alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1669.

#### SCOTT *v.*THE STATE.

An ordinary final hill of exceptions in a ease, civil or criminal, should be presented to the judge who presided in the cause, and certified by him, except in case of his dying subsequently to the ruling complained of and before the statutory period for certifying has expired. Where, just before the expiration of the term of office of a judge of the superior court, he overrules a motion for a new trial, the bill of exceptions complaining of this ruling should be tendered to him and signed and certified by him; and his successor in office has no power to sign and certify it.

Submitted February 24,

Decided March 16, 1909.

*E. S. Longley,*for plaintiff in error.

*W. E. Wooten, solicitor-general,*contra.

Powell, J.

Scott was convicted of an offense, in Decatur superior court, and on December 28, 1908, Judge Spence, then judge of the superior court of the Albany circuit, overruled a motion for a new trial in the case. On December 31 Judge Spence’s term of office expired, and he was succeeded by Hon. Frank Park. The defendant tendered to Judge Park a bill of exceptions, complaining of the judgment of Judge Spence in overruling the motion for a new trial, and Judge Park signed and certified the bill of exceptions.

We -are without jurisdiction of the 'writ of error. The Civil Code, §5539, provides that a bill of exceptions shall be tendered "to the judge who presided in the cause.” There is no statutory provision whereby any other judge may verify the bill of exceptions. Section 5542 provides that "if the judge trying the case resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold the office as judge, when the bill of exceptions is tendered, he may nevertheless sign end *813certify.” We are holding in the case of *Wright*v. *State,*post (63 S. E. 936), that this -applies to criminal as well as to civil cases. If the judge whose final ruling is complained of could not verify the bill of exceptions after his term of office had expired, there would be no one who could do so, and the defendant who failed to get his bill of exceptions signed before the judge’s term expired would-be remediless; for the legislature has made no provision whereby the successor to the judgeship may verify the bill of exceptions complaining of rulings made by his' predecessor. The inexpediency of allowing such procedure was demonstrated clearly when, during the present session of this court, we were presented with a ease in which the defendant’s counsel had succeeded to the judgeship of the court in which the case was tried, and he himself had signeii the statutory certificate to the bill of exceptions complaining of rulings made by his predecessor in office before whom he, as counsel, had tried the case. The cases of *Grace*v. *Gordon,*113 *Ga.*88 (38 S. E. 404), and *Brand*v. *Lawrenceville,*127 *Ga.*237 (55 S. E. 967), are authority for the proposition that in the special case of interlocutory fast writs, the ex-judge can not certify, but not for the proposition that his successor in office may do so. Let the writ of error be

*Dismissed.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
    This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheets as of September 30, 1997 (Unaudited) and the
Consolidated Statements of Income for the Three Months Ended September 30, 1997
(Unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           9,902
<SECURITIES>                                    18,614
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,614
<ALLOWANCES>                                       674
<INVENTORY>                                      4,530
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                43,446
<PP&E>                                           5,807
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,780
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  51,494
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,771
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                            57
<OTHER-SE>                                      43,666
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    51,494
<SALES>                                         14,781
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                14,781
<CGS>                                            5,475
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,475
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,277
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,294
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,185
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,109
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
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<NET-INCOME>                                     2,109
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .33
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</TABLE>
Amy Brandmeier BOBBER, Plaintiff, v. Ryan P. BOBBER, Defendant.

No. COA15-61.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 17, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
# C_2009205EN.01003102.xml

| 29.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 205/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 205/31

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 10 July 2009 — Italy v Commission

(Case T-373/05) (1)

1

(EAGGF - Guarantee Section - Expenditure excluded from Community financing - Raw tobacco - Obligation to state reasons - Article 7(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999)

2009/C 205/55

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Aiello, avvocato dello Stato)

Applicant:

Defendant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by C. Cattabriga and L. Visaggio, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment in part of Commission Decision 2005/579/EC of 20 July 2005 excluding from Community financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) (OJ 2005 L 199, p. 84), in so far as it excludes certain expenditure incurred by the Italian Republic in the sector of raw tobacco.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Italian Republic to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 296, 26.11.2005.

1

---
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 32(2)

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I, John F. Corcoran, Chief Financial Officer of CNA Surety Corporation (the
"Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:

          (1) the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the quarterly
     period ended December 31, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the
     requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
     1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

          (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

                                                 /s/ JOHN F. CORCORAN
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          JOHN F. CORCORAN
                                          SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
                                          FINANCIAL OFFICER
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-16-0000014

09-JAN-2018

08:22 AM
IN RE C.B.G.

No. COA08-668.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed December 2, 2008.

Certification Date December 22, 2008.

Appeal from Mecklenburg (07JB962).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
STATE v. Andrew Clayton LEDBETTER.

No. 426P15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 13, 2016.

David M. Black, Lincolnton, for Ledbetter, Andrew Clayton.

