UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Senior Airman JOSEPH D. MORCHINEK

United States Air Force

ACM S32291

9 May 2016

Sentence adjudged 28 September 2014 by SPCM convened at Bagram 

Airfield, Afghanistan. Military Judge: Christopher F. Leavey.

Approved Sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 2 months, 

forfeiture of $1,021.00 pay per month for 2 months, reduction to E-1, and a 

reprimand.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Captain Lauren A. Shure.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Captain Tyler B. Musselman and 

Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.

Before

ALLRED, MITCHELL, and ZIMMERMAN

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent 

under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

ZIMMERMAN, Judge:

Appellant was convicted, contrary to his plea, by a panel of officer members of 

misbehavior before the enemy in violation of Article 99, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 899. 

Appellant was convicted by the military judge, in accordance with his plea, of use, 

distribution and possession of hashish while receiving special pay in violation of Article 

112a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 912a. The court sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for two months, forfeiture of $1,021 pay per month for two months, reduction 
ACM S32291

2

to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand.1 The sentence was approved, as adjudged, on 2 

February 2015.

Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was factually insufficient to establish that 

Appellant was “before the enemy” and endangered the safety of Bagram Airfield; (2) that 

the Government was required to prove that Appellant had a duty to defend Bagram Airfield, 

and that it failed to do so; (3) the military judge erred in instructing the members prior to 

deliberation on findings; and (4) the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over the charge of 

misbehavior before the enemy because it alleged a capital offense yet was referred without 

consent of the general court-martial convening authority. Finding no error that materially 

prejudices a substantial right of Appellant, we affirm the findings and sentence.

Background

Appellant used, distributed, and possessed hashish both on and off-duty as a security 

forces member deployed to Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. He pled guilty to the controlled 

substance offenses, but contested the charge that his use constituted misbehavior before the 

enemy. He argued that under the circumstances, his drug offenses did not endanger the 

safety of the installation. He further contended that, based upon the state of hostilities, he 

was not before the enemy at the time of his misconduct. Appellant stipulated that on one 

occasion he used hashish while posted to a perimeter response team which had immediateaction responsibilities in the event of an attack on the installation. In that capacity, he was 

the senior member of a three-person crew of a tactical vehicle armed with a crew-served 

machine gun mounted in a turret. During that time, he both used hashish and distributed it 

to the other members of his crew. He also stipulated that on another occasion he used 

hashish while responsible for the search and inspection of personnel coming onto the 

installation. His commander testified during the trial that both postings were part of a 

“defense in depth” strategy to defend the installation. The commander also testified that 

the installation came under indirect fire attacks during the charged timeframe.

Factual and Legal Sufficiency

Appellant first argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for misbehavior before the enemy because the Government failed to prove that 

his misconduct was actually before the enemy and that it endangered the installation. We 

review issues of factual sufficiency de novo. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 

399 (C.A.A.F. 2002). The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after weighing the 

evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed 

 

1 The court-martial order incorrectly states that the sentence was adjudged by the military judge, rather than members. 

We direct the promulgation of a corrected order. We also note that a reprimand was adjudged and approved, but not 

included on the convening authority’s action, as required by Air Force Instruction 51-201, Administration of Military 

Justice (6 June 2013). Since the omission of the reprimand does not prejudice a material right of Appellant, we direct 

no further action in that regard. See Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a).
ACM S32291

3

the witnesses, [we are] convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987), quoted in United States v. Reed, 

54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000). In conducting this unique appellate role, we take “a fresh, 

impartial look at the evidence,” applying “neither a presumption of innocence nor a 

presumption of guilt” to “make [our] own independent determination as to whether the 

evidence constitutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Washington, 57 M.J. at 399. 

The Manual for Courts-Martial provides an explanation for the term “before the 

enemy.”

