J-S08041-24

2024 PA Super 73

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSE M SANTIAGO-BURGOS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 573 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0000886-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 15, 2024

Appellant, Jose M Santiago-Burgos, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

following his conviction by a jury on three counts of possession with the intent 

to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 

three counts of possession of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(16).

1

 After a careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On March 4, 

2016, the Commonwealth filed an Information charging Appellant with 

numerous drug-related offenses, and on May 23, 2018, Appellant, who was 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As discussed infra, Appellant’s direct appeal rights were reinstated via the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
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represented by counsel, proceeded to a two-day jury trial. The trial court has 

aptly summarized the evidence offered at the jury trial as follows: 

[The Commonwealth presented three witnesses, John 

Fielding, Detective Pasquale Leporace, and Lieutenant Nelson 

Ortiz. Their testimony established the following:] On January 15, 

2016, at approximately 6:35 a.m., a Berks County drug task force 

executed a search warrant on the residence located at [***]

South 18th Street, a three-story row home located in Reading, 

Berks County, Pennsylvania (“the Residence”). [N.T., 5/23-

5/24/28,] at 80-84. The search was related to an ongoing 

investigation regarding the distribution of illegal narcotics from 

the Residence and the subjects of the search were Appellant...and 

another individual—Luis Otero Casiano. [Id.] at 82. Upon entry 

to the Residence, officers found Appellant, his [paramour], and 

their two children. Id. at 83. Luis Otero Casiano was not found 

at the Residence. Id. at 85. After having been advised of his 

Miranda[2]rights, Appellant agreed to speak with detectives, and 

when asked whether there were drugs, guns, or money in the 

Residence, Appellant answered in the affirmative. Id. at 90. 

When asked [specifically about] guns or money in the Residence, 

Appellant told the officers that “he had a little bit of money 

upstairs.” Id. at 101. 

Appellant then led the officers into the basement of the 

Residence and, specifically, to a dresser where officers found 490 

packets of heroin, a digital scale, and various packaging items. 

Id. at 91-99. In the basement, officers located a small plastic 

cabinet in which they found a bag containing ammunition and 

magazines for firearms. Id. at 109. In the bottom of the cabinet, 

[officers] found a Ruger case with a .380 pistol inside of the case. 

Id. It was determined that the boxes of ammunition found were 

consistent with the firearm located in the plastic cabinet. Id. at 

110-11.

Officers found a bucket containing a kilo press, which, as 

testified, is used “when drug dealers dilute their product and they 

don’t want the product to appear to be diluted, so therefore they 

repress the product in order to make it appear as if it’s 

untouched.” Id. at 112-13. Large vice grips were also found that

would be used in conjunction with the kilo press to apply pressure 

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to the press. Id. at 114. Officers later found a bag containing 

benzocaine, which is used as a cutting agent for cocaine, which 

would be consistent with diluting cocaine with the benzocaine and 

using the kilo press to repackage the cocaine. Id. at 126.

Officers further found a box containing masks, a coffee 

grinder with heroin residue inside, boxes of blue glassine packets, 

and rubber bands, both of which are specific to the heroin trade 

and used in packaging for street level distribution. Id. at 116-17. 

Additionally, officers found a glass mason jar containing rice and 

a bulk amount of heroin in a plastic bag. Id. at 119. Officers 

likewise located a drill box in the basement in which [they] found 

ten baggies each containing twenty-eight grams of bulk 

methamphetamine, consistent with manufacturing for the purpose 

of distribution. Id. at 125. 

On a shelf in the hallway leading to the basement, officers 

found a heat sealer machine, which was consistent with sealing 

drugs for distribution in the packaging material found in the 

basement. Id. at 103-04. Hanging under the shelf, officers 

discovered a men’s jacket and a backpack, and inside the jacket, 

officers found a bulk amount of marijuana, which was packaged 

in one-ounce sized baggies for distribution. Id. at 106-07. 

Officers also found a larger scale for weighing bulkier items. Id. 

at 107-08.

In a room upstairs in the Residence, officers located a teal 

tub in which they found a .45 caliber handgun with a loaded 

magazine. Id. at 128. The handgun was later determined to be 

stolen. Id. at 129. [In the pockets of a] jean jacket found in a 

second-floor bedroom, [police found] numerous .45 caliber rounds 

of ammunition consistent with the handgun found in the tub. Id. 

at 131. Officers located bulk amounts of U.S. currency tucked into 

a blue purse and in a jacket—both found upstairs at the Residence. 

Id. at 132-35. Some of the currency was bound together into 

stacks with various names on papers attached to the stacks. Id. 

at 135-36.

On the third floor of the Residence, officers found a small 

amount of marijuana and a marijuana grinder, along with a pill 

bottle containing Oxycontin pills. Id. at 138-39. Appellant had 

directed officers to a plastic cabinet where he indicated there was 

a little money. Id. at 139. On top of the cabinet, there was a 

calculator and a wallet containing Appellant’s driver’s license and 

credit cards bearing Appellant’s name. Id. Inside of the plastic 

cabinet, officers located a notebook with the same corresponding 
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names as those earlier discovered on the papers attached to 

stacks of currency, as well as numeric values consistent with 

records of sales. Id. at 141, 143-44. 

***

Appellant presented three witnesses: Bernardo Cartagena, 

Jacqueline Casiano, and himself. Mr. Cartagena, who is the 

brother of Appellant’s [paramour], testified that he moved to the 

Reading area from Wisconsin in 2017 and that he works long hours 

with Appellant in the construction business. Id. at 249-52. Ms. 

Casiano, Appellant’s [paramour], testified that she has been with 

Appellant for eighteen years, and that Appellant worked long 

hours in construction. Id. at 254-55. Ms. Casiano stated that a 

portion of the money found by law enforcement was actually from 

a lawsuit that she had settled, and that she had planned to use 

the money for house repairs, bills, and a trip to Puerto Rico. Id. 

at 257. Ms. Casiano further testified that her son, Luis, along with 

his three children, came to live with her and Appellant in 2016. 

Id. at 255-56. Ms. Casiano noted that she believed the firearm 

found in the Residence may have belonged to Luis and that she 

knew Luis had been drinking a lot. Id. at 258-59. Ms. Casiano 

denied ever seeing Appellant involved in drugs or in the sale or 

distribution of drugs. Id. at 258. 

Appellant testified on his own behalf and denied any 

involvement in the sale or distribution of illegal drugs. Id. at 280-

81. Appellant further testified that he got [a] tattoo on his chest 

approximately twenty years before the trial. Id. at 282-83. 

Appellant denied ever telling officers that there were any drugs in 

the house but indicated that he did tell officers that everything 

they would find at the Residence belonged to him. Id. at 286-87. 

Appellant stated he believed that Luis was selling drugs. Id. at 

289. Appellant noted that the money found at the Residence was 

in part from Ms. Casiano’s lawsuit and the rest was from hi[s] 

construction business. Id. On cross-examination, Appellant 

stated that the tattoo [on his chest] was in reference to his 

astrological sign of the Libra, and that the money and marijuana 

[depicted in the tattoo] did not mean anything. Id. at 292-93. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 1-3, 10-11 (footnote added).

At the conclusion of all evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the 

offenses indicated supra. On June 29, 2018, Appellant proceeded to a 
J-S08041-24

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sentencing hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate of eight and one-half years to seventeen years in 

prison, to be followed by five years of probation. Appellant did not file postsentence motions; however, he filed a timely, counseled direct appeal on July 

25, 2018. Thereafter, counsel failed to file an appellate brief, and, 

consequently, by order entered on March 25, 2019, this Court dismissed 

Appellant’s appeal. 

