UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CELTNIEKS, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E1 JAMESON T. HAZELBOWER 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20150335 

Headquarters, Fort Campbell 

Steven E. Walburn, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Insani, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Lozano, JA; Captain Heather L. 

Tregle, JA; Captain Katherine L. DePaul, JA (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Melissa 

R. Covolesky, JA; Captain Katherine L. DePaul, JA (on reply brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major Melissa Dasgupta Smith, JA; 

Captain Jennifer A. Donahue (on brief). 

12 October 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

TOZZI, Senior Judge: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to his pleas, of one specification of desertion, four specifications of rape, 

two specifications of rape of a child, two specifications of sexual abuse of a child, 

sexual assault of a child, and possession of child pornography, in violation of 

Articles 85, 120, 120b, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 

885, 920, 920b, and 934 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced 

appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for fifty years, and forfeiture of 

all pay and allowances. Appellant received 201 days of confinement credit. The 

convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged.

 This case is before this court for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. 

Appellant raises two assignments of error, one of which merits discussion but no 
HAZELBOWER—ARMY 20150335 

2

relief. The matters personally raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. 

Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), do not warrant relief.1

 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant stands convicted of sexual offenses against three different victims, 

AA, SC, and MB. The military judge granted a government motion, over defense 

objection, to allow use of the charged sexual misconduct for Mil R. Evid. 413 and 

414 purposes to show appellant’s propensity to commit the charged sexual 

misconduct. Appellant alleges the military judge abused his discretion in so ruling. 

The military judge also allowed evidence of uncharged misconduct to show 

appellant’s propensity to commit the charged offenses. After hearing the evidence 

and arguments from both trial and defense counsel, which included argument 

 

1

 Appellant personally asserts, inter alia, in an unsworn submission pursuant to 

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), his trial defense counsel, 

Captain (CPT) G and (Mr.) P, were ineffective because they: (1) failed to object 

at several critical periods of the trial, specifically to the introduction of hearsay 

statements of SC in Prosecution Exhibit 30, where SC repeatedly alleges that 

appellant raped her, and by failing to effectively attack SC’s assertions on crossexamination; and (2) failed to object to the improper introduction of Mil. R. Evid. 

[hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.] 413/414 evidence concerning AH, C, and G. We 

disagree with these assertions. Under the circumstances of this case, we see no 

need to order affidavits from CPT G and Mr. P (regarding their trial strategy or 

tactics) or a fact-finding hearing pursuant to United States v. DuBay, 17 

U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967). The facts in appellant’s allegations—

even if true—“would not result in relief.” United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 

248 (C.A.A.F. 1997). Regarding Prosecution Exhibit 30 and the testimony of SC, 

the direct testimony of SC essentially encompasses the contents of Prosecution 

Exhibit 30, and the cross-examination of SC clearly demonstrates defense 

counsel’s strategy of attacking the veracity of SC’s assertions by pointing out her 

Skype messages, which could indicate her possible consent to the sexual 

encounters between her and appellant. The Mil. R. Evid. 413/414 evidence to 

which appellant points consists of appellant’s uncharged misconduct with 

individuals other than the victims in this case. Appellant’s submission 

“consists...of speculative [and] conclusory observations.” Ginn, 47 M.J. at 248. 

Furthermore, “the appellate filings and the record as a whole ‘compellingly 

demonstrate’ the improbability of [appellant’s allegations].” Id. Applying the 

first, second, and fourth Ginn principles to appellant’s unsworn submission, we 

reject appellant’s ineffective assistance claims. 
HAZELBOWER—ARMY 20150335 

3

concerning propensity evidence, the military judge found appellant guilty of all 

charges and specifications. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Appellant alleges our superior court’s holding in United States v. Hills, 75 

M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016), is controlling in this case and warrants a reversal of the 

military judge’s findings of guilty and the sentence. Appellant further asserts that 

propensity evidence was erroneously applied during sentencing proceedings. We 

disagree. 

We have considered our superior court’s holding in Hills, that it was error for 

the military judge, in a members trial, to admit charged offenses as Mil. R. Evid. 

413 evidence to show an appellant’s propensity to commit the charged offenses. Id. 

at 357. Consistent with the facts in United States v. Hukill, appellant in the instant 

case elected to be tried by a military judge sitting alone. ARMY 20140939, 2016 

CCA LEXIS 505, *1 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 16 Aug. 2016) (mem. op.). Unlike in 

Hills, there is no danger in a judge alone trial of piercing the presumption of 

innocence with contradictory or erroneous panel instructions. “Military judges are 

presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear evidence to the contrary.” 

Hukill, 2016 CCA LEXIS 505, at *4 (citing United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 

225 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 

As in Hukill, we find that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 

military judge did not hold the government to its burden of proving appellant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the military judge applied a lesser standard in 

adjudicating the charges against appellant. In addition, in the context of ruling on 

the use of propensity evidence during the sentencing portion of the trial, the military 

judge stated: 

The Court has, in fact, conducted an M.R.E 403 balancing 

test on those three pieces of propensity evidence and has 

found that they are admissible for sentencing purposes and 

again, the Court will provide a written ruling to that 

effect, and importantly, the Court notes that that evidence 

was also considered during the findings only for the 

limited purpose of propensity and the court used it only 

for that limited purpose and it had little to no effect on the 

Court’s deliberations and findings, even though the Court 

finds it was properly admissible. 

It is clear from this ruling that the military judge was well aware of the limits of 

propensity evidence in this case. There is no danger the military judge trampled 

upon appellant’s presumption of innocence. 
HAZELBOWER—ARMY 20150335 

4

In light of the military judge’s characterization of his use of propensity 

evidence on the record, we are satisfied the military judge’s view on the 

admissibility of propensity evidence involving the victims of the charged offenses 

under Mil. R. Evid. 413 and 414 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We find 

no risk that the military judge applied an impermissibly low standard of proof 

concerning both the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the 

prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We find nothing in the record to 

suggest that the military judge did not hold the government to its burden of proving 

appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the military judge applied a 

lesser standard in adjudicating the charges against appellant. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record, including the matters personally raised 

by the appellant pursuant to Grostefon, the findings and sentence as approved by the 

convening authority are AFFIRMED.

Judge CELTNIEKS and Judge BURTON concur. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 JOHN P. TAITT 

 Chief Deputy Clerk of Court 

JOHN P. TAITT 

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: