In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CALVIN JAMES, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 04 CR 285—J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

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ARGUED JUNE 3, 2008—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 2, 2008

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Before KANNE, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. A federal jury convicted Ted

Robertson, Calvin James, and Jarvis King of conspiring

to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 50

grams or more of cocaine base. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 846. The district court subsequently sentenced Robertson and James to 360 months’ imprisonment

each, and King to life in prison. All three men challenge

their convictions on appeal, and James and King challenge

their sentences as well. We affirm.
2 Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208

I. HISTORY

In December 2004, a federal grand jury returned a onecount indictment against 29 defendants, including Robertson, James, and King, alleging that they were members of

what was more widely known as the Cherry Street Mob—a

loosely organized, long-running drug-trafficking ring

that operated in the Lisbon Square neighborhood in the

west side of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Twenty-five of Robertson’s,

James’s, and King’s named co-defendants eventually

entered into plea agreements with the government. But

Robertson, James, and King each eschewed the idea of

pleading guilty, and elected to proceed to trial. At trial, the

government presented evidence of the three men’s participation in the Mob, including the testimony of nine of their

co-conspirators—Kevin Arnett, Corey Crook, Cameron

Gilbert, Joseph Gooden, Kinyater Grant, Marlon Hood,

Percy Hood, Dale Huff, and Lanell Taylor—and recordings

of wiretapped telephone conversations between several

members of the conspiracy. That evidence, which we

recount in a light most favorable to the government, United

States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 2005), revealed

the following:

Beginning in 1988, Robertson, James, and several of

their co-conspirators began selling small amounts of

powder cocaine near Cherry Street in Milwaukee’s

Lisbon Square neighborhood—a neighborhood that, at the

time, was transforming essentially into an open-air drug

market. At first, Robertson acted as the primary source

of cocaine for the group and recruited his friend, Huff,
Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208 3

to sell drugs for him. But a few years after Robertson

enlisted Huff, Huff established himself as the primary

source of cocaine for the drug dealers operating in the

Cherry Street area.

The drug dealers decided to call themselves the Cherry

Street Mob, and worked to consolidate their efforts to

open and to maintain a series of drug houses; they also

eventually graduated from selling powder cocaine to

manufacturing and selling crack cocaine. Each of the three

defendants played an integral role in the consolidation of

the Mob’s presence in the neighborhood. James allowed

his mother’s home to be used as a drug house for Robertson, Huff, and others; worked in a series of drug houses

later established by Mob members; acted as a middleman

to broker drug deals between other members of the

Mob; and helped Mob members develop drug clientele. Moreover, James developed a close relationship with

Huff, and in 2003 Huff employed James as a bodyguard. As

part of his duties, James accompanied Huff to deals with

the Mob’s suppliers, helped Huff run several drug houses,

and traveled to Texas with Huff to obtain large quantities

of cocaine to supply the organization. 

Robertson, in turn, operated a series of drug houses

with a number of other members of the Cherry Street

Mob, including James and King. Robertson allowed

numerous members of the Mob to manufacture and to

package crack at these houses. And although Huff had

become the primary source of cocaine for the Cherry

Street area, Robertson also occasionally supplied the

drug to other members of the Mob.
4 Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208

King was brought into the fold after the Cherry Street

Mob had been operating for nearly a decade, and he

began by working in drug houses run by Robertson and

his cousins, Percy and Marlon Hood. King later operated

a drug house with Robertson, and eventually began

operating and overseeing drug houses with, among other

co-conspirators, his cousin Percy. As part of this partnership, King and Percy would pool their money to purchase

cocaine from Huff. 

The Cherry Street Mob went through several periods of

fluctuation during its 16 years of operation. Several of

the Mob’s members—including Robertson, Huff, and

King—were occasionally arrested for various crimes and

sent to jail or prison for short periods of time; the men

would then resume their roles in the conspiracy upon

their release. The group also experienced some intraorganizational discord over money, drug supplies, and

clientele. These disputes led to some drug houses disbanding, and sometimes led to violence; for instance, a

dispute led Robertson to “bust[ ] up” a drug house so

that others could not operate there, and a dust-up over

money led King to shoot Robertson in the foot with a

handgun. 

But these occasional disruptions aside, each member of

the Cherry Street Mob depended on each other to a substantial degree. For the most part, each member would

obtain his or her cocaine from Huff or Robertson, and

would refer customers to other members’ houses if his or

her supply of crack was running low. Moreover, the

members depended on one another to defend the Cherry
Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208 5

Street area against encroaching outside drug-dealers.

Robertson, James, King, and Huff, in particular, played

large roles both in protecting the Cherry Street territory

and in acting as enforcers for the Mob. In fact, Huff

hid firearms in various locations throughout the Cherry

Street area so Mob members would have easy access

to them in the event that violence erupted. Finally, the

members all worked to notify each other of the presence

of police officers in the area. King’s cousin, Marlon Wood,

best described the Mob members’ interdependency: “[W]e

all in the same conspiracy . . . we all working a big ball, like

I told you all, it seems like it’s a knot. Jarvis King, me, him,

Percy Hood . . . we did our thing. I messed with Ted

Robertson. [Percy] messed with Ted Robertson and

Calvin James. You know, Jarvis is my first cousin, so you

know, he family, so when we did something we was

doing it together.”

At the close of evidence, Robertson, James, and King

all moved for judgments of acquittal, arguing that the

evidence failed to establish that they participated in the

drug conspiracy. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The district

court denied the motions, determining that the wiretap

evidence and the testimony of the three men’s co-conspirators was “more than sufficient to demonstrate the

existence of a conspiracy.” The court then submitted the

case to the jury, which subsequently found Robertson,

James, and King guilty. Shortly thereafter, the court

sentenced Robertson and James to 360 months’ imprisonment each, and King to life.
6 Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Robertson, James, and King all argue that the

district court erred by denying their motions for judgments of acquittal because the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to support their convictions. Each man

employs a different legal theory on this point, however. Robertson asserts that, although he had his own independent drug operation on Cherry Street, there was

no proof that he participated in the wide-reaching conspiracy alleged in the indictment. According to Robertson,

the evidence at trial showed that he participated in one

of many smaller conspiracies that competed against one

another in the Cherry Street drug market, and even used

violence against one another. Thus, Robertson argues,

there was a variance between his smaller conspiracy

proven at trial and the overarching single conspiracy

alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Womack, 496

F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A conspiracy variance

claim is a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence . . . .”). James, in turn, contends that there was no

evidence showing that he knew of the conspiracy or

“provided some service” in furtherance of the conspiracy.

King similarly argues that, although he trafficked cocaine,

there was no evidence that he “knowingly adopted” the

conspiracy’s “common purpose.” 

To prevail on appeal, Robertson, James, and King must

show that the court incorrectly concluded that there was

sufficient evidence to sustain their drug-conspiracy

convictions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); see also United States

v. Bolivar, 532 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2008). Although
Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208 7

we review the district court’s decision de novo, see United

States v. Emerson, 501 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2007), the

three men face a “ ‘nearly insurmountable’ ” burden when

challenging that decision, United States v. Jackson, 177 F.3d

628, 630 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Moore,

115 F.3d 1348, 1363 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also United States

v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2007). Viewing the

evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable

to the government, we will overturn Robertson’s, James’s,

and King’s convictions only if “the record contains no

evidence, regardless of how it is weighed,” from which

the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt

that they were guilty of conspiring to traffic cocaine.

Gougis, 432 F.3d at 743-44 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Robertson’s, James’s, and King’s arguments all fail.

Robertson, in particular, cannot prevail on his contention

that there was a variance between his smaller conspiracy

proven at trial and the overarching single conspiracy

alleged in the indictment. In making his argument, Robertson ignores that, “ ‘[e]ven if the evidence arguably established the existence of multiple conspiracies,’ ” the district

court nevertheless correctly denied his motion for a

judgment of acquittal “ ‘if a reasonable trier of fact

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence

of the single conspiracy charged in the indictment.’ ”

Womack, 496 F.3d at 794 (quoting United States v. Williams,

272 F.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v.

Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1991). 

And there was ample evidence showing that the single

conspiracy charged in the indictment existed. Although
8 Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208

the jury heard evidence detailing the intra-organizational

disruptions within the Cherry Street Mob, the jury also

heard a substantial amount of evidence describing how the

Mob worked as a single unit. Specifically, the evidence

detailed the formation of the Mob and outlined how its

members depended on one another to further their drugtrafficking goals. For instance, each member (1) obtained

his or her cocaine largely from Huff or Robertson;

