alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 99.9****CONSENT OF C. OSIOWY**     Reference is made to the Annual Report on Form 40-F and the documents incorporated byreference therein (the “40-F”) of Goldcorp Inc. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December31, 2009, and any amendments thereto, to be filed with the United States Securities and ExchangeCommission pursuant to the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and theAnnual Information Form (the “AIF”) and Management’s Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) of theCompany for the year then ended, which are filed as exhibits to and incorporated by reference inthe 40-F.     I hereby consent to the references, as applicable, to my name in connection with (including,as an expert) the following report(s) and documents: 1. The 40-F, the MD&A and the AIF, which include references in connectionwith information relating to the Red Lake GoldMines, and the properties described therein.Date:March 19, 2010              /s/ Chris Osiowy     Name:  Chris Osiowy, P. Geo.     Red Lake Gold Mines
# CE2004078EN.01022301.xml

| 27.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 78/223 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 78/223

---

(2004/C 78 E/0227)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3113/03

by Maurizio Turco (NI) to the Commission

(22 October 2003)

Subject:   Classification of the codes for the units of measurement of quantities exported shown on the Commission's database CATS (Clearance Audit Trail System)

Subject:

The additional answer to Written Question P-3202/02 (1) incorporated extracts from the Commission's database CATS (Clearance Audit Trail System) containing data from Member States concerning export refunds for Community agricultural products to third countries.

1

In these extracts the various figures include the unit of measurement of the exported quantities, for which the codes are: 1; 10; 30; GRA; HL; Hl; hl; HST; k; K; kg; Kg; Kgs; KGS; NUM; NUMBER; P; q; ST; T; t; TON; U; UNI.

Can the Commission say whether ‘GRA’ should be taken to mean grams; whether ‘k, kg, K, Kg, Kgs and KGS’ should be taken to mean kilograms; whether ‘q’ should be taken to mean quintal; whether ‘TON, T and’ should be taken to mean tonnes; whether ‘HL, Hl and hl’ should be taken to mean hectolitres, and to what units of measurement the following codes correspond: 1; 10; 30; HST; NUM; NUMBER; P; ST; U; UNI?

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(19 November 2003)

(19 November 2003)

The additional answer given to the Written Question P-3202/02 concerns a listing of aggregated refunds paid for exports to several different destinations. The aggregates cover the financial years 1998 until 2001 and the details shown in that listing for the units of measurement are indicated as reported by the Member States.

Until financial year 2001, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999 (2) did not impose any standard codes to be used by the Member States for the units of measurement reported to the Commission. For that period, the CATS database thus contains the units of measurement as internally used by the Member States in their own computer systems, with the significance given at the national level for each financial year.

2

Confronted with this large variety of non standardised codes used by the Member States, the Commission has introduced standard codes for the unit of measurement when updating Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999 for financial year 2002. From financial year 2002 onwards, the Commission requires the following standard codes:

| Character | Significance |
| --- | --- |
| K | Kilogram |
| L | Litre |
| P | Piece |

Character

Significance

K

Kilogram

L

Litre

P

Piece

---

(1)  OJ C 137 E, 12.6.2003, p. 172.

1

(2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999 of 25 October 1999 laying down detailed rules of the application of Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 as regards the form and content of the accounting information that the Member States must hold at the disposal of the Commission for the purposes of the clearance of the EAGGF Guarantee Section accounts, OJ L 295, 16.11.1999.

2

---
STATE of North Carolina, v. Teddy Rudolph KING.

No. COA15-54.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Sept. 1, 2015.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINON**

No Plain Error.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-7604

DILLARD J. BOOKER, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of 

Corrections, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District 

Judge. (2:08-cv-00507-RAJ-JEB) 

Submitted: December 15, 2009 Decided: December 21, 2009 

Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Dillard J. Booker, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Mozley Harris, 

Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Dillard J. Booker seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this 

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find 

that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district 

court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural 

ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El 

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th 

Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and 

conclude that Booker has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny Booker’s motion for transcript at 

government expense, deny a certificate of appealability, and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           1,054
<SECURITIES>                                    19,957
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,848
<ALLOWANCES>                                       (50)
<INVENTORY>                                      7,363
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                36,841
<PP&E>                                           9,528
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (4,592)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  45,972
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,612
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        50,631
<OTHER-SE>                                       2,467
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    45,972
<SALES>                                         24,422
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                24,422
<CGS>                                           12,609
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,609
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                20,530
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (6,997)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       123
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (7,120)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (7,120)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.59)



</TABLE>
STATE v. James Allen COOK.

No. 272P04-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Karen A. Blum, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State.

James Allen Cook, Bunn, for Cook, James Allen.

J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 10th of August 2015 by Defendant to Appoint Counsel:

> "Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of September 2015."
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM UNAUDITED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS DATED JUNE 30, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         1420470
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         6706113
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    7167794
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          377824
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            381000
<LOANS>                                       28228835
<ALLOWANCE>                                      82668
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                45063854
<DEPOSITS>                                    35211886
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             378486
<LONG-TERM>                                    3699985
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          3317
<OTHER-SE>                                     5770180
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                45063854
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                1795274
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               119176
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                581708
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               2496158
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             1225601
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1386967
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          1109191
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                     5000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               10989
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 798625
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 403673
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      403673
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    250227
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .88
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .88
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                     .06
<LOANS-NON>                                     173000
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 77000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                     1108
<RECOVERIES>                                      1776
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                82668
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             82668
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          33084
        

</TABLE>
STATE of North Carolina v. Milton Carl MORGAN.

No. COA15-85.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 20, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
# CE2004078EN.01076301.xml

| 27.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 78/763 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 78/763

---

(2004/C 78 E/0811)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2885/03

by Charles Tannock (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(29 September 2003)

Subject:   Application of the EU/Israel Association Agreement

Subject:

In recent years the European Commission has begun to apply a policy of imposing customs duties on importers of goods which are known to have been produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank. The Commission also imposes duties when it is suspected that goods have been produced in the settlements.

The European Union has Free Trade Agreements with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority covering the whole area of Israel and the occupied territories without regard to the nationality of the producer. Does the Commission accept, therefore, that there should be no discrimination with regard to customs duties on produce produced anywhere in the region regardless of the legal status of the settlements? Does the Commission also accept that under the Oslo accords reached between Israel and the Palestinian Authority that Israel is responsible for customs administration in all settlement areas, and, if so, does the Commission believe that it is important for the EU to respect the Oslo accords even if it is not legally bound to do so? Finally, what progress has been made under the terms of the dispute procedures that have been activated to deal with this situation under Article 79 of the EU/Israel Association Agreement, and which were put into place after a meeting of the Association Council in October, 2002?

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(6 November 2003)

(6 November 2003)

The Union-Israel Association Agreement provides for the establishment of a free trade area between the Union and Israel creating a favourable environment notably for the development of trade, investment and economic co-operation. As regards the application of the rules of origin, the Union's interpretation of the Agreement is clear: products originating from the Israeli settlements (West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) are not entitled to benefit from preferential treatment.

As regards the reference made by the Honourable Member to the Oslo accords, these agreements do not deal with the issue of preferential treatment of goods entering the Union since they regulate the bilateral relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Following the ‘Notice to Importers’ issued by the Commission in November 2001 and the measures adopted unilaterally by the Union, the ‘rules of origin’ issue has been discussed in the appropriate fora (i.e. relevant Association Committees and Association Councils) where the Union reasserted its position and the Israeli authorities expressed their willingness to explore appropriate technical measures in this respect. This matter is still under discussion.

---
CRIEGO-EL v. STATE.

No. 50P12-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Ovarias Verdad Criego-EL, Blanch, for Criego, Ovarias Verdad.

Kathleen N. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Ben R. David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of July 2015 by Plaintiff for Judicial Notice:

> "Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of September 2015."
# CE2004078EN.01072501.xml

| 27.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 78/725 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 78/725

---

(2004/C 78 E/0775)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1795/03

by Terence Wynn (PSE) to the Commission

(28 May 2003)

Subject:   Manufactured products from third countries

Subject:

Why does the Commission allow manufactured products to enter the EU from third countries that do not meet minimum health, safety and environmental standards that EU companies have to comply with? Would the Commission agree that by allowing such products into the EU, the direct result is the loss of European manufacturing jobs?

Answer given by Mr Liikanen on behalf of the Commission

(14 July 2003)

(14 July 2003)

Products marketed in the European Union, whether they originate from third countries or Member States, are subject to the same technical rules governing product safety or setting out requirements relating to health and/or environmental protection.

The requirements on producers, whatever their origins, are therefore the same throughout the Internal Market. The EU directives on product safety or on requirements relating to health or environmental protection can therefore affect the marketing of products in the EU.

The Commission is also committed to a comprehensive strategy aimed at promoting Europe's regulatory approach in certain third countries (and in particular the EU's principal trading partners) with regard to both enterprise policy and aspects of standardisation for industrial sectors. One of the objectives of this upstream strategy is to promote awareness and the implementation of Community rules by producers of products manufactured in third countries.

---
Opinion issued April 14, 2016

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 1 5 - 00 479 - CV

——————————— JOY WALLACE VARNER , Appellant

V. REOCO , INC. , Appellee

O n Appeal from the 157 th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2013 - 0 78 52 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Joy Wallace Varner, proceeding pro se , appealed from the trial court’s April 22, 2015 order g ranting the appellee’s motion to expunge appellant’s notice of lis pendens
. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 26.1 . However, a ppellant has failed to timely file her appellate brief. See id. 38.6( a ), 38.8(a)(1). After being notified by the Clerk of this Court on March 3 , 201 6 , that her appeal was subject to dismissal2

for failure to timely file her appellate brief, appellant failed to timely respond
. See id. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(c). Accordingly, w e dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution for failure to timely file a brief
. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c). We dismiss any pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley
.
Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Presidential Documents 54467 

Proclamation 7929 of September 9, 2005 

Patriot Day, 2005 

By the President of the United States of America 

A Proclamation 

Four years have passed since our country was brutally attacked on a quiet 

September morning. On that day, thousands of innocent lives were taken 

from us. The victims and the families who lost loved ones remain in the 

hearts and prayers of our Nation. We also remember the courage of the 

firefighters, police officers, emergency rescue personnel, and scores of private 

citizens who showed us the true meaning of heroism and demonstrated 

our resolve to the world. 

The mission that began on September 11, 2001, continues. Today, we see 

the virtue of the September 11th heroes embodied in our military personnel, 

who are taking the fight to our enemies and helping to keep us safe at 

home. Thousands of other Americans, from intelligence analysts to border 

guards to countless others, are doing vital work to help defend America 

and prevent future attacks. We are grateful to all of these men and women 

and to their families for their service and sacrifice. We honor those who 

have lost their lives defending our freedom, and we pray that God comfort 

their families. We pledge that we will not rest until we have won the 

war on terror. 

As we mark this solemn anniversary, I call upon all our citizens to express 

their patriotism and their gratitude for the blessings of liberty. By flying 

the flag, supporting military families, and teaching young people about 

our founding ideals, we honor the lives lost on September 11, 2001, and 

since, and we help preserve our freedom for future generations. 

By a joint resolution approved December 18, 2001 (Public Law 107–89), 

the Congress has designated September 11 of each year as ‘‘Patriot Day.’’ 

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States 

of America, do hereby proclaim September 11, 2005, as Patriot Day. I call 

upon the Governors of the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico, as well as appropriate officials of all units of government, to direct 

that the flag be flown at half-staff on Patriot Day. I call upon the people 

of the United States to observe Patriot Day with appropriate ceremonies 

and activities, including remembrance services, to display the flag at halfstaff from their homes on that day, and to observe a moment of silence 

beginning at 8:46 a.m. eastern daylight time to honor the innocent victims 

who lost their lives as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001. 

54468 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Presidential Documents 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ninth day of 

September, in the year of our Lord two thousand five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirtieth. 

W 

[FR Doc. 05–18370 

Filed 9–13–05; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 3195–01–P
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-15-00567-CR

Monty Shoopman

v.

The State Of Texas

On Appeal from the

94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 10CR2366-C

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

November 3, 2016
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-14-00463-CV

Don Titel and Carol Titel, Appellants

v.

Morris G. Melchor and Lisa Melchor, Appellees

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. C1-CV-14-004232, HONORABLE J.DAVID PHILLIPS, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Appellants’ brief was originally due on October 13, 2014, and we granted a first

extension for 90 days. In their second motion for extension of time, appellants informed this Court

that portions of the trial court clerk’s record, which are necessary for the appeal, were missing, and

asked for an extension of 60 days from the date a supplemental clerk’s record is filed. We granted

in part the second motion for extension of time, making their brief due on February 2, 2015. A

supplemental clerk’s record was filed on February 10, 2015, but in the meantime appellants’ brief

has become overdue. Appellants have now filed a third motion for extension of time requesting 30

days from the date the supplemental clerk’s record was filed. We grant appellants’ motion, making

the new deadline for filing a brief March 12, 2015. No further extensions will be granted.

It is ordered February 20, 2015.
Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland

2