### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A s s i gne d on B r i e f

s J a nua r y 13, 2009

S T AT E OF T E NN E S S E E v . RI CH AR D F
. S T RO UD

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. II-CR082832 R obert E. Lee Davies, Judge

No. M2008- 01200-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 21, 2009

Th e De fe nd ant, Ric ha

rd F . Stro ud , w a s in dic ted on one c ount o f d ri vin g un de r t

he inf lue nc e , f ir st offe nse, a Class A mis d em ea n o r. After a motion to suppress was he ard a nd denied, the De fe nd ant e nte re d a

g uil ty ple a . In th e ne g oti ate d p le a a g re eme nt , the pa

rt ie s p ur po rt e d to
rese rve a cert i fied que stion of law pursuant to Te nnessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)( 2). Af te r r e vie w, we c on c lud e that th e Defen dan t has f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th t he str ic t r e qu ir e me nts of Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 37( b)(2) . The a ppeal is dismissed. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dism issed
R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D H. W E L L ES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined. Mark M. Mizell, Fra

nklin, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, Richard F . Stroud.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , S ol ic ito r G e ne ra l; El iza be th B

. Marn e y , As sis tant Attor ne y Ge ne ra l; Ki m He lpe r, Di str ic t Attor ne y Ge ne ral; J os h D. Marc um, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION
I. F acts
This case arises f

rom the stop of the De fenda nt’s vehicl e b y

a F ranklin city

police off

icer t h at re s u l t edi nt h e D ef

en d an tb ei n g ch ar gedwi t hdri v i n g u n d er t h e i n f l u e n c e
. P ri o r t o en t er i n g a g uilty plea, the D efe ndant filed a motion to s u p p re ss evidence , which cha lleng ed the constitutionalit y

of the tra ffic stop. At the motion hea ring , Offic er Cra ig Wrig ht t es t ified that he was on duty

on Marc h 30, 2007, workingfrom 9:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. During his shift, he stopped a g old Buick dr iven by the Def endant. He descr ibed the eve nts leading to the stop, statin g that a s h e dr ov e his po lic e c ruis er he no ti ced the De fe nd ant’ s B uic k in fr on t of him suddenly jerk to the rig ht. Office r Wright a ssumed that the Def endant wa s o n h is cell phone a nd-2-

was not pay

ing a ttention. Next , t h e o ff

icer noticed the B uick start moving toward the rig ht turn lane a nd then suddenly

jerk lef t. The B uick then starte d “lea ning” to the left an d t h en jer ked rig ht ag ain. Off

icer Wright testifi ed t h at he noticed that the B uick was he aded towa rd a r ed light, b u t th e dr iv e r d id n o t a p p e ar to s e e th a t th e li g h t w a s r e d

. T h e o f f ic e r th o u g ht that the Buic k was g oing to hit the ca r in front of it, but the drive r “slammed t h e b ra k es ”ca using the front
e nd of the c ar t o “ no se -d ive [],” and the B uick n arr ow ly

avo ide d th e c oll isi on . T he of fi c e r s a id that, at th a t po int , h e be c ame c on c e rn e d a bo ut the Defen dan t’ s d ri vin g and

a c tiv a te d h is
emer g ency

equipment to pull him over.
On cr oss-examination, Office r Wright identifie d the nar rative he prepa

red e arlier d escr ibing this incident. He ag ree d his narrative included that he sa w the B uick jerk se vera l times and rapidly

apply the brakes to av o i d a collision but di d not include that he sa w the B uick
cross ove r the dividing line. The off icer ag ree d that the Def

endant did no t ru n o ff t h e road, run a stop sign, or spe ed. He ag ree d that nothing the D efe ndant did co n s t i t u t ed a moving violation. Of fi c e r Wr ig ht f

ur the r a g re e d th a t st op pin g qu ic kly to a vo id a c oll isi on wa s n ot i lle g a l.
At the close of

the suppression hea

ring , the trial cour t i s s u ed a writ ten orde r. In the
o rd er , t h e t ri al co u rt s t at edt h e f o l l o wi n g:
I n this case, Of

fice r Wright obse rved the Def end an t m ake a

brupt corr ections at least three times and nea rly cause a collision at a re d light. The Def endant wa s travel i n g d o wn Hig hway 96, which is a flat, straig ht stretch of r oadwa y . The l anes are not pa

rticularly narr ow or winding , as wa s the ca se in B i ne tte . The Def enda n t h ere never

enter ed the turn la

ne, so there is no reason to spec ulate that he wa s contemplating making a turn at an y time during Offic er Wrig ht’s period of observation. This woul d el i minate the possibility of suppre ssion based on the Ma rti n case
. Despite the f

ac t t h at the Def

endant’ s vehicle ne ver le ft its lane of travel and no spec ific traf

fic law s were violated, re asonable suspicion t o stop the Def en d ant still ex isted. When taking a totality of the c ircumstance s vew of the fac ts and occ urre nces le adingup to Office r Wright’ s pulling over of the Def e n d an t, th is Co u rt mu s t c o n c lu d e th a t th e r e d id e xis t r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic ion on which to base a tra ffic stop. (C i t i n g Sta te v . B ine tte , 33 S.W .3d 215 (Tenn. 2000) and Sta te v . Carl Ma rti n , No. W2002- 00066-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 57311, at *2-3 (T enn. Crim. App., at Jack s o n , J an
. 2, 2003), no Te n n

. R

. A

p p

. P

. 1 1 a

p p li c a tion filed

). Acc ording ly , the trial cour t denied the De fenda

nt’s mot ion to s up pr e ss t

he e vid e nc e . It is fr om t

his jud g me nt t

hat th e De fe nd ant n owa

pp e a ls.
II. Ana lys is
Th e De fe nd ant c on te nd s th e po lic e of fi c e r l a c ke d rea so na

ble su sp ic ion

to s top his
ve hic le , rende ri ngthe e vid e nc e g a the re d s ub se qu e nt t o th a t st op ina dmi ssi ble . T he State-3-

responds that the D efe ndant did n o t p roperly rese rve this question as a c ertified que stion of law beca use he f ailed to meet the ma

ndatory require ments of a c ertified que stion of law. Rule 37(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure pr escr ibes the req u i rements for
a pr op e r c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on of law a s f oll ow s: When an Ap peal Lies . The de fenda nt or the state may

appea l any

order or judgme nt in a cr i minal proce edingwhen the la w provides f

or such a ppeal. The defe ndant may

appea l from any

judgme nt of conviction: (1) on a plea of not guilty ; or (2) on a plea of g uilty or nolo contende re, if: (A ) t he de fe nd ant e nte re d into a ple a a g re e me nt u

nd e r R ule 11(a) (3) but explicitly

rese rved – w ith the co n sent of the state and of the c ourt – th e ri g ht t o a

pp e a l a c e rt if ied qu est io n of

law that is dis po sit ive of

the c a se , a

nd the fo llo wi ngre qu ir e me nts are me t: (i) the judg ment of convic tion or other docume nt to which such judgm en t refers that is filed be fore the notice of appea l, contains a stateme nt of the ce rtified question of law that the def

endant r eser

ved for appellate revie w; (ii) the question of law is stated in the judgme nt or document so as to identify clea rl y t h e scope and limits of the leg al issue re serve d; (iii) the judg ment or docume nt refle cts that the ce rtified question was expressly

rese rved w ith the consent of the state and the trial court; and (i v) the jud g me nt o r d oc ume nt r e fl e c ts that th e de fe ndant, the state, a

nd the trial c o u rt are of the opinion that the
cer tified question is disposi tive of the c ase . . . .
I n State v. Preston , our Supreme Court stated i t s intention to “make explicit to t he benc h and bar exactly what the a

pp el l at e courts will here afte r re quire a s prer equisites to the consideration of t h e merits of law ce rtified pursua nt to Tenn. R. Crim. P . 37(b)( 2)(i) or (iv).” 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988) . First, the f inal order or judg ment appea led from must contain a stateme nt of the dispositive question of law re serve d for r eview. Id. The que stion mu s t cl ear ly identify the scop e an d l i m i t s of the leg al issue and must have been pa ssed upon by the trial judg e. Id. Second, the order must a lso state that: ( 1) the cer tified question was rese rved as par t o f t h e p lea
a g re e me nt; (2 ) t

he State and

the tr ial ju dge co ns e nte d to the re se rv a tio n; a nd (3 ) b oth the State-4-

and the tria l judge ag ree d that the question d i s p o s i t i ve of the case
. Id. Third, the def endant bear s the burden of

satisfying the prer equisites. Id.
A def endant may

comply with these re qui reme nts either by using the judgme nt or a separ ate doc ument. S

ta t e v . I rwi n , 962 S.W. 2d

47 7, 47 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . I f a se pa rate do c ume nt i s u s ed, it must be clea

rly ref err ed to or incor

porate d by

ref ere nce into the judg ment. Id. Howeve r, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court has wa rn ed that mere “substantial c ompliance” with Preston is not
s u f f ic ie n t to a c qu ir e a

p p e ll a te r e v ie w o f th e c e rti f ie d qu e s tion. S t a t e v. Armstrong , 126 S.W .3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003) . Fur ther, this court ha s consistently and re peate dly

held that the Preston require ments are jurisdictional. See Stat e v. F aith W hitley , No. W2006-02595-CCA-R3-CD, 2 0 08 WL 450617, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, F eb. 19, 2008) ( citing multiple ca ses for this propositi on, including State v. Long , 1 59 S.W. 3d 88 5, 88 7 (T enn
. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); State v. Boyd , 51 S.W .3d 206, 210 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed

. The judg ment o f conviction in t his case r efle cts no mention of the re serve d cer tified question of law. T h e Def endant points to a handw ritten note on the judg ment form, which he
c on te nd s w a s w r i t t e nb y t h e S t a t e ’ s a t t o r

n e y
. T h e n o t e s t a t e s t h a tt h e D e f e n d an t ’ s s e n t e n c e is eff ective “u p o n action of the ct. of a pp.” The initials “MM” appea r to be the D efe ndant’s att o r n e y ’ s in it ia ls , an d th e y a p p e ar b e lo w th e h an dw r itte n n o te

. A d d it io n a ll y , th e r e is no mention of the neg otiated plea a g ree ment, even thoug h the re cord inc ludes a “N ego t iated Plea Ag re e me nt” that pu

rp or ts t o r e se rv e a

c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of law. Th e qu e sti on it “res erve s” is

“ [w]he the r t

he e vid e nc e sh ou ld h ave be e n s up pr e sse d b e c a us e th e of

fi c e r l a c ke d r e a so na

ble suspicion when the stop wa s initi ated, violating the def endant[ ’] s fede ral a

nd state constitutional rig hts.”
Rul e 37 c le arl y

state s th a t a

re qu ir e me nt o f o ur

re vie w o f a

c e rt if ie d q ue st io n of

law i s that “[t] he judgm en t o f co n v i ction, or other doc ument to which such judg ment ref ers that is filed b e f o r e th e n o ti c e o f a

p p e a l, mu s t c o n ta in a s tate me n t o f th e c e rti f ie d qu e s ti o n o f la

w rese rved by the def endant f or appe llate re view.” T enn. R. Cr i m
. P. 37(b)(2). I n this case the judg ment of
c on vic tio n d oe s n ot c ontai n a st ate ment of the c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of law, and it d oe s n ot r e fe r t o another document that conta ins a statement of the cer tified question law. Se e Ir win , 962 S.W .2d at 479. As such, we lack jurisdiction. We take no satisfac tion in the dism issal of this or the
many oth e r f a ile d Ru le 37 (b )( 2) a

pp e a ls. We, ho we ve r, c ann ot a ssume jur isd ic tio n w he re it i s denied due to failures in mee ting the stric t prer equisites. See A rmstrong , 126 S.W .3d at 912 and W hitley , 2008 WL 450617, at *3.
B. Jud gm ent Validity
I n his reply

brief, the Def

endant c ontends that this Court shoul d find the judgme nt of conviction is v o i d an d invalid and that we should ther efor e re mand the ca se bac k to the trial court for entry of a va lid judgment. He points to t he fa ct that the minim u m jail sentence at the time of the off

ense w as twenty -four

hours and that the D ef

en d an t be re quired to re move litter as part of his se n t ence. The judg ment, the Def endant c ontends, “re leg ates” him to forty -eig ht hours in jail with no mention of the leg al re quirement a s it was at the t i m e o f t h e offense. The ref ore,-5-

he a ss e rt s , t h e j u d g m e n t c o n t r av e n e s a s t a tu t e an d i s v o i d

. F u rt h e r , t h e D e f e n d an t po int s to alleg ed cle rica l error s and omissions in t he judg ment.
Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d, the judg ment appea rs valid on its face . A j u d gm ent nee d not cite the possible sentenc ing r ang es on its fac e, it need only inclu d e t h e d ef

en d ant’s plea, the verdic t or finding s, and the a djudication and s en t en ce
. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(e). The Def endant is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.
C. Due P roce ss Rights
The De fen d an t al so contends that his due proc ess rig hts were violated bec ause the trial court fa iled to determine that there w as a f actua l b as i s fo r t he plea . The De fenda nt has not inc lud e d th e tr ans c ri pt o f t he g uil ty ple a he ari ngin t

he re c or d. I t is the a

pp e ll ant ’s duty

to prep ar e th e r e c o r d

f o r a p p e ll a te r e v ie w
. T e n n
. R. Ap p
. P. 2 4 ( b )

. Wi th o u t t h e tr an s c r ip t, we cannot r eview this issue.
III. Conclusi on
After a tho roug h revie w of the e vidence and re levant author ities, we conc lude that the proposed c ertified que stion was not properly rese rved. A ccording ly , we dismiss the Defe ndant’s
a pp e a l.

_________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER