IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 23, 2008 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. MICHELLE STRICKLAND 

v. 

TERRY COPLEY

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Gibson County

Nos. S0307 and 8067 Clayburn Peeples, Judge 

No. W2007-01839-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 21, 2008

This appeal arises from post-divorce proceedings involving child support obligations. The original

divorce and support orders were entered in Michigan. The mother subsequently moved to North

Carolina, and the child support order was transferred to that state. The father moved to Tennessee

and became delinquent in making his support payments. The mother began to receive public

assistance and executed an income assignment assigning to North Carolina the right to receive the

back child support owed by the father. Upon request by North Carolina, Tennessee then brought suit

to enforce the North Carolina order. In the Tennessee proceedings, the trial court changed custody

from the mother to the father and ordered the mother to pay the father child support. In the process,

the trial court determined that the mother owed back child support to the father and then used this

amount to setoff the obligation owed by the father to North Carolina. For the reasons stated herein,

we determine that a setoff cannot be used to deprive North Carolina of recoupment of its public

assistance. The judgment below allowing the setoff is therefore vacated, and this case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated and

Remanded

WALTER C.KURTZ,SR.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E.HIGHERS,P.J.,W.S.,

and DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined. 

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, and Warren A. Jasper, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee ex rel. Michelle Strickland.

Gregory W. Minton and Brandon L. Newman, Trenton, Tennessee, for the appellee, Terry Copley.
 While the dates are not disclosed in the record, it appears that Mr. Copley also became disabled and began

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to receive Social Security Disability benefits. 

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OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

When a parent under a judicially decreed obligation to make child support payments to the

custodial parent fails to do so and the custodial parent then receives public assistance, the state

paying the benefits may obtain and enforce an income assignment granting to it the power to collect

and retain the delinquent child support payments. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mitchell v. Johnson, No.

M2002-00231-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22251335 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003); Butler v. State ex

rel. Butler, No. W2001-01137-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31845233 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2002).

These proceeds then typically belong to the state and are meant to compensate it for the fact that the

custodial parent has required public assistance during a time in which the other parent was

delinquent. See generally 79 Am. Jur. 2d Welfare § 81 (2008) (“Generally a custodial parent assigns

his or her rights to past, current, and future child support payments, including arrearages, to the state

in exchange for receiving public assistance.”). When the two parents reside in different states, the

state which is owed this money has the authority to ask the state in which the other parent resides

to bring an action for collection of back child support on its behalf. 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and

Separation § 1193 (2008) (discussing Uniform Interstate Family Support Act); see Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 71-3-124(a)(4). 

In this appeal we consider the contention of the state of Tennessee (State) that a decision of

the Circuit Court for Gibson County has impermissibly interfered with its ability to enforce a North

Carolina court’s orders assigning North Carolina the right to collect child support payments pursuant

to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-2001 et seq.

We conclude that the Circuit Court erred. We therefore vacate its decision and remand for further

proceedings. 

A. 

Terry Copley and Michelle Copley (now Ms. Strickland) were granted a divorce in the state

of Michigan in 1993. Ms. Strickland was awarded custody of their two minor children, and Mr.

Copley was ordered to pay child support. Ms. Strickland moved to North Carolina in 1997, and

administration of the case was transferred from Michigan to North Carolina. 

When Mr. Copley ceased to comply with his child support obligations, Ms. Strickland began

to receive public assistance. By an order of March 22, 2001, the District Court for Carteret County,

North Carolina set Mr. Copley’s arrears at $19,821.03 (as of February 23, 2001). It also made the

state of North Carolina a party to the case and designated North Carolina Child Support Centralized

Collections as the proper payee of any payments from Mr. Copley. At some point Mr. Copley had

moved to Gibson County, Tennessee, and one of his children eventually came to reside with him.1

Given this de facto change in custodial arrangements, the North Carolina Support Enforcement
 The Tennessee Department of Human Services had the authority to do this under Tenn. Code Ann. § 2

71-3-124(a)(1) and (4).

 This North Carolina order is referenced by the State in its brief, but it is not part of the record. 

3

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Agency (Support Agency) apparently began to prorate the child support he owed and compute the

arrearage based on only one child. 

In October 2002 the Support Agency transmitted a UIFSA request to Tennessee. The State

thus brought proceedings in the Circuit Court for Gibson County to enforce the North Carolina

order. At the hearing on this issue, the trial court found that Mr. Copley was in arrears in the 2

amount of $27,668.00 (as of July 6, 2003). Mr. Copley was ordered to pay child support and to

make payments in order to liquidate his arrears. Mr. Copley belatedly filed his answer in this case

in January 2006. He also then requested that he be designated as the custodial parent of the child

living with him and further that he be awarded child support. 

According to the State, at roughly the same time as these proceedings, the court in North

Carolina revisited the question of the amount owed by Mr. Copley; it maintains that the North

Carolina court then found that Mr. Copley owed $27,779.95 (as of August 1, 2004). The State says 3

Mr. Copley was ordered by the North Carolina court to pay $100.00 per month on this arrearage.

The State has therefore sought to enforce this order for North Carolina as well. A hearing on this

issue in Gibson County was continued several times. 

B. 

A new case was filed in the Circuit Court for Gibson County in March 2005. This time,

however, it was initiated by Mr. Copley against Ms. Strickland. The petition filed by Mr. Copley

sought to modify their divorce decree to award him custody of both of their children. Mr. Copley

moved for a default judgment in his case and also asked for the court to set child support. The trial

court heard his motion for default on August 1, 2005 and entered an order of default judgment on

February 27, 2006. The court awarded him full custody of both of his minor children and set child

support. For the older child, it was set as of July 2, 2004; for the younger, it was set as of March 9,

2005. The total amount of retroactive child support due from Ms. Strickland was found to be

$12,891.00. Based upon a presumptive income of $26,480.00, current child support was set at

$756.00 per month beginning March 1, 2006. A parenting plan was also entered. 

On April 20, 2007, Mr. Copley filed a motion requesting a determination of the arrearage

owed to him by Ms. Strickland. He further requested that his obligation be setoff by the amount

determined to be owed by her. The State filed opposition to this motion and argued that allowing

Mr. Copley’s child support arrears to be setoff by Ms. Strickland’s would deny the State its ability

to collect the portion of Mr. Copley’s child support arrearage owed to North Carolina and would

violate the principles of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1). Shortly thereafter the State filed a

motion asking the trial court to set aside the portions of its order granting Mr. Copley’s default

judgment and the parenting plan under which Ms. Strickland was to pay child support to Mr. Copley.
 The Court assumes that the State’s reference to “social benefits” means public assistance. 

4

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The State took the position that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Ms. Strickland and

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of child support since the matter was registered in

Tennessee pursuant to the UIFSA for enforcement only. 

By an order signed July 12, 2007, the trial court held that the children were residents of the

state of Tennessee and that they were properly before the court. It further found that service was

properly made on Ms. Strickland and the default judgment properly rendered. The trial court denied

the motion to set aside its orders regarding child support payments. It held that the arrearages

claimed by Ms. Strickland from Mr. Copley should be setoff by the arrearages owed by her to him.

Ms. Strickland’s arrearages were, according to the trial court, asserted strictly on her behalf and did

not represent any benefits owed to the states of North Carolina or Michigan. In the trial court’s

order, it made the following relevant findings: 

That the arrearages claimed by the Respondent are not contested . . . [but they are].

. . now offset by arrearages owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner for support and

maintenance of the same minor children. 

That it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor children for the Court not

to enforce its own judgment for child support, including arrearages. 

That arrearages as of the date of this hearing owed to the Petitioner by the

Respondent are $25,964.00. 

That all arrearages asserted by the Respondent, as is evidenced by the North Carolina

judgment and levee[,] were asserted strictly on behalf of the Respondent and did not

represent any benefits owed to the State of North Carolina or the State of Michigan.

The State timely filed a notice of appeal. It contends that the effect of the setoff is to deny North

Carolina its opportunity to recoup the monies it had paid for public assistance when Mr. Copley was

not complying with his child support obligations. 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

The State and Mr. Copley differ somewhat in their views of the issues. The State contends

that there are two issues here: 

I. Whether the trial court was correct to offset competing child support orders. 

II. Whether the trial court was correct to do so when the State’s ability to recoup 

social benefits is prejudiced. 

4

In contrast, Mr. Copley states the issues as follows:
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I. The State lacks standing to challenge personal jurisdiction and subject matter

jurisdiction on behalf of [Ms. Strickland] in [an] action to which the State is not a

party, and in which its interest is merely collateral. 

II. Subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction were valid in this case

pursuant to Tennessee’s UCCJEA statute, and Tennessee’s exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction. 

III. The trial court’s decision to offset child support arrearages owed by Mr. Copley

to [Ms. Strickland] with arrearages owed to Mr. Copley by [Ms. Strickland] is valid,

despite the State’s attempt to claim these arrearages as recoupment for public

assistance benefits. 

Mr. Copley frames the case in his brief by commenting that “[p]ractically speaking, were this Court

to reverse the trial court, Mr. Copley would be forced to pay the arrearages and then locate Ms.

Strickland to collect the Tennessee judgment for her arrears[.]” 

We are inclined to agree with Mr. Copley that the State does not have standing to contest the

change in custody. The State does have standing, however, to litigate the issue of whether a setoff

can be used to deprive North Carolina of its ability to recover the monies it has paid to Ms.

Strickland. The Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the issue to be resolved is whether the setoff

is lawful under the circumstances of this case. 

III. DISCUSSION 

It is important to separate the issue of custody from that of child support. A recent case

explains: 

Interstate jurisdictional questions involving child support and arrearage matters are

governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-5-2001 et seq. Proceedings to determine parentage are also governed by

the UIFSA. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-2301(a)(6) and 2701. Interstate jurisdictional

questions involving custody and visitation, on the other hand, are governed by the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-6-201 et seq. 

In re J.B.W., No. M2007-02541-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 4562885, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27,

2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 7, 2008). It is further recognized that these two uniform

acts—one governing child support and the other governing child custody and visitation—can create

“parallel proceedings in different states” which can in turn potentially lead to the “awkward” and

unsatisfactory severance of custody from child support. Straight v. Straight, 195 S.W.3d 461, 466-

67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).

The UIFSA is a complex statute, but it is designed to prevent the occurrence of competing

multistate support orders; thus, the ability of one state to modify the prior order of another is
 “A party generally must assert his or her own legal rights and interests and cannot rest his or her claim to

5

relief on rights or interests of third parties.” 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 38 (2008). The State asserts that Ms. Strickland

was not properly before the Gibson County Circuit Court and that it was not proper to change custody of the children

and order her to pay child support. The State is simply not the party to raise those issues. 

Support orders from other states must be registered in order to be enforced. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-2601 6

et seq.; see generally Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 99-163 (discussing registration and enforcement of foreign child support

(continued...)

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extremely limited. See LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490 (Tenn. 2001); Cliburn v. Bergeron,

Nos. M2002-01386-COA-R3-CV and M2001-03157-COA-R3-CV, 2002WL 31890868 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Dec. 31, 2002); see generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application

of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R.5th 1 (2001 & Supp. 2006). 

The enforcement and application of the UIFSA could involve this Court in a legal morass

unless we keep ourselves focused on the limited issue presented by this case. To do so, we must

make clear what this case does not involve. Mr. Copley did not contest the fact that he owes back

child support to North Carolina. And, while the State has contested the authority of the Gibson

County Circuit Court to change custody and order Ms. Strickland to pay child support, the State

lacks standing to make these assertions. The North Carolina order is for arrearages, not ongoing 5

support. Only Ms. Strickland can assert that Tennessee courts lack jurisdiction to change custody

and award her ex-husband child support. The State’s interest here is far narrower. Its interest only

relates to whether the efforts to collect past due child support can be thwarted by the trial court’s use

of a setoff. There is no need for this Court to determine whether or not the Gibson County Circuit

Court had jurisdiction to modify a prior court’s custody order. In their briefs both the State and Mr.

Copley have engaged in extensive discussions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201, but it is unnecessary to resolve that

issue. 

The trial court found in its order that the arrearages reflected in the North Carolina judgment

do not represent benefits owed to the state of North Carolina. The record does not support such a

determination. In fact, the North Carolina order of March 22, 2001 specifically states that the North

Carolina Department of Health and Human Services had been assigned Ms. Strickland’s rights as

she was “receiving public assistance for or on the behalf of a dependent child or children” and has

therefore assigned her collection rights to the state of North Carolina. 

A subsequent pleading filed in the Gibson County Circuit Court by the State in May 2005

reads:

The District Court of Carteret County North Carolina terminated support effective

June 1, 2004 and found that the Respondent owed past due child support in the

amount of $27,779.95 as of August 1, 2004 and ordered the Respondent to liquidate

said arrears at the rate of $100.00 per month. 

Inexplicably, the State did not file this support order. Mr. Copley correctly points out that the 6
(...continued) 6

orders); 19 W. Walton Garrett, Tennessee Practice: Tennessee Divorce, Alimony & Child Custody § 16.19, at 455-56

(2007). 

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record lacks transcripts of the hearings held below and even lacks a statement of the evidence. The

record comprises solely pleadings and orders—and, as noted, the North Carolina order from 2004

was never filed by the State.

The issue that confronts us in this case was addressed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in

Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Watkins, 119 S.W.3d 74 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003). The parties

there were divorced in Arkansas, and Ms. Watkins, the wife, was granted child custody. She then

moved to Missouri. In Missouri, Ms. Watkins began to receive public assistance and assigned her

child support rights to that state. Subsequently, a judgment was entered against Mr. Watkins, her

former husband, in favor of Missouri. She thereafter returned to Arkansas, and custody was awarded

to Mr. Watkins with the obligation to pay child support now being placed upon Ms. Watkins. The

trial court ordered that the amount owed by Mr. Watkins on the Missouri judgment be setoff by the

amount Ms. Watkins now owed him for child support. The Court of Appeals reversed. 

In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 

Because Ms. Watkins was receiving public assistance while she resided in Missouri

with the child, her child-support rights were assigned to the State of Missouri by

operation of law. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 208.055 (2002). Pursuant to Missouri

Annotated Statutes section 454.410 (2002), support rights assigned to the state shall

constitute an obligation owed to the state by the person responsible for providing

such support, and the obligation shall be collectible pursuant to all legal processes.

Through legal process, OCSE obtained a judgment against Mr. Watkins for unpaid

child support, andMr. Watkinstook no appeal from the judgment. Significantly, Ms.

Watkins’s assignment of her rights to Missouri was not a voluntary assignment for

her benefit, but by operation of law due to her receipt of public assistance for her

minor child. Thus, collection on the judgment is a matter strictly between Missouri

and Mr. Watkins.

In this case, Mr. Watkins has no right to set off the judgment owed to the State of

Missouri against the child-support arrearages owed to him by Ms. Watkins. At both

the time of assignment and entry of the judgment, Ms. Watkins owed nothing to Mr.

Watkins and thus, absent the assignment, Ms. Watkins would have had the right to

collect on the judgment. As Mr. Watkins would have had no set-off defense against

Ms. Watkins, he cannot now assert the defense against the assignee, State of

Missouri. The fact that Ms. Watkins later became delinquent on her child-support

obligation to Mr. Watkins does not affect the State of Missouri’s right to collection

on its judgment.

Watkins, 119 S.W.3d at 76. 
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The same logic applies here. Thus, Mr. Copley may not avail himself of a setoff to deprive

North Carolina of its recovery of public assistance. 

This Court has previously ruled that a trial court cannot modify a prior State-assigned support

order so as to prevent the State from recovering public assistance received by a parent. State ex rel.

Mitchell v. Lea, No. W2003-01650-COA-R3-JV, 2004 WL 2607564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16,

2004). While that case involved an assignment to the state of Tennessee and public assistance also

paid by Tennessee, the principles stated in Lea apply no less fully to the obligation of Tennessee to

enforce the collection of public assistance paid by a sister state. Cf., e.g., Commonwealth ex rel.

Gagne v. Chamberlain, 525 S.E.2d 19 (Va. 2000) (UIFSA required Virginia to enforce New

Hampshire order reimbursing New Hampshire for public assistance paid to custodial parent). The

decision of the Arkansas court in Watkins is entirely consistent with this Court’s opinion in Lea. 

There is, as mentioned, a significant gap in the State’s proof in this case. The State contends

in its reply brief that “clearly, it is undisputed that there are benefits to be recouped.” The State filed

the North Carolina support order from 2001 showing arrears of $19,821.03 as of February 23, 2001,

and this was made part of the record. That arrearage is clearly for reimbursement of public

assistance and cannot be setoff. On the other hand, the State’s contention that there are additional

monies reflected in the North Carolina court’s order from 2004 which cannot be setoff must be

rejected. Mr. Copley correctly points out that the 2004 order is not contained in the record and was

not attached to the State’s motion. This Court has no way of ascertaining whether the additional

amount accumulated between 2001 and 2004 was for reimbursement of public assistance or for

direct child support not paid to Ms. Strickland. We, therefore, conclude that the principles

articulated in the Watkins case can only be applied to the arrearage amount found in the North

Carolina court’s 2001 order; as for the 2004 order, which was never filed, we cannot find that this

additional amount is enforceable. 

The State further contends that a setoff of past due child support is barred by Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) and the principles set out in Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604 (Tenn.

1991). The Court need not address these arguments as we have already determined that the arrears

established in the 2001 North Carolina order cannot be setoff. We have further found that the 2004

North Carolina order cannot be enforced here since there is no proof of registration, and it was never

made of record. 
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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the order of the Circuit Court for Gibson County is vacated, and this case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and specifically for entry of an order

reflecting that the arrearage amount established by the North Carolina court’s 2001 order cannot be

setoff by child support currently owed to Mr. Copley by Ms. Strickland. Costs of this case are taxed

equally against the State and Mr. Copley for which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________ 

WALTER C. KURTZ, SENIOR JUDGE