FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

AUG 22, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-12328

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 06-00680-CV-IPJ

KEVIN DANLEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

RUBY ALLEN, 

Defendant, 

JACKIE RIKARD, 

RONNIE WILLIS, 

RUBY ALLYN, 

JEFF WOOD, 

STEVE WOODS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

_________________________

(August 22, 2008)
 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,

*

sitting by designation.

2

Before BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge. *

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Kevin Danley was arrested for driving under the influence and was taken to

jail. While there he had a disagreement with some of the jailers after he was made

to use a dirty toilet without any toilet paper. Because Danley failed to obey one of

the jailer’s orders during the disagreement, another jailer pepper sprayed him. 

Although pepper spray is an accepted non-lethal means of controlling unruly

inmates, Danley contends that the jailers used too much on him, that he was not

allowed to wash it off after he calmed down, and that he was denied adequate

medical care following the incident. He says he suffered, and he has sued. 

Kevin Danley, who had been locked up in the Lauderdale County Detention

Center, filed his lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he was subjected to

excessive force and deliberate indifference, both in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. He named as defendants Ruby Allyn, Jeff Wood, and Steve Woods,

who are jailers; Jackie Rikard, the jail administrator; and Ronnie Willis, the sheriff. 

The central allegations in Danley’s complaint are that after he was pepper sprayed

at the jail, he was locked in a poorly ventilated cell, prevented from washing off
3

the pepper spray, and denied medical care that he needed as a result of the

spraying. 

After the district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the

complaint on qualified immunity grounds, they appealed. We vacated and

remanded for further consideration and findings. Danley v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1090,

1092 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court made more findings about the evidence,

denied the motions to dismiss again, and the defendants have appealed again. 

I.

For now, we take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe

them in the light most favorable to Danley. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282,

1284 (11th Cir. 2008). In that light the facts are that on July 11, 2004 Danley was

arrested for driving under the influence and taken to the Lauderdale County,

Alabama Detention Center. Once there he was put in a group cell that had no

toilet. After asking the jailers several times to use a toilet, Danley was eventually

taken “to a small cell (~5 x 7) that had a toilet in the corner and no water.” He

complained that the toilet was unsanitary and there was no toilet paper, and he told

Allyn he needed some in order to “clean the ‘nasty’ toilet so he could sit down.” 

She refused his request. 
4

After Danley finished using the toilet, jailers Allyn, Wood, and Woods

began to take him from the small cell back to the larger group cell. Danley was

still upset about the lack of toilet paper and asked them “if he could please have

some ‘fucking’ or ‘damn’ toilet paper to wipe himself.” Allyn told Danley to

watch his language, to shut up, and to get back into the small cell. Danley replied

that he was done using the toilet, and Allyn told him that if he did not get back in

the small cell “she was going to spray him.” Danley then asked Allyn why she was

“fucking” with him and what “spray me” meant. Instead of answering the second

part of Danley’s question, Allyn decided to show him what she meant. She told

Wood to pepper spray Danley, and Wood sprayed him “at close range” for three to

five seconds. 

Wood and Woods then pushed Danley back into the small cell and closed

the door. Because Danley had been in the doorway of the cell when he was

sprayed, the spray remained not only on him and his clothes but also in the air of

the small, poorly ventilated cell. Danley began having trouble breathing, started to

hyperventilate, screamed and cried to the three jailers that he could not breathe,

and begged to be let out. The effects were so severe that he “feared he was going

to die.” In response to his pleas for help, the jailers laughed at Danley and made

fun of him; among other things, Wood and Woods held their hands to their necks
5

in a “mock-choking” gesture. They also told Danley that “if he did not shut up he

would not be let out.” 

After ten minutes, Danley quieted down. Still, the three jailers left him in

“the small, poorly ventilated cell for approximately 20 minutes,” doing nothing to

help him while he was suffering. Finally, they took him out of the cell and to a

shower, where he was allowed to rinse off. His shower, however, was less than

two minutes long, which “did not permit him adequate time for effective

decontamination.” The jailers then returned Danley to the group cell, which like

its smaller counterpart was also insufficiently ventilated. Because he had not been

permitted to adequately decontaminate himself, pepper spray still clung to Danley

and his clothes. Within thirty minutes of being placed in the group cell, Danley’s

cellmates began complaining that their eyes were burning because of the residue

left on him. 

Danley also continued to suffer the effects of the pepper spray once he was

back in the group cell. He had difficulty breathing, which he complained about to

the jailers for the remainder of his time in the jail. His eyes continued to burn and

swelled so badly he could hardly see. Danley’s symptoms got so bad that in an

attempt to relieve his suffering he laid down on the floor to breathe through the

crack under the cell door. Although he repeatedly requested medical treatment, the
6

jailers refused to let him see the jail nurse. At one point Danley “almost blacked

out because of the breathing difficulties he had been having for the prior twelveplus hours.” According to the allegations in Danley’s complaint, the three jailers

“intentionally did not comply with jail policy and procedure and manufacturer

instructions regarding ventilation and decontamination in order to inflict

unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering on” him. 

It was not until after another inmate intervened on Danley’s behalf that he

was taken to another cell that was better ventilated, but he was still not given any

medical treatment. Finally, after a total of twelve to thirteen hours of suffering,

Danley was released from the jail. He went to his doctor, who treated him for

chemical conjunctivitis in his eyes and irritant-induced bronchospasms in his lungs

and prescribed him “appropriate medication.” Danley’s injuries caused him to

miss a day of work. 

Danley complained about what had happened to him to Rikard, the jail

administrator, and to Sheriff Willis. After “reviewing the circumstances” they

“ratified and approved” what the three jailers had done to him. According to

Danley, before this incident Rikard and Willis knew through “force reports and

similar documents, inmate complaints, jailer complaints, attorney complaints,

judicial officer complaints, and personal observation” that their jailers regularly
7

punished inmates by denying them adequate ventilation, decontamination, and

medical care after they were pepper sprayed. There was a “de facto jail policy”

permitting that. And jailers who “engag[ed] in this pattern of abuse,” including

Allyn, Wood, and Woods, “were not disciplined for their actions or provided with

additional training.” 

After his complaints were ignored by the jail administrator and sheriff,

Danley filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. His complaint alleges against Allyn,

Wood, and Woods claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also seeks to have Rikard and Willis

held liable in their individual capacities for those violations under a theory of

supervisory liability. 

The defendants responded with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on

qualified immunity grounds, which the district court denied without any

explanation. On the defendants’ appeal, we vacated the district court’s orders

denying the motions to dismiss and remanded with instructions for the court “to

consider the case in full and to enter reasoned orders which discuss the facts

alleged in the . . . complaint and detail the legal analysis used by the district court

to reach its conclusions regarding the motions to dismiss.” Danley, 480 F.3d at

1092.
8

On remand, the district court again denied the defendants’ motions to

dismiss Danley’s complaint. In its memorandum opinion, the court explained that

the decision in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), had

“provided more than ‘fair warning’ to all of these defendants that to employ pepper

spray as punishment, or for the sadistic pleasure of the sprayers, as distinguished

from what is reasonably necessary to maintain prisoner control, is constitutionally

prohibited.” With respect to Rikard and Willis, the district court stated that

“Danley has done a creditable job of alleging facts and circumstances to show that

[they] created an atmosphere or practice under which the three hands-on

employees operated in, and that can create supervisory liability.” The defendants

have appealed again. 

II.

As to Danley’s excessive force claim, jailers Allyn, Wood, and Woods

contend that the district court erred by denying their motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds. Qualified immunity shields public officials in their individual

capacities from some lawsuits against them arising from torts committed while

they are performing a discretionary duty. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312,

1329 (11th Cir. 2007). No one disputes that Allyn, Wood, and Woods’ interactions

with Danley occurred while they were engaged in discretionary duties. To
9

overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show a constitutional

or statutory violation and also that the right violated was clearly established at the

time. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001); Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). The defendants argue

that Danley has not alleged a constitutional violation and, even if he has, the right

they allegedly violated was not clearly established. 

There are a number of different types of claims that arise under the Eighth

Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, including distinct claims for

basic cruel and unusual punishment, for excessive force against prisoners, and for

deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Courts apply a

different test to each. See, e.g., Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.

2005) (applying the test for an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

violation); Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying

the test for an Eighth Amendment excessive force violation); Hope v. Pelzer, 240

F.3d 975, 978 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying the test for an Eighth Amendment

basic cruel and unusual punishment violation), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S.

730, 122 S. Ct. 2508 (2002). Pretrial detainees, who are not protected by the

Eighth Amendment, can bring the same claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t makes no
10

difference whether [the plaintiff] was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner

because ‘the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison

inmates applies equally to cases involving . . . pretrial detainees.’” (omission in

original) (citation omitted)). 

The defendants question whether Danley’s asserted constitutional violation

is actually a single Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, as his complaint

alleges, or both an excessive force claim and a Fourteenth Amendment basic cruel

and unusual punishment claim. The defendants contend that only Danley’s initial

spraying should be considered under the test for excessive force claims. His

twenty-minute confinement in the poorly ventilated cell, the defendants argue,

should be considered under the test for basic cruel and unusual punishment claims. 

“The plaintiff is the master of the complaint. The plaintiff selects the claims

that will be alleged in the complaint.” United States v. Jones, 125 F.3d 1418, 1428

(11th Cir. 1997). At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, Danley is entitled to have the Court

consider both the spraying and the twenty minutes of confinement in the small,

poorly ventilated cell as a single claim of excessive force if “the allegations in the

complaint” can possibly be considered as such “in the light most favorable to

[him].” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations
11

omitted). Viewed in that light, the spraying and twenty-minute confinement

immediately thereafter can be seen as a single excessive force claim. 

In Skrtich, we held that “the force administered by each defendant in [a]

collective beating” should not “be analyzed separately to determine which of the

defendants’ blows, if any, used excessive force.” Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1302. The

use of the pepper spray against Danley immediately followed by confinement in a

small, poorly ventilated cell, which enhanced the effects of the spray, is analogous

to two blows in a beating. The nearly simultaneous actions are interrelated parts of

a single course of conduct, not separate events. Although we have parsed

individual acts in a single sequence of events into separate claims in some cases,

we have done so at the plaintiff’s request. See, e.g., id. at 1301–02; Williams v.

Cash, 836 F.2d 1318, 1319 (11th Cir. 1988). Danley has not asked us to do that,

and it is his complaint that we are construing in the light most favorable to him. 

Whether a jailer’s use of force is excessive, and thus violates the inmate’s

Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,

depends on whether the jailer’s act “shocks the conscience,” Cockrell v. Sparks,

510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007), and it necessarily will if the force “‘was

applied . . . maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Id.

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085 (1986)). 
12

To evaluate whether actions shock the conscience, we consider the following

factors: (1) the need for force; (2) the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used; and (3) the extent of the resulting injury. Whitley, 475 U.S.

at 321, 106 S. Ct. at 1085. In addition to those three factors we consider as fourth

and fifth factors “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as

reasonably perceived by the responsible official on the basis of facts known to

them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. 

When we consider whether the jailers’ use of force was excessive, we must “give a

wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and

security.” Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990). 

If there were nothing before us but the initial use of pepper spray following

Danley’s second failure to obey Allyn’s order to return to the cell, we would

readily conclude that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation. “Prison

guards may use force when necessary to restore order and need not wait until

disturbances reach dangerous proportions before responding.” Id. After Danley

twice disobeyed her commands, Allyn ordered Wood to spray him with pepper

spray. Wood sprayed Danley for “approximately 3–5 seconds,” and Wood and

Woods then pushed Danley back into the cell and closed the door. Pepper spray is

an accepted non-lethal means of controlling unruly inmates. See Jones v. Shields,
13

207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing cases); cf. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d

1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002). 

And prison guards do not have the luxury or obligation to convince every

inmate that their orders are reasonable and well-thought out. Certainly they are not

required to do so where an inmate repeatedly fails to follow those orders. Under

the first factor, “[t]he need for the use of force [was] established by the undisputed

evidence that [the inmate] created a disturbance.” Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1533. 

The second Whitley factor, the relationship between the need for force and

the amount of force, also weighs against finding a constitutional violation. A short

burst of pepper spray is not disproportionate to the need to control an inmate who

has failed to obey a jailer’s orders. See Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th

Cir. 2002) (holding that the use of two five-second bursts of pepper spray was not

excessive when used to break up a fight among inmates after they had repeatedly

ignored verbal commands to stop); Jones, 207 F.3d at 495–97 (holding that the use

of a type of pepper spray called capstun against a prisoner was not a violation of

the Eighth Amendment when he had disobeyed a supervisor’s order and then

questioned a guard’s order); see also Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838, 841

(5th Cir. 1998) (holding that jail guards did not use excessive force when they

sprayed a two-second burst of chemical mace into a bus filled with prisoners who
14

had continued jumping on the seats, spitting at officers outside the bus, rocking the

bus, and otherwise causing a disturbance after three times being told to stop);

Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 762–63 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of

chemical mace was not excessive when a prisoner disobeyed an order to stop

throwing water at a guard and then questioned the guard’s second order to remove

his arm from his cell’s food service window); cf. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348

(“Courts have consistently concluded that using pepper spray is reasonable . . .

where the plaintiff was . . . refusing police requests.”).

Nor does the third Whitley factor—the extent of Danley’s injury from the

initial use of pepper spray—favor finding a constitutional violation. Pepper spray

“is designed to disable a suspect without causing permanent physical injury. 

Indeed, pepper spray is a very reasonable alternative to escalating a physical

struggle . . . .” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Any injuries or discomfort Danley suffered as a necessary result of a

dose of pepper spray were neither substantial nor long lasting. 

The fourth Whitley factor, which requires an assessment of “the extent of the

threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible

official on the basis of facts known to them,” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct.

at 1085, does not support a finding of a constitutional violation when applied to the
15

initial use of the pepper spray. Because, as we discussed in light of the first and

second Whitley factors, Danley created a disturbance by failing to obey orders, and

the jailers’ initial use of pepper spray was a reasonable response to that threat. 

The only Whitley factor that would point toward the initial use of pepper

spray being unconstitutional is that by confining Danley in a small cell and not

permitting him to do anything to decontaminate himself after he had calmed down,

the jailers did not do enough to “temper the severity of [their] forceful response.” 

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. at 1085. This factor brings up the remainder

of the jailers’ conduct, which amounted to a continuation and aggravation of the

initial force applied to Danley after the need for force had ended.

Although the initial pepper spraying itself was not excessive force, this is not

a case in which a jailer simply sprayed an inmate who had repeatedly failed to obey

commands. Danley’s complaint groups together the initial spraying and the

subsequent twenty-minute confinement as a single instance of excessive force. 

Although less common than the direct application of force, subjecting a prisoner to

special confinement that causes him to suffer increased effects of environmental

conditions—here, the pepper spray lingering in the air and on him—can constitute

excessive force. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 765 (holding that there was a

constitutional violation under Whitley if guards “spray[ed] an inmate in the face
16

with mace and then confine[d] him in four-point restraints for an extended period

of time without permitting him to wash or use the toilet, without fumigating the

cell, and without allowing him the benefit of medical attention of any kind”); see

also Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 945 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that confining

the plaintiff, an arrestee, in a “police car with the windows rolled up in ninety

degree heat for three hours constituted excessive force” in violation of the Fourth

Amendment). This circumstance is to be distinguished from environmental

conditions that generally affect the inmates in the jail, which are analyzed as

conditions of confinement claims. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,

35, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993) (holding that a prisoner can state an Eighth

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim if jailers are deliberately

indifferent to the effects of environmental tobacco smoke). 

When jailers continue to use substantial force against a prisoner who has

clearly stopped resisting—whether because he has decided to become compliant,

he has been subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated—that use of force is

excessive. See Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1272 (giving special weight to the fact that

the jailers “continued [to] use . . . force in a manner that was severe enough to

render [the plaintiff], at the very least, unconscious after [he] had surrendered”);

Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1303 (“[G]overnment officials may not use gratuitous force
17

against a prisoner who has been already subdued or, as in this case,

incapacitated.”); see also Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505–06 (11th Cir.

1996); Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 1991); Williams v.

Cash-C.O.I., 836 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1988); Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d

1093, 1093–95 (11th Cir. 1986); cf. Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348. Once a prisoner

has stopped resisting there is no longer a need for force, so the use of force

thereafter is disproportionate to the need. 

Pepper spray is “designed to disable a suspect,” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), by causing “intense pain, a burning

sensation that causes mucus to come out of the nose, an involuntary closing of the

eyes, a gagging reflex, and temporary paralysis of the larynx,” Headwaters Forest

Def. v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated

on other grounds, 534 U.S. 801, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001). It sometimes also causes

“disorientation, anxiety, and panic” in the person sprayed. Id. at 1200 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Those effects are inherent in most, if not all, uses of

pepper spray. That is how it achieves its purpose. Reading the complaint in the

light most favorable to Danley, the pepper spray had its intended effect; it disabled

Danley before the jailers pushed him back into the small cell. Given that he was

disabled, there was no need for the jailers to continue using force after spraying
18

him. The use of force in the form of extended confinement in the small, poorly

ventilated, pepper spray-filled cell, when there were other readily available

alternatives, was excessive.

Our conclusion that, at least under the facts alleged in the complaint, Allyn,

Wood, and Woods acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm,” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21, 106 S. Ct. at 1085, is supported by

their actions after they made Danley’s suffering worse by confining him in the

small, pepper spray-filled cell. They mocked Danley while he suffered, parodying

his choking, which is circumstantial evidence of their malicious intent. See

Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1272 n.11 (noting that threatening language “can be relevant

to . . . the determination of reasonable inferences about the Officers’ subjective

state of mind”). We also look to “efforts made to temper the severity of [the]

forceful response” as circumstantial evidence of whether the force was used

maliciously. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S. Ct. at 1085. Although Allyn, Wood,

and Woods eventually did permit Danley to shower, they did not allow him the

amount of time required by jail policy. This inadequate measure to ameliorate the

effects of putting him in the small, unventilated cell weighs against concluding that

the jailers put him in that cell and left him there for twenty minutes in “a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Id. at 320, 106 S. Ct. at 1085. 
19

Having established a constitutional violation, the next step in the qualified

immunity analysis usually is to determine whether the right was clearly

established. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156. However, we have

held that “there is no room for qualified immunity” in Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment excessive force cases because they require a subjective element that is

“so extreme” that no reasonable person could believe that his actions were lawful. 

Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002). As a result, we

conclude that the district court did not err by denying the defendants’ motions to

dismiss Danley’s excessive force claim on qualified immunity grounds.

III.

Allyn, Wood, and Woods next contend that the district court erred by

denying their motions to dismiss Danley’s deliberate indifference claim based on

qualified immunity. Danley’s complaint alleges that the jailers acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when they refused to allow him

to adequately decontaminate himself and to see the jail nurse. 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the

Eighth Amendment. See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326. Under the Fourteenth

Amendment, pretrial detainees are afforded the same protection. See id. To prove

a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) a serious medical need;
20

(2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between

that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. Id. The defendants contend that Danley

has not properly alleged either a serious medical need or deliberate indifference to

it. 

There are at least two different tests for whether a medical need is serious. 

See Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 1994),

overruled in part on other grounds by Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 n.9, 122 S. Ct. at 2515

n.9. We need not decide when it is appropriate to use one and when the other

because Danley’s medical need was serious under either. One test is whether a

delay in treating the need worsens it. Id. at 1188. In his complaint, Danley alleges

that he would not have suffered any lingering effects from the pepper spray if he

had been allowed to fully decontaminate himself. He also alleges that he almost

blacked out more than twelve hours after he had been sprayed as a cumulative

result of his breathing problems during all of that time. Finally, Danley alleges

that the chemical conjunctivitis and bronchospasms he suffered were the result of

the delay in treatment. We conclude that Danley has alleged a serious medical

need under this test. See Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2000)

(holding that even a tooth cavity can become a serious medical need because it
21

“will degenerate with increasingly serious implications if neglected over sufficient

time”). 

The other measure of whether a medical need is serious enough to satisfy the

first element of a deliberate indifference claim is if the need “is one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 

Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

defendants rely on this definition in arguing that Danley did not have a serious

medical need, but we conclude that Danley has alleged a serious medical need

under this test as well. As we have mentioned, Danley alleges that he had

difficulty breathing, that his eyes burned and became so swollen he could hardly

see, and that more than twelve hours after he had been sprayed he nearly blacked

out as a result of all his breathing problems. Danley repeatedly asked to see the jail

nurse, and when the jailers refused to allow him to do so, “another inmate

intervened on his behalf with [the] jailers.” That Danley needed medical attention

was apparent enough for another inmate to recognize it and try to get help for

Danley is a fact weighing in favor of finding deliberate indifference, although it

may not be entitled to substantial weight. 
22

In Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537 (11th Cir. 1995), we stated that a prisoner’s

chronic asthma, which resulted in frequent asthma attacks, constituted a serious

medical need. Id. at 1539–40, 1543. Danley’s allegations about his inability to

breathe and his bronchospasms essentially describe an asthma attack. See 1 J.E.

Schmidt, M.D., Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder A–572

(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2007) (defining “asthma” as “[a] condition

characterized by recurring attacks of dypsnea (shortness of breath), a feeling of

pressure on the chest, wheezing, cough, fear, etc.”). While the plaintiff in Adams

allegedly suffered only breathing difficulties, Danley alleges that he suffered both

breathing problems and eye irritation and swelling from the prolonged exposure to

pepper spray. If the plaintiff in Adams stated a serious medical need, as we held he

did, then Danley does as well.

The defendants argue that pepper spray does not create a serious medical

need because it causes “only temporary discomfort.” That is usually true. The

serious medical needs Danley alleges, however, are the effects of prolonged

exposure to pepper spray with inadequate decontamination and poor ventilation,

not the immediate effects of the pepper spray. In addition to pain, Danley has

alleged that he suffered chemical conjunctivitis and bronchospasms because of the

delay in treatment. Finally, we have recognized that, while not all pain will
23

constitute a serious medical need, see Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187–88, “prison officials

may violate the Eighth Amendment’s commands by failing to treat an inmate’s

pain,” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999). If failing to treat

pain can violate the Eighth Amendment, then it can violate the Fourteenth as well. 

See Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326. 

The defendants also argue that Danley did not have a serious medical need

because the appropriate treatment for pepper spray is merely a shower. That

argument misses the point of Danley’s allegations, which is that the jailers forced

Danley to wait for too long before allowing him to shower and the shower that

finally was allowed was too short to treat the injury. The allegation is that, as a

result, Danley suffered needless pain, breathing problems, and inflamed eyes. If an

adequate shower is the only treatment that is required, then an adequate shower is

required. 

Defendants Allyn, Wood, and Woods next contend that their failure to let

Danley see the jail nurse cannot be deliberate indifference. According to them,

because the normal treatment for pepper spray is merely a shower, medical

attention is not necessary. Therefore, they argue, they could not have been

deliberately indifferent by not permitting Danley to see the jail nurse. This is less

an intent argument than a re-working of their earlier argument that Danley did not
24

have a serious medical need because the only treatment he needed was a good

shower. To the extent this is an intent argument, it fails. 

To establish the intent element of a deliberate indifference claim, a

“[p]laintiff must prove three things: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious

harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]

negligence.” Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1272 (second alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Danley has alleged facts meeting all three

elements. 

Reading Danley’s complaint in the light most favorable to him, Allyn,

Wood, and Woods were aware of a risk of serious harm from the prolonged

exposure to pepper spray that would result from failing to decontaminate Danley. 

Danley alleges that they knew about these effects, and he supports that contention

with allegations about the basis of their knowledge. First, Danley alleges that

“[j]ail policy and procedure . . . provide for inmates upon whom pepper spray has

been used to be provided with prompt and adequate ventilation and

decontamination to . . . prevent injury from prolonged exposure.” It is reasonable

to infer at this stage in the proceedings that, as jail employees, Allyn, Wood, and

Woods were aware of those policies and procedures. Second, the three of them

allegedly knew that Danley was actually suffering “injury from prolonged
25

exposure” because they “heard [his] pleas for help and requests for medical

treatment.” Finally, Danley has alleged that the jailers also heard the complaints

from other inmates in the group cell that their eyes were burning just from being

near Danley. It is reasonable to infer from this that the jailers must have known

that Danley, who still had pepper spray clinging to him, would be suffering as

much or more. 

Allyn, Wood, and Woods allegedly disregarded Danley’s serious medical

need by failing to provide him a shower that was anywhere near long enough to

fully decontaminate him and then by ignoring the pain, breathing problems,

swelling, and eye irritation that they knew had resulted. The shower they let

Danley take was less than two minutes in duration, while the jail’s own policy

allegedly specified that one allowed for this purpose must be fifteen minutes long

in order to ameliorate the effects of the spray. Grossly inadequate measures to

treat an inmate’s serious medical need will not eliminate a jailer’s liability for

deliberate indifference. See McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1256 (“[P]rison officials with

knowledge of [a serious] need for care may not . . . provid[e] grossly inadequate

care, caus[ing] a prisoner to needlessly suffer the pain resulting from his or her

illness.”); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985)

(stating that a jailer may be deliberately indifferent if the treatment provided is “so
26

cursory as to amount to no treatment at all”). The jailers allegedly did nothing

when the inadequacy of the decontamination shower became apparent from

Danley’s and the other inmates’ continuing complaints. 

Finally, Allyn, Wood, and Woods were more than grossly negligent. “When

prison guards ignore without explanation a prisoner’s serious medical condition

that is known or obvious to them, the trier of fact may infer deliberate

indifference.” Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1273 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Danley has alleged that the three jailers did exactly that. 

Allyn, Wood, and Woods contend that, even if there were a constitutional

violation, they are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because “there is no

clearly established law that would put [them] on notice that their conduct was

unlawful with regard to the . . . medical care claim[].” We disagree. A

government official can be put on notice that his actions will violate a

constitutional or statutory right by one or more of three sources: (1) a specific

constitutional or statutory provision; (2) a legal principle announced by a decision

from a court with jurisdiction over the place where the violation of rights was

committed; and (3) a case with similar facts that has already been decided by one

of those courts. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1330. 
27

This is a case in which general legal principles announced by our decisions

in this area of law are enough to make the right violated clearly established. As we

have concluded, Danley alleged both a serious medical need and the jailers’

deliberate indifference to it. The allegations in the complaint are that the jailers

took only ineffective measures to remedy the need and then mocked Danley and

ignored his pleas for help. Our earlier deliberate indifference decisions have stated

that when jailers are aware of serious medical needs they may not ignore them or

provide grossly inadequate care. Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1273; McElligott, 182 F.3d

at 1256. Although Danley’s allegations may later turn out to be unfounded,

reasonable jailers would have been aware that the conduct that Danley alleges

violated his clearly established rights. The district court did not err in concluding

that Allyn, Wood, and Woods are not entitled to qualified immunity on Danley’s

deliberate indifference claim. 

IV.

Jail Administrator Rikard and Sheriff Willis contend that the district court

erred by concluding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity on Danley’s

supervisory liability claim. Danley’s complaint does not allege that Rikard and

Willis were personally involved in the pepper spraying or the denial of medical

care. Instead, it alleges that the two were aware that Allyn, Wood, and Woods had
28

used excessive force and provided inadequate care for pepper spray injuries in the

past. That knowledge, Danley argues, put Rikard and Willis on notice that their

jailers were using pepper spray inappropriately. Yet neither of the two did

anything to correct the problem. 

As an initial matter, Danley asks us to reconsider our heightened pleading

standard for § 1983 claims in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Leatherman

v. Tarrant County N.I.C.U., 507 U.S. 163, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993) (rejecting a

heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 claims alleging municipal liability),

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998) (holding that a

prisoner bringing a § 1983 action against government official need not present

clear and convincing evidence of official’s improper motive in order to defeat

official’s motion for summary judgment), and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. 992 (2002) (holding that a plaintiff’s complaint in a Title VII

case need not contain specific facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case under

McDonnell Douglas). Danley argues that those two Supreme Court decisions

eliminated any heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 cases even when the

defense of qualified immunity is raised. 

However, the Court did not address in Leatherman, Crawford-El, or

Swierkiewicz the pleading standard for § 1983 cases against officials who are able
29

to assert qualified immunity as a defense. We have continued to apply the

heightened pleading requirement in this type of case since those three Supreme

Court opinions were issued, see, e.g., Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th

Cir. 2003); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1362 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003). We are

bound to apply the heightened pleading requirement even if no one raised Danley’s

argument in our earlier cases. See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1302–03

(11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an “overlooked reason” exception to the prior panel

precedent rule). Under the heightened pleading requirement, the relevant facts

must be alleged “with some specificity.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235

(11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will dismiss a

complaint under the heightened pleading standard where the allegations are “vague

and conclusory.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These are

not. 

“Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983 on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d

1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The

standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the

actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Supervisory liability occurs
30

either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional

violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising

official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). 

“The necessary causal connection can be established ‘when a history of

widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct

the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so.’” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (citation

omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify

the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued

duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. A plaintiff

can also establish the necessary causal connection by showing “facts which support

an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew

that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so,” 

Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235, or that a supervisor’s “custom or policy . . . resulted in

deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,” Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491,

1495 (11th Cir. 1991). 

In Cottone, the plaintiffs, the estate and the father of a deceased inmate who

had been held at the Broward County Jail, alleged that jail supervisors were liable

for the jail guards’ failure to monitor a mentally disturbed individual who attacked
31

and killed the inmate. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1361. The complaint further alleged

that “the defendants were on notice of the widespread unconstitutional conduct” by

guards at the jail but had failed to properly train and supervise them. Id. This

Court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim of supervisory liability because

the complaint did not allege “any specific facts at all” showing that the supervisors

had knowledge of the guards’ failure to monitor the inmates during this incident

“or even one prior incident.” Id. 

Because the complaint in Cottone failed to allege that the supervisors were

on notice of the guards’ unconstitutional conduct, it did not adequately allege that

they were aware of a need to correct it through further training or supervision. Id.

at 1361–62. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in that case did not allege that a policy or

custom implemented by the supervisors was involved with the inmate’s death or

that the supervisors instructed the guards to commit constitutional violations. Id. at

1362. Therefore, “the plaintiffs fail[ed] to establish the necessary causal

connection between the supervisors and the unconstitutional conduct in issue for

supervisory liability to be imposed.” Id.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Cottone, Danley has alleged sufficiently specific

facts to establish the necessary causal connection between supervisors Rikard and

Willis and the unconstitutional conduct of the jailers. Danley’s complaint alleges
32

that before this incident, Rikard and Willis had knowledge through “force reports

and similar documents, inmate complaints, jailer complaints, attorney complaints,

judicial officer complaints, and personal observation” that jailers at the Lauderdale

Detention Center “regularly used pepper spray excessively as a means of

punishment and not for legitimate reasons.” The complaint also alleges that

through the same sources, Rikard and Willis were aware that jailers at the detention

center “regularly denied inmates prompt and adequate ventilation,

decontamination, and medical care following pepper spray discharge as a means of

punishment and not for legitimate reasons.” 

The allegations are that, in spite of “numerous known incidents,” Rikard and

Willis took no action. They “did not discipline known incidents, and did not

conduct additional training despite knowledge that pepper spray was being

improperly used on a regular basis by jailers and that inmates were being denied

proper treatment after spraying incidents.” In addition, Rikard and Willis were

aware, before the incident involving Danley, “of numerous such incidents on the

shift on which Allyn, Wood, and Woods worked. Nevertheless, the jailers

engaging in this pattern of abuse were not disciplined for their actions or provided

with additional training.” 
33

Taking the allegations as true, which we must do at this stage of the

proceedings, the numerous complaints to Rikard and Willis about the excessive use

of pepper spray and the denial of adequate medical treatment to inmates, especially

during the shift on which Allyn, Wood, and Woods worked, were enough to put

them on notice of misconduct that was sufficiently “obvious, flagrant, rampant and

of continued duration” to require them to act. See Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. 

Because they allegedly failed to do so and the misconduct continued, Danley has

established the necessary causal connection to hold Rikard and Willis liable in their

supervisory capacities. See Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. 

Rikard and Willis contend that they could not have been on notice of the

jailers’ misconduct because, according to Danley’s complaint, Allyn, Wood, and

Woods falsified the incident report for his own case “in order to cover up their

allegedly wrongful actions.” Even if the three jailers falsified the report for

Danley’s case, however, that would not absolve Rikard and Willis from

responsibility for failing to act in response to the “numerous” prior incidents of

similar conduct of which they were specifically aware. 

Rikard and Willis also argue that, even if Danley has stated a claim for

supervisory liability, they are still entitled to qualified immunity because “Danley

cannot point to any clearly established law which demonstrates that the alleged
34

actions of Willis and Rikard violated his constitutional rights.” This Court has

long recognized that supervisors are liable for the excessive force and the

deliberate indifference of their employees where the supervisors received

numerous reports of prior misconduct of that nature by those same employees and

did nothing to remedy the situation. See, e.g., Gearson v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829,

839–40 (11th Cir. 1990) (involving a claim of supervisory liability against prison

warden for his employees’ deliberate indifference to inmate’s serious medical

need); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985)

(involving a claim of supervisory liability against city public safety director for his

employees’ use of excessive force). The district court properly denied Rikard and

Willis’ motions to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds Danley’s supervisory

liability claim. 

AFFIRMED.