alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-07-435-CR

RICHARD DEWAYNE BEASON 	APPELLANT

A/K/A RICHARD BEASON

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	Appellant Richard Dewayne Beason appeals his sixty-year sentence for aggravated assault of a family member with a weapon.2  We affirm.

	Appellant pleaded guilty before a jury to aggravated assault of a family member with a weapon.  After hearing evidence and argument on the issue of punishment, the jury assessed punishment at sixty years’ confinement.  In his sole point on appeal, appellant contends that his sentence was disproportionate to the crime committed. 

	Although appellant timely filed a motion for new trial, he has failed to preserve his complaint because the record does not indicate that he presented his motion for new trial to the trial court.3  The term “present” means the record must show that the movant for a new trial sustained the burden of actually delivering the motion for new trial to the attention or actual notice of the trial court.4  Here, the record establishes that Appellant timely filed his motion for new trial, but it does not show that he actually delivered it to the trial court or otherwise brought it to the trial court’s attention.5  Accordingly, because appellant did not preserve his claim regarding the alleged disproportionate sentencing, we overrule his sole point.  The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

							PER CURIAM

PANEL:  CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and HOLMAN, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)  

DELIVERED:  August 29, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4422

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEMETRIE A. YORK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(4:07-cr-00481-TLW-6)

Submitted: August 21, 2008 Decided: August 25, 2008

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David B. Betts, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID B. BETTS, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United

States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Demetrie A. York pled

guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of crack

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). He was sentenced

to 122 months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised

release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his opinion,

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the issue

of whether the district court complied with the requirements of

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting York’s guilty plea. Although

advised of his right to file a pro se brief, York has not done so.

We affirm.

York did not move in the district court to withdraw his

guilty plea, therefore his challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11

hearing is reviewed for plain error. See United States v.

Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). We have carefully

reviewed the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing and find no plain

error in the district court’s acceptance of York’s guilty plea.

See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).

Moreover, York is bound by the statements he made at the Rule 11

hearing, see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977), and we

find no evidence that York’s plea was not knowing or voluntary.

See United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992);

United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). 
3

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for

appeal. We therefore affirm York’s conviction and sentence. This

court requires that counsel inform York, in writing, of his right

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If York requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on York.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# CE2004088EN.01036401.xml

| 8.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 88/364 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 88/364

---

(2004/C 88 E/0370)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1921/03

by Carlos Bautista Ojeda (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(12 June 2003)

Subject:   Preserved mandarin segments from China

Subject:

The enormous increase in imports of preserved mandarin segments from China has seriously upset the Community market, whose mandarin segment production is located almost exclusively in Spain and fell by 36 % between the 1998/1999 and 2001/2002 marketing years.

Bearing in mind the safeguard clause in Article 22 of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/96 (1) which states that if the Community market is seriously disturbed by imports the Commission shall, at the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, decide upon the necessary measures within three working days following receipt of the request.

1

Why has the Commission not adopted any measure, in view of the serious situation there has been since 5 June 2002, when the Spanish Government urgently requested implementation of such measures?

Why has the Commission not adopted any measures on its own initiative?

Joint answer

to Written Questions E-1646/03, E-1920/03 and E-1921/03

given by Mr Lamy on behalf of the Commission

(25 July 2003)

(25 July 2003)

The Commission would like to take this opportunity to inform the Honourable Members that it has now received a fully documented request from the Spanish Government under Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 427/2003 of 3 March 2003 on a transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China and amending Regulation (EC) No 519/94 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (2).

2

The Commission recognises the urgency of this request, which it is already in the course of analysing, and a copy of the request has been sent to all Member States with a view to consultation.

---

(1)  OJ L 297, 21.11.1996, p. 29.

1

(2)  OJ L 65, 8.3.2003.

2

---
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 23, 2019

No. 04-18-00397-CV

MPII, INC. D/B/A Mission Park Funeral Chapels and Cemeteries,

Appellants

v.

Timothy MOTT and Sharlotte Mott,

Appellees

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CI00572

Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellee’s Brief is hereby 

GRANTED. Time is extended to March 1, 2019. “No further extensions absent extraordinary 

circumstances.”

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 23rd day of January, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           9,180
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  128,951
<ALLOWANCES>                                    19,068
<INVENTORY>                                      4,570
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               139,061
<PP&E>                                         178,857
<DEPRECIATION>                                  33,427
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 378,134
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           36,994
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              482
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     299,753
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   378,134
<SALES>                                         67,065
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                72,773
<CGS>                                           63,664
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   63,664
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 683
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,426
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,328
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,098
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                     5,098
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.10
        

</TABLE>
IN RE J.J.

No. COA08-456.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed November 18, 2008.

Certification Date December 8, 2008.

Appeal from Mecklenburg (07J188).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
STATE v. Albert Lee STEVENSON, Jr.

No. 50P00-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 11, 2015.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Albert Lee Stevenson, Jr., Nashville, for Stevenson, Albert Lee Jr.

Brandy Cook, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 11th of December 2015 by Defendant for Temporary Stay:

> "Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th of December 2015."
EXHIBIT 32

                    Certification of CEO and CFO Pursuant to
                 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Xechem
International, Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), Dr. Ramesh C. Pandey, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Dr. Ramesh C. Pandey, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:

            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the Company.

                                                     /s/ Ramesh C. Pandey, Ph.D.
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Ramesh C. Pandey, Ph.D.
                                                     Chief Executive Officer

                                                     Date:  November 9, 2005

                                                     /s/ Ramesh C. Pandey, Ph.D.
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Ramesh C. Pandey, Ph.D.
                                                     Chief Financial Officer

                                                     Date:  November 9, 2005
1

This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2005-CI-18347, pending in the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar

County, Texas, and Cause No. 2006-CI-08844, pending in the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas. The

challenged order was signed by the Honorable Karen H. Pozza, presiding judge of the 407th Judicial District Court,

Bexar County, Texas.

iii i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00388-CV

IN RE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 20, 2008

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

The court has considered relator’s petition for a writ of mandamus and the response of the

real parties in interest and is of the opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly, relator’s

petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). 

PER CURIAM
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-31144

Consolidated with

No. 07-30223

Summary Calendar

RICHARD MAHOGANY, JR

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JIM ROGERS, Warden, Washington Parish Correctional Institute; MICHAEL

HARRELL, Investigator; JEFF WILLIAMS, Lieutenant; MICAH MCMURRAY,

Sergeant; RONALD BRANCH, Major; RICHARD STALDER, Secretary; KATHY

MCGINNIS, Warden

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:06-CV-2351

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In these consolidated appeals, Defendant-Appellant Richard Mahogany,

Jr., Louisiana prisoner # 123340, contests the district court’s dismissal of his §

1983 complaint against various employees of the Louisiana Department of

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 27, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-31144

c/w No. 07-30223

2

Corrections, contending that they had initiated a false disciplinary action

against him as a “reprisal” for his filing an administrative remedy procedure

(ARP) complaint against them and submitting evidence in support of the ARP

and possible future court proceedings. The district court dismissed the

complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim because it was barred

under Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Mahogany also challenges the

district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of the magistrate

judge’s (MJ) denial of his “Motion For Judgment/Rule to Show Cause”concerning

the defendants’ alleged spoliation of evidence. This interlocutory order merged

into the district court’s final judgment and became reviewable in Mahogany’s

appeal of the final judgment. See Dickinson v. Auto Ctr. Mfg. Co., 733 F.2d 1092,

1102 (5th Cir. 1983).

Mahogany’s retaliation claim is not barred under Heck because “favorable

termination [of allegedly retaliatory disciplinary proceedings] is not a requisite

of a retaliatory interference claim.” Woods v. Smith, 60F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.

1995). Mahogany has not, however, alleged “a chronology of events from which

retaliation may plausibly be inferred,” nor has he shown that the defendants’

destruction of evidence supported such a chronology of events. Jones v.

Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999).

Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of Mahogany’s complaint is

AFFIRMED.

Despite our briefing order, counsel failed adequately to brief the issue

whether the district court erred in failing to consider Mahogany’s retaliation

claim or in denying his motion for judgment; neither has counsel addressed the

issue whether Mahogany has established a retaliation claim. Counsel is

ORDERED to show cause within 30 days why she should not be sanctioned. See

Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1988).
STATE v. Eric Glenn LANE.

No. 606A05-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 29, 2016.

Daniel Shatz, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Lane, Eric Glenn.

Derrick Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of NC.

Nicholaos Vlahos, Assistant Attorney General, for State of NC.

Matthew Delbridge, District Attorney, for State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 26th of February 2016 by Defendant:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 26th of February 2016."

Defendant shall have up to and including the 30th day of March 2016 to serve his/her proposed record upon the district attorney. The parties shall then proceed to settle and file the record on appeal pursuant to the provisions of Appellate Rules 11 and 12.
----

(2004/C 78 E/0157)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2693/03

by Caroline Lucas (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(2 September 2003)

Subject:   GMOs

A number of Member States have invoked Article 16 of Directive 90/220/EC (1) (now replaced by Directive 2001/18/EC (2)) in respect to the following Part C marketing consents:

Would the Commission please indicate the current status of the measures imposed by Member States on the basis of Article 16 of Directive 90/220/EEC. Have they been upheld or overturned by the European Union?

Would the Commission also indicate the specific reasons given by the Member States for imposing these measures and release copies of the documentation provided by these Member States or justification for invoking Article 16?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(28 October 2003)

Article 16 of Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into environment of genetically modified organisms, replaced on 17 October 2002 by Directive 2001/18/EC of the Parliament and the Council of 12 March 2001, was invoked by six Member States in nine cases which concerned five authorisations of genetically modified plant products. Italy has not invoked Article 16 under Directive 90/220/EEC, but has taken safeguard measures relating to certain products authorised under Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997, concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients (3).

The Commission submitted the documents Member States had provided to justify measures taken according to Article 16 of Directive 90/220/EEC to the Scientific Committee(s). In all cases the Committee(s) concluded, after examination of the reasons and information submitted by Member States, that they did not provide new scientific evidence to change the original risk assessment on the grounds of which the products concerned had been authorised.

In the case of Bt-176 maize (C/F/94/11-03) consultations of the Regulatory Committee were launched end of 1997, according to Article 21 of Directive 90/220/EEC. The Regulatory Committee failed to deliver an opinion on the draft decisions of the Commission in April 1998. These were subsequently transmitted to the Council. The Council did not have the qualified majority to act on the proposed decisions within the statutory three-month period. In the other Article 16 cases, the Regulatory Committee consultation is pending.

The reasons given by the Member States for imposing measures taken according to Article 16 are as follows:

The opinions of the Scientific Committees are publicly available on line at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/ fs/sc/scp/outcome_gmo_en.html and at (http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/oldcomm7/out02_en.html). The national safeguard measures can be found in the Official Journals of the above mentioned Member States.

----

(1)OJ L 117, 8.5.1990, p. 15.

(2)OJ L 106, 17.4.2001, p. 1.

(3)OJ L 43, 14.2.1997.

----
**Exhibit
      23.1 - CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING
      FIRM**








We
      hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of
      On2
      Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form S-3 (No. 333-142336 and No.
      333-137577), on Form S-8 (No. 333-147205) and on Form S-4 (No. 333-145809)
      of
      our report dated June 27, 2008 with respect to our audit of the consolidated
      financial statements of the Company as of December 31, 2007 and 2006 and for
      each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2007, which
      included an explanatory paragraph relating to the Company’s change in accounting
      principle for its method of accounting for stock-based compensation, which
      is
      included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
      2007. We also consent to the reference of our firm as Experts in the aforementioned
      Registration Statements.








/s/
      Eisner LLP





New
      York,
      New York


June
      27,
      2008
# CE2004084EN.01002901.xml

| 3.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 84/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 84/29

---

(2004/C 84 E/0032)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2516/03

by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission

(29 July 2003)

Subject:   Eurostat Task Force and OLAF independence

Subject:

On 9 July 2003 the Commission decided to set up a task force to investigate the complaints against Eurostat. Commission Press Release IP/03/979 states: ‘A multidisciplinary Commission Task Force will be set up to take rapidly forward the internal and external sides of the enquiries currently managed by OLAF alone. The Task Force will also carry out a full-scale administrative enquiry aimed at assessing the personal responsibilities of other staff involved with any financial irregularities. The Task Force will be managed by Mr Peter Zangl, currently Deputy Director-General of DG INFSO, and under the authority of Mr F.-H. Brüner, Director-General of OLAF.’

This decision conflicts with the Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (1), by which the Commission handed over to OLAF its powers to carry out internal and external administrative investigations (Article 2 of the Decision). It also conflicts with Article 3 of this Decision, which expressly guarantees OLAF's independence in exercising its investigative powers. In particular, the appointment of an official who does not belong to OLAF to lead the Task Force conflicts with the stipulation that the Director of OLAF may not take instructions from the Commission.

1

In these circumstances, has the Commission looked into the risk that officials and firms affected by the Task Force's investigations may challenge their legality?

What conclusions does the Commission draw in this connection from the recent Court of Justice rulings in Cases C-11/00 and C-15/00, which stressed the particular importance of OLAF investigations being independent?

---

(1)  OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20.

1

---
NO. 12-08-00248-CV

NO. 12-08-00249-CV

NO. 12-08-00250-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

§

IN RE: JAN WORSHAM,

CONTEMNOR § ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

On June 9, 2008, this Court initiated contempt proceedings against Jan Worsham pertaining

to three appellate cause numbers, 12-07-00363-CR, 12-07-00364-CR, and 12-07-00365-CR, styled

Ruben Muniz v. State of Texas. On June 30, 2008, the Court held a hearing, at which Worsham

appeared. Having concluded that no further action is necessary, we dismiss these original

proceedings.

Opinion delivered August 29, 2008.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)