Richard A. Graham, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

E. Burke Haywood, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Mike Miller, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 28th of January 2016 by State of NC to Deem Response Timely Filed:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 13th of April 2016."
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

DEC 20 2002

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LEE DAVID HUMPHREY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

VANCE EVERETT, Warden of

the Wyoming State Penitentiary;

WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL;

MARK MCKINNA, Warden of

Crowley County Correctional Facility,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-8030

(D.C. No. 99-CV-119-J)

(D. Wyo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ ,

Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
-2-

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Pro se appellant Lee David Humphrey was convicted of two counts of

second-degree sexual assault of his daughter, and his conviction was affirmed by

the Wyoming Supreme Court. See Humphrey v. State , 962 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1998). 

He petitioned the district court for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and was

denied relief. He now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) from this court.

Mr. Humphrey petitioned the federal district court for habeas relief on the

following grounds:

(1) erroneous admission of prior bad act evidence;

(2) erroneous admission of expert testimony;

(3) erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony by William D.

Hansen;

(4) erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony by Marilyn Davis

Newman;

(5) erroneous admission of prejudicial hearsay testimony;

(6) erroneous admission of prior consistent out-of-court statements;

and

(7) denial of a fair trial through ineffective assistance of counsel.
1 Mr. Humphrey makes passing reference to Brady violations by the district

court, but there is no argument or authority in support of this contention.

-3-

In his application for COA, Mr. Humphrey appears to confine himself to

the issue of whether the federal district court violated his due process rights in

delaying decision of his habeas petition. 1

We grant COA only where there is a substantial showing of denial of

a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In other words, the petitioner must

demonstrate that jurists of reason could debate whether the petition should have

been resolved in a different manner. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Having reviewed the arguments and materials submitted by Mr. Humphrey

and the district court’s decision, we conclude that Mr. Humphrey has failed

to meet this standard. Accordingly, the application for COA is DENIED and the

appeal is DISMISSED for substantially the reasons stated by the district court. 

Mr. Humphrey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby

Senior Circuit Judge
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<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-01-1999
<CASH>                                           2,762
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  179,103
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               236,228
<PP&E>                                         234,980
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,886
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 490,015
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          858,625
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       178,734
<OTHER-SE>                                    (547,344)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   490,015
<SALES>                                        320,832
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               320,832
<CGS>                                          202,149
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,915,545
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,399
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,783,875)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,783,875)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,783,875)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.10)


</TABLE>
STATE of North Carolina v. Robert BISHOP.

No. 223PA15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Bishop, Robert.

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Patrick Nadolski, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Defendant on the 1st of July 2015 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, and the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question filed by the State of NC, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the motion to dismiss the appeal is

> "Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 1st of July 2015 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 1st of July 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision *844of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

Upon consideration of the petition in the alternative filed by Defendant on the 1st of July 2015 in this matter for a writ of certiorari (As-Applied Challenge), the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 15(g)(2).
STATE of North Carolina v. Otha Ray BAREFOOT.

No. COA15-218.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 3, 2015.

**CASE REPORTED WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

No Error.
STATE of North Carolina v. Deberaux MOTLEY.

No. COA 15-452.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 17, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Remanded for Resentencing.
CITIBANK, N.A. v. Henry M. MICHAUX, Jr. aka Henry M. Michaux aka H.M. Michaux, Jr. aka H.M. Michaux aka H.M. Mickey Michaux, Jr. aka H.M. Mickey Michaux aka Henry McKinley Michaux, Jr. aka Henry McKinley Michaux.

No. 161P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

Eric C. Michaux, Durham, for Michaux, H.M. Mickey (aka).

Harrison A. Lord, Charlotte, for Citibank, N.A.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 12th of May 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
# C_2023216EN.01005101.xml

| 19.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 216/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 216/51

---

Action brought on 21 April 2023 — Yadex International v EUIPO — Armada Gida (doyum)

(Case T-209/23)

(2023/C 216/67)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Yadex International GmbH (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) (represented by: P. Kohl, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Armada Gida Ticaret Sanayi AŞ (Akdeniz, Türkiye)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative trade mark doyum — Application for registration No 18 249 375

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 February 2023 in Case R 1436/2022-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and reject the European Union trade mark application No 18 249 375 in its entirety; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and reject the European Union trade mark application No 18 249 375 in its entirety;

| — | order EUIPO to bear the costs incurred by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to bear the costs incurred by the applicant.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
STATE of North Carolina v. Michelle Lynn BAILEY.

No. 166P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Bailey, Michelle Lynn.

Victoria Voight, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Ronald L. Moore, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 18th of May 2015 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

JACKSON, J., recused.

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 18th of May 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

JACKSON, J., recused.
STATE of North Carolina v. Artie Stevenson SMITH, Jr.

No. 253P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Noell P. Tin, Charlotte, for Smith, Artie Stevenson (Jr.).

Charles G. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Rick Shaffer, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 21st of July 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of September 2015."
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7387

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee,

versus

CHARLES PAUL JOHNSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CA-96-477-6, CR-88-266)

Submitted: January 9, 1997 Decided: January 23, 1997

Before HALL and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Paul Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Rebecca A. Betts, United

States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying his

motion under former FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). We have reviewed the

record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Johnson v.

United States, Nos. CA-96-477-6; CR-88-266 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 16,

1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED