Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Munoz-Garcia CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUAN ALBERTO MUNOZ-GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165868

 (Contra Costa County 

 Super. Ct. No. 04-200408-3)

 

Defendant Juan Alberto Munoz-Garcia appeals from noneconomic 

restitution orders imposed after he pleaded guilty to sexual offenses involving 

his niece (Jane Doe 1) and his stepdaughter (Jane Doe 2). Munoz-Garcia 

contends that the trial court erred in awarding noneconomic damages of

$100,000 to each victim without a jury trial. He also argues that the 

noneconomic restitution award with respect to Jane Doe 2 must be stricken 

because there was insufficient evidence that she suffered psychological harm. 

Finally, he maintains that the trial court should not have imposed a $1,000 

restitution fine without determining his ability to pay. We reverse the 

noneconomic damages award with respect to Jane Doe 2, but otherwise 

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2021, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed the 

operative information in this case charging Munoz-Garcia, as relevant here,
2

with six felony counts of child sexual abuse. With respect to Jane Doe 1, the 

information alleged that Munoz-Garcia committed sexual intercourse or 

sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (a);

count 1); lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a);

count 2); and forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, 

subd. (b)(1); count 3). With respect to Jane Doe 2, the information alleged 

that Munoz-Garcia committed lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 

(§ 288, subd. (a); count 4) and two counts of oral copulation or sexual 

penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 5 

and 6). 

A. Underlying Facts

The following facts were presented at the preliminary hearing in this 

matter:

1. Allegations Involving Jane Doe 1

In 2015, when Jane Doe 1 was 11 years old, she disclosed that MunozGarcia, her uncle, had sexually assaulted her when she was nine or 10 years 

old. The incident occurred when Jane Doe 1 was spending the night at her 

aunt’s house after attending a family barbecue. She awoke in the middle of 

the night to find Munoz-Garcia putting her on the floor and pulling down her 

pants. She tried to pull them back up, but he prevented her. Munoz-Garcia 

then inserted his penis into her anus, pushing back and forth for about two

minutes. He continued even after Jane Doe 1 told him to stop. She indicated 

“it hurt.” He finally stopped after she told him she needed to use the 

bathroom. On other occasions, when she was 10, Munoz-Garcia would grab 

Jane Doe 1 by the wrist when she was trying to leave the room and place her 

hand on his private area. 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

2. Allegations Involving Jane Doe 2

Jane Doe 2, Munoz-Garcia’s stepdaughter, reported being assaulted by 

Munoz-Garcia on August 30, 2020. She was asleep in her bedroom when she 

woke up to find Munoz-Garcia touching her pants. She then felt him reach 

inside her pants and touch her private parts, which she used for peeing and 

called her “ ‘puka.’ ” She reported being scared and nervous and that it hurt. 

Munoz-Garcia then rolled her over and began touching inside her butt. He 

then spread her buttocks open and licked inside of her butt. He continued to 

touch her until he eventually left. At that point, Jane Doe 2 got up and 

reported the assault to her mother. When confronted, Munoz-Garcia initially 

denied the abuse but later stated he was still drunk, apologized, and said it 

would never happen again. 

B. Plea and Sentencing

On April 4, 2022, after advisement of his rights, Munoz-Garcia pleaded 

guilty to counts 3 and 4. In exchange for the guilty plea, the parties agreed to 

a 16-year prison term and dismissal of the remaining counts. The trial court 

then proceeded immediately to sentencing and heard a victim impact 

statement from Jane Doe 1. She stated that, although significant time had 

passed since Munoz-Garcia sexually assaulted her, she was still 

psychologically scarred by it. She blamed herself and still “remember[ed] 

everything” about the assault, despite trying to forget. She recalled that 

Munoz-Garcia had turned her family against her and that she had lost hope 

anyone would ever believe her. She cried for years “on the bedroom floor 

trying not to kill [herself].” Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court 

sentenced Munoz-Garcia—who was in his mid-30’s at the time—to 16 years 

in prison and imposed various fines and fees, including a $1,000 restitution 

fine. 
4

On July 28, 2022, the court held a hearing under section 1202.4, 

subdivision (f)(3)(F) regarding victim restitution for noneconomic losses. The 

prosecution requested noneconomic restitution of $100,000 for each victim. 

Defense counsel objected to the requested noneconomic damages for Jane 

Doe 2, arguing that there was no factual basis. In rejecting this argument 

and awarding the requested noneconomic restitution to both victims, the 

court reasoned: “Anyone who has any kind of life experience, especially 

judges who have seen the results of these things following years afterwards, 

knows that kind of assault causes damage. It causes physical damage. It 

causes emotional damage. And it causes rippling, reverberating problems 

throughout life.” It further concluded that it could “use the record that was 

established as to Jane Doe 1 in supporting an order for Jane [Doe] 2 because 

they were victimized in very similar ways.” Munoz-Garcia timely appealed 

from the order for noneconomic restitution.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Noneconomic Restitution

Munoz-Garcia argues that the noneconomic damages awarded in this

case must be stricken as unauthorized. First, he asserts that he was entitled

under the state and federal Constitutions to a jury trial on the amount of any

such damage award. Second, he maintains that the award of noneconomic

damages to Jane Doe 2 must be stricken due to insufficient evidence that she

suffered psychological harm. We address each contention in turn.

1. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review

“Pursuant to the California Constitution, victims of crime have a right

to restitution from criminal defendants: ‘Restitution shall be ordered from

the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or

disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.’ (Cal. Const.,
5

art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(B).) To [satisfy] this constitutional requirement, the

Legislature enacted section 1202.4, which requires the trial court to order a

defendant to pay victim restitution ‘in an amount established by court order,

based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to

the court.’ (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th

795, 800 (Lehman).)

“With one exception, restitution orders are limited to the victim’s

economic damages.” (People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 431

(Smith).) The exception provides that restitution may be ordered for

“[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm, for

felony violations of Section 288, 288.5, or 288.7.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).)

“Noneconomic damages are ‘subjective, non-monetary losses including, but

not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional

distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to

reputation and humiliation.’ (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).)” (Smith, at

p. 431.)

In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), the United 

States Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.) “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi 

purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of 

the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” (Blakely 

v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303 (Blakely), italics omitted.) The 

principle of Apprendi applies to criminal fines. (Southern Union Co. v. 

United States (2012) 567 U.S. 343, 346 [fines for violating federal 

environmental statutes].)
6

In the context of economic restitution awarded pursuant to

section 1202.4, numerous appellate courts have concluded that there is no

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Apprendi and its progeny

because direct victim restitution is not a criminal penalty. (People v. Pangan

(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 (Pangan), citing U.S. v. Behrman (7th Cir.

2000) 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 [“direct victim restitution is a substitute for a civil

remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits. It is

not increased ‘punishment’ ”]; People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th

1159, 1183–1184 (Chappelone) [rejecting argument that victim restitution

under § 1202.4 is increased punishment for a crime; instead, “ ‘ “the primary

purpose of victim restitution is to provide monetary compensation to an

individual injured by crime” ’ ”]; accord, People v. Millard (2009) 175

Cal.App.4th 7, 35–36 (Millard); see also § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B) [a victim

restitution award “shall be enforceable as if the order were a civil

judgment”].)

In Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 415, the Third Appellate District

concluded by analogy that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial with

respect to a restitution order for noneconomic damages awarded pursuant to

section 1202.4. (Smith, at p. 433.) Specifically, Smith reasoned: “[T]here is

no basis for distinguishing jury trial rights, or lack thereof, for restitution

orders for economic damages and restitution orders for noneconomic

damages. In both cases, the trial court is performing a task that, in a civil 

case, a jury would perform.” (Ibid.)

“ ‘ “A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not

be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of

discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the

amount of restitution ordered.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The court “must demonstrate a
7

rational basis for its award, and ensure that the record is sufficient to permit

meaningful review. The burden is on the party seeking restitution to provide

an adequate factual basis for the claim.” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2023)

97 Cal.App.5th 111, 116 (Gomez); accord, People v. Giordano (2007)

42 Cal.4th 644, 655.) “However, a restitution order ‘resting upon a

“ ‘demonstrable error of law’ ” constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion.’ ” 

(Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) 

2. No Right to a Jury Trial on Noneconomic Restitution

As mentioned above, the trial court here awarded noneconomic 

restitution of $100,000 to each victim. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).) MunozGarcia contends these awards were improper because he was entitled to a 

jury trial to determine the amount of these noneconomic losses based on proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Acknowledging the case law to the contrary set 

forth above, Munoz-Garcia maintains that Smith was wrongly decided. And 

he attempts to distinguish the other cases by arguing they involved economic 

rather than noneconomic restitution. Munoz-Garcia then asserts a string of 

reasons why noneconomic restitution should be treated differently than 

economic restitution with respect to jury trial rights, none of which we find 

persuasive.

To begin with, we disagree with Munoz-Garcia’s general premise—that 

noneconomic restitution constitutes increased punishment, while economic 

restitution does not. Both are forms of direct victim restitution under 

section 1202.4, the primary purpose of which “ ‘ “is to provide monetary

compensation to an individual injured by crime” ’ ” (Chappelone, supra,

2 The Attorney General argues in passing that Munoz-Garcia has 

forfeited this claim by failing to request a jury trial with respect to restitution 

in the trial court. Because we conclude that no such right exists, we do not 

reach the issue. 
8

183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184; see Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 585

[“direct victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims of

crime do not need to file separate civil suits”].) Moreover, “[t]o the extent a

victim restitution order has the secondary purposes of rehabilitation of a

defendant and/or deterrence of the defendant and others from committing

future crimes, those purposes do not constitute increased punishment of

the defendant.” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35–36.)

 Munoz-Garcia nevertheless argues that noneconomic restitution must 

be viewed as primarily punitive because subdivision (f)(3)(F) of 

section 1202.4—the provision authorizing noneconomic restitution—applies 

only to defendants convicted of certain sexual offenses against children, 

singling them out for disparate treatment. To the contrary, the legislative

history underlying the adoption of this provision reflects an entirely

nonpunitive purpose. In 1991, the Supreme Court held that insurers under 

general liability policies “are not required to indemnify their insureds for 

damages caused by an insured’s sexual molestation of a child.” (J. C. Penney 

Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1014 (J.C. Penney).) The 

case dealt specifically with a felony conviction under section 288 and 

“foreclosed the use of liability insurance proceeds as compensation” for

victims of such abuse. (People v. Montiel (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 312, 333 (dis. 

opn. of Banke, J.).) The Legislature responded by adopting legislation 

focused “on providing the minor child victims of molesters with additional 

sources of compensation. The Senate Committee on Judiciary report 

explained: ‘In lieu of making insurance benefits available to victims of an 

insured’s criminal conduct, proponents instead propose several other ideas to 

compensate the victim for the injuries.’ [Citation.] These were: 

(1) ‘[i]nvading the homestead exemption of the defendant’; (2) ‘[i]ncreasing 
9

State assistance to child victims of sexual abuse’; and (3) ‘[i]ncreasing 

restitution payments to the child molestation victim to also cover 

psychological damages and noneconomic losses.’ ” (Id. at pp. 333–334, italics 

omitted.) The Legislature’s aim, in other words, was not to punish child sex 

offenders, but to create a substitute for a civil remedy so that these particular

victims of crime need not file separate civil suits.

Munoz-Garcia additionally contends that noneconomic restitution is 

punitive because the amount of restitution “necessarily” turns on factors such 

as the duration or severity of the crime. Munoz-Garcia provides no authority 

for the proposition that a restitution award based on such factors is 

necessarily punitive. To the contrary, to the extent the duration and severity 

of the crime corroborate a victim’s claim of psychological harm, their 

consideration fully comports with the compensatory nature of the award.

Munoz-Garcia also complains there is “literally no limit” to the amount 

of noneconomic restitution a trial court may impose. We acknowledge that 

the task of translating nonpecuniary injuries into dollars and cents is 

“difficult” and “ ‘not a process of measurement.’ ” (Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 

65 Cal.2d 166, 172.) But the subjective nature of this determination does not 

change the compensatory nature of noneconomic restitution. (See 

Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1332 [noneconomic 

damages “compensate” injured plaintiff for nonpecuniary injuries such as 

pain and suffering].) Nor does it mean that noneconomic restitution does not 

compensate a victim for his or her actual loss. And it is simply incorrect to 

say there is no limiting principle to awards of noneconomic restitution. As 

stated above, case law cautions that a court must have a rational and factual

basis for the noneconomic restitution ordered and it may not be arbitrary or

capricious. (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)
10

Finally, citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), 

Munoz-Garcia contends that the noneconomic restitution award is punitive 

because he does not have the ability to pay it. However, Dueñas is of no 

assistance to Munoz-Garcia. There, the court held that an indigent 

defendant has a due process right to a determination of ability to pay before 

the imposition of court operations assessments (§ 1465.8) and court facilities 

assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373) and the execution of restitution fines 

(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)). (Dueñas, at pp. 1164, 1169.) Dueñas expressly did not 

address direct victim restitution (id. at pp. 1169–1170), and several courts 

have since held that the Dueñas rule does not apply to victim restitution (see, 

e.g., People v. Pack-Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 860; People v. 

Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 338; People v. Evans (2019) 

39 Cal.App.5th 771, 776–777). Thus, Dueñas does not suggest that 

noneconomic victim restitution constitutes increased punishment for 

purposes of Apprendi simply because a defendant does not have the ability to 

pay it.

3. Insufficient Evidence Supporting Restitution Award for

Jane Doe 2

Munoz-Garcia next challenges the award of noneconomic restitution to

Jane Doe 2 as not supported by the record because no evidence was presented 

that she suffered psychological harm. The Attorney General disagrees, 

contending that the $100,000 award was supported by the parties’ stipulation 

that Jane Doe 2 was particularly vulnerable, caselaw describing the 

psychological harm generally suffered by victims of child abuse, Jane Doe 2’s 

statement when initially interviewed that Munoz-Garcia “hurt” her and she 

was “scared and nervous” during the abuse, and the court’s conclusion that 

because both victims suffered similar “horrific and violent” assaults, similar 
11

restitution awards were appropriate. We conclude Munoz-Garcia has the 

better argument.

3

Section 1202.4 requires the trial court to order a defendant to pay 

victim restitution “in an amount established by court order, based on the 

amount of loss claimed by the victim . . . or any other showing to the court.” 

(§ 1202.4, subd. (f), italics added.) Thus, we agree with the Attorney General 

that the statute “does not require any particular kind of proof to establish a 

victim’s losses.” (Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) For instance, a 

court may consider the trial testimony of the victims, statements made at the 

sentencing hearing, and the contents of the probation report. (Id. at pp. 801, 

803.) But while there is no specific type of proof required, some showing of 

noneconomic loss related to the actual victim must still be made to the court

to justify the damages award.

It is no doubt true that the nature of the sexual crimes committed by

Munoz-Garcia renders it very likely that Jane Doe 2 was psychologically

harmed. (See J.C. Penney, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1026 [“Some acts are so 

inherently harmful that the intent to commit the act and the intent to harm 

3 Smith and Lehman applied the standard of review from the civil

damages context in reviewing the amount of a restitution award for

noneconomic damages under section 1202.4, holding: “ ‘An appellate court

can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the ground

that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and

suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Smith,

supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 436; accord, Lehman, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at

p. 801.) However, because Munoz-Garcia’s challenge is not that the award is 

excessive, but rather that it lacks an adequate factual basis, the shocks-theconscience standard is inapplicable here. (See Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 116, fn. 4.) We will thus apply the traditional abuse of discretion

standard. 
12

are one and the same. The act is the harm. Child molestation is not the kind 

of act that results in emotional and psychological harm only occasionally.” ].) 

However, as our colleagues in Division Five of this District recently

explained: “ ‘[A] crime victim may recover only for losses personally incurred

by that victim.’ (People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859; see also Cal.

Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A) [‘all persons who suffer losses as a result

of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from

the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer’ (italics

added)].) In other words, it is insufficient that the average victim would

suffer injury from a particular type of crime, or that generally victims of such

crimes suffer injury.” (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 118; see also

People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1182–1184 [noneconomic

restitution awards reversed where no facts or reliable evidence supported

them], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Brooks

(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 946 & fn. 17.) 

In this case, Jane Doe 2 did not testify at the preliminary hearing or

sentencing hearing, and no statement was provided by any knowledgeable

party regarding the impact of Munoz-Garcia’s crimes on her. Rather, the

only evidence even arguably relevant to the claim that Jane Doe 2 suffered

psychological damage or other noneconomic losses as the result of the abuse

was a statement from her forensic interview that she felt “scared and

nervous” at the time of the molestation when Munoz-Garcia “hurt” her, and a

stipulation by the parties (in order to allow imposition of an aggravated term)

that Jane Doe 2 was a “particularly vulnerable” victim.

We agree with the Gomez court that the “evidentiary bar is a low one” 

in this context. (Gomez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 119.) We also

acknowledge the difficulty in this case in providing such evidence because the
13

victim is a minor and her mother was not cooperative and did not want to

pursue a restitution request. However, the prosecution could have attempted

to obtain statements or testimony from others with personal knowledge of the

impact on the victim, such as her biological father or a treating physician or

therapist. Instead, there is no evidence of the impact of Munoz-Garcia’s

crimes on Jane Doe 2, and the trial court relied exclusively on its experience 

and common sense regarding similar incidents in awarding restitution. 

Under such circumstances, the trial court’s restitution award to Jane Doe 2

was an abuse of discretion.4 We will therefore reverse the award and issue a 

limited remand. On remand, the prosecution may again, if desired, seek 

noneconomic restitution for Jane Doe 2 based on more robust evidence. 

B. Restitution Fine

As part of his plea agreement, Munoz-Garcia acknowledged in writing 

that he would be required to pay a restitution fine of not less than $200 or 

more than $10,000 and gave up his right to appeal his sentence in exchange 

for the negotiated disposition. At sentencing on April 4, 2022, defense 

counsel asked to address fines and fees under Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 

1157. After the trial court allowed him to do so, counsel argued that MunozGarcia did not have the ability to pay the fines and fees because he was 

embarking on a lengthy prison sentence, had no assets, and would not be 

employed in prison. The court questioned how defense counsel knew that 

Munoz-Garcia would not be employed in prison. Counsel then changed 

tactics, asserting that any “meager income” he would receive in prison would 

likely go to direct victim restitution. The prosecutor argued that Munoz4 Because Munoz-Garcia does not contest the factual basis for the 

noneconomic restitution award to Jane Doe 1 and we reverse the award to 

Jane Doe 2, we need not determine the adequacy of any waiver pursuant to 

People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 made in this case.
14

Garcia had the ability to pay the restitution fine given his long prison 

sentence. Determining it could not find an inability to pay on the record 

before it, the court imposed the $1,000 restitution fine but agreed to suspend 

the court operations and criminal conviction assessments. 

Citing Dueñas and its progeny, Munoz-Garcia finally argues on appeal 

that imposing the restitution fine without a hearing on his ability to pay 

violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, equal 

protection, and protection from excessive fines. It appears that the court 

conducted a hearing and simply found insufficient evidence to stay the fine. 

However, we do not reach this issue on its merits because we have no 

jurisdiction to do so. “ ‘In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the 

trial court orally pronounces sentence.’ ” (People v. Montes (2021)

70 Cal.App.5th 35, 47, quoting People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, 

fn. 9.) Here, judgment was rendered on April 4, 2022, and Munoz-Garcia did 

not timely appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) [notice of appeal must 

be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment].) Rather, his 

notice of appeal in this case was from the July 28, 2022 victim restitution 

order and was filed that same day.

“ ‘A timely notice of appeal, as a general matter, is “essential to 

appellate jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] ‘An untimely notice of appeal is “wholly 

ineffectual: The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc 

order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss 

the appeal on motion or on its own motion.” [Citation.] The purpose of the 

requirement of a timely notice of appeal is, self-evidently, to further the 

finality of judgments by causing the [party] to take an appeal expeditiously or 

not at all.’ [Citation.] As a consequence, ‘ “ ‘an unappealed [judgment] is 

final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later 
15

appealable order.’ ” ’ ” (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1127.) Because 

Munoz-Garcia’s notice of appeal cannot be deemed timely with respect to the 

imposition of the restitution fine, we cannot consider its propriety.

III. DISPOSITION

The $100,000 award of noneconomic restitution to Jane Doe 2 is 

reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings regarding 

whether Munoz-Garcia owes noneconomic restitution to Jane Doe 2. The 

judgment is otherwise affirmed.
16

CASTRO, J.*

WE CONCUR:

BANKE, ACTING P. J.

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

A165868

People v. Munoz-Garcia

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.