UNPUBLISHED

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

 No. 07-4561

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

versus 

JEFFETH DONALDSON-PINILLA, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District 

Judge. (2:03-cr-00744-SB) 

 

Submitted: December 3, 2007 Decided: September 9, 2008 

Before TRAXLER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Hayden Bickerton, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2

PER CURIAM: 

Following a jury trial, Jeffeth Donaldson-Pinilla was 

convicted of conspiracy to import five kilograms or more of cocaine 

into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. ' 963 (2000), 

importation or aiding and abetting others in the importation of 500 

grams or more of cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. '' 952(a), 960(a)(1) & (b)(2) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. ' 2 

(2000), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to 

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. ' 846 (2000), and attempting to possess with intent to 

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 

U.S.C.A. ' 841 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007). The district court 

imposed a 320-month variance sentence, four months below the 

advisory guideline range. Donaldson-Pinilla timely appealed. 

Donaldson-Pinilla=s attorney has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

questioning whether the district court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress the statement he made before being administered the 

Miranda*

 warnings, permitting the Government to introduce evidence 

of Donaldson-Pinilla=s prior bad acts, attempts to hide evidence and 

create an alibi, and his illegal alien status, and denying his 

motion for a judgment of acquittal. Counsel also questions whether 

the downward variance sentence was reasonable. Counsel states, 

 *

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3

however, that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal. 

Donaldson-Pinilla was advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but he did not file one. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm Donaldson-Pinilla=s convictions and sentence. 

Turning first to the denial of the motion to suppress, 

Donaldson-Pinilla was stopped on the Port of Charleston, 

specifically the Wando Welch terminal in Mt. Pleasant, South 

Carolina, while police were conducting surveillance of drug 

trafficking activity. Because he was slow in responding to the 

officer=s commands to exit the vehicle and repeatedly tried to reach 

back into the vehicle, the officer placed him on the ground and 

handcuffed him for the officer=s safety. In response to the 

officer=s questions, Donaldson-Pinilla identified himself by an 

alias and stated that he was on the port with Ben Parker, an 

individual believed by the investigators to be involved in drug 

trafficking. 

Donaldson-Pinilla sought to suppress this statement on 

the ground that the officer failed to administer the Miranda

warnings before questioning him. Miranda warnings are required 

when an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation. United 

States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1995). However, 

Adrawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a 

patrol car for questioning, or using or threatening to use force 

does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest 
4

for Miranda purposes.@ Id. at 1109-10 (citations omitted). 

Although he does not dispute that there was reasonable suspicion to 

conduct a brief investigatory stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

30 (1968) (permitting brief, investigatory stop when officer has 

Areasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot@), Donaldson-Pinilla argues that the restrictions placed on 

him transformed his detention from a Terry stop to a full custodial 

arrest. We find that these restrictions lasted only long enough to 

verify the officer=s suspicions that Donaldson-Pinilla was engaged 

in illegal activity and therefore did not elevate the Terry stop 

into an arrest. Consequently, the Miranda warnings were not 

required. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying 

Donaldson-Pinilla=s motion to suppress. 

Next, Donaldson-Pinilla contends that the district court 

erred by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, as well as his 

efforts to hide evidence and create an alibi for his presence on 

the port. We find that the evidence of his prior bad acts was 

admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See

United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(discussing standard for admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence). 

In addition, we conclude that evidence that Donaldson-Pinilla tried 

to obstruct justice by attempting to hide evidence and create an 

alibi defense was admissible as intrinsic evidence of the crimes 

charged. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 311 (4th Cir. 
5

2003); United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1996). 

Moreover, assuming arguendo that the district court erred by 

admitting evidence of Donaldson-Pinilla=s illegal alien status, we 

find any error harmless because, in light of the overwhelming 

evidence against Donaldson-Pinilla, the jury was not substantially 

swayed by the fact that he was in the country illegally. See

United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing 

standard for determining whether nonconstitutional error was 

harmless). 

Counsel also questions whether the district court erred 

by denying Donaldson-Pinilla=s motions for a judgment of acquittal. 

Where, as here, the motions were based on claims of insufficient 

evidence, A[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is 

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the 

Government, to support it.@ Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 

80 (1942); United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 187 (2006). We have reviewed the record 

and find that substantial evidence supported Donaldson-Pinilla=s 

convictions on each count. 

Finally, Donaldson-Pinilla challenges the reasonableness 

of his sentence. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 

(2005), district courts are no longer bound by the range prescribed 

by the sentencing guidelines. When sentencing a defendant, a 

district court must: (1) properly calculate the guideline range; 
6

(2) determine whether a sentence within that range serves the 

factors set out in ' 3553(a); (3) implement mandatory statutory 

limitations; and (4) explain its reasons for selecting a sentence. 

United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). The 

Guidelines are Athe starting point and the initial benchmark.@ Gall 

v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). Next, the court 

should give the parties the opportunity to argue for whatever 

sentence they deem appropriate. The court is then instructed to 

consider the ' 3553(a) factors in light of the defendant=s request 

to impose a specific sentence. Id. Appellate courts review 

sentences imposed by district courts for reasonableness, applying 

an abuse of discretion standard. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597-98; 

Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473-74. 

Having thoroughly reviewed Donaldson-Pinilla=s sentence, 

we find that the district court properly calculated his guideline 

range and acted reasonably in imposing the downward variance 

sentence. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm Donaldson-Pinilla=s convictions and sentence. 

 This court requires that counsel inform DonaldsonPinilla, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of 

the United States for further review. If Donaldson-Pinilla 

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 

petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court 
7

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel=s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Donaldson-Pinilla. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions 

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED