Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1710-JC-2419 | April 27, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Danielle Sheff

Sheff Law Office

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Matter of E.E. (Minor 

Child) and 

C.E. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1710-JC-2419

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Gael S. Deppert, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1705-JC-1522

Mathias, Judge.
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[1] The Marion Superior Court adjudicated E.E. a child in need of services 

(“CHINS”), and C.E., her father, appeals. C.E. argues that the Department of 

Child Services (“DCS”) did not prove that venue was proper in Marion County 

and that he should have been dismissed from the CHINS proceedings.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] C.E. and T.C. live in Indianapolis with their three children. Their oldest child 

E.E. is six years old and is enrolled at Indianapolis Public School 90. On May 

5, 2017, DCS case manager Quinn Kissane (“Kissane”) responded to a report 

that E.E. had possibly been abused. She interviewed E.E. at School 90 and 

observed several “linear and looped” marks on E.E.’s body and abrasions on 

her face. 

[4] C.E. and T.C. were asked to bring their other two children and meet with E.E. 

and Kissane. T.C., E.E.’s mother, admitted that she struck E.E. with a 

television cable as punishment. C.E. was not home when T.C. struck E.E. and 

stated that he did not discipline the children. C.E. was not concerned that T.C. 

struck E.E. and stated, “if [E.E.] had to go to foster care maybe that is what it 

would take for her to learn her lesson.” Tr. p. 17. C.E. also admitted that he 

regularly used marijuana.

[5] On May 9, 2017, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children were CHINS. 

The children were removed from their home and placed in DCS custody. In 

addition to recounting T.C.’s abuse of E.E. and C.E.’s marijuana use, the 
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petition alleged that E.E. had fifteen unexcused absences from school and 

comes to school with poor hygiene. 

[6] A fact-finding hearing was held on August 9, 2017. T.C. admitted that the 

children were CHINS. Therefore, the hearing proceeded as to C.E. 

Photographs of E.E.’s injuries, charges against T.C. filed by the Marion County 

Prosecutor alleging battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than 

fourteen years old, and the Marion County Prosecutor’s request for a No 

Contact Order between T.C. and E.E were admitted into evidence.

[7] After DCS presented its evidence, C.E. moved to dismiss the CHINS petition 

pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B) arguing that the DCS had not proved venue. The 

trial court granted C.E.’s motion to dismiss. But later that day, DCS filed a 

motion to correct error, which the trial court granted. The court rescinded its 

order dismissing the petition after taking judicial notice that E.E.’s school, an 

Indianapolis Public School, is in Marion County. As to the two younger 

children, the court determined that dismissal of the CHINS petition was 

appropriate because DCS did not meet its burden of proving that those two 

children were CHINS.

[8] The continued fact-finding hearing with regard to E.E. was held on August 23, 

2017. The court subsequently adjudicated E.E. as a CHINS. The September 27, 

2017 Dispositional Order established that E.E. would remain in foster care and

that T.C. would participate in home-based therapy, random drug screens, and 
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therapeutic supervised visits with E.E. The court did not order C.E. to 

participate in any services. C.E. now appeals.

I. Venue

[9] C.E. argues that DCS failed to prove venue, and therefore, the trial court erred 

when it denied his request to dismiss the CHINS petition pursuant to Trial Rule 

41(B).1 Specifically, C.E. claims that DCS did not present any evidence of the 

location where T.C. struck E.E.

[10] Indiana Code section 31-32-7-1 provides that if a child is alleged to be a 

CHINS, proceedings may be commenced in the county “where the child 

resides,” “where the act occurred,” or “where the condition exists.” The State is 

required to prove venue but may establish venue by a preponderance of the 

evidence and need not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Baugh v. State, 801 

N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. 2004). And venue may be established by circumstantial 

evidence. Bryant v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1031, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[11] While we agree that DCS did not present evidence of the location where T.C. 

struck E.E., pursuant to section 31-32-7-1, CHINS proceedings may be 

commenced in the county where the child resides. Here, there is sufficient 

circumstantial evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that E.E. 

resides in Marion County. 

 

1 After the trial court reinstated the cause in response to DCS’s motion to correct error, C.E. renewed his 

request for dismissal at the subsequent fact-finding hearing.
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[12] E.E. attends Indianapolis Public School 90 where she was interviewed by the 

case manager. The trial court properly took judicial notice of the fact that 

Indianapolis Public Schools are located in Marion County. From this fact, we 

may infer that E.E. lives in Marion County. Moreover, C.E. admits in his brief 

that he and T.C. live with their children in Indianapolis, Indiana. Appellant’s 

Br. at 7. And the pleadings filed with the trial court list an Indianapolis address 

for T.C. and C.E. This evidence sufficiently established that E.E. resides in 

Marion County, and therefore, pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-32-7-1, 

DCS proved that Marion County is the proper venue for the CHINS 

proceedings. For these reasons, the trial court did not err when it denied C.E.’s 

motion to dismiss.

II. II. Should C.E. Have Been Dismissed from the CHINS 

Proceedings

[13] C.E. also argues that he should have been dismissed from the CHINS 

proceedings. C.E. claims that “[d]ue process, in the circumstances presented 

here, should allow a separate finding as to Father or exclude Father from the 

disposition regarding E.E.’s CHINS status.” Reply Br. at 15.

[14] “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child, . . . and the acts 

or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court 

intervention.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). Although there is

a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS 

adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS 

adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in 
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need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not 

establish culpability on the part of a particular parent.

Id. And “a CHINS intervention in no way challenges the general competency 

of a parent to continue a relationship with the child.” Id.

[15] Because a CHINS adjudication establishes only the status of the child, “a 

separate analysis as to each parent is not required in the CHINS determination 

stage.” Id. at 106. “Indeed, to adjudicate culpability on the part of each 

individual parent in a CHINS proceeding would be at variance with the 

purpose of the CHINS inquiry: determining whether a child’s circumstances 

necessitate services that are unlikely to be provided without the coercive 

intervention of the court.” Id. (citation omitted).

[16] Here, T.C. admitted that E.E. was a CHINS, but C.E. did not. For this reason, 

the trial court properly conducted a fact-finding hearing as to the entire matter. 

See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1259 (Ind. 2012). Our courts have not held that 

due process requires a separate CHINS determination for each parent, only that 

each parent is entitled to a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the child is 

a CHINS. See In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106.

[17] The trial court found that DCS proved that E.E.’s “physical and mental health 

is seriously endangered due to injury by the act of Mother, and that [E.E.] 

needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she is not receiving and is unlikely 

to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 104. The court also found that due to her injuries, E.E. was 
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presumed a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-24-12-4,2 and that 

presumption was not rebutted. Id. At the fact-finding hearing, C.E. did not 

dispute the allegation that T.C. beat E.E. with a television cable and that he and 

T.C. lived in the same home. 

[18] We agree with C.E. that there is no evidence that he caused E.E.’s injuries, but 

this fact was addressed by the court’s dispositional order. T.C. was ordered to 

participate in several services, but C.E. was not ordered to participate in any 

services and was allowed unsupervised parenting time with E.E.

[19] For all of these reasons, we conclude that C.E.’s argument that he should have 

been dismissed or excluded from the proceedings adjudicating E.E. a CHINS 

lacks merit. 

III. Conclusion

[20] DCS established proper venue in Marion County and C.E.’s argument that he 

should have been dismissed from the CHINS proceedings is meritless.

[21] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and May, J., concur. 

 

2

Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4 provides in pertinent part that if DCS presents competent evidence that a 

child was injured due to an act or omission of the child’s parent and there is a reasonable probability that the 

injury was not accidental, a rebuttable presumption is raised that the child is a CHINS.