Filed 3/18/22 Rosen v. Century Law Group CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JONATHAN C. ROSEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CENTURY LAW GROUP, LLP, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B306323

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

BC650926)

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Monica Bachner, Judge. Affirmed.

Brian D. McMahon and Chelsea Heaps for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

Century Law Group, Karen A. Larson for Defendants and 

Respondents.
2

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and appellant Jonathan Rosen (Rosen) sued 

Edward Lear (Lear) and his law firm, Century Law Group (CLG),

for legal malpractice. After a bench trial, the trial court entered 

judgment in favor of Lear and CLG on the ground that Rosen’s 

complaint was barred by the applicable one-year statute of 

limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340.6, subd. (a).)1

Rosen’s sole contention on appeal is that his action was 

timely because the statute of limitations was tolled until Lear

formally withdrew as his attorney of record. For the reasons 

discussed below, we reject this contention and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

In September 2015, Rosen retained Lear to defend him in a 

legal malpractice lawsuit (the underlying lawsuit). 

On February 3, 2016, Rosen emailed Lear, stating: “Your 

billing practices are insane. [¶] Youre [sic] fired. [¶] Prepare my 

file asap and let me know when it is available for pick up.” That 

same day, Lear replied: “Your file will be ready for pick up today. 

As you know, responses to discovery are due tomorrow.” 

On February 4, 2016, Rosen picked up his file and signed a 

substitution of attorney form. That same day, Rosen met with his 

new attorney, David Owen of Nemecek & Cole.

On February 8, 2016, Lear emailed Rosen advising him of 

pending dates in the underlying lawsuit. Lear confirmed: “In 

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Code of Civil Procedure.

2 We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the 

narrow issue on appeal.
3

light of your termination of my Firm’s services, we are not 

authorized to act on your behalf with respect to these upcoming 

matters.”

On February 9, 2019, in response to an email from Lear’s 

assistant stating she “still need[ed] another signature on the 

[substitution of attorney form] so [she] can file” it, Rosen stated: 

“I have my new lawyer taking care of it.”

On February 16, 2016, Rosen’s new attorney filed the 

substitution of attorney form. 

On February 16, 2017, Rosen filed a complaint for legal 

malpractice against Lear and CLG. Following a bench trial, the 

court issued a statement of decision. The court concluded: “Lear 

and CLG stopped being Rosen’s counsel when Rosen fired Lear, 

retrieved his files and signed the substitution of counsel. Also, 

Lear and CLG ended all work by February 9, 2016. As such, 

Rosen is barred by the [one-year] statute of limitations from 

asserting a legal malpractice action against Lear and CLG.” 

The court entered judgment in favor of Lear and CLG. 

Rosen appealed from the judgment. 

DISCUSSION

“‘The applicable statute of limitations for legal malpractice 

claims is section 340.6.’ [Citation] It provides that a malpractice 

action must be commenced ‘within one year after the plaintiff 

discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 

discovered, the fact constituting the wrongful act or 

omission . . . .’ (§ 340.6, subd. (a).) The running of the statute of 

limitations is tolled during the time that ‘[t]he attorney continues 

to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in 

which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred.’ (Id., subd. 

(a)(2); [citation.]) The tolling is referred to as the ‘continuous 
4

representation exception.’ [Citation].” (GoTek Energy, Inc. v. 

SoCal IP Law Group, LLP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1245-

1246.)

Rosen does not argue he filed this action within one year of 

discovering Lear’s alleged negligence as required under section 

340.6. Rosen contends his complaint was nevertheless timely 

because the continuous representation exception applied until 

Lear formally withdrew as his attorney of record under the 

provisions of section 284.3 Thus, he contends, the one-year 

statute of limitations did not begin to run until February 16, 

2016 —the date Rosen’s new attorney filed the substitution of 

attorney form. That is not the law, however. (See e.g. Shapero v. 

Fliegel (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 842, 846-847 [“[T]he failure to 

formally withdraw as attorney of record, standing alone, will not 

toll the statue of limitations under the rubric of continued 

representation. ¶ . . . ¶ If the Legislature had intended the 

running of the statute of limitations in section 340.6 to be tolled 

by failure of an attorney to file a withdrawal . . . it could have 

said so”]; Flake v. Neumiller & Beardslee (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 

223, 230 [“[T]he formal act of withdrawing does not demarcate 

the end of the professional relationship in the context of the legal 

3 Section 284 states: “The attorney in an action or special 

proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment 

or final determination, as follows: [¶] 1. Upon the consent of both 

client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the 

minutes; [¶] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application 

of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”
5

malpractice statute of limitations”]; Nguyen v. Ford (2020) 49 

Cal.App.5th 1, 13-14 [same].)4

Therefore, whether an attorney continues to represent a 

client for purposes of the continuous representation exception 

does not depend on whether the attorney formally withdrew from 

representation. Rather, “tolling under the continuous 

representation exception ends when ‘‘‘‘a client has no reasonable

expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services.’ 

[citation].”’” (Nguyen v. Ford, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) 

Here, as discussed above, it is undisputed Rosen fired Lear and 

CLG on February 3, 2016, and Rosen picked up his file from CLG

and signed a substitution of attorney form the following day. It is 

also undisputed that as of February 9, 2016, Rosen’s new 

attorney was performing substantive work on the case, and, 

according to Rosen, handling the filing of the substitution of 

attorney form. On this record, Rosen could not have reasonably 

believed Lear would continue to provide further legal services 

after February 9, 2016. 

Accordingly, we conclude Rosen’s complaint filed on 

February 16, 2017, more than one year after Lear and CLG 

ceased providing legal services to Rosen, is time-barred by section 

340.6.

4 Rosen makes no attempt to distinguish these authorities.

Nor does he argue the cases were wrongly decided.
6

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Lear and CLG are awarded their

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

COLLINS, J.