(2) would refer customers to other members’ drug houses

if his or her supply of crack was low; (3) depended on one

another to defend the Cherry Street area against encroaching outside drug-dealers; and (4) would warn each other

of police presence in the area. As Marlon Wood testified,

the members were “all in the same conspiracy.” The jury

also heard evidence detailing Robertson’s participation

in that conspiracy. In fact, the evidence described

(1) Robertson’s role in the Mob’s formation; (2) how he was

the Mob’s initial source of cocaine, and later its occasional

source of the drug; (3) how he set up, worked in, and

oversaw drug houses in the Cherry Street area; and (4) how

he provided security from outside drug dealers and

police. And because the evidence clearly established that

Robertson acted to further the Mob’s collective drugtrafficking operations, his challenge to the evidence

establishing the single conspiracy is meritless. See Womack,

496 F.3d at 795 (“The government was not required to

show that [the defendant] conspired with all of the previously indicted co-conspirators . . . . The government

needed only to prove that [the defendant] joined the

agreement alleged.”); Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1390 (“[I]f the

evidence indicates that a defendant must have known that
Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208 9

his actions were benefitting a larger conspiracy, he may be

said to have agreed to join that conspiracy.”).

Equally meritless are James’s and King’s arguments that

the government introduced no evidence showing that they

knew of, or participated in, the conspiracy. To prove that

James and King were members of the conspiracy, the

government needed to show that the two men “embraced

the criminal objective of the conspiracy, that the conspiracy

continued towards its common goal, and that there were

co-operative relationships.” United States v. Gilmer, Nos.

06-3201 & 06-3250, slip op. at 9 (7th Cir. July 18, 2008); see

also United States v. Messino, 382 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir.

2004). And while examining James’s and King’s participation in the conspiracy, the critical inquiry “ ‘is whether the

factfinder [could have] reasonably conclude[d] from the

proof that [James and King] likely had some appreciable

ability to guide the destiny of the [cocaine].’ ” United States

v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United

States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); see also

Gilmer, slip op. at 9. 

The government introduced ample evidence of James’s

and King’s participation in the drug conspiracy. Contrary

to James’s assertions, the government sufficiently established that he both knew of the conspiracy and played a

role in it. The evidence introduced at trial showed that

James (1) played a central role in establishing the Cherry

Street Mob; (2) helped set up drug houses over the years

(including one in his mother’s home); (3) protected the

Mob’s territory through violence; and (4) acted as a bodyguard and enforcer for Huff—the Mob’s main supplier
10 Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208

of cocaine. And although James’s role in the conspiracy

was not as central as, say, Huff’s or Robertson’s role, that

fact does not diminish the government’s evidence

showing that James played a role in establishing and

furthering the Mob’s drug-trafficking efforts. See Gilmer,

slip op. at 9 (“ ‘[O]ne need not be at the heart of the conspiracy to be part of its web.’ ” (quoting United States v.

Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2003))); United States v.

Miller, 159 F.3d 1106, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A defendant

need not know all of the co-conspirators or know the full

extent of the conspiracy to be convicted.”). The government likewise established that King (1) worked in drug

houses run by Robertson; (2) later operated a drug house

with Robertson; (3) eventually began operating and

overseeing drug houses with, among other co-conspirators,

his cousin Percy Hood; and (4) obtained his cocaine supply

primarily from Huff. King also warned his co-conspirators

about police presence and worked to protect the Mob’s

territory from outside drug dealers. Based on the overwhelming evidence of James’s and King’s roles in the

Mob’s drug enterprise, the jury could have easily concluded that both men embraced the conspiracy’s objectives, worked to continue the conspiracy, and cooperated

with each other to further the conspiracy, see Gilmer, slip

op. at 9; Messino, 382 F.3d at 709, and could have just as

easily found that the two men “ ‘had some appreciable

ability to guide the destiny’ ” of the cocaine in which

they trafficked, Starks, 309 F.3d at 1024 (quoting Staten,

581 F.2d at 883). James’s and King’s challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence thus fail. 
Nos. 07-1328, 07-1810 & 07-2208 11

In addition to their meritless arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence, James and King present a number

of additional arguments attacking their convictions

on other grounds and challenging their respective sentences. But each of these arguments has been foreclosed

by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, has

already been rejected by us, or simply is frivolous. James’s

and King’s additional arguments thus do not warrant

further discussion. See United States v. Murray, 474 F.3d 938,

939 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 616

(7th Cir. 2005); see also Hall v. Bates, 508 F.3d 854, 858 (7th

Cir. 2007).

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM James’s, Robertson’s, and King’s convictions,

as well as James’s and King’s respective sentences.

9-2-08