[Cite as State v. Yerra, 2016-Ohio-632.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

KISHORE K. YERRA 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 14CA010625 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 13CR086827 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: February 22, 2016 

 

SCHAFER, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Kishore Yerra, appeals the judgment of the Lorain County 

Court of Common Pleas convicting him on three counts of importuning and sentencing him to a 

three-year term of community control sanctions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

I. 

{¶2} The Lorain County Grand Jury indicted Yerra on four counts of importuning in 

violation of R.C. 2907.07(D)(2), a felony of the fifth degree. The indictment arose from a series 

of online conversations that occurred via an Internet chat room between Yerra, who called 

himself “Sam,” and Lorain County Sherriff Detective Dave Lottman, who posed as a 13-year old 

female named “Lisa.” After exchanging basic information, the conversations turned sexual and 

graphic in nature with “Sam” describing various sex acts that he wanted to perform on “Lisa.” 

These conversations occurred during a span of approximately four months after which police 
2 

 

discovered that “Sam” was Yerra. When police arrested Yerra and questioned him, he denied 

knowing who “Lisa” was at first. However, later in the interview, Yerra admitted to engaging in 

the online conversations and that they were sexual in nature. However, Yerra asserted that he 

thought the person he was conversing with was an adult male posing as a young girl. 

{¶3} Yerra waived his right to a jury trial and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. 

After receiving evidence, the trial court found Yerra guilty of three counts of importuning. In 

doing so, it specifically outlined the following regarding Yerra’s mental state during the online 

conversations with “Lisa”: 

This [c]ourt has reviewed the transcript in its entirety and notes that [Yerra] on ten 

(10) separate dates engaged in online chats with the officer posing as a 13 year 

old girl. On many dates there were multiple chats on each date. * * * During 

[those chats, Yerra] was informed that the person on the other side of the chat was 

a 13 year old girl. Furthermore, the Defendant, when referring to the area beneath 

his chat mate’s panties asked if she was “familiar with a razor yet?” [and] on 

another occasion he indicated that you are so young, so tender” and on another 

date asked “do you want to be a kid with me or treated like an adult?” Another 

time [Yerra] stated “I wish you were an adult.” [Yerra] called his chat mate “my 

13 year old baby.” * * * 

 Based on these comments from [Yerra] and a review of the all the 

evidence this court concludes that if [Yerra] did not believe that his chat mate was 

older than 13 but less than 16, then he acted recklessly with respect to his conduct 

on this issue. 

 

The trial court subsequently imposed a three-year term of community control sanctions.1

 Yerra 

filed a motion for delayed appeal, which this Court granted, and he has presented one assignment 

of error for our review. 

 1

 After Yerra’s conviction and imposition of sentence, he was deported to Delhi, India. 

Due to his deportation, the Adult Parole Authority requested that the trial court terminate Yerra’s 

community control sanctions, which it has done. 
3 

 

II. 

Assignment of Error 

Appellant’s convictions for importuning were against the manifest weight of 

the evidence in violation of Article IV, Section 3, of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Yerra contends that his convictions are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he argues that it was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence to find that he believed “Lisa” was actually a 13-year old female or was reckless 

in that regard. We disagree. 

{¶5} When considering a manifest weight of the evidence challenge, we must review 

the whole record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of 

witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). 

Reviewing courts are cautioned to only reverse a conviction on manifest weight grounds “in 

exceptional cases,” State v. Carson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26900, 2013-Ohio-5785, ¶ 32, citing 

Otten at 340, where the evidence “weighs heavily against the conviction,” State v. Thompkins, 78 

Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). 

{¶6} Yerra was convicted pursuant to R.C. 2907.07(D)(2), which relevantly provides 

as follows: 

No person shall solicit another by means of a telecommunications device * * * to 

engage in sexual activity when the offender is eighteen years of age or older and * 

* * [t]he other person is a law enforcement officer posing as a person who is 

thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, [and] the offender 

believes that the other person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen 

years of age or is reckless in that regard[.] 
4 

 

Former R.C. 2901.22(C) stated that “[a] person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, 

with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such 

circumstances are likely to exist.”2 

{¶7} Since Yerra’s challenge to his convictions is based on his belief regarding 

“Lisa’s” age, we must consider his subjective state of mind. See State v. Weir, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 22052, 2007-Ohio-6671, ¶ 17. “State of mind can be proved in two ways: 

through the person’s own admission that he or she harbored the state of mind concerned, which 

is direct evidence of that proposition, or by circumstantial evidence of an objective nature from 

which the state of mind reasonably may be inferred.” Id. When considering the evidence 

offered in this matter, we must be “mindful that direct and circumstantial evidence are of equal 

probative value[.]” State v. Spikes, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008680, 2006-Ohio-1822, ¶ 21, 

citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 259 (1991). 

{¶8} Detective Lottman testified at trial that he, posing as “Lisa,” told Yerra within a 

minute of the Internet chat’s initiation that “Lisa” was only 13 years old. He further explained 

that Yerra asked a variety of questions regarding “Lisa’s” mother, who she described as 

controlling, and her schoolwork. Detective Lottman also indicated that Yerra never 

communicated a belief that “Lisa” was actually older than 13 years old: 

Q: Did Mr. Yerra ever ask you or challenge you on your age? 

A: Not that I recall. 

The State offered into evidence two pictures that Detective Lottman sent to Yerra of “Lisa.” 

Detective Lottman said that these pictures were provided by a Sheriff Deputy auxiliary who 

 2

 2014 Am.S.B. No. 361, effective March 23, 2015, amended R.C. 2901.22’s definition 

of recklessness. Since the charged offenses in this matter occurred before Am.S.B. 361’s 

effective date, we rely on the previous statutory definition of recklessness. 
5 

 

consented to their use for this purpose. The pictures were of the auxiliary when she was 13 years 

old. 

{¶9} The State also offered the transcripts of the online conversations into evidence. 

The transcripts are replete with references to “Lisa’s” age and Yerra’s acknowledgment of her 

age. They reflect that “Lisa” told Yerra that she was 13 years old within a minute of the first 

chat’s initiation, which is consistent with Detective Lottman’s testimony on this point. In their 

second chat three days later, Yerra asked, “but how old are you again?” to which “Lisa” again 

stated “13.” After receiving the pictures of “Lisa,” Yerra remarked “you need to do a lot of 

developing” and “you are not a woman yet.” After the conversations turned sexual in nature, 

Yerra stated, “i [sic] wish the age difference will go away,” and that “you [Lisa] are so young.” 

Indeed, Yerra acknowledged on two occasions that “Lisa” was not of “legal age” and that 

consummating the sex acts that he described during the conversations would put him “behind 

bars.” And, due to their age difference, Yerra suggested to “Lisa” that if they ever met in person, 

they would have to meet somewhere in private so as to avoid detection by the public. 

{¶10} Yerra points out that he testified as follows regarding his state of mind during the 

conversations: 

Q: Now, Deputy Lottman indicated early on in the conversation that he was a 

13-year old girl? 

A: Right. 

Q: What was your reaction to that? 

A: I did not believe that. That’s the reason why I actually asked the age the 

next day. Once again, I could not believe that a 13-year old could get into the 

chat room like that. 

Q: In the course of your conversation with Deputy Lottman, did you ever 

believe that you – that he was actually a 13-year old girl? 
6 

 

A: Based on the nature of the – based on the conversation that what we’re 

taught, I always doubted that it was a 13-year old. I always thought that it was 

somebody much older and probably a male. 

Yerra further testified that he was in an “adults-only” chat room when he initiated the contacted 

with “Lisa” and did not expect a young child to be allowed into the chat room. Based on this 

evidence in the record, Yerra contends that he was “merely engaging in fictional, unrealistic, and 

at times repulsive, conversation about sexual acts between adults and minors” with an individual 

he believed was an adult who was just purporting to be 13 years old. 

{¶11} When considering Yerra’s testimony, we first note that “the mere fact that [a 

defendant] offered his own self-serving contradictory testimony does not support a reversal on 

manifest weight grounds since the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony 

of each witness.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Johnson, 9th Dist. Lorain 

No. 13CA010496, 2015-Ohio-1689, ¶ 15. We see no reason to depart from this axiom in this 

matter since a review of the entire transcript of the online conversations does not support Yerra’s 

assertions regarding his state of mind. Rather, the transcript reflects that Yerra was informed 

multiple times of “Lisa’s” age and that he subsequently referred to their age gap on multiple 

occasions as well as the legal ramifications of actually consummating the sexual acts that he 

described. 

{¶12} Moreover, Yerra did not only engage in sex-driven conversations with “Lisa,” as 

he argues on appeal. He also offered advice on how she should behave with her mother on 

multiple occasions. For instance, the following exchange occurred after “Lisa” described an 

argument that she was having with her mother: 
7 

 

[Yerra]: be a puppy3 and say sorry to her [Lisa’s mother] for being a kid * * 

* i [sic] would really love it if you patched up with her now * * * i [sic] know you 

hate this now . . but you will thank me later * * * 

[“Lisa”]: i [sic] do hate it 

[Yerra]: i [sic] really really really really mean it * * * Lisa, whatever it is 

between us . . i [sic] want to, at the end of the day, be the best human you ever 

possibly can be 

Additionally, Yerra offered advice on how “Lisa” should treat her father and how to handle her 

parents’ divorce. These paternalistic messages suggest that Yerra believed that his online 

conversations were more than “fictional, unrealistic” conversations about sex with an adult male 

who was merely posing as a female child. 

{¶13} Finally, the cross-examination of Yerra effectively reduced the credibility of his 

assertions. Yerra acknowledged that he could not point to “anywhere [in the transcript] where 

[he] say[s], ‘Hey, you know what? I don’t really believe you’re 13 years old. I believe you’re an 

adult male[.]’” The following exchange also occurred regarding Detective Lottman’s interview 

of Yerra: 

Q: Now, when you first met with Detective Lottman here, that was [at 

Yerra’s place of employment], correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And he read you your Miranda rights? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay. And he asked you about Lisa and all of that stuff, right? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And you said, no, you don’t know anybody by that name, correct? 

 3

 Yerra used multiple pet names for “Lisa,” including “baby,” “kiddo,” and “puppy,” all 

of which connote an understanding that “Lisa” was a child. 
8 

 

A: Correct. 

Q: So you lied to him, right? Yes or no. 

A: Yes. 

In light of these acknowledgments on cross-examination, we cannot second-guess on appeal the 

trial court’s determination that Yerra’s assertions lacked credibility. See State v. Jacobs, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 27545, 2015-Ohio-4353, ¶ 47 (rejecting manifest weight challenge where the 

credibility of the defendant’s testimony was “effectively diminished”). 

{¶14} In sum, we cannot conclude that the trial court lost its way when it determined 

that Yerra either believed “Lisa” was 13 years old or was reckless in that regard. As a result, we 

determine that Yerra’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See 

Weir, 2007-Ohio-6671, at ¶ 28 (rejecting the defendant’s manifest weight challenge to 

importuning conviction since “the trial court was free to reject Defendant’s testimony concerning 

his belief [about the other person’s age], and there is no basis for us to find that the trial court 

lost its way in that regard”); State v. Chance, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-09-373, 2006-Ohio3622, ¶ 26-29 (rejecting the defendant’s manifest weight challenge to importuning conviction on 

basis that he believed the other person in chat log was an adult playing out a sexual fantasy 

where there were “indications that [the girl] had little freedom from parental control” and the 

defendant “indicated more than once that he was aware that he was treading on legally dangerous 

ground”). 

{¶15} Accordingly, we overrule Yerra’s sole assignment of error. 

III. 

{¶16} Having overruled Yerra’s assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the 

Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. 
9 

 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

MICHAEL J. GOLDBERG, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.