FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN CHRISTOPHER MAGDIRILA, 

AKA John Christopher Gambol 

Magdrila, AKA Jose Francis 

Hernandez-Castillo, AKA JC, AKA 

Sike,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-50430

D.C. No.

2:17-cr-00729-

CAS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 13, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed June 23, 2020

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Ryan D. Nelson,

and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge R. Nelson;

Concurrence by Judge Berzon
2 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a 

criminal defendant’s motion to suppress contraband found 

during an inventory search of a vehicle he was driving, 

vacated challenged conditions of supervised release, and 

remanded.

The panel held that the defendant preserved both of his 

central arguments on appeal challenging the denial of the 

motion to suppress.

The panel held that the officers’ failure to precisely 

comply with Inglewood Police Department towing policy 

when they failed to completely fill out an inventory form did 

not render the search invalid. The panel explained that this 

case is considerably clearer than United States v. Garay, 

938 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2019), which held that the failure to 

complete the form under the circumstances was not a 

material deviation from policy and did not make the search 

invalid. The panel wrote that by creating a list of recovered 

items and incorporating it into a CHP 180 form, an officer 

complied substantially with the policy’s direction to 

inventory the property in an impounded vehicle. The panel 

also held that, given the early stage at which an officer 

decided to impound the vehicle, it is a reasonable view of the 

evidence that the officer’s intent at the time the vehicle was 

impounded was administrative rather than investigatory.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 3

The panel vacated three conditions of supervised release 

as to which the government conceded error or made no 

argument, and remanded for revision. The panel vacated a 

disputed notification-of-risk condition, and remanded for the 

district court to craft a condition that accords with the 

defendant’s criminal history.

Concurring, Judge Berzon wrote separately to note that 

she believes Garay was wrongly decided.

COUNSEL

Joshua D. Weiss (argued) and Sonam Henderson, Deputy 

Federal Public Defenders; Amy M. Karlin, Interim Federal 

Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los 

Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant.

Roger A. Hsiech (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; 

L. Ashley Aull, Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Nicola T. 

Hanna, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s 

Office, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

During a search of a vehicle John Magdirila was driving, 

officers found methamphetamine, a firearm, and counterfeit 

currency. The district court denied Magdirila’s motion to 

suppress this contraband, holding it was discovered during a 

valid inventory search. Magdirila then entered a conditional 

plea agreement and was sentenced to 41 months in prison. 
4 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

The district court also imposed General, Specific, and 

Standard Conditions of Supervised Release. We affirm the 

denial of Magdirila’s motion to suppress. We vacate, 

however, the challenged Conditions and remand for the 

district court to revise them.

I

Officers Mark Robinson and Tyler Villicana were on 

patrol in Inglewood, California, as part of a tactical response 

to a surge in gang activity in the area. At nearly 11:00 pm, 

Robinson observed a black Infiniti stopped in an alley with 

its engine running and “lights . . . illuminated as if the driver 

had the foot on the brake.” The vehicle was parked in 

violation of Inglewood Municipal Code 3-50 and lacked 

permanent—as opposed to dealer-issued—license plates, in 

violation of California Vehicle Code § 5200(a).

Villicana activated the cruiser’s lights and siren, causing 

the vehicle’s passenger, D.R., to “spontaneously” exit the 

vehicle. Upon questioning by Villicana, D.R. admitted he 

was on parole and was detained pending further 

investigation. After detaining D.R., Villicana ran a warrants 

inquiry for D.R. The inquiry confirmed that D.R. was on 

parole and subject to a search condition.

As Villicana questioned D.R., Robinson approached the 

Infiniti and observed Magdirila sitting in the driver’s seat 

with the engine on and his foot on the break. Magdirila 

admitted he did not have a driver’s license and stated the 

vehicle belonged to a friend. Robinson, pursuant to the 

Inglewood Police Department Vehicle Towing and Release 

Policy (the “Policy”), decided “from the moment that . . .

[Magdirila] admitted he did not have a driver’s license” to 

impound the vehicle.
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 5

Robinson then searched the glove compartment of the 

vehicle and found a bag of what he believed was crystal 

methamphetamine. When asked who the crystal 

methamphetamine belonged to, Magdirila claimed 

ownership. Robinson arrested Magdirila for possession of 

methamphetamine in violation of California Health and 

Safety Code § 11377(a), and searched the rest of the vehicle.

During the inventory search, Robinson found a lockbox 

in the back seat of the vehicle resting on top of a backpack. 

Magdirila claimed ownership of the lockbox and backpack. 

Inside the lockbox, Robinson found a loaded semi-automatic 

pistol, an air pistol, a USB drive, and Magdirila’s EBT card.

Robinson’s decision to impound the vehicle triggered a 

duty under the Policy to take an “accurate” inventory of the 

vehicle’s contents on a CHP 180 form. The Policy requires 

officers to list “[a]ll property in a stored or impounded 

vehicle” and to “be as thorough and accurate as practical in 

preparing an itemized inventory.” In the “REMARKS” 

section of the CHP 180 form, Villicana cross-referenced the 

police report and noted that the vehicle contained an 

“IPHONE/APPLE WATCH.” In the police report, 

Robinson listed items contained in the car including, but not 

limited to, a black backpack, air pistol, ink cartridges, USB 

flash drive, and an American Express credit card.

Magdirila moved to suppress “all evidence and 

statements obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest, search, 

and questioning.” The Government opposed suppression, 

relying primarily on declarations from Robinson and 

Villicana, along with the CHP 180 form and police report. 

During a hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court 

heard testimony from Robinson, Villicana, and Magdirila.
6 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

After the hearing, the district court denied Magdirila’s 

motion to suppress the contraband and made the following 

factual findings:

1. “the Infiniti was illegally parked in an 

alleyway and . . . was without proper 

license plates”;

2. “the officers impounded the Infiniti 

because the owner of the car was not 

present, the [defendant] was unlicensed 

and did not have any evidence that he was 

authorized to drive the car, and the car 

was parked in and blocking an alley”;

3. “Robinson impounded the Infiniti 

pursuant to the [Inglewood Police 

Department’s] Vehicle Towing and 

Release Policy . . . [at] the moment that 

defendant admitted that he did not have a 

driver’s license”; and

4. “[t]he record demonstrates that Robinson 

conducted an inventory search of the 

Infiniti pursuant to the Vehicle Inventory 

requirements set forth in section 510.4 of 

Towing Policy, and that Villicana 

completed CHP Form 180 pursuant to the 

Vehicle Storage Report requirements set 

forth in section 510.2.1.”

United States v. Magdirila, No. 2:17-CR-00729-CAS-1, 

2018 WL 1472498, at *4, *6, *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2018) 
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 7

(internal quotation marks omitted).1 In light of those 

findings, the district court held that the contraband was the 

fruit of a properly conducted inventory search. Magdirila 

subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, and the 

district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison.

The district court also imposed Standard and Specific 

Conditions of Supervised Release. Additionally, the district 

court incorporated and imposed conditions of supervised 

release from United States District Court for the Central 

District of California General Order 05-02—which we refer 

to as General Order Conditions. The five General Order, 

Specific, and Standard Conditions relevant to this appeal are:

1. General Order Condition 5: “The 

defendant shall support his or her 

dependents and meet other family 

responsibilities,” General Order 05-02, 

United States District Court for the 

Central District of California (Jan. 18, 

2005), https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sit

es/default/files/general-orders/GO-05-

02.pdf (last visited June 3, 2020);

2. General Order Condition 6: “The 

defendant shall work regularly at a lawful 

occupation unless excused by the 

probation officer for schooling, training, 

or other acceptable reasons,” id.;

1 The district court did not resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether 

Magdirila had Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search of his 

friend’s vehicle. The Government does not raise this argument on 

appeal. We do not decide, therefore, whether Magdirila has standing and 

instead assume that he does.
8 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

3. General Order Condition 14: “As 

directed by the probation officer, the 

defendant shall notify third parties of 

risks that may be occasioned by the 

defendant’s criminal record or personal 

history or characteristics, and shall permit 

the probation officer to make such 

notifications and to confirm the 

defendant’s compliance with such 

notification requirement,” id.;

4. Specific Condition 2: “As directed by the 

probation officer, the defendant shall 

notify specific persons and organizations 

of specific risks and shall permit the 

probation officer to confirm the 

defendant’s compliance with such 

requirement and to make such 

notifications”;

5. Standard Condition 14: “As directed by 

the probation officer, the defendant must 

notify specific persons and organizations 

of specific risks posed by the defendant to 

those persons and organizations and must 

permit the probation officer to confirm 

the defendant’s compliance with such 

requirement and to make such 

notifications.”

Magdirila timely appealed the denial of his motion to 

suppress and the imposition of these five conditions. We 

have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 9

II

The denial of Magdirila’s motion to suppress is reviewed 

de novo. See United States v. Tan Duc Nguyen, 673 F.3d 

1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court’s underlying 

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See United 

States v. Barnes, 895 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Where the district court does not make a finding on a precise 

factual issue relevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis, we 

“uphold a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress if there 

was a reasonable view to support it.” United States v. 

Gooch, 506 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007).

III

We address whether Magdirila has waived certain 

arguments challenging the district court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress and then turn to whether the district court 

erred in its denial.

