# FILED
January 8, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE SEPTEMBER 1997 SESSION

DENNIS P. NEILAN, ) NO. 03C01-9611-CC-00411 ) Appellant ) SEVIER COUNTY ) V. ) HON. REX HENRY OGLE ) JUDGE STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) (Post- Convic

tion Rel ief) Appellee )
FOR THE APPELLANT FOR THE APPELLEE James W. Greenlee John Knox Walkup 118 Bruce Street Attorney General and Repor ter Sevierville, Tenness

ee 37862 Michael J. Fahey, II Assistant Attorney Gener al 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493 G. Scott Green Assistant District A

ttorney Al Schmutzer District Attorney General Suite 301, Sevier County Courthouse Sevierville, Tenness

ee 37862

OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO R ULE 20
William M. Barker, Judge2 Opinion The appellant, Dennis P. Neil an, appeals from the judgment of the Sev ier County Circuit Cour

t which dismissed, w

ithout hearing, his petit ion seeking postconviction relief. We affirm the trial co urt pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rul es of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal s. Following his pl eas of guilty, the appella nt was convicted on M arch 15, 1988, of the offenses of aggravated kidnappi ng, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and grand larceny. The appellant was sentenced to forty years’ incarceration for those offenses. Over eight years

later, on June 21, 1996, the appell ant filed his petition seeking post-conviction reli ef with respect to his co nviction for aggrav ated kidnapping only. The State filed a motion to dismiss ar guing that the appellant’s petition was barred by the applicable statute of limitat ion. The trial court agr eed and, accordingly, d ismissed the petition. On appeal, the appellant contends th at the trial court erred in concluding that his post-conviction petition was time-barr ed. In that respect, the appell ant relies upon this Court’s opinion in Lawrence Moore v. St ate , No. 03C01-9504-CR-00122 ( Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, February 14, 1996). In that case, a panel of our Court held that the petitioner had raised a claim under State v. Anthony , 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), and further concluded that Anthony announced a new constitutional rule which should be applied retroactively, and therefore, under Burford v. State , 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992), and Sands v. State , 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995), the petition was timely. The petitioner here contends that the facts in his case are similar to those in Moore , and the trial court err ed in concluding that the st atute of limitation barred the appellant’s petition. We disagree.3 On April 28, 1997, after the parti es had filed their briefs in our Court, the supreme court unanimously r eversed this Court’s

opinion in the Moore case. See Moore v. State , 943 S.W.2d 878 (Te nn. 1997). In overruling this

Court’s decision in Moore , the supreme court reaffirmed its decision in State v. Denton , 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996), that State v. Anthony did not announce a new constituti onal rule, and therefore, an Anthony issue does not constitute a later arising ground for relief under Burford and Sands . We are bound by the decisions of our supreme court, and accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the appellant’ s petition.

__________________________ WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUDGE CONCUR:

__________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, JUDG E

__________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JUDG E