IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gregory Thomas, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 458 M.D. 2013

: Submitted: October 26, 2018

Tom Corbett, et al., Governor of :

Pennsylvania, John E. Wetzel, :

et al., Secretary of Corrections, :

Shirley R. Moore Smeal, :

Deputy Secretary of Corrections, :

His Policy Executive Board Makers :

Sued in Their Individual Capacities :

and Official Capacities, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: March 22, 2019

This is a matter in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Presently before 

the Court for consideration is an application for summary relief filed by former 

Governor Tom Corbett, Secretary of Corrections John E. Wetzel, and Deputy 

Secretary of Corrections Shirley R. Moore Smeal (collectively, DOC) with respect 
2

to a petition for review (Petition) filed by Petitioner Gregory Thomas (Thomas).

1

 

In his Petition, Thomas seeks injunctive and declaratory relief concerning specific 

DOC policies that allegedly infringe on constitutional rights arising under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution2and violate the Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).3 For the reasons set forth 

below, we now grant, in part, and deny, in part, DOC’s motion for summary relief.

This action began on July 26, 2013, when Thomas filed the Petition

with this Court. Thomas raised several claims in the Petition identifying three of 

DOC’s policies—namely, its conjugal visits policy, prayer oil policy, and phone 

policy—as infringing on his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments4and violating the RLUIPA. On August 19, 2013, DOC 

filed preliminary objections to the Petition, challenging the legal sufficiency of 

Thomas’s claims. On April 29, 2014, this Court overruled, in part, and sustained, in 

part, DOC’s preliminary objections. As a result of our decision, four of Thomas’s 

claims remained: (1) DOC’s policy concerning conjugal visits violates the RLUIPA; 

(2) DOC’s policy concerning prayer oil violates the RLUIPA; (3) DOC’s policy 

concerning prayer oil violates Thomas’s constitutional rights under the First 

Amendment; and (4) DOC’s policy concerning phone lists violates Thomas’s

constitutional rights under the First Amendment. DOC now requests summary relief 

 

1 Petitioner titled his initial filing as a complaint, and DOC filed what it referred to as a 

motion for summary judgment. Consistent with Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, the Court shall treat the filings as a petition for review and an application for summary

relief, respectively. 

2 U.S. Const. amend. I.

3

42 U.S.C §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. 

4 U.S. Const. amends. I, VIII, XIV. 
3

on all four claims, alleging that there are no material facts in dispute with respect to 

each claim.5 DOC also argues that Thomas’s religious claims—i.e., Thomas’s 

claims with respect to the conjugal visit and prayer oil policies—are barred under 

Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.6 Lastly, DOC seeks 

to have former Governor Thomas Corbett dismissed from the case.

We will first address DOC’s request for summary relief on the claims 

that DOC’s conjugal visit and prayer oil policies violate the RLUIPA. Under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1035.2, a party may move for summary 

relief where there is “no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element 

of the cause of action or defense.” Material facts are considered to be facts that 

could have an effect on the outcome of the case. Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Dep’t 

of Envtl. Prot., 193 A.3d 447, 459 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). 

In our 2014 opinion, ruling on DOC’s preliminary objections, we 

engaged in a thorough discussion of the framework and applicability of Section 3 of 

the RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1: 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 . . . creates statutory protection for 

inmates in the exercise of their religion, providing, in 

relevant part, that “[n]o government shall impose a 

substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 

residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the 

 

5 This Court may take judicial notice of administrative policies, as we have done with 

respect to one of the three policies discussed in this opinion. See Figueroa v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 900 A.2d 949, 950 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (taking judicial notice of information found on 

DOC website). The parties have not, however, submitted the administrative policies at issue into 

evidence. This makes it difficult for this Court to be absolutely certain as to the contents of the 

policies, especially with respect to the conjugal visit and phone policies. 

6 The Court need not consider DOC’s argument that it is entitled to summary relief on 

Thomas’s religious claims due to Thomas’s alleged failure to file his action prior to the expiration 

of the statutes of limitations, because the Court grants summary relief in favor of DOC on those 

religious claims on other grounds.
4

burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless 

the government establishes that the burden on religion 

furthers a “compelling governmental interest” through the 

“least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

government interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). In 

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 . . . (2005), the United 

States Supreme Court, in addressing a facial First 

Amendment Establishment Clause[7]challenge to this 

provision of RLUIPA, observed that this provision was 

“the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord 

religious exercise heightened protection from 

government-imposed burdens.” Id. at 714 . . . . The 

Supreme Court also noted that governmental 

accommodation of religious exercise does not necessarily 

constitute an improper governmental establishment of 

religion in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 713-14

. . . . RLUIPA, as compared to the Establishment Clause, 

thereby imposes a greater burden on institutional entities 

in the defense of regulations and policies that impose 

burdens on an individual’s desire to practice his or her 

religion while incarcerated.

Thomas v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789, 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (Thomas I) (footnote 

omitted). The RLUIPA, therefore, provides protection for all exercises of religion, 

regardless of whether the exercise is compelled by the religious belief or central to 

it. Holt v. Hobbs, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). In order to prevail 

on a claim under Section 3 of the RLUIPA, an inmate must first show that “an 

institutional policy or regulation has substantially burdened his sincerely held 

religious beliefs.” Thomas I, 90 A.3d at 794. Once the inmate makes such a 

showing, “the institution must demonstrate that the burden is the least restrictive 

means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 794-95. The United 

States Supreme Court has stated that this standard is “exceptionally demanding” and 

calls for the institution to show that “it lacks other means of achieving its desired 

 

7 U.S. Const. amend. I. Pursuant to the Establishment Clause, “Congress shall make no 

law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 
5

goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the 

objecting party.” Holt, ___ U.S. at ___. Further, the institution’s burden is inmateand situation-specific, meaning that courts are required to “‘scrutinize the asserted 

harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants’ and ‘to look 

to the marginal interest in enforcing’ the challenged government action in that 

particular context.” Id. at 863 (emphasis added) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 

Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 727, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)). 

In Holt, the United States Supreme Court examined whether an 

institution violated the RLUIPA where the institution forbade an inmate from 

growing a half-inch beard in accordance with his Muslim faith. The policy at issue 

prohibited inmates from growing beards unless the inmate had a dermatological 

condition. The institution did not question the sincerity of the inmate’s belief, but it 

argued that the policy furthered the institution’s compelling interest in curtailing 

transportation of contraband. According to the institution, it feared that inmates 

would conceal contraband in their beards. The Supreme Court agreed that the 

institution had a compelling interest in curtailing transportation of contraband, but it 

did not agree that the interest could be compromised by allowing an inmate to grow 

a half-inch beard. The institution already searched all prisoners’ hair and clothing 

and could do the same with the inmate. Denying the exemption to the inmate was, 

therefore, not the least restrictive means of furthering the institution’s compelling 

interest. 

Here, DOC first seeks summary relief on Thomas’s claim that DOC’s 

policy concerning conjugal visits violates the RLUIPA. DOC appears to focus on 

the second prong of the RLUIPA and does not mention whether the conjugal visit 

policy substantially burdens Thomas’s religious beliefs. Further, we decline to make 
6

such a ruling. Assuming, arguendo, that there is a substantial burden on Thomas’s

religious beliefs, we must determine whether DOC has met its burden under the 

second prong of the RLUIPA. 

In support of its motion, DOC offers allegations of fact contained in its 

new matter. DOC asserts that, to the extent that Thomas responded to certain 

averments in the new matter with general denials, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Civil Procedure No. 1029(b),

8

those general denials must have the effect of an 

admission. The averments at issue are as follows: 

48. This [DOC] policy exists because conjugal visits risk 

the security of the prison and the health of inmates and 

staff.

49. Given the need/desire for privacy to engage in 

conjugal visits, the administration has a compelling 

interest in prohibiting such visits where at least one of the 

participants is a known criminal often of a violent crime.

