PRESENT: All the Justices

DWAYNE LAMONT SAMPLE, JR.

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 220445 JUSTICE THOMAS P. MANN

FEBRUARY 8, 2024

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr. was found guilty of attempted robbery. Sample assigns 

error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification and the 

subsequent in-court identification as well as his motion to strike. In this appeal, we consider 

whether the single photo showup, from which the victim identified Sample, was impermissibly 

suggestive, and even if it were, whether it was nonetheless constitutionally reliable under the 

totality of the circumstances. We also consider whether the evidence presented was sufficient to 

convict Sample of attempted robbery. For the following reasons, we agree with the trial court 

and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on September 17, 2019, a man wearing a bandana attempted 

to rob Mark Angiulli at gunpoint outside of a warehouse garage. Angiulli and his son were 

loading granite onto a trailer when the man approached Angiulli from the left side. While 

standing 15 to 20 feet away from Angiulli, the man pointed a gun back and forth between 

Angiulli and his son and said, “Give me your wallet. Give me your f***ing wallet.” He then 

“came right up” within two to three feet of Angiulli while pointing the gun directly in his face

the entire time. Angiulli noticed the gun’s small barrel and quickly realized the gun was likely a 

BB gun. Angiulli yelled out to his son that it was a BB gun, and as he grabbed the gun away

from the assailant, both men hit the ground. The gun dropped and the man fled the scene.
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Angiulli called 911 less than five minutes after the incident, and an officer equipped with 

a body-worn camera arrived on scene five to ten minutes after the 911 call. Angiulli told the 

officer the man was wearing a black hoodie, black jeans, black ballcap, black and white tennis 

shoes, and a black or dark blue bandana. Angiulli described the man as a “skinny white kid,”

about 20 years old or in his early twenties with big brown eyes and dark short hair. He estimated 

the man was about his height, 5’10”, and weighed around 150 pounds. Angiulli and his son

indicated to the officer the direction of the assailant’s flight.

The officer then described to Angiulli several people who lived in that location, including

Sample who is “mixed, so he looks almost Hispanic, cause he’s not a white guy.” Angiulli then 

responded, “this guy’s face was awfully pale though, you know, he didn’t look mixed to me, he 

looked pure white.” Throughout the conversation with the officer, Angiulli repeated the same 

description multiple times.

The officer left the scene to search for someone matching Angiulli’s description. He 

suspected Sample, with whom he had prior encounters, because of Sample’s “very distinctive 

eyes,” his build, and the direction of the man’s escape. The officer asked dispatch to send 

Sample’s photograph to the officer’s cell phone, and he returned to the scene 15 minutes later.1

 

The officer showed Angiulli a booking photo of Sample on his phone and said, “I have a picture 

of somebody that I was thinking about, but I don’t know if—you said you just saw their eyes.” 

After seeing the photo, Angiulli immediately said, “Yep.” The officer clarified, “That’s him?” 

and Angiulli repeated, “Yep.” The officer then asked again, “But you think that’s definitely 

him?” Angiulli replied, “Yeah—those big brown eyes, yep . . . he’s light-complected like that.” 

“Yeah, kind of like pale-ish?” the officer asked, and Angiulli replied, “Yeah. Yep.” The officer 

1 The length of time is calculated based on the body-worn camera time stamps.
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collected the gun and the magazine left behind at the scene as well as buccal swabs from 

Angiulli and his son. Sample was charged with attempted robbery and subsequently arrested.

Sample filed a motion to suppress all evidence of any pretrial identification and any 

subsequent in-court identification. Sample argued that the manner in which the officer showed 

Angiulli his photograph was impermissibly suggestive, rendering the identification unreliable in 

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

At the suppression hearing, Angiulli testified that even though it was nighttime, and a 

streetlight was out of service, the warehouse LED lights sufficiently illuminated the area where 

the incident occurred. He testified he was “looking back and forth” between the man and the gun 

and repeating to himself, “Remember him. Remember the gun.” Angiulli also testified that the 

man who attempted to rob him wore dark clothing and a dark bandana. He recalled describing 

the man to the officer as “Caucasian with very dark eyes and eyebrows,” “lighter skinned,” and 

of “thin build, about 150 to 170 pounds . . . wearing a black hoodie, a black hat, black skinny 

jeans and Van[s]-looking shoes, like white soles and black tops.” Angiulli reiterated he noticed 

the man “had real dark, sunken eyes; real dark eyebrows with distinct marks on them . . . and 

almost black pupils.” Angiulli declared he had no question when he saw the photograph of 

Sample that he was the man who attempted to rob him. Angiulli then identified Sample in court. 

