*

Honorable J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit

Judge for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4100.

Barbara KORNBLAU, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DADE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida,

Defendant-Appellee.

June 20, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida. (No. 94-655-CIV), Donald L. Graham, Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and RONEY and PHILLIPS*

, Senior

Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge:

The district court granted summary judgment in this case for

Dade County and against the plaintiff, who, by this suit, sought

access as a disabled person to a parking space in a private

employee parking lot that she would not have been entitled to use

even if she were not disabled. We affirm.

There is no issue of fact. The decision turns on the proper

interpretation of a federal statute and its regulations.

Plaintiff Barbara Kornblau, by virtue of her difficulty in

walking due to arthritis, is a disabled person entitled to the

benefits of Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12132. The regulations that implement the Act provide

that where parking is provided for a public building, a certain

number of spaces must be provided for the disabled, located on the

shortest accessible route of travel to the entrance of the
building. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.6.2.

 Metropolitan Dade County's Government Center Building

provides several public parking lots where plaintiff is entitled to

park. These parking lots meet the requirements for the number and

location of disabled parking spaces. The parking lot closest to

the entrance to the building, however, is reserved with marked

spaces for the county commissioners and certain senior management

officials of the County. Plaintiff, who is not a County employee,

wants the County to provide a disabled parking space in that

employees' private lot that would be available to her, basing that

claim upon the ADA.

 The ADA was enacted to provide a national mandate "for the

elimination of discrimination against individuals with

disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). Although the Act must be

broadly construed, Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F.Supp. 547, 551

(E.D.Pa.), aff'd 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S.

----, 114 S.Ct. 1545, 128 L.Ed.2d 196 (1994), nothing in the Act,

its purpose, or the regulations can reasonably be read to give

disabled parkers access to areas that would not be available to

them if they were not disabled. The purpose of the Act is to place

those with disabilities on an equal footing, not to give them an

unfair advantage. In re Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131 (Del.1994). The

discrimination that must be eliminated is the discriminatory effect

that results because of the disability. As Judge Ryskamp said in

a decision granting a preliminary injunction enforcing the Act in

another context, to show a violation of Title II the plaintiff must

show disability, the denial of a public benefit, and that such
"denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the

plaintiff's disability." Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park

Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F.Supp. 986, 990

(S.D.Fla.1994).

 Plaintiff seeks to gain an advantage over non-disabled

parkers through a confused interpretation of the Accessibility

Guidelines adopted as a part of the Department of Justice's

Regulations with regard to Title II of the ADA, contained in

Appendix A to Part 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, referred

to as "ADAAG." Regulations promulgated by the Department of

Justice interpreting the ADA are, of course, entitled to

considerable weight. Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F.Supp. 476, 483

(N.D.Ind.1993). See also, Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512, 1518

(11th Cir.1986); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed.2d 26

(1995); Thurber v. Browner, 3 AD Cases 1257, 1994 WL 395007

(N.D.Ill.1994). While we note the regulations cannot require more

than a reasonably interpreted Act can require, see Robbins v.

Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195 (7th Cir.1994); Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 25 F.3d

1063 (D.C.Cir.1994), it is not necessary to fall back on that

principle here. The regulations here simply do not require what

the plaintiff claims they require.

We are satisfied that Judge Graham made a proper

interpretation of the regulations which we set forth in full as

follows:

The dispositive issue in this case is whether Dade County

is required by the ADA to provide disabled parking spaces for
visitors to the Government Center Building in an adjacent

parking lot reserved for County Commissioners and Senior

Management Officials. To determine this issue, the Court must

review the regulations contained in Appendix A to 28 C.F.R.

Part 36.

Kornblau argues that Dade County is not in compliance

with 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A § 4.6.2 and, therefore, is in

violation of the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 4.6.2 provides:

Accessible parking spaces serving a particular building

shall be located on the shortest accessible route of

travel from adjacent parking to an accessible entrance.

In parking facilities that do not serve a particular

building, accessible parking shall be located on the

shortest accessible route of travel to an accessible

pedestrian entrance of the parking facility. In

buildings with multiple accessible entrances with

adjacent parking, accessible parking spaces shall be

dispersed and located closest to the accessible

entrances.

While Kornblau does not dispute Dade County's argument that

this section distinguishes between employee and visitor

parking, she insists that the regulations require that

disabled parking be provided at the shortest accessible route

which in this case would be the employee parking reserved for

the County Commissioners and Senior Management Officials.

Dade County contends that 28 C.F.R. § 4.6.2 must be read

in conjunction with 28 C.F.R. § 4.1.2(5)(a) which provides in

pertinent part:

If parking spaces are provided for self-parking by

employees or visitors, or both, then accessible spaces

complying with 4.6 shall be provided in each such parking

area in conformance with the table below. Spaces

required by the table need not be provided in the

particular lot. They may be provided in a different

location if equivalent or greater accessibility, in terms

of distance from an accessible entrance, cost and

convenience is ensured.

The starting point in statutory construction must be the

language of the statute itself. Gonzalez v. McNary, 980 F.2d

1418, 1420 (11th Cir.1993). A statute should be construed so

that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part of

it will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.

Id. It is a court's duty to give effect, if possible, to

every clause and word of a statute. Id. This Court must

review both sections 4.6.2 and 4.1.2(5)(a).

With regard to section 4.1.2(5)(a), the first sentence

states "[i]f parking spaces are provided for self-parking
employees or visitors, or both, then accessible spaces

complying with 4.6 shall be provided in each such parking area

in conformance with the table below.' The following two

sentences in this section are logically conditioned on the

rule contained in the first sentence. The second sentence

need not be discussed because it refers to a table showing the

minimum number of accessible spaces require. The third

sentence, "[t]hey may be provided in a different location if

equivalent or greater accessibility, in terms of distance from

an accessible entrance, cost and convenience is ensured' is

referring to the spaces provided for employees or visitors in

compliance with the first sentence.

The regulations do not prohibit having separate lots for

employees and visitors. In fact, the regulations allow the

provision of three separate lots, one for employees, one for

visitors or one for both employees and visitors. Parking

spaces for the disabled must be provided in each lot on the

shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to

an accessible entrance. Therefore, for example, if a lot is

reserved for employees, a handicapped space must be reserved

within the lot. If a handicapped space is not reserved within

the lot, then it must be reserved at a location which is

equivalent or has greater accessibility in distance, cost and

convenience from the reserved lot.

The court finds that Dade County is in compliance with

section 4.6.2 as it provides accessible parking spaces for the

government center on the shortest accessible route of travel.

Dade County is also in compliance with section 4.1.2(5)(a).

Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Dade County is

appropriate.

Kornblau v. Dade County, [No. 94-0655-CIV-Graham, slip op. at 6-8]

(S.D.Fla.1994).

In sum, to base a claim on the ADA, plaintiff must first show

she was denied a public benefit. She has failed to do that.

Two points are worth noting. First, although plaintiff has no

standing to claim that disabled parking places should be available

for the senior officials and county commissioners in their parking

lot, the ADA Technical Assistance Manual addresses this type of

parking facility. The Technical Assistance Manual on ADA's Title

III was published by the Justice Department in January 1993 and

prepared pursuant to ADA's Title IV, § 12206(c)(3). Technical
Assistance Manual's Section III—7.4300 reads in pertinent part:

Parking (ADAAG § 4.1.2(5)(b)).

ADAAG provides a table with the number of accessible

parking spaces required dependent on the size of the lot....

If a lot is limited to the exclusive use of employees,

and none of the employees are individuals with disabilities

requiring accessible parking, accessible spaces may be

assigned to employees without disabilities.

Second, plaintiff Kornblau, a lawyer, is a volunteer member of

the Dade County Commission on Disability Issues. It holds monthly

meetings. She is entitled to park in several visitor and

visitor/employee lots, all of which provide the requisite number of

disabled parking spaces. In addition, she may attend the meetings

by riding the Metrorail or Dade County's Special Transportation

Services without charge. The Special Transportation Services,

using mini-vans, sedans, lift equipment vans and small buses,

provides portal to portal transportation for Dade County residents

who are unable or who do not care to use the Metrorail. It

provides service to the Government Center seven days a week from

4:30 A.M. to 2:30 A.M.

The argument that plaintiff is entitled to valet service for

her car is frivolous and needs no comment.

AFFIRMED.