IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

December 4, 2019 Session

JEFFREY GLENN MITCHELL v. CAROL ANN THOMAS MITCHELL

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Blount County

No. S-17664 William R. Brewer, Jr., Judge

No. E2019-00759-COA-R3-CV

This is the second appeal in this post-divorce action involving the interpretation of the 

parties’ marital dissolution agreement and allegations of contempt for failure to comply 

with the same. We remanded the case to the trial court for submission of additional 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. The husband appeals the trial court’s opinion on 

remand. We affirm the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS R.

FRIERSON, II and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

Elizabeth Sitgreaves, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffrey Glenn Mitchell.

Craig L. Garrett, Maryville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Carol Ann Thomas Mitchell.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

A review of the record reveals that the facts and issues on appeal remain the same. 

Accordingly, we will recount our earlier opinion and then address the issues now 

properly before this court. The facts and procedural background pertinent to this appeal 

are as follows: 

Jeffrey Glenn Mitchell (“Husband”) and Carol Ann Thomas 

Mitchell (“Wife”) were divorced on October 28, 2011, by order of the trial 

court. They had two minor children of the marriage, R.K.M., who was 

fifteen years of age at the time of the divorce, and D.T.M., who was eleven 

03/31/2020
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years old (collectively, “the Children”). Husband’s primary source of 

income was from Benefit Consulting Services, Inc. (“BCS”), a company 

which was owned solely by Husband following the parties’ divorce. The 

parties’ MDA, which was incorporated into the trial court’s divorce 

judgment, included the following relevant provisions:

CHILD SUPPORT: The provisions of the Permanent 

Parenting Plan are hereby incorporated herein as if fully and 

specifically set out. Said Plan is adopted as Exhibit 1.

* * *

PROPERTY DIVISION / CHILD SUPPORT: The 

Husband shall pay to the Wife a combination of property 

division and child support that will be paid in three levels as 

set out below. All payments shall cease upon the death of 

either party. All property division payments to the Wife shall 

be non-deductible to the Husband, nor considered income to 

the Wife for federal income tax purposes. Should the Wife 

remarry or cohabitate with another individual who is not a 

family member, the Husband’s obligation for the payment of 

property division portion shall terminate.

Stage 1: Based upon the Husband’s current yearly income of 

$250,000 and the Wife’s ability to earn is $48,000 per year 

and that those amounts shall be used for child support 

worksheet calculation purposes now through the end of Stage 

2, the date the parties[’] younger minor child [D.T.M.], 

attains the age of majority and there is no longer a child 

support obligation for him, which is anticipated to occur on 

May 31, 2018, the date of his graduation from high school 

[after] he will have attained the age of eighteen.

As per the attached child support worksheets, Stage l, shall be 

from the date of the entry of the Final Decree of Divorce until 

May 31, 2014, when the parties’ daughter, [R.K.M.] attains 

the age of majority and there is no longer a child support 

obligation for her. Husband shall pay a total amount of 

28.8% ($6,000 / $250,000) of his gross annual income to the 

Wife, not to exceed a combination of child support and 

property division of $6,000.00 per month, which by way of 
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current example would represent $2,082.00 per month child 

support and $3,918.00 per month as property division.

Stage 2: Beginning June 1, 2014, and continuing until the 

parties’ son, [D.T.M.], attains the age of majority on May 31, 

2018, and there is no longer a child support obligation for 

him, the Husband’s monthly obligation of property division / 

child support shall be reduced to 24.0% of his annual income 

not to exceed $5,000.00 per month. By way of example this 

would represent a monthly obligation of child support of 

$1,624.00 (see child support worksheet attached hereto) and a 

monthly obligation of $3,376.00 as property division 

beginning June 1, 2014, and continuing until May 31, 2018, 

making a total payment of $5,000.00.

Stage 3: Beginning June 1, 2018, and continuing until May 

31, 2021, the Husband’s monthly obligation of property 

division shall be reduced to 13.2% of his annual income not 

to exceed $2,750.00 per month for a total of 36 months.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.)

The parties had also entered into an agreed permanent parenting plan 

(“PPP”), which provided that reasonable health insurance for the Children 

would be maintained by Husband and that any reasonable and necessary 

medical expenses not covered by health insurance would be paid by 

Husband. The parties subsequently reached an agreement that despite the 

health insurance provision of the PPP, Wife would provide health insurance 

for the Children through her employment, with Husband reimbursing her 

the cost of such health insurance. Both the PPP and child support 

worksheet demonstrate that Husband’s initial child support obligation was 

$2,082.00 for both of the Children.

On January 10, 2014, Husband filed a “Motion to Clarify, Amend, 

Modify, and/or Void Final Judgment for Divorce as to Child Support 

Obligation and Property Division.” Husband argued in his motion that a 

substantial change of circumstance had occurred because his income had 

decreased. Husband averred that the decrease of his income was not 

foreseeable or voluntary and that he was accordingly entitled to a 

downward modification of his child support obligation. Husband further 

contended that the MDA was “deficient, ambiguous, and contrary to the 
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requirements of the Tennessee Income Shares Guidelines and Tenn. Comp. 

R. & Regs., Chapter 1240-2-4-.04(3)(a)” because it purportedly comingled 

the property division and child support obligations, was determined based

on a percentage of Husband’s income, and failed to designate how much of 

that amount would be categorized as child support. Husband argued that 

the trial court “must state a specific dollar amount [of child support], not a 

percentage of Adjusted Gross Income.”

In March 2014, Wife filed an answer in response to Husband’s 

motion, denying Husband’s averment that a substantial change in 

circumstance existed and his assertion that the MDA was deficient, 

ambiguous, and contrary to Tennessee law. Wife included in her response 

a counter-motion, requesting that the trial court find Husband to be in 

contempt of court due to his noncompliance with certain requirements in 

the MDA. Specifically, Wife alleged that Husband had failed to maintain a 

“vacation fund account for the benefit of [Wife],” as required by the MDA, 

and that none of the conditions that would terminate Husband’s obligation 

to maintain the fund had occurred. According to Wife, Husband had also 

“unilaterally reduced his $6,000.00 a month payment which constituted 

child support of $2,082.00 and property division payment of $3,918.00 to 

the sum of $4,000.00” and the reduction was in violation of the trial court’s 

order. Wife further requested an award of attorney’s fees and associated 

expenses.

On December 16, 2014, Wife filed a motion to dismiss, which the 

trial court subsequently granted due to Husband’s failure to prosecute his 

motion and respond to discovery requests. Wife subsequently filed an 

amended counter-motion on September 16, 2016, which included 

allegations of another violation by Husband of the court’s order. 

Specifically, Wife alleged that Husband was required to pay all medical 

expenses of the Children pursuant to the PPP and that he had “failed and 

refused to pay the medical bills.” According to Wife, she had also paid for 

some of the Children’s medical bills and despite her requests, Husband had 

“failed and refused to reimburse” her. In the amended counter-motion, 

Wife again requested that Husband “be held in willful contempt” and that 

she be awarded her attorney’s fees and court costs.

On September 19, 2016, Husband filed a motion, alleging that 

Wife’s interpretation of the MDA was flawed and requesting an award of 

attorney’s fees and costs that Husband had incurred defending against 

Wife’s claims. All pending matters were heard during a hearing on 
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September 20, 2016, which included testimony from Husband and Wife. 

Following the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement, 

requesting that the parties file respective proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. The trial court entered an order on December 16, 2016, 

adopting verbatim those findings and conclusions prepared by Wife.

The trial court found, as part of the findings of fact and conclusions 

of law adopted in its December 16, 2016 order, that Husband was in willful 

contempt of court for his “failure to maintain the vacation fund, failure to 

pay the son’s medical bills, and failure to make the payments owed” 

pursuant to the Property Division/Child Support section of the MDA. Also 

as part of the adopted findings and conclusions, the trial court awarded to 

Wife a judgment against Husband totaling $82,156.45; which included 

$73,763.00 in unpaid property division and child support payments; 

$2,093.97 for payment of the Children’s medical bills; $2,400.00 for unpaid 

payments to the vacation fund account, and $3,899.48 owed to Wife for 

reimbursement of the Children’s health insurance costs.

Following entry of the trial court’s order on December 16, 2016, 

Wife filed a motion on January 13, 2017, requesting that she be awarded 

attorney’s fees incurred in the matter. The trial court subsequently granted 

Wife’s request for attorney’s fees in the amount of $14,675.00 in its final 

order entered on May 26, 2017. The final order reflects that following the 

trial but before the final order was entered, Husband had paid to Wife the 

money he owed toward the vacation fund account and had paid D.T.M.’s 

outstanding medical bills. Husband timely appealed.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. E201700100COAR3CV, 2019 WL 81594, at *1-3 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Jan. 3, 2019).

In the first appeal, we concluded that we were unable to determine whether the 

adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law represented the trial court’s own 

independent analysis and judgment and not that of Wife or her counsel. We vacated the 

opinion of the court and remanded for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Upon remand, the trial court issued extensive findings in support of its assertion that 

Husband’s testimony was false and misleading and that he had manipulated his income to 

Wife’s detriment. Based upon these findings, the court concluded that Husband was 

intentionally under employed and had failed to operate in good faith while carrying out 

his part of the MDA. The court again adopted Wife’s proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law as amended. This appeal followed.
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II. ISSUES

We have consolidated and restated the issues on appeal as follows:

A. Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the MDA.

B. Whether the trial court erred by finding Husband to be in willful 

contempt of court and in calculating the amounts owed by Husband 

pursuant to the MDA.

C. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Husband was voluntarily 

under employed and failed to act in good faith.

D. Whether the trial court erred in awarding to Wife her attorney’s fees, 

and whether Husband should be awarded his attorney’s fees.

E. Whether Wife is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo with a presumption of 

correctness unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings. Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(d); Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

Id.; Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Marital 

dissolution agreements are contracts and are to be treated as such. Johnson v. Johnson,

37 S.W.3d 892, 896 (Tenn. 2001); Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 152 S.W.3d 556, 561-62 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). The interpretation of contracts is a matter of law. Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Watson, 195 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tenn. 2006).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. & B.

Husband argues that the court erred in its interpretation of the MDA insofar as 

holding that his monthly obligation was a set amount and not modifiable on an annual 

basis. He acknowledges that the language supports a finding that his income was set at 

$250,000 for purposes of child support1but that a specific dollar amount was not 

specified for property division purposes but was instead subject to yearly review. Wife 

 

1 Husband does not raise issues pertaining to his child support obligation on appeal. 
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responds that the court did not err in its interpretation of the MDA, which simply set a

ceiling for Husband’s financial obligations. She explains that they anticipated that his 

property division obligations would decrease in the event that his child support obligation 

increased, not that his income would be calculated anew each year or that he could 

submit a separate income figure for property division purposes. 

This court has provided the following guidance in resolving a dispute concerning 

the interpretation of a contract: 

[O]ur task is to ascertain the intention of the parties based upon the usual, 

natural, and ordinary meaning of the contract language. Planters Gin Co. v. 

Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., Inc., 78 S.W.3d 885, 889-90 (Tenn. 

2002) (citing Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999)). A

determination of the intention of the parties “is generally treated as a 

question of law because the words of the contract are definite and 

undisputed, and in deciding the legal effect of the words, there is no 

genuine factual issue left for a jury to decide.” Planters Gin Co., 78 

S.W.3d at 890 (citing 5 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts, § 24.30 

(rev. ed. 1998); Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 

196 (Tenn. 2001)). The central tenet of contract construction is that the 

intent of the contracting parties at the time of executing the agreement 

should govern. Planters Gin Co., 78 S.W.3d at 890. The parties’ intent is 

presumed to be that specifically expressed in the body of the contract. “In 

other words, the object to be attained in construing a contract is to ascertain 

the meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in the language used and 

to give effect to such intent if it does not conflict with any rule of law, good 

morals, or public policy.” Id. (quoting 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 245).

Kafozi v. Windward Cove, LLC, 184 S.W.3d 693, 698 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2006). A court will not look beyond the four corners of the 

document to determine the parties’ intent when the contract is unambiguous. Williams v. 

Larry Stoves and Lincoln Mercury, Inc., No. M2014-00004-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL

5308634, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014). An ambiguity “does not arise in a 

contract merely because the parties may differ as to interpretations of certain of its 

provisions. Rather, a contract is ambiguous only when it is of uncertain meaning and 

may fairly be understood in more ways than one.” Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 

896 (Tenn. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The provisions at issue, as previously provided, provide as follows:
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PROPERTY DIVISION / CHILD SUPPORT: The Husband shall pay to 

the Wife a combination of property division and child support that will be 

paid in three levels as set out below[:]

Stage 1: Based upon the Husband’s current yearly income of $250,000 and 

the Wife’s ability to earn is $48,000 per year and that those amounts shall 

be used for child support worksheet calculation purposes now through the 

end of Stage 2, the date the parties[’] younger minor child [D.T.M.], attains 

the age of majority and there is no longer a child support obligation for 

him, which is anticipated to occur on May 31, 2018, the date of his 

graduation from high school [after] he will have attained the age of 

eighteen.

As per the attached child support worksheets, Stage l, shall be from the date 

of the entry of the Final Decree of Divorce until May 31, 2014, when the 

parties’ daughter, [R.K.M.] attains the age of majority and there is no 

longer a child support obligation for her. Husband shall pay a total amount 

of 28.8% ($6,000 / $250,000) of his gross annual income to the Wife, not to 

exceed a combination of child support and property division of $6,000.00 

per month, which by way of current example would represent $2,082.00 per 

month child support and $3,918.00 per month as property division.

Stage 2: Beginning June 1, 2014, and continuing until the parties’ son, 

[D.T.M.], attains the age of majority on May 31, 2018, and there is no 

longer a child support obligation for him, the Husband’s monthly obligation 

of property division / child support shall be reduced to 24.0% of his annual 

income not to exceed $5,000.00 per month. By way of example this would 

represent a monthly obligation of child support of $1,624.00 (see child 

support worksheet attached hereto) and a monthly obligation of $3,376.00 

as property division beginning June 1, 2014, and continuing until May 31, 

2018, making a total payment of $5,000.00.

Stage 3: Beginning June 1, 2018, and continuing until May 31, 2021, the 

Husband’s monthly obligation of property division shall be reduced to 

13.2% of his annual income not to exceed $2,750.00 per month for a total 

of 36 months.

A fair reading of the contract supports the trial court’s holding of Husband in 

contempt for failure to pay pursuant to the terms of the MDA, calculated with an income 

of $250,000. The legislature has provided that “[w]hen a court having jurisdiction 

determines child support pursuant to the Tennessee child support guidelines, based on 
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either the actual income or the court’s findings of an obligor’s ability to earn income, the 

final child support order shall create an inference in any subsequent proceeding that the 

obligor has the ability to pay the ordered amount until such time as the obligor files an 

application with the court to modify the ordered amount.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-

101(a)(8). We acknowledge Husband’s argument that the same provisions do not 

necessarily apply when calculating income for purposes of a property division obligation. 

However, the contract specifically set his income at $250,000 through the end of Stage 2 

and did not provide guidelines for a yearly income evaluation. We will not read such a 

term into the contract. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s interpretation of the contract, 

holding of Husband in contempt, and calculation of his support arrearages pursuant to the 

terms of the MDA. 

C.

Husband also objects to the court’s finding of voluntary under employment and 

violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as applied to his property division 

obligations. He reasons that a finding of voluntary under employment is only utilized for 

imputing income under the child support guidelines. Further, the MDA did not require 

him to maintain his specific employment, much less a specific gross annual income. 

While voluntary under employment may be a term specific in child support disputes, 

Husband was subject to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing applicable in all 

contracts. See Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). (“A

marital dissolution agreement, like any other contract, contains an implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing both in the performance and in the interpretation of the 

contract.”). The covenant has been explained as follows: 

While this covenant does not create new contractual rights or obligations, it 

protects the parties’ reasonable expectations as well as their right to receive 

the benefits of their agreement. Lopez v. Taylor, 195 S.W.3d 627, 633 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The covenant imposes a duty on the contracting 

parties to do nothing that will impair or destroy the rights of the other party 

to receive the benefits of the contract. Elliott v. Elliott, 149 S.W.3d at 85. 

Id. Here, the court found that Husband manipulated his income to Wife’s detriment and 

was voluntarily under employed. Our review of the record supports this finding. Such 

behavior is a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, regardless of 

whether issues of child support are before the court. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s 

findings on these issues and ultimate decision to enter judgment against Husband for 

failure to comply with the provisions of the MDA. 
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D. & E.

Wife asks this court to affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to 

the MDA. She also requests attorney fees on appeal and again requests attorney fees 

incurred in the first appeal.2 Husband responds with his own request for attorney fees at 

trial and on appeal. 

Tennessee follows the American Rule which provides that “litigants pay their own 

attorney’s fees absent a statute or an agreement providing otherwise.” State v. Brown & 

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000); accord Taylor v. Fezell, 

158 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tenn. 2005). The language of a fee provision in a marital 

dissolution agreement is subject to the usual rules of contract interpretation, and the 

award of such fees is limited to the situation agreed to by the parties. Segneri v. Miller, 

No. M2003-01014-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2357996, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 

2004). The attorney fee provision in the MDA at issue provides as follows:

In the event that it becomes reasonably necessary for either party to 

institute legal proceedings to procure the enforcement of any provision of 

this Agreement or to defend unsubstantiated claims hereunder, in addition 

to any other relief to which the enforcing party may be adjudged entitled, 

he or she shall also be entitled to request a judgment for reasonable 

expenses, including attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting or defending 

this action.

(Emphasis added.).

The MDA presented here simply provides that the prevailing party is only entitled 

to “request” such fees, thereby establishing that the award of such fees remained within 

the discretion of the trial court. Yount v. Yount, 91 S.W.3d 777, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2002). We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Wife in deference to the 

court’s discretion in such matters pursuant to the terms of the MDA and the court’s 

finding of contempt. Exercising our discretion, we respectfully deny the competing 

requests for attorney fees on appeal, incurred in both the first and second appeal. 

 

2 Wife raised the issue of attorney fees in the first appeal. We rendered the issue moot as a result of our 

decision to vacate the order and remand for further findings. Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. E2017-00100-

COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 81594, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. January 3, 2019).
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V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for such further proceedings 

as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellant, Jeffrey Glenn 

Mitchell.

_________________________________ 

JOHN W. McCLARTY, JUDGE