Angiulli stated he “will never forget those eyes directly above the barrel of the weapon.” 

Angiulli also identified the gun and the magazine as the ones Sample used that night.

On cross examination, Angiulli stated he owned several guns and during the robbery he 

was able to determine within a few seconds that Sample was using a BB gun. He came to this 

conclusion based on the opening of the barrel in comparison to the size of the gun. Angiulli

clarified that the man was in front of him for five to ten seconds before Angiulli wrestled him to 
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the ground. Angiulli asserted he had no doubt in his mind that if Sample did not look like the 

person who robbed him, he would speak up.

The officer then testified about the encounter. The officer stated that after Angiulli gave 

him the description of the assailant and the direction in which the man ran, he thought of Sample 

due to previous encounters with him. On cross examination, the officer testified he relied on the 

exigency of the circumstances as a justification for the single photo showup. Based on his 

training, he explained that a single photo showup is permitted when the victim of a crime gives a 

“vivid description” of the suspect and can identify the suspect within a reasonable amount of 

time.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the photographic identification 

was not unduly suggestive. It observed that Angiulli “was able to focus” and within “a matter of 

seconds” determined that the gun pointed at him was a BB gun. Angiulli saw “something about 

the assailant’s eyes that were very distinctive.” When commenting on the body-worn camera 

footage, the trial court noted that its “understanding of the evidence is that the assailant was 

facing the lights and facing the garage opening.” The trial court also stressed that Angiulli 

immediately identified Sample upon seeing his photograph. The case proceeded to a bench trial,

and the trial court incorporated the transcript from the suppression hearing as part of the record.

At trial, the Commonwealth called two expert witnesses in addition to the incorporated 

evidence. A forensic scientist specializing in DNA analysis, Dr. Thonensen, testified that 

Sample could not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA mixture profile found on the 

receiver of the BB gun, while both Angiulli and his son were eliminated. Dr. Greenspoon, a 

forensic molecular biologist specializing in DNA analysis and statistics conducted probabilistic 

modeling. Dr. Greenspoon testified Sample could not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA 
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mixture profile obtained from the gun’s trigger and grip area. Dr. Greenspoon elaborated that a 

match between the swab of the trigger and the grip area of the BB gun and Sample is two trillion 

times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated African American person, 39 

billion times more probable than a coincidental match to a Caucasian person, and 35 billion 

times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated Hispanic person.

The Commonwealth then rested, and Sample moved to strike the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, arguing that Angiulli’s identification was unreliable, and the DNA evidence could 

have been a result of secondary transfer. The trial court denied the motion to strike, and the 

renewed motion to strike after Sample presented no evidence. The trial court ultimately found 

Sample guilty of attempted robbery. It also found that Angiulli’s description of Sample as 

“Caucasian” was not unreasonable considering Sample is “light-skinned” and was wearing dark 

clothes during the incident. Lastly, the trial court noted that Sample could not be eliminated as a 

contributor of the DNA mixture found on the gun and there was no evidence of secondary 

transfer. Sample appealed his conviction.

In a divided decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by 

unpublished opinion. Sample v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0161-21-1, 2022 Va. App. LEXIS 

265, at *17-18 (Va. Ct. App. June 28, 2022). The Court of Appeals, relying on the factors set out 

in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), found that the factors weighed in favor of finding 

Angiulli’s out-of-court identification reliable. Sample, 2022 Va. App. LEXIS 265, at *11-12. 

The court also found the evidence sufficient to convict Sample based on the DNA found on the 

gun and Angiulli’s out-of-court and in-court identifications. Id. at *15-16. The dissent 

“[w]eigh[ed] the Biggers factors against the corrupting influence of the officer’s suggestive 

identification procedure, [and] concluded that the officer’s unduly suggestive identification 
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procedure created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at *23. Sample 

timely noted his appeal to this Court.

ANALYSIS

I. OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION

“When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court considers 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and will accord the 

Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.” 

Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 279 (2012). The appellant “has the burden of showing 

that even when the evidence is reviewed in that light, denying the motion to suppress was 

reversible error.” Id. While “[w]e give deference to the factual findings of the trial court,”

Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 522 (2010), “[w]e review de novo the trial court’s 

application of the law to the particular facts of the case.” Branham, 283 Va. at 279.

A. Suggestiveness of the Photo Showup

Viewing the evidence in this light, we turn to whether the single photo showup violated 

Sample’s due process rights. Sample contends that the trial court should have suppressed 

Angiulli’s out-of-court identification and prohibited future in-court identifications because the 

single photo showup, combined with the officer’s comments, was unduly suggestive and created 

a likelihood of misidentification. Sample argues that the officer’s comment, “I have a picture of 

someone that I was thinking about” was suggestive in nature and led Angiulli to believe the 

officer knew Sample was the man who attempted to rob Angiulli. We disagree.

When analyzing the constitutionality of an out-of-court identification, we must first 

determine whether the procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198. 

“[D]ue process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an identification 
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procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 

238-39 (2012) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977) and Biggers, 409 U.S. at 

198)) (emphasis added). Because Sample’s argument focuses solely on the suggestiveness of the 

procedure, we need not address whether it was unnecessary. While single photo showups 

generally should be viewed with suspicion, we must consider the specific facts in the case before 

us to determine whether the single photo showup was unduly suggestive. See, e.g., Drewry v. 

Commonwealth, 213 Va. 186, 190 (1972). “It is not enough that the procedure ‘may have in 

some respects fallen short of the ideal.’” Sexton v. Beaudreaux, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 

2559 (2018) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1968)). An identification 

procedure becomes impermissibly suggestive only when it rises to a level of suggestiveness that 

undermines the identification’s reliability. Id.

An identification procedure may be impermissibly suggestive when an officer’s 

comments indicate law enforcement has “other evidence that one of the persons pictured 

committed the crime.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383. The 

procedure may also be prohibitively suggestive when it makes the identification “virtually 

inevitable.” See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). The Supreme Court of the 

United States addressed “virtually inevitable” identifications in Foster and found an 

identification virtually inevitable when the defendant was the only subject to appear repeatedly 

in different lineups. Id. The Court held that this procedure equated to law enforcement 

effectively telling the witness, “This is the man.” Id.

However, a comment indicating that a law enforcement officer believes the assailant is in 

one of the pictures does not make the identification virtually inevitable and thus impermissibly 

suggestive. Drewry, 213 Va. at 190. In Drewry, during a photographic lineup, the officer 
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expressed his belief that “the assailant was among those pictured.” Id. Holding that the 

procedure was not impermissibly suggestive, this Court reasoned that the necessary and 

unavoidable implication of showing a witness photographs of possible assailants is that law 

enforcement believe the “guilty party” might be in one of them. Id.

Here, the officer’s comment was not suggestive and was, in fact, more equivocal than the 

belief expressed in Drewry that the assailant was among those pictured. Here, the officer 

commented, “I have a picture of somebody that I was thinking about, but I don’t know if—you 

said you just saw their eyes.” The comment was merely an expression of what a photographic

identification unavoidably implies–that the officer believed the assailant might be pictured–not 

that “this is the man” who did it. Unlike the practice criticized in Simmons, the officer in this 

case did not suggest to Angiulli that there was some other evidence establishing Sample as the 

culprit. The officer’s comment acknowledged that he was unsure about his suspicion of Sample 

and had only provided the photograph of Sample because the officer believed Sample roughly 

matched the description given by Angiulli.

In sum, the officer’s comments did not create circumstances which induced Angiulli to 

inevitably identify Sample. The officer’s comments here cannot be said to be impermissibly 

suggestive and were “at most, harmless in [their] effect.” See Drewry, 213 Va. at 190. We agree 

with the trial court that the single photo showup of Sample, including the officer’s comment, “I 

have a picture of somebody that I was thinking about,” did not run afoul of Sample’s due process 

protections and that the out-of-court identification was constitutionally reliable.

Accordingly, due process does not require any further finding of the identification’s 

reliability because it was not procured by impermissibly suggestive methods. Walker v. 

Commonwealth, 302 Va. __, __ (2023) (citing Perry, 565 U.S. at 248). Even still, while an 
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identification procedure may be arguably suggestive, it still does not inevitably result in its 

suppression without further consideration. Perry, 565 U.S. at 239. An out-of-court 

identification procured through an impermissibly suggestive procedure is constitutionally 

acceptable so long as it is reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Biggers, 409 U.S. at

199. “Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of [an] identification.” 

Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. To determine the identification’s reliability, due process requires 

courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the “procedure was so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 

Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.

B. Biggers Factors2

The Supreme Court of the United States has identified five factors in evaluating the 

likelihood of misidentification: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the 

time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior 

description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 

confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409 

U.S. at 199. At oral argument and in his brief, Sample conceded factors four and five weigh in 

favor of finding Angiulli’s identification reliable. Oral Argument Audio 02:08 to 02:19 

(November 1, 2023). We find that under the totality of the circumstances, all five factors weigh 

in favor of the reliability determination.

2 While we do not find the identification procedure used in this case was impermissibly 

suggestive, we still review the Biggers factors here to emphasize that, even had we found a 

constitutional problem with the process used, the identification was nonetheless constitutionally 

sound.
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1. Opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime.

The record demonstrates that Angiulli had an adequate opportunity to view his assailant. 

Sample argues that the encounter was very brief and occurred at night with no streetlights. This 

Court analyzed the first factor in Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 248-49 (1992). There,

this Court found that the victim had a sufficient opportunity to view her assailant when she saw

him on a bike path 30 and 50 feet away, and then made eye contact with him while passing each 

other less than two feet apart at nighttime. Id.

Here, the man who attempted to rob Angiulli first stood 15 to 20 feet away from him and 

then approached Angiulli while pointing the gun in his face. Angiulli testified that he faced the 

man for about five to ten seconds at arm’s length before he decided to wrestle him to the ground, 

affording himself enough opportunity to look at the man’s eyes. As seen on footage from the 

body worn camera, the warehouse’s garage door was open and interior LED lights illuminated 

the area of the incident. A streetlight diagonal to the warehouse was also lit. We give deference 

to the trial court’s finding of fact that the area was well lit and bright enough for Angiulli to 

observe the man clearly. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of finding Angiulli’s identification 

reliable.

2. Witness’ degree of attention.

The record reflects that Angiulli paid close attention to the assailant throughout the 

attempted robbery. When addressing this factor, the Supreme Court in Biggers found that the 

witness was a victim of a prolonged rape where she spent a “considerable period of time” with 

her assailant. 409 U.S. at 200-01. The Court reasoned that she was not a “casual observer,” 

given that her description of the assailant was “more than ordinarily thorough,” and weighed this 

factor in favor of reliability. Id.
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Here, despite the gravity of having a gun pointed at him, Angiulli paid enough attention 

to recognize the weapon as a BB gun and remembered the distinctive eyes of the man attempting 

to rob him. While under stress, Angiulli managed to repeatedly tell himself, “Remember the 

man. Remember the gun.” He testified that he was concentrating on the man and the gun so

attentively that he noticed the barrel’s disproportionately small circumference relative to the size 

of the gun and within seconds determined that it was a BB gun. He was also able to notice the 

man’s distinctive eyes and confidently stated that he would never forget them. Lastly, Angiulli

described the man’s clothing in great detail, and estimated his height, weight, and age. It is clear 

that Angiulli’s attention to both the gun and Sample’s appearance was “more than ordinarily 

thorough” and that he was not merely a casual observer in this situation. Thus, this factor weighs 

in favor of finding reliability.

3. Accuracy of the witness’ prior description.

The record shows Angiulli provided a detailed and accurate description of Sample to the 

officer. This Court examined this factor in McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 233 (1984),

and found that a description consisting of clothing and shoes that matched the defendant was 

sufficient for this factor to weigh in favor of reliability. Sample argues that Angiulli’s 

description was inconsistent with Sample’s “physical characteristics” because Angiulli described 

him as Caucasian while Sample is of mixed race. We are unpersuaded.

Deference is given to the trial court’s observations, and it was not unreasonable, on these 

facts, for Angiulli to describe Sample as Caucasian. Angiulli also estimated the man to be about 

5’10” tall, 150 to 160 pounds and emphasized the man’s big brown eyes, brown hair, and how 

pale he looked. This estimated height, weight, and age all matched Sample’s features. Angiulli 

repeated this comprehensive description multiple times throughout his conversation with the 
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officer. The description never changed and remained the same during the suppression hearing.

We find that this factor weighs in favor of finding the identification reliable.

4. Level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation.

Angiulli testified he was certain the man in the photograph was the same man who 

attempted to rob him, and the record amply demonstrates this certainty. Compare Delong v. 

Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 367 (1987) (finding identification reliable because “[t]he level of 

certainty [the witness] demonstrated at the time of confrontation leaves no doubt that she was 

utterly convinced . . . when . . . her exclamation was, ‘My God, that's the car, and My God, that's 

him.’”), with Curtis v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 28, 32 (1990) (finding identification not 

reliable because of “[t]he victim’s inability to identify the appellant when first presented with his 

photograph” and the court’s inability to verify the accuracy of the description).

