IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 125 / 05–2115 

Filed September 5, 2008 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ELIZABETH A. 

BRIDDLE AND DAVID J. BRIDDLE 

Upon the Petition of 

ELIZABETH A. BRIDDLE, 

 Appellee, 

And concerning 

DAVID J. BRIDDLE, 

 Appellant. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. 

Gamble (enforcement of settlement agreement) and Jerrold W. Jordan 

(decree), Judges. 

 Further review of a dissolution of marriage action in which the court 

of appeals ordered enforcement of a settlement agreement reached through 

mediation. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, AND CASE REMANDED.

Patricia A. Schoff, David Swinton, and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin 

Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, a Professional Corporation, Des 

Moines, for appellant. 

John C. Conger, West Des Moines, for appellee. 
2 

HECHT, Justice. 

After engaging in contentious discovery disputes for more than two 

years, the parties spent a long day negotiating a settlement of their 

dissolution action with the assistance of a mediator. The mediator 

summarized the terms of the accord in a letter to the parties’ counsel, but 

the parties were subsequently unable to agree upon a proposed decree. The 

district court refused to enforce the mediated settlement, a trial was held on 

all disputed issues, and a dissolution decree was entered. The court of 

appeals affirmed the dissolution of the parties’ marriage but reversed the 

balance of the district court’s decision, concluding the settlement should be 

enforced. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, affirm the 

dissolution decree as modified herein, and remand to the district court for 

entry of a decree consistent with the terms of the settlement reached by the 

parties. 

I. Factual Background and Proceedings. 

 Elizabeth and David Briddle met while they were employed as real 

estate agents. They were married on September 12, 1992. Elizabeth and 

David are the parents of three minor children. 

 David acquired minority-shareholder interests in several corporations 

that lease space and provide management services to antique dealers. The 

five corporations do business under the name of “Brass Armadillo” in Des 

Moines, Omaha, Kansas City, Phoenix, Denver and Cincinnati. Three of the 

corporations are Iowa corporations, and the others are incorporated in 

Nevada. 

 Elizabeth finished her undergraduate degree after the marriage and 

resumed selling real estate. She interrupted her real estate career to 

become a stay-at-home mother. Marital discord arose, and Elizabeth filed a 

petition for dissolution on October 23, 2002. She returned to school at Des 
3 

Moines Area Community College in the fall semester of 2002 and completed 

her training in medical sonography at Mercy College of Health in May 2005. 

Although she was diagnosed with Crohn’s disease during the marriage, the 

evidence establishes that the disease is controlled with medications. She is 

employed in the medical field in Iowa City and earns $46,000 per year. 

 Elizabeth requested production of documents evidencing David’s 

income and the value of his minority interests in the several Brass 

Armadillo corporations. On several occasions during the litigation, the 

district court held hearings calculated to resolve the parties’ protracted 

discovery disputes. Unsatisfied with David’s claims that he was not 

authorized as a minority shareholder to produce the corporations’ financial 

records, Elizabeth filed a series of motions to compel production of 

documents. 

 David eventually filed suit against the corporations to obtain the 

requested information under Iowa Code section 490.1602(2)(b) (entitling 

shareholder to inspect and copy the corporations’ accounting records “at a 

reasonable location specified by the corporation”). Elizabeth intervened in 

that litigation, and the court entered an order on August 14, 2004, directing 

only the Iowa corporations to produce their check ledgers, general ledgers, 

certified financial statements, profit and loss statements, and tax returns no 

later than September 25, 2004. The court’s order did not, however, resolve 

the discovery dispute. 

 The Iowa corporations sought a protective order on the ground that 

the discovery of their records ordered by the court in the August 14 order 

exceeded the definition of “accounting records” contemplated by section 

490.1602. Elizabeth filed another motion to compel production of 

documents and served on the corporations’ custodian of records a notice of 

deposition and subpoena duces tecum demanding access to “any and all 
4 

books and records regarding the Nevada corporations” and “all credit card 

statements for the last 2 years.” The Nevada corporations sought an order 

quashing the subpoena, contending the documents exceeded the scope of 

discovery previously ordered by the court. Yet another hearing was held by 

the court to address pending discovery motions on January 4, 2005. The 

court extended the discovery deadline to allow time for the production of 

documents and completion of depositions, and ordered David to produce 

“all information in his possession related to the out-of-state corporations.” 

