alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3727 

To prohibit the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from 

proposing any standard of performance for emissions of carbon dioxide 

from existing fossil fuel-fired electric utility generating units before the 

Administrator has finalized a standard of performance for emissions 

of carbon dioxide from new fossil fuel-fired electric utility generating 

units. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 12, 2013 

Mr. MCKINLEY (for himself, Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas, Mr. STIVERS, Mrs. 

CAPITO, Mr. JOHNSON of Ohio, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. GUTHRIE, and Mr. 

CRAMER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To prohibit the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from proposing any standard of performance 

for emissions of carbon dioxide from existing fossil fuelfired electric utility generating units before the Administrator has finalized a standard of performance for emissions of carbon dioxide from new fossil fuel-fired electric 

utility generating units. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•HR 3727 IH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Keep the EPA Honest 

3 Act of 2013’’. 

4 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST PROPOSING STANDARDS OF 

5 PERFORMANCE FOR EMISSIONS OF CARBON 

6 DIOXIDE FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS BE7 FORE FINALIZING STANDARDS OF PERFORM8 ANCE FOR EMISSIONS OF CARBON DIOXIDE 

9 FROM NEW POWER PLANTS. 

10 (a) PROHIBITION.—The Administrator of the Envi11 ronmental Protection Agency shall not propose any stand12 ard of performance under section 111(d) of the Clean Air 

13 Act (42 U.S.C. 7411(d)) for emissions of carbon dioxide 

14 from existing fossil fuel-fired electric utility generating 

15 units before the Administrator has finalized and published 

16 in the Federal Register a standard of performance under 

17 section 111(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 7411(b)) for emis18 sions of carbon dioxide from new fossil fuel-fired electric 

19 utility generating units. 

20 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This Act shall not be 

21 construed to have any implication with respect to whether 

22 the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agen23 cy has authority to propose standards of performance 

24 under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 

25 7411(d)) for emissions of air pollutants other than carbon 

26 dioxide from existing sources before finalizing standards 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS

3 

•HR 3727 IH

1 of performance under section 111(b) of such Act (42 

2 U.S.C. 7411(b)) for emissions of such air pollutants from 

3 new sources. 

Æ 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
STATE v. Andrew Darrin RAMSEUR.

No. 388A10-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 10, 2015.

Daniel Shatz, Assistant Appellate Defender.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Amy Kunstling Irene, Assistant Attorney General.

Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Ramseur, Andrew Darrin.

Jonathan Babb, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Sarah Kirkman, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 9th of April 2015 by Defendant to Maintain Stay of Direct Appeal:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 10th of June 2015."
#### In the Matter of Roger Simmonds, Petitioner, v Donald Selsky, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, Respondent.

[801 NYS2d 87]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge a determination finding him guilty of violating the prison disciplinary rule that prohibits the unauthorized use of a controlled substance. The Attorney General has advised this Court that the determination at issue has been administratively reversed and all references thereto expunged from petitioner’s institutional record. Inasmuch as petitioner has received all the relief to which he is entitled and is no longer aggrieved, the matter is dismissed as moot *(see Matter of Hyde v Selsky,*16 AD3d 799 [2005]).

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Spain, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the petition is dismissed, as moot, without costs, but with disbursements in the amount of $50.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

ARTHUR RASHAD COLE, JR.,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 329 MAL 2015

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of July, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
STATE of North Carolina v. Sharon Dean FARABEE.

No. COA15-696.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 3, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error in Part; Vacated in part.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Providence Props Inc. :

:

v. : No. 933 C.D. 2018

:

Limerick Township Board of :

Supervisors, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

NOW, July 23, 2019

, having considered A ppellant’ s application for

reargument, the application is denied.

MARY HANNAH LEAVITT,

P resident Judge
In the Matter of the Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by John Paul SMITH1 Dated November 10, 2007 and Recorded in Book RB 913 at page 432 in the Columbus County Public Registry, North Carolina.

No. COA15-195.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 10, 2016.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reversed and Remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              APR-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                       1,250,115
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          83,504
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               698,578
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 66,621,761
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       1,584,840
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         1,626,076
<LOANS>                                    173,800,267
<ALLOWANCE>                                    474,100
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             253,112,027
<DEPOSITS>                                 179,403,009
<SHORT-TERM>                                44,700,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          3,512,139
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        16,645
<OTHER-SE>                                  25,480,234
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             253,112,027
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             12,703,906
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            5,540,921
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               125,221
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            18,370,048
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           8,898,118
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          10,998,766
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        7,371,282
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   65,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,342,547
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,394,696
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   2,037,146
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,037,146
<EPS-BASIC>                                     1.25
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.23
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.54
<LOANS-NON>                                    559,006
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                387,000
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               457,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   47,900
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              474,100
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        474,100


</TABLE>
Trevon Deandre RICE v. HARNETT COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, Jacqualyn L. Lee.

No. 428P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Jan. 28, 2016.

Trevon DeAndre Rice, for Rice, Trevon DeAndre.

Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for Harnett County District Court.

Vernon K. Stewart, District Attorney, for Harnett County District Court.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Plaintiff on the 22nd of December 2015 in this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Harnett County:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of January 2016."
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND
AS OF MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                    0000919602
<NAME> HELSINKI CAPITAL PARTNERS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                    1
<CURRENCY>                      US dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Mar-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 Apr-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          436
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1,246
<OTHER-SE>                                     (1,682)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   0
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  166
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (166)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (166)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (166)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.00)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THE  SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF LACROSSE FOOTWEAR, INC. AS OF AND FOR THE PERIOD ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         2,022
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  21,301
<ALLOWANCES>                                   369
<INVENTORY>                                    40,337
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               68,529
<PP&E>                                         39,797
<DEPRECIATION>                                 26,986
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 98,020
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          27,737
<BONDS>                                        10,702
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       67
<OTHER-SE>                                     56,321
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   98,020
<SALES>                                        124,328
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               124,328
<CGS>                                          95,129
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  31,293
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               113
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             2,208
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (4,324)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,687)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,637)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,637)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (.41)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.41)


</TABLE>
In the Matter of J.L., F.L., C.L., and J.L.

No. COA15-1096.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

April 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Dismissed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part.
f8k112210ex4i_mustang.htm


 


 


Exhibit 4.1


 


 



 PROMISSORY NOTE







$25,000.00


November 22, 2010







FOR VALUED RECEIVED, Mustang Alliances, Inc., a Nevada corporation ("Payor"), promises to pay to Sarah Laufer ("Payee") the principal sum of Twenty Five Thousand Dollars and 00/100 ($25,000.00) Dollars with interest accruing on the unpaid principal balance commencing on the date hereof at the rate of five (5%) percent per annum.  The principal and accrued interest under this promissory note (the "Note") shall be due and payable in full on November 22, 2012.







Each of the following events shall constitute an event of default hereunder: (a) Payor’s failure to make payment of any amount due hereunder after the same shall become due and payable in accordance with the terms hereof and such failure continues for three (3) business days thereafter; or (b) Payor files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or an involuntary petition is filed against it and not dismissed within twenty (20) days.  Payor hereby waives presentment, demand for payment, protest, and all other demands and notices in connection with the delivery, acceptance, performance and enforcement of this Note and authorizes Payee, without notice or further consent, to grant extensions of time in the payment of any monies under this Note, and to waive compliance of any provision of this Note.







This Note may be prepaid by Payor, in whole or in part, at any time without penalty.







This Note shall be construed, performed, and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York.  Payor and Payee hereby irrevocably consent to the in personam jurisdiction of the state or federal courts located in the State of New York, in connection with any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this Note or the transactions and the relationships established hereunder.  Payor and Payee hereby agree that such courts shall be the venue and exclusive and proper forum in which to adjudicate such matters and that they will not contest or challenge the jurisdiction or venue of these courts.







This Note shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Payor and Payee and their permitted successors and assigns.







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Payor has executed this Promissory Note as of the 22nd day of November, 2010.









 


MUSTANG ALLIANCES, INC.


 


By: /s/ Joseph Levi                       


Name: Joseph Levi


Title:   Director
STATE v. Jonathan E. WALKER, Sr.

No. 287P09-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 10, 2015.

Jonathan Elwood Walker, Sr., for Walker, Jonathan Elwood (Sr.).

Derrick C. Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Philip E. Berger, Jr., District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 21st of April 2015 by Defendant to Grant Another Direct Appeal:

> "Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 10th of June 2015."

JACKSON, J. recused.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-7001

STANLEY WILLIAMS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Columbia. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.

(3:08-cv-00798-HFF-JRM)

Submitted: August 20, 2008 Decided: August 29, 2008

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stanley Williams, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Stanley Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s

order dismissing without prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)

petition for failure to prosecute and has filed an application for

an original writ of habeas corpus with this court under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 (2000). 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has

not made the requisite showing.

Although we are authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) to

exercise jurisdiction over original petitions for habeas corpus

relief, we are not required to do so and we typically decline to

exercise such jurisdiction and instead transfer the matter to the

appropriate district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(a). We will
3

not transfer a habeas corpus petition unless the transfer would

serve the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000). We

conclude that a transfer of this matter would not be in the

interests of justice.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny the

motion for an original writ of habeas corpus, and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
II 

Calendar No. 356 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 645 

[Report No. 110–158] 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to provide an alternate sulfur 

dioxide removal measurement for certain coal gasification project goals. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 15, 2007 

Mr. THOMAS (for himself, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. 

CRAIG, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. ENZI, Mr. HAGEL, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. SALAZAR, Mr. HATCH, Mr. COLEMAN, and Mr. BARRASSO) 

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2007 

Reported by Mr. BINGAMAN, without amendment 

A BILL 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to provide an 

alternate sulfur dioxide removal measurement for certain 

coal gasification project goals. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
2 

•S 645 RS

1 SECTION 1. TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR CLEAN COAL 

2 POWER INITIATIVE. 

3 Section 402(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Energy Policy Act of 

4 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15962(b)(1)(B)(ii)) is amended by strik5 ing subclause (I) and inserting the following: 

6 ‘‘(I)(aa) to remove at least 99 

7 percent of sulfur dioxide; or 

8 ‘‘(bb) to emit not more than 0.04 

9 pound SO2 per million Btu, based on 

10 a 30-day average;’’. 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS

bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
Calendar No. 356 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 645 

[Report No. 110

–158] 

A BILL 

To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to provide 

for certain coal gasification project goals. an alternate sulfur dioxide removal measurement 

FEBRUARY 17, 2007 

Reported without amendment 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with BILLS
STATE of North Carolina v. Reginald Underwood FULLARD.

No. 309P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 17, 2016.

Kathryn L. VandenBerg, for Fullard, Reginald Underwood.

Karen A. Blum, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Reginald Fullard, for Fullard, Reginald Underwood.

James R. O'Neill, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 1st of September 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of March 2016."
**KFS** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 2 3 - 0203 STATE OF MONTANA ,

P la intiff and Appell ee , v. DION CURTIS GRAY ,

Defendant and Appell an

t . **GRANT OF EXTENSION** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is gran ted an extension of time to and including June 18 , 202 4 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court May 8 2024

05/08/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0203
On petition for review filed June 27,1997,

petition for review allowed; decision of Court of Appeals vacated and case remanded to Court of Appeals with instructions January 27, 2000

#### TERRENCE LEE TUCKER, *Petitioner on Review, v.*BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION, *Respondent on Review.*

(CA A92606; SC S44326)

997 P2d 189

Daniel Q. O’Dell, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, filed the petition for review. With him on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

Christine Chute, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General.

Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen, and Durham, Justices.**

**

 Padeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 3Í, 1998, and did not participate in this decision; Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The petition for review is allowed. The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss the petition for judicial review. *See Quintero v. Board of Parole,*329 Or 319, 986 P2d 575 (1999).