alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20
- 7467

REGINALD U. FULLARD , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. ROY COOPER; KENNETH LASSITER, Director of Prisons; MR. FIELDS, JR., Asst. Supt. at Facility , Respondents

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. Loretta C. Biggs , District Judge. ( 1:19

- cv - 01085

- LCB

- JLW )

Submitted : June 24, 2021 Decided: July 15, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, FLOYD , Circuit Judge , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Reginald U. Fullard, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Reginald U. Fullard seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Fullard’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a ci rcuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Fullard has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss th e appeal. We deny Fullard’s motions entitled “petition

- motion per 28 U.S.C. § 2242” and “motion for relief from constitutional error” and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
----

(2004/C 33 E/252)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2287/03

by Herbert Bösch (PSE) to the Commission

(7 July 2003)

Subject:   VAT rates for soy products

Soy products are mainly used as substitutes for milk products of animal origin (often in case of lactose intolerance or milk protein allergy) since they are able to provide an equivalent nutritional value to dairy products, which leads to the fact that soy and dairy products are directly competing on the market.

Whereas all Member States apply reduced VAT rates on dairy products, several Member States apply the standard VAT rate — which is considerably higher — on soy products (e.g. Spain and Austria).

Member States have to respect the principle of ‘fiscal neutrality’ which prohibits the application of different VAT treatments on equal/similar competing products since it leads to a distortion of competition. Also the European Court of Justice decided in several cases that similar goods/services have to be subjected to a uniform VAT rate.

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(8 August 2003)

The current Community rules on VAT rates (Article 12(3) of the Sixth VAT Directive (1)) do indeed give the Member States the option of applying a reduced rate to food products, since that category is listed in Annex Η to the Sixth Directive. If they opt to do so, they are not, however, obliged to apply a reduced rate to all food products.

The Commission has recently approved a proposal for a directive on reduced rates of VAT (2). The main purpose of this proposal is to improve the working of the internal market by rationalising the Member States' use of reduced rates in order to avoid potential distortions of competition by giving all Member States equal opportunities to apply reduced rates.

Though its proposal does not affect the category of foodstuffs, the Commission has nevertheless taken this opportunity to remind Member States of the need to bear in mind the case-law of the Court of Justice when defining the scope of their reduced rates. In particular, they need to respect the principle of fiscal neutrality, which includes two other principles, namely the principles of VAT uniformity and of elimination of distortion in competition.

----

(1)  Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment; OJ L 145, 13.6.1977. Last amended by Directive 2002/93/EC; OJ L 331, 7.12.2002.

(2)  COM(2003) 397 final.

----
<PAGE>
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                      EXHIBIT 11



                      UNIVERSAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES, INC.
                        COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                      Three Months Ended June 30,       Six Months Ended June 30,
                                                          2003           2002             2003             2002
                                                      -----------     -----------     -----------      -----------
<S>                                                   <C>             <C>             <C>              <C>
Earnings (Loss) per share:

BASIC NET INCOME (LOSS)  PER COMMON SHARE
Numerator:
  Income (Loss) from continuing operations            $    15,083     $   517,225     $  (959,387)     $   669,136

Denominator:
  Weighted average common shares outstanding            8,224,949       8,185,921       8,224,949        8,170,955
  Effect of dilutive securitiesd
    Conversion of preferred stock                       3,014,380       3,014,380               -        3,014,380
    Common stock equivalents from
     warrants and options                                 964,962               -               -                -
                                                      -----------     -----------     -----------      -----------
Denominator for diluted earnings per common share      12,204,291      11,200,301       8,224,949       11,185,335
                                                      ===========     ===========     ===========      ===========

  Basic net income (loss) per common share            $      0.00     $      0.06     $     (0.12)     $      0.08
  Diluted net income (loss) per common share          $      0.00     $      0.05     $     (0.12)     $      0.06
</TABLE>
The respondent is the Honorable Kerry S. Russell, Judge of the 7th Judicial District Court, Smith County, 1

Texas.

NO. 12-08-00337-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

§

IN RE:

§ ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

VINCE ALLEN LYNCH

§

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this original proceeding, Vince Allen Lynch complains that the respondent trial court

dismissed his lawsuit against the “114th Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas.” He seeks 1

a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its dismissal order and enter an order

compelling production of all relevant documents. We deny the petition.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and was intended to be available “only in situations

involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances that may be addressed by other

remedies.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). For Lynch to

be entitled to relief by mandamus, he must meet two requirements. First, he must show that the trial

court clearly abused its discretion. See id. Second, he must show that he lacks an adequate remedy

at law, such as an ordinary appeal. See id.

Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to a suit brought by an

inmate who files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002 (Vernon 2008). Section 14.003 provides that a court may dismiss such

a claim, either before or after service of process, if the court finds that
2

(1) the allegation of poverty in the affidavit or unsworn declaration is false;

(2) the claim is frivolous or malicious; or

(3) the inmate filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration required by [Chapter 14] that

the inmate knew was false.

TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2) (Vernon 2002). An order dismissing a lawsuit

governed by Chapter 14 is an appealable order. See Williams v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 176

S.W.3d 590, 592 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. denied).

In this case, the trial court implicitly found that Chapter 14 applied to Lynch’s lawsuit.

Consequently, the dismissal order is appealable. See id. Because the dismissal order is appealable,

Lynch cannot establish the second requirement for mandamus—the unavailability of an adequate

remedy at law. Therefore, Lynch cannot show that he is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly,

his petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

 JAMES T. WORTHEN 

 Chief Justice

Opinion delivered September 3, 2008.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

         We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement Form S-8 No. 333-2886 pertaining to the 1985 Stock Incentive Program,
the Outside Directors' Stock Option Plan, the Employee Qualified Stock Purchase
Plan and the 1994 Stock Option Plan, Forms S-8 No. 333-52037, No. 333-89275 and
No. 333-100784 pertaining to the 1994 Stock Option Plan, Form S-8 No. 333-68249
pertaining to the Employee Qualified Stock Purchase Plan, Form S-8 No. 333-49906
pertaining to the 1994 Stock Option Plan and the 2000 Nonstatutory Stock Option
Plan, Form S-8 No. 333-67624 pertaining to the 1994 Stock Option Plan and the
Employee Qualified Stock Purchase Plan, and Form S-8 No. 333-102538 pertaining
to the Tavanza, Inc. 2000 Stock Incentive Plan of Celeritek, Inc. of our report
dated April 25, 2003, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and
schedule of Celeritek, Inc. included in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the
year ended March 31, 2003.


                                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP


San Jose, California
June 24, 2003
Exhibit 10.23





EXHIBIT
10.23




SUMMARY OF DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

OF

AMERIGAS PROPANE, INC.,

General Partner of

AMERIGAS PARTNERS, L.P.




The table below shows the components of director compensation effective October 1, 2010. A director
who is an officer or employee of the Registrant or its subsidiaries is not compensated for service
on the Board of Directors or on any Committee of the Board.



DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	CASH	 	 	EQUITY	 
	 	 	COMPONENT	 	 	COMPONENT	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Annual retainer
	 	$	65,000	 	 	500 Phantom Units (Representing AmeriGas Partners, L.P. Common Units)
	Additional annual retainer for
Audit Committee Members
(other than the Chairperson)
	 	 	10,000	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Additional retainer for
Audit Committee Chairperson
	 	 	15,000	 	 	 	 	 






The Directors are also offered employee rates on propane purchases.
ACCEPTED

07-15-00070-CV

SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

AMARILLO, TEXAS

7/14/2015 2:04:27 PM

Vivian Long, Clerk

 FILED IN 7th COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 7/14/2015 2:04:27 PM VIVIAN LONG CLERK
STATE of North Carolina v. Randy BASKIN.

No. 249P08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 26, 2008.

Richard Croutharmel, Apex, for Baskin.

*649Catherine F. Jordan, James C. Gaither, Jr., District Attorney, for State of NC.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 660 S.E.2d 566.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 3rd day of June 2008 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 26th day of August 2008."
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The Honorable Cormac J. Carney, United States District Judge for the ***

Central District of California, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE RUBICEL CAMPO-ORTIZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-73908

Agency No. A075-891-084

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 8, 2010** 

San Francisco, California

Before: BEEZER and GRABER, Circuit Judges, and CARNEY, District Judge. *** 

Petitioner Jorge Rucibel Campo-Ortiz petitions for review from the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of his claim that he meets the requirements of the

applicable naturalization statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1432 (1999) (repealed 2000).

FILED

OCT 21 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Reviewing de novo, Retuta v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2010), we

deny the petition for review.

Petitioner does not meet the plain-text requirements of § 1432(a)(5), because

he was not a lawful permanent resident "at the time of the naturalization of" his

mother, and because he did not become a lawful permanent resident "while under

the age of eighteen years." See also Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057,

1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (clarifying the requirements defined by this statutory

subsection). Petitioner’s claim of derivative citizenship therefore fails.

Although we have imputed a parent’s lawful permanent resident status to a

child for purposes of cancellation of removal, Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430

F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), and Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th

Cir. 2009), we did so in large part because of an ambiguity in the statute. Unlike in

those cases, where the cancellation-of-removal statute refers broadly to "an alien,"

the plain text of this naturalization statute is crystal clear with respect to who must

have what status and when. The naturalization statute refers specifically to "the

parent" and "the child," and it plainly states that the "child" must have permanent

resident status during the required time frame (at any time between the mother’s

naturalization and the child’s eighteenth birthday). 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(5)

(emphasis added). There is no ambiguity for us to interpret.

Petition DENIED.
3
In the Matter of the FORECLOSURE OF A DEED OF TRUST EXECUTED BY William Gerald PRICE in the original amount of $190,000.00 dated December 12, 2002, recorded in Book 286, Page 113, Ashe County Registry. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc., Substitute Trustee.

No. COA15-639.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Feb. 2, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Dismissed.
STATE of North Carolina v. Danny Allen STANLEY, Jr.

No. COA15-906.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 15, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.
# CE2004065EN.01003702.xml

| 13.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 65/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 65/37

---

(2004/C 65 E/037)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-0616/03

by Lord Inglewood (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(25 February 2003)

Subject:   Directive on Tobacco Sponsorship and Advertising

Subject:

Will the Commission confirm that, in making the proposal for the Directive on Tobacco Sponsorship and Advertising, it was not its intention to prevent the continued use of brand names originally used for non-tobacco products, and still used in good faith for advertising or sponsoring non-tobacco products, provided it is in a manner distinct from that used for tobacco products of the same names?

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(13 March 2003)

(13 March 2003)

The Commission can confirm that in making the proposal for the Directive of the Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products (1), it was not its intention to prevent the continued use of brand names originally used for non-tobacco products, and still used in good faith for advertising and sponsoring non-tobacco products, provided it is in a manner distinct from that used for tobacco products of the same names.

1

---

(1)  OJ C 270 E, 25.9.2001.

1

---
STATE v. Marvin Wade MILLSAPS.

No. 374P13-5.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 5, 2015.

Barry H. Bloch, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Marvin W. Millsaps, Norlina, for Millsaps, Marvin Wade.

Sarah Kirkman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of August 2015 by Defendant for Rule 15 Discretionary Review:

> "Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 5th of November 2015."

ERVIN, J. recused.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CASEY JAMES PERKINS A/K/A 

JIMMY PERKINS, 

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-19-00068-CR

Appeal from the

120th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20180D01802)

O R D E R

The Court has this day considered the Honorable Maria Salas-Mendoza’s request for 

extension of time to conduct the hearing and concludes the motion should be GRANTED.

Therefore, the trial court has until October 12, 2019 to hold the hearing pursuant to this 

Court’s order of September 5, 2019. The District Clerk shall prepare and forward a supplemental 

clerk’s record containing the trial court’s orders and/or findings on or before October 19, 2019. 

Further, the transcription of the hearing shall be prepared, certified and filed with this Court on or 

before October 19, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of September, 2019.

PER CURIAM
# C_2008008EN.01001302.xml

| 12.1.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 8/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.1.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 8/13

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 20 November 2007 — Tegometall International v OHIM — Wuppermann (TEK)

(Case T-458/05) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Application for the Community word mark TEK - Subject-matter of the proceedings - Observance of the rights of the defence - Absolute grounds for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(b),(c) and (g) and Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94)

(2008/C 8/25)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Tegometall International AG (Lengwil-Oberhofen, Switzerland) (represented by: H. Timmann, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: J. Weberndörfer, Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervener before the Court of First Instance: Wuppermann AG (Leverkusen, Germany) (represented: initially by H. Huisken, and subsequently by I. Friedhoff, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervener before the Court of First Instance:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 21 October 2005 (Case R 1063/2004-2), as rectified on 16 November 2005, relating to invalidity proceedings between Wuppermann AG and Tegometall International AG.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the applicant to pay the costs, except those incurred by the intervener; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the applicant to pay the costs, except those incurred by the intervener;

| 3. | Orders the intervener to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the intervener to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 60, 11.3.2006.

1

---
STATE of North Carolina v. Eric Cornell WILSON.

No. COA 15-234.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 6, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
Exhibit 14.1

                 SELECTED QUARTERLY FINANCIAL DATA - (UNAUDITED)
                (US dollars in thousands, except per share data)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                     Quarter ended
                                           ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Mar. 31          Jun. 30         Sep. 30          Dec. 31
                                           -------------    -------------   -------------    -------------
<S>                                            <C>              <C>             <C>              <C>
Year ended December 31, 2003
----------------------------
   Net sales                                   $ 16,045         $ 16,944        $ 37,655         $ 34,556
   Gross profit                                   6,254            5,647          14,598           14,130
   Net income (loss)                               (604)            (789)          6,625            7,259
   Basic income (loss) per share                  (0.03)           (0.04)           0.37             0.40
   Diluted income (loss) per share                (0.03)           (0.04)           0.34             0.38

Year ended December 31, 2002
----------------------------
   Net sales                                   $ 17,503         $ 20,507        $ 47,305         $ 39,331
   Gross profit                                   5,928            6,202          18,939           16,096
   Net income (loss)                             (1,575)             962           9,379            3,168
   Basic income (loss) per share                  (0.09)            0.05            0.53             0.18
   Diluted income (loss) per share                (0.09)            0.05            0.51             0.17
</TABLE>


Common Share Price                                      High       Low

2003 Quarter
   Fourth...........................................  $ 7.950    $ 6.300
   Third............................................    8.170      6.880
   Second...........................................    8.000      5.540
   First............................................    6.540      4.200

2002 Quarter
   Fourth...........................................  $ 4.600    $ 3.450
   Third............................................    4.029      3.560
   Second...........................................    4.600      3.800
   First............................................    4.400      3.400

2001 Quarter
   Fourth...........................................  $ 4.900    $ 2.531
   Third............................................    4.250      2.400
   Second...........................................    3.500      2.500
   First............................................    3.375      1.625