IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 153 / 06-1121 

Filed January 25, 2008 

SAM ROBINSON, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

FREMONT COUNTY, IOWA, 

 Appellee. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fremont County, J.C. Irvin, 

Judge. 

 Holder of tax sale certificates appeals a ruling that the county is 

only required to reimburse him the amount he paid for the certificates 

and pay him a ratable part of the interest and costs. REVERSED AND 

CASE REMANDED.

 A. W. Tauke of Porter, Tauke & Ebke, Council Bluffs, for appellant. 

Richard D. Crowl of Stuart Tinley Law Firm LLP, Council Bluffs, for 

appellee. 
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WIGGINS, Justice. 

In this appeal, we must determine whether the district court erred 

in ruling the county was only required to reimburse the holder of three 

tax certificates the amount he paid for the certificates and pay him a 

ratable part of the interest and costs. Because the district court erred 

when it held the county could compromise the taxpayers’ liability after it 

assigned the certificates, and a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

whether the payment made by the taxpayers redeemed the parcels, we 

reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Based upon the summary judgment record, we find the undisputed 

facts as follows. In June of 1989 the property tax on three parcels of 

land owned by Jeffrey and Suzanne Barrett became delinquent. Fremont 

County, Iowa conducted a public bidder sale pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 446.18 (1989). There were no bids, so the county became the 

default owner of the tax sale certificates pursuant to section 446.19. The 

county never served a notice of redemption on the Barretts. Fourteen 

years after the county became the default owner, it notified the Barretts 

of its intention to assign the certificates if they did not pay the back 

taxes. The Barretts did not respond. 

In 2004 the county approached Sam Robinson and asked him to 

purchase the three tax certificates so the county could put the parcels 

back on the tax roll. As of March 31, 2004, the total unpaid taxes plus 

interest and costs on the parcels was $13,362.78. On April 13 Robinson 

offered to pay $1500 for the three tax certificates. On May 11 the 

county’s board of supervisors adopted a resolution assigning the 

certificates to Robinson. The resolution stated the reason for assigning 
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the certificates was the county’s desire to avoid the expenses of the tax 

redemption procedure and the expenses of abating any nuisances on the 

parcels. 

On June 29 Robinson served the Barretts a notice informing them 

that their right to redeem the parcels would expire in ninety days. On 

August 26, a few days prior to the expiration of the redemption period, 

the county’s board of supervisors adopted a resolution directing the 

county treasurer to accept $11,000 from the Barretts as full redemption 

for the three parcels. The resolution also directed the treasurer to pay 

Robinson “all amounts due him under Chapters 446 and 447 and to 

thereafter issue a certificate of redemption in compliance with the 

resolution and section 447.5 of the Code of Iowa.” The county offered to 

pay Robinson $500 for each certificate plus interest from the time of the 

sale to the time of redemption upon his surrender of the certificates 

pursuant to section 447.4.1

Robinson filed a petition for declaratory judgment that asked the 

district court to declare the county “wholly without right or justification 

to assert any rights under certificates of purchase in which it had 

absolutely no interest . . . .” Robinson also asked the district court for 

“supplemental relief to remedy the unlawful actions taken by the 

defendant and to award him damages” including attorney fees and costs. 

 1Iowa Code section 447.4 (1989) provides: 

In case a redemption is made of any real estate sold for a less sum than 

the taxes, penalty, interest, and costs, the purchaser shall receive only 

the amount paid and a ratable part of such penalty, interest, and costs. 

In determining the interest and penalties to be paid upon redemption 

from such sale, the sum due on any parcel sold shall be taken to be the 

full amount of taxes, interest, and costs due thereon at the time of such 

sale, and the amount paid for any such parcel at such sale shall be 

apportioned ratably among the several funds to which it belongs. Real 

estate so sold shall be redeemable in the same manner and with the 

same penalties as that sold for the taxes of the preceding year. 
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The county answered the petition and requested Robinson’s 

petition be dismissed. The county also claimed it was only required to 

pay Robinson “a ratable part of the interest and costs under a 

compromised certificate in accordance with Iowa Code section 447.4.” 

Both parties moved for summary judgment. Robinson claimed he 

was entitled to the relief requested in his petition as a matter of law. The 

county claimed it was “entitled to summary judgment even if all the facts 

alleged by the plaintiff in his petition were true.” 

The district court denied Robinson’s motion for summary judgment 

and granted the county’s. The court found the county acted within its 

power to compromise the back taxes with the Barretts even after it 

assigned the tax certificates to Robinson. The court further determined 

that Robinson was entitled to receive only the amount paid and a ratable 

portion of the penalty, interest, and costs for his tax certificates under 

section 447.4. Therefore, the court dismissed Robinson’s petition with 

prejudice. 

Robinson appeals. 

II. Issues. 

Robinson raises two dispositive issues. First, he claims the county 

had no right to compromise the taxes after it assigned the tax 

certificates. Second, he claims the amount the Barretts paid to the 

county did not constitute a valid redemption of the parcels. 

III. Standard of Review. 

Our review of an order granting summary judgment is for 

correction of errors at law. Green v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 713 

N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 2006). The district court correctly enters a 

summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. 
5

P. 1.981. On review, we examine the record before the district court and 

determine whether there was a material fact in dispute and if not, 

whether the district court correctly applied the law. Gen. Car & Truck 

Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 

1996). 

IV. Analysis. 

In 1989 when the tax sale occurred, the Code provided: 

When property is offered at a tax sale under the provisions of 

section 446.18, and no bid is received, or if the bid received 

is less than the total amount of the delinquent general and 

special taxes, interest, penalties and costs, the county in 

which the real estate is located, through its board of 

supervisors, shall bid for the real estate a sum equal to the 

total amount of all delinquent general taxes, special 

assessments, interest, penalties and costs charged against 

real estate. No money shall be paid by the county or other 

tax-levying and tax-certifying body for the purchase, but 

each of the tax-levying and tax-certifying bodies having any 

interest in the general and special taxes for which the real 

estate is sold shall be charged with the full amount of all the 

delinquent general and special taxes due the levying and taxcertifying bodies, as its just share of the purchase price. 

This section does not prohibit a governmental agency or 

political subdivision from bidding at the sale for property to 

protect its interests. 

Iowa Code § 446.19. Under this statute, the county became the default 

holder of the tax certificates to the three parcels owned by the Barretts 

because there were no bids. Id. The county is credited with purchasing 

the parcels for a sum equal to the total amount of the delinquent general 

and special taxes, interest, penalties and costs. Id. 

In 2004 the county wanted to get the parcels back on the tax roll 

and recoup the back taxes. The county was also afraid it would be 

responsible for abating any nuisances on the parcels while it held the tax 

certificates. At that time, the legislature had codified various options 

that allowed a county to divest itself of a tax certificate. 
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One option available was to assign the certificate to a person other 

than the person entitled to redeem the parcel. Iowa Code § 446.31 

(2003).2 Under the plain language of section 446.31 the county could 

have assigned “the certificate[s] for the total amount due as of the date of 

assignment or compromise the total amount due and assign the 

certificate.” Id. Once the county made a valid assignment, the assignee 

had to comply with the time limits established by the Code to avoid the 

cancellation of the sale. Id. 

 Another option given to the county was “to compromise by written 

agreement, or abate by resolution, the tax, interest, fees, or costs.” Iowa 

Code § 445.16. The plain language of section 445.16 allowed the county 

to compromise or abate if it “holds the tax sale certificate of purchase.” 

In the present case the county divested itself of the tax certificates 

by proper assignment under section 446.31. After making the 

assignment the county attempted to compromise the back taxes under 

section 445.16. Because the county was not the holder of the certificates 

at the time it compromised the back taxes, it did not have the authority 

under section 445.16 to do so. 

Robinson also argues section 447.4 does not apply to him because 

the $11,000 paid by the Barretts did not constitute a full redemption. 

Therefore, Robinson claims the district court should have granted his 

motion for summary judgment and awarded him more than the $500 he 

paid for each certificate, and more than a ratable portion of the penalty, 

interest, and costs allowed under section 447.4. 

To determine if a valid redemption took place, we must examine 

the redemption statutes. The law in effect at the time of the tax sale 

 2Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Iowa Code from this point 

forward are to the 2003 Code of Iowa. 
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applies to redemption. Iowa Code § 447.14. Therefore, we must look to 

the 1989 Iowa Code to determine if the Barretts redeemed the parcels 

when they paid the county $11,000. 

Section 447.1 governs redemption. The 1989 Code provided in 

relevant part: 

Real estate sold under this chapter and chapter 446 may be 

redeemed at any time before the right of redemption is cut 

off, by the payment to the treasurer, to be held by the 

treasurer subject to the order of the purchaser, of the 

amount for which the real estate was sold and four percent of 

the amount added as a penalty, with three-quarters percent 

interest per month on the sale price plus the penalty from the 

date of sale, and the amount of all taxes, interest, and costs 

paid by the purchaser or the purchaser’s assignee for any 

subsequent year, with a similar penalty added as before on 

the amount of the payment for each subsequent year, and 

three-quarters percent per month on the whole amount from 

the date of payment. 

Iowa Code § 447.1 (1989) (emphasis added). 

After the sale of a tax certificate, the purchaser of the certificate 

can pay the taxes due in the subsequent years. Id. § 446.32 (1989). The 

record does not indicate whom, if anyone, paid the taxes between the 

date of the tax sale and the date the county accepted the $11,000 from 

the Barretts. Robinson does not cite any authority stating the county 

should be credited with paying the taxes in the years after it became the 

default owner of the certificates. See Iowa Code § 446.19 (stating that a 

county becomes the default owner of a tax sale certificate if there are no 

bids, and the county is credited for paying the purchase price). 

Accordingly, this record does not indicate if the payment of $11,000 by 

the Barretts equaled the amount required to redeem the parcels under 

section 447.1 (1989). Therefore, we cannot say as a matter of law the 

Barretts redeemed the parcels within the terms of the statute. 
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V. Conclusion and Disposition. 

The county was not authorized to compromise the back taxes 

under section 445.16 because it divested itself of the tax certificates prior 

to the compromise. Moreover, under this record we cannot determine 

whether the $11,000 paid by the Barretts to the county redeemed the 

parcels under section 447.1 (1989). Accordingly, we must reverse the 

judgment of the district court dismissing Robinson’s petition and remand 

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.