On or about October 11, 2019, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition seeking the restoration of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on 

February 14, 2023. By order entered on March 20, 2023, the PCRA court 

reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights, and on April 17, 2023, this 

counseled appeal followed. All Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 

requirements have been met. 

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of 

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

1. Whether it was error to admit at trial, over defense objection 

and in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403, 

photographic evidence of Appellant’s large tattoo on his chest 

which depicts a scale, drugs, and money where:

a. the probative value was outweighed by the 

prejudicial effect as the photograph was potentially 

perceived as Appellant’s continued trade in 

controlled substances and glamorization of selling 

drugs;

b. the evidence implied previous involvement in 

illegal narcotics transactions; and/or,
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c. no written notice was given pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403(c)[3] and no 

motion was filed seeking to admit the photograph 

as evidence of other acts?

2. Whether it was error for the prosecutor to twice show to the 

jury on a large screen monitor Appellant’s large tattoo on his 

chest which depicts a scale, drugs, and money, and to further 

impermissibly aver to the jury that the tattoo is evidence that 

Appellant is a longtime, proud drug dealer and was, therefore, 

a drug dealer in the instant offense?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted) (footnote added).

In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in permitting 

the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence a photograph, which depicted 

Appellant’s shirtless chest, thus revealing a large, colored tattoo on his chest.4

It is undisputed Appellant’s tattoo depicts a scale with a stack of money on 

one side and marijuana leaves on the other side.5 Appellant argues the trial 

court should have excluded the evidence on the following basis: (1) the 

probative value of the photograph was outweighed by its prejudicial effect as 

____________________________________________

3 We note Pa.R.E. 403 has no subsection (c).

4 The photograph is of Appellant’s chest and does not include his head.

5 We note the trial court included copies of the Commonwealth’s exhibits, 

including the photograph at issue, with the certified paper record. However, 

the photograph has been reduced to the size of a post-it note, and, due to the 

low quality of the black and white copy, the tattoo is difficult to make out in 

the photograph. In any event, Appellant included in his reproduced record a 

full-size colored copy of the Commonwealth’s exhibit, which clearly shows the 

tattoo at issue. The Commonwealth does not challenge the accuracy of the 

copy of the photograph provided in Appellant’s reproduced record. Thus, for 

the sake of judicial economy, we shall address Appellant’s issue without 

requiring the trial court to further supplement the certified record.
J-S08041-24

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provided by Pa.R.E. 403; (2) the photograph was improper evidence of 

Appellant’s prior bad acts under Pa.R.E. 404(b); and (3) the Commonwealth 

failed to give written notice seeking to introduce the evidence. 

Initially, we note the following exchange occurred outside the presence 

of the jury on the first day of trial:

THE COURT: [Defense counsel,] you made mention of the 

photographs when we were back in the retiring room. Do you 

want to raise those issues now? I think I know which ones, but—

***

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So then referring to Commonwealth premarked Exhibit C3, C4, and C5. C3 and C4 being a shirtless 

picture of [Appellant] showing tattoos, which I do not believe 

they’re relevant in this case. Identification is not relevant.

C5, I believe is a picture of [Appellant’s paramour], which I 

don’t know why that’s relevant. Again, identification is not at 

issue.

THE COURT: Let me ask [the ADA]. First of all, I note that the 

woman in the photograph is not charged, nor is she alleged to be 

a co-conspirator in the case; is that correct?

[ADA]: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. What is the purpose of these three 

particular exhibits?

[ADA]: Most importantly, there’s going to be evidence that when 

[Appellant] was taken away, he asked for clothing. In fact, his 

[paramour], the person identified in C5, is the person that 

retrieved his clothing. It was retrieved from the bin identified as 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit Number 8. The same bin [where] one of 

the guns was located. It goes to show—

THE COURT: I understand that. But, I don’t see—there’s a 

potential prejudicial value of these extensive tattoos, and it seems 

to be that you have witnesses who are going to testify that this 

was the state of dress or undress he was in at the time.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 6:30 in the morning.

[ADA]: One of the tattoos, on [Appellant’s] right chest area, is 

relevant. My expert witness, Lieutenant Ortiz, is going to refer—
J-S08041-24

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that’s going to be one of his items that also goes into his—partly 

goes into his—

THE COURT: What tattoo might that be?

[ADA]: It’s a tattoo of scales. One scale has—and I do have the 

full page. One scale has a stack of cash, the other scale appears 

to have a bunch of marijuana. 

THE COURT: Well, I note that Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4 portrays 

that particular tattoo as well as another one, but also, maybe more 

importantly, it does not contain [Appellant’s] head. So, the other 

one, Commonwealth’s Exhibit 3, doesn’t even show the tattoo in 

its entirely.

[ADA]: Right. I didn’t have a photograph that had the entire head 

or the entire tattoo, so that’s why I put in both of them.

THE COURT: Well, what’s your—is your argument in favor of 

Commonwealth’s 5 simply that this is a picture of the woman who 

got the clothing for him?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just that—

THE COURT: No, that’s [a question] for [the ADA]. I’m 

addressing—

[ADA]: Right. People that were in the house. Everybody who was 

in the house, not law enforcement, were photographed. Which, 

you could imply that Luis Otero Casiano was not present. Which, 

I think—I don’t know what the defense is going to be, but I think 

they’re going to pin these drugs on Luis Otero Casiano. 

THE COURT: I understand that. But what do photographs have to 

do with that? Your officers are going to testify as to who was there 

and who was not there.

[ADA]: It just—well, they would have to believe the officers in 

their entirety, and I hope they do, but—

THE COURT: Well, this is what I’m going to do. I’m going to allow, 

over [Appellant’s] objection, the use of Commonwealth’s 4. I will 

not allow the use of Commonwealth’s 3 and 5, unless they become 

more germane due to cross-examination or the testimony of 

defense witnesses.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Got you, that makes sense.

[ADA]: So, 3 and 4 are—

THE COURT: 3 and 5.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 3 and 5 are out.
J-S08041-24

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With 4, Your Honor, I’m still going to renew my objection 

there. I understand the tattoo, which half of Facebook has. We 

don’t know what age he was when he got that. Certainly, 

someone that has a scale with money and marijuana doesn’t mean 

they’re a drug dealer. 

THE COURT: Well, I don’t disagree with that but it’s relevant 

evidence and its probative and you may make those arguments. 

I don’t believe it is unduly prejudicial under the circumstances, so 

your objection to Commonwealth’s 4 is denied. 

N.T., 5/23-5/24/18, at 18-22.

Thereafter, during the direct examination of Lieutenant Nelson Ortiz, the 

Commonwealth showed the lieutenant the photograph of the tattoo on 

Appellant’s chest. Id. at 232. The lieutenant testified people often get tattoos 

of items or other people that are important to them. Id. He testified: “So, 

this tattoo obviously is something that’s important to [Appellant]. It’s showing 

that marijuana—in my opinion, it’s showing marijuana equals cash.” Id.

As indicated supra, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to 

introduce the photograph at issue, marked as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4, on 

the basis it was relevant, and the probative value outweighed the prejudicial 

effect. On appeal, Appellant does not dispute the photograph was relevant; 

however, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in holding 

the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. 

The trial court’s decision to admit evidence is subject to 

review for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion may not 

be found merely because an appellate court might have reached 

a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such 

lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
J-S08041-24

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Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 84 A.3d 657, 664-65 (2014)

(citation, quotation marks, and quotation omitted). See Commonwealth v. 

Pruitt, 597 Pa. 307, 951 A.2d 307 (2008) (indicating the appellate courts 

review a challenge to the trial court’s admission of photographs under an 

abuse of discretion standard). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 402 provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence 

is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not 

relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has 

any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” 

Pa.R.E. 401. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its 

probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. 

In the case sub judice, the trial court relevantly indicated the following:

The [trial] court, when presented with [defense] counsel’s 

objection, noted that the photograph of Appellant as shirtless and 

appearing with his tattoo was relevant and probative. The 

photograph was relevant both to Appellant’s physical state when 

the officers arrived to execute the search warrant, but also to 

demonstrate, at least, the personal importance of drugs and 

money to Appellant. Appellant’s physical state at the time of the 

search led his [paramour] to retrieve clothing from the same 

plastic bin from which the stolen handgun had earlier been found, 

demonstrating a connection between Appellant’s personal effects 

and the handgun, and tending to show that Appellant had received 

and now possessed the stolen handgun. The photograph of 

Appellant’s tattoo was relevant in demonstrating that he valued 

drugs and money, and the connection between the two, to such 
J-S08041-24

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an extent as to have a permanent tattoo placed on his body 

depicting that relationship. This tended to show that Appellant 

was involved in the sale or distribution of illegal drugs. 

While Appellant argues that “the probative value was 

outweighed by the prejudicial effects as the photograph was 

potentially perceived as Appellant’s continued trade in controlled 

substances and glamorization of selling drugs,” such an argument 

can hardly be considered meaningful since any relevant evidence 

will have the effect of causing the factfinder to infer a connection 

between the evidence and a defendant’s guilt in the crime being 

charged. Our courts have repeatedly held that “[e]vidence will 

not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant.” 

Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 770 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

The prejudice complained of by Appellant provides no basis in

itself to exclude the evidence. The very behavior that the 

Commonwealth was attempting to prove was Appellant’s current 

participation in the drug trade. There was no allegation of 

Appellant’s prior involvement in drug transactions, or that the 

tattoo was demonstrative of Appellant’s prior involvement in drug 

transactions. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 8-9 (some quotation marks and 

quotations omitted).

We find no abuse of discretion. Appellant contends the introduction of 

the photograph resulted in “unfair prejudice” because “society has a general 

disdain for drug dealers.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. Thus, he suggests the 

photograph “damned Appellant” for glamorizing drugs. Id. However, as the 

trial court indicated above, “[e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because 

it is harmful to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 

750 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). Trial courts 

are not required to “sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the 
J-S08041-24

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jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand[.]”

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 592 Pa. 351, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (2007). 

Further, as the Comment to Pa.R.E. 403 instructs: 

“Unfair prejudice” means a tendency to suggest decision on an 

improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty 

of weighing the evidence impartially....[E]xclusion is limited to 

evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a 

decision based upon something other than the legal propositions 

relevant to the case.

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 750 (citations, quotation marks, and quotations 

omitted). Here, the photograph of Appellant’s tattoo on his chest, introduced 

for a legitimate purpose, was not so prejudicial that it likely diverted the jury’s 

attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially or inflamed 

the jury to make a decision based on “something other than the legal 

propositions relevant to the case.” Id. Thus, we find Appellant is not entitled 

to relief.

To the extent Appellant contends the photograph should have been 

excluded under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) as it was indicative of a prior bad act and

improperly used by the Commonwealth to show Appellant acted in conformity 

with the bad act, Appellant has not set forth that place in the record where he 

objected to the evidence on this basis. Pointing to the discussion on the record 

set forth supra, the trial court indicates Appellant failed to object to the 

admission of the photograph on this basis. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 

8/28/23, at 9. That is, Appellant confined his objection at trial to whether the 

photograph was relevant and/or whether the probative value was outweighed 
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by the prejudicial effect. “The rule is well settled that a party complaining on 

appeal of the admission of evidence in the [c]ourt below will be confined to 

the specific objection there made.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 

928 A.2d 1025, 1041 (2007) (quotation marks and quotations omitted). Thus, 

we decline to address this challenge further.

Similarly, regarding Appellant’s contention the trial court should have 

excluded the photograph on the basis the Commonwealth failed to give 

Appellant pre-trial written notice that it was planning to introduce the 

evidence, Appellant has failed to set forth that place in the record where he 

objected on this basis. The trial court notes in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion

that Appellant did not raise an objection to the admission of the photograph 

on this basis during trial. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 9. Thus, 

this issue is waived. Cousar, supra.

In any event, we note that, assuming, arguendo, Appellant preserved 

his issues, and the trial court should have precluded the evidence and/or 

testimony related to the photograph as alleged by Appellant, any error with 

regard thereto is harmless.6 

____________________________________________

6 We note our Supreme Court has held that this Court may sua sponte invoke 

the harmless error doctrine since it “does nothing more than affirm a valid 

judgment of sentence on an alternative basis.” Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 

660 Pa. 379, 234 A.3d 486, 492 (2020) (quotation marks and quotation 

omitted). In any event, the Commonwealth, as well as the trial court, indicate 

any error in the admittance of the photograph was harmless error. 
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The harmless error doctrine reflects the reality that the 

accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. [The Supreme 

Court has] described the proper analysis as follows:

Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates 

either: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant 

or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the 

erroneously admitted evidence was merely 

cumulative of other untainted evidence which was 

substantially similar to the erroneously admitted 

evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and 

uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming 

and the prejudicial effect of the error was so

insignificant by comparison that the error could not 

have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (2014) 

(quotation marks and quotations omitted).

Relevantly, in analyzing the harmless error doctrine, the trial court 

indicated the following:

Instantly, the Commonwealth presented three witnesses at 

the trial. First, John Fielding, the owner of the stolen firearm, 

testified to his ownership of the stolen firearm and the 

circumstances of its theft. Next, Detective Pasquale Leporace 

testified about the investigation and executed the search of the 

Residence, detailing the discovery of all the previously cited items 

retained and presented as evidence at trial. Finally, Lieutenant 

Nelson Ortiz, who was qualified as an expert in the trafficking of 

narcotics, testified as to the items that were discovered through 

the search of the Residence and how those items are utilized in 

the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. Lieutenant Ortiz likewise 

testified as to the behavior and common habits of those involved 

in the drug trade. 

***

Given the detailed evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth, including photographs of all items found during 

the search, and the expert opinion analysis provided by Lieutenant 

Ortiz, it is clear that the other properly admitted evidence 

demonstrated [Appellant’s guilt] overwhelmingly. It is difficult to 
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imagine that the minimal prejudicial effect of the photograph of 

the tattoo contributed in any meaningful manner to the verdict of 

the jury.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 10-11 (citations to record omitted). 

We agree with the trial court’s analysis. Here, the Commonwealth 

established at length, and its witnesses described in detail, the controlled 

substances, guns, and cash found throughout the Residence. The 

Commonwealth also established the police discovered several items, which 

are commonly used in the drug distribution business, in the Residence. 

Further, not only was Appellant discovered in the Residence during the early 

morning hours when the police executed the search warrant, but a wallet 

containing his driver’s license and credit cards was discovered in the 

Residence. Accordingly, given that the uncontradicted evidence of guilt was 

so overwhelming, the prejudicial effect from the evidence and testimony 

related to the photograph of Appellant’s tattoo was so insignificant by 

comparison that any error in the admittance of the photograph could not have 

contributed to the verdict. Hairston, supra. Thus, Appellant is not entitled 

to relief. 

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the Commonwealth’s closing 

statement to the jury.7 Specifically, Appellant contends:

____________________________________________

7

In the argument portion related to his second issue, Appellant also makes a 

passing reference to the Commonwealth presenting the photograph of 

Appellant’s tattoo during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief via a large screen. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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During the trial, [the ADA] exceeded what was proper in a District 

Attorney’s presentation to the jury. In his closing argument, [the 

ADA] gave his personal opinion to the jury that Appellant was a 

longtime drug dealer and was therefore a drug dealer on this 

occasion as well. Appellant argues that this was highly 

inflammatory and also a statement of personal opinion. District 

Attorneys are well regarded by the public, and they have a duty 

to act within the confines of the law. The case law is very clear

that a District Attorney cannot act in an inflammatory manner, 

and the District Attorney cannot give their personal opinion at any 

time in the trial. 

Appellant’s Brief at 24. 

Specifically, Appellant challenges the following bolded portions of the 

ADA’s closing argument:

[Appellant] branded himself as a drug dealer. 

(Indicating). Drugs equals money. That’s forever branded 

on his body. That’s who he is. He’s a drug dealer. How do 

we know that? Because the evidence tells you. [Appellant]

told you though his tattoo.

I’m not going to show you every single photograph. There 

are almost a hundred of them. I’m not going to show you every 

single piece of evidence because you already saw it. I don’t want 

to waste your time. 

How do we know that [Appellant] is a drug dealer? He told 

Detective Leporace. He came into the house on January 15th of 

2016 and was asked, “Do you have any drugs, guns or money in 

____________________________________________

See Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant contends the presentation of the 

photograph in this manner was “likely offensive.” Id. Appellant has not set 

forth where in the record he objected to the photograph being displayed on 

the large screen monitor. In any event, as discussed supra, given the 

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, we conclude any error in the trial 

court allowing the jury to view the photograph on a large screen monitor is 

harmless error. See Hairston, supra, 84 A.3d at 671 (holding error is 

harmless where “the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt 

was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant 

by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict”) 

(quotation marks and quotation omitted)). 
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the house?” Detective Leporace told you that he said, “My drugs 

are downstairs.” 

***

So, I’m not going to go into any further detail, but I’ll 

just ask you, is there any explanation about where the 

money came from or where the money got to? Does that 

make sense? Does his explanation about his tattoo make 

sense that it was just a nice design? He liked the design, 

therefore he put it [sic]. You have to determine whether 

[Appellant] lied to you, whether [Appellant’s paramour] lied to 

you. And if you believe that they lied to you, you can disregard 

their entire testimony. 

This has been a long case. From January of 2016 until now, 

almost two and a half years. [Appellant] ever since the first day 

has been cloaked—has been covered in the cloak of innocence. To 

this day he still wears that cloak. But you can change that. You 

have the power to change that. You can tell him that what he did 

was wrong. 

Appellant’s Brief at 25 (citing N.T., 5/23-5/24/18, at 323, 329) (bold added).

8

The trial court concluded the ADA did not commit misconduct. Trial 

Court Opinion, filed 8/28/23, at 11-12. Assuming, arguendo, Appellant has 

preserved his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we find no relief is due.9

____________________________________________

8 We note the trial transcript from May 23 and 24, 2018, is included in the 

certified record; however, pages 328 to 331 have apparently been

inadvertently omitted from the certified transcript. In any event, Appellant 

included in his reproduced record an excerpt of the transcript, including page 

329, which is related to his second appellate issue. The Commonwealth does 

not challenge the accuracy of the excerpt included in Appellant’s reproduced 

record. Thus, for the sake of judicial economy, we shall address Appellant’s 

issue without requiring the trial court to further supplement the certified 

record. 

9 The Commonwealth suggests Appellant did not object to the challenged 

portions of the ADA’s closing argument, and, therefore, his issue is waived. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S08041-24

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With specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct in a closing statement, it is well settled that “[i]n 

reviewing prosecutorial remarks to determine their prejudicial 

quality, comments cannot be viewed in isolation but, rather, must 

be considered in the context in which they were made.” 

Commonwealth v. Sampson, 900 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa.Super.

2006) (citation omitted). Our review of prosecutorial remarks and 

an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate 

whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial. 

Commonwealth v. Rios, 554 Pa. 419, 721 A.2d 1049, 1054 

(1998).

***

It is well settled that a prosecutor has considerable latitude 

during closing arguments and his arguments are fair if they are 

supported by the evidence or use inferences that can reasonably 

be derived from the evidence. Further, prosecutorial misconduct

does not take place unless the unavoidable effect of the comments 

at issue was to prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a 

fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their 

ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. 

Prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under a harmless error 

standard.

Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 250 (Pa.Super.2008) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). We are further mindful 

of the following:

In determining whether the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct, we must keep in mind that comments made by a 

prosecutor must be examined within the context of defense 

counsel’s conduct. It is well settled that the prosecutor may fairly 

respond to points made in the defense closing. Moreover, 

prosecutorial misconduct will not be found where comments were 

based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were only 

oratorical flair.

***

It is settled that it is improper for a prosecutor to express a 

personal belief as to the credibility of the defendant or other 

____________________________________________

However, given the certified record is missing pages from the ADA’s closing 

argument (and some of those pages are also absent from Appellant’s 

reproduced record), we are unable to confirm whether Appellant did or did not 

object. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver under these particular 

circumstances.
J-S08041-24

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witnesses. However, the prosecutor may comment on the 

credibility of witnesses. Further, a prosecutor is allowed to 

respond to defense arguments with logical force and vigor. If 

defense counsel has attacked the credibility of witnesses in 

closing, the prosecutor may present argument addressing the 

witnesses’ credibility.

Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation

omitted). Thus, proper examination of the comments of the ADA in closing

requires review of the arguments advanced by defense counsel in the defense

summation. Id.

Here, during his closing statement, defense counsel indicated Appellant,

who testified during trial, “spoke the truth.” N.T., 5/23-5/24/18, at 316.

Defense counsel argued the drugs found in the Residence belonged to Luis 

Otero Casiano, who is the son of Appellant’s long-time paramour. Id. at 317. 

He averred that, if the police had tested the fingerprints, they would have 

discovered that fingerprints on various items belonged to Mr. Casiano. Id. 

Defense counsel argued the reason the police did not test the fingerprints was 

because “[t]hey know whose fingerprints are on this.” Id. 

Defense counsel also suggested the police should have conducted a 

more thorough investigation, including stopping people who came in and out 

of the Residence. Id. at 320-21. Defense counsel indicated that, if the police

had done so, they would have discovered people were buying drugs from Mr. 

Casiano. Id. at 321. Defense counsel specifically argued Appellant was not 

involved with the drugs. Id. at 318. Defense counsel suggested he had to 

make “difficult decisions” on how to defend Appellant because Appellant
J-S08041-24

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wanted to protect family and friends who were actually involved in the drug 

trafficking. Id. at 314.

In response, as indicated supra, the ADA argued in his closing that the 

evidence, including Appellant’s tattoo, reveals that Appellant was the person 

dealing the drugs seized from the Residence. Id. at 323. When read in 

context, the comments of the ADA represented a fair response to defense 

counsel’s contention that Appellant was not involved with the dealing of drugs, 

and it did nothing more than focus the attention of the jury on the evidence 

that was presented by the Commonwealth. See Judy, supra. Contrary to 

Appellant’s assertion, the ADA’s comments were not improper personal 

opinions. See id. 

Moreover, regarding the ADA’s comments asking the jury to consider 

whether Appellant’s explanations about the money and tattoo make sense, we 

disagree with Appellant that the ADA improperly asserted a personal opinion 

regarding the credibility of Appellant’s explanation. When read in context, the 

ADA specifically informed the jury that the jury needed to determine whether 

to believe Appellant and/or his paramour. N.T., 5/23/-5/24/18, at 329. The 

ADA specifically advised the jury that Appellant was presumed innocent, and 

it was up to the jury to decide whether Appellant was telling the truth. Id. In 

a case such as this where the outcome is controlled by credibility 

determinations, an ADA “is permitted to make comments reinforcing the fact 

that the jury is presented with conflicting accounts.” Judy, 978 A.2d at 1024 
J-S08041-24

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(citation omitted). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim 

of prosecutorial misconduct. 

For all of the aforementioned reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/15/2024