DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CARLOS HENFIELD EL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-938

[December 9, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Mariya Weekes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 18-7297 CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, 

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina JimenezOrosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CIKLIN, J.

Carlos Henfield El (“the defendant”) appeals his convictions for offenses 

related to marijuana possession and argues that reversal is required for 

two reasons: 1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for discharge 

based on a speedy trial violation, and 2) the trial court erred in granting 

the state’s peremptory strike to a juror over the defendant’s objection that 

it was racially motivated. With respect to the first argument, we find no 

ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the record, and therefore 

affirm without prejudice to the defendant’s right to seek postconviction 

relief. With respect to the second argument, we affirm based on an 

inadequate trial record.

On appeal, the defendant argues that, during jury selection, the trial 

court erred in not conducting an inquiry into the genuineness of the state’s 

purported race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. 

“The trial court’s decision to uphold a peremptory strike is reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion.” Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 942 (Fla. 2017). 

In Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996), the Florida Supreme 
2

Court set out the procedure that must be followed when a party challenges 

a peremptory strike as discriminatory:

A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory 

challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection 

on that basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a 

distinct racial group, and c) request that the court ask the 

striking party its reason for the strike. If these initial 

requirements are met (step 1), the court must ask the 

proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.

At this point, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 

proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 

explanation (step 2). If the explanation is facially race-neutral 

and the court believes that, given all the circumstances 

surrounding the strike, the explanation is not a pretext, the 

strike will be sustained (step 3). The court’s focus in step 3 is 

not on the reasonableness of the explanation but rather its 

genuineness. Throughout this process, the burden of 

persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove 

purposeful racial discrimination.

Id. at 764 (footnotes omitted).

The central question before us relates to step 3 of the Melbourne 

procedure, the trial court’s genuineness determination. “Under 

Melbourne, ‘[r]elevant circumstances [in the genuineness analysis] may 

include—but are not limited to–-the following: the racial make-up of the 

venire; prior strikes exercised against the same racial group; a strike based 

on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; or singling the 

juror out for special treatment.’” Johnson v. State, 238 So. 3d 726, 741 

(Fla. 2018) (first alteration in original) (quoting Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 

764 n.8). Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has explained that 

“reviewing courts should keep in mind two principles when enforcing the 

above guidelines”: first, that “peremptories are presumed to be exercised 

in a nondiscriminatory manner” and “[s]econd, [that] the trial court’s 

decision turns primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be 

affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” Melbourne, 679 So. 2d at 

764–65. 

Unfortunately, our appellate review is hampered by a collective failure

at the trial level to make a sufficient record. We are unable to conclusively 

identify the racial make-up of the venire, prior strikes exercised against 

the racial group of the challenged juror, or whether the reason proffered 
3

for the strike—the juror’s purported belief that marijuana should be 

legalized—was equally applicable to unchallenged jurors. Part of the 

reason for the inscrutability of the record centers around the fact that the 

two-member defense team frequently talked over one another, without 

corrective intervention by the trial court. Another impediment to 

meaningful appellate review revolves around the failure of counsel to 

identify, on the record, how many and which venirepersons shared or 

opposed the challenged juror’s belief in legalization. 

In the end, this case serves as a good reminder that the trial court and 

the attorneys must always keep a keen eye on and an appreciation for the 

record that is being made in real time. As with any other aspect of trial, 

the details of the jury selection process must be clearly documented in the 

record to facilitate appellate review. In its written transcript form, the 

record of a jury trial can easily become garbled, which is what occurred in 

this case. Because the record is unclear and cannot be rehabilitated to 

satisfy the precision required by Melbourne, our review is hindered. We 

state the obvious by suggesting that the preparation of a “clean” and 

understandable record is essential as it is the backbone of the appellate 

process.

Based on this record, we are unable to conclude that the trial court’s 

genuineness determination constituted an abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

FORST and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.