J-A04023-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 KATIE WAKELEY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v. M.J. BRUNNER, INC., Appellee No. 392 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): GD 14-009877

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and S HOGAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 11, 2016 In this employment dispute, Katie Wakeley appeals f rom the order entered February 18, 2015, granting M.J. Brunner, I nc. (“Brunner”) judgment on the pleadings. We affirm. In 2011, Appellant worked as a project manager for an advertising agency in Dallas, Texas, earning $80,000 annually. 1 Appellant and her family, a husband and child, were settled in Dallas with no intention of leaving. Appellant’s husband worked as a recruiter ; their daughter was fouryears-old.

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1 We derive the background for this case from the pl eadings.J-A04023-16

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In March 2012, a recruiter approached Appellant abo ut a position with Brunner as a digital account director. The positio n was located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Appellant indicated that she was not interested unless the position paid more than her current position and of fered opportunity for advancement. Following a series of interviews, Bru nner offered Appellant the position at $90,000 per year, plus benefits and a $4,000 relocation allowance. In April 2012, Appellant accepted Brunn er’s offer and gave her Dallas-employer notice. However, five days later, Brunner rescinded its offer, citing an unexpected change in its business. Appellant was able to keep her job in Dallas. In May 2012, the same recruiter again approached Ap pellant about another opening at Brunner, this time as an account director. This position offered the same salary and benefits as the previou s one offered her. During her interview, Brunner executives disclosed that the position was available because the incumbent was taking maternit y leave. However, Brunner assured Appellant that she would be assigne d another, permanent position when the incumbent returned from leave. B runner also promised Appellant that she would receive extensive training and work closely under a supervisor as she learned her new job responsibilit ies. Following her interview, Brunner increased the relocation allowan ce to $9,000. In June 2012, Appellant accepted Brunner’s offer of employment, and her family relocated from Dallas to Pittsburgh. Ho wever, Appellant receivedJ-A04023-16

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little training and little guidance from her superv isor. Her only assistance came from an inexperienced subordinate. Following two mishaps - the first involving an unsuccessful conference call with a cl ient, the second an email exchange with another client provider – Brunner exe cutives were critical of Appellant’s work performance. Shortly thereafter i n September 2012, and only four days before the previous incumbent return ed from maternity leave, Brunner fired Appellant. In August 2014, Appellant commenced this action by filing a complaint asserting three counts: (1) breach of implied contr act, (2) breach of express contract, and (3) fraudulent inducement. According to Appellant, she left a secure job, relocated her family, and assumed a 30- year home mortgage –

and this additional consideration entitled her to e mployment with Brunner for a reasonable period. See Complaint at 9-10. Moreover, according to Appellant, Brunner breached an express promise to p rovide her with proper training, an experienced supervisor, and a comparab le, permanent position.

Id. at 10. Finally, based upon these express promises, Appellant asserted that Brunner knowingly and falsely induced Appellan t to accept its offer of employment. Id. at 11.

Brunner filed an answer and new matter to which it attached two documents executed by Appellant: (1) an Application for Employment and (2) a Confirmation of Employment. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibits A (“Application for Employment,” 04/02/2012) and B (“ Confirmation ofJ-A04023-16

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Employment,” 06/06/2012) (collectively, “pre-hire d ocuments”). Also attached was an introductory statement purported to be from Brunner’s employee handbook. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibit C (“I. Introductory Statement”). The application was completed by Appellant when she applied for the digital account director position with Brunner in A pril 2012. It included the following statements, acknowledged and accepted by Appellant: I understand that this application remains current for only 30 days. At the conclusion of that time, if I have no t heard from the employer and still wish to be considered for em ployment, it will be necessary for me to reapply and fill out a new application. If I am hired, I understand that I am free to resig n at any time, with or without cause and with or without prior not ice, and the employer reserves the same right to terminate my em ployment at any time, with or without cause and with or with out prior notice, except as may be required by law. This app lication does not constitute an agreement or contract for employm ent for any specified period or definite duration. I understan d that no supervisor or representative of the employer is aut horized to make any assurances to the contrary and that no imp lied oral or written agreements contrary to the foregoing expres s language are valid unless they are in writing and signed by the employer’s president. Answer and New Matter, Exhibit A, at 2 (thereafter signed and dated by Appellant). The confirmation, completed by Appellant just prior to commencing employment with Brunner as an account director, set forth the following, in relevant part: This confirmation is intended to convey, for our mu tual understanding, your title, salary, start date and b enefits with M.J-A04023-16

