Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 

and Agee,1 JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 

WEST CREEK ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 071411 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 September 12, 2008 

COUNTY OF GOOCHLAND 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY 

Timothy K. Sanner, Judge 

This appeal involves numerous applications for relief 

from the allegedly erroneous assessment of real property 

taxes. The primary issue concerns whether a taxpayer must 

prove manifest error in the “manner” in which a taxing 

authority arrived at the assessed value of real property or 

whether a taxpayer can prevail by proving a sufficient 

disparity between the assessed value of real property and 

its fair market value. Because we conclude the circuit 

court erred by holding that, in order to show manifest 

error, a taxpayer must prove what information the taxing 

authority considered and how it arrived at the assessment 

in question, we will reverse that portion of the circuit 

court’s judgment sustaining a motion to strike the evidence 

with regard to certain parcels. We will, however, affirm 

the portion of the circuit court’s judgment holding that 

 1

 Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision 

of this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 

30, 2008. 
the taxpayers failed to present credible evidence of fair 

market value with regard to certain other parcels. 

MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

In June 2000, 144 separate limited liability companies 

with various names (collectively, West Creek) purchased 

from Bank of America, N.A., as Trustee of the WC Land 

Trust, approximately 2,500 acres of real estate located in 

the West Creek Business Park (the Park) in Goochland County 

(the County).2 Each limited liability company was conveyed 

only a small portion of the acreage, but the total purchase 

price for the 144 separate parcels comprising the 2,500 

acres was approximately 34.1 million dollars. For the 

purpose of preparing the deeds, a map of the 2,500 acres 

was drawn to create 144 separate parcels for recordation 

purposes. The map, which the parties referred to as the 

“Timmons Sketch,” did not contain a metes and bounds 

description for any of the 144 parcels, but the Timmons 

Sketch was recorded in the land records of the County along 

with the 144 deeds.3

 2

 Ninety percent of each of the 144 limited liability 

companies is owned by another limited liability company, 

with the remaining ten percent owned by Beverly W. 

Armstrong. 

3

 The purpose of creating 144 parcels out of the 2,500 

acres and deeding each parcel to a different limited 

liability company was to obtain long-term capital gains tax 

treatment should the parcels be subsequently sold. 

2
The Timmons Sketch contained the following notation: 

The parcels described on this sketch do not 

constitute a subdivision under the provisions of 

Article IV, Section 1 of the Code of Ordinances, 

Goochland County, Virginia (“Goochland County”), 

and a recording of this sketch and the reference 

to parcels depicted thereon in any deed of 

conveyance shall not be deemed to imply any 

approval by Goochland County for a division of 

property pursuant to the subdivision ordinance of 

Goochland County, nor shall the depiction of any 

parcel thereon as a road or right-of-way or the 

recording of this sketch constitute a dedication 

of such parcel to Goochland County, the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, or political 

subdivision thereof. 

Prior to the 2000 sale, the County had assessed the 

2,500 acres as 20 separate parcels having a total assessed 

value of 54.8 million dollars. In 2001, the County 

conducted its quadrennial reassessment of real property 

pursuant to Code § 58.1-3252. In that reassessment, the 

County assessed the 2,500 acres as 144 separate parcels, 

reflecting the 144 recorded deeds conveying various 

acreages to the 144 limited liability companies. The total 

2001 assessed value of the 144 parcels was 105.4 million 

dollars. The County assessed a few of the parcels at a 

value of approximately $1,000 per acre, 40 parcels at a 

value of approximately $35,000 per acre, and the majority 

of the 144 parcels at a value of approximately $75,000 per 

acre. 

3
On December 28, 2004, each limited liability company 

filed an application for relief from an erroneous 

assessment of real property taxes for the years 2001, 2002, 

2003, and 2004.4 In each application for relief, the 

respective limited liability company asserted that, 

“[a]lthough there were no changes to the infrastructure and 

no improvements to the Park between 2000 and 2001, the 

County ignored the fact that the Park had not been 

subdivided and subsequently assessed the Park . . . as if 

it had been subdivided into 144 parcels.” Such assessment 

was allegedly in error and resulted in an assessed value 

that “substantially exceeded the fair market value of the 

Property and was invalid.” The limited liability companies 

further alleged that the County’s assessments were not 

uniform in their applications and that the County 

disregarded controlling evidence in making the assessments. 

After the circuit court granted West Creek’s motion to 

consolidate the 130 applications into a single action, the 

case proceeded to a bench trial. During its case-in-chief, 

West Creek called numerous witnesses, including William H. 

 4

 Although 144 applications for relief were filed, the 

circuit court dismissed 14 of the applications. The record 

in this appeal does not disclose the basis for that 

dismissal. The issues before this Court relate only to the 

remaining 130 applications. 

4
Goodwin, Jr., who was Armstrong’s business associate and 

participated in the decision to purchase the 2,500 acres 

and to deed the property to 144 limited liability 

companies; Steven I. Wampler, the reassessment contractor 

hired by the County to appraise all real property in the 

County for purposes of the quadrennial reassessment; 

members of the County’s board of assessors (BOA) and board 

of equalization (BOE);5 and its own real estate appraiser, 

Michael G. Miller. 

Goodwin testified that, for purposes of determining 

how much to offer Bank of America for the 2,500 acres, the 

Park was divided into three or four phases or quadrants 

that represented the presence of infrastructure, or lack 

thereof, and charts were prepared that contained estimates 

of the costs of developing the water, sewer, and roads in 

the quadrants that still needed such infrastructure. Using 

three methods to estimate the value of the 2,500 acres, 

Goodwin concluded that the property was worth approximately 

33 to 34 million dollars. To form his opinion as to the 

value of the 144 parcels assessed by the County, Goodwin 

 5

 During the quadrennial reassessment, the function of 

the BOA was to assess the real property in the County at 

fair market value. The role of the BOE was to resolve 

appeals by taxpayers challenging the assessed value of real 

property set by the BOA and to equalize assessments when 

needed.

5
assigned a portion of the purchase price to each phase or 

quadrant, divided that number by the acres in the quadrant, 

and thereby arrived at the per acre value. 

Wampler testified that he used a mass appraisal method 

to assess real property in the County because that method 

provided a systematic approach to valuing parcels in large 

quantities by using characteristics of similar parcels. 

With regard to the West Creek parcels, Wampler received 144 

separate tax cards from the commissioner of revenue, with 

each card containing the acreage for that parcel. Wampler 

assessed the West Creek parcels at $75,000 per acre, except 

for parcels labeled on the Timmons Sketch as “floodplain,” 

“waste,” “lakes,” or “roads,” which he valued at $1,000 per 

acre. The total assessed value of the 144 parcels, 

according to Wampler, was $128,664,800. 

Wampler acknowledged that, although he was appraising 

each individual parcel, he spread the $75,000 per acre 

value “across every bit of dirt out there except waste and 

roads.” Wampler, however, did not believe that every 

parcel was worth $75,000 an acre. He agreed that the 

parcels in phase one of the Park’s development were worth 

more than $75,000 per acre and those parcels in phases two 

and three were worth less than $75,000 per acre. Wampler 

admitted that he did not consider the cost of 

6
infrastructure in his appraisal because County officials 

told him that the infrastructure “was coming.” At the time 

of his appraisal, he also knew that the water and sewer 

allocations then available would only support the 

development of an additional 110 acres of the Park. 

In making his appraisal, Wampler used comparable sales 

of parcels in the Park, which ranged from $63,000 to 

$120,000 per acre. Wampler stated that he “threw out the 

highest and the lowest [sales] . . . and came up with 

[$]75,000.” Most of the comparable sales were in the range 

of $100,000 per acre, but Wampler discounted the 144 

parcels to $75,000 per acre in part because they lacked 

improvements for water and sewer. Wampler also testified 

that he valued the 144 parcels at $75,000 per acre before 

he learned about a contract to sell 27 of the 144 parcels 

for approximately $77,500 per acre to an entity known as 

“Capital One.” 

Wampler provided his appraisal and all the information 

he had collected to the BOA. The BOA adopted only part of 

Wampler’s appraisal of the 144 parcels. It reduced the 

assessed value of parcels in phase two of the Park to 

$35,000 per acre. Wampler was not present at all of the 

BOA meetings and did not know what information the BOA 

possessed in addition to that which he had provided. 

7
Three individuals who served as members of the BOA 

during the quadrennial reassessment testified at trial. 

They indicated that the BOA reviewed Wampler’s appraisal, 

but none of the board members who testified could remember 

why the BOA reduced the assessed value of certain parcels 

from $75,000 to $35,000 per acre. One member explained 

that the BOA members rode through the West Creek property, 

discussed the land, and performed their job with the 

information they had. 

Members of the BOE also testified at trial. The BOE 

did not agree with the BOA’s assessment of the parcels 

designated as “roads.” Thus, the BOE increased the 

assessed value of the road parcels from $1,000 per acre to 

either $35,000 or $75,000 per acre, thereby increasing the 

total assessment by $594,000. The BOE also changed the 

description of those parcels from “road” to 

“commercial/industrial.” Like the BOA, the BOE members who 

testified could not recall how the BOE arrived at its 

equalization numbers. 

Miller, who qualified as an expert in the field of 

real estate appraisal, valued the 144 parcels at 34.1 

million dollars, which was the purchase price paid for the 

2,500 acres. Miller opined that the parcels should be 

appraised as a whole, rather than individually, for several 

8
reasons: (1) there were no metes and bounds descriptions 

for the parcels; (2) the Timmons Sketch was not an approved 

subdivision of the property; and (3) over two-thirds of the 

acreage was, according to Miller, “raw land, [with] no 

infrastructure to it.” Miller considered the 34.1 million 

dollar sale price of the 2,500 acres as “a controlling 

factor” and used that sale as his comparable sale. He then 

divided the total acreage into quadrants and assigned a per 

acre value to each quadrant based on the availability of 

infrastructure in the particular area of the Park. 

In making his appraisal, Miller stated the price per 

acre in relation to the average per acre sale price for the 

2,500 acres, which was $13,552. For example, he valued the 

best quadrant at about 5.5 times the average per acre sale 

price, another quadrant with existing infrastructure at 3.5 

times the average sale price, the quadrant close to 

existing infrastructure at twice the average sale price, 

the quadrant that would be in the third phase of 

development at 1.3 times the average sale price, and the 

quadrant with limited access and no infrastructure at about 

half of the average sale price. Thus, Miller appraised the 

most valuable quadrant at $75,000 an acre and the quadrant 

with no infrastructure at $7,500 per acre. Finally, Miller 

9
valued the areas of wetlands or waste at a little over ten 

percent of the average per acre sale price, i.e., $1,614. 

Except for the wetlands and waste areas, Miller 

admitted that he agreed with and adopted the values that 

Goodwin had placed on the 2,500 acres for purposes of 

negotiating with Bank of America. In Miller’s words, “I 

also agreed with . . . the way that [Goodwin] came up with 

[the values]. And I concluded that that was logical and 

reasonable, and that’s what I’ve come up with.” In fact, 

he acknowledged that he simply did a mathematical 

calculation in order to arrive at a per acre value for the 

wetland and waste areas: 

Q Okay. And when you say you do the math, what 

you’re saying is when you got to the bottom line 

on the fourth page of this chart and you see the 

values listed, 2001 fair market value, that 

bottom line, that bottom number, the total is 

$33,096,832.79. What you’re saying is you change 

the values of the waste parcels so that it would 

add up to $31.9 million? 

A What I did – that wasn’t the only thing. I 

looked at the waste and I divided it out, the 

million dollars difference, and then in my mind I 

reconciled it. 

Miller criticized Wampler’s assessment because, in 

Miller’s opinion, Wampler treated the parcels as if they 

all were “retail pad sites, where a site is ready to be 

built upon, it’s approved, you have roads to it, you have 

infrastructure, you have everything that you need in order 

10
to go and build a building on it.” Miller also questioned 

the validity of the comparable sales Wampler used in his 

appraisal because those parcels already had access to 

water, sewer, and roads. Unlike Wampler, Miller believed 

that the lines on the Timmons Sketch creating the 144 

parcels did not increase the value of the parcels because 

they would not be developed and/or sold in accordance with 

those lines. 

After Miller testified, West Creek rested its case, 

and the County moved to strike the evidence. The County 

contended that West Creek had failed to establish a 

sufficient record from which the circuit court could 

conclude that the County had assessed the relevant parcels 

in violation of Code § 58.1-3984.6 In the County’s view, 

West Creek proved only how Wampler appraised the parcels 

but did not establish what the BOA did with the information 

provided by Wampler. Similarly, the County argued that 

West Creek did not show what information the BOE considered 

in making the adjustments to the assessments set by the 

BOA. 

 6

 In relevant part, Code § 58.1-3984(A) provides that, 

in a proceeding to correct an allegedly erroneous tax 

assessment, “the burden of proof shall be upon the taxpayer 

to show that the property in question is valued at more 

than its fair market value or that the assessment is not 

11
In ruling on the motion, the circuit court noted that 

there is a “presumption in favor of the validity of the 

assessment and that the taxpayer must show manifest error 

in the manner of making the estimate, or that evidence 

which should be controlling has been disregarded.” 

Continuing, the circuit court concluded that Wampler 

committed “manifest error” by applying a median value of 

$75,000 per acre to all 144 parcels even though that figure 

bore no relation to any particular parcel. The question 

for the court, however, was whether that error could be 

“reasonably inferred to serve as the basis for the 

assessment ultimately arrived at by the board of assessors 

and the board of equalization.” 

As to the 90 parcels assessed at either $75,000 per 

acre or $1,000 per acre, the circuit court overruled the 

County’s motion to strike. Drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court 

concluded that, since the assessed values matched Wampler’s 

appraised values, Wampler’s manifest error could be imputed 

to the County. The court also concluded that West Creek 

had presented sufficient evidence at that point in the 

 

uniform in its application, or that the assessment is 

otherwise invalid or illegal.” 

12
proceedings to establish that those assessments were in 

excess of the fair market values of the parcels. 

With regard to the 40 parcels assessed at $35,000 per 

acre, the circuit court granted the motion to strike. In 

the court’s view, West Creek had presented no evidence 

regarding the “manner” in which the County arrived at the 

assessment of $35,000 per acre for those parcels nor any 

evidence from which it could infer the methodology used. 

The court further stated that “the difference in values on 

those parcels determined by the board of assessors and 

those set forth by the taxpayers is insufficient to permit 

the [c]ourt to reasonably infer there was manifest error in 

the . . . manner of making the estimate or that controlling 

evidence was disregarded.” 

 The County then presented its evidence, calling as one 

of its witnesses, Joseph B. Call, III, who qualified as an 

expert in the field of real estate appraisal. Call 

explained that, when the County hired him, his assignment 

was to appraise the 144 West Creek parcels “as separate and 

distinct parcels, not recognizing the value of other 

parcels in conjunction with each of the 144 subjects of 

[his] assignment.” Call testified that he began his 

assignment by researching information in the office of the 

commissioner of revenue, inspecting portions of the 

13
property from existing roadways, interviewing members of 

the planning staff and the utilities department, and 

reviewing various maps including the Timmons Sketch of the 

144 parcels. Call also inquired about the availability of 

utilities in the Park and learned about the exact location 

of existing utility lines, the current capacity of the 

water and sewer system, and the “chronology of the dealings 

between Goochland County and Henrico County regarding 

enhanced utility service as required by users of land 

within the project.” Call concluded that, while the water 

and sewer capacity at that particular time would not serve 

the requirements of the Park if it were fully developed, 

“the [C]ounty had shown good faith and persistence in 

making efforts to ensure that there were sufficient 

utilities and capacities to serve existing [land users], as 

well as any requirements of land users as they might 

develop within the foreseeable future.” He also collected 

market data and identified “land sales that exhibited 

similar function and economic characteristics as each of 

the subject properties.” 

Call decided that the appropriate valuation method was 

the “sale comparison approach where comparable sales were 

considered, evaluated, analyzed, [and] adjusted to . . . 

provide for a credible value estimate for each parcel.” 

14
Call determined that any other approach for arriving at the 

fair market value for the 144 parcels would not have been 

reliable. Call explained the sales comparison approach 

that he conducted. First, he “identif[ied] sales which 

[were] deemed as superior to the subject property and 

others which [were] inferior to set the upper and lower 

limits of value.” This method permitted Call “to then 

consider each sale on its own merits and consider the 

differences between the sale and subject [property] and 

apply some adjustment.” Call explained that “[v]alue 

factor considerations include those for time, location, 

physical features, zoning, availability of utilities, and 

size.” 

Call identified a number of sales involving parcels 

with acreage that approximated the sizes of the subject 

parcels and having “similar soil types, topographical 

features, locational features, and to some degree 

availability of utilities and accessibility.” Even though 

all the comparable sales were not timely, Call stated that 

he could not “ascertain that the market had changed 

measurably during the period of study [s]o there was no 

time adjustment.” Since all the comparable sales involved 

parcels in the Park, Call made neither a “locational 

15
adjustment” nor “an adjustment for physical features of any 

significance.” 

Call did, however, make value adjustments for parcels 

that did not have utilities or road access. Generally, he 

valued such parcels at 40 to 50 percent less per acre than 

parcels with such infrastructure. Call also made 

adjustments to certain parcels because of their limited 

marketability. For “lake parcels” as well as parcels 

containing “floodplain,” “swamp,” or “wetlands,” he 

assigned a value of $1,000 per acre. Call placed no value 

on the “road parcels” because, in his opinion, “[w]hatever 

value they have is inherent in the adjacent lands that 

[they] serve.” Call also made adjustments for certain 

parcels labeled on the Timmons Sketch as “waste parcels” 

because they, nevertheless, have “considerable usable 

land.” He valued the usable land in those parcels between 

$15,000 and $37,500 per acre. 

Call concluded that these comparable sales occurring 

between 1991 and 2000 “yielded prices of $83,333 to 

$120,000 per usable acre[; the parcels] had usable areas 

ranging from 7.3 to 38.43 acres[; and t]he mean price 

during that 9-year period of study was $107,503 [p]er 

acre.” In summary, Call appraised the 144 parcels at 

values ranging from a high of $90,000-$100,000 per acre to 

16
a low of $15,000-$17,500 per acre, excluding those parcels 

valued at $1,000 per acre or with no value. According to 

Call’s appraisal, the total fair market value for the 144 

parcels ranged from approximately $103,200,000 to 

$113,700,000.7

Call testified about his use of the Capital One sale 

as a comparable sale. He admitted “[t]here were some 

inducements to the Capital One purchase.” Specifically, 

according to Call, Capital One “would receive about $3 

million from the state governor’s opportunity fund, about 

$3 million in county rebates.” Call believed that Capital 

One would expend over four million dollars for water and 

sewer line extensions but that the “cost would be rebated 

by the [C]ounty over the term.” Call concluded that the 

Capital One sale “at approximately $77,000 an acre should 

be viewed as a pertinent and excellent indication of 

values” as to a certain group of the West Creek parcels. 

Call further testified that he arrived at a value between 

$70,000 and $75,000 per acre for this same group of parcels 

without utilizing the Capital One purchase as a comparable 

sale. 

 7

 Armstrong testified that, if the cost of 

infrastructure were added to the 34.1 million dollar 

purchase price, that sum would approximate Call’s appraised 

fair market value of the parcels. 

17
When asked why he did not consider the June 2000 

purchase price for the 2,500 acres when valuing the 144 

separate parcels, Call responded: 

First off, the sale in excess of 2,000 acres 

has a totally different highest and best use as 

concluded for each of the 144 units. Secondly, 

. . . the large sale would appear to appeal to a 

different type of purchaser than any anticipated 

purchasers of [individual lots.] Thirdly, a 

comparison of in excess of a 2,000-acre parcel 

with a smaller of 7 to 25 acres is just 

ludicrous. Comparisons in that instance are 

odious. 

 The only comparability with regard to that 

over 2,000-acre sale of the West Creek project is 

the fact that it is approximate and timely. But 

in no way is it physically similar. No way does 

it offer the same economies. I don’t think a 

size adjustment is possible. Relying on that 

sale as an independent indicator of value for any 

of the 144 parcels would produce an appraisal 

report that would lack total credibility. 

 The use of that sale and that sale alone as 

an indication of value would be grounds for 

possible dismissal from The Appraisal Institute 

and probably revocation of one’s appraisal 

license. 

On cross-examination, Call stated that, if someone 

wanted to purchase the entire acreage in a single 

transaction, the price would be discounted, maybe down to 

34.1 million dollars. Call, however, reiterated that he 

had appraised 144 separate parcels, not “the project.” He 

also admitted that he appraised each parcel believing that 

the acreage had been subdivided into 144 parcels and did 

18
not initially realize the Timmons Sketch was not an 

approved subdivision under the County’s ordinances. He, 

nevertheless, insisted that fact would not affect his 

appraisal of the parcels. 

Call also admitted that, in making his appraisal, he 

assumed each parcel had some form of “legal access,” except 

for the few parcels that he had otherwise specifically 

identified. Call testified that “[if he] were instructed 

by [his] client to assume that certain parcels have no 

legal access, then [he] would have to amend [his] opinion 

of market value for . . . the particular parcels.” When 

questioned about the fact that, after the Capital One 

purchase, the remaining water and sewer allocation was 

sufficient only to develop an additional 145 acres, Call 

explained that he had “reached a comfort level” that led 

him to believe that water and sewer allocations would be 

increased as development occurred in the Park. 

At the close of the trial after considering all the 

evidence, the circuit court dismissed West Creek’s 

remaining 90 applications with prejudice. In doing so, it 

made several rulings that are the subject of this appeal. 

The circuit court held that the law of the Commonwealth 

requires an individual assessment of each of the parcels in 

question even though the 2,500 acres were not “legally 

19
subdivided.” In the court’s words, “[t]he difference in 

how the parties regard these parcels has shaped the 

presentation of the evidence, affected the determination of 

value, and created a conflict regarding the applicable 

law.” The court then explained the parties’ disagreement 

about the applicable law. According to the court, West 

Creek argued that evidence showing a great disparity 

between real property’s assessed value and its fair market 

value is sufficient to establish manifest error; whereas, 

the County asserted that in order to establish manifest 

error or disregard of controlling evidence, a taxpayer must 

show “what information the assessing authority had, how 

that evidence was considered and weighed, and ultimately 

what was the basis for [the] decision.” 

Relying on this Court’s decision in City of Norfolk v. 

Snyder, 161 Va. 288, 170 S.E. 721 (1933), the circuit court 

concluded that the County’s position was correct. The 

court reasoned that manifest error cannot be established 

merely by evidence of differing opinions about fair market 

value but that, instead, a taxpayer must present evidence 

establishing what information the taxing authority 

considered and how it arrived at the assessment in 

question. The court described the evidence as to how the 

BOA and the BOE arrived at the assessments in question as 

20
“nearly nonexistent” and therefore concluded that West 

Creek had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence either manifest error or disregard of controlling 

evidence. 

In contrast to its view when it overruled the motion 

to strike West Creek’s evidence, the court refused to 

impute Wampler’s manifest error in his appraisal to the 

County. The court reached this contrary position because 

of evidence that the BOA met at times when Wampler was not 

present and had information other than that provided in his 

appraisal. According to the court, the “best evidence” 

that the BOA considered other evidence and was influenced 

by factors unrelated to Wampler’s appraisal was its 

assessment of certain parcels at $35,000 per acre, which 

was a number not found in Wampler’s appraisal. 

In an alternative holding utilizing the legal standard 

urged by West Creek, the circuit court found West Creek’s 

evidence about the parcels’ fair market values unpersuasive 

because West Creek did “nothing more than spread the value 

of the development across the individual parcels.” The 

court noted that West Creek was able “to negotiate a bulk 

sale of this property for cash at a price $5 million lower 

than that initially sought by Bank of America.” The court 

concluded that the bulk sale of the 2,500 acres was not a 

21
comparable sale for the purpose of establishing the 

assessed value of each individual parcel, despite West 

Creek’s urging to the contrary. West Creek’s evidence 

regarding the parcels’ fair market values, in the court’s 

words, “fl[ew] in the face of the evidence that land in the 

. . . Park was selling at prices ranging from $43,000 per 

acre to $120,000 per acre.” The court found it “difficult 

to accept that any kind of independent appraisal was 

conducted by Mr. Miller when it matched the testimony of 

Mr. Goodwin, except for the waste parcels, to the penny.” 

In contrast, the circuit court was persuaded by Call’s 

appraisal and concluded that it supported the assessments 

in question. The court described Call’s appraisal as a 

“detailed evaluation of each parcel with appropriate 

adjustments.” 

On appeal to this Court, West Creek assigns four 

errors to the circuit court’s judgment. First, West Creek 

asserts that the circuit court “erred when it eliminated 

the ability of the Taxpayer to challenge the assessment by 

showing ‘manifest error’ through the disparity between the 

assessment and the fair market value of the property.” 

West Creek also claims that the circuit court erred by 

holding that it did not present sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate that the County committed manifest error in the 

22
methodology employed in assessing the parcels in question 

when the assessment was based on Wampler’s appraisal that 

the court had found to be erroneous. Next, West Creek 

assigns error to the circuit court’s holding that the 

property in question should be assessed as 144 separate 

parcels without regard to the fair market value of the 

parcels aggregated as a whole. Finally, West Creek asserts 

that the circuit court erred by holding that the County’s 

assessment may be based on sales of property with “fully 

developed utilities and infrastructure where no such 

infrastructure existed for the assessed property, and no 

such improvements were imminent.” 

ANALYSIS 

We begin our analysis by repeating the wellestablished principles that guide our review of a circuit 

court’s judgment upholding a taxing authority’s assessment 

of the fair market value of real property. A taxing 

authority’s assessment is presumed to be correct, and a 

taxpayer has the burden to rebut that presumption by 

establishing that the real property in question is assessed 

at more than fair market value or that the assessment is 

not uniform in its application. Code § 58.1-3984(A); 

Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of Albemarle, 273 Va. 128, 

136, 639 S.E.2d 243, 247 (2007); Shoosmith Bros., Inc. v. 

23
County of Chesterfield, 268 Va. 241, 245, 601 S.E.2d 641, 

643 (2004); Arlington County Board v. Ginsberg, 228 Va. 

633, 640, 325 S.E.2d 348, 352 (1985). “ ‘The effect of 

this presumption is that even if the assessor is unable to 

come forward with evidence to prove the correctness of the 

assessment this does not impeach it since the taxpayer has 

the burden of proving the assessment erroneous.’ ” R. 

Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 207, 228 

S.E.2d 113, 117 (1976) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 695, 179 S.E.2d 623, 626 

(1971)). We have held that a taxpayer must show by a clear 

preponderance of the evidence that the taxing authority 

committed manifest error or totally disregarded controlling 

evidence in making the assessment. Keswick Club, 273 Va. 

at 137-38, 639 S.E.2d at 247; Board of Supervisors v. HCA 

Health Servs. of Va., 260 Va. 317, 329, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169 

(2000); Tidewater Psychiatric Inst. v. City of Virginia 

Beach, 256 Va. 136, 141, 501 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (1998). 

The initial issue we decide involves the legal dispute 

between the parties regarding the means by which a taxpayer 

can show manifest error by a taxing authority in assessing 

the fair market value of real property. Relying on this 

Court’s decision in Board of Supervisors v. 

Telecommunications Indus., 246 Va. 472, 436 S.E.2d 442 

24
(1993), West Creek contends that a taxpayer can establish 

manifest error by proving a sufficient disparity between 

the assessed value of real property and its fair market 

value. Thus, according to West Creek, the circuit court 

erred by holding, both in the motion to strike and at the 

end of the trial, that a taxpayer must prove manifest error 

in the “manner” in which the taxing authority arrived at 

the assessed value of the real property in question, i.e., 

what information the taxing authority considered and how it 

arrived at the assessment. 

The County, on the other hand, agrees with the circuit 

court’s ruling and argues that this Court’s precedent 

establishes that a taxpayer must prove manifest error in 

the taxing authority’s methodology and that a mere 

difference of opinion as to fair market value is 

insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness 

afforded an assessment. Continuing, the County argues that 

a taxpayer must present evidence showing “what methodology 

was used, how it was applied, what factual information was 

available to the assessing authority when making the 

assessments, how that information was considered and/or 

what weight it was given, and what information was 

disregarded.” Then, according to the County, a taxpayer 

25
must identify the alleged error in the taxing authority’s 

methodology. 

In Snyder, we explained why a court cannot substitute 

its judgment for that of a taxing authority with regard to 

the assessed value of real property: 

The value of property is a matter of opinion 

and there must necessarily be left a wide room 

for the exercise of opinion, otherwise courts 

will be converted into assessing boards and in 

assuming to act as such, would assume the powers 

lodged elsewhere by the law-making branch of 

government. Judge Cooley says in Cooley on 

Taxation, section 1612: “Courts cannot substitute 

their judgment as to the valuation of property 

for the judgment of the duly constituted tax 

authorities.” 

Generally the question as to whether an 

applicant’s property in any particular case has 

been assessed at more than its fair market value, 

or out of proportion to other like property, 

presents a question of fact to be decided by the 

assessors or the local board of equalization and 

the result fairly arrived at by them should not 

be disturbed by the court unless the applicant 

has carried the burden of showing clearly that 

the assessment is excessive or out of proportion 

to that of other like property. 

 

In Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. Kanawha 

County Court, 41 W.Va. 658, 24 S.E. 1002, 1005 

[(1896)], the court said: “. . . if assessments 

are to be based upon the opinions of individuals 

. . . instead of being uniform and bearing 

equally upon property of the same character 

throughout the State, the assessments would be as 

shifting and variable as the opinions of men 

influenced oftentimes by local causes could 

possibly make them.” 

26
161 Va. at 292, 170 S.E. at 723. We then stated: 

“Conclusions of a board of commissioners will not be 

disturbed unless it appears that there has been a manifest 

error in the manner of making the estimate, or that 

evidence which should be controlling has been disregarded.” 

Id. at 292-93, 170 S.E. at 723 (citing 4 Thomas M. Cooley, 

The Law of Taxation § 1618, at 3235 & n.58 (4th ed. 1924)) 

(emphasis added). 

 Despite the emphasized language, the Court’s decision 

upholding the assessment at issue in Snyder did not turn on 

the taxpayer’s failure to demonstrate “a manifest error in 

the manner of making” the assessment. Instead, the Court 

noted that the evidence showed a difference of opinion 

about the fair market value of the real property at issue. 

Id. at 293, 170 S.E. at 723. The Court concluded that “so 

long as the assessment comes within the range of a 

reasonable difference of opinion, . . . when considered in 

the light of the presumption in its favor, it cannot be 

said that the assessment is erroneous.” Id. at 293, 170 

S.E. at 723. 

 As the County contends, however, this Court has 

affirmatively stated in some cases that, in order to rebut 

the presumption of correctness, a taxpayer must show a 

manifest error in the manner that the assessment was made 

27
or that controlling evidence has been disregarded. See, 

e.g., Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., 256 Va. at 141, 501 

S.E.2d at 764 (deciding whether the trial court correctly 

determined that the taxpayer failed to rebut the 

presumption of correctness by “ ‘a showing of manifest 

error or total disregard of controlling evidence’ in the 

[taxing authority’s] method of determining the fair market 

value of the property” (quoting Telecomm. Indus., 246 Va. 

at 475, 436 S.E.2d at 444)); City of Richmond v. Gordon, 

224 Va. 103, 110, 294 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1982) (“The taxpayer 

must show ‘manifest error in the manner of making the 

estimate, or that evidence which should be controlling has 

been disregarded.’ ” (quoting Snyder, 161 Va. at 293, 170 

S.E. at 723)); Tuckahoe Woman’s Club v. City of Richmond, 

199 Va. 734, 739-40, 101 S.E.2d 571, 575 (1958) (holding 

that the assessment will not be disturbed “ ‘unless it 

appears that there has been a manifest error in the manner 

of making the estimate, or that evidence which should be 

controlling has been disregarded’ ” (quoting Snyder, 161 

Va. at 293, 170 S.E. at 723)); City of Norfolk v. Holland, 

163 Va. 342, 345-46, 175 S.E. 737, 739 (1934) (same). 

Yet, in other cases, the Court stated only that a 

taxpayer must show that the taxing authority committed 

manifest error or disregarded controlling evidence in 

28
making the assessment. The Court’s holdings, nevertheless, 

turned on whether the taxing authority had employed an 

improper methodology in determining fair market value. 

See, e.g., Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 139-41, 639 S.E.2d at 

249-50 (assessment was not entitled to the presumption of 

validity because the taxing authority did not properly 

consider and reject certain methods of evaluation); 

Shoosmith Bros., 268 Va. at 247, 601 S.E.2d at 644 (finding 

that the taxing authority “did not commit manifest error in 

assessing [the taxpayer’s property by] using the income 

method of assessment”); HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 330-

31, 501 S.E.2d at 170 (evidence was insufficient to show 

that the taxing authority considered and properly rejected 

other methods of calculating the value of the taxpayer’s 

real property when it used only a depreciated reproduction 

cost approach as the sole method of determining fair market 

value); County of Mecklenburg v. Carter, 248 Va. 522, 526, 

449 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1994) (in deciding whether an 

assessment was uniform in its application, there was “no 

evidence that the methodology used was erroneous, or that 

it was not followed in appraising the [taxpayer’s] property 

and each property with which it was compared”); Clarke 

Assocs. v. County of Arlington, 235 Va. 624, 629, 369 

S.E.2d 414, 416 (1988) (finding assessment erroneous 

29
because “neither the assessor nor the trial court factored 

the contract rent into a determination of the fair market 

value” of the taxpayer’s properties); Smith v. Board of 

Supervisors, 234 Va. 250, 258-59, 361 S.E.2d 351, 355-56 

(1987) (finding assessment erroneous because the taxing 

authority did not consider actual rent and expense figures 

in determining the fair market value of the taxpayer’s 

property); Nassif v. Board of Supervisors, 231 Va. 472, 

483, 345 S.E.2d 520, 526-27 (1986) (holding that assessment 

was erroneous because the taxing authority’s methodology 

gave no effect to contract rent); Board of Supervisors v. 

Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 620, 627-28, 325 S.E.2d 

342, 345-46 (1985) (affirming the trial court’s decision to 

reduce the assessment because the taxing authority had 

disregarded the recent sale price of the property and other 

factors); Ginsberg, 228 Va. at 642-43, 325 S.E.2d at 353-54 

(affirming trial court’s judgment reducing tax assessment 

on the basis that the taxing authority “had ignored the 

sale price and the contract rents and had relied entirely 

on highly speculative economic rents”). 

 Despite these cases that support the County’s position 

that West Creek had to demonstrate manifest error in the 

County’s methodology, we also have decisions that turned on 

nothing more than conflicting evidence of fair market value 

30
and whether the taxpayer had demonstrated that the real 

property at issue was assessed at more than fair market 

value. See, e.g., City of Martinsville v. Commonwealth 

Boulevard Assocs., LLC, 268 Va. 697, 699-700, 604 S.E.2d 

69, 70-71 (2004) (after concluding that a taxpayer may 

challenge an annual levy of taxes without demonstrating 

that the previous general reassessment was erroneous, the 

Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, based on 

conflicting evidence of value, that the real property was 

assessed at more than its fair market value); Fray v. 

County of Culpeper, 212 Va. 148, 151, 183 S.E.2d 175, 178 

(1971) (because the evidence introduced by both the 

taxpayer and the taxing authority showed a fair market 

value less than the assessed value of the property in 

question, the trial court erred in concluding that the 

taxpayer had not shown that the assessed value of the 

property was in excess of fair market value); City of 

Harrisonburg v. Taubman, 212 Va. 28, 30, 181 S.E.2d 654, 

656 (1971) (upon conflicting evidence of fair market value, 

the trial court did not err in reducing the assessed value 

of the subject property); Washington County Nat’l Bank v. 

Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 222, 10 S.E.2d 515, 518 

(1940) (evidence of fair market value from several 

31
witnesses demonstrated that the value fixed by the trial 

court was excessive). 

 This survey of the Court’s decisions leads to the 

conclusion that the circuit court erred by holding that, in 

order to show manifest error, a taxpayer must prove what 

information the taxing authority considered and how it 

arrived at the assessment in question, i.e., its 

methodology. It is correct that, in the majority of our 

cases, the dispositive issue was whether the taxing 

authority had utilized an improper methodology in setting 

the assessed value of real property. But, we have never 

explicitly held that manifest error cannot be established 

simply by evidence showing that real property is assessed 

at more than its fair market value. In all cases, however, 

a taxing authority’s assessment is presumed to be correct, 

Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 136, 639 S.E.2d at 247, and the 

taxpayer has the burden of proof “to show that the property 

in question is valued at more than its fair market value or 

that the assessment is not uniform in its application, or 

that the assessment is otherwise invalid or illegal.” Code 

§ 58.1-3984(A). When a taxpayer attempts to prove manifest 

error solely by showing a significant disparity between 

fair market value and assessed value without showing that 

the taxing authority employed an improper methodology in 

32
arriving at the property’s assessed value, the taxpayer 

cannot prevail “so long as the assessment comes within the 

range of a reasonable difference of opinion, . . . when 

considered in light of the presumption in its favor.” 

Snyder, 161 Va. at 293, 170 S.E. at 723; accord Gordon, 224 

Va. at 112, 294 S.E.2d at 851. Thus, we conclude that the 

circuit court erred in granting the County’s motion to 

strike. 

 This conclusion does not end our analysis because the 

circuit court had an alternative basis for dismissing the 

90 applications that remained after the court sustained the 

County’s motion to strike the evidence. The court 

concluded that West Creek had not established those 

parcels’ fair market values because West Creek had done 

“nothing more than spread the value of the development 

across the individual parcels.” West Creek challenges the 

circuit court’s alternative holding in two respects. It 

claims that the court erred by valuing the property as 144 

separate parcels without giving due regard to the fair 

market value of the parcels aggregated as a whole and by 

accepting the County’s appraisal that was based on sales of 

parcels with fully developed utilities and infrastructure. 

We do not agree with West Creek’s position. 

33
 First, West Creek acknowledges on brief that the 

circuit court was correct in finding that, pursuant to Code 

§ 58.1-3290, the County was required to assess the 144 

parcels individually.8 West Creek, nevertheless, contends 

that the circuit court erred by failing to consider the 

recent purchase price for the amassed parcels as evidence 

of fair market value. According to West Creek, the 

creation of the 144 parcels on the Timmons Sketch was for 

income tax planning purposes and the total sale price 

represented the highest and best use of the property as a 

business park comprised of parcels containing 10 to 20 

acres. 

 8

 In relevant part, Code § 58.1-3290 provides that, 

“[w]hen a tract or lot becomes the property of different 

owners in two or more parcels, subsequent to any general 

reassessment of real estate in the city or county in which 

such tract or lot is situated each of the two or more 

parcels shall be assessed and shown separately upon the 

land books, as required by law.” Although the assessments 

at issue in this appeal were part of the County’s 

quadrennial reassessment, other statutes also require the 

parcels to be assessed individually. See, e.g., Code 

§ 58.1-3281 (commissioner of revenue shall annually, on 

January 1, “ascertain all the real estate in his county or 

city, . . . and the person to whom the same is chargeable 

with taxes on that day”); Code § 58.1-3303 (requiring clerk 

of each circuit court to provide commissioner of revenue 

with deed recordation receipt showing, among other things, 

description of real property conveyed and names of grantor 

and grantee); Code § 58.1-3309 (requiring information 

appearing in receipts provided pursuant to Code § 58.1-3303 

to be transferred “on the land book and charged to the 

person to whom the transfer is made”). 

34
Contrary to West Creek’s argument, the circuit court 

did not ignore the 34.1 million dollar purchase price of 

the 2,500 acres. In weighing the evidence, the court, 

however, concluded that West Creek negotiated a bulk sale 

of the property at a price significantly lower than Bank of 

America first sought and that the bulk sale price was not a 

comparable sale for the purpose of establishing the 

assessed value of the 144 parcels. Although the purchase 

of the 2,500 acres was an arms-length transaction between a 

willing buyer and a willing seller, the court’s factual 

determination that the sale was a “bulk sale” is not 

challenged on appeal by West Creek. Since the 34.1 million 

dollar figure represented the “bulk sale” of the 2,500 

acres, the County is correct in its assertion that the mere 

difference between the purchase price and the assessed 

value was not sufficient to show manifest error or 

disregard of controlling evidence. As we have previously 

stated, the recent sale price of real property is “merely 

one of the factors to be taken into consideration” when 

determining whether such property has been assessed at more 

than fair market value. American Viscose Corp. v. City of 

Roanoke, 205 Va. 192, 196, 133 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1964). The 

sale price is accorded substantial weight but, contrary to 

West Creek’s position, it is not “conclusive evidence of 

35
[the property’s] fair market value.” Id.; accord Ginsberg, 

228 Va. at 640, 325 S.E.2d at 352; Donatelli & Klein, 228 

Va. at 628, 325 S.E.2d at 345. 

The circuit court’s factual finding also distinguishes 

the present case from the situation in Donatelli & Klein. 

There, the recent sale of the subject property “was not a 

sale in bulk, because the sale of each individual property 

was negotiated separately to its ultimate purchase price.” 

228 Va. at 625, 325 S.E.2d at 343. Thus, we concluded that 

the trial court did not err by according “substantial 

weight” to the sale price and concluding that the fair 

market value of each property was the sale price paid by 

the taxpayer. Id. at 628, 325 S.E.2d at 345-46. 

With regard to West Creek’s second challenge to the 

circuit court’s alternative holding, we agree that “fair 

market value ‘is the present actual value of the land with 

all its adaptations to general and special uses, and not 

its prospective, speculative or possible value, based on 

future expenditures and improvements.’ ” Fruit Growers 

Express Co. v. City of Alexandria, 216 Va. 602, 609, 221 

S.E.2d 157, 162 (1976) (emphasis in original) (quoting 

Appalachian Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 708, 187 

S.E.2d 148, 152 (1972)). West Creek’s assertion, however, 

that the County’s assessment was based on sales of parcels 

36
with fully developed utilities and infrastructure is not 

entirely accurate. Despite the manifest error in Wampler’s 

appraisal methodology,9 Call took into account the lack of 

infrastructure and reduced the per acre value of parcels 

that did not have utilities or road access by forty to 

fifty percent of the per acre value of comparable sales of 

parcels having such infrastructure. His appraisal supports 

the assessments at issue. 

Furthermore, the circuit court, in weighing the 

evidence, found Call’s testimony “the most compelling.” 

“It was within the province of the court, as the factfinder, to determine the credibility of the witnesses. The 

factual determinations of the [circuit] court, like those 

of a jury, are binding on this Court, and we will reverse 

such findings only if they are plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support them.” Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 

408, 641 S.E.2d 494, 506 (2007) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Code 

§ 8.01-680; Ivy Constr. Co. v. Booth, 226 Va. 299, 301, 309 

S.E.2d 300, 301 (1983) (trial court’s findings based on 

conflicting evidence heard ore tenus will not be disturbed 

 9

 The circuit court held that Wampler committed 

manifest error by applying a median value of $75,000 per 

acre to all 144 parcels. That holding is not challenged on 

appeal. 

37
on appeal unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence 

to support them). 

Moreover, the crux of the circuit court’s alternative 

holding was not that it accepted the County’s appraisal 

but, instead, that West Creek failed to present credible 

evidence of the parcels’ fair market values. In order to 

satisfy the statutory requirement of showing that real 

property is assessed at more than its fair market value, 

see Code § 58.1-3984(A), a taxpayer must necessarily 

establish the property’s fair market value. This is so 

irrespective of whether a taxpayer is attempting to show 

manifest error or disregard of controlling evidence by 

proving a significant disparity between fair market value 

and assessed value, or by establishing a flawed methodology 

by the taxing authority in setting the assessed value. 

The circuit court enunciated several reasons why it 

rejected West Creek’s evidence regarding the fair market 

values of the parcels. First, the court found that West 

Creek’s valuation method of “spread[ing] the value of the 

development across the individual parcels” was not 

persuasive. The court explained that West Creek purchased 

2,500 acres for 34.1 million dollars and now wants to 

allocate that sale price to the individual parcels. The 

court, however, rejected the use of the sale price of the 

38
2,500 acres as a comparable sale because West Creek was 

ignoring the “economy of scale” realized when it purchased 

the 2,500 acres at one time. The court pointed out that 

even Goodwin testified that there is an inverse 

relationship between the size of a parcel and the purchase 

price, i.e., the larger the parcel, the cheaper the price. 

Finally, the court concluded that Miller had not conducted 

an independent appraisal because his testimony “matched the 

testimony of . . . Goodwin, except for the waste parcels, 

to the penny.” 

We cannot say that the circuit court’s findings are 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. See,

e.g., Booth, 226 Va. at 301, 309 S.E.2d at 301. There is 

no question that Miller accepted the sale price of the 

2,500 acres as controlling and assigned portions of the 

price as the per acre value for parcels depending on the 

developmental phase in which the parcels were located. In 

the words of one of the County’s witnesses, Miller’s 

methodology was “an arithmetic formula,” which is not an 

accepted appraisal method. Thus, we conclude, as did the 

circuit court, that West Creek did not carry its burden of 

showing that the parcels are assessed at more than fair 

39
market value. See Code § 58.1-3984(A).10 West Creek’s 

evidence did not rebut the presumption of correctness 

afforded the assessments. Because of the presumption, the 

County did not have to come forward with evidence to prove 

the correctness of the assessment. See R. Cross, Inc., 217 

Va. at 207, 228 S.E.2d at 117; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 211 

Va. at 695, 170 S.E.2d at 626. 

CONCLUSION 

 The circuit court erred in granting the motion to 

strike West Creek’s evidence with regard to the parcels 

assessed at $35,000 per acre. We will, therefore, reverse 

that portion of the circuit court’s judgment and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Gina 

Chin & Assocs., Inc. v. First Union Bank, 260 Va. 533, 540, 

537 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2000) (“following the trial court’s 

grant of [a] motion to strike [the] evidence [this Court 

is] unable to review [the] case in consideration of all the 

evidence that may have been produced on the issue in 

 10 This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the Court 

to address West Creek’s remaining assignment of error 

challenging the circuit court’s holding that the County did 

not commit manifest error in the methodology it used in 

setting the assessments with regard to the 90 parcels that 

remained in the case after the court sustained the motion 

to strike the evidence. Assuming without deciding that the 

court erred in refusing to impute Wampler’s flawed 

methodology to the County at that point in the proceeding, 

40
41

question [and is] unable to reach the ultimate merits [of 

the case]”). With regard to the 90 remaining parcels, we 

will affirm the circuit court’s judgment. 

Affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

 and remanded. 

 

West Creek, nevertheless, did not establish the fair market 

values of those 90 parcels.