alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE of North Carolina v. William Gerald PRICE, Defendant.

No. COA15-1073.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 15, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No error in part, dismissed in part.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Captaris, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, Peter Papano, Chief Financial Officer and
Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                              
|--------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                              
|/s/ PETER PAPANO                                              
|Peter Papano Chief Financial Officer and
Treasurer May 9, 2008
Exhibit 99.18

CONSENT OF SOPHIE BERGERON

Reference is made to the Annual Report on Form 40-F and the documents incorporated by reference therein (the 40-F) of Goldcorp Inc. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2012, and any amendments thereto, to be filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the Annual Information Form (the
AIF) and Managements Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of the Company for the year then ended, which are filed as exhibits to and incorporated by reference in the 40-F.

I hereby consent to the references to, and the information derived from, the following report(s) and to the references, as applicable, to
my name in connection with (including, as an expert or qualified person) the following report(s) and documents:



|1. | The technical report dated April 5, 2011, entitled Cerro Negro Gold Project, Santa Cruz Province, Argentina, NI 43-101 Technical Report on Updated
Feasibility Study (the Cerro Negro Report); and
|-- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The 40-F, the MD&A and the AIF, which include references in connection with information relating to the Cerro Negro Report and the Cerro Negro Project, and the
properties described therein.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I also hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of such information
contained in the 40-F, the MD&A and the AIF into Registration Statement Nos. 333-126038, 333-126039, 333-126040, 333-151243, 333-151251, 333-174376 and 333-181116 on Form S-8 of the Company.



|                    |  |                            
|------------------- |  | ---------------------------
|Date: March 1, 2013 |  |                            
|                    | 
|                    |  | /s/ Sophie Bergeron        
|                    |  | Name: Sophie Bergeron, eng.
----

(2004/C 65 E/139)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2282/03

by Elspeth Attwooll (ELDR) to the Commission

(9 July 2003)

Subject:   Fishing opportunities

Can the Commission provide any information on the level of fishing opportunities used by British fishers both within 200 miles of the British coast and beyond 200 miles?

Furthermore, could the Commission provide any information on the level of fishing opportunities used by other EU fishers within 200 miles of the British coast and by non-EU fishers within that same area?

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(12 August 2003)

The Commission does not have the means of producing the information requested.

The Control Regulation (1) (EEC Council Regulation No 2847/93) sets for each Member State the obligation to notify to the Commission the quantities of each stock or group of stocks landed during the preceding month, when the concerned stocks are subject to total allowable catch (TAC) or quotas. For other stocks (not subject to TAC or quotas and caught either in Community waters, in third countries' waters or on the high seas) Member States have the obligation to notify to the Commission the quantities landed of each stock quarterly. This allows the Commission to monitor the level of fishing opportunities used by Member States.

The notifications of landings received from Member States do not distinguish between catches made within 200 miles of one Member State's coast and those made beyond, as they are based on the areas established by the TAC and quota Regulation.

The fishing or catch areas defined by this Regulation correspond, in general, to entire International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) divisions or subdivisions or to fishing areas as defined by Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) for statistical purposes. They are not established following the line of the 200 miles.

----

(1)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy, OJ L 261, 20.10.1993.

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRANDON O’NEIL HALL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.

(8:06-cr-00028-DKC-9)

Submitted: August 8, 2008 Decided: September 9, 2008

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Warren E. Gorman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Barbara S. Skalla, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Brandon O’Neil Hall pled guilty, pursuant to a plea

agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or

more of cocaine base. Hall’s plea agreement reads: “Defendant

waives any right to appeal from any sentence within or below the

advisory guidelines range resulting from an adjusted offense level

of 35.” (SJA 137, emphasis in original). The district court

conducted Hall’s plea hearing in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P.

11 and specifically reviewed Hall’s above waiver. Hall was

sentenced to 135 months of imprisonment, based on an offense level

of 33. 

Hall appeals, alleging that the district court erred by

failing to give him a sentence reduction under the “safety valve”

provision of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2 (2006). The Government

responds that Hall has waived his right to contest his sentence.

For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal. 

We review de novo whether a defendant has effectively

waived his right to appeal. United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493,

496 (4th Cir. 1992). A defendant may waive the right to appeal if

that waiver is a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the

right to appeal. United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143,

1146 (4th Cir. 1995). Our review of the plea hearing reveals that
- 3 -

Hall knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his

instant sentence. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d at 1146. The district

court fully questioned Hall regarding his waiver of his right to

appeal during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy at his plea hearing,

United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991),

and based on an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, we

find the waiver enforceable. United States v. General, 278 F.3d

389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, because Hall has waived his right to contest

his 135-month sentence on appeal and he raises no issues falling

outside the scope of that waiver, we dismiss. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

 DISMISSED
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas** MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

- 14

- 00634

- CR
Steven VELASCO , Appellant

v. The The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 227th Judicial District Court , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2013CR 4702 Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr. , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice 1
Delivered and Filed: December 23, 2014
DIS MISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION Appellant Steven Velasco is seeking to appeal from the trial court’s order modifying the conditions of his probation. An order modifying the conditions of probation is not appealable at the time of the modification. A defendant may appeal the judgment pl acing him on probation.
T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art. 42.12(23)(b) (West Supp. 2014). A defendant may also appeal an order revoking his probation. Id . Those are the two opportunities permitting an appeal in a case involving probation. Basaldua v. St ate , 558 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

1 Not participating.04

- 14

- 00634

- CR On September 30, 2014, this court ordered Velasco to show cause in writing no later than October 30, 2014, why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Velasco did not respond to our order. Accordingly, because this court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal of an order modifying the conditions of probation, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id

. PER CURIAM
DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2

-
<PAGE>


EXHIBIT 10.15

                                      NOTE

$500,000.00                                                  September 5, 2001


         FOR VALUE RECEIVED, RMU MANAGEMENT LLC, having an office at 52 Lanark
Road, Stamford, Connecticut 06902 ("RMU"), promises to pay to i3 MOBILE, INC., a
Delaware corporation having an office at 181 Harbor Drive, Stamford, Connecticut
06902 ("i3 Mobile"), or order, on the first anniversary of the date hereof the
principal sum of Five Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($500,000.00), in
lawful money of the United States of America, together with interest on the
unpaid principal sum at an annual rate equal to the Prime rate of interest
published in The Wall Street Journal plus two percent.

