ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Supreme Court

People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920

Caption in Supreme

Court:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MARINA

KLADIS, Appellee.

 

Docket No. 110920

Filed December 30, 2011

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

A squad-car video recording of a misdemeanor DUI arrest was

discoverable, and there was no abuse of discretion in sanctioning its

destruction, subsequent to a timely request to produce, by barring the

arresting officer’s testimony as to what was on the tape.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court

on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. William H.

Wise, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed; cause remanded.
Counsel on

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez,

State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins and John

E. Nowak, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Edward M. Maloney, of Ahern, Maloney, Moran & Block, of Skokie,

Louis A. Berns, of Favil David Berns & Associates, LLC, of Northlake,

Robert B. Marcus and Michael Maksimovich, of Lyons, and Katie M.

Anderson, of Chicago (Ralph Ruebner, of Chicago, of counsel), and

Danielle L. Berns and Nikki G. Ashmore, law students, for appellee.

Justices JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Burke,

and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, MarinaKladis,was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI)

(625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006)). She requested that the State produce the video

recording of the stop made by the camera located in the arresting officer’s vehicle. After the

State destroyed the recording, the circuit court of Cook County granted defendant’s motion

for sanctions and barred theState from introducing testimonyconcerningwhat was contained

on the videotape. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and a notice of

appeal. The appellate court affirmed. 403 Ill. App. 3d 99. We granted the State’s petition for

leave to appeal and now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On May 3, 2008, defendant was arrested for DUI by Northlake police officer Phillip

Gaske. On May 8, 2008–five days after her arrest and 25 days prior to the first court date on

June 3, 2008–defendant filed and hand delivered to the State’s Attorney’s office a petition

to rescind her statutory summary license suspension. Defendant also filed and delivered on

the same date a document captioned “Notice to Produce at Summary Suspension Hearing.”

The notice was premised upon our Rule 237 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 237 (eff. July 1, 2005)) and

requested that at the first court date the State produce the arresting officer along with copies

of various reports and “any and all video tapes of defendant” while she was in custody.

¶ 4 On June 3, 2008, at approximately 1:30 p.m., the parties appeared in court for the first

-2-
time. Because the State had not yet produced the materials defendant had previously 1

requested, defense counsel made an oral motion for discovery, pursuant to People v. Schmidt,

56 Ill. 2d 572 (1974), which included the videotape. Because the State claimed that it did not

know whether such a tape existed, Officer Gaske–who was present for the hearing–was

questioned. Gaske confirmed that his squad car had a camera mounted to the windshield

which had recorded his encounter with defendant.

¶ 5 The State thereafter agreed to produce all the requested materials–including the

videotape–to defense counsel. Laterin the day on June 3, the State mailed written discovery 2

to counsel and a request for the video recording to the Northlake police department. By

agreement, the hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension

of her driver’s license was entered and continued to June 17, 2008.

¶ 6 When the parties returned to court on that date, the State tendered to defense counsel a

two-page business record from the Northlake police department. This document stated that

pursuant to departmental policy, video recordings are automatically purged within 30 days

of arrest, and that the tape requested by defendant had been erased at 4:24 a.m. on June 3,

2008, just hours before the parties first appeared in court. Because the requested evidence

had been destroyed, and in view of the fact that, but for its absence, defendant would have

been ready to proceed on her petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension, the court

granted her leave to file a written motion for sanctions against the State. The court scheduled

3

a hearing on the sanctions motion for June 26, 2008, and further ordered that the hearing on

the petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension would proceed immediately after

the court ruled on the motion for sanctions.

¶ 7 Upon their return to court on June 26, the parties discovered that the judge handling this

case had been transferred, and they appeared before a different judge who was unfamiliar

with what had previously transpired. The parties stipulated to the facts in the case up to that

point, and then engaged in brief argument on defendant’s sanctions motion.

¶ 8 The court found that the “Notice to Produce” which accompanied defendant’s petition

to rescind her statutory summary suspension placed the State on clear notice that she wished

to have a copy of the video recording at the first court date–a fact which the State did not

No transcripts existfor the June 3, 2008, court date or forthe proceedings subsequently held

1

on June 17, 2008. However, during a court hearing on June 26, 2008, the parties stipulated as to what

transpired on those earlier dates.

We note that at no time did the State dispute that it received defendant's Rule 237 request

2

for production of the video recording, nor did the State object to defendant’s oral Schmidt motion

to preserve and produce the same recording referenced in her earlier request for production. The

record, therefore, unquestionably establishesthat the State was fully on notice regarding defendant's

repeated requests to obtain the recording, a factsupported by its ready agreement during this hearing

to produce it.

This motion, which was premised on our Rule 219 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 219 (eff. July 1, 2002)),

3

was filed on June 20, 2008.

-3-
dispute. The State, however, did nothing in response. The court observed that the State

“could have called the police department and got the tape prior to the time that it ran out” or

it “could have filed an answer *** stating it’s not our obligation [to produce the tape] yet

because we don’t deem this to be a discovery motion *** [because it includes] things

requested in here that we don’t have to supply to you.”

¶ 9 Noting that this was “the third case I have had like this in three weeks” where a defendant

asked the State to preserve a video recording and it was destroyed, the court found the

recording of defendant’s traffic stop to be “an important piece of evidence” and held that

imposition of a sanction against the State for its destruction was proper. The court

determined that it would bar the State from introducing testimony relating to what was

contained on the tape. However, because no one had seen the recording, defendant called

Officer Gaske to establish its contents and thereby clarify the scope of the court’s ruling.

¶ 10 Gaske testified that the in-car video system begins recording five seconds prior to the

activation of the emergency lights. At that time, the microphone he wears is also activated.4

According to Gaske, the tape would have captured the following: images of defendant’s car

five seconds prior to the stop; the manner in which defendant pulled over and curbed her

vehicle; defendant’s actions when he approached her vehicle; the mannerin which defendant

opened her car door and exited her vehicle; and defendant’s performance of the field sobriety

tests. Gaske stated that he turned off the emergency lights prior to transporting defendant to

the station, and it was then that the recording ended.

¶ 11 The court then clarified its sanction ruling, holding that “[t]he video may not be used for

any purpose from five seconds prior to the lights going on at the time that the defendant was

stopped getting out of the car until she was taken away via the arrest.” The court specified,

however, that any driving or actions of defendant prior to this were admissible, as were any

of her actions after she was placed under arrest.

¶ 12 The court then proceeded to conduct the hearing on defendant’s petition for recision of

the statutory summary suspension of her driver’s license. Although defendant answered

ready, the State requested leave to immediately file a notice of appeal of the sanctions ruling.

However, because the State did not ask the court to certify an interlocutory appeal on the

sanctions issue and because therewas no final judgment in the statutory summary suspension

matter at that time, the State’s request was denied.

¶ 13 The hearing on defendant’s petition proceeded. Based upon the evidence presented, the

court held that Officer Gaske had no probable cause to stop, detain and arrest defendant.

Accordingly, defendant’s petition to rescind the statutorysummarysuspension of her driver’s

license was granted.

¶ 14 Defense counsel then made an oral motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence in

After defendant’s arrest, Gaske realized that the microphone was not on, and believed that

4

the recording of that encounter would not have had audio.

-4-
defendant’s criminal DUI case. The court instructed counsel to file a written pleading and 5

the parties set a return date by agreement. The State then renewed its request for leave to file

an appeal, which was granted. The State thereafter filed an appeal of the sanctions ruling in

the statutory summary suspension case. However, it later voluntarily dismissed that action.

Accordingly, that ruling is not at issue here.

¶ 15 The parties returned on September 2, 2008. The court inquired of the State whether it

wished to “relitigate the sanctions for purposes of trial.” The State responded that “[t]here

is going to be a lot of the same testimony, and we were here, basically, for arguments and for

ruling [on] the criminal case at hand.” The court then granted defendant’s motion for

sanctions in the DUI case, stating that its ruling would be “exactly the same” as on June 26.

The court held that “the video may not be used, or any testimony regarding what is on the

video pertaining to just before the officer stopped the defendant and the time that the

defendant was placed in the squad car, which would mean anything that happened on the

street prior to her being placed in the squad car.” As it had in the summary suspension

matter, the court again clarified that any relevant evidence of defendant’s conduct which

occurred before and after the recording would be admissible.

¶ 16 After the court had ruled, the State maintained that the court’s decision on the sanctions

motion substantially impaired its ability to prosecute defendant. Based upon the court’s

understanding of the State’s position, it granted the State leave to file a certificate of

substantial impairment and a notice of appeal of the sanction order.

¶ 17 The appellate court upheld the sanctions imposed by the trial court in the DUI case. 403

Ill. App. 3d 99. Applying Schmidt, the court held that the video recording was discoverable,

and that the State was placed on notice that it should not be destroyed. Nevertheless, the

State took no action in response to defendant’s discovery request, which set the stage for the

deletion of the recording. The appellate court further determined that the sanction imposed

by the trial court was proportionate to the State’s discovery violation and that there was no

abuse of discretion.

¶ 18 We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)).

¶ 19 ANALYSIS

¶ 20 The State does not dispute that it was placed on notice by defendant to produce the

recording of her stop and arrest in the civil statutory summary suspension proceedings. The

State also does not contest that its inaction resulted in the destruction of this recording, and,

in fact, concedes that the sanction was proper in that matter.

¶ 21 The State does contend, however, that its conduct has no import with respect to

defendant’s criminal DUI case. Asserting that discovery in misdemeanor actions is strictly

limited by our decision in People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572 (1974), and noting that video

recordings are not included within Schmidt’s list of discoverable items, the State maintains

Defendant filed her “Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized” on 5

July 10, 2008.

-5-
that it had no obligation to produce the recording. The State therefore concludes that its

failure to preserve the recording was not sanctionable in the DUI case and the trial court

abused its discretion by doing so. We disagree.

¶ 22 A. Discovery Violation

¶ 23 The State contends that because the trial court had no discretion to order discovery in a

misdemeanor case beyond the limited areas set forth in People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572

(1974), it therefore erred in imposing sanctions against the State. A trial court’s decision to

impose sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Ramsey, 239

Ill. 2d 342, 429 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “fanciful,

arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.”

People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (2004).

¶ 24 We must first determine whether the State’s failure to produce and preserve the video

recording of the stop and arrest in defendant’s misdemeanor DUI case constitutes a discovery

violation. This court addressed the scope of discovery required in a misdemeanor case nearly

40 years ago in People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572 (1974). There, the defendant was charged

with a misdemeanor DUI. She sought pretrial discovery of various reports, including a

“Driving While Intoxicated Arrest Report,” which the State refused to produce. Id. at 573.

¶ 25 In holding that the requested report should have been tendered to the defendant, we

observed that it was only one of a number of items a misdemeanor defendant may discover:

“The State is required to furnish defendants in misdemeanor cases with a list of

witnesses (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 114-9), any confession of the defendant

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 114-10), evidence negating the defendant’s guilt

(Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194), and, in this

particular case, the results of the breathalyzer test (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 951⁄2, par.

11-501(g)). Additionally, the report which the defendant seeks will be available at

trial for use in impeachment of the prosecution witness who prepared it. (People v.

Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528.)” Id. at 575.

This ruling was based on “the discovery provided [for] by case law and statute” at that time,

and distinguished its limited scope from the broader discovery available for felony cases

under our Rule 411. Id. at 574-75. Our decision to limit discovery in misdemeanor matters

was based on “our awareness of the very substantial volume of less serious cases and the

impact upon their expeditious disposition” if broader discovery were required. Id. We

concluded that there was “no reason to depart from th[e] view” that the scope of discoverable

items noted in that opinion was “adequate for the lesser offenses” at the time of that ruling.

Id. at 575.

¶ 26 The State misapprehends our decision in Schmidt and interprets it in a far too narrow

manner. Schmidt determined the scope of discovery in misdemeanor cases by considering

relevant decisions, statutes, and custom and practice as it existed in 1974. From this survey,

the Schmidt court drew together a number of items which share important evidentiary value

and are relevant to those charged with offenses in crafting a defense. Indeed, our case law

with respect to discovery at that time was clear. We previously held that pretrial discovery

-6-
“presupposes a range of relevance and materialitywhich includes not onlywhat is admissible

at the trial, but also that which leads to what is admissible.” Krupp v. Chicago Transit

Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 41 (1956). The State overlooks the nature and relevancy of these

discovery items, instead focusing on the incorrect concept that Schmidt set forth a rigid list

which it believes should remain static and not take into account the fundamental changes

which have occurred in law and society since that ruling.

¶ 27 Relevancy is “determined by reference to the issues, for generally, something is relevant

if it tends to prove or disprove something in issue.” Bauter v. Reding, 68 Ill. App. 3d 171,

175 (1979). In the nearly four decades since we decided Schmidt, video recordings made by

in-squad car cameras in misdemeanor DUI cases have become as relevant to the issue of

proving or disproving guilt as the materials specifically mentioned in Schmidt. As such,

allowing their discovery furthers the objectives of pretrial discovery to “enhance the truthseeking process, to enable attorneys to better prepare for trial, to eliminate surprise and to

promote an expeditious and final determination of controversies in accordance with the

substantive rights of the parties.” D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 561 (1997).

¶ 28 Since the time of Schmidt, the use of video recordings as evidence at trial has become a

common practice to allow a defendant the opportunity to present an effective defense and to

further the truth-seeking process. We recently reaffirmed the general admissibility of such

evidence (People v. Taylor, 2011 IL 110067), and courts across the country are increasingly

relying on video recordings to present an objective view of the facts in a case. See, e.g., Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (relying on a squad car video recording, Supreme Court

reversed lower court’s denial of summary judgment on claim against the officer for the use

of excessive force; Court found that a videotape capturing the events in question clearly

contradicted the version of the story told by the driver and adopted by the court of appeals,

and stated that the court of appeals should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the

videotape); United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2011) (reversing the district

court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the officer’s testimony

at the suppression hearing was clearly contradicted by his contemporaneous statements

captured on the squad-car video recording).

¶ 29 In sum, we conclude that the routine video recording of traffic stops has now become an

integral part of those encounters, objectively documenting what takes place by capturing the

conduct and the words of both parties. We therefore hold that this important and relevant

evidence falls within the scope of materials held to be discoverable under Schmidt. We

therefore clarify that under Schmidt, these video recordings are discoverable in misdemeanor

DUI cases.

¶ 30 This conclusion is supported by several recent legislative enactments regarding

recordings of traffic stops made by law enforcement officers. Although the passage of these

laws occurred subsequent to defendant’s arrest in this case, the great importance placed by

the General Assembly upon the production and preservation of video recordings made by

squad car cameras during law enforcement actions confirms our recognition of their

significant evidentiary value and relevance.

¶ 31 In late 2008 our legislature mandated that Illinois State Police squad cars be equipped

-7-
with recording equipment. 20 ILCS 2610/30(b) (West 2008) (Pub. Act 95-1009 (eff. Dec.

15, 2008)). The law specified that both video and audio must be captured (id.) and required

that these recordings be maintained for a storage period of at least 90 days before being

destroyed. 20 ILCS 2610/30(f) (West 2008).

¶ 32 The following year, the General Assembly clarified and broadened the production and

preservation safeguards for police recordings. It established the general rule that when any

law enforcement agency makes an in-squad video and audio recording in connection with

either law enforcement or investigative duties, that recording shall be retained for a minimum

period of 90 days. 720 ILCS 5/14-3(h-15) (West 2010) (Pub. Act 96-670 (eff. Aug. 25,

2009)). Significantly, the legislature has also mandated an extended period of storage for

certain recordings. Where “the recordings *** are made as a part of an arrest or *** are

deemed evidence in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding” they cannot be

destroyed except “upon a final disposition and an order from the court.” Id. We note that this

heightened protection is triggered either where, as here, an arrest occurred or where the

recording is considered to be evidence in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding.

Significantly, the General Assembly placed no restriction on this latter factor, encompassing

all proceedings.

¶ 33 The transcript of the debates of the 2009 enactment reveals that the General Assembly

intended that the routine recording of traffic stops by squad car cameras would be of benefit

to both citizens and law enforcement agencies by providing an objective record of what

occurred during the encounter. This is illustrated by remarks made by the sponsor of this

provision, who explained that “[i]t’s a tool for law enforcement, but I also believe it is a tool

for the citizens, too, because then there is actual proof of what was said or what was done.

So I think it’s a protection for both.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 2,

2009, at 84-85 (statements of Representative Dugan).

¶ 34 These enactments express the clear legislative intent that the purpose of recording traffic

stops and preserving these recordings for later production is to assist in the truth-seeking

process by providing objective evidence of what occurred between the law enforcement

officer and the citizen. As noted in the legislative history, the General Assembly enacted

these laws with the view that these recordings could be useful to both the State and the

defendant. If the recording reflects the defendant committing an offense, the State could use

it to cement his or her guilt. The reverse is also true: if the recording does not clearly reflect

commission of a crime, the defendant could use it in support of his or her defense. In either

instance, the recording assists the trier of fact in seeking the truth and at arriving at a just

result.

¶ 35 The State contends, however, that requiring discovery of video recordings in

misdemeanor DUI cases is unduly burdensome and will delay the judicial process. Noting

that the limited scope of misdemeanor discovery set forth in Schmidt was partially driven by

consideration of the large number of misdemeanor actions and the desire to efficientlymove

them through the system, the State contendsthese same considerations applywith equal force

today. We believe that the particular facts of this case undermine the State’s general

assertions.

-8-
¶ 36 The record indicates that defendant’s request was not one that was unique in any way.

The State never formally objected to the request, nor did it contend that it fell outside of

Schmidt. Further, we note that during oral argument before this court, counsel for the State

was asked to comment on the fact that the State had readily agreed to produce and preserve

the videotape in this matter. He responded: “We have no problem tendering these videos in

a particular case. If the defendant asks for it, and it is available, we will do so. *** It’s just

a matter of collegiality.”

¶ 37 The video recording is relevant and admissible evidence because it reveals what

transpired during the traffic stop which serves to further the truth-seeking function of a trial.

This evidence may be helpful to both the defendant and the State. Indeed, the flow of cases

actually going to trial may be eased upon allowing defendants and their counsel to review

these recordings: those which reflect events favorable to the State may result in defendants

willing to enter pleas which they otherwise may not have contemplated. This also advances

the purpose of our DUI statutes to ensure that our roads remain safe from impaired drivers.

¶ 38 We therefore agree with the courts below that upon receiving the written Rule 237 notice

to produce the video recording five days after defendant was arrested–and 25 days before it

was destroyed–the State was placed on notice and should have taken appropriate steps to

ensure that it was preserved.6

¶ 39 In sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the video

recording of defendant’s stop and arrest was subject to discovery in her misdemeanor DUI

case and that the State committed a discovery violation by allowing the destruction of the

recording. We next address the question of whether the sanction imposed by the trial court

was appropriate for the discovery violation.

¶ 40 B. Reasonableness of the Discovery Sanction

¶ 41 The State contends that the discovery sanction imposed by the trial court was too harsh

for the circumstances presented in this case and, therefore, amounted to an abuse of

discretion. According to the State, the sanction was “effectively a dismissal of the charges

as it prevented the officer from testifying about all of the relevant facts showing that

defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.” We reject the State’s contentions.

¶ 42 The correct sanction to be applied for a discovery violation is a decision appropriately

left to the discretion of the trial court, and its judgment shall be given great weight. People

v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 135 (1986). The trial court is in the best position to determine an

appropriate sanction based upon the effect the discovery violation will have upon the

Although the Rule 237 notice was filed in the civil summary suspension proceeding, the 6

State explained at oral argument that the summary suspension proceeding and the criminal DUI case

proceed in tandem, before the same judge and with the same State’s Attorneys handling both matters.

Although the better practice would be for the defendant to request production of the video recording

in both proceedings, we have no doubt that in this case the State was aware of the need to preserve

the recording. Indeed, defendant also made an oral motion for discovery pursuant to Schmidt during

the proceedings on the first court date.

-9-
defendant. People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d 306, 314 (1993). As stated, an abuse of

discretion exists only where the decision of the trial court is fanciful, arbitrary, or

unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial

court. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 359.

¶ 43 The record clearly establishes that the discovery sanction imposed by the trial court did

not preclude the State from prosecuting defendant. The court’s sanction ruling was narrowly

tailored, and provided that “[t]he video may not be used for any purpose from five seconds

prior to the lights going on at the time that the defendant was stopped getting out of the car

until she was taken away via the arrest.” Notably, the court also clearly specified that any

driving or actions of defendant prior to the start of the recording were admissible, as were

any of her actions after she was placed under arrest.

¶ 44 Accordingly, under the court’s ruling, Officer Gaske was not barred from testifying;

rather, his testimony was limited to observations regarding events other than those captured

on the purged recording. Thus, the State could have questioned Officer Gaske concerning any

erratic driving on the part of defendant prior to her being stopped. Gaske could also have

been questioned about defendant’s behavior after he deactivated the lights and placed her in

his squad car to transport her back to the police station, which occurred immediately after

defendant performed the field sobriety tests. Gaske could have offered any observations of

indications of intoxication at that time, including whether defendant exhibited bloodshot and

glassy eyes, slurred speech or an odor of alcohol. He also could have testified to any

problems with balance or dexterity defendant may have had as she arrived at the police

station for processing. Thus, contrary to the State’s assertion that the court’s sanction

“removed all possible proof that defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol,”

the State could have questioned Gaske on any of these points. It declined to do so.

¶ 45 As stated, the authority to impose reasonable sanctions for discovery violations lies

within the sound discretion of the trial court. Here, the court properly exercised its discretion

in choosing from the spectrum of available options and narrowly tailoring its sanction to bar

the State from introducing testimony regarding what was contained in the video recording.

Contrary to the State’s assertion that the sanction was disproportionate to the discovery

violation because it “excluded all evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt,” the record establishes that the State made the conscious decision not to participate

in the trial and to forgo the opportunities available to present evidence apart from that which

was barred under the sanction.

¶ 46 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this

sanction against the State. We therefore affirm the sanction order entered by the trial court

against the State. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings on the

State’s prosecution of defendant’s misdemeanor DUI case.

¶ 47 CONCLUSION

¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. This cause is

remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

-10-
¶ 49 Affirmed;

¶ 50 cause remanded.

-11-