UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7455

GEORGE DAVID REDDING, Administrator of the Estate of Daphne 

Stubbs Redding,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

ESTATE OF DAPHNE STUBBS REDDING,

Party-In-Interest,

v.

TROOPER D.P. BOULWARE; DEPUTY B.A. HILL; SOUTH CAROLINA 

HIGHWAY PATROL,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

LEXINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(0:09-cv-01357-HFF)

Argued: September 20, 2012 Decided: December 20, 2012

Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and Michael F. 

URBANSKI, United States District Judge for the Western District 

of Virginia, sitting by designation.
2

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Urbanski joined. Judge Keenan wrote a 

dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: John Dewey Elliott, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. Patrick John Frawley, DAVIS, FRAWLEY, ANDERSON, 

MCCAULEY, AYER, FISHER & SMITH, LLC, Lexington, South Carolina, 

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David A. Fedor, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Michael S. Pauley, LIDE AND PAULEY, 

LLC, Lexington, South Carolina, for Appellees Trooper D.P. 

Boulware and South Carolina Highway Patrol; Daniel C. Plyler, 

DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Lexington County Sheriff's Department.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

This case presents the issue of whether law enforcement 

officers used excessive force in effecting the arrest of Daphne 

Redding, of Columbia, South Carolina, following a traffic stop.

During the course of a traffic stop, Redding (1) failed to 

stop in response to South Carolina State Trooper D.P. Boulware’s 

use of his police car’s blue light and siren; (2) failed to obey 

the trooper’s repeated directives to sit down in her car after 

she was stopped; (3) refused to produce her driver’s license and 

registration; and (4) in other respects failed to cooperate with 

the trooper’s lawful commands. When Redding pushed Trooper 

Boulware out of her way in an effort to walk past Boulware to 

her apartment, Trooper Boulware attempted to place Redding under 

arrest for assaulting a police officer. Redding, however,

refused to be handcuffed. Trooper Boulware was able to place a 

handcuff on one of Redding’s wrists but, because of her 

continuing and active resistance, was unable to place the 

handcuff on the other.

In response to Trooper Boulware’s call for assistance,

Lexington County Deputy Sheriff B.A. Hill arrived and directed 

Redding to place her unsecured arm behind her back so that it 

could be cuffed. As she refused, Deputy Hill repeated the 

command six more times. Because Redding continued to resist, 

Deputy Hill used force to move Redding’s hand behind her back 
4

and place the second handcuff on her. After being cuffed, 

Redding ceased resisting, and charges against her were processed 

in the normal course.

During the course of the scuffle, however, Redding 

sustained abrasions when resisting as she was held on the ground

and a broken arm when Deputy Hill forced her arm behind her to 

be cuffed. She commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

contending that the officers used excessive force in arresting 

her. The district court granted summary judgment to the 

officers, and we now affirm.

I

The record in this case is substantially not in dispute,1 as 

the entire encounter was recorded on videotape, with a clock 

recording the passage of time on the videotape, and discloses a 

continually escalating series of events that developed over a 

period of some 20 minutes.

A few minutes after 4 a.m. on May 28, 2007, Trooper 

Boulware observed a vehicle on I-26 in Columbia, South Carolina,

 1 Redding does dispute that she was going only 35 miles per 

hour on I-26, below the minimum speed of 45 miles per hour, as 

claimed by Trooper Boulware. She testified that she was going 

the speed limit. The district court, however, found that this 

factual dispute over Redding’s speed was not material. We agree 

because the traffic stop was justified by various other traffic 

violations, as well as Trooper Boulware’s initial suspicion that 

Redding had been drinking, although, as it turned out, he 

concluded later that she had not been drinking.
5

traveling at about 35 miles per hour, which was below the 

minimum 45-mile-per-hour speed limit on the Interstate. As he 

observed the vehicle, it was also weaving from lane to lane; its 

brakes were being applied for no apparent reason; and, when 

turning right from the Interstate, its turn signal was not used. 

Trooper Boulware turned on his marked police car’s blue light 

and, on an intermittent basis, his siren in an effort to stop 

the vehicle. The vehicle, however, failed to stop and continued 

driving for about a half a mile, after which it entered the 

parking lot of an apartment complex. Using his public address 

microphone, Trooper Boulware directed the driver to stop the 

car, and he focused his search light on the vehicle. The 

vehicle stopped, and Daphne Redding, a 67-year-old woman, exited 

the vehicle. Trooper Boulware asked Redding why she took so 

long to stop, and Redding responded that she could not tell 

whether he was a policeman. Boulware then told Redding to “have 

a seat back in your car.” Redding, however, refused, and 

Boulware repeated the command four separate times. Redding

stated that she was going to go to her apartment to get her 

husband. When the officer told her that she could not do that, 

she started to honk the horn. Again Trooper Boulware instructed 

her not to honk the horn.

Trooper Boulware demanded that Redding produce her driver’s 

license, registration, and proof of insurance, and Redding 
6

responded, “Wait just a minute,” and she continued to yell for 

her husband. Boulware continued to insist that Redding produce 

her registration and insurance on four different occasions over

the next several minutes. On each occasion, Redding told the 

trooper to wait a minute. Redding also tried to use her cell

phone to call her husband, and after she ignored Trooper 

Boulware’s command not to call anyone, Boulware moved to take 

her phone. Redding then attempted to walk to the apartment to 

get her husband. As Trooper Boulware blocked her way and 

pressed Redding for her license, Redding pushed Trooper Boulware 

backward, and walked by him. At that point, at 4:09 a.m., 

Trooper Boulware announced that he was placing Redding under 

arrest.

When Trooper Boulware sought to effect the arrest by 

placing handcuffs on Redding, Redding resisted. Trooper 

Boulware then pushed Redding against the front of a nearby 

automobile in an effort to handcuff her. As Redding continued 

to resist, he took her to the ground. Trooper Boulware told 

Redding reportedly to quit fighting him; she was under arrest;

and “you are going to be charged with resisting if you do not 

put that other hand behind your back.” Redding, however, kept 

calling for her husband and kept resisting. While the officer 

was able to get one handcuff on, he was unable to get the other

on, despite instructing Redding several times, “Give me your 
7

hand.” After struggling unsuccessfully to place Redding in 

handcuffs for a period of some four minutes, Boulware called the 

dispatcher for assistance. He stated, “I’ve got one cuff on 

her. I can’t do much else with her.” Trooper Boulware and 

Redding were about the same size. Boulware was approximately 5 

feet 7 inches tall and weighed 175 pounds; Redding was 

approximately 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighed 190 pounds. 

Over the next five to ten minutes, while Trooper Boulware 

was holding Redding on the ground and waiting for assistance, 

Redding continued to resist. At one point, she said she was 

hurting, and the officer indicated “we both are. I think you 

dislocated my finger.” When Redding asked, “what do you want 

from me?”, the trooper stated, “You are under arrest for 

assaulting a police officer.” After several minutes passed, 

Trooper Boulware stated again, “Now you need to quit fighting me 

and give me your other hand so that we can get this over with 

instead of fighting me because you ain’t doing nothing but 

hurtin’ yourself.” Several minutes later, when the dispatcher

asked Officer Boulware, “Have you got the subject in custody 

now?”, Officer Boulware stated, “Negative. Not Yet. I am just 

trying to do what I can without hurting her any --.”

At 4:21 a.m., some 12 minutes after Trooper Boulware first 

sought to effect the arrest of Redding, Lexington County Deputy 

Sheriff Hill arrived. Deputy Hill then instructed Redding, 
8

“Ma’am come, you need to bring hands behind your back.” After 

Redding refused and resisted, Deputy Hill repeated the command 

six more times as he attempted to place her wrist into the 

handcuffs, warning her that her resisting was “going to cause 

[him] to break [her] arm.” Finally, at 4:22 a.m., while Officer 

Boulware was holding Redding down, Deputy Hill forced Redding’s 

wrist into the handcuffs and thus placed her in custody. At 

that point, Redding stopped resisting, and the officers called 

for medical help to treat Redding’s injuries -- abrasions and 

what turned out to be a broken arm.

In May 2009, Redding commenced this action against the 

officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that Trooper 

Boulware and Deputy Hill used excessive force, in violation of 

her Fourth Amendment rights. She alleged that when Deputy Hill 

came to assist Trooper Boulware, he “grabbed her right hand and 

jammed it into Boulware’s handcuff, twisting her arm and 

breaking it.” She alleged that this use of physical force was 

“clearly excessive in light of the circumstances that existed at 

the time of the traffic stop.”

On the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, in which 

the defendants contended that Redding had failed to establish a 

constitutional violation and that, in any event, they enjoyed 

qualified immunity, the district court ruled that
9

in light of plaintiff’s persistent resistance and 

attempts to leave the scene, the force applied by 

defendant Boulware and defendant Hill was objectively 

reasonable. The facts -- as recounted by the 

magistrate judge and not objected to by the plaintiff 

-- demonstrate that the level of force applied by the 

officers was tailored to that necessary to effectuate 

the seizure. Plaintiff’s behavior from the outset was 

marked by continual resistance and evasiveness.

Addressing more particularly the conduct of Deputy Hill, on 

which Redding’s claims centered, the court concluded

the force applied by defendant Hill was not 

gratuitous. It was designed at all times to 

effectuate the seizure by putting the handcuffs on 

plaintiff, who continually resisted his efforts. Upon 

arriving, he instructed plaintiff at least six times 

to put her hands behind her back, but she persisted in 

her resistance and refused to do so.

The court thus held that the force used by the law enforcement 

officers was not excessive and did not contravene the 

reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Because the 

court found no constitutional violation, it concluded that it 

need not address the issue of qualified immunity.

This appeal followed.2

II

The Fourth Amendment protects the people against 

unreasonable seizures -- i.e., as applicable in this 

 2 Shortly before oral argument, Redding died of unrelated 

causes, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

43(a)(1), we have substituted the administrator of her estate as 

the appellant.
10

case -- against officers’ use of excessive force in effecting a 

seizure. See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 

2003) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). The 

standard for whether an officer uses excessive force is 

“objective reasonableness.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.

In this case, Redding does not challenge an officer’s right 

to place a person under arrest for assaulting a police officer,

nor an officer’s right to place that person in handcuffs as part 

of the arrest process. Rather, she contends that the law 

enforcement officers used excessive force in putting on the 

handcuffs.3

While it is undisputed that Redding sustained injuries, it 

is also undisputed that throughout the entire encounter, Redding 

resisted arrest and that the officers used such force as was 

necessary to handcuff her, and no more. Indeed, Trooper 

 3 Redding also challenges the justification of “her 

custodial arrest for the offense of driving below the minimum 

limit,” arguing that she had the right to resist such an arrest 

as unlawful. But this argument fails because it relies on an 

erroneous reading of the record. Trooper Boulware’s initial 

traffic stop of Redding was justified, as we explained in 

footnote 1, and Redding was arrested later for assaulting a 

police officer after pushing Trooper Boulware. As Boulware 

tried to take Redding into custody, Redding asked, “What do you 

want from me?” Boulware answered, “You are under arrest for 

assaulting a police officer.” In addition, as Redding resisted 

Trooper Boulware’s attempt to place her in custody, Boulware 

told Redding, “You are going to be charged with resisting if you 

do not put that other hand behind your back.” Despite the 

warning, Redding continued to resist.
11

Boulware could not accomplish the task alone and needed the 

assistance of Deputy Hill.

When Deputy Hill finally came, he commanded Redding to 

succumb to handcuffing. Only when she refused to comply, after 

seven separate commands, Deputy Hill forced Redding’s wrist into 

the handcuffs. That force was not greater than necessary to 

effect the arrest, and any injury resulting from it, while 

unfortunate, was the result of Redding’s resisting arrest and 

refusing the officers’ efforts to place her in handcuffs. There 

was no evidence on the videotape or in the transcript of it 

showing or suggesting any gratuitous violence by either officer. 

To the contrary, the officers repeatedly expressed regret to 

Redding, noting that all she had to do was to obey the officers’ 

commands and there would be no problem. Indeed, Officer 

Boulware told Redding that she would not even have received a 

traffic ticket.

We conclude that the force used by the officers was only so 

much as was necessary to effect the arrest and, therefore, was 

not objectively unreasonable. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.
12

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Daphne S. Redding, a 67-year-old woman returning home from 

a local hospital, committed the minor traffic violation of 

failing to activate her vehicle’s “turn signal” upon making a 

right turn. The majority concludes that the use of force to 

arrest her, which included breaking her arm, was not excessive. 

I respectfully dissent.

“The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 

seizures bars police officers from using excessive force to 

seize a free citizen.” Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 

(4th Cir. 2003) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 

(1989)). In determining whether a particular use of force 

violated an individual’s right to be free from an unreasonable 

seizure, “the question is whether a reasonable officer in the 

same circumstances would have concluded that a threat existed 

justifying the particular use of force.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 

F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-

97). 

In the present case, South Carolina Highway Patrol Trooper 

D.P. Boulware activated his vehicle’s emergency lights after 

observing Redding’s traffic violation, and followed her a short 
13

distance to her apartment complex.1 Upon arriving at the 

apartment complex and being confronted by Trooper Boulware, 

Redding exhibited clear signs of fear and confusion,2 and sought 

to contact her husband using her cellular telephone. Trooper 

Boulware denied Redding this request and attempted to gain 

control of her cellular telephone. After Boulware failed in 

this effort, he informed Redding that she was under arrest. 

Redding made no attempt to leave the scene.

After unsuccessfully trying to place both Redding’s hands 

in handcuffs, Trooper Boulware executed a maneuver forcing 

Redding to the concrete surface, injuring her in the process. 

Even while “straddling” Redding on the ground, Trooper Boulware 

was unable to secure Redding in handcuffs. At this point, he 

sought “backup assistance,” which resulted in Lexington County 

Deputy Sheriff B.A. Hill arriving at the scene of the incident. 

 1 The majority emphasizes the fact that, after Trooper 

Boulware activated his emergency lights Redding “failed to stop 

and continued driving for about half a mile.” (Maj. slip op. at 

5.) However, the policy of the Lexington County Sheriff’s 

Department recognizes that female or elderly drivers “may be 

hesitant to stop for a law enforcement vehicle while [alone] on 

an unlighted or desolate roadway,” and provides that “[i]n nonfelony situations, this is a reasonable expectation.”

2 The video recording of the incident establishes that any 

reasonable observer would have been able to ascertain that 

Redding was frightened and confused, almost to the point of 

being disoriented. In fact, Redding immediately informed 

Trooper Boulware that she was “really afraid.” Redding was not 

under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or medication.
14

Deputy Hill informed Redding that if she did not follow his 

directions, she was “going to cause [him] to break [her] arm.” 

When Redding did not acquiesce, Deputy Hill forcibly placed her 

hands into handcuffs, breaking her arm as he warned he would. 

The injury to Redding’s arm required surgery and resulted in 

permanent injury. As stated in their deposition testimony, at 

no point in the encounter did Trooper Boulware or Deputy Hill 

think that Redding posed any threat to their safety.

Rather than recite these facts and all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we 

are required to do at this stage of the proceedings, see Bonds 

v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011), the majority 

states the facts from Trooper Boulware and Deputy Hill’s 

perspective. Among other omissions, the majority fails to 

account for Deputy Hill’s statement that Redding would “cause” 

him to break her arm if she did not allow him to place her hands 

into the handcuffs.

Based on the above facts, I would conclude that Trooper 

Boulware and Deputy Hill (collectively, the officers) were not 

entitled to qualified immunity. However, the egregious nature 

of the officers’ actions in injuring Redding is even more 

apparent when considering other evidence before the district 

court. This evidence included the preliminary report and 

deposition testimony of Melvin L. Tucker, who had served as 
15

chief of police in four cities during a 25-year career in law 

enforcement3 and had worked as a special agent for the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation.

After reviewing the evidence in this case, including the 

video recording from Trooper Boulware’s patrol car camera, 

Tucker concluded that the officers’ use of force against Redding 

was unreasonable, and that “properly trained police officers 

would not have used the same level of force if confronted with 

the same or similar circumstances.” Tucker observed that 

Redding, a 67-year-old woman, posed no immediate threat to the 

officers’ safety and was not attempting to evade arrest by 

flight. In Tucker’s opinion, informed by his law enforcement 

experience involving the use of force, “[t]o use a takedown 

maneuver to place a [67-year-old] female on the ground and then 

to sit on her lower back for several minutes while awaiting for 

another officer to pull her arms behind her back to handcuff her 

. . . are not actions that other reasonable officers would have 

 3 Tucker served as chief of police for the cities of 

Tallahassee, Florida; Asheville, North Carolina; Hickory, North 

Carolina; and Morristown, Tennessee. Tucker has written 

numerous published articles concerning police use of force, has 

provided training to hundreds of law enforcement officers on the 

legal and professional standards governing police use of force, 

and has served as an expert witness, on behalf of plaintiffs and 

defendants, on many legal matters relating to police practices.
16

taken under the same or similar circumstances.”4 Yet, without 

explanation, the majority fails to acknowledge this evidence 

concerning proper police tactics under these circumstances.

The majority also fails, without explanation, to apply this 

Court’s four-factor test for determining whether an application 

of force was unreasonable and excessive. Under this approach, 

as set forth by the district court, a reviewing court must 

examine (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether 

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others”; (3) “whether the suspect is actively 

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”; and 

(4) the extent of the plaintiff’s injury. Jones v. Buchanan, 

325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at

396); see also Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 

2005) (applying Buchanan factors); Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 

202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (same). Applying these factors, I 

would conclude that while the third factor weighs in favor of 

the officers, the remaining factors, and the factors as a whole, 

favor Redding.

 4 Tucker further elaborated on this conclusion in his 

deposition testimony, stating “to use an arm bar take-down and 

hold her down and handcuffing her with her hands behind her back 

is certainly not the minimum level of force that could have been 

used.”
17

Instead of employing this analytical framework, the 

majority merely concludes summarily that “the officers used such 

force as was necessary to handcuff her, and no more.” (Maj. 

slip op. at 10.) In my view, this conclusion is erroneous 

because, as an initial matter, the conclusion is not grounded in 

the facts of the case. 

Further undermining the majority’s position is Trooper 

Boulware’s unequivocal statement during his deposition that 

“[t]here was no reason to break [Redding’s] arm to make an 

arrest.” Thus, while the majority concludes that the breaking 

of Redding’s arm was “necessary to effect the arrest” (Maj. slip 

op. at 11), Trooper Boulware himself, as well as a former police 

chief with 25 years of law enforcement experience, reached the 

opposite conclusion. So would I, in keeping with our duty to 

view the facts in the light most favorable to Redding on summary 

judgment. 

Simply put, the officers’ conduct was objectively 

unreasonable in the context of the enforcement of traffic 

regulations. Redding, a 67-year old woman who was resisting 

arrest but did not pose a threat to the officers’ safety and was 

not attempting to flee, was thrown to the pavement and forcibly 

placed in handcuffs, when it was apparent to at least one of the 

officers that doing so would break her arm. Thus, I would 
18

conclude that the officers’ use of force against Redding was 

excessive.

Although the majority did not reach the second step of the 

qualified immunity analysis, I would conclude that the officers’ 

use of excessive force in this case violated Redding’s “clearly 

established constitutional rights.” Government officials are 

entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law so long as 

they have not violated “‘clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.’” Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 

1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); 

see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Although 

“the contours of the right [at issue] must be specifically 

clear,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), there 

is no requirement that the conduct involved in this specific 

fact pattern have been found previously to violate an 

individual’s rights. See Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 

(4th Cir. 1992) (“The fact that an exact right allegedly 

violated has not earlier been specifically recognized by any 

court does not prevent a determination that it was nevertheless 

‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes.”).

The right not to have one’s arm fractured when being placed 

into handcuffs under the circumstances presented here is 

“manifestly included within more general applications of the 
19

core constitutional principle invoked,” id., namely, the right 

to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable police 

force. See Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993)

(discussing the use of unreasonable police force, and observing 

that “[i]t would have been ‘apparent’ to a reasonable officer in 

[defendant’s] position that, after he had pinned to the ground a 

woman half his size and the woman did not pose a threat to him, 

it was unreasonable to push her face into the pavement with such 

force that her teeth cracked.”). Thus, I would conclude that 

the officers’ use of excessive force in arresting Redding 

violated her clearly established constitutional rights, which 

the officers should have known. See Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 

261. Accordingly, I would hold that Trooper Boulware and Deputy 

Hill were not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.