UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4755

RAHIM WALIYY SHAKUR,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.

(CR-00-72-MU)

Submitted: April 13, 2001

Decided: April 23, 2001

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Marshall A. Swann, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark

T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Karen E. Eady, Assistant United

States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Rahim Waliyy Shakur appeals the sentence of 180 months imprisonment and three years supervised release imposed by the district

court after his guilty plea to attempted carjacking, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119

(West 2000). Shakur contends that the district court erred in refusing

to reduce the offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2X1.1(b)(1) (1998), for an attempted crime, and that his total sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence of 180 months imprisonment. We affirm. 

Shakur was unable to complete the carjacking because the victim’s

car was equipped with an anti-theft device which prevented him from

starting the engine. In sentencing Shakur, the district court refused to

make a three-level reduction under USSG § 2X1.1(b)(1), which provides for the decrease if the offense is an attempt, "unless the defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed necessary for

successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances

demonstrate that the defendant was about to complete all such acts

but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond the

defendant’s control." The district court decided that the reduction did

not apply in Shakur’s case because the victim’s activation of the antitheft device was the kind of event beyond the defendant’s control that

is within the scope of § 2X1.1. 

The commentary to § 2X1.1 explicitly states that the reduction is

intended for cases in which the defendant is arrested well before he

has completed the acts necessary to commit the offense. Shakur had

completed all such acts. Therefore, the district court did not err in

interpreting the exception to include events beyond the defendant’s

control other than intrusion by law enforcement. See United States v.

Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1993) ("near accomplishment of the criminal object normally poses enough risk of actual

harm, and reveals enough culpability . . . [to defeat] the reduction

available for conspiracies and attempts that have not progressed very

far."); accord United States v. Medina, 74 F.3d 413, 418 (2d Cir.

1996). 

2 UNITED STATES v. SHAKUR
Shakur also contends that his sentence of 180 months imprisonment and thirty-six months supervised release exceeded the statutory

maximum sentence of 180 months imprisonment provided under 18

U.S.C.A. § 2119(1). Because he did not raise the issue in the district

court, it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 731-32 (1993) (when issue not preserved for appeal, defendant

must show error that was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings). 

The district court accepted the parties’ stipulation that the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for Shakur’s offense was 180

months. However, supervised release is not treated as part of the

incarceration portion of a federal sentence. United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 223, 231 n.10 (4th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed,

Mar. 19, 2001 (No. 00-9234). Consequently, a term of supervised

release may be added to any sentence of imprisonment authorized by

the applicable statute, including a maximum sentence. United States

v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 174 (4th Cir. 1996). The district court thus did

not plainly err in imposing a three-year term of supervised release. 

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. SHAKUR 3