FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL BOSCHETTO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 06-16595 v.

D.C. No. JEFFREY D. HANSING; FRANK- 

BOUCHER CHRYSLER DODGE-JEEP;

CV-06-01390-VRW

GORDIE BOUCHER FORD; BOUCHER OPINION

AUTOMOTIVE GROUP,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Vaughn R. Walker, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 14, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed August 20, 2008

Before: Betty B. Fletcher and Pamela Ann Rymer,

Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher;

Concurrence by Judge Rymer

*The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior United States District

Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

11119
COUNSEL

Kenneth D. Simoncini, Esq., Simoncini & Associates, San

Jose, California, for plaintiff-appellant Paul Boschetto. 

Robert G. Krohn, Esq., Roethe Krohn Pope LLP, Edgerton,

Washington, for defendant-appellee Jeffrey D. Hansing. 

Timothy C. Davis, Davis Law Firm, San Francisco, California, for defendants-appellees Frank-Boucher Chrysler DodgeJeep, Gordie Boucher Ford and Boucher Automotive Group.

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 

This appeal presents a question that remains surprisingly

unanswered by the circuit courts: Does the sale of an item via

the eBay Internet auction site provide sufficient “minimum

contacts” to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant in the buyer’s forum state? Plaintiff-Appellant Paul

Boschetto (“Boschetto”) was the winning bidder for a 1964

Ford Galaxie sold on eBay by the Defendant-Appellee, Jeffrey Hansing (“Hansing”) for $34,106. Boschetto arranged for

the car to be shipped from Wisconsin to California, but upon

arrival it failed to meet his expectations or the advertised

description. Boschetto sued in federal court; his complaint

was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. We now

affirm.

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11123
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Boschetto lives in San Francisco, California.1 DefendantAppellee Jeffrey D. Hansing resides in Milton, Wisconsin. Id.

Defendants-Appellees Frank-Boucher Chrysler Dodge-Jeep,

Gordie Boucher Ford and Boucher Automotive Group

(“Boucher Defendants”) are private corporations with their

principal places of business in Wisconsin. The Boucher

Defendants operate a website that advertises their auto dealerships, although it is not alleged that this website was connected in any way with the transaction at issue in this case.

Hansing is an employee of one of the Boucher Defendants,

Frank Boucher Chrysler Dodge-Jeep. The complaint avers

that on August 1, 2005, all Defendants “owned and advertised

[ ] a 1964 Ford Galaxie 500 XL 427/425 hp ‘R Code’ in awesome condition, not restored, rust free chrome in excellent

condition, recently rebuilt and ready to be driven, with clear

title, and a vehicle warranty number of 4E68R149127.”

The car was advertised for sale on the eBay Internet auction

site; a copy of a portion of the eBay listing was attached to

Boschetto’s complaint. Id. The eBay listing indicated that the

item was located in Janesville, Wisconsin. Boschetto bid

$34,106 for the Galaxie on August 8, 2005, and was notified

through eBay that same day that he was the winning bidder.

Id. Boschetto and Hansing communicated via email to arrange

for delivery of the vehicle from Wisconsin to California. Boschetto ultimately hired a transport company to pick up the car

in Wisconsin; it arrived in California on September 15, 2005.

Id.

Upon delivery, Boschetto discovered that the car was not

1The summary of facts is taken from Boschetto’s complaint and his affidavit filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss. For purposes of determining whether the court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the

court assumes Boschetto’s allegations are true. See AT&T v. Compagnie

Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). 

