Slip Op. 08-85

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

BEFORE: SENIOR JUDGE NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS

________________________________________

:

CONSOLIDATED FIBERS, INC. :

and STEIN FIBERS, LTD., :

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

: Court No.:

UNITED STATES, : 07-00233

:

Defendant, :

:

and :

:

DAK AMERICAS LLC, NAN YA PLASTICS :

CORP. AMERICA and WELLMAN, INC., :

:

Defendant-Intervenors. :

________________________________________:

Held: Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment upon the agency record

denied. The United States International Trade Commission’s final

determination affirmed. 

deKieffer & Horgan, (Gregory S. Menegaz) for Plaintiffs,

Consolidated Fibers, Inc. and Stein Fibers, Ltd.

James M. Lyons, General Counsel; Neal J. Reynolds, Assistant

General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, United States

International Trade Commission (Karl S. Von Schriltz), for

Defendant, United States.

Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, (Paul C. Rosenthal; Kathleen W.

Cannon; David C. Smith, Jr.) for Defendant-Intervenors, DAK

Americas LLC, Nan Ya Plastics Corp. America and Wellman, Inc. 

Dated: August 20, 2008
Court No. 07-00233 Page 2

1 Citations to the confidential documents of the

administrative record are cited “CR” followed by the document

number.

OPINION 

This matter is before the Court on motion for judgment upon

the agency record brought by plaintiffs Consolidated Fibers, Inc.

and Stein Fibers, Ltd. (“Plaintiffs”) pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2.

Plaintiffs challenge aspects of the final affirmative determination

by the United States International Trade Commission (“Commission”

or “ITC”) in Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From China (“Final

Determination”), Inv. No. 731-TA-1104, USITC Pub. 3922 (June 2007)

(CR 335).1 Domestic producers DAK Americas LLC, Nan Ya Plastics

Corp. America and Wellman, Inc. join as Defendant-Intervenors. 

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i).

BACKGROUND

On June 23, 2006, the Commission instituted an antidumping

investigation on certain polyester staple fiber (“PSF”) from the

People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) upon receipt of a petition filed

by domestic producers DAK Americas LLC, Nan Ya Plastics Corp.

America and Wellman, Inc. See Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From

China, 71 Fed. Reg. 37,097 (June 29, 2006).

In August 2006, the Commission issued an affirmative

preliminary determination and instituted the final phase
Court No. 07-00233 Page 3

2 Citations to the public documents of the administrative

record are cited “PR” followed by the document number.

investigation. See Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From China, 71

Fed. Reg. 46,241 (August 11, 2006). 

On December 18, 2006, the Commission issued draft

questionnaires with an accompanying memorandum requesting comments

on those questionnaires. See Memorandum from Robert Carpenter to

Parties dated December 18, 2006 (PR 163).2 Domestic producers

submitted comments on the draft questionnaires asking the

Commission to collapse pricing of certain PSF made from virgin

materials (“virgin PSF”) and PSF made from regenerated or recycled

materials (“regenerated PSF”). These domestic producers argued

that regenerated PSF and virgin PSF were one like product and they

were found to be directly competing in the market. See

Petitioners’ Comments on Draft Questionnaires dated December 21,

2006 (CR 115). Based on the comments received, the Commission

determined to request pricing data on PSF without regard for input

materials. Reviewing the pricing information, the Commission found

that underselling by imports occurred in 37 of 54 instances. See

Final Report V-16 (CR 315).

A notice of the schedule for the final phase investigation was

published on January 11, 2007. See 72 Fed. Reg. 1341. A notice of

the revised schedule was published on February 16, 2007. See 72

Fed. Reg. 7676. The revised schedule called for prehearing briefs
Court No. 07-00233 Page 4

to be filed by March 6, 2007, a hearing to be held on March 13,

2007 and posthearing briefs to be filed by March 22, 2007. See id.

Parties were also invited to file comments on Commerce’s final

determination by April 16, 2007. See id.

On May 8, 2007, the Commission closed its record. On May 10,

2007, Plaintiffs filed their final comments. On May 14, 2007, the

Commission staff issued a memorandum identifying certain portions

of Plaintiffs’ final comments as new factual information. See

Memorandum INV-EE-050 (May 14, 2007) (PR 126). 

On May 15, 2007, the Commission voted unanimously that subject

imports of PSF from China had caused present material injury to

domestic producers of the like product. The Commission’s views and

determinations were published in June 2007. See 72 Fed. Reg.

30,394 (May 31, 2007). 

Plaintiffs contend that the Commission’s affirmative material

injury determination was unsupported by substantial evidence and

otherwise contrary to law because the Commission failed to

distinguish between virgin PSF and regenerated PSF, and to consider

the color of PSF in pricing comparisons. See Mot. For J. Upon The

Agency R. On Behalf Of Consolidated Fibers, Inc. and Stein Fibers,

Ltd. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 1. The Commission responds that the Final

Determination was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise

in accordance with law and requests that the Court affirm it. See

Mem. Of Def. United States International Trade Commission In Opp’n
Court No. 07-00233 Page 5

To Pls.’ Mot. For Summ. J. On The Agency R. (“ITC Mem.”) at 1.

Defendant–Intervenors’ arguments are not addressed separately where

they parallel those of the Commission. See Defendant–Intervenors’

Resp. Br. (“Domestic Producers’ Resp.”).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will uphold an ITC determination unless it is

“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise

not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory Framework and the Final Determination

Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b), the Commission is charged

with determining whether a domestic industry is materially injured

by reason of a subject import. Material injury is defined as “harm

[to the domestic industry] which is not inconsequential,

immaterial, or unimportant.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A). To find

material injury, the Commission must find a present material injury

or a threat thereof and causation of such harm by reason of subject

imports. See Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, 30 CIT

__, __, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (2006) (citation omitted).

“When determining whether subject imports have caused material

injury to the domestic industry, the Commission must evaluate three

factors: (1) the volume of subject imports; (2) the price effects

of subject imports on domestic like products; and (3) the impact of

subject imports on the domestic producers of domestic like
Court No. 07-00233 Page 6

products.” See id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i)(I)-(III)).

In addition, the Commission “‘may consider such other economic

factors as are relevant to the determination.’” Id. (quoting 19

U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(ii)).

II. The Commission’s Disregard of Plaintiffs’ Final Comments

In the Final Determination, the Commission disregarded certain

portions of Plaintiffs’ final comments upon finding that they

constituted new factual information. See Memorandum INV-EE-050

(May 14, 2007) (PR 126). The disregarded information concerned the

distinctions between virgin PSF and regenerated PSF. See Pls.’

Mem. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that the Commission acted

unreasonably because the facts they alleged in the final comments

were “clear from the administrative record before the Commission.”

Id. Plaintiffs thus argue that the Final Determination is

unsupported by substantial evidence because the Commission failed

to consider these disregarded facts. See id. at 10. 

Defendant responds that Plaintiffs’ final comments were

improperly styled as miniature hearing briefs to make arguments

that could have been made earlier and included new factual

information contrary to statutory and regulatory requirements set

forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(g) and 19 C.F.R. § 207.30(b). See

Def.’s Mem. at 15-16. Moreover, Defendants contend that some facts

contained in Plaintiffs’ final comments were without citation to

record documents and others were explicitly drawn from the record
Court No. 07-00233 Page 7

before the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”). See

id. at 17. As such, Defendant states that it reasonably identified

and disregarded new factual information. 

The Commission’s disregard of the certain factual information

in Plaintiffs’ final comments was reasonable and consistent with

the law. The statute directs the Commission as follows:

Information that is submitted on a timely basis to the

administering authority or the Commission during the

course of a proceeding under this subtitle shall be

subject to comment by other parties to the proceeding

within such reasonable time as the administering

authority or the Commission shall provide. The

administering authority and the Commission, before making

a final determination . . . shall cease collecting

information and shall provide the parties with a final

opportunity to comment on the information obtained by the

administering authority or the Commission (as the case

may be) upon which the parties have not previously had an

opportunity to comment. Comments containing new factual

information shall be disregarded. 

