54412 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Notices 

Submit, by November 14, 2005, 

comments that address the following 

questions: 

1. Is the proposed collection of 

information necessary for the NRC to 

properly perform its functions? Does the 

information have practical utility? 

2. Is the burden estimate accurate? 

3. Is there a way to enhance the 

quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected? 

4. How can the burden of the 

information collection be minimized, 

including the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology? 

A copy of the final supporting 

statement may be viewed free of charge 

at the NRC Public Document Room, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Room O–1 F21, Rockville, MD 

20852. OMB clearance requests are 

available at the NRC World Wide Web 

site: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/ 

doc-comment/omb/index.html. The 

document will be available on the NRC 

home page site for 60 days after the 

signature date of this notice. 

Comments and questions should be 

directed to the OMB reviewer listed 

below by October 14, 2005. Comments 

received after this date will be 

considered if it is practical to do so, but 

assurance of consideration cannot be 

given to comments received after this 

date. John A. Asalone, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs 

(3150–0043), NEOB–10202, Office of 

Management and Budget, Washington, 

DC 20503. 

Comments can also be e-mailed to 

John_A._Asalone@omb.eop.gov or 

submitted by telephone at (202) 395–

4650. 

The NRC Clearance Officer is Brenda 

Jo. Shelton, 301–415–7233. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day 

of September, 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Beth St. Mary, 

Acting NRC Clearance Officer, Office of 

Information Services. 

[FR Doc. 05–18196 Filed 9–13–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318] 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., 

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 

Nos. 1 and 2; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power 

Plant, Inc. (the licensee) is the holder of 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

Nos. DPR–53 and DPR–69, which 

authorize operation of Calvert Cliffs 

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 

(CCNPP), respectively. The licenses 

provide, among other things, that the 

facility is subject to all rules, 

regulations, and orders of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC, the 

Commission) now or hereafter in effect. 

The facility consists of two 

pressurized-water reactors located in 

Calvert County in Maryland. 

2.0 Request/Action 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 

50.68, ‘‘Criticality accident 

requirements,’’ sets forth requirements 

for which a licensee shall comply in 

lieu of maintaining a monitoring system 

capable of detecting a criticality as 

described in 10 CFR 70.24. In particular, 

subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 50.68 

requires that plant procedures shall 

prohibit the handling and storage at any 

one time of more fuel assemblies than 

have been determined to be safely 

subcritical under the most adverse 

moderation conditions feasible by 

unborated water. 

By letter dated December 21, 2004, as 

supplemented on May 31, 2005, the 

licensee submitted a request for an 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.68(b)(1) during the pent fuel 

pool (SFP) activities related to the 

underwater handling, loading, and 

unloading of the Transnuclear 

NUHOMS–32P dry shielded canister 

(DSC), as described in its proposed 

Amendment to Materials License No. 

SNM–2505, dated December 12, 2003, 

for the plant-specific independent spent 

fuel storage installation (ISFSI) at 

CCNPP. 

In summary, the licensee is unable to 

satisfy the above requirement for 

handling of the Transnuclear 

NUHOMS–32P DSC authorized by 10 

CFR Part 72 at CCNPP. Section 50.12(a) 

allows licensees to apply for an 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 50 if the application of the 

regulation is not necessary to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the rule and 

special conditions are met. The licensee 

stated in its application that compliance 

with 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) is not necessary 

for handling the Transnuclear 

NUHOMS–32P DSC system to achieve 

the underlying purpose of the rule. 

3.0 Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when: 

(1) The exemptions are authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

public health or safety, and are 

consistent with the common defense 

and security; and (2) when special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, in 

determining the acceptability of the 

licensee’s exemption request, the NRC 

staff has performed the following 

regulatory, technical, and legal 

evaluations to satisfy the requirements 

of 10 CFR 50.12 for granting the 

exemption. 

3.1 Regulatory Evaluation 

The CCNPP Technical Specifications 

(TSs) currently permit the licensee to 

store spent fuel assemblies in highdensity storage racks in its SFP. In 

accordance with the provisions of 10 

CFR 50.68(b)(4), the licensee takes 

credit for soluble boron for criticality 

control and ensures that the effective 

neutron multiplication factor (keff) of the 

SFP does not exceed 0.95, if flooded 

with borated water. Subsection 

50.68(b)(4) also requires that if credit is 

taken for soluble boron, the keff must 

remain below 1.0 (subcritical) if flooded 

with unborated water. However, the 

licensee is unable to satisfy the 

requirement to maintain the keff below 

1.0 (subcritical) with unborated water, 

which is also the requirement of 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1), during cask handling 

operations in the SFP. Therefore, the 

licensee proposed an exemption from 10 

CFR 50.68(b)(1) to permit the 

performance of spent fuel loading, 

unloading, and handling operations 

related to dry cask storage without being 

analyzed to be subcritical under the 

most adverse moderation conditions 

feasible by unborated water. 

Appendix A, ‘‘General Design Criteria 

(GDC) for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ to 10 

CFR Part 50 provides a list of the 

minimum design requirements for 

nuclear power plants. According to GDC 

62, ‘‘Prevention of criticality in fuel 

storage and handling,’’ the licensee 

must limit the potential for criticality in 

the fuel handling and storage system by 

physical systems or processes. Since 

CCNPP was licensed prior to the 

issuance of the Appendix A to 10 CFR 

Part 50, GDC 62 is not directly 

applicable. However, CCNPP was 

licensed to the 1967 draft GDC, as 

discussed in Appendix 1C of the 

CCNNP Updated Final Safety Analysis 

Report (UFSAR). The comparable draft 

GDC is Criterion 66, ‘‘Prevention of Fuel 

Storage Criticality,’’ that states: 

‘‘Criticality in new and spent fuel 

storage shall be prevented by physical 

systems or processes. Such means as 

geometrically safe configurations shall 

be emphasized over procedural 

controls.’’

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Notices 54413 

1The criteria have been used previously in the 

review of similar exemptions from the requirements 

of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for Diablo Canyon Units No. 

1 and 2 and Sequoyah Units No. 1 and 2. The 

evaluations for these exemptions are available in 

the Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System under accession numbers 

ML040300693 and ML041540213, respectively. 

Section 50.68 of 10 CFR Part 50 

provides the NRC requirements for 

maintaining subcritical conditions in 

SFPs. Section 50.68 provides criticality 

control requirements that, if satisfied, 

ensure that an inadvertent criticality in 

the SFP is an extremely unlikely event. 

These requirements ensure that the 

licensee has appropriately conservative 

criticality margins during handling and 

storage of spent fuel. Section 50.68(b)(1) 

states, ‘‘Plant procedures shall prohibit 

the handling and storage at any one time 

of more fuel assemblies than have been 

determined to be safely subcritical 

under the most adverse moderation 

conditions feasible by unborated water.’’

Specifically, 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) ensures 

that the licensee will maintain the pool 

in a subcritical condition during 

handling and storage operations without 

crediting the soluble boron in the SFP 

water. 

The licensee is authorized under 

plant-specific Materials License No. 

SNM–2505 to construct and operate an 

ISFSI at CCNPP. The ISFSI permits the 

licensee to store spent fuel assemblies in 

large concrete dry storage casks. As part 

of its ISFSI loading campaigns, the 

licensee transfers spent fuel assemblies 

to a DSC in the cask pit area of the SFP. 

The licensee performed criticality 

analyses assuming the DSC fully loaded 

with fuel having the highest permissible 

reactivity and determined that a soluble 

boron credit was necessary to ensure 

that the DSC would remain subcritical 

in the SFP. Since the licensee is unable 

to satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1) to ensure subcritical 

conditions during handling and storage 

of spent fuel assemblies in the pool with 

unborated water, the licensee identified 

the need for an exemption from the 10 

CFR 50.68(b)(1) requirement to support 

DSC loading, unloading, and handling 

operations without being subcritical 

under the most adverse moderation 

conditions feasible by unborated water. 

The NRC staff evaluated the 

possibility of an inadvertent criticality 

of the spent nuclear fuel at CCNPP 

during DSC loading, unloading, and 

handling. The NRC staff has established 

a set of acceptance criteria that, if met, 

satisfy the underlying intent of 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1). In lieu of complying with 10 

CFR 50.68(b)(1), the NRC staff 

determined that an inadvertent 

criticality accident is unlikely to occur 

if the licensee meets the following five 

criteria: 1

1. The cask criticality analyses are 

based on the following conservative 

assumptions: 

a. All fuel assemblies in the cask are 

unirradiated and at the highest 

permissible enrichment, 

b. Only 75 percent of the Boron-10 in 

the fixed poison panel inserts is 

credited, 

c. No credit is taken for fuel-related 

burnable absorbers, and 

d. The cask is assumed to be flooded 

with moderator at the temperature and 

density corresponding to optimum 

moderation. 

2. The licensee’s ISFSI TSs require the 

soluble boron concentration to be equal 

to or greater than the level assumed in 

the criticality analysis, and surveillance 

requirements necessitate the periodic 

verification of the concentration both 

prior to and during loading and 

unloading operations. 

3. Radiation monitors, as required by 

GDC 63, ‘‘Monitoring fuel and waste 

storage,’’ are provided in fuel storage 

and handling areas to detect excessive 

radiation levels and to initiate 

appropriate safety actions. 

4. The quantity of other forms of 

special nuclear material, such as 

sources, detectors, etc., to be stored in 

the cask will not increase the effective 

multiplication factor above the limit 

calculated in the criticality analysis. 

5. Sufficient time exists for plant 

personnel to identify and terminate a 

boron dilution event prior to achieving 

a critical boron concentration in the 

DSC. To demonstrate that it can safely 

identify and terminate a boron dilution 

event, the licensee must provide the 

following: 

a. A plant-specific criticality analysis 

to identify the critical boron 

concentration in the cask based on the 

highest reactivity loading pattern. 

b. A plant-specific boron dilution 

analysis to identify all potential dilution 

pathways, their flowrates, and the time 

necessary to reach a critical boron 

concentration. 

c. A description of all alarms and 

indications available to promptly alert 

operators of a boron dilution event. 

d. A description of plant controls that 

will be implemented to minimize the 

potential for a boron dilution event. 

e. A summary of operator training and 

procedures that will be used to ensure 

that operators can quickly identify and 

terminate a boron dilution event. 

3.2 Technical Evaluation 

In determining the acceptability of the 

licensee’s exemption request, the NRC 

staff reviewed three aspects of the 

licensee’s analyses: (1) Criticality 

analyses submitted to support the ISFSI 

license application and its exemption 

request, (2) boron dilution analysis, and 

(3) legal basis for approving the 

exemption. For each of the aspects, the 

staff evaluated whether the licensee’s 

analyses and methodologies provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

safety margins are developed and can be 

maintained in the CCNPP SFP during 

loading of spent fuel into canisters for 

dry cask storage. 

3.2.1 Criticality Analyses 

For evaluation of the acceptability of 

the licensee’s exemption request, the 

NRC staff reviewed the criticality 

analyses provided by the licensee in 

support of its ISFSI license application. 

First, the NRC staff reviewed the 

methodology and assumptions used by 

the licensee in its criticality analysis to 

determine if Criterion 1 of Section 3.1 

above was satisfied. The licensee stated 

that it took no credit in the criticality 

analyses for burnup or fuel-related 

burnable neutron absorbers. 

Specifically, the licensee stated that its 

criticality analyses did not take credit 

for integral burnable absorbers, integral 

fuel burnable absorbers, nor control 

element assemblies. The licensee also 

stated that all assemblies were analyzed 

at the highest permissible enrichment, 

4.5 weight percent Uranium-235 at 

CCNPP. Additionally, the licensee 

stated that all criticality analyses for a 

flooded DSC were performed at 

temperatures and densities of water 

corresponding to optimum moderation 

conditions. Finally, the licensee stated 

that it credited 90 percent of the Boron10 content for the fixed neutron 

absorber in the DSC. NUREG–1536, 

‘‘Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask 

Storage System,’’ states that ‘‘[f] or a 

greater credit allowance [i.e., greater 

than 75 percent for fixed neutron 

absorbers] special, comprehensive 

fabrication tests capable of verifying the 

presence and uniformity of the neutron 

absorber are needed.’’ As part of an 

amendment to the Part 72 license for the 

Transnuclear NUHOMS–32P design, 

the NRC staff reviewed and accepted the 

results of additional data supplied by 

the manufacturer that demonstrated that 

a 90-percent credit for the fixed neutron 

absorbers was acceptable. Therefore, for 

the purposes of this exemption, the staff 

finds a 90-percent credit acceptable on 

the basis that it has previously been 

reviewed and approved by the NRC. 

Subsequently, based on its review of the 

criticality analyses and the information 

submitted in its exemption request, the 

54414 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Notices 

NRC staff finds that the licensee has 

satisfied Criterion 1. 

Second, the NRC staff reviewed the 

proposed CCNPP ISFSI TSs and the 

licensee’s criticality analyses credit 

soluble boron for reactivity control 

during DSC loading, unloading, and 

handling operations. Since the boron 

concentration is a key safety component 

necessary for ensuring subcritical 

conditions in the pool, the licensee 

must have a conservative ISFSI TS 

capable of ensuring that sufficient 

soluble boron is present to perform its 

safety function. The licensee stated that 

ISFSI TS Limiting Condition for 

Operation (LCO) 3.2.1.1 requires that 

the NUHOMS–32P DSC cavity be 

moderated by water with a boron 

concentration greater than or equal to 

2450 ppm to accommodate cask 

operations. In all cases, the boron 

concentration required by the ISFSI TS 

ensures that the keff will be below 0.95 

for the analyzed loading configuration. 

Additionally, the licensee’s ISFSI TS 

contain surveillance requirements (SRs) 

that assure it will verify the boron 

concentration is above the required 

level both prior to and during DSC 

loading, unloading, and handling 

operations. Specifically, SRs 4.2.1.1 and 

4.2.1.2 require verification of the boron 

concentration in the SFP within 24 

hours prior to either insertion of the first 

spent fuel assembly into a DSC for 

loading operations or flooding the DSC 

cavity for unloading operations. 

Additionally, both SRs require the 

licensee to reconfirm the boron 

concentration is above the TS LCO limit 

at intervals not to exceed 48 hours until 

such time as the DSC is removed from 

the SFP. Based on its review of the 

CCNPP ISFSI TS, the NRC staff finds 

that the licensee has satisfied Criterion 

2. 

Third, the NRC staff reviewed the 

CCNPP UFSAR and the information 

provided by the licensee in its 

exemption request to ensure that it 

complies with GDC 63. GDC 63 requires 

that licensees have radiation monitors 

in fuel storage and associated handling 

areas to detect conditions that may 

result in a loss of residual heat removal 

capability and excessive radiation levels 

and initiate appropriate safety actions. 

As previously described, since CCNPP 

was licensed prior to the issuance of the 

GDC listed in Appendix A to 10 CFR 

Part 50, GDC 63 is not directly 

applicable. However, CCNPP is licensed 

to the 1967 draft GDC as discussed in its 

UFSAR, Appendix 1C. The comparable 

draft GDC is Criterion 18, ‘‘Monitoring 

Fuel and Waste Storage,’’ that states the 

following: ‘‘Monitoring and alarm 

instrumentation shall be provided for 

fuel and waste storage and handling 

areas for conditions that might 

contribute to loss of continuity in decay 

heat removal and to radiation 

exposure.’’ The NRC staff reviewed the 

CCNPP UFSAR, 1967 draft GDC, and 

exemption request to determine whether 

the licensee had provided sufficient 

information to demonstrate compliance 

with the intent of GDC 63. In its 

exemption request, the licensee stated 

that three area radiation monitors are 

provided for detecting high radiation 

levels in the fuel storage areas. 

Specifically, the monitors are located in 

the SFP area, on the spent fuel handling 

machine, and in the new fuel storage 

area. At the montors’ alarm setpoints, 

audible and visual alarms annunciate 

locally and in the Control Room. Based 

on its review of the exemption request, 

the CCNPP UFSAR, and the 1967 draft 

GDC, the NRC staff finds that the 

licensee has satisfied Criterion 3. 

Finally, as part of the criticality 

analysis review, the NRC staff evaluated 

the storage of non-fuel-related material 

in a DSC. The NRC staff evaluated the 

potential to increase the reactivity of a 

DSC by loading it with materials other 

than spent nuclear fuel and fuel debris. 

The approved contents for storage in the 

NUHOMS–32P cask design are listed 

in the CCNPP ISFSI TS LCO 3.1.1 (1), 

‘‘Fuel to be Stored at ISFSI.’’ This ISFSI 

TS LCO restricts the contents of the DSC 

to only fuels (14 x 14 Combustion 

Engineering-type pressurized water 

reactor fuel) irradiated at CCNPP. As 

such, CCNPP is prohibited from loading 

other forms of special nuclear material, 

such as sources, detectors, etc., in the 

DSC. Therefore, the NRC staff 

determined that the loading limitations 

described in the CCNPP ISFSI TSs will 

ensure that any authorized components 

loaded in the DSCs will not result in a 

reactivity increase. Based on its review 

of the loading restrictions, the NRC staff 

finds that the licensee has satisfied 

Criterion 4. 

3.2.2 Boron Dilution Analysis 

Since the licensee’s ISFSI application 

relies on soluble boron to maintain 

subcritical conditions within the DSCs 

during loading, unloading, and handling 

operations, the NRC staff reviewed the 

licensee’s boron dilution analysis to 

determine whether appropriate controls, 

alarms, and procedures were available 

to identify and terminate a boron 

dilution accident prior to reaching a 

critical boron concentration. 

By letter dated October 25, 1996, the 

NRC staff issued a safety evaluation (SE) 

on licensing topical report WCAP–

14416, ‘‘Westinghouse Spent Fuel Rack 

Criticality Analysis Methodology.’’ This 

SE specified that the following issues be 

evaluated for applications involving 

soluble boron credit: the events that 

could cause boron dilution, the time 

available to detect and mitigate each 

dilution event, the potential for 

incomplete boron mixing, and the 

adequacy of the boron concentration 

surveillance interval. 

In its exemption request, the licensee 

described the criticality analyses 

performed to determine the worst-case 

bounding keff. The CCNPP criticality 

calculations employed the KENO V.a 

code with the 44-group ENDF/B-V cross 

section library. The calculations 

determined the minimum soluble boron 

concentration required to maintain 

subcriticality (keff < 1.0) following a 

boron dilution event in a NUHOMS–

32P DSC loaded with fresh 4.5 weight 

percent enriched fuel assemblies that 

bound the CCNPP fuel designs 

(Combustion Engineering (CE) 14 x 14 

fuel). The results of the calculations for 

the bounding case indicate that 

subcriticality is maintained with 1650 

ppm of soluble boron in the SFP. 

The TS requirements for the 

NUHOMS–32P Cask System include a 

minimum boron concentration 

requirement of 2450 ppm boron when 

spent fuel assemblies with enrichments 

less than or equal to 4.5 weight-percent 

(wt-percent) U–235 are loaded into a 

DSC canister. The approval of this 

exemption is limited to the DSC 

loading, unloading, and handling of CE 

14 x 14 fuel assemblies enriched to a 

maximum of 4.5 wt-percent U–235. The 

use of fuel-related burnable absorbers is 

credited in the analysis. The NUHOMS–

32P soluble boron TS requirements 

ensure that keff is maintained less than 

0.95. TS SRs require the boron 

concentration in the DSC water to be 

verified within 24 hours prior to the 

insertion of the first spent fuel assembly 

into a DSC and reconfirmed at intervals 

not to exceed 48 hours until such time 

as the DSC is removed from the SFP. 

The licensee contracted with 

Transnuclear to perform a criticality 

analysis to determine the soluble boron 

concentration that results in a keff equal 

to 1.0 for 4.5 wt-percent U–235 fuel 

enrichments using the same 

methodology as approved in the 

Standardized NUHOMS Cask System 

Final Safety Analysis. The analysis 

determined the critical boron 

concentration level for 4.5 wt-percent 

U–235 enriched fuel was 1650 ppm. The 

boron concentration within the canister 

would have to decrease from the TS 

limit to the critical boron concentration 

before criticality is possible. The 

licensee based its boron dilution 

analyses and its preventive and 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Notices 54415 

mitigative actions on dilution sources 

with the potential to reduce the boron 

concentration from the TS minimum 

values for the two fuel enrichment 

bands to the respective concentration 

for criticality. 

During the current analysis the 

licensee identified all credible potential 

sources that could dilute the SFP to 

critical conditions. The licensee 

determined that the limiting boron 

dilution event occurs when water from 

the fire protection system (FPS), with a 

maximum flow rate of 1000 gpm from 

the most limiting hose (a 3-inch 

diameter with a 2-inch nozzle), is added 

to the SFP. The licensee’s calculations 

show that at least 4 hours will be 

available to terminate the event before 

the DSC water boron concentration 

decreases from 2450 ppm to the critical 

concentration of 1650 ppm, assuming a 

straight dilution to the SFP overflow 

limit and a feed and bleed operation 

thereafter with instantaneous complete 

mixing. 

To demonstrate that sufficient time 

exists for plant personnel to identify 

and terminate a boron dilution event, 

the licensee provided a description of 

all alarms available to alert operators, 

and plant controls that will be 

implemented. There is no automatic 

level control system for the SFP; 

therefore, the SFP will overflow on an 

uncontrolled water addition. However, a 

high level alarm in the control room 

would alert personnel of a potential 

boron dilution event within 15 minutes 

for a 1000 gpm dilution rate. In addition 

to the SFP high level alarm, annunciator 

alarms for the FPS exist in the Control 

Room, which would alert operators to 

identify and terminate the worst-case 

boron dilution source. This means that 

there would be more than 3 additional 

hours before the critical boron 

concentration of 1650 ppm within the 

DSC is reached. The NRC staff finds that 

this is acceptable. 

The CCNPP’s SFP is a large 

rectangular structure filled with borated 

water that completely covers the spent 

fuel assemblies. A 3.5-foot wall divides 

the pool, with the north half associated 

to Unit 1 and the south half associated 

to Unit 2. A slot in the dividing wall has 

removable gates, which allow 

movement of the fuel assemblies 

between the two halves of the pool. The 

slot is normally open and the removable 

gate stored in the Unit 1 SFP close to the 

west end of the south wall. However, to 

ensure the applicability of the 

assumptions in its dilution and 

criticality evaluations, the licensee has 

committed to revise the fuel-handling 

procedure to include an initial 

condition that requires the slot between 

the two pools to be open and the gate 

to be stored in its proper storage 

location when a DSC is present in the 

Unit 1 SFP. 

To ensure that operators are capable 

of identifying and terminating a boron 

dilution event during DSC loading, 

unloading, and handling operations, 

operator training will be conducted. 

During training activities operators will 

receive revised alarm manual 

procedures which verify that the SFP 

boron concentration is in compliance 

with the new ISFSI TS limit prior to the 

loading of a NUHOMS–32P DSC. 

Based on the NRC staff’s review of the 

licensee’s exemption request dated 

December 21, 2004, as supplemented on 

May 31, 2005, and its boron dilution 

analysis, the NRC staff finds that the 

licensee has provided sufficient 

information to demonstrate that an 

undetected and uncorrected dilution 

from the TS required boron 

concentration to the calculated critical 

boron concentration is very unlikely. 

Based on its review of the boron 

analysis and enhancements to the 

operating procedures and operator 

training program, the NRC staff finds the 

licensee has satisfied Criterion 5. 

Therefore, in conjunction with the 

conservative assumptions used to 

establish the TS required boron 

concentration and critical boron 

concentration, the boron dilution 

evaluation demonstrates that the 

underlying intent of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) 

is satisfied. 

3.3 Legal Basis for the Exemption 

3.3.1 Authorized by Law 

This exemption results in changes to 

the operation of the plant by allowing 

the operation of the new dry fuel storage 

facility and loading of the NUHOMS–

32P DSC. As stated above, 10 CFR 

50.12 allows the NRC to grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 50. In addition, the granting of 

the licensee’s exemption request will 

not result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

intent of the Commission’s regulations. 

Therefore, the exemption is authorized 

by law. 

3.3.2 No Undue Risk to Public Health 

and Safety 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.68(b)(1) is to ensure that adequate 

controls are in place to ensure that the 

handling and storage of fuel assemblies 

is conducted in a manner such that the 

fuel assemblies remain safely 

subcritical. Based on the NRC staff’s 

review of the licensee’s exemption 

request, the licensee has demonstrated 

that sufficient controls are in place to 

provide reasonable assurance that there 

is no undue risk to public health and 

safety given conservative assumptions 

in the criticality analysis (Criterion 1 

above); surveillances periodically verify 

the boron concentration before and 

during loading and unloading (Criterion 

2 above); radiation monitoring 

equipment is used to detect excessive 

radiation and initiate appropriate 

protective actions (Criterion 3 above); 

only fuel authorized by the ISFSI TS 

will be loaded and stored in the ISFSI 

(Criterion 4 above); and boron dilution 

events have been analyzed, and there 

are sufficient monitoring capabilities 

and time for the licensee to identify and 

terminate a dilution event prior to 

achieving a critical boron concentration 

in the cask (Criterion 5 above). 

Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that 

the underlying purpose of the rule has 

been satisfied and that there is no undue 

risk to public health and safety. 

3.3.3 Consistent with Common 

Defense and Security 

This exemption results in changes to 

the operation of the plant by allowing 

the operation of the new dry fuel storage 

facility and loading of the NUHOMS–

32P DSC. This change to the fuel 

assembly storage and handling in the 

plant does not affect the national 

defense strategy because the national 

defense is maintained by resources 

(hardware or software or other) that are 

outside the plant and that have no direct 

relation to plant operation. In addition, 

loading spent fuel into the NUHOMS–

32P DSC in the SFP does not affect the 

ability of the licensee to defend the 

plant against a terrorist attack. 

Therefore, the common defense and 

security is not impacted by this 

exemption request. 

3.3.4 Special Circumstances 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions,’’ the NRC staff reviewed 

the licensee’s exemption request to 

determine if the legal basis for granting 

an exemption had been satisfied. With 

regards to the six special circumstances 

listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the NRC 

staff finds that the licensee’s exemption 

request satisfies 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 

‘‘Application of the regulation in the 

particular circumstances would not 

serve the underlying purpose of the rule 

or is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule.’’

Specifically, the NRC staff concludes 

that since the licensee has satisfied the 

five criteria in Section 3.1 of this 

exemption, the application of the rule is 

not necessary to achieve its underlying 

purpose in this particular case. 

54416 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 177 / Wednesday, September 14, 2005 / Notices 

3.4 Summary 

Based upon the review of the 

licensee’s exemption request to credit 

soluble boron during DSC loading, 

unloading, and handling in the CCNPP 

SFP, the NRC staff concludes that 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) the 

licensee’s exemption request is 

acceptable. However, the NRC staff 

places the following limitations and/or 

conditions on the approval of this 

exemption: 

1. This exemption is limited to the 

loading, unloading, and handling of the 

DSC for only the TN NUHOMS–32P at 

CCNPP. 

2. This exemption is limited to the 

loading, unloading, and handling in the 

DSC at CCNPP of Combustion 

Engineering 14x14 fuel assemblies that 

had maximum initial, unirradiated U–

235 enrichments of 4.5 weight percent. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants the 

licensee an exemption from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.68(b)(1) for 

the loading, unloading, and handling of 

the components of the Transnuclear 

NUHOMS–32P dry cask storage 

system at CCNPP. However, since the 

licensee does not have an NRCapproved methodology for evaluating 

changes to the analyses or systems 

supporting this exemption request, the 

NRC staff’s approval of the exemption is 

restricted to those specific design and 

operating conditions described in the 

licensee’s December 21, 2004, 

exemption request. The licensee may 

not apply the 10 CFR 50.59 process for 

evaluating changes to specific 

exemptions. Any changes to the design 

or operation of (1) the dry cask storage 

system, (2) the SFP, (3) the fuel 

assemblies to be stored, (4) the boron 

dilution analyses, or (5) supporting 

procedures and controls, regardless of 

whether they are approved under the 

general Part 72 license or perceived to 

be conservative, will invalidate this 

exemption. Upon invalidation of the 

exemption, the licensee will be required 

to comply with NRC regulations prior to 

future cask loadings. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (70 FR 51853). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day 

of September, 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Ledyard B. Marsh, 

Director, Division of Licensing Project 

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 05–18193 Filed 9–13–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–395] 

South Carolina Electric & Gas 

Company; Notice of Withdrawal of 

Application for Amendment to Facility 

Operating License 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (the Commission) has 

granted the request of South Carolina 

Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) to 

withdraw its January 14, 2003, 

application for proposed amendment to 

Facility Operating License No. NPF–12 

for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear 

Station, Unit No. 1, located in Fairfield 

County, South Carolina. 

The proposed amendment would 

have revised the Technical 

Specifications pertaining to emergency 

core cooling systems (ECCS); exclusion 

of safety injection pumps from the 

requirement to vent ECCS pumps. 

The Commission had previously 

issued a Notice of Consideration of 

Issuance of Amendment published in 

the Federal Register on March 4, 2003 

(68 FR 10281). However, by letter dated 

June 22, 2005, the licensee withdrew the 

proposed change. 

For further details with respect to this 

action, see the application for 

amendment dated January 14, 2003, and 

the licensee’s letter dated June 22, 2005, 

which withdrew the application for 

license amendment. Documents may be 

examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR), 

located at One White Flint North, Public 

File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike 

(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 

Publicly available records will be 

accessible electronically from the 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management Systems (ADAMS) Public 

Electronic Reading Room on the Internet 

at the NRC Web site, http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/html. 

Persons who do not have access to 

ADAMS or who encounter problems in 

accessing the documents located in 

ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR 

Reference staff by telephone at 1–800–

397–4209, or 301–415–4737 or by e-mail 

to pdr@nrc.gov. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day 

of September, 2005. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Robert E. Martin, 

Senior Project Manager, Section 1, Project 

Directorate II, Division of Licensing Project 

Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 05–18195 Filed 9–13–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–244] 

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC; 

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Notice 

of Public Meeting To Obtain Comments 

on Request Regarding Proposed 

Release of Part of Site for Unrestricted 

Use 

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of public meeting. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is conducting a 

meeting, pursuant to Section 50.83, 

‘‘Release of part of a power reactor 

facility or site for unrestricted use,’’ of 

Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), for purpose of 

obtaining comments from the public on 

the proposed release of part of the R.E. 

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna 

Plant) site, located in Wayne County, 

New York. 

DATES: The public meeting will be held 

on Wednesday, September 28, 2005, 

from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. at the Ginna Plant 

Training Center, 1517 Lake Road 

Ontario, NY 14519. 

Travel Information: From Rochester, 

take Interstate I–590 towards RT–590. 

Road name changes to SR–590. At exit 

10B, take Ramp (Right) onto SR–104 

towards RT–104/Webster. Turn LEFT 

(North) onto CR–102 (Lakeside Road). 

Turn RIGHT (East) onto CR–101 (Lake 

Road). Follow Lake Road to the Ginna 

Information Center. 

Notification of Attendance: It is 

strongly encouraged that prospective 

participants contact NRC prior to the 

meeting to ensure adequate 

accommodations and to expedite the 

required visitor processing. Contact 

Shannine DiMora, telephone: (315) 524–

6935; e-mail: sjd1@nrc.gov, and submit 

participant name and affiliated 

organization by September 23, 2005. 

Also, it is suggested that attendees limit 

the amount of personal items and 

electronic devices brought into the