IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 52 / 07–0172 

Filed August 29, 2008 

MONIQUE RHODEN and CURT W. CANFIELD, 

on behalf of themselves and others Similarly Situated, 

 Appellees, 

vs. 

THE CITY OF DAVENPORT, IOWA, 

 Appellant. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. 

McKenrick, Judge. 

 Decision of the district court granting summary judgment and 

certifying the class action is reversed. REVERSED.

 Craig A. Levien and Peter J. Thill of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, 

P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant. 

Thomas D. Waterman and Richard A. Davidson of Lane & 

Waterman, LLP, Davenport, and Catherine Z. Cartee of Cartee & Clausen 

Law Firm, P.C., Davenport, for appellees. 
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APPEL, Justice. 

In this case, plaintiffs brought a class action challenging the 

validity of the Davenport Automated Traffic Enforcement (ATE) 

ordinance. See Davenport Mun. Code § 10.16.070 (2005). On cross 

motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the 

Davenport ATE ordinance was preempted by state traffic regulations and 

therefore was invalid. The district court also held that the City was not 

entitled to summary judgment on its claim that the individual plaintiffs 

who paid the civil penalty voluntarily waived their right to recover against 

the City. In a subsequent order, the district court certified the class and 

ruled that plaintiffs who had paid the civil fine were entitled to recover 

against the City. We granted the City’s application for interlocutory 

review. 

In City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533 (2008), we 

considered whether the Davenport ATE ordinance is impliedly preempted 

by the same statutes cited by the plaintiffs in this case—Iowa Code 

chapter 321 and sections 364.22(5)(b), 805.6, and 805.8A. In Seymour, 

we held that the Davenport ATE ordinance was not preempted by the 

cited state law. Although the plaintiffs here characterize their 

preemption analysis as one of express, not implied, preemption, this has 

no effect on the outcome of this case. Implied preemption analysis is 

employed only where the legislature fails to expressly preempt local 

action. Nothing in either chapter 321 or sections 364.22(5)(b), 805.6, 

and 805.8A expressly preempts municipalities from creating civil money 

penalties for traffic infractions. Thus the Davenport ATE ordinance is 

not impliedly or expressly preempted by the cited state law. 
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In addition to the claims raised in Seymour, the plaintiffs allege 

that the Davenport ATE ordinance is preempted because it is 

inconsistent with Iowa Code sections 805.9, 805.12, 602.8106(1), and 

364.22(6). Sections 805.9, 805.12, and 602.8106(1) concern the proper 

procedure for collecting fines for criminal traffic violations. This court 

concluded in Seymour, however, that the Davenport ATE ordinance 

provides for a civil violation that is parallel to and not preempted by the 

criminal scheme outlined in Iowa Code chapter 321. Any perceived 

inconsistency with sections 805.9, 805.12, and 602.8106(1), therefore, 

does not defeat the Davenport ATE ordinance. 

Iowa Code section 364.22(6) concerns the proper procedure for 

collecting civil penalties for municipal infractions. That section provides 

in relevant part, “All penalties or forfeitures collected by the court for 

municipal infractions shall be remitted to the city in the same manner as 

fines and forfeitures are remitted for criminal violations under section 

602.8106.” Iowa Code § 364.22(6) (emphasis added). Section 602.8106 

requires fines to be collected by the clerk of court. Ninety percent of the 

fine is thereafter remitted to the city which prosecuted the action. Id.

§ 364.22. Plaintiffs contend that the Davenport ATE ordinance is 

inconsistent with this requirement because it provides that civil fines 

under the ordinance are payable to the City at the City’s finance 

department. Davenport Mun. Code § 10.16.070(D)(1)–(2). 

 Assuming that section 364.22 applies to the Davenport ATE 

ordinance, we nevertheless conclude that the two provisions are not 

“irreconcilable.” City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 

1990). Section 364.22(6) provides that all civil penalties collected by the 

court be payable to the clerk of court and then remitted to the city. The 
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Davenport ATE ordinance, alternatively, requires only that payments for 

unchallenged violations, which do not involve the court, be payable to 

the City’s finance department. As a result, no conflict exists between the 

two provisions and the Davenport ATE ordinance is not preempted by 

section 364.22(6). 

For the reasons expressed above and in Seymour, the district court 

order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the ground that 

the Davenport ATE ordinance is preempted by state traffic and 

enforcement regulations is reversed. In light of this disposition, it is not 

necessary to address the other issues raised in this appeal. 

REVERSED. 

 All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who dissents and Baker, J., 

who takes no part. 

 
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#52/07–0172, Rhoden v. City of Davenport

WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting). 

 I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in City of Davenport 

v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 545 (Iowa 2008) (Wiggins, J., dissenting).