19 U.S.C. § 1677m(g). Thus, the statute not only requires the

Commission to disregard new factual information, it provides that

a party may comment on information upon which it has not previously

had an opportunity to comment. The Commission’s regulations

contain a similar provision, which provides, in relevant part:

The parties shall have an opportunity to file comments on

any information disclosed to them after they have filed

their posthearing brief pursuant to § 207.25. Comments

shall only concern such information[.] A comment may

address the accuracy, reliability, or probative value of

such information by reference to information elsewhere in

the record, in which case the comment shall identify where

in the record such information is found. Comments

containing new factual information shall be disregarded.

 

19 C.F.R. § 207.30(b).
Court No. 07-00233 Page 8

The Court agrees with the Commission that Plaintiffs

improperly fashioned its final comments as briefs to belatedly make

arguments it should have made earlier in the investigation. In

addition, the Court finds that the Commission properly disregarded

portions of Plaintiffs’ final comments. The disregarded facts were

new information that either (1) did not have a citation to the

record, which is also contrary to 19 C.F.R. § 207.30(b) requiring

plaintiffs to identify where in the record such information is

found, or (2) cited to the administrative record before Commerce,

which is not part of the Commission’s record, see 19 C.F.R. §

207.4. Had the Commission accepted new factual information at such

a late stage in the investigation, after the record had closed, it

would have run afoul of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(g) requiring a public

comment period.

Indeed, this Court has previously approved the Commission’s

disregard of new factual information submitted in the final

comments. See Navneet Publications (India) Limited v. United

States, Slip Op. 08-22 at 25-29; Committee For Fair Beam Imports v.

United States, 31 CIT __, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1313, n.16 (2007). Thus,

the Commission’s disregard of the new factual information submitted

in Plaintiffs’ final comments was in accordance with law.
Court No. 07-00233 Page 9

III. The Commission’s Affirmative Material Injury Determination

Is Supported by Substantial Evidence

A. Pricing Comparisons 

Having determined that the Commission properly disregarded

certain portions of Plaintiffs’ final comments as new factual

information, the Court next addresses Plaintiffs’ arguments

concerning two particular aspects of the Commission’s pricing

comparisons. First, Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s

collapsing of pricing data between virgin and regenerated PSF is

not supported by substantial evidence. See Pls.’ Mem. at 11-12.

According to the Plaintiffs, the record unequivocally reflects that

there were significant differences in raw materials and raw

material costs, that the vast majority of Chinese production for

export to the United States was focused on regenerated PSF and that

the margins calculated for the two product categories were vastly

different. See id. at 11. 

Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Commission’s determination

not to consider the color of PSF in its pricing comparisons is not

supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 12-14. In support

of this argument, Plaintiffs point to the Staff Report, which they

state is “replete with reports from importers that color was a

factor in their buying and pricing decision.” Id. at 12. Indeed,

Plaintiffs note that the Petitioners argued before Commerce that

color was key to pricing, then downplayed the importance of color

before the Commission. See id. at 13. Plaintiffs contend that
Court No. 07-00233 Page 10

3 Although Plaintiffs complain that the Commission’s

determination is invalid because the Commission used different

pricing descriptors than did Commerce, the Court finds that

nothing prohibits the Commission and Commerce from using

different pricing comparisons. The two agencies make pricing

comparisons for different reasons. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)

with 19 U.S.C. § 1677b. This Court has long recognized the

division of labor between the two agencies “even where it has

resulted in decisions which are difficult to reconcile[.]” 

Algoma Steel Corp., Ltd. v. U.S., 12 CIT 518, 523, 688 F. Supp.

639, 644 (1988) (citations omitted). 

because Commerce found that color was essential to pricing, the

Commission’s price comparisons not including color were invalid.3

Defendant responds that Plaintiffs are precluded from raising

these pricing issues on appeal because they failed to raise them

in the administrative review. See Def.’s Mem. at 18-22. Defendant

states that the Commission circulated copies of the draft

questionnaires to parties on December 18, 2006 accompanied by a

memorandum specifically requesting comments by December 21, 2006 on

the proposed combination of regenerated PSF and virgin PSF into the

same pricing products. See id. at 20. Yet, according to

Defendant, Plaintiffs failed to comment on the Commission’s

proposed pricing products by the relevant deadline or to raise

these issues to the Commission through briefs and hearing

testimony. See id.

Moreover, Defendant states that Plaintiffs never argued before

the Commission that it should have collected pricing data on each

available color of certain PSF. See id. at 20. Indeed, Defendant
Court No. 07-00233 Page 11

4 Defendant concedes that two interested parties, Ashley

Furniture and Southern Textiles, requested collection of pricing

data on regenerated PSF and virgin PSF on the basis that such

data would accurately capture possible injury to particular

segments of the domestic industry. See Def.’s Mem. at 21. 

However, Defendant maintains that this position is

distinguishable from Plaintiffs’ current argument that the

Commission should have collected separate pricing data on

regenerated PSF and virgin PSF in its underselling analysis. See

id. at 22. The Court agrees with Defendant that Ashley Furniture

and Southern Textiles’ position focusing on possible injury to a

particular segments of the domestic industry did not sufficiently

afford the Commission an opportunity to evaluate the same

arguments that Plaintiffs advanced here with respect to the

Commission’s underselling analysis.

The parties do not dispute that no interested party made the

argument that the Commission should have collected separate

pricing data on each available color although Ashley Furniture

and Southern Textiles did argue that the Commission should

collect pricing data on colored PSF and noncolored PSF. See id. 

notes that Plaintiffs raised these issues for the first time in

their final comments on May 10, 2007, two days after the close of

the record and five days before the Commission’s vote. See id. at

19. In addition, Defendant contends that since no other party

raised the identical issues, the Commission did not have the

opportunity to otherwise consider them.4 See id. at 21-22. 

The Court agrees with Defendant and finds that Plaintiffs are

precluded from raising these issues on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §

2637(d) (stating that the court “shall, where appropriate, require

the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); JCM, Ltd. v. United

States, 210 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the antidumping

context, Congress has prescribed a clear, step-by-step process for
Court No. 07-00233 Page 12

5 Courts have waived the requirement of exhausting

administrative remedies in cases where: (1) plaintiff raised a

new argument that was purely legal and required no further agency

involvement; (2) plaintiff did not have timely access to the

confidential record; (3) a judicial interpretation intervened

since the remand proceeding, changing the agency result; or (4)

it would have been futile for plaintiff to have raised its

argument at the administrative level. See Budd Co., Wheel &

Brake Div. v. United States, 15 CIT 446, 452 n. 2, 773 F. Supp.

1549, 1555 n. 2 (1991). None of these exceptions are relevant

here. 

a claimant to follow, and the failure to do so precludes it from

obtaining review of that issue in the Court of International

Trade.” (citing Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596,

599-600 (Fed. Cir. 1998); National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840

F.2d 1547, 1555-57 (Fed. Cir. 1988))). Indeed, this Court has

“‘generally take[n] a strict view of the need [for parties] to

exhaust [their] remedies by raising all arguments’ in a timely

fashion so that they may be appropriately addressed by the agency.”

Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. v. United States, 28 CIT 627,

644, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1205 (2004) (quoting Pohang Iron and

Steel Co. v. United States, 23 CIT 778, 792 (1999))(alterations in

original). None of the exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion

of administrative remedies apply here. See Alhambra Foundry Co.

Ltd., v. United States, 12 CIT 343, 347, 685 F. Supp. 1252, 1256

(1988) (stating that when mandating administrative exhaustion would

prove “futile or an insistence on a useless formality,” the court

has waived the requirement).5

The record reflects that the Commission circulated copies of
Court No. 07-00233 Page 13

the draft questionnaire to the parties on December 18, 2006 and

invited comments by December 21, 2006. The Commission specifically

requested the parties to comment on the proposed combination of

regenerated PSF and virgin PSF into the same pricing category.

Plaintiffs did not comment on or raise the pricing issues then, but

determined to wait and raise them in their final comments. As

Defendant aptly notes, by the time Plaintiffs raised these issues,

no additional evidence could be collected, other parties could not

respond to Plaintiffs’ arguments, and the Commission was within

days of its vote pursuant to a statutory deadline. 

Plaintiffs thus failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies with respect to the Commission’s collection and analysis

of pricing data and are barred from raising these issues on appeal.

Indeed, “[a] party that chooses to absent itself from proceedings

– whether at the administrative level or in a judicial forum – does

so at its peril,” Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States,

29 CIT 276, 285, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245 (2005), and Plaintiffs

did just that. 

B. Magnitude of Margins

Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(V), the Commission

must “evaluate . . . the magnitude of the margin of dumping.” In

the final determination, the Commission stated that “we have

considered the magnitude of the dumping margins found by Commerce,

but do not find them conclusive for our analysis of impact.” See
Court No. 07-00233 Page 14

Final Determination at 28, n. 127 (CR 335).

Plaintiffs complain that this analysis by the Commission fails

to evaluate the relevant arguments and falls short of the statutory

requirement. See Pls.’ Mem. at 14-16. Specifically, Plaintiffs

state that “[i]ndividually, and cumulatively, the final antidumping

margins assigned to Chinese exporters were among the lowest found

in recent history in an antidumping investigation of the PRC.” Id.

at 14. Plaintiffs go on to state that “the only virgin producer

investigated earned a margin of 3.47%; the only regenerated PSF

producer for whom ‘facts available’ was not used, Cixi Jiangnan,

earned a de minimis margin” and that “[e]ven the recycled PSF

producer for whom near total ‘facts available’ was used earned a

4.86% margin.” Id. In light of such low margins assigned to the

exporters in this case, Plaintiffs argue that “[m]erely stating

that the magnitude of the margins was not influential in the final

injury determination without evaluating the arguments suggesting it

should be influential fails to meet the standard” required by the

statute. Id. at 14-15.

The statute requires the Commission to “evaluate all relevant

economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the industry

in the United States, including, but not limited to . . . the

magnitude of the margin of dumping.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677

(7)(C)(iii)(V); Iwatsu Elec. Co. v. United States, 15 CIT 44, 48,

758 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (1991) (stating that the “statutory
Court No. 07-00233 Page 15

language does not . . . require that ITC demonstrate that dumped

imports, through the effects of particular margins of dumping, are

causing injury.”). Congress stated that this section “does not

alter the requirement in current law that none of the factors which

the Commission considers is necessarily dispositive in the

Commission’s material injury analysis.” Statement of

Administrative Action (“SAA ”), H.R. Rep. 103-826(I), 850 reprinted

in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4184 (1994). Indeed, “[n]othing in the

statutory scheme compels [the Commission] to reach a certain

conclusion concerning the dumping margins – the statute only

compels [the Commission] to consider such margins.” Asociacion de

Productores de Salmon y Trucha de Chile AG v. United States, 26 CIT

29, 45, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376 (2002)(citation omitted). 

The Court finds that the Commission properly considered the

magnitude of the antidumping duty margins in accordance with the

law and court precedent. The statute only requires the Commission

to evaluate antidumping margins as one of many relevant economic

factors. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii)(V). This Court has

previously found that the Commission “reciting the margins of

dumping and declining to attach any significance to the margins”

was sufficient. Asociacion de Productores de Salmon, 26 CIT at 44,

180 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. Likewise, the Commission’s evaluation of

the dumping margin here, though contained within a footnote, fully

complied with its statutory mandate. In addition, contrary to
Court No. 07-00233 Page 16

Plaintiffs’ claim, the dumping margins found by Commerce were not

atypically low. See Far Eastern Textile Ltd. v. ITC, 25 CIT 999

(2001) (ranging from 5.77 to 14.10 percent); Asociacion de

Productores de Salmon, 26 CIT at 45, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1376

(ranging from 2.22 to 10.69 percent).

C. Causal Nexus Between the Subject Imports And Injury To

Domestic Industry

Plaintiffs also object to the Commission’s finding that

“[t]he primary cause of material injury to the domestic industry

was the loss of volume, in terms of U.S. shipments, and market

share, which was caused by the rapid increase in volume of lowpriced subject imports” arguing that it was based on flawed

pricing comparisons discussed supra. Pls.’ Mem. at 16. Since

the Court already ruled that Plaintiffs are precluded from

raising their pricing comparisons arguments, the Court finds no

merit to Plaintiffs’ lack of causation argument based on flawed

pricing comparisons. In any event, the Commission reasonably

found a causal connection between subject imports and injury to

domestic industry. The Commission did not rely solely on the

pricing data which Plaintiffs challenge, but relied upon subject

import’s volume and impact stating that “subject imports greatly

increased their market share, at the domestic industry’s expense,

in an environment of declining demand, thereby depressing

domestic industry sales, production, and capacity utilization.” 
Court No. 07-00233 Page 17

Final Determination at 31-32 (CR 335). The Commission’s injury

determination is thus supported by substantial evidence. 

IV. Companion Appeal of Commerce’s Final Determination

Lastly, Plaintiffs ask the Court to refrain from ruling in

this action until the pending companion appeal of Commerce’s

final determination in Case No. 07-236 (“Commerce Appeal”) can be

fully adjudicated. See Pls.’ Mem. at 16-17. First, Plaintiffs

argue that the Commerce Appeal is an “all or nothing appeal in

which the plaintiffs contend that Ningbo Dafa’s antidumping duty

margin is de minimis” rather than a “debate between various

positive antidumping margin alternatives.” Id. at 17. As such,

Plaintiffs believe that the Commission’s determination is subject

to revision depending on the outcome of the Commerce Appeal. 

Second, Plaintiffs contend that, should Ningbo Dafa prevail in

the Commerce Appeal, the record establishes that the Chinese

producers of regenerated PSF were not selling below fair value

during the period of investigation. See id.

Defendant maintains that it complied with 19 U.S.C. §

1677(35)(C)(ii), which requires that the Commission consider “the

dumping margin or margins most recently published by [Commerce]

prior to the closing of the Commission’s administrative record.” 

Def.’s Mem. at 32. Citing the SAA, Defendant reasons that §

1677(35)(C)(ii) “precludes challenges to a Commission

determination on the basis that Commerce later modifies the
Court No. 07-00233 Page 18

original dumping margin . . . on judicial remand.” Id. at 32-33.

Amended margins found by Commerce on remand may warrant a

remand to the Commission in a related appeal if the amended

margins “may be determinative” and have been finalized i.e.,

reviewed by this Court or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit. See Usinor Industeel, S.A. v. United States, 27

CIT 238, 238-40 (2003) (citing Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos

Industrias v. United States, 913 F.2d 933, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

The status of the Commerce Appeal is far from being final. Thus,

the Court agrees with Defendant that a stay of this action

pending the Commerce Appeal is improper. The Commission properly

and reasonably considered the dumping margin as it is directed by

the statute. Should the Court issue a remand in the Commerce

Appeal, and Commerce determines Ningbo Dafa’s dumping margin to

be de minimis, the appropriate relief is for the Plaintiffs to

seek a changed circumstances review once the amended margin

becomes final. See Usinor, 27 CIT at 239.
Court No. 07-00233 Page 19

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court affirms the

ITC’s Final Determination. Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment upon

the agency record is denied. 

 /s/ Nicholas Tsoucalas 

 NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS

 SENIOR JUDGE

Dated: August 20, 2008

New York, New York