United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 2016 Decided April 1, 2016 

No. 15-7040 

MARIETTA ROBINSON, 

APPELLANT

v. 

SARAH PEZZAT, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:12-cv-00302) 

Tobias S. Loss-Eaton argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs was Frank R. Volpe. 

John D. Martorana, Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor 

General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General. 

Holly M. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, entered an 

appearance. 
2 

Before: GARLAND,* Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, 

and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

TATEL, Circuit Judge: We return once again to the 

familiar yet significant issue of the proper role of the district 

court at summary judgment. In this section 1983 action, 

plaintiff sought to hold police officers liable for unlawfully 

seizing her property in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

when the officers shot and killed her dog while executing a 

search warrant. The district court granted summary judgment 

to the officer who first shot the dog on the grounds that 

plaintiff’s eyewitness account of the shooting was 

uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence. Because 

the district court improperly assumed the “jury functions” of 

making “[c]redibility determinations, . . . weighing . . . the 

evidence, and . . . drawing . . . legitimate inferences from the 

facts,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 

(1986), we reverse this portion of the judgment. We affirm the 

grant of summary judgment to another officer who shot the 

dog, as well as to the District of Columbia. 

I. 

In the summer of 2010, the Metropolitan Police 

Department (MPD) obtained a warrant to search appellant 

Marietta Robinson’s home after her grandson was arrested 

while in possession of marijuana. Around 9 p.m. on the 

evening of June 15, a police squad consisting of nine officers 

 

*Chief Judge Garland was a member of the panel at the time the 

case was argued but did not participate in this opinion. 
3 

arrived at Robinson’s house to execute the warrant. In her 

deposition, Robinson testified that when she heard someone 

“knocking very hard” on the door, her dog Wrinkles, a 

thirteen-year-old female pit bull/German shepherd mix, 

“barked to let [her] know that somebody was there.” 

Robinson Dep. at 15, 24. Having owned Wrinkles since she 

was a puppy, Robinson acknowledged that the dog would 

sometimes bark and growl when “stranger[s] [came] in the 

house.” Id. at 16–17. 

Robinson testified that after the police identified 

themselves, she opened the inner door to her home, leaving 

the screen door in place. Wrinkles barked again, then “sat 

down and [was] quiet.” Id. at 23. According to several 

officers, however, Wrinkles “lunge[d] out,” “showing [her] 

teeth” in an aggressive manner. McLeod Dep. at 42; see also

Selby Dep. at 94; Boteler Dep. at 112. Both Robinson and the 

officers agree about what happened next: Robinson asked the 

lead officer, appellee Sergeant James Boteler, if she could put 

Wrinkles “in the back yard or . . . in the bathroom” while the 

police executed the warrant and, in response, Boteler 

instructed her to place the dog in the bathroom, which was 

immediately adjacent to and visible from the front door. 

Robinson Dep. at 26, 31. 

Boteler testified that he “yelled pretty loud” to the officers 

behind him to warn them that there was a “dog in the 

bathroom.” Boteler Dep. at 73–74. Officer Sarah Pezzat, 

another appellee, testified that although she never heard a 

warning, she knew that a dog was in the house because she 

“could easily hear the dog barking and growling.” Pezzat 

Dep. at 69. Pezzat also testified that she heard Boteler and 
4 

Robinson discussing where to put the dog and “something 

about the dog being in a backroom.” Id. 

When Robinson opened the front door after securing 

Wrinkles, the officers rushed inside. Pezzat, with gun drawn, 

was at least the fifth officer to enter the home. After several 

others bypassed the bathroom, Pezzat opened the door, which 

Boteler testified violated police protocol. Typically, Boteler 

explained, the first officer to encounter a door would “stop, 

clear that area, and then move to the next area,” unless there 

was a reason not to do so, such as the presence of a dog, 

which was “why several officers passed that door and did not 

open that door.” Boteler Dep. at 100–02. Other officers 

warned that there was a “[d]og on the left” as the search team 

entered, Ledesma Dep. at 23, 46–47, and heard Wrinkles 

barking. Pezzat recalled hearing no such warnings. 

Robinson testified that while standing near the entryway, 

she saw Pezzat open the bathroom door, “sho[o]t once, and 

then Wrinkles comes running out, got up and ran out the 

bathroom. Then [Pezzat] shot again. Then she backed out my 

door.” Robinson Dep. at 44. Repeating the point, Robinson 

testified that “[w]hen [Pezzat] shot the first time, Wrinkles got 

up. And when Wrinkles got up to come towards her, then she 

shot again.” Id. at 45–46. When the District of Columbia’s 

attorney asked whether it was Robinson’s testimony “that 

Wrinkles was on the floor—lying on the floor” in the 

bathroom, Robinson replied, “Yes.” Id. at 46. Asked how she 

knew that, Robinson explained, “Because when she first 

opened the door—when she had the gun in her hand, at first I 

. . . thought she was going to shoot me. But then when she . . . 

turned the [k]nob and pushed the door, . . . it wasn’t pointed 
5 

towards me no more.” Id. Robinson then testified—for the 

third time—that “the first shot, Wrinkles got up. . . . The 

second shot, Wrinkles ran out the bathroom.” Id. at 47. 

After Wrinkles made it out of the bathroom, Robinson 

testified, the dog ran to her and collapsed on the ground. 

Although Robinson never saw Wrinkles bite Pezzat, she 

acknowledged that Wrinkles would have bitten the officer 

“[i]n defense of herself, after being shot at . . . . [I]f you shoot 

a dog, most likely they’re going to attack you.” Id. at 55. 

Officer Pezzat had a very different view of what 

happened. She testified that after opening the bathroom door, 

she “saw that there was a dog inside of the room. I tried to 

close the door, but it was too late. The dog was already 

coming out of the room at me. And I picked up my leg to 

protect myself, and the dog bit down on my foot” once “the 

dog was already most of the way out of the room.” Pezzat 

Dep. at 73, 81. According to Pezzat, it was at that point—after 

the dog bit her—that she shot the animal. Echoing Pezzat, 

another officer, appellee Christian Glynn, testified that before 

Pezzat fired, Wrinkles “was barking, very angry and charged 

at Officer Pezzat,” then “latched on and bit Officer Pezzat’s 

foot and started shaking her” and “pulling her down and into 

the bathroom.” Glynn Dep. at 58–59. Sergeant Boteler 

testified that before hearing any gunfire, he too saw Wrinkles 

biting Pezzat “just outside the bathroom in the hallway.” 

Boteler Dep. at 104. 

Although Robinson testified that Wrinkles collapsed next 

to her feet after the shooting, Officer Richard McLeod, also 

an appellee, testified that Wrinkles began “coming towards” 
6 

him, deeper into the house. McLeod Dep. at 43. Another 

officer testified that McLeod fired at least a half-dozen shots 

at Wrinkles, toward the front of the house. According to 

Robinson, Wrinkles fled up the stairs to get away from the 

shots, but McLeod kept firing. In the end, officers blocked 

Wrinkles from climbing the stairs, and she died on the 

landing. 

According to Robinson, officers then took her clean 

laundry from the top of the washing machine and “cover[ed] 

the dog up and the blood up with my clean clothes.” Robinson 

Dep. at 77–78. Officer Adrian Ledesma testified that they 

covered Wrinkles “with like a white sheet or something like 

that,” Ledesma Dep. at 33, and Boteler confirmed that he 

placed one of Robinson’s sheets over Wrinkles’ body. While 

searching the house, officers left bloody “fingerprints on 

[Robinson’s] curtains”; “two whole [bloody] handprints” and 

a third partial print on Robinson’s sofa, which she had to 

throw away; bloody handprints on the walls and doors, 

“inside the closet,” and “[o]n the two fans . . . in the living 

room”; “smudges of blood on . . . [e]very picture that was on 

the wall that came down”; and blood “splattered all over” a 

painting made by Robinson’s brother, which looked like 

“somebody had just took and threw blood.” Robinson Dep. at 

62, 66–73. Robinson kept a water cooler “at [her] front door,” 

and after the officers left, “you could see the blood where they 

washed their hands. Blood there and fingerprints all over.” Id.

at 80. Robinson also saw officers “jumping on” her clothes 

dryer multiple times, breaking the door. Id. at 79. Boteler 

acknowledged that the police did nothing to clean up the 

house, and recalled a captain saying that “the dog’s blood is 
7 

her property. It’s going to be up to her or her family to clean it 

up, not us.” Boteler Dep. at 130–31. 

Mrs. Robinson filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Columbia against Officers Pezzat and 

McLeod, several other officers involved in the shooting and 

the search, and the District of Columbia, seeking damages 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various D.C. statutes. Robinson 

alleged, among other claims, that the officers had made illegal 

seizures under the Fourth Amendment both by shooting 

Wrinkles and by damaging her property during the subsequent 

search. 

The district court granted summary judgment for 

defendants on all claims. It first found that “[t]here is no 

genuine dispute that Wrinkles posed an imminent threat” to 

the officers and that their conduct was thus reasonable. 

Robinson v. Pezzat, 83 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267–68 (D.D.C. 

2015). The court explained: 

Plaintiff argues that her uncorroborated version of events 

creates a genuine dispute of material fact precluding 

summary judgment. I disagree. To withstand summary 

judgment, a plaintiff must advance more than a scintilla 

of doubt as to her claims. Unsubstantiated allegations of 

harm fall short of this standard, making dismissal 

imminently [sic] more likely where, as here, a plaintiff’s 

claims are contradicted, and overborn, by a record of 

credible evidence. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). According to the court, 

“several undisputed facts corroborate defendants’ account”: 
8 

(1) “that Wrinkles had a history of aggression,” as evidenced 

both by Robinson’s statements that Wrinkles would 

sometimes “bark and growl” at strangers and a veterinarian 

report from 2006, which stated that Wrinkles was 

“aggressive”; (2) that “Wrinkles barked and growled at the 

search team, prompting plaintiff to place the dog in the 

downstairs bathroom”; (3) that “Wrinkles bit, shook, and 

attempted to bodily drag Officer Pezzat into the bathroom,” 

injuring her; and (4) that “even after being shot, the dog 

charged two other police officers stationed on the staircase, 

prompting them to take cover behind a protective shield.” Id.

at 262, 267. The court concluded that “given Wrinkles’ 

threatening behavior, the government’s interest in 

safeguarding the lives of its officers, and the pressure of splitsecond decision making,” Pezzat’s and McLeod’s decisions 

were “eminently reasonable.” Id. at 267. 

The district court also rejected Robinson’s propertydamage claim, ruling that “[t]he damage here was reasonable 

under the circumstances.” Id. at 268. The court first concluded 

that “the immediate damage to plaintiff’s clothing, furniture, 

and walls from Wrinkles’ shooting was incident to a 

reasonable seizure and, therefore, is within the realm of 

constitutionality.” Id. “[A]ny subsequent damage to plaintiff’s 

personal items,” the court continued, “was the product of a 

reasonable search” because, by virtue of a “broadly-worded 

warrant authoriz[ing] defendants to search plaintiff’s 

residence for concealed drugs,” the officers “had every 

reason, indeed, every right, to search in closets, beneath sofas, 

and behind picture frames for concealed drugs.” Id. As for the 

bloody handprints, the court concluded that “[the] blood made 

its way onto plaintiff’s fixtures as the officers turned on light 
9 

switches, lifted furniture, and removed wall hangings is 

neither remarkable nor unduly destructive.” Id. 

In granting summary judgment to the District of 

Columbia, the court ruled that Robinson had failed to show 

that the District could be held liable under Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The 

court explained that Robinson could “point to no formal 

policy sanctioning the indiscriminate killing of household 

pets, let alone one that catalyzed the shooting here,” and that 

MPD policy “restrict[ed] the use of deadly force to selfdefense.” Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 269. And although 

Robinson had provided the court with twenty-one police 

reports documenting dog shootings during home searches 

between 2002 and 2009, the court found those reports 

insufficient to demonstrate that the District was deliberately 

indifferent to a risk of constitutional violations because “even 

if these incidents placed the District on notice of domestic 

animal shootings, plaintiff has tendered no evidence 

suggesting that the majority of these shootings were 

unconstitutional.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). Nor, the court concluded, had Robinson “articulated 

how improved training would have prevented Wrinkles’ 

death.” Id. at 270. 

Having rejected Robinson’s federal claims, the court 

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her 

District of Columbia law claims. Accordingly, it dismissed 

those claims without prejudice. Id. at 271. 

Robinson appeals, arguing that the district court 

improperly rejected her sworn testimony, which she believes 
10 

raises a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 

Wrinkles posed an imminent threat to Pezzat before the 

shooting. Robinson raises four additional arguments: (1) that 

even if her testimony could be disregarded, a jury could find 

unreasonable Pezzat’s decision to open the door, which 

sparked the confrontation with Wrinkles; (2) that the district 

court erred in granting summary judgment on her propertydamage claim because the seizure of Wrinkles, which caused 

much of the blood damage, was unreasonable, and the other 

damage following the dog’s death was independently 

unreasonable; (3) that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of McLeod because his decision 

to shoot the dog was unreasonable; and (4) that the District of 

Columbia should be liable for the officers’ actions under 

Monell because it failed to provide adequate training for 

police officers who encounter dogs during home searches. 

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo.” DeGraff v. District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 301 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). 

II. 

We begin with the demise of Wrinkles. “Every circuit 

that has considered the issue has held that the killing of a 

companion dog constitutes a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment.” Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th 

Cir. 2008); see also Carroll v. County of Monroe, 712 F.3d 

649, 651 (2d. Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). Those circuits 

have invariably concluded that “the use of deadly force 

against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an 

immediate danger and the use of force is unavoidable.” Viilo, 

547 F.3d at 710; see also San Jose Charter of the Hells 

Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 
11 

975–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the killing of guard dogs 

was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment where “the 

officers were not presented with exigent circumstances that 

necessitated killing the dogs”); Brown v. Muhlenberg 

Township, 269 F.3d 205, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 

state’s interest in protecting life and property may be 

implicated when there is reason to believe the pet poses an 

imminent danger. In the latter case, the state’s interest may 

even justify the extreme intrusion occasioned by the 

destruction of the pet in the owner’s presence. This does not 

mean, however, that the state may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, destroy a pet when it poses no immediate danger 

and the owner is looking on, obviously desirous of retaining 

custody.” (footnotes omitted)). As in any Fourth Amendment 

case, “[w]e analyze [the] question [of whether a pet 

constitutes an imminent threat] from the perspective ‘of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 

vision of hindsight.’” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 

2020 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 

(1989)). This analysis “allow[s] for the fact that police 

officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 

evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 

The question for the district court, then, was whether, 

given all of the circumstances and viewed from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, Wrinkles 

posed an imminent threat to Officer Pezzat before the 

shooting. Because the District of Columbia moved for 

summary judgment, Robinson must point to admissible 

evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact—that 
12 

is, a dispute that would allow “a reasonable jury [to] return a 

verdict” in her favor—on this precise question. Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 248. As noted above, Robinson testified that Wrinkles 

posed no threat to the police because Pezzat shot the dog 

while she was lying on the floor: “[T]he first shot, Wrinkles 

got up. . . . The second shot, Wrinkles ran out the bathroom.” 

