UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4865

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CLEVELAND LAQUINCY GRIFFIN, a/k/a Q, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District 

Judge. (3:07-cr-00926-JFA-1) 

Submitted: September 3, 2009 Decided: October 15, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Aileen P. 

Clare, Research and Writing Specialist, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL 

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

William Walter Wilkins, III, United States Attorney, John David 

Rowell, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Cleveland Laquincy Griffin pleaded guilty to 

possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) (2006 & West Supp. 

2009). Griffin was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and 

now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues 

but stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Griffin filed a pro se supplemental brief raising an additional 

issue.* We affirm. 

In the Anders brief, counsel first questions whether 

the district court erred in accepting Griffin’s guilty plea. 

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through 

colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and 

determine that he understands, the nature of the charges to 

which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the 

maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is 

relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The 

court also must determine whether there is a factual basis for 

the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th 

Cir. 1991). The purpose of the Rule 11 colloquy is to ensure 

 *

 We have considered the claim raised in Griffin’s pro se 

brief and conclude the claim lacks merit. 

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that the plea of guilt is entered into knowingly and 

voluntarily. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). 

Because Griffin did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is 

reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Griffin] 

must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and 

that the error affected his substantial rights.” United 

States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if 

Griffin satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error 

remains within our discretion, which we should not exercise 

. . . unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. 

Our review of the transcript reveals full compliance with the 

requirements of Rule 11, and we conclude that Griffin pleaded 

guilty knowingly and voluntarily. 

Counsel next questions whether the district court 

erred in sentencing Griffin as a career offender. The district 

court considered a prior conviction for failure to stop for a 

blue light as a predicate offense for purposes of the career 

offender designation under the advisory guidelines. See U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2008). We conclude that 

this was error. See United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226 

(4th Cir. 2009) (holding that failure to stop for a blue light 

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under South Carolina law is not per se violent felony under the 

Armed Career Criminal Act). However, Griffin had two other 

prior offenses that qualified as predicates for career offender 

purposes and, therefore, the district court properly designated 

Griffin a career offender. Accordingly, this error did not 

affect Griffin’s substantial rights. See Muhammad, 478 F.3d at 

249 (providing standard for plain error review). 

 We have examined the entire record in accordance with 

the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues 

for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Griffin, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Griffin requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Griffin. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED