2008 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-9-2008

Lewis v. Atlas Van Lines Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 07-2688

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PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 07-2688

_____________

RICHARD J. LEWIS;

PATRICIA A. LEWIS

 Appellants,

 v.

ATLAS VAN LINES, INC.

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 06-cv-1862)

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III

_______________

Argued June 3, 2008 

Before: FISHER, JORDAN, Circuit Judges,

 and YOHN*, District Judge.

_______________

 *Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr., Senior Judge, United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

sitting by designation.
2

(Filed: September 9, 2008)

_______________

James J. West [ARGUED]

105 N. Front Street - #205

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Appellants

James A. Wescoe [ARGUED]

Rawle & Henderson

1339 Chestnut Street - 16 Fl. th

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellant

_____________

OPINION

_____________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves a claim by Richard and Patricia

Lewis against Atlas Van Lines, Inc. (“Atlas”) for damages

incurred as a result of Atlas’s failure to live up to its promise

to move the Lewises’ household belongings by a date certain. 

The District Court dismissed the Lewises’ claim, concluding

that they had failed to comply with the procedural

requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 14706, also known as the

“Carmack Amendment,” or, for purposes of this opinion, the

“Amendment.” While we agree with the District Court as to

one aspect of its ruling, as more fully explained herein, we

disagree that the Lewises’ claim for damages in the amount
3

of additional mortgage payments they had to make and the

lost profit on the sale of their home was insufficient to

comply with the Carmack Amendment and applicable

regulations. We will therefore vacate the District Court’s

order dismissing the case and remand for further proceedings.

I. Standard of Review & Jurisdiction

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291. The standard of review for a dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is de novo. Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). In

conducting our review, we must “accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any

reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be

entitled to relief.” Id. at 233. 

II. Background

Consistent with our standard of review, we recite the

facts of the case in the light most favorable to the Lewises. 

The Lewises owned and lived in a house in Glen Rock,

Pennsylvania. On July 19, 2004, as part of a planned move to

New York, they entered into a contract to sell that residence. 

The sales agreement provided that the Lewises would deliver

“a vacant building” to the buyer at the time of the closing,

which was scheduled for August 27, 2004. (Appellee App. at

A24 ¶¶ 6-8.) Well aware of the need to move their

belongings quickly to comply with the terms of the sales
4

agreement, the Lewises solicited a bid from Atlas’s local

agent, Warners Moving and Storage (“Warners”), explicitly

informing Warners that their house had to be empty before

August 27. The Lewises also informed Warners that they had

purchased a new home in New York and that they intended to

use the proceeds from the sale of their Pennsylvania home to

pay for it. 

Warners assured the Lewises that, if hired, it would

have their Pennsylvania residence emptied by August 26, the

day before the closing was scheduled to occur. On July 27,

2004, a Warners sales representative executed an agreement

with the Lewises providing that “Warners Moving and

Storage will arrive at your home on 8/23 & 8/24 to box the

household belongings with loading the household effects on

8/25 & 8/26. Delivery is scheduled for 8/31 or 9/1.”

(Appellee App. at A42.)

However, notwithstanding its explicit promise, made

with full awareness of the Lewises’ obligation to present an

empty home at closing on August 27 and their need to pay for

their new home in New York, Warners dramatically failed to

fulfill its commitment. On August 23 and 24, Warners did

pack the Lewises’ belongings as required, and on August 25,

Warners did provide a moving van at the Lewises' residence,

and began loading the belongings into the van. Despite its

obligation to complete the loading by the following day,

though, and knowing full well the possible consequences to

the Lewises, Warners advised the Lewises that the moving

van was leaving that evening because the tractor and crew
 We are unable to tell from the record whether Jeff Warner 1

was a principal of Warners or simply an employee.

5

were needed to handle a move to North Carolina for another

customer the next day. 

The Lewises were still left believing that another crew

would appear with a tractor trailer to finish their move as

scheduled. But, on August 26, the day it had agreed to

complete the loading, Warners failed to show up at the

Lewises’ home. Obviously concerned, the Lewises attempted

to contact Warners. No one from Warners appeared at the

Lewises’ home that day, and no one from Warners offered

any explanation for the delay. Nor did Warners appear on

August 27, the day of the closing. Aware that the real estate

transaction was in serious jeopardy, the Lewises again tried to

contact Warners and eventually spoke to Jeff Warner at

around noon on August 27. Mr. Warner advised the Lewises 1

that there were no licensed drivers available to deliver a

moving van to their residence. 

Later that day, the Lewises attended the scheduled

closing. Not surprisingly, given Warners’ failure to perform

as promised, the Lewises were unable to deliver a vacant

home to the purchasers. The purchasers refused to go through

with the sale. Warners did not complete the loading of the

Lewises’ belongings until August 29, and did not deliver them

to New York until September 3, 2004. 
6

When the Lewises’ belongings arrived at their new

home in New York, Richard Lewis acknowledged their

receipt by signing a Household Goods Bill of Lading and

Freight Bill. That document provided that “as a condition

precedent to recovery, a claim for any damage ... or delay,

must be filed within nine months after delivery ... . When a

claim is not filed ... in accordance with the foregoing

provisions, carrier shall not be liable and such a claim shall

not be paid.” (Appellee App. at A139.)

The following month, on October 26, 2004, the

Lewises’ attorney sent a letter to Warners requesting

compensation for losses incurred because of Warners’ failure

to timely perform as promised under the parties’ agreement. 

The letter requested damages equal to the “loss of profit on

the sale of their residence, additional mortgage payments that

Mr. and Mrs. Lewis have had to pay on two mortgages on

their Pennsylvania residence which otherwise would have

been paid off at closing, and various other miscellaneous

expenses they would not have otherwise incurred.” (Appellee

App. at A150.) The letter went on to explain that the Lewises

could not provide an exact dollar amount for their losses

“until they are able to sell their Pennsylvania residence.” 

(Appellee App. at A151.) Shortly thereafter, on November 4,

2004, Warners’ counsel sent a letter to the Lewises’ attorney

acknowledging receipt of the October 26, 2004 letter, and

requesting additional information and documentation. 

On March 14, 2005, the Lewises entered into a new

contract to sell their Pennsylvania property. The sale closed

on June 3, 2005, at a price approximately $35,000 lower than
 While $28,000 may seem an extraordinary tax liablity

2

under these circumstances, the Lewis’s explained in a

November 9, 2005 letter to Atlas that approximately $20,000

of that figure represented federal income taxes that they were

required to pay as a penalty for withdrawing money from a

401(k) account. They assert that they withdrew the money so

that they could purchase their home in New York, a step they

would not have had to take if they had been able to sell their

Pennsylvania home as planned. 

7

the amount the Lewises would have received under the prior

sales agreement, had that transaction been completed. During

the nine-month period between the delivery of their

belongings to New York and the sale of their Pennsylvania

residence, the Lewises paid approximately $9,000 in

mortgage payments on the Pennsylvania residence,

approximately $1,600 in additional utility bills, and over

$28,000 in additional taxes.2

On November 9, 2005, the Lewises sent a letter to

Warners fully explaining their damages and providing a

detailed spreadsheet showing the expenses incurred because

of Warners’ failure to keep its promises. Warners refused to

pay, and the Lewises were compelled to file suit.

In their complaint filed on August 23, 2006 against

Atlas in its capacity as Warners’ principal, the Lewises

asserted claims for breach of contract and negligence and

sought approximately $72,000 in damages. Atlas, relying on

the Carmack Amendment, removed the case to the United
8

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 

Atlas then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It argued that the Lewises’ state

law claims were preempted by the Amendment and that the

Lewises could not obtain relief under that statute because they

had not complied with an associated regulation, 49 C.F.R. §

370.3, which requires a shipper to file a claim “for a specified

or determinable amount of money” with the carrier within the

time limits specified in the bill of lading. 

On January 30, 2007, the District Court denied Atlas’s

motion to dismiss, concluding that the Carmack Amendment

did not preempt the Lewises’ state law claims. However, on

May 30, 2007, the District Court granted Atlas’s motion for

reconsideration and dismissed the case. In doing so, the

District Court agreed with Atlas that the Lewises’ state law

claims were preempted and that the Lewises had not complied

with the cited regulation. This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion

Subsection (a)(1) of the Carmack Amendment, 49

U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), provides in relevant part that:

A carrier providing transportation or service ...

shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property

it receives for transportation ... . That carrier...

[is] liable to the person entitled to recover under

the receipt or bill of lading. The liability

imposed under this paragraph is for the actual

loss or injury to the property ... .
 Although the Lewises concede that the Carmack 3

Amendment governs their claims, they urge us to exempt

them entirely from complying with the claim filing

requirements set out in 49 C.F.R. § 370.3. Relying on

Wisconsin Packing Co. v. Indiana Refrigerator Lines, Inc.,

618 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980), the Lewises contend that §

370.3 does not apply to them because Atlas has chosen to

contest their claim. Were we writing on a clean slate, the

Lewises’ argument might have greater force because, as the

Seventh Circuit pointed out in Wisconsin Packing, § 370.3

explicitly refers only to claims paid “voluntarily” by a carrier. 

Id. at 445. However, the Lewises’ reading of the regulation is

foreclosed by our recent decision in S&H Hardware & Supply

Co. v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 432 F.3d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 2005)

(explaining that “[a]s a matter of public policy, the

[regulation] is intended to provide carriers with an

opportunity to investigate claims, so it reaches its full

usefulness precisely when a carrier wishes to contest a

claim”).

9

At oral argument, counsel for the Lewises correctly

conceded that the Amendment preempts the Lewises’ state

law claims against Atlas. See, e.g., Ga., Fla. & Atlantic Ry. 3

Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196 (1916)

(explaining that the Carmack Amendment covers “all losses

resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier’s duty as to

any part of the agreed transportation”); Moffit v. Bekins Van

Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 306 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the

Carmack Amendment preempted state law claims by a
 The regulations found in 49 C.F.R. § 370.3 went into 4

effect in 1997 and are also found in 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2. As a

result, several of the cases we discuss in this opinion cite to

49 C.F.R. § 1005.2 rather than 49 C.F.R. § 370.3. However,

the two provisions are identical. See Motor Carrier Routing

Regulations; Disposition of Loss and Damage Claims and

Processing Salvage; Preservation of Records, 62 Fed. Reg.

32040-01 (June 12, 1997) (explaining that, due to the passage

of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of

1995, it was necessary to “add[] to 49 CFR chapter III certain

motor carrier transportation regulations, also codified in 49

CFR chapter X.” For clarity’s sake, we will refer to the

regulation as 49 C.F.R. § 370.3 throughout this opinion.

10

consumer shipper against a moving company based on late

delivery of the shipper’s belongings). 

As to claims under the Carmack Amendment itself,

subsection (e)(1) provides that “a carrier may not provide ... a

period of less than 9 months for filing a claim against it under

this section ... .” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(e)(1). The contents of a

valid claim are set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 370.3. Pursuant to 4

subsection (b) of that regulation, a claim for “loss, damage, or

delay to cargo” must include:

A written or electronic communication ... from

a claimant, filed with a proper carrier within the

time limits specified in the bill of lading ... and:

(1) Containing facts sufficient to

identify the baggage or shipment

(or shipments) of property,

(2) Asserting liability for alleged

loss, damage, injury, or delay, and
 We note that the bill of lading does not appear to contain 5

any reference to the regulation or any requirement that the

claim be for a specified or determinable amount of money. 

We do not imply that such a reference is legally required, but

its inclusion may have assisted in the resolution of this dispute

before litigation.

11

(3) Making claim for the payment

of a specified or determinable

amount of money,

shall be considered as sufficient compliance

with the provisions for filing claims embraced

in the bill of lading ... .

Consistent with subsection (e)(1) of the Amendment,

the bill of lading that Atlas gave to the Lewises required that,

“as a condition precedent to recovery, a claim for any damage

... or delay, must be filed within nine months after delivery ... . 

When a claim is not filed ... in accordance with the foregoing

provisions, carrier shall not be liable and such a claim shall

not be paid.” (Appellee App. at A139.) Atlas delivered the 5

Lewises’ belongings to their new home in New York on

September 3, 2004. Thus, pursuant to the bill of lading and

the Amendment, the Lewises had until June 3, 2005 to

provide Atlas with notice of their claim in a manner that

complied with 49 C.F.R. § 370.3(b). 

On appeal, the parties do not dispute that the October

26, 2004 letter sent by the Lewises’ attorney to Atlas satisfies

the requirements found in § 370.3(b)(1) and (b)(2). They

disagree, however, on whether that letter makes a claim for a

“specified or determinable amount of money,” as required by

§ 370.3(b)(3). The Lewises argue that the letter makes a

claim for a determinable amount of money because it
12

identifies their losses as the “loss of profit on the sale of their

residence, additional mortgage payments that [they] have had

to pay on two mortgages on their Pennsylvania residence

which otherwise would have been paid off at closing, and

various other miscellaneous expenses they would not have

otherwise incurred.” (Appellee App. at A150.) According to

the Lewises, listing the nature of their damages renders their

claim “determinable” because those damages are “susceptible

of being determined, found out, definitively decided upon, or

settled.” (Appellant Br. at 17.) Atlas responds that, to make a

claim for a determinable amount of money, the Lewises’

claim must include, at minimum, some dollar amount, and the

October 26 letter fails to provide “any dollar amount

whatsoever.” (Appellee Br. at 9, 26.) We agree with the

Lewises that the October 26, 2004 letter stated a claim for a

determinable amount of money as to the amount of their extra

mortgage payments and the difference between the price at

which they would have sold their Pennsylvania home, but for

Warners’ actions, and the lower price at which the home

ultimately sold. However, a claim for “miscellaneous”

expenses is too vague to constitute a claim for a determinable

amount of money, as contemplated by the regulation, and

hence Atlas is not liable for those expenses.

We begin our analysis of § 370.3 with the rule that

“[t]he basic tenets of statutory construction apply to

construction of regulations and ‘our starting point on any

question concerning the application of a regulation is its

particular written text.’” Pa. Fed’n. of Sportsmen’s Clubs,

Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 337, 351 (3d Cir. 2007)

(quoting Wilson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195, 197

(3d Cir.1999)). In examining a regulation’s text, “[i]t is a

fundamental canon of ... construction ... that unless otherwise

defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,

contemporary, common meaning.” CSX Transp. Co. v.
13

Novolog Bucks County, 502 F.3d 247, 257 (3d Cir. 2007)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

As noted already, § 370.3(b)(3) requires that a valid

claim include a “written communication ... [m]aking [a] claim

for the payment of a specified or determinable amount of

money.” 49 C.F.R. § 370.3(b)(3) (emphasis added). Because

the regulation does not define the meaning of the term

“specified” or the term “determinable,” we must apply the

ordinary meaning of those words. “Determinable” simply

means “[a]ble to be determined or ascertained.” Black’s Law

Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). “Specify,” by contrast, means “to

mention or name in a specific or explicit manner: tell or state

explicitly or in detail.” Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary, 2187 (Philip Babcock Gove, ed. 1961) (1986). 

The plain meanings of “specified” and “determinable” reveal

a key difference between them and hence between the kinds

of claims permitted by the regulation. A claim for a

“specified amount of money” is a claim that explicitly gives

the dollar amount of money being claimed. However, a claim

for a “determinable amount of money” need not explicitly

state the dollar amount claimed. Instead, a claim is

“determinable” if the amount of money claimed is merely

“[cap]able of being determined or ascertained.” Notably,

because a claim for a “specific amount of money” must state

the amount explicitly, such claims must be reduced to an

exact dollar amount at the time the claim is made. By

contrast, a claim that is “determinable” need not include any

dollar amount at all. Instead, all that is required is that the

claim provide enough information to make it possible to

assign a dollar amount to the claim at some point after the

claim itself is filed.

Our conclusion that “specified” claims under §

370.3(b)(3) include exact dollar amounts while

“determinable” claims do not is not only consistent with the
 Rather than focus on the regulation’s text, the Lewises 6

urge us to adopt a “substantial performance” standard to

evaluating claims under § 370.3(b). We have previously

noted the possibility of such a standard in dicta. See S&H

Hardware, 432 F.3d at 554 (stating that “[c]ourts have

construed the written claim requirement liberally, however,

and the standard for determining sufficiency is one of

substantial performance”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In this case, we may resolve the Lewises’

appeal based on the plain meaning of § 370.3(b)(3). Thus,

while we do not reject the application of a substantial

performance standard in an appropriate case, we have no

reason to consider it here. 

14

ordinary usage of both terms, it is also consistent with another

canon of statutory and regulatory construction. We have

explained that “[i]f possible, we must give effect to every

clause and word of a statute, and be reluctant to treat statutory

terms as surplusage.” Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d

188, 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal punctuation

and quotation marks omitted). Were we to accept Atlas’s

invitation to require that every claim must provide some

dollar amount to comply with subsection (b)(3), we would be

treating the term “determinable” as merely redundant of the

term “specified,” and would be ignoring the use of the word

“or” between the two terms.6

Atlas attempts to evade the ordinary meaning of the

regulation’s language and the basic rules of textual

construction by arguing that, while a “determinable” claim

need not include the exact amount of the shipper’s claim, it

must include some dollar amount. We find no support for

Atlas’s reading, either in the text of the statute itself or in

common sense. Requiring a shipper to list some dollar

amount presents the shipper with some limited options. The
15

shipper might list a single dollar amount, such as “$100.00.” 

As we have already explained, such a claim is a claim for a

“specified” amount of money, not a “determinable” amount

of money. Second, a shipper might list an estimate of its

damages, for example, by filing a claim for “$100 more or

less.” Without further amplification, such a claim is not for a

specified or determinable amount of money because 49

C.F.R. § 370.3(d) provides that:

[w]henever a claim is presented ... for an

uncertain amount, such as ‘$100 more or less,’

[the carrier] shall ascertain as nearly as possible

the extent, if any, of the loss or damage for

which it may be responsible. It shall not,

however, voluntarily pay [such] a claim unless

and until a formal claim in writing for a

specified or determinable amount of money

shall have been filed in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph (b) of this section.

The implication of the clause “until a formal claim in writing

for a specified or determinable amount of money shall have

been filed” is that a claim like “$100 more or less” is

different from and does not meet the “specified or

determinable” standard. 

However, we do not read § 370.3(d) to bar all claims

that are less than fully specific regarding the dollar amount at

stake. Instead, the plain meaning of the word “determinable”

leads us to conclude that § 370.3(d) bars claims that include

estimated dollar amounts only when the claim does not

contain sufficient information to put the carrier on notice of

the nature and extent of its liability. Cf. Trepel v. Roadway

Exp., Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding §

370.3(b)(3) was satisfied when the nature of the shipper’s

damages was not in dispute and the shipper estimated those
16

damages at $150,000); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. G.I. Trucking

Co., 1 F.3d 903, 904-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying a

“substantial performance” standard to § 370.3(b) and holding

that a claim satisfied § 370.3(b)(3) when the shipper

identified the shipment at issue, provided supporting

documentation, and estimated his damages at $100,000).

Beyond the unwarranted twist Atlas’s argument gives

to the plain meaning of “determinable,” the argument also

violates an important purpose of the statute. “The purpose of

the written claim requirement is to insure that the carrier may

promptly investigate claims, and not to permit the carrier to

escape liability.” S&H Hardware & Supply Co. v. Yellow

Transp. Inc., 432 F.3d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). The “crux of

the notice [under § 370.3(b)] is whether it apprises the carrier

of the basis for the claim and that reimbursement will be

sought.” Id. Valid claims are determinable not because they

include some dollar amount, but because they provide enough

information about the nature and extent of the carrier’s

liability to allow the carrier to understand its potential

exposure to liability. See G.I. Trucking Co., 1 F.3d at 906

(explaining that “the form of the written notice is less

important than its adequacy in apprising the carrier of the

basis for the claim and the fact that reimbursement will be

sought.”). Thus, although a valid claim will often include an

estimate of the shipper’s damages along with enough factual

information to inform the carrier of the basis for the claim, a

dollar amount is not an absolute requirement. See id. (stating

that “[o]ther circuits ... have held that a claim must specify an

amount of damages to be considered legally sufficient under

the regulations. ... We expressly reject this conclusion.”)

(citations omitted). 

We conclude that, as to part of what they demanded,

the Lewises’ October 26, 2004 letter provides a sound

example of how a shipper may give proper notice to a carrier
 Atlas also alleges that the Lewises failed to act in a timely 7

manner because they did not provide it with the final dollar

amount of their damages until November 2005, well after the

nine-month claim filing period specified in the bill of lading

had expired. Atlas’s argument misses the mark because, for

the reasons we have explained, the Lewises’ October 26, 2004

letter, which was undisputedly sent within the nine-month

period, included a valid claim for a “determinable amount of

money” under § 370.3(b)(3). 

17

of a determinable claim without including a dollar amount. 

The letter informed Atlas that it was being asked to pay for

the loss of profit on the sale of their residence and for

additional mortgage payments that Mr. and Mrs. Lewis would

have to pay on their Pennsylvania residence which otherwise

would have been paid off at closing. (Appellee App. at

A150.) The letter went on to explain that the Lewises could

not provide an exact dollar amount for their losses “until

they are able to sell their Pennsylvania residence.” (Appellee

App. at A151.) Based on the information provided to it by

the Lewises, Atlas knew the nature of that claim, and how the

amount of it would ultimately be determined. Section 7

370.3(b) requires nothing more.

However, the Lewises’ additional demand that they be

reimbursed for “miscellaneous expenses” requires different

treatment. Unlike their claim for lost profit and payment of

additional mortgage liability, that claim is not determinable

because it does not inform Atlas of the nature of the claim or

the extent of Atlas’s liability. Hence, with respect to that

claim, the Lewises did not file a “determinable” claim within
 It was, for example, only after the nine-month time frame 8

that the Lewises described the tax penalty they faced by being

forced to withdraw funds from their 401(k) account. 

 We note, however, that Atlas overstates the holdings of at 9

least two of the cases on which it relies. In Pathway Bellows

Inc. v. Blanchette, 630 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second

Circuit did not explicitly hold that a dollar amount was

required. Instead it held that the shipper’s claim was

“inadequate in form” when the relevant portion of the

shipper’s claim stated in its entirety that “the purpose of this

letter is to state, in writing, that we are in the process of filing

a claim for freight damage.” Id. at 901, 904. As we have

explained, it is not the lack of a dollar amount that dooms

such claims, rather such claims are inadequate because they

do not provide a carrier with any information about the nature

of the damage incurred, or the extent of the carrier’s liability. 

In addition, such claims are potentially open-ended in the

sense that they do not indicate to the carrier when, or how, the

shipper’s claim will be reduced to a dollar amount. In

Siemens Power Transmission & Distribution, Inc. v. Norfolk

Southern Ry. Co., 420 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005), the

Eleventh Circuit considered a claim that included an

estimated damages amount of $25,000, not a claim that

entirely lacked a dollar amount. The issue before the

18

the nine months specified by the bill of lading, and Atlas is

not liable to them for whatever those expenses may be.8

Finally, Atlas urges us to follow other Circuits which,

it insists, have held that claims which completely lack dollar

amounts cannot satisfy § 370.3(b)(3). We decline the

invitation. As already explained, our analysis of the text of

the regulation persuades us that a dollar amount is not

required.9
Eleventh Circuit was whether “[§ 370.3(b)] could be

construed to invalidate ... estimated damages [claims] ... on

the ground that such a [claim] is not specified or

determinable.” Id. at 1252. In the course of deciding that

estimated damages amounts were permissible, the Eleventh

Circuit noted that other circuit courts had held a shipper’s

claim invalid in “situations in which the shipper provided the

carrier with no damage amount at all.” Id. (emphasis in

original). However, contrary to Atlas’s contention, nothing in

Siemens indicates that the Eleventh Circuit adopted the view

that a dollar amount is always required. Instead, it concluded

that cases that did not include dollar amounts were inapposite

to the issue before it because the claim under consideration

included an estimated damages amount. Id. Thus, Atlas’s

reading of Siemens is overly broad. 

19

IV. Conclusion

The District Court erred in concluding that the

Lewises’ request for reimbursement for additional mortgage

payments and loss incurred by virtue of the decrease in the

sale price of their Pennsylvania home were not

“determinable” claims under § 370.3(b)(3). Hence, we will

vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.