 0 1 2 2 3

- C C A

- R 3

- H C , 20 0 6 W L 3 2 9 0 8 2 6 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. N o v. 13 , 2 0 0 6 ), p erm

. a p p

. d eni ed (T enn. Jan. 2 9 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( af

f i r mi ng s ummary di s mi s s al an d s t at i ng t hat t he pet i t i oner ’ s ch al l eng e t o hi s ca r eer of f ender cl as s i f i ca t i on wou l d at mos t r en der h i s t we l v e- y ea r s en t en ce s v oi dabl e, n ot v oi d) ; Car s on v
. M i l l s , N o. W 2005- 00745- C C A

- R 3- H C , 200 6 W L 16 30 6, at * 5 (T enn

. Cri m. Ap p. Jan

. 4, 200 6) ( hol di ng t hat an y err or i n cl as s i f y i ng t he pet i t i oner fo r se n te n c ing p u rp o se s w o u ld re n d e r th e re su lti n g ju d g m e n ts m e r e ly v o id a b le , no t vo id , an d no t sub je c t t o a ttac k in h abe as c or pu s ) ; M oor e v
. T u r n er , N o. W 2005- 01995- CC A- R3- H C, 2006 W L 473725 ( T en n

. Cr i m. App. Fe b. 28, 2006) ( af f i r mi ng s ummary di s mi s s al and s t at i ng t hat t he pet i t i oner ’ s cha l l eng e t o hi s ca r eer of f ender cl as s i f

i cat i on woul d re nder hi s t hi rt y - y ear s ent en ce v oi d ab l e, not vo i d ); Sp o o ner v. Stat e, N o

. E 2 0 0 4

- 0 2 1 6 0

- C C A

- R 3

- H C , 20 0 5 W L 1 5 8 4 3 5 7 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. Jul y 7, 20 0 5 ), pe rm. app

. de ni ed (T enn . D e c. 5, 20 0 5 ) ( af f i rming summ ary dis m i ss al of a hab eas corp us p e tit io n a n d sta ting tha t P e tit io n e r’s c la im tha t h e la c k e d the re q u isite nu m b e r o f p rio r co n v ic tio n s to su p p o rt h is m u lti p le of f e n de r c l a s s i f

i c a t i on w ou l d r e n de r t h e j u d g m e n t v o i da bl e , n ot v oi d) ; L e w i s v
. Pa r k e r , No. W 20 04

- 00 46 5- CCA- R3- H C, 2004 W L 3021127 ( T en n

. Cr i m. A pp. , D ec

. 30, 2004) ( opi n i n g t h at a n e r r on eou s de t er mi n at i on t h at pe t i t i on er ’ s pr i or
r ecor d of co nv i ct i ons q ual i f

i ed hi m f or s ent enc i ng as a ca r eer of f ender ne i t her r es ul t s i n a voi d ju dgment nor es t abl i s hes t h at t h e t r i al cou r t l ac k ed j u r i s di ct i on t o s en t en ce t h e pe t i t i on er ) ; C ol l i n s v
. St at e, N o. 03C01- 9805- CR

- 00192, 1999 W L 5 4 4 6 5 8 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. Ju ly 2 8 , 1 9 9 9 ), pe rm. app

. de ni ed (T enn. N o v. 22 , 19 9 9 ) ( st at i ng t hat a chal l enge t o t he l eg al i t y of

a Ran g e I I mu l t i pl e of

f en der s en t en ce i s not cog n i za bl e i n a ha bea s cor pu s proc ee di n g ) ; Fr en ch v. B el l , N o. 01C01- 9801- CR

- 00022, 1999 W L 8277 ( T en n

. C ri m

. A pp. J an

. 12, 1999) , pe r m. a pp. de n i ed ( T en n

. J u n

. 21, 1999) (a ff irm ing su m m a ry d ism issa l o f a h a b e a s c o rp u s p e tit io n a lleg ing tha t t h e se n te n c ing c o u rt lac k e d a u tho rity to c la ssify
a n d s e n te n c e the p et i t i o ner as a pe rs i st ent off end er bec ause t he p et i t i o ner l acked t he requis i t e num b er of pri o r f el o ny co nvi ct i o ns t o s up p o rt t he cl ass i f i cat i o n); M at hews v. R aney, N o

. 02 C 0 1

- 9 5 1 2

- C C

- 0 0 3 6 6 , 19 9 7 W L 2 0 6 7 7 1 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. A p r. 28 , 19 9 7 ), pe rm. app

. de ni ed (T enn . J ul y 7, 19 9 7 ) ( af f i rming summ ary dis m i ss al of a hab eas corp us p et i t i o n al l egi ng t hat t he t ri al co urt err o neo usl y cl ass i f i ed t he p et i t i o ner as a pe rs i st ent off end er).
-10- dis mis sa l of

ha be a s c or pu s p e tit ion s a lle g ingsim ila r c la ims

. 8

As a re sult of our holding, w e nee d not addre ss the S t at e’ s argume nts that the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls e rr e d 1 ) i n d ete rm ini ngthat E dw ard s p ro vid e d a n a de qu ate re c or d to avo id summary dismiss al and 2) by

rema nding to the tr ial court for the appointm ent of counsel and for a n “evide ntiary

hear ing” on Edwar ds’ claim. Howev er, we note that Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, whi ch ad dresse s both of these issues, wa s relea sed twelve day s after the Court of Criminal Ap pe a ls’ de c isi on

in t his a pp e a l.

IV . C ON CL USI ON Take n as t ru e, t h e al leg ations of Edwa rds’ ha beas c orpus petition and of the attached documents fa il to establish that the judgme nt classifying him as a persistent off

ender and imposing a nine- y ear , Rang e I I I s en t ence is void. Thus, we re verse the judg ment of the Court of Criminal Appea ls and reinstate the judg ment of the trial c ourt summarily dismiss ing E dwar ds’ petition.

Pur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d se c tio n 40 -1 4- 20 7( a ) (2 00 6) , atto rn e y s a pp ointe d to
re pr e se nt i nd ig e nt d e fe nd ants are e nti tle d to re a so na ble c omp e ns atio n fo r the ir se rv ic e s on a pp e a l. Pur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Sup re me Court Rul e 13 (e )( 1) , for the purp os e s of se e kin gc omp e ns atio n, thi s case is declar ed to be complex and ex tended because it involved novel and c omplex leg al issues and-11-

beca use counse l was re q u i red, at the reque st of the Court, to seek a nd obtain supplementary information not usually

require d to be obtained at this st ag e of the proce eding s.
I t appea ring Edwar ds is indige nt, costs of t his appea l shall be taxed to the St ate, f or which
e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

WI L L IAM M. B ARKE R, C HI EF JUSTI CE