Robinson Dep. 47. For her part, Pezzat testified that Wrinkles 

represented a threat because—before she fired her gun—the 

dog “was already coming out of the room at me” and “bit 

down on my foot.” Pezzat Dep. at 73. The district court 

concluded that Pezzat acted reasonably because Robinson’s 

“uncorroborated” testimony failed to create a genuine dispute 

as to whether Wrinkles constituted an imminent threat. 

Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 267. As District counsel wisely 

conceded at oral argument, this was error. Oral Arg. Tr. 32 

(“The Court: [T]hat the district judge said her testimony is 

uncorroborated, that’s irrelevant, isn’t it? Counsel: It is.”). 

In order to determine whether the moving party is entitled 

to summary judgment, we, like the district court, “examine 

the facts in the record and all reasonable inferences derived 

therefrom in a light most favorable to” the nonmoving party, 

here Mrs. Robinson. DeGraff, 120 F.3d at 299–300 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, “[t]he 

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed.” Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 255. This mode of analysis serves to separate the “jury 

functions” of making “[c]redibility determinations, . . . 

weighing . . . the evidence, and . . . drawing . . . legitimate 

inferences from the facts” from the district court’s role as the 

arbiter of legal questions. Id. Thus, “[a]lthough a jury might 

ultimately decide to credit the version of the events described 

by the defendants over that offered by the plaintiff, this is not 
13 

a basis upon which a court may rest in granting a motion for 

summary judgment.” Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 

329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Indeed, the summary judgment standard requires us to credit 

the plaintiff’s version of events, even if “directly 

contradictory” to other testimony. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 

1861, 1867 (2014). The Supreme Court, rejecting a lower 

court’s refusal to credit a plaintiff’s uncorroborated testimony, 

recently explained it this way: 

The witnesses on both sides come to th[e] case with their 

own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases. 

It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are 

generally resolved by juries in our adversarial system. By 

weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences 

contrary to [the nonmoving party’s] competent evidence, 

the court below neglect[s] to adhere to the fundamental 

principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable 

inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 

party. 

Id. at 1868. 

Given these standards, we think it quite obvious that the 

uncorroborated nature of Robinson’s testimony had nothing at 

all to do with the question before the district court: did 

Robinson present a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether Wrinkles posed an imminent threat to Pezzat’s 

safety? Corroboration goes to credibility, a question for the 

jury, not the district court. Perhaps a jury will disbelieve 

Robinson because her testimony was uncorroborated, but at 

this stage of the litigation, the district court must “believe[]” 
14 

her testimony and must not make “[c]redibility 

determinations.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Our decision in Arrington v. United States illustrates this 

point. There, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action 

alleging excessive force, claiming that “he was beaten by 

police officers after he was captured, restrained, disarmed, 

and handcuffed.” 473 F.3d at 331. According to the police 

officers, “force was used to subdue [the plaintiff] while he 

was armed and before he was in handcuffs.” Id. at 336. The 

government argued that the plaintiff’s “conclusory, 

unsubstantiated statements . . . unsupported by specific facts 

[were] insufficient to overcome a summary judgment 

motion.” Id. We rejected that argument, holding that “a 

plaintiff may defeat a summary judgment granted to a 

defendant if the parties’ sworn statements are materially 

different.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 

Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). It made no 

difference that the plaintiff’s testimony was uncorroborated. 

All that mattered was that the testimony created a genuine 

issue of material fact. Although acknowledging that “‘some 

statements are so conclusory as to come within an exception 

to that rule,’” we concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations 

“f[ound] support in sworn deposition testimony filed in the 

District Court.” Id. at 336, 338 (quoting Greene, 164 F.3d at 

675). “Possessed of this testimony,” we explained, “a jury can 

assess the validity of [the plaintiff’s] claims.” Id. at 338; see 

also Harris v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 776 F.3d 

907, 914–15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that conflicting 

statements from plaintiff and police officers raised genuine 

disputes of material fact in excessive force case); Ayissi-Etoh 

v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per 
15 

curiam) (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate 

when the plaintiff’s account of what happened during a 

meeting differed from his supervisor’s recollection); Johnson 

v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(holding that “[s]ummary judgment was premature because 

there exists a genuine issue of material fact” that could “only 

be resolved by evaluating the conflicting testimony of” two 

people involved in an altercation). As in Arrington, it is up to 

the jury, not the district court, to “assess the validity of” 

plaintiff’s uncorroborated version of events. 473 F.3d at 338. 

Although the District of Columbia agrees with all of this, 

it nonetheless argues that we can sustain the district court’s 

rejection of Robinson’s testimony for two independent 

reasons. First, the District contends that the court properly 

refused to credit Robinson’s testimony because she never 

expressly stated that she saw Wrinkles lying on the bathroom 

floor. This, the District argues, “demonstrate[s] that Robinson 

lacked personal knowledge for her allegation that the dog was 

simply lying on the floor when Officer Pezzat shot it and that 

it was not in fact attacking Officer Pezzat.” Appellees’ Br. 31. 

We disagree. As explained above, at summary judgment we 

“examine the facts in the record and all reasonable inferences 

derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

DeGraff, 120 F.3d at 299–300 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Given Robinson’s testimony that she saw Pezzat 

open the door, her answering “yes” to the question whether 

she intended to testify that “Wrinkles was . . . lying on the 

floor” in the bathroom, Robinson Dep. at 46, and her repeated 

statements that Wrinkles “got up” after Pezzat fired, a jury 

could reasonably infer that Robinson saw Wrinkles lying on 

the bathroom floor. 
16 

The District insists that such an inference is unjustified 

because when its lawyer asked Robinson how she knew 

Wrinkles was lying down, Robinson “refused to say she 

actually saw these events,” and instead gave an answer not 

directly responsive to counsel’s question. Appellees’ Br. 30. 

Again, we disagree. Accepting the District’s argument would 

require that we draw an inference against Robinson 

notwithstanding her testimony explaining that she witnessed 

the scene and describing the precise order of events. We may 

not draw such an inference at summary judgment. 

The District of Columbia next argues that we can sustain 

the district court’s rejection of Robinson’s testimony because, 

according to the District, the weight of evidence corroborating 

the officers’ accounts fatally undermined Robinson’s 

credibility. In support, the District invokes our decision in 

Johnson v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 

in which we recognized that a district court may “lawfully put 

aside testimony that is so undermined as to be incredible.” 

883 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1989), abrogated on other 

grounds by Robinson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1255, 

1258 (D.C. 1990). This circumstance, we explained, was 

“most likely when a plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by 

the plaintiff’s own self-serving testimony, unsupported by 

corroborating evidence, and undermined either by other 

credible evidence, physical impossibility or other persuasive 

evidence that the plaintiff has deliberately committed 

perjury.” Id. Evidence satisfying this standard, such as a video 

tape that “quite clearly” demonstrates the falsity of the 

plaintiff’s statement, rarely exists. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 378 (2007). Indeed, in Johnson we identified only two 

instances in which this circuit rejected a plaintiff’s testimony 
17 

as “so undermined as to be incredible,” both of which 

involved testimony contradicted by multiple disinterested 

witnesses and, in one case, by the plaintiff herself. See 

Johnson, 883 F.2d at 128–29 (citing Law v. Virginia Stage 

Lines, 444 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Washington, 

Marlboro & Annapolis Motor Lines v. Maske, 190 F.2d 621 

(D.C. Cir. 1951)). 

In this case, the district court rejected Robinson’s 

testimony because, in addition to it being uncorroborated, 

Wrinkles had a “history of aggression” (based primarily on 

the 2006 veterinary report), “barked and growled at the search 

team,” bit Pezzat, and “charged” the officers standing on the 

stairs after McLeod shot the dog. Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 

262, 267. In our view, however, none of this evidence is 

remotely compelling enough to require a jury to disregard 

Robinson’s testimony as “so undermined as to be incredible.” 

Johnson, 883 F.2d at 128. A jury could regard the years-old 

veterinary report and Wrinkles’ barking at the police—as 

would most any self-respecting dog—to be of limited 

probative value to the question of exactly what happened 

when Pezzat opened the bathroom door. If the jury believed 

Robinson’s testimony that Wrinkles was lying down, it could 

reasonably conclude that the dog acted aggressively toward 

Pezzat only after being shot. Finally, a jury could either credit 

Robinson’s testimony that the dog ran up the stairs to escape 

McLeod or conclude that Wrinkles’ behavior after being shot 

was of limited probative value. 

To sum up, then, viewing the facts and all reasonable 

inferences most favorably to Robinson, we believe that a jury 
18 

could conclude that Pezzat acted unreasonably in shooting 

Wrinkles. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. 

Seeking to avoid this result, the District urges us to affirm 

on an alternative ground, i.e., that Pezzat is entitled to 

qualified immunity because she violated no clearly 

established law. “[Q]ualified immunity protects government 

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

This argument comes too late. In the district court, the District 

of Columbia argued only that Robinson suffered no 

constitutional injury; it never argued that the officers were 

entitled to qualified immunity on clearly established law 

grounds. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 16–18, 23–25. This 

argument is thus forfeited. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. 

Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It is 

well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the 

District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal.”). 

Given that we are reversing the grant of summary 

judgment to Officer Pezzat, we shall also reverse the grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the officers on Robinson’s 

claim that they violated the Fourth Amendment by 

unreasonably destroying her personal property during the 

shooting. As the district court observed, this claim is 

intertwined with Wrinkles’ seizure. See Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 

3d at 268. And because the district court will have to 

reconsider its property-damage analysis, we think it unwise at 

this point to consider whether the post-shooting damage was 
19 

independently unreasonable. Finally, because the district court 

never addressed Robinson’s argument that a reasonable jury 

could find that Pezzat acted unreasonably when she opened 

the bathroom door, we decline to consider that issue as well. 

III. 

We can easily dispose of Mrs. Robinson’s claim that 

Officer McLeod acted unreasonably when he shot Wrinkles. 

Robinson does not dispute that Wrinkles had bitten Officer 

Pezzat and had run out of the bathroom by the time McLeod 

began firing. Nor does she dispute that events unfolded 

quickly—within a matter of seconds. Even were a jury to 

credit Robinson’s testimony that Wrinkles ran to her and 

collapsed on the floor, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must 

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that 

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount 

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham,

490 U.S. at 396–97. Given that Wrinkles bit Officer Pezzat 

hard enough to puncture her leather boots, McLeod’s belief—

just seconds later—that the dog continued to pose an 

imminent threat even absent additional aggressive behavior 

was hardly unreasonable. We shall thus affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer McLeod on this 

issue. 

Mrs. Robinson’s claim against the District requires a little 

more discussion. She argues that the District may be held 

liable for Pezzat’s conduct under Monell because the MPD 

“failed to provide training to address a clear risk of 

constitutional violations” arising from dog shootings. 

Appellant’s Br. 57. According to Robinson, this lack of 
20 

training contributed to a constitutional violation because “the 

search team arrived at Mrs. Robinson’s home with no plan to 

deal with any animals they might encounter” or “protocol for 

ensuring that each officer knew where Wrinkles was 

secured.” Id. at 64. 

A plaintiff may establish a “policy or custom” under 

Monell by “the failure of the government to respond to a need 

(for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to 

show deliberate indifference to the risk that not addressing the 

need will result in constitutional violations.” Baker v. District 

of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Deliberate indifference is 

determined by analyzing whether the municipality knew or 

should have known of the risk of constitutional violations, an 

objective standard.” Id. at 1307. Because a finding of liability 

in the context of a failure to train amounts to a judicial 

determination that “the city itself [decided] to violate the 

Constitution,” the Supreme Court has imposed “a stringent 

standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor 

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” 

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). “A pattern of 

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is 

ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for 

purposes of failure to train,” although there are rare 

circumstances in which “the unconstitutional consequences of 

failing to train could be so patently obvious that a city could 

be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern 

of violations.” Id. at 62, 64 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In the case of police officers, it will not 
21 

suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have 

been avoided if an officer had had better or more training, 

sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injurycausing conduct. Such a claim could be made about 

almost any encounter resulting in injury, yet not condemn 

the adequacy of the program to enable officers to respond 

properly to the usual and recurring situations with which 

they must deal.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). 

In this case, the district court found that the seven years’ 

worth of police reports of dog shootings were insufficient to 

establish deliberate indifference because they gave no 

indication “that the majority of these shootings were 

unconstitutional.” Robinson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 269. Robinson 

nonetheless contends that the district court disregarded the 

risk that officers would encounter dogs during home searches 

and that some of those encounters would result in unnecessary 

shootings. In support, she relies on our decision in Smith v. 

District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in 

which we held the District liable under Monell where it had 

failed to establish any standards at all for selecting 

independent living programs with which it placed at-risk 

youth, leading to a situation in which children “could be sent 

to totally inappropriate programs run by unqualified 

counselors and located in unsafe areas,” risks that “were 

realized” when a substandard provider “failed to react to the 

murder of one youth and the armed robbery of another.” 

Under those circumstances, the jury “may infer deliberate 

indifference from the District’s failure to have adequate 

safeguards for dealing with situations fraught with risk.” Id. 
22 

The situation here is very different from the one we 

confronted in Smith. Unlike there, the District has municipal 

regulations governing the conduct at issue. Those regulations 

allow police officers to discharge their firearms only in 

specified circumstances, including “[t]o kill a dangerous 

animal” and “[t]o defend him or herself or another from an 

attack which the officer has reasonable cause to believe could 

result in death or serious bodily injury.” 6A DCMR § 

207.2(a), (c). The MPD manual likewise authorizes the use of 

deadly force only “[w]hen it is necessary and objectively 

reasonable . . . [t]o defend [the officer] or another from an 

actual or threatened attack that is imminent and could result in 

death or serious bodily injury.” Metropolitan Police, General 

Order GO-RAR-901.07, at 7 (2002). Unlike in Smith, 

moreover, where the District had provided employees with no 

relevant training, here the MPD gives officers specific 

training about how to identify and control dangerous dogs. 

Even if, as Robinson insists, the MPD could improve its 

training, Monell requires a plaintiff to do more than “prove 

that an injury or accident could have been avoided if an 

officer had had better or more training, sufficient to equip him 

to avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.” City of 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. We also agree with the district court 

that the police reports of dog shootings provide no basis for a 

reasonable jury to conclude that the District had notice of a 

pattern of likely unconstitutional conduct adequate to prove 

deliberate indifference. Indeed, the reports that contain any 

detail at all invariably indicate that the dogs attacked the 

police officers, and thus fail to establish “[a] pattern of similar 

constitutional violations by untrained employees” or 

demonstrate such a risky environment that “the 

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train [were] so 
23 

patently obvious” that the city’s reaction rises to “the 

functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate 

the Constitution.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–64. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the grant of 

summary judgment to Officer Sarah Pezzat and affirm as to 

Officer Richard McLeod and the District of Columbia. 

Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Officer 

Pezzat, we also reverse the court’s dismissal of Mrs. 

Robinson’s District of Columbia law claims. 

So ordered.