A

We begin with the Government’s waiver claims. Except 

for good cause, a motion to suppress must “be raised by 

pretrial motion.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

12(b)(3)(C); see also United States v. Guerrero, 921 F.3d 

895, 897–98 (9th Cir. 2019). Defendants ordinarily may not 

raise new grounds for suppression on appeal. See United 

States v. Keesee, 358 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004). That 

is, a defendant may not (1) assert facts contradicting the facts 

he or she asserted before the district court, id.; (2) rely on 

facts that were not raised before or relied upon by the district 

court, Guerrero, 921 F.3d at 898; or (3) make a new legal 

argument in support of suppression, unless the issue does not 

affect or rely on the factual record developed by the parties, 

see United States v. Hawkins, 249 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 
10 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

2001), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Perez, 

116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). An argument is not 

waived if “the district court nevertheless addressed the 

merits of the issue not explicitly raised by the party.” 

Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1260 n.8 

(9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Here, Magdirila preserved both of his central arguments 

on appeal—that the officers “had an improper subjective 

motivation that rendered the search pretextual” and that “the 

inventory search was invalid because officers conducted 

their search in a manner inconsistent with the Policy.”

With respect to his broad pretext argument, Magdirila 

claimed the inventory search was a “post-hoc justification” 

for an illegal search at inception. During the suppression 

hearing, Magdirila questioned Robinson about his state of 

mind during the time of the search, apparently to 

demonstrate pretext. Magdirila relies on no new facts or 

legal theories. Rather, he continues to assert that the 

inventory search was pretext for an illegal investigatory 

search. We conclude this argument was preserved.

Magdirila also preserved his narrower argument that the 

officers conducted their search inconsistent with the Policy, 

as a component of his pretext argument. Although Magdirila 

did not specifically challenge the officers’ compliance with 

the Policy, the Government submitted a copy of the Policy

and the CHP 180 form, as part of the suppression hearing. 

The district court, in turn, found that the officers properly 

filled out the CHP 180 form. That finding, in turn, 

undergirded the district court’s holding that the officers 

performed a valid inventory search. Any argument 

regarding the officers’ failure to comply with the Policy was 

therefore preserved.
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 11

B

We next address whether failure to completely fill out 

the CHP 180 form rendered the search invalid and, relatedly, 

whether any failure combined with other indicia of pretext 

rendered the search invalid. Inventory searches that 

materially deviate from department policy can be invalid. 

United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019). 

However, minor noncompliance with department policies 

does not invalidate an otherwise lawful inventory search. Id. 

at 1112.

Additionally, a search conducted pursuant to a regulatory 

scheme is invalid if the officer’s sole purpose in performing 

it is investigatory. United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 

1210 (9th Cir. 2017). If, however, the officer’s purpose is 

administrative, the inventory search is valid. United States 

v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Importantly, “the mere presence of a criminal investigatory 

motive or a dual motive—one valid, and one 

impermissible—does not render an administrative stop or 

search invalid; instead, . . . [the Court] ask[s] whether the 

challenged search or seizure would . . . have occurred in the 

absence of an impermissible reason.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

The officers’ failure to precisely follow Section 510.4 of 

the Policy, in and of itself, does not make the inventory 

search invalid. In Garay, sheriffs performed an inventory 

search of a vehicle after engaging in a high-speed chase but 

failed to fill out the inventory search form required by the 

sheriff’s department policy. 938 F.3d at 1110–11. 

Nevertheless, we held that the failure to complete the form 

under the circumstances was not a “material deviation from 

policy” and did not make the search invalid. Id. at 1112.
12 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

This case is considerably clearer than Garay. Although 

the officers here did not include “all property” on the CHP 

180 form as required by Section 510.2.1, they did fill out an 

inventory form that included some of the property, including 

an iPhone and an Apple watch. Moreover, the items 

contained in the vehicle, but unlisted on the CHP 180 form—

including a backpack, Magdirila’s welfare benefits card, the 

Sentry lockbox, an air gun, a flash drive, and ink jet toner 

cartridges,—were listed on the police report, which 

Villicana cross-referenced on the CHP 180 form. By 

creating a list of recovered items and incorporating it into the 

CHP 180 form, Villicana complied substantially with the 

Policy’s direction to inventory the property in an impounded 

vehicle. His failure to precisely comply with the Policy did 

not render the search invalid.

Nor do we agree with Magdirila that there is not a 

“reasonable view to support” the trial court’s implied 

conclusion that Robinson’s purpose in conducting the search 

was administrative rather than investigatory. Gooch, 

506 F.3d at 1158. Department Policy required the officers 

to impound the vehicle upon determining that Magdirila was 

unlicensed. Robinson established that fact during his initial 

questioning of Magdirila and decided to impound the vehicle 

before discovering methamphetamine in the glove 

compartment. Given the early stage at which Robinson 

decided to impound the vehicle, it is a “reasonable view” of 

the evidence that Robinson’s intent at the time the vehicle 

was impounded was administrative rather than investigatory. 

Id. at 1158.2

2 Because we hold the inventory search was proper, we do not 

address the Government’s alternative arguments that (1) the police were 
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 13

IV

Finally, we turn to the conditions of supervised release 

imposed by the district court. The Government concedes 

that General Order Condition 5, General Order Condition 6, 

and Specific Condition 2 must be struck or, in the case of 

General Order Condition 6, revised to avoid being struck for 

vagueness. The Government also makes no argument about 

General Order Condition 14, which we struck down in 

United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 

2018). Accordingly, we vacate these conditions and remand 

for the district court to revise them.

The sole disputed condition is Standard Condition 14, 

which provides:

As directed by the probation officer, the 

defendant must notify specific persons and 

organizations of specific risks posed by the 

defendant to those persons and organizations 

and must permit the probation officer to 

confirm the defendant’s compliance with 

such requirement and to make such 

notifications.

Standard Condition 14 is nearly identical to General Order 

Condition 14, which we struck down in Evans. In Evans, we 

held General Order Condition 14 unconstitutional, in part 

because it failed to answer the question of what conduct the 

defendant needed to warn the public about. 883 F.3d 

at 1163. The revised language in Standard Condition 14 

entitled to search the glove compartment because of D.R.’s parole search 

condition, or (2) the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.
14 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

does not cure this deficiency. We therefore vacate and 

remand Standard Condition 14.

We leave it for the district court on remand to craft a 

supervised release condition that accords with Magdirila’s 

criminal history. See United States v. Ped, 943 F.3d 427, 

434 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The district court ‘is better suited to 

the job of crafting adequate but not overly restrictive 

conditions.’” (quoting United States v. Sales, 476 F.3d 732, 

738 (9th Cir. 2007))).

On remand, the district court may wish to consider the 

language in United States Sentencing Guideline Manual 

§ 5D1.3(c)(12), which suggests that a defendant’s 

notification obligations should be limited to specific persons 

regarding specific risks posed by the defendant’s criminal 

record. Magdirila argued on appeal that if such language 

was incorporated into Standard Condition 14, the revised 

condition would not be unconstitutionally vague.

AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED AND 

REMANDED IN PART.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the opinion in full. I write separately to note 

that I believe United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 

2019), was wrongly decided.

In Garay, sheriffs performed an inventory search of a 

vehicle but did not create any list of the items found inside 

the car, i.e., an inventory, in violation of both their 

department’s inventory policy and the pivotal requirement 

of the inventory search exception to the usual Fourth 
UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA 15

Amendment probable cause requirement. 938 F.3d at 1111. 

Garay held that the lack of any inventory is an insufficient 

reason to invalidate the inventory search. Id. at 1112. That 

conclusion is, in my view, just wrong.

The inventory search exception “serve[s] to protect an 

owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to 

insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, 

and to guard the police from danger.” Florida v. Wells, 

495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 

367, 372 (1987)). Failure to produce any written inventory 

following a supposed inventory search is not, as held by 

Garay, 938 F.3d at 1112, a trivial administrative error in 

adhering to policy. Where no inventory at all is produced, 

the property protection, insurance, and danger reasons for 

the exception all go up in smoke. If there is no written record 

of the objects found in the vehicle, then there is no way to 

tell whether objects are taken once in police custody, no 

protection against false claims that property has disappeared, 

and no way to segregate dangerous objects while recording 

their existence should they need to be returned.

Moreover, that an officer purports to conduct an 

inventory search but fails to produce an inventory strongly

suggests the investigatory nature of the search. Law 

enforcement may not use an inventory search as a “ruse for 

a general rummaging.” Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. Treating items 

seized from a vehicle “specifically as evidence of a crime 

[and] not as property held for safekeeping” invalidates an 

inventory search. United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 

1127–28 (9th Cir. 2018). An inventory search that does not 

result in a written inventory goes a long way toward 

indicating that the officers did not treat recovered items as 

“property held for safekeeping,” but rather as evidence of 

criminal activity.
16 UNITED STATES V. MAGDIRILA

Wells held that “[t]he policy or practice governing 

inventory searches should be designed to produce an 

inventory.” 495 U.S. at 4. Given the Supreme Court’s 

emphasis that an inventory search should aid property 

owners and law enforcement in tracking the category and 

condition of items seized from vehicles, and should not be 

used to disguise investigative law enforcement activity, the 

exception cannot apply where there is no written inventory 

at all.

That was not the case here, however. The error here 

really was a technical one—only some of the items 

recovered were recorded on the inventory form, but the rest 

appeared on the cross-referenced police report. I therefore 

concur in the opinion, but recommend reconsidering Garay 

en banc should the opportunity arise.