IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2015-CT-00710-SCT CITY OF MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI d/b/a EAST MISSISSIPPI DRUG TASK FORCE

v. $104,960.00 U.S. CURRENCY , AND A 2003 FORD F-150 SUPERCAB TRUCK, V IN #1FTRX17213NB65899 AND MARIA I. V ALLE CATALAN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/28/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LESTER F. W I LLIAMSON, JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ANDY DAVIS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: J. STEW ART PARRISH JESSICA LEIGH MASSEY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 09/28/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. BEAM, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The City of Meridian f iled a petition f

or f orf eiture under Mississippi Code Sections 41-29-153(a)(5) and/or 41-29-153(a)(7) against Maria Catalan af ter p olice f

o und $104,690
in her truck during a traf

f ic stop. C atalan f

iled a m otion to dism iss f

or f a i lure to state a claim

un d e r R u l e 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi R ules of Civil Procedure, which the Lauderdale County County Court g ran t e d

. The Lauderdale C ounty Circuit Court af f irm ed. The Cityappealed, and the Court of Appeals a f f irm ed the judgm ent o f t h e c i rcuit court. City of
Meridian v. $104,960.00 U.S. Currency , 2016 W L 3906076 ( Miss. Ct. App. July 19, 2016). The City petitioned this Court f

or writ of certiorari. ¶2. Having granted certiorari, w e agree with the Court of Appeals’ dissent that the City ’s f o r f e i t u r e petition satisf

ies the n o tice pleading requirem ents of R ule 8 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. W e also agree with the Court of A ppeals’ dissent that in deciding the Rule 12(b)(6) mo t i on, the county court considered m a t ters outside the City ’s petition. The court also considered ma t ters outside the p leadings f or purposes o f Rule 1 2(c), which allows f or a judgm ent on the pleadings. In doing s o, the county court in ef f ect converted the Rule 12(b)(6) and/or 1 2(c) m otion into a m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent, as provided in Rule
56 of t he Mississippi R

ules o f Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi R ules of Civil Procedure requires at l east ten day s’ notice to both parties that the court is converting the

m otion, which did not occur in this instance. Accordingly , w e reverse the judgm ent of the
Court of Appeals as well a s t he county co urt’s order, and rem and the case f or f urther proceedings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. The Court of

Appeals set f

orth the f acts of the case as f

ollows:
On June 2, 2012, Catalan w as pulled over f o r “ t i red” driving. A c o nsensual search revealed $104,690 h idden in one o f the truck’s c o mp a rtm ents. N o contraband or drugs were f ound in the truck. Nor wa s Catalan charged with any crim inal of

f ense or even a traf

f ic citation.
A f ew weeks l ater, the City f

iled a p etition f

or f orf eiture requesting the f orf eiture of Catalan’s truck and the $104,690. Catalan f iled an answer and a

2request f or production. The City then f iled a m o tion to c ontinue and/or set the case, and the case was set f or Novem ber 3, 2012. The case dragged on f

or over a y ear w i t h d i s c overy and m otions. On August 14, 2013, Catalan f iled a m otion to dism iss under Rule 12(b)(6). Af ter a hearing, the court gr a n t ed the m o tion and ordered t he City to return the conf iscated m oney a nd truck to Catalan. The City appealed t o the circuit court, which af f irm ed the county

court’s decision. . . . City of Meridian , 2016 W L 3906076, at *1. ¶4. The C ourt of Appeals held that, while the C ity ’s petition n am ed the currency and truck

as item s f

or f o rf eiture, i t f

a iled to state any reason f or thei r f

o r f e i t u re. Id

. at *3. “Specif ically , the City presented no f a cts or circum stances to show h ow the use o r intended

use o f the m oney and truck violated the Mississippi Unif orm Controlled Substances Law.”
See i d

. (rely ing on M.R.C.P. 8 c m t., which states, “ [ a ]lthough Rule 8 a bolishes m any technic a l r e q u i r em ents of pleadings, it does not elim inate t he necessity of stating circum stances, occurrences, and events which support the prof f ered clai m” )

. T h eref

ore, according to the Court of Appeals, the City f ailed to m eet Rule 8’s threshold requirem ents, and its petition was properly dism issed under Rule 12(b)(6). I d

. ¶5. The Court of Appeals a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e C i t y ’ s claim that the county c o urt m ade
f indings o f f

act and conclusions of law outside the com plaint, w hich would have converted Catalan’s Rule 12(b)(6) m o t ion to dism iss i nto a m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent, a nd which requires the City

be given ten day s’ notice of the m otion f

or response. Id

. ¶6. The C o u r t of Appeals f ound that, in looking at the county court’s order, “it is clear that the court relied sol e l y o n t h e p l e a d ings to f ind that the City had f

ailed to state a claim

3upon which relief could b e granted.” Id

. According t o the Court o f A ppeals, “[ n]o exhibits,

af f idavits, or other f

orm s of evidence were presented to the court.” Id

. ¶7. W e disagree with the Court of Appeals that the City ’s petition f ailed to state a claim
f or purposes of

Rule 12(b)(6). W e also d isagree w ith the Court of Appeals that the county

court did not g o outside th e p e t ition f or purposes of R

ule 12(b)(6) or the pleadings f or
purposes o f Rule 12(c) of the Mississippi Rules of C ivil Procedure. Based on our review of the record, the county court did do so a nd ef f e c tively treated the m o tion as one f or sum m ary judgm ent. Accordingly , we m u st reverse. DISCUSSION ¶8. A m otion to dism i ss under R ule 12(b)(6) f

or f ailure to state a c laim upon which relief

can be granted raises an issue of law, which i s reviewed de novo. Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre , 212 So. 3d 800, 802 (Miss. 2015). T he m otion t ests the legal suf f iciency of the com plaint, specif

ically t he City ’s petition f or f orf eiture in this case. Id

. Review is lim ited to the f

ace of the p l eading, and allegations m ust be accepted as t rue. Id

. T he m otion should not be granted unless it appears bey ond a reasonable doubt that the plaintif f will be unable to prove any set of f acts in support of the claim

. Rose v. Tullos , 994 S o. 2d 734, 737 (Miss. 2008). “There m

u st be no set of f

acts that w ould allow the plaintif f to prevail.” J.B.
Hunt T ransp., I nc. v. Forrest Gen. Hosp. , 34 So. 3d 1 171, 1173 (Miss. 2010) (quoting
Wilbourn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S. , 998 So. 2d 430, 4 35 (Miss. 2008)).
A reviewing c ourt need “not def er to t he trial c ourt’s ruling.” Fa v r e , 2 1 2 S o. 3d at 8 03 (quoting Rose , 994 So. 2d at 737).

4¶9. Further, Mississippi is a “notice-pleadings ” s t a t e ; f act pleadings a r e not required. Children’s Med. Grp., P.A. v. Phillips , 940 So. 2d 931, 934 (Miss. 2006). This m eans: [ U]nder our r

ules, [ the p laintif

f ] is not required t o plead the specif ic w rongf ul conduct. At the pleading stage, he is required only to place [ t he def endant] on reasonable notice o f the claim s aga inst it a nd t o dem onstrate t hat he h as alleged a recognized cause of action upon w hich, under som e set of f acts, he m ight prevail.
Id

. ¶10. Here, a s the Court of Appeals’ d issent f o u n d , t h e C i t y ’ s p e t i t i o n f o r f orf eiture inf orm ed Catalan this is “ a c ivil action of the f orf eiture of property u nder t he authority of Mississippi Code Annotated s e ctions 41-29-101, et. seq . ” C i ty o f Meridian , 2016 W L 3906076, *3 (Carlton, J., dissenting). The petition say s “ the p roperty , $ 104,960 in currency and a 2003 Ford F-150 Supercab truck, VIN # 1FTRX17213NB65899, was lawf u lly seized

on J une 2, 2012, [ in Lauderdale County , Mississippi] by t he East Mississippi D r u g Task
Force and that the C ity has l awf u lly retained custody of subject property s ince seizure.” Id

. The petition states t hat “bot h t h e c u r r ency and the t ruck were subject to f orf eiture under section 41-29-153(b).” Id

. I t al l e g e s that “the truck and currency have been used, or intended f or use, or constituted p roceeds in violation of the Mississippi Unif orm C ontrolled Substances Law.” I

d

. And it states that “the truck and currency should be f orf eited pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated sections 41-29-179(4) (Rev. 2013) a n d 41-29-181(2) (Rev. 2013).” Id

. ¶11. W e f

ind that the petition f

o r f orf eiture puts Catalan o n reasonable n otice of the City ’s claim s, and it suf

f i ciently dem onstrates that a recognized cause of a ction exists upon which

5the City m ight p r e v a i l u n der som e set of f a cts. The p etition describes with specif icity the property subject to f

orf eiture and provides when, where, and why it was s eized. And if , as the City alleges, the currency and truck have been used, o r were intended f or use to f acilitate
any violation o f t he Mississippi Unif orm Controlled S ubstance Law, the n t h e p roperty is subject to f

orf eiture under Section 41-29-153. Viewing t he petition in t h e l i g h t most f avorable to the C ity , we cannot say it appears bey ond reasonab l e d o u b t there is no set of
f acts by which City

could prevail in its claim

. 1 ¶12. Further, we a lso agree with the Court of Appeals’ dissent t hat the county c ourt went outside the petition i n ruling on Catalan’s Rule 12(b)(6) m otion. W e also f ind that the county court went outside the pleadings f or purposes of Rule 12(c), which a llows a party to m ove f or a judgm e nt on the pleadings. Sim ilar to a Rule 12(b)(6) m o tion, a Rule 12(c) m otion is decided on the pleadings alone. H artford Cas. Ins. C

o. v. Halliburton Co. , 8 26 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Miss. 2001). “If

. . . m atters outside the pleading are presented and not excluded by the court, the m otion shall be t reated as o n e f or sum m ary judgm ent and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties s hall be g i v e n r e a s onable opportunity to present all

m aterial m ade pertinent to such a m otion by Rule 56 . . . .” M.R.C.P. 12(c).

1 We ack n o w led g e th at th e U n ited S tates S u p rem e C o u r t h as rej ected th e “n o set o f f acts” stan d ard f

o r f ed eral cases ap p raisin g a R u l e 1 2 (b )(6 ) m o tio n . S ee B ell A t

l. C o rp . v. T w o m b l y , 5 5 0 U .S

. 5 4 4 , 5 6 0

- 6 3 , 1 2 7 S

. C t

. 1 9 5 5 , 1 9 6 9 , 1 6 7 L

. E d

. 2 d 9 2 9 (2 0 0 7 ) (“T h e p h rase is b est f

o rg o tten as a n in co m

p lete, n eg ativ e g lo ss o n an accep ted p lead in g stan d ard : o n ce a claim h as b een stated ad eq u ately , i t m ay b e su p p o r ted b y s h o w in g an y set o f f acts co n sisten t w ith th e a lleg atio n s in th e co m p l ain t.”). F o r p u rp o ses o f o u r d e c isio n in th is case, w e n eed n o t d ecid e w h eth er th is C o u rt w ill ad o p t th e T w o m b ly stan d a rd

. 6¶13. In the c ourt’s “order on m otion t o dism iss,” the county court f ound, i nter alia , that: (1) Catalan was stopped f or investigation of “ t ired” driving and “gave p erm ission f or the of f icers to search the vehicle”; (2) of f icers c o nducted a “very detailed search,” and f ound the
currency “in a h i dden com partm ent of t he truck”; (3) la w e n f orcem ent m aintained that Catalan “denied ownership of t he c urrency ” when it w a s s e i z e d and C atalan, through counsel, subsequently “claim [ ed] ownership of the truck a s well as th e conf i scated m oney ” in her answer(s) to the City ’ s petition; (4) f ollowing a m otion to com pel f iled b y the City t o require Catalan t o supp ly a m ore detailed and specif ic answer t o interrogatories a nd request f or production of docum ents, the county c ourt h eld that Catalan “had a r ight to assert her Fif th
Am endm ent Privileges[ .]” ¶14. Based o n our review of the record, the court’s order contains a num ber o f f acts and/or evidence t hat are n either contained in the City ’s petition ( f or purposes of Rule 12(b)(6)) nor in Catalan’s responsive pleading(s) (f or purposes of Rule 12(c)). Som e of t hese f acts and/or evidence are disputed by the parties and, as the City contends, m ay be p robative with respect
to the ultim ate question of w h e t h e r t he seized property h as been used, or was intended f or
use, or constitute(s) proceeds in violation of the Mississippi Unif orm Controlled Substances
Law. S e e e
. g. , One Hundred S

even Thousand Dollars ($107,000.00) U.S. Currency v. State ex rel. Harrison County Sheriff’s Dep’t , 643 So. 2 d 917, 9 23 (Miss. 1994) (“f orf eiture

m ay be based w holly on c ircum stantial evidence and inf erence”); see also United States v. U.S. C urrency in the Am ount of $119 , 9 8 4 . 0 0 , M o r e or Less , 304 F.3d 165, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) (in contrast to a crim inal case, if claim ants in a civil f orf eiture case exercise their Fif th

7Am endm ent rights to avoid di s c o v e r y , “the Governm ent m ay be a b le to obtain an adverse inf erence based on their ref

u sal to testif

y ”).
CONCLUSION ¶15. For these r easons, we reverse the county cou r t ’ s o r d er of Rule 12(b)(6) dism issal and/or R ule 12(c) judgm ent a s w ell as the judgm e nt o f t he Lauderdale County Circuit Court and rem and the case to the county court f o r f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶16. REVERSED AND REMANDED

. WALLER, C.J., RA N D OLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING AND MAX W ELL, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., D I S S E N TS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHAMBERLIN, J. ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶17. The C ourt of A ppeals c orrectly h e ld that the petition f or f orf eiture f iled by the City of Meridian f

a i l ed to state a viable claim and af f i rm ed t he trial court’s dism issal of the petition. The “no set of f acts” test em

ploy ed by the m ajority to hold the petition suf f icient has f or good reason been a

bandoned by the United St ates Suprem e C ourt f rom which the Mississippi Suprem e Court adopted it in 1985. Furtherm o re, “no set of f a cts” contradicts another s t andard, also adopted by the Mississippi Suprem e C ourt f or determ ining the suf f i ciency of the com

p laint, that requires that f acts supporting the allegations be pleaded. Because the Suprem e Court’s reasons f or abandoning “no s et of f acts” are persuasive, and because doing so would resolve the conf lict in our own c aselaw, I would abrogate “ no set of
f acts” in f avor of the current stan d a rd of suf f iciency established i n Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556
U.S. 662 (2009), w hich is consistent with Penn National Gam ing, Inc. v. Ratliff , 954 So.

82d 427 (Miss. 2007). In s o doing, I would af f irm the judgm ents of the Court o f Appeals and the trial court. Accordingly , and with respect, I dissent. ¶18. As noted by t h e C o u r t o f A p peals, the City of Meridian’s petition wholly f ailed to allege f acts or c ircum stances that showed that t he m oney and truck were used or were intended to be used i n violation of the Mississippi Unif orm Controlled Substances Law. City of Meridian v. $104,960.00 U.S. Currency , 2016 W L 3906076, *2 ( ¶ 9) (Miss. C t. App. July 19, 2016). Such u s e o r i n t ended use is a prerequisite to f o rf eiture under M ississippi Code Section 41-29-153(a)(5) and (a)(7), under which the city ’ s petition traveled. Accordingly ,

even when taking all o f the f acts alleg e d i n t he petition as true, the city cannot seize the property unless, as the m ajority

holds, no f

acts in support of

the necessary

elem ent m ay

be pleaded. ¶19. The m ajority

excuses the absence by rely ing on Children’s Medical Group P.A. v. Phillips , 940 So. 2d 931, 9 34 (Miss. 2006), to hold that a l l that is r equired in a pleading is

t h at the def

endant be put on notice of the ty pe o f claim and t hat allegations of s u p p o r t i n g f acts are not required. In P hillips , an estranged husband sued his wif e’s c o -worker and the

e mp l oy er of his wif

e and her co-worker f

or alienation of af

f ections. Id. at 932 (¶ 1 )

. T h e def endants challenged the s uf f i c i e n c y o f h is c l aim s pursuant to R ule 12(b)(6). Id. The Phillips Court em

phasized the “any set of f

acts rule,” i

d. at 933 (¶ 6 ), and acknowledged that the “any set of f

acts” standard required “ a high degree o f sp e c u l a t i o n ” on t he part of the reviewi n g c o u r t. Id. a t 9 3 4 (¶ 7). The Phillips Court a llowed the claim to p roceed and af f irm ed the denial of t he m otions to dism i ss, writing, “At the p leading stage, [ the plaintif f ]

9i s required only to place CMG on reasonable notice of t he claim s against i t a n d t o

dem onstrate that he has a lleged a r ecognized cause of action upon which, under som e set of
f acts, he m ight prevail.” Id. at 934 (¶ 10). ¶20. T h e r e e x i s t t w o r eadily identif iable p roblem s w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s c o n t i n u e d

em ploy m ent of the “no s et of f

acts” standard in toda y ’ s c ase. First, t he “no set of f acts” standard contradicts other opinions f rom the Mississippi Supreme C o u rt that f ollowed Phillips and require that som e f a cts be pleaded. Second, the United States Suprem e Court has wholly

abandoned the “no set of f acts” s tandard because, when taken to its e xtrem e , it allows claim s to proceed with nothing m ore alleged than legal conclusions that f all short of the Rule 8 standard of

showing entitlem ent to relief

. ¶21. As to the f

irst p r oblem , we have been inconsistent, to say the least, when delineating what a pleading m

ust contain to be suf

f icient. C ontrary to P

hillips , which handed down in 2006, i n Penn National Gam ing, Inc. v . Ratliff , 954 S o. 2d 427 ( Miss. 2007), which was an unanim ous decision with three justices not participating, the court wrote the f ollowing:
In construing our rules, we som etim es look f or guidance to the f

ederal cases, since the Mississippi Rules of Civil P rocedure were patterned af ter the Federal Rules of C ivil Procedure. W hite v. Stewm a n , 932 S o. 2d 2 7, 39 (Miss. 2006) (“f ederal practice shou l d b e o ur guide when considering questions a rising under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Proc e d ure.”); B ourn v. T om linson Interest, Inc. , 456 So. 2d 747, 749 (Miss. 1984). A m ajority o f f ederal circuits have held that “even under t h e liberal pleading requirem ents of Rule 8(a), a plaintif f m u s t set f

orth f actual allegations, either d irect or i nf erential, respecting each m aterial elem ent necessary t o sustain recovery under som e actionable legal theo r

y . ” United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose–Wakefield Hosp. , 360 F.3d 220, 240 (1st Cir. 2004); see a lso V arljen v. Cleveland Gear Co. , 250 F .3d 426, 4 29 (6th Cir. 2001) (“To survive a m otion to dism iss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a com plaint mu s t c o ntain either direct o r i nf erential allegations r e s p e c t ing all the m aterial e lem ents to sustain a recovery under

1 0som e viable legal theory

. ”); Carl Sandburg V i ll. C ondo. Ass’n No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co. , 7 5 8 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1985) ( “A com plaint m u st state either direct or inf

erential allegations concerning all of the m aterial e lem ents necessary f or recovery

under the relevant legal theory

. ”). Ratliff , 954 So. 2d at 432 (¶ 11). The Rat l i f f C o u r t held that the plaintif f s f a iled to allege

s uf f icient f acts to s upport the attem

pt in their com

p laint to pierce the c o rporate v e i l o f a

c o r p orate def

endant. Ratliff

, 954 So. 2d at 432 (¶ 12). “The Ratlif f s f ail to ma k e a n y assertion in their c om

plaint that BSL is a m ere corporate shell or alter ego of Penn National.
T h e Ratlif

f s do not allege in t heir com plaint that Penn National has disregarded c orpor a t e f orm alities or has u s ed the corporate f orm to com m it m i sf

easance.” Id. The Ratliff standard, which held a case should be dism issed f or f ailing to allege suf

f icient f acts, contradicts and

cannot be reconciled to t he “no set of f acts” s t a ndard em

ploy ed by the Phillips Court, y et neither case has been overruled. ¶22. A s t o t h e second p roblem , the Mississippi Suprem e Court adopted the s t a n d a r d

e mp l o y ed by the m ajority , that the com plaint should n ot b e dism issed unless, bey ond a reasonable doubt, no set of f a cts exists to support it, in Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Construction Com

p any, Inc. , 464 So. 2d 499 (Miss. 1985). In doing so, the Court looked to the then-leading f

ederal case Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Stanton & Assoc.,
Inc. , 464 So. 2d at 505. However, the United S tates Suprem e Court a b rogated Conley and
“no set of f

acts” in B e l

l A t l a n t ic Corp. v. Twom bly , 550 U.S. 544 ( 2007). T he Twom bly
Court wholly rejected the “literal reading o f Conley ’s ‘no set o f f acts’” emp l o y e d b y t h e

m ajority today and, f

r ankly , b y the Phillips C ourt. Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 561. “This “no set of f acts” language c an be r ead in isolation as say ing that any statem e nt revealing the theory

1 1of

the claim will suf f i ce unless its f

actual im possibility m ay

be shown f

rom the f a ce of the pleadings.

. . .” Id. The Twom b ly Court cam e not to praise “no set of f a cts,” but to bury it. “The phra s e i s best f

orgotten as an incom

p lete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim

has been stated adequately , it m ay be supported by showing any set of f acts consistent with the allegations in the com plaint.” Id. at 563. ¶23. Two y ears later, in Ash c r o f t v . I q b a l , 5 56 U .S. 662 (2009), the Court provided a standard f

or f actual su f f i c i e ncy i n a com

plaint that M ississippi would do well to adopt. There, the Court characterized T wom b ly as describi n g the f ederal Rule 8 standard as not

r e q u i r i n g “ d e tailed f

actual allegations” but dem anding m ore than “unadorned , t h e - d e fe n d a

n t

h a r m ed-m e” accusation. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. “A pleading that of f ers ‘label s a n d conclusions’ or ‘a f

orm ulaic recitation of t he elem e nts of a cause o f a c tion will not do.’” Id. (citing Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 5 5 5). A com plaint that “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of
‘f u rther f actu a l enhancem ent’” f

ails. Id. (quoting Twom bly , 555 U.S. at 557). The Iqbal Court continued as f

ollows:
To survive a m otion to dism iss, a com p laint m ust contain suf

f icient f actual m atter, accepted as true, to state a claim t o relief that is plausible on its f ace. A claim has f

acial p lausibility when t he p laintif f pleads f ac t u a l c ontent t hat allows the court to draw the reasonable inf erence that the d ef

endant is liable f or the m isconduct alleged. The plausibility standard i s not akin to a “probability requirem ent,” but it asks f or m ore t han a s heer possibility that a def endant has acted unlawf ully

. W here a com

p laint p l e a d s f

acts t hat are “m erely consistent with” a def endant’s liability , it “stops s hort of the l ine between possibility

and plausibility

of ‘entitlem ent to relief

.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotations to Twom bly om itted).

1 2¶24. T h e Iqbal Court went on to identif y “two working princi p l e s ” t h a t u n d e r l a y t h e Twom bly opinion. The f

irst, very m

uch applicable to the case sub judice , is that the principle requiring courts to accept as true all f actual allegations i n a com plaint does not a

p ply to legal conclusions. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. As the Court o f Appeals pointed out, the C ity does no

m ore than allege a legal conclusion when it alleges that the assets i n question are subject to f or f e i t u r e b y t h eir owner. “Threadbare recitals o f the elem e nts of a cause of action,

s u p p orted by m ere conclusory statem ents, do not suf f ice.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 67 8 ( c i t i n g Twom bly , 555 U.S. at 555). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of C ivil Procedure, which rem ains in pertinent part i dentical to M i ssissippi’s, “m arks a notable and g enerous d eparture f rom the h y p e r t e c h n i cal, code-pleading regim e o f a prior e ra, but it does n ot unlock the doors o f discovery f

or a plaintif

f arm ed with nothing m ore t han conclusions.” Iqbal , 5 56 U.S. at 678-
679. ¶25. The s econd working principle, also a ppli cable, is t hat only a com plaint that states a plausible claim f

or relief survives a R

ule 12(b)(6) m o tion to dism iss. Id. a t 6 79. W hile the determ ination is “context-specif ic,” when “the well-pleaded f acts do not perm it the court to inf er m ore than the m ere p ossibility of m isconduct, t he com plaint has a lleged—but it has not ‘show[ n]’ – ‘that the pleader is e ntitled to relief .’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In the i nstant case, the City ’s petition alleges – but f ails t o show – that the City is entitled to the property at issue. ¶26. Pursu a n t t o t h e f

o r e g o i n g reasoning, I would adopt the standard f or suf f iciency elucidated b y the Twom bly and Iq b a l Courts and af f irm the judgm e nts of the Court of

1 3Appeals and the trial court. In t ruth, as the law stands in Mississippi t oday , l a w y e r s f i ling

or responding to Rule 12(b)(6) m otions can c i te our cases that require f acts to be pleaded,
e.g. , Ratliff

, o r c a s e s t h a t a

pply the extrem e version o f “no set of f acts” decried by the
Twom bly Court, i.e., Phillips

. W e have m anaged to keep both lines of cases alive, despite the f act that they cannot be reconciled. I am persuaded by

the T wom bly Court’s reasoning in bury ing “no set of f

acts.” However, as the m ajority chooses t o f o l l o w it, the m ajority should take the step of overruling Ratliff and ot h e r cases that require t he pleading of f acts
to overcom e a m otion to dism i ss. CHAMBERLIN, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

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