alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# CE2004078EN.01006102.xml

| 27.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 78/61 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 78/61

---

(2004/C 78 E/0062)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1971/03

by Cristiana Muscardini (UEN) to the Commission

(13 June 2003)

Subject:   Flying ultralight aircraft

Subject:

Pleasure and sports flights on board ultralight aircraft are apparently governed by specific regulations in all EU Member States. Under the Italian regulations, pilots of such aircraft may be given the green light to fly without being required to show their ‘flight plan’, unlike pilots of standard flights. At present most states accept that such flights may even cross borders; however, the Italian authorities have recently stated that they are not prepared to recognise a German ‘green light’ given to flights over Italian territory because the relevant documents are not identical in the two countries.

Even though the equivalence of such documents is a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Member States, does the Commission not consider that the governments of the Member states should be asked to harmonise their regulations on procedures and the documents required for authorisation to fly such aircraft, in particular since such harmonisation would remove an obstacle to the exercise of a sporting activity which is very popular among young people?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(24 July 2003)

(24 July 2003)

The Commission welcomes all efforts to remove obstacles to free movement in general and to the exercise of a sporting activity in particular.

However, on the basis of the information given, the Commission cannot give a precise reply to the question asked, namely how Community law could be involved in this case, because the rules to which the Honourable Member refers do not seem to be based on discrimination on grounds of nationality.

The Honourable Member is requested to bear in mind that the Community is not competent to deal with the question of harmonisation between the Member States of regulations on the procedures and documents required for authorisations to fly ultra-light aircraft.

The problems of harmonisation of such documents therefore lie solely within the competence of the Member States.

---
STATE of North Carolina v. Marlon E. MENDOZA-MEJIA, Defendant.

No. COA14-1261.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 1, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Vacated and Remanded.
STATE of North Carolina v. Horace Hamid KERSEY, Defendant.

No. COA15-240.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 6, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No error in part, Vacated and Remanded in Part.
EXHIBIT 99.3


CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


I, Kathryn L. Scanlon, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Littlefield
  Corporation;2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
  untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
  to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
  statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
  quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
  information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
  respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
  registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report; 4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
  establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
  in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

> a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
>     information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
>     is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
>     period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
>     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
>     procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this quarterly
>     report (the "Evaluation Date"); and
>     c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness
>     of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
>     Evaluation Date;

5.The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed,
  based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
  committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
  function):

> a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
>     which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
>     summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's
>     auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
>     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
>     who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated
  in this quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
  controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
  subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
  actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
  May 14, 2003
  /s/ Kathryn L. Scanlon
  Chief Financial Officer
STATE of North Carolina v. Bo Anderson TAYLOR.

No. 1A15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 25, 2015.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Nicholas C. Woomer-Deters, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

For reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining issue on appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Justice ERVIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

**Opinion**

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, --- N.C.App. ----, 767 S.E.2d 585 (2014), finding error in judgments entered on 16 September 2011 by Judge Charles H. Henry in Superior Court, New Hanover County, and ordering that defendant receive a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on 2 September 2015.
August 12, 2015

Mr. Jeffrey Kyle, Clerk Third Court of Appeals of Texas
P.O. Box 12547 Austin, Texas 78711

RE: Robert Ritz vs. State
03-14-00403-CR

Dear Mr. Kyle,

Please be advised that Mr. Bria n Erskine will be appearing be fore the Court on September 23, 2015 at 9:00 a. m. to present oral argument in the above-mentioned case. Should you have any questions, please contact our office.

Best regards,

Wes Mau Criminal District Attorney 712 S. Stagecoach Trail, Suite 2057 San Marcos, Texas 78666 Ph: (512) 393-7600 / Fax: (512) 393-2246
State Bar No.: 0074539 wes.mau@co.hays.tx.us Attorney for the State

Cc: Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
1103 Nueces Austin, Texas 78701 ljir@aol.com 

## W ES 

## M AU 

### Criminal District Attorney Hays County Government Center

712 South Stagecoach, Suite 2057 San Marcos, Texas 78666 (512)393-7600 FAX (512)393-2246 ACCEPTED 03-14-00403-CR
6458990 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/12/2015 10:45:03 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Captaris, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, David P. Anastasi, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted
pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|                                     
|/s/ DAVID P. ANASTASI                
|David P. Anastasi                    
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|May 10, 2005
Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 19, 2019

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A19A1256. TERRANCE D. SHIELDS v. THE STATE.

The appellant in this case failed to comply with the notice of docketing mailed by this 

Court and with Court of Appeals Rule 23 (a), regarding the filing of an enumeration of errors 

and brief within twenty days after the appeal was docketed. See also Court of Appeals Rule 13.

On February 26, 2019, this Court ordered the appellant to file an enumeration of errors 

and a brief no later than March 07, 2019. As of the date of this order, the appellant's 

enumeration of errors and brief still have not been filed. Accordingly, this appeal is deemed 

abandoned and is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7, 23 (a).

Because procedural deficiencies have deprived the appellant of the right of appellate 

review, the appellant is hereby informed of the following in accordance with Rowland v. State, 

264 Ga. 872 (452 SE2d 756) (1995):

This Court has dismissed your appeal because an enumeration of errors and a 

brief have not been filed on your behalf as required. If this failure occurred while 

you were represented by legal counsel and was due to your appellate counsel's 

failure to perform the duties of appellate counsel, and if you still wish to appeal, 

you may file a motion in the trial court for permission to pursue an out-of-time 

appeal. If the trial court grants your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will 

have 30 days from the filing date of the order granting your motion to file in the 

trial court a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. If the 

trial court denies your motion for an out-of-time appeal, you will have 30 days 

from the filing date of the order denying your motion to file in the trial court a 

notice of appeal from that order.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 19, 2019.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the appellant as well as to 

the appellant's attorney of record, if any. The appellant's attorney is also directed to send a copy 

of this order to the appellant.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              NOV-30-1999

<PERIOD-END>                                   FEB-28-1999
<CASH>                                               53488
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      1217593
<ALLOWANCES>                                         71593
<INVENTORY>                                         548866
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   2043850
<PP&E>                                             3547955
<DEPRECIATION>                                     1874586
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     3976058
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              2523897
<BONDS>                                             707269
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                         496236
<COMMON>                                             21472
<OTHER-SE>                                          227184
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       3976058
<SALES>                                            1853020
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   1853020
<CGS>                                              1382675
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      1382675
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    678956
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      1500
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   73198
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (281809)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                (281809)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (281809)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (0.21)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.21)
        


</TABLE>
MOUNTAIN VILLAGES, LLC. et al. v. SADLER.

No. 204P15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 24, 2015.

Zara Ellis Sadler, Sylva, for Sadler, Zara Ellis.

Mountain Villages, Lori Richards, for Mountain Villages, LLC.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 22nd of June 2015 by Defendant-Appellant for Temporary Stay:

> "Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of June 2015."
----

(2004/C 70 E/086)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2318/03

by Armando Cossutta (GUE/NGL) to the Council

(14 July 2003)

Subject:   European citizens' right to privacy

The EU-US summit was held on 25 June this year. One of the topics was or should have been the TIA project (originally ‘Total Information Awareness’, subsequently changed to ‘Terrorism Information Awareness’), basically a project to provide a gigantic apparatus for gathering and analysing information obtained from the most varied sources, ranging from existing data banks to commercial transactions, from people's movements to intercepted communications. According to Stefano Rodotà, the guarantor of the Italian privacy watchdog, we are witnessing a new dimension of surveillance, which increases the power of the State to obtain any personal data, irrespective of who gathered it and the original purpose for which it was gathered. The European Parliament, via its President Pat Cox, made its views clear: ‘we cannot let the US dictate law in Europe’.

Reply

(8 December 2003)

The Council would inform the Honourable Member that there was no discussion of TIA at the summit with the United States on 25 June 2003. The Council notes the points on which the Honourable Member has expressed concern.

The Council would remind the Honourable Member that at the end of 2002 it approved an agreement between Europol and the United States covering, inter alia, the transmission of personal data. The Europol Joint Supervisory Body (the authority for the protection of personal data) gave a favourable opinion concerning that agreement. The EU's position concerning the protection of personal data is therefore well known to the United States. The Council intends to insist to the United States authorities — as the Commission is doing — on full respect for the European position and the need to find an appropriate solution that meets European standards. The Council also invites the Honourable Member to refer, in this connection, to the position stated on the transmission of data concerning passengers in Opinions 6/2002 and 4/2003 of the Article 29 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data.

----
# C_2009113EN.01003002.xml

| 16.5.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 113/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 113/30

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18 March 2009 — Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise and Shanghai Adeptech Precision v Council

(Case T-299/05) (1)

1

(Dumping - Imports of certain electronic weighing scales originating in China - Market economy status - Article 2(7)(a) and (c), Article 2(10), and Article 11(9) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96)

2009/C 113/61

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co. Ltd (Shanghai, China) and Shanghai Adeptech Precision Co. Ltd (Huaxin Town, China) (represented by: R. MacLean, Solicitor, and E. Gybels, lawyer)

Applicants:

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: J.-P. Hix, acting as Agent, assisted by G. Berrisch, lawyer)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented initially by: K. Talabér-Ritz and E. Righini, and subsequently by H. van Vliet and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant

Re:

Re:

Action for annulment of Articles 1 and 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 692/2005 of 28 April 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 2605/2000 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain electronic weighing scales (REWS) originating, inter alia, in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2005 L 112, p. 1).

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co. Ltd and Shanghai Adeptech Precision Co. Ltd to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Shanghai Excell M&E Enterprise Co. Ltd and Shanghai Adeptech Precision Co. Ltd to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council;

| 3. | Orders the Commission to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Commission to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 257, 15.10.2005.

1

---
Exhibit 24.1

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY
                        For Executing Form 10-K for 1999

     KNOW  ALL BY THESE  PRESENTS,  that  theundersigned  director  of  Electric
Lightwave,  Inc.  constitutes  and  appoints  Robert J.  DeSantis and Kerry Rea,
jointly and  severally,  for him in any and all  capacities to sign on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year 1999 for Electric Lightwave, Inc., and any ad all amendments
to said  Form  10-K,  and to file the same,  with the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission,   hereby   ratifying   and   conforming   all  that   each  of  said
attorneys-in-fact, or his substitute or substitutes   may do or cause to be done
by virtue hereof.

Dated March 3, 2000

                                                      /s/ Guenther E. Greiner
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                          Guenther E. Greiner

                                                       /s/ Stanley Harfenist
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           Stanley Harfenist

                                                       /s/ Robert A. Stanger
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           Robert A. Stanger

                                                      /s/ Maggie Wilderotter
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                          Maggie Wilderotter

                                                       /s/ David B. Sharkey
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           David B. Sharkey

                                                         /s/ Rudy C. Graf
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                             Rudy C. Graf
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2006-7322 

MICHAEL J. POPE, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Hugh D. Cox Jr., Greenville, North Carolina, for claimant-appellant. 

Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. With him 

on the brief were Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant Director, 

and David F. D’Alessandris, Attorney. Of counsel on the brief were David J. Barrans, 

Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and Jamie L. Mueller, Attorney, United States 

Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Judge Bruce E. Kasold 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2006-7322 

MICHAEL J. POPE, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 

02-1552, Judge Bruce E. Kasold. 

 __________________________ 

DECIDED: May 1, 2009 

 __________________________ 

Before GAJARSA, DYK, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Michael J. Pope appeals a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims (Veterans Court) affirming a Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision denying his 

claims related to postoperative residuals of a ventral hernia. See Pope v. Nicholson, 

No. 02-1552, 2006 WL 1667039 (Vet. App. Apr. 25, 2006). Mr. Pope, relying on our 

decision in Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom.

Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. ---, 2009 WL 1045952 (2009), asserts that the Veterans 

Court erred by improperly assigning him the burden of proving that a notice error under 

38 U.S.C. § 5103 was prejudicial. 
2006-7322 2

Following Mr. Pope’s appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed 

our judgment in Sanders, holding that the burden of proving prejudicial error is properly 

placed on the Veteran. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 2009 WL 1045952, at *8-9. In light of 

the Supreme Court decision in Sanders, we affirm the Veterans Court. 

COSTS 

No costs.
STATE v. ARNOLD.

No. COA07-712.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed April 15, 2008.

Certification Date May 5, 2008.

Appeal from Lincoln (05CRS51043, 06CRS1144).

Cases reported without published opinion. No error.