06-0833-cr

USA v. Santos

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 August Term, 2007

4 (Argued: June 2, 2008 Decided: September 2, 2008)

5 Docket No. 06-0833-cr

6 -------------------------------------

7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

8 Appellee,

9 - v -

10 MANUEL SANTOS,

11 Defendant-Appellant.

12 -------------------------------------

13 Before: McLAUGHLIN, SACK, and LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

14 Appeal by the defendant Manuel Santos from a judgment

15 of conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern

16 District of New York (David G. Trager, Judge) for murder while

17 engaging in a drug offense punishable under 21 U.S.C.

18 § 841(b)(1)(A), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). On

19 appeal, the defendant raises questions of statutory

20 interpretation with respect to section 848(e)(1)(A) and argues

21 that the evidence presented was insufficient for conviction.

22 Affirmed.

23 CARRIE CAPWELL, Assistant United States

24 Attorney (Benton J. Campbell, United

25 States Attorney for the Eastern District

26 of New York, Jo Ann M. Navickas,

27 Assistant United States Attorney, of

28 counsel), Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
2

1 PHILIP R. SCHATZ, Wrobel & Schatz LLP,

2 New York, NY, for Appellant.

3 SACK, Circuit Judge:

4 Defendant Manuel Santos was convicted, following a jury

5 trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern

6 District of New York (David G. Trager, Judge), of the murders of

7 Wilber Garces and Edgardo Bryan while engaging in a drug offense

8 punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), in violation of 21

9 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), and for possession and discharge of a

10 firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18

11 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). He was sentenced principally to two

12 concurrent terms of life imprisonment and a consecutive term of

13 imprisonment of ten years.

14 On appeal, Santos raises questions of statutory

15 interpretation, and a related challenge to the sufficiency of the

16 evidence pertaining to his drug-related murder conviction under

17 section 848(e)(1)(A). We are asked to determine: (1) whether

18 section 848(e)(1)(A) requires the government to prove that the

19 defendant was, at the time of the murder, "actively engaged in

20 drug dealing," Appellant's Br. 39; (2) what type of nexus the

21 statute requires between a murder and a drug offense; and, in

22 light of our answers to those questions, (3) whether the evidence

23 adduced at Santos's trial was sufficient to support his

24 conviction.

25 We conclude that (1) because some drug conspiracies in

26 violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 are "punishable under" section
3

1 841(b)(1)(A), criminal liability under section 848(e)(1)(A)

2 requires no active involvement in drug distribution; (2) the

3 nexus between a murder and a drug offense need not be more than

4 the "substantive connection" described in United States v.

5 Desinor, 525 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2008); and (3) the evidence

6 adduced at trial that Santos killed Garces and Bryan while

7 engaging in a drug offense punishable under 21 U.S.C.

8 § 841(b)(1)(A) was sufficient for a jury to convict him under 21

9 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). We therefore affirm.

10 BACKGROUND

11 In setting forth the factual background of this appeal,

12 we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

13 government, and insofar as we draw inferences, we draw them in

14 the government's favor. See United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d

15 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2004).

16 Santos's involvement in the murders of thirty-year-old

17 Wilber Garces and fourteen-year-old Edgardo Bryan arose from his

18 acquaintance with Carlos Medina. Medina was a cooperating

19 witness whose testimony was central to the government's case at

20 trial. Medina worked for German Dario Polanco, a Colombian drug

21 boss who sold large quantities of cocaine and marijuana. As

22 Polanco's "enforcer," Medina collected drug debts and committed

23 acts of violence on Polanco's behalf.

24 In September 2000, Polanco instructed Medina to hire

25 some men to kill "Ronnie" and "El Ranco," two men Polanco blamed

26 for stealing $316,000 in cocaine proceeds from him in 1998. 
 A DEA expert witness on wholesale cocaine prices testified 1

that $316,000 would buy ten to eighteen kilograms of cocaine in

early 1998, the year of the alleged robbery, and eleven to

fifteen kilograms in September 2000, when the killings occurred.

4

1 Medina, in turn, hired Alex Core to commit the murders, and Core

2 subsequently enlisted Santos in the effort.

3 Medina and Santos first met on the morning of the

4 murders, September 26, 2000. According to the testimony of

5 Medina -- the cooperating witness -- Santos "wanted to know

6 everything." Trial Tr. 322, United States v. Santos, No. 01-cr7 537 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2004). Santos first asked about the "job." 

8 Id. at 321. Medina explained that Polanco, whom Medina referred

9 to as his "uncle," was a "traquetero" -- which he said was a

10 "Caribbean" word for a well-connected, heavy-selling drug dealer

11 -- who wanted two men killed for robbing him of $316,000. Id. 1

12 at 321-22. Santos then asked Medina the price at which he and

13 his "uncle" sold "the kilos" of cocaine, and how much he would be

14 paid for the killings. Id. at 322. Medina told Santos that he

15 and Core had agreed to "$7,500 per head." Id. The trio drove to

16 a parking lot on 102nd Street in Queens so that Medina and Core

17 could point out Ronnie's house to Santos. Santos said, "These

18 motherfuckers are dead with me today." Id. at 339.

19 That evening, Santos, Medina, and Core returned to the

20 parking lot across from Ronnie's house and waited. Two people

21 exited the house, got into a car in the same parking lot where

22 the trio was waiting, and began to back the car out. Santos
 Santos was also charged with a firearms offense related to 2

the killings, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), but that count

is a tangential issue on this appeal.

5

1 maneuvered his vehicle to block its exit. He and Core jumped out

2 and opened fire. Garces and Bryan were killed.

3 The killings were a mistake. Neither Garces nor Bryan

4 had been Polanco's intended target.

5 Santos was indicted for the murders. The indictment

6 charged that Santos,

7 while engaging in an offense punishable under

8 Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the

9 United States Code, to wit: conspiring to

10 distribute five kilograms or more of a

11 substance containing cocaine, a Schedule II

12 controlled substance, in violation of Section

13 846 of Title 21, United States Code, did

14 knowingly and intentionally kill, counsel,

15 command, induce, procure and cause the

16 intentional killings of Wilber Garces [and

17 Edgardo Bryan], and such killing[s] did

18 result.

19 Indictment 1-2, United States v. Santos, No. 01-cr-537 (E.D.N.Y.

20 May 18, 2001) (charging violations of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)).2

21 At Santos's trial, the district court instructed the

22 jury on three elements the government was required to prove

23 beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Santos: (1) that he engaged

24 in a conspiracy to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine;

25 (2) while engaging in the conspiracy, he knowingly and

26 intentionally killed Garces (Count 1) or Bryan (Count 2) or both;

27 and (3) the killings actually resulted from his actions. The

28 court also instructed the jury on the elements of conspiracy,

29 noting that "[t]here are various roles members can play in a drug
6

1 conspiracy," including "collecting money owed" and "enforcing

2 drug debts." Trial Tr. 904, United States v. Santos, No. 01-cr3 537 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2004). And the court instructed the jury

4 that, for a conviction, "the defendant's participation in the

5 killing must be related to the drug conspiracy" and that this

6 condition would be satisfied if there was a "meaningful

7 connection between the defendant's role in the killing and his

8 participation in the drug conspiracy." Id. at 908.

9 Santos was convicted. He appeals.

10 DISCUSSION

11 I. Statutory Interpretation

12 Santos was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C.

13 § 848(e)(1)(A), which requires a term of imprisonment of 20 years

14 to life, and permits the death penalty, for

15 any person engaging in or working in

16 furtherance of a continuing criminal

17 enterprise, or any person engaging in an

18 offense punishable under section

19 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section

20 960(b)(1) of this title who

21 intentionally kills or counsels,

22 commands, induces, procures, or causes

23 the intentional killing of an individual

24 and such killing results . . . .

25 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The subject of this

26 appeal is Santos's conviction under the statute's second prong,

27 the drug-related murder provision.

28 Santos's challenge to his conviction implicates two

29 questions of statutory interpretation, which, as questions of

30 law, we review de novo. See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89,
7

1 91 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1026 (2005). First,

2 what is the scope of the statutory requirement that the defendant

3 was "engaging in an offense punishable under" 21 U.S.C.

4 § 841(b)(1)(A)? Second, what sort of nexus or connection between

5 the charged drug offense and the charged killing is required for

6 conviction?

7 A. "Engaging in an Offense Punishable

8 Under Section 841(b)(1)(A)"

9 Santos argues that, as a matter of law, the government

10 was required to prove that he was "actively engaged in the

11 distribution of drugs." Appellant's Br. 42. We disagree.

12 "Statutory interpretation always begins with the plain

13 language of the statute, assuming the statute is unambiguous." 

14 Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2006),

15 cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 961 (2007). When a court determines

16 that the language of a statute is unambiguous, its inquiry is

17 complete. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d

18 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, although Santos argues that his

19 position is supported by the legislative history of section

20 848(e)(1)(A) and principles of statutory construction favoring a

21 narrow interpretation of criminal statutes, we need not resort to

22 these modes of interpretation if the plain language of the

23 statute is clear. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503

24 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489

25 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989); Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498
 As relevant to this appeal, 21 U.S.C. 3

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II) provides a mandatory minimum term of

imprisonment for drug offenses involving five kilograms or more

of cocaine.

8

1 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007); Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436

2 F.3d 335, 337-38 (2d Cir. 2006). 

3 Section 848(e)(1)(A), as relevant to this appeal,

4 applies to "any person engaging in an offense punishable under

5 [21 U.S.C. §] 841(b)(1)(A) . . . who intentionally kills or

6 counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional

7 killing of an individual and such killing results." 21 U.S.C.

8 § 848(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Section 841(b)(1)(A), referred

9 to in section 848(e)(1)(A), does not itself proscribe specific

10 conduct; it establishes penalties, including imprisonment for ten

11 years to life, for drug offenses involving specific types and

12 quantities of controlled substances. 

3

13 The penalties set forth in section 841(b) apply not

14 only to those who "knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture,

15 distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,

16 distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance," id.

17 § 841(a)(1), but also to those who "attempt[] or conspire[]" to

18 do so, id. § 846. See United States v. Richards, 302 F.3d 58, 70

19 n.8 (2d Cir. 2002). That is, "[a]ny person who attempts or

20 conspires to commit any offense defined in [21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904]

21 [is] subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the

22 offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or

23 conspiracy." 21 U.S.C. § 846. Therefore, conspiracy to commit a
 Although we have never squarely addressed the question of 4

whether offenses "punishable under" section 841(b)(1)(A) include

conspiracies, we have affirmed several convictions under the

drug-related murder prong of section 848(e)(1)(A) in which the

defendants were charged with engaging in a drug conspiracy, not

actively engaging in the distribution of drugs. See United

States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2008); United

States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2008); United States

v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

896 (1998). Santos has brought to our attention an unpublished

decision of the Sixth Circuit stating that the district court

"may have been mistaken" in charging the jury that the defendants

could be convicted if they "engaged in (or worked in furtherance

of) a drug conspiracy," as opposed to engaging in a substantive

drug offense. United States v. Robinson, Nos. 94-1538, 94-1727,

1996 WL 506498, at *13, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25346, at *40 (6th

Cir. Sept. 5, 1996) (unpublished), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1181

(1997). We find this brief, unpublished dictum unpersuasive.

9

1 substantive offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) is

2 itself "an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A)," id.

3 § 848(e)(1)(A).4

4 Consequently, and contrary to Santos's argument, a

5 defendant need not be "actively engaged in the distribution of

6 drugs," Appellant's Br. 42, in order to be convicted under the

7 drug-related murder prong of section 848(e)(1)(A). The defendant

8 need only be engaging in an offense punishable under section

9 841(b)(1)(A), which includes conspiracy to commit such an

10 offense.

11 Santos also argues that the drug-related murder prong

12 of section 848(e)(1)(A) does not apply to persons who are doing

13 no more than "working in furtherance of" a drug offense,

14 Appellant's Br. 31; that such a drug offense must be committed

15 "independent of the killing itself," id. at 36; and that it must

16 be "ongoing" when the killing occurs, id. at 35. We may assume
10

1 that these interpretations of the statute are correct. They do

2 not help Santos, however, because the drug conspiracy statute, 21

3 U.S.C. § 846, does not require proof of an overt act in

4 furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Shabani, 513

5 U.S. 10, 11 (1994). Thus, the conspiracy itself -- and no act in

6 furtherance of it, homicidal or otherwise -- serves as the

7 predicate drug offense under section 848(e)(1)(A). So long as

8 the defendant enters into the unlawful agreement before the

9 killing, and the conspiracy is ongoing when the killing occurs,

10 the drug-offense and killing elements of section 848(e)(1)(A) are

11 satisfied by independent acts that overlap in time.

12 Santos, noting that he was not involved in the charged

13 drug conspiracy before the day of the murders, complains that his

14 conviction rests on an interpretation of section 848(e)(1)(A)

15 that would allow the drug-offense and killing elements to be

16 "satisfied by one and the same act." Appellant's Br. 33. We

17 disagree. The "while engaging in" language does imply two

18 separate elements: one drug offense and one killing. An unlawful

19 act committed in furtherance of a drug conspiracy, however, is

20 not itself the drug conspiracy or any element thereof. But such

21 acts -- including killings -- may and often do serve as powerful

22 circumstantial evidence that the charged conspiracy existed and

23 that the actor joined it. See United States v. Quinones, 511

24 F.3d 289, 308 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Aleskerova, 300

25 F.3d 286, 292-93 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Hunte,

26 196 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Johnston, 146
11

1 F.3d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1088

2 (1999). Thus, although a murder committed by the defendant in

3 furtherance of a drug conspiracy cannot itself satisfy the drug4 offense element of section 848(e)(1)(A), it can, in appropriate

5 circumstances, persuade the jury that the defendant was a member

6 of the drug conspiracy in furtherance of which the killing was

7 committed. This would be consistent with the commands of the

8 statute.

9 B. Nexus Between Drug Offense and Killing

10 Next, Santos argues that section 848(e)(1)(A) requires

11 a "direct and substantial nexus" between the killing and the drug

12 offense. Appellant's Br. 42. Santos does little to explain what

13 a "direct and substantial nexus" means, although he suggests that

14 the killing must be "directly related . . . , either proximately

15 or temporally," to the charged drug offense, id. at 43, and that

16 a defendant cannot be convicted if the connection is "too limited

17 and attenuated," id. at 44. These proposed standards are too

18 vague to give courts and juries sufficiently concrete guidance. 

19 We therefore decline to adopt them.

20 In United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.

21 2008), we concluded that section 848(e)(1)(A) does require a

22 meaningful connection between the killing and the drug offense. 

23 See id. at 202. We explained the requirement as follows:

24 To convict a defendant of engaging in a

25 narcotics conspiracy resulting in

26 murder . . . under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A),

27 the government need only prove beyond a

28 reasonable doubt that one motive for the
 In Desinor, we approved jury instructions stating that the 5

government must prove a murder in connection with, and not just

contemporaneous to, a serious drug offense: "For example, a

defendant engaging in a narcotics conspiracy who kills a spouse

in a purely non-drug-related domestic dispute would not satisfy

this element . . . ." Desinor, 525 F.3d at 201.

12

1 killing . . . was related to the drug

2 conspiracy. The existence of other motives

3 does not affect the government's ability to

4 satisfy the "engaging in" element, as long as

5 there is a substantive connection between the

6 defendant's role in the murder . . . and his

7 participation in the drug conspiracy. The

8 government has no burden to establish that a

9 drug-related motive was the sole purpose, the

10 primary purpose, or even that it was equally

11 as important as any non-drug-related purpose,

12 as long as it was one purpose.

13 Id. (citation omitted).5

14 By focusing on the defendant's motive or purpose in the

15 killing, the Desinor standard requires a finding of fact familiar

16 to and accessible by juries. We think the rule set forth in

17 Desinor fully satisfies whatever "nexus" requirement might be

18 implied by the language of section 848(e)(1)(A).

19 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

20 We turn now to Santos's claim that the evidence

21 presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. 

22 "It is well settled that a defendant seeking to overturn a

23 conviction based upon insufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy

24 burden." United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1042 (2d

25 Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1001 (1995) (citation and internal

26 quotation marks omitted). While "a conviction based on

27 speculation and surmise alone cannot stand," United States v.
 Santos does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence 6

that he shot and killed Garces and Bryan.

13

1 D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1256 (2d Cir. 1994), "the jury's verdict

2 may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence," Martinez, 54

3 F.3d at 1043, and may be "inferred" from the evidence, United

4 States v. Ceballos, 340 F.3d 115, 129 (2d Cir. 2003). So long as

5 the inference is reasonable, "it is the task of the jury, not the

6 court, to choose among competing inferences." Martinez, 54 F.3d

7 at 1043 (citing United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 577 (2d

8 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991)). Thus, where "either

9 of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is

10 fairly possible, the court must let the jury decide the matter." 

11 United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)

12 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). In

13 sum, a conviction must be affirmed if, "after viewing the

14 evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

15 rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

16 the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443

17 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

18 Santos's sufficiency-of-the-evidence assertion consists

19 of two arguments, either one of which -- if successful -- would

20 require us to reverse his conviction. He argues that there was

21 insufficient evidence (1) that he conspired to distribute five

22 kilograms or more of cocaine and (2) of a substantial connection

23 between the killings and the drug conspiracy. As explained 6

24 below, we reject both arguments and conclude that the evidence
 "In contrast to the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 7

§ 371, which requires the performance of an overt act, no overt

14

1 was sufficient to sustain Santos's conviction for drug-related

2 murder under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A).

3 A. The Drug Conspiracy

4 1. Generally. When a defendant challenges the

5 sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy case, "deference to

6 the jury's findings is especially important . . . because a

7 conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is

8 a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in

9 court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel." United States

10 v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2004) (ellipsis in

11 original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

12 record must nonetheless permit a rational jury to find: (1) the

13 existence of the conspiracy charged, see United States v. Gaskin,

14 364 F.3d 438, 460 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 990

15 (2005); (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy,

16 see United States v. Atehortva, 17 F.3d 546, 550-51 (2d Cir.

17 1994); and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the

18 conspiracy, see United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1167

19 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990). Furthermore,

20 in a conspiracy punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the

21 government must also prove (4) that it was either known or

22 reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the conspiracy

23 involved the drug type and quantity charged. United States v.

24 Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 499 (2d Cir. 2006).7
act need be alleged or proven as a necessary element of a

conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846." United States v. Delvecchio,

816 F.2d 859, 864 (2d Cir. 1987); accord United States v.

Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994).

15

1 2. The Existence of the Conspiracy. Here, setting

2 aside for the moment the extent of Santos's involvement, there

3 was ample evidence that the charged drug conspiracy existed. The

4 gist of a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more

5 participants to achieve a particular illegal end. See United

6 States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2003), cert.

7 denied, 541 U.S. 1044 (2004); United States v. Stavroulakis, 952

8 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 926 (1992). 

9 "Moreover, the conspiratorial agreement itself may be established

10 by proof of a tacit understanding among the participants, rather

11 than by proof of an explicit agreement, and the absence of an

12 actual sale or seizure of narcotics does not render insufficient

13 the proof of a conspiracy to distribute it." United States v.

14 Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted),

15 cert. denied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998). Medina testified that he

16 worked for Polanco, importing and distributing hundreds of

17 kilograms of cocaine and collecting drug debts and committing

18 violence on Polanco's behalf. This evidence permitted the jury

19 to infer reasonably that Medina and Polanco conspired to

20 distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.

21 3. Santos's Participation in the Conspiracy. Once the

22 existence of a conspiracy has been established, the government

23 must prove that the person charged "knew of the existence of the
16

1 scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and

2 participated in it." United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 123

3 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

4 cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000).

5 We have overturned conspiracy convictions for

6 insufficiency of the evidence where the government presented

7 insufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer

8 that the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy charged. See

9 United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2002),

10 cert. denied, 538 U.S. 981 (2003); United States v. Samaria, 239

11 F.3d 228, 236-38 (2d Cir. 2001); Atehortva, 17 F.3d at 551;

12 United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1989). In

13 Atehortva, for example, the defendant was hired to commit a

14 kidnaping for ransom, the purpose of which was to enforce a drug

15 debt. Atehortva, 17 F.3d at 548. We concluded that the evidence

16 was insufficient to support a conviction for a narcotics

17 conspiracy because the government failed to prove that the

18 defendant, although he knowingly joined and participated in the

19 kidnaping plot, "knew of the existence of the . . . debt, or that

20 he knew or should have known that the debt resulted from a

21 narcotics transaction." Id. at 551 (footnote omitted).

22 We have similarly overturned conspiracy convictions

23 where, although the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy,

24 there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could

25 reasonably have inferred that the defendant intended to join it. 

26 See United States v. Ceballos, 340 F.3d 115, 127-28 (2d Cir.
17

1 2003); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 764 (2d Cir. 1984),

2 cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States v. Gaviria, 740

3 F.2d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 1984). In the absence of an explicit

4 agreement to join a conspiracy, we typically look for evidence

5 that the defendant, in addition to knowing the essential nature

6 of the plan, has "associated himself with the venture in some

7 fashion, participated in it as something that he wished to bring

8 about, or sought by his action to make it succeed." United

9 States v. Vargas, 986 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir.) (citation, internal

10 quotation marks, and alterations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

11 827 (1993); see also Desimone, 119 F.3d at 223 ("An individual

12 defendant's membership in a conspiracy may not be established

13 simply by his presence at the scene of a crime, nor by the fact

14 he knows that a crime is being committed. Instead, membership

15 requires proof of purposeful behavior aimed at furthering the

16 goals of the conspiracy.").

17 Here, there is more than sufficient evidence on which

18 a rational jury could have based a finding that Santos knew of

19 the drug conspiracy. On the morning of the murders, Medina

20 explained to Santos that Medina's "uncle" -- Polanco -- was a

21 heavy-selling drug dealer who wanted two men killed for robbing

22 him of $316,000. Santos, in response, expressed interest in the

23 drug-dealing operation, inquiring as to the price per kilogram of

24 cocaine. 

25 There is also ample evidence that Santos engaged in

26 "purposeful behavior," Desimone, 119 F.3d at 223: He agreed to
18

1 commit the murders and in fact then shot Garces and Bryan to

2 death.

3 We are left with two questions in this regard: (a)

4 whether a rational jury could find that Santos knew these acts of

5 violence were intended to further the ongoing conspiracy to

6 distribute cocaine; and (b) whether a rational jury could find

7 that he joined the conspiracy "as something that he wished to

8 bring about" and with the intent "to make it succeed," Vargas,

9 986 F.2d at 39 (citation, internal quotation marks, and

10 alteration omitted). We think both inferences were permissible.

11 Because narcotics conspiracies are illicit ventures,

12 disputes are frequently settled by force or the threat of force. 

13 See, e.g., Atehortva, 17 F.3d at 548 (kidnaping for ransom to

14 enforce drug debt); see also United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d

15 225, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that "drug trafficking is

16 often attended by violence"); United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d

17 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1987) ("We often have taken judicial notice

18 that, to substantial dealers in narcotics, firearms are . . .

19 tools of the trade . . . ."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988). 

20 Consequently, "[a]dvancing the aim of [a narcotics] conspiracy

21 can involve performing ancillary functions such as . . .

22 enforcing discipline [and] chastising rivals." United States v.

23 Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 541 U.S.

24 1074 (2004); see also United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614, 620

25 (7th Cir.) ("Different people play different roles in a drug

26 conspiracy, be it supplier, lookout, courier, or enforcer."),
19

1 cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1051 (2005). Violence furthers such a

2 conspiracy when used to collect debts directly, as in Atehortva,

3 or, as in this case, "by sending the message that those suspected

4 of stealing from the conspiracy would be treated harshly," Soto5 Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 32. And Medina testified extensively

6 regarding other acts of violence he had carried out in

7 furtherance of this and other drug conspiracies. In light of

8 these facts established at trial, a reasonable jury could

9 permissibly have concluded that Santos knew not only the nature

10 of the drug conspiracy, but knew also that carrying out the

11 murders would advance its goals.

12 In addition to proving that Santos knew his acts would

13 enable Medina to further the goals of the conspiracy, the

14 government was required to prove that Santos had the specific

15 intent to do so. See Samaria, 239 F.3d at 234. Proof of

16 conspiratorial intent, of course, may be established through

17 circumstantial evidence. United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 40

18 (2d Cir. 1998). And where there is evidence that the defendant

19 had knowledge of the conspiracy and knowingly took actions

20 advancing the conspiracy's aims, we ordinarily will permit the

21 jury "to infer intent and agreement from knowledge," particularly

22 in the context of the defendant's "interested cooperation,

23 stimulation, and instigation," or when the defendant has a "stake

24 in the venture." United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091, 1095

25 (2d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Direct

26 Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 712-13 (1943)); see
20

1 also, e.g., United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182, 201 (2d Cir.

2 2002) (affirming narcotics conspiracy conviction of arms dealer

3 because "the evidence was ample to permit the jury to infer that

4 [the defendant] knew his purchasers were jointly engaged in

5 narcotics trafficking, that he made numerous and repeated sales

6 to the coconspirators, and that he intended his sales to further

7 their business"), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 915 (2003).

8 There was indeed sufficient evidence for a reasonable

9 jury to conclude that Santos had the specific intent to further

10 the goals of the conspiracy. In addition to knowing that Medina

11 and his "uncle" wished to advance the goals of their narcotics

12 conspiracy by killing the men who they said had stolen from them,

13 Santos exhibited a form of "interested cooperation, stimulation,

14 and instigation" that would permit the jury to infer the "intent

15 and agreement necessary to sustain a conspiracy charge,"

16 Zambrano, 776 F.2d at 1095. Santos's affirmative requests to

17 know more about the purpose behind the killings and details of

18 the drug conspiracy, his declaration that "[t]hese motherfuckers

19 are dead with me today," Trial Tr. 339, United States v. Santos,

20 No. 01-cr-537 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2004), and his participation in

21 the killings themselves together amount to a set of circumstances

22 from which the jury could conclude that Santos joined the

23 conspiracy charged. And "[a]lthough, as [Santos] argues, a

24 reasonable juror may have reached a contrary conclusion, such

25 matters are appropriately argued to the jury and are not grounds
 Santos's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim contains a 8

barely argued contention that the district court should have

given the jury a multiple-conspiracy charge because there was

evidence of a conspiracy to commit murder in addition to the

21

1 for reversal on appeal." United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 69

2 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1022 (2007).

3 That Santos did not participate in the narcotics

4 conspiracy in some way other than carrying out the murders does

5 not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence that he was a co6 conspirator. "The defendant's participation in a single

7 transaction can, on an appropriate record, suffice to sustain a

8 charge of knowing participation in an existing conspiracy." 

9 United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir.),

10 cert. denied, 502 U.S. 928 (1991). "The defendant need not know

11 the identities of all of the other conspirators, nor all of the

12 details of the conspiracy," Gore, 154 F.3d at 40, and "[a]

13 defendant need not have joined a conspiracy at its inception in

14 order to incur liability for the unlawful acts of the conspiracy

15 committed both before and after he or she became a member,"

16 United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992). Santos

17 may not have played a central role in the charged cocaine

18 conspiracy, but he is liable as a co-conspirator if the jury

19 found -- as it apparently did and reasonably could have here --

20 that he "knew of [its] existence . . . and knowingly joined and

21 participated in it." Snow, 462 F.3d at 68 (citations and

22 internal quotation marks omitted); see also Soto-Beníquez, 356

23 F.3d at 23.8
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. This claim is without merit. 

"In order to prevail on a contention that the trial court erred

in refusing to give requested instructions, an appellant must

establish that his own requested charge accurately represented

the law in every respect, and that the charge actually given,

viewed as a whole, prejudiced him." United States v. Thompson,

76 F.3d 442, 454 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, the defense theory was that the jury must

acquit if it found that Santos had joined a conspiracy to murder

but not a drug conspiracy. The jury instructions properly

emphasized, however, that the "government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt . . . that the conspiracy be to commit an

unlawful act concerning narcotics," Trial Tr. 905, United States

v. Santos, No. 01-cr-537 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2004) (emphasis

added), and that "the government must establish that the

defendant intentionally killed Wilber Garces and/or Edgardo Bryan

while engaging in a conspiracy to distribute . . . five kilograms

or more of . . . cocaine," id. at 907-08 (emphasis added). 

Because there was no evidence of more than one drug conspiracy

and the instructions clearly required the jury to find that the

defendant had participated in such a conspiracy in order to

convict, the jury charge was adequate.

22

1 Finally, the kind of drug involved and its weight were

2 known or reasonably foreseeable to Santos. See Adams, 448 F.3d

3 at 499. Medina told Santos that his "uncle" -- Polanco -- was a

4 well-connected, heavy-selling cocaine dealer and had been robbed

5 of $316,000 –- an amount that would have represented the proceeds

6 from far more than five kilograms of cocaine. Santos took an

7 active interest in the drug type and quantity, inquiring

8 specifically as to the sale price per kilogram of cocaine. We

9 conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find

10 the drug-type and quantity elements proved beyond a reasonable

11 doubt.
23

1 B. Connection Between the Killings

2 and the Drug Conspiracy

3 Having determined that there was sufficient evidence

4 for the jury to find that Santos joined the drug conspiracy as

5 charged, we conclude without difficulty that there was sufficient

6 evidence of a connection between the drug conspiracy and the

7 killings. As noted, "the government need only prove beyond a

8 reasonable doubt that one motive for the killing[s] . . . was

9 related to the drug conspiracy." Desinor, 525 F.3d at 202. 

10 Again, the evidence reflects that Santos asked Medina why he was

11 being hired, and Medina told him that his "uncle" -- Polanco --

12 was a large-scale cocaine dealer who wanted two men killed for

13 stealing $316,000. If the jury found that Santos joined the drug

14 conspiracy, then it unquestionably could have found that one

15 motive for the killings was related to that conspiracy.

16 Santos's argument to the contrary rests primarily on

17 what he contends is the absence of persuasive evidence that

18 Polanco was robbed by the men he wanted killed and that his

19 desire to have them killed was related to his drug dealing. The

20 alleged robbery took place more than two years before the

21 killings, and neither Polanco nor Medina was present when the

22 robbery took place. Santos's argument is misplaced, however,

23 because Santos was told that Polanco had ordered the killings in

24 retaliation for a drug-related robbery. Assuming Santos believed

25 what he was told, that was enough for the jury to find that
24

1 Santos's motive for committing the murders was, at least in part,

2 related to the drug conspiracy.

3 Santos also argues that the killings were unrelated to

4 the drug conspiracy because he agreed to carry them out before he

5 learned about the drug conspiracy. But the record fails to

6 support this assertion. The first time Santos expressed his

7 intent to kill anyone was when, after Medina explained that his

8 drug-dealer "uncle" had been robbed of $316,000, Santos

9 exclaimed, "These motherfuckers are dead with me today." Trial

10 Tr. 339, United States v. Santos, No. 01-cr-537 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,

11 2004).

12 Last, we reject Santos's argument that his motive was

13 not drug related because Medina told him that his "uncle" had

14 been robbed, thereby suggesting to Santos that the murders were

15 motivated by Medina's desire to exact revenge on behalf of his

16 family rather than in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. This

17 argument is unavailing. As we explained in Desinor, the jury

18 need only find that one motive for the killing was drug related. 

19 See Desinor, 525 F.3d at 203 (concluding that "the jury easily

20 could have inferred that . . . whether or not there was also a

21 personal vendetta . . . there was an underlying motive to protect

22 the [defendants'] narcotics business from . . . interference"). 

23 Here, too, the jury easily could have inferred that an underlying

24 motive for the murders was related to the drug conspiracy.
25

1 CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

3 court is affirmed.