J-A12044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JERMAINE M. JACKSON, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2707 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 4, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0000513-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 4, 2023

Jermaine M. Jackson appeals pro se from the order denying his Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

Jackson maintains that he is entitled to relief due to ineffectiveness of trial

counsel. We affirm.1

A panel of this Court previously summarized the facts as follows:

On February 22, 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment 

against [Jackson] for multiple offenses based on his involvement 

in a large drug trafficking operation based in Chester County. On

March 10, 2017, the Commonwealth filed an information charging 

[Jackson] with one count of [possession with intent to deliver

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1 Jackson filed a motion on April 17, 2023, stating he had never received the 

Commonwealth’s brief and asking for an order requiring it to be sent to him. 

The Commonwealth in response stated that its initial attempt at mail service 

had been returned for failure to include an inmate number in the address and 

that it had re-sent its brief to Jackson, with a complete address including 

Jackson’s inmate number. Jackson subsequently filed a reply brief, evidently 

having received the Commonwealth’s brief. We therefore dismiss his 

application to compel as moot. 
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(“PWID”)], fifteen counts of criminal use of a communication 

facility, four counts of dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities, 

one count of criminal solicitation, one count of corrupt 

organizations, and four counts of criminal conspiracy. See

Criminal Information, 3/10/17.

On June 4, 2018, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing. [Jackson]

was represented [by] Attorney Matthew Miller, Esq. (trial 

counsel), who was privately retained. At the outset of the hearing, 

the Commonwealth informed the trial court that the parties had 

agreed to proceed with a bench trial with stipulated facts. N.T. 

Hr’g, 6/4/18, at 2-3. Specifically, the Commonwealth explained:

What we plan to present to your Honor today, is one, 

[Jackson] would waive his right to a jury trial. In exchange

he would also be agreeing to stipulated facts with the 

Commonwealth which would shorten this basically into a 

bench trial on certain elements only.

In exchange for [Jackson] agreeing to said [stipulated2]

facts, the Commonwealth will be withdrawing and 

proceeding on only a certain number of charges going 

forward, which would leave your Honor with the stipulations 

at the end of the day[,] the opportunity to find him guilty or 

not guilty on only certain counts based on the stipulations[,]

and the evidentiary hearing going forward. All tol[d,] the 

crux of the issue is the controlled substance in play.

As your Honor knows, [this] is a wire case in which no 

controlled substances were seized from [Jackson] or from 

his home, et cetera. So it is a, for lack of a better term 

what’s called a no dope case. There’s no controlled 

substances involved, so it’s all going to be proved through 

circumstantial evidence, which is what your Honor would 

base his opinion as to what the substance was.

Id. at 2-3.

Trial counsel stated:

I agree with what [the Commonwealth] has said. [Jackson] 

and I have discussed his rights to a trial by jury and all the 

intended rights. We have gone over the stipulated facts that 

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2 “Separated” in prior Memorandum and in original transcript.
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the Commonwealth typed up and that that we have agreed 

to. It tracks pretty closely the documentary evidence from 

what we have seen on the wiretaps. [Jackson] is fully aware 

of what we are doing in court.

Id. at 3-4.

The trial court conducted on-the-record colloquies regarding 

[Jackson’s] decision to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed 

to a bench trial on the stipulated facts. Id. at 4-18. First, the trial 

court incorporated [Jackson’s] written jury waiver colloquy, which 

he signed and reviewed with trial counsel. Id[.]; Written Jury Trial 

Waiver Colloquy, 6/4/18. Ultimately, the trial court accepted 

[Jackson’s] waiver, finding that he waived his right to a jury 

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. at 18.

The trial court also conducted a colloquy regarding [Jackson’s]

decision to accept the terms of the stipulations. [Jackson] stated 

that he, along with trial counsel, had reviewed and signed the fivepage document setting forth the stipulated facts. Id. at 19-20. 

[Jackson] acknowledged that he was waiving his right to crossexamine witnesses on the facts covered by the stipulation. Id. at 

21-22. [Jackson] also confirmed that, by agreeing to the 

stipulated facts, the Commonwealth had established a basis for 

finding [Jackson] guilty of each offense. Id. at 22. [Jackson]

confirmed that the sole issue of fact to be determined by the trial 

court was whether [he] possessed marijuana or 

methamphetamine. Id. at 11. At the conclusion of the colloquy, 

the trial court accepted the stipulation and [Jackson’s] waiver of 

his rights. Id. at 23.

The following day, the trial court began the two-day bench trial. 

The Commonwealth presented Detective Joseph Nangle, a 

member of the drug and organized crime unit, who testified as 

[an] expert on PWID offenses and “the code of language used by 

drug dealers in their investigations of possession with people who 

are drug dealers.” N.T. Trial, 6/5/18, at 24, 32. Detective Nangle 

stated that, during the course of the investigation, his department 

conducted multiple controlled buys, implemented visual electronic 

surveillance, and obtained wiretaps. Id. at 46, 49. Detective 

Nangle stated that, based on the totality of the circumstances, it 

was his opinion that [Jackson] was dealing methamphetamine, 

not marijuana. Id. at 40-51.

The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Barry 

Sydenstricker and Michael Zelek, cooperating witnesses who sold 
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methamphetamine for [Richard] Maitre, who led the drug 

organization. N.T. Trial, 6/6/18, at 56, 99-100. Zelek testified that 

he purchased methamphetamine from [Jackson], and that the 

sale was facilitated by Maitre. Id. at 64-65. Sydenstricker testified 

that [Jackson] gave him a package containing a controlled 

substance, which he delivered to Maitre. Id. at 108. Sydenstricker 

stated that although he did not see the contents of the package, 

he believed it was methamphetamine. Id. at 108-11. 

Sydenstricker also testified that after he was arrested, while he 

was in Chester County Prison with [Jackson, Jackson] instructed 

Sydenstricker to tell investigators that he transported marijuana, 

not methamphetamine. Id. at 115-125.

On June 15, 2018, the trial court found that the substance 

possessed and delivered by [Jackson] was methamphetamine. On 

September 25, 2018, the trial court sentenced [Jackson] to an 

aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years’ incarceration.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 347 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 4436293, at *1-

3 (Pa.Super. 2020) (unpublished mem.) (some alterations in original; 

footnotes omitted).

Jackson filed a direct appeal, and we affirmed the judgment of sentence.

See id. at *1. Jackson filed a petition for allowance of appeal in the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on June 2, 2021. See

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 255 A.3d 1254 (Table) (Pa. 2021).

A few weeks later, in June 2021, Jackson filed a timely, pro se PCRA 

petition. Counsel was appointed and in April 2022, filed a Finley3/no-merit 

letter and a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel. The court thereafter 

issued a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Jackson did not file a response to the Rule 907 

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3 Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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notice. The court dismissed Jackson’s PCRA petition, on October 4, 2022, and 

granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. This appeal followed.

Jackson raises the following issues: 

1. Did the trial court err by denying PCRA relief where [Jackson]

established by a preponderance of the evidence that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, when counsel failed 

to object to a defective plea colloquy and protect [Jackson] 

from being found guilty of crimes he did not commit?

2. Did the trial court err in granting the Commonwealth’s Request

to Amend the Information, as the Commonwealth added 

additional charges of possession with the intent to deliver 

(PWID) and conspiracy?

3. Did the trial court err by denying PCRA relief where [Jackson] 

established by the preponderance of the evidence that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, where counsel failed 

to object to the filing of a criminal information without a 

preliminary hearing?

4. Did the trial court err by denying PCRA relief where [Jackson] 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, when counsel failed 

to advise [Jackson] of the existence of a possible negotiated 

plea agreement?

Jackson’s Br. at 4.

On appeal from the denial or grant of relief under the PCRA, our review 

is limited to determining “whether the PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the 

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 

442 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

Jackson first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the trial court’s colloquy regarding the stipulated fact trial. Jackson’s Br. at 

7. He contends that although he was aware that he was waiving his right to a 
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jury trial, his counsel did not explain that a stipulated trial was the functional 

equivalent to a guilty plea. Id. at 7-8, 10. Jackson maintains that the colloquy

was defective because it was “neither voluntary, nor intelligent, where [he] 

was not apprised of the nature of the charges, nor was he warned of charges 

running consecutive[ly], his rights against self[-]incrimination, or the 

maximum sentence of the charges running consecutive[ly].” Id. at 6.

According to Jackson, counsel’s failure to explain the effect of a stipulated trial

prejudiced him “by allowing him to admit to crimes that he did not commit.” 

Id. at 10. 

“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating 

ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 

1276, 1279 (Pa.Super. 2010). To obtain relief based on a claim of 

ineffectiveness, a petitioner must establish: “(1) his underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; 

and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result.” Commonwealth 

v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). Prejudice in this context means that, 

“absent counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of 

the proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Velazquez, 

216 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). A failure to meet 

any of these prongs bars a petitioner from obtaining relief. Commonwealth 

v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. 2012). Further, “[c]ounsel will not be 

deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1210 (Pa. 2006).
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“A colloquy ensuring a knowing and voluntary decision is required any 

time a defendant stipulates to evidence that virtually assures his conviction 

because such a stipulation is functionally the same as a guilty plea.”

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 832 (Pa. 2014).

Here, the record belies Jackson’s argument that his colloquy was 

defective. Prior to trial, the following colloquy took place, wherein Jackson

voluntarily and knowingly agreed to proceed on a stipulated fact trial in 

exchange for the Commonwealth withdrawing numerous charges against him:

THE COURT: . . . Have you had enough time to go over with your 

attorney, Mr. Miller, this five[-]page document which is entitled 

stipulated facts[?]

MR . JACKSON: Yes , sir.

THE COURT: Have you -- if you have had questions concerning 

this, has Mr. Miller answered to your satisfaction any questions 

that you had concerning the contents of this document?

MR . JACKSON: Yes , sir.

THE COURT: And about the middle of the last page on the line 

below which the words appear, Jermaine Jackson, the defendant, 

is the signature on that line above those words, is that your 

signature?

MR . JACKSON: Yes , sir.

THE COURT: And did you review and sign this earlier today here 

in the Justice Center building?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: The critical legal concept that the defendant needs 

to understand and be aware of prior to what some folks refer to 

as a stipulated fact trial, and we have here in large part a 

stipulated fact trial, but we also have reserved for the nonjury trial 

certain issues to be determined by me as the Judge as fact finder.
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But the critical understanding that needs to be established before 

any stipulated fact trial can proceed is that the defendant is aware, 

as to those stipulated facts, that he is waiving any right to be able 

to cross-examine. The Commonwealth will not be calling 

witnesses as to the stipulated facts , and the defendant is waiving 

his right to be able to cross-examine through his attorney those 

witnesses, and there [is] a line of cases in Pennsylvania identifying 

a stipulated fact procedure.

***

So I’ll ask you directly, Mr. Jackson, the stipulated facts 

presentation method means that your lawyer, Mr. Miller, has 

agreed that those facts may be read into the record without the 

necessity of witnesses taking the stand. Do you understand that?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, I do, sir.

THE COURT: But that because what we are proceeding through 

the stipulated fact method or are proposing to, Mr. Miller will 

not have the right to cross-examine any Commonwealth 

witnesses on the facts covered in this stipulation, and not 

have the right to develop any facts or theories of his own through 

cross-examination. Do you understand that?

MR . JACKSON: Yes, I do, sir.

THE COURT: So that you will not have the right or Mr. Miller will 

not have the right as your attorney to confront any 

Commonwealth witnesses on these issues as that right is 

guaranteed to you by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution.

Do you understand that?

MR . JACKSON: Yes, I do, Judge.

THE COURT: And that in effect you’re agreeing to these 

stipulated facts means that a basis will have been formed 

for the Court’s finding you guilty with regard to the counts 

of this information that have been identified by [the 

Commonwealth]. Do you understand that?

MR . JACKSON: Yes, I do, sir.

N.T., 6/4/18, at 19-22 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the trial court questioned Jackson quite extensively about the 

effect of a trial based on stipulated facts. This colloquy was sufficient to 

establish that Jackson fully understood that he was giving up his right to crossexamine witnesses and giving the court a factual basis on which to find him 

guilty on certain charges. Moreover, on direct appeal, this Court previously 

determined that the underlying claim was meritless since his decision to 

proceed on a stipulated fact trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See 

Jackson, 2020 WL 4436293, at *6. Without a viable underlying objection, 

there is no basis on which to mount an ineffectiveness claim. See Spotz, 896 

A.2d at 1210. For like reason – i.e., Jackson’s agreement to the stipulated trial 

was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary – he has failed to show that he would 

have opted for a different proceeding other than a stipulated trial if trial 

counsel objected to the colloquy. His first issue fails.

Jackson next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

Commonwealth to amend the information to include the additional charges of 

PWID and conspiracy. Jackson’s Br. at 11. This claim is both not cognizable 

under the PCRA and waived because Jackson could have raised it on direct 

appeal but did not. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 270 (Pa. 

2011). In any event, it is meritless. As part of his signed stipulation, Jackson 

agreed that one count of dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity would be 

replaced with one count of PWID. See Stipulated Facts, 6/4/18, at ¶ 5.

Moreover, Jackson orally agreed to the amendment during a colloquy on the 

record. See N.T., 6/4/18, at 9-10.
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Jackson next alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to Jackson’s lack of a preliminary hearing. Jackson’s Br. at 12. He contends 

that “if this case was presented at a preliminary hearing at the time of [his] 

arrest, this case would have been dismissed.” Id. at 13.

This claim is also without merit. Jackson has not demonstrated that had 

a preliminary hearing occurred, this case would have likely had a different 

outcome. He cites a Common Pleas opinion in an unrelated case stating that

the evidence there – also a “no dope case” – was insufficient to survive a 

preliminary hearing. However, he has not explained why the evidence in this 

case was inadequate to state a prima facie case. Furthermore, once the 

Commonwealth has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial – a 

finding that this Court affirmed on direct appeal – “any defect in the 

preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 

82 A.3d 943, 984 (Pa. 2013). Counsel’s failure to require a preliminary hearing

cannot support an ineffectiveness claim because the evidence established 

Jackson’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. See Commonwealth v. 

Lyons, 568 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Pa.Super. 1989).

Jackson’s final claim is that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed 

to advise Jackson of the existence of a possible negotiated plea agreement.

Jackson’s Br. at 14. He alleges that counsel never informed him that there 

was a plea deal offered by the Commonwealth that contained “less charges 

and less time.” Id.
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To establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate 

a plea offer, a petitioner must plead and prove that: “(1) an offer for a plea 

was made; (2) trial counsel failed to inform him of such offer; (3) trial counsel 

had no reasonable basis for failing to inform him of the plea offer; and (4) he 

was prejudiced thereby.” Commonwealth v. Chazin, 873 A.2d 732, 735 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

Here, Jackson’s claim is conclusory and undeveloped. His brief 

essentially recites the elements of an ineffectiveness claim without relevant 

discussion. Nor has he provided any specifics about an alleged plea offer. 

“[B]oilerplate allegations have never been sufficient to discharge [the]

affirmative burden to rebut the presumption of effectiveness” of counsel.

Commonwealth v. Nelson, No. 3300 EDA 2018, 2020 WL 5797645, at *5

(Pa.Super. Sept. 29, 2020) (unpublished mem.) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Simmons, 804 A.2d 625, 639 (Pa. 2001) (plurality)). Thus, Jackson’s final

claim fails. 

Order affirmed. Application to Compel dismissed as moot. 

Date: October 4, 2023