Filed 1/22/14 P. v. Chuc CA4/1 

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JUAN ALBERTO CHUC, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 D063766 

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD240347) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Eugenia 

Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Law Office of Narciso Delgado-Cruz and Narciso Delgado-Cruz for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa 

Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 Juan Chuc entered a negotiated guilty plea to three lewd act counts. (Pen. Code, 

§ 288, subd. (a).) Less than one month later, Chuc moved to withdraw his plea, but the 
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court denied the motion. On appeal, Chuc contends the court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion. We reject this contention and affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 

 Chuc was charged with seven counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 

the age of 14; the counts pertained to two victims. In a plea agreement, Chuc agreed to 

plead guilty to three of the counts in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts 

and a 12-year sentence. Chuc signed and initialed the standard change-of-plea form, 

which included his statement that he understood his conviction would be "a 

serious/violent felony ('strike') resulting in . . . substantially increased penalties," 

including "a term in State Prison in any future felony case." 

 At the plea hearing, Chuc was represented by counsel and was assisted by a 

Spanish interpreter and a Quiche interpreter, Policarpo Chaj. Chuc was born in 

Guatemala and his primary language is Quiche. The Spanish interpreter was necessary 

because the Quiche interpreter could translate into Spanish, but not English. 

 Before the court accepted the plea, the following colloquy occurred: 

"Q. Mr. Chuc, have you had any drugs, alcohol or medication in the last 

24 hours?" 

"A. No, nothing." 

[¶] . . . [¶] 

"Q. Did you have ample opportunity to go over these change-of-plea 

forms with your attorney Miss Oliver today?" 

"A. Yes." 
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"Q. Prior to initialing and signing these forms, did you understand all the 

contents and all the consequences contained in these forms?" 

"A. Yes." 

"Q. And were these change-of-plea forms in their entirety translated for 

you from English into your native language?" 

"A. Yes." 

[¶] . . . [¶] 

"Q. You understand, sir, that by pleading guilty today, you would be 

giving up these constitutional rights in this case: your right to a speedy and 

public trial by jury, your right to confront and cross-examine all the 

witnesses in this case, your right to remain silent, and your right to present 

evidence and to have the court subpoena witnesses at no cost to you?" 

"A. Yes." 

"Q. And you, and you wish to give up those rights, correct?" 

"A. Yes." 

"Q. I'm told that this is the plea agreement that has been reached between 

you and the district attorney's office. And that is if you plead guilty to 

counts one, two and three, the district attorney's office will dismiss the 

balance of the information and you and they agree that I am going to 

sentence you to 12 years in the state prison. [¶] Is that your understanding 

of the plea agreement that's been reached with you in this case?" 

"A. Yes, that's right." 

[¶] . . . [¶] 

"Q. And you understand, sir, that these three convictions will be 

considered to be three separate and independent serious and/or violent 

felony convictions, what we call Three Strike convictions, resulting in 

mandatory denial of probation, substantially increased penalties, and a 

term in state prison in any future felony case? [¶] You understand that is a 

consequence of pleading guilty to counts one, two and three?"

"A. Yes, I understand." 
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"Q. And you also understand, sir, that because you are pleading guilty to 

Three Strikes, in any future felony case you could receive up to 25 years to 

life or more; you understand that?"

"A. Yes, I know that, too." 

"Q. And you understand, sir, that if you are not a United States citizen, 

these pleas of guilty will result in your removal, deportation, exclusion 

from admission to the United States and a denial of naturalization; you 

understand that?" 

"A. I do understood, too." 

"Q. And you understand, sir, that as a consequence of this plea, you have 

to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290 for the rest 

of your life; you understand that's a consequence of this plea?" 

"A. Yes." 

"Q. And you understand that because you're pleading guilty to three 

counts of 288(a), you would be subjected to the Sexually Violent Predator 

law; you understand that?" 

"A. Yes." (Italics added.) 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Chuc entered the plea 

"knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily," and accepted the plea. 

 Less than one month later, Chuc moved to withdraw his plea. Chuc argued his 

plea was not knowing or voluntary because: (1) he did not understand the meaning of the 

word "strike" and thus did not fully understand the consequences of his plea; and (2) at 

the plea hearing he suffered from substantial pain because of a hernia and was under the 

influence of prescription pain medication that impaired his judgment. 

