alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# **EXHIBIT10.3.15.1**

#  

# **FIRSTAMENDMENT**

## **TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**

**BETWEENWESTAFF SUPPORT, INC., WESTAFF (USA), INC.**

**ANDWESTAFF, INC. AND MICHAEL T. WILLIS**

 

TheExecutive Employment Agreement effective as of June 1, 2007 by and amongWestaff Support, Inc., Westaff (USA), Inc. and Westaff, Inc. (collectivelythe “Company”),, and Michael T. Willis (“Executive” or “you”) is hereby amendedas follows.

 

1.             **LivingAllowance and Travel Reimbursements (Section II.D.):**  Effective June 1, 2008, the Companyshall extend the Executive’s Living Allowance of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000)for a month-to-month period not to exceed six (6) months.  Following this period, the Company shalldetermine any further personal allowances or travel reimbursements in itsdiscretion.

 

Allother terms and conditions of the above-referenced Executive EmploymentAgreement shall remain in full force and effect unless otherwise amendedherein.

 
|   | **THE  COMPANY:**             |
|--------|-------------------------------|
|   |                          |
|   | **WESTAFF  SUPPORT, INC.**    |
|   |                          |
|   |                          |
|   | By:                           |      /s/  Jamie M. Ryan |
|   | Name:  Jamie M. Ryan          |
|   | Title:  Vice President, Legal |
|   | Date:                         |    June 3,  2008 |
|   |                          |
|   |                          |
|   | **WESTAFF  (USA), INC.**      |
|   |                          |
|   |                          |
|   | By:                           |      /s/  Jamie M. Ryan |
|   | Name:  Jamie M. Ryan          |
|   | Title:  Vice President, Legal |
|   | Date:                         |    June 3,  2008 |
|   |                          |
|   |                          |
|   | **WESTAFF,  INC.**            |
|   |                          |
|   |                          |
|   | By:                           |      /s/  Jamie M. Ryan |
|   | Name:  Jamie M. Ryan          |
|   | Title:  Vice President, Legal |
|   | Date:                         |    June 3,  2008 |
|        |                               |  |  |  |  |

** **
| **AGREED:**                                          |   |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                 |   |
| **EXECUTIVE**                                        |   |
|                                                 |   |
|                                                 |   |
|      /s/  Michael T. Willis |   |
| Michael  T. Willis                                   |   |
| Date:                                                |   |   |
|                                                      |        |  |

 

----
# C_2008223EN.01006001.xml

| 30.8.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 223/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.8.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 223/60

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 21 February 2008 — Vande Velde v Commission

(Case F-60/05) (1)

1

(Staff - Contract staff member - Late claim - Action manifestly inadmissible)

(2008/C 223/112)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Patricke Vande Velde (Linkebeek, Belgium) (represented by: L. Vogel, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: J. Currall and G. Berscheid, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the form of order sought by the defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Arpio Santacruz and I. Sulce, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the form of order sought by the defendant:

Re:

Staff case — First, annulment of the Commission's decision rejecting the complaint submitted by the applicant, a former member of the auxiliary staff, against the decision fixing his grade and remuneration as a contract staff member and, secondly, an application for damages (formerly T-268/05)

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.

| 2. | Each party shall bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 229, 17.9.2005, p. 30 (case originally registered at the Court of First Instance of the European Communities as Case T 268/05 and transferred to the European Union Civil Service Tribunal by order of 15.12.2005).

1

---
**Order of the Court of First Instance (Eighth Chamber) of 13 November 2008 – Lemaître Sécurité v Commission**

**(Case T-301/06)**

Action for annulment – Dumping – Imports of footwear with a protective toecap originating in the People’s Republic of China and India – Commission Decision closing the anti-dumping proceeding – Not individually concerned – Manifest inadmissibility

1.                     *Actions for annulment – Natural or legal persons – Measures of direct and individual concern to them (Art. 230, fourth para.,
EC; Council Regulation No 384/96, Arts 5(10) and 6(5); Commission Decision No 2006/582) (see paras 23-29)*

2.                     *Actions for annulment – Jurisdiction of the Community judicature – Unlimited jurisdiction – Direction issued to an institution
– Not permissible (Arts 229 EC and 230 EC) (see para. 31)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ANNULMENT of Commission Decision No 2006/582/EC of 28 August 2006 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of footwear with a protective toecap, originating in the People’s Republic of China and India (OJ 2006 L 234, p. 33). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action as manifestly inadmissible; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Lemaître Sécurité SAS to pay its own costs and pay those incurred by the Commission; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 3. | | Orders Associazione nazionale calzaturifici italiani to pay its own costs. |
*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th

Cir. R. 32.1.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously to grant counsel’s request for a decision on the briefs

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

September 2, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERTO MARTINEZCOBARUBIAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-2298

(D.C. No. 07–cr–00926–JB–1)

(D.N.M.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

Defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States as a deported

alien and was sentenced to a forty-six month term of imprisonment. Pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Defendant’s counsel has filed a

motion to withdraw and a corresponding brief stating that he has found no nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal. The government declined to file a response
-2-

brief, and Defendant himself has not responded or raised any additional points.

In his Anders brief, defense counsel raises two potential issues for appeal. 

First, Defendant could potentially challenge the voluntary nature of his guilty

plea. However, the record on appeal contains nothing that would support such a

challenge, instead reflecting that Defendant signed the plea agreement, which

represented that the plea was freely and voluntarily made, after reading and

reviewing every part of it with his attorney in his native language. Second,

Defendant could potentially challenge his sentence. However, as defense counsel

notes, Defendant in fact benefitted from a downward departure under the

Guidelines. Because the district court accepted Defendant’s argument that his

criminal history category of IV significantly overstated his criminal past, it

calculated the range for his sentence based on a criminal history category of III. 

The record also demonstrates that the district court carefully considered the

factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in deciding that a sentence of forty-six

months, at the bottom of the new sentencing range, would be appropriate. 

After reviewing the record, we agree with defense counsel that there are no

meritorious issues to raise on appeal. We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to

withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay

Circuit Judge
**Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 3 April 2008 – Commission v Portugal**

**(Case C‐289/07)**

Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations – Directive 2004/17/EC – Coordination of the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors
– Failure to transpose within the prescribed period

Actions for failure to fulfil obligations – Examination of merits by the Court – Situation to be taken into consideration – Situation on expiry of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion (Art. 226 EC) (see para. 9)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations – Failure to adopt, within the prescribed period, the measures necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 1). |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Declares that, by failing to adopt, within the prescribed period, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 71 of that directive; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs. |
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Jaime Tellez

, * From the 142nd District

Court of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CR39128

.

Vs. No. 11

- 12

- 00 048

- CR * May 16, 2013

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Wright, C.J.

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson , J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
32.2



CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





I, Ralph M. Amato, Chief Financial Officer of BoysToys.com, Inc. (the "Registrant"), do hereby certify pursuant to Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code that:



(1)	the Registrant's Report on Form 10-QSB of the Registrant for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 (the "Report"), to which this Statement is filed as an exhibit, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and



(2) 	the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



Dated:   May 15, 2004





By: /s/ Ralph M. AmatoChief Financial Officer
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 MARCH 18, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-14895

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 07-80973-CV-WJZ

ABD ELQADER HAWAMDEN,

on his own behalf and others

similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

A.M.K. PETROLEUM ENTERPRISES, INC.,

a Florida corporation, 

KLEOPAS KLEOPA,

individually,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_______________________

(March 18, 2009)

Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
This appeal challenges the refusal of the trial judge to give a requested

instruction for the jury in a suit for overtime compensation. Applying the

deferential standard of review applicable, we find no error. The instructions given

to the jury, considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jurors on the issues

presented.

AFFIRMED.

2
In the Matter of E.R., E.R., I.L.

No. COA16-116.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

July 19, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Reversed and Remanded in part.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NOS. AP-75,982; AP-75,983; AP-75,984

EX PARTE FRANK FLORES, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NOS. F-0450069-UP, F-0450070-HP & F-0450071-HP

IN THE 203 DISTRICT COURT RD

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court these applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex

parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of three counts

of aggravated robbery and sentenced to three terms of forty years’ imprisonment. The Fifth Court

of Appeals dismissed his appeals. Flores v. State, Nos. 05-04-01506-CR, 05-04-01507-CR & 05-04-

01508-CR (Tex. App.–Dallas, Jan. 24, 2005, no pet.).

Applicant contends that he was denied his right to appeal his convictions. The trial court has
2

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommends that Applicant be granted out-oftime appeals. We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file out-of-time

appeals of the judgments of conviction in Cause Nos. F-0450069-UP, F-0450070-HP and F0450071-HP from the 203 Judicial District Court of Dallas County. Applicant is ordered returned rd

to that time at which he may give written notices of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of

counsel, obtain meaningful appeals. All time limits shall be calculated as if the sentences had been

imposed on the date on which the mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should Applicant

desire to prosecute appeals, he must take affirmative steps to file written notices of appeal in the trial

court within 30 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Applicant’s remaining claims are dismissed. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997).

Delivered: September 10, 2008

Do Not Publish
In the Court of Criminal 

Appeals of Texas

══════════

No. WR-92,812-01

══════════

EX PARTE THEODORE CHARLES SCHMIDT,

Applicant

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Cause No. 1204964-A in the 182nd District Court

From Harris County

═══════════════════════════════════════

YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SLAUGHTER, J. 

joined.

Applicant was convicted in 2010 of capital murder and sentenced 

to life imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his 

conviction in 2012. Schmidt v. State, No. 14-10-00713-CR (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2012) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication).
SCHMIDT – 2

In January 2021, Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas 

corpus in the county of conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07. In 

his application, he alleges six grounds related to new DNA evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and false testimony. 

Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to 

further develop the record. I join the Court’s remand order. But I write 

separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and 

its possible application to this case. See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua 

sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, ___ S.W.3d ___, 

No. WR-89,851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2022) 

(Yeary, J., concurring).

The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this 

one. Applicant’s trial occurred in 2010, but this writ application was not 

filed until over ten years later. The record is also silent regarding 

circumstances that may excuse Applicant’s delay, and at least some 

explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided.

Consistent with this Court’s precedent, the trial court may, sua 

sponte, give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the 

delay. It may also give the State’s prosecutors and/or former counsel for 

Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant’s delay has caused 

any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant’s claims.1 And 

1 “Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the 

diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of 

the State’s evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years 

after a conviction becomes final.” Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437–39 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)). 
SCHMIDT – 3

ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions 

of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court’s 

remand order.

With these additional thoughts, I join the Court’s order.

FILED: May 11, 2022

DO NOT PUBLISH
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. KEVIN PATTERSON, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 157 EAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 1st day of October, 2014, the Petition for Allo wance of Appeal is DENIED
.
# C_2008285EN.01003402.xml

| 8.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 285/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 285/34

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 24 September 2008 — HUP Uslugi Polska v OHIM — (I.T.@MANPOWER)

(Case T-248/05) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Communityword mark ‘I.T.@MANPOWER’ - Absolute grounds for refusal - Distinctive character - Lack of descriptive character - No signs or indications which have become customary - Not a trade mark of such a nature as to deceive the public - Article 7(1)(b), (c), (d) and (g) and Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94)

(2008/C 285/61)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: HUP Uslugi Polska sp. z o.o., formerly HP Temporärpersonalgesellschaft mbH (Czeladz, Poland) (represented by: M. Ciresa, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the Court of First Instance: Manpower Inc. (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States) (represented by: R. Moscona and V. Marsland, Solicitors, and A. Bryson, Barrister)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the Court of First Instance:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 April 2005 (Case R 124/2004-4) concerning invalidity proceedings between MP Temporärpersonal GmbH and Manpower Inc.

Operative part of the order

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders HUP Uslugi Polska sp. z o.o. to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders HUP Uslugi Polska sp. z o.o. to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 217, 3.9.2005.

1

---
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3841 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide that foreign income 

be considered in the determination of eligibility for grants and loans 

under that Act. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 10, 2014 

Mr. GRAYSON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide 

that foreign income be considered in the determination 

of eligibility for grants and loans under that Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INCLUSION OF FOREIGN INCOME FOR PUR4 POSES OF DETERMINING TOTAL INCOME FOR 

5 HIGHER EDUCATION GRANT AND LOAN ELI6 GIBILITY. 

7 Section 480(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 

8 (20 U.S.C. 1087vv(b)) is amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (1)— 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3841 IH

1 (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H) 

2 and (I) as subparagraphs (I) and (J), respec3 tively; and 

4 (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) 

5 the following new subparagraph: 

6 ‘‘(H) foreign income excluded for purposes 

7 of Federal income taxes;’’; and 

8 (2) in paragraph (2)— 

9 (A) in subparagraph (D), by striking the 

10 semicolon and inserting ‘‘; or’’; 

11 (B) by striking subparagraph (E); and 

12 (C) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as 

13 subparagraph (E). 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-50896

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DENISE LUJAN-SAUCEDA,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

 

August 25, 1999

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Denise Lujan-Sauceda pleaded guilty to possession

with intent to distribute for carrying over 80 pounds of marijuana

in her car. Her initial presentence report included a three-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Lujan-Sauceda then

failed to appear at her sentencing hearing, and a warrant was

issued for her arrest. She later turned herself in. At her second

sentencing hearing, her offense level was revised to remove the

three-level reduction and to include a two-level upward adjustment

for obstruction of justice. Lujan-Sauceda argues on appeal that

the district court erred in denying offense level reductions for

acceptance of responsibility and for a minor or minimal role in the

offense. 

The denied requested reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, addressed in section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing
2

Guidelines, results from the obstruction of justice adjustment.

The Comment to section 3E1.1 notes, “Conduct resulting in an

enhancement under §3C1.1 [Obstructing or Impeding the

Administration of Justice] ordinarily indicates that the defendant

has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There

may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under

both §§3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.” § 3E1.1 n.4. In this case,

Lujan-Sauceda’s eventual voluntary surrender does not present such

an extraordinary circumstance. 

The district court did not err in denying Lujan-Sauceda a

downward adjustment for a minimal or minor role in the offense.

Lujan-Sauceda was the only actor in her offense and the court used

only the drugs she was transporting in calculating her sentence.

Appellant’s status as a first-time offender and her claims to be a

courier do not require a different result.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.