alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-1983

In re: GLORIA TYNDLE,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (1:16-cr-00001-IMK-MJA-1; 

1:16-cv-00205-IMK-MJA)

Submitted: November 16, 2017 Decided: November 20, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gloria Tyndle, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Gloria Tyndle petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has 

unduly delayed in ruling on her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. She seeks an order 

from this court directing the district court to act. We find the present record does not 

reveal undue delay in the district court. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, deny the motion to expedite, and deny the mandamus petition. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in 

the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
# CE2004084EN.01022701.xml

| 3.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 84/227 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 84/227

---

(2004/C 84 E/0272)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3248/03

by Anna Karamanou (PSE) to the Council

(3 November 2003)

Subject:   Possibility of tracking cellphone users

Subject:

Information has recently come to light regarding the commercial possibilities offered by mobile telephony networks which are being exploited by at least six companies in Great Britain, making it possible to pinpoint the location of a cellphone user at a very low monthly cost (EUR 7,5). Clearly this opens the door to the exploitation of sensitive personal information, for example by employers wishing to know where their employees are at any given moment. A number of ideas were also put forward regarding a code of conduct on the part of these companies which in theory, offer protection to cellphone users who do not wish their whereabouts to be divulged. The arguments put forward however were singularly unconvincing, given the danger of the emergence of a surveillance mentality with unforeseeable consequences.

What action does the Council intend to take to protect European citizens from the use of mobile telephony to track their movements?

Reply

(9 March 2004)

(9 March 2004)

| 1. | Agreements between network operators, service providers and customers of mobile telephone communications are to be negotiated between them, in respect of existing provisions, especially those for data protection. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Agreements between network operators, service providers and customers of mobile telephone communications are to be negotiated between them, in respect of existing provisions, especially those for data protection.

| 2. | As concerns lawful interception of telecommunications, the Council has adopted a Resolution which reaffirms the need to observe the right of individuals to respect for their privacy (1). |
| --- | --- |

2.

As concerns lawful interception of telecommunications, the Council has adopted a Resolution which reaffirms the need to observe the right of individuals to respect for their privacy (1).

1

---

(1)  OJ C 329, 4.11.1996, p. 1.

1

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4392

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNNY CHERRY, III,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(4:07-cr-00797-TLW-1)

Submitted: September 11, 2008 Decided: September 15, 2008

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary Sheppard

Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
 2 

PER CURIAM:

Johnny Cherry, III, pled guilty to being a felon in

possession of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).

He was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment, the bottom of

his properly-calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On

appeal, counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that there are no meritorious claims on

appeal but raising the following issues: (1) whether Cherry’s

guilty plea was valid under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and (2) whether

Cherry’s third South Carolina conviction for criminal domestic

violence was a proper predicate felony for purposes of § 922(g).

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

First, our review of the plea hearing reveals that the

district court complied with Rule 11 and that Cherry knowingly and

voluntarily pled guilty. Thus, we find no reversible error for

this claim. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th

Cir. 2002) (holding that when a defendant does not seek to withdraw

his guilty plea, Rule 11 errors are reviewed for plain error). The

second claim also fails, as the record reveals that Cherry also had

a South Carolina conviction for possession of crack cocaine, which

has a maximum sentence of five years. Moreover, counsel concedes

that Cherry’s claim regarding the criminal domestic violence

conviction would fail on the merits, in any event, under the
 3 

Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Burgess v. United States, 128 S.

Ct. 1572, 1577 (2008). 

We have examined the entire record in this case in

accordance with the requirements of Anders, and find no meritorious

issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. This court requires

that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the

client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

 AFFIRMED
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2006-CR-8861, styled The State of Texas v. Mathew D. Warfield,

1

pending in the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl presiding.

i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00637-CR

IN RE Mathew D. WARFIELD

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 10, 2008

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On August 20, 2008, relator filed an Application for Leave to File Petition for Writ of

Mandamus. No leave is required to file a petition for writ of mandamus; therefore, we deny the

motion for leave to file as moot. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1. 

Additionally, on August 20, 2008, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining

of the trial court’s failure to rule on his Motion for Speedy Trial and Motion for Appointment of

Counsel. Mr. Edward F. Shaughnessy, III has been appointed to represent relator in the trial court.

We conclude that appointed counsel for relator is also his counsel for an original proceeding on the

issue presented.
04-08–00637-CR

-2-

To obtain mandamus relief in a criminal matter, the relator must establish that (1) the act

sought to be compelled is ministerial rather than discretionary in nature and (2) there is no adequate

remedy at law. Dickens v. Second Court of Appeals, 727 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

Respondent has no ministerial duty to rule on relator’s pro se motion because relator is represented

by appointed counsel, and relator is not entitled to hybrid representation. See Patrick v. State, 906

S.W.2d 481, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Consequently, the respondent did not violate a ministerial

duty by declining to rule on relator’s motion. Therefore, this court has determined that relator is not

entitled to the relief sought, and the petition is denied. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3772 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3772

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase to $500 the 
  residential energy property expenditures limitation with respect to 
 heat pumps for purposes of the credit for nonbusiness energy property.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 12, 2013

  Mr. Welch introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase to $500 the 
  residential energy property expenditures limitation with respect to 
 heat pumps for purposes of the credit for nonbusiness energy property.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Home Heating and Cooling Efficiently 
Act''.

SEC. 2. INCREASE IN LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO FUEL PUMPS FOR 
              NONBUSINESS ENERGY PROPERTY CREDIT.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (C) of section 25C(b)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting ``(other than an 
electric heat pump described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection 
(d)(3))'' before the period at the end.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to property placed in service after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Presidential Documents

55011 

Federal Register 

Vol. 70, No. 180 

Monday, September 19, 2005 

Presidential Determination No. 2005–33 of August 29, 2005 

Waiving Prohibition on Use of FY 2005 Economic Support 

Funds with Respect to Jordan 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

Consistent with the authority vested in me by section 574 of the Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 

2005 (the ‘‘Act’’), Division D of Public Law 108–447, I hereby: 

• Determine that it is important to the national security interests of 

the United States to waive, for a period of 6 months from the date 

of this determination, the prohibition of section 574(a) of the Act 

with respect to Jordan; and 

• Waive the prohibition with respect to this country for that period. 

You are authorized and directed to report this determination to the Congress, 

and to arrange for its publication in the 

W 

Federal Register. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, August 29, 2005. 

[FR Doc. 05–18739 

Filed 9–16–05; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 4710–10–P
MEMORANDUM OPINION 

No. 04-08-00592-CR 

Luis Alberto GONZALEZ-MCNUTT a/k/a Luis Gonzalez, 

Appellant 

v. 

The STATE of Texas, 

Appellee 

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2008-CR-5009 

Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding 

PER CURIAM 

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice 

 Rebecca Simmons, Justice 

 Steven C. Hilbig, Justice 

Delivered and Filed: September 17, 2008 

DISMISSED 

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal by withdrawing his notice of 

appeal. The motion is granted and this appeal is dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). 

PER CURIAM 

DO NOT PUBLISH
```

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                  CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In  connection  with the  Annual  Report  of  Enclaves  Group,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark D.
MacFarlane,   Chief  Operating   Officer  and  Acting  Chief  Financial  Officer
(Principal  Accounting Officer) of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) of 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all material
      respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of the
      Company.

Date: May 18, 2006

                                            /s/ Mark D. MacFarlane
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Mark D. MacFarlane
                                            Chief Operating Officer and Acting
                                            Chief Financial Officer (Principal
                                            Accounting Officer)
```
The State /s



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

July 31, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00223

- CR

Carlos FAZ

,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR10674

The Honorable Kevin M. O'Connell, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The appellant ’ s motion for extension of time to file the brief is GRANTED. The

appellant ’ s brief will be due 30 days after the last portion of the reporter ’ s record is filed.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 31st day of July, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-17-00680-CR

NO. 03-17-00681-CR

NO. 03-17-00682-CR

Freddie Ray Mulkey, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. CR2014-549, CR2015-522 & CR2016-880

HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Freddie Ray Mulkey filed notices of appeal from his judgments of conviction for the

offenses of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1, 4 grams or more but less than

200 grams (cause number CR2014-549); delivery of a controlled substance in penalty group 1, less

than 1 gram (cause number CR2015-522); and possession with intent to deliver a controlled

substance in penalty group 1, 1 gram or more but less than 4 grams (cause number CR2016-880),

all of which were enhanced by Mulkey’s prior felony convictions. See Tex. Health & Safety Code

§§ 481.112(b), (c), .115(d); Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(d).

However, the trial court certified that each of these cases is a plea-bargain case and

that Mulkey has no right of appeal. Mulkey and his counsel signed the trial court’s certifications.
Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

 

Jeff Rose, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Goodwin

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: November 14, 2017

Do Not Publish

2
# CE2004088EN.01008501.xml

| 8.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 88/85 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 88/85

---

(2004/C 88 E/0092)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2402/03

by Mario Borghezio (NI) to the Commission

(21 July 2003)

Subject:   Turkey: book-burning and State jobs for 15 000 imams

Subject:

Western books considered ideologically incorrect according to Islam were recently burnt publicly on the orders of the judiciary in Turkey. It has also recently been reported that the Turkish government has decided to employ 15 000 imams at public expense to promote the Muslim faith further.

Does the Commission consider that these events constitute steps along the road to the ‘new’ Turkey's accession to the EU and adoption of its values?

Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(8 September 2003)

(8 September 2003)

The Commission is not aware of the issue mentioned by the Honourable Member about judgements concerning the public burning of books.

As regards the appointment of additional imams, the Commission is aware of a proposal of the Bureau of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) intended to fill vacancies existing in Turkey for Moslem cleric personnel. According to our information this proposal has not been adopted by the Government.

As a Candidate Country, Turkey has undertaken to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria. These criteria imply freedom of religion for all religious groups. The Commission makes a detailed assessment of the situation in the area of freedom of religion in its Regular Report published annually, and will continue to monitor developments.

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-60334

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RAYMOND BENTLEY

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:04-CR-2-3

Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Raymond Bentley appeals the 135-month guidelines sentence that he

received after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine.

Bentley asserts that he did not validly waive his right to appeal. Although the

Government initially indicated its intent to enforce the appeal waiver, it now

acknowledges that it agreed to strike the waiver provision in the district court.

Consequently,there is no appeal waiver to enforce. Bentley, however, has failed

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 8, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 05-60334

1 Nothing in our decision prevents Bentley from filing a motion for a reduced sentence

with the District Court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

2

to brief adequately any challenge to the validity of the sentence.1 See FED. R.

APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A); Edmond v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 292 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6288

LARRY SHELTON JAMES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DURHAM CENTER, Mental Health Department; CIVIL ADVOCATE, City

of Durham Human Relations Commission,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

District Judge. (5:07-ct-03144-D)

Submitted: September 16, 2008 Decided: September 19, 2008

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Shelton James, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Larry Shelton James appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by

the district court. See James v. Durham Center, No. 5:07-ct-03144-

D (E.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Applix, Inc. (the
"Company") for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, Alan
Goldsworthy, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Walt Hilger, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                   /s/ Alan Goldsworthy
                                   ------------------------------------
Dated: November 12, 2002           Alan Goldsworthy
                                   Chief Executive Officer

                                   /s/ Walt Hilger
                                   ------------------------------------
Dated: November 12, 2002           Walt Hilger
                                   Chief Financial Officer
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 11047 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:09

- cr - 21019

- UU

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus DAVID MARRERO, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (August 13, 2014) Before TJOFLAT , PRYOR and JORDAN , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 14-11047 Date Filed: 08/13/2014 Page: 1 of 32 David Marrero appeals the denial of his pro se motion to dismiss his indictment for health care fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B). Marrero mo ved to dismiss his indictment more than two years after his conviction became final on direct appeal . He argued that his indictment was void ab initio because the offenses charged were not within the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied M arrero’s motion

. Because Marrero failed to file his motion while his case was pending, see id. , we vacate the order that deni ed his motion on the merits and remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. “[W] e are obligate d to address the district court’ s jurisdiction to issue a ruling we are reviewing on appeal. ” United States v. Diveroli , 729 F.3d 1339, 1341 ( 1 1 th Cir

. 2013). “[W]e review jurisdictional issues de novo .” United States v. Lopez , 562 F.3d 1309 , 1 311 ( 11 th Cir. 2009 ). The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Marrero’s collateral challenge to his indictment

. A defendant may move to dismiss the charges against him on the ground there is a “ defect in the indictment ,” but the motion m u st be filed “ while the case is pending .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B). When a case is no longer pending, the district court is divested of authority to consider a motion for relief from the judgment. See United States v. Elso , 571 F.3d 1163 , 1166 ( 11 th

Case: 14-11047 Date Filed: 08/13/2014 Page: 2 of 33 Cir

. 2009 ). Marrero’s case was no longer pending after he exhausted his claims on direct appeal and we issued our mandate on September 14, 2011. See id. On February 19, 2014, when Marrero moved to dismiss his indictment, the district court lacked authority t o consider Marrero’s motion . We vacate the order that denied Marrero’s motion on its merits and remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS . Case: 14-11047 Date Filed: 08/13/2014 Page: 3 of 3