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J. Brunner, Inc. This is not a contractual agreeme nt between you and M. J. Brunner, Inc. and we want to point ou t your employment with M. J. Brunner is on an at-will basi s. No M. J. Brunner, Inc. representative has the authority to m ake any contrary agreement. Answer and New Matter, Exhibit B, at 1 (also provid ing details of Appellant’s employment; thereafter signed and dated by Appellan t). Appellant acknowledged her execution of the confirmation. See Answer to New Matter at ¶ 109. Sometime in late 2014, Brunner filed a motion for j udgment on the pleadings. 2 Referencing and attaching the pre-hire documents t o its motion, Brunner asserted that Appellant’s employment was at -will, that she could not establish her claims, and that her complaint sh ould be dismissed. Following argument in February 2015, the trial cour t granted Brunner’s motion and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with pre judice. Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b ) statement. The trial court issued a responsive opinion, concluding that the pre-hire documents introduced by Brunner established explicitly that A ppellant’s employment

was at-will. See Trial Court Opinion, 04/28/2015, at 3. The court further

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2 Brunner’s motion is not included in the certified record, nor does it appear in the trial court’s docket. Nevertheless, Appella nt responded to Brunner’s motion. See Response, 12/24/2014. The docket reflects that th e trial court scheduled argument on Brunner’s motion for February 17, 2015. Moreover, Brunner filed a brief in response to Appellant’s op position to the motion. See Brief, 02/10/2015.J-A04023-16

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opined that Appellant could not establish that Brun ner knowingly or recklessly made false representations that induced Appellant to accept employment. See id. at 3-4. Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 1. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient fact s to enable a reasonable jury to find that she provided her emplo yer with additional consideration sufficient to rebut the pr esumption of employment at-will[;] 2. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] that she and [Br unner] entered into a specific agreement for employment at -will[;] 3. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient fact s to enable a reasonable jury to find that [Brunner] breached the employment contract by failing to provide her: (1) with extens ive training in her new position; (2) the assistance of an experien ced supervisor; and (3) to find her a new position when the incumbent returned from leave[; and] 4. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient fact s to enable a reasonable jury to find that [Brunner] fraudulently induced her to accept employment[.] Appellant’s Brief at 2. Essentially, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted Brunner judgment on the pleadings and dismissed her complaint with prejudice. In so doing, she renews arguments raise d below. According to Appellant, the pre-hire documents do not establish that she agreed to at-will employment with Brunner. Regarding the application , Appellant notes that it was completed when she applied for a different posi tion with Brunner and asserts that it is irrelevant to the position she e ventually secured with

Brunner. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 14-15. As for the confir mation,J-A04023-16

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Appellant suggests that language contained therein negates any contractually binding significance of the document. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 15-16. Thus, according to Appellant, by their plain terms, these documents do not impact her case. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 16. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 governs m otions for judgment on the pleadings and provides that “[a]fte r the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreason ably delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Pa. R.C.P. 1034(a). We review a trial court’s decision to grant judgment o n the pleadings in the following manner: Appellate review of an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is plenary. The appellate court will apply the same standard employed by the trial court. A trial cour t must confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant doc uments. The court must accept as true all well pleaded statemen ts of fact, admissions, and any documents properly attached to the pleadings presented by the party against whom the m otion is filed, considering only those facts which were spec ifically admitted. We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving party's right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless e xercise. In other words, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is si milar to a demurrer. It may be entered when there are no dispu ted issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgmen t as a matter of law. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti , 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted; formatting and punctua tion modified). Further, it

is well settled that if the court’s decision is cor rect, we may affirm on anyJ-A04023-16

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ground. See, e.g. , Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Domtar Paper Co. , 77 A.3d 1282, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013). In Pennsylvania, employment is presumed to be at-wi ll, unless there is an agreement otherwise. Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh , 595 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. 1991). Thus, “an employmen t relationship ... may be terminated by either party at any time, for any reason or for no reason.”

Id. A plaintiff may overcome the presumption if she ca n demonstrate additional consideration beyond the services for wh ich she was hired. Id. However, where the plaintiff has clearly acknowledg ed the at-will nature of her employment, the presumption must prevail. See, e.g. , Walden v. Saint Gobain Corp. , 323 F.Supp.2d 637, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (applyi ng Pennsylvania law). Here, Appellant pleaded additional consideration po tentially sufficient to overcome the presumption that her Brunner employ ment was at-will. For example, Appellant pleaded that she left a stable j ob and home in Dallas, uprooted her family and moved to Pittsburgh, therea fter purchasing a home financed by a 30-year mortgage. See Cashdollar , 595 A.2d at 73-74 (affirming the trial court’s denial of judgment not withstanding the verdict where a jury concluded that similar evidence was su fficient to overcome the presumption of at-will employment). In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Brunne r presented the two, pre-hire documents suggesting that Appellant a cknowledged expresslyJ-A04023-16

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that her new employment was at-will. The trial cou rt deemed these documents dispositive, concluding as follows: The documents executed by the parties govern[]. Th ose documents explicitly reflect an at-will employment relationship. [Appellant’s] attempt to circumvent these documents must fail. Trial Court Opinion at 3. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion. Howeve r, mindful of the appropriate standards that govern review of a motio n for judgment on the pleadings, we are constrained to distinguish betwee n the pre-hire documents. In our view, the trial court could not properly consider the application as indicative of Appellant’s at-will em ployment. As pleaded by Appellant in her response to Brunner’s new matter, the application was completed when she applied for a different position with Brunner and was unrelated to the position eventually secured. See Answer to New Matter, 11/05/2014, at ¶¶ 106-08. The trial court was obli gated to view these pleadings, as well as the document itself, against Brunner and in the light most favorable to Appellant. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. , 935 A.2d at 570. Appellant continues to maintain that this document is unrelated to the job she eventually secured with Brunner, and we agree. Moreover, not only does it relate to a different job opportunity, but also by its terms the document remained valid for only 30 days. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibit A, at 2. Appellant signed the application document on April 2, 2012. The recruiter approached Appellant about a second e mployment opportunityJ-A04023-16

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at Brunner on May 14, 2012. See Complaint at ¶ 26. Thus, the application was no longer valid. For these reasons, the applic ation does not clearly establish the at-will nature of Appellant’s employm ent and cannot support Brunner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Nevertheless, the confirmation, signed by Appellant just prior to commencing her Brunner employment, is clear and dis positive. It provides specifically that her employment was at-will. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibit B, at 1. By signing this document, Appella nt was properly notified and acknowledged the nature of her employment. In our view, this acknowledgment defeats Appellant’s “additional cons ideration” claim as a

matter of law. In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Appellant su ggests that other language included in the confirmation negates any a dverse impact on her

claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-16 (suggesting that the st atement, “This is not a contractual agreement ...,” renders her ackn owledgment ambiguous). We discern no ambiguity. Appellant’s position is hypertechnical and does nothing to undermine the clear a cknowledgment that her employment was at-will. The notice and acknowledgment of Appellant’s at-wil l status effectively eliminates each of her claims, and we need not addr ess in detail Appellant’s arguments to the contrary. Appellant’s claim for b reach of implied contract relies upon her theory of additional consideration. However, theJ-A04023-16

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confirmation of at-will employment signed by Appell ant precludes this claim. See, e.g. , Walden , 323 F.Supp.2d at 646-47. Appellant’s claim for b reach of express contract relies upon alleged promises th at Brunner would provide her with proper training, an experienced supervisor , and a comparable, permanent position. However, this claim too is def eated by Appellant’s confirmation of employment, which in addition to st ating the at-will nature of employment, provided additional express terms, incl uding a statement of salary and benefits, and clear notice that “[n]o [B runner] representative has the authority to make any contrary agreement.” Ans wer and New Matter, Exhibit B, at 1; see also, e.g. , Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications,

Inc. , 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989) (“[A]s a general rul e, there is no common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an atwill employment relationship.”). Finally, notice a nd acknowledgment of these terms – specifically disclaiming any terms or promises to the contrary - precludes Appellant from stating a claim for frau d, which would require her to establish justifiable reliance upon the aforemen tioned alleged promises. See, e.g. , Martin v. Hale Prods., Inc. , 699 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. 1997). 3 For these reasons, Appellant is entitled to no re lief.

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3 We observe that the trial court determined that Ap pellant’s fraud claim must fail because she could not establish that Brun ner knowingly or recklessly made false representations to Appellant. Trial Court Opinion at 3. This was erroneous in light of the procedural postu re of this case. Appellant pleaded that Brunner promised to provide her with p roper training, an (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-A04023-16

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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/11/2016

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ experienced supervisor, and a comparable, permanent position, and that Brunner made these representations knowing they wer e false. See Complaint at ¶¶ 91-92. This error, however, does n ot entitle Appellant to relief. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 77 A.3d at 1286.