 Elizabeth’s counsel deposed David in early January of 2005. David’s 

deposition testimony disclosed the location of the corporations’ accounting 

records in Ankeny and generally described the companies’ accounting 

practices. Thereafter, Elizabeth’s counsel again invoked the court’s 

authority to gain access to the corporations’ records at the Ankeny office 

location. On January 18, 2005, the district court ordered the corporations 

to produce their records “at the facility where they [were] located” or at some 

other place agreed upon by counsel.1 The corporations produced to 

Elizabeth’s counsel on January 21, 2005 a disk containing accounting 

records and supporting data for all of the Brass Armadillo corporations for 

the years 2003 and 2004.2 

 

1The court’s order expressed considerable frustration with the protracted and 

ongoing discovery disputes and scolded David for his “lack of candor” and for engaging in a 

“charade” of attempting to gain access to the corporations’ documents through a lawsuit 

when, all the while, they were under his control and located in an Ankeny office. The court 

did not, however, deem David’s conduct worthy of any sanction. 

2The disk contained approximately 250,000 pages of the requested accounting and 

financial data stored by the companies using Quick Books software. Among the records 

produced were profit and loss statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements, accounts 

receivable and payable reports, general ledgers, and check registers. On the same day, 

David’s counsel produced hard copies of the general ledgers for 2003 and 2004, periodic 

internal financial statements, and adjusting entries prepared by the corporations’ certified 

public accountant for 2003. 
5 

 Despite the corporations’ production of their voluminous accounting 

records, Elizabeth’s counsel insisted he be allowed to inspect the records at 

the corporations’ Ankeny office. Another subpoena duces tecum was served 

on the corporations’ custodian of records demanding production of the 

records at that office on January 31, 2005. The corporations sought a 

protective order, claiming they had satisfied their obligation to respond to 

Elizabeth’s discovery requests. After yet another hearing, the court filed an 

order on February 1, 2005 generally directing Brass Armadillo, Inc. to fully 

comply with the court’s prior discovery orders.3 

 The scheduled trial date of Tuesday, February 8, 2005 was drawing 

near. Having previously reached a stipulation resolving their disputes as to 

child custody and visitation matters, David and Elizabeth agreed to mediate 

the issues of child support, spousal support and property division on 

Saturday, February 5, 2005. After eleven hours of negotiations, the parties 

reached an accord on all issues. In relevant part, the agreement called for 

David to pay child support in the amount of $2200 per month, a property 

settlement of $425,000 in ten annual installments, and spousal support in 

an amount equal to five percent of the declining unpaid balance of the 

property settlement. David also agreed to pay Elizabeth $61,300 for the 

fees charged by her attorneys and expert witnesses. In a thorough letter to 

counsel for the parties on February 8, the mediator detailed the terms of the 

agreement and noted his understanding that counsel for the parties would 

draft the documents necessary to complete the dissolution.4 Counsel for 

the parties notified the district court that a settlement had been reached. 

 

3This ruling did not address whether the corporations were obligated to permit 

Elizabeth or her counsel access to the corporate office, and did not detail in what particular 

the corporations’ production of records was then incomplete. 

4The agreement also (1) required David to provide health insurance for the children, 

(2) allocated one parcel of Des Moines residential property to each party, (3) awarded to 
6 

 On February 9, 2005, David’s counsel faxed a proposed decree and 

supporting child support worksheets to Elizabeth’s counsel. Elizabeth 

withheld her approval of the proposed decree, contending it constituted an 

admission by David that his earnings were more substantial than he 

claimed before and during the mediation session.5 David filed a motion 

requesting enforcement of the agreement reached with the assistance of the 

mediator. Elizabeth opposed enforcement of the agreement, claiming it was 

induced by David’s misrepresentation of his actual income. The district 

court held the agreement was not enforceable because David’s failure “to 

disclose his actual income to [Elizabeth] before and during the mediation 

constituted a misrepresentation of fact” that “placed [Elizabeth] at a 

substantial disadvantage in the mediation” and impeded the court’s 

evaluation of whether the settlement agreement was fair under the 

circumstances. 

 This court denied David’s application for interlocutory appeal and the 

matter proceeded to trial. The district court adopted with minor exceptions, 

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David his one-third ownership interest in a parcel of commercial real estate located near 

Kansas City, but promised to Elizabeth payment of fifty percent of the net proceeds from 

any future sale, (4) allocated a 1998 Pontiac Transport Van to Elizabeth and a 1977 Ford 

pickup to David, (5) set aside to Elizabeth an Edward Jones mutual fund account valued at 

$14,998, (6) divided equally between the parties three retirement accounts with a total 

value of $41,428, and (7) awarded to David his minority interest in the five Brass Armadillo 

corporations. 

5David claimed before and during the mediation that his actual income was 

$72,800, the amount of his W-2 earnings disclosed in the parties’ 2003 tax return. 

Although the parties’ tax returns for the years 2000 through 2003 consistently showed 

“flow-through” distributions of income or loss from the Brass Armadillo corporations to 

David as fully detailed below, he claimed he did not actually receive payment for such 

distributions in 2003 or 2004. The child support worksheets prepared by David’s counsel 

and presented to Elizabeth’s counsel after the mediation, however, assumed David’s income 

was $200,000 per year and Elizabeth’s income was $42,000 per year. In the cover letter 

transmitted with the proposed decree and worksheets, David’s counsel explained he made 

the income numbers inserted in the worksheets “jive” with the amount of child support the 

parties agreed upon during the mediation. 
7 

the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree submitted by 

Elizabeth’s counsel. David was ordered in relevant part to pay $3000 per 

month for child support, $1000 per month for thirty-six months for spousal 

support, $250,000 per year for four years as a property division, and 

$207,783.05 to reimburse Elizabeth for attorney fees and expert witness 

fees. David appealed, assigning as error the district court’s failure to 

enforce the mediation agreement, and, in the alternative asserting the 

financial obligations imposed under the decree are inequitable and 

oppressive. The court of appeals affirmed the dissolution of the parties’ 

marriage, reversed the district court’s refusal to enforce the settlement 

agreement, and remanded to the district court for entry of an order 

consistent with that agreement. We granted Elizabeth’s application for 

further review. 

 II. Scope of Review. 

Our review of dissolution-of-marriage cases is de novo. In re Marriage 

of Jones, 653 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 2002). We adjudicate anew the issues 

properly preserved by the parties. Id. We are not bound by the trial court’s 

findings of fact, but we give them weight especially when considering the 

credibility of witnesses. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). 

 III. Discussion. 

We begin our analysis with a review of the applicable legal principles. 

This court has recognized the validity of agreements resolving issues in 

domestic relations cases. In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 645–46 

(Iowa 1996). “A stipulation and settlement in a dissolution proceeding is a 

contract between the parties.” Jones, 653 N.W.2d at 593. A party to such 

an agreement “is not entitled as a matter of right” to rescind such a 

stipulation. Ask, 551 N.W.2d at 646. Settlement stipulations are entitled 

“ ‘to all of the sanctity of an ordinary contract if supported by legal 
8 

consideration.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). The court does, however, retain the 

power to reject the parties’ stipulation if it is unfair or contrary to law. Id. 

 At the outset, we note Elizabeth did not deny in the district court that 

the parties reached agreement on all disputed issues during the mediation 

conference. She opposed enforcement of the agreement in the district court 

solely on the ground David misrepresented his actual income before and 

during the mediation and thereby fraudulently induced her to reach a 

settlement. The claimed misrepresentation was clearly established, she 

asserts, by contrasting the amount of actual income claimed by David 

against the documents drafted by David’s attorney following the mediation 

conference. As we have noted, David claimed before and during the 

mediation his actual income was only $72,800, but the child support 

worksheets prepared by David’s attorney in support of the proposed 

dissolution decree assumed David’s income was $200,000. Upon our de 

novo review of the record, we conclude the district court erred in finding 

David misrepresented his actual earnings before and during the mediation 

and fraudulently induced Elizabeth to enter the mediation agreement. 

 We now turn to a review of the financial information known to 

Elizabeth prior to the mediation conference on February 5, 2005. She and 

her attorney were in possession of the parties’ tax returns for the years 

2000 through 2003. Each of those returns disclosed David’s W-2 income 

and, on Schedule E, reported supplemental “flow-through” income or loss 

based in part on distributions from the Brass Armadillo Subchapter S 

corporations: 

 Year W-2 earnings Flow-through income

 2000 $66,800 $ 24,298 

 2001 $66,800 ($ 8,795) 

 2002 $66,093 $ 67,723 

 2003 $72,800 $134,861 
9 

The parties’ 2004 tax return was not prepared before the mediation 

conference because the parties had sought an extension to file it after the 

corporations’ tax returns were prepared. Consistent with their historical 

pattern, the corporations’ returns for the 2004 tax year were not prepared 

until September of 2005. 

 Elizabeth’s assertion, and the district court’s finding, that David 

misrepresented his actual income are not supported by the evidence. 

Although the parties’ 2003 joint income tax return reported total taxable 

income in excess of $200,000 from David’s W-2 earnings and from the 

“flow-through” distributions reported by the corporations, David 

consistently maintained he did not actually receive payment of the 

$134,861 distribution reported on Schedule E of the parties’ tax return for 

that year.6 We find no evidence—other than the child support worksheets 

prepared by David’s counsel after the mediation to support the amount of 

child support agreed to by the parties—tending to prove that distribution 

was actually paid to David by the corporations in 2003. Under the 

circumstances presented here, we find completely unpersuasive Elizabeth’s 

claim of shock and surprise after viewing the child support worksheets 

attributing to David income of $200,000. As David’s counsel’s postmediation cover letter of February 9, 2005 clearly communicated, the 

worksheets assumed David had annual income of $200,000 in order to 

make the numbers “jive” and support a child support award of $2200 per 

month. We find no misrepresentation occurred because David’s actual 

income was in fact what he had represented it to be, $72,800 per year. 

 We also reject the district court’s finding that the settlement 

agreement reached by the parties in the mediation conference should not be 

 

6David also consistently maintained he did not receive a payment from the 

corporations during 2004. 
10 

enforced because Elizabeth and her counsel were disadvantaged by the 

recalcitrance of David and the corporations in their responses to discovery 

requests. In addition to the parties’ tax returns produced by David long 

before the mediation occurred, Elizabeth, her counsel, and her experts were 

also in possession of the voluminous accounting records produced by the 

Brass Armadillo corporations on January 21. Although these records were 

produced by the corporations only after litigation was commenced against 

them and the court entered several orders mandating their production, 

Elizabeth, her counsel, and her valuation experts did have access to the 

records approximately two weeks prior to the mediation conference.7 We 

find that although David and the corporations may be justly criticized for 

their recalcitrant approach to discovery matters, Elizabeth was in 

possession of the relevant financial information sufficiently in advance of 

the mediation conference to engage in meaningful negotiations during the 

mediation conference that lasted eleven hours. 

 A stipulation will be enforced if it constitutes an appropriate and 

legally approved method of disposing of the contested issues. See Jones, 

653 N.W.2d at 593–94. As we have noted, the decree ultimately entered by 

the district court on October 27, 2005 was significantly more favorable to 

Elizabeth than the terms of the mediation agreement. This fact is not 

controlling, however, in our determination of the validity of the settlement 

agreement. The validity of the solutions reached in the parties’ settlement 

agreement need not be those the court itself would have adopted if it were 

adjudicating the controversy. Ask, 551 N.W.2d at 646. 

 

7Elizabeth continued to claim David and the corporations had failed to produce all 

of their records until the trial began on September 13, 2005. We find it significant, 

however, that the experts who opined at trial as to the value of David’s interests in the 

Brass Armadillo corporations relied on the accounting records produced by David and the 

corporations on January 21, 2005, more than two weeks before the mediation conference. 
11 

 We find the terms of the settlement agreement were in all respects 

within the range of the evidence presented in the record. An equitable 

division of the parties’ assets depends primarily on the hotly contested value 

of two assets: David’s minority shareholder interest in the Brass Armadillo 

corporations and his interest in FLD Land Company which owns a parcel of 

commercial real estate near Kansas City. Although Elizabeth’s expert 

valued David’s interest in the Brass Armadillo corporations at $1,740,000, 

David’s expert valued it at only $478,000. And while Elizabeth’s expert 

valued David’s interest in the commercial real estate at $433,000, David’s 

expert placed a value of only $63,350 on that asset. Although the values 

placed on these key assets by the district court after trial were the higher 

values allocated to them by Elizabeth’s experts, credible and compelling 

countervailing evidence from David’s highly qualified experts supported the 

much lower valuations. 

 Upon our de novo review of the record, we find the settlement reached 

in the mediation conference constitutes an appropriate and legally approved 

method of disposing of the contested issues in the dissolution action. Given 

David’s actual income of $72,800 per year at the time of the mediation and 

the range of the evidence as to the value of the two key assets owned by the 

parties, David’s agreement to pay Elizabeth the sum of $425,000 over ten 

years as a property settlement, spousal support calculated at five percent 

per annum of the declining unpaid balance of the property settlement, and 

child support of $2200 per month constituted a fair resolution of the 

dispute.8 Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals. We 

 

8The parties did not agree in their mediated settlement that David had income of 

$200,000 per year. The parties’ mediation agreement that David shall pay $2200 per 

month as child support is based on his actual annual income of $72,800. Although this 

child support obligation agreed upon by the parties is higher than the child support 

guidelines would require given the parties’ incomes, we find an upward adjustment is 
12 

affirm the dissolution decree as modified and remand to the district court 

for entry of a decree consistent with the terms of the settlement reached by 

the parties. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, AND CASE REMANDED. 

 All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part. 

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“necessary to provide for the needs of the children and to do justice between the parties 

under the special circumstances of this case.” Iowa Ct. R. 9.4.