Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Agee,1

and Goodwyn, JJ. 

SUE CAROL PERREAULT, ADMINISTRATRIX AND 

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 

ALBERT L. PERREAULT, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 071978 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 September 12, 2008 

THE FREE LANCE-STAR, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

Ann Hunter Simpson, Judge 

This appeal arises from four separate wrongful death 

actions brought pursuant to Code § 8.01-50 and ultimately 

settled by the parties through mediation. The principal issue 

we consider is whether the circuit court erred in requiring 

the settling parties to those actions to file written 

petitions reciting the financial terms of the compromise 

settlements in order to obtain court approval of those 

settlements pursuant to Code § 8.01-55. We also consider 

whether the contents of such petitions remain subject to the 

presumption of public access to court records mandated by Code 

§ 17.1-208 notwithstanding the provisions of Code § 8.01-

581.22, which govern the confidentiality of mediation 

 

1

 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision of 

this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 30, 

2008. 
proceedings. Finally, we review the decision of the circuit 

court denying a request to partially seal the records in these 

cases by permitting the redaction of the monetary amounts of 

the compromise settlements in the court records. 

BACKGROUND 

Sue Carol Perreault, Phyllis Ann Mulholland, Sue Ella C. 

Musselman, and Dona J. Holt, each in her capacity as 

administratrix of an estate (collectively, “the personal 

representatives”), brought wrongful death actions in the 

Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County against several 

defendants including B. Braun Medical, Inc. and its subsidiary 

Central Admixture Pharmacy Services (collectively, “CAPS”). 

With respect to the alleged liability of CAPS, each action 

asserted that the decedent’s death resulted from the 

administration during open-heart surgery of an improperly 

formulated or contaminated cardioplegic solution manufactured 

and distributed by CAPS.2 

 

2

 Cardioplegia is the medical term for the temporary 

paralyzation of the heart muscle during cardiac surgical 

procedures. Since the 1960s, the most common method of 

protecting the heart during cardioplegia is the infusion of a 

cold crystalloid solution into the heart. Hans J. Geissler 

and Uwe Mehlhorn, Cold crystalloid cardioplegia, The 

Multimedia Manual of Cardiothoracic Surgery (2006). 

2
The personal representatives entered into mediation with 

CAPS that resulted in compromise settlements of the wrongful 

death claims. As expressed in the settlement agreements, a 

principal concern of the personal representatives and CAPS was 

the desire to keep the terms, and specifically the financial 

terms, of the settlements confidential. 

Thereafter, on a date not specified in the record, 

Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman applied to the circuit 

court under Code § 8.01-55 for approval of their respective 

compromise settlements by making oral motions to the court in 

a closed, in camera hearing. Because no written petitions 

seeking approval of the settlements were submitted to the 

circuit court in these cases, the record originally provided 

to this Court by the circuit court was unclear as to how this 

hearing was docketed and whether notice was given to potential 

“parties in interest” or that such parties were convened as 

required by Code § 8.01-55. 

By writ of certiorari entered May 21, 2008, this Court 

directed the circuit court to forward the records of the 

original actions filed by the personal representatives. An 

examination of those records did not disclose any praecipe 

for, or notice to any parties of, the in camera hearing. The 

proceeding conducted during that hearing was not transcribed. 

The record merely reflects that on February 16, 2007, the 

3
circuit court entered orders approving the compromise 

settlements in these three cases. The orders recite only the 

fact that the claims against CAPS had been resolved by 

compromise and that the personal representatives and statutory 

beneficiaries of the decedent in each case agreed to and 

approved the compromise.3

By letter from counsel to the circuit court dated 

February 28, 2007, The Free Lance-Star, a newspaper published 

in Fredericksburg, and Media General Operations, Inc., 

publisher of The Richmond Times-Dispatch (collectively, “the 

newspapers”), complained of a “lack of transparency” in the 

approval of the compromise settlements in the Perreault, 

Mulholland, and Musselman cases. The newspapers contended 

that a reporter for The Free Lance-Star had been barred from 

attending the hearing concerning approval of the compromise 

settlements and that the failure to require petitions setting 

out the terms of the compromises was “inconsistent with” the 

requirements of Code § 8.01-55. The newspapers further 

 

3

 There is no suggestion of any misconduct by any of the 

personal representatives in these cases or that the compromise 

settlements were not appropriate. We are confident in our 

assumption that the circuit court was made fully aware of the 

specific financial terms of the compromise settlement in each 

case. 

4
contended that under Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. v. 

Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 368 S.E.2d 253 (1988), petitions for 

approval of compromise settlements of wrongful death claims 

were judicial records subject to disclosure under Code § 17.1-

208. 

On March 2, 2007, the newspapers filed a formal petition 

to intervene in the Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman 

cases. The newspapers again asserted that approval of a 

compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim pursuant to 

Code § 8.01-55 required the filing of a petition that recited 

the particulars of the settlement and, thus, that the circuit 

court erred in approving the settlements in these cases based 

on oral motions. The newspapers further asserted that, under 

Shenandoah Publishing and Code § 17.1-208, such petitions were 

judicial documents subject to inspection by the media and the 

general public. The newspapers requested that Perreault, 

Mulholland, and Musselman be required to file petitions “that 

fully comply with [Code] Section 8.01-55.” In response to the 

petition to intervene, on March 8, 2007, the circuit court 

entered orders suspending the February 16, 2007 orders 

approving the compromise settlements. On May 2, 2007, the 

court entered an order permitting the newspapers to intervene 

in the Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman cases. 

5
On June 6, 2007, Holt filed in the circuit court a 

written petition for approval of the compromise settlement of 

her wrongful death action against CAPS. The petition noted 

the fact of the compromise settlement and that “the reason for 

the compromise is that the matter is highly contested, 

liability is not admitted, there is uncertainty associated 

with litigation, the time value of settlement versus trial 

currently scheduled greater than one year from the date of the 

Petition [to approve the settlement], and the best interests 

of all parties concerned.” However, no specific terms of the 

settlement with regard to the consideration to be paid were 

recited in the petition. An unexecuted copy of the settlement 

agreement appended to the petition was redacted to remove all 

references to payments to be made to the appropriate statutory 

beneficiaries of the estate. 

On June 11, 2007, the circuit court entered an order 

requiring Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman to file 

petitions that “shall state as to each of the settled cases 

the compromise, its terms and the reasons therefor.” The 

order further provided that “[t]he settling parties and the 

newspaper[s]” would be permitted “to present evidence and to 

otherwise be heard on the issue of whether the settling 

parties can meet the burden imposed by law to permit the 

petition[s] filed . . . to remain under seal.” 

6
Also on June 11, 2007, during a hearing on Holt’s 

petition for approval of the compromise settlement in her 

case, the newspapers appeared and made an oral motion to 

intervene in that case as well. The circuit court directed 

that Holt be required to file under seal an unredacted copy of 

the settlement agreement. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the court entered an order, styled as a final order, approving 

the settlement based upon the petition and the redacted 

exhibit. The order, however, provided that the issue whether 

Holt would be required to file an unredacted settlement 

agreement would be subsequently reviewed. 

In response to the circuit court’s order, Perreault, 

Mulholland, and Musselman filed the requested petitions, which 

were placed under seal. They also filed a joint motion to 

permit the petitions to be filed with “limited redactions” 

along with supporting affidavits by each of them and Michael 

Koch, Vice President of Sales and Support Services for CAPS, 

stating the reasons therefor. Holt filed an identical motion 

supported by her own affidavit and that of Koch. Each motion 

also contained exhibits showing the media coverage of wrongful 

death actions involving the alleged misformulation or 

contamination of cardioplegic solutions by CAPS. 

The circuit court heard extensive argument on the issue 

whether Code § 8.01-55 required a party seeking approval of a 

7
compromise settlement in a wrongful death action to file a 

petition, whether that petition was required to contain 

comprehensive details of the compromise, and also whether the 

contents of such petitions were subject to disclosure both 

generally and in the present cases specifically. Apart from 

the affidavits already submitted, no additional evidence was 

received in the Perreault, Mulholland, and Musselman cases 

with respect to the request to redact the compromise 

settlements. Holt and two other beneficiaries under the 

compromise settlement in that case did testify. Their 

testimony was limited to explaining their decision to agree to 

the compromise. 

On June 29, 2007, the circuit court entered orders in the 

four cases ruling that Code § 8.01-55 required the personal 

representatives to file petitions for approval of the 

compromise settlements and that the petitions must “includ[e] 

the terms and conditions of each such settlement.” The court 

further ruled that “the settling parties have failed to meet 

their burden to establish a compelling reason sufficient to 

overcome the presumption of openness of such settlement 

information.” Accordingly, the court denied the motions to 

permit the filing of redacted copies of the settlement 

agreements. However, the court permitted the petitions and 

the unredacted settlement agreements to remain under seal “for 

8
the purpose of preserving the settling parties’ objections to 

the [c]ourt’s ruling pending such appeal as they may choose to 

take from this Order.”4 In an order dated March 6, 2008, we 

awarded the personal representatives in all four cases and 

CAPS this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

The personal representatives and CAPS (collectively, “the 

settling parties”) have asserted three assignments of error in 

this appeal. First, they contend that the circuit court erred 

in construing Code § 8.01-55 to require the filing of a 

petition stating the particulars of a compromise settlement, 

and specifically the financial terms of the compromise 

settlement, in order for the court to approve the settlement 

of a wrongful death action. Next, they contend that the 

circuit court erred as a matter of law in these cases by 

failing to give proper effect to the confidentiality 

provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22. Finally, the settling 

parties contend that even if the court did not err in its 

application of Code § 8.01-55 as applied to court-approved 

compromise settlements of wrongful death actions generally, it 

 

4

 In Holt’s case, the court also granted, nunc pro tunc to 

June 11, 2007, the newspapers’ motion to intervene in that 

case. 

9
nonetheless erred in failing to find that the specific 

circumstances of these cases warranted permitting the filing 

of redacted settlement agreements. We will address these 

issues seriatim, beginning with the challenge to the circuit 

court’s interpretation of Code § 8.01-55. 

Because the construction of a statute presents a pure 

question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review to the 

judgment of the circuit court, as here, that is based solely 

on its interpretation of a statute. Logan v. City Council, 

275 Va. 483, 492, 659 S.E.2d 296, 300 (2008). Code § 8.01-55 

in relevant part, provides that: 

The personal representative of the deceased may 

compromise any claim to damages arising under or by 

virtue of § 8.01-50, including claims under the 

provision of a liability insurance policy, before or 

after an action is brought, with the approval of the 

court in which the action was brought, or if an 

action has not been brought, with the consent of any 

circuit court. Such approval may be applied for on 

petition to such court, by the personal 

representative, or by any potential defendant, or by 

any interested insurance carrier . . . . The 

petition shall state the compromise, its terms and 

the reason therefor. The court shall require the 

convening of the parties in interest . . . . The 

parties in interest shall be deemed to be convened 

if each such party (i) endorses the order by which 

the court approves the compromise or (ii) is given 

notice of the hearing and proposed compromise as 

provided in § 8.01-296 if a resident of the 

Commonwealth or as provided in § 8.01-320 if a 

nonresident, or is otherwise given reasonable notice 

of the hearing and proposed compromise as may be 

required by the court. 

(Emphasis added.) 

10
The settling parties essentially contend that nothing in 

Code § 8.01-55 requires the “petition” made to the court for 

approval of a compromise of a wrongful death claim to be in 

writing or to otherwise require disclosure of the financial 

terms of that compromise in a public record. We disagree. 

In resolving this issue, we consider the language of Code 

§ 8.01-55 under the settled principle of statutory 

construction that courts are bound by the plain meaning of 

statutory language. Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 

S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008); Young v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 528, 

533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2007); Alliance to Save the 

Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 439, 621 S.E.2d 78, 

86-87 (2005). Under this principle, when the language of a 

statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may not interpret 

that language in a manner effectively holding that the General 

Assembly did not mean what it actually stated. Hicks, 275 Va. 

at 218, 657 S.E.2d at 144; Young, 273 Va. at 533, 643 S.E.2d 

at 493; Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 

630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006). 

Initially, we note that in enacting Code § 8.01-55, the 

General Assembly required that “settlements of wrongful death 

claims must be approved by the courts.” Shenandoah 

Publishing, 235 Va. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 256. In plain and 

unambiguous language, Code § 8.01-55 requires that before a 

11
circuit court may approve any settlement of a wrongful death 

claim, the statutorily designated party must apply for such 

approval by petition to the court. The usual and accepted 

meaning of “petition” is “[a] formal written request presented 

to a court or other official body.” Black’s Law Dictionary

1182 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Moreover, Code § 8.01-

55 is equally unambiguous in its requirement that “[t]he 

petition shall state the compromise, its terms and the reason 

therefor.” (Emphasis added.) Common sense dictates that the 

most significant of the “terms” of any compromise settlement 

of a wrongful death claim include the monetary provisions in 

consideration of which the party with the right to seek 

damages is compromising its right to sue for those damages. 

Clearly, the settling parties’ contention that Code § 8.01-55 

does not require a written petition to the circuit court or 

that such petition need not state the financial terms of the 

compromise settlement is not supported by the plain meaning of 

the language of the statute. 

Furthermore, in Ramey v. Bobbitt, 250 Va. 474, 481, 463 

S.E.2d 437, 441 (1995), we held that “[t]hose portions of a 

release that are not made part of a wrongful death compromise 

settlement approved by a circuit court [under Code § 8.01-55] 

are not binding on the parties to the release.” Accordingly, 

if the terms of a settlement were not made express in the 

12
petition filed under Code § 8.01-55 or were not otherwise made 

a part of the record, there would be no definite basis upon 

which the court would later be able to determine what the 

parties had bound themselves to in the compromise settlement 

if a dispute subsequently arose regarding compliance with the 

settlement. 

For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 

err in construing Code § 8.01-55 to require a party seeking 

approval of a compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim 

to file in the court a written petition that includes the 

complete and unredacted terms of the compromise settlement. 

We now turn to the settling parties’ contention that the 

circuit court erred by failing to give proper effect to the 

confidentiality provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22. The 

resolution of this contention necessarily invokes the 

interplay among the applications of Code §§ 8.01-55, 8.01-

581.22 and 17.1-208. 

In relevant part, Code § 17.1-208 provides that: 

 Except as otherwise provided by law, any 

records and papers of every circuit court that are 

maintained by the clerk of the circuit court shall 

be open to inspection by any person and the clerk 

shall, when requested, furnish copies thereof, 

except in cases in which it is otherwise specially 

provided. 

In Shenandoah Publishing, we identified the “judicial 

records” that ordinarily come within the ambit of this statute 

13
as “the pleadings and any exhibits or motions filed by the 

parties and all orders entered by the trial court in the 

judicial proceedings leading to the judgment under review.” 

235 Va. at 257, 368 S.E.2d at 255. The petition required by 

Code § 8.01-55 is clearly a pleading and comports with this 

definition of a judicial record. Accordingly, the petition 

comes within the statutory presumption of openness to the 

public contained in Code § 17.1-208. 

In relevant part, Code § 8.01-581.22 provides that: 

All memoranda, work products and other 

materials contained in the case files of a mediator 

or mediation program are confidential. . . . 

However, a written mediated agreement signed by the 

parties shall not be confidential, unless the 

parties otherwise agree in writing. 

Confidential materials and communications are 

not subject to disclosure in discovery or in any 

judicial or administrative proceeding except (i) 

where all parties to the mediation agree, in 

writing, to waive the confidentiality, . . . or (ix) 

as provided by law or rule. 

The settling parties initially stress the undisputed fact 

that the compromise settlements of the wrongful death claims 

in these cases resulted from mediation and that the parties to 

the mediation agreed that the terms of the settlements were to 

remain confidential. Consequently, the settling parties 

contend, notwithstanding the mandate of Code § 8.01-55 that 

the terms of the compromise settlements be included in the 

proper petitions to the circuit court for approval of the 

14
settlements, that Code § 8.01-581.22 operates so as to ensure 

the confidentiality of the terms of the mediated settlements. 

The settling parties’ contention creates an unnecessary 

tension between the provisions of Code §§ 8.01-55 and 8.01-

581.22 and is an unwarranted interpretation of the pertinent 

statutory scheme. The thrust of their contention is that the 

confidentiality provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22 require that 

the provisions of Code § 8.01-55 be applied so that the 

circuit court will be informed of the specific financial terms 

of the compromise settlement but those terms would not be 

included in the written petition so as to be subject to 

disclosure to the public under Code § 17.1-208. On brief in 

this appeal, the settling parties suggest that this could be 

accomplished by permitting the circuit court “to conduct all 

portions of the settlement approval petition in open court, 

but permit the [s]ettling [p]arties to present (but not file) 

a written document to the court that states the settlements’ 

dollar amount and distribution.” We disagree. 

In resolving this issue we acknowledge that within the 

pertinent statutory scheme there exists at least a facial 

tension between the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” 

provision contained in Code § 17.1-208 and the “as provided by 

law or rule” provision contained in the confidentiality 

provisions of Code § 8.01-581.22(ix). The former suggests a 

15
limitation upon public access to judicial records whereas the 

latter suggests a limitation upon otherwise confidential 

mediated agreements. Because of the view we take in resolving 

this case, we need not further address that issue. 

The statutory scheme that provides for resolution of 

civil disputes through mediation found in Code § 8.01-581.21 

et seq., including the confidentiality provisions of Code 

§ 8.01-581.22 at issue here, is one of general application to 

all mediated settlements, not just to settlements of wrongful 

death claims. By contrast, Code § 8.01-55 is a statute of 

precise and specific application, dealing only with the 

requirement for court approval of compromise settlements of 

wrongful death claims. Cf. Peerless Ins. Co. v. County of 

Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483 (2007) (holding 

that when one statute addresses a subject in a general manner 

and another statute addresses part of the same subject in a 

more specific manner, the differing statutes should be 

harmonized if possible, but when they conflict the more 

specific statute prevails); see also, Alliance to Save the 

Mattaponi, 270 Va. at 439-40, 621 S.E.2d at 87; Capelle v. 

Orange County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005). 

Undoubtedly, and consistent with the provisions of Code 

§ 8.01-581.22, it may be common for settlements of various 

types of civil claims to be achieved through mediation and, 

16
yet, for the terms of such settlements not to be publicly 

disclosed because the parties agree not to do so. In this 

case, however, we must consider the harmonious application of 

Code § 8.01-55 and Code § 8.01-581.22 in light of the fact 

that the settling parties were required to obtain court 

approval of the mediated settlements of these wrongful death 

claims and to disclose the terms of those settlements in the 

petitions to the court seeking such approval. 

Although Shenandoah Publishing did not involve a mediated 

settlement of a wrongful death claim, we nonetheless find the 

rationale underlying the decision in that case to be 

instructive. In Shenandoah Publishing, we stated that the 

legislative purpose underpinning Code § 8.01-55 served the 

public’s “societal interest in learning whether compromise 

settlements are equitable and whether the courts are 

administering properly the powers conferred upon them.” 235 

Va. at 260, 368 S.E.2d at 256. This is so because “the people 

have a vital interest, one of personal and familial as well as 

community concern, in cases involving claims of medical 

malpractice on the part of licensed practitioners and other 

health care providers.” Id.

Given the salutary purpose of Code § 8.01-55, we cannot 

conceive that the General Assembly intended to permit the 

confidentiality provisions allowed but not required by Code 

17
§ 8.01-581.22 to trump the provisions of Code § 8.01-55 and, 

consequently, the right of public access provided for by Code 

§ 17.1-208 in the context of the records of court approval of 

the compromise settlement of a wrongful death claim achieved 

through mediation. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 

court did not err in ruling that in approving the compromise 

settlements in the present cases, the court was not subject to 

a de jure requirement under Code § 8.01-581.22 to place the 

record, or at least that portion of it detailing the financial 

terms of the compromise settlements, under seal. 

Finally, we consider the settling parties’ assertion that 

the circuit court erred in finding that the circumstances of 

these particular cases did not warrant their being permitted 

to redact from the record all references to the financial 

terms of the compromise settlements. When the sealing of a 

record or part thereof is not a duty imposed by law, the 

decision whether to seal the record rests within the sound 

discretion of the circuit court. See In re Worrell Enters., 

Inc., 14 Va. App. 671, 675, 419 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1992). In 

Shenandoah Publishing, we said that in order to overcome the 

strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial 

records “the moving party must bear the burden of establishing 

an interest so compelling that it cannot be protected 

18
reasonably by some measure other than a protective order.” 

235 Va. at 259, 368 S.E.2d at 256. 

On brief, the settling parties assert that under 

Shenandoah Publishing, “when a court considers a motion to 

seal records, or exclude the public from civil judicial 

proceedings, ‘it may not base its decision on conclusory 

assertions alone, but must make specific factual findings.’ ” 

Thus, they contend that the circuit court was required to make 

express findings of fact supporting its decision not to permit 

redaction of the records. We disagree. 

The settling parties’ assertion wholly mischaracterizes 

the holding in Shenandoah Publishing. The quotation that the 

settling parties have drawn from the opinion appears only as a 

parenthetical to a citation in the opinion of the Court. 235 

Va. at 259, 368 S.E.2d at 256 (citing and quoting In re 

Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 392 (4th Cir. 1986)). 

Moreover, in context it is clear that the citation and its 

explanatory parenthetical were supporting a proposition 

directly contradictory of the position being asserted by the 

settling parties in this case. When correctly interpreted, 

Shenandoah Publishing requires that a court may not base its 

decision to limit public access to court proceedings or 

records upon the conclusory assertions of the party requesting 

the closure. Id. Thus, the court must make specific factual 

19
findings only to support a decision to restrict public access 

to court records or proceedings. Because the presumption is 

in favor of openness, a court need not make findings of fact 

to justify a decision denying a request for closure of a 

proceeding or record absent any applicable statute or Rule of 

Court requiring such finding. 

Similarly, the settling parties’ reliance on Richmond 

Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 590, 281 S.E.2d 

915, 924 (1981), to assert that the newspapers as “intervenors 

. . . have the burden of showing that reasonable alternatives 

to closure are available” is misplaced. That burden exists 

only after the party seeking to restrict public access to 

judicial proceedings or records has made an adequate showing 

that it is entitled to such relief. Accordingly, our focus in 

this appeal is limited to whether the circuit court abused its 

discretion in finding that the settling parties failed to meet 

their burden to establish a compelling reason sufficient to 

overcome the presumption of public access to the records of 

the compromise settlements in these cases. 

In Koch’s affidavit submitted on behalf of CAPS, it is 

asserted that if the terms of the compromise settlements were 

made public, CAPS “could become the target of lawsuits by 

individuals and/or businesses who might file lawsuits for the 

sole purpose of extracting a ‘nuisance value’ settlement.” 

20
Koch further asserted that CAPS would not have entered into 

the settlement agreements had it known that the terms would 

not remain confidential and that an order requiring disclosure 

of the financial terms of the settlement would “deprive the 

CAPS defendants of one of the benefits it bargained for and 

obtained in exchange for the consideration paid.” 

CAPS’s concern that disclosure of the financial terms of 

the compromise settlements might subject it to further 

litigation may be well founded. However, that concern 

reflects no more than an unsupported conclusory assertion and 

pales in view of the statutory presumption of public access to 

judicial records contained in Code § 17.1-208. 

CAPS’s assertion that the circuit court’s order denying 

the request to redact the settlement agreements would deny it 

the benefit of its bargain is based on the legally flawed 

presumption that private parties can agree to deprive the 

public of the right of access to judicial records guaranteed 

by Code § 17.1-208. While CAPS may have anticipated that the 

court would permit the petitions to approve the compromise 

settlements of the wrongful death claims at issue here to be 

made without disclosure of the financial terms of these 

settlements, it did so at its own risk. Clearly it did not 

lose any benefit of its bargains through the court’s decision 

denying its request to redact the financial terms of the 

21
settlement agreements. The personal representatives and the 

beneficiaries to the settlements are still bound by their 

agreements that they keep the terms thereof confidential, and 

they fulfilled that duty by joining with CAPS in seeking to 

have the records sealed. The court’s decision to not permit 

redaction of the financial terms from the petitions does not 

constitute a breach of that duty. 

In their affidavits submitted to the circuit court, the 

personal representatives stated various concerns they had with 

respect to having the financial terms of the compromise 

settlements made public. They asserted that the settlements 

of their claims were “private matter[s] between [the 

beneficiaries] and the defendants;” that they did not desire 

to be subject to further publicity as this would cause them 

“to re-live the trauma” associated with their decedents’ 

demise; and, that publicity concerning the financial terms of 

the settlements might result in unwanted solicitations. Holt 

further expressed concern that she might be targeted by 

criminals and that she and her family “will be subject to 

public ridicule, criticism, and embarrassment” for having 

accepted the compromise settlement. 

While we are not unmindful of the seriousness of the 

concerns expressed by the personal representatives with 

respect to the potential consequences of the financial terms 

22
23

of their settlements being made public, concerns of emotional 

damage or financial harm when stated “in the abstract, [do 

not] constitute sufficient reasons to seal judicial records.” 

Shenandoah Publishing, 235 Va. at 259, 368 S.E.2d at 256. 

“[T]he desire of the litigants is not sufficient reason to 

override the presumption of openness.” Id. Moreover, it is 

not within the province of this Court to alter the pertinent 

statutory scheme which otherwise might warrant amendment by 

the legislature so as to preserve the confidentiality of the 

mediated settlement terms involving wrongful death claims such 

as those at issue here. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 

court did not err in denying the settling parties’ request to 

have the financial terms of the compromise settlements 

redacted in the court records. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court. We will remand the cases to the circuit court 

with direction that the records be unsealed in the Perreault, 

Mulholland, and Musselman cases and that an unredacted version 

of the settlement in the Holt case be entered into the record 

in accord with the prior order of the court. 

Affirmed and remanded.