FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

September 5, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-11715

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 04-80032-CR-DMM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

LARRY E. SCHWARTZ, 

RAPHAEL RAYMOND LEVY, 

a.k.a. R. Ray Levy, 

EDWARD MEYER, 

RONALEE LEVY ORLICK, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(September 5, 2008)
 Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting *

by designation.

 Louis Ratfield, a codefendant, was tried jointly with the others. The jury acquitted him 1

of all charges.

 As indicated infra in part I.B., the jury found the defendants guilty of several offenses, 2

including conspiracy to commit mail fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and the

substantive offenses that were objects of these conspiracies, e.g., mail fraud and money

laundering. 

 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968). 3

2

Before TJOFLAT, FAY and SILER, Circuit Judges. *

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge.

A Southern District of Florida jury found Larry Schwartz, Edward Meyer,

Raphael Raymond Levy, and Ronalee Orlick guilty of offenses they committed in 1

carrying out a fraudulent scheme to sell high-yield promissory notes, issued by

companies Schwartz and Levy owned, to individual investors. The scheme had a 2

life of about four years; it came to an end shortly before Schwartz’s company filed

for bankruptcy. As investors became aware that their notes might become

worthless, they demanded payment. Most were too late; the losses they suffered

totaled in excess of $30 million.

The district court accepted the jury’s verdicts and sentenced the defendants

to lengthy prison terms. They now appeal. Schwartz appeals his convictions on

the ground that the district court committed a Bruton violation when it permitted 3
 Levy also appeals his sentences on the grounds that the district court’s findings of fact 4

at the sentencing hearing that he was an organizer of the criminal activity and that he was

accountable for $20 million in money laundering were clearly erroneous, and that the court

misapplied the grouping provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. We find no clear error in the

court’s findings of fact, or error in its application of the grouping provisions of the Guidelines,

and therefore affirm Levy’s sentences without further comment.

3

the prosecutor to introduce into evidence an out-of-court statement by codefendant

Meyer that implicated him in most, if not all, of the charged offenses. Meyer

appeals the district court’s refusal to dismiss the charges against him on the

ground that the Government used statements he made under a grant of immunity to

obtain his indictment. Levy and Orlick challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

to convict. We consider these individual appeals in the above order, after 4

describing the sale of the high-yield promissory notes, the crimes charged in the

indictment, and the case’s post-indictment history. 

I.

A. 

1. First Capital Services sells “capital notes” to individual investors to raise

money for its factoring business.

Larry Schwartz formed First Capital Services (“FCS”) on December 23,

1992. From the beginning, FCS specialized in the purchase of discounted
 A typical factoring deal goes like this. A factor purchases the accounts receivable of a 5

“client.” The debtor’s payment is then directed to the factor by the due date on the invoice. 

Typically the factor gives about 70 percent of the invoice’s face value up front to the client and

keeps 30 percent as a “reserve,” as a kind of insurance against default by the debtor (either on

this deal or another deal with the same client). When the debtor satisfies the invoice, the factor

sends the reserve to the client, minus (1) collection and handling fees, and (2) some agreed rate

of return per week or month that the receivable was outstanding after the factor purchased it. The

factor’s rate of return would typically be about 1 percent of the face value of the invoice for every

ten days before the debtor satisfied the invoice, which amounts to 36.5 percent annually.

 For a time, Fred Horwin was the other director. By all accounts he was a factoring guru 6

and spearheaded FCS’s factoring program while he was with FCS. By 1999, he had parted ways

with Schwartz to start his own factoring firm.

4

accounts receivable, or invoices, a financing practice called factoring. Schwartz 5

was FCS’s president and one of its two directors. 

6

Edward Meyer started at FCS in October 1994 as a special projects

manager. He served as controller from about January 1995 to October 1999. As

controller, he maintained the financial books and records of the company,

including the general ledger, cash disbursement journal, and accounts payable

ledger.

Starting in 1996, FCS sold “senior capital notes” to individual investors to

raise money for factoring accounts receivable. FCS sold the notes to investors

directly and through outside brokers.

FCS provided the brokers with a tri-fold sales brochure advertising the

terms and options for “Capital Funding/Senior Capital Notes.” One panel of the

brochure titled “Safety and Yield[:] the Capital Note Advantages” provided an
 Some notes earned more than 9.25 percent, depending on the amount borrowed as 7

shown on the face of the note. Also, a note’s rate of return often increased by one to three and a

half percent upon renewal as an incentive to stay in the program.

5

overview of the notes. It stated: “Notes [are] backed by Federal, State or Local

Government receivables, and Insured Corporate Receivables.” The next

paragraph stated: “All funds are held in a segregated Capital Note Account used

only for the purchasing of Government backed and Insured corporate receivables.”

This was followed by a bulleted list of the note’s attributes: 9.25 annual

percentage rate (“APR”); 6-month term; fixed principal; fixed interest rate; liquid; 7

monthly interest payments; ownership of receivables by First Capital evidenced by

a first lien on a UCC-1 filing; no sales charge; and $25,000 minimum. There was

a footnote linked to “liquid” that stated: “Note may be redeemed by lender prior to

maturity date. Early redemptions will incur a one month interest penalty.”

Another panel of the brochure was titled “About First Capital Services.” It

stated, among other things, that FCS had been in the “business of financing

government backed and insured receivables since 1992, and as of December 1997

has purchased in excess of $225,000,000 in accounts receivable.” It further stated:

[t]o assure and maintain the highest level of safety of principal,

Continental Insurance Company part [sic] of the 65 Billion Dollar

CNA/Continental insurance group conducts its own independent due

diligence on all receivables and all debtor companies. FIRST

CAPITAL SERVICES, INC. WILL ONLY FINANCE
 At trial, the Government introduced into evidence at least three different permutations 8

of the capital note brochure. They were identical except for minor details, such as the value of

FCS’s factoring business to date.

6

RECEIVABLES THAT ARE UNDERWRITTEN AND INSURED

BY THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY. (Government

backed receivables are exempt from this requirement.).

(Emphasis in original).

A third panel of the brochure was dedicated to a list of “Debtor Clients,”

including “Government” entities such as the “Federal Government,” “Department

of Navy,” “Department of Transportation,” “State of Florida,” “State of Georgia,”

“City of New York,” and “Broward County,” and reliable “Corporate” entities

such as “Wal-Mart,” “3M,” “General Electric,” “AT&T,” “Heinz,” and “Florida

Power & Light.”

Yet another panel urged potential investors that upon “review[ing] this

brochure,” “[c]ommon sense will tell you this investment is an ideal combination

of handsome returns, rock-solid safety, and liquidity.”8

Upon sending a check to FCS, investors received a “Corporate Funding

Note” in the mail that detailed the terms of their investment and reiterated the

representations made in the brochure. In particular, the note stated: “For the sole

purposes of purchasing insured corporate receivables or government backed

accounts receivables [sic].” Unlike the brochure, the note referred to the investor
 At some point, the note was accompanied by a notice that a Form UCC-1 Financing 9

Statement had been filed, securing a lien in the investor’s favor against the accounts receivable

purchased by FCS.

 Among the changes touted in the letter was that FCS “intends to purchase discounted 10

life insurance policies on an exclusive basis from Ray Levy . . . [and] [t]hese products will

continue to be insured” and “intends to fund various assets at generally accepted industry

standards providing high yields.”

7

as “lender” and FCS as “borrower.” Paragraph four of the note stated that “[t]he

terms of this note cannot be changed nor may the note be discharged in whole or

in part except by a writing executed by the lender.”9

2. U.S. Capital takes over FCS’s individual investor note program and buys FCS

corporate notes.

In 1997, the senior capital notes program came under investigation by the

Florida Department of Financial Services, subsequently called the Florida

Department of Banking and Finance. The Department was concerned that the

notes should be registered as securities, and it had several conversations with FCS.

On December 4, 1997, FCS sent a letter to note holders, stating that it was

“pleased to announce important changes to the senior capital note program.” The 10

letter mentions that an “offering memorandum” explaining the changes would

follow; the memorandum never made it to a note holder.

 On December 22, 1997, Raphael Raymond Levy formed U.S. Capital

Funding, Incorporated (“U.S. Capital”), a Florida corporation. Up to that point,
 The Government introduced a copy of U.S. Capital’s March 11, 1999 corporate filings 11

listing Orlick as president and Levy as director.

8

Levy had been selling FCS senior capital notes through his companies – American

Benefits Services, Incorporated (“American Benefits”), and Asset Based

Management. U.S. Capital was evidently formed for the purpose of enabling FCS

to continue the senior capital note program. U.S. Capital would sell its own

promissory notes to individual investors and invest the proceeds in FCS

“corporate” notes, which were substantially identical to the notes FCS had issued

to individual investors, except that FCS issued them only to U.S. Capital. This

plan was effectuated as follows.

On December 31, 1997, FCS, through its counsel, sent a letter to the Florida

Office of the Comptroller stating that it would stop selling and renewing senior

capital notes. Some months later, Schwartz reaffirmed that position to Korinne

Harper, a Department investigator, telling her that the existing FCS senior capital

notes would mature in July 1998 without renewal.

In February 1998, Levy’s daughter, Ronalee Levy Orlick, began managing

U.S. Capital’s office and at some point she began exercising signatory authority. 

By early 1999, she was the company’s president. Levy remained U.S. Capital’s

owner and director throughout the course of the charged conspiracies.11
 A senior capital note was renewed or “rolled over” automatically unless the investor 12

requested liquidation of the note in writing.

9

By April 1998, senior capital note holders, without solicitation, began

receiving renewal notes issued in the name of U.S. Capital instead of FCS. The 12

renewal notes had the same terms as the original and stated: “The undersigned,

U.S. Capital Funding, Incorporated, borrower, hereby promises to pay to the order

of [investor].” U.S. Capital also began marketing its own notes, “U.S. Capital

notes,” to individual investors directly – by placing ads in newspapers – and

through independent brokers, often insurance agents, who were given sales

brochures substantially identical to those previously used by FCS. Levy assured

brokers and investors that the money generated from notes would be used to invest

in FCS’s factoring program as described on the brochures; he described U.S.

Capital as FCS’s “exclusive broker.” Investors wrote their checks to U.S. Capital,

which deposited their money into its account and issued them a promissory note

identical to those formerly issued by FCS, except that U.S. Capital was the

borrower. Orlick signed most of the notes and accompanying literature explaining

the note program.

In 1998, U.S. Capital used the bulk of investor funds raised from its note

program to purchase FCS corporate notes, which indicated FCS as the borrower
 At least some of the loans were secured by an interest in the debtor’s assets. For 13

example, FCS issued the following loans in 1998: $136,500 to Quality Equestrian Connections,

in which Schwartz owned an interest, for the purchase of a horse, secured by horses and

equipment; $154,000 to Seahawk Deep Ocean Technology, Inc., apparently for the purchase of a

ship, secured by a preferred ship’s mortgage; $762,607 to Vanderbilt Square, for the purchase of

“The Dry Tortugas Treasure,” secured by the treasure itself; $1,027,062 in 1998 to Nick’s Italian

10

and U.S. Capital as the lender. The rate of return on those notes was 10% per six

months, or 20% annually, and the notes stated that the principal was to be used for

government or corporate receivables insured by Continental Insurance.

3. What FCS did with U.S. Capital’s money.

Besides buying accounts receivable, FCS used investor money to make asset

based loans. From 1997 to 1999, FCS made loans totaling $28,774,303, with

about $14 million of that in 1998 to 1999, after U.S. Capital was supplying FCS

with funds. From 1997 to 1999, FCS collected a total of $2,307,911 from its asset

based loan debtors. Stephen Kelley, a forensic accountant hired by FCS’s

attorneys in 2000 to prepare FCS’s 1996-2000 tax returns, testified that it was

impossible to pinpoint the source of the funds used for any given transaction

because FCS “commingled” operating and investor funds. Based on the

percentage of FCS’s income represented by U.S. Capital notes and the amount

FCS spent on issuing asset based loans, however, such loans “would have had to

have been funded through U.S. Capital funds.” The loans were not covered by

FCS’s accounts receivable insurance. In addition, FCS entered into transactions

13
Fishery (it is unclear if this loan was secured); and $660,000 to River Ranch American Resorts,

Incorporated, a western-themed resort in central Florida, secured by real estate and chattel.

 For instance, on June 1, 1998, FCS bought the receivables of Kaye Kotts & Associates, 14

a consulting firm, for $200,000. The receivables were in the form of post-dated checks from

Kaye Kotts’ clients, many of whom were not credit-worthy, and many of whom defaulted on

their checks. Also in 1998, FCS entered into an unusual transaction with South Mountain, a

North Carolina resort membership club. The transaction could be described as the purchase of

accounts receivable – future membership dues – that, besides being “secured” by the membership

dues owed by resort members over the course of five years, were also secured by liens against

resort chattel and a mortgage on 15 acres of property adjacent to the resort.

 Sometime during the course of the alleged conspiracy, Continental Insurance

15

discovered that FCS and U.S. Capital were using its name in its advertisements. On several

occasions, Continental demanded that the two companies stop their use of its name because the

use was unauthorized and misleading. Continental sent a letter to Schwartz on February 1, 1999,

stating that FCS’s policy would expire on March 24, 1999 and would not be renewed.

 American Credit Indemnity issued a policy to FCS, effective April 1, 1999 to March 16

31, 2000. Under the policy, the maximum that American Credit would pay to satisfy claims was

$1.5 million annually. Like FCS’s previous policy with Continental Insurance, the American

Credit Indemnity insurance covered only accounts receivable.

11

for assets that – though perhaps accurately described as accounts receivable –

were by nature not insurable and, in fact, were uninsured.

14

FCS did not carry insurance adequate to cover all of the accounts receivable

it did purchase. FCS’s Continental insurance policy technically covered most of

its accounts receivable individually, but it had a $2 million annual ceiling. 

Further, Continental Insurance, which became CNA Insurance, declined to renew

FCS’s policy beginning March 24, 1999. Thus, none of the notes set to mature 15

after that date were covered by Continental Insurance.16

4. What U.S. Capital did with individual investor funds.
 One of the issues debated by witnesses and counsel at trial was whether U.S. Capital’s 17

practice amounted to a “Ponzi scheme” or was merely the ordinary offsetting of its balance with

FCS.

12

U.S. Capital commingled investor funds in the same accounts with the funds

it used to pay its own commission and the commission of independent brokers. In

1998, U.S. Capital forwarded its note holders’ liquidation requests to FCS, which

would write a check to U.S. Capital, which in turn would write a check to the

investor to satisfy the request. By early 1999, though, U.S. Capital was apparently

receiving more in new investor funds than in liquidation requests and therefore

started satisfying those requests – as well as paying interest and brokerage

commissions – from funds provided by new investors. U.S. Capital then sent the

balance of new investor funds minus payouts for liquidation, interest, and

commissions to FCS, along with new business transmittals documenting each

individual investor’s current balance. U.S. Capital usually paid brokers their 17

commission within a week of when U.S. Capital issued the underlying note. The

brokers believed their commission was coming from U.S. Capital’s profit from the

notes program.

5. Things fall apart.

In the spring of 1999, Levy was indicted in the Southern District of Florida

for fraudulently operating a viatical program through his company American
 In a viatical settlement, a life insurance policyholder sells the right to benefits under 18

the policy. The buyer pays the policyholder a discount and gets the full value when the

policyholder dies. The following cases detail Levy’s involvement in the scheme mentioned in th

text. See United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 545 U.S. 1101,

125 S. Ct. 2542, 162 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2005) (judgment vacated and remanded for consideration in

light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005)); In re

Fin. Federated Title & Trust, Inc., 273 B.R. 706, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (ordering an

equitable lien and constructive trust in favor of a bankruptcy trustee against Levy’s homestead),

aff’d In re Fin. Federated Title & Trust, Inc., 347 F.3d 880, 882-84 (11th Cir. 2003).

 U.S. Capital sent investor money to companies such as Merchants Capital, Invoice 19

Funding, and Sun Capital Services. 

13

Benefits, which operated out of the same office as U.S. Capital. The indictment

18

was publicly reported, and by all accounts, inspired many senior capital note

investors to liquidate their U.S. Capital notes.

U.S. Capital could not satisfy investor interest payments or liquidation

requests, and FCS, which had been operating at a loss for years, was unable to

marshal the funds.

Also in the spring of 1999, U.S. Capital began putting the funds of its note

holders into factoring companies besides FCS. July 19, 1999, was the last time 19

U.S. Capital forwarded investor money to FCS. U.S. Capital stopped issuing

senior capital notes by the end of July, and FCS sent money to U.S. Capital to

satisfy an investor’s liquidation request for the final time on September 10, 1999. 

U.S. Capital made its last payment to an investor on November 24, 1999.

In October 1999, Meyer left FCS and U.S. Capital sued FCS for defaulting
 FCS’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization failed, however, and its case was converted 20

into a Chapter 7 liquidation case. Alan Goldberg, who had been hired by Schwartz to serve as

FCS’s Chief Operating Officer in January 2000, developed the failed reorganization plan, and the

bankruptcy court appointed him the trustee in FCS’s Chapter 7 case.

 On October 29, 1999, Kelly Schaeffer, a receptionist at U.S. Capital, sent a facsimile 21

to Meyer and Schwartz with “Liquidations” in the subject line. It listed the names of investors

who had demanded liquidation, the amounts they were due, the dates on which their note(s) had

matured (if they had), and the dates on which those investors had written U.S. Capital requesting

liquidation. The facsimile demanded a total of around $16 million from FCS.

In the course of FCS’s liquidation, it filed a proof of claim indicating that FCS owed U.S.

Capital $33,501,232.12. Alan Goldberg, FCS’s trustee, testified at trial that U.S. Capital was

likely to recover no more than $2.5 million from FCS, “in a perfect world.”

14

on its corporate funding notes. Orlick resigned from U.S. Capital in November,

after signing the last check to an investor. FCS ultimately filed for Chapter 11

bankruptcy on May 12, 2000.20

From February 2, 1998 to July 19, 1999, U.S. Capital bought over $22.9

million in FCS corporate notes. Over a broader period – January 16, 1998 to

September 10, 1999 – FCS returned only $7.2 million to U.S. Capital. Over the 21

course of the whole program, from when FCS began selling senior capital notes in

1996 to its collapse in 1999, individual investors – many of them elderly people

lured into the program by periodic interest payments and the relatively low risk

associated with insured and government accounts receivable – lost around $30

million.

B.

On April 27, 2004, a Southern District of Florida grand jury returned a
 Ratfield was also indicted. See supra note 1. The superceding indictment alleged the 22

following.

Count I: all defendants conspired to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and interstate

transportation of stolen property taken by fraud (18 U.S.C. § 2314), all in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371, which makes it unlawful for “two or more persons [to] conspire either to commit any

offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any

manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the

conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 371.

Counts 2-5: Schwartz, Meyer, Levy, and Orlick committed mail fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1341, which then provided, in pertinent part:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,

or for obtaining money . . . by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,

representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or

artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository

for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal

Service . . . or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly

causes to be delivered by mail . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not

more than 20 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1341.

Counts 6 and 7: Schwartz, Meyer, Levy, and Orlick variously committed interstate

transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which provides:

Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any

. . . securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have

been stolen, converted or taken by fraud; or

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,

or for obtaining money . . . by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,

representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported . . . in interstate

or foreign commerce in the execution or concealment of a scheme or artifice to

defraud that person or those persons of money or property having a value of

$5,000 or more . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 2314.

15

superceding 25-count indictment charging Schwartz, Meyer, Levy, and Orlick

with various permutations of fraud and theft for their respective roles in the above

scheme. The case went to trial on October 19, 2004, and on December 1 the jury 22
Count 8: all defendants conspired to commit money laundering activity in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1956(h), which prohibits “conspir[ing] to commit any offense defined in this section or

section 1957.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

Counts 9-18: defendants variously committed money laundering promotion in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), which then prohibited “conduct[ing] or attempt[ing] to conduct .

. . a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,”

while “knowing that the property involved in [the] financial transaction represents the proceeds

of some form of unlawful activity,” and “(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of

specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).

Counts 19-24: Schwartz, Levy, Orlick, and Ratfield variously committed money

laundering (concealment) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), which then prohibited

“conduct[ing] or attempt[ing] to conduct . . . a financial transaction which in fact involves the

proceeds of specified unlawful activity,” while “knowing that the property involved in [the]

financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,” and “(B)(i)

knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part [] to conceal or disguise the nature,

the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful

activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

Count 25: Orlick conducted monetary transactions in criminally derived property in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which prohibits “knowingly engag[ing] or attempt[ing] to engage

in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is

derived from specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).

 As we state supra at note 1, the jury found Ratfield not guilty as to all charges. 23

 The jury found Schwartz guilty of Counts 1-11, and 14, and not guilty as to Counts 12, 24

20, and 22. The jury found Levy guilty as to Counts 1-9, 13, 15-19, 21, and 24, and not guilty as

to Count 23.

 The jury found Meyer guilty of Counts 1, 8, and 14, and acquitted him as to Counts 2-5 25

and 7.

16

convicted Schwartz and Levy of conspiracies to commit mail fraud and interstate 23

transportation of stolen property (both under Count 1), and money laundering

(Count 8), as well as numerous substantive counts. Meyer was convicted of the 24

conspiracy charges and one count of money laundering. Orlick was convicted of 25

conspiracy to commit mail fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property –
 The jury found Orlick guilty of Counts 1-7, 19, 21, and 24-25, and not guilty of Counts 26

8-9, 13, 15-18, and 23.

 Schwartz was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment as to Counts 1-5, 120 months as 27

to Counts 6-7, and 210 months as to Counts 9-11 and 14, with three-year terms of supervised

release, all to be served concurrently.

 60 months as to Counts 1-5, 120 months as to Counts 6-8, and 235 months as to 28

Counts 9, 13, 15-19, 21 and 24, with three-year terms of supervised release, all to be served

concurrently with each other and with the sentence previously imposed in Case No. 99-Cr-8125-

Hurley (S.D. Fla.).

 48 months as to Counts 1, 8, and 14, with three-year terms of supervised release, all to

29

be served concurrently.

 60 months as to each count, to be served concurrently. 30

 The court delayed its order of restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), which 31

provides:

If the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to

sentencing, the attorney for the Government or the probation officer shall so

inform the court, and the court shall set a date for the final determination of the

victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.

17

but not conspiracy to commit money laundering – and numerous substantive

counts.26

On March 15, 2005, the court sent Schwartz to prison for 210 months,27

Levy for 235 months, and Meyer for 48 months. Orlick was sentenced on April 28 29

28, 2005 to a term of 60 months.30

On June 1, 2005, the court conducted a restitution hearing and amended 31

the judgments of Schwartz, Meyer, and Levy to order $32,381,080.62 in

restitution. The court amended Orlick’s judgment to order $16,894,476.72 in
 The four codefendants challenge their convictions on several grounds. The only 32

grounds having merit, that are worthy of discussion, are those dealt with in the succeeding text. 

 Prior to trial, the Government moved the court in limine to obtain advance rulings on 33

the admissibility of statements made by the defendants to FBI agents and others, including a

statement made by Meyer during and in relation to FCS’s bankruptcy proceedings. The

statements, as proffered, had been redacted in an attempt to avoid Bruton problems. Several of

the proffered statements implicated Schwartz. His attorney therefore argued that, even as

redacted, the statements implicated his client in violation of the Sixth Amendment and Bruton. 

Although the transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine is not clear, it appears that the

court reserved ruling on the admissibility of the several statements until they were offered into

evidence at trial. 

At trial, when the Government offered Meyer’s statement into evidence, Schwartz’s

counsel reiterated the objection he had made at the hearing. The court overruled his objection,

concluding that the redaction was sufficient to remove Schwartz’s identity. 

18

restitution. The four codefendants thereafter filed timely notices of appeal. 

32

II. 

The Government introduced into evidence over Schwartz’s objections a

redacted statement made by codefendant Meyer, who did not testify at trial. 

Schwartz argues that the statement inculpated him in violation of the Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause by implying his guilt without affording him

the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See Bruton v. United States, 391

U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968). Unlike in Bruton, the 33

statement here did not inculpate Schwartz by name. Instead, it named

corporations he owned or controlled, which he argues compelled an inference of

his guilt. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1156, 140 L.

Ed. 2d 294 (1998) (noting that the “kind of, not the simple fact of, inference”
19

matters). The Government, though, in its closing argument to the jury, linked

Schwartz to the affidavit by name. After the Government’s argument, Schwartz

moved for a mistrial and the court denied the motion.

In evaluating Schwartz’s Bruton claim, we examine the whole record to

determine whether a reasonable juror was compelled to draw an inference of

Schwartz’s guilt from the codefendant statements. See Harrington v. California,

395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969) (“Our judgment

must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have

been the probable impact of the [codefendant statements] on the minds of an

average jury.”). 

A.

We consider the following in the order it was presented to the jury at trial:

the Government’s evidence against Schwartz linking him to Meyer’s statement;

the statement itself; and the Government’s closing argument.

1.

The Government called forty-two witnesses in its case in chief, which lasted

from October 20 to November 12, 2004. One of the Government’s chief goals was

to show that FCS, at Schwartz’s direction, used investor money to make asset

based loans, in spite of its representation to investors that it would use their money
 Summers cooperated with the Government pursuant to a limited use immunity 34

agreement. He was not charged as a codefendant in the indictment. The Government called

Summers on October 29, the sixth day the jury heard testimony. Although numerous witnesses

had testified to the effect that Schwartz was the president of FCS and to some extent ran the

show, Summers was the first to go into detail regarding Schwartz’s management of FCS and his

other corporations.

 Summers was a partner in the firm Mattlin & McClosky when Schwartz asked him to

35

handle the legal formation of FCS in 1992. Besides representing FCS, he represented Schwartz

personally in two or three matters. He sold his partnership shares back to Mattlin & McClosky

sometime around 1994 and became “general counsel” to FCS. Accordingly, he moved out of

Mattlin & McClosky’s office and subleased office space from FCS (although FCS paid for the

sublease). His office was separated from FCS’s office space by a door, which was usually kept

closed and sometimes locked. Summers was not technically “in-house” counsel to FCS. 

Although FCS retained him, he maintained other clients as well.

 Horwin left FCS in 1999. 36

20

strictly to purchase government or insured accounts receivable. 

Lee Summers, FCS’s first attorney, testified for more than two days about

Schwartz’s business affairs with FCS and other corporations. Schwartz recruited 34

Summers in 1992 to form FCS, which retained his legal services until 1999.

35

Summers testified to the following.

Schwartz was the president of FCS. Schwartz and a shareholder named

Fred Horwin were the only two directors. FCS had early on formed a committee 36

to consider potential investments and make recommendations to the board. 

Schwartz, however, as CEO and “major shareholder,” occasionally funded an

investment in spite of the committee’s recommendation against it.

During the course of his work for FCS, Schwartz occasionally came upon
 Summers provided few details about these transactions.

37

 May 20, 1987 incorporation papers listed Schwartz as the incorporator, initial director, 38

and president. Reinstatement papers filed in 1996 listed Schwartz as president and listed First

Consolidated’s address, which was the same as FCS’s. First Consolidated’s 1997 and 1998

filing statements both listed Schwartz as the president and registered agent. The 1999 filing

statement, however, listed Nikki Nedbor (the attorney who eventually replaced Summers at FCS)

as First Consolidated’s agent, with Schwartz still as president. The 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003

filings listed Schwartz as agent and president. 

 The Government introduced two checks made from FCS to First Consolidated: a July 39

31, 1998 check in the amount of $35,000 and a June 24, 1998 check in the amount of $70,000. 

Summers testified that he knew that First Consolidated received commissions from FCS, and

that, likewise, First Consolidated sometimes sent money to FCS. He did not know, however,

whether the two checks mentioned above represented commission payments.

21

business opportunities. Summers advised him to offer each opportunity to FCS

before taking it himself, and testified that Schwartz normally got Horwin’s consent

before doing so. On several occasions, Schwartz and Horwin purchased stock

they became aware of in the course of acting in their capacity as directors of

FCS.37

Schwartz owned and operated a company called First Consolidated

Financial Corporation (“First Consolidated”). The Government introduced First

Consolidated’s incorporation papers and filing statements, which showed that

Schwartz controlled the company. First Consolidated referred investors to FCS 38

and, in return, FCS paid a commission to Schwartz – above and beyond his FCS

salary – for each referral.39

FCS regularly did business with other corporations owned partly by
 FCS had loaned $100,000 to Nick’s Italian Fishery less than a year before. 40

 Ships, Summers noted, often depreciate rapidly. 41

22

Schwartz, both by factoring their accounts and by making them loans (many of

which were never repaid). Three scenarios recounted by Summers link Schwartz

to the Brutonized statements at issue.

First, FCS made a loan to Florida Restaurant Management, which had been

formed by Summers at Schwartz’s request, for the purpose of purchasing the

restaurant Nick’s Italian Fishery. Although Summers’ testimony is not entirely 40

clear, it seems that FCS was joined in the purchase by Schwartz’s consulting firm

First Consolidated, defendant Levy, and a man named Alex, the maitre d’ at

Nick’s. Summers “did not issue any stock to First Capital” as a result of the loan,

and did not know whether FCS’s books accounted for the loan.

Second, FCS loaned around $160,000 to Seahawk Deep Ocean Technology,

Inc. (“Seahawk”), a treasure salvager. The loan was secured by a preferred ship’s

mortgage on one of Seahawk’s “research vessels.” The value of the lien was

based on a three- to four-year-old appraisal of the vessel. Subsequent to the loan, 41

the vessel’s crew placed several admiralty liens on it for items like dockage and

materials, which turned out to be superior to FCS’s interest in the ship. It is

unclear whether Seahawk ever repaid the loan.
 At some point, either when FCS loaned money to Vanderbilt or later, Schwartz was the 42

sole director and primary shareholder of Vanderbilt. Summers could not remember whether

Schwartz held his interest in Vanderbilt personally or through other companies under his control. 

In any case, Summers testified unequivocally that Schwartz controlled Vanderbilt Square.

 It is unclear from the record whether Seahawk or another salvage company, Odyssey 43

Marine, actually discovered the treasure.

 The Dry Tortugas is a chain of seven islands about seventy miles west of Key West, 44

Florida. The islands and its surrounding shoals and waters compose the Dry Tortugas National

Park, administered by the National Park Service.

 Summers relayed another notable episode involving a deal in which FCS factored the 45

accounts receivable of Q-Pack, a food packaging company. Summers discovered that Q-Pack

was fraudulently endorsing the signature of the debtor, Frito-Lay, on letters indicating that FritoLay consented to the factoring deal. Summers recommended that FCS stop factoring Q-Pack’s

invoices, but Schwartz and Horwin overruled him. He later discovered that First Consolidated,

owned by Schwartz, and another corporation owned by Horwin were providing consulting

services for Q-Pack at the time Summers discovered Q-Pack’s fraud.

23

Third, FCS loaned money to Vanderbilt Square, a company controlled by

Schwartz, to purchase the Dry Tortugas treasure from Seahawk. The treasure, a 42 43

collection of artifacts recovered from a Spanish galleon in the waters of the Dry

Tortugas, included gold bars, cannon, jewelry, and astrolabes. According to 44

Summers, “Vanderbilt used a combination of cash and its stock to purchase” the

collection. Summers did not know whether FCS documented its loan to

Vanderbilt and he did not think Vanderbilt ever repaid it.45

On November 4, 2004, the Government called Alan Goldberg as a witness. 

On March 31, 2000, Schwartz hired Goldberg, a professional bankruptcy trustee

and turn-around-artist, to lead FCS to profitability as Chief Operating Officer. 
 The case was filed on March 31, 2000. 46

24

After FCS’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case was converted to a Chapter 7 46

liquidation case, Goldberg was appointed trustee to preside over FCS’s

liquidation. In his capacity as FCS’s Chief Operating Officer and, later as the

bankruptcy trustee, Goldberg became intimately acquainted with FCS’s financial

history and its outstanding credits and debts. He testified as follows.

 FCS made loans to Florida Restaurant Management for the purpose of

buying Nick’s and then paid off Nick’s debts and carried the payments at first as

“accounts receivable,” and then as “asset based loans.” At that point, Schwartz

and Levy both had an ownership interest in Nick’s Italian Fishery, according to

Goldberg. FCS never collected a dime from Nick’s or Florida Restaurant

Management.

Goldberg also relayed his role in the hunt for the Dry Tortugas treasure. 

FCS made a loan to Vanderbilt Square to acquire the collection. That loan was

secured by the collection, which FCS had appraised at around $5 million. FCS

also made a loan to Michael’s Jewelry and Michael’s International, both of which

promoted and tried to sell the treasure. Eventually FCS acquired possession of the

treasure as partial satisfaction of the debt owed by Vanderbilt.

As FCS’s bankruptcy trustee, Goldberg was interested in selling the treasure
25

to pay back FCS’s creditors. Schwartz told him, however, that FCS had already

sold and sent the treasure to an Idaho-based corporation called Grand Slam. 

Goldberg, believing the treasure had been sold for a fraction of its value, traveled

to Idaho in the hopes that the collection could be recovered. The president of

Grand Slam informed him, however, that the company had never received the

goods.

Goldberg, with a “crew” of deputy U.S. marshals and Boca Raton officers,

executed a writ of entry in a hunt for the missing treasure. They discovered some

of the loot in Schwartz’s house and more at FCS’s office, in a FedEx box shoved

into Schwartz’s credenza. They also found 12 “goldfinger” bars worth from

$20,000 to $40,000 apiece in a shoe box in a closet in Schwartz’s mother’s

condominium. Goldberg ultimately sold the “treasure” for about $450,000, or

about 10% of its appraised value as originally reported by FCS.

According to Goldberg, Schwartz owned and served as the president of a

corporation called Big Sun, which benefited from loans issued by FCS.

Goldberg also confirmed Summers’ testimony that Schwartz owned and

operated First Consolidated. In addition to his salary of $96,000 a year as CEO

and president of FCS, Schwartz was paid brokerage commissions by FCS for the

deals he negotiated as the operator of First Consolidated. Goldberg identified
26

Schwartz’s signature on several checks drawn on accounts held by FCS, two of

which were payable to First Consolidated. The following exchange between the

prosecutor and Goldberg is particularly relevant for our Bruton inquiry:

Q: [A]re you able to quantify any of the transactions as far as the

total dollar figure . . . that you were able to identify as additional

compensation paid to Mr. Schwartz over and above the 96,000 we

have already talked about?

. . . .

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what general figure do you recall?

A: The ninety day period immediately preceding the bankruptcy, so

that is ninety days from May 12th or 14th earlier, First Capital

Services disbursed to Larry Schwartz $120,000 and $135,000 was

disbursed to First Consolidated. I’m sorry, 126,000 to First

Consolidated.

Schwartz’s attorney cross-examined Goldberg on that line of questioning. 

Goldberg said that the money disbursed to First Consolidated was to pay

commissions, and “one was to repay a loan that . . . First Consolidated allegedly

made to First Capital, two or three I don’t recall.” Schwartz’s attorney said:

Q: First Capital Services, the company with you [Goldberg] at its

head, and the committees of unsecured creditors entered into a

settlement agreement with First Consolidated, Larry Schwartz, right? 

A: Correct.

Q: And that settlement agreement was for all claims that First Capital

Services and the committees of unsecured creditors had against either

First Consolidated, Larry Schwartz and actually a Debra Stanley, Z.

B. Levin, Sara Levin and Palm Bay Capital, right?

A: I believe that’s correct.

Q: And how much was the amount of that settlement?
 The letter states: 47

Pursuant to terms of that certain promissory note in the amount of $2 million that

is dated effective October 1, 1997 in favor of First Capital Services, Inc., be

advised that Vanderbilt has failed to make payments of the accrued interest due on

November 1, 1997 and all subsequent payments. As a result of said failure, FCS

has elected to take possession of some of it’s the [sic] collateral that serves as the

security for sums due under the note. In particular, FCS hereby demands the

delivery of the artifacts known as the Dry Tortugas Artifacts Collection, including

but not limited to gold bars, silver coins, pearls, olive jars, beads, three astrolabes,

gold chains, rings, various plates, various ceramic pieces, cannon balls, pottery,

chards and ballast stones. Please deliver all of said collateral to FCS forthwith. In

the event First Capital decides to accelerate the sums due under the note, it shall

execute against the collateral in its possession and all other collateral which has

been given as security for the loan.

27

. . . .

A: 650,000 I believe.

On November 8, the Government called Nikki Nedbor. She testified that

Schwartz alone interviewed her for the position of in-house counsel, as Summers’

replacement. According to her, Schwartz was the president of Vanderbilt Square,

subsequently renamed Treasures & Exhibits International, Incorporated. On

November 12, 1999, Nedbor wrote a letter on FCS letterhead to Larry Schwartz, as

president of Vanderbilt Square, demanding the collateral of the Dry Tortugas

collection in payment of Vanderbilt’s debt to FCS.

47

Stephen Kelley testified on November 9. He is a forensic accountant with

the firm Berger, Epstein & Garver, PA, which was hired in January 2000 by FCS’s

counsel to prepare FCS’s tax returns for the years 1996 through 2000. While at

FCS’s office he learned that Schwartz was “affiliated” with the Big Sun family of
 Kelley also testified that FCS received the following sums in repayment of those loans: 48

$60,000 from Nick’s, $40,000 from Michael’s International, and about $57,000 from Big Sun.

 The court was referring to the redactions the Government had made in an attempt to 49

avoid a Bruton problem, see note 34, supra.

28

corporations.

Kelley offered detailed testimony on FCS’s asset based loans from 1997 to

sometime in 1999, based on several summary reports of FCS’s books. During that

time period, FCS issued, inter alia, the following loans: $1,027,062 to Nick’s

Italian Fishery, $762,607 to Vanderbilt Square, $592,753 to Michael’s

International, $462,420 to Big Sun, and $154,000 to Seahawk.48

On July 19, 1997, FCS began accounting for certain transactions to Big Sun,

Nick’s, and Michael’s International as asset based loans, even though they had

originally been carried on the books as accounts receivable. Kelley’s team was

unable to find documentation to justify that change one way or the other.

2.

On November 10, before calling any witnesses, the Government proffered

an “Affidavit of Edward Mark Meyer,” which originated as evidence in FCS’s 

bankruptcy proceedings. Schwartz raised “[t]he same objections that we have

discussed about Bruton.” The court overruled the objection “with the changes we

have previously made” and admitted the document into evidence as 49
 Before redaction, this statement read: “First Consolidated Financial Corporation is a 50

company owned [and] controlled by Larry Schwartz.”

 In this instance, “First Consolidated” was substituted for “Mr. Schwartz,” which 51

appeared in the original.

29

Government’s Exhibit 1.76. Then a prosecutor read the text of the statement to the

jury.

The affidavit’s theme is summed up in its assertion that “First Capital was in

the business of factoring account receivables and also made asset-based loans.” It

states:

Paragraph 9. When First Capital made loans to or advanced monies

pursuant to factoring agreements with third parties First

Consolidated was paid a commission sometimes approaching 20 50

percent of the amount advanced.

Paragraph 10. In some instances when First Capital made loans to or

factored invoices for third parties, including First Consolidated, it

received shares of stock or ownership interest in those third parties. 

These shares of stock or ownership interests were not entered into the

books and records of First Capital. Examples of transactions in

which First Consolidated received shares of stock or ownership 51

interest include Superior Waterlogged Lumber and Aviation

Composites, Incorporated.

Paragraph 12. I was never able to ascertain that the shares of stock

had been properly issued in the name of First Capital and was never

able to enter such assets on the company’s books.

Paragraph 13. First Capital also made loans and advanced monies to

Vanderbilt Square Company and to Michael’s International Jewelers
 Redacted: “At the time, Mr. Schwartz represented to me that he owned Michael’s 52

Jewelers.”

 Redacted: “At the direction of Mr Schwartz.” 53

 Redacted: “substantially owned and/or controlled by Larry Schwartz.” 54

30

(“Michael’s Jewelers”). These funds were used by Vanderbilt to 52

purchase the inventory of Michael’s Jewelers and other assets.

Paragraph 14. As part of these transactions with Vanderbilt and

Michael’s International Jewelers, a large amount of gold coins, pearls,

goldfinger bars, silver bars and other artifacts (known collectively as

the “Dry Tortugas Treasure”) came into the possession of First

Capital. Portions of the treasure were delivered to the offices of First

Capital in Boca Raton. A portion of the gold was personally brought

by me and Zachary Metrick, operations manager of First Capital, to 53

First Union Bank, Town Center Branch, located at 5355 Town Center

Road, Boca Raton, Florida, 33486, to be stored in a safety deposit

box.

Paragraph 15. In addition to the “Dry Tortugas Treasure,” inventory

from Michael’s Jewelers consisting of numerous watches, including

Rolex, Cartier and other designer makes, was also delivered to the

offices of First Capital. These watches were subsequently sold to

wholesalers. The proceeds of these sales did not go into the books

and records of First Capital. These loans and advances were never

repaid to First Capital.

Paragraph 16. In addition to loans made to third parties, on several

occasions First Capital loaned substantial sums of money to

companies. Examples of these transactions included loans or 54

factoring arrangements made with Big Sun Investments, Inc., and

Florida Restaurant Management, Inc. (which owned and operated a

restaurant known as Nick’s Italian Fishery). This included factored

invoices for and advanced money to Southern Multi-Capital, which

provided paving services for Big Sun. First Capital was never able to

collect on the invoices from Big Sun or never intended to seek
31

collection from Big Sun of the invoices. The invoices totaled

hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Paragraph 17. Additionally, First Capital directly paid the invoices

generated by materialmen, suppliers and contractors who were

providing services and materials to Big Sun Investments for

construction work in Ocala, Florida. These amounts totaled in excess

of several hundred thousand dollars. Such advances were booked as

additional loans to Big Sun. Big Sun, however, never repaid any of

the loans or advances made either directly to it or on behalf to its

third party creditors.

Paragraph 18. I was directed to issue checks to third party companies

without any due diligence being conducted as to whether the loans by

First Capital should be made.

After the prosecutor read the statement to the jury, the court instructed the

jury to consider it only against Meyer.

B.

The prosecutor’s closing argument to the jury before it retired to consider its

verdicts included the following remarks on the above evidence:

We talked earlier about what First Capital did with the money

and specifically we know from the discussion and analysis done by

Mr. Kelley and Mr. Goldberg and the evidence in this case that First

Capital utilized a significant portion of the money that was investor

funds to go to asset-based loans, many of which were controlled by or

affiliated with Mr. Schwartz. What are some of those companies?

Nick’s Italian Fishery, a restaurant. They don’t have any

accounts receivable. There is no factoring in a restaurant. Who owes

you money in a restaurant? The customer that comes in to buy food,

buy a meal. There’s no accounts receivable there. And Mr. Goldberg

testified that when he went in to the books and records of First
32

Capital he discovered that they were doctored records attempting to

show that the monies that had been sent to Nick’s Italian Fishery were

factoring when they were not.

Now, who would do that? There’s only two people in this case

that would have access to those records and have a motive to do that

and that’s Edward Meyer and Larry Schwartz.

What are the types of asset-based loans that were involved?

Michael’s International, Michael’s Jewelry, South Mountain Resort,

an [asset-based loan]. Big Sun Investment. We know from the

records filed with the State of Florida that Mr. Schwartz is a director

of that company.

We also know that, with regard to other entities that are listed

here, that Vanderbilt Square was a recipient of an asset-based loan. 

. . . .

Seahawk Deep Ocean, a deep sea diving vessel used in

treasurer [sic] hunting.

We know from Mr. Kelley that these ABL’s that occurred, $9

million in ‘98, only $185,000 was collected from those. And with

regard to the next year, $4.6 million in asset-based loans, only

$654,000 was collected.

. . . .

Let’s talk about Larry Schwartz. Larry Schwartz, it is

undisputed that he, during the relevant years after Mr. Horwin left,

that he owned and controlled First Capital. . . .

Mr. Schwartz was responsible in large measure for the ABL

diversions. You will recall that deals that occurred and transactions

that occurred over the objection or the rejection by the investment

committee or the executive committee or the loan committee,

whatever name you put on it internally at First Captial [sic] Services,

that the only person that really had the authority to override the

decisions and the rejections of the ad hoc committee of Zack Metrick,

Lee Summers and Edward Meyer was Larry Schwartz, and he did it

whenever he pleased because it was his company.

So you can’t have it both ways. He was responsible in large

measure for diverting most of this money.

. . . .

Even more important, however, with regard to Mr. Levy’s
33

knowledge of what was really going on, is the evidence in this case

that Mr. Levy was a partner with Mr. Schwartz in one of the

beneficial years of these asset-based loans, Nick’s Italian Fishery. 

That is pretty darn significant, ladies and gentlemen, because it shows

circumstantially that Ray Levy knows Larry Schwartz owns this

restaurant.

. . . .

We know that Mr. Meyer knew exactly what was going on with

this company and that he aided it despite the fact that he knew what

was going on there because he signed a declaration himself in which

he admitted that. Government Exhibit 1.76, after this company has

gone in the toilet and gone in bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors file

a suit, and in connection with this, and this is in the bankruptcy court,

in connection with that Mr. Meyer provides an affidavit in which he

is being sworn and he indicates various facts that are in this affidavit,

and this is Government’s Exhibit 1.76.

What is significant about the representations that Mr. Meyer

swears are true? In paragraph 9 he says when First Capital made

loans with third parties First Consolidated was paid a commission

sometimes approaching 20 percent of the amount advanced. From

independent evidence in this case you know that the person

benefitting from those commissions that paid sometimes 20 percent of

the ABL’s was Larry Schwartz. The independent evidence has

demonstrated to you in this case . . .

[SCHWARTZ’S COUNSEL]: I have an objection at this point

and would ask the Court to instruct the jury that evidence again can

only be considered as to Mr. Meyer, not as to Mr. Schwartz or any

other defendant. That’s argument in support of their conspiracy.

THE COURT: Certainly as to this affidavit, that is the case. 

That affidavit was introduced only as to Mr. Meyer.

[PROSECUTOR]: Let me move on.

With regard to paragraph 13, Mr. Meyer clearly knew, based on

his sworn affidavit, that First Capital made loans and advanced

monies to Vanderbilt Square and to Michael’s International. He

clearly knew that First Capital was diverting investor funds to these

purposes while he worked at First Capital. That, ladies and

gentlemen, shows you knowing participation and aiding and abetting
 After the Government’s closing argument, Schwartz’s attorney moved the court for a 55

mistrial. He argued as follows:

[The prosecutor] placed in front of the jury the affidavit of Ed Meyer that the

Government has persisted in telling you they cleaned up so it doesn’t impact on

Larry Schwartz so that they can use it just against Mr. Meyer, and in arguing

conspiracy aspects of the case not only did he, not only did he suggest that it

transgressed the rule, that the affidavit only refers to First Capital Services, he

flat-out said that that affidavit was proof of guilt as to Larry Schwartz. He

referred to Larry Schwartz directly.

The court denied the motion, stating:

34

a fraud conspiracy.

. . . .

Count 20, Count 20 is Edward Meyer signing a check on the First

Capital account during this time period investor funds from U.S.

Capital are in that account, this is April of 1999, the check is for the

amount of $3,495 and the person, the entity to whom this check is cut

is First Consolidated.

Now, First Consolidated, from the face of this check you can’t

tell who that is. You don’t know who controls that. We only know if

you go to the records of the State of Florida or subpoena the account

of First Consolidated that it’s Larry Schwartz. It’s not apparent from

this where the money came from, originally U.S. Capital investors, or

who’s benefitting from this check. That’s a concealment and that’s

Count 20.

. . . .

With regards to Count 22, same comments as before with

regards to First Consolidated. This particular check is a check

apparently signed by Larry Schwartz himself on May 5th of ‘99 with

First Capital. We know from Steve Kelly most of the money in the

account during this time period had been provided by U.S. Capital.

And again a check to First Consolidated, you cannot tell from

the face of the check where the money came from originally or who

controls the money when this check was cashed or deposited. And

again there’s no Larry Schwartz endorsement on the back of that. It

just says, “For Deposit Only, First Consolidated.” That is evidence of

concealment, ladies and gentlemen.

55
I think the context of the, of Mr. Carlton’s argument at that time was with respect

to Mr. Meyer’s knowledge, and so his argument was appropriate. I at your request

again gave the instruction that the affidavit could not be considered as to any other

defendant. But I don’t see anything improper in the argument that he gave.

35

C.

A criminal defendant prosecuted by the United States enjoys the Sixth

Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.

amend. VI. One purpose of the right is to enable the accused to cross-examine,

and thereby test the credibility and evidentiary force of, the witnesses against him. 

See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S. Ct. at 1628.

In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the admission of “powerfully

incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant” violates the Sixth

Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, even if the court issues an instruction to the

jury not to consider the statement as evidence against the defendant. Id. at 135, 88

S. Ct. at 1627. The Supreme Court reasoned that “in the context of a joint trial we

cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for [the defendant’s]

constitutional right of cross-examination,” id. at 137, 88 S. Ct. at 1628, the finest

tool for testing the credibility of a codefendant’s “devastating” statement against

the defendant, id. at 136, 88 S. Ct. at 1628. See also id. at 138, 88 S. Ct. at 1629

(“A basic premise of the Confrontation Clause, it seems to me, is that certain kinds
 Petitioner Richardson was tried jointly with Benjamin Williams for assaulting Cynthia 56

Knighton and murdering two others in the course of a robbery. A third coconspirator, Kareem

Martin, was at large at the time of their trial. At trial, Knighton testified that Richardson was

present throughout the course of the robbery but did not participate in the shootings. The State

also introduced William’s confession, which “was redacted to omit all reference to [Richardson]

– indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in the

crime,” and “largely corroborated Knighton’s account of the activities of persons other than

[Richardson].” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 203-04, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1705, 95 L. Ed.

2d. 176 (1987). Williams’ confession stated that “Kareem [Martin] said he would have to take

[the victims] out after the robbery” while the two were on their way over to Knighton’s house. 

36

of hearsay . . . are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount,

that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically

deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give.”) (Stewart, J.,

concurring). Still, the Court acknowledged that “[n]ot every admission of

inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error

unavoidable through limiting instructions.” See id. at 135, 88 S. Ct. at 1627.

In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 95 L. Ed. 2d. 176

(1987), the Supreme Court held that “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by

the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting

instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the

defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” Id. at 211, 107 S. Ct.

1709. To come to its conclusion, the Court examined the totality of the

Government’s case against Richardson and the precise nature of the codefendant

statement allegedly inculpating her. It noted that “the confession was not 56
Id. at 204 n.1, 107 S. Ct. at 1705 n.1. The trial court instructed the jury not to consider the

confession as evidence against Richardson.

Richardson took the stand in her case in chief. She testified that she was with Williams

throughout the robbery but not during the shootings, corroborating the testimony of Knighton. 

To show she did not know that the robbery would end in a shooting, she testified that she could

not overhear the conversation between Williams and Martin as the three traveled to Knighton’s.

In the prosecutor’s closing argument, he initially reminded the jury not to consider

Williams’ confession against Richardson. Later, though, he “linked respondent to the portion of

Williams’ confession describing [Williams’] conversation with Martin in the car,” and

Richardson did not object. The court reiterated the prohibition on considering the confession

against Richardson before the jury retired. Id. at 205, 107 S. Ct. at 1706.

As stated in the text, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that the redaction of any

reference to Richardson’s existence, coupled with a limiting instruction, immunized the

admission of the confession from a Confrontation Clause violation. The Court noted, however,

that on remand the trial court should consider whether the failure of Richardson’s attorney to

object to the prosecutor’s statements at closing argument which, directly linking Richardson to

Williams’ confession, constituted an error on which a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be

granted. Id. at 211, 107 S. Ct. at 1702.

 The Richardson Court reaffirmed the pragmatic value of presuming that a jury will 57

follow the court’s limiting instruction, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S. Ct. at 1709, explaining that

Bruton was a “narrow exception” to that rule, id. at 207, 107 S. Ct. at 1707.

37

incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence

introduced later at trial (the defendant’s own testimony).” Id. at 208, 107 S. Ct. at

1707. Therefore, unlike in Bruton, the trial court’s limiting instruction immunized

the potentially incriminating statement against a Confrontation Clause violation.57

The Court “express[ed] no opinion,” however, “on the admissibility of a

confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced with a symbol or

neutral pronoun.” Id. at 211 n. 5, 107 S. Ct. at 1709 n.5.

In Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 140 L. Ed. 2d 294

(1998), the Supreme Court held that a “redaction that replaces a defendant’s name
 Per the trial court’s instruction, the Government had redacted a confession by Gray’s 58

only codefendant. The redaction replaced Gray’s name and the name of a coconspirator (who

died before trial) with a blank space or the word “deleted.” A police detective read the redacted

statement in court and said “deleted” or “deletion” every time he came upon a blank space or the

word “deleted.” In addition, “[i]mmediately after the police detective read the redacted

confession to the jury, the prosecutor asked, ‘after he gave you that information, you

subsequently were able to arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?’ The officer responded ‘That’s

correct.’” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188-89, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1153, 140 L. Ed. 2d 294

(1998). The State submitted a copy of the redacted statement into evidence and produced other

witnesses who testified that a group of six people, including Gray, participated in the beating. 

Gray took the stand and denied his involvement in the crime.

 The Court noted that allowing all statements that incriminate by inference “would also 59

place outside Bruton’s scope confessions that use shortened first names, nicknames, descriptions

as unique as the ‘red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp,’ and perhaps even full names

of defendants who are always known by a nickname.” Gray, 523 U.S. at 195, 118 S. Ct. at 1156

(citation omitted).

38

with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank space, the word ‘deleted,’

or a similar symbol” violates the rule announced in Bruton. Id. at 192, 118 S. Ct.

at 1155. Just like in Richardson, the Court recounted the other evidence admitted

against the defendant, the nature of the codefendant statement against him, and

how the prosecution used that statement at trial.

58

The Court conceded that Richardson “limited Bruton’s scope,” id. at 189,

118 S. Ct. at 1154, placing outside of it “those statements that incriminate

inferentially.” Id. at 195, 118 S. Ct. at 1156. “But inference pure and simple

cannot make the critical difference,” id., the Court added, explaining that 59

“Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact
 Although the Court described its majority opinion as of a piece with Richardson, the 60

dissent characterized Gray as “chang[ing]” “the line drawn in Richardson,” 523 U.S. at 200, 118

S. Ct. at 1159, which did not “extend Bruton to confessions that incriminate only by inference

from other evidence,” id. at 201, 118 S. Ct. at 1159.

39

of, inference,” id. at 196, 118 S. Ct. at 1157. 

60

The inference required in Richardson was of a different kind than the one 

required to link the defendant to the codefendant’s statement in Gray. In

Richardson, the statement “did not refer directly to the defendant himself,” id. at

196, 118 S. Ct. at 1157, and allowed an inference of guilt “‘only when linked with

evidence introduced later at trial,’” id. (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107

S. Ct. at 1707). In contrast, the codefendant statement in Gray “obviously refer

directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences

that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very

first item introduced at trial.” Id. “Moreover,” the Court noted, “the redacted

confession with the blank prominent on its face, in Richardson’s words, ‘facially

incriminates’ the [defendant],” id. (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209, 107 S.

Ct. at 1709), even without naming him.

In 1999, the year following Gray, we evaluated three different

Bruton claims, none of which was factually identical to Bruton, Richardson, or

Gray. In United States v. Taylor, 186 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999), we addressed a
40

codefendant statement that replaced the defendant’s name with neutral pronouns. 

We wrote:

Although the Supreme Court did not express any opinion in

Richardson about the admission of a statement that includes neutral

pronouns, the Eleventh Circuit has dealt with the issue. Under our

precedent, the admission of a co-defendant’s statement that contains

neutral pronouns does not violate the Confrontation Clause so long as

the statement does not compel a direct implication of the defendant’s

guilt.

Id. at 1336 (citing United States v. Vasquez, 847 F.2d 1515, 1518 (11th Cir. 1989)

(per curiam)). The court concluded that the codefendant statement did not

necessarily implicate the defendant. Id.

We addressed a codefendant statement that referred to the defendant by

nationality and a physical description in United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315

(11th Cir. 1999). Because “[f]rom other evidence, including Buitrago’s own

confession, it became obvious at trial that the Colombian was Buitrago,” id. at

1322, we held that the trial court violated Bruton by admitting the statement

(though the mistake amounted to harmless error). Id. at 1323. Another

codefendant statement introduced in Gonzalez replaced the defendants’ names

with neutral nouns, such as “a couple of people” and “the people.” We held that
 That violation was not harmless because the codefendant statement was the only 61

evidence linking the implicated defendants to the crime. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d at 1323 (11th Cir.

1999).

41

the redacted statement implicated the defendants in violation of Bruton and Gray.61

In the drug conspiracy case United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 166 F.3d 1106

(11th Cir. 1999), we addressed a codefendant statement even more vague than

those described above. A Government agent testified regarding a post-arrest

statement by the codefendant. “He said the pistol belonged to him,” asked to have

the pistol brought to the drug transaction at issue, and “stated he wanted the pistol

at the location for protection in case [the undercover agent] tried to rip him off.”

Id. at 1109. Other evidence suggested that the defendant brought a pistol to the

codefendant. The Government conceded that admitting the codefendant statement

that passively referred to some actor who brought a pistol to the codefendant

inculpated the defendant in violation of Bruton. We validated that concession by

holding that the Bruton violation was not a harmless error because it was the only

evidence showing the defendant had knowledge that the transaction at issue was

for drugs. Id. at 1110-11.

We think the proper Bruton standard is clear from a close reading of Bruton,

Richardson, Gray, and our subsequent Bruton decisions: a defendant’s

confrontation right is violated when the court admits a codefendant statement that,
 We look at everything the Government presented to the jury, not just admissible 62

evidence, because a statement violating Bruton by definition is inadmissible as evidence, and a

limiting instruction does not cure it.

42

in light of the Government’s whole case, compels a reasonable person to infer 62

the defendant’s guilt.

D.

In this case, Meyer’s affidavit “powerfully incriminat[ed]” Schwartz by

summarizing the loans FCS made to other companies Schwartz controlled. See

Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S. Ct. at 1627. Even though Meyer’s statement “was

not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked” with other

evidence, Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S. Ct. at 1707, we think that the

statement compelled an inference that Schwartz directed FCS to use investor

monies to line the coffers of his personal business enterprises. Any doubt that the

limiting instructions were ineffective was erased when the prosecutor, in his

closing argument, expressly linked Schwartz to the companies named in Meyer’s

statement.

The trial evidence besides the affidavit was sufficient to link Schwartz to

FCS and his other corporations. Although the trial was lengthy and the

Government called forty-two witnesses, the evidence showing Schwartz controlled

FCS and that he personally benefited from FCS loans to companies like First
43

Consolidated, Florida Restaurant Management, Seahawk, and Vanderbilt Square

would not have been lost on the jury. FCS’s attorneys Lee Summers and Nicki

Nedbor, and FCS’s Chief Operating Officer-turned-bankruptcy trustee Alan

Goldberg, were in many ways star witnesses. Each had worked for Schwartz at

FCS, knew FCS’s corporate structure and its transactions, and together their

testimony took the equivalent of about five trial days out of a total of only fifteen

in the Government’s case in chief.

The evidence showed that Schwartz controlled the day-to-day operations of

FCS, made all hiring and firing decisions, and regularly overrode the investment

committee’s recommendations, effectively directing FCS’s investment strategies. 

Indeed, the fact that corporations owned or controlled by Schwartz received loans

from FCS presents circumstantial evidence that he had substantial, if not unilateral

power over how FCS used investor funds. 

Moreover, the Government presented sufficient evidence to show that

Schwartz owned or controlled a number of corporations receiving loans from FCS. 

Money was constantly sloshing back and forth from FCS and First Consolidated,

owned by Schwartz. FCS loaned money to Nick’s Italian Fishery and then Florida

Restaurant Management, created for Schwartz as a vehicle to purchase Nick’s. 

FCS also issued loans to numerous corporations, including Schwartz’s Vanderbilt
 Of course, merely naming a corporation owned or controlled by the defendant is not a 63

per se Bruton violation. We addressed a similar scenario in United States v. Williamson, 339

F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2003). In that case, the court admitted a redacted codefendant statement

naming the defendant’s corporation. Id. at 1302. The panel determined that the case was

“covered by Richardson” because it was not “obviously redacted” as in Gray. Id. at 1303

(quotation omitted).

We think this case is different from Williamson because here the prosecutor linked

Schwartz to the codefendant statement by name. We also think that Williamson, to the degree it

limits Gray’s logic to “obviously redacted” statements, does not comport with our prior decisions

such as Taylor, Gonzalez, and Ramirez-Perez, by which we are bound. See United States v.

Turner, 474 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Thomas, 271 Fed. Appx. 818 (11th

Cir.); Scott v. Upton, 208 Fed. Appx. 774 (11th Cir. 2006).

44

Square, to purchase the Dry Tortugas collection. The treasure was ultimately

found divided between Schwartz’s desk at work, his apartment, and his mother’s

condominium. FCS also made loans to Big Sun, owned by Schwartz. 

In light of the foregoing, Meyer’s affidavit “obviously referr[ed]” to

Schwartz, Gray, 523 U.S. at 196, 118 S. Ct. at 1157, without naming him. See

Gonzalez, 183 F.3d at 1322 (“[From other evidence, including [the defendant’s]

own confession, it became obvious at trial that the Colombian was Buitrago.”). 

By naming Schwartz’s corporations after the jury had heard lengthy testimony

regarding the extent of Schwartz’s ownership and control of them, the codefendant

statements compelled an inference against Schwartz even more forcefully than a

statement could that replaces a defendant’s name with a neutral pronoun. See

United States v. Taylor, 186 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999).63

The affidavit was particularly damaging because it summarized in one
 Although our focus is on the post-redacted version of the statement, the fact that the 64

Government swapped “First Consolidated” for “Mr. Schwartz” suggests that the Government

thought the two were interchangeable. Doubtless the jury concluded the same.

This dilemma highlights the practical difficulties of redacting a codefendant statement

without draining its meaning. A redaction is not a magic charm, an amulet against constitutional

violation. Nor is it simple arithmetic. If done too liberally, redaction risks inaccuracy by

eliminating words that played an integral role in establishing the statement’s meaning. This idea

is memorialized in the interpretive canon of noscitur associatus. If performed too sparingly,

though, redaction jeopardizes the confrontation rights of the nonconfessing codefendant. See

Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 140 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1998). Of course, “viable

alternatives do exist,” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 133, 88 S. Ct. at 1626, when redacting a defendant’s

statement proves unsatisfactory: a prosecutor can either try the defendants separately and use the

confessing defendant’s confession against him in toto, or do without the confession. We

recognize the efficiency of joint trials and their economic benefits for the justice system, but

economy without constitutional fairness is just a system, not our justice system. See Id. at 135,

88 S. Ct. 1627.

45

streamlined and articulate statement all of the Government’s evidence of

Schwartz’s self-dealing with investor money, all without expressly naming him. 

64

If the affidavit was insufficient to compel an inference of guilt based on the

trial testimony alone, the inference was made inevitable – and therefore

“devastating” – when the prosecutor expressly made that connection for the jury in

his closing argument. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S. Ct. at 1628. He first

reminded the jury that “it is undisputed that [Schwartz], during the relevant years

after Mr. Horwin left, that he owned and controlled First Capital,” and that “Mr.

Schwartz was responsible in large measure for the ABL diversions” to companies

such as Nick’s Italian Fishery, Big Sun Investments, Seahawk, and Vanderbilt

Square, several of which were owned by Schwartz. He then expressly referred to
 Although the transcript it silent on the issue, we can only assume that the prosecutor 65

was holding the affidavit in is hands and showing it to the jury when he stated “this is

Government Exhibit 1.76.” 

46

Meyer’s bankruptcy affidavit, stating “this is Government’s Exhibit 1.76” and 65

reminded the jury that “[f]rom independent evidence in this case you know that the

person benefitting from those commissions [to First Consolidated] that paid

sometimes 20 percent of the [asset based loans] was Larry Schwartz.” After

Schwartz’s sustained objection at this point, the prosecutor took another approach

to equate Schwartz with First Consolidated, by reminding the jury that First

Consolidated’s incorporation papers listed Schwartz as the owner. 

 In sum, the Government was relying on the jury to equate Schwartz with

the corporations named in the codefendant statement, and we agree that, by the

time the jury retired to its deliberations, its reasonable members would have

inferred from the statement that Schwartz – in violation of his representations to

investors – directed FCS to issue unsecured asset-based loans, frequently to his

own companies.

E.

A Bruton violation requires a new trial unless the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S. Ct.

1056, 1060, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1972) (noting that a new trial is required if “there is
47

a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the

conviction”); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1728,

23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969) (“Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the

record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the

[codefendant statements] on the minds of an average jury.”); United States v.

Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999). We have explained this standard

as follows: “[a] Bruton error is harmless only if the properly admitted evidence of

guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the co-defendant's statement

so insignificant, that beyond any reasonable doubt the improper use of the

statement was harmless.” United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th

Cir. 2000).

We cannot say that the admission of Meyer’s affidavit, and the

indispensable role it played in the prosecutor’s closing argument to the jury, was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ironically, it is in part the strength of the

testimony of witnesses like Summers, Goldberg, and Nedbor that transformed the

affidavit’s references to Schwartz’s corporations into a Bruton violation. Still, we

do not think that the weight of that evidence is so great as to marginalize the

significantly prejudicial impact of the affidavit.

Although the disparate evidence against Schwartz was sufficient to compel
48

an inference that Schwartz equaled his corporations in the context described by the

affidavit, that evidence – though organized and summarized in this opinion – was

presented to the jury piecemeal, over the course of numerous hours of testimony

that meandered across various subjects and was punctuated by objections,

argument, rulings, and breaks in the trial.

The affidavit, by contrast, articulately summarized the evidence preceding

it. It was admitted into evidence as a written document and available for study by

the members of the jury during its deliberation. It impacted the jury like a

prosecutor’s closing argument, except it was available to the jury in its

deliberations as an admitted exhibit, and, as a written document, was not subject to

the vagaries of jurors’ memories. 

In addition, the statement’s source lent it singular credibility; Meyer was

FCS’s controller during the course of the alleged conspiracies and his testimony

made under oath to the bankruptcy court could reasonably be perceived as

unusually reliable, particularly as a confession that clearly did not help him avoid

prosecution. The prosecutor, recognizing the unique power of the statement as

evidence against Schwartz, resorted to it in his closing argument despite the

weight of the other evidence against him. We cannot say that the Government’s

use of the statement was harmless.
 The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, states: 66

(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on

direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant,

order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter

defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which

49

III.

Meyer challenges the indictment on the ground that the grand jury returned

it on the basis of his immunized statements to the grand jury.

A.

On October 5, 2002, an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern

District of Florida sent a “proffer letter” to Edward Meyer’s attorney, granting

Meyer limited use immunity in exchange for his cooperation with investigative

interviews. Government agents thereafter interviewed Meyer four times in

November and December 2002.

On February 17, 2004, and then again on April 27, FBI Special Agent Gary

Hellmer, the case agent, testified as to the substance of those four interviews to a

grand jury, which ultimately returned the superceding indictment against Meyer

and the other defendants.

The jury trial began on October 19, 2004. After Hellmer testified on

November 10, the Government turned over his grand jury statements to Meyer

pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Meyer thereby learned that 66
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.

. . . .

(e) The term “statement”, as used in subsection[](b) . . . means -

. . . .

(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made

by said witness to a grand jury.

 At no point has Meyer alleged that the Government violated or attempted to violate his 67

immunity agreement during trial. 

50

Hellmer had testified as to the substance of Meyer’s immunized statements before

the grand jury. Meyer believed his statements were immune from direct use by the

Government before the grand jury. On November 15, he filed a motion to dismiss

the indictment or, alternatively, for a mistrial on the ground that the Government

obtained the indictment in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. The court stayed consideration of the motion until the jury 67

returned its verdict.

On December 1, the jury found Meyer guilty of two counts of conspiracy

and one count of money laundering. The court held a hearing on Meyer’s motion

on February 16, and entered a written order denying it on March 14. The court

found that the agreement was ambiguous as to whether Meyer’s proffer statements

were immune from direct use by the Government before the grand jury. The court

therefore construed the agreement in Meyer’s favor and found that the

Government violated it by making direct use of Meyer’s statements before the
 To support its reasoning, the court quoted a Ninth Circuit case, Guam v. Muna, 999 68

F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1993), which itself cites to the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v.

Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 106 S. Ct. 938, 89 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1986). Mechanik was a case about the

Government’s violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d). Because we affirm the district court’s ruling on

another ground, we state no opinion about the propriety of applying Mechanik’s formula to an

alleged Fifth Amendment violation.

 We review a court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of 69

discretion, United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir. 1998), but in determining

whether the court abused its discretion, we resolve issues of law, including the meaning of

Meyer’s immunity agreement, de novo, see Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir.

1998).

51

grand jury. The court concluded that the error was harmless, though, because the

statements in question were not admitted at trial and the jury still convicted him.68

Meyer appeals, arguing that the Government violated his immunity agreement, and

thereby violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

B.

1.

Meyer’s argument requires that we first review the scope of his immunity

agreement, which we interpret like a contract. See Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d

1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 1998). That agreement states:

69

1. The United States agrees that any statement made by [Meyer]

during the proffer will not be used against him during the United

States’ case in chief should [Meyer] proceed to trial in any matter

being investigated in the Southern District of Florida.

2. Should [Meyer] proceed to trial in any case that may be indicted in

the Southern District of Florida and testify on his behalf . . . the

United States may use any statements made by [Meyer] during the
52

proffer to cross-examine [Meyer].

3. The United States may make derivative use of the statements

[Meyer] makes during the proffer and may pursue investigative leads

therefrom, and would not be required to prove an independent source

at any Kastigar or other hearing held thereon. By signing this

agreement [Meyer] agrees to waive any right to a Kastigar hearing in

the future.

4. Should [Meyer] intentionally provide any false, incomplete or

misleading information or testimony, any statement made by [Meyer]

during the proffer may be used in the prosecution’s direct case of any

other criminal violations, including but not limited to the offenses of

perjury, obstruction of justice and false statements to government

agencies.

In other words, the United States is extending [Meyer] only limited

“use immunity” for nonviolent offenses during the course of the

proffer; neither “derivative use immunity” nor “transactional

immunity” is applicable to the proffer.

. . . .

Finally, Mr. Meyer should understand that there are no agreements as

to the number or nature of any charges that may be brought, or

sentences recommended in this or any other District in the United

States. In other words, this agreement does not guarantee that he will

not be charged with a crime; the agreement only guarantees that his

statements will not be used against him in the government’s case in

chief.

2.

We note at the outset that Meyer’s immunity agreement does not directly

address whether the Government may introduce his statements to a grand jury. 

The first paragraph provides that the Government may not use his statements
 In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972), 70

the defendant was compelled by court order to testify pursuant to a statutory grant of immunity. 

In determining whether the compulsion amounted to a Fifth Amendment violation

53

directly against him in its case in chief at trial. The final paragraph likewise states

that “the agreement only guarantees that his statements will not be used against

him in the government’s case in chief.” Those assertions, standing alone, seem to

allow the Government to use his statements in any way except as evidence in its

case in chief. Paragraphs two, three, and four of the agreement, however, list

specific ways that the Government may use Meyer’s statements. Absent from the

list is direct use of the statements before a grand jury. Applying the doctrine of

expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “the expression of one excludes

alternatives,” the district court concluded that the agreement was ambiguous as to

that term.

We think, however, that the parties’ intent as to the scope of immunity is

expressed in the third paragraph. The first sentence of that paragraph provides

that the Government may make “derivative use” of Meyer’s statements; that is, the

Government may use his statements as a springboard to find evidence or other

witnesses to testify against him. The second sentence in paragraph three provides

that “[Meyer] agrees to waive any right to a Kastigar hearing in the future.” A

“Kastigar hearing” is a hearing to determine if the Government has introduced 70
notwithstanding the statutory grant of immunity, the Supreme Court held that a statute that

provides “use and derivative-use immunity is constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over

a claim of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege [against self-incrimination].” Id. at 458, 92 S. Ct. at

1664. A defendant may seek a Kastigar hearing on an alleged Fifth Amendment violation

whether that alleged violation arises from court-compelled testimony, as in Kastigar, or out of an

alleged breach of an immunity agreement, as in Meyer’s case. See generally United States v.

Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1994).

 “The following persons may be present while the grand jury is in session: attorneys for 71

the government, the witness being questioned, interpreters when needed, and a court reporter or

an operator of a recording device.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1).

 Once the defendant shows that his statements were made pursuant to a grant of 72

immunity, the Government bears the “heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it [used

or] proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.” Kastigar v. United States,

406 U.S. 441, 461-62, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 1665.

54

testimony before the grand jury, or plans to introduce testimony at trial, that

violates the defendant’s immunity and Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1441 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)(1), a defendant is not present at his own grand

71

jury hearing to object to the Government’s testimony during the proceedings. 

Thus, the only way for a criminal defendant to challenge an indictment on the

ground that the Government obtained it in violation of his Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination is via a Kastigar hearing. See United States v.

Schmidgall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1527-29 (11th Cir. 1994).72

3.

Although the agreement does not state explicitly that the Government may
55

use Meyer’s statement directly before the grand jury, we think it is nonetheless

clear when read holistically. Meyer waived his right to a Kastigar hearing. Put

differently, he waived his right to challenge the Government’s use of his

statements before the grand jury. We cannot conclude that he left himself

vulnerable to what he characterizes as a Fifth Amendment violation but

voluntarily waived his right to learn about and seek a remedy for that violation. 

The only reasonable inference is that Meyer intended to waive his Fifth

Amendment privilege against use of his statements before the grand jury.

That inference is strengthened by an application of the interpretive doctrine

of noscitur a sociis, or a phrase is “known by its associates.” In paragraph three of

the agreement Meyer first voluntarily waives his Fifth Amendment privilege

against derivative use of his statement against him at trial. In the next sentence he

waives his right to a Kastigar hearing. We think the parties intended paragraph

three to list ways the Government could use Meyer’s statements notwithstanding

the Fifth Amendment.

We conclude that Meyer clearly waived his privilege against selfincrimination before a grand jury by waiving his right to challenge the

Government’s introduction of his statements before the grand jury. We therefore

affirm the court’s denial of Meyer’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the
 Both were convicted of mail fraud (Counts 2-5), interstate transportation of stolen 73

property (Counts 6-7), and various permutations of money laundering (Levy for Counts 9, 13, 15-

19, 21, and 24 and Orlick for Counts 19, 21, and 24). Orlick was convicted of engaging in a

monetary transaction in criminally derived property (Count 25).

 Levy and Orlick also challenge their convictions of the substantive crimes that were 74

the object of the conspiracy on the ground that the underlying scheme was not fraudulent, and

they therefore lacked the requisite mens rea to commit mail fraud, money laundering, and

interstate transportation of stolen property. Because we hold there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s conspiracy verdicts, we dismiss their claims as to the other crimes.

56

ground that the Government did not violate its immunity agreement with Meyer.

IV.

Levy and Orlick were convicted on Count 1 of the superceding indictment,

which charged that they and the other defendants “did knowingly and willfully

combine, conspire, confederate, agree and reach a tacit understanding with each

other” to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and interstate transportation of

stolen property (18 U.S.C. § 2314), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Levy was also

convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1956(h) under Count 8.73

Levy and Orlick argue that there was insufficient evidence to prove that

they knowingly and willfully agreed and participated in the alleged conspiracy. 

Their theory is that FCS misused investor funds without their knowledge and that

U.S. Capital did not misuse investor funds. We consider Levy’s argument first. 74

A. Levy
57

1.

a. The creation of U.S. Capital.

In 1997, Levy sold FCS senior capital notes through his companies

American Benefits and Asset Based Management. In spite of a Department

investigation into the note program, and just a few days before FCS represented to

the Department that it would no longer sell or renew senior capital notes, Levy

formed U.S. Capital in December 1997 for the purpose of selling effectively

identical senior capital notes to individual investors. Levy owned U.S. Capital,

was its president until Orlick took over that role, and was its director throughout

the alleged conspiracy.

b. Levy’s representations to brokers and investors.

U.S. Capital furnished brokers and investors with sales brochures

representing that their money would be used to invest in FCS’s factoring program,

to be invested strictly in insured corporate and government receivables. The

brochures also represented that investor funds would be segregated and that the

notes were liquid upon written notice, subject to a fee of one month’s interest for

early liquidation. According to Zendell Katz, a broker, “[Levy] was responsible

for printing and marketing and advertising” the notes program.

Additionally, Levy and Schwartz together met with brokers on several
 John Pennington, a Charterhouse insurance broker from Lynchburg, Virginia, testified 75

that in 1997 Levy went to Roanoke, Virginia, to pitch viatical settlements to the insurance and

investment brokers with Charterhouse Group. In the fall of 1997, Levy sent FCS senior capital

note brochures to the Charterhouse brokers for their consideration. Sometime in 1998, Levy and

Schwartz flew in a private jet, believed by Pennington to belong to Schwartz, to Virginia for a

meeting to explain the senior capital note program to the Charterhouse brokers. The meeting

lasted about two and a half hours. Schwartz did most of the talking; he echoed the brochure’s

representations that investor money would be spent strictly on insured corporate and government

accounts receivable and walked through a blank note with the brokers. Levy did not contradict

him. According to Pennington, it looked like Levy and Schwartz were working together and that

Levy raised money for Schwartz in a “close business relationship.”

In June 1999, Brian Kreider, an independent broker from Virginia who worked with

Charterhouse, spoke on a conference call with Schwartz, Levy, Pennington, and potential

invester James Hurd regarding the senior capital note program. Again Schwartz reiterated the

familiar representations of the sales brochure and Levy backed him up. Hurd, an experienced

investor, was hesitant. He made suggestions to Schwartz and Levy that would make the program

“foolproof,” including, according to Kreider, that FCS and U.S. Capital should set up two

corporate bank accounts, one operating account for commissions and one bonded trust account to

protect investors from embezzlement or fraud. Schwartz told Hurd that FCS would create a trust

account for his funds if he invested at least $500,000, but Hurd declined to invest that much at

once. Hurd ultimately, though, invested about $750,000 in U.S. Capital notes signed by Orlick. 

In early 2000 or so, Kreider began trying to contact Levy with concerns about the note program. 

Levy admitted that there were problems paying back investors and stated that U.S. Capital had

put investor funds into other factoring companies, citing problems with FCS.

In May 1999, John Pennington travelled to Florida to meet with Levy regarding Levy’s

viatical program, into which Pennington had placed some of his clients. Schwartz, Levy, and

Pennington went to dinner. Levy stated that he “was in trouble, would be in more, and would

have a hard time paying back investors.”

Zenon Rawley, partner in the brokerage firm of RHC Financial Group (“RHC”), testified

that Levy called her firm in 1998 to pitch U.S. Capital’s note program. The three partners and

Levy went to West Palm Beach for lunch and Levy explained the program and gave them sales

brochures. The partners contacted Schwartz and set up a meeting at FCS, which Levy attended,

in an effort to perform due diligence. RHC wound up putting a number of investors into the

program, many of whom lost a significant amount of money.

In March 1999, broker Gary Fox met with Schwartz and Levy to discuss the notes

program; they ate lunch at Nick’s Italian Fishery, which they indicated they owned.

58

occasions to explain the notes program. They echoed the representations in the

brochures and on the face of the notes.

75

c. FCS’s asset based loans.
59

In late 1998, Schwartz asked Lee Summers, FCS’s attorney, to form Florida

Restaurant Management. Summers testified that FCS, Schwartz (through his

company First Consolidated), Levy, and Nick’s maitre d’ Alex all loaned money to

Florida Restaurant Management for the purchase of Nick’s Italian Fishery. Gary

Fox, U.S. Capital’s exclusive broker in West Virginia, testified that he had lunch

with Levy and Schwartz at Nick’s in March 1999, and they indicated that they

owned the restaurant. Stephen Kelley, who in 2001 prepared FCS’s back taxes for

the years 1996-2000, testified that FCS loaned Nick’s a total of $1,027,062.

Zendell Katz testified that Levy and Schwartz co-owned various property

besides Nick’s, including airplanes and helicopters. Alan Goldberg, FCS’s

bankruptcy trustee, testified that FCS loaned $2.7 million to Southwest Florida

Aviation for the purchase of a helicopter, although he did not say whether

Schwartz or Levy owned an interest in that helicopter.

Sometime before September 1999, Levy’s attorney, Jeffrey Paine, sent a

draft security agreement to FCS. The agreement stipulated that FCS would use

U.S. Capital money only for factoring accounts receivable. Nikki Nedbor, FCS’s

attorney at the time, advised Schwartz that FCS could not truthfully execute the

agreement without substantial revision; Schwartz agreed. After Nedbor relayed

FCS’s position to Paine, he set up a lunch meeting to discuss the issue. Schwartz,
60

Nedbor, Levy, and Paine ate at Nick’s sometime before September. According to

Nedbor, the issue of how FCS was using investor funds was not broached at lunch

and neither Levy nor Paine ever mentioned it again. FCS continued to make asset

based loans until sometime in September.

Lawrence Nunez, U.S. Capital’s data-entry guy, called FCS twice in late

1999 because investors were calling U.S. Capital, inquiring about their money. 

The first time Schwartz stated “I’ve dealt with it with Ray [Levy],” and the second

time he told Nunez to mind his own business.

d. FCS’s lack of insurance.

FCS did not adequately insure the accounts receivable it bought. There was

a $2 million annual limit on its Continental Insurance policy. On January 27,

1999, Nicholas Diacou, of Continental’s Chicago office, sent U.S. Capital a letter

titled “Unauthorized use of Continental Insurance Company’s name and

unauthorized reference to CNA/Continental Insurance Group in promotional

brochures.” The letter states:

Gentlemen: It recently came to our attention that U.S. Capital . . .

without our consent, is using Continental Insurance Company’s name

and referring to CNA/Continental Insurance Group in brochures used

do [sic] solicit investors for financing instruments, so-called capital

notes, offered by U.S. Capital.

. . . .

We have concerns about the use of our name in the brochures. We
 Levy did, however, receive a letter from FCS dated April 9, 1999, which stated: 76

This will confirm prior conversations with Larry Schwartz regarding the status of

credit insurance on accounts receivable factored by First Capital. As you are

aware, CNA has refused to renew its insurance policy with FCS as a result of the

telephone calls it received from the Secretary of State and numerous potential

investors. CNA is aware that certain brokers have made representations to

investors regarding the insurance carried by FCS in connection with the factored

accounts receivable and that brochures using CNA’s name have been

disseminated by your compnay to brokers and to investors. FCS is extremely

61

have received calls and inquiries about the promotional brochures. 

Someone may contend that, because our name is mentioned in the

brochure, CIC or the CNA/Continental Insurance Group guarantees

investments in the capital notes or is otherwise associated with them.

As you know, CIC does not guarantee such investments and has no

association with the capital notes. Furthermore, CIC has no

association with First Capital other than to act as its accounts

receivable credit insurer under Policy Number N49130. CIC has no

association whatsoever with U.S. Capital.

. . . .

U.S. Capital’s use of Continental Insurance Company’s name and

reference to CNA/Continental Insurance Group in the brochure or in

any of its advertising, sales, promotional or solicitation materials is

unauthorized and illegal.

You are hereby instructed to stop such activity immediately and

to refrain from doing so in the future. This instruction also applies to

your affiliated companies and any entity with which you have a

contractual relationship.

Throughout the alleged conspiracies, a number of investors and independent

brokers contacted Continental Insurance to discover what sort of insurance FCS

carried on the accounts receivable. By contrast, Levy presented no evidence that

he inquired into the nature and coverage of FCS’s insurance policy before

Continental’s demand letter to U.S. Capital. Further, Levy presented no direct or 76
disappointed that it has lost its credit insurance coverage with CNA. FCS has

established a verbal confirmation from American Credit Indemnity to replace that

insurance. The name of the insurance company is not to be disclosed to any

employees, brokers, agents, investors or anyone else for any purpose whatsoever. 

And under no circumstances are any of your employees, agents or brokers which

you utilize to make any representations to investors regarding credit insurance on

accounts receivable.

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circumstantial evidence suggesting that Schwartz positively deceived him

regarding the nature of FCS’s insurance or FCS’s use of U.S. Capital’s funds. 

There was no evidence that U.S. Capital ever stopped using a brochure listing

Continental as an insurer to sell notes.

e. U.S. Capital’s use of investor funds.

Korinne Harper, a Government investigator, testified that in 1998 U.S.

Capital transferred about $1.2 million in investor funds to American Benefits

Services, Levy’s viatical brokerage company, and also invested investor funds in

Invoice Funding, another factoring company. From May to June of 1999, U.S.

Capital spent over $4 million worth of senior note holders’ money on promissory

notes issued by factoring firms like Sun Capital, Incorporated, and Merchants

Capital, instead of FCS. Those firm’s accounts receivable were not insured by

Continental, per the senior capital notes sales brochures.

In May or June 1999, the Department issued a subpoena for U.S. Capital’s

corporate records regarding the sale of senior capital notes and purchase of
63

corporate funding notes. July 19, 1999 was the last date on which U.S. Capital

purchased a six-month corporate note from FCS.

The Government presented direct evidence in the form of summaries of

bank account activity showing that U.S. Capital commingled investor funds with

its own profits and paid commissions out of the pool of investor funds. Several

witnesses testified that, starting in 1999, U.S. Capital did not forward all investor

funds to FCS, but paid interest and satisfied liquidation requests out of its pool of

investor funds and forwarded the remainder to FCS along with a “new business

transmittal” indicating how much each investor had put into the capital note

program. From February 19, 1998 to July 19, 1999, U.S. Capital purchased $22.9

million in FCS corporate notes. From January 16, 1998 to September 1999, it

received only $7.25 in return from FCS. Korinne Harper, a Government

investigator, testified that “[i]f you look at the entire life of the [U.S. Capital]

account, there wasn’t enough money received or earned in prepaid interest or any

other way from factoring companies to pay the expenses in interest, commissions,

and other business expenses of U.S. Capital.”

Numerous investors and brokers testified that, toward the end of the alleged

fraud scheme, they wrote U.S. Capital to liquidate their notes, with no response –

or a negative response – from U.S. Capital. When Alan Goldberg was going
 We review the evidence against Levy and then Orlick de novo, considering the 77

evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and construing all reasonable factual

inferences – including inferences about the credibility of witnesses – to be consistent with the

jury’s verdict. See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006).

64

through FCS’s credits and debts as its liquidation trustee in 2000, he discovered

that many of U.S. Capital’s loans to FCS were not secured because U.S. Capital

had either not filed its UCC-1 forms or filed them incorrectly.

2.

An agreement to conspire may “be proved by circumstantial as well as

direct evidence,” United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569, 1575 (11th Cir.

1991), and may be inferred from the relationship of the parties, their overt acts and

concert of action, and the totality of their conduct. United States v. Guerra, 293

F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002).77

We think a reasonable jury could have concluded the following. 

(1) Levy formed U.S. Capital to help Schwartz and FCS evade a Government

inquiry into the legality of the note program. (2) Levy joined Schwartz in pitching

the note program – by brochures, advertisements, and personal assurances – as

being directed strictly for the sale of insured corporate and government

receivables, that investors’ funds would be segregated, and that U.S. Capital’s

notes would be backed by UCC-1 filings securing its interest in the accounts
65

receivable purchased by FCS. (3) Levy was on notice that at least some investors

were concerned about the validity of those representations, as demonstrated by

James Hurd’s suggestions that investors’ funds be segregated in a bonded trust

account. 

(4) Levy knew about FCS’s loans because he personally benefited from

them. He and Schwartz bought Nick’s in part with money provided by FCS and

FCS made loans in excess of $1 million to Nick’s while he was co-owner. The

jury could have also inferred that he co-owned a helicopter with Schwartz bought

with money loaned by FCS.

(5) Levy knew FCS’s receivables were underinsured. U.S. Capital

forwarded over $20 million to FCS in the course of three years; the jury could

have reasonably inferred that Levy, based on such an investment, had done his

homework regarding the insurance that protected it. His ignorance, if any, was

dispelled by Continental’s January 1999 demand letter. After that, U.S. Capital

voluntarily continued to use the old brochures naming Continental and CNA

insurance to sell notes and continued its business with FCS through the summer of

1999.

(6) Levy knew U.S. Capital was misusing investor funds and directed it to

do so. The jury could have inferred that Levy, as the owner and director of U.S.
66

Capital, knew that U.S. Capital was not segregating investor funds from U.S.

Capital profits and the commission due independent brokers. Additionally, in

1998, U.S. Capital made loans using investor funds to Levy’s company American

Benefits and used investor funds to buy promissory notes of companies other than

FCS, in violation of its promise in the sales brochures and on the face of the senior

capital notes.

(7) The jury could have inferred that Levy knew FCS was losing money and

that investor funds were therefore not truly liquid. As U.S. Capital’s owner and

director, he would have known about its so-called offset accounting technique of

sending new investor funds – minus old interest, liquidation, and commission

payments – to FCS. The jury could have inferred that Levy directed U.S. Capital

to use the accounting technique to hide FCS’s losses, and thereby forestall the day

that investors’ liquidation requests could not be met.

(8) As to Levy’s conviction of conspiracy to commit money laundering, a

reasonable jury could have inferred that U.S. Capital’s offset accounting was a

deliberate attempt by Levy and Schwartz to delay the inevitable day of reckoning

by shielding FCS’s indiscretions from investors: as long as new investor funds

outpaced interest and liquidation payments, U.S. Capital and FCS could continue
 Several witnesses testified that U.S. Capital’s offset accounting amounted to a Ponzi 78

scheme. We note that it differed from a classic Ponzi scheme – in which old investors are paid

with new investors’ funds – in that FCS issued corporate notes to U.S. Capital totaling the same

amount that U.S. Capital had received from investors. At least on the books, U.S. Capital had

forwarded enough money to FCS to represent adequately the amount investors had loaned to U.S.

Capital. The offset accounting, however, allowed FCS to lose the money while U.S. Capital

continued to pay off investors.

67

to misuse investor funds without risk of discovery. In that way, the conspirators 78

“hid” the proceeds of their fraud scheme in some cases by actually paying their

clients. In addition, U.S. Capital and FCS both made loans with investor funds to

corporations owned and controlled by Schwartz and Levy, and wrote checks to

outside entities – brokers, business partners, etc. – all to secret away the proceeds

of their fraud.

B. Orlick.

Orlick joined U.S. Capital sometime early in 1998. At first Orlick was

directed by her father and trained by the outgoing office manager, Linda

Lundgren. However, Levy told Zendell Katz, a sales broker, that “[Orlick] was

going to run things and [Levy] was going to show her how to do it.”

By the middle of 1998, Orlick managed U.S. Capital’s office day-to-day. 

Independent brokerage agents who worked on-site at U.S. Capital, like Richard

Porcelli, were told to bring their paperwork and questions to Orlick, who signed

their commission checks. According to Porcelli, Orlick collected paperwork from
 Crowning was a secretary from approximately 1998 to 2000 for American Benefits, 79

which was run out of the same office as U.S. Capital.

68

agents, paid agents’ commission, issued paperwork to investors, and wrote

monthly checks to investors. She signed many of the U.S. Capital senior capital

notes. When Levy was out of the office, Orlick was in charge. She hired at least

one employee, Kelly Crowning, who testified that Levy was in the office only

“[o]nce in a while.”79

Orlick also managed U.S. Capital’s operating account, into which investor

funds were deposited and out of which FCS corporate funding notes were

purchased and investors and brokers were paid. She reviewed the work of

Lawrence Nunez, who was responsible for updating U.S. Capital’s electronic

accounting records when new investors sent in their checks and paid liquidations. 

According to Nunez, Orlick knew that U.S. Capital was not sending all of the new

investors’ money to FCS, but deducting the amount paid in commissions and

interest.

Over the course of the conspiracy, Orlick signed checks to FCS for $22

million in investor money. Starting in July 1999, FCS began to default on its

obligations to U.S. Capital. Orlick kept sending investor funds to FCS, but paid

liquidation requests out of the money coming in from new investors because
69

money from FCS was not forthcoming. By the end of the notes program, FCS had

returned only $7 million to U.S. Capital. 

At some point in 1999, U.S. Capital made it more difficult for investors to

liquidate their notes. Orlick implemented the change. Several brokers and

investors testified that, after mid-1999, their liquidation requests were denied. Jay

Long, an investor, testified that when he called about his investment in September

1999, Orlick told him that U.S. Capital was having administration problems.

We think a reasonable jury could have found that Orlick, from her position

at U.S. Capital, knew about and voluntarily participated in the scheme to defraud

individual investors through the senior capital notes program. She signed the

notes and accompanying literature representing that investors’ funds would be

segregated, liquid, and used only to invest in FCS, for government or insured

corporate receivables. She knew that U.S. Capital did not segregate investor funds

from U.S. Capital’s corporate funds, and the jury could have inferred from her

formal position, her management of the office, her oversight of U.S. Capital’s

account, and her responsibility for signing checks out of U.S. Capital’s checking

accounts that she consorted with her father to dictate how investor funds were

used. Even if Orlick did not know how FCS was using funds, her knowledge of

U.S. Capital’s misuse coupled with a tacit agreement with Levy to misuse those
70

funds linked her to the larger conspiracy because Levy knew about FCS’s misuse

of funds. 

We think, though, that a reasonable jury could have concluded, based on

Orlick’s position and activities at U.S. Capital and her personal relationship to her

father, Raphael Levy, who benefited from several FCS loans, that she knew and

voluntarily participated in how FCS misused investor funds as well. The jury

could have inferred that she must have investigated the nature of FCS’s activities

because she personally represented that investor funds would be used in a certain

way. The jury could have found from U.S. Capital’s decision to begin satisfying

interest and liquidation payments out of new investors’ funds that Orlick knew

about and helped direct U.S. Capital to delay investor scrutiny by keeping up the

appearances of success while FCS was losing money.

V.

We AFFIRM the court’s judgment in all respects except as to Schwartz’s

convictions, which we VACATE.

SO ORDERED.