alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

July Term 2014

DUANE M. BLAKE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D14-1816

[November 12, 2014]

Appeal from order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Robin Lee Rosenberg, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 502009CF012955A.

Duane M. Blake, Madison, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the summary denial of grounds one through five and seven 

of appellant’s pro se motion for post-conviction relief. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.850. However, as to ground six, we reverse and remand with directions 

to grant the appellant an evidentiary hearing. See Morales v. State, 731 

So. 2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In ground six, appellant alleged that trial 

counsel failed to call an available defense witness who would have testified 

that the victim of the shooting was pointing a firearm at appellant when 

he shot his firearm, thus potentially corroborating appellant’s asserted 

self-defense claim. See Morales, 731 So. 2d at 92; see also Moran v. State, 

750 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Balmori v. State, 985 So. 2d 646, 

650-651 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Spellers v. State, 993 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2008). 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. 

GROSS, CONNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *
2

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-19-00142-CV

Lickety Split Express, Inc., Appellant

v.

Lyndee Solutions, Inc., Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY

NO. 3734, THE HONORABLE EDWARD F. JANECKA, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

This is an appeal from a summary judgment rendered by the Fayette County

Court in a suit on a sworn account filed by appellee, Lyndee Solutions, Inc. against appellant

Lickety Split Express, Inc. We will reverse the judgment.

After suit was filed, then-counsel for Lickety Split filed a general denial. 

Thereafter, Lyndee filed a motion for summary judgment. The hearing on the motion for 

summary judgment was set for December 5, 2018.

About a week before the scheduled hearing, Lickety Split retained new counsel,

who only learned of the setting for the hearing when he called the clerk’s office. Counsel then 

telephoned counsel for Lyndee, who agreed to continue the hearing. Counsel notified the court 

coordinator of the agreement and was told that the hearing would be passed. Lickety Split filed 

the agreed motion for continuance and a motion for leave to file a response to the summaryjudgment motion on December 5. However, the trial court had already signed the summary 
2

judgment affording Lyndee’s requested relief on December 4, before the time of the scheduled 

hearing. Lickety Split first received notice of the December 4 judgment on January 9, 2019,

when counsel telephoned the court to determine the status of the agreed motion for continuance.1

Lickety Split filed a motion for new trial on January 9, which the trial court 

denied on January 30. Lickety Split maintains in this Court that the trial court erred in rendering 

summary judgment before the scheduled hearing date. We agree.

When a hearing on a motion for summary judgment has been scheduled, and the 

trial court grants the motion before the scheduled hearing, the court violates the non-moving 

party’s procedural due process right to be heard. Texas Integrated Conveyor Systems, Inc. v. 

Innovative Conveyer Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 363–64 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.

denied); see Campbell v. Stucki, 220 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.); 

Timothy Patton, Summary Judgments in Texas § 2.01[4][a] (Lexis Nexis 3rd ed. 2018).

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

__________________________________________

Bob E. Shannon, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Smith, and Shannon*

Reversed and Remanded

Filed: February 14, 2020

* Before Bob E. Shannon, Chief Justice (retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.

See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).

1 The trial court conducted a Rule 306a hearing, concluding that Lickety Split or its 

attorney first either received notice of the final judgment signed December 4, 2018, or acquired

actual knowledge of the signing on January 9, 2019, a time more than twenty days after the 

final judgment was signed. Accordingly, the motion for new trial was timely filed, see Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 306a(4), and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                        TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP.
                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report of Travelers Property Casualty Corp. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Jay S. Benet, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

Dated this 2nd day of March, 2004

/s/ Jay S. Benet
--------------------------
Jay S. Benet
Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                      21,229,372
<SECURITIES>                                16,473,613
<RECEIVABLES>                               74,985,257
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 52,753,936
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           208,957,238
<PP&E>                                     639,926,112
<DEPRECIATION>                            (41,079,844)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             821,355,666
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      155,165,167
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       167,669
<OTHER-SE>                                 173,211,723
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               821,355,666
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           147,353,798
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              130,435,281
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               530,420
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           9,699,154
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,881,512)
<INCOME-TAX>                               (1,152,606)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,728,906)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.10)
        

</TABLE>
Freddie HUFF, Petitioner-Appellee, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent-Appellant.

No. COA15-889.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

April 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
Matthew Clark FLETCHER, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF the STATE of North Carolina, et. al., Defendants.

No. COA15-861.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 15, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
----

(2004/C 65 E/179)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2502/03

by Martin Callanan (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(29 July 2003)

Subject:   The Draft EU REACH Regulation

Following the interview on BBC Radio 4's Today programme on 10 July, can the Commission explain whether a comment made by Commissioner Wallström:

reflects the Commission's new policy on the Draft EU REACH Regulation?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(16 September 2003)

The reply of the Member of the Commission in charge of Environment does indeed reflect the Commission's policy on Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH), as set out in the White Paper on the Strategy for a future Chemicals Policy of February 2001 (1) and subsequently developed in the draft that formed the basis of the recent Internet consultation. There is no need to test chemicals for which adequate information is already available or for which adequate information can be obtained by other means. Furthermore, when the exposure to a chemical is very limited, such as for certain types of intermediates, the potential risk does not generally merit the performance of tests.

----

(1)  COM(2001) 88 final.

----
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   Exhibit 10.9

                             AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT

     The Agreement Regarding Initial Employment Terms, dated as of December 2,
1996, between The Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB and Fred B. Koons, is
hereby amended, effective as of May 12, 1997, to replace the clause "Hostile
Change in Control" where it appears therein with the clause "Transfer of
Control."

                                                  AGREED AND ACCEPTED

                                                  THE DIME SAVINGS BANK OF
                                                  NEW YORK, FSB

                                                  By: /S/LAWRENCE J. TOAL
                                                      -------------------------

                                                     /s/FRED B. KOONS
                                                     --------------------------
                                                        FRED B. KOONS
1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-3525

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Brenda Louise Niehaus, also known as *

Brenda Louise Alexander, also known * [UNPUBLISHED]

as Linda Alexander, also known as *

Linda Louise Alexander, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: August 20, 2008

Filed: September 12, 2008

___________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After revoking her supervised release, the district court1

 sentenced Brenda

Louise Niehaus to 7 days in prison and 1 year of supervised release with a special

condition requiring her to reside in a residential re-entry center for up to 120 days. On

appeal, Niehaus argues that her confinement in a residential re-entry center is
-2-

unreasonable, and that her revocation sentence is greater than necessary to meet the

statutory goals of sentencing.

Niehaus’s challenge to this condition of her sentence is moot because she has

been released from the residential re-entry center. Cf. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.

1, 5-7, 18 (1998) (habeas challenge to parole revocation became moot upon expiration

of sentence). After careful review, we conclude that her revocation sentence, which

is within statutory limits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583, is not unreasonable, see United States

v. Tyson, 413 F.3d 824, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (court reviews revocation

sentences under “unreasonableness” standard announced in United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220, 258-63 (2005)); see also United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F. 3d 1120,

1123 (8th Cir. 2005) (reasonableness of sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion,

which occurs if court fails to consider relevant factor that should have received

significant weight, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or

considers only appropriate factors but commits clear error of judgment in weighing

factors).

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

______________________________
STATE of North Carolina v. Andrew Darrin RAMSEUR.

No. 388A10.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 17, 2016.

Daniel Shatz, Assistant Appellate Defender, for State of N.C.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Amy Kunstling Irene, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Ramseur, Andrew Darrin.

Jonathan Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Sarah Kirkman, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

*AMENDED ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 9th of April 2015 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Iredell County, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court of that County:

> *900"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of March 2016."

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. A record necessary for determination of the issues presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari shall be filed on or before April 22, 2016. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 13(a)(2).
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 26, 2018

No. 04

- 17

- 00058

- CR

David Alexander ZUNIGA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CR4390B

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The State ’ s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is GRANTED. The State ’ s brief is

deemed filed.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 26th day of September, 2018

.

___________________________________ K eith E. H ottle

Clerk of Court
Exhibit 32
                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                         18 U.S.C. 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection with the Quarterly Report of AEI Income  &  Growth
Fund  XXI Limited Partnership (the "Partnership") on Form  10-QSB
for  the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the
undersigned, Robert P. Johnson, President of AEI Fund  Management
XXI,  Inc., the Managing General Partner of the Partnership,  and
Patrick  W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer of AEI Fund Management
XXI,  Inc., each certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as  adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The  Report  fully  complies with the  requirements  of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934; and

     2.   The   information  contained  in  the   Report   fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Partnership.


                          /s/ Robert P Johnson
                              Robert P. Johnson, President
                              AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              January 7, 2008



                          /s/ Patrick W Keene
                              Patrick W. Keene, Chief Financial Officer
                              AEI Fund Management XXI, Inc.
                              Managing General Partner
                              January 7, 2008
**EXHIBIT 32.1****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Applix, Inc. (the “Company”) for theperiod ended March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), the undersigned, David C. Mahoney, President and Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                            /s/ David C. Mahoney  Date: May 15, 2006 David C. Mahoney   President and Chief Executive Officer
# C_2008197EN.01002101.xml

| 2.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 197/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 197/21

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18 June 2008 — Coca-Cola v OHIM — San Polo (MEZZOPANE)

(Case T-175/06) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for Community figurative trade mark MEZZOPANE - Earlier national word marks MEZZO and MEZZOMIX - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 - No likelihood of confusion)

(2008/C 197/35)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: The Coca-Cola Company (Atlanta, Georgia, United States) (represented by: E. Armijo Chávarri and A. Castán Pérez-Gómez, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: O. Montalto and L. Rampini, Agents)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the Court of First Instance: San Polo Srl (Montalcino, Italy) (represented by: G. Casucci and F. Luciani, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the Court of First Instance:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 April 2006 (Case R 99/2005-1) concerning opposition proceedings between The Coca-Cola Company and San Polo Srl.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action.

| 2. | Orders The Coca-Cola Company to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders The Coca-Cola Company to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 212 of 2.9.2006.

1

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
STATEMENTS  FOR THE THREE  AND NINE  MONTHS  ENDED  JANUARY  31,  1997 AND AS OF
JANUARY 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                    0000930817
<NAME> PL BRANDS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                    1
<CURRENCY>                      US dollars
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Apr-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 Nov-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   Jan-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         6,493
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  467,568
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    137,228
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               621,832
<PP&E>                                         815,013
<DEPRECIATION>                                 599,324
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 837,521
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          701,302
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       4,120
<OTHER-SE>                                     (1,206,873)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   837,521
<SALES>                                        1,945,856
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1,945,856
<CGS>                                          1,756,004
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  286,994
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (29,207)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (126,349)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (126,349)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (126,349)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.03)
        



</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Andrew F. Puzder, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of CKE Restaurants, Inc.; and
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ ANDREW F. PUZDERAndrew F. PuzderChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)


Date: May 4, 2012
STATE of North Carolina, v. Xavier HACKNEY, Defendant.

No. COA15-82.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 6, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
# C_2008092EN.01002401.xml

| 12.4.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 92/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.4.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 92/24

---

Order of the President of the Court of 11 February 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland

(Case C-423/06) (1)

1

(2008/C 92/46)

Language of the case: Polish

Language of the case: Polish

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 326, 30.12.2006.

1

---