In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-1963 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

MICHAEL SARNO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:08-cr-0115-3 — Ronald A. Guzman, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 31, 2022 — DECIDED JUNE 21, 2022 

____________________ 

Before MANION, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. Nearly halfway through a 25-year 

prison term, federal inmate Michael Sarno moved for compassionate release based on severe physical disabilities. The district court assumed Sarno’s medical circumstances were extraordinary and compelling but nevertheless denied the motion after finding numerous factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) weighed strongly against a sentence reduction. 

Sarno contends the district court erred in weighing those
2 No. 21-1963 

factors and failed to discuss evidence he submitted. He also 

contends the inability to communicate with his attorney at a 

critical point in proceedings prevented him from disputing 

certain inaccurate government assertions. Finding no reason

to question the district court’s judgment, we affirm.

Sarno headed a criminal enterprise operating out of northern Illinois for several years. The enterprise placed video gambling machines in local bars and restaurants in an arrangement that, contrary to the law, allowed patrons using the machines to take their winnings in cash. This illegal operation 

was lucrative for Sarno. When a rival organization tried to 

push into Sarno’s territory, he sent it a warning in the form of 

a pipe bomb that exploded outside its headquarters. The enterprise also burglarized or robbed more than a dozen homes 

and jewelry stores in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin and trafficked in the stolen property.

Eventually, the law caught up with Sarno. In December 

2010, a jury found him guilty of conspiring to participate in 

racketeering activity and of conducting an illegal gambling 

business. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1955, 1962. He was sentenced to 25 

years in prison and ordered to pay nearly $1.8 million in restitution. We affirmed both the conviction and the sentence. 

United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Sarno filed the motion for compassionate release at issue 

here in November 2020. Then 62 years old, his health had 

steadily deteriorated over the previous six months. Severe osteoarthritis in his left shoulder and knee prevented him from 

walking, bathing, dressing, or using the toilet on his own. He 

would frequently fall when trying to transition into and out 

of his wheelchair. This immobility compounded the disabling 

effects of several other maladies, such as respiratory disease, 
No. 21-1963 3

obesity, hypertension, and kidney dysfunction. On multiple

occasions, Sarno had to be transported to outside medical facilities for treatment of acute health problems.

The district court held two hearings and considered many

submissions from the parties. A week after Sarno’s last filing, 

it ruled on the motion. The court assumed Sarno’s poor health 

constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant 

compassionate release. Nevertheless, the court determined 

early release would be inconsistent with the § 3553(a) factors.

Specifically, cutting Sarno’s sentence short would deprecate 

the seriousness of his offenses, undermine respect for the law, 

ignore his extensive criminal history, and pose a danger to the 

public. Concluding that these factors weighed decisively 

against releasing him, the district court denied Sarno’s motion. After the court declined to reconsider, Sarno brought this 

appeal. 

Generally, a federal court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). But 

Congress has permitted early release if “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant ... a reduction” in sentence.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Such a motion for compassionate release 

may be filed by a prisoner or by the Director of the Bureau of 

Prisons. Id. When initiated by a prisoner, the motion “involves 

a two-step inquiry: one, did the prisoner present an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, and two, is release 

appropriate under § 3553(a).” United States v. Kurzynowski, 

17 F.4th 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2021). We review the original denial 

of a compassionate-release motion, as well as the denial of a 

motion to reconsider, for abuse of discretion. Id.; O'Donnell v. 

Saul, 983 F.3d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 2020). 
4 No. 21-1963 

As the district court explained, the record amply supports 

denial of Sarno’s motion for a sentence reduction. The factors 

the court cited—seriousness of the crime, respect for the law, 

criminal history, danger to the public—are all considerations 

under § 3553(a) that militate against a defendant’s early release from prison. 

Sarno criticizes the court’s assessment of some of these factors, but his arguments are meritless. He asserts the district 

court, in finding he would continue to pose a danger to the 

public, overlooked that his age and infirmity lessened the 

likelihood of recidivism. But there was no oversight on this 

issue. The court specifically noted Sarno did not personally 

undertake the bombing or the robberies but “directed others 

to do these things and received the benefit of their criminal 

activities.” His current physical condition, the court concluded, would not prevent him from returning to his old ways 

and using subordinates to commit crimes. This reasoning 

seems eminently sensible to us. Youth and vigor might have 

been necessary for Bill Sikes and the Artful Dodger to ply 

their trades, but Fagin could still run a criminal enterprise as 

an old man. 

Sarno similarly suggests the district court judged his criminal history too harshly. He acknowledges the robberies and 

the bombing but asserts he personally “did not harm anyone.” Even if true, this is faint praise indeed. Sarno may not 

have carried out these crimes, but he ordered the bombing 

and exercised control over the robberies. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 

at 297. Illegal gambling, racketeering conspiracy, robbery, 

and the use of explosives are all grave and violent crimes with 

potentially deadly consequences for their victims. Sarno 

played a central role in these illegal activities. 
No. 21-1963 5

In addition to these crimes, the court considered Sarno’s 

long career “entrenched in organized crime and its street 

crews long before his conviction in this case.” His criminal 

history spanned decades; it involved not only racketeering 

conspiracy and running an illegal gambling business but also 

predatory lending, extortion, and violent debt collection. Before being sentenced in this case, Sarno already had multiple 

felony convictions. The district court’s assessment of these 

matters was “well within the broad discretion a judge possesses under § 3582(c)(1).” United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 

598 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Next, Sarno objects to what the district court did not say. 

During the hearings, the court expressed concern that, if released, the inability to find legitimate work coupled with substantial healthcare costs would tempt Sarno to resume his 

criminal career. In response, Sarno detailed the health insurance he would obtain upon release and informed the court 

that a generous friend had offered to set up a trust that would 

cover Sarno’s medical expenses for as long as necessary. In his 

order denying compassionate release, however, the district 

judge did not mention this issue or evidence. 

A district court must provide “reasonable assurance that 

it at least considered the prisoner’s principal arguments.”

United States v. Newton, 996 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2021). This 

does not mean the court’s opinion must address every issue 

that arises in compassionate-release proceedings. See United 

States v. Sanders, 992 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2021). Instead, an 

opinion is adequate when it reflects individualized assessment of the prisoner’s circumstances and primary arguments 

and makes the judge’s thinking clear. Newton, 996 F.3d at 491.
6 No. 21-1963 

The district court’s opinion here did that. The court accepted (for argument’s sake) Sarno’s primary contention that 

his medical condition met the statutory threshold for a sentence reduction. The court then denied compassionate release 

based on Sarno’s specific circumstances. The evidence Sarno 

says the district court should have discussed concerned one 

risk factor (financial pressure) relating to one aspect (likelihood of recidivism) of one relevant factor under § 3553(a) 

(protecting the public from further crimes by Sarno). If the 

court had cited this risk factor to deny the motion while ignoring the rebuttal evidence offered, Sarno might have a 

point. But the court didn’t do that. The issue’s omission from 

the court’s ruling indicates that the judge ultimately did not 

think it relevant to resolving the motion. “Federal law does 

not contain a mandatory-dictum policy, under which a judge 

must consider every possible issue.” Ugbah, 4 F.4th at 598. The 

district court’s opinion satisfies us that it properly exercised 

its discretion and considered all appropriate matters. 

Sarno’s final argument is a procedural one that bundles 

together the constitutional rights to confer with counsel and 

to be heard in a meaningful way. During proceedings, the 

government advised the district court that Sarno had been 

transferred to the United States Medical Center for Federal 

Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri (MCFP Springfield), where 

he would receive round-the-clock nursing care and remain

until he was healthy enough to undergo knee-replacement 

surgery. Sometime after the second hearing, Sarno’s counsel 

learned he had been transferred temporarily from MCFP 

Springfield to an outside medical facility for treatment. 

Sarno’s attorney was not told where and was not able to speak 

with him in the time leading up to the court’s April 14, 2021,

ruling. 
No. 21-1963 7

Thus, while Sarno was held incommunicado, he could not 

confer with his attorney to respond to the assertions in the 

government’s April 7, 2021, memorandum. Sarno contends he 

was denied the right to communicate with counsel about the 

government’s new allegations and to respond to those allegations before the court ruled on his motion.

This argument was not timely raised below. Sarno’s attorney did not alert the district court to any problem contacting 

his client until he moved for reconsideration. And even then, 

the three-sentence assertion was underdeveloped. Nor did 

counsel ask for a continuance. He responded to the government’s April 7 memorandum that same day but never requested a delay in proceedings until he could reach Sarno. 

The response suggested another hearing only if the court still 

questioned the information Sarno had already submitted.

Otherwise, counsel urged the court to grant the compassionate-release motion.

An argument first raised or developed in a motion to reconsider usually comes too late to preserve the issue for appellate review. Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 938 (7th Cir. 

2009). At most, we would review an argument not presented 

to the district court during § 3582(c) proceedings for plain error. See United States v. Williams, 32 F.4th 653, 655 (7th Cir. 

2022). Under plain-error review, reversing the district court is 

appropriate only if we find: (1) an error, (2) that is clear or 

obvious under the law, (3) affects a prisoner’s substantial 

rights, and (4) seriously impugns the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. 

Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Initially, we have doubts whether the first two elements 

are met in this context. Sarno does not assert a constitutional 
8 No. 21-1963 

right to appointed counsel; there is none in § 3582(c) proceedings. United States v. Clayton, 811 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Rather, he invokes the right to access the attorney he retained. 

But although “an inmate’s opportunity to confer with counsel 

is a particularly important constitutional right which the 

courts will not permit to be unnecessarily abridged,” Dreher 

v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1146 (7th Cir. 1980), preventing escape 

and ensuring public safety “’are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional 

rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees,’” id.

at 1145–46 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979)). 

Sarno doesn’t dispute that the temporary inability to communicate with his attorney was predicated at least partially 

on valid security concerns.

Moreover, “a § 3582(c)(2) motion does not require a doover of an original sentencing proceeding where a defendant 

is cloaked in rights mandated by statutory law and the Constitution.” United States v. Young, 555 F.3d 611, 614–15 (7th Cir. 

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district judge has 

“considerable leeway in choosing how to adjudicate 

§ 3582(c)(2) sentence-reduction motions.” Id. at 615. So, 

whether the district court was obliged to explicitly invite 

Sarno to respond to the government’s April 7 memorandum

before ruling on the motion is an unsettled question. See id.

(declining “to identify the minimum procedural protections 

that are required in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings”).

But we need not resolve whether there was error here that 

was clear or obvious. Under the third element of plain-error 

review, a prisoner’s substantial rights were not affected unless he “can show a reasonable probability that, but for the 

error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
No. 21-1963 9

different.” Burns, 843 F.3d at 688 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In these circumstances, this means Sarno must show

a reasonable probability that, had he been able with counsel’s 

assistance to respond meaningfully to the government’s April 

7 assertions, the district court would have granted his compassionate-release motion.

We see no reasonable probability that the information or 

arguments Sarno now proffers would have changed the district court’s judgment if he had presented them below. 

First, he challenges the government’s contention that 

MCFP Springfield could adequately care for his medical 

needs because, since arriving there, he was twice transferred 

to outside facilities for treatment of acute problems (pneumonia and suspected tuberculosis). It could be argued, as the 

government does, that these transfers show MCFP Springfield is capable of ensuring Sarno receives all necessary medical care. But even if the transfers suggest the inability to provide sufficient care for his chronic disabilities, the level of care 

Sarno receives while incarcerated is relevant, if at all, to the 

threshold question of whether extraordinary and compelling 

reasons exist to justify a sentence reduction. The district court 

assumed Sarno met that threshold but found § 3553(a) considerations made reduction inappropriate. There is no reason to 

think Sarno’s present contentions (of slightly worse medical 

circumstances) might have changed the district judge’s mind.

See United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021) 

(noting “courts are not compelled to release every prisoner 

with extraordinary and compelling health concerns”).

Second, Sarno asserts spurious information provided by 

the government led the district court to conclude wrongly 

that he “remains in contact with and dependent upon 
10 No. 21-1963 

previous associates from his life of organized crime.” Sarno

disputes the extent to which the three individuals the government and the court cited stayed in touch with him, deposited 

money in his prison account, or had criminal records. We 

agree the district court shouldn’t have assumed one individual (Sarno’s nephew by marriage) to be of unsavory character 

simply because he is related to a convicted organized crime 

boss. The other men, however, did contribute to Sarno’s 

prison account and either had a criminal record or were reliably implicated in Sarno’s illegal enterprise. In any event, this 

was a relatively minor issue in the court’s analysis compared 

to Sarno’s serious criminal history and danger to the public. 

Even if the district judge accepted the more nuanced circumstances Sarno sketches, there is no reasonable basis to think 

he would have granted compassionate release. Even “one 

good reason for denying a compassionate-release motion suffices,” United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022), 

and here there were several. Thus, there was no plain error.

The district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise 

err in denying Sarno early release. 

AFFIRMED