IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30559

Summary Calendar

NORMAN MAPES

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JAMESON BISHOP; PATRICK WENNEMAN; KEN STELLY; CITY OF

BATON ROUGE

Defendants-Appellees

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NORMAN MAPES

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BOBBY SIMPSON; PATRICK ENGLADE; CHRIS CRANFORD; MIKE

PONDER; CARL JACKSON; DEIDRE ROBERT; VICKY JONES; CITY OF

BATON ROUGE

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 22, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-30559

2

PER CURIAM:

We sua sponte recall the mandate, withdraw the prior panel opinion,

Mapes v. Bishop, No. 06-30559, 2007 WL 1733069, (5th Cir. June 15, 2007), in

its entirety, and substitute the following:

Norman Mapes appeals the dismissal of two consolidated civil rights

actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he alleged that police officers,

the police chief, the City of Baton Rouge (“City”), and employees of the parish

attorney’s and prosecuting attorney’s offices violated his constitutional rights by

falsely arresting him and maliciously prosecuting him on a charge of soliciting

a prostitute.

In No. 3:03-CV-67, the District Court held that the applicable one-year

Louisiana statute of limitations for personal injury actions barred Mapes’s false

arrest claim against the City and police officer defendants Jameson Bishop,

Patrick Wenneman, and Ken Stelly. We review the District Court’s conclusion

that Mapes’s claim is time-barred de novo. Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex.,

431 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2005). 

The District Court held that the statute of limitations began to run when

Mapes was arrested on April 13, 2001, and, as a result, expired before Mapes

filed his complaint on January 27, 2003. Mapes’s sole argument on appeal is

that the District Court erred in dismissing the false arrest claim against these

defendants because his false arrest claim did not accrue until the prosecution

terminated in his favor on January 25, 2002. Neither the District Court nor

Mapes were correct.

The “statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false

arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by

criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained

pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1100 (2007). To the

extent that Wallace conflicts with our decision in Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d
No. 06-30559

3

196 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a false arrest cause of action accrues when the

criminal prosecution terminates in favor of the accused), Wallace abrogates

Brandley.

Mapes filed his § 1983 complaint exactly one year after the criminal

prosecution terminated in his favor. The date on which Mapes became detained

pursuant to legal process does not appear in the record. It is difficult to see how

Mapes’s complaint could be timely because the date on which he was detained

pursuant to legal process must have preceded the date on which proceedings

terminated. Nevertheless, we vacate and remand to the District Court to

determine the date on which Mapes was detained pursuant to legal process.

Mapes briefs no argument concerning the claims that were dismissed in

No. 3:04-CV-443. He also fails to brief any claim in No. 3:03-CV-67 other than

his false arrest claim. Although pro se briefs are afforded liberal construction,

see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even pro se litigants must brief

arguments in order to preserve them. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25

(5th Cir. 1993); FED. R. APP.P. 28(a)(9). Accordingly, Mapes’s remaining claims

are effectively abandoned. Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25.

VACATED AND REMANDED AS TO FALSE-ARREST CLAIM IN

NO. 3:03-CV-67; AFFIRMED AS TO ALL OTHER CLAIMS.