In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 07-3661

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ERIC S. VENTERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 06 CR 40064—William D. Stiehl, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 15, 2008—DECIDED AUGUST 27, 2008

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Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Police officers searched Eric

Venters’s house and tool shed and recovered materials and

equipment they suspected were being used to manufacture methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6). Venters

moved to suppress the items, but the district court

denied the motion. We affirm.
2 No. 07-3661

I. HISTORY

In August 2006, police officers in Mt. Vernon, Illinois,

arrested Venters at his house while investigating a

report that he neglected to care for his three young children. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/2. The officers subsequently executed two search warrants on Venters’s property, where they found various equipment and materials

suspected to be used to manufacture methamphetamine.

For instance, officers found in Venters’s house large

quantities of pseudoephedrine pills, numerous lithium

batteries, a jar of liquid that tested positive for meth, and

coffee filters that also tested positive for the drug; in a

tool shed located behind Venters’s house officers recovered more items that tested positive for meth, such as

a blender covered with a white residue and a container of

drain cleaner. Based on the items seized, a grand jury

indicted Venters on one count of possessing materials

and equipment for manufacturing meth while knowing

that the items would be used to make the drug. See 21

U.S.C. § 843(a)(6).

Shortly after the grand jury indicted him, Venters filed a

motion to suppress the items recovered from his residence

on the basis that they were the “fruits of [an] unlawful

entry.” Specifically, Venters asserted that the police

officers obtained the warrants to search his property only

after they entered his house without a warrant while

investigating the report of child neglect. But for that

illegal entry, Venters argued, the officers would not have

had the requisite probable cause to obtain the search

warrants that allowed them to locate and seize the contraband found on his property.
No. 07-3661 3

These names are pseudonyms. Out of concern for the chil- 1

dren’s privacy, we decline to use their real first names.

The district court held a hearing on Venters’s motion.

Venters introduced no evidence in support of his motion,

but the government presented two witnesses: Vanessa

Shaw, a Child Protective Investigator with the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and

Officer Rodney Sweetin, a patrolman with the Mt. Vernon

Police Department. Together, Shaw and Sweetin testified

to the following:

On the morning of August 2, 2006, the DCFS central

office in Springfield, Illinois, forwarded to Shaw at her

office in Mt. Vernon a report of suspected child neglect.

The report contained allegations made by Sue Houseworth,

the stepmother of Venters’s wife, Natalie, that Venters

and Natalie had been neglecting to care for their three

children: Steven (age seven at the time of the report), Ellen

(age six), and Sebastian (age five). Specifically, the report 1

stated that the Venters’ house was “filthy, stinks, and [was]

full of human and animal feces,” and that Sebastian

“smear[ed] feces all over the house.” The report further

stated that Venters made, sold, and used meth. The report

explained that Venters “used to make the drug in the shed

behind the house,” but that he had since moved his

operations to a field. However, the report also recounted

that Venters’s son, Steven, had stated that “he goes with

his daddy sometimes where his daddy cooks in the barn.”

After reviewing the DCFS report, Shaw contacted

Detective Sergeant Ken McElroy, the Mt. Vernon Police
4 No. 07-3661

Department’s Juvenile Officer, and explained to him the

allegations contained in the report. McElroy, in turn,

opined that they needed to confirm the allegations, so he

and Shaw telephoned Houseworth. During their conversation, Houseworth both confirmed her initial report

and elaborated on her description of Venters and his

children. Houseworth explained that Venters had a history

of using and manufacturing meth, and that he had been

arrested for crimes related to the drug. She further described the Venters’ house as “terrible”—“it was nasty

and ha[d] an odor” because Venters both used and manufactured meth in it. In fact, Houseworth stated, when

Steven, Ellen, and Sebastian visit her, she makes it a

habit to bathe them and to give them clean clothes because

“she can smell the meth” on the clothes that they are

wearing. Houseworth further explained that “three or

four days” earlier, Natalie was taken to Good Samaritan

Hospital in Mt. Vernon after she was bitten by a spider,

and that since then only Venters had been caring for the

three children.

After Shaw and Sergeant McElroy spoke with

Houseworth, they visited Natalie at Good Samaritan

Hospital. Like her stepmother, Natalie stated that Venters

was addicted to meth, and that because of his addiction his

health had greatly deteriorated: he had “lost a lot of

weight, [did] not sleep, and [looked] terrible.” Natalie also

stated that Venters was “probably” making the drug as

well. When asked if Venters was making meth at their

house, Natalie responded that although he had in the

past, she did not think that he currently was. However,
No. 07-3661 5

Natalie could not confirm that Venters had not made

the drug at the house since she had been in the hospital.

Shaw and Sergeant McElroy then decided to visit

Venters’s house to investigate the report of child neglect.

While en route to the house, Shaw and McElroy met

with Officer Sweetin, the patrolman on duty. McElroy

recounted to Sweetin Houseworth’s and Natalie’s statements, and asked him to accompany them in the event

that they had to arrest Venters for child neglect.

When Shaw, Sergeant McElroy, and Officer Sweetin

arrived at Venters’s house, McElroy and Sweetin walked

up to the front porch to see if anyone was home, while

Shaw remained behind in McElroy’s car. Sweetin knocked

on the front door, but received no response. Sweetin

then peered through a set of windows located next to the

door; he was able to see into the living room, and observed

that there were feces on the floor and that the room was

extremely cluttered. McElroy then began to “pound” on

the front door “quite hard and loud[ly].” No one responded to McElroy either, and after he pounded on the

door for “one to two minutes,” he peered through another

window next to the door and yelled to Sweetin and Shaw

that he saw “a child on the couch” who “raised his head,”

but did not otherwise move. McElroy then opened the

unlocked front door, announced the officers’ presence,

and yelled several times that they were there “to check on

the welfare of the children.” Although McElroy yelled

at “the top of his voice,” the child on the couch did not

move.

Seeing that the child was not moving, Sergeant McElroy

“went straight to the couch” to check on the child’s wel-
6 No. 07-3661

fare, with Officer Sweetin immediately in tow. The child,

who turned out to be Steven, had no clothes on, and had

only a small blanket covering him. Sweetin asked Steven

where his father was, but Steven responded that he did

not know. Meanwhile, McElroy found Ellen and Sebastian

in a nearby bedroom where they “appeared to be sleeping.” The officers then called Shaw to come into the house.

Upon entering the house, Shaw found Ellen and

Sebastian lying naked on a “very dirty mattress” with no

sheets. Both children were “extremely dirty”; bloody

mucus had collected under Sebastian’s nose, and Ellen

both exhibited sores on her body and had lost clumps of

hair. Neither child immediately awakened when Shaw

attempted to rouse them, and they were disoriented

when Shaw eventually woke them up. Believing that the

two children required immediate medical attention, Shaw

asked Officer Sweetin to call for an ambulance. Shaw then

asked Steven if he knew where his father was, or if he

could tell her the last time that he had seen his father.

Steven responded that he did not know where Venters

was, and that the last time he had seen his father was

the day before. The ambulance arrived shortly thereafter,

and having found no clean clothing in the surrounding

filth, Shaw and Sergeant McElroy wrapped the children

in blankets and carried them out of the house.

While Shaw and Sergeant McElroy were waiting for

the ambulance, Officer Sweetin walked to the rear of

Venters’s property to speak with a cable serviceman

working there. After questioning the serviceman about

whether he had seen any adults in the area, Sweetin
No. 07-3661 7

noticed that the tool shed behind Venters’s house had

an air conditioner installed in an opening on the door.

Sweetin believed that someone was inside the shed because the air conditioner was running to combat the 100-

degree heat; he accordingly knocked on the shed’s door,

but received no response. The lack of response led Sweetin

to grow concerned that Venters was inside, but was

unable to answer the door because he had injured himself

or had fallen ill; this, Sweetin thought, would also

explain why Steven had not seen him since the day

before. Sweetin therefore opened the door, and saw

Venters and another man sitting on the shed’s floor.

Sweetin informed Venters that he was under arrest for

child neglect and took him into custody.

About two hours after Venters’s arrest, police officers

obtained a warrant to allow Shaw and other officers to reenter Venters’s house to photograph the conditions

inside. While they were in the house, an officer located a

small bag of marijuana sitting in plain view, and this

discovery, in turn, led the officers to obtain a second

warrant to search the house for drugs and drug-related

paraphernalia. The second search turned up the items

upon which the grand jury’s indictment was based.

The district court took Venters’s motion to suppress

under advisement after hearing from Shaw and Officer

Sweetin, and soon thereafter issued a written decision

denying the motion. The court determined that Sergeant

McElroy and Sweetin’s warrantless entry into Venters’s

house was reasonable given the exigency of the situation,

as was Sweetin’s warrantless entry into Venters’s tool
8 No. 07-3661

shed. Specifically, the court determined that upon “minimal investigation” both officers confirmed Houseworth’s

report of child neglect, and that their observations at the

house led them to believe that the three Venters children

were in danger. Likewise, the court continued, Sweetin’s

entry of the shed was reasonable because he acted out of

concern that Venters was incapacitated inside. The court

thus concluded that “the entry into the home and into the

shed were fully warranted.” 

His motion to suppress having been denied, Venters

entered into a conditional plea agreement under which he

pled guilty to the one count of possessing materials and

equipment used to manufacture meth. However,

Venters also preserved his right to appeal the district

court’s suppression ruling. The district court accepted the

agreement, and subsequently sentenced Venters to 188

months’ imprisonment.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Venters challenges the district court’s conclusion that Sergeant McElroy and Officer Sweetin’s

warrantless entry into his house was justified by exigent

circumstances. As Venters sees it, the district court’s

determination that the officers had a reasonable belief

that the Venters children were in danger finds no support in the record. In fact, Venters continues, the two

officers’ decision to enter the house was based on nothing

more than “wild speculation” that a medical emergency

existed inside, meaning that the officers’ initial entry

was illegal, and that the items that were subsequently
No. 07-3661 9

recovered were inadmissible as “fruits of the unlawful

entry.” Our review is de novo. See United States v. Andrews,

442 F.3d 996, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from

making an unreasonable entry into a house, see United

States v. Elder, 466 F.3d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir. 2006), and an

officer’s warrantless entry into a house is presumed to be

unreasonable, see Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403

(2006); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); United

States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2001). However,

the Fourth Amendment does permit an officer to enter a

house without a warrant where there is (1) probable

cause supporting the entry; and (2) exigent circumstances. See Andrews, 442 F.3d at 1000, Rivera, 248 F.3d

at 680. “Exigent circumstances exist when there is a

compelling need for official action and no time to secure a

warrant,” United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (7th

Cir. 1998), such as when an officer must enter a premises

“to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or

to protect an occupant from imminent injury,” see Stuart,

547 U.S. at 403; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-

93 (1978) (“ ‘The need to protect or preserve life or

avoid serious injury is justification for what would be

otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.’ ”

(quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.

1963))); Elder, 466 F.3d at 1090-91 (stating that officers’

warrantless entries were justified to assure safety of

individual who called 911). It falls to the government to

show that exigent circumstances justified an officer’s

warrantless entry. See Andrews, 442 F.3d at 1000. And to
10 No. 07-3661

satisfy that burden, the government must establish that,

based on “ ‘the situation from the perspective of the

officer[ ] at the scene,’ ” Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1082

(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Marshall, 157 F.3d at 482), the

officer had “ ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ ” that such circumstances existed at the time of the

entry, Andrews, 442 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Rivera, 248 F.3d

at 680); see also Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404. 

We agree with the district court that Sergeant McElroy

and Officer Sweetin’s warrantless entry into Venters’s

house was reasonable. On this record, it is clear that the

officers’ entry was supported by probable cause that

Venters had committed child neglect. Probable cause

exists if police officers “‘possess knowledge from reasonably trustworthy information that is sufficient to warrant

a prudent person in believing that [the] suspect has

committed, or is committing, a crime.’ ” United States v.

Hobbs, 509 F.3d 353, 359-60 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United

States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also

United States v. Mounts, 248 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2001).

And under Illinois law, a parent commits child neglect

when he or she allows his or her children to live in a

house that, “by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity on

the part of its parents,” is an unfit place for the children.

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/1; see also id. 130/2; Illinois v. Melton,

667 N.E.2d 1371, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Here,

Houseworth reported that Venters was committing child

neglect, and nothing about the information she provided

rendered her untrustworthy. To the contrary, on two

separate occasions she provided detailed allegations

that Venters allowed his three children to live in a filthy
No. 07-3661 11

and feces-ridden house where he used and manufactured

meth. Moreover, Houseworth’s allegations were corroborated by Venters’s wife, Natalie, and by Sweetin’s

observations from the porch of Venters’s house, where

he saw that the living room was extremely cluttered

and that there were feces on the floor. We are thus comfortable stating that the officers had probable cause to

believe that Venters had violated Illinois law by allowing

his children to live in a house that his neglect and depravity rendered unfit. See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 130/1,130/2;

United States v. Huebner, 356 F.3d 807, 816 (7th Cir. 2004)

(concluding that probable cause existed when report of

crime was detailed and corroborated by police investigation); United States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir.

1996) (determining that probable cause existed for

warrantless arrest when police officers’ independent

observations confirmed report of crime).

Moreover, exigent circumstances justified Sergeant

McElroy and Officer Sweetin’s entry into Venters’s house.

When the officers arrived at the residence, they knew from

Houseworth and Natalie that, for the previous three-tofour days, the Venters children were living in a dangerous

environment that posed serious threats to their well-being:

a decrepit, unsanitary house with little or no adult supervision, and where theirfatherregularly used, and probably

made, meth in their presence. It is well documented that

the noxious chemicals and toxic fumes created by the

use and manufacture of meth pose great dangers to third

parties, see United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 469-71 (6th

Cir. 2003); Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked up Menace:

Responses to Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 Harv.
12 No. 07-3661

L. Rev. 2508, 2511-12 (2006), Ill. Attorney Gen., Meth Evils,

http: / / w w w . ag. sta te. i l . us/m ethnet/

understandingmeth/evils.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008),

and that the chemicals and fumes pose acute dangers to

children in particular, see Anne E. Hardwick, Comment,

Meth Manufacturing: Arizona Increases Protection for Children,

39 Ariz. St. L.J. 297, 298-306 (2007); U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

Information Bulletin: Children at Risk, http://www.usdoj.gov/

ndic/pubs1/1466/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2008). Even more,

the fact that Venters regularly exposed his children to the

drug created the possibility that the children had ingested

the drug some time before the officers arrived on the scene.

We are sure that Detective McElroy and Officer Sweetin

immediately thought of the effect that meth and its byproducts would have had on Steven when they saw him

lying on the couch, at first unresponsive to McElroy’s

prolonged “pounding” on the door and “yelling,” and then

able only to “raise his head.” As such, it was eminently

reasonable for the officers to have feared that Steven’s

groggy movements meant that he was sick from meth

fumes, was hurt from an accident that occurred while

his father was making meth, had ingested the drug, or

worse—all scenarios that would have required emergency

medical attention. Simply put, there was nothing unreasonable about McElroy and Sweetin’s belief that they

needed to enter Venters’s house to provide Steven emergency medical care, see Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403, and once

inside, they were right to ensure the safety of his siblings

as well, Elder, 466 F.3d at 1090-91 (stating that “considerations” of building’s occupants’ safety made police officers’

brief warrantless entry “prudent”).
No. 07-3661 13

Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize the narrowness

of our determination that exigent circumstances justified

Detective McElroy and Officer Sweetin’s entry into Venters’s house. The situation at the house was not one

where McElroy’s and Sweetin’s knocks simply went

unanswered; nor was it a situation where the officers

saw that the children were healthy and unharmed

inside, but yet unsupervised. Instead, it was a situation

where McElroy and Sweetin (1) were aware that, for the

three-to-four previous days, a drug-addicted father was

left alone to “care” for his three young children, and that

their house was in a state of extreme filth; (2) knew of

credible and corroborated allegations that the father

had exposed the children to meth in the past, including

the manufacture of the drug, to such an extent that

their clothing reeked of the drug; (3) observed that a small

child inside the house did not immediately react to their

prolonged pounding on the door; and (4) believed that the

child’s extremely delayed and lethargic reaction to the

pounding suggested a medical problem caused by the

dangerous environment in which he lived. And given

these unique facts, the officers’ belief that they needed to

respond to a medical emergency inside was reasonable,

and their entry into the house was prudent. See United

States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (allowing

warrantless entry of officers responding to report of

domestic abuse: “This is a case where the police would be

harshly criticized had they not investigated and [defendant] was in fact in the apartment. Erring on the side of

caution is exactly what we expect of conscientious police

officers.”).
14 No. 07-3661

We come, then, to the district court’s determination that

Officer Sweetin’s entry into the tool shed was reasonable.

Notably, though, Venters abandons any challenge to the

court’s conclusion by failing to raise the argument in his

brief. See United States v. Dabney, 498 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir.

2007); United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1256 n.19 (7th

Cir. 1995). But even if Venters had raised the point, his

challenge would have been unavailing. As discussed,

Sweetin had probable cause to believe that Venters had

committed child neglect in violation of Illinois law. And

in his uncontradicted testimony at the suppression

hearing, Sweetin stated that he entered the shed believing

that Venters could have been in there, yet was unable to

respond to his knocks on the shed door because of illness

or injury. This belief was reasonable; the fact that Steven

had not seen Venters since the day before suggested that

Venters was incapacitated somewhere. Sweetin’s belief

was also supported by (1) the fact that Venters was

already suffering from extremely ill health from his meth

addiction; (2) the chance that Venters could have overdosed on meth or could have taken a tainted version of the

drug; and (3) the possibility that Venters could have

suffered a life-threatening injury while manufacturing

meth in the shed—the area where both Houseworth and

Natalie stated that Venters had manufactured the drug

in the past. We accordingly agree with the district court

that Sweetin’s entry into the shed was reasonable. See

Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403; Elder, 466 F.3d at 1090-91.
No. 07-3661 15

III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err by denying Venters’s

motion to suppress. We thus AFFIRM Venters’s conviction.

8-27-08