FILED

June 20, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

KATHY S. DILLON, and husband )

DONALD L. DILLON, )

)

Plaintiffs/Appellants, )

) Tennessee Claims Commission 

VS. ) No. 304797

)

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9701-BC-00020

Defendant/Appellee. )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

APPEAL FROM TENNESSEE CLAIMS COMMISSION, 

MIDDLE DIVISION, OF DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

HONORABLE W. R. BAKER, COMMISSIONER, MIDDLE DIVISION

John Knox Walkup

Attorney General & Reporter

Michael W. Catalano

Associate Solicitor General

500 Charlotte Avenue

Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0497

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Gary R. Gober

Harry L. Weddle

2505 21st Avenue, Suite 301

Post Office Box 121497

Nashville, Tennessee 37212

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS

MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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KATHY S. DILLON, and husband )

DONALD L. DILLON, )

)

Plaintiffs/Appellants, )

) Tennessee Claims Commission

) No. 304797

VS. )

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9701-BC-00020

Defendant/Appellee. )

O P I N I O N

This appeal arises from the injury of a passenger in a motor vehicle which was struck in

the rear by a Tennessee Highway Patrol Cruiser operated by a Trooper of the patrol. The State

Claims Commission found the fault of the Trooper to be 85% and that of the driver of vehicle

occupied by the injured passenger to be 15% and assessed damages accordingly. The State filed

a petition for judicial review by this Court, presenting the following issues:

1. Trooper Christian saw the Dillon car followed by a car

driving erratically. He pursued the erratic car, crested a rise,

saw only Dillon and immediately turned on his emergency

equipment. When Dillon slowed and moved toward the right

shoulder, Christian attempted to pass, but Dillon began to

turn left. Christian veered to the right and hit Dillon’s rear

bumper. Did the Commissioner err in holding that Trooper

Christian breached his duty of care to Dillon?

2. When Mr. Dillon began to turn left, he activated his left

turn signal less than 50 feet before the turn in violation of

state law. Based on this act, the Commissioner held that Mr.

Dillon was only 15% at fault. Did the Commissioner err in

that Trooper Christian was 85% at fault?

The Claimants present the issues in the following form:

1. Whether the Tennessee Claims Commissioner erred by a

preponderance of the evidence in holding that an experienced

highway patrol officer failed to use due regard for the safety

of the plaintiffs by initiating a high-speed chase around them

from the rear over hilly terrain in the dark on a rain-wet road

after turning on his emergency equipment two-tenths of a

mile back at 50 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. residential area and then,

despite having total visual command of the situation, crashing

violently into the rear of the car as it sat entirely in the right

lane of a shoulderless, two-lane road in front of the plaintiffs’

driveway with the turn indicator blinking?
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2. Whether the Commissioner, after assessing the credibility

of the witnesses and the weight of all the evidence at trial,

erred in apportioning 85% of the fault to the negligent trooper

who had ample time and distance to slow his cruiser to a

controllable speed under the road conditions and known

presence of the plaintiffs; and who testified that he knew

beforehand that the wetness of the road would diminish his

ability to stop or slow his cruiser, yet maintained an

uncontrollable speed on approach of the plaintiffs’ vehicle

from the rear, despite his admitted personal knowledge that

the driver of the plaintiffs’ vehicle might not have then

perceived his cruiser two-tenths of a mile behind him at 50

m.p.h.?

I.

THE FACTS

With minor exceptions noted hereafter, the facts are undisputed.

The collision occurred on U.S. Highway 70N which is a two lane paved highway with

no shoulder adjoining the pavement on the north side due to a ditch near the pavement.

Plaintiff Donald Dillon was driving his vehicle westward in the described area at a very

slow speed searching for a driveway on the south (left) side of the roadway which driveway he

intended to enter by turning left across the (south) east-bound lane of the roadway. It was dark

and raining, causing low visibility. Approximately 3/10 of a mile to the east of the scene, there

is a crest in the level of the road obscuring vehicles beyond the crest. East of said crest, the

speed limit was 55 m.p.h., but west of the crest, the speed limit was 30 m.p.h.

For some distance before arriving at the scene, Mr. Dillon noticed another private vehicle

(not the patrol cruiser), approaching at a high rate of speed shifting his headlights high and low

as though trying to pass. At some point near the crest, the speeding vehicle passed the Dillon

vehicle and continued westward at a high rate of speed.
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At about this time, the Trooper was approaching the scene from the west, moving

eastward, facing the Dillon vehicle. Seeing the antics of the speeding vehicle, the Trooper

decided to chase and intercept the speeding vehicle, but it was necessary to change direction to

do so. After passing the Dillon vehicle, the Trooper continued eastward to a point where the

reversal of direction was accomplished and the Trooper approached the scene, westbound at a

high rate of speed with siren and emergency lights activated. The cruiser was not visible to Mr.

Dillon until it passed the crest in the road 3/10 of a mile from the Dillon vehicle. Mr. Dillon

testified that he never heard the siren or saw the blue lights until just before the collision, but that

at the time of the collision he had moved to the extreme right of his lane and was moving slowly.

The trooper testified that he saw the brake signal of the Dillon vehicle and the movement

to the right portion of the west bound lane and presumed that Mr. Dillon was yielding the right

of way, and that he (the Trooper) began the movement to pass the Dillon vehicle on the left,

using the southern (east-bound) lane; but the Dillon vehicle began to display a signal for a left

turn and began to move to the left (southerly) portion of the west bound lane; and that the

Trooper then expected Mr. Dillon to turn left across the south (east bound) lane which would

result in the cruiser striking the Dillon broadside.

The Trooper testified that his only alternative was to attempt to pass to the right of the

Dillon vehicle, but that he was unable to do so, succeeding only in hitting the Dillon vehicle in

the rear instead of the side.

The points of contact with the Dillon vehicle included the entire rear, that is, from the left

end to the right end of the rear bumper. When struck, the Dillon vehicle was entirely within the

west bound lane.
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II.

THE LAW

T.C.A. § 55-8-108 reads in pertinent part as follows:

Authorized emergency vehicles. - (a) The driver of

an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an

emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or

suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not

upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges

set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein

stated.

- - - -

(3) Exceed the speed limits so long as life or property are not

thereby endangered; and

(4) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or

turning in specified directions.

(c) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized

emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is

making use of audible and visual signals meeting the

requirements of the applicable laws of this state, except that

an authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle

may be equipped with or display a red light only in

combination with a blue light visible from in front of the

vehicle.

(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an

authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due

regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions

protect the driver from the consequences of the driver’s own

reckless disregard for the safety of others.

T.C.A. § 55-8-143 reads in pertinent part as follows:

Signals for turns. - (a) Every driver who intends to

start, stop or turn, or partly turn from a direct line, shall first

see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever

the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such

movement, shall give a signal required in this section, plainly

visible to the driver of such other vehicle of the intention to

make such movement. (Emphasis supplied.)

T.C.A. § 9-8-403 (a) (1) provides in pertinent part as follows:

The decisions of the individual commissioners may be

appealed to the entire claims commission pursuant to rules

promulgated by the commission. The decisions of the

individual commissioners or, when rendered, decisions of the

entire commission regarding claims on the regular docketmay

be appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals pursuant to

the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that tax

appeals shall go directly to the Tennessee Supreme Court and
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workers’ compensation appeals shall be appealed pursuant to

the procedure for other workers’ compensation cases under 

§ 50-6-225(e). 

TRAP Rule 13 (d) provides in pertinent part as follows:

(d) Findings of Fact of Civil Actions. - Unless

otherwise required by statute, review of findings of fact by the

trial court in civil actions shall be de novo upon the record of

the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the

correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the

evidence is otherwise. Findings of fact by a jury in civil

actions shall be set aside only if there is no material evidence

to support the verdict.

III.

DECISION OF THE COMMISSION

The judgment of the Commission contains the following:

The trooper was trying to catch a westbound car that

had been driving recklessly and apparently drunkenly. His

bluelight signals, his siren, and his headlights were all in full

operation (but not his horn). At one point he had been driving

65 or seventy miles an hour. There was no impediment

whatever to his seeing traffic ahead of him for at least a

quarter of a mile, and he did in fact see the car he hit as he

came up behind it. The trooper testified that he was going

“forty to fifty” miles an hour at the point of impact.

The trooper said that he hit the car the claimant was in

“right smack dab in the rear.” The collision happened in the

westbound right lane of the highway.

It is not disputed that, as a matter of fact, neither the

claimant nor her husband saw or heard any of the trooper’s

signals.

The duty arises when a party should have heard the

siren or should have seen the lights flashing. But Thomas v.

State does not say that anybody has a duty to hear what he did

not hear or see what de did not see; the holding of Thomas v.

State is that anybody is responsible for looking for on-coming

traffic on any road he enters or crosses. Kowalski v.

Elderridge, 765 S.W.2nd 746 (Tenn. App. 1988), has no

reference to the duty of a driver who did not hear or see a

signal but should have: in that case the Court held that the

driver in fact did hear the signal.

- - - -
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This trooper was trained and experienced; in particular

he knew that other drivers sometimes cannot see or hear

emergency equipment. He had a full view of all the

circumstances. This trooper mademistaken assumptions (like

thinking the car ahead of him was going to go straight down

the highway and not turn left) and mistaken perceptions (like

thinking that the car ahead of him had heard or seen his

signals and was yielding); his acting on these mistakes, when

ordinary care under the circumstances required him to slow

down, was the main cause of this wreck.

But the trooper’s actions were not the only cause of

the wreck. As the State’s brief says, “It is a violation of

Tennessee law to make a left-hand turn into a private

driveway without giving a signal continuously for a distance

of at least fifty feet. It is undisputed in this case that Mr.

Dillon failed to signal his proposed left-hand turn properly.

This Commission takes judicial notice that any (sic) people

perform the dangerous driving error (which as the State’s

brief says is a violation of the law) of signaling a turn only

while they are making the turn rather than before it, and

sometimes only after coming to a full stop preparatory to

making the turn; this peculiar unreasonable hesitation and

reluctance to sue turn signals is very common, so that any

trained and experienced highway patrolman must be familiar

with it and prepared for it.

All things considered, particularly that the trooper was

experienced and well trained, that the trooper had a full clear

view of everything involved, that the other driver never heard

or saw the trooper’s signals and had no obligation to notice

them because he never left his own traffic lane, that there was

nothing to keep the trooper from driving more carefully than

he did while coming up behind the other car, and that Mr.

Dillon clearly violated a statute in not signaling his proposed

turn properly. The Commission finds that Mr. Dillon was

15% liable, and that trooper Christian was 85% liable, for this

wreck.

IV.

NEGLIGENCE OF MR. DILLON

The evidence does not preponderate against the decision of the Commission that Mr.

Dillon did not see or hear the lights or siren (in time to obey them), and the finding of the

Commission that Mr. Dillon violated T.C.A. § 55-8-142 and 143 by failing to give a timely

signal before stopping or turning. These findings must therefore be affirmed.
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However, the Commission did not mention that Mr. Dillon failed to perform the mandate

of T.C.A. § 55-8-143, that every driver “who intends to start, stop or turn from a direct line shall

first see that such movement can be made in safety.” It is clear from a preponderance of the

evidence that Mr. Dillon failed to observe the above emphasized portion of the statute; that his

negligence in this regard was one of the principal causes of the collision and; that, had Mr. Dillon

looked before turning from a straight line, he would not have begun the left turn which misled

the Trooper as to Mr. Dillon’s intentions, and the collision would probably not have occurred.

V.

NEGLIGENCE OF THE TROOPER

The evidence preponderates in favor of the finding of the Commission that the Trooper

was negligent acting upon assumptions that were not sufficiently well founded to justify his

actions, and that said negligence of the Trooper was the “main cause of this wreck.” However,

the preponderance of the evidence does not support the finding that the failure to give timely

notice of a turn is commonplace or, if so, such practice was known and should have been acted

upon by the Trooper, or that it was subject to “judicial” (or administrative) notice by the

Commission. This Court therefore declines to affirm these findings.

VI.

DISPOSITION OF APPEAL

The findings of fact heretofore concurred in by this Court distinguish the present case

from Kowalski v. Eldridge, Tenn. App. 1988, 765 S.W.2d 746 and Thomas v. State, Tenn. App.

1987, 742 S.W.2d 649, cited by the State.
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The circumstances of this particular case require a revision of the percentages of fault

assigned by the Commission (85% to the Trooper and 15% to Mr. Dillon). As above explained,

the failure of Mr. Dillon to first ascertain that his movement could be made with safety

substantially increases the percentage of his fault; and the rejection of the duty of the Trooper

to know and act upon common negligence of motorists materially reduces the percentage of fault

of the Trooper.

In Wright v. City of Knoxville, Tenn. 1995, 898 S.W.2d 177, the Supreme Court said:

Although it is true that the trier of fact has

considerable latitude in allocating percentages of fault to

negligent parties, see e.g., Martin v. Bussert, 292 Minn. 29,

193 N.W.2d 134 (1971), appellate courts may alter those

findings if they are clearly erroneous. Because this case was

tried without a jury, our review of the issues of fact is de novo

on the record of the trial court. However, we must presume

that the trial court’s findings were correct unless the

preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 27-3-103; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

In the present appeal, after revising the finding of fact to conform with the preponderance

of the evidence, this Court finds that the allocation of fault by the Commission was “clearly

erroneous” and revises the judgment of the Commission by allocating 60% of fault to the

Trooper (i.e., the State) and 40% to the claimant Donald L. Dillon.

No issue is made as to the finding of the Commission of $220,000.00 total damages.

Accordingly, this Court affirms and adopts this finding, but reduces the net award 40% or

$88,000.00 to $132,000.00. Costs of this appeal will be paid out of the Claims Fund of the State.
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The cause is remanded to the Claim Commission for further appropriate procedure.

MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

___________________________________

HENRY F. TODD

PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

CONCUR:

____________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE