NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

ALONZO ROBINSON, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SOPHIA J. F. HUTCHINS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0502

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2011-094309

The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Alonzo Robinson, Mesa

Petitioner/Appellee

Sophia J. F. Hutchins, Columbus, Ohio

Respondent/Appellant
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge John C. Gemmill and Chief Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Respondent/appellant, Sophia J. F. Hutchins (“Wife”),

appeals those portions of the family court’s decree of dissolution awarding 

her spousal maintenance, dividing the parties’ community property and 

debts, and denying her request for an award of attorneys’ fees. For the 

following reasons, we affirm in part and remand in part for further 

proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Petitioner/appellee, Alonzo Robinson (“Husband”), initiated 

this action for dissolution. After an evidentiary hearing, the family court 

ordered Husband to pay Wife spousal maintenance of $1,000 per month for 

three years. In addition, as relevant, the court awarded Wife $300 for her 

share of the household property, awarded Wife one-half of Husband’s 

401(k) account, and equally divided the parties’ joint credit card debt. The 

court denied Wife’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees. Wife timely 

appealed.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1) (2014).

2

ANALYSIS

I. Spousal Maintenance

¶3 Wife contends the family court abused its discretion by 

awarding her spousal maintenance of $1,000 per month for three years, 

 

1 Wife filed her notice of appeal before the family court entered a 

signed order disposing of a time-extending post-trial motion. Accordingly, 

on November 13, 2013, this court suspended the appeal and remanded; the 

family court entered a signed order on November 20, 2013.

2 We cite the current version of all applicable statutes unless changes 

material to our decision have occurred since the relevant date.
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

3

arguing she was entitled to a greater monthly amount for the remainder of 

her life.3

¶4 In determining the amount and duration of a spousal 

maintenance award, the family court must consider all relevant factors, 

including, as applicable, the thirteen factors set forth in A.R.S. § 25-319(B).

4

 

3 On appeal, Wife argues the court should have awarded her spousal 

maintenance of $2,506 per month. At trial, however, she requested $1,500.

4 The statutory factors listed under A.R.S. § 25-319(B) are as follows:

1. The standard of living established during the marriage.

2. The duration of the marriage.

3. The age, employment history, earning ability and physical and 

emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance.

4. The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to 

meet that spouse’s needs while meeting those of the spouse 

seeking maintenance.

5. The comparative financial resources of the spouses, including 

their comparative earning abilities in the labor market.

6. The contribution of the spouse seeking maintenance to the 

earning ability of the other spouse.

7. The extent to which the spouse seeking maintenance has reduced 

that spouse’s income or career opportunities for the benefit of the 

other spouse.

8. The ability of both parties after the dissolution to contribute to 

the future educational costs of their mutual children.

9. The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, 

including marital property apportioned to that spouse, and that 

spouse’s ability to meet that spouse’s own needs independently.

10. The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate 

employment and whether such education or training is readily 

available.

11. Excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or 

fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other 

property held in common.

12. The cost for the spouse who is seeking maintenance to obtain 

health insurance and the reduction in the cost of health insurance 

for the spouse from whom maintenance is sought if the spouse 

from whom maintenance is sought is able to convert family 
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

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We afford the family court’s decision substantial discretion and will affirm 

if any reasonable evidence supports it. Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 354, 

¶ 9, 160 P.3d 231, 233 (App. 2007); Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502, 

869 P.2d 176, 178 (App. 1993).

¶5 The family court considered and made findings concerning 

each of the factors under A.R.S. § 25-319(B). For example, the court found

(1) Wife is available for full-time employment and has no physical or mental 

health conditions that prevent her employment; (2) the parties do not have 

substantial assets and Wife is currently unable to independently meet her 

financial needs; (3) Wife contributed to Husband’s career by maintaining 

the household and caring for the parties’ children during the marriage; and 

(4) Husband’s earning ability is greater than Wife’s, and despite his 

substantial debts, he is able to contribute some to Wife’s financial needs 

while meeting his own obligations.

¶6 Wife contends the spousal maintenance award is insufficient 

because she is qualified for few jobs that would pay enough to allow her to 

live independently and has physical conditions that preclude her 

employment at this time. She also argues the court erred by failing to award 

her additional maintenance for housing and education expenses.

¶7 Although Wife claims she has herniated spinal discs that 

hinder her ability to search for work, at trial she testified only that those 

conditions preclude her from jobs that require heavy lifting. Wife indicated 

she had twice been employed full-time within the year before trial and, 

since she left her last job, had been actively searching for, and expected to 

find, work paying approximately $11 per hour. Moreover, Wife’s Affidavit 

of Financial Information was based on her future expected expenses, not 

her present expenses, and she admitted her estimates for certain items were 

too high. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s award of spousal 

maintenance of $1,000 per month to Wife for a period of three years.5

 

health insurance to employee health insurance after the marriage 

is dissolved.

13. All actual damages and judgments from conduct that results in 

criminal conviction of either spouse in which the other spouse or 

child was the victim.

5 Husband contends Wife is capable of being self-sufficient and asks 

this court to end all spousal maintenance. We do not consider this issue 
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

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¶8 We also reject Wife’s argument that the family court’s failure 

to rule on her repeated requests for temporary spousal maintenance during 

the pendency of the action caused her irreparable harm. Wife offered no 

evidence at trial that the delay caused her any such harm and, ultimately, 

the court granted her maintenance for this period, as its award was 

retroactive to the first day of the first month after Husband filed the petition

for dissolution.

6

II. Division of Community Property and Debt

¶9 Wife next challenges the family court’s division of certain 

community property and debts. Arizona Revised Statutes § 25–318(A)

governs the division of marital property in a dissolution proceeding and 

requires the court to divide community property equitably, although not 

necessarily in kind. In determining an equitable division, the family court 

retains broad discretion in allocating individual assets and liabilities. In re 

Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 535, ¶ 14, 225 P.3d 588, 592 (App. 2010).

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s 

findings and will not disturb its apportionment of community property 

absent an abuse of discretion. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5, 

972 P.2d 676, 679 (App. 1998).

A. Household Property

¶10 Wife argues the court erred by awarding her only $300 for her 

share of the household property. Husband testified at trial that, after Wife 

left the marital home, he was unable to maintain the residence and was 

forced to move to a small apartment that would not accommodate all of the 

parties’ personal property. Husband claimed he gave Wife notice of the 

 

because Husband did not cross-appeal from the decree. See Maricopa Cnty. 

v. Corp. Comm'n of Ariz., 79 Ariz. 307, 310, 289 P.2d 183, 185 (1955) (stating 

that an appellee who desires to attack the judgment to either enlarge his 

rights or lessen the rights of his adversary must cross-appeal).

6 Similarly, we reject Wife’s argument that the court erred by failing 

to rule on her claim that Husband removed Wife from his medical 

insurance in violation of the court’s standard injunction prohibiting such 

actions. Wife did not present any evidence at trial that she had obtained 

health insurance at a higher cost or otherwise suffered any harm from the 

loss of the insurance. Moreover, the evidence showed Husband was not 

able to contact Wife to obtain the information necessary to continue the 

coverage and Wife failed to take any action to reinstate coverage.
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

6

move and allowed her to retrieve any belongings she desired, and he sold 

the remaining items for less than $600. Wife disputed this testimony, 

alleging the marital home contained personal property worth

approximately $100,000, and Husband did not give her adequate time to 

remove her belongings. We defer to the family court’s determination of the 

witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give this conflicting evidence, id. at

347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680, and find no abuse of discretion.

B. Husband’s 401(k) Account

¶11 Wife challenges the court’s ruling awarding her one-half of 

the approximate $1,500 value of Husband’s 401(k) account, arguing the 

court erred by rejecting her claim that Husband withdrew almost $80,000 

from the account to spend on gambling. The family court may consider 

excessive or abnormal expenditures when apportioning community 

property. A.R.S. § 25-318(C); Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 6, 972 P.2d at 

679. However, Wife’s allegations that Husband wasted community funds 

withdrawn from his 401(k) account on gambling activities were 

contradicted by the account statements, which showed the account’s value 

had not exceeded $1,500 in the preceding six years.7 Accordingly, we find 

no abuse of discretion in the family court’s rejection of Wife’s waste 

argument and determination that she was entitled to one-half of the current 

value of Husband’s 401(k) account. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 5, 972 

P.2d at 679.

C. Refund from Bankruptcy Proceedings

¶12 Husband testified that, during pendency of this action, he 

received a $9,431.65 refund of monies he paid to the bankruptcy trustee

while his bankruptcy action was pending. He claimed he spent the money 

to purchase a new vehicle, to move from the marital residence, and to pay 

other bills. Wife argues the family court erred by not ruling on her claim

that she was entitled to one-half of the refund amount.

¶13 The court did not mention the refund in the decree or 

otherwise indicate that it intended to reject Wife’s claim. Generally, when

neither party has requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, we 

assume the family court found every fact necessary to support its judgment, 

as long as any reasonable construction of the evidence justifies the decision. 

 

7 The evidence also does not support Wife’s claim that Husband 

withdrew $5,997 from the account in July 2012, as the value of the account 

on June 30, 2012, was only $1,441.32.
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

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Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46, 643 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1982). In this 

case, however, the evidence does not support a decision to deny Wife an 

interest in the refunded monies, as it was undisputed the funds were 

community property paid from Husband’s earnings during the marriage 

and later refunded to him. Accordingly, we remand to allow the family

court to consider whether Wife was entitled to some portion of the $9,431.65 

refund as part of an equitable division of the parties’ assets.

D. Division of Credit Card Debt

¶14 Wife maintains the court abused its discretion by equally 

dividing the debt from several of Husband’s credit card accounts because 

Husband held the accounts in his name only and used the cards to obtain 

cash for gambling. All debt incurred by either spouse during marriage is 

presumed to be a community obligation. Hrudka v. Hrudka, 186 Ariz. 84, 91-

92, 919 P.2d 179, 186-87 (App. 1995), superseded in part by statute on other 

grounds as recognized in Myrick v. Maloney, ___ Ariz. ___, 333 P.3d 818 (App. 

2014). To overcome that presumption, Wife was required to offer clear and 

convincing evidence the debt was Husband’s separate obligation. See id.

¶15 Husband testified that, even though the relevant accounts 

were held in his name, Wife incurred the majority of the charges.

8 He 

admitted both he and Wife visited casinos to gamble but claimed the debt 

was also the result of the parties’ unsustainable standard of living during 

the marriage. Wife denied she gambled or charged to the credit card 

accounts.

¶16 We defer to the family court’s determination of the witnesses’ 

credibility and the weight to give this conflicting evidence. See Gutierrez, 

193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680. Accordingly, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the court’s classification of the credit card debt as a community 

obligation. See Hrudka, 186 Ariz. at 91-92, 919 P.2d at 186-87.

 

8 Wife objects that Husband did not offer current statements for the 

relevant accounts. However, she waived this objection by failing to raise it 

at trial. See Medlin v. Medlin, 194 Ariz. 306, 308, ¶ 6, 981 P.2d 1087, 1089 

(App. 1999). Moreover, Husband testified the statements were the most 

recent ones available, and no payments had been made on those accounts 

because of his bankruptcy proceeding.
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

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III. Attorneys’ Fees

¶17 Finally, Wife argues the court erred by denying her request 

for an award of attorneys’ fees because it found she is unable to meet her 

financial needs independently.

¶18 In a dissolution case, the court may award fees “after 

considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness 

of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” A.R.S. 

§ 25-324(A). “Although the intent of A.R.S. § 25–324 is to assure a remedy 

for the party least able to pay, the trial court may also consider whether a 

party has adopted unreasonable positions.” MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 

Ariz. 584, 592, ¶ 37, 250 P.3d 1213, 1221 (App. 2011). The family court stated 

it considered the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their 

positions throughout the litigation in accordance with A.R.S. § 25-324. We 

will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 

Ariz. at 351, ¶ 32, 972 P.2d at 684.

¶19 The evidence supports a determination that Wife acted 

unreasonably during pendency of the dissolution. Husband testified he 

made several attempts to reach a settlement of the disputed issues with 

Wife, but she refused to negotiate and insisted on proceeding to trial. Wife 

also maintained at trial that the parties had substantial assets, despite 

contrary evidence, and the court ultimately rejected her claims. Because the 

family court was in the best position to observe and assess the conduct of 

the parties before it, we cannot say the court abused its discretion when it 

denied Wife’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees. See MacMillan, 226 

Ariz. at 592, ¶ 38, 250 P.3d at 1221.

9

 

9 We reject Wife’s argument that Husband should pay her attorneys’ 

fees because he caused the dissolution. Cf. Marce v. Bailey, 130 Ariz. 443, 

445, 636 P.2d 1225, 1227 (App. 1979) (stating that a major purpose of the 

adoption of Arizona’s current dissolution statutes was to eliminate 

questions of the parties’ fault and prior conduct from the court’s 

consideration of whether the marriage should be dissolved and how the 

property should be divided).
ROBINSON v. HUTCHINS

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and remand in 

part for further proceedings consistent with this decision.