J-A04023-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

KATIE WAKELEY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

M.J. BRUNNER, INC., 

 Appellee No. 392 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD 14-009877 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 11, 2016 

In this employment dispute, Katie Wakeley appeals from the order 

entered February 18, 2015, granting M.J. Brunner, Inc. (“Brunner”) 

judgment on the pleadings. We affirm. 

In 2011, Appellant worked as a project manager for an advertising 

agency in Dallas, Texas, earning $80,000 annually.1 Appellant and her 

family, a husband and child, were settled in Dallas with no intention of 

leaving. Appellant’s husband worked as a recruiter; their daughter was fouryears-old. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 We derive the background for this case from the pleadings. 
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In March 2012, a recruiter approached Appellant about a position with 

Brunner as a digital account director. The position was located in Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania. Appellant indicated that she was not interested unless the 

position paid more than her current position and offered opportunity for 

advancement. Following a series of interviews, Brunner offered Appellant 

the position at $90,000 per year, plus benefits and a $4,000 relocation 

allowance. In April 2012, Appellant accepted Brunner’s offer and gave her 

Dallas-employer notice. However, five days later, Brunner rescinded its 

offer, citing an unexpected change in its business. Appellant was able to 

keep her job in Dallas. 

In May 2012, the same recruiter again approached Appellant about 

another opening at Brunner, this time as an account director. This position 

offered the same salary and benefits as the previous one offered her. 

During her interview, Brunner executives disclosed that the position was 

available because the incumbent was taking maternity leave. However, 

Brunner assured Appellant that she would be assigned another, permanent 

position when the incumbent returned from leave. Brunner also promised 

Appellant that she would receive extensive training and work closely under a 

supervisor as she learned her new job responsibilities. Following her 

interview, Brunner increased the relocation allowance to $9,000. 

In June 2012, Appellant accepted Brunner’s offer of employment, and 

her family relocated from Dallas to Pittsburgh. However, Appellant received 
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little training and little guidance from her supervisor. Her only assistance 

came from an inexperienced subordinate. Following two mishaps - the first 

involving an unsuccessful conference call with a client, the second an email 

exchange with another client provider – Brunner executives were critical of 

Appellant’s work performance. Shortly thereafter in September 2012, and 

only four days before the previous incumbent returned from maternity leave, 

Brunner fired Appellant. 

In August 2014, Appellant commenced this action by filing a complaint 

asserting three counts: (1) breach of implied contract, (2) breach of express 

contract, and (3) fraudulent inducement. According to Appellant, she left a 

secure job, relocated her family, and assumed a 30-year home mortgage – 

and this additional consideration entitled her to employment with Brunner 

for a reasonable period. See Complaint at 9-10. Moreover, according to 

Appellant, Brunner breached an express promise to provide her with proper 

training, an experienced supervisor, and a comparable, permanent position. 

Id. at 10. Finally, based upon these express promises, Appellant asserted 

that Brunner knowingly and falsely induced Appellant to accept its offer of 

employment. Id. at 11. 

Brunner filed an answer and new matter to which it attached two 

documents executed by Appellant: (1) an Application for Employment and 

(2) a Confirmation of Employment. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibits A 

(“Application for Employment,” 04/02/2012) and B (“Confirmation of 
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Employment,” 06/06/2012) (collectively, “pre-hire documents”). Also 

attached was an introductory statement purported to be from Brunner’s 

employee handbook. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibit C (“I. 

Introductory Statement”). 

The application was completed by Appellant when she applied for the 

digital account director position with Brunner in April 2012. It included the 

following statements, acknowledged and accepted by Appellant: 

I understand that this application remains current for only 30 

days. At the conclusion of that time, if I have not heard from 

the employer and still wish to be considered for employment, it 

will be necessary for me to reapply and fill out a new application. 

If I am hired, I understand that I am free to resign at any time, 

with or without cause and with or without prior notice, and the 

employer reserves the same right to terminate my employment 

at any time, with or without cause and with or without prior 

notice, except as may be required by law. This application does 

not constitute an agreement or contract for employment for any 

specified period or definite duration. I understand that no 

supervisor or representative of the employer is authorized to 

make any assurances to the contrary and that no implied oral or 

written agreements contrary to the foregoing express language 

are valid unless they are in writing and signed by the employer’s 

president. 

Answer and New Matter, Exhibit A, at 2 (thereafter signed and dated by 

Appellant). 

The confirmation, completed by Appellant just prior to commencing 

employment with Brunner as an account director, set forth the following, in 

relevant part: 

This confirmation is intended to convey, for our mutual 

understanding, your title, salary, start date and benefits with M. 
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J. Brunner, Inc. This is not a contractual agreement between 

you and M. J. Brunner, Inc. and we want to point out your 

employment with M. J. Brunner is on an at-will basis. No M. J. 

Brunner, Inc. representative has the authority to make any 

contrary agreement. 

Answer and New Matter, Exhibit B, at 1 (also providing details of Appellant’s 

employment; thereafter signed and dated by Appellant). Appellant 

acknowledged her execution of the confirmation. See Answer to New Matter 

at ¶ 109. 

Sometime in late 2014, Brunner filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings.2 Referencing and attaching the pre-hire documents to its motion, 

Brunner asserted that Appellant’s employment was at-will, that she could 

not establish her claims, and that her complaint should be dismissed. 

Following argument in February 2015, the trial court granted Brunner’s 

motion and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. Appellant timely 

appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial 

court issued a responsive opinion, concluding that the pre-hire documents 

introduced by Brunner established explicitly that Appellant’s employment 

was at-will. See Trial Court Opinion, 04/28/2015, at 3. The court further 

____________________________________________ 

2

 Brunner’s motion is not included in the certified record, nor does it appear 

in the trial court’s docket. Nevertheless, Appellant responded to Brunner’s 

motion. See Response, 12/24/2014. The docket reflects that the trial court 

scheduled argument on Brunner’s motion for February 17, 2015. Moreover, 

Brunner filed a brief in response to Appellant’s opposition to the motion. 

See Brief, 02/10/2015. 
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opined that Appellant could not establish that Brunner knowingly or 

recklessly made false representations that induced Appellant to accept 

employment. See id. at 3-4. 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 

1. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient facts to enable a 

reasonable jury to find that she provided her employer with 

additional consideration sufficient to rebut the presumption of 

employment at-will[;] 

2. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] that she and [Brunner] 

entered into a specific agreement for employment at-will[;] 

3. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient facts to enable a 

reasonable jury to find that [Brunner] breached the employment 

contract by failing to provide her: (1) with extensive training in 

her new position; (2) the assistance of an experienced 

supervisor; and (3) to find her a new position when the 

incumbent returned from leave[; and] 

4. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient facts to enable a 

reasonable jury to find that [Brunner] fraudulently induced her 

to accept employment[.] 

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

Essentially, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted 

Brunner judgment on the pleadings and dismissed her complaint with 

prejudice. In so doing, she renews arguments raised below. According to 

Appellant, the pre-hire documents do not establish that she agreed to at-will 

employment with Brunner. Regarding the application, Appellant notes that it 

was completed when she applied for a different position with Brunner and 

asserts that it is irrelevant to the position she eventually secured with 

Brunner. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 14-15. As for the confirmation, 
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Appellant suggests that language contained therein negates any 

contractually binding significance of the document. See Appellant’s Brief at 

10, 15-16. Thus, according to Appellant, by their plain terms, these 

documents do not impact her case. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 16. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 governs motions for 

judgment on the pleadings and provides that “[a]fter the relevant pleadings 

are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any 

party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). We 

review a trial court’s decision to grant judgment on the pleadings in the 

following manner: 

Appellate review of an order granting a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings is plenary. The appellate court will apply the same 

standard employed by the trial court. A trial court must confine 

its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. The 

court must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact, 

admissions, and any documents properly attached to the 

pleadings presented by the party against whom the motion is 

filed, considering only those facts which were specifically 

admitted. 

We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving 

party's right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from 

doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise. In other 

words, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a 

demurrer. It may be entered when there are no disputed issues 

of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. 

Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(internal citations omitted; formatting and punctuation modified). Further, it 

is well settled that if the court’s decision is correct, we may affirm on any 
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ground. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Domtar Paper Co., 77 A.3d 

1282, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

In Pennsylvania, employment is presumed to be at-will, unless there is 

an agreement otherwise. Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 595 

A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. 1991). Thus, “an employment relationship ... may 

be terminated by either party at any time, for any reason or for no reason.” 

Id. A plaintiff may overcome the presumption if she can demonstrate 

additional consideration beyond the services for which she was hired. Id. 

However, where the plaintiff has clearly acknowledged the at-will nature of 

her employment, the presumption must prevail. See, e.g., Walden v. 

Saint Gobain Corp., 323 F.Supp.2d 637, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (applying 

Pennsylvania law). 

Here, Appellant pleaded additional consideration potentially sufficient 

to overcome the presumption that her Brunner employment was at-will. For 

example, Appellant pleaded that she left a stable job and home in Dallas, 

uprooted her family and moved to Pittsburgh, thereafter purchasing a home 

financed by a 30-year mortgage. See Cashdollar, 595 A.2d at 73-74 

(affirming the trial court’s denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

where a jury concluded that similar evidence was sufficient to overcome the 

presumption of at-will employment). 

In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Brunner presented the 

two, pre-hire documents suggesting that Appellant acknowledged expressly 
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that her new employment was at-will. The trial court deemed these 

documents dispositive, concluding as follows: 

The documents executed by the parties govern[]. Those 

documents explicitly reflect an at-will employment relationship. 

[Appellant’s] attempt to circumvent these documents must fail. 

Trial Court Opinion at 3. 

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion. However, mindful of the 

appropriate standards that govern review of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, we are constrained to distinguish between the pre-hire 

documents. In our view, the trial court could not properly consider the 

application as indicative of Appellant’s at-will employment. As pleaded by 

Appellant in her response to Brunner’s new matter, the application was 

completed when she applied for a different position with Brunner and was 

unrelated to the position eventually secured. See Answer to New Matter, 

11/05/2014, at ¶¶ 106-08. The trial court was obligated to view these 

pleadings, as well as the document itself, against Brunner and in the light 

most favorable to Appellant. See Wachovia Bank, N.A., 935 A.2d at 570. 

Appellant continues to maintain that this document is unrelated to the job 

she eventually secured with Brunner, and we agree. Moreover, not only 

does it relate to a different job opportunity, but also by its terms the 

document remained valid for only 30 days. See Answer and New Matter, 

Exhibit A, at 2. Appellant signed the application document on April 2, 2012. 

The recruiter approached Appellant about a second employment opportunity 
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at Brunner on May 14, 2012. See Complaint at ¶ 26. Thus, the application 

was no longer valid. For these reasons, the application does not clearly 

establish the at-will nature of Appellant’s employment and cannot support 

Brunner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

Nevertheless, the confirmation, signed by Appellant just prior to 

commencing her Brunner employment, is clear and dispositive. It provides 

specifically that her employment was at-will. See Answer and New Matter, 

Exhibit B, at 1. By signing this document, Appellant was properly notified 

and acknowledged the nature of her employment. In our view, this 

acknowledgment defeats Appellant’s “additional consideration” claim as a 

matter of law. 

In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Appellant suggests that other 

language included in the confirmation negates any adverse impact on her 

claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-16 (suggesting that the statement, “This 

is not a contractual agreement ...,” renders her acknowledgment 

ambiguous). We discern no ambiguity. Appellant’s position is hypertechnical and does nothing to undermine the clear acknowledgment that her 

employment was at-will. 

The notice and acknowledgment of Appellant’s at-will status effectively 

eliminates each of her claims, and we need not address in detail Appellant’s 

arguments to the contrary. Appellant’s claim for breach of implied contract 

relies upon her theory of additional consideration. However, the 
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confirmation of at-will employment signed by Appellant precludes this claim. 

See, e.g., Walden, 323 F.Supp.2d at 646-47. Appellant’s claim for breach 

of express contract relies upon alleged promises that Brunner would provide 

her with proper training, an experienced supervisor, and a comparable, 

permanent position. However, this claim too is defeated by Appellant’s 

confirmation of employment, which in addition to stating the at-will nature of 

employment, provided additional express terms, including a statement of 

salary and benefits, and clear notice that “[n]o [Brunner] representative has 

the authority to make any contrary agreement.” Answer and New Matter, 

Exhibit B, at 1; see also, e.g., Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 

Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989) (“[A]s a general rule, there is no 

common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an atwill employment relationship.”). Finally, notice and acknowledgment of 

these terms – specifically disclaiming any terms or promises to the contrary 

- precludes Appellant from stating a claim for fraud, which would require her 

to establish justifiable reliance upon the aforementioned alleged promises. 

See, e.g., Martin v. Hale Prods., Inc., 699 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. 

1997).3 For these reasons, Appellant is entitled to no relief. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We observe that the trial court determined that Appellant’s fraud claim 

must fail because she could not establish that Brunner knowingly or 

recklessly made false representations to Appellant. Trial Court Opinion at 3. 

This was erroneous in light of the procedural posture of this case. Appellant 

pleaded that Brunner promised to provide her with proper training, an 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/11/2016 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

experienced supervisor, and a comparable, permanent position, and that 

Brunner made these representations knowing they were false. See

Complaint at ¶¶ 91-92. This error, however, does not entitle Appellant to 

relief. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 77 A.3d at 1286.