* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60629

CARLOS R DAVIS

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ALTACARE CORPORATION; HEALTHPRIME INC; ADVENTIST HEALTH

CENTER

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi, Hattiesburg

No. 2:05-CV-2027

Before KING, DeMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-appellant Carlos R. Davis, a/k/a Shaun Davis, appeals the district

court’s summary judgment for defendants-appellees AltaCare Corp.,

HealthPrime, Inc., and Adventist Health Center, dismissing his claims for

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.,

and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as his state law claims for defamation and

intentional inflection of emotional distress. Davis also appeals the district

court’s judgment insofar as it dismissed as moot his motions to strike portions

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 8, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-60629

1

In Trevino v. Celanese Corp., we explained that:

The term “employer” as used in Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act was meant to be liberally

construed. . . . Thus the rule has emerged that

superficially distinct entities may be exposed to liability

upon a finding that they represent a single, integrated

enterprise: a single employer. Factors considered in

determining whether distinct entities constitute an

integrated enterprise are (1) interrelation of operations,

(2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common

management, and (4) common ownership or financial

control. 

Courts applying this four-part standard in Title

VII and related cases have focused on the second factor:

centralized control of labor relations. This criterion has

been further refined to the point that “[t]he critical

question to be answered then is: What entity made the

final decisions regarding employment matters related

to the person claiming discrimination?”

701 F.2d 397, 403–04 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted); see also

Johnson v. Crown Enters., Inc., 398 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 2005). 

2

of the defendants’ summary judgment evidence. We affirm the judgment of the

district court essentially for the reasons stated in its Memorandum Opinion and

Order.

We have one modest qualification, which does not affect our judgment. We

note that there is some evidence that AltaCare Corp. (“AltaCare”) and

HealthPrime, Inc. (“HealthPrime”)—in addition to Adventist Health Center

(“Adventist”)—were Davis’s employers for the purpose of his federal claims.1

Specifically, there is evidence in the record that Annice Horton, AltaCare’s

Executive Director of Operations, signed Davis’s “Separation of Employment”

form, formally terminating him. There is also evidence in the record that Horton

verbally terminated Davis in an exit interview on November 5, 2004. By
No. 07-60629

3

contrast, the only evidence that Davis’s direct supervisor at Adventist, Sandra

King, terminated him is a sworn statement to that effect in the affidavit of

AltaCare’s Director of Human Resources, Brenda Brawner. With respect to

HealthPrime, there is evidence that: (1) HealthPrime was owned by AltaCare;

(2) Adventist used HealthPrime’s letterhead; and (3) HealthPrime issued

Adventist’s employee code of conduct. 

Nevertheless, we need not resolve this issue. Because we conclude that

the district court’s resolution of the merits of all of Davis’s claims was correct,

any potential liability of AltaCare and HealthPrime is extinguished along with

that of Adventist.

With respect to Davis’s late-filed motions (denied by the district court as

moot) to strike portions of defendants’ summary judgment evidence, only the

statements attached to Horton’s affidavit concerning Davis’s actions and

inactions on the night of July 14, 2004, could possibly affect Davis’s substantial

rights. See Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., 922 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1991). We

first note that these statements were used for the non-hearsay purpose of

showing the defendants’ state of mind in terminating Davis. But even if the

district court had considered the statements for the truth of the matter asserted

in them, it would not have abused its discretion because the business records

exception in Rule 803(6) would apply. FED. R. EVID. 803(6); see Positive Black

Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 376 (5th Cir. 2004); United

States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 986–87 (5th Cir. 1990); Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.

v. Austin, 292 F.2d 415, 422–23 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Sana v. Hawaiian

Cruises, Ltd., 181 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999).

With respect to the affidavit of defense expert Polly Darnall, there is no

indication in the district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order thatthe court

relied on it.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.