alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50523

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GERMAN ESTRADA

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:06-CR-163-ALL

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

German Estrada appeals his 108-month sentence following his guilty plea

to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of

methamphetamine. He argues that the district court clearly erred in

determining the drug quantity attributed to him for sentencing purposes.

Estrada contends that the district court erred in its conversion of the 223.3

grams of methamphetamine at 60% purity to the 133.92 grams of

“methamphetamine (actual).” According to Estrada, his base offense level

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 19, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-50523

2

should have been a level 28, using only the 223.3 grams of methamphetamine

because there was no evidence that he knew the purity ofthe methamphetamine

Estrada stipulated in his plea agreement that the offense involved a net

weight of 223.2 grams, with a purity of 60%, resulting in 133.92 grams of

“methamphetamine (actual).” Thus, the district court’s finding as to the purity

of the methamphetamine and its drug quantity determination as to

“methamphetamine (actual)” under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) was not clearly

erroneous and was plausible in light of the record as a whole. See United States

v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2005). The judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
Freddie Wayne HUFF, II, Petitioner, v. NC DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent.

No. COA15-703.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 1, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
----

----

|   | CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO |
|--------|--------------------------------|

|   | 18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350 |
|--------|-----------------------------|

|   | AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO |
|--------|-----------------------------|

|   | SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002 |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------|

|   | a)  The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15(d)      of  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:  and |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | b)  The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations  the      Company. |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | Dated      March 11, 2008         /s/ Ronald L.    Wilder |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                  Ronald L. Wilder, President |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                  (Chief      Executive Officer) |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                                                       (Chief FinancialOfficer) |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----

----
In the Matter of T.C.K.

No. COA15-580.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Jan. 19, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
TRUHAN v. WALSTON, et al.

No. 364P14-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 10, 2015.

Ann C. Ochsner, Raleigh, for Walston, Susan P.

Bryan T. Simpson, Natalia K. Isenberg, Raleigh, for Truhan, Daniel, et al.

*61Timothy W. Wilson, Rocky Mount, for North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.

M. Greg Crumpler, Rocky Mount, for United Services Automobile Association.

Thomas H. Morris, Wilson, for Walston, Susan P., et al.

Donald E. Clark, Jr., Goldsboro, for Walston, David M.

James D. Secor, III, for Argonaut Great Central Insurance Company.

Jonathan M. Smith, Goldsboro.

Donald J. Dunn, for Truhan, Daniel Joseph.

Fred Baggett, for N.C. Association of Chiefs of Police.

Amy Y. Bason, General Counsel, for N.C. Association of County Commissioners.

Wanda M. Copley, County Attorney, Sharon J. Huffman, Assistant County Attorney, for New Hanover County.

Lowell L. Siler, Durham, for Durham County.

Angela I. Carmon, for City of Winston Salem.

R. Michael Cox, Pasquotank County Attorney, for Pasquotank County.

Debra Bechtel, for Catawba County.

Sam Shames, Gaston, for Gaston County.

John F. Henning, Jr., Franklin, for Town of Franklin.

Wesley L. Deaton, for Lincoln County.

Huey B. Marshall, Bolivia, for Brunswick County.

Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel, for N.C. Sheriffs' Association.

Leon M. Killian, III, Raleigh, for Haywood County.

Chester M. Jones, Franklin, for Macon County.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 19th of December 2014 by NC Sheriffs Association for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief:

> "Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 10th of June 2015."
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A0123. WILMA ISAOLA v. HABITAT FOR HUMANITY OF DALTONWHITFIELD & MURRAY, INC.

This case originated as a dispossessory proceeding in magistrate court.

Following an adverse ruling, defendant Wilma Isaola appealed to the superior court.

The superior court also ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and Isaola filed this direct

appeal from the superior court’s order. We lack jurisdiction.

 Because the superior court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a

magistrate court decision, Isaola was required to follow the discretionary appeal

procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1);English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367

(454 SE2d 175) (1995). Isaola’s failure to follow this procedure deprives us of

jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

09/29/2014

September 29, 2014
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF JULY 12, 1997; THE CONSENSED 
CONSOLIDATED STATMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE 36 WEEKS ENDED JULY 12, 1997; 
AND THE CONDSENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE 36 WEEKS 
ENDED JULY 12, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE  
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   OTHER
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          NOV-01-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             NOV-03-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-12-1997
<CASH>                                           5,048
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   79,788
<ALLOWANCES>                                       987
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                96,637
<PP&E>                                          37,652
<DEPRECIATION>                                  18,129
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 134,840
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           62,731
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           103
<OTHER-SE>                                      52,346
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   134,840
<SALES>                                        372,136
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               373,423
<CGS>                                          295,389
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  365,206
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (308)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   780
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,036
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,489
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,026
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,463
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,463
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.43
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6908

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH H. MOORE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Norman K. Moon, District Judge.

(6:03-cr-30103-nkm; 7:06-cv-00410-nkm)

Submitted: July 2, 2008 Decided: August 26, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph H. Moore, Appellant Pro Se. Ray Burton Fitzgerald, Jr.,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Joseph H. Moore seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Moore has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1781

JOHN PAUL “POPS” TURNER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CITY OF STAUNTON,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District

Judge. (7:08-cv-00413-sgw)

Submitted: August 18, 2008 Decided: September 9, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Paul Turner, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

John Paul Turner appeals the district court’s order

granting his request to proceed in forma pauperis but dismissing

the case as patently frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii)

(2000). We have reviewed the record and find that this appeal is

frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for the reasons

stated by the district court. Turner v. City of Staunton, No.

7:08-cv-00413-sgw (W.D. Va. July 9, 2008). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

LUIS ALBERTO GARCIA DE JESUS, 

AKA Luis Garcia De Jesus, AKA Jose Luis 

Garcia Tolentino, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10383 

D.C. No. 2:18-cr-01446-SMB-3 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 2, 2020**

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. 

Luis Alberto Garcia De Jesus appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 36-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for 

conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-10383 

(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), De Jesus’s 

counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a 

motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided De Jesus the 

opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or 

answering brief has been filed. 

De Jesus waived his right to appeal his sentence. Our independent review of 

the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), discloses no 

arguable issue as to the validity of the waiver. See United States v. Watson, 582 

F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2009). We accordingly dismiss the appeal. See id. at 

988. 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Leobardo Romero-Morales, Appellant.

[799 NYS2d 913]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Rosato, J.), rendered February 27, 2003, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted (see *Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Adams, J.P., Goldstein, Smith, Rivera and Lifson, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                       5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUL-29-2000
<CASH>                                           5,341,687
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      289,575
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (123,584)
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 5,588,324
<PP&E>                                           1,506,111
<DEPRECIATION>                                    (656,569)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,222,331
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,176,956
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           279,051
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,045,375
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,222,331
<SALES>                                          5,298,247
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 5,298,247
<CGS>                                            4,613,832
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,613,832
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 352,577
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (3,322,179)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3,322,179)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (3,322,179)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.13)


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4082

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DONZELL W. BIGGS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Chief

District Judge. (2:06-cr-00025-IMK-JSK-1)

Submitted: August 8, 2008 Decided: August 29, 2008

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling, West

Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon L. Potter, United States Attorney,

David E. Godwin, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Donzell W. Biggs entered a conditional guilty plea,

pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of assaulting a federal

employee with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111

(a), (b) (2000). Biggs agreed to plead guilty after the district

court granted the Government’s motion in limine that sought to

preclude Biggs from asserting at trial the defenses of necessity,

justification, or self-defense. At sentencing, the district court

denied Biggs’ request for a downward departure and sentenced him to

eighty months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release,

and a $100 special assessment. Biggs timely appealed. We affirm.

On appeal, Biggs argues that the district court erred in

granting the Government’s motion in limine because the facts

supported the affirmative defenses of necessity, justification, or

self-defense. A trial court’s refusal to allow an affirmative

defense raises a question of law, reviewable de novo. See United

States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1995). This court has

also held that if “an affirmative defense consists of several

elements and testimony supporting one element is insufficient to

sustain it even if believed, the trial court and jury need not be

burdened with testimony supporting other elements of the defense.”

United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994). Our

review of the record convinces us that the district court correctly
3

concluded that the evidence was insufficient to allow Biggs to

assert the requested defenses at trial.

Accordingly, we affirm Biggs’ conviction and sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Section 1


SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT



This Second Amendment (the "Second Amendment") to that certain Employment Agreement dated effective as of June 1, 2007 by and between HCC Insurance Holdings, Inc (the "Company" or "HCC") and MICHAEL J. SCHELL ("Executive") (the "Agreement") is effective as of December 1, 2010.  Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning set forth in the Agreement.



In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the parties set forth below and other good and valuable consideration the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:



1.Section 1 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


1.Term.  The Company hereby agrees to employ Executive as its Executive Vice President and Chief Property and Casualty Insurance Officer, and as President, Chief Executive Officer and Director of HC, and Executive hereby agrees to accept such employment, on the terms and conditions set forth herein, for the period (the "Term") commencing on the Effective Date and expiring at the earlier to occur of (a) 11:59 p.m. on December 31, 2014 (the "Expiration Date") and (b) the Termination Date (as hereinafter defined).



2.Section 3(a) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


(a)Base Salary.  During the Term Executive shall receive a base salary (the "Base Salary") paid by the Company at the annual rate of $750,000, payable not less frequently than in substantially equal monthly installments (or such other, more frequent times as executives of HCC normally are paid).




3.Section 18(b) of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 

(a)Overall Compliance.  This Agreement is intended to be written, administered, interpreted and construed in a manner such that no payment hereunder becomes subject to gross income inclusion under Code section 409A or additional penalty taxes under Code section 409A.  To the extent that any terms of this Agreement are ambiguous, such terms shall be interpreted as necessary so that amounts payable under this Agreement are not includible in income under Code section 409A(a)(1).



4.All other provisions of the Agreement remain in full force and effect and are not altered by this Second Amendment. 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Second Amendment to be effective as of December 1, 2011.



COMPANY:

HCC INSURANCE HOLDINGS, INC.



/s/ John N. Molbeck, Jr.

John N. Molbeck, Jr.

President and Chief Executive Officer

Date:12/06/2010



 

EXECUTIVE:



/s/ Michael J. Shell

Michael J. Schell  

Date:12/03/2010