alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-13-00064-CR

____________________

ADENIKKE LAKENYA CANTY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court 

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 09-07072 

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Adenikke Lakenya Canty pleaded guilty, under a plea agreement, to arson.

The trial court placed her on deferred adjudication community supervision. She 

violated the terms and conditions of community supervision set by the court. The 

State filed a motion to revoke. The trial court revoked the community supervision, 

found her guilty of arson, and sentenced her to six years in prison. Canty argues the 

trial court abused its discretion by also assessing a $1,000 fine against her in the 

written judgment adjudicating guilt when there was no pronouncement of the fine 
2

in the oral rendition of judgment at the revocation and adjudication hearing. See 

Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The State concedes 

error, and “recommends modification of the second page of the Judgment 

Adjudicating Guilt deleting the One Thousand ($1,000.00) fine notation found on 

the second page of the Judgment.” 

The trial court sentenced Canty to six years in prison and did not assess a 

fine. The first page of the written judgment reflects the defendant’s punishment as 

six years in prison with no amount indicated in the fine column. The second page 

of the judgment notes a fine of $1,000. To the extent there is a variance between 

the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the written judgment, the oral 

pronouncement controls. Id. at 500-02 (affirming court of appeal’s modification of 

judgment to remove fine assessed in the written judgment, but not orally 

pronounced); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As 

requested by appellant and recommended by the State, we modify the written 

judgment to delete the reference to the $1,000 fine on the second page. The 

judgment is affirmed as modified.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 

 ________________________________

 DAVID GAULTNEY

 Justice
3

Submitted on May 20, 2013

Opinion Delivered May 29, 2013

Do Not Publish

Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
State v. Thomas Craig Campbell

252PA14-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 10, 2016

Barbara S. Blackman, Assistant Appellate Defender, Hannah H. Love, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Campbell, Thomas Craig.

Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney General, Mike Miller, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 1st of August 2016 by Defendant to Strike Section D of the State's Brief as Outside the Scope of this Court's Special Order Allowing the State's Petition for Discretionary Review in Part and Denying the State's Petition for Discretionary Review in Part:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 10th of August 2016."
Exhibit 10.10

                                 ASPA GOLD CORP.
                 (FORMERLY KNOWN AS RENAISSANCE BIOENERGY INC.)
                      CANCELLATION OF ACCRUED COMPENSATION

The  undersigned  present  or former  officer  or  director  of ASPA Gold  Corp.
(formerly   known  as  Renaissance   BioEnergy   Inc.),  a  Nevada   corporation
("Company"),  is owed  compensation  (the  "Payable") by the Company for past or
future  services.  The Company is entering into a Line of Credit Loan  Agreement
(the "Loan  Agreement")  with North  American Gold & Minerals  Fund  ("Lender"),
pursuant to which Lender will make available to the Company an unsecured line of
credit. As a condition to entering into the Loan Agreement, Lender requires that
the undersigned cancel and forgive, in its entirety,  the Payable.  Accordingly,
for good and valuable  consideration  and  intending to be legally bound hereby,
the  undersigned  hereby  cancels and  forgives,  in its  entirety,  any accrued
compensation  owed by the Company for past or future  services.  The undersigned
represents  and warrants  that the amount set forth below  constitutes  all sums
owing to the undersigned with respect to past or future services to the Company.
The undersigned will claim no further  compensation  from the Company and hereby
consents to termination by the Company of any agreement or arrangement  pursuant
to which such compensation was accrued.

Name:   Samuel Gulko
Amount: $50,000.00

Each of Company  and Lender  shall be  beneficiaries  entitled  to enforce  this
Cancellation.

This Cancellation shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the State of Nevada (other than conflict-of-laws principles). The undersigned
hereby  consents to the  jurisdiction of the State and Federal courts sitting in
Clark  County,  Nevada,  for all  cases  and  controversies  arising  from  this
Cancellation and acknowledges that said courts are not "inconvenient forums."

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed and delivered this Cancellation
as of the day and year set forth below.

SAMUEL GULKO


/s/ Samuel Gulko
-----------------------------------
Date: November 30, 2010
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

  CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

  In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Applix, Inc. (the
  "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2003 (the "Report"), the undersigned,
  Milton A. Alpern, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies,
  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of 15(d) of
  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                  /s/ Milton A. Alpern
                                      ------------------------------------------
Dated: August 14, 2003                Milton A. Alpern

                                      Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
**Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Seventh Chamber) of 19 November 2008 – Ercros v OHIM – Degussa (TAI CROS)**

**(Case T-315/06)**

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the Community figurative mark TAI CROS – Earlier national word marks CROS, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA CROS and ERCROS – Earlier national figurative marks CROS – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – No similarity of the signs – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services
– Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 29, 42-43, 47)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of OHIM of 20 September 2006 (Case R 29/2006-1) concerning opposition proceedings between Ercros, SA and Degussa GmbH. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | Degussa GmbH |
| Community trade mark sought: | Figurative mark TAI CROS for goods in Class 1 – Application No 2768851 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Ercros, SA |
| Mark or sign cited in opposition: | National word marks CROS, SOCIEDAD ANÓNIMA CROS and ERCROS and national figurative marks CROS for goods in Class 1 |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Rejection of the opposition |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Appeal dismissed |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Ercros, SA to pay the costs. |
Exhibit 10.6(d)

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYMENTAGREEMENT

THIS FOURTH AMENDMENT (this Amendment) is made as of this 13thday of April, 2007 to that certain AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT, dated as of
May 15, 2002, as amended (collectively, the Employment Agreement), by and between CHARLES D. FRAZER (Employee) and JOS. A. BANK CLOTHIERS, INC. (Employer).

FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, Employer and Employee, being the sole parties to the Employment Agreement, hereby amend the Employment
Agreement as follows:

1. Subject to earlier termination otherwise set forth in the Employment Agreement, the last day of the Employment Period shall be January 31, 2009.

2. Effective March 4, 2007, Employees Base Salary shall be $260,000.00.

Except as specifically amended hereby, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect according to its terms. To the extent of any conflict between the terms of this Amendment and the
terms of the remainder of the Employment Agreement, the terms of this Amendment shall control and prevail. Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have those respective meanings attributed to them in the Employment Agreement. This
Amendment shall hereafter be deemed a part of the Employment Agreement for all purposes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the date first above written.

JOS. A. BANK CLOTHIERS, INC.

|By: | /s/
    David E. Ullman                            |                   | /s/
    Charles D. Frazer
|--- | -------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | -------------------------
|    | David E. Ullman,                                   | CHARLES D. FRAZER
|    | Executive Vice President  Chief Financial Officer |                  

---
LIEBERG v. PIONEER PARENT, INC., et al.

No. 33A16-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 8, 2016.

Scott M. Tyler, Charlotte, Attorney at Law, for Pike Corporation.

Glenn E. Ketner, III, Charlotte, Attorney at Law, for Pike Corporation.

Paul R. Dickinson, Jr., Charlotte, Attorney at Law, for Lieberg, Collin.

Marc Ackerman, Attorney at Law, For Lieberg, Collin.

Richard A. Maniskas, Attorney at Law, for Lieberg, Collin.

David G. Schiller, Raleigh, Attorney at Law, for Lieberg, Collin.

The following order has been entered on the motion to Dismiss Appeal filed on the 5th of February 2016 by Plaintiff:

> "Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of February 2016."
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3715 

To reduce prescription drug costs by allowing the importation and 

reimportation of certain drugs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 12, 2013 

Mr. ELLISON (for himself and Mr. ROHRABACHER) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To reduce prescription drug costs by allowing the importation 

and reimportation of certain drugs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Personal Drug Impor5 tation Fairness Act of 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REDUCING PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS BY ALLOW7 ING CERTAIN DRUGS TO BE IMPORTED OR 

8 REIMPORTED. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any provision of 

10 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•HR 3715 IH

1 et seq.), a drug may be imported into the United States, 

2 and may be reimported into the United States by a person 

3 other than the drug’s manufacturer, if the drug— 

4 (1) has the same active ingredients, route of ad5 ministration, and strength as a prescription drug ap6 proved under chapter V of such Act (21 U.S.C. 351 

7 et seq.); 

8 (2) may be lawfully marketed in, and is im9 ported or reimported from, a qualified country; 

10 (3) is dispensed by a licensed pharmacist; 

11 (4) is shipped directly to, or is imported by, the 

12 ultimate consumer from the qualified country; 

13 (5) is shipped or imported in quantities that do 

14 not exceed a 90-day supply; and 

15 (6) is accompanied by a copy of a valid pre16 scription. 

17 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

18 (1) The term ‘‘drug’’ has the meaning given to 

19 such term in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, 

20 and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321), except that such 

21 term excludes any controlled substance (as defined 

22 in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 

23 U.S.C. 802)). 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS

3 

•HR 3715 IH

1 (2) The term ‘‘prescription drug’’ means a drug 

2 subject to section 503(b)(1) of the Federal Food, 

3 Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 353(b)(1)). 

4 (3) The term ‘‘qualified country’’ means a 

5 country that— 

6 (A) is Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, 

7 New Zealand, Switzerland, South Africa, a 

8 member-state of the European Union, or a 

9 country in the European Economic Area; and 

10 (B) is determined by the Commissioner of 

11 Food and Drugs to have standards for ensuring 

12 the safety and effectiveness of drugs that are at 

13 least as protective as such standards in the 

14 United States. 

Æ 

maindgalligan on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

WILLIE LAWSON, as parent and )

guardian of Bryton Lawson, a minor, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-1023

)

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF )

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, )

)

Respondent. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed September 12, 2018.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit

Court for Hillsborough County; Martha J.

Cook, Judge.

Keith P. Ligori and Alyssa L. Katz of

Ligori & Sanders, Tampa, for Petitioner.

Debra M. Metzler of Barr, Murman &

Tonelli, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Denied.

NORTHCUTT, VILLANTI, and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

The Board of Directors
Electronic Manufacturing Services Group, Inc:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement 
related to the J.A. Industries, Inc. 1994 Employee Consultant and Advisor 
Stock Compensation Plan on Form S-8 of J.A. Industries, Inc. (now known 
as Electronic Manufacturing Services Group, Inc.) of our report, dated October
3, 1996, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Electronic 
Manufacturing Services Group, Inc. as of August 31, 1996 and 1995 and the 
related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' equity (deficit)
and cash flows for the years then ended.

Our report dated October 3, 1996, contains an explanatory paragraph which 
states that the Company has suffered losses from operations which raises
substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. The 
consolidated financial statements do not include any adjustments that might
result from the outcome of this uncertainty.


                                    KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Raleigh, North Carolina
December 13, 1996
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6625

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICHARD OLTON, a/k/a Bobby, a/k/a O.B.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,

District Judge. (3:03-cr-00127-MR-1)

Submitted: September 11, 2008 Decided: September 16, 2008

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Olton, Appellant Pro Se. Keith Michael Cave, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Richard Olton appeals the district court’s order denying

his motion for a new trial. We have reviewed the record and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated

by the district court. United States v. Olton, No. 3:03-cr-00127-

MR-1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2008). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# C_2008301EN.01000701.xml

| 22.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 301/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 301/7

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 18 September 2008 — Armacell Enterprise GmbH v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), nmc SA

(Case C-514/06 P) (1)

1

(Appeal - Community trade mark - Application for the Community word mark ARMAFOAM - Earlier Community trade mark NOMAFOAM - Relative ground for refusal - Similarity of the signs - Existence of a relative ground for refusal in part of the European Community)

(2008/C 301/12)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Armacell Enterprise GmbH (represented by: O. Spuhler, Rechtsanwalt)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent), nmc SA (represented by: P. Péters and T. de Haan, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings:

Re:

Appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 10 October 2006 in Case T-172/05 Armacell v OHIM whereby the Court dismissed an action by the applicant for the word mark ‘ARMAFOAM’ for goods in Class 20 for annulment of Decision R 552/2004-1 of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) of 23 February 2005 annulling the decision of the Opposition Division which rejected the opposition brought by the proprietor of the Community word mark ‘NOMAFOAM’ for goods in Classes 11, 19, 20, 27 and 28

Armacell

OHIM

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Armacell Enterprise GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Armacell Enterprise GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 56, 10.3.2007.

1

---
**Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 25 October 2007 – Komninou and Others v Commission**

**(Case C‐167/06 P)**

Appeal – Non-contractual liability of the Community – Complaint under Article 226 EC – Treatment of complainants by the Commission – Principles of sound administration, legitimate expectations and legal certainty – Scope – Article 21 EC – Right of complaint – Scope of the Ombudsman’s findings

1.                     *Appeals – Grounds – Inadequate statement of reasons – Reliance by the Court of First Instance on implied reasoning – Lawfulness
– Limits (Arts 21(2) and (3), EC and 225 EC) (see paras 22-27)*

2.                     *Citizens of the European Union – Rights of the citizen (Art. 21(2) and (3), EC) (see paras 35-37)*

3.                     *Appeals – Grounds – Mistaken assessment of the facts – Inadmissibility – Review by the Court of Justice of the assessment
of the evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted (Art. 225 EC; Statute of the Court
of Justice, Art. 58) (see paras 40-46)*

4.                     *Economic and social cohesion – Structural assistance – Community financing granted for national initiatives (Art. 226 EC)
(see para. 52)*

5.                     *Community law – Principles – Equal treatment (see para. 57)*

**Re:**

| | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Appeal brought against the order of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) of 13 January 2006, | Komninou and Others | v | Commission | (T‐42/04), in which the Court dismissed as unfounded an application for compensation for the non-material damage allegedly suffered by the applicants following the Commission’s treatment of their complaint concerning Community financing of a biological sewage treatment plant in Preveza in Greece. |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | | Sets aside the order of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities of 13 January 2006, Komninou and Others v Commission (T‐42/04), in so far as the Court failed to rule on the plea alleging breach of Article 21(2) and (3) EC; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | | Dismisses the remainder of the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | | Dismisses the application before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, in so far as it is based on a breach of Article 21(2) and (3) EC; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | | Orders Ermioni Komninou, Grigorios Ntokos, Donatos Pappas, Vassileios Pappas, Aristeidis Pappas, Eleftheria Pappa, Lamprini Pappa, Eirini Pappa, Alexandra Ntokou, Fotios Dimitriou, Zoï Dimitriou, Petros Bolossis, Despoina Bolossi and Konstantinos Bolossis, Thomas Bolossis to pay the costs at first instance. The costs of the proceedings at first instance leading to the order of the Court of First of the European Communities of 13 January 2006, Komninou and Others v Commission (T-42/04), shall be borne in the manner set out in paragraph 2 of the operative part of that order. |
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-7520

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

PAUL PARKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior

District Judge. (CR-97-325-A, CA-01-1098-AM)

Submitted: January 17, 2002 Decided: January 29, 2002

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul Parker, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Paul Parker seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2001). We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Parker, Nos. CR-97-325-A; CA-01-1098-AM

(E.D. Va. July 27, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED