22-6469

Bhojak v. Garland

BIA

Sichel, IJ

A206 223 001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of October, two thousand 

twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

REENA RAGGI,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

BETH ROBINSON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

CHINTAN JYOTINDRA BHOJAK, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 22-6469 

 NAC 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Usman B. Ahmad, Esq., Long Island City, NY. 
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FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General; Justin Markel, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Kevin J. Conway, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Chintan Jyotindra Bhojak, a native and citizen of India, seeks 

review of an August 30, 2022 decision of the BIA affirming a June 17, 2019 decision 

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chintan 

Jyotindra Bhojak, No. A 206 223 001 (B.I.A. Aug. 30, 2022), aff’g No. A 206 223 001

(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 17, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history. 

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the 

BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan 

Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). Bhojak does not challenge the 

IJ’s finding that his conviction is a particularly serious crime that bars asylum and 

withholding of removal or the BIA’s finding that he waived review of this basis 
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for the denial of asylum and withholding of removal, so we consider only his CAT 

claim. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider 

abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, and an 

appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). We review factfinding related to a CAT claim for 

substantial evidence, and we review questions of law and application of law to 

fact de novo. Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021).

Bhojak alleged that U.S. newspapers reported on his arrest and conviction 

in New Jersey, and people in India learned of the charges against him. He 

testified that a group of “Hindu extremist[s]” confronted his father in 2012 and 

threatened to harm the family if Bhojak returned to India. He argued that he 

would be tortured in India and could not relocate within India because people 

could learn of his conviction through the internet. 

The agency did not err in denying the CAT claim as speculative. A CAT 

applicant must show that he will “more likely than not” be tortured in the country 

of removal. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a); see also Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 

53 F.4th 752, 758–59 (2d Cir. 2022).1 “It is the likelihood of all necessary events 

1 The citations are to the regulations as written at the time of the IJ’s decision. 
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coming together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of 

events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 

F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Matter of J–F–F–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 

(AG 2006)). 

First, Bhojak asserts that the IJ did not properly consider evidence that he 

will be placed on a sex-offender registry in India. As the Government argues, 

although Bhojak broadly argued that information about his conviction will be 

available on the internet, he did not argue before the IJ or the BIA that he would 

be placed on a sex-offender registry. This specific claim is therefore unexhausted. 

See Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 419–20 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2023) (confirming that 

issue exhaustion is mandatory when the opposing party raises the issue). 

Even if individuals could learn about Bhojak’s conviction from a general

internet search, the agency did not err in finding insufficient evidence that he

would be tortured. He relied on two articles about “honor killings” in India, but 

neither article discusses whether individuals with criminal convictions (either in 

India or abroad) are targeted for honor killings. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 

421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the 

record . . .[an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”). Moreover, Bhojak cites no 
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country-conditions evidence that government authorities would fail to protect him 

or acquiesce to his torture. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce 

evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support the 

agency’s challenged decision.” (citation omitted)). On this record, the IJ 

reasonably determined that Bhojak’s fear of torture was speculative. See Mu 

Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (denying CAT claim 

where country conditions evidence reflected instances of torture, but petitioner 

had no “particularized evidence” that someone in his circumstances would be 

tortured). Accordingly, the agency did not err in denying deferral of removal 

under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (requiring applicant to show torture 

is “more likely than not” to occur).

Because the agency’s determination regarding the likelihood of torture is 

dispositive, we do not reach its alternative finding that Bhojak could safely relocate 

in India. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts 

and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 

unnecessary to the results they reach.” (citations omitted)).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court