UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER LEE FOSTER, a/k/a Capone,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:10-cr-00644-CCB-2)

Submitted: January 30, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. X. Becker, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod 

J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Michael T. Packard, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Christopher Lee Foster appeals his conviction pursuant 

to a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2012), and to possessing 

and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). Foster 

argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because the 

district court failed to define the term “brandish” during the 

plea colloquy. We affirm. 

Because Foster did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his plea, this court reviews this claim for plain 

error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th 

Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Foster must show: (1) an 

error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In the context of a guilty plea, an error 

affects substantial rights if there is “a reasonable probability 

that, but for the error, [the defendant] would not have entered 

the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 

(2004).

We find that Foster has failed to show that the 

alleged defect in the plea colloquy affected his substantial 

rights. We “presume that in most cases defense counsel 
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routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail 

to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.” 

Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976). Foster testified

during the plea hearing that he was satisfied with counsel’s 

representation and understood the elements of the offenses to 

which he was pleading guilty. Foster’s ability to consult with 

counsel on such matters was demonstrated at the plea hearing, 

when Foster responded to the district court’s inquiries 

regarding his understanding of the conspiracy charge by excusing 

himself to speak with counsel. Foster does not now allege that 

his testimony was false or that he was ever under a 

misapprehension of what “brandish” meant. Nor does Foster 

allege that he would not have pled guilty if the district court 

had defined this term. 

Because Foster has failed to show that the alleged 

defect affected his substantial rights, we affirm the judgment 

of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED