REVISED AUGUST 14, 2008

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-51071

EDWARD CARMONA

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY 

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Edward Carmona sued his employer of fourteen years,

Defendant-Appellee Southwest Airlines Company (“Southwest”), alleging sex

discrimination, disability discrimination, and failure to accommodate. The

district court dismissed Carmona’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

declining to reach the merits of his claims. As we disagree with the district

court’s conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Carmona’s suit, we

reverse and remand for consideration of the substance of Carmona’s

discrimination allegations.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 16, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-51071

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I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Carmona worked as a flight attendant for Southwest from 1991 to 2005.

The terms and conditions of Carmona’s employment were governed by a

collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) between Southwest and the

Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 556 (the “Union”).

The CBA sets forth rules for leaves of absence, medical and sick leave,

attendance, discipline and termination, and grievance procedures. Under the

CBA’s attendance provisions, any employee who exceeds twelve attendance

“points” within a rolling sixteen-month period is subject to termination.

From the beginning of his tenure with Southwest, Carmona suffered from

psoriasis, a skin condition, and from psoriatic arthritis. These illnesses caused

him to take leave under theFamily Medical Leave Act(the “FMLA”) roughly two

or three times each month for three or four days at a time. In 2005, Carmona

took additional absences “for illness,” which Southwest did not excuse under the

FMLA. For these unexcused absences, Carmona accumulated points pursuant

to Southwest’s attendance policy, and was disciplined by Southwest as a result:

When Carmona received his seventh attendance point on May 1, 2005,

Southwest issued him a “letter of counseling”; when Carmona accumulated his

ninth point on May 10, 2005, Southwest issued him a written warning. 

On June 22, 2005, Carmona injured his thumb at home. He called Carolyn

Jernigan, a Houston Inflight Assistant Base Manager with Southwest, to report

that he was going to the hospital and would be unable to fly that day. Carmona

also requested a medical leave of absence. As mandated by the CBA, Jernigan

instructed him to send a written request to Southwest together with supporting

documentation from the hospital.

As a result of his thumb injury, Carmona missed four work days (June 22,

23, 25, and 26, 2005). These absences moved his absence point total above

twelve points, the maximum allowable under the CBA. After returning to work
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on June 27, 2005, Carmona faxed a doctor’s note to Southwest, which indicated

that he was cleared to return to work as of June 25, 2005; but because Carmona

had already used a doctor’s note for an earlier absence that quarter, provisions

ofthe CBA prevented this note from excusing his absences between June 22 and

June 26, inclusive.

By June 26, 2005, Carmona had exceeded the maximum of twelve points

permitted under the CBA, making him subject to immediate termination from

employment. As was Southwest’s practice, however, its Houston Inflight Base

Manager, Kevin Clark, held a fact-finding meeting with Carmona, another of

Carmona’s supervisors, and a representative of the Union to review Carmona’s

point total. Clark determined that Carmona had actually accumulated even

more points than the twelve originally calculated. The following month,

Southwest terminated Carmona’s employment for excessive absenteeism.

Days later, Carmona followed the grievance procedures in the CBA and

provisions in the Railway Labor Act (the “RLA”) by appealing his termination

as being in violation of the CBA. At the final level of review, Carmona’s

grievance was heard by a four-member panel ofthe Board of Adjustment, which,

in March 2006, upheld Carmona’s termination. 

In September 2005, Carmona filed a charge of discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging sex and

disability discrimination. The EEOC dismissed Carmona’s claims, finding no

evidence of sex discrimination and concluding that Carmona was not disabled

within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). 

The EEOC issued Carmona a “right to sue” letter, after which he filed the

instant action, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act

(“Title VII”), disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the
No. 07-51071

1 On appeal, Carmona has abandoned his FMLA retaliation claim.

2 As Carmona’s claims are based on federal statutes, the district court correctly

characterizedSouthwest’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction as questioning whether the RLA

precludes, rather than preempts, Carmona’s suit. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512

U.S. 246, 259 n.6 (1994) (citing Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,

559 (1987)). 

4

ADA, and retaliation in violation of the FMLA.1 Specifically, Carmona asserted

that Southwest: (1) assessed him attendance points and denied him medical

leave in situations under which similarly situated female flight attendants were

not assessed points or were granted medical leave, and that similarly situated

female employees have not been terminated for excessive absenteeism even after

accumulating twelve points; and (2) discriminated against him because of his

psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis and refused him medical accommodation when

it assessed him points for his illness-related absences prior to his thumb injury.

In September 2006, Southwest filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), contending that the court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Carmona’s claims were precluded by

the RLA.2In November 2006, the district court denied the motion without

prejudice to filing a motion for summary judgment. In May 2007, Southwest

filed a motion for summary judgment, reasserting its contention that Carmona’s

claims were precluded by the RLA and further asserting that, if they were not

precluded, Carmona’s claims were substantively without merit. The district

court granted Southwest’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that

Carmona’s claims were precluded by the RLA and dismissed Carmona’s action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the court did not reach the

merits of Carmona’s claims. Carmona timely filed a notice of appeal. 
No. 07-51071

3 See Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1994).

4 Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Vestron, Inc.

v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

5 Carmona’s arguments against RLA preclusion are largely confined to his sex and

disability discrimination claims. Carmona did not discuss failure to accommodate in any of his

filings in the district court or in the first of his two briefs filed on appeal. He only raises the

argument that his claim of failure to accommodate is not precluded by the RLA in his reply

brief, after Southwest argued in its brief that Carmona had waived this argument. As we do

not generally consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, we hold that Carmona

has waived his right to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his failure-to-accommodate

claim. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989). 

6 Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53.

7 Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972) (“Thus, the

notion that the grievance and arbitration procedures provided for minor disputes in the

Railway Labor Act are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the carrier chooses, was

never good history and is no longer good law.”). 

5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s preclusion-based grant of summary judgment

de novo.

3

“Because the district court dismissed the complaint before reaching

the merits, we confine our independent review to the jurisdictional issue.”4

III. ANALYSIS

Carmona has waived his rightto appealthe district court’s dismissal of his

ADA claim of failure to accommodate.5 As discussed below, however, because

Carmona’s claims alleging (1) Title VII gender discrimination and (2) ADA

disability discrimination cannot be resolved through an “interpretation” of the

CBA, these claims are not precluded by the RLA.

A. Applicable Law 

The RLA classifies CBA-related disputes as either “major” or “minor.”6In

1972, the Supreme Court held that minor disputes are exclusively within the

jurisdiction of RLA adjustment boards.7 Six years later, the Court reemphasized that“Congress considered it essentialto keep these so-called ‘minor’
No. 07-51071

8 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978).

9 Norris, 512 U.S. at 252-53 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a) (emphasis added). 

10 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989); see also

Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing id.).

11 Norris, 512 U.S. at 265.

12 Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999).

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disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts.”8 The Court

defined minor disputes as disputes growing “‘out of grievances or out of the

interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or

working conditions.’”9 The “distinguishing feature” of a minor dispute “is that

the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [collective

bargaining] agreement.”10 To state that a claim can be “‘conclusively resolved’”

by interpreting a CBA “is another way of saying that the dispute does not

involve rights that exist independent of the CBA.”11

Minor disputes “resist a rigid definition.”12 If Carmona’s claims can be

resolved through an interpretation of the CBA, i.e., if the rights at issue do not

exist independent of the CBA, his suit would qualify as a minor dispute under

the RLA, and would be precluded from judicial review.

B. Merits

The district court concluded that Carmona’s allegations that Southwest

did not assess negative attendance points under similar circumstances when

flight attendants (1) were female, (2) were not disabled, or (3) had not requested

intermittent FMLA leave, required interpretation of the CBA. As such, ruled

the court, it qualified as a minor dispute and was precluded by the RLA. 

On appeal, Southwest echoes the district court’s logic, insisting that

Carmona’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA. According to

Southwest, interpretation of the CBA’s attendance policy, procedures for
No. 07-51071

13 Norris, 512 U.S. at 264 n.10 (quoting Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311-12).

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obtaining medical and sick leave, and discipline and termination procedures is

required to evaluate whether (1) Carmona has established a prima facie case, (2)

Southwest proffered a non-discriminatory reason for firing Carmona, and (3)

Southwest’s stated rationale for terminating his employment was a pretext for

discrimination. Southwest asserts that Carmona’s suit is a minor dispute

because it can be resolved only through interpretation of the CBA.

Carmona, in contrast, insists thatthe district court erred in ruling that his

claims require interpretation of the CBA and thus should be classified as a

minor dispute under the RLA. Carmona acknowledges that it is necessary to

refer to the CBA, particularly Southwest’s attendance rules, method for

calculating attendance points, and procedures for obtaining medical and sick

leave, to resolve his claims; but he asserts that his claims create no dispute over

the meaning of any provision of the CBA. Stated differently, he insists that no

interpretation of the CBA is required, only adjudication of the factual question

whether Southwest was motivated by sex or his alleged disability (or both) in

terminating his employment. According to Carmona, Southwest is attempting

to “hide behind” RLA preclusion by equating his “straightforward” references to

the CBA’s terms with CBA interpretation.

As a preliminary matter before addressing whether Carmona’s claims

require CBA interpretation, we note that a CBA is not merely a simple, written

contract. Although Carmona attempts to narrow the scope of how a CBA is

defined to bolster his argument that his suit does not require CBA

interpretation, a CBA encompasses more than its explicit, written provisions.

The Supreme Court has held that a CBA includes not only written terms, but a

broad range of implied, unwritten terms “arising from ‘practice, usage and

custom.’”13 A CBA may encompass, for example,“a norm that the parties have
No. 07-51071

14 Id. at 264. 

15 Id. at 264 n.10 (quoting Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp.

Union, 396 U.S. 142, 154-55 (1969)).

16 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 

17 Id. at 579.

18 Norris, 512 U.S. at 264-65. 

19 Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991). 

20 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 305 (1989) (emphasis

added). 

8

created but have omitted from the CBA’s explicit language”14 or a working

“‘condition [that] is satisfactorily tolerable to both sides’” and so “‘is often omitted

from the agreement . . . .’”15 According to the Court, a CBA is “more than a

contract; itis a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen

cannot wholly anticipate.”16 The CBA “covers the whole employment

relationship.”17 Inasmuch as a CBA incorporates by reference more than just the

content of its black-letter terminology, both disputes over explicit written

provisions and disputes over implicit, non-written provisions of the agreement

may qualify as minor and be precluded by the RLA.18

Even so, for the federal courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over

claims like Carmona’s “do[es] not require that the CBA be irrelevant to the

dispute; either party may still use the CBA to support the credibility of its

claims.”19 Southwest’s contention that Carmona’s claims necessitate CBA

interpretation fails to recognize the distinction between reference to the CBA

and reliance on it. As noted, the “distinguishing feature” of a minor dispute

under the RLA is that“the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting”

the CBA.20

As provisions of the CBA are relevant to, but not dispositive of, the

resolution of Carmona’s claims, his claims do not constitute a minor dispute
No. 07-51071

21 See Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 668 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A claim brought

under an independent federal statute is precluded by the RLA only if it can be dispositively

resolved through an interpretation of a CBA. This occurs only when a provision of the

collective bargaining agreement is the subject of the dispute or the dispute is substantially

dependent upon an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, an

employer cannot ensure the preclusion of a plaintiff’s claim merely by asserting certain

CBA-based defenses to what is essentially a non-CBA-based claim, or by arguing that the

action challenged by the plaintiff is arguably justified by the terms of a CBA. Nor will a claim

be precluded merely because certain provisions of the CBA must be examined and weighed as

a relevant but non-dispositive factor in deciding a claim or a defense.” (internal quotations and

citations omitted)). 

22 79 F.3d 485, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1996).

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under the RLA. Even though a court would have to refer to the CBA to consider

fully each of the alleged acts of disparate treatment, there is no disagreement

about how to interpret these provisions of the CBA that detail Southwest’s

procedures for assessing attendance, leave, discipline, and termination.

Carmona’s factual allegations that unexcused absences by female flight

attendants went unpunished, that remarks of his supervisors regarding male

employees were discriminatory, and that his chronic illnesses were the real

reason he was fired, do not bring the meaning of any CBA provisions into

dispute. He alleges that CBA procedures were applied in a discriminatory

manner, not that CBA procedures were fundamentally discriminatory. Thus,

consideration of the CBA as applied to Title VII and the ADA — not

interpretation of the CBA itself — is what is required to resolve Carmona’s

claims.21

Southwest cites Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., in which we held

that a state claim of race discrimination was preempted by § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act, as support for the proposition that Carmona’s

references to the CBA necessitate CBA interpretation.22In reaching the decision

in Reece, however, we noted that the plaintiff’s claim “turn[ed] on questions of

promotion, seniority, and assignment to training programs, all of which are

provided for in the CBA,” and that the plaintiff directly challenged his
No. 07-51071

23 Id. at 487. 

24 Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that ADA

claim is independent of CBA and thus minor dispute); Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry.

Co., 60 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII claim is independent of CBA

and thus minor dispute). 

25 Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 171 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that “the

present controversy concerns the plaintiff’s rights under state and federal statutes which exist

independently ofthe collective bargaining agreement and do not require interpretation ofthat

agreement”); Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1115 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that

plaintiff’s ADA claim is not preempted by RLA because plaintiff “seeks to enforce a federal

statutory right, not a contractual right embodied by the collective bargaining agreement”); cf.

Brown, 254 F.3d at 667-68 (“It remains true as a general rule that the RLA will not bar a

plaintiff from bringing a claim under an independent federal statute in court (because such

claims are generally independent of the CBA and will be adjudicated under non-CBA

standards). However, this rule no longer applies if the federal claim asserted by the plaintiff

depends for its resolution on the interpretation of a CBA. Such claims are not ‘independent’

of the CBA regardless of their source, and are therefore precluded by the RLA.”).

10

employer’s rights under the CBA, all of which required interpretation of the

CBA.23 Southwest has not identified any CBA provision in dispute or in need of

interpretation to adjudicate Carmona’s claims, and neither have we. Carmona’s

claims do not turn on the CBA, so Reece is inapposite to Southwest’s contention

that the instant matter requires CBA interpretation.

In addition, the realization that Carmona is seeking to enforce his federal

statutory rights under Title VII and the ADA, not his contractual rights

embodied in the CBA, bolsters the contention that Carmona’s claims do not

require CBA interpretation. Other circuits have held that claims grounded in

federal statutory rights are generally not precluded by the RLA. The Ninth

Circuit, for example, has held that anti-discrimination claims brought under

Title VII and the ADA are independent of the CBA, so they do not qualify as

minor disputes.24 Similarly, the First and Eighth circuits have held that ADA

rights are independent of the RLA and are therefore outside the ambit of

disputes classified as minor.25 Even though Carmona’s action involves statutory

rights that exist independent of the CBA, we do not cite these decisions of other
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26 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (citing Atchison, Topeka

& Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987)). 

11

circuits to suggest that the source of the rights asserted in a union member’s

claims determines absolutely whether his action is precluded by the RLA. We

are persuaded, however,thatthe factthat Carmona’s claims allege Title VII and

ADA violations, as opposed to violations ofthe CBA itself, further evidences that

the instant suit does not require CBA interpretation. 

We recognize that compelling federal policies encourage the arbitration,

not the litigation, of CBA-related disputes between employers and their

employees. “Congress’ purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in

labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for

resolving labor disputes.”26 Notwithstanding this preference for arbitration, we

are convinced that Carmona’s claims do not require interpretation of the CBA,

only reference to it. As Carmona’s suit does not advance claims that constitute

a minor dispute, it is not precluded from judicial review by the RLA.

IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that because Carmona’s allegations of Title VII sex discrimination

and ADA disability discrimination do not require interpretation of the CBA, they

do not constitute a minor dispute precluded by the RLA. Consequently, the

district court erred in holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to

hear Carmona’s claims. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for

consideration of the merits of Carmona’s claims.