 In support of these claims, Chuc testified he speaks a dialect of Quiche, a language 

spoken in his native country. He acknowledged he had a Quiche interpreter, and 
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confirmed the interpreter (with the assistance of the Spanish interpreter) translated his 

attorney's explanation regarding the change-of-plea form and translated at the plea 

hearing. He said that although he understood most of the interpreter's translation, he did 

not "completely" understand the interpretation of the word "strike." Chuc said he 

questioned the interpreter about the word and "whatever the attorney said is what was 

interpreted to me." 

 Regarding his physical condition, Chuc testified that during the hearing he "felt a 

lot of pain" due to a hernia. He said it felt as if he was "being stabbed with a knife." He 

said the jail doctor had given him a medication called "Aferfil" to "calm the pain" the 

night before his change of plea hearing. 

 In opposing Chuc's motion, the prosecutor presented the testimony of Euketa 

Oliver, the attorney who represented Chuc at the plea hearing. Oliver testified that Chuc 

did not appear ill or under the influence of medication at the hearing, and Chuc never 

mentioned he was in any pain or on medication at the hearing. Oliver confirmed that she 

provided Chuc with a detailed explanation regarding the consequences of his guilty plea, 

including the meaning of a "strike" and the specific consequences of pleading to multiple 

strike charges. Oliver said Chuc appeared to understand her explanations. She said "I 

didn't use fancy words, no legalese . . . . If there was something that I said that didn't 

translate, the interpreter would let me know, can you use another word . . . ." 

 Consistent with this testimony, Interpreter Chaj testified that he recalled Oliver 

explaining the meaning and consequences of a strike to Chuc, and Chaj interpreted the 

attorney's explanation to Chuc. Chaj said he did not remember any problems 
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communicating with Chuc and confirmed his interpretations were accurate. Chaj 

indicated that although there is no specific equivalent Quiche word for "strike," he was 

able to accurately describe the meaning of a strike to Chuc by using other words. Chaj 

said he had received formal training in interpretation and had been working as a Quiche 

interpreter for about 13 years. 

 The prosecution also presented Chuc's medical records while in custody. The 

records did not show any prescription for a drug called "Aferfil" and reflect that he had 

received only Ibuprofen for pain. 

 After considering the evidence and argument, the court ruled Chuc did not show 

by clear and convincing evidence he had good cause to withdraw his guilty plea. The 

court found Chuc understood the consequences of his plea, and this understanding was 

confirmed by Oliver, Chaj, and Chuc's prior representations. The court also found 

unsupported Chuc's claims that his physical condition precluded him from knowingly 

waiving his rights. The court based this finding on its own independent recollections of 

Chuc's demeanor, Chuc's statements at the hearing, Oliver's testimony, and the fact that 

Chuc's medical records did not support his claims. 

 The court concluded that "based on all of this [evidence] and based on Ms. 

Oliver's testimony, the court feels very comfortable that at the time [Chuc] understood 

the consequences of pleading guilty to counts one, two, and three. . . . [T]he court feels 

very comfortable that that was explained to him in a variety of ways. [¶] As to Mr. 

Chuc's indication that he was in pain and suffering from pain, based on Mr. Chuc's 

testimony today, I didn't get the sense that if he was in pain, [it was] so overwhelming 
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that he didn't understand the nature of what he was doing. Ms. Oliver certainly didn't 

seem concerned at all in terms of whether or not he was in pain on that day. In fact, she 

stated nothing led her to believe that he was in any pain and . . . under the influence of 

any medication. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The court cannot find based on the testimony today that 

somehow Mr. Chuc was in any type of pain that would cause the court any concern that 

he somehow was under duress or painful circumstances and was so overcome to exercise 

his free judgment . . . ." 

DISCUSSION 

 Chuc contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea because: (1) he did not understand the consequences of pleading 

to a "strike"; and (2) he was in substantial pain and under the influence of medication and 

therefore did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights. 

I. Legal Principles

 Penal Code section 1018 provides: "On application of the defendant at any time 

before judgment . . . , the court may, . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty 

to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. . . . This section shall be liberally 

construed to effect these objects and to promote justice." In general, "[m]istake, 

ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for 

withdrawal of a guilty plea." (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) However, "[a] 

plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind." 

(People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456.) The defendant has the burden to 
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show, by clear and convincing evidence, there is good cause for withdrawal of his or her 

guilty plea. (Id. at p. 1457.) 

 A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 

(People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) On appeal, we must affirm the 

court's ruling, unless the defendant "show[s] a clear abuse of that discretion." (Ibid.) In 

evaluating challenges to the court's ruling, we "must adopt the trial court's factual 

findings if substantial evidence supports them." (Ibid.; People v. Breslin (2012) 205 

Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416.) " 'All questions of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence 

are addressed, in the first instance, to the trier of fact, in this case, the trial judge. We 

cannot reverse [a court's] order if there is substantial evidence or a reasonable inference 

to be drawn from it which supports the order. Where two conflicting inferences may be 

drawn from the evidence it is our duty to adopt the one supporting the challenged order.' " 

(People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660, 667.) The trial court may consider its 

own observation of the defendant and the credibility of the defendant when it decides 

whether to grant the change-of-plea motion. We are bound by the court's credibility 

determinations. (See Fairbank, supra, at p. 1254.) 

II. Analysis

The court found Chuc fully understood the consequences of the plea agreement 

and that Chuc's waivers were knowing and voluntary. These findings are supported by 

the record. 
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 Chuc contends the trial court abused its discretion because he testified he did not 

understand the meaning of the word "strike." However, the court had a reasonable basis 

to find this testimony did not show he did not understand the consequences of his plea. 

 Chuc's attorney testified that she fully and clearly explained to Chuc the 

consequences of pleading guilty to the three counts, including the strike consequences. 

Interpreter Chaj corroborated this testimony and specifically recalled explaining the 

meaning of a strike. Oliver and Chaj both testified that Chuc manifested an 

understanding of the explanation. Additionally, before accepting the plea, the trial court 

asked Chuc if he understood that by pleading guilty to the three offenses, the offenses 

would be considered three separate and independent serious or violent convictions, and 

that the consequences of pleading guilty included mandatory denial of probation, 

substantially increased penalties, and a term in state prison in any future felony case up to 

25 years to life. Chuc responded that he understood these consequences. Chuc also 

initialed line 7c of the change-of-plea form which identified the consequences of pleading 

guilty to the three counts. Chuc admitted the form was translated and explained to him in 

both Quiche and Spanish. 

 Despite this evidence, Chuc contends he could not have understood the meaning 

of a strike because there is no equivalent term for a "strike" in his native language. 

However, even assuming Chuc did not understand the word "strike" in isolation because 

of the difficulty of a word-for-word translation, the record shows that the court and 

defense counsel explained to him the consequences of pleading guilty to strike offenses, 

including the possibility of a 25-years-to-life sentence if he commits another felony. By 
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knowing the result of pleading to the three strike offenses, Chuc was properly informed 

of the consequences of the plea. On this record, the trial court reasonably rejected Chuc's 

contention that he did not understand the "strike" consequences. 

 We also reject Chuc's claim that the court abused its discretion because he was in 

substantial pain and/or he was under the influence of prescription medication that clouded 

his mind. At the motion-to-withdraw hearing, Chuc testified that he had been in 

substantial pain at the prior hearing. However, this testimony was inconsistent with the 

observations of others at the prior hearing and was not supported by the information in 

his medical chart. Other than his own statements, Chuc offered no corroborating 

evidence. Additionally, Chuc made several statements reflecting that he was seeking to 

withdraw his plea because he had changed his mind and not because his earlier plea was 

involuntary or coerced because of his physical pain. 

 The court had reasonable grounds for finding Chuc's testimony was not credible. 

The court, which was the same court that presided over the initial plea hearing, stated that 

it had not observed any indications that Chuc was suffering from pain that would have 

precluded him from making a voluntary and knowing choice. These observations were 

consistent with the testimony of Chuc's attorney and the information in Chuc's medical 

records. The court specifically asked Chuc during the initial plea hearing if he took any 

medication within the past 24 hours, and Chuc said "No." 

 The prosecution presented substantial evidence coupled with the trial court's 

independent observations to establish Chuc understood the consequences of his plea and 
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pleaded freely and voluntarily. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chuc's 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

DISPOSITION 

 Judgment affirmed. 

HALLER, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

NARES, Acting P. J. 

MCDONALD, J.