When Angiulli pointed the officer in the direction the man ran, the officer described a 

person of mixed race living there. Instead of subscribing to that idea, Angiulli pushed back and 

confidently told the officer, the man “did not look mixed” to him. However, when the officer 

showed Sample’s photograph to Angiulli less than an hour after the incident, Angiulli 

immediately said “Yep,” and confirmed it was the man who tried to rob him. Even upon 

questioning by the officer, Angiulli expressed no doubt when identifying Sample as his assailant. 

Angiulli confidently repeated three times that Sample, the person in the photograph, was the man 

who tried to rob him, despite how adamant he was before viewing the photograph that the man

did not appear to him to be of mixed race. Therefore, we agree with Sample’s concession that 

this factor weighs in favor of reliability.
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5. Length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

This factor is also conceded by Sample and our own review is consistent with Sample’s 

concession. The time that elapsed between the attempted robbery and the identification was 

between 45 minutes to an hour. Based upon the facts of this case, the certainty of the victim’s 

identification, and all of the other facts and circumstances described herein, the length of time 

between the crime and the confrontation is a nominal consideration, and, under any 

circumstances, weighs in favor of concluding that the identification was reliable.

Whether our analysis centers upon the likelihood of misidentification and impermissible 

suggestiveness or the Biggers factors, the result is the same: the victim’s identification of Sample 

was constitutionally valid and not violative of his due process rights and protections.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Sample also assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike based upon 

the sufficiency of the evidence. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he 

judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such 

cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant 

question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) 

(quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). Additionally, in evaluating the 

sufficiency of the evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
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party below, the Commonwealth, and grant it the benefit of all fairly deducible inferences.” 

Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 609 (2004).

Sample argues in his second assignment of error that Angiulli’s identification and the 

DNA evidence were insufficient to find Sample guilty of attempted robbery beyond a reasonable 

doubt. He contends that even if the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress, it should 

have nonetheless found Angiulli’s identification at trial not reliable beyond a reasonable doubt.

Preliminarily, we note that an identification analysis does not address the sufficiency of 

the evidence. Rather, that analysis focuses upon due process considerations. Certainly, if there 

are no due process concerns, the trier of fact may consider the evidence, but that is a very 

different thing than evaluating the identification within a sufficiency matrix. Motions to strike, 

on the other hand, “deal with the sufficiency rather than the admissibility of evidence.” 

Woodson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288 (1970). Moving to the sufficiency of the evidence 

analysis, this Court gives deference to the trier of fact’s finding of witnesses’ credibility and 

“will not seek to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses where their evidence is not inherently 

incredible.” See Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 486 (2018). Because Angiulli’s 

identifications did not present due process concerns and were admissible into evidence at trial, 

we give deference to the trial court’s finding that both identifications were credible and cannot 

say that no rational trier of fact could find them credible.

Additionally, Sample asserts that the existence of other contributors for the DNA found 

on the gun and the possibility of secondary transfer are consistent with Sample’s theory of 

innocence. At trial, the factfinder “determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn 

from the evidence, and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced 

by a defendant.” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017). However, the question is 
15

not whether there is some evidence to support the accused’s hypotheses of innocence, but rather

“whether a reasonable [factfinder], upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected 

[the accused’s] theories.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003). While the 

Commonwealth must prove that the accused committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it 

has to do so by excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence flowing “‘from the evidence 

itself, and not from the imagination of defendant’s counsel.’” Tyler v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 

162, 166 (1997) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 148 (1977)).

Here, the trial court considered and rejected the DNA secondary transfer theory because 

Sample did not present any evidence that would support it. Indeed, the record is devoid of any 

evidence that would explain how Sample’s DNA could be found on the BB gun through means 

other than Sample himself. In contrast, the trial court heard the testimony of two forensic 

scientists asserting that Sample could not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA mixture 

profile found in three places: on the receiver, trigger, and grip area of the BB gun. The trial court 

found this expert testimony credible. In addition to the DNA evidence and the eye-witness 

identifications, Sample lived in the path of the assailant’s flight. Therefore, viewing the totality 

of this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we cannot say that no rational 

trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We find the evidence 

was sufficient to sustain Sample’s conviction.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court did not err by denying Sample’s motion to suppress Angiulli’s 

identification of Sample arising from a single photo showup or in denying his motion to strike

the evidence for a lack of evidentiary sufficiency, we affirm Sample’s conviction for attempted 

robbery.
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Affirmed.