-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

TENITA WEBB-EATON, also known as TENITA 

WEBB EATON, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 21, 2017 

v No. 328068 

Wayne Circuit Court 

WAYNE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT, DORIS FIELDS, MADELINE 

DIEDO, PRADATSUNDARASAR SUKHTA, 

DORESEA LEWIS, MARY BEYERS, 

DEBORAH WATSON, and CURTIS L. IVERY, 

LC No. 13-012060-NZ 

 Defendants, 

and 

CLARISSA SHAVERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

TENITA WEBB-EATON, also known as TENITA 

WEBB EATON, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v No. 328069 

Wayne Circuit Court 

WAYNE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT, DORIS FIELDS, CLARISSA 

SHAVERS, MADELINE DIEDO, 

PRADATSUNDARASAR SUKHTA, DORESEA 

LEWIS, MARY BEYERS, and DEBORAH 

WATSON, 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

LC No. 03-012060-NZ 
-2- 

CURTIS L. IVERY, 

 Defendant. 

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and GLEICHER and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 These consolidated appeals concern an action instituted by plaintiff, Tenita Webb-Eaton, 

against the Wayne County Community College District (WCCCD) and several of its faculty. 

The complaint raises two counts, one alleging violation of the Persons with Disabilities Civil 

Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., and another alleging intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (IIED). The trial court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion 

for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and MCR 

2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). In Docket No. 328068, defendant Clarissa 

Shavers appeals as of right that portion of the trial court’s opinion and order denying her motion 

for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity with respect to plaintiff’s IIED 

count against her.1 In Docket No. 328069, WCCCD, Shavers, and defendants Doris Fields, 

Madeline Diedo, Pradatsundarasar Sukhta, Doresea Lewis, Mary Beyers, and Deborah Watson 

(collectively defendants) appeal by leave granted that portion of the trial court’s opinion and 

order denying their motion for summary disposition with respect to the PWDCRA claim.2 We 

reverse both the denial of defendants’ motion for summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s 

PWDCRA claim and the denial of defendant Shavers’s motion for summary disposition on 

plaintiff’s IIED claim. 

I. 

 Plaintiff is allergic to latex. Her condition is so severe that an allergic reaction can be 

triggered by airborne, as well as direct, contact with latex. Because of her sensitivity to airborne 

latex, she can suffer reactions simply by being in the same room or area as latex materials. 

Plaintiff first began her studies at WCCCD in 2008, earning two degrees. Plaintiff was accepted 

into WCCCD’s nursing program in 2011. When she enrolled, plaintiff disclosed to WCCCD that 

she had a latex allergy. Plaintiff left the program in 2012 claiming that defendants’ failure to 

 

1

 The trial court granted the remaining defendants’ motions for summary disposition on 

plaintiff’s IIED claims against them, and plaintiff has not appealed that portion of the trial 

court’s order. 

2 Webb-Eaton v Wayne Co Community College Dist, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals 

entered October 27, 2015 (Docket No. 328069). 
-3- 

accommodate her latex allergy and other acts of discrimination against her because of her allergy 

made it impossible for her to continue in the program. Plaintiff then commenced this action.3

II. 

 We first address whether defendants were entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s 

PWDCRA count. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate when the 

evidence presented viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party shows that there is 

no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The PWDCRA 

prohibits educational institutions from “discriminat[ing] in any manner in the full utilization of 

or benefit from the institution, or the services provided and rendered by the institution to an 

individual because of a disability that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to utilize and benefit 

from the institution.” MCL 37.1402(a). The PWDCRA also requires educational institutions to 

“accommodate a person with a disability for purposes of . . . education . . . unless the person 

demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” MCL 37.1102(2). 

 “[I]n order to make out a prima facie case based on a violation of Article 4 of the 

[PWDCRA], a plaintiff must show (1) that she [has a disability] under the [PWDCRA], (2) that 

she is qualified for the educational opportunity sought in spite of her [disability], and (3) that, in 

spite of the above qualifications, she is not being afforded an equal opportunity to secure the 

educational opportunity as other applicants.” Crancer v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 156 

Mich App 790, 795; 402 NW2d 90 (1986).4

 The PWDCRA defines a “disability” under the act as “[a] determinable physical or 

mental characterisitic of an individual . . . if the characteristic . . . [f]or purposes of article 4, is 

unrelated to the individual’s ability to utilize and benefit from educational opportunities, 

programs, and facilities at an educational institution.” MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(C). A characteristic 

is “unrelated to the individual’s ability” if “with or without accommodation, an individual’s 

disability does not prevent the individual from . . . utilizing and benefiting from educational 

opportunities, programs, and facilities at an educational institution.” MCL 37.1103(l)(iii). MCL 

37.1102(2) provides further guidance on the extent to which an educational institution is to 

provide an accommodation by stating that “a person shall accommodate a person with a 

disability for purposes of . . . education . . . unless the person demonstrates that the 

accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” At the summary disposition stage, a plaintiff 

 

3

 Plaintiff first filed a lawsuit in federal court, raising a claim under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., and the same two claims at issue in this matter. 

The federal court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the ADA 

claim. Having dismissed the only federal claim, the federal court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 

4 Crancer was decided when the act was known as the Handicappers Civil Rights Act (HCRA), 

156 Mich App at 794-795, the HCRA is now called the PWDCRA, Peden v Detroit, 470 Mich 

195, 219; 680 NW2d 857 (2004). 
-4- 

bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that a defendant has failed to accommodate 

her handicap, however, “[o]nce such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the defendant 

to show that the accommodation required would impose an ‘undue hardship.’ ” Cebreco v Music 

Hall Ctr for the Performing Arts, 219 Mich App 353, 355-356, 360; 555 NW2d 862 (1996). 

 It is undisputed by the parties that plaintiff’s latex allergy is a determinable physical 

characteristic. Furthermore, plaintiff established through her own deposition testimony that she 

was exposed to latex on several occasions while a student in the nursing program. There is also 

evidence that plaintiff was qualified for the program and that but for the use of latex in the 

program, she would have been able to continue.5

 As noted in Cebreco, the question for purposes 

of this prong is whether plaintiff would be able to continue in her program with provision of 

“some accommodation.” See 219 Mich App at 361. 

 The difficulty is that plaintiff offers little if any description as to what accommodation 

would allow her to complete the program. Plaintiff asserts that defendants should have had a 

formal policy regarding how to address latex allergies, but she fails to offer any suggestions as to 

what that policy might contain that would have allowed her to participate. The only suggestion 

that we can discern in her arguments and in the evidence she presented would be that the 

defendants wholly and immediately eliminate the use of all latex materials in their program. 

Defendants argues that such an accommodation would be an undue burden. 

 The parties agree that plaintiff’s allergy can be triggered by merely being in the presence 

of latex, even if she does not make physical contact with it. They also agree that latex is 

ubiquitous in the instructional rooms. This would appear to be the reason that the 

accommodation sought by plaintiff amounts to removal of all latex from the premises. However, 

we agree with defendants that to immediately remove all latex materials from the program and 

immediately replace them all with non-latex products would constitute an undue hardship. 

Moreover, while plaintiff presents evidence that hospitals are accommodating patients who 

suffer from latex allergies on an individual basis and that some hospitals are converting to latex 

free facilities, defendants cannot require their associated hospitals, in which nursing candidates 

must perform the clinical part of their training, to become latex free. Therefore, plaintiff’s 

failure to posit what reasonable accommodation short of complete and immediate removal of all 

latex would have allowed her to continue in the nursing program leaves us with little choice but 

to reverse the trial court and direct that defendants be granted summary disposition. 

 

5

 Defendants also rely on our opinion in Miller v Detroit, 185 Mich App 789, 790-792; 462 

NW2d 856 (1990) where we held that the plaintiffs were not handicapped under the HCRA 

because their determinable physical characterisitic, being confined to wheelchairs, was directly 

related to their ability to utilize and benfit from the defendant’s public transportation system. 

Miller did not address whether the plaintiffs could have utilized or benefited from the public 

transportation system with an accommodation. See id. However, our Supreme Court has since 

stated that MCL 37.1103(l) requires courts to consider the effect of a reasonable accommodation 

in determining whether an individual’s ability is unaffected by their determinable characterisitic. 

Rourk v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 458 Mich 25, 30-31; 580 NW2d 397 (1998). 
-5- 

 In so ruling, however, we do not mean to suggest that more circumscribed 

accommodations for a student with a latex allergy would constitute an undue burden. Again, we 

emphasize that plaintiff has offered neither argument nor evidence to suggest that her very severe 

condition can be accommodated in a less comprehensive manner such as having certain rooms or 

areas designated as latex free or by purchasing latex free materials to offer as an alternative for 

the affected student to use. 

III. 

 We next turn to defendant Shavers’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of her motion for 

summary disposition with regard to plaintiff’s IIED claim against her. Shavers contendeds that 

she is entitled to governmental immunity with respect to this count, and thus, entitled to 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).6

 Because IIED is an intentional tort, Shavers is 

entitled to immunity if: 

 (a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and the 

employee was acting, or reasonably believed that [s]he was acting, within the 

scope of [her] authority, 

 (b) the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken with 

malice, and 

 (c) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial. [Odom v Wayne 

Co, 482 Mich 459, 480; 760 NW2d 217 (2008).] 

 The only acts that the trial court found could support plaintiff’s IIED claim, and the only 

acts that plaintiff argues could support the claim, concern Shavers’s conduct with regard to 

plaintiff’s grades.7

 Plaintiff concedes that Shavers’s conduct concerning her grades falls within 

the first and third prongs above. Therefore, the only question is whether Shavers acted in good 

faith. Our Supreme Court has explained that the “good faith” inquiry is not objective, but rather, 

“[t]he good-faith element . . . is subjective in nature.” Id. at 481-482. So long as the 

governmental employee has an honest belief that his or her conduct is justified, the employee 

acts with good faith, even if the employee later discovers that he or she was mistaken. See id. 

(“A police officer would be entitled to immunity . . . if he acted in good faith and honestly 

believed that he had probable cause to arrest, even if he later learned that he was mistaken.”). 

 

6

 We review a “trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo.” Kendricks v 

Rehfield, 270 Mich App 679, 681; 716 NW2d 623 (2006). “Governmental immunity is a 

question of law that is also reviewed de novo on appeal.” Id. at 682. 

7

 Plaintiff does discuss other instances of “harassment” by Shavers in the statement of fact 

portion in her brief on appeal. However, in the argument portion of her brief she does not point 

to this conduct as supporting her IIED claim but instead relies solely on her allegations of 

Shavers’s conduct concerning her grades. 
-6- 

 Plaintiff alleges that Shavers specifically directed two of plaintiff’s instructors to give 

plaintiff lower or failing grades. While Shavers does not deny that she advised plaintiff’s 

instructors to lower her grades, Shavers contends that she did so because plaintiff did not, in her 

opinion, adequately fulfill the requirements of the courses necessary to earn a higher grade. 

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Shavers directed an instructor to give plaintiff a failing 

grade after plaintiff did not take the final exam in the instructor’s course. However, as plaintiff 

testified, she was later allowed to make up the final exam and received a “B” in the course. 

Plaintiff also relies on the deposition testimony of defendant Mary Beyers, who stated that 

Shavers directed her to turn in plaintiff’s evaluation for a clinical without marking it pass or fail.8

 

Plaintiff claims that Shavers then failed her in that clinical. However, Beyers testified that 

Shavers directed her to turn plaintiff’s evaluation in blank because plaintiff had missed required 

clinical hours, and Beyers stated that she did not believe Shavers’s actions towards plaintiff were 

motivated by any form of bias or dislike for her. The deposition testimony does not establish 

that Shavers failed to act in good faith. Rather, it suggests that Shavers made decisions about 

plaintiff’s grades based on an honest belief that plaintiff had not met the requirements of the 

respective courses. 

 Plaintiff also relies heavily on the affidavit of Chrissy Brooks, a classmate, in which 

Brooks averred that she witnessed a conversation between plaintiff and Shavers where Shavers 

threatened plaintiff about receiving a failing grade. Missing from the affidavit is any 

explanation, other than the affiant’s mere opinion, regarding why Shavers would make such a 

statement to plaintiff. Plaintiff offers nothing more than speculation that the grades she received 

from Shavers were motivated by an animus towards plaintiff as opposed to a honest belief that 

plaintiff had failed to meet the necessary requirements of her courses. Speculation is not 

sufficient to survive a motion for summary disposition. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 

174; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). As such, Shavers is entitled to summary disposition with respect to 

plaintiff’s IIED claim. 

 Reversed and remanded for entry of dismissal of all claims. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro 

 

8

 Beyers explained that clinicals are graded on a pass/fail basis.