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Filed 1/19/22 P. v. Johnson CA1/1

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JULIAN H. JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A158366

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 51603604)

In our March 2021 opinion in this matter, we ruled that appellant 

Julian H. Johnson was ineligible for resentencing under the procedures set 

forth in Penal Code1 section 1170.95 because he had been convicted of 

voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder, not murder. (People v. 

Johnson (Mar. 30, 2021, A158366) [nonpub. opn.] (Johnson I).) In 

December 2021, our Supreme Court directed us to reconsider the cause in 

light of Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), which 

clarifies that section 1170.95 does apply to persons convicted of voluntary 

manslaughter and attempted murder. 

Both appellant and the Attorney General agree that this matter should 

be remanded to the trial court for further consideration. We concur. 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Accordingly, we vacate our prior opinion, reverse the order denying 

appellant’s resentencing petition, and remand the matter to the trial court

with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As we recounted in our prior opinion, “[o]n June 17, 2015, appellant 

drove Clydedale Hoskin and Miguel Gutierrez to a location in Antioch to 

acquire narcotics and commit a robbery. After appellant parked the car, 

Hoskin and Gutierrez exited the vehicle wearing masks and armed with guns 

and approached a group of people who were congregated outside. Appellant 

planned to join the two men but was delayed while he hid their cell phones 

inside the car. Hoskin ordered everyone to the ground and shot into the 

group, hitting Shannah Tatum in her head and leg. A man in the group fired 

back and hit Hoskin, killing him. Gutierrez returned fire, killing a bystander 

named Adrian Craig. Gutierrez returned to the car alone and appellant 

drove away.” (Johnson I, supra, A158366, fn. omitted.)

In 2016, appellant and two codefendants were charged with two counts 

of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted second degree robbery

(§§ 664/211), and one count of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). 

Several enhancements were also alleged against appellant, including four 

firearm use enhancements. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)

In 2018, appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of voluntary 

manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and to the other two counts as charged, i.e.,

attempted murder and attempted robbery. He also admitted the firearm use 

enhancement allegations and two prior prison term enhancements. (§ 667.5.)

The trial court sentenced him to a determinate term of 20 years in state 

prison. 
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Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 

(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not 

imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to 

kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with 

reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) As 

part of this legislation, the bill added section 1170.95 to provide a procedure 

for those convicted of a qualifying offense to seek vacature of their conviction 

and resentencing on any remaining counts. (See former § 1170.95, subd. (a).)

In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to 

section 1170.95. At that time, section 1170.95 expressly applied to persons 

“convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable 

consequences theory.” (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a).) The trial court 

appointed counsel, received briefing, and then summarily denied the petition

on the ground that the statute did not apply to persons who pleaded guilty 

to voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder as lesser offenses of 

murder.

In March 2021, this court issued a nonpublished opinion affirming the 

trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing. (Johnson I, 

supra, A158366.) We held that persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter 

and attempted murder were ineligible for resentencing under 

section 1170.95. (Johnson I, supra, A158366.) The following month, 

appellant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (S268537).

While this matter was pending, the Legislature enacted Senate 

Bill 775, which amended section 1170.95 to clarify that persons convicted of 

manslaughter and attempted murder may be eligible for resentencing under 

that section. As amended, section 1170.95 expressly applies to persons 
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“convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)

On December 29, 2021, S268537, the Supreme Court transferred 

appellant’s case back to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision 

and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill 775. We received a 

supplemental brief from appellant arguing that the case must be remanded 

to the trial court in light of the recent amendments to section 1170.95 that 

permit persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted murder

to seek resentencing under this this law. The Attorney General submitted a 

letter agreeing that appellant is entitled to a remand for further proceedings.

We agree with the parties and will remand the matter to the trial court with 

directions.

DISCUSSION

Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 775, California Courts of Appeal 

were uniform in concluding that persons who pleaded guilty to manslaughter 

or attempted murder as lesser offenses of murder were not eligible for 

resentencing under section 1170.95. (See, e.g., People v. Turner (2020) 

45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435–436.) One of the Legislature’s stated purposes in 

enacting Senate Bill 775 was to clarify that section 1170.95 is applicable to 

manslaughter and attempted murder convictions. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 551, 

§ 1, subd. (a) [“[T]his legislation . . . [¶] . . . [c]larifies that persons who were 

convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony 

murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted 

the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same 

theories”].)

Senate Bill 775 was passed as nonurgency legislation during the 

regular session and became effective on January 1, 2022. (Cal. Const., 
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art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1); see People v. Camba (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) 

Because appellant’s appeal from the denial of his resentencing petition was 

not final by this date, and he is eligible to benefit from this remedial 

legislation. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 306; People v. Garcia

(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961, 973.)

The amendments to section 1170.95 under Senate Bill 775 compel the 

conclusion that appellant’s resentencing petition is entitled to further 

consideration under section 1170.95. On remand, the trial court must

determine whether appellant has stated a prima facie case for relief under 

section 1170.95. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).) If the court finds a prima facie case is 

stated, it shall issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing “to determine 

whether to vacate the . . . attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction[s]

and to recall the sentence and resentence [appellant] on any remaining 

counts in the same manner as if [he] had not previously been sentenced, 

provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial 

sentence.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) We express no opinion as to the 

appropriate outcome of any further proceedings. 

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing under 

section 1170.95 is reversed. Upon remand, the superior court shall conduct 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A158366

People v. Johnson