* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no pre cedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-20180

(Summary Calendar)

CORLIS T. SIMMONS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND

TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-94-2803)

November 3, 1995

Before WIENER, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM * :

In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff-Appellant

Corlis T. Simmons challenges the district court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee American Telephone and

Telegraph Company (AT&T). Concluding that Simmons failed to meet1 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

2 Simmons detailed other allegedly discrim inatory incidents

before the district court, but she does not raise them on appeal.

2 the evidentiary burden established for Title VII plaintiffs under

McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green 1 and its progeny, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Simmons, an African-American, has been employed as an account

executive (AE) at AT&T for several years; in fact, the parties'

appellate briefs suggest that Simmons still works for AT&T. On

appeal, Si mmons asserts that on four specific occasions between

1992 and 1994, she was subjected to unfair empl oyment practices

that were not inflicted on similarly situated, white employees at

AT&T. 2 First, Simmons contends that her sales manager, James

Priestly, removed a lucrative account from her control and placed

it under the direction of a white AE. According to Simmons, that

transfer of accounts caused a decrease in her income, as the

compensation received by AEs depends in part on the revenue value

of their accounts. Second, Simmons asserts that when she and

several white employees were chosen to receive the company's Sales

Vice President (SVP) Award for having made an outstanding sale, the

white employees were given higher compensation despite having

produced less in sales. Third, Priestly allegedly accused Simmons

on one occasion of using cocaine. More specifically, on the date

in question, Simmons mentioned that she neede d to get her can of

Coke from a co-worker's desk, to which Priestly allegedly3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.

4 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. Simmons also brought various

claims under Texas state law, but she does not renew those claims

on appeal.

5 See Cavallini v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. , 44 F.3d

256, 266 (5th Cir. 1995)

.

6 See Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp.

, 58 F.3d 1063, 1 065

(5th Cir. 1995)

.

3 responded, "Going to retrieve your drugs, huh?" Finally, Priestly

and other AT&T managers suppo sedly refused to help Simmons track

r evenue which she claimed had been wrongly attributed to another

AE.

In August 1994, Simmons filed suit against AT&T in district

court, alleging inter alia that she had been discriminated against

in violation of Title VII 3 and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (§

1981). 4 After both parties had conducted fairly extensive

discovery, the district court granted AT&T's mo tion for summary

judgment dismissing Simmons's complaint, and she timely appealed.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts

and inferences in the light most favorable to the non -moving

party; 5 and we apply the same standards as those governing the

lower court in its determination. 6 Summary judgment must be

granted if a court determines "that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the mo ving party is entitled to a7 F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c).

8 See Burden v. General Dynamics Corp.

, 60 F.3d 213, 216 (5th

Cir. 1995)

.

9 411 U.S. 792.

1 0 Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R. Co. , 760 F.2d 633

(5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

Burdine

, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)), abrogated on other grounds

, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks , 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).

1 1 The allocation of evidenti ary burdens established in

McDonnell also applies to Simmons's § 1981 claim. S ee Marcantel v.

State of La ., Dept. of Transp. & Dev. , 37 F.3d 197, 198 n.4 (5th

Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., Inc.

, 26 F.3d 1277,

1284 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1099 (1995).

4 judgment as a matter of law." 7 If any element of the plaintiff's

case lacks fa ctual support, a defendant's motion for summary

judgment should be granted. 8 Applying this standard, we conclude

that the district court properly granted summary judgment for AT&T.

B. T HE M ERITS OF S IMMONS ' S C LAIM

The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 9

delineated special rules of proof fo r employment discrimination

claims. The M cDonnell standard reflects an effort "`to sharpen the

inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional

discrimination.'" 10 Recognizing that direct evidence of

discrimination is rarely available, McDonnell and its progeny have

set forth the steps of an evidentiary "minuet" through which the

partie s may in turn establish, rebut, and rebuild a permissible

inference of discrimination. 11

The steps of the minuet are as follows: First, the plaintiff

must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance12 See Burdine , 450 U.S. at 252.

1 3 See Waggoner v. City of Garland, Tex. , 987 F.2d 1160, 1163-

64.

1 4 See Burdine

, 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell

, 411 U.S. at

802).

1 5 See Burdine

, 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell

, 411 U.S. at

804); Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 14 F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir.

1994) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center , 113 S. Ct. 2742).

16 Davis , 14 F.3d at 1087.

5 of the evidence. 12 The showing required to establish a prima facie

case is generally minimal: The plaintiff need only prove that he

or she (1) is within the protected class, (2) is qualified for the

job in question, and (3) has been treated less favorably than

employees outside of the protected class. 13 If the plaintiff

successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the difference in treatment. 14 Finally, if the defendant

successfully performs that second step, the pla intiff must show

that the employer's articulated reasons were not its true reasons,

but were merely pretexts for discrimination. 15 If this macabre

dance lasts that long, a trial ensues in which the plaintiff has

the burden of proving that a Title VII violation occurred. 16

Even if we assume, arguendo, that Simmons has presented a

prima facie case of discrimination, she has nonetheless failed to

meet the burdens imposed by McDonnell ; and so the district court

properly entered summary judgment for AT&T. As to the first two

instances of alleged discrimination, AT&T presented to the district

court legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions of its17 See Waggoner

, 987 F.2d at 1164, 1166; Molnar v. Ebasco

Constructors, Inc. , 986 F.2d 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1993).

1 8 See Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co. , 58 F.3d 144 (5th

Cir. 1995); Guthrie v. Tifco Industries

, 941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.

1991), cert. denied , 503 U.S. 908 (1992);

6 managers. First, in a deposition given under oath, Priestly

maintained that he had removed Simmons from the account in question

after he received a phone call from the client complaining about

Simmons's performance. Similarly, Priestly explained that Simmons

had in fact not been selected for an SVP award; rather, after a

branch manager erroneously announced that Simmons was to receive

the award, AT&T managers accumulated money to give to her so that

she would not be disappointed or embarrassed. In response, Simmons

offered no competent evidence to show that eith er of Priestly's

benign explanations amounted to pretext. We have consistently held

that a plaintiff's subjective beliefs and conclusionary

allegations, unsupported even by circumstantial evidence, are

insufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination in the face of

evidence sh owing an adequate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

behavior at issue. 17

Likewise, Simmons cannot re ly on her final two alleged

i nstances of differential treatment to establish an employment

discrimination claim. Even assuming that Priestly made the "Coke"

s tatement and that the comment was somehow infused with implicit

racial overtones S Q which, candidly, we cannot discern SQ such vagu e

,

"stray remarks" are insufficient to establish discrimination. 18

Moreover, Simmons produced no factual evidence to support her bald7

assertion that AT&T managers fail ed to help her track "lost"

revenue. In the face of the numerous documents and affidavits

produced by AT&T to show that the revenue in question had in fact

been traced to her account, Simmons's conclusionary allegations

fail to raise any genuine factual issue, much less to support a

finding of racial discrimination.

In summary, we conclude that none of the incidents addressed

by Simmons am ounts to a violation of Title VII or of § 1981.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary

judgment for AT&T.

AFFIRMED.