UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4461

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TYREE DORIAN RHINEHARDT, a/k/a Reek,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00099-RLV-DCK-2)

Submitted: January 30, 2018 Decided: February 5, 2018 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William D. Auman, AUMAN LAW OFFICES, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Tyree Dorian Rhinehardt pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012). The district court sentenced 

Rhinehardt to 12 months and 1 day of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised 

release. After Rhinehardt was released from incarceration, the district court revoked his

supervised release and sentenced him to 11 months of imprisonment, followed by 24 

months of supervised release. Rhinehardt appeals, arguing that the court abused its 

discretion in revoking his supervised release and that the sentence imposed upon 

revocation is plainly unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and 

dismiss in part.

During the pendency of this appeal, Rhinehardt was released from incarceration. 

We may address the issue of mootness sua sponte, “since mootness goes to the heart of 

the Article III jurisdiction of the courts.” Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 

(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] case is moot when the issues 

presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome.” United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Upon the expiration of a defendant’s sentence “some concrete and 

continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole—some collateral 

consequence of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a “presumption of collateral consequences does not 

apply to supervised release revocations.” United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611-12 (3d 

Cir. 2013). Because Rhinehardt has served his term of imprisonment, there is no longer a 
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live controversy regarding the length of his confinement. Therefore, his challenge to the 

district court’s decision to impose an 11-month term of imprisonment is moot. 

As Rhinehardt is still serving his supervised release term, however, we retain 

jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised release. We 

review the district court’s revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion, and the 

court’s factual determinations underlying the conclusion that a violation occurred for 

clear error. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). Upon finding a 

violation of a term of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence, the court 

may revoke a term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve imprisonment 

for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by the statute for the 

underlying offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); see United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 

829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). Prior to revoking supervised release and imposing a sentence, a 

court must consider some of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Rhinehardt’s supervised release 

upon his admission to violating the terms of that supervision. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in part, insofar as it challenges the length of 

Rhinehardt’s term of imprisonment, and affirm the revocation judgment in all other 

respects. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART