Interim Decision #1650 

Mama or CE0131NARD 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-12483469 O 

Decided by Board (Moller 10, 1966 

Itespondent'a conviction of me offense or "illegal use ex a credit ears," as cleaned by section 28.416(1), Miehigiui Statutes Annotated, is conviction of a 

crime involving moral turpitude since an intent to defraud may be implied 

notwithstanding the statute makes no specific reference to such intent. 

Cnesos: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) [8 US.C. i251(a)(4)1—.After entry convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 

misconduct, to wit: simple larceny (Michigan), and 

illegal use of a credit card (Michigan). 

An order entered by the special inquiry officer on April 8, 1966 

directs the respondent's deportation to Canada on the charge , that 

after entry he has been convicted of two crimes involving moral 

turpitude not arising out of a, single scheme of misconduct, to wit: 

simple larceny (Michigan) and illegal use of a credit card (Michigan) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4)). The special inquiry officer certified 

his decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals for review and 

final decision on the issue of whether as a matter of law a conviction 

for -violation of section 28.416(1) of the Michigan Stautes Annotated 

involves moral turpitude. 

The respondent is an unmarried male alien, 20 years of age, who 

entered the United States for permanent residence on August 13, 

1963. He was convicted in-the Municipal Court at Allen Park 

Michigan for the offense of simple larceny on April 26, 1965. It 

is well established that this offense involves moral turpitude. 

(Matter of P—, 4 I. & N. Dec. 252, Act. A.G., March 2, 1951.) 

The respondent was convicted on a plea of guilty in the Recorder's 

Court in Detroit, Michigan on February 23, 1965 of the offense or 

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Interim Decision 4t1650 

"illegal use of a credit card" which is defined by section 28.416(1) 

of the Michigan Statutes Annotated as follows: 

Obtaining credit by false device See. 219a. Any person who knowingly 

obtains or attempts to obtain credit, or purchases or attempts to purchase 

any goods, property or service, by the use of any false, fictitious or counterfeit credit card, credit number, telephone number or other credit device, 

or by the use of any credit card, credit number, telephone number or other 

credit device of another without the authority of the person to whom such 

card, number or device was issued, or -by the use of any credit card, credit 

number, telephone number or other credit device in any case where such 

cards, number or device has been revoked and notice or revocation, as 

provided in seetioa 2101,, has been given to the person to whom issued. is 

guilty of a misdemeanor. (CL '48, § 750219a.) 

According to the complaint which is set forth in Appendix A of 

this opinion, the offense committed by the respondent is covered by 

that portion of the statute -which reads: "Any person who knowingly obtains or attempts to obtain credit . . . by the use of any 

credit card, credit number, _telephone number or other credit device 

of another without the authority of the person to whom such card, 

number of device was issued, is guilty of a misdemeanor." The question before us is whether under the Michigan Statutes the crime 

charged in the complaint requires the proof of a criminal intent to 

defraud. • 

The special inquiry officer answers this question in the affirmative. 

He relies on our debision in Matter of M—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 743 (June 

26, 1902),,whereip. we „held. that the drawing- and delivering of a 

worthless check in idohition Of 'a statute of the Virgin Islands is a 

crime. involving moral turpitude notwithstanding the fact that the 

statute did not state on its face that it required the proof of an intent to defraud. We reasoned that- a,' criminal intent to defraud is 

an implied and necessary slenient of a statute which punishes one 

who, at the time aissuing a worthless. check, knows "that the maker 

ar drawer has. insufficient funds On deposit to cover the check" We 

said that the issuing-of a check under -such circumstances-necessarily 

involves an intention to defraud. • 

We are confronted with--a :similar statute in the case before us. 

The respondent'knowingly purchased twb automobile tires -valued at 

$68.50 "by the Ase of a' false; fictitious or counterfeit credit card . . . 

to wit: -"a credit card Of another . without the authority of the 

said person ..." • The respondent testified that he was not acquainted 

with the owner of the credit card; that the credit card was given to 

him by a friend; that he obtained about $115 worth of merchandise 

with the card; that he signed the male' of the credit card owner 

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wnen he received the merchandise and that he made no attempt to 

return the credit card to the person whOse name appeared thereon. 

We note that section 28.416(1) 'of the Michigan. Statutes Annotated (supra) does not contain the phrase "with intent to defraud." 

However, an intent to defraud may be implied despite the fact that 

a statute makes no specific reference to . suchan_intent._ 'This is especially true where scienter is an element of the offense as defined by 

the statute. Cf. Ramirez v. United States, 818 F2d 155 (C.A. 9, 

May 1963); Golden v. United. States, 318 FM 357 (CA, 1, 1963) ; 

Matter of Batten,•Int. Dec. No. 1494 (B.I.A., August 17, 1965). 

Crimes in which fraud is an' element have always been. regarded 

as involving moral turpitude Vordon v. -be George, 341 U.S. 223 

(1951). Furthermore, the•.phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" 

has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduet. Unit©d States ex 141. Popoff v. Reintey 79 F.2d 513 (al. '25 

1985) ; Seaboard Oil Company v. Cunningham, 51 F.2d 321 (CA. 5, 

1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 657. It is clear from the evidence before 

us that the respondent fully intended to permanently deprive the 

owner of the service station of the value of the automobile tires he . 

purchased by fraudulently using the credit card which he knew full 

well belonged to someone else. It is our considered opinion that in 

this particular instance the crime for which the respondent was convicted in the Recorder's Court at Detroit, Michigan on February 23, 

1963, to wit, illegal use of a credit card, does involve moral turpitude. 

The respondent has applied for the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. The special inquiry officer finds the respondent ineligible for relief since he has been found deportable as 

one who has been convicted of two offenses involving moral turpitude. The respondent is precluded from a finding of good moral 

character under section 101(f) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for the reason that he has been convicted of two crimes 

involving moral turpitude within the past five years. We affirm the 

finding of the special inquiry officer that the respondent is ineligible 

for the privilege of voluntary departure. An appropriate order 

will be entered. 

ORDER: The decision and order of the special inquiry officer 

dated April 8, 1966 directing the alien's deportation to Canada on 

the charge stated in the order to show cause is hereby affirmed. 

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Interim Decision #1650 

APPENDIX A 

The complaint and examination of the service station owner from 

whom the tires were purchased reads as follows: 

The complaint and examination of Mirl Siebert taken and made before the 

undersigned, a Judge of the Recorder's Court, of the 

City of Detroit, in said County, upon the 28rd day of February, A.D. 1985, 

who being duly sworn, says that heretofore, to wit, on the 20th day of 

February 1985 at the City of Detroit and in the County aforesaid HOLLAND 

JOSEPH CHOIIINARD, late of the City of Detroit, County and State aforesaid, did then and there knowingly purchase goods, property or service, 

to wit: two tires the value of S88.80 from Standard Oil Division of American 

Oil Co., a foreign corporation, by the use or a raise, neutrons or counterreit 

credit card, credit number, telephone number or other credit devices, to wit: 

a credit card of another, to wit: John McCracken, without the authority 

of the said person, to wit: John McCracken, to whom such card, number or 

other credit device was Leaned. 

842