UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1387

PAULA A. PIEHL, Individually and as Personal Representative 

of The Estate of Martin Abraham Piehl; FORREST PIEHL,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

NARAYAN P. SAHETA, M.D.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District 

Judge. (1:13-cv-00254-WMN)

Submitted: January 28, 2015 Decided: March 5, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henry L. Belsky, Mitchell E. Rosensweig, SCHLACHMAN, BELSKY & 

WEINER, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Matthew H. 

Fogelson, Frederick W. Goundry, III, VARNER & GOUNDRY, 

Frederick, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Paula and Forrest Piehl (“the Piehls”) brought this 

diversity action against cardiologist Narayan Saheta alleging 

medical negligence and wrongful death in Saheta’s treatment of 

Martin Piehl (“Mr. Piehl”). Following a jury verdict in 

Saheta’s favor on all counts, the Piehls appeal.

The Piehls assert that the district court erred in 

three different respects at trial. First, they contend that 

they were prejudiced by improper remarks in both opening 

statements and closing arguments. Second, the Piehls argue that 

the district court permitted an improper voir dire of an expert 

witness. Finally, the Piehls contend that the district court 

erred in rejecting six of their proposed jury instructions. 

Having considered the record, the briefs, and the applicable 

law, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

The Piehls contend that the district court erred when 

it overruled their objection to Saheta’s reference to the theory 

of contributory negligence in opening statements. The Piehls 

further contend that, at the conclusion of the trial, the court 

should have explained to the jury that contributory negligence 

was not an issue in the case. 

During closing arguments the jury heard from both the 

court and the Piehls that contributory negligence was “not an 

issue” (J.A. 360), and the Piehls did not request a further
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instruction from the court on the matter. The jury was 

instructed to decide only the issue of Saheta’s negligence. 

There was no instruction for the jury to consider whether Mr. 

Piehl was negligent. The court instructed the jury not to 

consider counsels’ statements or arguments as evidence. 

Jurors are presumed to follow the law. See United 

States v. Min, 704 F.3d 314, 322 n.6 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)). There is 

nothing in the record to suggest that the jury ignored the 

instructions and imputed contributory negligence on Mr. Piehl’s 

part in finding that Saheta was not negligent. Accordingly, we 

conclude that, even if the district court erred, the Piehls were 

not prejudiced in either instance. 

In their second assignment of error, the Piehls assert 

that the district court allowed Saheta to improperly voir dire 

their expert witness, Dr. Jonathan Arden, by referencing a 

report irrelevant to his qualifications as an expert in forensic 

pathology. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed 

for abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the district 

court’s decision “is guided by erroneous legal principles or 

rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” United States 

v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Further, evidentiary rulings are 

subject to harmless error review, such that any error is 
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harmless if we may say “with fair assurance, after pondering all 

that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the 

whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 

error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, 

with some exceptions, that all relevant evidence is admissible. 

Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if “its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . 

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the 

jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Rule 611(b) provides that “[c]rossexamination should not go beyond the subject matter of the 

direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s 

credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional 

matters as if on direct examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). 

The district court “is vested with broad discretion to control 

the mode of interrogation and presentation of evidence.” United 

States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 955-56 (4th Cir. 1994) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Saheta 

to question Dr. Arden concerning the report, but in any event, 

any error in permitting that cross-examination was harmless 

given that the jury never reached the issue addressed by Dr. 

Arden’s testimony, that of causation. 
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In their third and final assignment of error, the 

Piehls assert that the district court erred in rejecting a 

number of their proposed instructions. In determining whether 

the district court erred in instructing the jury, we review the 

trial court’s jury instructions as a whole. Rowland v. Am. Gen. 

Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2003). “Instructions 

will be considered adequate if construed as a whole, and in 

light of the whole record, they adequately inform the jury of 

the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing 

the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Where a 

party objects to the trial court’s failure to give a requested 

instruction, we review for abuse of discretion. See id.

With respect to the Piehls’ proposed instructions 

numbered 3, 10, and 11, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in rejecting these instructions. The 

court’s instructions adequately conveyed the material proposed 

in instructions 3 and 10. To the extent that the Piehls 

preserved their objection regarding proposed instruction 11, 

they fail to establish that it stated a controlling principle of 

Maryland law. With respect to the Piehls’ proposed instructions 

numbered 5, 6, and 13 addressing causation, we conclude that any 

error in rejecting them was harmless in light of the fact that 
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the jury found that Saheta did not breach the standard of care 

and, accordingly, never reached the issue of causation.

We affirm the judgment of the district court. We 

grant Saheta’s motion and dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED