alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE of North Carolina v. Purcell Orlando JONES, Jr.

No. 10P16.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 17, 2016.

M. Lynne Weaver, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Purcell Orlando Jones, Jr., for Jones, Purcell Orlando (Jr.).

N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 11th of January 2016 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of March 2016."
Argued and submitted October 19,

ballot title certified November 4, 1999

#### Steve DOELL, *Petitioner, v.*Hardy MYERS, Attorney General for the State of Oregon, *Respondent.*

(SC S46795)

988 P2d 390

John A. Bennett, of Bullivant Houser Bailey, P.C., Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner.

Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the answering memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

PER CURIAM

*474PER CURIAM

This is a ballot title review proceeding brought under ORS 250.085(2). Petitioner is an elector who timely submitted written comments concerning the content of the Secretary of State’s draft ballot title and who therefore is entitled to seek review of the ballot title certified by the Attorney General. *See*ORS 250.085(2) (setting that requirement).

We have considered each of petitioner’s arguments concerning the ballot title certified by the Attorney General. We conclude that none establishes that the Attorney General’s certified ballot title fails to comply with the standards for such ballot titles set out in ORS 250.035(2)(a) to (d). Accordingly, we certify to the Secretary of State the following ballot title:

> AMENDS CONSTITUTION: RESTITUTION AND MANDATORY LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE REPLACE DEATH PENALTY

> RESULT OF ‘YES” VOTE: “Yes” vote abolishes death penalty, replaces with restitution and mandatory life imprisonment without parole.

> RESULT OF “NO” VOTE: “No” vote retains death penalty, life with or without parole, as sentences for aggravated murder.

> SUMMARY: Amends Oregon Constitution. Under current law, a jury determines whether someone convicted of aggravated murder is punished by death, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 30 years. Under proposed measure, such a person must be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole; the death penalty would be abolished; and the person would have to provide restitution to the people of Oregon (by helping to pay incarceration costs) and the victim’s heirs.

Ballot title certified. This decision shall become effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).
- 606 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

296 Nebraska Report

STATE v. ARTIS

Cite as 296 Neb. 606

State of Nebraska, appellee, v.

Tareik Q. Artis, appella

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed May 5, 2017. No. S-16-464.

supplemental opin

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lor

A. Maret, Judge. Supplemental opinion: Former opinio

modified. Motion for rehearing overruled.

Robert Wm. Chapin, Jr., for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, Sarah E. Marfisi, 

and Nathan A. Liss for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel,

Kelch, and Funke,

Per Curiam

Case No. S-16-464 is before this court on the appellee’s motion for rehearing concerning our opinion in State v. 

Artis.

1

 We overrule the motion, but we modify the original 

opinion as follows: In the section entitled “V. ANALYSIS,” 

under subheading “2. Plain Error,” subsection “(a) Arti

Sentence Is Indeterminate,” we withdraw the third and fourth 

sentences of the single paragraph of that subsection, which 

now reads:

1 State v. Artis, ante p. 172, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2017).

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

07/28/2017 09:10 AM CDT
- 607 -

Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

296 Nebraska Report

STATE v. ARTIS

Cite as 296 Neb. 606

(a) Artis’ Sentence 

Is Indeterminate

[9-12] The State has mischaracterized Artis’ sentence 

of “not less than 2 years, nor more than 2 years” as a 

determinate sentence. A determinate sentence is imposed 

when the defendant is sentenced to a single term of years, 

such as a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment. See State v. 

White, 256 Neb. 536, 590 N.W.2d 863 (1999). In contrast, 

when imposing an indeterminate sentence, a sentencing 

court ordinarily articulates either a minimum term and 

maximum term or a range of time for which a defendant 

is to be incarcerated. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Reissue 

2016); State v. White, supra. In Nebraska, the fact that the 

minimum term and maximum term of a sentence are the 

same does not affect the sentence’s status as an indeterminate sentence. See, State v. Marrs, 272 Neb. 573, 723 

N.W.2d 499 (2006); State v. Urbano, 256 Neb. 194, 589 

N.W.2d 144 (1999). Thus, we conclude that Artis’ sentence for his Class IV felony is an indeterminate sentence 

in which the minimum and maximum terms are the same. 

Such sentence complies with L.B. 1094’s requirement that 

the court impose an indeterminate sentence for a Class IV 

felony when that sentence is imposed consecutively with 

a Class IIA felony, and we therefore find no plain error in 

this regard.2

The remainder of the opinion shall remain unmodified.

 Former opinion modif

 Motion for rehearing overru

2 Id. at 179-80, ___ N.W.2d at ___.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         105,806
<SECURITIES>                                   128,075
<RECEIVABLES>                                  370,276
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               806,679
<PP&E>                                         460,600
<DEPRECIATION>                                 152,033
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,519,087
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          427,990
<BONDS>                                        154,833
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,146
<OTHER-SE>                                     894,432
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,562,527
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               761,981
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  681,009
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                16,686
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,552
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 56,734
<INCOME-TAX>                                    28,231
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             28,503
<DISCONTINUED>                                  15,291
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    43,794
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.38


</TABLE>
NIES v. TOWN OF EMERALD ISLE

409PA15-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 29, 2016

J. David Breemer, Attorney at Law, Keith P. Anthony, Attorney at Law, Durham, for Nies, Gregory P., et al.

Brian E. Edes, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Norwood P. Blanchard, III, Attorney at Law, J. Allen Jernigan, Attorney at Law, for Town of Emerald Isle.

Elliot Engstrom, Attorney at Law, for Civitas Institute Center for Law and Freedom.

Robert H. Thomas, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, Jason T. Campbell, Attorney at Law, Durham, for Owners' Counsel of America, et al.

James Patrick Longest, Jr., Attorney at Law, for Surfrider Foundation.

Geoffrey R. Gisler, Attorney at Law, Derb S. Carter, Jr., Attorney at Law, Chapel Hill, for Southern Environmental Law Center.

Mary Louise Lucasse, Special Deputy Attorney General, for N.C. Coastal Resources Commission.

*12Todd S. Roessler, Attorney at Law, Phillip A. Harris, Jr., Attorney at Law, Joseph S. Dowdy, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Joseph J. Kalo, Attorney at Law, Amy Y. Bason, General Counsel, Walter Derrickson Taylor, Attorney at Law, Neil B. Whitford, Attorney at Law, Morehead City, Garris Neil Yarborough, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Charles S. Lanier, Attorney at Law, Jacksonville, Carl W. Thurman, III, Attorney at Law, Stephen D. Coggins, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Wanda M. Copley, County Attorney, John C. Wessell, III, Attorney at Law, Charlotte Noel Fox, Attorney at Law, A. A. Canoutas, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Robert V. Shaver, Jr., Attorney at Law, Charles S. Baldwin, IV, Attorney at Law, Justin K. Humphries, Attorney at Law, Wilmington, Michael R. Isenberg, Attorney at Law, Southport, G. Grady Richardson, Jr., Attorney at Law, for Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus Joseph Kalo, et al.

John F. Maddrey, Solicitor General, Elizabeth A. Fisher, Assistant Solicitor General, Marc Bernstein, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina Ex Rel. Attorney General Roy Cooper.

J. Mitchell Armbruster, Attorney at Law, B. Davis Horne, Jr., Attorney at Law, Eva G. Frongello, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for N.C. Travel and Tourism Coalition, et al.

Sam Hayes, Attorney at Law, David B. Efird, Deputy General Counsel, Beth A. Onyenwoke, Attorney at Law, Kevin V. Howell, Attorney at Law, for Department of Environmental Quality, et al.

Benjamin Marshall Gallop, Attorney at Law, John D. Leidy, Attorney at Law, Elizabeth City, Robert B. Hobbs, Jr., Attorney at Law, Nags Head, Donald I. McRee, Jr., Currituck County Attorney, Ronald G. Baker, Attorney at Law, Casey C. Varnell, Attorney at Law, For County of Dare, et al.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of July 2016 by Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus Joseph Kalo, et al. for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 29th of July 2016."

Unless already submitted, the Amicus Brief shall be submitted to the court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 28(i).
State of North Carolina v. Jeremy Rossco Bishop, Defendant.

No. COA16-276

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 18, 2016

NO ERROR.
Exhibit 4.1







THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


2 HANSON PLACE, 12TH FLOOR, BROOKLYN,
N.Y. 11217


 


 


 


July 8, 2014


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


Smart Trust, Adelante REIT Growth & Income
Trust, Series 4


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for Smart Trust, Adelante REIT Growth & Income Trust, Series 4 set forth above (the “Trust”).
We enclosed a list of the Securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our
evaluation of such Securities as of close of business on July 8, 2014, in accordance with the valuation method set forth in the
Trust Indenture and Agreement. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations
of the Trust Securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-196139) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect
to the registration of the sale of the Trust Units and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


 


Very truly yours,


 


/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO_______________ 


Gerardo Cipriano


Vice President
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Transportation

###### Federal Aviation Administration

          - [Policy Statement Number PS-ACE100-2005-10038] 

# AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

# ACTION:

Notice of issuance of policy statement. 

# SUMMARY:

This notice announces the issuance of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) policy for certification of bonded structures. This notice is necessary to advise the public, especially manufacturers of normal, and acrobatic category airplanes, and commuter category airplanes and their suppliers, that the FAA has adopted a policy on bonded joints and structures.

# DATES:

Policy statement PS-ACE100-2005-10038 was issued by the Manager of the Small Airplane Directorate on September 2, 2005.

*How to Obtain Copies:*                         A paper copy of policy statement may be obtained by writing to the following: Small Airplane Directorate, Standards Office (ACE-110), Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 901 Locust Street, Room 301, Kansas City, MO 64106. The policy statement will also be available on the Internet at the following address                         *http://www.faa.gov/​regulations_​policies/​.*

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Lester Cheng, Federal Aviation Administration, Small Airplane Directorate, Regulations & Policy, ACE-111, 901 Locust Street, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: (316) 946-4111; fax: 816-4090; e-mail:                         *lester.cheng@faa.gov.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

## Background

We announced the availability of the policy statement on May 27, 2005 (70 FR 30829). We revised the policy in response to the comments, and the policy has been adopted.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on September 12, 2005. 

James E. Jackson,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 05-18504 Filed 9-16-05; 8:45am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
SHAPEMASTERS, INC., Plaintiff, v. Angelo ACCETTURO, Wilderness Trail Development Corporation and Wilderness Trail Holdings, LLC, Defendants.

No. COA15-741.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Jan. 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSE PLASOLA,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 20

- 55246

D.C. No. 2:19

- cv

- 05592

- JAK

- PVC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 18, 2021 * *

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Jesse Plasola appeal s pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of his state court divorce proceedings. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Brown v. Cal.

Dep’t of Corr. , 554 F.3d 747, 749

- 50 (9th Cir. 2009) (Eleventh Amendment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 25 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 55246

immunity); Sadoski v. Mosley , 435 F.3d 1076, 1077 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (judicial

immunity); Omar v. Sea

- Land Serv., Inc. , 813 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (sua

sponte dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))

. We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Plasola’s claims against defendants

State of California and Santa Barbara Superior Court because these defendants are

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Simmons v. Sacramento County

Superior C t. , 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (state courts are “arms of the

state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Franceschi v. Schwartz , 57

F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek

either damages or injunctive relie f against a state, an arm of the state, its

instrumentalities, or its agencies.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Plasola’s claims against defendant s

Timothy Staffel and Jed Beebe because these defend ants are entitled to judicial

immunity. See Ashelman v. Pope , 793 F.2d 1072, 1075

- 76 (9th Cir. 1986) (en

banc) (judges are immune from suit when performing judicial acts).

The district court properly dismissed Plasola’s claims against defendant

Roger Hub bard because he is not a state actor under § 1983. See Simmons , 318

F.3d at 1161 (a lawyer in private practice does not act under color of state law

under § 1983 ).

T he State of California’s request for summary affirmance, set forth in its3 20

- 55246

answering brief, is denied as moot.

Plasola’s motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 41) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
**Order of the Court of First Instance (Seventh Chamber) of 8 September 2008 – Rath v OHIM – Grandel (Epican)**

**(Case T-374/06)**

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for registration of the Community word mark Epican – Earlier Community word mark EPIGRAN – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services
– Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 32-33, 60-61)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 October 2006 (Case R 1324/2005-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Dr. Grandel GmbH and Matthias Rath. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | Matthias Rath |
| Community trade mark sought: | Word mark Epican for goods and services in Classes 5, 30 and 32 – Application No 2524510 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Dr. Grandel GmbH |
| Mark or sign cited in opposition: | Word Mark EPIGRAN, initially registered for goods in Classes 1, 3 and 5, currently also registered for goods and services in Class 3 (Community mark No 560292) |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Opposition upheld; partial rejection of the application for registration |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Partial annulment of the decision of the Opposition Division |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Matthias Rath to bear his own costs and those incurred by the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) and Dr. Grandel GmbH. |
Christopher T. GRUBB, Plaintiff, v. Margaret PEAL, Defendant.

No. COA15-1109.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 7, 2016.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1996
<CASH>                                      27,294,783
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,141,216
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  2,578,197
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            42,049,214
<PP&E>                                      78,083,749
<DEPRECIATION>                            (15,016,667)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             105,116,296
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       25,674,169
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       106,695
<OTHER-SE>                                  54,569,050
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               105,116,296
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            25,413,706
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               20,295,584
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,397,543
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,720,579
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,088,232
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,632,347
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,632,347
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .18
        

</TABLE>
WILKES v. CITY OF GREENVILLE.

No. 368P15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 12, 2015.

Anita B. Hunt, Durham, for Wilkes, Johnnie.

Matthew P. Blake, Raleigh, for City of Greenville, et al.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 10th of November 2015 by Defendant-Appellant for Temporary Stay:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 12th of November 2015."