Whether a person is “before the enemy” is a question of tactical 

relation, not distance. For example, a member of an antiaircraft 

gun crew charged with opposing anticipated attack from the 

air, or a member of a unit about to move into combat may be 

before the enemy although miles from the enemy lines. On the 

other hand, an organization some distance from the front or

immediate area of combat which is not a part of a tactical 

operation then going on or in immediate prospect is not “before 

or in the presence of the enemy” within the meaning of this 

article. 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶ 23.c.(1)(c) (2012 ed.). Our superior 

court has also examined the issue, holding that “if an organization is in position ready to 

participate in either an offensive or defensive battle, and, its weapons are capable of 

delivering fire on the enemy and in turn are so situated that they are within effective range 

of the enemy weapons, then that unit is before the enemy.” United States v. Sperland, 5 

C.M.R. 89, 91 (C.M.A. 1952).

Appellant contends that “[n]o evidence was presented that Appellant was tactically 

engaged with the enemy.” Neither Sperland nor the definition in the Manual focuses on 

individual engagement, however. The Manual references, by way of illustration, those 

before the enemy as a “member of an antiaircraft gun crew” and “a member of a unit about 

to move into combat.” Since one form of misbehavior before the enemy is wrongful failure 

to engage in combat, we find this unit-based analysis significant. See United States v. 

Payne, 40 C.M.R. 516, 519–20 (A.B.R. 1969). Appellant’s commander affirmatively 

testified that the unit was tactically engaged in the defense of Bagram Airfield. We find 

Appellant’s contention that Bagram Airfield was “some distance from the front or 

immediate area of combat” unconvincing in light of the uncontested evidence in the record 

that the installation did, in fact, come under indirect-fire attack during the charged timeframe. Nor are we convinced by Appellant’s argument that his misconduct did not actually 

endanger the base. After making allowances for not having personally observed the 

witnesses, and based upon our independent review of the record, we are convinced beyond 
ACM S32291

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a reasonable doubt that Appellant was before the enemy and that his conduct endangered 

Bagram Airfield.

Appellant separately argues that, although not explicitly stated in the statute, the 

specification as alleged incorporated as an element that Appellant had a duty to defend 

Bagram Airfield. More importantly, Appellant argues that the Government failed to prove 

such an element beyond a reasonable doubt. We construe this assignment of error as an 

assertion that the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to support his conviction 

because it did not show that Appellant had a duty to defend Bagram Airfield. 

We review legal sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Washington, 57 M.J. at 399. 

“The test for legal sufficiency of the evidence is ‘whether, considering the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the 

essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83, 

94 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (quoting Turner, 25 M.J. at 324). The term reasonable doubt does not 

mean that the evidence must be free from conflict. United States v. Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 

(A.F.C.M.R. 1986). “[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw 

every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” United 

States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001). Our assessment of legal and factual 

sufficiency is limited to the evidence produced at trial. United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 

270, 272 (C.M.A. 1993). We review the factual sufficiency component of Appellant’s 

assertion using the same standard of review and legal test articulated above. 

Appellant first sets out a statutory and due process argument to establish, as an 

element, that Appellant had a duty to defend Bagram Airfield. We agree with Appellant’s 

interpretation that the specification alleged in this case established an element that 

Appellant had a duty to defend Bagram Airfield.

We find, however, that the evidence was factually and legally sufficient to show 

that Appellant had such a duty. Appellant’s commander testified both about the general 

duty of Airmen assigned to his unit and about the specific duties Appellant performed. He 

testified that all members of his unit had a duty to defend Bagram Airfield. He also testified 

about the layered defenses he employed, including searches of incoming and outgoing 

traffic as well as perimeter response teams with additional weapons. Other members of 

the unit also testified that Airmen assigned to the unit had a duty to defend Bagram Airfield, 

even during rest periods, or while “off-shift.” Appellant also stipulated that he “was 

assigned to perform base defense duties.” More specifically, Appellant stipulated that he 

used hashish while on-shift assigned to both search duties and perimeter response team 

duties. We find this evidence was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution for a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Appellant had a duty to 

defend Bagram Airfield at all times relevant to the charged offense. We ourselves, after 

making allowances for not having personally observed the witnesses, and based upon our 
ACM S32291

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independent review of the record, also conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant 

was guilty of the offense alleged.

Reasonable Doubt Instruction

Appellant also argues that the military judge erred in instructing the members prior 

to deliberation on findings, particularly as it relates to reasonable doubt. We review de 

novo the military judge’s instructions to ensure that they correctly address the issues raised 

by the evidence. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 424 (C.A.A.F. 1996). When, as 

in this case, trial defense counsel made no challenge to the instruction now contested on 

appeal, the matter has been forfeited absent plain error.2 See Rule for Courts-Martial 

(R.C.M.) 920(f). If we find error, we must then determine whether the error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Medina, 69 M.J. 462, 465 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

The language used by the military judge in Appellant’s case is—and has been for 

many years—an accepted reasonable doubt instruction used in Air Force courts-martial. 

See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 50 M.J. 506, 509–10 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999); see 

also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 873–74 (1st Cir. 1984) (upholding similar 

language). It was also offered by our superior court as a suggested instruction. See United 

States v. Meeks, 41 M.J. 150, 157–58 n.2 (C.M.A. 1994) (citing Federal Judicial Center, 

Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 17–18 (1987)). As such, we cannot say the military judge 

committed error, plain or otherwise, in giving the challenged instruction in Appellant’s 

case.

Jurisdiction over Capital Offense

Appellant raises for the first time on appeal that the convening authority who 

referred his case to a special court-martial lacked the consent of the general court-martial 

convening authority, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. See 

R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(C); United States v. Henderson, 59 M.J. 350, 353 (C.A.A.F. 2004). We 

disagree with Appellant’s contention. 

“The jurisdiction of a special court-martial over a non-mandatory capital offense is 

a legal question we review de novo.” Henderson, 59 M.J. at 351–52. 

“Misbehavior before the enemy” under Article 99, UCMJ, is a non-mandatory 

capital offense, punishable by “[d]eath or such other punishments as a court-martial may 

direct.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, ¶ 23.e. (2012 ed.). When read 

together, Article 19, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(C)(ii) 3allow a special court-martial 

 

2 Although we recognize that the rule speaks of “waiver,” this is in fact forfeiture. United States. v. Sousa, 72 M.J. 

643 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2013).

3 Article 19 states in part, “special courts-martial have jurisdiction to try persons . . . under such regulations as the 

President may prescribe, for capital offenses.” Rule for Courts-Martial 201(f)(2)(C)(ii) prescribes one such exception, 
ACM S32291

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convening authority (SPCMCA) to refer a non-mandatory capital offense to trial by special 

court-martial, when permitted by “[a]n officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction 

over the command which includes the accused.” Appellant did not raise this jurisdictional 

issue at trial, and the record of trial is devoid of any indication that the general court-martial 

convening authority (GCMCA) granted authority to the convening authority. Hence, the 

Government filed affidavits in support of its argument that the convening authority actually 

exercised proper jurisdiction under the R.C.M. 201(f)(2)(C)(ii) exception, which affidavits 

were not contested by Appellant.4

The Government supplied an affidavit from the GCMCA and one from the 

SPCMCA who convened this court-martial. Both affiants unequivocally attested to 

discussing this case with one another on multiple occasions, and to the GCMCA’s granting 

of approval to the SPCMCA to refer the Article 99 offense to a special court-martial. We 

find the statements in the affidavits were relevant; the GCMCA granted permission to the 

convening authority to refer the offenses to trial by a special court-martial; and therefore, 

the special court-martial had jurisdiction to convict and sentence Appellant.5

Conclusion

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 

66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c). Accordingly, the approved findings and 

sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

 LEAH M. CALAHAN

Clerk of the Court

 

allowing for special court-martial jurisdiction over non-mandatory capital offenses when permitted by “[a]n officer 

exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command which includes the accused.”

4 The Government filed a motion to attach documents with its response to Appellant’s supplemental filings, which 

motion was uncontested and granted by this court. We considered the affidavits in our review of Appellant’s claim 

of jurisdictional error. See United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 242 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Averell, 2014 

CCA LEXIS 841 (N.M. Ct .Crim. App. 6 November 2014), pet. rev. denied, 74 M.J. 354 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (where 

appellant did not raise jurisdictional issue at trial and did not dispute contents of post-trial affidavit, court relied on 

post-trial affidavit to find proper referral of charges to court-martial).

5 Although neither required by law nor regulation, where the GCMCA permits a non-mandatory capital offense to be 

referred to a special court-martial, such approval could be expressly stated on the charge sheet, DD Form 458, Section 

V.