### FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAY 20, 2003 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

* Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation. [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH

CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 02-15545

________________________ D. C. Docket No. 01-00068-CV-WCO-2 COLEMAN JACKSON, Petitioner-AppellantCross-Appellee,

versus STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Respondents-AppelleesCross-Appellants.

________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern D

istrict of Georgia

_________________________ (May 20, 2003) Before ANDERSON and WILSON, Circuit Judge s, and OWENS * , District Judge.1 Although “the F ifth Amendment con

tains no equal prot

ection clause, it

does forbid discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” United States v. PerezHernandez , 672 F.2d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “a classification [that] is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amen

dment . . . is also inva

lid under the Due Pr

ocess Clause of th

e Fifth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 WILSON, Circuit Judge: Coleman Jackso

n appeals the distric

t court’s order g

ranting in part and denying in part his

motion for attor

ney’s fees a

nd his supplementa

l application for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA

), 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(d). Jackson contends that § 1997e(d) does not govern his m

otion for attorney ’s fees and his supplemental appli cation for attorney’ s fees, because h is 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 action challenged t he length of his confinement and no t “prison conditions ” within the meaning of § 1 997e(a). Alternatively

, he contends that § 19 97e(d) violates his r ight to equal protecti

on under the due process

clause of the Fift

h Amendme

nt. 1 The State Board

of Pardons and Paroles cross-appeals, contending that the court erroneously awarded Jackson fees-on-f

ees, or attorney ’s fees incurre d in the course of liti

gating his petition for attorne

y’s fees. These three argu ments present i ssues of first impres sion in th is Cir cuit. For th e reas ons s et for th bel ow, we a ffirm. BACKGROUND2 Jackson did not appeal his conviction and sentence. 3 On August 4, 1999, Ja

ckson was convicted o f aggravated assau lt and sentenced to twenty

years of im

prisonment with

five years to s erve in prison and fifteen year

s of probation. 2 As of August 25, 1996, the date Jackson committed the assault, a prisoner convicted of aggravated assault was required to serve a minimum of one-third of his pr

ison term befor

e becoming eligi

ble for a parole hearing before the bo ard. See O.C.G.A.§ 42-9-45(f). On December 9,

1997, however, the boar

d amended its poli

cy to provide that

a prisoner convicte

d on or after January 1, 1998 of certain crimes, including aggravated assault, must serve a minimum of ninety perce

nt of his term before becoming e ligible for a parole hearing. The boar

d applied its ninety

-percent policy

retroactively

– that is, the board applied the new

policy to all conv

ictions entered on or

after January

1, 1998 even if the underly

ing criminal co

nduct occurred bef

ore January 1,

1998. Thus, under the new policy

, the board postponed t

he date of Jackson’ s initial parole eligibility hearing. After his request

s to reconsider his pa

role eligibility

were denied twice by the board and once by

Georgia’s Supe

rior Courts Sentence Review Panel, Jackson filed a joint m

otion for a writ of habeas corpus pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a complaint for damages pursuant to § 1983. He alleged that by applying the new3 The board also an nounced its intent t

o review the par

ole eligibility

of 2200 similarly situated prisoners throughout Georgia. 4 policy to his offe

nse the board retroa

ctively increa

sed his punishment i

n violation of the Ex Post Fact

o Clause of the Unit

ed States Constitutio

n. The magist

rate judge recomm

ended that the distric

t court dismiss hi s habeas corpus petit ion without prejudice

for lack of exhaust

ion of administra

tive remedies , dismiss his claim for damages under § 1983, and permit his claim for equitable relief under § 1983 to proceed. Jac

kson subsequently f

iled objections to the

report and

recomme ndation and incorpora

ted a motion for

equitable judgm

ent therein. The district court

adopted the magi strate judge’s report and recom

mendation and, after conduc

ting an evidentiary

hearing, granted J

ackson’s moti

on for equitable judgment, permanently enjoined the board from enforcing the new policy against Jackson, and ordered the board to provide Jackson with an initial parole eligibility hearing within forty-five days of the order. As a result, the board held a hearing and subsequently notified the court that it granted Jackson parole. 3 Thereafter, pursuant to § 1988(b), Jackson filed the inst

ant motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $34,875 and costs in the amount of $335.21, for a total award of $35,210.21. The board objected to his motion and asserted that because Jackson fil ed a § 1983 claim “with respect to prison conditio ns,” 424 The board raise d the applicability

of the PLRA to thi

s litigation for th

e first time in its objection to Jackson’s motion.

5 Specifically, the court awarded Jackson attorney’s fees in the amount of $9194.82, and costs in the amount of $113.96, for a total award of $9308.78.

6 Jackson does not app

eal the district c

ourt’s award of

costs. 5 U.S.C. § 1997e(

a), the motion

for attorney’ s fees and costs should be governed by § 1997e(d) of the PLRA. 4 Thereafter, Jackson filed a reply brief and a supplemental ap

plication for attor

ney’s fees i

ncurred while liti

gating the underlying m

otion in the amount

of $2375. The district court

concluded that (1) § 1 997e governed Jackson’ s underlying § 1983 cl

aim and thus his m

otion for attorney ’s fees, beca use the underlying claim challenged “prison conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a); (2) § 1997e(d)’s fees res trictions do not violate

the equal protection component of the

Fifth Amendm

ent; and (3) § 1997e(d

) permits a pr

evailing plaintiff to recove

r fees-on-fees.Thus, pursuant to § 19 88 and § 1997e(d), the court granted in par

t and denied in part Ja

ckson’s motion f

or attorney’ s fees and costs and his supplem

ental application fo

r attorney’ s fees. 5 Jackson appeals the court’s applicat

ion of § 1997e(d) to his m otion for attorney ’s fees and his supplemental ap

plication for attor

ney’s fees, 6 and the board cross- appeals, challenging Jackson’ s supplemental a ttorney’s fe

es award as im

permissible fe

es-7 “We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation.” United States v. Fischer , 168

F.3d 1273, 1276 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999), aff’d , 529 U.S. 667 (2000).

8 Section 1988(b) provides in relevant part that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enfor ce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney ’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 6 on-fees. See id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (prohibiting attorne

y’s fees tha

t are not “dire

ctly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights”). DISCUSSION I. Applicability

of § 1997e(d) 7 Under § 1988(b), a

district court m

ay, in its discr

etion, award re

asonable attorney’s fees to a successf ul § 1983 plaint iff. See id. § 1988(b). 8 Accordi ngly, neither party d

isputes that, as a su

ccessful § 1983 plainti

ff, Jackson m

ay receive reasonable attorney’s fees u nder § 1988. See id. The parties disagree, however, on the applicability

of § 1997e(d) to Jackson’s underlying § 1983 claim and t

hus his motion for attorney’s fees. See id. § 1997e(d)(1) (restricting attorney’s fees awards authorize

d under § 1988 “[i] n any action broug ht by a prisoner”

). Jackson contends that § 1997e(d)

is not applicable to his

motion for attor

ney’s fees, because his § 1983 acti

on challenged the leng

th of his confinem

ent and not “prison conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). The board alleges that because Jackson’ s § 1983 action was “ brought by a prisone

r,” § 1997e(d) is applicable to his m

otion for attorney ’s fees.9 As we frequently have stated, “[w]hen the import of words Congress has used is clea r . . . we need not resort to legislative history, and we certainly should not do so to undermine the plain meaning of the statutory language.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeT ime 24 Joint Ventur

e , 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 “We begin our

construction of sect

ion 1997e[(d)] w

here courts should always begin the

process of legislat

ive interpretation,

and where they

often should end it as well, which is wi th the words of the st atutory provision.” 9 Harris v. Garner , 216 F.3d 970, 972 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (en ban c), cert. denied , 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). Section 199 7e(d) provides,

(1) Inany action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’ s fees are authorized under [42

U.S.C. §] 1988 . . ., such f ees shall not be awarded, excep

t to the extent that – (A) the fee wa

s directly and r

easonably incur

red in provin g an act ual vio lation of the p lainti ff’s rig hts pro tected by a statute pursuant to w

hich a fee may

be awarded under section 1988 . . . and (B)(i) the am

ount of the fee is pro

portionately related to the cour

t ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was

directly and re

asonably incurr

ed in enforcing the reli

ef ordered for the

violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)– (B) (footnotes omitted) (e mphasis added). Here, we must determ

ine the meaning o f the phrase “a ny action brought by

a prisoner” to decide whether § 19 97e(d) applies to Jac kson’s underlyi

ng § 1983 action and thus his motion for at

torney’s fees and his supplem ental application fo

r attorney’ s fees.8

“In the absence of a statutory definition of a term

, we look to the com

mon usage of words for their meaning.” CBS Inc. v. P rimeTime 24 Joint Venture , 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th C

ir. 2001) (interna

l quotation marks

omitted). O ften, courts look to di ctionary definitions to ascertain the common usage o f words. Id. at 1223. The diction

ary definition o f the word “a ction” is “a le

gal proceeding by which one seeks to have a wrong put right; lawsuit.” Webster’s New W orld College Dictionary

14 (Michael Agnes e

t al. eds., 4th ed. 1999); see also Black’s Law Dictionary

28 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 7th ed. 1999) (defining “ action” as “[a] civil or criminal judicial proc eeding”). Furthermore, Congress c hose “an expa nsive modif ier – the wor d ‘any’ – instead of a restrictive one.” CBS Inc. , 245 F.3d at 1223; see also United States v. Gonzales , 520 U.S. 1, 5 ( 1997) (“Read na turally, the w

ord ‘any’ has an expansive meaning . . ..”). We pre

viously stated tha

t “the adjec

tive any is not am

biguous; it has a well-established meaning.” Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach , 166 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, without any language to limit the significance of this modifier, “any means all.” CBS Inc. , 245 F.3d at 1223 (internal quotation m arks omitted).Hence, the phra se “any actio

n” covers a lawsuit

challenging the length

of an inmate’ s confinement.9

Additionally, w

e have held that the t

erm “brou

ght,” as used in subsec

tions (a) and (e) of § 1997e, means fil ed. See Harris , 216 F.3d at 974 (int erpreting the term “br ought” as used in § 1997e( e)’s “[n] o federal civil ac tion shall be brought” language to mean filed); Miller v. Tanner , 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 ( 11th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the t

erm “brou

ght” as used in § 1997e(a )’s “[n] o action shall be brought” language to m

ean filed). Nor

mally, ide ntical words that a

ppear in various parts of th e same act are meant to have the same meaning. See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States , 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“[T]here is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the sa

me meanin

g.”). Thus, the

term “br ought” as used in § 1997e(d)’s “[i]n any action brou ght” language means file d. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). Finally, we need not resort to com mon usage to dete

rmine the m

eaning of the term “prisoner” in § 1997e(d), because Congress defined that term as it is used within § 1997e as follo

ws: “any p erson incarcerat ed or detained in any

facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). As Jackson was convi cted of aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment, he is a prisoner within the meaning of § 1997e(h).10 The district court concluded that § 1997e(d) governed Jackson’s underlying § 1983 action and his motion for attorney’s fees, because the underly ing action challenged “prison conditions” within t

he meaning of § 1 997e(a). Sectio n 1997e(a) provi

des that “[n]o action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). Although Congress included the term “prison conditions” in three of § 1997e’s subsections, see id. § 1997e(a), (c)(1), (f)(1), it did not include that term in the remaining subsections, see id. § 1997e(d)(1), (e), (g), (h). Clearly, Cong ress knew how to specify “prison conditions” and purposefully chose where to do so and where not to do so. See In re Griffith , 206 F.3d 1389, 1394

(11th Cir. 2000) (e

n banc) (noting

that “[w]here Cong

ress knows how to say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling” (alteration in original) (interna l quotation marks omitted)). As Congress did not specify “prison conditions” in the subsection addressed in this a

ppeal, § 1997e(d) , we render no de cision as to whethe

r Jackson’s § 1983 c

laim challenges “prison conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). Nevertheless, we aff irm the district court’s judgment, because § 1997e(d) applies to all lawsuits that are filed by a prisoner. See Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc. , 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“[W]e may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that finds support in the record” (internal quotation marks omitted).).

11 “We review the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo .” United States v. Jackson , 111 F.3d 101, 101 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 10 Therefo re, it is appare nt that § 1997 e(d)’s p hrase “an y action brough t by a prisoner” mea

ns all lawsuits that a

re filed by a pr

isoner and is not restr

icted to lawsui ts chal lengin g “priso n condi tions ” that a re filed by a pris oner. Ac cordin gly, § 1997e(d) applies to Ja

ckson’s underly

ing § 1983 action and thus his motion for attorney’s f

ees and his supplem

ental application fo

r attorney’ s fees. 10 II. Equal Prote

ction 11 Jackson contends that § 1997e(d) violates his right to equal protection under the Fifth Ame

ndment by re stricting the attorne y’s fees aw

ards of prisoners w

hile12 Section 1997e(d) provides, (2) Whenever a mo

netary judg

ment is awarded in

an action descri

bed in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be appli ed to s atisf

y the am ount o f atto rney’s f ees aw arded again st th e defe ndant . If the award of attorney’s fees is not greate r than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be pai

d by the def

endant. (3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action desc ribed in paragraph (1) shall be based on a

n hourly rat

e greater tha

n 150 percent of t

he hourly ra

te established under section 3006A of title 18 for payment of court-appointed counsel. (4) Nothing in this

subsection shall pr

ohibit a prisoner f

rom entering int

o an agreement to pay an attorney ’s fee in an amount greater than the amount authorized under this subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by the defendant pursuant to section 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2)–(4). 11 permitting other

litigants to recover

full attorney’ s fees awards. 12 Although we previously have no

t addressed the const

itutionality of § 1 997e(d), several of our sister circuits hav

e addressed this issue

and found § 1997e(d) in i ts entirety, or

its various subsecti ons, constitutio nal. See Foulk v. Charrier , 262 F.3d 687, 704 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that § 1997e(d)(2) survives rational basis review); Walker v. Bain , 257 F.3d 660, 670 (6 th Cir. 2001) (conclu ding the same), cert. denied , 535 U.S. 1095 (2002); Hadix v. Johnson , 230 F.3d 840, 847 (6 th Cir. 2000) (concluding that § 1997e(d)(3) survives rational basis review); Boivin v. Black , 225 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that § 1997e(d)(2) survives rational basis review); Madrid v. Gomez , 190 F.3d 990, 995–96 ( 9th Cir. 1999) (find

ing that § 1997e(d) passes constitutional muster). But see Collins v. Montgomery13 While none of the courts of appeals that have addressed the constitutionality of §

1997e(d) have found it unconstitutional, one district court found § 1997e(d) unconstitutional. See Johnson v. Daley , 117 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (finding no rational relationship between § 1997e(d)’s classification and the government’s interests). 12 County Bd. of Pris

on Inspectors , 176 F.3d 679, 686 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (declining to rule upon the constitutionality of § 1997e(d)(3) because the court was divided equally on the issue). 13 We conclude, li ke our sister circu

its, that § 1997e(d) is constitutio

nal. Generally spe

aking, “legisla

tion is presumed t

o be valid and will be sustained if the cla

ssification drawn b

y the statute is r

ationally rela

ted to a legitimate [governmental] interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. , 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The level of scrutiny is heightened, however, “[i] f a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved.” Gary v. City of W arner Robins , 311 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11t h Cir. 2002). As p

risoners are not a s

uspect class, heightened scruti ny is not warranted on th at basis. Rivera v. Allin , 144 F.3d 719, 727 (11th Cir. 1998) . Jackson c ontends, however, th at § 1997e (d)’s attor ney’s fees restrictions

violate the fundam

ental right of acce ss to the courts by discouraging att orneys from taking prisoner s’ civil rights cases. Without question, “

prisoners have a con

stitutional right of ac

cess to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To have standing to seek13

relief under this r

ight, however, a

plaintiff must show actual injur y by “demonstrat[ing] that a nonfri volous legal clai m ha[s] been frustrated or . . . impeded.” Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996 ) (footnote omitted). As Jackson was repre sented by counsel and was successful in his § 1983 action, he does not have stan ding to seek relief u nder the right of acces s to the courts. See Boivin , 225 F.3d at 43 n.5 (noting that a prisoner who was represented by counsel and won his claim

did not have standing to se ek relief under the

right of access to the courts). Thus, Jackson has not demonstrated a violation of a fundamental right, and, therefore, heightened scrutiny is not wa rranted on that basis

. As § 1997e(d) does not i

nvolve a suspect clas s nor infringe upon a fundamental right, we review i ts constitution ality under the rationa l basis test. See Gary , 311 F.3d at 1338. U nder rational basis r

eview, a classif

ication within a statute “is acc

orded a strong presum

ption of validity, ” and we must up hold the statute “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Heller v. Doe e x rel. Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (interna

l quotation marks

omitted). T

he government is

not required to provide e

videntiary suppor

t for its classifications and may rely upon conjecture. Hadix , 230 F.3d at 843. T hus, Jackson bears t

he heavy burden of “negati[ng] every conceiva ble basis which m

ight support [the statu

te], whether

or14 It is irrelevant that Congress did not specify its purpose in making the classification. See Heller , 509 U.S. at 320 (“[A ] legislature tha

t creates these

categories ne

ed not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification” (inter nal quotation marks omitted).); see also Boivin , 225 F.3d at 44 n.6 ( citing the legi

slative history

of the PLRA as evidence of Congress’s goals); Harris , 216 F.3d at 977 & n.5 (citing floor statements of the PLRA’s princip

al architects to d

etermine Congr

ess’s intent beca

use the PLRA wa

s enacted “as a rider to an appropriations bill” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14 not the basis has a foundation in the record.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. United States , 169 F.3d 1342, 1350 ( 11th Cir. 1999) (inte rnal quotation ma

rks omitted). Under this highly deferential standard, we conclude that § 1997e(d) survives rational basis revie

w. Apparently

, by enacting § 19 97e(d), Congress i ntended to decrease “marginal or trivial laws uits.” 14 Hadix , 230 F.3d at 845; see also Walker , 257 F.3d at 668–69; Boivin , 225 F.3d at 45; Madrid, 190 F.3d at 996. B efore the fee cap, there was nothing to dissuade attorneys from

“adopt[ing] a

‘shotgun’ approach, filing num

erous claims in

the hopes that at lea

st a minor violat

ion would likely be found, [thus] assuring the recovery of attorneys fees.” Hadix , 230 F.3d at 845. By lowering the fees recoverable for a successful claim, “ a rational attorney [is likely t o] demand a grea ter likeli hood of su ccess befo re taking a prisoner’s case.” Id. Additionally, b

y decreasing f

rivolous claims,

“Congress could

also . . . be seeking to protect the

state and federal

treasuries, fr

om which the m

ajority of15 Jackson also contends that § 1997e(d)’s application has a disparate impact on African

American males, because they represent the majority of persons incarcerated in our prisons. As Jackson has not demonstrated any evidence of discriminatory intent, we find that this claim lacks merit. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins , 43 F.3d 609, 616 (11th Cir. 1995) (requiring “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose . . . to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause” (interna

l quotation marks omi

tted)). He furth

er contends that §

1997e(d) violate

s his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. As this issue was not raised before the district court, we decline to address it on appeal. See United States v. S. Fabricating Co. , 764 F.2d 780, 781 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“Generally, an appe llate court will not consider a legal issue or theory raised for the first time on appeal.”).

16 “We review an award of attorney’s fees by the district court only for an abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. Breeden , 280 F.3d 1308, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002). 15 prisoner civil rights awards are paid.” Id. In light of the “shotgun” approach many attor

neys utilized bef

ore the fee cap,

“Congress could

have rationally concluded that [such] prisoner civil rights litigation leads to attorney fees which are often dispropor

tionate to the harm

or injury. T

hus, by reducing the number of marginal, al

beit meritorio

us claims, som

e government re sources would be preserved.” Walker , 257 F.3d at 669. As Jackson has faile

d “to negat[e] every conceiva ble basis which m

ight support” § 1997e(d),

we must conclu

de that § 1997e(d) sur

vives rational basis review. Rodriguez , 169 F.3d at 1350 (internal quotation marks omitted). 15
III. Fees-on-Fees 16 On cross-appeal,

the board contends tha

t the district court e

rred in awarding Jackson fees-on-f

ees, because the fees-on-fees w ere not “direc

tly and reasonably incurred in provin g an actual violati on” of Jackson’s righ ts. 42 U.S.C. §16

1997e(d)(1)(A).Although we have not addressed whether

§ 1997e(d)(1) perm

its a prevailing § 1983 plaint

iff to recover fe

es-on-fees, the Third and Fifth Cir cuits have concluded th at fees-on-fees are recove rable under § 1997e (d)(1). See Volk v. Gonzalez , 262 F.3d 528, 536 (5 th Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Kalinowski , 146 F.3d 196, 200–01 (3d Cir. 1998). We agree. Section 1988(b) per

mits reasonable

attorney’s f

ees “[i]n a

ny action or proceeding to enfo rce a provision of sec tion[] . . . 1983,” 42 U.S.C. § 1988( b), and § 1997e(d)(1)(A)

permits attorn

ey’s fees f

or “proving an ac

tual violation of the plaintiff’s rights,” id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). It is well-settled that fees-on-fees are permitted under

§ 1988 even though Congre ss did not explicitlyprovide for feeson-fees therein. Hernandez , 146 F.3d at 200; s ee also Jonas v. Stack, 758 F.2d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 19 85) (“[A] prevailing party ’s counsel is entitl ed to reasonable compensation when he li tigates his own clai m for entitlement to § 1988 fee s.”). As Congress has not “express[ed] an intent to change th[is] established construction,” we will continue to follo w that construction

. Volk , 262 F.3d at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, as § 1988(b)’s language permitting fees-on-fees does not differ significantly f

rom § 1997e(d)( 1)(A)’s langua ge, we join our sister circuits in17

concluding that fees-on-fees are recoverab le under § 1997e(d)

. See id. ; Hernandez , 146 F.3d at 200–01. CONCLUSION Thus, we conclude

that § 1997e(d) applie s to Jackson’s under lying § 1983 action and thus his m

otion for attorney ’s fees and his supplemental appli cation for attorney’s f

ees. Furtherm

ore, we find that

§ 1997e(d)’s attor

ney’s fees r

estrictions survive rational basis review. Finally, we conclude that fees-on-fees are recoverable under § 1997e(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.