ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

26 September 2007

Case F-129/06

**Rocío Salvador Roldán**

**v**

**Commission of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Officials – Remuneration – Expatriation allowance – Conditions laid down by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations – Habitual residence – Action manifestly devoid of any legal basis)

**Application:**brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mrs Salvador Roldán seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the appointing
authority of the Commission of 18 August 2006, dismissing her complaint brought on 15 May 2006 against the Commission’s decision
of 6 April 2006 not to pay her the expatriation allowance and, second, an order that the Commission pay her amounts corresponding
to that allowance, with effect from 1 April 2006, plus interest.

**Held:**The action is dismissed as manifestly unfounded. The parties are ordered to bear their own costs.

**Summary**

*Officials – Remuneration – Expatriation allowance – Conditions for granting*

*(Staff Regulations, Annex VII, Art. 4(1)(a)))*

The habitual residence to which Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations refers for the purpose of the grant
of the expatriation allowance corresponds to the place in which the official concerned has established, with the intention
that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual centre of his interests, it being understood that, for
the purposes of determining habitual residence, all the factual circumstances which constitute such residence and, in particular,
the actual residence of the official concerned must be taken into account.

The place where a person carries on their occupation, apart from its relevance as an independent criterion for the application
of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, is an important indicator for determining habitual residence.

The fact that an official might have the intention of looking for a job other than in his country of residence is not such
as to call into question the determination of his habitual residence, since it is not disputed that, throughout the reference
period, that official maintained the centre of his interests at the place of his subsequent employment, where he had his home
and where, for most of the period, he carried on his occupation. Accordingly, that requirement of an intention to confer stability
on the centre of his interests is not to be interpreted as meaning that the official concerned must have excluded the possibility
of returning to his country of origin or leaving for another Member State of the European Union.

An official’s other ties with his country of origin, such as ownership of a car, medical consultations, property owned by
his parents in that country, the fact of having renewed his official identity papers there, the exercise of his rights as
a citizen or the fact of having his tax domicile, financial interests and assets there, including a bank account, and the
visits which he makes to it are only those normal ties which people retain with the country in which their parents live and
where they have lived for a long time, but are insufficient to establish that they are habitually resident in that country.

(see paras 48, 51, 56, 59)

See:

T-18/91 *Costacurta Gelabert* v *Commission* [1992] ECR II‐1655, para. 42; T‐90/92 *Magdalena Fernández* v *Commission* [1993] ECR II‐971, para. 30; T‐18/98 *Reichert* v *Parliament* [2000] ECR‐SC I‐A‐73 and II‐309, para. 25; T‐60/00 *Liaskou* v *Council* [2001] ECR-SC I‐A‐107 and II‐489, paras 53 and 64; T‐283/03 *Recalde Langarica* v *Commission* [2005] ECR-SC I‐A‐235 and II‐1075, para. 114; T-83/03 *Salazar Brier* v *Commission* [2005] ECR-SC I‐A‐311 and II‐1407, paras 56 and 71, under appeal to the Court of Justice, C‐9/06 P; T-259/04 *Koistinen* v *Commission* [2006] ECR-SC I-A-2-177 and II-A-2-879, para. 34; T‐324/04 *F* v *Commission* [2007] ECR-SC I-A-2-0000 and II-A-2-0000, para. 87


ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

26 September 2007 ([\*](#Footnote*))

(Staff cases – Officials – Remuneration – Expatriation allowance – Conditions laid down by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations – Habitual residence – Action manifestly devoid of any legal basis)

In Case F‐129/06,

ACTION under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA,

**Rocío Salvador Roldán**, official of the Commission of the European Communities, residing in Brussels (Belgium), represented by F. Tuytschaever and
H. Burez, lawyers,

applicant,

v

**Commission of the European Communities**, represented by J. Currall and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber),

composed of H. Kreppel, President, H. Tagaras (Rapporteur) and S. Gervasoni, Judges,

Registrar: W. Hakenberg,

makes the following

**Order**

1        By application lodged at the Registry of the Civil Service Tribunal on 16 November 2006, Ms Salvador Roldán brought an action
seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the appointing authority of the Commission of the European Communities of 18 August 2006,
dismissing her complaint brought on 15 May 2006 against the Commission’s decision of 6 April 2006, not to pay her the expatriation
allowance and, second, an order that the Commission pay her amounts corresponding to that allowance, with effect from 1 April 2006,
plus interest.

**Legal context**

2        Article 69 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities (‘the Staff Regulations’) provides:

‘The expatriation allowance shall be equal to 16% of the total of the basic salary, household allowance and dependent child
allowance to which the official is entitled. The expatriation allowance shall be not less than EUR 445.88 per month.’

3        Article 4(1) of Annexe VII to the Staff Regulations provides:

‘1. An expatriation allowance shall be paid, equal to 16% of the total amount of the basic salary plus household allowance
and the dependent child allowance paid to the official:

(a)      to officials:

–        who are not and have never been nationals of the State in whose territory the place where they are employed is situated, and

–        who during the five years ending six months before they entered the service did not habitually reside or carry on their main
occupation within the European territory of that State. For the purposes of this provision, circumstances arising from work
done for another State or for an international organisation shall not be taken into account;

(b)      to officials who are or have been nationals of the State in whose territory the place where they are employed is situated
but who during the 10 years ending at the date of their entering the service habitually resided outside the European territory
of that State for reasons other than the performance of duties in the service of a State or of an international organisation.

The expatriation allowance shall not be less than EUR 445.88 per month.’

**Facts giving rise to the dispute**

4        The applicant was born in Spain and has been a Spanish national since birth.

5        Having studied law in Spain, the applicant attended a specialised European law programme at Bruges (Belgium) from September
1998 to June 1999, after which, from October 1999 to March 2000, she completed a traineeship at the Commission.

6        In April 2000, after that traineeship had come to an end, the applicant, who had been a member of the Madrid bar since 29 December 1998,
began providing services to the Brussels office of an international law firm (‘the Brussels law firm’). On 15 May 2002, she
set up a private limited company for lawyers (‘the SPRL’), the registered office of which was in Brussels, through which she
pursued her collaboration with the Brussels law firm.

7        According to documents drawn up by the Civil Registration Officer for the municipality of Ixelles, Brussels, from 9 December
1999, the applicant was registered consecutively as being resident in the Brussels municipalities of Saint‐Josse‐ten‐Noode,
Saint‐Gilles and Ixelles. Initially living in rented accommodation, the applicant purchased her own flat in Brussels in 2003.

8        On 1 April 2006, the applicant entered into service as a probationary official at the Commission.

9        On 6 April 2006, the Office for administration and payment of individual entitlements (PMO) adopted a decision not to pay
the applicant the expatriation allowance. On 15 May 2006, she brought a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations
against the PMO’s decision. In her complaint she indicated that, from 2000 to 2005, she had been living as much in Spain as
in Belgium and that, in the latter country, she was working not as an employee, but as a provider of services to a Brussels
law firm. According to the applicant, her lack of job stability or lasting ties with Belgium during a period in which she
incurred expenses in Spain proved that she had maintained her residence in that country and that, in those circumstances,
she was entitled to the expatriation allowance.

10      On 20 April 2006, the applicant requested the amendment of her place of origin, initially fixed as Brussels. The appointing
authority granted that request by decision of 3 July 2006 and fixed her place of origin as Astorga (Spain).

11      By decision of 18 August 2006, the appointing authority dismissed the complaint on the ground that the applicant was habitually
resident in Belgium during the reference period provided for by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations (‘the
reference period’), fixed in the present case from 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2005.

**Form of order sought**

12      The applicant claims that the Tribunal should:

–        annul the appointing authority’s decision of 18 August 2006 dismissing her complaint;

–        order the Commission to pay her the amounts corresponding to the expatriation allowance, with effect from 1 April 2006, plus
default interest at the rate of 7% from the date each amount became due until the date of actual payment;

–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

13      The Commission contends that the Tribunal should:

–        dismiss the application;

–        give a ruling as to costs in accordance with the relevant rules.

**The Tribunal’s decision to rule by way of reasoned order**

14      Under Article 111 the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, applicable mutatis mutandis
to the Civil Service Tribunal, by virtue of Article 3(4) of Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004 establishing
the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (OJ 2004 L 333, p. 7), until the entry into force of the Tribunal’s own rules of
procedure, where the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible
or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Tribunal may, by reasoned order, without taking further steps in the proceedings,
give a decision on the action.

15      The final situation covered by that provision includes all actions manifestly bound to fail for reasons connected with the
substance of the case. The dismissal of such an action by reasoned ordered pursuant to Article 111 the Rules of Procedure
of the Court of First Instance not only contributes to the economy of the procedure but also spares the parties the costs
involved in holding a hearing.

16      In the present case, the Tribunal considers itself to be sufficiently informed by the contents of the case‐file to give a
decision on the action, pursuant to Article 111 the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, without taking further
steps in the proceedings.

**The claim for annulment**

17      The applicant claims annulment of the appointing authority’s decision of 18 August 2006 by which it dismissed her complaint
against the decision not to pay her the expatriation allowance. In that respect, it is necessary to state at the outset that,
although the action is formally directed against the rejection of the complaint, it has the effect of bringing before the
Court the act adversely affecting the applicant against which the complaint was submitted (see, to that effect, Case 293/87
*Vainker* v *Parliament* [1989] ECR 23, paragraph 8, and Case F‐100/05 *Chatziioannidou* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐0000, paragraph 24). Consequently, the form of order sought by the applicant must be understood as also seeking
the annulment of the decision of 6 April 2006 refusing to grant her the expatriation allowance.

18      In support of her application, the applicant advances two pleas in law alleging, first, manifest errors of assessment when
examining the evidence she submitted regarding her place of habitual residence during the reference period and, second, breach
of the principle of non‐discrimination.

*The plea in law alleging manifest errors of assessment*

 Arguments of the applicant

19      The applicant states, first, that it is settled case‐law that the concept of habitual residence depends on the personal position
of the official, more specifically on his intention to establish lasting ties with a particular country, and that a person
can have two residences, one being his habitual residence and the other connected with his occupation.

20      The applicant goes on to structure her argument in two parts. She denies the existence of lasting ties with Belgium and she
submits that she maintained such ties with Spain.

–       Whether there are lasting ties with Belgium

21      The applicant denies the existence of lasting ties with Belgium, submitting, first, that the fact that, during the reference
period, she provided services to the Brussels law firm, as a result of which she frequently spent time in Belgium, did not
lead her to establish lasting ties with that country and, secondly, that Belgium cannot be considered to be her place of ‘habitual
residence’.

22      In support of the first part of her argument, the applicant puts forward three specific arguments.

23      The applicant submits, first, that the Commission’s assessment to the effect that her main occupation was in Belgium during
the reference period, is vitiated by an error of assessment, since the institution failed to take account of the fact that
an important part of that occupation related to Spain or to questions of Spanish law and that she also derived her professional
income from providing services in Spain on behalf of the Brussels law firm.

24      By her second argument, the applicant claims that the Commission failed properly to appreciate the nature of her employment
relationship with the Brussels law firm. That employment relationship was not a stable one, as the applicant had the status
of an independent lawyer and was consequently responsible for paying her own tax and national insurance contributions. The
applicant relies on case‐law according to which the lack of a stable employment relationship rebuts the presumption of an
intention to settle in a particular country and claims that she could not, in the conditions in which she provided services
to the Brussels law firm, have established lasting ties with Belgium. Moreover, there is no conflict between her argument
derived from the lack of a stable employment relationship and the fact that she took steps to end that employment relationship.
Indeed, it was owing to difficulties she experienced in ending that relationship before securing another source of income
that the applicant made efforts to build a professional reputation in Spain.

25      Finally, the applicant claims that the Commission failed to interpret correctly the reasons for the creation of the SPRL,
through which since 2002 she continued her collaboration with the Brussels law firm. She submits that her purpose in establishing
the SPRL was to improve her tax position. Incorporation cannot be taken as an indication that her employment relationship
with the Brussels law firm was stable or that she had the intention of establishing lasting ties with Belgium, particularly
in view of the ease with which such a company could be formed and wound up and the fact that the Brussels law firm was the
SPRL’s only source of revenue.

26      As regards the second part of her argument regarding whether lasting ties existed with Belgium, the applicant seeks to demonstrate
that she had no habitual residence in that country by submitting that the case‐law relied on by the Commission does not support
the conclusion that she had her residence in Belgium and that that institution failed to assess properly the evidence that
she put forward.

27      The applicant submits that the case‐law which the Commission relies on is not particularly relevant to her case, in which,
first, there are no ties with the country of recruitment other than the fact that she provided services to the Brussels law
firm and, second, there are lasting ties with Spain. Conversely, the officials concerned in the case‐law cited by the Commission
were in radically different situations from that of the applicant, having lived for long periods in the country of recruitment,
with which they had family ties. The applicant submits that, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, this case‐law establishes
that, for the purpose of determining the place of ‘habitual residence’, account must be taken of the official’s personal situation,
in particular, his intention to establish lasting ties with a place. Thus, the case‐law actually supports the applicant’s
claim, since her periods outside Spain, for the purpose of providing services to the Brussels law firm, were not accompanied
by an intention to move permanently the centre of her interests and that, consequently, her habitual residence could only
be Spain.

28      Furthermore, the Commission failed properly to assess the evidence submitted to the effect that Belgium was not the place
of her habitual residence.

29      The applicant insists, in particular, that the Commission wrongly treated her purchase of a flat as an indication that she
was resident in Brussels, whilst that purchase was only made so that she could deduct her accommodation costs for tax purposes.
The decision to purchase a flat came after the applicant discovered that she was unable to deduct the rent she was paying
because her landlord refused to register the tenancy agreement. The applicant claims that she did not purchase the flat with
the aim of maximising her investment, something which would have required a long stay in Belgium, but in the light of the
fact that, if her employment relationship with the Brussels law firm had ended, market conditions should have enabled her
to recover the cost of that investment. That is the reason why she did not seek to exploit the tax advantages which would
have been entailed either by the purchase of the bare title to the flat with a transfer of the usufruct to the SPRL, a solution
which would require the usufruct to be of a minimum duration of 15 years, or by the purchase of the flat on behalf of the
SPRL, which would subsequently rent it back to her, a solution which would entail the risk of substantial costs, were she
to break her employment relationship with the Brussels law firm, with the flat being transferred to her and treated as one
of her personal assets until a purchaser was found.

30      The applicant also puts forward other evidence relied on at the stage of the complaint – namely the conditions under which
she collaborated with the Brussels law firm, the fact of not transferring to the SPRL the goodwill she had built up as an
independent lawyer, the lack of group insurance or of a car in Belgium – to show that she had no intention of establishing
lasting ties with Belgium.

–       Whether there are lasting ties with Spain

31      In order to prove the existence of lasting ties with Spain, the applicant submits, first, that, in its response to the earlier
complaint, the Commission did not take into consideration the evidence showing that those ties existed, secondly, that the
Commission misquoted her in that respect and, thirdly, that the Commission made untrue allegations.

32      According to the applicant, first, the Commission did not take into account evidence showing that she retained lasting ties
with Spain, as shown by her national identity card, her passport and her driving licence, all of which indicated the town
of Astorga as her place of residence. The Commission also failed to take account of evidence indicating that the applicant
retained a family doctor in Spain, as well as a bank account, an active correspondence address, a car and a mobile phone.

33      Second, the Commission misinterpreted the applicant’s reliance on the existence in Spain of a family property. The applicant
maintains that she relied on this circumstance for the sole purpose of proving her family ties with Spain. The Commission,
moreover, wrongly attributed to the applicant the admission that she had her residence in Brussels during the reference period,
when actually she referred to long stays in that city, whilst proving that her residence remained in Spain.

34      Third, the applicant claims that the Commission made untrue and speculative allegations about her, questioning the efforts
which she had made to find a job in Spain, despite the evidence she submitted that her job search was genuine. Moreover, according
to the applicant, the Commission wrongly interpreted her participation in the selection procedure for a position with a Community
agency in London as proof of the insufficiency of her ties with Spain. That application, on the contrary, confirmed that she
did not intend to remain in Belgium and establish lasting ties there. In addition, the Commission wrongly ascribed importance
to the fact that the applicant did not have a property in Spain, whether as proprietor or as tenant. Such a circumstance has
little relevance for finding whether the applicant maintained lasting ties with Spain. The applicant submits, in particular,
that the fact of having used a flat placed free at her disposal by her parents does not preclude her residence in Spain being
taken into account.

 Arguments of the Commission

35      The Commission contends, first, that the evidence which the applicant adduces for the purpose of showing that she maintained
lasting ties with Spain merely discloses the ordinary ties which everyone retains with his country of origin and are insufficient
to demonstrate that the applicant’s habitual residence was Spain.

36      The Commission emphasises the fact that the applicant admits that she was resident and worked in Brussels during the reference
period, even though she considers that that residence cannot be considered to be habitual in the absence of an intention to
make Brussels the permanent centre of her interests. The Commission contends in that respect that Community case‐law has laid
down simple and objective criteria for determining an official’s habitual residence, specifically in order to avoid the administration
having to investigate the official’s personal motivation and that, in the present case, the simple hope of settling down in
Spain or elsewhere is insufficient to call into question the fact that the applicant was habitually resident in Belgium. The
Commission adds that the applicant failed to have regard to the fact that the grounds for exclusion laid down in Article 4(1)(a)
of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations do not relate only to the habitual residence of the person concerned during the reference
period, but also to the place where he carries on his main occupation during that period.

37      For the purpose of establishing whether it had correctly assessed the applicant’s situation as regards her habitual residence,
the Commission began by reviewing her employment relationship with the Brussels law firm, went on to assess her actual residence,
and ended by considering the arguments regarding lasting ties with Spain.

38      The Commission contends, first, that the employment relationship which the applicant maintained during the reference period
with the Brussels law firm was of a permanent nature, in view of the prospect that in time it would lead to her being made
a partner of that firm. It contends that the applicant’s main area of work was not Spanish law, her continued membership of
the Madrid bar merely enabling her occasionally to appear in court in Spain on behalf of the Brussels law firm, and that in
any event the applicant had failed to show that she had made use of her membership of the Madrid bar in that respect. Her
self‐employed status in no way altered the fact that, until her recruitment by the Commission, her only source of work and
the only income of the SPRL which she set up was the Brussels law firm, her work for other clients being marginal and occasional.
Her main occupation was in Brussels, a finding which was substantiated by the incorporation of the SPRL, which had its registered
office there.

39      Concerning the applicant’s actual residence, the Commission infers from the documents entitled ‘Certificat de residence’ (Certificate
of residence) and ‘Historique des adresses’ (List of past addresses), annexed to the complaint and the application, that,
at least since 9 December 1999, she has continuously lived in Brussels. The rental and subsequent purchase of a flat in that
city were signs of her need to live in proximity to her place of work. The reference to reasons of a tax nature confirms that
her occupation was in Belgium and that she was subject to Belgian tax. Conversely, the absence of Spanish tax considerations
provides an indication that she lacked occupational and other ties with Spain.

40      The Commission contends that the applicant gave her Brussels addresses in her application for the competition which led to
her recruitment as a Community official and that she would not have been able to give the Commission a ‘Certificat de bonne
conduite, vie et mœurs’ (Certificate of good character), issued by the municipality of Ixelles, unless she was resident there.

41      The Commission contends, moreover, that the case‐law on the distinction between habitual residence and occupational residence
would only support the applicant’s position if she were to prove the existence of such a double residence. The applicant has,
however, neither claimed nor proved that to be the case. The Commission states that, in the declaration which she made on
entering the service, the applicant gave Brussels as one of the places in which she had been habitually resident during the
10 years immediately preceding her entry into service.

42      Concerning the existence of lasting ties with Spain, the Commission contends that, in accordance with the Community case‐law,
neither (i) the reference in official documents to an address, (ii) the fact of having consulted a doctor, possibly whilst
on holiday, (iii) the existence of a bank account, (iv) the intention of looking for work in Spain or elsewhere nor (v) the
fixing by the Commission of her place of origin are relevant for the purpose of determining the applicant’s centre of interests.

 Findings of the Court

43      The conditions for granting the expatriation allowance are laid down by Article 4(1) of Annexe VII to the Staff Regulations,
which envisages two situations:

–        that of officials who ‘are not and have never been nationals of the State in whose territory the place where they are employed
is situated’;

–        that of officials who ‘are or have been’ such nationals.

44      In the present case, the applicant, who entered into service at the Commission in Brussels, has had Spanish nationality from
birth, and has never acquired Belgian nationality. Consequently, she comes within the first situation above, provided for
by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.

45      Under that provision, recognition of the right to the expatriation allowance is subject to a double negative condition that,
during the five years ending six months before he entered the service, the official concerned did not habitually reside or
carry on his main occupation within the territory of that State. It is enough for that negative condition to be met in respect
of the first or the second part in order for the official to be denied entitlement to the expatriation allowance (see, to
that effect, Case T‐324/04 *F* v *Commission* [2007] ECR II‐0000, paragraph 54).

46      As the applicant entered the service on 1 April 2006, the reference period extends, subject to the applicant’s plea of illegality
raised against the provision on services provided to a State or to an international organisation (see paragraphs 63 to 74
of the present order), during the period from 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2005.

47      Since the decision of 6 April 2006 refusing the applicant’s entitlement to the expatriation allowance failed to state reasons
for that refusal, the applicant chose to challenge it on the issue of ‘habitual residence’, namely on the first part of the
double negative condition laid down by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations. In the complaint and the present
application, the plea in law alleging errors of assessment in the application of the provision is based solely on issues relating
to the applicant’s habitual residence. Likewise, the decision dismissing the complaint and the Commission’s defence confine
themselves to the issue of the applicant’s habitual residence, merely replying to the arguments set out by her on that subject.
In those circumstances, the Tribunal will also confine itself to that issue, which is the only one in respect of which the
parties are in dispute. It will examine in particular whether, during the reference period, the applicant can be considered
to have had her habitual residence in Belgium.

48      It is settled case‐law that the concept of habitual residence corresponds to the place in which the official concerned has
established, with the intention that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual centre of his interests,
it being understood that, for the purposes of determining habitual residence, all the factual circumstances which constitute
such residence and, in particular, the actual residence of the official concerned must be taken into account. (see, concerning
the expatriation allowance, Case T‐60/00 *Liaskou* v *Council* [2001] ECR‐SC I‐A‐107 and II‐489, paragraph 53; Case T‐283/03 *Recalde Langarica* v *Commission* [2005] ECR‐SC I‐A‐235 and II‐1075, paragraph 114; and Case T‐83/03 *Salazar Brier* v *Commission* [2005] ECR‐SC I‐A‐311 and II‐1407, paragraph 56, and on appeal as Case C‐9/06 P; and Case T‐259/04 *Koistinen* v *Commission* [2006] ECR‐SC I‐A‐0000 and II‐0000, paragraph 34; see, concerning the installation allowance Case T‐37/99 *Miranda* v *Commission* [2001] ECR‐SC I‐A‐87 and II‐413, paragraphs 31 and 32; see, also, concerning the application of weighting to pensions, Joined
Cases T‐124/01 and T‐320/01 *Del Vaglio* v *Commission* [2003]ECR‐SC I‐A‐157 and II‐767, paragraph 71).

49      It must be held that the applicant’s actual residence was Brussels for the whole of the reference period.

50      It is apparent from the documents on the case‐file that, throughout the reference period, the applicant lived in Brussels,
initially occupying a rented flat, and subsequently a flat which she bought. The applicant is not claiming in that respect
that her use of those flats was only occasional. Conversely, the applicant is unable to show any property, occupied by her
as tenant or owner, in Spain, merely asserting that, on her stays in that country, she used a flat placed at her disposal
free of charge by her parents, without, however, adducing evidence, by means, for example, of domestic utility bills, of her
actual use thereof.

51      Similarly, it is apparent from the documents on the case‐file that the applicant’s occupation was in Brussels. The place where
a person carries on their occupation, apart from its relevance as an independent criterion for the application of Article 4(1)(a)
of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations (a criterion which, for the reasons set out at paragraph 47 of the present order, will
not, however, be taken into account in the present case), is an important indicator for determining habitual residence. Accordingly,
the fact that the applicant had worked in a stable manner for the Brussels law firm throughout the reference period, initially
on a private basis and subsequently through an SPRL which she had set up under Belgian law for that purpose, is not in dispute.
Nor is it in dispute that the applicant paid her national insurance contributions and taxes on earnings and fees to the Belgian
State – a clear indication of the close territorial link that existed between the services she provided and Belgium.

52      That link with Belgium is supported by the certificate of residence which the applicant produced herself and which is precisely
the type of document which may validly be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining habitual residence, since
registration as a resident demonstrates the intention of the official concerned to fix the permanent or habitual centre of
his residence and of his interests in that place (see Case T‐368/03 *De Bustamante Tello* v *Council* [2005] ECR‐SC I‐A‐321 and II‐1439, paragraph 60, and on appeal as Case C‐10/06 P), all the more so since it concerns residence
in a country other than the country of origin of the official concerned. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant used an
address in Brussels for correspondence purposes in connection with an open competition for recruitment organised by the Community
institutions is an indication of habitual residence in that city (*Recalde Langarica* v *Commission*, paragraph 127).

53      It is true that case‐law has, in certain cases, recognised that persons actually working in the country of their future employment
as Community officials retain their residence in their country of origin. This, however, concerns people who had a stable
employment relationship in the latter country, usually as civil servants, and were temporarily posted to Brussels, most frequently
as national experts on secondment, whilst at the same time retaining their home in their country of origin (see, to that effect,
Case T‐137/95 *Mozzaglia* v *Commission* [1996] ECR‐SC I‐A‐619 and II‐1657; see, also, under the system instituted by the provisions of the Staff Regulations applicable
from 1 May 2004, Case F‐126/05 *Borbély* v *Commission* [2007] ECR‐SC I‐A‐0000 and II‐0000), a situation which differs clearly from that of the applicant. In addition, those cases
mainly concern installation and daily subsistence allowances, although the payment of the expatriation allowance was, until
the reform of the Staff Regulations in 2004, a necessary precondition for payment of the installation allowance.

54      In those circumstances, it cannot reasonably be denied that the applicant’s habitual residence during the reference period
was in her country of employment, Belgium, specifically, in Brussels.

55      The converse arguments, which the applicant relies on, are in no way such as to call that finding into question.

56      This is particularly the case for the contentions concerning the lack of intention on the part of the applicant to establish
herself definitively in Brussels and the instability of her employment relationship with the Brussels law firm. Indeed, the
case‐law on habitual residence, cited at paragraph 48 of the present order, also requires an element of stability, inasmuch
as the interested party must evince the intention of conferring a lasting character on the centre of his interests, such as
to fix his habitual residence; that same case‐law moreover states, on occasion (see *Miranda* v *Commission*, paragraphs 32 and 33, and *Del Vaglio* v *Commission*, paragraph 71), that the concept of residence implies, irrespective of the purely quantitative element of the time spent
by the person in a particular country, not only the actual fact of living in a given place, but also the intention of thereby
achieving the continuity which stems from a stable way of life and from the course of normal social relations. However, the
Court of First Instance has expressly held that the circumstance that an official might have the intention of looking for
a job other than in his country of residence is not such as to call into question the determination of his habitual residence,
since it is not disputed that, throughout the reference period, that official maintained the centre of his interests at the
place of his subsequent employment, where he had his home and where, for most of the period, he carried on his occupation
(see Case T‐90/92 *Magdalena Fernández* v *Commission* [1993] ECR II‐971, paragraph 30). Accordingly, and in the light of the case‐law on the simple and objective criteria which
must be applied to implement the system of Article 4(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations (Case T‐18/91 *Costacurta Gelabert* v *Commission* [1992] ECR II‐1655, paragraph 42, and Case T‐18/98 *Reichert* v *Parliament* [2000] ECR‐SC I‐A‐73 and II‐309, paragraph 25), as well as the increased level of mobility in the European Union in the last
few years, that requirement of an intention to confer stability on the centre of his interests is not to be interpreted as
meaning that the official concerned must have excluded the possibility of returning to his country of origin or leaving for
another Member State of the European Union. That requirement cannot have any other significance than to exclude from the negative
condition in Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII merely short‐term or temporary stays.

57      The applicant’s stay in Brussels was certainly not of such a nature, since she lived there continuously throughout the reference
period, having, moreover, acquired a flat there, and carried on her occupation in that city, having even taken the steps necessary
to benefit fully from the tax advantages afforded by the Belgian legislation. The incorporation of the SPRL and the purchase
of real estate for tax purposes are clear indicators that far from considering her occupation in Brussels to be short‐term
or temporary, she saw it as a lasting one. It is immaterial in that respect that the Belgian legislation offered, as the applicant
submits, other means by which she could have reduced her tax bill to a greater extent (see paragraph 29 of the present order),
but which, to be profitable, would have required her to work for longer periods in Belgium, especially as no tangible evidence
exists that it was for that reason that the applicant did not avail herself of those means. Furthermore, her reluctance to
use those means of reducing her tax bill to a greater extent may well be explained not by the prospect of her leaving Belgium,
but by that of her leaving her work as a lawyer for another career in the same country.

58      In addition, as regards the trips to Spain connected with her work, which the applicant relies on, it is necessary to point
out that, according to the case‐law, occasional and short absences cannot be considered sufficient for the applicant’s residence
in the Member State of employment to stop being habitual within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations
(see *Salazar Brier* v *Commission*, paragraph 65). Moreover, the applicant has not succeeded in providing evidence of her systematic absence from Brussels,
or her periods of work in Spain.

59      As for the other ties with the country of origin, relied on by the applicant, such as, for example, ownership of a car, medical
consultations, her parents’ real estate in that country, the fact of having renewed her official identity papers there, the
exercise of her rights as a citizen or the fact of having her tax domicile, financial interests and assets there, including
a bank account, it is necessary to point out that, according to Community case‐law, such ties which an official has with his
country of birth and the visits which he makes to it are only those normal ties which people retain with the country in which
their parents live and where they have lived for a long time, but which, on the other hand, are insufficient to establish
that they are habitually resident in that country (see, to that effect, *Liaskou* v *Council*, paragraph 64; *Salazar Brier* v *Commission*, paragraph 71, and *F* v *Commission*, paragraph 87).

60      Moreover, and contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the fact that the Commission determines her place of origin to be Spain
cannot have any relevance to the solution of this dispute, as the determination of an official’s place of origin and the grant
of an expatriation allowance meet different needs and interests (see *Magdalena Fernández* v *Commission*, paragraph 30 and the case‐law cited, and *F* v *Commission*, paragraph 53).

61      It follows that, taken as a whole, the various items of evidence and information disclosed by the parties’ pleadings support
the Commission’s proposition that the applicant was habitually resident in Brussels throughout the reference period.

62      The first plea in law is therefore manifestly unfounded.

*The plea in law alleging breach of the principle of non‐discrimination*

 Arguments of the applicant

63      In support of this plea in law, the applicant outlines one argument alleging that the criteria set out in the second indent
of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations are discriminatory in nature and another alleging that the Commission
applied those criteria in a discriminatory fashion.

64      As a preliminary point, the applicant submits that the principle of non‐discrimination takes precedence over all other considerations
concerning the interpretation and application of the rules of the Staff Regulations, such as the principle relied on by the
Commission, pursuant to which the provisions on financial advantages are to be given a strict interpretation.

–       Whether the criteria in the second indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations are discriminatory

65      The applicant submits, first, that the situation of officials who have worked, prior to their recruitment, for a State or
an international organisation in their subsequent country of employment does not differ materially from her own situation
in terms of the possibility of forming lasting ties with that country, and that therefore she finds herself in a situation
comparable to that of those other officials.

66      Second, the applicant points out the difference in treatment provided for by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.

67      Third, the applicant disputes the Commission’s justification for that different treatment, namely that the criteria are objective
and apply in like manner to all persons coming under the abovementioned provision. According to the applicant, that reasoning
makes nonsense of the principle of non‐discrimination and fails to ensure equal treatment within a group of officials. She
submits that the derogation adopted at the time of the foundation of the European Communities in favour of persons working
for a State or an international organisation can be explained by the fact that those persons then comprised the vast majority
of individuals required to change their residence for work reasons. The derogation raises a presumption that such persons
were incapable of forming lasting ties with the receiving country because they had stayed there for a limited period and for
work reasons. Today, however, with free movement of workers a commonplace within the European Union, owing to the influence
of the Treaty, the distinction upon which the derogation is based, and accordingly the derogation itself, is no longer justified.

–       Whether the Commission’s application of the criteria in the second indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations
is discriminatory

68      As to the allegation that the Commission applied the criteria laid down by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations
in a discriminatory way, the applicant maintains that, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, it enjoys a wide discretion
in relation to the definition of the concept of ‘habitual residence’, which it failed to use in her case.

 Arguments of the Commission

69      The Commission interprets that plea in law as a plea of illegality against the derogating provision in the final sentence
of the second indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, on ‘work done for another State or for an international
organisation’. It contends that, since the applicant has not established that her occupation was covered by the derogation,
the lawfulness of that provision cannot be called into question in the present case and that, even if the derogation were
to be unlawful, such a finding of illegality could not have any effect on the lawfulness of the decision refusing to grant
her the expatriation allowance.

70      In any event, the derogation in question is objectively justified, since the temporary nature of the employment of the persons
covered by the derogation in the country of their future Community employment prevents them from establishing lasting ties.

 Findings of the Court

71      As the Court of First Instance stated in its judgment in Case T‐251/02 *E* v *Commission* [2004] ECR‐SC I‐A‐359 and II‐1643, ‘*E*’, paragraphs 121 to 127), a plea in law such as that raised here constitutes a plea of illegality against Article 4(1)(a)
of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, which is admissible, but unfounded.

72      The plea of illegality is admissible, because it is directed against a provision of general scope affecting the applicant
but whose annulment she is not able to seek under Article 230 EC (*E*, paragraph 122; see, also, Joined Cases T‐94/01, T‐152/01 and T‐286/01 *Hirsch and Others* v *ECB* [2003] ECR‐SC I‐A‐1 and II‐27, paragraph 50 and the case‐law cited).

73      That plea of illegality is, however, unfounded. Although the provisions concerned differentiate between officials, reserving
more favourable treatment to those whose previous work in the country of employment was done for the benefit of a State or
of an international organisation, that provision falls within the discretion left to the legislature for the purpose of determining
categories of persons eligible to benefit from an allowance provided for by the Staff Regulations, and the differentiation
which that provision lays down is neither arbitrary nor manifestly inappropriate in relation to the purpose of the expatriation
allowance (see *E*, paragraphs 124 and 126), which is to compensate for the extra expense and inconvenience of taking up permanent employment
in a country with which the official has established no lasting ties before his entry into service (Case T‐28/98 *J* v *Commission* [1999] ECR‐SC I‐A‐185 and II‐973, paragraph 32). As stated at paragraph 126 of *E*, the derogation provided by Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations in favour of an official who, during the
reference period, lived in the country of employment whilst he was employed by another State or an international organisation
finds its justification, necessarily, in the fact that, in such circumstances, that official cannot be considered to have
established lasting ties with the country of employment. It is true that the application of the categories of Article 4 of
Annex VII to the Staff Regulations may give rise to borderline situations in which the officials have payment of the expatriation
allowance denied them even though they are in situations which are quite close to those which fall within that article, but,
as is also stated at the same paragraph 126 of *E*, that circumstance does not justify the conclusion that the article contains an arbitrary differentiation, since the legislature
is fully entitled to limit the presumption of the absence of lasting ties solely to situations arising from work done for
another State or for an international organisation.

74      It follows that the second plea in law must also be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

**The claim for an order that the Commission pay the amounts corresponding to the expatriation allowance, plus default interest**

75      Inasmuch as the action for annulment cannot be upheld, this claim must also be dismissed.

76      It follows from all of the foregoing that the entire action must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.

**Costs**

77      As the Tribunal held in Case F‐16/05 *Falcione* v *Commission* [2006] ECR II‐0000, paragraphs 77 to 86, as long as the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, in particular the specific provisions
concerning costs, have not come into force, in the interest of the sound administration of justice and in order to ensure
that individuals are able to a sufficient extent to predict the costs of proceedings, only the Rules of Procedure of the Court
of First Instance can be applied.

78      Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay
the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Likewise, under Article 88 of those rules, in
proceedings between the Communities and their servants the institutions are to bear their own costs.

79      Since the Commission has applied for costs against the applicant and the latter has been unsuccessful in the present case,
each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber)

hereby orders:

1.      **The action is dismissed as manifestly unfounded.**

2.      **The parties are ordered to bear their own costs.**

Luxembourg, 26 September 2007.

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| W. Hakenberg | | H. Kreppel |

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| Registrar | | President |

The text of the present decision and the decisions of the Community judicature cited therein and not yet published in the
ECR are available on the website of the Court of Justice: www.curia.europa.eu

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[\*](#Footref*) Language of the case: English.