IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2015-CP-01410-COA CASEY CARTER APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/04/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CASEY CARTER (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LADONNA C. HOLLAND JASON L. DAVIS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: POSTCONVICTION-RELIEF PETITION DISMISSED DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/08/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE LEE, C.J., JAMES AND GREENLEE, JJ. JAMES, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This appeal arises f rom the Madison C o u n t y C i r c u i t C o u r t ’ s dism issal of Casey C a r t e r ’ s p e t i t i on f

or postconviction relief (PCR), c hallenging his 2006 conviction f or f orcible rape. Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. A g r a n d jury indicted C arter f or f orcible rape as a h abitual of f ender on M a r c h 1 7 , 2003. Carter, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea i n the circuit court on February 2, 2006. On February 7, 2006, the circuit court sentenced Carter to a term of f orty -nine y earsin the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections. ¶3. On July 23, 2015, Carter f iled a petition to vacate his c o nviction. Treating the petition

to vacate as a PCR petition, the circuit court e ntered an order o f dism issal on Septem ber 4, 2015. As detailed in the o r der, Carter has f iled f ive previous PCR petitions, all of which the circuit court has either denied or dism issed. In its order, the circuit court noted that Carter does not a ppear to have appealed any of the previous petitions. Carter has n ow a ppealed the circuit court’s latest order of dism issal. ¶4. W e agree with the circuit court and f ind Carter’s petition to be procedurally barred. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5. W e wi l l o n l y r e v e r s e t he dism issal or d enial of a PCR petition where the circuit court’s decision i s clearly erroneou s , b u t w e review questions of l aw under a de novo standard. Crosby v. State , 16 So. 3d 74, 77 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). DISCUSSION ¶6. The circuit court properly dism isse d C a r t e r ’ s P CR petition as procedurally barred. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) provides t h a t a P C R petition “shall be m ade

. . . in case o f a g uilty plea, within three (3) y ears af ter entry of the j udgm ent of conviction.” This s ection excepts a p etitioner f r om the t hree-y ear bar if h e can show that
any s tatutory exception applies. Id

. § 9 9-39-5(2)(a)-(b) (exceptions include: an intervening decision, a dditionally d iscovered e vidence, grounds f or additional DNA t esting, and a claim of a n expired sentence). Further, section 9 9-39-23 im poses a successive-writ bar. Id

. § 99- 39-23(6) (“[ A]ny order dism issing the petitioner’s m otion or otherwise deny ing r elief under

2this article is a f inal judgm ent and shall be conclusiv e u n t i l r e versed. It shall be a bar to a second o r successive m otion under this article.”). The sam e exceptions to t he tim e-bar apply to the successive-writ bar. Id

. ¶7. Errors af

f ecting f undam ental rights are also excepted f rom p rocedural bars. Salter v. State , 184 So. 3d 944, 950 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). Only f ou r f u n d a me n tal-rights exceptions “ have been expressly f ound to survive procedural b ars: (1) the right against double jeopardy ; (2) the right t o be f ree f rom an illegal sentence; (3) the right t o due process at sentencing; and (4) the right not to be subject to ex post f acto laws.” Id . at (¶22). ¶8. Carter’s petition is tim e-barred and b arred as a s uccessive writ. Carter pled guilty , and the circuit court sentenced him on February 7, 2006. His current PCR petition was f iled on July 1, 2015, nine y ears af t er the circuit court’s j udgm e n t against him

. It is theref ore tim ebarred. Carter’s petition is also barred as a successive writ. T his is Carter’s sixth PCR petition. The record does not ref l ect and Carter does n ot claim that he appealed any of his previously denied or dism issed petitions. Thus, under section 99-39-23(6), the circuit court’s denial of Carter’s f

i rst PCR petition is a f

inal ju d g m e n t , barring Carter’s current petition. Moreover, Carter has not alleged any f acts that would d em onstrate that his p etition should be a llowed under t he f

undam ental-rights exce p t ion. T he c i rcuit court correctly f ound Carter’s petition barred. CONCLUSION ¶9. Because Carter’s petition is tim e-barred and barred as a successive writ, we af f irm

. ¶10. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E CIRCUIT COURT OF M ADISON COU N T Y DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF I S AFFIRMED.

3ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY.

LEE, C .J., IRVING A N D G R I F F I S , P . J J . , B A R N E S , I S H E E , C A R L T O N, FAIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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