UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

SHEILA BOWE-CONNOR,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DC-0752-13-0668-I-1

DATE: January 20, 2015

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Sheila Bowe-Connor, Laurel, Maryland, pro se.

Julie Rebecca Zimmer, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: 

the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial 

decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings 

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent 

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting 

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal 

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not 

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this 

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the 

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the 

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as 

expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision. 

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶2 The agency removed the appellant from her position as a Clinical 

Pharmacist based upon charges of causing a delay in patients receiving 

medications, conduct unbecoming, and disrespectful conduct. Initial Appeal File 

(IAF), Tab 6 at 12-17. The appellant appealed the removal, arguing that the 

charges were untimely, that the agency failed to properly investigate the charges,

and that the agency failed to consider evidence disproving the charges. IAF, 

Tab 1 at 6. After holding a hearing, the administrative judge sustained the 

removal and found that the appellant did not establish her affirmative defense of 

harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID).

¶3 The appellant has petitioned for review, challenging the administrative 

judge’s findings as to the charges, reiterating claims of a disparate penalty, 

disagreeing with the administrative judge’s evidentiary determinations, alleging 

bias on the part of the administrative judge, and asserting harmful procedural 

error. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2, 7-14. She also submits 

evidence that she argues is new and material. Id. at 7, 16-28. Finally, the 

appellant appears to raise, for the first time on review, affirmative defenses of 
3

reprisal based upon prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity and 

disability discrimination. Id. at 9, 13-14. The agency responds in opposition. 

PFR File, Tab 7. In reply, the appellant submits additional evidence that she 

argues is new and material. PFR File, Tab 8 at 5, 9.

¶4 As a preliminary matter, we have considered the evidence that the appellant 

submits for the first time on review and find that this evidence is not new and 

material. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The Board will not consider evidence 

submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it 

was unavailable before the record closed despite the party’s due diligence. Davis 

v. Department of Commerce, 120 M.S.P.R. 34, ¶ 16 (2013). Regarding most of 

the evidence that the appellant submits, she has not shown that the evidence was 

unavailable despite her due diligence and we therefore do not consider this 

evidence. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-21. We also do not consider the appellant’s

evidence regarding a charge made by a fellow employee against one of the 

appellant’s supervisors, PFR File, Tab 8 at 9, because evidence offered merely to 

impeach a witness’s credibility is not generally considered new and material, see

Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 18 (2014). Lastly, 

concerning the submitted testimony from the appellant’s EEO case, although the 

document itself may not have been available to the appellant until after the 

hearing, see PFR File, Tab 7, it merely reflects her past history of filing EEO 

cases and her supervisor’s knowledge of this history. It does not contain any new 

evidence.

2

 See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) (to constitute new evidence, the 

 2 The appellant alleges that the administrative judge denied her submission of evidence 

related to disparate treatment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. Although it is unclear from the 

Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) to what evidence the appellant refers, we find that any 

such denial is harmless error because the appellant has not stated how the evidence 

would have affected the merits of her case. See Reeves v. U.S. Postal Service, 

117 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 12 (2012), overruled on other grounds by Boucher v. U.S. Postal 

Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 20 n.4 (2012) (in order to obtain reversal of an initial 

decision on the ground that the administrative judge abused her discretion in excluding 

evidence, the petitioning party must show on review that relevant evidence, which 

could have affected the outcome, was disallowed).
4

information contained in the documents, not just the documents themselves, must 

have been unavailable despite due diligence when the record closed).

¶5 When taking an adverse action against an employee, an agency must 

establish that: (1) the charged conduct occurred; (2) a nexus exists between the 

conduct and the efficiency of the service; and (3) the particular penalty imposed 

is reasonable. Crawford-Graham v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 99 M.S.P.R.

389, ¶ 16 (2005) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(c)(1)(B), 7513(a)). For a charge to be 

sustained, an agency must prove all of the elements of the charge by a

preponderance of the evidence.

3

 Id., ¶ 17 (citing Burroughs v. Department of the 

Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

The administrative judge properly sustained the charges.

¶6 As to the charge of causing a delay in patients receiving medications, the 

administrative judge sustained the charge because she found that the appellant did 

not deny that her failure to answer the phones in the pharmacy delayed the 

dispensing of medications to patients in the surgical intensive care unit (SICU) 

(which was the only specification of the charge) and that the record is undisputed 

that the appellant caused the delay. ID at 3; see IAF, Tab 6 at 27. The 

administrative judge considered the appellant’s explanations that the pharmacy 

was extremely busy, that the phones were ringing frequently, and that when the 

nursing supervisor observed a phone off the hook, it was because the appellant 

had been speaking to a customer. ID at 3; HCD 2; HCD 3. However, the record 

is undisputed that the SICU nurses had tried to call the pharmacy for several 

hours before the medications they needed were finally dispensed. ID at 3. We 

therefore agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved its first 

charge.

 3 A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a 

contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2).
5

¶7 We also sustain the charge of conduct unbecoming. 4

 To prove a charge of 

conduct unbecoming a federal employee, an agency is required to demonstrate 

that the appellant engaged in the underlying conduct alleged in support of the 

broad label. Scheffler v. Department of Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 499, ¶ 4 (2012), 

aff’d, 522 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In this case, the agency charged that 

the appellant responded to a call from another pharmacist regarding the urgent 

need for a medication which had been requested an hour earlier for an unstable 

critically ill patient in the SICU. When the SICU pharmacist requested the 

medication “STAT,” the appellant responded by saying that he should not be 

requesting orders “STAT” and continued to argue with him. IAF, Tab 6 at 27-28. 

The appellant does not dispute that this interchange occurred, but rather contends 

that, regardless, she timely filled the prescription. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. 

However, the SICU pharmacist testified that, rather than continue to argue with 

the appellant over the phone, he had to leave the SICU, go to the pharmacy and 

prepare the medication himself, and bring it to the patient in the SICU. The 

administrative judge found the SICU pharmacist’s testimony more credible than 

the appellant’s and sustained the charge of conduct unbecoming. We find no 

error in the administrative judge’s credibility determination and thus find that the 

agency proved the second charge.

¶8 We also sustain the charge of disrespectful conduct. See IAF, Tab 6 at 28. 

In sustaining the charge, the administrative judge considered that the appellant 

did not deny the charge in either her written reply to the proposed removal or her 

hearing testimony. ID at 6; see IAF, Tab 6 at 23-24; see also HCD 3. She also 

credited the testimony of the appellant’s supervisors that the appellant engaged in 

the charged conduct. ID at 6. We see no reason to disturb the administrative 

judge’s credibility determinations or her finding sustaining the charge. See 

 4 Although the agency’s proposal notice included four specifications of conduct 

unbecoming, IAF, Tab 6 at 27-28, the deciding official only sustained one specification 

of the charge, id. at 13. 
6

Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (the 

Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations 

when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of the demeanor 

of witnesses at the hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only 

when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).

There is a nexus between the charged conduct and the efficiency of the service.

¶9 The deciding official testified concerning the importance of patient safety 

and that the appellant’s return to the pharmacy could cause delays in dispensing 

medications. HCD 1. We therefore find that a nexus has been established 

because the testimony supports the conclusion that the appellant’s conduct 

interfered with the agency’s mission. See Williams v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs, 65 M.S.P.R. 612, 614-15 (1994) (affirming the administrative judge’s 

finding of nexus where the appellant’s negligence in failing to properly install 

filters used for surgical instruments could have endangered patient safety and 

caused additional delay and cost to the agency), aff’d, 69 F.3d 554 (Fed. Cir. 

1995) (Table).

5

The administrative judge appropriately sustained the penalty of removal.

¶10 Where, as here, all of the agency’s charges have been sustained, the Board 

will review the agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency 

considered all of the relevant Douglas factors and exercised management 

discretion within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. See Woebcke v. 

Department of Homeland Security, 114 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 7 (2010). 6

 The deciding 

 5 To the extent that the administrative judge did not clearly address the nexus between 

the charged conduct and the efficiency of the service, we find that this error is 

harmless. See Bernal v. Department of the Air Force, 21 M.S.P.R. 283, 284 (1984) 

(finding that presiding official’s failure to address nexus was not prejudicial error 

where the Board found that nexus was established by preponderant evidence). 

6 In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board 

articulated a nonexhaustive list of twelve factors that are relevant in assessing the 

penalty to be imposed for an act of misconduct.
7

official’s testimony reflects that he considered all of the Douglas factors and 

checked off those factors on the Douglas factors worksheet that he found were 

most applicable to the appellant’s case. HCD 1; see IAF, Tab 6 at 16. 

Additionally, the deciding official’s testimony reflects that in considering several 

of the Douglas factors, he emphasized the necessity of the removal because of the 

appellant’s past history of, and potential for interfering with, safely caring for 

patients. HCD 1. We therefore see no reason to disturb the administrative 

judge’s finding that the removal penalty was warranted in this case.

¶11 The appellant argues that the administrative judge did not consider her 

evidence of disparate penalties. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. In sustaining the 

removal, the administrative judge found that the appellant claimed that she was 

subjected to a disparate penalty but did not identify any “allegedly comparable 

employee who had not been disciplined as harshly for similar conduct.” ID at 7. 

Contrary to the initial decision, however, the appellant did identify two alleged 

comparators who were suspended for 10 days for engaging in physical and verbal 

altercations. IAF, Tab 14 at 22-29. The appellant argued that, unlike these 

employees, she was not involved in a physical or verbal altercation. Id. at 5. She

also testified that another pharmacist made inappropriate comments but was not 

disciplined. HCD 3. Because the administrative judge did not fully address the 

appellant’s claim of disparate penalties, we MODIFY the initial decision to 

address this issue, nonetheless finding that the appellant has not met her burden 

concerning her disparate penalties claim. See McNab v. Department of the 

Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶¶ 10-11 (2014). 

¶12 To establish disparate penalties, the appellant must show that there is 

enough similarity between both the nature of the misconduct and the other factors 

to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the agency treated similarly-situated 

employees differently. Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 

657, ¶ 15 (2010). An appellant does not demonstrate disparate penalties when an 

alleged comparator engaged in similar conduct regarding only some of the 
8

charges for which she was disciplined. Reid v. Department of the 

Navy, 118 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶ 22 (2012). In this case, even though two of the

comparators engaged in an altercation and the appellant alleges that another 

comparator made inappropriate comments, there is certainly no evidence that they 

engaged in conduct consistent with the charge of causing a delay in patient

medications. We find that the appellant has not described any comparators with a 

history of similar misconduct as to all of the charges against her. These alleged 

comparators therefore do not demonstrate that the appellant was subjected to a 

disparate penalty. Id. Additionally, the appellant has not established a similarity 

between her history of discipline and that of the other employees. In particular, 

we note that the appellant has a history of previous discipline that includes 

suspensions for conduct involving altercations and violence. IAF, Tab 6 at 62-71. 

There is no evidence that the alleged comparators had such a history. The 

appellant has therefore not established that she was subjected to a disparate 

penalty. See Lewis, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶ 15. 

The appellant has not established her affirmative defense of harmful procedural 

error through violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

¶13 On review, the appellant alleges, as she did below, that the agency 

committed harmful procedural error by violating the collective bargaining 

agreement when it failed to provide her with supervisory notes and reports of 

contact until she received the proposed removal.

7 PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, Tab 8 

at 5. Concerning the alleged violations of a collective bargaining agreement, the 

Board applies the harmful error standard. LeBlanc v. Department of 

Transportation, 60 M.S.P.R. 405, 417 (1994), aff’d, 53 F.3d 436 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 

(Table). In order to show harmful error, the appellant must prove that any 

procedural error was likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion 

 7 On review, the appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings on her 

assertions below of harmful error due to timeliness of the charges or failure to 

investigate. See ID at 7-9. Regardless, we find that the record does not establish 

harmful error on these bases. See LeBlanc, 60 M.S.P.R. 405, 417.
9

different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error. 

Rawls v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 614, ¶ 23 (2003), aff’d, 129 F. App’x 

628 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Although the appellant vaguely asserted at the hearing that 

her ability to view these documents may have changed the result in this case, see

HCD 3, we do not find that this failure by the agency caused it to reach a 

different conclusion than it otherwise would have. We therefore find that the 

appellant failed to establish harmful procedural error.

The Board does not consider the affirmative defenses of disability discrimination 

and reprisal to the extent that the appellant asserts these defenses.

¶14 On review, the appellant appears to raise affirmative defenses of disability 

discrimination and reprisal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10, 13-14. In particular, she

alleges that the agency has ignored her disability status and recommended 

accommodations. See id. at 9. The appellant also testified at the hearing that she 

is disabled. HCD 3. With respect to reprisal, the appellant testified that her 

supervisor stated that, if she filed any lawsuits, she would be sorry. Id. Here, the 

appellant, who was represented by a union steward (who is an attorney), raised 

the affirmative defense of harmful procedural error below. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, 

Tab 14 at 6-7, Tab 17 at 1. In two hearing orders, the appellant was notified that, 

absent good cause, she would be limited to the facts and issues (including 

affirmative defenses) identified in her prehearing submissions in presenting 

evidence at the hearing. IAF, Tabs 4, 10. The appellant, however, did not raise 

the affirmative defenses of disability discrimination or reprisal. The Board will 

not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a 

showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available 

despite the party's due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air 

Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). The appellant has not offered such evidence 

and instead attempts to reframe prior allegations as retaliation and disability 

discrimination. Therefore, to the extent that the appellant again raises these as 

affirmative defenses, we do not consider them.
10

The appellant has not shown bias.

¶15 The appellant alleges that the administrative judge showed bias against her. 

PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. In making a claim of bias or prejudice, the appellant must 

overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies 

administrative adjudicators. Asatov v. Agency for International 

Development, 119 M.S.P.R. 692, ¶ 13 (2013). Specifically, an administrative 

judge’s honest appraisal of the appellant’s case does not constitute bias. 

Galloway v. Department of Agriculture, 110 M.S.P.R. 311, ¶ 13 (2008). In 

addition to alleging bias on the basis of the administrative judge’s factual 

determinations, the appellant states that the administrative judge commented off 

the record that the appellant should apply for disability retirement. PFR File, Tab 

1 at 11. The appellant also makes a vague allegation of bias based upon her 

religious background. PFR File, Tab 8 at 6. We find that the appellant’s 

allegations do not meet the legal standard for establishing that the administrative 

judge was biased against her or her case. 

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review

You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination 

claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5 

of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you 

submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method 

requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
11

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after 

your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your 

representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no 

later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to 

file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action

If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your 

discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your 

discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States 

district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with 

the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If 

you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order 

before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar 

days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to 

file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to 

representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of
12

prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) 

and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board