NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ANDRE LAMAR PRICE, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0595 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-146350-002

The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joshua C. Smith

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jeffrey L. Force

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 8-17-2021
STATE v. PRICE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Andre Lamar Price appeals his sentences and convictions. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 One morning in October 2017, Price and two friends robbed 

or tried to rob three convenience stores before their getaway car stalled. All 

three were arrested. The State indicted Price on two counts of armed 

robbery, one count of attempted armed robbery, four counts of aggravated 

assault, and two counts of kidnapping. After a 12-day trial, the jury 

convicted Price of two counts of armed robbery, three counts of aggravated 

assault and two counts of kidnapping. It also found aggravating factors, 

including that Price was on probation when he committed the offenses. See

A.R.S. § 13-708(A). The court sentenced Price to concurrent prison 

sentences, the longest lasting 17 years.

¶3 Price timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. 

art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶4 Price asserts three arguments on appeal.

I. Batson Challenge

¶5 Price first contends the State’s peremptory strike of a black 

juror violated his rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). A 

discriminatory peremptory strike violates the Equal Protection Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 85-86. 

¶6 During voir dire, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge to 

the State’s peremptory strike of a potential black juror, Juror 23. The 

prosecutor then offered a race-neutral reason for the strike. He said that 

Juror 23 was a college professor, and college professors are “typically not 
STATE v. PRICE

Decision of the Court

3

strong jurors for us.” The trial court asked the prosecutor about Juror 50, a 

non-minority juror seated on the final jury despite her position as a “faculty 

manager and teacher” at the same university. The prosecutor said he did 

not know Juror 50 was a teacher and pointed to his trial notes that “she was 

a manager, like, administrative, not a college professor.” The court denied 

Price’s challenge and empaneled the jury, which included one black 

member. We review Batson challenges for clear error. State v. Hardy, 230 

Ariz. 281, 285, ¶ 11 (2012).

¶7 A Batson challenge has three steps. The defendant must first 

make a prima facie claim of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 

100. The State must then offer a facially valid race-neutral reason for the 

strike, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991), which need not be 

“persuasive, or even plausible,” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). 

And finally, the defendant must prove the State’s race-neutral reasons were

mere pretext for purposeful discrimination. State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 

204, ¶ 15 (2006).

¶8 We find no clear error on this record because reasonable 

evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Price did not establish 

purposeful discrimination. The court heard and accepted the prosecutor’s 

nondiscriminatory explanation that he “did not hear the teaching part.” 

The superior court is best positioned to assess credibility and we afford 

“much deference” to its ruling. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 401, ¶ 54 

(2006).

II. Exhibits in the Jury Room

¶9 Price next argues the superior court abused its discretion by 

allowing the jury to review testimony from three witnesses in the jury room 

during deliberations, including the testimony of two police officers and 

Price himself. We agree. See State v. Jovenal, 117 Ariz. 441, 443-44 (App. 

1977) (holding that trial courts may not furnish written transcripts of 

testimony to the jury to review during deliberation). Even so, the error was 

harmless. The jury saw video footage of the robberies and heard from 22 

other witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, over the 12-day trial. See State 

v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 335, ¶ 44 (2007) (“An error is harmless if it appears 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict 

obtained.”) (cleaned up) (citing State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 565, ¶ 18 (2003)).

III. Probation Aggravator

¶10 Price last argues the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find he 

committed the offenses while on felony probation. We review this issue de 
STATE v. PRICE

Decision of the Court

4

novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to supporting the jury’s 

verdict and resolving “any conflicts in the evidence against the defendant.” 

State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). We discern no error because the 

record has “evidence that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to 

support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Prosise v. Kottke, 249 

Ariz. 75, 79, ¶ 21 (App. 2020) (quoting Pena, 235 Ariz. at 279, ¶ 5). In 

particular, the record shows that Price was placed on three years’ felony 

probation in 2016 and committed the felonies here in 2017. No conflicting 

evidence was presented. We affirm. 

CONCLUSION

¶11 Because Price shows no reversible error, we affirm his 

convictions and sentences.