         All payments under this Note shall be payable to i3 Mobile at its
office or at such other place as i3 Mobile shall notify RMU in writing.

         RMU shall have the right, at any time and from time to time, to prepay
all or any part of this Note without premium or penalty.

         There is delivered herewith as collateral security for the performance
of RMU's obligations hereunder certificates representing Five Hundred Thousand
(500,000) shares of i3 Mobile's Common Stock owned by RMU (the "Shares")
pursuant to that certain Security Agreement of even date herewith by and between
i3 Mobile and RMU with full authority to have Shares with a market value equal
to all amounts due hereunder transferred to i3 Mobile on its books upon default
in the performance of RMU's obligations hereunder, and any transfer so made
shall operate to discharge RMU from all obligations hereunder.

         RMU hereby waives presentment, protest, demand, diligence, notice of
dishonor and of nonpayment.

         This Note shall be governed by and construed according to the laws of
the State of Connecticut (without giving effect to conflicts of law).

         This Note shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the heirs,
representatives, successors or assigns of the parties hereto.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Note has been duly executed by RMU on the day
and year first above written.

                                                     RMU MANAGEMENT LLC


                                                     By:   /s/ Robert M. Unnold
                                                           --------------------
                                                              Robert M. Unnold
                                                              Managing Member
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40870

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SHANE EUGENE RUSHING

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:06-CR-160-1

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and PRADO and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Shane Eugene Rushing appeal his conviction for being a felon in

possession of a firearm. Rushing argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion to suppress the evidence because the officers’ warrantless entry ofthe

residence Rushing shared with his father violated hisFourth Amendment rights

under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). Rushing also contends that the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 19, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40870

2

evidence was insufficientto show he had actual or constructive possession of the

shotgun found in the residence. 

In Randolph, the Supreme Court established a rule “that a physically

present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive

as to him, regardless of the consent of the fellow occupant.” 547 U.S. at 122-23.

Because the district courtfound that Rushing did not refuse entry to the officers,

Randolph is inapplicable to the instant case. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120-23.

The consent of Rushing’s father was sufficient to justify the warrantless entry

of the residence. See Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

Rushing’s challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence is also without merit.

Officer O’Dell McDuffie testified that Rushing grabbed the shotgun, thus placing

him in actual possession of the firearm. Rushing provided a statement to the

officers that he owned the shotgun. Rushing’s father testified that Rushing

brought the shotgun to the house when he moved into the residence.

Additionally, Rushing was found in possession of ammunition for the shotgun.

Although Rushing testified that he did not touch the shotgun and that it did not

belong to him, the district court rejected this testimony as not credible.

Credibility determinations are “resolved in favor of the verdict.” United States

v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, a reasonable trier of fact

could have found Rushing guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States

v. Mendoza, 226 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>
                                              
<ARTICLE>                                          5
<LEGEND>                                      
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 1996 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>                                     
<MULTIPLIER>                                                  1000
                                                    
<S>                                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                      YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                  Dec-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                     Jan-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                       Dec-31-1996
<CASH>                                                        5236
<SECURITIES>                                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                26506
<ALLOWANCES>                                                   284
<INVENTORY>                                                  78438
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                            117169
<PP&E>                                                       87627
<DEPRECIATION>                                               43644
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                              234044
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                        77720
<BONDS>                                                      15535
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                            0
<PREFERRED>                                                      0
<COMMON>                                                       176
<OTHER-SE>                                                  120804
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                234044
<SALES>                                                     291407
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                            291407
<CGS>                                                       232434
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                               234560
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                            9143
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                              20287
<INCOME-TAX>                                                  7714
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                          12573
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                               1064
<CHANGES>                                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                                 11509
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                    0.66
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                    0.66
        
 

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM LIN
HOLDINGS CORP. CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATED BALANCE
SHEET AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH LIN HOLDINGS
CORP. QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q DATED MARCH 31, 1999.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>  0001062707
<NAME> LIN HOLDINGS CORP.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          11,123
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   45,180
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,554
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                77,951
<PP&E>                                         188,278
<DEPRECIATION>                                  35,094
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,053,402
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           62,853
<BONDS>                                        543,931
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     477,410
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,053,402
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                59,274
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   54,983
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                19,804
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (55)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,774
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (15,513)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (7,053)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (22,566)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (34,026)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:



(1)     The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company.





|Dated:  August 12, 2009 | By:                                   
|----------------------- | --------------------------------------
|                        | RALPH M. AMATO
Chief Financial Officer
STATE v. Napoleon Junior RANKIN.

No. 40P15-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

Catherine F. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Napoleon J. Rankin, Spruce Pines, for Rankins, Napoleon Junior.

J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 9th of July 2015 by Defendant for Appointment of Counsel:

> "Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
STATE of North Carolina v. Melvin Lomar FIELDS.

No. COA15-734.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Feb. 16, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 29, 2010 

y0322 

Order 

 

March 29, 2010 

139738 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139738 

 COA: 292826 

Ottawa CC: 03-026672-FC 

KENNETH L. KRUITHOF, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 14, 2009 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).