50. The prohibition also cuts down on the spread of 

communicable diseases including, but not limited to, those 

that are sexually transmitted. 

51. With prison overcrowding there is also limited space 

where conjugal visits for the numerous inmates who 

would no doubt like them could be accommodated. 

52. In this particular case, to permit conjugal visits would 

appear to require the [DOC], a criminal justice agency, to 

place its imprimatur of approval on a situation that may 

well constitute a crime, i.e., bigamy, if [Thomas] indeed is 

married to several women simultaneously.

 

8 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 1029(b) provides: “Averments in a pleading 

to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not denied specifically or by 

necessary implication. A general denial or a demand for proof . . . shall have the effect of an 

admission.” Pa. R.C.P. No. 1029(b). There are exceptions to this general rule; however, none are 

applicable in this case.
7

53. The limited non-sexual contact policy reduces the 

opportunity to pass contraband to inmates. 

. . . .

67. [Thomas] is not legally married to anyone.

(Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Review and New Matter at 8-9.) In the above 

averments, DOC asserts that its conjugal visit policy furthers its interests in health 

and safety and the abatement of criminal activity. DOC further asserts that relaxing 

restrictions on conjugal visits would lead to the spread of sexually transmitted 

infections and increase the likelihood that inmates would receive contraband items. 

In response to these allegations, Thomas merely provided general denials, which 

asserted that DOC’s allegations are conclusions of law. (Petitioner’s Response to 

Respondents’ New Matter.)

9

 Pursuant to Rule 1029(b), we accept DOC’s 

allegations as undisputed fact. We, therefore, conclude that there are no facts in 

dispute as to DOC’s claim that its conjugal visit policy furthers its compelling 

interest in ensuring the health and safety of inmates and abating criminal activity. 

Our inquiry, however, does not end here. DOC must also show that 

there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning its allegation that an outright 

ban on conjugal visits is the least restrictive means of furthering DOC’s health and 

safety interest and its interest in abating criminal activity. Thomas argues that an 

outright ban is not the least restrictive means because the institution allegedly has 

movable homes on its property. On the other hand, DOC contends that the nature of 

conjugal visits requires a complete ban instead of a restriction because these visits 

require privacy, could spread communicable diseases, create an opportunity to bring 

in contraband, and may allow for the commission of crimes. Despite Thomas’s 

contentions, we see no dispute concerning any material facts as to the least restrictive 

 

9 Thomas did not include page numbers in this pleading. 
8

means prong. DOC has a clear responsibility to ensure the health and safety of 

inmates and to ensure that criminal activity is abated. DOC cannot abate crime and 

ensure the health and safety of inmates by permitting conjugal visits, even in a 

restricted manner. Any conceivable restriction, due to the inherently private nature 

of a conjugal visit, would still result in health and safety concerns. Accordingly, we 

will grant summary relief in DOC’s favor with respect to the conjugal visit policy. 

DOC also seeks summary relief on Thomas’s claim that DOC’s prayer 

oil policy violates the RLUIPA. The prayer oil policy permits prison staff to apply 

a small amount of prayer oil to the wrists of inmates of the Muslim faith before 

attending “Jumu’ah.”10 The policy also provides that these inmates may have the oil 

applied to their wrists when the inmates enter Jumu’ah. DOC’s prayer oil policy, 

therefore, operates as a limitation on the use of prayer oil and as an outright ban on 

the possession of prayer oil. DOC argues that the policy does not substantially 

burden Thomas’s practice of his faith. Further, DOC contendsthat, even if the policy

substantially burdened Thomas’s religious exercise, the policy is the least restrictive 

means of furthering DOC’s interest in ensuring a safe environment. According to 

DOC, the prayer oil may be flammable and could be used to mask the scent of drugs. 

 

10 Neither Thomas nor DOC define the term Jumu’ah. In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 

U.S. 342 (1987), the United States Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a 

prison policy that restricted an inmate’s rights to attend Jumu’ah, and described Jumu’ah as “the 

central religious ceremony of Muslims, ‘comparable to the Saturday service of the Jewish faith 

and the Sunday service of the various Christian sects.’” Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 

(quoting Shabazz v. O’Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 782 

F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1986)). The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 

Shabazz determined that “Jumu’ah is . . . regarded as the central service of the Muslim religion, 

and the obligation to attend is commanded by the Qur’an, the central book of the Muslim religion.” 

Id. (quoting Shabazz, 595 F. Supp. at 930.) Thus, while we do not make a factual finding regarding 

this term, it appears that Jumu’ah refers to a type of mandatory congregational service.
9

Concerning the question of whether the prayer oil policy imposes a 

substantial burden on Thomas’s religious beliefs, Thomas claims that the use of 

prayer oil is integral to his religious practice not just when attending Jumu’ah but 

when praying by himself. Thomas alleges that he must possess prayer oil because

he prays five times daily, and the prayer oil must be used each time he prays. 

(Petitioner’s Br. at 2, 6, and 11.) Further, he states that the use of prayer oil for five 

daily prayers is “compelled by his understanding of the Prophet Muhammad’s 

teachings.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 6.) DOC responds by arguing that according to 

Thomas’s Petition, his faith requires the use but not possession of prayer oil. DOC 

further argues that because the prayer oil policy permits use of the prayer oil, Thomas 

has not suffered a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. We agree with DOC 

on this point. Though the prayer oil policy does act as an outright ban on possession 

of prayer oil, the policy permits inmates to use the prayer oil at certain religious 

ceremonies. Due to the fact that prayer oil is available for his use, Thomas has not 

suffered a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion.11

As to whether the prayer oil policy is the least restrictive means of 

ensuring the safety of the inmates, DOC’s proffered reason for not allowing the 

possession of prayer oil is that such oils are flammable and may be used to mask the 

scent of drugs. Thomas disputes that such oils are flammable in his brief. DOC 

included these allegations of fact in its new matter. Thomas responded to DOC’s 

averments with general denials. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure No. 1029(b), the general denials operate as admissions. Thus, we accept 

 

11 Thomas has not met his burden of proving that the prayer oil policy substantially burdens 

his religious beliefs; therefore, we may end our analysis at this point. Even if Thomas met this 

burden, however, he could not succeed under the second prong, as is evident from our continued 

analysis. 
10

those averments as undisputed fact. There are, therefore, no material facts in dispute 

concerning the allegation that the prayer oil policy is the least restrictive means of 

furthering DOC’s compelling interest. Accordingly, we will grant summary relief

on the above grounds. 

Next, we will address DOC’s request for summary relief on the claim 

that DOC’s prayer oil and phone policies violate Thomas’s constitutional rights 

under the First Amendment. Where constitutional challenges are concerned, this 

Court applies a two-step approach. Bussinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 29 A.3d 79, 83 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2011), aff’d, 65 A.3d 289 (Pa. 2013); Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 

932 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). The first inquiry focuses on whether the 

policy at issue infringes on the inmate’s constitutional rights. Bussinger, 29 A.3d at 

83. Where an inmate has a free exercise of religion claim, as part of addressing the 

first inquiry we must determine whether the inmate’s beliefs are sincerely held and 

religious in nature. Meggett v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 892 A.2d 872, 880 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2006). Further, where telephone communication is concerned, this Court has stated 

that such communication “triggers constitutional concerns.” Thomas I, 90 A.3d at 

798. If we find infringement, we move on to the second inquiry, which is to 

determine whether the policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests. Id. In order to resolve the second inquiry, this Court considers the 

following factors:

(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between 

the prison regulation[12]and the legitimate governmental 

 

12 It appears that case law developing these factors makes no distinction between the 

treatment of challenges to prison regulations and challenges to prison policies or administrative 

directives. See Smith v. Beard, 26 A.3d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (applying case law from cases 

where inmates challenge prison regulations, policies, and administrative directives, without 

making distinctions between challenges in each case); see also Brittain v. Beard, 974 A.2d 479 

(Pa. 2009) (using “regulation” and “policy” interchangeably when applying case law).
11

interest asserted to justify it; (2) whether alternative means 

are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; (3) what 

impact an accommodation of the asserted constitutional 

right will have on guards, inmates, and prison resources; 

and, (4) whether there are “ready alternatives” to the rule 

that would accommodate prisoners’ rights at de minimus

[sic] cost to penological interests.

Brittain v. Beard, 974 A.2d 479, 486 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis in original). Prison 

regulations or policies are considered to be valid “‘if [they are] reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interests.’” Smith v. Beard, 26 A.3d 551, 557 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). When applying 

these factors to determine whether there is a connection between the policy and the 

penological interest, we must “accord substantial deference to the professional 

judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining 

the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate 

means to accomplish them.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003); accord 

Smith, 26 A.3d at 557. In light of this deferential standard, the burden to prove a 

valid connection between the policy and the penological interest is not on the 

institution. Smith, 26 A.3d at 557. Rather, the inmate must bear the burden of 

proving that no valid connection exists between the policy and a legitimate 

penological interest. Id. In Bussinger, this Court listed a number of interests that 

our courts have recognized as legitimate penological interests: 

(a) maintaining internal security for the protection of 

prison employers, prisoners, and visitors; (b) deterring the 

use of drugs and alcohol in prisons; (c) preventing future 

crime; (d) the rehabilitation of inmates; (e) fair and 

appropriate treatment among inmates; (f) curbing 

sexually-offensive behavior in the prison; and 

(g) controlling/eliminating the flow of contraband into 

prisons. 

Bussinger, 29 A.3d at 87. 
12

Although Thomas does not specify the clause under the First 

Amendment that DOC’s prayer oil policy violates, a fair reading of the pleadings 

indicates that Thomas’s claim is a free exercise of religion claim. DOC’s argument 

focuses on the second prong of the above test; it posits that the prayer oil policy has 

a valid connection to the legitimate penological goal of ensuring safety within the 

prison. DOC argues that allowing inmates to possess prayer oil within their cells 

would cause safety concerns due to the allegedly flammable nature of the oil. 

Further, DOC contends that prayer oil, if possessed by inmates, could be used to 

cover smells of contraband. Thomas argues that the policy is not connected to a 

legitimate penological interest because he alleges that prayer oil is not flammable 

and cannot, therefore, undermine the safety of the prison. As we discussed earlier 

in this opinion, DOC included these averments in its new matter, to which Thomas

responded in general denials. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Procedure 

No. 1029(b), Thomas’s general denials operate as admissions. Accordingly, we will

grant DOC summary relief on the claim that DOC’s prayer oil policy violates

Thomas’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment. 

DOC further seeks summary relief on Thomas’s claim that DOC’s 

phone policy13 violates his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. Thomas 

 

13 We take judicial notice of DOC policy DC-ADM 818 as set forth on DOC’s official 

website at:

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/818%20Automated%20Inm

ate%20Telephone%20System.pdf (last visited March 18, 2019).

See Figueroa, 900 A.2d at 950 n.1 (taking judicial notice of information found on DOC’s website). 

The policy, however, appears to be a compilation of portions of documents, including policy 

statements, policies, and a bulletin, with varying effective dates spanning from 2012 to 2015, put 

together to form DC-ADM 818. Although it appears that DOC issued DC-ADM on April 18,

2012, a bulletin indicates that DOC subsequently amended Section 2-01 of DC-ADM 818, as 

originally issued on February 12, 2014. The version of Section 2-01 that is included in the 
13

contends that DOC’s phone policy, which purportedly does not allow a telephone 

number to appear on more than one inmate’s phone list, violates his free speech 

rights under the First Amendment. DOC does not challenge Thomas’s assertion that

the phone policy infringes on Thomas’s free speech rights; DOC does, however, 

argue that the policy has a valid connection to the legitimate penological interest of 

discouraging criminal activities which could otherwise be fostered by allowing 

inmates to contact mutual friends of other inmates. Thomas argues that there is no 

valid connection between DOC’s phone policy and any legitimate penological 

interest. Specifically, Thomas posits: 

The telephone system is the most expensive, it has every 

high tech feature necessary [to] not be a legitimate security 

concern to the point to disallow inmates from having the 

same phone number on the list. The intention behind this 

practice is not in the best interest of family, society, 

rehabilitation initiatives re-entry back into society. Its 

over-reachimg [sic].

(Petitioner’s Brief in Opposition to Respondents’ Preliminary Objections at 10.) 

Thomas also alleges that DOC monitors inmates’ phone calls, decreasing the 

possibility of any security risks posed by inmates contacting mutual friends. (Id. 

at 20.) At this stage of the proceedings, DOC has failed to establish that there is no 

dispute concerning any material fact on this claim. Accordingly, we will deny

 

compilation contains a notation that it was issued on February 12, 2014—which is after Thomas 

filed his Petition. The Court is unable to ascertain what version of DC-ADM 804 was in affect at 

the time Thomas filed his Petition. Furthermore, the bulletin appears to delete subsection B.6 of 

Section 2 of DC-ADM 818—i.e., the language at issue with respect to DOC’s phone policy. It is 

unclear from our review of DC-ADM 818 whether DOC included the language that appears to be 

at issue (as set forth in Section 2, subsection B.6) in DC-ADM 818 as issued on April 18, 2012,

whether DOC added it at a later date (possibly on February 12, 2014), and/or whether DOC 

subsequently deleted this language, thereby possibly rendering this claim moot. Thus, the Court 

has concerns that material issues of fact may exist as to the substance of DOC’s phone policy. 
14

summary relief on the claim that DOC’s phone policy violates Thomas’s

constitutional rights under the First Amendment.

DOC also urges this Court to dismiss former Governor Corbett from 

this lawsuit on the grounds that Thomas has brought suit against Governor Corbett 

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to bring a claim under Section 1983, the 

plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation and show that the violation was 

“committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” Pa. Workers’ Comp. 

Judges Prof’l Ass’n v. Exec. Bd. of Cmwlth., 39 A.3d 486, 493 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), 

aff’d, 66 A.3d 765 (Pa. 2013). The plaintiff must, therefore, allege that the individual 

had personal involvement in the alleged violations. Watkins v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 

196 A.3d 272, 275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). We agree that Thomas does not allege that 

Governor Corbett was personally involved in any of the alleged wrongs done to him. 

Such a claim cannot, therefore, be brought against Governor Corbett. 

Accordingly, we will grant DOC’s motion for summary relief with 

respect to Thomas’s claims that DOC’s conjugal visit and prayer oil policies violate

the RLUIPA and that DOC’s prayer oil policy violates his constitutional rights under 

the First Amendment. We will dismiss Governor Thomas Corbett as a named 

defendant. We, however, will deny DOC’s motion for summary relief as to 

Thomas’s claim that DOC’s phone policy violates his constitutional rights under the 

First Amendment.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gregory Thomas, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 458 M.D. 2013

:

Tom Corbett, et al., Governor of :

Pennsylvania, John E. Wetzel, :

et al., Secretary of Corrections, :

Shirley R. Moore Smeal, :

Deputy Secretary of Corrections, :

His Policy Executive Board Makers :

Sued in Their Individual Capacities :

and Official Capacities, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2019, it is hereby ordered that 

Respondents’ application for summary relief is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED,

in part, as follows:

1. Summary relief is GRANTED in favor of Respondents on the claim 

that the Department of Corrections’ (DOC) conjugal visit and prayer 

oil policies violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C §§ 2000cc to 2000cc- 5.

2. Summary relief is GRANTED in favor of Respondents on the claim 

that DOC’s prayer oil policy violates Petitioner’s constitutional 

rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
3. Summary relief is DENIED on the claim that DOC’s phone policy

violates Petitioner’s constitutional rights under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

It is further ordered that DOC’s request to dismiss Governor Thomas 

Corbett from this case is GRANTED.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge