alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JAIME SILVA, Individually and d/b/a

SOUTHWEST DISPOSAL,

 Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF EL PASO,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

 § 

No. 08-08-00172-CV

Appeal from the

171st Judicial District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 2008-1407) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal is before the Court on its own motion for determination whether the appeal

should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Finding that Appellant did not timely file a notice

of appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

A civil appeal is perfected when the notice of appeal is filed. TEX.R.APP.P. 26.1;

Restrepo v. First Nat’l Bank of Dona Ana County, N.M., 892 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex.App.--

El Paso 1995, no w rit)(applying former TEX.R.APP.P. 40(a)(1)). When no motion for new

trial or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is filed, the notice of appeal must be

filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed. TEX.R.APP.P. 26.1; Restrepo, 892 S.W.2d at

238. When motion for new trial is timely filed, or a party timely files a request for findings of

fact and conclusions of law, the notice of appeal is due ninety days after the judgment is signed. 

See TEX.R.APP.P. 26.1(a). An untimely notice of appeal will be considered timely if it is filed

within fifteen days after the due date and includes a reasonable explanation for the appellant’s

failure to file on the due date. See TEX.R.APP.P. 26.3; Vergburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615,
 Appellant did file a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following the 1

trial court’s order granting the County’s partial summary judgment motion, but before the claims

were severed. Even if we were to consider Appellant’s request for findings for the purpose of

extending the date to perfect the appeal, Appellant’s notice of appeal remains untimely as at the

latest, it was due to be filed April 11, 2008. See TEX.R.APP.P. 26.1(a)(4).

-2-

617 (Tex. 1997).

In this case, the trial court signed a motion for partial summary judgment in the County’s

favor on November 14, 2007. That order became a final and appealable judgment on January 14,

2008, when the trial court signed an order severing the summary judgment claims from the

original suit. See Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995). Appellant did

not file a motion for new trial, or a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following

the severance order. The notice of appeal was due to be filed February 13, 2008. See 1

TEX.R.APP.P. 26.1. The notice of appeal was not filed until May 6, 2008, and therefore failed to

perfect the appeal. See id. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

September 11, 2008

DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Chief Justice

Before Chew, C.J., McClure, and Carr, JJ.
# C_2008301EN.01006206.xml

| 22.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 301/62 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 301/62

---

Order of the Court of First Instance of 11 September 2008 — Italian Republic v Commission

(Case T-77/06) (1)

1

(2008/C 301/112)

Language of the case: Italian

Language of the case: Italian

The President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 96, 22.4.2006.

1

---
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          26,444
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,097
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,343
<INVENTORY>                                      8,011
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                88,666
<PP&E>                                         252,432
<DEPRECIATION>                                  35,655
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 463,034
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          197,158
<BONDS>                                        238,075
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           139
<OTHER-SE>                                     126,396
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   463,034
<SALES>                                         64,793
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,793
<CGS>                                           56,188
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,256
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,351
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    45
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,319
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (10,321)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,417)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,904)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,904)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.50)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.50)


</TABLE>
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-17-00680- CR NO. 03-17-00681- CR NO. 03-17-00682- CR

F reddie Ray Mulkey, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F CO MAL CO UNTY, 207 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NOS . CR201 4-5 49, CR2 015- 522 & CR2016 -88 0 HO NORAB LE DIB WALDRIP , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Fr eddie Ray Mulkey filed notices of appea l from his judgme nts of conviction for the offe nses of possession of a c ontrolled substance in penalty g roup 1, 4 g rams or more but less than 200 g rams (ca

use number CR2014-549); delivery of a controlled substance in penalty g roup 1, less than 1 g ram (ca

use number CR2015-522); and possession with intent to deli v er a controll ed substance in penalty g roup 1, 1 g ram or more but less than 4 g rams (cause number CR2016-880), all of which wer e enhanc ed by Mulkey ’s prior felony convictions. See Tex. Hea lth & Safety Code §§ 481.112(b), ( c), .115( d); Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(d).

Howeve r, the trial court cer tified that eac h of these case s is a plea- barg ain case and that Mulkey

has no rig ht of appe al. Mulkey and his counsel sig ned the tria l court’s c ertifications.Acc ording ly , the appe als are dismiss ed. SeeTex. R. App. P . 25.2(a) (2), ( d).

J eff Rose, Chief J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Pemberton a nd Goodwin Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: Nove mber 14, 2017 Do Not Publish

2
HUNT v. PERRY

290P16-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 12, 2016

Michael Eugene Hunt, for Hunt, Michael Eugene.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, Michael D. Waters, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 8th of August 2016 by Petitioner for Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 12th of August 2016. "
# International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014

        - Previous
        - Next

U.K.

# International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014

# 2014 CHAPTER 9

An Act to promote gender equality in the provision by the Government of development assistance and humanitarian assistance                        to countries outside the United Kingdom, and for connected purposes.                     

[13th March 2014]

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons,                           in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—                        

## 1Duty to have regard to gender inequalityU.K.

(1)The International Development Act 2002 is amended as follows.                  

(2)In section 1 (development assistance), after subsection (1) insert—                  

“(1A)Before providing development assistance under subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall have regard to the desirability                           of providing development assistance that is likely to contribute to reducing poverty in a way which is likely to contribute                           to reducing inequality between persons of different gender.”                  

(3)In section 3 (humanitarian assistance), after the existing provision (which becomes subsection (1)) insert—                  

“(2)Before providing assistance under subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall have regard to the desirability of providing                           assistance under that subsection in a way that takes account of any gender-related differences in the needs of those affected                           by the disaster or emergency.”                  

(4)The requirement imposed by an amendment made by this section may be satisfied by things done (wholly or in part) before the                        commencement of the amendment (including things done before the passing of this Act).                  

## 2Annual reportingU.K.

In section 4(1) of the International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006 (annual report on effectiveness of                     aid), after paragraph (c) insert—                  

“(ca)what steps have been taken as a result of sections 1(1A) and 3(2) of the International Development Act 2002 in pursuing Millennium                           Development Goal 3,”.                  

## 3Short title, commencement and extentU.K.

(1)This Act may be cited as the International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014.                  

(2)This Act shall come into force on the expiry of two months beginning with the day on which it is passed.                  

(3)This Act extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
STATE of North Carolina v. Jerome SHAW, Jr.

No. 65P16.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 13, 2016.

M. Alexander Charns, for Shaw, Jerome (Jr.).

Carolyn McLain, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Daniel Hirschman, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

David Learner, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 1st of March 2016 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of April 2016."
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**
     I, Randy S. Leiser, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Kitty Hawk, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respectto the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures,or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;
 (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 (c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):
 (a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarizeand report financial information; and
 (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role inthe registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.        August 12, 2004 By:  /s/ RANDY S. LEISER    Randy S. Leiser    Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

September 19, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

 [DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 07-11264

 

D. C. Docket No. 03-00195 CR-2-IPJ-JGD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MALCOM E. MCVAY,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

 

(September 19, 2008)

Before DUBINA, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
2

This is the second time we have considered an appeal in this case. In our

first decision, United States v. McVay, 447 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2006), we vacated

McVay’s 60-month probationary sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. 

(“McVay I”). On remand, the district court again imposed a 60-month

probationary sentence, and the government appealed.

It is important to recognize that the government is not challenging in this

appeal the district court’s advisory guideline calculation (as was done in McVay I),

or its imposition of a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 departure. In fact, the government

concedes that the district court fully complied with the law in this circuit in both

regards. The government’s challenge in this case is limited to the reasonableness

of the sentence the district court imposed. In light of the factors enumerated in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote

respect for the law, and the need for just punishment, a non-custodial sentence for

a key participant in a corporate fraud that exceeded a loss of a billion dollars and

left victims too numerous to be counted is, argued by the government,

unreasonable. We agree.

After considering what the Supreme Court said in Gall v. United States, 128

S. Ct. 586 (2007), and after reviewing what the district court did on resentencing

in this case, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it
3

wholly failed to consider, among other things, the seriousness and full

implications of McVay’s criminal conduct. 

A sentence of probation for a high-ranking officer in a corporation where

over a billion dollars of fraud was perpetrated on an unsuspecting work force and

investing public is not reasonable, given the criteria found in § 3553(a) for

determining an appropriate sentence. Probation does not account for the

seriousness of McVay’s conduct. It does not punish him sufficiently. It does not

deter the defendant’s future misconduct. It does not deter other similarly situated

individuals from engaging in criminal conduct. It does nothing to encourage

respect for the court system in this country. Post-Gall, a district court need not

justify an extraordinary departure with extraordinary reasons, but it must still

provide a compelling justification for the sentence it selects. In our view, that was

not done in this case. We once again vacate McVay’s sentence and remand this

case for resentencing.

VACATED and REMANDED.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63of Title 18 of the United States Code**

 

I, Michael T. Willis,hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in my capacity as an officer of Westaff, Inc.(the “Company”), that, to the best of my knowledge;

 

(1)                                  The QuarterlyReport of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended January 26,2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Date:   March 11, 2008 |
|--------------------------------------------|

 
| By:                                     | /s/ Michael T. Willis |   |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|
| Michael T. Willis                       |                  |
| *President and Chief Executive Officer* |                  |

 

Asigned original of this written statement required by § 906 has been providedto Westaff, Inc. and will be retained by Westaff, Inc. and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-08-002-CV

PRISCILLA PORRAS	APPELLANT

	V.

TEMPEST RECOVERY SERVICES,	APPELLEE

INC. (SERVICING AGENT FOR

PREMIER AUTO FINANCE)	

	------------

	FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	On July 22, 2008, we notified Appellant Priscilla Porras that her brief did not comply with rules 9.4(h) and 38.1(a)–(j) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.2  On August 12, 2008, we notified Appellant that her amended brief did not comply with rules 9.4(h) and 38.1(a), (d), (f), (g), (h), and (j).3  We allowed Appellant until August 22, 2008 to file a second amended brief that complied with the above rules.  We stated in our letter to Appellant that her failure to do so would result in our striking her brief and dismissing her appeal for want of prosecution.4  On August 25, 2008, we received Appellant’s second amended brief.  It does not comply with rules 38.1(a), (d), (f), and (h).5

	Accordingly, we strike Appellant’s brief and dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution.6

								PER CURIAM

PANEL:  DAUPHINOT, HOLMAN, and GARDNER, JJ.

DELIVERED:  September 11, 2008
S. 550

One Hundred Tenth Congress

of the

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and eight 

An Act 

To preserve existing judgeships on the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. COMPOSITION OF SUPERIOR COURT. 

Section 903 of title 11 of the District of Columbia Code is 

amended by striking ‘‘fifty-eight’’ and inserting ‘‘61’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
NO. 07-07-0485-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL A

	SEPTEMBER 22, 2008

	______________________________

	EMMA L. CZARNECKI, APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. ONE OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

	NO. 2006-498,812; HONORABLE LARRY B. “RUSTY” LADD, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

	ABATEMENT AND REMAND

	Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Emma L. Czarnecki, was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to 120 days confinement in the Lubbock County Jail.  She was assessed a $1,000 fine, which was suspended.  The Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal contained in the supplemental clerk’s record filed on February 13, 2008, does not comply with the requirements of Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.1  As of September 1, 2007, a defendant must sign and receive a copy of the certification.  Additionally, the new form provides certain admonishments to a defendant not previously required.  

	Consequently, we abate this appeal and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.  Upon remand, the trial court shall utilize whatever means necessary to secure a proper Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal in compliance with Rule 25.2(d).  Once properly completed and executed, the certification shall be included in a supplemental clerk’s record.  See Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(c)(2).  The trial court shall cause this supplemental clerk's record to be filed with the Clerk of this Court by November 6, 2008. This order constitutes notice to all parties, pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, of the defective certification.  If a supplemental clerk’s record containing a proper certification is not filed in accordance with this order, this matter will be referred to the Court for dismissal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). 

	It is so ordered.

							Per Curiam

Do not publish.
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

((((((((((((((((

No. 08-0501

((((((((((((((((

In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Kathryn Houseworth Gibbs, An Incapacitated Person

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((

**ORDER**

1.The motion to abate, filed on September 4, 2008, is granted, and this case is **ABATED** to allow the parties to proceed with settlement negotiations.

2.This case is removed from the Court's active docket until **October 15, 2008**, by which time the parties must file either a status report or a motion to dismiss.  The parties shall immediately notify this Court about any changes in status in the settlement proceedings.

Done at the City of Austin, this 12th day of September, 2008.

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

Supreme Court of Texas

By Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk