* District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5,the court has determined thatthis opinion should

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Rule

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-51132

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TERRY CONLENZO-HUFFMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas, 

Waco Division.

USDC No. 6:07-cr-73

Before GARZA and ELROD, Circuit Judges, and HICKS, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM:**

Appellant Terry Conlenzo-Huffman appeals the district court’s denial of

his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In the district court below the parties stipulated the following facts. 

On January 17, 2007, Commander Joe Davis of the Robertson County

Sheriff’s Department received a tip that Appellant Huffman would be in Calvert,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 15, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-51132

2

Texas that day driving a blue Buick Park Avenue with a missing hubcap, and

that Huffman would be in possession of a substantial amount of cocaine. That

tip was provided by a confidential informant (“CI”) who had provided reliable

tips to Davis in the past. Prompted by the tip, Davis traveled to Calvert on

January 17th to pursue Huffman; in doing so, he asked for and received the

assistance of Calvert Police Chief Joe Cheatham. Davis asked Cheatham to

locate and stop Huffman on a traffic violation if possible. Cheatham spotted

Huffman as a passenger in a vehicle matching that described by the CI.

Although Huffman owned the Buick, driving it was an acquaintance of his

named Joey Bowen; a third individual occupied the back seat. 

Observing that neither Huffman nor his passenger were wearing seatbelts,

Cheatham stopped the vehicle and asked the occupants to exit. Although he

complied, Huffman refused to step away from the vehicle, but rather insisted on

remaining in the area between the front seat and the open passenger door.

Huffman was also observed reaching into the passenger compartment for various

items. Cheatham asked Bowen for permission to search the vehicle. Stating

that he could not provide such permission because he was not the vehicle’s

owner, Bowen declined. Cheatham thus sought permission to search the vehicle

from Huffman, the owner, who also declined. 

Bowen had a valid driver’s licence, and Huffman provided proof of

automobile insurance. Further, a computer check did not reveal any

outstanding warrants as to any of the Buick’s occupants. Cheatham issued

Bowen and Huffman citations for failing to wear seatbelts. He next told

Huffman that he was free to leave, but Huffman chose to remain. 

Based on the information provided by the CI, the officers’ suspicion that

the Buick contained narcotics was not quickly dispelled. Unable to obtain

consent to search the vehicle, the officers sought a narcotics dog to conduct a

“sniff test” of the vehicle. Because the narcotics dog belonging to the Calvert

Police Department was not “certified,” the officers sought the use of the dog
No. 07-51132

3

belonging to the City of Bryan, located thirty-five miles away. That dog

eventually arrived on scene. Upon examining the vehicle, the dog signaled the

presence of narcotics inside. The stop lasted one hour and twenty minutes. It

was stipulated below that “much of the delay in the stop was attributable to

[Huffman], who refused to comply with officers’ orders to step away from the

vehicle and was verbally abusive.” A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded

approximately 82.7 grams of cocaine. 

In agreeing to stipulate the above facts, Huffman sought “to avoid the

needless time, expense and inconvenience of trial, but to preserve his appellate

rights on the [c]ourt’s denial of his Motion to Suppress.” Huffman moved to

suppress the evidence found in his vehicle, which the district court denied on

July 19, 2007. On July 26, 2007, the district court held a bench trial on the

stipulated facts. The district court found Huffman guilty of possession with the

intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine, after which it sentenced

Huffman to life in prison. Huffman appeals only the district court’s refusal to

suppress the evidence found in his vehicle. 

II. DISCUSSION

Huffman argues that, based on the stipulated facts, “the scope of the

investigative detention and seizure lasted longer than was necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop,” and therefore his detention was

unconstitutionally prolonged, and the search of his vehicle, illegal. In evaluating

the propriety of a district court’s suppression ruling, we review questions of law

de novo and findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d

512, 515 (5th Cir. 2008). Because the facts on which the district court based its

suppression ruling are not in dispute, we face only the task of determining de

novo whether Huffman’s detention was unconstitutionally prolonged.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), we have concluded that “[t]he stopping of a vehicle and detention

of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.” United
No. 07-51132

4

States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004). Under Terry, we employ

a two-part test to determine the legality of police investigatory stops. We “first

examine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and then

inquire whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope

to the circumstances that justified the stop.” Id. Huffman does not challenge

the validity ofthe initial stop, as it was clearly justified: Cheatham observed him

violating a traffic law. 

Under the second prong of the Terry test we must determine whether the

length of Huffman’s detention was “reasonably related to the circumstances that

justified the stop, or to dispelling [the officers’] reasonable suspicion developed

during the stop.” Id. With regard to the duration of a detention, the Supreme

Court has stated:

While it is clear that the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining

whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on

reasonable suspicion, we have emphasized the need to consider the

law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the

time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. Much as a

“bright line” rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an

investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary

human experience must govern over rigid criteria.

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). The court interpreted the Terry reasonableness

requirement to mean that:

In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be

justified as an investigative stop, . . . it [is] appropriate to examine

whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that

was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during

which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. 

Id. at 686 (1985); see also United States v. Hare, 150 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir.

1998) (“[S]o long as Young was diligently pursuing a means of investigation that

was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly, during which time it was
No. 07-51132

5

necessary to detain the defendant, the duration of Majors’ detention was

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted)). 

The evidence does not support Huffman’s contention that the officers

unreasonably detained him. First, Huffman stipulated that “much of the delay

in the stop was attributable to [Huffman], who refused to comply with officers’

orders to step away from the vehicle and was verbally abusive.” Thus, he

implicitly concedes that the officers cannot be faulted for the entire length of the

investigation.

Second, although such details were not specifically stipulated to,

Huffman’s own explanation as to why the officers’ investigation was prolonged

actually helps demonstrate why its duration was not unreasonable. At

Huffman’s trial, Commander Davis explained that while he asked the Calvert

Police Departmentfor permission to use their narcotics dog, he was notified that

the Calvert dog was “not certified,” and that an officer with the Calvert Police

was “trying to retrain the dog and . . . was not comfortable with that particular

dog.” Consequently, the officers sought the assistance of the Bryan Police

Department, thirty-five miles away, which eventually lent the officers its

narcotics dog. These facts suggest that the officers obtained a capable narcotics

dog as quickly as possible. Thus, Huffman has “presented no evidence that the

officers were dilatory in their investigation.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687. Indeed,

he fails to even so allege.

Rather than alleging a lack of investigatory diligence, Huffman simply

argues that the length of his detention per se was a Fourth Amendment

violation. According to Huffman, “[t]he police do not have the right to pick and

choose which narcotics trained dog to use while a citizen and his property are

subject to a lengthy detention . . . .” Huffman cites no authority to support this

bald declaration. 
No. 07-51132

6

We acknowledge that Huffman’s detention was unusually lengthy, but this

fact does not alone establish a Fourth Amendment violation. To be sure, we

have recognized that:

a detention may be of excessively long duration even though the

officers have not completed and continue to pursue investigation of

the matters justifying its initiation. . . . A prolonged investigative

detention may be tantamount to a de facto arrest, a more intrusive

custodial state which must be based upon probable cause rather

than mere reasonable suspicion. 

United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993). However, we have

also stated that “The removal of the suspect from the scene of the stop to police

headquarters usually marks the point at which an investigative stop becomes a

de facto arrest.” United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 1987).

After they issued Huffman the citation, the officers told him he was free

to leave. Thus, the stop subsequent to that point amounted to a seizure of his

vehicle rather than of Huffman himself. This fact alone does not categorically

foreclose Huffman’s Fourth Amendment argument. See United States v. Place,

462 U.S. 696, 705, 708-09 (1983) (“The intrusion on possessory interests

occasioned by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature and

extent. . . . [W]hen the police seize luggage from the suspect’s custody, we think

the limitations applicable to investigative detentions ofthe person should define

the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the person's luggage on

less than probable cause.”). It does, however, suggest that the officers sought to

use the most minimally intrusive means in dispelling or confirming their

suspicions. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (investigation must be “minimally

intrusive . . . to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion”). 

More importantly, unlike in cases where courts have found detentions

unreasonably lengthy, see, e.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 709, here Huffman stipulated

that “much” of the delay in the stop was the result of his own recalcitrant and

insolent behavior. Huffman argues that the district court placed excessive
No. 07-51132

7

emphasis on this concession, and argues before us that “even if [he] had been

completely cooperative and compliant, the prolonged delay caused by the police

choosing which drug detecting dog to use . . . was constitutionally unreasonable.”

Huffman, however, does not explain how we are to determine what percentage

of the investigation’s duration is apportionable to the officers’ conduct alone.

Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that case law such as Place is

inapposite where officers do not unnecessarily prolong detention. See Sharpe,

470 U.S. at 685. As explained above, we have no reason to believe the officers

were dilatory in their investigation of Huffman’s vehicle, and Huffman does not

even attempt to provide one. Thus, given the specific facts of this case, we have

no basis on which to conclude that the officers took an unconstitutionally long

time to complete their investigation.

Based on Huffman’s recalcitrance, his suspicious behavior at the scene,

and the reliable tip from the CI, the officers, even after issuing Huffman and

Bowen citations, had continuing reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was

afoot. In light of the stipulated facts, the officers’ continued detention of

Huffman’s vehicle was constitutionally permissible because, as far as we can

tell, the officers were diligent in attempting to confirm or dispel their suspicion

that Huffman was in possession of narcotics. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.