IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DAVID I. BULL, :

 : C.A. No.: K23A-12-002 JJC

Appellant, :

 :

v. :

 : 

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE :

APPEAL BOARD and : 

FIRST STATE COMMUNITY : 

ACTION AGENCY, :

 :

Appellees. :

Submitted: March 26, 2024

 Decided: June 24, 2024

ORDER

On this 24th day of June 2024, having considered Appellant David Bull’s

appeal of the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board” 

or “UIAB”), and the response of Appellee First State Community Action Agency 

(“First State”), it appears that: 

1. Mr. Bull worked for First State as its human resources director until

First State terminated his employment on April 28, 2023.1 Bernice Edwards, 

Executive Director of First State and Mr. Bull’s direct supervisor, wrote Mr. Bull’s 

termination letter. In it, she explained that First State terminated him for policy 

violations for inappropriate interactions with other First State employees and a

“pattern of unprofessional conduct, insubordination, and poor job performance.”2 

1 Termination Letter, R. at 87 [hereinafter the Court refers to the UIAB’s certified record as “R. at 

...”].

2

Id.
2

The letter further explained that First State made the decision to terminate him after 

a consultant finished investigating Mr. Bull’s conduct, which included the review of

a complaint lodged against Mr. Bull by another employee.

3

2. Following his termination, Mr. Bull applied for unemployment 

insurance benefits. Initially, a claims deputy found him eligible.

4

 First State then 

appealed the decision, and a referee held a hearing.5 After the hearing, the referee 

reversed the claims deputy’s determination and found just cause to terminate his 

employment.6 

3. Mr. Bull then appealed the referee’s decision to the UIAB. During that 

hearing, Mr. Bull contended that (1) the appeals referee erred when relying on 

inadmissible hearsay, and (2) Ms. Edwards misrepresented events during the 

hearing.

7

 The Board affirmed the referee’s decision.8 The Board agreed, however,

that Mr. Bull’s alleged failure to comply with a performance improvement plan did 

not contribute to just cause because the evidence supporting the allegation was based 

purely upon hearsay. Nevertheless, the UIAB found that his “other performance 

deficits” were supported by correspondence between Mr. Bull and Ms. Edwards.

9

Based upon those deficits, the UIAB found Mr. Bull ineligible for unemployment 

benefits because his “refusal to comply with his job responsibilities and direct orders 

from the Executive Director amounted to willful and wanton conduct in violation of 

the employer’s interest.”10

3

Id.

4 R. at 216.

5 R. at 80.

6 R. at 83.

7

See Tr. of Bd. Hr’g, R at 31:2–40:22 (arguing, inter alia, that the policy violations referenced in 

his termination letter were unsubstantiated by admissible non-hearsay evidence, that his 

performance improvement plan was based entirely upon a false narrative, and that he did not 

violate any policies).

8 Decision of the Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., R. at 6.

9

Id., R. at 8. 

10 Decision of the Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., R. at 8.
3

4. The Board based its finding of just cause, in large part, on a series of 

emails exchanged between Mr. Bull and Ms. Edwards, which corroborated Ms. 

Edwards’ testimony. When viewing the evidence most favorably to First State, the 

emails referenced multiple late, or otherwise inadequate, reports.

11

 In the first

exchange, Ms. Edwards emailed Mr. Bull on November 18, 2022. There, she 

memorialized Mr. Bull’s failure to produce monthly reports in September, October, 

and November of 2022, which were due on the 5th of each month.12 In response,

Mr. Bull emailed that he would produce the September and October reports on 

November 21st.

13

 He failed to address the delinquent November report, however.

14

 

On December 1, 2022, Ms. Edwards sent another email to Mr. Bull to reprimand 

him for not having produced the November report.

15 In that email, Ms. Edwards

provided him “[his] written warning and [his] final warning” for failing to submit 

his reports on time.16 Mr. Bull failed to respond to her email for six days. Then, 

he replied that the report would be completed by December 9th, while disputing that 

it was late.17 Then, after the warning, on January 9, 2023, Ms. Edwards emailed 

Mr. Bull because the information he had provided in another matter for First State’s 

Board of Directors was inadequate.18 She contended that he incorrectly formatted

material in a report and that it looked like it “was thrown together at the last 

11 Id.

12 R at 102.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 R. at 104.

16 Id.

17 Id. While Mr. Bull appears to dispute the allegation that this report was late, this Court does not 

make factual findings or weigh evidence on appeal. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 

(Del. 1965) (“On appeal from the Board ... the Superior Court does not sit as a trier of fact with 

authority to weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, and make its own factual 

findings and conclusions.”).

18 R. at 106.
4

minute.”19 In response, Mr. Bull denied that he sloppily prepared the report. He

contended that he formatted it consistently with a consultant’s instructions.

20

 

5. Mr. Bull now appeals the UIAB’s decision. 21 He contends that the 

record does not support the Board’s findings

22 More specifically, Mr. Bull assets

that the Board erred because (1) it based its decision upon hearsay, and not upon 

otherwise admissible evidence; (2) First State did not adequately warn him in 

December that his job was in jeopardy for failing to submit adequate reports; and (3) 

the Board’s factual findings regarding the extent of his late submissions were 

erroneous.

23

 

6. First State contends that substantial evidence supported the UIAB’s 

decision.

24

 It asserts that the evidence below demonstrated that Mr. Bull (1) treated 

requests from his supervisor to submit his reports on time “very casually,” and (2) 

submitted incomplete work “thrown together at the last minute” after receiving a 

written, final warning regarding his poor performance.

25 First State also relies upon 

a separate investigation by a legal consultant which it asserts found other policy 

violations by Mr. Bull.

26

 On balance, First State asserts that the evidence from the 

referee and UIAB hearings, combined, supported the conclusion that he exhibited 

“willful and wanton conduct in violation of the employer’s interest.”27

7. In a UIAB appeal, the Court must review the record to determine if 

substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision and whether the Board 

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 R. at 3.

22 Appellant’s Opening Brief (D.I. 9).

23 Id.

24 Appellee’s Answering Brief (D.I. 10) at 5.

25 Id. at 5.

26 Id. at 5–6.

27 Id. at 6.
5

committed legal error.28 Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”29 The Court 

must consider the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below

when performing this review.

30

 In an appeal, the Court does not make factual 

findings of its own, assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence other than to 

consider whether it meets the deferential threshold of “substantial.”

31

 Finally, the 

Court’s review of the Board’s discretionary rulings is limited to a review for 

arbitrariness and capriciousness.

32

 Questions of law, on the other hand, are reviewed

de novo.

33

 

8. An employee who is terminated for just cause may not recover 

unemployment benefits.34 Just cause constitutes a “willful or wanton act in violation 

of either the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or the employee’s expected 

standard of conduct.”35 Furthermore, “[w]illful or wanton conduct is ‘that which is 

evidenced by either conscious action, or reckless indifference leading to a deviation 

from established and acceptable workplace performance.’”36 The burden before the 

UIAB rests with the employer.37

28 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. Of Dept. of Labor v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975); 

Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 781–82 (Del. 2011). 

29 Oceanport Industries, Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); 

Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del. Super. July 21, 1986).

30 Pochvatilla v. U.S. Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062, at *2 (Del. Super. June 9, 1997).

31 Sokoloff v. Bd. of Med. Prac., 2010 WL 5550692, at *5 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2010).

32 Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991).

33 Id.

34 19 Del. C. § 3314. The statute provides that, “[a]n individual shall be disqualified for benefits 

... [f]or the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual’s work for just cause 

in connection with the individual’s work and for each week thereafter....” Id.

35 Murphy & Landon, P.A. v. Pernic, 121 A.3d 1215, 1222 (Del. 2015).

36 Wilson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2011 WL 3243366, at *2 (Del. Super. July 27, 2011)

(quoting MRPC Fin. Mgmt., LLC v. Carter, 2003 WL 21517977, at *4 (Del. Super. June 20, 

2003)).

37 Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1222.
6

9. Mr. Bull asserts multiple errors in the UIAB’s decision. When

addressing his contentions in series, first, he contests the sufficiency of the evidence

because the employer presented allegedly inadmissible hearsay to both the referee 

and the Board. More specifically, he argues that the UIAB erred by considering 

the alleged violations of his improvement plan when the only evidence to support 

those findings was based upon hearsay.38 In response, First State concedes that if it 

had terminated Mr. Bull only because of violations of his performance improvement 

plan, there would have been no just cause.39 First State, argues, however, that it 

terminated him for his combined instances of misconduct.40 First State emphasizes 

his allegedly late submissions and poor job performance that followed his warning.41

10. At the outset, Mr. Bull mistakenly asserts that the Board was required 

to disregard hearsay. Section 1201–4.0 of the Delaware Administrative Code 

provides that the Board must apply the Delaware Rules of Evidence in only a general 

sense.42 That provision further provides that “[t]he Board may admit and consider 

hearsay evidence, [but]shall not base its decision solely on hearsay or other evidence 

not admissible under the Rules of Evidence.”43 Section 1201–4.0 also recognizes 

the UIAB’s discretion by providing that “[t]he Board may consider all relevant 

evidence relating to any issue raised below... The admissibility of evidence and 

38 D.I. 9. Mr. Bull mistakenly argues that the performance improvement plan should not have been 

considered in the Board’s decision to disqualify him for unemployment benefits. It was not

considered – the Board clarified in its decision that it excluded the plan from its analysis. See R. 

at 21 n.11.

39 Tr. of Bd. Hr’g, R. at 41:23–42:7.

40 Id., R at 42:2-7.

41 Tr. of Bd. Hr’g, R at 42:2–43:21.

42 19 Del. Admin. C. § 1201–4.0

43 Id. at 4.7 (emphasis added); see also Husbands v. Del. Dept. of Ed., 227 A.3d, 2020 WL 

1814045, at *2 (Del. 2020) (TABLE) (“[I]t is well settled in Delaware that hearsay evidence is 

permissible in administrative hearings, so long as that evidence is not the sole basis for the hearing 

officer’s decision.”).
7

determinations of the weight to be given evidence and the credibility of witnesses 

shall be within the sound discretion of the Board.”44 

11. Accordingly, the Board, consistent with its regulations and general 

tenets of administrative law, had the discretion to admit and consider hearsay 

evidence together with “all relevant evidence relating to any issue raised below.”

45

 

As a result, it was not required to exclude Mr. Bull’s alleged violations of his 

performance improvement plan from its decision. The Board declined to consider 

the evidence, however, despite having the discretion to do so.

46

 That choice fell 

firmly within its discretion as the finder of fact. 

12. Mr. Bull’s argument regarding hearsay, however, does not address Ms.

Edwards’ direct testimony and the email exchange between he and Ms. Edwards 

regarding his late and non-compliant reports that corroborated her testimony. The 

Board placed significant weight on the email chains which were comprised of nonhearsay. Namely, Mr. Bull’s statements in the emails were admissions by a party 

opponent making them non-hearsay under the Delaware Rules of Evidence.47 

Furthermore, Ms. Edwards’ statements in the emails were non-hearsay based upon 

their effect on the listener,

48 and because they demonstrated that Mr. Bull received 

notice that he may be terminated. Accordingly, the emails would have been 

admissible under even the strict rules of evidence (which again, do not apply in this 

administrative setting). They were admissions, in part, and admissible for purposes 

other than for the truth of the matter asserted, in other part The record contains 

credible evidence to support the Board’s finding of just cause. 

44 19 Del. Admin. C. § 1201–4.0 (4.7.2–3).

45 Id. 

46 Decision of the Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., R. at 8 n.11.

47 D.R.E 801(d)(2)(A).

48 Estate of Rochester v. Reyes, 2015 WL 7823132, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 3, 2015).
8

13. Second, Mr. Bull contends that he did not receive notice that his conduct

violated a policy or that his employment was in jeopardy.49 As a general rule, 

“[e]mployees are entitled to some notice that their performance is unacceptable 

before being discharged.”50 Accordingly, a single instance of misconduct is 

generally not just cause to terminate employment.51 The warning need not explicitly 

state that termination may result from one’s repeated misconduct, however.52 

Rather, the warning must merely provide the employee notice of the impropriety of 

her conduct and that disciplinary action should be expected if it continues.

53

 In this 

case, the UIAB did not err when finding that Ms. Edwards emailed “final” warning 

provided Mr. Bull sufficient notice of the consequences of future misconduct. In 

fact, that email alone constituted substantial evidence to support notice the Board’s 

finding.

14. Third, Mr. Bull mistakenly contends that First State’s warning was 

insufficient because it did not address the specific behavior for which he was 

terminated. To that point, “an employer’s warning is not necessarily limited to 

putting the employee on notice of the impropriety of the specific conduct that led to 

the warning[.]”54 Here, First State notified Mr. Bull that he had filed reports 

49 See D.I. 9 (“The UIAB has inappropriately described ... [the email] as sufficient warning 

(evidence) that this was a warning of insubordination that could result in my termination.”).

50 MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Capella, 2003 WL 1880127, at *3 (Del. Super. April 15, 2003).

51 See Weaver v. Employment Sec. Commission, 274 A.2d 446, 447 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 1971) 

(“[A] single instance of an irresponsible failure to heed an employer's instructions does not rise to 

the level of a ‘willful or wanton act in violation of . . . the employer's expected standard of conduct’ 

. . . where it appears that the employer tolerated previous actions of similar severity without 

warning.”)

52 Capella, 2003 WL 1880127, at *3.

53 Id.

54 Optima Cleaning Systems, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2010 WL 5307981, at *4 (Del. 

Super. Dec. 7, 2010) (“If an employee is cited for failing to wear a tie, he may be unsuccessful in 

arguing that he did not receive a warning for subsequently failing to shine his shoes. Arguably the 

two violations are different. However, both violations involved the employee’s attire, and the 

employee had notice that improper attire was unacceptable. Whether an employee was on notice 

that certain conduct is unacceptable is a question of fact.”)
9

improperly over a three month period and explained that, “[t]hese reports are 

essential to the Board meetings ... please remit them in a timely manner ... Thank 

you for your attention to this very important manner.”55 Accordingly, the 

administrative record supports the UIAB’s finding that Mr. Bull had notice that

filing proper reports was an essential responsibility of his position and that First State

considered it “very important.”56 To be sure, Ms. Edwards’ emailed warning did 

not explicitly address report formatting. But, the warning provided Mr. Bull 

unambiguous notice that First State expected him to file adequate reports for its 

Board of Directors.57 On this record, substantial evidence supported the Board’s 

finding of just cause because (1) he repeatedly submitted assignments late which 

demonstrated a conscious disregard of his employers’ expectations; (2) he received 

a final warning requiring him to file proper reports for First State’s Board; and (3) 

he subsequently failed to do so in January 2023 because he filed a report that lacked 

necessary information and appeared to be “thrown together at the last minute.”

15. Mr. Bull also asserts that First State did not warn him that the alleged 

conduct investigated by a legal consultant in early 2023 could contribute to the just 

cause needed to deny his benefits. This fails to acknowledge, however, that First 

State provided him a written warning in July 2022 for inappropriate discussions 

about an employee’s employment status.

58 At the time, First State warned him that 

“any further infractions may result in disciplinary actions.”59 Accordingly, the July 

55 R. at 102.

56 Id.

57 See Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1225 (“An employer need not specify the types of conduct that could 

lead to termination so long as the employee is aware that certain types of conduct are improper 

and prohibited.”)

58 R. at 101.

59 Id. On July 15, 2022, Ms. Edwards gave Mr. Bull a warning for an allegation of inappropriate 

discussions concerning other employees and told him that, “this behavior from our Human 

Resource department is unacceptable and will not be tolerated... [T]his is a verbal warning to 

you... Be advised that any further infractions may result in disciplinary actions.”
10

2022 warning augments the record regarding his notice of the consequences of future 

misconduct, including possible termination.60

16. Fourth, Mr. Bull seems to suggest that the four months that passed 

between Ms. Edwards’ warning regarding improper report submissions (on 

December 1, 2022) and his termination (in April 2023) precluded a finding of just 

cause.61 Granted, an employer’s inaction may constitute acquiescence to an 

employee’s misconduct if the employer fails to address the misconduct and then later 

arbitrarily terminates the employee.

62

 The Delaware Supreme Court has rejected the

suggestion, however, that an employer cannot rely on prior misconduct in a later 

termination decision.63 Such a blanket rule would be unfair to employers in many 

circumstances. Likewise, such a rule would often cut to the detriment of many 

employees by creating a “perverse incentive” for employers to prematurely 

terminate employees without fully considering available options.64 Namely, to bar 

an employer from relying on prior instances of misconduct could incentivize an

employer to terminate an employee without providing the employer the opportunity 

to redeem herself.65 

60 See Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1225 (holding that a warning is sufficient if it provides notice that a 

“general category of misconduct [is] unacceptable”).

61 See D.I. 13 (where Mr. Bull writes “[i]t is astonishing that my employment was terminated 

predicated on reflections during 2022. During the four (4) months of 2023 there were no negative 

reflections to meet the DOL’s standard of preponderance of evidence. The lack of 2023 negative 

work reflections are the red herring that certainly has to be acknowledged.”).

62 Avon Products, Inc. v. Wilson, 513 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. 1986) (“When an employer has 

consistently tolerated certain misconduct on the part of an employee, or when the employer has 

already punished the employee by a mere verbal reprimand, such misconduct usually would not 

be a major factor in establishing just cause for the employee’s discharge.”).

63 See Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1225; but see Ortiz v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 317 A.2d 100, 

100–101 (Del. 1974) (holding that, where the employer attempted to accommodate an employee 

with severe attendance issues and those attendance issues persisted for a year following the 

employer’s initial effort to address the issue without any discipline, the employer had acquiesced 

to the employees’ poor attendance and could not rely on that misconduct to establish just cause).

64 Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1226.

65 Id. 
11

17. Here, the record does not support that Mr. Bull fairly raised the issue of 

acquiescence below. As a result, the Court may not consider the issue on appeal 

unless the Board committed legal error by not considering the issue sua sponte. 

There was no legal error. In fact, the record would have strongly supported a finding 

of no acquiescence by First State. Namely, the investigation during the three months 

after Mr. Bull’s improper January 2023 submission was the stated cause for First 

State’s delay in terminating Mr. Bull.66 The referee’s hearing transcript, which 

statutorily becomes part of the UIAB’s record, establishes that First State retained a 

consultant to investigate Mr. Bull’s misconduct in February 2023.

67

 When 

addressing the issue in the UIAB hearing, First State explained that “at that point, 

even in February, [we] could have terminated but there was an investigation into a 

report that had to be completed before that happened, and he was terminated in 

April.”68

18. Furthermore, First State emphasizes that it terminated Mr. Bull for 

several reasons. Those multiple reasons, in addition to the inadequate report filings, 

explain why First State did not proceed to terminate Mr. Bull in January 2023 with 

an investigation regarding further alleged misconduct underway.69 To that end, the 

termination letter informed Mr. Bull that he was fired for “recent actions [which] 

demonstrate a pattern of unprofessional conduct, insubordination, and poor job 

performance despite prior warnings[.]”70 In First State’s eyes, the late and 

incomplete assignments were part of a larger pattern of misconduct. As a result, 

First State reasonably stayed its termination decision pending the conclusion of the 

66 See Tr. of Bd. Hr’g, R. at 43: 22 – 44:1 (“So at that point, even in February, [First State] could 

have terminated but there was an investigation into a report that had to be completed before that 

happened, and he was terminated in April.”).

67 Id., R at 155:11–20.

68 Id., R. at 43:22–24, 44:1.

69 Id., R. at 42:2–43:21; D.I. 10 at 3.

70 Termination Letter, R. at 87.
12

investigation. For that additional reason, the Board committed no legal error by 

declining to find, sua sponte, that First State acquiesced to Mr. Bull’s inadequate 

performance. 

19. Fifth and finally, Mr. Bull contends that the Board misinterpreted the 

factual record.71 Specifically, he contends that it misunderstood the December 1,

2022, email by considering assignments that were already delinquent by the time 

Ms. Edwards sent her November 2022 email. Mr. Bull contends that the UIAB’s 

misunderstanding magnified the appearance of his tardiness.

72

 

20. The Board’s decision is unclear regarding whether it recognized that 

the emailed warning to Mr. Bull addressed three entirely separate assignments. 

Nevertheless, any possible confusion is not dispositive because there was substantial 

evidence to support a finding that Mr. Bull’s poor work performance spanned

multiple job responsibilities rather than simply one of his assigned tasks. In totality, 

the record supports the UIAB’s finding of cause because (1) Mr. Bull knew he 

provided multiple, consecutive, late submissions, (2) First State found those 

submissions unacceptable, and (3) Mr. Bull then submitted an assignment lacking 

required information that had been sloppily prepared.

73

 Assuming, arguendo, that 

Mr. Bull submitted each subsequent report by its due date in each remaining month 

of his employment, there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding 

that he submitted a January report, one month after his final warning, in an 

unacceptable form. 

71 D.I. 9.

72 Id.

73 See Pernic, 121 A.3d at 1225 (“An employer need not specify the types of conduct that could 

lead to termination so long as the employee is aware that certain types of conduct are improper 

and prohibited. The employer is only required to show that the employee was warned that a general 

category of misconduct was unacceptable.”) 
13

21. On balance, the facts of record, when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below, provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable mind to

accept the UIAB’s findings. Likewise, the Board committed no error of law. Given

the deference due the Board’s decision on appeal, the UIAB permissibly found that 

Mr. Bull willfully disregarded his responsibilities and the expectations set by his 

employer. 

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 

is AFFIRMED for the reasons explained above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Jeffrey J Clark

 Resident Judge