Filed 3/13/17; pub. order 4/5/17 (see end of opn.)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ISABELLA M., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B277142

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK97180)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Debra Losnick, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________

R.C., the alleged father of Isabella M., was incarcerated 

from the time of her birth until she was 20 months old. The 

juvenile court denied R.C.’s petition to adjust his parental status 

from alleged to presumed father and thereafter terminated his 

parental rights. R.C. appeals from both orders. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Isabella was born in June 2014 to Bridgett M., whose 16-

month-old son, Andrew M., had been detained in July 2013 by the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(Department) based in part on Bridgett’s illicit drug use. In 

detaining Isabella under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1),1 the Department alleged that 

Bridgett had a history of substance abuse and was a current 

abuser of methamphetamine, which she had used consistently 

while pregnant with Isabella,

2 and that Andrew was a current 

dependent of the juvenile court for similar reasons. The petition 

did not identify R.C. as an offending parent. At the June 25, 

2014 detention hearing the juvenile court found R.C. to be 

 

1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 

stated.

2 Isabella did not test positive for methamphetamine at the 

time of her birth. However, she tested positive for a sexually 

transmitted disease and was hypotonic and lethargic. She was 

later found to be lagging in development and was provided with

regional center services.
3

Isabella’s alleged father and issued a statewide jail removal order 

to allow R.C. to attend the jurisdiction hearing scheduled for 

August 6, 2014. Isabella was placed with Bridgett’s mother, with 

whom Andrew had also been placed.

R.C.’s name was not included on Isabella’s birth certificate. 

Bridgett told a Department social worker she had begun living 

with R.C. in July 2013, became pregnant in September 2013 and

broke up with R.C. in December 2013. She knew R.C. had been

arrested in February 2014 and had received a multi-year 

sentence, but did not know where he had been incarcerated. 

Bridgett reported that R.C. had other children and had told her

he did not want to be involved in Isabella’s life. 

The Department located R.C. at a Vacaville correctional

facility and served him by certified mail with notice of the 

August 6, 2014 hearing and a copy of the petition. The 

Department also sent an order for R.C.’s appearance at the 

hearing to the warden of the correctional facility. R.C. did not 

appear at the hearing and did not execute and return a waiver for 

his appearance.

3 The court found notice had been proper, 

sustained the section 300 petition and declared Isabella a 

dependent of the court. The court denied reunification services to 

Bridgett with respect to Isabella (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13)) and 

terminated them with respect to Andrew. The court denied 

reunification services to R.C. as an alleged father under 

section 361.5, subdivision (a). The section 366.26 selection and 

implementation hearing was scheduled for December 3, 2014. On 

 

3 In his section 388 petition to change his parentage status

R.C. admitted he had received notice of the hearing but claimed 

he had not been provided with legal counsel as to its import. 
4

August 7, 2014 the court clerk served the parties, including R.C., 

with a copy of the minute order from the hearing, forms for 

seeking writ review of the order denying services and an 

advisement of rights for the scheduled section 366.26 hearing. 

In the report prepared for the December 3, 2014 hearing, the 

Department advised the court Isabella was thriving in her 

placement with the maternal grandmother, who had agreed to 

adopt both children. The Department requested the section 366.26 

hearing be continued to allow completion of the adoption home 

study. The Department again served R.C. with notice of the 

hearing (attaching its report) and his new correctional facility with 

an order for him to appear at the hearing. R.C. did not appear at 

the hearing. The court found notice had been proper and 

continued the hearing to February 4, 2015.

Thereafter, the section 366.26 hearing was continued on 

multiple occasions4 due to the Department’s need to seek an 

administrative waiver for approval of the home study.5 The 

Department’s February 18, 2015 interim review report advised the 

court of its receipt of a waiver of appearance for the December 3, 

2014 hearing, signed by R.C. and a prison official on November 17, 

2014. R.C. did not appear or otherwise respond to other 

Department notices, although the Department received a 

December 2014 letter from a program director stating R.C. was 

participating in a prison substance abuse treatment program. 

 

4 Notice was provided to R.C. for continued hearing dates of 

February 4, 2015, March 5, 2015, August 5, 2015, February 3, 

2016 and March 23, 2016. 

5 The maternal grandmother’s home had been the subject of 

several referrals to the Department, and some of the adults living 

in the home had criminal records.
5

On March 10, 2016 the Department finally approved the 

adoption home study for the maternal grandmother and 

recommended the court terminate parental rights at the hearing 

scheduled for March 23, 2016. R.C., who had been released from 

prison, appeared at the hearing and was appointed counsel. At 

his request, the court ordered a paternity test and continued the 

hearing to allow R.C.’s counsel to review the record for any notice 

issues. The court denied R.C.’s request for visitation, citing

Isabella’s best interest. 

The paternity test confirmed R.C. was Isabella’s biological 

father. At the next scheduled hearing R.C.’s counsel requested a 

continuance to allow him to file a motion on R.C.’s behalf. R.C. 

filed a section 388 petition on May 9, 2016, alleging the court had 

violated his due process rights by adjudicating the section 300 

petition in his absence. He acknowledged he had received notice 

of the jurisdiction and disposition hearings but claimed he had

not waived his presence and had not been provided with counsel 

or brought to court to enable him to establish presumed father 

status. He attended the first hearing he could after his release 

from custody and argued Isabella (now almost two years old) 

deserved to be raised by her nonoffending parent. He asked that 

the court hold new jurisdiction and disposition hearings and 

place Isabella in his custody or provide him with reunification 

services. The court scheduled a hearing on the petition for June 

16, 2016.

On June 16, 2016 R.C. appeared and requested a 

continuance to allow him to hire private counsel. The court 

granted the request and continued the section 388 and 

section 366.26 hearings to August 3, 2016. The court informed

R.C. that, if he did not appear with new counsel on July 1, 2016, 
6

the case would proceed on August 3, 2016 with appointed 

counsel. 

R.C. did not appear on July 1, 2016 or August 3, 2016. 

Having been unable to contact his client, his appointed counsel 

requested a continuance, which was denied for lack of good cause. 

Following argument the court denied the section 388 petition, 

finding R.C. had not shown that granting the petition would be in 

Isabella’s best interest. The court also found R.C. had been 

provided with adequate notice through the course of the 

dependency proceedings but had failed to contact anyone with the 

Department. The court then relieved his counsel on the ground 

R.C. remained an alleged father and proceeded to the 

section 366.26 hearing. The court terminated parental rights as 

to Isabella and Andrew and designated the maternal grandmother 

as the children’s prospective adoptive parent. 

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law

a. Statutory and due process rights of incarcerated

alleged fathers

The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (Fam. Code, § 7600 

et seq.), which governs parentage determinations (Elisa B. v. 

Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 116), identifies “the parent 

and child relationship” as “the legal relationship existing between 

a child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents.” (Fam. Code, 

§ 7601.) In determining whether a person qualifies as a natural 

parent, the dependency courts recognize and differentiate among 

three categories of parents: an alleged parent, a biological parent 

and a presumed parent. (In re H.R. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1277, 

1283; accord, In re D.P. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 689, 695.)
7

A presumed parent “ranks highest” of all three categories 

and enjoys a full panoply of rights attendant to parenthood, 

including entitlement to appointed counsel, custody (assuming 

the court has not made a detriment finding) and reunification 

services. (In re H.R., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283; In re 

D.P., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p.695; see generally In re 

Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 65 [presumed parent status is 

intended to preserve the important relationship created between 

an alleged parent and child when the alleged parent has treated 

that child as a son or daughter].) A natural mother attains 

presumed parent status by giving birth to the child. (Fam. Code, 

§ 7610, subd. (a).) A person who may be the biological father of a 

child but has not achieved presumed parent status is an alleged 

father. (In re H.R., at p. 1283; In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 

139, 146-147.) 

An alleged father has a narrow range of rights in 

dependency proceedings, generally limited under the due process 

clause to notice of the proceedings so that he may appear and 

have the opportunity to challenge his parentage status. 

(In re D.P., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 695; In re J.H. (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 635, 644; In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 

1408.) An alleged parent is not entitled to appointed counsel, 

custody or reunification services. (In re H.R., supra, 

245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283; In re D.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 811, 

824.) A biological father who has established paternity but has 

not achieved presumed parent status is still an alleged father, but 

with the additional opportunity for reunification services if the 

court determines such services will benefit the child. (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a); see In re P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974, 980 [“[a] 
8

man’s status as biological father based on genetic testing does not 

entitle him to the rights or status of a presumed father”].)

“Due process for an alleged father requires only that the 

alleged father be given notice and ‘an opportunity to appear and 

assert a position and attempt to change his paternity status. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.] The statutory procedure that protects 

these limited due process rights is set forth in section 316.2.” 

(In re Paul H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 753, 760.) 

Section 316.2, subdivision (a), requires the juvenile court to 

inquire as to the identity of all “presumed or alleged fathers.”

Once an alleged father has been identified, section 316.2, 

subdivision (b), requires the court to provide the alleged father 

with notice that he is or could be the father of the child and that 

the child is the subject of juvenile dependency proceedings that 

could result in the termination of parental rights and adoption of 

the child. The court6 is further required to include with the 

notice Judicial Council form JV–505, entitled “Statement 

Regarding Parentage.” As explained in In re Marcos G. (2010) 

182 Cal.App.4th 369 (Marcos G.), “Form JV–505 contains 

important information for an alleged father. Among other things, 

it tells him that as an alleged father he will not receive 

reunification services and will not ‘automatically get the child to 

 

6 The statutory directive uses the passive voice, but 

section 316.2 appears to place the burden of ensuring that alleged 

fathers are served with Judicial Council form JV–505 on the 

juvenile court. (See, e.g., In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 

1113, 1122 [clerk of court required by statute and court rule to 

serve alleged father with JV–505].) Juvenile courts often

implement this duty by directing child welfare agencies to 

provide the required notice. 
9

live with you or your relatives.’ He is also told that he can have 

a trial on the issue of parentage and an attorney may be afforded 

him if he cannot afford one for himself, and if he wants the court 

to decide if he is the minor’s parent he should fill out form 

JV-505.” (Id. at p. 384; see In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 

601 (Jesusa V.) [“due process entitles a biological father [to] a 

meaningful opportunity to qualify as a presumed father”].)

California Rules of Court, rule 5.635 implements 

section 316.2. Rule 5.635(h) requires, if an alleged father appears 

in a dependency case and requests a finding of paternity through 

Judicial Council form JV–505, that the court determine: 

“(1) Whether that person is the biological parent of the child; and 

[¶] (2) Whether that person is the presumed parent of the child, if 

that finding is requested.” The court may make the required 

parentage determination by ordering blood testing and considering 

testimony, declarations or statements by the mother and alleged 

father. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(e)(2) & (e)(3); In re D.P., 

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 696; In re B.C. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th

1306, 1311-1312.) Thus, section 316.2, subdivision (b), and rule 

5.635 provide an alleged father with the notice and procedural 

means to attempt to change his paternity status. (In re O.S.,

supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.)

In addition to these provisions, Penal Code section 2625 

governs notice of dependency proceedings to incarcerated parents.

7 

When a proceeding is brought under section 300 to adjudicate 

 

7 Although we have found no published decision holding

Penal Code section 2625 requires notice to incarcerated alleged 

fathers, we assume for the sake of argument it does, as did 

Division Three of this court in Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 

at page 384. 
10

whether a child of a prisoner is a dependent child of the court or 

under section 366.26 to terminate the parental rights of a prisoner, 

the court “shall order notice of any court proceeding regarding the 

proceeding transmitted to the prisoner.” (Pen. Code, § 2625, 

subd. (b).) Pursuant to subdivision (d), if an incarcerated parent 

indicates a desire to be present during these proceedings, “the 

court shall issue an order for the temporary removal of the 

prisoner from the institution, and for the prisoner’s production 

before the court. . . . [N]o petition to adjudge the child of a prisoner 

a dependent child of the court pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), (c), 

(d), (e), (f), (i), or (j) of Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions 

Code may be adjudicated without the physical presence of the 

prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney, unless the court has before it a 

knowing waiver of the right of physical presence signed by the 

prisoner or an affidavit signed by the warden, superintendent, or 

other person in charge of the institution, or his or her designated 

representative stating that the prisoner has, by express statement 

or action, indicated an intent not to appear at the proceeding.”

Subdivision (e) of Penal Code section 2625 provides that “[i]n 

any other action or proceeding in which a prisoner’s parental . . .

rights are subject to adjudication, an order for the prisoner’s 

temporary removal from the institution and for the prisoner’s 

production before the court may be made by the superior court. . . . 

A copy of the order shall be transmitted to the warden, 

superintendent, or other person in charge of the institution not 

less than 15 days before the order is to be executed.” “Thus, only 

in proceedings to adjudicate a child of a prisoner a dependent of 

the juvenile court or to terminate parental rights must a court 

order production of a prisoner for the hearing. For all other 

proceedings, the trial court has discretion whether to order 
11

removal from the institution of a prisoner-parent.” (Marcos G., 

supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 386, citing Jesusa V., supra,

32 Cal.4th at p. 599.)

b. Relief under section 388

When an alleged father claims a lack of notice of the 

proceedings caused him to fail to achieve presumed father status 

prior to expiration of the reunification period, “[h]is only remedy

. . . [is] to file a motion to modify [prior orders] under section 388.”8

(In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 453 (Zacharia D.); accord, 

In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189 [§ 388 motion 

“proper vehicle to raise a due process challenge based on lack of 

notice”]; Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 380, fn. 8 [“a 

challenge to a dependency judgment on lack of due process/notice 

grounds is properly made by means of a section 388 petition”].) 

Generally, section 388 provides for modification of juvenile 

court orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a 

change of circumstance and demonstrates modification of the 

previous order is in the child’s best interest. (In re Jasmon O. 

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 

317; In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 919; see Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.570(e); Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 455

[“‘[s]ection 388 provides the “escape mechanism” that . . . must be 

built into the process to allow the court to consider new 

 

8 Section 388 provides a parent or other interested party 

“may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, 

petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside 

any order of court previously made . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] If it appears 

that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the 

proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing 

be held . . . .”
12

information’”].) When, as in this case, a section 388 petition is 

filed after family reunification services have been terminated, the 

juvenile court’s overriding concern is the child’s best interest. 

(Stephanie M., at p. 317.) The parent’s interests in the care, 

custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount; 

and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and 

stability. (Ibid.; In re Vincent M. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 943, 

960.) Because time is of the essence to young children, when it 

comes to securing a stable, permanent home, prolonged 

uncertainty is not in their best interest. (See In re Josiah Z.

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 674 [“‘[t]here is little that can be as 

detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty over 

whether he is to remain in his current “home,” under the care of 

his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty is 

prolonged’”]; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531

[“our Supreme Court made it very clear in Jasmon O.[, supra,

8 Cal.4th 398] the disruption of an existing psychological bond 

between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely 

important factor bearing on any section 388 motion”].)9

 

9 “[B]est interests is a complex idea” that requires 

consideration of a number of factors. (In re Kimberly F., supra,

56 Cal.App.4th at p. 530; see In re Jacob P. (2007) 

157 Cal.App.4th 819, 832-833.) In considering whether a 

section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the 

juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural 

history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of 

the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem 

was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal, 

the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the 

change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made 

sooner. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; In re 
13

We review the juvenile court’s order for abuse of discretion 

and may disturb the exercise of that discretion only in the rare 

case when the court has made an arbitrary, capricious or 

“patently absurd” determination. (In re Stephanie M., supra,

7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) We do not inquire whether substantial 

evidence would have supported a different order, nor do we 

reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the 

juvenile court. (Ibid.) We ask only whether the juvenile court 

abused its discretion with respect to the order it actually made. 

(In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.)

2. Although R.C.’s Right To Proper Notice May Have Been

Violated, Any Error Was Harmless

R.C. does not dispute he received notice of the jurisdiction 

and disposition hearings held on August 6, 2013. The notice that 

appears in the record advised him that he had a right to appear 

at the hearing and to have an attorney appointed for him if he 

could not afford one. A separate notice contained an order 

authorizing his transport to the hearing. Nonetheless, R.C. 

contends the court violated Penal Code section 2625, 

subdivision (d), by adjudicating Isabella a dependent of the court 

under section 300 and then denying him reunification services

under section 361.5 without an express waiver of attendance

signed by him or a prison official. R.C. misapprehends the scope 

of this provision. Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d)’s 

directive the hearing not proceed in the absence of the court’s 

receipt of a waiver is expressly premised on the prisoner-parent’s 

request to attend the hearing. Because R.C. never made such a 

 

Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447; In re Justice P.,

supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 188-189.) 
14

request, there was no violation of Penal Code section 2625, 

subdivision (d). 

However, the notice R.C. received was incomplete because 

it apparently did not contain Judicial Council form JV–505 

informing him of his right to seek presumed father status—a 

violation of section 316.2. Absent this notice, R.C. would not

know he was entitled to seek a change in his status from alleged 

to presumed father. Based on this omission, R.C. argues reversal 

is required because the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction by 

proceeding in his absence in violation of his right to due process. 

That is not the correct test. Unless the child welfare agency 

has made no attempt to give the parent notice, errors in notice are 

subject to harmless error analysis. (See Jesusa V., supra,

32 Cal.4th at pp. 624-625 [rejecting contention defective notice was 

jurisdictional error; harmless error standard applies to statutory 

notice violations]; accord, In re A.D. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1319, 

1325-1327; Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 387; In re J.H.

(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183.) Using the proper standard, we 

consider whether, had R.C. received the proper notice and asked to 

change his status from alleged father to presumed father, “it is 

reasonably probable that a result more favorable [to R.C.] would 

have been reached.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; 

see Jesusa V., at p. 625.) 

R.C. did not make the required showing. To begin, R.C. 

received notice of each hearing, as well as copies of the petition 

and various reports, throughout the dependency proceeding. Yet 

he never attempted to contact the court or any of the Department 

caseworkers. Further, R.C. was not an offending parent. His 

presence at the jurisdiction hearing would not have resulted in a 

different outcome in the court’s decision to assert jurisdiction 
15

over Isabella and to make all orders necessary to protect her. 

(See In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [jurisdiction 

finding involving one parent is good against both; “‘“the minor is 

a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him or her] 

within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent”’”].) To be 

sure, had R.C. appeared at the jurisdiction hearing and requested 

counsel to assist him in changing his status, the disposition 

hearing would likely have been continued. Until he achieved a 

status change, however, as an alleged parent he would have been 

eligible for reunification services only if the court found such 

services to be in Isabella’s best interest (§ 361.5, subd. (a)), a 

highly unlikely result given R.C.’s incarceration and lack of 

involvement in Bridgett’s pregnancy and Isabella’s life. 

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that R.C. would have been 

able “to meet the statutory elements to be declared a presumed 

father under Family Code section 7611” at any point in the 

dependency proceeding. (In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 

1113, 1122.) R.C. was not married to Bridgett and did not appear 

on Isabella’s birth certificate. Because Isabella was born after he 

was incarcerated and he made no effort to assert his paternity or 

engage his family in Isabella’s care and support, he could not 

have demonstrated he had earned presumed parent status by 

receiving her into his home and providing for her needs. As 

Justice Croskey explained in Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 

369, “Merely being a biological father is not sufficient. If a man 

has not legally married or attempted to legally marry the mother 

of his child, he can only be a presumed father if he has received 

the minor into his home and openly held the child out as his 

natural child.” (Id. at p. 383.) 
16

Equally problematic for alleged fathers like R.C., the 

dependency scheme does not wait for them to belatedly assert

their intent to form a parental relationship with their children. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[T]he Legislature has 

statutorily limited reunification services to ‘a maximum time 

period not to exceed 12 months,’ which, under certain 

circumstances, may be extended to 18 months. (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a).)[10] The 18-month period is not tolled by the parents’

physical custody of the child, or by the parents’ absence or 

incarceration. (§ 361.5, subds. (a), (d) & (e)(1).) [¶] What all of 

these express nontolling events have in common is that they 

prevent a parent’s unilateral action from impeding a child’s 

permanent and timely placement. We conclude that the 18-

month period is therefore also not extended . . . by an alleged 

father’s own failure to ascertain the existence of his child, or by 

his decision to wait until the 18-month hearing to assert his 

 

10 Pursuant to legislation enacted after the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Zacharia D., under certain limited circumstances 

court-ordered services may be extended for an additional 

six months—that is, for a period not to exceed 24 months from 

the date the child was originally removed from the physical 

custody of his or her parent—upon a showing the best interest of 

the child would be furthered by additional reunification services. 

(§§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A), 366.22, subd. (b).) This extraordinary 

extension of services is authorized, among other specific 

situations, for a parent who has been “recently discharged from 

incarceration . . . and making significant and consistent progress 

in establishing a safe home for the child’s return . . . .” (§ 366.22, 

subd. (b).) In this case, more than 24 months had elapsed 

between Isabella’s initial removal from Bridgett in June 2014 and 

the hearing on R.C.’s section 388 motion in August 2016.
17

paternity claim.” (Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 452; see 

Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 391 [“Had the trial court 

. . . not made adjudication and disposition orders and findings at 

the hearing in March 2007 but instead continued that hearing 

over and over and over until such time as Father decided to 

participate in the case and counsel could be appointed for him, 

the record shows that Marcos would have waited a very, very 

long time. The law does not require children to wait so long for 

parents to become sufficiently interested in dependency 

proceedings.”].)

11

 

11 The facts in Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th 435 and 

Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 369 are strikingly similar to the 

facts presented here. In Zacharia D. a biological father had reason 

to believe at the outset of the dependency case he was the child’s 

father, but waited until the 18-month review hearing before 

requesting paternity testing. (Zacharia, at p. 441.) The juvenile 

court terminated the mother’s reunification services and set a 

section 366.26 hearing before ruling on the father’s paternity 

status. (Ibid.) The court later found the father to be the child’s 

biological and presumed father, but declined to extend additional 

reunification services because “the County had no obligation to 

offer [the father] reunification services until the court declared him 

a parent, which had not occurred until [too late] because of [the 

father]’s ‘own doing.’” (Id. at pp. 443, 441-442.) Under those 

circumstances the Supreme Court was understandably concerned 

with a biological father “impeding a child’s permanent and timely 

placement” due to the father’s “decision to wait until the 18-month 

hearing to assert his paternity claim.” (Id. at p. 452.)

In Marcos G., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 369 the father was 

incarcerated when his biological son was born and through the 

time dependency proceedings began. The court found the father 

to be an alleged father only and did not appoint counsel to 

represent him. (Id. at p. 375.) The father eventually appeared
18

Like the alleged fathers in Zacharia D. and Marcos G., R.C. 

waited more than 20 months to seek an adjustment of his 

parental status, well past the 18-month maximum period for 

reunification efforts. He appeared at the last moment before his 

rights were to be terminated, following the approval of the home 

study for the maternal grandmother. Isabella’s permanent plan 

was in place and scheduled for approval. She would turn two 

before R.C.’s section 388 petition to adjust his status could be 

heard. Her best interest lay in remaining in the only home she 

had ever known with the only parent she had ever known and 

her half-brother. (See In re Justice P. supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 191 [“If a missing parent later surfaces, it does not 

automatically follow that the best interests of the child will be 

promoted by going back to square one and relitigating the case. 

Children need stability and permanence in their lives, not 

protracted legal proceedings that prolong uncertainty for 

them.”].)

In sum, there is no basis to find the juvenile court abused 

its discretion in denying the petition. 

 

16 months later, asserted notice to him had been defective (he 

had never been served with Judicial Council form JV–505, and 

the court had proceeded without an express written waiver of his 

attendance). He filed a section 388 petition requesting the court 

hold a new disposition hearing for him and find him to be the 

child’s presumed father. (Id. at p. 380.) Thereafter, he failed to 

appear at two section 366.26 hearings. (Id. at p. 389.) The 

juvenile court denied the petition and terminated the father’s 

parental rights. (Id. at pp. 381-382.) The Court of Appeal 

affirmed, concluding the father had ignored the case and, even 

had he received required notices and been transported to the 

jurisdiction hearing, the result would not have differed.
19

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

ZELON, J.

SEGAL, J.
Filed 4/5/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ISABELLA M., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B277142

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK97180)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 ORDER CERTIFYING

 OPINION FOR 

 PUBLICATION

THE COURT: 

The opinion in this case filed March 13, 2017 was not 

certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c), respondent’s request pursuant to California Rules 

of Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication is granted. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c); and 

ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the 

Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted 

and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.

___________________________________________________________

 PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J. SEGAL, J.