* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60810

Summary Calendar

LEROY CHAMBERS, also known as Jamica Chambers, also known as Jamaica

Chambers

Petitioner

v.

MICHAEL B MUKASEY, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL

Respondent

Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A18 133 311

Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

Leroy Chambers is a native and citizen of Jamaica. He petitions this court

for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing

his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order of removal. Chambers was

found to be removable as an alien who had remained in the United States longer

than permitted, as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense, and as

an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 29, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-60810

2

When, as in this case, the BIA enters a decision independent of the IJ’s

decision, this court will confine its review to the BIA’s decision. See Girma v.

INS, 283 F.3d 664, 666 (5th Cir. 2002). The BIA’s legal conclusions are reviewed

de novo and its factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Id. This

court lacks “jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien

who is removable by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses,

including a controlled substance offense or an aggravated felony.

§§ 1252(a)(2)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(B). However, this court does have

jurisdiction to review its own jurisdiction and to review constitutional claims or

questions of law. See Omari v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 2005);

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

Chambers argues that the BIA erred by finding that he was bound by his

counsel’s concessions of the factual allegation against him and his removability;

he also argues that counsel’s concessions constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel. An alien generally is bound by his counsel’s admissions. See Matter of

Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986). In the instant case, the BIA

found that Chambers failed to meet any of the procedural requirements for

raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Lozada, 19 I. & N.

Dec. 637, 638 (BIA 1988); Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 497-98 (5th Cir.

2000). Nothing in the record suggests that Chambers complied with these

requirements. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in rejecting Chambers’s claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Chambers’s other primary argument is that the Government failed to show

that his prior state felony conviction was an aggravated felony or a drug

trafficking offense. “Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any

time after admission is deportable.” § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). For immigration

purposes, an aggravated felony includes drug trafficking crimes as defined in 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Section 924(c)(2) provides that

the phrase drug trafficking crime includes “any felony punishable under the
No. 07-60810

3

Controlled Substances Act.” A state offense constitutes a felony punishable

under the Controlled Substances Act only if it proscribes conduct punishable as

a felony under that federal law. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S. Ct.

625, 629-33 (2006).

When determining whether an offense qualifies as an aggravated felony,

this court“look[s] atthe statute under which the alien was convicted rather than

at the particular underlying facts.” Omari, 419 F.3d at 307. “If the statute of

conviction defines multiple offenses, at least one of which does not describe an

aggravated felony,” then this court looks to the record of conviction to determine

under which subsection the individual was convicted to determine whether the

conviction is an aggravated felony. Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456, 464

(5th Cir. 2006); Omari, 419 F.3d at 308. The record contains a certified copy of

Chambers’ judgment of conviction and order for commitment, which reflects

Chambers’s guilty plea and conviction for “possession with intent to distribute -

cocaine.” R. 141-42; 8 C.F.R. 1003.41(a). Chambers was convicted under New

Jersey Stat. Ann. 2C:35-5a(1), which tracks the language of the analogous

federal statute criminalizing possession with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). The record also contains a certified copy of Chambers’s indictment,

which specifies that Chambers “knowingly or purposely did possess with intent

to distribute cocaine in a quantity of five ounces or more.” Therefore, the BIA

did not err in finding that Chambers’s conviction was an aggravated felony for

immigration purposes. As an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, Chambers

was correctly found to be removable. See § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Chambers also filed a petition for review from the BIA’s denial of his

motion for reconsideration. However, as he does not address this issue in his

brief, it is abandoned. See Chambers v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 445, 448 n.1 (5th Cir.

2008).

The petition for review is DENIED.