alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Side Letter Agreement, dated October 30, 2010



  
 Exhibit 10.19

 October 30, 2010 
 GEOTAG
INC. 
 555 Republic Drive 
 Suite 200

 Plano, Texas 75074 
 Attn: Antony
Norris 
 Dear Tony: 

Reference is hereby made to (i) that certain Promissory Note, dated as of January 16, 2009 (the “January
Note”), issued to Zasis LLC, a Nevada limited liability company (“Zasis”), by Ubixo Limited, an Antigua and Barbuda company that was formerly known as M2 Global Ltd. (“Ubixo”), and (ii) that certain
Promissory Note, dated as of February 25, 2009 (the “February Note,” and together with the January Note, the “Notes”), issued to Zasis by Ubixo. Each of the Notes were assigned by Ubixo to GEOTAG INC. on
July 12, 2010, pursuant to the terms of that certain Business Purchase Agreement, dated as of July 12, 2010, by and between Ubixo and GEOTAG INC., as amended by that certain Amendment No. 1 to Business Purchase Agreement, dated as of
August 26, 2010, by and between Ubixo Limited and GEOTAG INC. For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows: 

1. Maturity Date Extension. The maturity date of each of the Notes shall be extended to December 31, 2011. 

2. Consent and Waiver. 
 (a) Zasis hereby expressly acknowledges and ratifies the assignment of the Notes to GEOTAG INC.; provided, however, that Ubixo and any co-signor shall still remain liable on the Notes and this letter
shall not in any way act as a release of Ubixo or any co-signor except as stated in (b) below. 
 (b) ZASIS HEREBY
IRREVOCABLY, UNCONDITIONALLY AND COMPLETELY RELEASES, ACQUITS AND FOREVER DISCHARGES GEOTAG INC., AND EACH OF ITS AFFILIATES, PREDECESSORS, SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS (THE “RELEASEES”) FROM ANY PAST OR PRESENT DISPUTES, CLAIMS,
CONTROVERSIES, DEMANDS, RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, LIABILITIES, ACTIONS AND/OR CAUSES OF ACTION OF EVERY KIND AND NATURE THAT MAY BE ASSERTED OR EXERCISED BY ZASIS IN CONNECTION WITH ANY PAST OR PRESENT BREACHES OF THE NOTES OR ANY AGREEMENTS SECURING THE
NOTES BY ANY OF THE RELEASEES. 
 3. Ratification and Effect. This letter shall be construed in connection with and as
part of each of the Notes, and all terms, conditions, and covenants set forth in the Notes and each other instrument or agreement referred to therein, as applicable, except as herein amended, are hereby ratified and confirmed and shall remain in
full force and effect. 
 4. Counterparts. This letter may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which shall
be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 
 [Signature Page Follows]








  
 To acknowledge your
acceptance of the terms of this letter, please so indicate in the space provided below. 
  

	
	Sincerely,
	
	Zasis LLC
	
	 /s/ Illegible

	Authorized Signatory


 Accepted and agreed as of the
date first above written: 
  

	
	GEOTAG INC.
	
	 /s/ Antony Norris

	Antony Norris
	President
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 21

- 00088

- CV

Diane S. Jones , Appellant

v.

Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts , Appellee

FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D

- 1

- GN

- 19

- 005814 , THE HONORABLE TIM SULAK , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant ’s brief was originally due on April 29, 2021. On May 20, 2021, this

C ou rt sent a notice to appellant informing her that her brief was overdue and that a failure to file

a sat isfactory response by June 1, 2021, would result in the dismissal of this appeal for want of

p rosecution. To date, appellan t has not filed a brief or a motion for extension of time.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution. See Te x. R . App. P. 42.3(b).

__________________________________________ Darlene Byr ne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice By rne, Justices Baker and Smith

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: June 30, 2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHAD STEPHEN WILSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-30252 

D.C. No. 3:15-cr-00080-JO-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Robert E. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 5, 2018

Portland, Oregon

Before: N.R. SMITH and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and CURIEL,** District 

Judge.

Chad Stephen Wilson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His appeal challenges only the 

district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. We have jurisdiction under 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s ruling de novo, but we review the 

court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Zapien, 861 

F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

1. The warrantless search of Wilson’s drawstring backpack complied with 

the Fourth Amendment as a reasonable protective search under Michigan v. Long, 

463 U.S. 1032 (1983). At the time of the search, there was reasonable suspicion to 

believe that Wilson (or Smith, another recent occupant of the vehicle that was 

searched) was “dangerous and [could have] gain[ed] immediate control of 

weapons.” Id. at 1049.

2. The warrantless search of Wilson’s drawstring backpack also complied 

with the Fourth Amendment as a reasonable search incident to arrest under Arizona 

v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). Wilson was “unsecured and within reaching 

distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Id. at 343. 

Under such circumstances, the officers could conduct a warrantless search of the 

backpack in the passenger compartment without violating the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 345. The fact that the search occurred prior to Wilson’s arrest did not make 

it unreasonable. At the time of the search, the officers possessed probable cause to 

believe Wilson had unlawfully possessed a restricted weapon, and the search was 

“roughly contemporaneous” with the arrest. United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 

951–52 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
3

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOUND ON
PAGES 2 AND 3 OF THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE YEAR-TO-DATE AND IS QUALIFIED  
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
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</TABLE>
Jonathan WILNER, et al., and all others similarly situated v. The CEDARS OF CHAPEL HILL, LLC, et al.

No. 234P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 24, 2015.

James T. Williams, Jr., Greensboro, for The Cedars of Chapel Hill, LLC, et al.

Jennifer K. Van Zant, Greensboro, for The Cedars of Chapel Hill, LLC, et al.

D.J. O'Brien, III, Greensboro, for The Cedars of Chapel Hill, LLC, et al.

Benjamin R. Kuhn, Raleigh, for Wilner, Jonathan, et al.

Amie C. Sivon, Raleigh, for Wilner, Diane, et al.

R. Michael Pipkin, Chapel Hill, for Wilner, Diane, et al.

Paul Stam, Apex, for N.C. Association of Realtors.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 7th of July 2015 by Plaintiffs in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of September 2015."
ADKINS v. NC DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

No. 53P16-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 17, 2016.

Darryl Adkins, Laurinburg, for Adkins, Darryl.

*743Zachary Padget, Associate Attorney General, for NC Department of Public Safety.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 18th of February 2016 by Plaintiff for Request for Review:

> "Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of March 2016."
# C_2009193EN.01003701.xml

| 15.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 193/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 193/37

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal of 18 June 2009 — Albert-Bousquet and Others and Johansson and Others v Commission

(Joined Cases F-14/05 and F-20/05) (1)

1

2009/C 193/62

Language of the case: French

Language of the case: French

The President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the joined cases be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 132, 28.5.2005, p. 31 and C 171, 9.7.2005, p. 27.

1

---
1 This proceeding arises out of Cause Nos. 2006-CR-3125, 2006-CR-3128-B, 2006-CR-6116, 2006-CR6117-A, styled State of Texas v. Jesse Mendez, pending in the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas,

the Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl presiding.

iii i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00573-CR

IN RE Jesse MENDEZ

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 20, 2008 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

Relator Jesse Mendez filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging he filed an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court on June 18, 2008, and the trial court has failed to rule

on the application. Mendez asks this court to compel the trial court to issue a pre-trial writ of habeas

corpus and to conduct a hearing on the merits of his application. A copy of the pro se application

for a writ of habeas corpus is attached to the mandamus petition.

“Mandamus relief may be granted if the relator shows the following: (1) that the act sought

to be compelled is purely ministerial and (2) that there is no adequate remedy at law.” Deleon v.

District Clerk, 187 S.W.3d 473, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Winters v. Presiding Judge
04-08-00573-CR

-2-

of the Crim. Dist. Court No. Three, 118 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). To satisfy the

ministerial act requirement, relator must show a clear right to the relief sought, meaning that the

merits are beyond dispute and nothing is left to the exercise of discretion or judgment. Id.; State ex

rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall be

granted without delay by the judge or court receiving the petition, unless it [is] manifest from the

petition itself, or some documents annexed to it, that the party is entitled to no relief whatever.” TEX.

CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 11.15 (Vernon 2005). Mendez alleges in the habeas corpus application

that he is illegally confined pursuant to indictments that are “illegal and unlawful” because Mendez

has “a valid and sufficient defense to all charges.” Habeas corpus is generally not available to

challenge the sufficiency of an indictment prior to trial, except under limited circumstances not

applicable here. See Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Ex parte Tamez,

38 S.W.3d 159, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Ex parte Matthews, 873 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1994). We conclude the trial court could have determined from the face of the application that

Mendez was entitled to no relief at all. Because Mendez has not shown the issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus is a purely ministerial act in this case, he has failed to satisfy his mandamus burden.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
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MARCH 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                  0000919599
<NAME> ACHIOTE CORPORATION
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 99.21****CONSENT OF P. JOHN BARTON**     I hereby consent to the use of my name in connection with the following report and documents,which are being filed as exhibits to and incorporated by reference into the registration statementon Form 40-F of Goldcorp Inc. (the “Company”) being filed with the United States Securities andExchange Commission: 1. The technical report dated March 31, 2006 entitled “Technical Report NI 43-101Los Filos Project, Mexico” (the “Los Filos Report”); and  2. The annual information form of the Company dated March 25, 2008, which includesreference to my name in connection with information relating to the Los Filos Reportand the properties described therein.Date: March 28, 2008         /s/ P. John Barton   Name:  P. John Barton   Title:  Consultant
STATE of North Carolina v. Lucious Bernard SULLIVAN, Jr.

No. 292P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 2015.

Aaron Young, for Sullivan, Lucious Bernard (Jr.).

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Mike Miller, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 12th of August 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of December 2015."

Ervin, J. recused.
----

(2004/C 65 E/146)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2323/03

by Christopher Heaton-Harris (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(8 July 2003)

Subject:   UCLAF

After consultations with Cocobu a number of former UCLAF staff were transferred back into the main Commission out of OLAF.

What departments did they enter? What positions did they hold and have they held since?

Have any of these employees had previous or current connection with Eurostat?

Answer given by Mrs Schreyer on behalf of the Commission

(22 September 2003)

In spring 2001, two management level officials left the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). In mid 2001, ten officials were transferred to Directorate General (DG) Administration (ADMIN) for redeployment purposes.

----
J

- S32026

- 15

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

DEAN L. PROPER,

Appellant No. 1855 WDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order of October 23

, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 43

- CR

- 0000675

- 2013

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON AND MUSMANNO, JJ.

JUDGMENT ORDER PER CURIAM: FILED JUNE 19, 2015

Appellant, Dean L. Proper, appeals from the order entered on October

23, 2014 dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

- Conviction Relief

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541

- 9546. We dismiss the appeal.

On May 19, 2015, we entered the following order:

In order to be eligible for relief under the Post

- Conviction Relief Act, a petitioner must be “[] currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation[,] or parole for the crime[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543 (a)(1)(i). On November 26, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6 to 24 months’ imprisonment with credit for time served back to May 14, 2013. Therefore, it appears that Appellant is no longer serving a
sentence of imprisonment, probatio n, or parole for this
conviction.

AND NOW, this 19 th day of May, 2015, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, within ten days of this order, Appellant shall show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed.

Order, 5/19/15.J

- S32026

- 15

- 2

-

To date, no response has been filed . As such, Appellant has waived

any argument that he is still serving a term of imprisonment, probation, or

parole for this conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot. See

Commonwealth v. Schmohl , 975 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(cita tion omitted) (if a petitioner finishes serving his sentence while an

appeal is pending, the case is moot).

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/19/2015
Filed 9/7/16 P. v. Nicholson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ELDRED ANDRE NICHOLSON,

Defendant and Appellant. F070990

(Super. Ct. No. 14CM7411)



### OPINION

THE COURT *

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Michael J.

Reinhart, Judge.

J. Edward Jones , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and

Respondent.

- ooOoo

-

* Before Kane, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.2

Appointed counsel for defendant Eldred Andre Nicholson asked this court to

review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.

( People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 .) Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth

the facts of the case and requests that we review the record. Defendant was advised of

the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening

brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communicatio n from defendant.

Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable t o defendant,

we affirm the judgment.

We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of

the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

On December 11, 2014, defendant pled no contest to three counts of bat tery on a

correctional officer (Pen. Code, § 4501.5). 1 His five prior strike allegations were

dismissed. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison: the middle term of

three years on count 1, plus one year each for counts 2 and 3. The court ordered

defendant to pay a $3 00 restitution fine (§ 1202.4 , subd. (b) ); a suspended $ 300 parole

revocation fine (§ 1202.45); a $40 court operations assessment fine (§ 1465.8

,

subd. (a)(1)); and a $30 conviction assessment fine (Gov. Code, § 70373). The co urt

waived the restitution fines on counts 2 and 3, and imposed only a $40 court operations

assessment fine (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 conviction assessment fine (Gov.

Code, § 70373) on each count.

On January 28, 2015, defendant filed a notice of appeal. The trial court granted

his request for a certificate of probable cause.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.3

Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no evidence of

ineffective assistance of counsel or any other arguable error that would result in a

disposition more favorable to defendant.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.