alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-40024

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CARLOS CECILIO DE LA CRUZ-MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:11-CR-1244-1

Before SMITH, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Carlos Cecilio De La

Cruz-Martinez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v.

Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). De La Cruz-Martinez has not filed a

response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the

record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal

presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 21, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 12-40024 Document: 00511964044 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/21/2012
No. 12-40024

motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further

responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

Case: 12-40024 Document: 00511964044 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/21/2012
<PAGE>   1


                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.25

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

     Date of            Name of                   Warrant            Number of Shares       Expiration
     Issuance      Warrant Recipient                No.              of Common Stock           Date
<S>                 <C>                            <C>                   <C>                <C>
     3/03/99        John E. Feltl                  BWL-2                  82,500             3/03/2004
     3/03/99        Stephen D. King                BWL-3                  82,500             3/03/2004
     3/03/99        Timothy I. Maudlin             BWL-4                  50,000             3/03/2004
     3/03/99        Wayne W. Mills                 BWL-5                 250,000             3/03/2004

</TABLE>
In the Matter of: Z.B.

No. COA16-128

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: September 6, 2016

AFFIRMED.
STATE of North Carolina v. Keithan Lindale RHONE, Defendant.

No. COA15-865.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 15, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
# C_2009069EN.01000502.xml

| 21.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 69/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 69/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 9 October 2008 — Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands

(Case C-230/07) (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2002/22/EC - Electronic communications - Single European emergency call number - Caller location - Failure to transpose within the period prescribed)

(2009/C 69/07)

Language of the case: Dutch

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: W. Wils and M. Shotter, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: C.M. Wissels)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: Republic of Lithuania (represented by: D. Kriaučiūnas, agent)

Intervener in support of the defendant:

Re:

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Failure to adopt, within the prescribed period, the measures necessary to comply with Article 26(3) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) (OJ L 108, p. 51)

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | declares that by not making, for calls to the single European emergency call number ‘112’, caller location information available to authorities handling emergencies, to the extent technically feasible, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 26(3) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive); |
| --- | --- |

1.

declares that by not making, for calls to the single European emergency call number ‘112’, caller location information available to authorities handling emergencies, to the extent technically feasible, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 26(3) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive);

| 2. | orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs; |
| --- | --- |

2.

orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to pay the costs;

| 3. | orders the Republic of Lithuania to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

orders the Republic of Lithuania to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 155, 7.7.2007.

1

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

August 5, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

137015 (11) Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

GLYNN LATERREL WELLS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 137015 

 COA: 285062 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

___________________________________ 

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it 

is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be 

liable for filing fees. 

Within 21 days of the certification of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the 

Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $2.00, shall submit a copy of this order 

with the payment, and shall refile the copy of the pleadings which is being returned 

with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being 

filed in this Court. 

If plaintiff timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly 

payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in an amount of 50 percent of 

the deposits made to plaintiff’s account until the payments equal the balance due of 

$373.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court.

 Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) plaintiff shall not file further appeals in this 

Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. 

The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to plaintiff and 

return plaintiff’s pleadings with this order. 

jm 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

August 5, 2008 

Clerk
After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument

*

is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 14, 2008*

Decided August 22, 2008

Before

 RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

 DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08-1940

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CORTEZ L. TRAPPS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 05-CR-10006-001

Joe Billy McDade, 

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-1940 Page 2

O R D E R

Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual retroactively

reduced the base-offense levels for crack-cocaine offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c); see

generally United States v. Lawrence, Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, 08-1862, 2008 WL 2854151,

at *1 (7th Cir. July 25, 2008). In July 2005 Cortez Trapps was sentenced to 120 months’

imprisonment after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, see

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), but earlier this year he moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to modify

that sentence based on Amendment 706. The district court denied the motion, and we

affirm.

Trapps’s appeal has no merit because, although his guidelines range was 140 to 175

months’ imprisonment, he received the mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). When the sentencing guidelines are amended, a district court

may reduce a prisoner’s sentence only “if such a reduction is consistent with applicable

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A

reduction is inconsistent with the policy statements accompanying Amendment 706 if a

“statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment)”

prevents the district court from lowering the prisoner’s guidelines range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10

(n.1(A)). Because Trapps received the statutory mandatory-minimum sentence for his

crime, the district court correctly recognized that it lacked authority to reduce Trapps’s

sentence any further. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574 (2008) (“[A]s to

crack cocaine sentences in particular, we note [that] . . . district courts are constrained by

the mandatory minimums Congress prescribed in the 1986 Act.”); United States v. Black, 523

F.3d 892, 892-93 (8th Cir. 2008) (district courts lack authority to modify a sentence below the

mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 706); see also United

States v. Harris, No. 07-2195, 2008 WL 3012362, at *12 (7th Cir. Aug. 6, 2008) (“While the

sentencing guidelines may be only advisory for district judges, congressional legislation is

not.”); United States v. Simpson, 337 F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The only provisions

allowing for departure from a statutory minimum are 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(e) and (f).”).

AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 178 (Thursday, September 15, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54555-54556]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18301]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding 
Companies

    The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for 
approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 
1841 et seq.) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR Part 225), and all other 
applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company 
and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the 
power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the 
banks and nonbanking companies owned by the bank holding company, 
including the companies listed below.
    The applications listed below, as well as other related filings 
required by the Board, are available for immediate inspection at the 
Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The application also will be available 
for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested 
persons may express their views in writing on the standards enumerated 
in the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the proposal also involves the 
acquisition of a nonbanking company, the review also includes whether 
the acquisition of the nonbanking company complies with the standards 
in section 4 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise noted, 
nonbanking activities will be conducted throughout the United States. 
Additional information on all bank holding companies may be obtained 
from the National Information Center website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding each of these 
applications must be received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the 
offices of the Board of Governors not later than October 10, 2005.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Richard Walker, Community 
Affairs

[[Page 54556]]

Officer) P.O. Box 55882, Boston, Massachusetts 02106-2204:
    1. Southern Connecticut Bancorp, Inc., New Haven, Connecticut; to 
acquire 100 percent of the voting shares of The Bank of Southeastern 
Connecticut, New London, Connecticut, a de nova bank.
    B. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Tracy Basinger, Director, 
Regional and Community Bank Group) 101 Market Street, San Francisco, 
California 94105-1579:
    1. Cathay General Bancorp, Los Angeles, California; to acquire up 
to 100 percent of Great Eastern Bank, New York, New York.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 9, 
2005.

Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 05-18301 Filed 9-14-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
Michael Smith, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

August 2, 2016

ORDER

Petitioner filed a motion on July 21, 2016 for resentencing pursuant to Aiken v. Byars , 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 2014). Now, therefore, pursuant to SC CONST. Art. V, § 4,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable G. Thomas Cooper, Jr. be vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the Petitioner's Motion for Resentencing in the above-captioned matter.

Judge Cooper shall at all times be vested with concurrent jurisdiction in all circuits of the state to dispose of matters relating to this case, and shall decide all matters pertaining to the Petitioner's Motion, and shall retain jurisdiction over this matter regardless of where he may be assigned to hold court, and may schedule such hearings as may be necessary at any time without regard as to whether there is a term of court scheduled.

If necessary, to resolve issues related to the appointment of counsel, a hearing shall be conducted within thirty (30) days of this order.

Within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, Judge Cooper shall issue a scheduling order setting forth the schedule that shall be followed in this matter, including the date of the hearing on the merits. The scheduling order may be amended as necessary.

s/Costa M. Pleicones

Costa M. Pleicones

Chief Justice
State of North Carolina v. Kenneth Black, Defendant.

No. COA15-1387

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 16, 2016

NO ERROR.
STATE of North Carolina v. Arraqib Ahad HARDY.

No. COA15-1122.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

July 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20D0232. MALCOM JAMAL CONNER v. THE STATE. 

In 2008, Malcom Jamal Conner pled guilty to one count of voluntary

manslaughter, five counts of aggravated assault, two counts of armed robbery, and

two counts of theft by receiving stolen property, and the trial court sentenced him to

a total of 30 years, with the first 20 years to be served in confinement and the

remainder on probation. There is no indication in the record that Conner directly

appealed hisjudgment of conviction. Recently, Conner filed a “supplemental out-oftime appeal motion,” which the trial court denied on September 20, 2019. On

November 6, 2019, Conner filed the instant application for discretionary review of

that trial court order in the Supreme Court, which transferred it to this Court. See

Supreme Court Case No. S20D0486 (transferred Dec. 2, 2019). 

We lack jurisdiction because, pretermitting whether Conner has a right to

directly appeal the trial court’s order,1his application is untimely. To be timely, an

application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. See

OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). Here, Conner filed his application 47 days after the trial court’s

1 The denial of a motion for out-of-time appeal is directly appealable when the

conviction at issue has not been the subject of a direct appeal. See English v. State,

307 Ga. App. 544, 545 n.4 (705 SE2d 667) (2010); Lunsford v. State, 237 Ga. App.

696, 696 (515 SE2d 198) (1999). Generally, if a party appliesfor discretionary review

of a directly appealable order, this Court grants the application under OCGA § 5-6-35

(j). To fall within this general rule, however, the application must be filed within 30

days of entry of the order to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204

Ga. App. 582, 582 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). 

January 10, 2020
order was entered. His application is therefore untimely and subject to dismissal. See

Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga. 220, 220 (1) (728 SE2d 617) (2012); see also Boyle v.

State, 190 Ga. App. 734, 734 (380 SE2d 57) (1989) (“The requirements of OCGA

§ 5-6-35 are jurisdictional and this [C]ourt cannot accept an appeal not made in

compliance therewith.”). Accordingly, this application is hereby DISMISSED. 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

01/10/2020
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         199,800
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  197,700
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (4,100)
<INVENTORY>                                    128,200
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               779,800
<PP&E>                                       1,525,600
<DEPRECIATION>                               (908,300)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,475,100
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          769,400
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           800
<OTHER-SE>                                     110,300
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,475,100
<SALES>                                      1,471,900
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,528,600
<CGS>                                          856,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,325,200
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,100
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                203,400
<INCOME-TAX>                                    73,200
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            130,200
<DISCONTINUED>                                   5,700
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   135,900
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.84
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.76




</TABLE>
# C_2013038EN.01002802.xml

| 9.2.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 38/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.2.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 38/28

---

Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber) of 6 November 2012 — Marcuccio v Commission

(Case F-41/06 RENV) (1)

1

(Civil service - Officials - Referral back to the Tribunal after setting aside - Invalidity - Retirement on the grounds of invalidity - Composition of the Invalidity Committee - Validity - Conditions)

2013/C 38/52

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Luigi Marcuccio (Tricase, Italy) (represented by: G. Cipressa. lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Currall and C. Berardis-Kayser, Agents, and A. Dal Ferro, lawyer)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Referral back after setting aside — Civil service — First, application for annulment of the Commission’s decision to retire the applicant on grounds of invalidity as well as a series of acts related to that decision and, second, a claim for damages

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Tribunal:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Marcuccio to bear his own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission in Cases F-41/06, F-41/06 RENV and T-20/09 P. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Marcuccio to bear his own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission in Cases F-41/06, F-41/06 RENV and T-20/09 P.

---

(1)  OJ C 131, 3.6.2006, p. 54.

1

---
iii i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00427-CV

Jackie T. BUTLER,

Appellant

v.

Michael SPENCER,

Appellee

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CI-15031

Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 17, 2008

DISMISSED

Appellant has filed a motion indicating that the parties have fully resolved and settled all

issues in dispute. Because the parties have reached a final settlement of all issues raised in this

appeal, appellant asks that we dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). Appellant’s

motion to dismiss is granted, and this appeal is dismissed. The parties have agreed that each party

will bear his or her own costs; therefore, costs of appeal are taxed against the parties who incurred

them. See id. at (d). 

PER CURIAM
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT WILLIE LAWSON, as parent and ) guardian of Bryton Lawson, a minor, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-1023 ) THE SCHOOL BOARD OF ) HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, ) ) Respondent. ) ________________________________ ) Opinion filed September 12, 2018. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Martha J. Cook, Judge. Keith P. Ligori and Alyssa L. Katz of Ligori & Sanders, Tampa, for Petitioner. Debra M. Metzler of Barr, Murman & Tonelli, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.

Denied. NORTHCUTT, VILLANTI, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
HOUSTON ENTERPRISES, INC., Judgment Creditor, v. Dana R. BRADLEY and Performance Holdings, Judgment Debtors.

No. COA15-403.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 1, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
In the Matter of A.E.

No. COA15-790.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

April 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Reversed and Remanded.