11124 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
an “R Code” as advertised, and noted a variety of other problems, including a motor that would not turn over, rust, and

extensive dents on the body of the vehicle. Id. Boschetto contacted eBay and Hansing in an attempt to rescind the purchase, but those efforts failed. Id. He filed a complaint in

United States District Court, Northern District of California

on February 23, 2006. Boschetto alleged four state law

causes of action (violation of the California Consumer Protection Act; breach of contract; misrepresentation; and fraud),

and pled jurisdiction pursuant to the federal diversity statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

All Defendants moved to dismiss based on lack of personal

jurisdiction. On July 13, 2006, the district court granted the

motion. The district court reasoned that the lone jurisdictionally relevant contact with California, an eBay sale consummated with a California purchaser, was insufficient to

establish jurisdiction over any of the Defendants. Although

Hansing used eBay to market the automobile, the district

court observed that “eBay acted not as a ‘distribution center’

but rather as a virtual forum for the exchange of goods,” and

that in a standard eBay transaction—like the one at issue in

this appeal—the item goes to whomever is the highest bidder,

and so “the eBay seller does not purposefully avail himself of

the privilege of doing business in a forum state absent some

additional conduct directed at the forum state.” Id.

The district court also rejected Boschetto’s request to conduct additional discovery relevant to jurisdiction. Id. Noting

its “broad discretion” to permit or deny such discovery, the

court found that Boschetto’s request for further discovery was

premised on “speculat[ion] without any support” that the

additional discovery would yield jurisdictionally relevant

information. Id. Judgment was entered on July 17, 2006 and

this timely appeal followed.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

We review a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de

novo. See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1071

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11125
(9th Cir. 2001). In opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. See Sher v.

Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). If the district

court decides the motion without an evidentiary hearing,

which is the case here, then “the plaintiff need only make a

prima facie showing of the jurisdictional facts.” Id. (citation

omitted). Absent an evidentiary hearing this court “only

inquire[s] into whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.”

Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 127-28

(9th Cir. 1995). Uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s

complaint must be taken as true. See AT&T, 94 F.3d at 588.

“Conflicts between the parties over statements contained in

affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir.

2004).

When no federal statute governs personal jurisdiction, the

district court applies the law of the forum state. See Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir.

1998). California’s long-arm statute is co-extensive with federal standards, so a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction if doing so comports with federal constitutional due

process. Id. at 1320. “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have

at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that

the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Schwarzenegger, 374

F.3d at 801 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1945)).

There are two forms of personal jurisdiction that a forum state

may exercise over a nonresident defendant—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. We deal here only with the latter.2

2The district court summarily, and correctly, rejected Boschetto’s contention that the Defendants could be subject to general jurisdiction in California. Boschetto does not challenge that aspect of the district court’s

dismissal order on appeal. 

11126 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
A. The district court correctly dismissed Boschetto’s

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

[1] We apply a three-part test to determine whether the

exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

is appropriate: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully

direct his activities or consummate some transaction

with the forum or resident thereof; or perform (some

act by which he purposefully avails himself of the

privilege of conducting activities in the forum,

thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its

laws; 

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or

relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities;

and 

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with

fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. 

Id. at 802 (citing Lake v. Lake, 814 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.

1987)). The plaintiff bears the burden on the first two prongs.

Id. If the plaintiff establishes both prongs one and two, the

defendant must come forward with a “compelling case” that

the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78,

105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)). But if the plaintiff

fails at the first step, the jurisdictional inquiry ends and the

case must be dismissed. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453

F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[Plaintiff’s] arguments fail

under the first prong. Accordingly, we need not address [the

remaining two prongs].”). 

[2] For part one of this three-part test, we have typically

analyzed cases that sound primarily in contract—as BoschetBOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11127
to’s case does—under a “purposeful availment” standard.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (“We often use the phrase

‘purposeful availment’ in shorthand fashion, to include both

purposeful availment and purposeful direction, but availment

and direction are, in fact, two distinct concepts. A purposeful

availment analysis is most often used in suits sounding in contract.”) (internal citation omitted); see also McGlinchy v. Shell

Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817 (9th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing purposeful direction precedents where “personal jurisdiction is sought on a contract claim, not on a tort claim”). To

have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum, a defendant must have “performed some

type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the

transaction of business within the forum state.” Sher, 911 F.2d

at 1362 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our

evaluation of the jurisdictional significance of a defendant’s

contract or other business in the forum is not rigid and formalistic, but rather practical and pragmatic. Burger King Corp.,

471 U.S. at 478 (“[W]e have emphasized the need for a highly

realistic approach that recognizes that contract is ordinarily

but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with future consequences which themselves are the

real object of the business transaction.”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421 (“The

first step of the specific jurisdiction analysis involves a qualitative evaluation of the defendant’s contact with the forum

state.”) (emphasis added). In doing so, we are guided by the

Supreme Court’s admonition that the formation of a contract

with a nonresident defendant is not, standing alone, sufficient

to create jurisdiction. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478 (“If

the question is whether an individual’s contract with an outof-state party alone can automatically establish sufficient

minimum contacts in the other party’s home forum, we

believe the answer clearly is that it cannot.”) (emphasis in

original); see also McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 816 n.9 (same). 

[3] Here, Boschetto fails at step one of the test for specific

jurisdiction, as the lone transaction for the sale of one item

11128 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
does not establish that the Defendants purposefully availed

themselves of the privilege of doing business in California.

The arrangement between Boschetto and Hansing which is, at

bottom, a contract for the sale of a good, is insufficient to

have created a substantial connection with California. Hansing (and assuming arguendo that they had any involvement in

the transaction, the Boucher Defendants) did not create any

ongoing obligations with Boschetto in California; once the car

was sold the parties were to go their separate ways. Neither

Boschetto’s complaint nor his affidavit in opposition to dismissal point to any continuing commitments assumed by the

Defendants under the contract. Id. Nor did performance of the

contract require the Defendants to engage in any substantial

business in California. On Boschetto’s version of the facts,

funds were sent to Wisconsin and arrangements were made to

pick up the car there and have it delivered to California. This

was, as the district court observed, a “one-shot affair.” See

Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir.

1996)). As the Supreme Court has expressly cautioned, a contract alone does not automatically establish minimum contacts

in the plaintiff’s home forum. See Burger King Corp., 471

U.S. at 478; see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 924

(9th Cir. 2001) (“However, an individual’s contract with an

out-of-state party alone [cannot] automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction.”)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Travelers

Health Ass’n v. Commonwealth of Va, 339 U.S. 643, 647, 70

S. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed. 1154 (1950) (purposeful availment

found if “business activities reach out beyond one state and

create continuing relationships and obligations”) (emphasis

added).3

3

In Burger King the Court noted that even a “single act” by the defendant can support jurisdiction, but only if that act creates a “substantial connection” with the forum. 471 U.S. at 476 n.18 (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life

Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223) (1957)). The

Court’s reliance on McGee is, however, telling. In McGee, the record suggested there was only one contract between the defendant and any CaliforBOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11129
[4] Ignoring the limited nature of the transaction at issue,

Boschetto attaches special significance to the fact that the

transaction was consummated via eBay, noting that the eBay

listing could have been viewed by anyone in California (or

any other state for that matter) with Internet access. But the

fact that eBay was used as the conduit for this sale does not

affect the jurisdictional outcome, at least not on the particular

facts presented here. 

[5] In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419

(9th Cir. 1997), we discussed with approval a sliding scale

analysis that looks to how interactive an Internet website is

for purposes of determining its jurisdictional effect. (“In sum,

the common thread, well stated by the district court in Zippo,

is that the ‘likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and

quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over

the Internet.’ ”) (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,

952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). The plaintiff in

Cybersell relied on the fact that the defendant operated a website, accessible in the forum state, that contained allegedly

infringing trademarks. 130 F.3d at 416. The defendant’s website advertised its services but did not allow parties to transact

business via the site. Id. at 419. Noting the lack of interactivity on the defendant’s website, the court concluded that the

nia resident. 355 U.S. at 222. But the Court did not decide the

jurisdictional issue on a quantitative assessment of the number of contracts

the defendant had entered into in the forum state; rather, it looked to the

content or qualitative nature of the contract before it, and reasoned that the

contract gave rise to ongoing obligations that connected the defendant

with the forum state. Id. at 223. Applied here, it is not the fact that Defendants may have entered into only one contract with a California resident

that is dispositive. Rather, it is the fact that the nature of the contract

entered into did not create any “substantial connection” between Boschetto and the Defendants beyond the contract itself. Id. (“It is sufficient

for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which

had substantial connection with that State.”). 

11130 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
defendant had “done no act and [ ] consummated no transaction, nor has it performed any act by which it purposefully

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities, in Arizona, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of Arizona law.” Id.

[6] The Cybersell analysis, while persuasive where the contact under consideration is the website itself, is largely inapplicable in this case. Here, eBay was used to create a listing

for the sale of a good. Based on a superficial application of

Cybersell, the eBay listing process and the sale it engenders

is “interactive.” Id. (noting the lack of evidence suggesting

that defendant’s website resulted in any business generation).

But, as the district court noted, “the issue is not whether the

court has personal jurisdiction over the intermediary eBay but

whether it has personal jurisdiction over an individual who

conducted business over eBay.” In Cybersell and related cases

where the Internet site actually belongs to and is operated by

the defendant, the nature of the website has jurisdictional significance because the website allows the defendant to maintain some ongoing contact with the forum state (as well as

every other state that can access the site). See Zippo, 952 F.

Supp. at 1125-26 (“We are being asked to determine whether

Dot Com’s conducting of electronic commerce with Pennsylvania residents constitutes the purposeful availment of doing

business in Pennsylvania.”). Here, the eBay listing was not

part of broader e-commerce activity; the listing temporarily

advertised a good for sale and that listing closed once the item

was sold, thereby extinguishing the Internet contact for this

transaction within the forum state (and every other forum).4

Moreover, Boschetto does not allege that any of the Defen4Under a traditional jurisdictional analysis, advertising in a forum state

does not typically suffice to establish personal jurisdiction. See Wood v.

Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, 705 F.2d 1515, 1522 (9th Cir.

1983); Holland America Line, Inc. v. Wärtsilä North America, Inc., 485

F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007). 

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11131
dants are using eBay to conduct business generally. He does

not allege that Defendants conduct regular sales in California

(or anywhere else) via eBay. Based on his own affidavit he

named the Boucher Defendants based on a “good faith belief”

that Hansing may have been acting as their agent during the

sale. But he does not go on to allege—on information and

belief or otherwise—that either Hansing or the Boucher

Defendants are regular users of the eBay sales platform to sell

their cars.5

This is a distinction with a difference, as the cases that have

found that jurisdiction was proper based on eBay sales relied

heavily on the fact that the defendant was using the platform

as a broader vehicle for commercial activity. See, e.g., Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So.2d 497, 500 (Ct. App. La. 2007) (evidence of two prior sales to Louisiana residents in prior year);

Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822-23 (E.D.

Mich. 2006) (“Although the Court’s research has not disclosed any personal jurisdiction cases involving the use of

eBay auctions as a commercial seller’s primary marketing

vehicle, it is clear from the record that Defendants’ use of

eBay is regular and systemic.”); Malcolm v. Esposito, 2003

WL 23272406 at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 2003)

(“Defendants are commercial sellers of automobiles who, at

the time the BMW was sold, were represented on eBay as

‘power sellers’ with 213 transactions.”). 

[7] At bottom, the consummation of the sale via eBay here

is a distraction from the core issue: This was a one-time contract for the sale of a good that involved the forum state only

because that is where the purchaser happened to reside, but

otherwise created no “substantial connection” or ongoing

5

It is for this reason that Boschetto’s reliance on Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO

LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999) is misplaced. In Stomp, the

defendant used its own website as a portal for on-line sales, and the defendant consummated at least a “small” number of sales in the forum state.

Id. at 1078. 

11132 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
obligations there. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. The Supreme

Court has, in the past, sounded a note of caution that traditional jurisdictional analyses are not upended simply because

a case involves technological developments that make it easier for parties to reach across state lines. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (“[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of

interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”). The use

of eBay no doubt made it far easier to reach a California

buyer, but the ease with which Boschetto was contacted does

not determine whether the nature and quality of the Defendants’ contacts serve to support jurisdiction. That is not to say

that the use of eBay digs a virtual moat around the defendant,

fending off jurisdiction in all cases. Where eBay is used as a

means for establishing regular business with a remote forum

such that a finding of personal jurisdiction comports with

“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, then a defendant’s use of

eBay may be properly taken into account for purposes of

establishing personal jurisdiction. See Crummey, 965 So.2d at

500; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23; Malcolm, 2003

WL 23272406 at *4. But on the facts of this case—a one-time

transaction—the use of eBay as the conduit for that transaction does not have any dispositive effect on jurisdiction.6

6We note that our affirmance of the district court’s dismissal is in-line

with a number of state court decisions that have addressed whether personal jurisdiction can be established by way of a single eBay transaction

with a forum plaintiff. See e.g., Sayeedi v. Wasler, 15 Misc.3d 621, 628

(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007) (“No evidence was provided by Plaintiff as to Defendant’s overall eBay statistics, experience, or any marketing directed at

potential customers, designed for instance, to welcome bids from New

Yorkers or any other acts that indicate Defendant may be purposely availing himself specifically to the business of New Yorkers or any desire to

take advantage of New York law.”); Gossett v. HBL, LLC, 2006 WL

1328757 at *2 (D.S.C. 2006 May 11, 2006) (“[Defendant’s] mere listing

on eBay is not enough to invoke jurisdiction in South Carolina.”); Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 405 (Tex. App. 2006) (“There was no evidence that appellees traveled to Kansas or engaged in other transactions

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11133
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

denying Boschetto’s request for jurisdictional 

discovery.

A district court’s decision to permit or deny jurisdictional

discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Data Disc,

Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1

(9th Cir. 1977). The district court’s refusal to provide such

discovery, “will not be reversed except upon the clearest

showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant. Discovery may be

appropriately granted where pertinent facts bearing on the

question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” Id. (citing Wells

Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430

n.24 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Boschetto’s request for jurisdictional discovery. Boschetto

does not allege that the Boucher Defendants’ dealership website is used to conduct sales, merely that it can be viewed by

potential customers. Moreover, Boschetto does not allege that

any of the Defendants made any other eBay sales or posted

listings either before or after the initiation of the lawsuit.

While it might be jurisdictionally relevant if Hansing or the

Boucher Defendants had used eBay to conduct a significant

quantity of automobile sales to California residents or in other

states, neither Boschetto’s complaint nor his affidavit allege

that any of the Defendants are engaged in such sales. The

denial of Boschetto’s request for discovery, which was based

on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally

with appellant or other Kansas residents either through the eBay service

or otherwise.”); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1227 (N.H. 2002)

(“Finally, what appears to be the isolated nature of this transaction and the

absence of any evidence that the defendant was a commercial seller militate against a finding of jurisdiction.”). 

11134 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
relevant facts, was not an abuse of discretion. See Butcher’s

Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th

Cir. 1986) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiffs

“state only that they ‘believe’ discovery will enable them to

demonstrate sufficient California business contacts to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction”).

III. CONCLUSION

[8] The sale of one automobile via the eBay website, without more, does not provide sufficient “minimum contacts” to

establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the

forum state. Likewise, given the total absence of any evidence

or allegations that the conduct here involved more than just

this one sale, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

refusing to allow jurisdictional discovery. 

AFFIRMED.

RYMER, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I agree that jurisdiction is lacking. I write separately to

underscore my disagreement with Boschetto’s argument that

Hansing, as a seller on eBay, necessarily availed himself of

the privilege of doing business in each state across the nation.

I believe that a defendant does not establish minimum contacts nationwide by listing an item for sale on eBay; rather, he

must do “something more,” such as individually targeting residents of a particular state, to be haled into another jurisdiction. 

The basic principles are well settled. Personal jurisdiction

is proper if it is consistent with the forum state’s long-arm

statutes and if it comports with due process of law. Fireman’s

Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11135
Cir. 1996). California’s long-arm statute extends the exercise

of personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Harris

Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328

F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Pro.

§ 410.10). For due process to be satisfied, a defendant must

have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the

assertion of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy,

453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945)). 

This circuit applies a three-part test to determine whether

a plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient minimum contacts to

establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant. Minimum

contacts are found where:

(1) the defendant has performed some act or consummated some transaction within the forum or otherwise purposefully availed himself of the privileges

of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claim

arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum

related activities, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction

is reasonable. 

Id. at 1155 (citing Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l

Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)). The plaintiff bears

the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test, and

the defendant bears the burden on the third. Id. Boschetto falls

short on the first prong. 

The “purposeful availment” requirement ensures that a

defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a

result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76

(1985) (citations omitted). We have refined this to mean that

the defendant must either have “purposefully availed” himself

of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thus

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, or have

11136 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
“purposefully directed” his activities toward the forum. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807

(9th Cir. 2004). 

A defendant “purposefully avails” himself of a forum when

he acts in a way that creates a “substantial connection” with

the state, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, see also Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94, n.7 (1978), as where

he deliberately engages in significant activities there, Keeton

v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984), or

creates “continuing obligations” between himself and its residents. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648

(1950). In return for taking advantage of the forum state’s

“benefits and protections,” the defendant must submit to the

burden of being sued there. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76.

A defendant “purposefully directs” activity at a forum state

when he: (1) commits an intentional act, that is (2) expressly

aimed at the forum state, and that (3) causes harm that he

knows is likely to be suffered in that jurisdiction. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.

783 (1984)). Under this “effects test,” it is not sufficient that

the defendant took action with a foreseeable effect in the

forum state. Id. at 804-05. He must do “something more” for

courts to conclude that he “expressly aimed” activity at the

forum, such as individually targeting its residents. Id. at 805;

Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1157. 

In my view, Hansing did not purposefully avail himself of

California. Hansing created no continuing obligations to California residents by selling his car on eBay. His only obligation was to complete the sale with the highest bidder, whoever

and wherever he might be, which Hansing fulfilled by allowing Boschetto to retrieve the car in Janesville, Wisconsin. Nor

did Hansing’s eBay auction establish a substantial connection

between himself and California such that he invoked the benefits and protections of its laws. There is no suggestion that

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11137
he is engaged in ongoing business activities there,1

 and though

a Californian ultimately made the highest of fifty bids, this

was a fortuity; Boschetto does not argue either that Hansing

had any control over the high bidder’s location within the

United States, or that the high bidder’s residence had any

effect on Hansing’s obligations, given Hansing’s requirement

that the high bidder either pick up the car in Wisconsin or, as

Boschetto did, arrange for a third-party to ship it somewhere

else. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286, 297-99

(1980) (“the foreseeability that is critical to [the] due process

analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its

way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”)

(citations omitted). 

I also do not think that Hansing purposefully directed any

activity at California. Boschetto argues that Hansing directed

his eBay auction at the state by failing to bar Californians

from bidding. By accepting bids from all states, he contends,

Hansing offered to sell the subject vehicle to residents of each

state of the union, including California. I disagree that allowing eBay users throughout the United States and Canada to

bid on an auction subjects the seller to nationwide jurisdiction. As we have previously held, merely advertising over the

Internet is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction throughout the

United States, even though the advertisement or website at

issue may be viewed nationwide. Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d

at 1157-58; Cybersell, Inc, 130 F.3d at 419-20.

2

 The defen1There is no basis for concluding that Hansing is engaged in extensive

business activity on the Internet, with California or any other forum. See

Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997).

Although Boschetto points to Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, LLC, 61 F.Supp.2d

1074, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1999), I do not accept its suggestion that conducting any business over the Internet subjects a defendant to suit nationwide.

2Boschetto argues that Hansing should not be allowed to take advantage

of modern technology while simultaneously escaping traditional notions of

11138 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
dant must do “something more” to aim activity expressly at

a state, Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418, 419; Pebble Beach Co.,

453 F.3d at 1156-57,3 and Boschetto has not shown either that

Hansing tailored his auction to the residents of any state in

particular, or that he sent or advertised his auction to any state

in particular, much less California.4 Arguably, Hansing could

foresee that California residents would bid on his auction, and

that he would benefit from their participation, but foreseeable

participation by Californians is not enough. Hansing must

have done something more to aim his auction expressly at the

state, such as individually targeting California residents.5 Pebjurisdiction. However, we rejected this precise argument in Cybersell. 130

F.3d at 419. Haling Hansing into California would be inconsistent with

traditional notions of jurisdiction. In any event, I am not persuaded by

Boschetto’s characterization of Hansing’s use of the Internet to sell his car

as “taking advantage.” Allowing sellers to hold nationally available auctions without requiring them to submit to jurisdiction nationwide is beneficial to buyers as well. A less-burdensome jurisdictional rule encourages

sellers to hold auctions in the first place, thereby creating opportunities for

buyers to find items they want and to decide for themselves whether —

taking all relevant matters into account — they want to place a bid. 

3

See also Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020

(9th Cir. 2000) (no jurisdiction based on passive website without “something more”); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir.

1998) (posting website on internet does not establish jurisdiction nationwide); and Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806-07 (foreseeable effect of

Ohio print advertisement in California did not render advertisement “expressly aimed” at California); cf. Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1084 (letter to

domain registrar, which interfered with plaintiff’s use of registered

domain, independently targeted plaintiff); and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent letter sent to

plaintiff in forum state was express aiming). 

4Even if Hansing knew Boschetto was in California when he sent the

post-auction email, the email was not sufficient to subject him to personal

jurisdiction there. It established only a limited contact, and Hansing sent

it because Boschetto won the auction, not because he was in California.

See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474. 

5Nor did Hansing purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of California by allowing Californians to bid. His auction did not

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11139
ble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1157. On the facts of this case, he

did nothing more. He simply permitted those with eBay

access throughout the United States and Canada to bid on his

car, agreeing to let the winner retrieve it in Janesville, Wisconsin. 

Accordingly, although Hansing listed his car for sale in an

unrestricted eBay auction, allowing residents of all states to

view the auction and bid, and though he ultimately sold the

car to a California resident, he neither availed himself of the

privilege of doing business in California nor purposefully

directed any activity at the state.6

I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

denying Boschetto jurisdictional discovery. Where, as here, a

plaintiff’s claim of personal jurisdiction is both attenuated and

based on bare allegations rebutted by specific denials made by

create a substantial connection with the forum, and nothing in the record

indicates that it made any difference to Hansing where the winning bidder

resided (within the United States or Canada) or where he took the car

when it left Wisconsin. World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 295-97 (no

jurisdiction over auto distributor based on customer’s decision to drive to

the forum state). 

6This is consistent with the approach of the majority of courts to address

whether listing an item for nationwide sale on eBay requires a seller to

submit to suit nationwide. See e.g. Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley,

105 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (eBay sales are random and

attenuated); Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1226 (N.H. 2002) (seller

had no control over ultimate winner); Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396,

405 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (contact with Kansas was random, isolated and

fortuitous); Action Tapes, Inc. v. Ebert, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4958 (N.D.

Tex. 2006) (eBay sellers do not control interactivity of eBay site); United

Cutlery Corp. v. NFZ, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21664 (D. Md. 2003)

(intent was to sell to highest bidder, irrespective of location); Gossett v.

HBL, LLC, 2006 WL 1328757, *2 (D.S.C. 2006) (“mere listing on eBay

is not enough to invoke jurisdiction . . . .” ); and Sayeedi v. Walser, 2007

WL 623521 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 2007) (ultimate destination of eBay item

completely determined by bidders). 

11140 BOSCHETTO v. HANSING
the defendants, the district court need not permit even limited

discovery. Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1160. 

BOSCHETTO v. HANSING 11141