IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 103 / 06–1461 

Filed September 26, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

JOHN EDWARD COWLES, 

Appellee. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Daniel P. 

Wilson, Judge. 

On further review of a decision of the court of appeals affirming the 

district court’s ruling that a portion of defendant’s sentence was illegal. 

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

RULING REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Karen Doland, 

Assistant Attorneys General, and Rick Lynch, County Attorney, for 

appellant. 

 Justin Kurt Swaim of Swaim Law Firm, Bloomfield, for appellee. 

 
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HECHT, Justice.

We are asked, on further review of a decision of the court of 

appeals, to decide whether the district court erred in concluding it 

imposed an illegal mandatory minimum sentence. We conclude the 

sentence was not illegal under the circumstances presented here, and 

the district court therefore erred in correcting it. Accordingly, we vacate 

the decision of the court of appeals affirming the “correction” of the 

sentence, reverse the district court’s ruling, and remand for entry of a 

judgment reinstating the mandatory minimum sentence. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

On March 14, 2003, John Edward Cowles was charged with twenty 

counts of sexual abuse in the second degree,1 a class “B” felony, four 

counts of sexual abuse in the third degree,2 a class “C” felony, and one 

count of incest,3 a class “D” felony. The parties reached a plea 

agreement. Cowles pled guilty on July 18, 2003 to one count of sexual 

 1Each of the twenty counts alleged Cowles committed sexual abuse in the 

second degree against his minor daughter in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 

709.3(2) “[o]n or about April 9, 1996 through February 2, 1997” when the victim was 

under the age of 12. 

2Count XXI alleged Cowles committed sexual abuse in the third degree in 

violation of Iowa Code section 709.1 and section 709.4(2)(b) between the dates of 

February 3, 1997 and February 2, 1998 when his daughter was 12 or 13 years of age. 

Count XXII alleged Cowles violated the same statutes between the dates of February 3, 

1998 and February 2, 1999. Count XXIII charged Cowles with acts of sexual abuse 

against the same victim in violation of Iowa Code section 709.1 and section 

709.4(2)(c)(1)–(4) between the dates of February 3, 1999 and February 2, 2000 when his 

daughter was 14 or 15 years old. In count XXIV, the State alleged Cowles violated the 

same statutes between the dates of February 3, 2000 and February 2, 2001. 

3Count XXV of the information alleged Cowles committed incest between 

February 3, 2001 and February 2, 2002 in violation of Iowa Code section 726.2. 
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abuse in the second degree,4 four counts of sexual abuse in the third 

degree, and one count of incest. 

To establish a factual basis for Cowles’s guilty plea to the class “B” 

felony, the district court asked Cowles if he engaged in a sex act with his 

daughter “prior to February 3, 1997.” Cowles responded affirmatively. 

The district court informed Cowles that, if convicted, he would be 

required to serve a minimum of seventy percent of the sentence for the 

class “B” felony. After Cowles’s counsel affirmed he had advised his 

client of the relevant maximum and minimum penalties, the court 

accepted Cowles’s guilty plea.5 

Cowles requested he be sentenced the same day. The prosecutor 

and Cowles’s counsel jointly recommended Cowles be sentenced to the 

maximum sentences of twenty-five years on the class “B” felony, ten 

years on each of the four class “C” felonies, and five years on the class 

“D” felony, with the sentences to run concurrently. In imposing the 

sentence, the court noted Iowa Code section 902.12 prescribes a 

mandatory minimum period of incarceration for conviction of sexual 

abuse in the second degree. 

 Cowles subsequently filed an application for correction of illegal 

sentence asserting the sentence violated state and federal constitutional 

prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The district court concluded the 

 4Cowles pled guilty to only one class “B” felony: Count XX. Although the 

information did not expressly allege the crime charged in that count occurred in 

January of 1997, the prosecutor asserted in the district court and the State asserts on 

appeal that the twenty class “B” felonies occurred at the rate of two per month during 

the months of April 1996 through January 1997. Thus, according to the State’s theory, 

the crime charged in count XX was committed by Cowles in January 1997. The other 

nineteen counts of sexual abuse in the second degree were dismissed consistent with 

the terms of the plea agreement. 

5The plea colloquy conducted by the sentencing court also addressed the other 

five offenses to which Cowles pled guilty. As Cowles’s pleas to those offenses are not at 

issue in this appeal, we do not discuss them here. 
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mandatory minimum sentence imposed under Iowa Code section 902.12 

for the conviction on count XX violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in 

Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and the corollary 

clause found in article I, section 21 of the Iowa Constitution because the 

plea colloquy did not establish the crime of sexual abuse in the second 

degree was committed before July 1, 1996, the effective date of the 

statute. The court concluded “where the record does not establish 

otherwise, [the] court must presume the [sentence] may have been based 

on pre-July 1, 1996 acts.” Having concluded the sentence originally 

imposed was unconstitutional and therefore illegal, the district court 

“corrected” Cowles’s sentence by deleting from the judgment entry the 

reference to the applicability of section 902.12. 

The State sought, and this court granted, discretionary review of 

the district court’s ruling. We transferred the case to the court of 

appeals, and that court affirmed the district court’s ruling. We granted 

the State’s application for further review. 

II. Scope of Review.

Ordinarily we review for errors at law a case challenging the 

legality of a sentence. State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 

1997). In this instance, however, Cowles claimed and the district court 

concluded the sentence on the class “B” felony violated the Ex Post Facto 

clauses of the Iowa and United States Constitutions. We review 

constitutional claims de novo. State v. Corwin, 616 N.W.2d 600, 601 

(Iowa 2000). When performing de novo review, “we must make ‘an 

independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by 

the entire record.’ ” State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1997) 

(quoting State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995)). 
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III. Discussion.

 Iowa Code section 902.12 became effective on July 1, 1996. 1996 

Iowa Acts ch. 1151, § 3. As originally adopted, the statute required a 

person convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree to “serve one 

hundred percent of the maximum term of the person’s sentence . . . .” 

An amendment of the measure which became effective on July 1, 2003 

provided in relevant part: 

A person serving a sentence for conviction of the following 

felonies shall be denied parole or work release unless the 

person has served at least seven-tenths of the maximum 

term of the person’s sentence: 

. . . . 

3. Sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of section 

709.3. 

2003 Iowa Acts ch. 156, § 11. As we have already noted, the district 

court concluded the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by this 

statute could not be imposed on Cowles consistent with the Ex Post 

Facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 

The United States Constitution states, “[n]o State shall . . . pass 

any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Ex Post Facto 

Clause prohibits: (1) making criminal and punishing an act that was 

innocent when done; (2) reclassifying a crime as a greater offense after it 

was committed; (3) attaching greater punishment to a crime after it was 

committed; and (4) altering the rules of evidence after the crime in order 

to convict an offender. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42, 110 S. Ct. 

2715, 2719, 111 L. Ed. 2d 30, 39 (1990).

The Iowa Constitution similarly states, “[n]o ex post facto law . . . 

shall ever be passed.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 21. “Both the federal and 

state constitutions’ Ex Post Facto Clauses ‘forbid the application of a new 
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punitive measure to conduct already committed,’ and may also be 

violated ‘when a statute makes more burdensome the punishment for a 

crime after its commission.’ ” State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 666–67 

(Iowa 2005) (quoting Schreiber v. State, 666 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Iowa 

2003)); see also State v. Klindt, 542 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa 1996); State 

v. Soppe, 374 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1985). 

Under the circumstances presented in this case, we conclude the 

mandatory minimum sentence did not violate the Ex Post Facto clauses. 

At his plea and sentencing hearing, Cowles expressly admitted he 

perpetrated a sex act on a victim under 12 years of age between April 9, 

1996 and February 2, 1997. Cowles also acknowledged he wished to 

plead guilty after he was advised he would be required to serve at least 

seventy percent of the maximum sentence for the offense. Although it is 

true Cowles did not expressly admit during the plea colloquy he 

committed the offense after July 1, 1996, we find an implicit admission 

of such conduct in the full context of the hearing. 

The record made by the parties on the occasion of the plea-taking 

and sentencing hearing evidences Cowles admitted guilt for an act of 

sexual abuse that occurred after July 1, 1996. The mandatory minimum 

sentence requirement of section 902.12 applied only to acts of sexual 

abuse committed after that date. As we have already noted, the court 

informed Cowles an admission of guilt would expose him to a mandatory 

minimum sentence. With knowledge of that prospect, and after his 

counsel confirmed on the record he had advised his client of the 

maximum and minimum penalties that could result, Cowles entered and 

the court accepted the guilty plea. We conclude the guilty plea and the 

resulting sentence conformed completely with the parties’ plea 

agreement. This conclusion is supported by the fact Cowles did not 
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challenge the legality of the sentence until he filed an application for 

postconviction relief more than two years later on August 4, 2005. 

Under the circumstances, we conclude no violation of the Ex Post Facto 

clauses occurred here. 

This case must be distinguished from cases in which a general jury 

verdict of guilt leaves the court with uncertainty as to whether the verdict 

is based on a valid factual or legal basis, or on an alternative invalid 

theory submitted to the jury. When such uncertainty arises from a jury 

verdict, the court will not speculate as to whether the verdict is based on 

the valid or invalid grounds. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 354–

56 (Iowa 1976) (noting the court will not speculate whether a guilty 

verdict is based on a constitutionally repugnant or alternative 

constitutionally sound ground). In such cases of uncertainty, a 

conviction cannot stand. 

The conviction of Cowles is not similarly vulnerable as the parties 

and the sentencing court were left with no uncertainty as to the crime for 

which Cowles was convicted and sentenced. He admitted guilt for a 

crime that was committed after July 1, 1996 and was sentenced 

accordingly. The sentencing court’s application of section 902.12 did not 

result in an illegal sentence. 

IV. Conclusion.

The mandatory minimum sentence was not illegal under the 

circumstances presented here. The district court therefore erred in 

“correcting” it. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the 

district court’s ruling, and remand for entry of a judgment reinstating the 

original sentence. 

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

RULING REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.