* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED November 16, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-10667

Unit ed States of America, Pl aint iff- Appellee,
versus Troy Dean Palmer, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Texas
Before GARZA, DEMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Troy Dean Palmer appeals th e district court’s rul ing on a motion to suppress. For the fo llo wing reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 15, 2003, Palmer, driving alo ng wit h a com panion, parked a truck in a residential driveway. Palmer was being followed by Officer Keller, a Grapevine police officer, who had run Palmer’s registration and discovered several outstanding traffic warrants. Upon seeing Palmer and2

his com panion exit , Officer Keller made contact and requested their licenses. Aft er running Palmer’s license, Officer Keller discovered several more outstanding traffic warrants. Palmer requested th at the of ficer not make an arrest as he was cooperating with an ongoing, unrelated FBI invest igation. Officer Keller contacted the FBI, which also requested that an arrest not be made. Officer Keller’s supervisor, however, insisted on arresting Palmer. Approximately twenty-four minutes passed while Officer Keller completed Palmer’s arrest. During th at time, Palmer was in t he general area of the parked truck and Officer Keller. After arresting Palmer, placing him in the back of the patrol car, and obtaining the car keys from Palmer’s
com panion, Officer Keller searched the truck, discovering a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun, a small amo unt (24.1 grams) of methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia. Palmer is an ex-felon and was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and for being in possession of a fir earm wit h an alt ered serial number. Aft er the di strict court denied his
mo tion to suppress, Palmer agreed to pl ead guilt y t o being a felon in possession of a firearm but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the mo tion to suppress. See , e.g ., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a) (2). Palmer now appeals and we affirm. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a mo tion to suppress, this court views all evidence in the light mo st favorable to the prevailing party . U nited States v. How

ard , 106 F.3d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1997). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id
. III. DISCUSSION Palmer alleges that the search of the truck was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We affirm the district court. Our decision is guided by Thornton v. United States , 541 U.S. 6153

(2004), which held th at the legalit y of searches incident to a lawful arrest do not rest on whether an of ficer makes contact wit h a person inside or outside of a vehicle. Thornton extended the holding in New Yor

k v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454 (1981), a case establishing the constitutionality of searches incident to a lawful arrest, to cover such sit uations where “recent occupants” of vehicles are arrested. The majority in Thornton does not precisely define the term “recent occupants” other than to remark th at “t he arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding of ficer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.” Thornton, 453 U.S. at 621. Thus, the opinion appears to provide officers broad discretion to search any and all areas within reach of a person who is arrested. The Thornton holding does not go any further th an th at, simply stating th at it is constitutional fo r of ficers to search vehicles fo llo wing the arrest of a “recent occupant of a vehicle such as peti tioner
was here.” Id
. at 624. In Thornton , th e of ficer began following a car, ran its registration and discovered th at it did not mat ch. Soon thereaf ter, the defendant parked the car and exited. The of ficer approached and questioned the defendant. Aft er a pat down search, the officer discovered narcotics, leading to a lawful arrest. Following the arrest and after placing the defendant in the patrol car, the of

ficer searched the vehicle, finding a .9 millimet er handgun. The situation in T hornton is analogous to the one here. Aft er a lawful arrest and after placing Palmer in the patrol car, Officer Keller conducted a constitutional search incident to the arrest. The twenty -four minutes that passed between the time the of

ficer approached Palmer and the time he made the arrest was not sufficient to rem ove Palmer from being characterized as a “recent occupant.” The majo rity opinio n in Thornton chose not to reach the majo r issue raised in the concurring opinio ns, which is whether Belton should be limit ed to situations where it is “reasonable to believe4

evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be fo und in the vehicle
. . . .” I d
. at 624. Likewise, we decline to decide th at issue as the concurring opinio ns ult imat ely jo ined the majo rity holding in Thornton , which would uphold the constitutionality of Officer Keller’s search of Palmer’s vehicle. Under Thornton , two of our sist er circuits have also up held “recent occupant” searches resting on facts similar to th ose invo lved here. S ee , e.g ., United States v. Herndon , 393 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2005) (vacated on other grounds); United States v. Poggemiller , 375 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2004). IV. CONCLUSION For the fo regoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the mo tion to suppress. AFFIRMED.