IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs October 7, 2003

WALTER EUGENE INGRAM v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. B95509 Joseph B. Dailey, Judge

No. W2003-00442-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 14, 2004

The defendant, Walter Eugene Ingram, filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” in the Shelby

County Criminal Court. Upon reviewing the motion and the State’s response, the trial court

summarily dismissed the motion, finding that it failed to allege grounds for relief. The defendant

appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the defendant’s appeal

should be dismissed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal Dismissed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,JR.

and JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.

Walter Eugene Ingram, Only, Tennessee, Pro se.

Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; David H. Findley, Assistant Attorney General; William L.

Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Steve P. Jones, Assistant District Attorney General, for the

appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On June 26, 1985, this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences for robbery

with a deadly weapon and violation of the habitual criminal statute. See State v. Walter Eugene

Ingram, No. 147, slip op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, June 26, 1985). The defendant was

sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary for the robbery conviction and the sentence was enhanced

to life imprisonment due to the habitual criminal conviction. Our opinion in the post-conviction

action previously filed by the defendant noted that “it appears that the habitual criminal conviction

occurred in September or November of 1983.” Walter E. Ingram v. State, No. 02C01-9608-CR00258, 1997 WL 421213, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, July 28, 1997).
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 Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120 (1994), the code section providing the correct sentencing for

repeat violent offenders, references Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-118 to assist in determining which prior

felony offenses should be considered to be violent offenses.

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On December 5, 2001, the defendant filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence,” alleging

that his conviction for robbery by use of a deadly weapon was incorrectly used as the basis for his

conviction as an habitual offender. The defendant cited Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-

120 (1994) and 40-35-118 (1994) in support of this contention. 

In its response, the State noted that the defendant’s conviction became final in 1985, well

after the enactment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-118 on July 1, 1994.1

 Thus, the

State argues because Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-118 is prospective in nature, it has

no affect on the defendant’s sentence and can afford the defendant no relief.

Without an evidentiary hearing or appointment of counsel, the trial court agreed with the

State and determined that the statute cited by the defendant “in no way affects the sentence under

which Defendant labors.” The defendant subsequently appealed to this court, again claiming that

“Armed Robbery By Use Of A Deadly Weapon IS NOT SPECIFIED as an offense for purpose of

the Habitual Criminal Statute [Tennessee Code Annotated section] 39-1-801 that allows it to be

use[d] as prior conviction for Enhancement.” 

II. Analysis

Initially, we note that “[g]enerally, trial court orders denying motions to correct sentences are

not appealable as a matter of right.” Cox v. State, 53 S.W.3d 287, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

However, “[a]s a general rule, a trial judge may correct an illegal, as opposed to a merely erroneous,

sentence at any time, even if it has become final.” State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.

1978). “In cases arising from criminal convictions, the remedy of habeas corpus relief applies when

the judgment is void. Thus the appropriate procedure for challenging a void sentence is a petition

for habeas corpus relief.” State v. Donald Ree Jones, No. M2000-00381-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL

1520012, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 13, 2000) (citations omitted). In the instant

case, the defendant has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a habeas corpus action,

namely in that he failed to submit his judgment of conviction to the trial court in conjunction with

his motion, thereby precluding our review on that basis. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107 (1997);

Cox 53 S.W.3d at 292.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no remedy available. “A defendant may pursue

appellate review from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence through the common law

writ of certiorari. See Jones, No. M2000-00381-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1520012, at *2 (Tenn.

Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 13, 2000). The writ of certiorari is limited in application and is used

to address a lower court’s illegal actions when there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy.

See Cox, 53 S.W.3d at 294. Accordingly, if the sentencing infirmity does not rise to the level of

illegality or voidness, an appeal via certiorari should not be granted. Id. “A void judgment ‘is one
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in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render

the judgment or because the defendant’s sentence has expired.’ We have recognized that a sentence

imposed in direct contravention of a statute, for example, is void and illegal.” Stephenson v.

Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted).

As we earlier noted, the defendant argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120

affords him relief from the sentence imposed as the result of his being found to be an habitual

offender. However, the trial court correctly found that such code section was made applicable to all

offenses committed on or after July 1, 1994, nearly ten years after the defendant’s judgment of

conviction became final, and, thus, the code section did not apply to the defendant. This court can

discern no reason to grant a writ of certiorari to review the trial court’s denial of his motion.

Therefore, we conclude that the defendant’s arguments afford him no relief.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we dismiss the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to correct an

illegal sentence. 

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NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE