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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

J.A.M.M. DOB: 04/18/2000, Appellant. ) FILED: June 8, 2015 Schindler, J. — J.A.M.M. seeks reversal of his conviction for rape of a child in 

### the firstdegree. J.A.M.M. contends the courterred inadmitting child hearsay statements the victim made to his motherand a child interview specialist. We disagree, and affirm. FACTS InJuly 2012, five-year-old K.R. wentto stay at his paternal grandparents' house in Everettfor a week or two while his motherA.H. was out oftown. The grandparents' 12-year-old son J.A.M.M. lived with K.R.'s grandparents. 

### After returning home, A.H. noticed K.R. was acting "more emotional" than normal. At the time, A.H. assumed K.R. was sad because he missed his father. No. 72145-3-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONNo. 72145-3-1/2 

### A few days laterwhile the familywas getting readyto go swimming, K.R. told A.H. he needed to tell her something and then burst into tears. A.H. said, "[0]kay, 

### what's going on." K.R. told A.H. thatwhile he was at his grandparents' house, J.A.M.M. "made him suck his pee pee." A.H. asked K.R. how itstarted and what J.A.M.M. had said to him. K.R. told A.H. that ithappened in a bedroom atthe grandparents' house and J.A.M.M. told K.R. notto tell anyone. K.R. told his motherthatJ.A.M.M. "would hold his head there and itmade him choke." K.R. asked A.H. neverto make him go backto J.A.M.M.'s house again. A.H. called the police. InAugust, K.R. metwith child interview specialist Gina Coslett at Dawson Place Child Advocacy Center. When Coslett asked K.R. what he was there to talkto her about, he said, "Idon't remember." Coslett asked K.R. ifhe did not remember or ifhe did not want to talk about it. K.R. told Coslett he did not want to talk about it because it

was "a hard question." Three weeks later, K.R. metwith Coslett again. When Coslett asked K.R. what he was there to talk to her about, he said J.A.M.M. "made me suck his peepee." K.R. told Coslettthat ithappened inJ.A.M.M.'s room and thatJ.A.M.M. closed the door and blocked it with a suitcase. K.R. said ithappened "more than one time" and J.A.M.M. 

### threatened to hurt K.R. if he told anyone. Coslett asked K.R. if J.A.M.M. "want[ed] you to touch [any] other part of his body" or if J.A.M.M. "put his peepee on any otherpartof your body." K.R. said he did not. 

### The State charged J.A.M.M. injuvenile courtwith child molestation inthefirst degree and rape of a child inthe first degree.No. 72145-3-1/3 The parties agreed to combine the competency, child hearsay, and fact-finding 

### hearings. K.R., A.H., child interview specialist Gina Coslett, and Snohomish County Sheriff's Office Detective Steven Martin testified. The court admitted into evidence the transcripts of Coslett's interviews with K.R. The court entered detailed findings offact and conclusions of law. The court found K.R. was competentto testify and the hearsay statements he made to A.H. and 

### Coslettmet "all nine ofthe Ryan[1] factors." The court conluded that "[w]ith regard to time, content and circumstances the child hearsay statements made inthis case show sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible." The courtfound J.A.M.M. guilty of child molestation inthe first degree and rape of a child inthe first degree. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss the child molestation count and imposed a standard range disposition of 15 to 36 weeks inthe custody ofthe Juvenile Justice and Rehabilitation Administration. ANALYSIS J.A.M.M. contends the courterred in ruling the hearsay statements K.R. made to his mother and the child interview specialistwere admissible under RCW 9A.44.120 and State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984). We review a court's admission of child hearsay statements for a manifest abuse ofdiscretion. State v. Woods, 154Wn.2d 613, 623, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005). The court abuses its discretion when itbases its decision on unreasonable or untenable grounds. State v.C.J.. 148 Wn.2d 672, 686, 63 P.3d 765 (2003). We review the factual findings 

### supporting the admission for substantial evidence. State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 128, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficientto persuade a 1State v. Rvan. 103 Wn.2d 165, 175-76, 691 P.2d 197 (1984). 3No. 72145-3-1/4 

### fair-minded rational person ofthe truth ofthe premise asserted. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d at 129. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. State v. Shafer, 156Wn.2d 381, 391, 128P.3d87(2006). 

### Under RCW 9A.44.120(1), a statementby a child underthe age of 10-years-old describing sexual contact is admissible ifthe "time, content, and circumstances ofthe 

### statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability." InRyan, the court identified nine factors to determine reliability: (1) whetherthere is an apparent motive to lie, (2) the declarant's general character, (3) whethermore than one person heard the statements, (4) whetherthe statements were spontaneous, (5) the timing ofthe declaration and the relationship between the declarant and the witness, (6) whetherthe statementcontains express assertions about pastfacts, (7) whethercross-examination could showthe declarant's lack ofknowledge, (8) whetherthe possibilitythatthe declarant's 

### recollection is faulty is remote, and (9) whetherthe circumstances surrounding the statement are such thatthere is no reason to suppose the declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement. Ryan. 103 Wn.2d at 175-76; see also State v. Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 647-48, 790 P.2d 610 (1990). We considerthe Ryan factors as a whole; no single factor is decisive. State v. Young. 62 Wn. App. 895, 902, 802 P.2d 829, 817 P.2d 412 (1991). To be admissible, the statements need only substantially meetthese factors. Woods, 154Wn.2d at 623- 24. Because only the trial court has the opportunity to see and evaluate the child and the otherwitnesses, it is inthe best position to determine the reliability of child hearsay statements. State v. Pham, 75 Wn. App. 626, 631, 879 P.2d 321 (1994). Accordingly,No. 72145-3-1/5 "[t]he trial court is necessarily vested with considerable discretion inevaluating the indicia of reliability." CJ,, 148 Wn.2d at 686. J.A.M.M. contends K.R.'s hearsay statements were unreliable due to repeated questioning and the use ofleading questions. J.A.M.M. argues substantial evidence does not supportthe court's findings as to two ofthe Ryan factors, spontaneity and number of people who heard. The courtfound, in pertinent part: Spontaneous- The initial disclosure was completely spontaneous. The disclosure to Gina Coslettwas to a professional; and questions asked were notgenerally leading or suggestive. There were direct questions used to follow up on past information which is permissible under rstate v. Henderson, 48 Wn. App. 543, 740 P.2d 329 (1987)]. [] Number ofPeople Who Heard- K.R. told his mother, Gina Coslett, and testified in court sufficiently consistently. Statements to Mother J.A.M.M. concedes the initial disclosure K.R. made to A.H. was spontaneous but 

### argues that K.R.'s subsequent hearsay statements to his motherwere the result of leading questions. The record does not support his argument. A child's statements are spontaneous "so long as the questions are not leading

or suggestive." Young, 62 Wn. App. at 901. A leading question is one that suggests the desired answer. State v. Scott, 20Wn.2d 696, 698, 149 P.2d 152 (1944). 

### When K.R. started crying and told A.H. he had to tell hersomething, A.H. said to 

### him, "[0]kay, what's going on." A.H. testified she was surprised when K.R.responded thatJ.A.M.M. "made him suck his pee pee" because itwas "out ofthe blue." A.H. 

### testified that afterthis unexpected disclosure, she asked K.R. "how did itstart, where


### was his grandma and his brother, [and] what [J.A.M.M.] toldhim." These questions were not leading becausethey "were open-ended and did notsuggestthat the childNo. 72145-3-1/6 respond with a statement about sexual contact." State v. Kennealv, 151 Wn. App. 861, 883, 214 P.3d 200 (2009). J.A.M.M. relies on Ryan to argue that because A.H. asked K.R. follow-up questions afterthe initialdisclosure, all of his subsequent statements were tainted by his mother's lack ofobjectivity. In Ryan, the mothers of two child victims had been told "ofthe strong likelihood thatthe defendant had committed indecent liberties upon their children" before eitherchild disclosed the abuse to his mother. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 168-69, 176. After hearing aboutthe abuse from someone else, each mother questioned her child aboutwhat happened. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 168-69. The court concluded the children's statements to their mothers were unreliable in partbecause the mothers were "predisposed to confirm whatthey had been told." Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 

### 176. The court stated, "Their relationship to their children is understandably of a characterwhich makes theirobjectivity questionable." Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 176. Unlike in Ryan, the record shows A.H. was not predisposed to ask K.R. suggestive questions in orderto confirm an accusation or preconceived suspicion. A.H. testified she "was taken back" when K.R. suddenly started crying and telling her about the incidentbecause she had no prior suspicion ofabuse. Without more, the fact that A.H. is K.R.'s motherdoes not render his statements to her inherently unreliable. 

### Rather, when a witness is in a position oftrustwiththe child, that relationship likely enhances the reliability ofthe child's statements. Swan, 114Wn.2d at 650. J.A.M.M. also argues the court erred in relying on Henderson for purposes of 

### analyzing spontaneity. We disagree. InHenderson, we stated thatthe fourth Ryan factor "compels a less narrow definition of'spontaneous,' one that considers the entireNo. 72145-3-1/7 

### context in which the child makes the statement." Henderson, 48 Wn. App. at 550. The court did not manifestlyabuse its discretion in considering the context in whichK.R. answered his mother's open-ended nonsuggestive questions. Statements to Child Interview Specialist 

### J.A.M.M. contends K.R.'s hearsay statements to Coslettwere unreliable because 

### they were the result of improper repeated questioning that had a coercive effect on the child. Again, the record does not support his argument. The record shows the statements K.R. made to Coslettwere notthe result of 

### incessantquestioning orthe use of leading questions: 

### ClSt2' Coslett: So [K.R.] tell me about whatyou came to talkto me about today [K.R.]: of[J.A.M.M.] 

### CIS Coslett: of[J.A.M.M.], okay, what about [J.A.M.M.] [K.R.]: he made me suck his peepee

CIS Coslett: [K.R.]: CIS Coslett: [K.R.]: okay, when he made you suck his peepee where is his peepee points down underthe table area towards himself 

### Okay and what does he use that partof his bodyfor, what is that part ofthe bodyfor to go potty

CIS Coslett:

.... [T]ellme everything about how what part ofyour body you used to suck his peepee that he made you [K.R.]: my mouth 2Child interview specialist. 7No. 72145-3-1/8



### CIS Coslett: your mouth okay what did you taste when that happened [K.R.]: itwas gross stuff. J.A.M.M. relies on an out-of-state case, State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994), for the proposition that repeated questioning weighs againsta finding ofspontaneity. Michaels does not support his assertion that multiple instances of questioning, without more, necessarily diminishes the reliability of a child's out-of-court

statements. In Michaels, a nursery school teacherwas convicted of sexual abuse against a number of children. Michaels, 136 N.J. at 303. Because there was "limited physical evidence" to prove the abuse, the "bulk ofthe State's evidence" consisted of statements made by the children during "highly improper" pretrial interviews. Michaels, 136 N.J. at 

### 305-06, 315. The children "were subjected to repeated, almost incessant, interrogation" by investigators who "were not trained in interviewing young children." Michaels, 136 N.J. at 315, 313. The investigators "asked blatantly leading questions thatfurnished information the children themselves had not mentioned" and utilized "mild threats, 

### cajoling, and bribing" to obtain inculpatory statements. Michaels, 136 N.J. at 314-15. 

### Based on "a highlynuanced inquiry intothe totality ofcircumstances surrounding those interviews," the court held that "a hearing must be held to determine whetherthose 

### clearly improper interrogations so infected the ability of the children to recall the alleged abusive events thattheirpretrial statements and in-courttestimony based on that recollection are unreliable and should not be admitted into evidence." Michaels, 136 N.J. at 306, 315-16.No. 72145-3-1/9 

### Here, unlike in Michaels, K.R. was questioned by a "child interview specialist." 

### Coslettreceived ongoing training in the child interviewtechniques recommended by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. Cosletttestified that at the 

### beginning of a child interview, she goes over "ground rules," such as tellingthe child that "it's okay to say Idon't know and it's important not to guess." Cosletttestified she does not "go in with a preconceived idea, nor do Iwantto suggestto the child something that happened." During the first interviewwhen K.R. was reluctantto talkto Coslett aboutwhat 

### happened with J.A.M.M., she asked K.R. whether "you don't rememberor you don't want to talk about it." K.R. answered, "Idon't want to talk about it" and Coslett said, "[H]owcome [K.R.] you don'twantto talk about it." When K.R. responded, "[C]ause it's

a hard question," Coslett redirected the conversation to talk about "rules at home about 

### being safe." Unlike inMichaels, Coslettdid not incessantly interrogate K.R. with leading questions, nor did she use threats orbribes to obtain an inculpatory statement. Infact, J.A.M.M. concedes that "several ofthe egregious investigative techniques that occurred in Michaels did not happen here." K.R. simply did not wantto talk aboutthe incident during his first meeting with Coslett and the fact thatthey had a second follow-up meeting does not, without more, nullifythe spontaneity of his statements. Inaddition, "when more than one person hears a similarstory ofabuse from a 

### child, the hearsay statement is more reliable." Kennealv, 151 Wn. App. at 883. Here, the record shows K.R. "told a substantially similar account ofthe events to multiple 

### people sequentially." Kennealv, 151 Wn. App. at 883. K.R. repeatedly stated that J.A.M.M. "made me suck his peepee." K.R. consistently said J.A.M.M. did not try toNo. 72145-3-1/10 

### touch him or make him do anything else. K.R. also repeatedly stated thatJ.A.M.M. told him notto tell anyone and that itwas hard for him to talk aboutthe incident. Because the court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in concluding the Ryan factors were substantially met and admitting the hearsay statements K.R. made to his mother and Coslett, we affirm. 

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WE CONCUR:

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