[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 17-13864

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00131-WTH-GRJ

KELLY-JO MULLEN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(May 22, 2018)

Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Kelly Jo Mullen appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision by 

the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for 

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disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On appeal, 

she argues that the finding by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that Mullen 

was not disabled because she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform sedentary work and could return to her past work as a quality assurance 

analyst was not supported by substantial evidence.

We review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s 

decision is based, and review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is 

supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th 

Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, and requires only 

such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion. Id. In conducting this limited review, we may not decide the facts 

anew, make credibility determinations, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. 

An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that 

she is disabled. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible 

for benefits when she demonstrates disability on or before the date for which she 

was last insured. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A). The social security regulations 

establish a five-step evaluation process used to determine eligibility for DIB 

claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

At step four of the analysis, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC and 

ability to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The RFC is 

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a measure of what the claimant is able to do despite the limitations caused by her 

impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). If the claimant is able to return to her past 

relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). The 

regulations place “a very heavy burden” on the claimant to demonstrate a 

qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work. Moore, 405 

F.3d at 1211.

In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant medical and 

other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(e). The ALJ is required to weigh all the 

medical opinions received, and generally gives more weight to the opinions of 

treating or examining physicians than to the opinions of physicians that have not 

treated or examined the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). However, in weighing 

medical evidence, the ALJ considers many factors, including whether the opinion 

is well-supported and consistent with the record, and the length and nature of the 

relationship between the physician and the claimant. Id. The ALJ must state with 

particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the supporting 

reasons. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). 

A report from a non-examining physician does not, on its own, constitute 

substantial evidence supporting an administrative decision, and is entitled to little 

weight if it contradicts the opinion of an examining physician. Lamb v. Bowen, 

847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988). However, the ALJ is free to reject any 

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medical opinion when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Sryock v. 

Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985).

Mullen was required to prove that she was disabled on or before 

December 1, 2008, her date last insured. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211; 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(a)(1)(A). Dr. Chodosh’s opinion, which expressly stated that the limitations 

he recognized first presented in 2010, was not relevant to the determination of 

disability during the period between Mullen’s alleged onset date and her date last 

insured, and was inconsistent with medical and opinion evidence related to that

time period. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to 

disregard that opinion. See Sryock, 764 F.2d at 835. Furthermore, Dr. West’s 

expert opinion and medical evidence from the relevant time period, both of which 

indicated that Mullen had received successful treatment for her heart condition, 

constituted substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination that, as of the 

date last insured, Mullen retained the RFC to perform sedentary work. Because the 

vocational expert testified that Mullen’s past work as a quality assurance analyst 

was performed at the sedentary level, there was substantial evidence supporting the 

ALJ’s conclusion that Mullen could return to such work and was, therefore, not 

disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. 

AFFIRMED.

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