IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2008 MT 296 

 _____________________________________ 

STATE OF MONTANA, No. 05-676 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MICHAEL THADDEUS GOETZ, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 _____________________________________ 

STATE OF MONTANA, No. 05-539 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JOSEPH PATRICK HAMPER, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 ____________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

 In and for the County of Gallatin, Cause Nos. DC-04-354 and DC-04-390 

 The Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

 For Appellants: 

Peter B. Ohman (argued), Gallatin County Public Defender’s Office, 

Bozeman, Montana 

Brian K. Gallik (argued), Goetz, Gallik & Baldwin, P.C., Bozeman, 

Montana 
 For Respondent: 

 Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jim Wheelis and Mark Mattioli 

(argued), Assistant Attorneys General, Helena, Montana 

 Marty Lambert, County Attorney; Todd Whipple, Deputy County 

Attorney, Bozeman, Montana 

 _____________________________________ 

 Argued and Submitted: July 19, 2006 

 Decided: August 20, 2008 

Filed: 

____________________________________________ 

Clerk 

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Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Michael Thaddeus Goetz (Goetz) and Joseph Patrick Hamper (Hamper) 

(collectively, the Defendants) appeal from the judgments entered by the Eighteenth 

Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, on their respective convictions for felony 

criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. Specifically, the Defendants challenge the 

District Court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence. We reverse and remand. 

¶2 We address the following issue: 

¶3 Were the Defendants’ rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana 

Constitution violated by the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of their oneon-one conversations with confidential informants, notwithstanding the confidential 

informants’ consent to the monitoring? 

BACKGROUND 

¶4 In light of the identical primary legal issue raised in these two appeals, we 

consolidated the cases for purposes of oral argument and resolution. The following sets 

forth the relevant factual and procedural background of the individual cases. 

State v. Goetz

¶5 On May 19, 2004, Matt Collar (Collar), a detective with the Missouri River Drug 

Task Force (Task Force), made contact with Suzanne Trusler (Trusler), who previously 

had agreed to act as a confidential informant for the Task Force. Trusler informed Collar 

she had arranged to purchase a gram of methamphetamine from Goetz. Trusler then met 

with Collar and Detective Travis Swandal (Swandal) and allowed them to outfit her with 

a body wire receiving device. The detectives did not seek or obtain a search warrant 

 3
authorizing use of the body wire. Collar gave Trusler $200 with which to purchase the 

drug. Trusler then went to Goetz’s residence and purchased methamphetamine from him. 

The conversation between Goetz and Trusler during the drug transaction was monitored 

and recorded by the detectives via Trusler’s body wire. Goetz was unaware of, and did 

not consent to, the electronic monitoring and recording of his conversation with Trusler. 

¶6 The State of Montana (State) subsequently charged Goetz by information with the 

offense of felony criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. In the information, the State 

listed Collar and Swandal as witnesses to be called at trial. The State also advised Goetz 

that it intended to introduce the tape recording of his and Trusler’s conversation, and a 

transcript of the recording, into evidence at trial. Goetz moved the District Court to 

suppress the evidence derived from the electronic monitoring and recording of the 

conversation on the basis that it violated his rights to privacy and to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the 

Montana Constitution. The District Court held a hearing and subsequently denied the 

motion to suppress. Goetz then pled guilty to the charged offense, expressly reserving his 

right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his suppression motion. 

State v. Hamper

¶7 On August 4, 2004, Collar made contact with Chrystal White (White), who 

previously had agreed to act as a confidential informant with the Task Force. White 

informed Collar that she had arranged to purchase 1/8 ounce of marijuana for $50 from 

Hamper. White met with Collar and Swandal and allowed the detectives to outfit her 

with a body wire receiving device. Collar provided White with $50 to purchase the 

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marijuana. White met Hamper in a parking lot and purchased marijuana from him. The 

drug transaction took place in White’s vehicle and the conversation between White and 

Hamper was monitored and recorded by the detectives via White’s body wire. The 

following day, White again contacted Collar and informed him she had arranged to 

purchase another 1/8 ounce of marijuana from Hamper for $50. White met with Collar 

and Swandal and again allowed them to outfit her with a body wire. White then went to 

Hamper’s residence and purchased marijuana from him. Again, the conversation 

between White and Hamper regarding the drug transaction was electronically monitored 

and recorded by the detectives via White’s body wire. The detectives did not seek or 

obtain search warrants authorizing the electronic monitoring or recording of either 

conversation. Hamper was unaware of, and did not consent to, the electronic monitoring 

and recording of either conversation. 

¶8 The State subsequently charged Hamper by information with two counts of felony 

criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. The State indicated its intent to call Collar and 

Swandal as witnesses at trial, and also indicated its intent to introduce the recordings of 

the two conversations—and transcripts of those recordings—into evidence at trial. 

Hamper moved to suppress evidence obtained via the electronic monitoring and 

recording of the two conversations on the basis that it violated his rights to privacy and to 

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by Article II, Sections 10 

and 11 of the Montana Constitution. The District Court held a hearing and subsequently 

denied Hamper’s motion to suppress. Hamper then pled guilty to the charged offenses, 

expressly reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶9 We review a district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress 

evidence to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its 

interpretation and application of the law correct. State v. Copelton, 2006 MT 182, ¶ 8, 

333 Mont. 91, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 1074, ¶ 8. Here, the parties do not dispute the District 

Court’s relevant findings of fact. Consequently, we review only whether the court 

correctly interpreted and applied the law. 

DISCUSSION 

¶10 Were the Defendants’ rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the 

Montana Constitution violated by the warrantless electronic monitoring and 

recording of their one-on-one conversations with confidential informants, 

notwithstanding the confidential informants’ consent to the monitoring? 

¶11 The Defendants’ motions to suppress relied primarily on State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 

310, 693 P.2d 518 (1984), in which this Court determined that the warrantless electronic 

monitoring and recording of the defendant’s conversations with an undercover law 

enforcement officer violated the defendant’s rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of 

the Montana Constitution, notwithstanding the undercover officer’s consent to the 

monitoring. The State countered that, under State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364 

(1988), the electronic monitoring of a conversation between two people, with the consent 

of one of them, does not constitute a search subject to the search warrant requirement. 

¶12 The District Court recognized the conflict between Solis and Brown, and noted our 

own observation, in State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 51, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 51, 36 P.3d 

900, ¶ 51, of jurisprudential inconsistencies in privacy law cases from the mid-1980s 

through the early 1990s. Determining stare decisis required the application of Brown, the 

 6
District Court denied the motions to suppress. It concluded the Defendants did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations with the confidential informants 

and, thus, the electronic monitoring of the conversations by use of body wire transmitting 

devices did not violate the Defendants’ rights of privacy or to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. The Defendants assert legal error. 

¶13 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 

11 of the Montana Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. The Defendants do not dispute that, pursuant to United States Supreme Court 

jurisprudence, warrantless electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations, with the 

consent of one party to the conversation, does not constitute a search and, therefore, does 

not violate the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S. 

Ct. 1122 (1971). They assert, however, that Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the 

Montana Constitution afford citizens a greater right to privacy which, in turn, provides 

broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in situations involving searches and 

seizures occurring in private settings. 

¶14 Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution provides that “[t]he right of 

individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be 

infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” Article II, Section 11 of 

the Montana Constitution provides that 

[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or 

seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be 

searched or the person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, 

supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. 

 7
We address Article II, Section 10 in conjunction with Article II, Section 11 in analyzing 

and resolving a search or seizure issue that specifically implicates the right to privacy. 

See e.g. Hardaway, ¶ 32; State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 264-65, 934 P.2d 176, 184-85 

(1997) (overruled in part in State v. Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, ¶ 19, 291 Mont. 474, ¶ 19, 970 

P.2d 556, ¶ 19). Furthermore, “[i]n light of the constitutional right to privacy to which 

Montanans are entitled, we have held that the range of warrantless searches which may 

be lawfully conducted under the Montana Constitution is narrower than the 

corresponding range of searches that may be lawfully conducted pursuant to the federal 

Fourth Amendment.” Hardaway, ¶ 35. 

I. Solis and Brown

¶15 Given the parties’ and the District Court’s understandable reliance in this case on 

early Montana privacy and search and seizure jurisprudence as set forth in Solis and 

Brown, we begin with a discussion of those cases. In Solis, law enforcement employed 

an undercover officer to act as a pawnshop proprietor and, with the officer’s consent, 

videotaped certain events in the pawnshop. On numerous occasions, Solis was 

videotaped selling merchandise—some of which apparently was stolen—to the 

undercover officer. The State charged Solis with theft and intended to rely at trial on the 

videotapes and testimony from the officers running the taping machine rather than any 

testimony from the undercover officer who consented to the videotaping. Solis, 214 

Mont. at 312-13, 693 P.2d at 519. 

 8
¶16 On appeal from the trial court’s suppression of the videotapes and testimony, we 

addressed whether the State violated Solis’s right to privacy under Article II, Section 10 

of the Montana Constitution. First, we set forth the test for determining whether an 

individual has a constitutionally protected right of privacy as (1) does the individual have 

an actual or subjective expectation of privacy? and, if so, (2) is that expectation of 

privacy one which society is willing to view as reasonable? Solis, 214 Mont. at 314, 693 

P.2d at 520 (citing Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 207 Mont. 513, 522, 

675 P.2d 962, 967 (1984)). We concluded the defendant exhibited an actual expectation 

of privacy by holding his conversations with the undercover officer in a small, enclosed 

office within the pawnshop with only a personal friend of the defendant present, and this 

expectation of privacy was reasonable because there were no areas from which other 

individuals could have overheard the conversations. Solis, 214 Mont. at 314, 693 P.2d at 

520. On the privacy versus electronic monitoring issue, we held that “in face-to-face 

encounters in a private setting, there is a reasonable expectation that hidden monitoring is 

not taking place.” Solis, 214 Mont. at 318, 693 P.2d at 522. 

¶17 We next proceeded to the question of whether a compelling state interest justified 

infringing on Solis’s right under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution. We 

determined that a compelling state interest exists where the state is enforcing its criminal 

laws for the benefit and protection of its citizens, especially under the Solis circumstances 

where the suspect had engaged in repeated activity thought to be criminal. Even when a 

compelling interest in invading an individual’s privacy existed, however, we required that 

the procedural safeguards attached to the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 

 9
searches and seizures must first be met. In other words, “[t]he State was required to show 

probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant.” Solis, 214 Mont. at 318-19, 

693 P.2d at 522. The trial court having found no exigent circumstances precluding law 

enforcement from a reasonable opportunity to seek a search warrant, we held that the 

warrantless monitoring and recording of the defendant’s conversations with the 

undercover officer violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches. Solis, 214 

Mont. at 319-20, 693 P.2d at 523. 

¶18 Solis set forth an in-depth discussion and analysis of the right to privacy 

guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. However, only two Justices concurred in the 

holding based on application of the Montana Constitution. Three additional Justices 

concurred in the result of the decision, but relied on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 

88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), and other federal case law to determine that an unreasonable 

warrantless search occurred which was not justified by any exception to the warrant 

requirement. Solis, 214 Mont. at 320, 693 P.2d at 523 (Sheehy & Weber, JJ., & Haswell, 

C.J., concurring). Consequently, Solis is not controlling precedent regarding application 

of Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution to the substantially similar 

circumstances of the present case. 

¶19 The Court decided Brown in 1988, less than four years after Solis. In that case, 

law enforcement monitored and recorded three conversations between a suspect and an 

undercover police officer via a body wire transmitting device attached to the officer. The 

conversations took place in a vehicle in a parking lot, over the telephone and in a motel 

room rented by the undercover officer, and all related to arranging and completing a 

 10
single transaction for the sale of marijuana. Upon being charged with felony criminal 

sale of dangerous drugs, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing in part that 

the recording of her conversations without her knowledge was illegal. The trial court 

denied the motion to dismiss and the defendant appealed. Brown, 232 Mont. at 3-4, 755 

P.2d at 1366. 

¶20 In addressing the defendant’s face-to-face conversations in the vehicle and motel 

room, the Court noted the United States Supreme Court’s holding in White that 

warrantless electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations—with the consent of one 

participant—does not violate the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution. The Court also recognized, however, that Article II, 

Section 10 of the Montana Constitution, in conjunction with Article II, Section 11, grants 

rights beyond those in the federal constitution and requires an independent analysis of 

privacy and search and seizure issues. Brown, 232 Mont. at 9-10, 755 P.2d at 1369-70. 

¶21 The Brown Court observed that some violation of a person’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy must have occurred before the protections of Article II, Section 11 

are implicated. The Court then determined—with little analysis and no citation to 

authority—that, while the defendant possessed a subjective expectation that her 

conversations with the undercover officer would remain private, her expectation of 

privacy was not reasonably justifiable and, consequently, no search or seizure occurred. 

Brown, 232 Mont. at 10, 755 P.2d at 1370. The Court further determined that the 

warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of a conversation with the consent of one 

participant did not violate Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution. Brown, 232 

 11
Mont. at 11, 755 P.2d at 1371. On that basis, the Court held that “warrantless consensual 

electronic monitoring of face-to-face conversations by the use of a body wire transmitting 

device, performed by law enforcement officers while pursuing their official duties, does 

not violate the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures nor the privacy 

section of the Montana Constitution.” Brown, 232 Mont. at 8, 755 P.2d at 1369. The 

Court’s prior holding in Solis was neither acknowledged nor overruled. 

¶22 When discussing why the warrantless consensual electronic monitoring and 

recording of the conversation did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Montana 

Constitution in Brown, the Court cited United States Supreme Court cases and one legal 

commentator. Furthermore, while Brown did not expressly cite White, the concepts 

contained in the discussion of the Montana Constitution in Brown appear to be taken 

directly from the Supreme Court’s rationale in that case. See White, 401 U.S. at 749-54, 

91 S. Ct. at 1125-27; Brown, 232 Mont. at 10-11, 755 P.2d at 1370-71. Thus, 

notwithstanding our recognition in Brown that Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the 

Montana Constitution, taken together, grant rights beyond those contained in the federal 

constitution, our resolution of that case merely paralleled federal jurisprudence on the 

subject and failed to properly analyze the greater rights guaranteed by Montana’s 

Constitution. Stated differently, having stated without equivocation that the Montana 

Constitution expressly provides more privacy protection than that inferred from the 

United States Constitution—with the corresponding obligation to provide an independent 

analysis under the Montana Constitution—we failed to follow through. See Brown, 232 

Mont. at 10-11, 755 P.2d at 1370-71. Nor did we do so in the only two cases since 1988 

 12
in which we have cited Brown for its holding regarding the monitoring and recording of 

face-to-face conversations. See State v. Belgarde, 244 Mont. 500, 798 P.2d 539 (1990) 

and State v. Staat, 251 Mont. 1, 822 P.2d 643 (1991). 

¶23 In more recent years, this Court has readily applied Article II, Section 10 in search 

and seizure cases to protect the privacy interests of Montana citizens. Indeed, in 

Hardaway, ¶ 57, we noted our “consistent trend toward protecting the privacy interests of 

our citizens[:]” 

[I]n State v. Sawyer [174 Mont. 512, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977)], this Court first 

applied Article II, Section 10 to a search and seizure case and explicitly 

stated that Section 10 provided greater individual privacy protection in such 

cases than did the federal constitution. We restated this rule in [Solis] and 

State v. Sierra, [214 Mont. 472, 692 P.2d 1273 (1985)], among others. 

During this same time, however, the Court ruled on numerous other search 

and seizure cases and made no reference to Article II, Section 10 

whatsoever. . . . Subsequently, from the mid-1980s through the early 

1990s, the Court provided no greater protection for individual privacy in 

search and seizure cases than parallel federal law provided . . . . However, 

since City of Billings v. Whalen (1990), 242 Mont. 293, 790 P.2d 471, this 

Court has given increased protection to the privacy rights of Montana 

citizens, limiting the scope of search and seizure cases, and since State v. 

Bullock [272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61 (1995)], the Court has applied Article 

II, Section 10, emphasizing “privacy as a mechanism to support 

interpretation of search and seizure cases.” . . . In the ensuing years, we 

consistently analyzed search and seizure cases involving significant privacy 

issues under both Sections 10 and 11 of Article II of the Montana 

Constitution. 

Hardaway, ¶ 51. In light of this “consistent trend” of protecting Montana citizens’ 

heightened privacy rights under our Constitution, the Hardaway Court overruled an 

earlier case addressing the relevant issue on the basis that the rationale in the prior case 

was premised exclusively on federal jurisprudence and failed to comport with current 

 13
search and seizure and right to privacy analyses under the Montana Constitution. 

Hardaway, ¶¶ 55-57 (overruling State v. Ulrich, 187 Mont. 347, 609 P.2d 1218 (1980)). 

¶24 Similarly here, we conclude Brown provides little, if any, guidance in resolving 

the issue before us in light of the reliance on federal jurisprudence—and limited analysis 

and application of the provisions of the Montana Constitution—in that case. Therefore, 

we overrule Brown and again recognize that Solis is not controlling precedent. As a 

result, we examine the issue before us anew, applying more current and consistent 

interpretations of Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. 

II. Analysis Under Current Montana Constitutional Search and 

Seizure and Right To Privacy Jurisprudence 

¶25 The issue in the present case is whether the warrantless electronic monitoring and 

recording of a face-to-face conversation with the consent of one participant in the 

conversation violates the other participant’s rights to privacy and to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article II, Sections 10 and 11. The 

initial inquiry in addressing this issue is determining whether such conduct constitutes a 

search. See State v. Scheetz, 286 Mont. 41, 46, 950 P.2d 722, 724 (1997). A search is 

“the use of some means of gathering evidence which infringes upon a person’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy.” Hardaway, ¶ 16. “A search occurs when the 

government infringes upon an individual’s expectation of privacy that society considers 

objectively reasonable.” Where no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists, a 

“search” does not occur within the contemplation of Article II, Section 11 of the Montana 

 14
Constitution. State v. Hamilton, 2003 MT 71, ¶ 17, 314 Mont. 507, ¶ 17, 67 P.3d 871, ¶ 

17 (citing Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 46, 950 P.2d at 725). 

¶26 Article II, Section 11 protects Montana citizens from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. Similarly, the Article II, Section 10 right to privacy—even where established—

is not absolute, but may be infringed upon a showing of a compelling state interest to do 

so. See State v. Nelson, 283 Mont. 231, 243, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (1997). However, even 

upon a showing of a compelling state interest, “the State may not invade an individual’s 

privacy unless the procedural safeguards attached to the right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures are met.” State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶53, 302 

Mont. 228, ¶ 53, 14 P.3d 456, ¶ 53. 

¶27 We determine whether a state action constitutes an “unreasonable” or “unlawful” 

search or seizure in violation of the Montana Constitution by analyzing three factors: 1) 

whether the person challenging the state’s action has an actual subjective expectation of 

privacy; 2) whether society is willing to recognize that subjective expectation as 

objectively reasonable; and 3) the nature of the state’s intrusion. See e.g. State v. Hill, 

2004 MT 184, ¶ 24, 322 Mont. 165, ¶ 24, 94 P.3d 752, ¶ 24. The first two factors are 

considered in determining whether a search or seizure occurred, thus triggering the 

protections of Article II, Sections 10 and 11. The third factor relates to the 

reasonableness of the search or seizure under the circumstances. Under the third factor, 

we determine whether the state action complained of violated the Article II, Section 10 

and 11 protections because it was not justified by a compelling state interest or was 

undertaken without procedural safeguards such as a properly issued search warrant or 

 15
other special circumstances. See e.g. State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81, ¶ 23, 315 Mont. 59, ¶ 

23, 67 P.3d 295, ¶ 23; Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 50, 950 P.2d at 727; State v. Smith, 2004 MT 

234, ¶¶ 12-13, 322 Mont. 466, ¶¶ 12-13, 97 P.3d 567, ¶¶ 12-13. We address these factors 

in turn. 

A. Did the Defendants Have an Actual Subjective Expectation of Privacy? 

¶28 “[W]e recognize that naturally a person seeks to protect certain parts of his or her 

privacy, and it is those desires which are at the foundation for the constitutional 

safeguards that exist to protect them.” Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 48, 950 P.2d at 726. 

Moreover, a person normally expects privacy free from governmental intrusion not 

authorized by a warrant in her or his home. See State v. Graham, 2004 MT 385, ¶ 21, 

325 Mont. 110, ¶ 21, 103 P.3d 1073, ¶ 21 (citations omitted). Thus, while the home is 

traditionally “the raison d’être for the constitutional protection[,]” “the right to be free 

from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses more than the home . . . .” 

Graham, ¶ 22. In that regard, we observe again that Article II, Section 11 guarantees that 

“[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Emphasis added). 

¶29 These fundamental principles clarify that we base our recognition of an actual 

expectation of privacy on various factors. See Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 48, 950 P.2d at 726. 

“‘What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected, but what an individual 

seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 

constitutionally protected.’” Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 49, 950 P.2d at 726-27 (quoting 

Bullock, 272 Mont. at 375, 901 P.2d at 70). Indeed, in Montana, 

 16
when persons leave the privacy of their home and expose themselves and 

their effects to the public and its independent powers of perception, it is 

clear that they cannot expect to preserve the same degree of privacy for 

themselves or their affairs as they could expect at home. However, when a 

person takes precautions to place items behind or underneath seats, in 

trunks or glove boxes, or uses other methods of ensuring that those items 

may not be accessed and viewed without permission, there is no obvious 

reason to believe that any privacy interest with regard to those items has 

been surrendered simply because those items happen to be in an 

automobile. 

Elison, ¶ 51 (citation omitted). While Elison involved physical items stowed within a 

vehicle, the same rationale applies to a conversation with another person in a vehicle 

which cannot be overheard by the public outside the vehicle. Thus, where a person has 

gone to considerable trouble to keep activities and property away from prying eyes, the 

person evinces a subjective expectation of privacy in those activities and that property. 

State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 2005 MT 180, ¶ 12, 328 Mont. 10, ¶ 12, 116 P.3d 800, ¶ 

12. Accordingly, we determine whether a person has knowingly exposed something to 

the public and, consequently, surrendered his or her privacy protections by looking at the 

particular facts of the case. Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 49, 950 P.2d at 726-27. 

¶30 Here, the face-to-face conversations between the Defendants and one other 

individual were within the Defendants’ private homes and, in Hamper’s case, in the 

confines of a vehicle. The Defendants did not conduct their conversations where other 

individuals were present or physically within range to overhear the conversations. In 

other words, the Defendants kept their activities and conversations away from prying 

eyes (and ears), and did not expose their conversations to the public’s “independent 

 17
powers of perception.” We conclude the Defendants exhibited actual subjective 

expectations of privacy in the face-to-face conversations they held in private settings. 

B. Is Society Willing to Recognize the Defendants’ Expectations of 

Privacy as Reasonable? 

¶31 We next address whether society is willing to recognize an individual’s subjective 

expectation that a one-on-one conversation conducted in a private setting is not being 

surreptitiously electronically monitored and recorded. Stated differently, does society 

perceive it is reasonable to expect privacy in a personal conversation held in a private 

setting? “The reasonableness inquiry hinges on the essence of underlying constitutional 

values—including respect for both private, subjective expectations and public norms. In 

assessing the constitutionality of technologically enhanced government surveillance in a 

particular case, we must identify the values that are at risk, and vest the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test with those values.” State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552, 555 (Vt. 

1991). 

¶32 We observe here the importance of avoiding an overly narrow delineation of the 

nature of the reasonableness inquiry, because to do so would render every conceivable 

factual difference in a conversation subject to litigation. In Montana, the protections 

afforded by Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution “extend to all of 

Montana’s citizens including those suspected of a criminal act or charged with one.” 

Hardaway, ¶ 14. Indeed, we have long observed this principle, even under the search and 

seizure provision of our 1889 Constitution: 

the exercise of the power of search and seizure is absolutely essential to the 

public welfare. . . . But the process may be exercised, and the law enforced 

 18
and vindicated, without transgressing those constitutional guaranties which 

are provided for all alike, the guiltless and the guilty. 

State ex rel. Thibodeau v. Fourth Jud. Dist., 70 Mont. 202, 209, 224 P. 866, 869 (1924) 

(emphasis added). 

¶33 We have on prior occasions quoted extensively from—and discussed the debates 

of—the delegates to the constitutional convention with regard to the inclusion of the right 

to privacy in the 1972 Montana Constitution. See e.g. Siegal, 281 Mont. at 276-77, 934 

P.2d at 191-92. Delegate Campbell stated that “the [Bill of Rights] committee felt very 

strongly that the people of Montana should be protected as much as possible against 

eavesdropping, electronic surveillance, and such type of activities. . . . [W]e found that 

the citizens of Montana were very suspicious of such type of activity.” Montana 

Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1682. Delegate 

Dahood reported even more strongly: “[I]t is inconceivable to any of us that there would 

ever exist a situation in the State of Montana where electronic surveillance could be 

justified. . . . [W]ithin the area of the State of Montana, we cannot conceive of a situation 

where we could ever permit electronic surveillance.” Transcript, p. 1687. Thus, the 

Constitutional Convention delegates were aware of the great value Montana citizens 

place on the right to privacy and the clear risk to that privacy engendered by the existence 

and advancement of electronic technology as used by law enforcement. 

¶34 “[T]he proceedings of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention disclose on 

the part of the delegates a particular concern over the intrusion of the government into the 

 19
privacy of Montanans through the use of various types of electronic monitoring and 

surveillance.” Siegal, 281 Mont. at 265, 934 P.2d at 184. 

[I]t is clear that the delegates’ concerns encompassed the invasion of 

citizens’ privacy without their knowledge by means of various sorts of 

electronic audio and visual monitoring and surveillance equipment. Not 

only were the delegates wary of existing technology of this type, but they 

recognized that this sort of technology would continue to be refined and 

would become more widespread and easily available. In this regard their 

concerns have been well-founded. Moreover, it is also clear that, in the 

delegates’ view, the use of this sort of technology should be justified only 

in the most serious of situations, involving heinous crimes where it is 

necessary to “risk the right of individual privacy because there is a greater 

purpose to be served.” 

Siegal, 281 Mont. at 277, 934 P.2d at 192. 

¶35 The express statements of the delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional 

Convention regarding the government’s use of electronic surveillance against Montana’s 

citizens provide direct support for a conclusion that society is willing to recognize as 

reasonable the expectation that conversations held in a private setting are not 

surreptitiously being electronically monitored and recorded by government agents. We 

are convinced that Montanans continue to cherish the privacy guaranteed them by 

Montana’s Constitution. Thus, while we recognize that Montanans are willing to risk 

that a person with whom they are conversing in their home or other private setting may 

repeat that conversation to a third person, we are firmly persuaded that they are unwilling 

to accept as reasonable that the same conversation is being electronically monitored and 

recorded by government agents without their knowledge. 

 20
¶36 Nor should the underlying purpose or content of the conversations at issue reflect 

upon society’s willingness to accept a subjective expectation of privacy in those 

conversations as reasonable. As the Supreme Court of Alaska aptly stated, 

[a]ll of us discuss topics and use expressions with one person that we would 

not undertake with another and that we would never broadcast to a crowd. 

Few of us would ever speak freely if we knew that all our words were being 

captured by machines for later release before an unknown and potentially 

hostile audience. No one talks to a recorder as he talks to a person. . . . 

One takes the risk that his friend may repeat what has been said. One 

shouldn’t be required to take the additional risk of an entirely different 

character—that his conversation is being surreptitiously transcribed or 

broadcast. 

. . . 

. . . . It is axiomatic that police conduct may not be justified on the basis of 

the fruits obtained. It is, of course, easy to say that one engaged in an 

illegal activity has no right to complain if his conversations are broadcast or 

recorded. If, however, law enforcement officials may lawfully cause 

participants secretly to record and transcribe private conversations, nothing 

prevents monitoring of those persons not engaged in illegal activity, who 

have incurred displeasure, have not conformed or have espoused unpopular 

causes. 

State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 877-78 (Alaska 1978) (internal citations omitted). 

¶37 Based on the foregoing, we conclude each Defendant’s expectation of privacy in 

the conversations at issue here is one society is willing to accept as reasonable. As stated 

above, “[a] search occurs when the government infringes upon an individual’s 

expectation of privacy that society considers objectively reasonable.” Hamilton, ¶ 17. 

Thus, we further conclude that the electronic monitoring and recording of the 

Defendants’ in-person conversations constituted searches within the contemplation of the 

Article II, Sections 10 and 11 rights to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches. 

C. Nature of the State’s Intrusion

 21
¶38 We next address whether the nature of the State’s intrusion in conducting the 

searches at issue renders those searches unreasonable under the circumstances before us. 

In other words, the remaining question is whether the searches violate the Defendants’ 

rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. 

¶39 As stated above, the Article II, Section 10 right to privacy is not absolute, but may 

be infringed upon a showing of a compelling state interest to do so. Even upon the 

showing of a compelling state interest, however, state action which infringes upon an 

individual’s privacy right must be closely tailored to effectuate that compelling interest. 

Hamilton, ¶ 37. Thus, “the State may not invade an individual’s privacy unless the 

procedural safeguards attached to the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures are met.” Elison, ¶ 53. 

¶40 Our long-standing rule is that searches conducted in the absence of a properly 

issued search warrant are per se unreasonable, absent a recognized exception to the 

warrant requirement. See e.g. State v. McLees, 2000 MT 6, ¶¶ 10 and 26, 298 Mont. 15, 

¶¶ 10 and 26, 994 P.2d 683, ¶¶ 10 and 26. 

“The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some 

grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment [and Article II, Section 11 of the 

Montana Constitution] has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and 

the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a 

safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind 

might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. 

The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of 

those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.” 

McLees, ¶ 26 (quoting State v. Sorenson, 180 Mont. 269, 274, 590 P.2d 136, 140 (1979)). 

Where, as here, a warrantless search has been conducted, the State bears the burden of 

 22
establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement justifies the search. See 

Sorenson, 180 Mont. at 273, 590 P.2d at 139. The State advances alternative arguments 

in this regard and we address them in turn. 

1. Consent 

¶41 The State first argues that the warrantless searches at issue here were authorized 

by the confidential informants’ consent to the monitoring and recording of the 

conversations. Indeed, we long have recognized that a warrantless search is not unlawful 

where it is conducted with consent freely and voluntarily given. See e.g. Sorenson, 180 

Mont. at 275, 590 P.2d at 140. Furthermore, 

“when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of a 

voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the 

defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a 

third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient 

relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” 

Sorenson, 180 Mont. at 275, 590 P.2d at 140 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 

164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974)). The State asserts that, because the confidential 

informants in these cases arranged with law enforcement to wear the body wires and 

clearly consented to the electronic monitoring and recording of the conversations, their 

consents justified the warrantless searches. 

¶42 As noted above, we derived the third-party consent exception to the constitutional 

search warrant requirement in Sorenson from the United States Supreme Court’s decision 

in Matlock. While we interpret Montana’s Constitution to provide greater protections for 

individuals in the context of search and seizure issues than does the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, we use some federal Fourth Amendment analysis in 

 23
addressing issues under the Montana Constitution. See e.g. Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 46-49, 

950 P.2d at 725-27; Hill, ¶ 32. In that regard, we observe that the Supreme Court 

recently refined the third-party consent exception in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 

126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006). 

¶43 In Randolph, the defendant’s wife contacted law enforcement regarding a 

domestic dispute she had with Randolph. The wife informed the officers upon their 

arrival that Randolph was a drug user and items of drug use were located in the house. 

Randolph, who was present in the house at the time, denied his wife’s allegations and 

unequivocally refused the officers’ request for his consent to search the house. The 

officers then obtained the wife’s consent to search. During the search, the officers 

observed and seized evidence of drug use. Upon being charged with possession of 

cocaine, Randolph moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that his wife’s consent, 

given over his express refusal to consent, rendered the searches unlawful. The trial court 

denied the motion, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court, and the 

Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107-08 126 S. Ct. at 1519. 

¶44 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of 

“whether one occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared 

premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search.” 

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108, 126 S. Ct. at 1520. The Supreme Court first reiterated its 

Matlock statement that “‘the consent of one who possesses common authority over 

premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that 

authority is shared.’” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110, 126 S. Ct. at 1521 (quoting Matlock, 

 24
415 U.S. at 170, 94 S. Ct. at 993) (emphasis added). After some discussion of the 

underlying principles of co-tenancy, mutual authority over property or effects, and the 

Fourth Amendment’s protection of the individual against intrusion by the government, 

the Supreme Court held that “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over 

the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as 

reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” 

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120, 126 S. Ct. at 1526. 

¶45 The Supreme Court further clarified that 

if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door 

and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable 

search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in 

the threshold colloquy, loses out. . . . So long as there is no evidence that 

the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance 

for the sake of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the 

simple clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s 

permission when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other according 

dispositive weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication when he 

expresses it. 

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121-22, 126 S. Ct. at 1527. 

 Here, the search of conversations by means of electronic monitoring and recording, 

rather than the search of premises, is at issue. Each party to each conversation was 

physically present at the time of the search and had an interest—that is, an interest in the 

nature of a co-tenant in physical premises—in the conversation. Under the Randolph

rationale—which we expressly adopt vis-à-vis private face-to-face conversations—the 

confidential informants’ consent to the electronic monitoring and recording of the 

conversations could not override any objection expressed by the Defendants. 

 25
Furthermore, because both parties to the conversations were present at the time the 

searches were conducted, both parties must have the opportunity to object to the search. 

As the Supreme Court observed, law enforcement may not avoid a refusal of consent by 

removing a potentially objecting individual from the premises prior to requesting consent. 

“A generalized interest in expedient law enforcement cannot, without more, justify a 

warrantless search.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115, 126 S. Ct. at 1524, n. 5. 

¶46 Similarly, here, the State cannot justify a search under the consent exception as a 

result of the simple expedient of failing to inform the potential—and physically present—

objecting party that the search is being conducted. We conclude that the warrantless 

searches of the conversations at issue here cannot be justified by the consent exception to 

the warrant requirement. 

2. Particularized Suspicion Standard 

¶47 Alternatively, the State contends that, if we conclude the electronic monitoring 

and recording of a face-to-face conversation constitutes a search, it should be subject to a 

particularized suspicion standard rather than the Article II, Section 11 probable cause 

requirement for the issuance of a search warrant. In essence, the argument is that the 

State’s intrusion into the Defendants’ privacy expectations by the electronic monitoring 

and recording of their conversations was minimal and, therefore, did not rise to a level of 

requiring probable cause. 

¶48 We observe at the outset that the State relies on 1993 Chevrolet Pickup and State 

v. Hart, 2004 MT 51, 320 Mont. 154, 85 P.3d 1275, in support of applying a 

particularized suspicion standard to justify the searches of the conversations in the 

 26
present cases. Neither of the cited cases—one of which involved the search of garbage 

placed in an alley and the other a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle—remotely 

supports applying a particularized suspicion standard to justify a search occurring in an 

individual’s home. “In Bullock and Siegal, we validated the long-standing notion 

throughout this country, but especially in Montana, that a person’s residence and his 

homestead are secure from unwarranted government intrusion, be it by physical or 

technological means.” Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 48, 950 P.2d at 726. In two of the searches 

at issue here, the State intruded into the sanctity of the Defendants’ homes for the purpose 

of performing those searches by technological means. We will not countenance such an 

intrusion under a lesser standard than probable cause. 

¶49 We turn, then, to the State’s argument that the particularized suspicion standard 

should apply to the search of the conversation between Hamper and the confidential 

informant which took place in the confidential informant’s vehicle. It first relies on 1993 

Chevrolet Pickup in support of its argument, but that case is readily distinguishable. 

¶50 In 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, law enforcement believed a suspect was operating an 

illegal drug laboratory. After a several-month investigation of the suspect’s activities, 

law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless “trash dive” on garbage cans located in 

the alley behind the suspect’s residence and discovered items related to the manufacture 

of methamphetamine. Based on the evidence found in the suspect’s trash bags, the 

officers obtained a search warrant and the subsequent search of the suspect’s residence, 

pickup truck and boat turned up additional drug-related evidence. The suspect moved to 

suppress the evidence found during the warrant search, arguing the warrant was invalid 

 27
because it was based on evidence obtained from an illegal search of his garbage. The 

trial court denied the motion, determining that the suspect did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in his garbage. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, ¶¶ 3-4. 

¶51 On appeal, we addressed whether the warrantless search of a person’s garbage 

violated the person’s rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana 

Constitution. We determined that, where a person has abandoned his or her garbage by 

placing it at a curb or in an alley for collection, any continued expectation of privacy in 

the garbage is not one society is willing to accept as reasonable. Thus, law enforcement’s 

actions of removing the garbage bag and looking through it for evidence constituted 

neither a seizure nor a search as contemplated by the Montana Constitution. 1993 

Chevrolet Pickup, ¶ 17. Notwithstanding the absence of a seizure or a search, we placed 

constraints on such law enforcement activities, including a requirement that law 

enforcement have particularized suspicion that a crime is being committed to justify 

looking through the garbage. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, ¶¶ 19-20. Having concluded above 

that the electronic monitoring and recording of Hamper’s conversation with the 

confidential informant in the informant’s vehicle constituted a search, we need not 

address 1993 Chevrolet Pickup further. 

¶52 The State also relies on Hart in support of its argument that a particularized 

suspicion standard should apply to justify the warrantless monitoring and recording of 

face-to-face conversations with the consent of one participant in the conversation. Hart

involved a drug-detecting canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle. We determined the 

dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle constituted a search, but that such a search may be 

 28
justified by particularized suspicion of wrongdoing, rather than probable cause sufficient 

for issuance of a search warrant. Hart, ¶ 20 (citing Tackitt, ¶ 29). Here, the State asserts 

that, because the electronic monitoring and recording of a conversation is even less 

intrusive than a dog sniff, particularized suspicion is a sufficient standard here. We 

disagree. 

¶53 In Tackitt, law enforcement officers used a drug-detecting canine to sniff the 

exterior of the defendant’s vehicle parked outside his residence and the canine alerted on 

the trunk of the vehicle, indicating the presence of drugs. Tackitt, ¶ 7. We relied on 

Elison, ¶ 51, in concluding that the canine sniff constituted a search because Tackitt 

maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items stowed in his vehicle’s trunk. 

Tackitt, ¶¶ 21-22. We then determined that, although warrantless searches generally are 

per se unreasonable, the purpose and minimally intrusive nature of such a canine sniff 

warranted an exception to the warrant requirement, but would “still require particularized 

suspicion when the area or object subject to the canine sniff is already exposed to the 

public.” Tackitt, ¶ 29. Here, however, the private face-to-face conversation in the 

vehicle was not exposed to the public. Consequently, we decline to adopt a particularized 

suspicion standard to justify the warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of a oneon-one conversation occurring in a vehicle. 

III. Conclusion 

¶54 For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the electronic monitoring and recording 

of the Defendants’ conversations with the confidential informants, notwithstanding the 

consent of the confidential informants, constituted searches subject to the warrant 

 29
requirement of Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. The electronic 

monitoring and recording of those conversations without a warrant or the existence of an 

established exception to the warrant requirement violated the Defendants’ rights under 

Article II, Sections 10 and 11. As a result, we hold the District Court erred in denying 

the Defendants’ motions to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless electronic 

monitoring and recording of the three conversations at issue on the basis that the 

activities at issue did not constitute searches. 

¶55 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

We concur: 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring. 

¶56 I specially concur in the court’s conclusion that evidence obtained through 

warrantless, consensual participant recording of a conversation in a home or automobile 

is not admissible in court. Although the court ties its rationale to the private settings 

(home and automobile) involved in these cases, I would not limit a Montana citizen’s 

reasonable expectation of conversational privacy to “private settings.” 

 30
¶57 In my view, Montanans do not have to anticipate that a conversation, no matter 

what the setting, is being secretly recorded by agents of the state acting without benefit of 

a search warrant. As Justice Harlan noted in his dissent in United States v. White, 401 

U.S. 745, 91 S. Ct. 1122 (1971), “it is one thing to subject the average citizen to the risk 

that participants in a conversation with him will subsequently divulge its contents to 

another, but quite a different matter to foist upon him the risk that unknown third parties 

may be simultaneously listening in.” 401 U.S. at 777, 91 S. Ct. at 1138. This Court 

relied on this distinction in State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 115, 582 P.2d 1216, 1221 

(1978), where we recognized that consensual participant monitoring of a conversation in 

a shopping center parking lot violated Brackman’s expectations of privacy under the 

Montana Constitution. In State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 693 P.2d 518 (1984), we 

specifically noted the concern with electronic eavesdropping expressed during the 

debates at the constitutional convention, Solis, 214 Mont. at 316-18, 693 P.2d at 521-22, 

and concluded that, in “face to face encounters in a private setting, there is a reasonable 

expectation that hidden monitoring is not taking place.” Solis, 214 Mont. at 318, 693 

P.2d at 522. Brackman was overruled in State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 8, 755 P.2d 1364, 

1369 (1988). Although the Court now breathes life back into our decisions in Solis and 

Brackman by overruling Brown, it does so in the limited context of “private settings,” 

i.e., in a home or an automobile. 

¶58 Article II, Section 11, like the Fourth Amendment, protects people not places. 

State v. Bassett, 1999 MT 109, ¶ 36, 294 Mont. 327, ¶ 36, 982 P.2d 410, ¶ 36 (citing Katz 

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511). This focus on the person rather 

 31
than the place or setting is even more compelling in the context of Article II, Section 10, 

which “is broader in the sense that it encompasses information and activities in addition 

to places and persons.” State v. Nelson, 283 Mont. 231, 243, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (1997). 

Article II, Section 10, provides that “[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the 

well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a 

compelling state interest.” Although an individual’s expectation of privacy may be more 

compelling in one setting (e.g., a home) than another, that is not to say that an individual 

conversing in a more public setting has no expectation of privacy and must reasonably 

anticipate the risk of warrantless consensual monitoring. As Justice Harlan observed in 

White, warrantless consensual monitoring “undermine[s] that confidence and sense of 

security in dealing with one another that is characteristic of individual relationships 

between citizens in a free society.” White, 491 U.S. at 787, 91 S. Ct. at 1143 (Harlan 

dissenting). A “free society” is precisely what Article 10, Section 10, was designed to 

foster. This constitutional guarantee ensures that our citizens may continue to engage in 

private discourse, free to speak with the uninhibited spontaneity that is characteristic of 

our democratic society. As is evident from the constitutional debates, warrantless 

monitoring has a chilling effect on citizen discourse and thereby undermines the “wellbeing of a free society.” See Montana Constitutional Convention Verbatim Transcript 

Vol. V, pp. 1682-87; Mont. Const., art. X, § 10. 

¶59 In my view, a society in which individuals conversing outside a private setting 

such as their home must anticipate the risk of state instigated, warrantless monitoring is 

not the “free society” envisioned by the framers of our Constitution. 

 32
¶60 Accordingly, I would resurrect our Brackman holding in its entirety and recognize 

an expectation of conversational privacy free from warrantless consensual monitoring, in 

any setting, including, but not limited to, a public parking lot. 

¶61 I also note that Justice Rice’s dissent castigates the Court for framing the issue too 

broadly given that “the facts here do not involve situations where police did not have 

particularized suspicion and probable cause.” ¶ 88. One wonders why, if the police had 

probable cause, they did not simply apply for a warrant, as the constitution requires. 

There is a theme throughout the dissent that someone who chooses to engage in discourse 

about criminal endeavors, has no expectation of privacy.1

 The examples and rationales 

cited are all circuitous in that they assume the “risky” or illegal “nature” of the 

conversation in question. An officer does not know that a call is obscene or that the 

conversation relates to a drug sale until after the officer listens in or hears the tape of the 

conversation. If the officer does have prior reason to believe that an individual has 

already engaged in obscene calling or drug sales, then the officer has probable cause to 

obtain a warrant. In the absence of probable cause, however, we should not let the ends 

 

1 Examples from the dissent: “without considering the nature and purpose [drug deal] of 

the conversation.” ¶ 90; “A person simply cannot have the same expectation of privacy 

when he knowingly exposes illegal drugs for the commercial purpose of selling them to a 

non-confident as he does while engaged in private socializing with friends and family.” 

¶ 96; “because society would not consider a privacy interest in a non-private commercial 

drug transaction to be reasonable.” ¶ 99; “The very idea that one engaged in the 

commercial sale of illegal drugs to a non-confidant must be given the ‘opportunity to 

object’ before police can monitor the parties’ conversation is a flight into the fanciful, 

perhaps the ludicrous.” ¶ 104 n.2; “There is not only no indication that the Declaration of 

Rights was intended to be applied to such risky, non-private behavior, but the debates 

demonstrate just the opposite.” ¶ 114. 

 33
(the illegal nature of the call) justify the means (monitoring). This is tantamount to 

concluding that someone who allegedly engages in theft has no Fourth Amendment 

expectation of privacy and thus the police are free to search his house without a warrant. 

¶62 The dissent endeavors to distinguish illegal commercial discourse from private 

socializing; suggesting that warrantless consensual monitoring will only be allowed in 

illegal commercial transactions. What if the transaction were not “commercial,” that the 

defendant was delivering drugs free of charge. Would the dissent’s constitutional 

analysis suddenly transform, cloaking the defendant with an expectation of privacy? 

¶63 The dissent believes that the Court has strayed from the facts of this case and has 

stated the issues too broadly. The Court’s societal approach is more than justified 

however when one looks at the breadth of the dissent’s rationale. The dissent reasons 

that “a conversation, unlike a home, is not a shared space. Once the conversation 

commences, it becomes the individual property of each participant. . . . Neither 

participant can prevent the other (absent privilege) from sharing or repeating the 

conversation because each has full control over it.” ¶ 101. Thus despite the dissent’s 

protestations that those of us engaged in private conversations about legitimate matters 

need not be concerned, in fact under the dissent’s reasoning, no one engaged in a 

conversation, wherever the setting, whatever the purpose, has an expectation of privacy 

since the other participant (with full control) can, consent to third-party monitoring or 

recording. The dissent reasons that a person conversing in a private setting for non 

commercial purposes, for example at a family Thanksgiving dinner, or even someone 

engaging in illegal activity (e.g., smoking pot at a friend’s house) will have more of an 

 34
expectation of privacy than the defendants here. What the dissent fails to recognize is 

that, whatever the expectation of privacy is (be it heightened or diminished), it can 

always be undermined by monitoring through the consent of the other party to the 

conversation. In other words, consent of one party to a conversation will always trump 

the expectation of the other. 

¶64 The dissent’s reliance on our decision in State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 

1364 (1988), and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. White, 

401 U.S. 745 (1971), illustrate this point; that is, irrespective of the setting, any 

expectation of privacy in a conversation dissolves in the face of consent by the other 

party. The Supreme Court “has held that however strongly a defendant may trust an 

apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth 

Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly 

communicating with the authorities.” The Fourth Amendment does not protect “a 

wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his 

wrongdoing will not reveal it.” White, 401 U.S. at 749 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 

385 U.S. 293 (1966)). 

¶65 Justice Cotter suggests that Justice Rice’s rationale would apply not just to illegal 

commercial transactions, but to all commercial transactions. Although I agree, I think the 

dissent’s rationale is even broader than Justice Cotter suggests. It applies to all 

conversations, commercial or otherwise. Under the dissent’s reliance on Brown2

, as long 

 

2 “We now hold that warrantless consensual electronic monitoring of face-to-face 

conversations by the use of body wire transmitting device, performed by law enforcement 

 35
as one of the participants with “full control” consents, third-party recording or monitoring 

simply is not a search under the constitution. It matters not whether the monitoring 

occurs in the home or on main street USA. Law enforcement, without the necessity of 

showing probable cause or obtaining a warrant, can use this tool at their whim. 

¶66 Justice Rice is of the opinion that a society in which individuals feel that they can 

speak freely with one another confident that the government cannot monitor the 

conversation without a warrant would result in anarchy. He argues that “freedom means 

the right to pursue one’s own life within the confines of the solemn principles upon 

which the democracy was founded.” ¶ 120. In my view, one of the most “solemn” of the 

principles upon which our democracy flourishes is the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement which protects citizens from unreasonable intrusion by the state. 

¶67 Anarchy is the absence of any political authority; the theory that all forms of 

government are oppressive and should be abolished. American Heritage Dictionary 3rd 

Ed. Justice Rice’s characterization to the contrary, I am not advocating anarchy. Quite 

the opposite; I’m arguing that our constitutional form of government, the Fourth 

Amendment in particular, should be enforced-not abolished. 

¶68 In this day and age of high-tech surveillance, warrantless monitoring of 

conversations between individuals does not bode well for a free and democratic society. 

 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

 

officers while pursing their official duties, does not violate the right to be free of 

unreasonable searches and seizures nor the privacy section of the Montana Constitution.” 

Brown, 232 Mont. at 8, 755 P.2d at 1369. 

 36
Justice James C. Nelson joins the special concurrence of Justice Leaphart. 

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

Justice Brian Morris concurs and dissents. 

¶69 I concur with the Court’s determination that Goetz and Hamper possessed a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations that took place in their own 

homes. I part ways with the Court’s conclusion, however, that Hamper similarly enjoyed 

a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with White that took place inside 

White’s vehicle. 

¶70 State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), plainly controls our decision 

on whether Hamper had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation that took 

place in White’s vehicle. This Court held that Brown had no reasonable expectation of 

privacy in his conversation with an informant in “a vehicle parked in a bar parking lot.” 

Brown, 232 Mont. at 3, 755 P.2d at 1366. We likewise should conclude that Hamper had 

no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with White in White’s vehicle as 

there is no meaningful distinction between the facts at issue here and the facts at issue in 

Brown. 

¶71 This Court discards Brown, along with our seemingly contradictory holding in 

State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 320, 693 P.2d 518, 523 (1984), however, in light of their 

 37
reliance on federal jurisprudence and their limited analysis and application of the 

Montana Constitution. ¶ 24. The Solis court stated that “in face-to-face encounters in a 

private setting, there is a reasonable expectation that hidden monitoring is not taking 

place.” Solis, 214 Mont. at 318, 693 P.2d at 522. The Brown court countered, without 

any attempt to distinguish Solis, that “there is no violation of Montana’s right to privacy, 

or the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, when law enforcement 

officers pursing [sic] their official duties perform warrantless consensual electronic 

monitoring of face-to-face conversations.” Brown, 232 Mont. at 11, 755 P.2d at 1371. 

The Court now foregoes any attempt to reconcile the broad rule in Brown and the equally 

broad rule, but contradictory rule in Solis, in favor of what it deems to be “more current 

and consistent interpretations of Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana 

Constitution.” ¶ 24. 

¶72 The Court’s discarding of Brown represents an unnecessary departure from the 

principle of stare decisis. We have held that precedent should be overruled only if it is 

manifestly wrong. Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2000 MT 112, ¶ 20, 299 Mont. 

389, ¶ 20, 1 P.3d 348, ¶ 20. This Court squarely has affirmed the analysis in Brown on 

several occasions, including State v. Staat, 251 Mont. 1, 7-8, 822 P.2d 643, 647 (1991), 

and State v. Belgarde, 244 Mont. 500, 504, 798 P.2d 539, 542 (1990). Nowhere in these 

decisions does the Court question the continuing vitality of Brown’s analysis. 

¶73 I cannot agree under these circumstances that the result in Brown is so manifestly 

wrong that it should be discarded entirely. The Court cites State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 

 38
252, ¶ 51, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 51, 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 51, to justify its discarding of Brown and 

Solis. ¶ 23. Hardaway, in turn, cites Solis with approval. Hardaway, ¶ 51. 

¶74 For better, or worse, Solis and Brown provide our precedent on the very issue 

before the Court--whether warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of a party’s 

one-on-one conversations with a confidential informant violates the party’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy. Rather than discarding them to the rubbish heap, I would 

reconcile the holdings in Solis and Brown by limiting them to the facts that were before 

those courts. I would read Solis to hold that a person may have a reasonable expectation 

of privacy in a conversation that takes place in a “small, enclosed office” that ostensibly 

remains under the exclusive control of his confidant. Solis, 214 Mont. at 314, 693 P.2d at 

520. Solis reasonably could have assumed that the pawnbroker had exclusive control 

over his own “small, enclosed office.” By contrast, I would read Brown to hold that a 

person may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation that takes 

place in a vehicle or motel that the person reasonably could not assume was under the 

exclusive control of his confidant. Brown, 232 Mont. at 3, 755 P.2d at 1366. Both the 

vehicle and the motel room at issue in Brown may have been subject to third-party 

ownership and a variety of different users, any of whom could subject a conversation to 

electronic monitoring. 

¶75 I would conclude pursuant to our holding in Solis that Goetz and Hamper 

possessed reasonable expectations of privacy in the conversations with the informants 

that took place in their homes. Hamper and Goetz reasonably could have expected as 

much privacy in their own homes as Solis could have expected in the private office of his 

 39
confidant. Solis, 214 Mont. at 314, 693 P.2d at 520. I would conclude pursuant to our 

holding in Brown, however, that Hamper lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

his conversation with White in White’s vehicle, as both Hamper’s and Brown’s 

conversations took place under similar circumstances. White’s vehicle--like Brown’s--

was parked in a parking lot. Brown, 232 Mont. at 3, 755 P.2d at 1366. Furthermore, the 

record does not indicate whether Hamper reasonably could be sure that his confidant 

exclusively had control over the vehicle in which their conversation took place. In fact, 

the record indicates that Hamper did not know the informant, and presumably he would 

not know whether the informant owned or controlled the vehicle in which the 

conversation took place. 

¶76 Other courts likewise have distinguished a warrantless search of a person’s home 

from a warrantless search of a person’s automobile. The Supreme Court of West 

Virginia recently held that warrantless consensual electronic monitoring of face-to-face 

conversations in a defendant’s home represents an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 

The court overruled its earlier conflicting decision on the basis that the court had 

“assumed, without discussion, that no difference existed between a person’s reasonable 

expectations of privacy in his/her home, versus the privacy a person expects outside the 

home.” State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 189 (W.Va. 2007). The court supported its 

assertion with its earlier statement in State v. Peacher, 280 S.E.2d 559, 578 (W.Va. 

1981), that “‘[a] person’s expectation of privacy in his automobile is less than that which 

he would have in his home[.]’” Mullens, 650 S.E.2d at 189. The United States Supreme 

Court similarly has stated that “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of 

 40
freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of 

privacy and freedom in one’s residence.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 

543, 561, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3084-85 (1976). 

¶77 For these reasons, I join the Court’s opinion with respect to its decision that 

Hamper and Goetz possessed reasonable expectations of privacy in their conversations 

with the informants that took place in their homes. For these same reasons, I dissent from 

the Court’s opinion with respect to its decision that Hamper enjoyed a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in his conversation with White that took place inside White’s 

vehicle. 

 /S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

 41
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting. 

¶78 It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth 

Amendment to make them bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by 

farfetched analogies which would liken eavesdropping on a conversation, 

with the connivance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search or 

seizure. We find no violation of the Fourth Amendment here. 

On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754, 72 S. Ct. 967, 972 (1952). 

¶79 The Court today makes the precise error with regard to the Montana Constitution’s 

Declaration of Rights, which the United States Supreme Court warned against in deciding 

the same issue under the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. The Court’s 

error springs from an incorrect analytical approach to the issue, resulting in an 

unnecessarily broad and sweeping decision not predicated on the specific facts of this 

case. Indeed, the inattentiveness to the facts leads the Court to overlook the critical point 

of the case, and the unfortunate result is the overruling of our long-standing precedent 

and the distortion of the right to privacy. 

¶80 Today the Court overrules the state and federal precedent we have long followed 

and strongly re-endorsed, and upon which law enforcement in this state has relied for 

twenty years. The Court justifies its decision to overturn this precedent by characterizing 

our resolution in Solis as non-controlling and our decision in Brown as “merely 

parallel[ing] federal jurisprudence . . . and fail[ing] to properly analyze the greater rights 

guaranteed by Montana’s Constitution.” Opinion, ¶ 22. I disagree with this assessment. 

¶81 First, while I agree that Solis is not “controlling precedent,” Opinion, ¶ 24, I 

submit that the fact-grounded reasoning of the plurality opinion in Solis is precisely the 

correct analysis to be employed, and that the Solis plurality reached the correct decision 

 42
under that fact-based approach. However, the Court determines that because Solis is not 

“controlling,” it need not be considered at all. Opinion, ¶¶ 18, 24. 

¶82 Second, the Court’s contention that our decision in Brown failed to properly 

analyze the greater rights guaranteed by the Montana Constitution, Opinion, ¶ 22, is 

clearly without merit. In Brown we recognized that “Montana’s Constitutional 

protections have an existence which is separate from the Federal Constitutional 

protections” and that it is necessary to “offer an independent analysis of the privacy and 

search and seizure provisions of the Montana Constitution.” Brown, 232 Mont. at 9-10, 

755 P.2d at 1370. Accordingly, we lengthened the analysis in Brown beyond the Fourth 

Amendment, stating that “[t]he analysis . . . must go further because the framers of the 

Montana Constitution specifically provided an additional protection with the right to 

privacy provision.” Brown, 232 Mont. at 10, 755 P.2d at 1370. Thus, we did not, as the 

Court spins, ignore the heightened privacy protections of our Montana Constitution in 

Brown. 

¶83 Critically, the Brown court concluded that, under the Montana Constitution, the 

facts demonstrated that the defendant’s claim to an expectation of privacy was not one 

society would deem reasonable, and that the government’s actions, which effectuated 

only “the recording of [Brown’s] words,” were not excessively intrusive. Brown, 232 

Mont. at 11, 755 P.2d at 1371. Under the facts of that case, the Court approved the 

warrantless consensual electronic monitoring of a face-to-face conversation regarding a 

drug deal. However, the Court today ignores our holding in Brown and overrules that 

 43
case on the thin basis that Brown “merely paralleled federal jurisprudence on the subject . 

. . .” Opinion, ¶ 22. 

¶84 It is true that Brown relied upon the United State Supreme Court case of White, a 

case which offered a very practical and common sense approach to the same issue we 

face today, and we should be wary of abandoning the well established and practical White

decision by overruling Brown merely because Brown followed federal jurisprudence. In 

White the High Court emphasized a twentieth century “doctrinal” Fourth Amendment 

analysis, explaining the absence of a privacy interest in a consensually recorded drug 

transaction with a stranger: 

Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write 

down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify 

concerning them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters with the 

defendant and without otherwise violating the latter’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S., at 300-03. For constitutional 

purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately 

reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1) 

simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is 

carrying on his person, Lopez v. United States, supra; (2) or carries radio 

equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to 

recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the 

transmitting frequency. On Lee v. United States, supra. If the conduct and 

revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not 

invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, 

neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by 

the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom 

the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant 

necessarily risks.

White, 401 U.S. at 751, 91 S. Ct. at 1125-26 (emphasis added). The Brown court noted 

that, while White was a four justice plurality opinion, seventeen years had passed since 

the decision, the Supreme Court had since endorsed the holding in U.S. v. Caceres, 440 

 44
U.S. 741, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979), and it had since been applied in the federal circuits. 

Brown, 232 Mont. at 8-9, 755 P.2d at 1369-70. Thus, our Court adopted White’s strong, 

practical reasoning and we should not discard it now. 

¶85 Moreover, the Court ignores the fact that Brown has been specifically and 

repeatedly reaffirmed by this Court. In fact, in Belgarde, when we again entertained an 

argument that warrantless consensual monitoring violated the Montana Constitution’s 

privacy provisions, we noted our decision in Brown, and then took the unusual step of 

holding—emphatically—that “[w]e refuse to reverse this rule.” Belgarde, 244 Mont. at 

504, 798 P.2d at 542 (emphasis added). The Court’s departure from stare decisis here is 

demonstratively weak and unsupported. With one fell swoop, the Court today overturns 

a longstanding and strongly applied line of authority with little concern for the 

consequences. 

¶86 Having overruled Brown and dismissed Solis entirely, the Court then flits to 

another analysis in order to “examine the issue before us anew, applying more current 

and consistent interpretations of Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana 

Constitution.” Opinion, ¶ 24. This “analysis” is one which wholly disregards the facts, 

generalizes the issue on appeal, and renders broad, sweeping conclusions under the guise 

of “more current and consistent interpretations” of the Montana Constitution. I submit 

that there could be nothing more “current and consistent” than the interpretation we have 

repeatedly applied for the past twenty years. 

¶87 After setting forth briefly the facts in the background section of the Opinion, ¶¶ 4-

8, the Court barely mentions them again during the remainder of the Opinion. An 

 45
explanation for this detachment from the particulars may be that the Court, from the 

beginning, appears to have been thinking about broader or different issues than those 

actually raised here, as evidenced by the questions the Court asked the State during oral 

argument: 

Q. It’s the State’s contention that there’s no need for particularized 

suspicion or probable cause. In fact, as I understand it, the State doesn’t 

even believe that there is any necessity that the cops believe that a crime 

was, is, or is about to be committed. They can run somebody with a body 

wire into somebody’s home at the cop’s discretion. 

A. Because there is no search as this Court held in Brown – 

Q. Well, isn’t that true? 

A. Well, I think, I think your – the question, with all respect, is phrased too 

broadly. 

Q. Well, why is it phrased too broadly? If, if this is completely 

discretionary with the cops, they can send someone with a body wire into 

someone’s home to gather evidence. They can send somebody into a 

person’s home just to snoop. They can send somebody into a home to 

gather information that might be used in a future prosecution or no 

prosecution at all. It’s completely discretionary with the police. Correct? 

A. No. 

State’s counsel was correct. These questions were indeed phrased too broadly, 

demanding answers from counsel for scenarios not at issue. 

¶88 The facts of this case do not involve the exercise of “complete discretion” by 

police to wire someone “just to snoop” or “to gather information that might be used” or 

not used at all. The facts here do not involve situations where police did not have 

particularized suspicion and probable cause. Even before wiring the informants, police 

had probable cause to believe that both defendants had already committed the crime of 

 46
criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. Authority to wire aside, the police could have 

arrested the defendants because they had already committed a crime.1

¶89 The facts are critical, and this case should be decided on its facts. As the Court 

recites, “whether a person has knowingly exposed something to the public and, 

consequently, surrendered his or her privacy protections [is determined] by looking at the 

particular facts of the case.” Opinion, ¶ 29. See State v. Dunn, 2007 MT 296, ¶ 13, 340 

Mont. 31, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d 110, ¶ 13 (explaining that when “ascertaining if a person has a 

legitimate expectation of privacy, we look to the circumstances . . . .”); Scheetz, 286 

Mont. at 48, 950 P.2d at 726 (stating that we look to “various factors”); State v. Siegal, 

281 Mont. 250, 273-74, 934 P.2d 176, 190 (1997) (detailing the extensive measures taken 

by the defendant to ensure his privacy). 

¶90 Although the Court gives “lip service” to the necessity of analyzing the facts, it 

largely fails to do so. For example, paragraphs 30 and 37 contain the critical holdings 

that the Defendants held an expectation of privacy that society accepts as reasonable. 

However, the Court neglects to mention the central factual issue of this case: the 

consensual electronic monitoring of a drug deal by police. Instead, and without 

considering the nature or purpose of the conversations, the Court issues the sweeping 

proposition that there is an expectation of privacy in “face-to-face conversations” held in 

 

1 Pursuant to § 45-9-101(1), MCA, a person commits the offense of criminal distribution 

of dangerous drugs by, inter alia, “offer[ing] to sell, barter, exchange, or give away any 

dangerous drug[.]” (Emphasis added.) The defendants violated this statute by arranging 

the sale transactions with the informants, who reported the “offer” to police prior to the 

monitoring. An arrest could have been made without any monitoring. Of course, the 

police wisely sought additional evidence to bolster their case. 

 47
“private settings.” Opinion, ¶ 30. This conclusion, disconnected from the facts, will even 

prohibit a participant in the conversation from testifying about what the Defendant said 

or did, unless a warrant is first obtained. Not even the Defendants are asking for such a 

broad holding—but that is a consequence of leaving the facts behind. The facts of this 

case should form the basis of the analysis for the critical legal question before us, and I 

thus turn to the facts, beginning with those related to the expectation of privacy and the 

reasonableness of that expectation. 

¶91 This was a commercial transaction. In each of the two cases before us, the seller, 

for the purpose of making a financial profit, offered and then sold a product to a buyer. 

But for the seller’s financial motive, and the buyer’s assurance of payment, these parties 

would not have met at all. It was the business deal, and only the business deal, which 

brought them together. Goetz was selling methamphetamine—Hamper, marijuana. 

¶92 As in the typical commercial transaction, the sellers here offered their product to 

members of the public—they intentionally exposed and sold their product to customers 

who were non-confidants. The length of each transaction is reflective of its impersonal 

and commercial nature as each lasted only moments—similar to other retail purchases. 

These meetings were not social occasions between friends or family. The exchange of 

product and cash was made and the parties immediately went their own way, because the 

only purpose of their meeting—the sale—was completed. Thus, in these transactions, the 

defendants first “knowingly exposed” their business by offering to sell and then exposed 

their product during the actual exchange to someone who was not a confidant to them. 

See Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 53, 950 P.2d at 726-27 (explaining that “[w]hat a person 

 48
knowingly exposes to the public is not protected, but what an individual seeks to preserve 

as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” 

(internal quotations omitted)). 

¶93 The place of the transaction is also a relevant fact, though not necessarily 

determinative. See Siegal, 281 Mont. at 260, 934 P.2d at 181 (stating that what a person 

knowingly exposes “even in his own home or office” is not considered private). Goetz 

invited Trusler, described by the District Court as a “mere visitor,” into his home on 

Main Street and there conducted the brief sales transaction. Hamper met Ms. White first 

in a parking lot on Main Street, where he got into her car for the brief conversation and 

sale. For the second sale, the District Court found that White was likewise a “mere 

visitor” in Hamper’s home where the brief sales exchange occurred. 

¶94 The Court’s analysis wholly ignores the specifics of these circumstances and it is 

clear that the Court’s decision is significantly disconnected from the factual predicate. In 

fact, this disconnect leads the Court to restate the issue on appeal in a generic form as: 

“whether society is willing to recognize an individual’s subjective expectation that a oneon-one conversation conducted in a private setting is not being surreptitiously 

electronically monitored and recorded.” Opinion, ¶ 31. Accordingly, the Court only 

considers whether there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy in “a personal 

conversation held in a private setting[.]” Opinion, ¶ 31. This statement, and others in the 

opinion, is so broad that it would apply as readily to governmental recording of a 

conversation among friends or relatives socially gathered around the living room, as to 

the facts of this case. Indeed, who would disagree that society reasonably expects the 

 49
government to not record “conversations held in a private setting” such as the confines of 

one’s home during a family Thanksgiving dinner? I certainly would not disagree—but 

those are not the facts here. The expectation of privacy in a personal family dinner 

setting is far different than the expectation of privacy in a commercial transaction where a 

product is sold to a non-confidant in a brief encounter. Although remarkably different, 

the Court’s imprecise analysis treats them as if they are identical—as if the Court is 

powerless to distinguish between these very different factual scenarios. 

¶95 The law, however, does make such distinctions. Commercial transactions made 

with the public are not the same as social conversations among friends in the living room. 

Criminal enterprises are not the same as family Thanksgiving dinners. We should recall 

what Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote about the sale of illegal drugs out of a home. He 

too realized that these were “commercial” transactions which alter the privacy 

expectation: 

The fact that the undercover agent entered petitioner’s home does not 

compel a different conclusion. Without question, the home is accorded the 

full range of Fourth Amendment protections. See Amos v. United States, 

255 U.S. 313 (1921); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151, n. 15 

(1947). But when, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center 

to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful 

business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were 

carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A government 

agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to 

do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes 

contemplated by the occupant. 

Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S. Ct. 424, 427 (1966) (emphasis added). 

Thus, it is not merely the place, but the circumstances and character of a meeting—i.e., 

all the facts—which are critical to the assessment of the expectation of privacy. We 

 50
should not endow criminal enterprises with a blanket expectation of privacy just because 

they are conducted within a home or within a vehicle. Indeed, a jurist no less concerned 

about individual rights than Justice William Brennan was very clear about the privacy 

claims of those engaged in the activities of the defendants here: 

The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon “the 

sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Boyd v. United States, 

116 U.S. 616, 630. However, the occupant can break the seal of sanctity 

and waive his right to privacy in the premises. Plainly he does this to the 

extent that he opens his home to the transaction of business and invites 

anyone willing to enter to come in to trade with him. 

 

Lewis, 385 U.S. at 213, 87 S. Ct. at 428 (J. Brennan, concurring). 

¶96 The public and commercial nature of the criminal enterprise at issue here—the 

sale of illegal drugs to strangers—separates this case from other kinds of crimes, even 

drug-related, and further illustrates the necessity of a close factual analysis. For instance, 

a person joining others at a friend’s house to smoke pot, though an illegal act, would have 

a different privacy expectation than a person who undertakes the risk of meeting with a 

member of the public to consummate a drug transaction. The dynamics of these 

situations are clearly different, and it is the different dynamics which instruct the analysis 

under the first two prongs of the unreasonable search and seizure test—(1) actual 

expectation of privacy and (2) society’s willingness to accept the expectation as 

objectively reasonable. A person simply cannot have the same expectation of privacy 

when he knowingly exposes illegal drugs for the commercial purpose of selling them to a 

non-confidant as he does while engaged in private socializing with friends and family. 

Indeed, as shown below, the Defendants here expressed as much. 

 51
¶97 Consistent with its approach of over-generalizing, the Court attempts to 

summarize the statements of the delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional 

Convention in a manner which appears to provide support for its holding, and concludes 

that the Defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy because “Montanans 

continue to cherish the privacy guaranteed them by Montana’s Constitution.” Opinion, 

¶ 35. I certainly do not dispute this general conclusion, and do not dispute the general 

idea that the delegates to the constitutional convention held privacy in high regard. 

However, the Court considers only some of the delegates words, and ignores other 

specifically applicable words altogether, thereby covering up the reality that the 

delegates’ primary concern was over electronic surveillance and eavesdropping 

undertaken by the government without the consent of any party, about which Delegate 

Campbell’s indication that such activity “was really not a need and such activity was not 

taking place at this time” can be understood, as well as the delegates’ actual expressions 

about the factual scenario at issue here. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim 

Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1682. Delegate Campbell further amplified: 

I feel that with “oral communications” you are not excluding the legitimate 

law enforcement people, who, with the consent of one party, the person 

who is being threatened by phone calls and things like this, to act on behalf 

of the victim. The privacy of that individual certainly could be waived with 

his or her consent, and there’s certainly no privacy toward the obscene 

caller. 

Transcript, p. 1685. And Delegate Dahood added: 

 Yes, let me answer that question. First of all, this does not in any 

way relate to the obscene phone call situation, nor does it relate to the 

ability of the telephone company to make traces. The logic and reason is 

this: all personal rights, constitutional or otherwise, may be waived. Lady 

 52
A is receiving the obscene phone call. She waives her right and grants the 

telephone company the right to intercept that communication. The 

individual that’s making the call does not have the right of privacy with 

respect to violating the law and making the obscene phone calls, so as a 

consequence, we are not interfering with anyone’s rights . . . . 

Transcript, p. 1686. 

¶98 To be sure, the delegates, as quoted in Siegal, 281 Mont. at 276-77, 934 P.2d at 

192, condemned “wiretaps,” “eavesdropping,” “electronic surveillance” and other forms 

of nonconsensual monitoring, yet at the same time spoke approvingly of a party 

consenting to the monitoring of a telephonic conversation wherein the other party had, 

under the facts, waived the right to privacy in the communication. The case before us 

illustrates a similar scenario—consent by one party and facts illustrating no reasonable 

expectation of privacy on part of the other in the transaction. The delegates clearly 

distinguished between these two different scenarios, but the Court does not. Neither does 

the Court acknowledge the delegates’ specific views in this regard. 

¶99 Consequently, the Court finds a privacy expectation in what the delegates clearly 

stated was a non-private situation. The Court does not explain how a privacy interest 

springs forth from a non-private commercial transaction. In paragraph 35, the Court 

appears to distinguish between the risk that a conversation will be repeated and the risk 

that the same conversation will be consensually electronically monitored by government 

agents. However, if this is the Court’s distinction, it is without a constitutional difference 

because society would not consider a privacy interest in a non-private commercial drug 

transaction to be reasonable. Indeed, our constitutional convention delegates did not, and 

neither did some of the greatest legal minds of our time, as quoted herein. Accordingly, I 

 53
would join them and conclude that no “search” took place. See Hamilton, ¶ 17 

(explaining that where no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy exists a search 

does not occur). 

¶100 However, even assuming arguendo that a search did occur, the Court’s analysis of 

the “nature of the State’s intrusion” again further ignores the facts of the present case and 

mischaracterizes the role of consent in our search and seizure jurisprudence. Most 

notably, while the Court overrules Brown on the basis that it “merely paralleled federal 

jurisprudence,” in its discussion of “consent” the Court opts to “use some federal Fourth 

Amendment analysis in addressing issues under the Montana Constitution” and relies on 

the Supreme Court case of Georgia v. Randolph. Opinion, ¶ 42. The Court’s reliance on 

federal jurisprudence is inconsistent at best and an unfortunate consequence is the 

twisting of the holding in Randolph to fit the issue at hand. 

¶101 Randolph involved the search of a home despite one of the co-occupant’s express 

refusal to consent to the search. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the 

refusal of one occupant to consent trumps the consent of a co-occupant and the police 

may not search the shared quarters. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120, 126 S. Ct. at 1526. The 

Randolph situation cannot fairly be likened to the instant case. As the Court correctly 

deduces, the item searched here is the conversation. Opinion, ¶ 45. However, a 

conversation, unlike a home, is not a shared space. Once the conversation commences, it 

becomes the individual property of each participant. See Brown, 232 Mont at 10, 755 

P.2d at 1370 (stating that “both participants [have] an equal interest in the conversation . . 

. .”). Neither participant can prevent the other (absent privilege) from sharing or 

 54
repeating the conversation because each has full control over it. A conversation is not the 

same as a dwelling space and, accordingly, consent of both conversationalists is not 

required in order to monitor the conversation. 

¶102 However, by concluding that both parties to an electronically monitored 

conversation must consent to the monitoring, the Court fails to acknowledge the true 

distinction at work here: that consensual monitoring is different than “eavesdropping”—

the monitoring of a conversation by the government without the consent of any party. 

The failure to honor the informant’s consent lumps consensual monitoring with 

eavesdropping for all constitutional purposes, because the same requirements are 

imposed for either, even though they are, according to longstanding jurisprudence, clearly 

constitutionally distinct. In sum, the Court renders the party’s “consent” null, giving it no 

effect whatsoever. “[T]here is a substantial distinction between ‘[revelations] to the 

Government by a party to conversations with the defendant’ and eavesdropping on 

conversations without the knowledge or consent of either party to it.” United States v. 

Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 n.4, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304 n.4 (1984). (Bracket in original.) 

We explain this in Brown: “It is important to stress that this holding does not open the 

floodgates to create an Orwellian society and that the individual is not left without 

protections against inappropriate electronic eavesdropping.” Brown, 232 Mont. at 11, 

755 P.2d at 1371. 

¶103 The Court’s conclusion also ignores the High Court’s guidance that “[t]he constant 

element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases . . . is the 

great significance given to widely shared social expectations[.]” Randolph, 547 US. at 

 55
111, 126 S. Ct. at 1521 (emphasis added). The widely shared social expectation, as this 

Court accepts in paragraph 35, is that each person assumes the risk that a participant to 

the conversation may turn around and repeat the conversation. More importantly, we 

share the social expectation that we assume a person is who he purports to be. See 

Brown, 232 Mont at 11, 755 P.2d at 1371 (explaining that “mistaken trust” is not a 

defense). However, the Court leaves these social expectations behind and forces the 

Randolph rationale onto a highly distinguishable situation. 

¶104 Even assuming that the Randolph rationale is appropriately used here, the Court 

ignores two critical points of that decision: (1) neither defendant “refused” consent here, 

as in Randolph, and (2) the Randolph Court expressly stated that the police need not 

“take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the 

permission they [have] already received.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122, 126 S. Ct. at 1527. 

The Court today reads into Randolph the requirement that the police give each person 

present an “opportunity to object to the search.” Opinion, ¶ 45.2

 However, the Supreme 

Court expressly refused to require police to take this type of affirmative action, stating: 

“There is no ready reason to believe that efforts to invite a refusal would make a 

difference in many cases, whereas every co-tenant consent case would turn into a test 

about the adequacy of the police’s efforts to consult with a potential objector.” 

Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122, 126 S. Ct. at 1527-28. The Court conveniently ignores these 

 

2

The very idea that one engaged in the commercial sale of illegal drugs to a non-confidant 

must be given the “opportunity to object” before police can monitor the parties’ 

conversation is a flight into the fanciful, perhaps the ludicrous. 

 56
portions of the Randolph decision—perhaps this is what the Court means by saying it will 

“use some federal Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .” Opinion, ¶ 42 (emphasis added). 

¶105 Moreover, by likening the instant case to Randolph the Court ends its analysis of 

the nature of the state’s intrusion and fails to consider other pertinent details. First and 

foremost, the recording did not produce any evidence beyond what the informant herself 

could have relayed. This fact led the District Court to conclude that the government 

action here was “not excessively intrusive.” The facts clearly distinguish the monitoring 

here from the “sense enhancing” technologies of the type we addressed in Siegal, which 

we noted could be used to “surreptitiously monitor the heat signatures generated by 

activities conducted within the confines of [Montanans’] private homes and enclosed 

structures for the purpose of drawing inferences about the legality of such activities.” 

Siegal, 281 Mont. at 274, 934 P.2d at 190. No such capture of private, unexposed 

information about the defendants was accomplished here. Nothing was recorded that the 

defendants did not consciously state, and which the informants could not relate as having 

heard firsthand. 

¶106 It could be argued that consensual monitoring enhances the senses of police 

because officers can hear a conversation which they otherwise could not. However, this 

distinction is not one of constitutional dimension, because it relates only to the mode by 

which the information is received, not the content of that information. Whether the 

informant testifies, or the officer testifies with the tape, the evidentiary potential is the 

same. Thus, it is clear that defendants’ constitutional privacy claim really boils down to 

trial strategy: they do not want the daunting task of fighting against the pesky 

 57
truthfulness of their very own, recorded words. However, as well explained by Justice 

Harlan, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Lopez, there is no constitutional 

right in the expectation that a defendant’s own words will not be surreptitiously recorded: 

Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s argument amounts to saying that he 

has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s memory, or 

to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by corroborating 

evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no other argument 

can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the agent 

could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner took in 

offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be 

accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical 

recording.

Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 1388 (1963) (emphasis added). 

¶107 It is true that Justice Harlan later parted ways with the United States Supreme 

Court on the issue of warrantless consensual monitoring in White. His dissent in White

often serves as fodder for arguments criticizing the practice, and, indeed, this Court 

quoted it in State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 115, 582 P.2d 1216, 1221 (1978), 

overruled, Brown, 232 Mont. at 8, 755 P.2d at 1369. Given that citation, and further, that 

Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516, is generally 

regarded as the source of our Court’s privacy jurisprudence, his approach in White to the 

issue before us is worth noting. In his White dissent, Justice Harlan gave the following 

test or construct for analyzing this technological issue: 

This question must, in my view, be answered by assessing the nature of a 

particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual’s 

sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique 

of law enforcement. 

White, 401 U.S. at 786, 91 S. Ct. at 1143 (J. Harlan, dissenting). 

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¶108 Applying Justice Harlan’s construct to the facts of this case yields interesting 

results. First, the “nature of the particular practice,” as discussed above, is not intrusive, 

as the monitoring here captured nothing more than the informant could also testify about, 

thus reducing defendants’ privacy claim to nothing more than a wish to be tried without 

the jury hearing a recording of their own words. Secondly, what is the “likely extent of 

its impact on the individual’s sense of security”? Of course, the “extent” of the impact is 

likewise reduced by the limited information obtained by the monitoring, but this question 

is more fully answered by other facts from the record, which are most illustrative. As 

Goetz stated while selling drugs to Trusler: 

[T]he real deal is with this sh**, they are all over. The Feds are f***ing 

everywhere in this town. The DTF, the FBI, there’s reason to be superultra-f***ing-freaked! 

¶109 I would suggest that the “likely extent of the impact” of consensual monitoring 

upon the “sense of security” of people commercially marketing illegal drugs to the public 

in an environment of active law enforcement is, respectfully, very minimal. This activity 

is a highly risky venture, and, indeed, one engaging in it truly has good reason to be 

“freaked” because, consistent with Goetz’s knowledge of the risk, law enforcement is 

engaged. Thus, the likely extent of the impact of consensual monitoring upon the 

defendants’ “sense of security,” with or without a warrant, is not reasonably significant. 

¶110 Lastly, Justice Harlan’s construct requires a balancing of these first two factors 

against the “utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.” On this point, few 

would disagree that, as a technology, this tool is of great utility to law enforcement. In a 

case involving a wired informant, we acknowledged that “[t]he use of informants has 

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long been recognized as an allowable tool of police investigation.” State v. Reavley, 

2003 MT 298, ¶ 36, 318 Mont. 150, ¶ 36, 79 P.3d 270, ¶ 36. This point was further 

acknowledged in the Court’s questioning of State’s counsel during oral argument in this 

case: 

Counsel: What I am suggesting is that the heightened standards of 

particularized suspicion that the government would be burdened with if 

particularized suspicion were imposed absent this Court finding a search 

would really jeopardize our ability to use informants effectively and would 

basically give people a license to engage in criminal businesses in their 

homes. That’s what I’m suggesting. 

Justice: Counsel, let me ask a broader question. I think all of us have 

become accustomed to the notion of, through television and the movies and 

books about police conduct, police investigation, . . . the use of criminal 

informants, confidential informants and the use of body wires. But often 

times we see [in] those, that the defendants are bad guys, they’re mafia, 

they’re organized crime, there’s murders involved. Do we really need to 

allow this technology to come into play, allow this intrusion, when we’re 

talking about a fifty dollar pot buy? 

Counsel: Well, I can see where people would disagree about the 

government doing that, but the fact of the matter is that this involves the 

criminal sale of dangerous drugs that the people’s representatives have 

determined to be illegal. And I don’t think the Court should get into 

determining whether one interest is stronger, whether you’re dealing with 

Mr. Goetz involving methamphetamine or Mr. Hamper involving 

marijuana. [Emphasis added.] 

¶111 Truly, it is a different world today, not only in terms of technological advances, 

but also in the expectation of the use of technology. I would submit, as the questioning 

italicized above likewise indicates, that our citizens, especially young people in today’s 

society who have been raised in the age of Law and Order and CSI, would think it 

unusual that a drug dealer would have a reasonable expectation that his conversations 

during a drug sale to a non-confidant were not being consensually monitored. The drug 

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dealer may have a subjective expectation, but it is not an expectation that our society 

would deem reasonable. 

¶112 Moreover, monitoring provides protection for the informant, who risks physical 

harm to work with police, and provides for accurate recording and preservation of the 

evidence of the transaction. Thus, for purposes of Justice Harlan’s construct, the utility 

of this technology is very high in the furtherance of the state’s compelling state interest in 

“enforc[ing] its criminal laws for the benefit and protection” of the citizens. State ex rel 

Zander v. Dist. Ct., 180 Mont. 548, 556, 591 P.2d 656, 660 (1979). The weighing of 

Justice Harlan’s factors therefore results in a conclusion that the utility of the “particular 

practice” here clearly outweighs the impact upon the defendant’s sense of security. 

Conclusion 

¶113 This case has little to do with Montanans continuing to “cherish the privacy” of 

their homes, Opinion, ¶ 35, and even less about “one-on-one conversation[s] conducted 

in a private setting,” Opinion, ¶ 31 (emphasis added), simply because, in view of the 

facts, the setting here should not be considered private. A proper focus on the facts 

reveals that the defendants were engaged in commercial transactions with non-confidants, 

and we have been careful to explain that our privacy holdings do not necessarily apply to 

conduct engaged in “for commercial purposes.” Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 455-

56, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (1997). 

¶114 Rather, this case is about avoiding the truth—the defendants’ raising of a privacy 

claim to keep the truth, that is, the recording of their own words, from the jury and 

thereby gaining a tactical advantage by escaping the strong evidence of their crimes. 

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They want this result despite the fact they are informed of the active police involvement 

to the point of being “super ultra freaked out” about local police presence and nonetheless 

assumed the high risk of exposing their trade and their wares through multiple contacts 

with non-confidants. Their actions were not consistent with the desire for privacy. 

Indeed, I believe it is untenable for the Court to conclude that society would find 

reasonable the privacy claims against the consensual monitoring of such actions. The 

District Court rightly concluded that society would not find this connived claim 

reasonable. There is not only no indication that the Declaration of Rights was intended to 

be applied to such risky, non-private behavior, but the debates demonstrate just the 

opposite. The Court’s conclusion to the contrary results, in my view, to the cheapening 

of our “genuine liberties,” about which the United States Supreme Court clearly warned. 

On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754, 72 S. Ct. at 971. Our right of privacy has been hijacked by 

those engaging in activities which the right was clearly not meant to protect, and has thus 

been devalued—becoming the new refuge of meth dealers selling to the public by means 

they well knew risked law enforcement involvement. The delegates to the Constitutional 

Convention did not countenance such a distortion of the right they found “essential to the 

well-being of a free society.” 

¶115 And I would not, either. I dissent. 

¶116 In response to the concurrences by Justice Cotter and Justice Leaphart, I 

appreciate that Justice Cotter’s concurrence at least recognizes the commercial nature of 

the facts, something the Court’s opinion does not do. However, I must disagree with her 

suggestion, made also by Justice Leaphart’s concurrence, that the analysis herein “is 

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intended to apply only to those transactions that are criminal in nature.” J. Cotter, 

concurrence ¶ 125. As indicated by the discussion in paragraph 96 herein, and the 

example therein—that those gathering to smoke pot together, though a criminal act, 

would nonetheless have a different expectation than those engaged in the actions in this 

case—the criminal nature of the transaction does not control the outcome. As the Court 

recognizes in paragraph 29, the law requires that the expectation of privacy be 

determined by “looking at the particular facts of the case.” That is precisely what this 

dissent advocates, without regard to the legality of those facts. It bears repeating, 

however, as recognized by the esteemed jurists quoted herein, that factual considerations, 

such as opening one’s house for commercial transactions, inevitably impacts the privacy 

analysis. Neither Justice Cotter nor Justice Leaphart has any answer to the collective 

wisdom expressed by these jurists on these issues. 

¶117 I also disagree with Justice Cotter’s statement that the analysis would “gut any 

expectation of privacy one might reasonably have in his commercial conversation[.]” 

J. Cotter, concurrence ¶ 125. Again, we should be careful about making broad statements 

disconnected from the facts and the law. In addition to the commercial nature of the 

transaction, there are many additional facts, varying in each case, which our law requires 

to be considered. For purposes of brevity, no doubt, Justice Cotter’s concurrence does 

not consider the additional facts about this transaction. However, the facts are critical 

under our law. For example, is the expectation of privacy in a commercial transaction 

which takes place at a crowded garage sale the same as one consummated in a closed 

office? Unless we are going to decide cases without regard to the “particular facts of the 

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case,” these factual distinctions should matter. Indeed, the law requires that we 

determine whether a claimed expectation of privacy is one society believes to be 

reasonable. The only way we can do so is by considering how society views the facts of 

the matter. If we are properly applying the law to the facts, then some commercial 

transactions would be viewed by society as private, and others would not. Our duty is to 

decide one case at a time, based upon the particular facts. 

¶118 Justice Leaphart’s concurrence advocates that agents of the state should not 

monitor any conversation without a warrant, “no matter what the setting,” even those 

conversations which occur “outside a private setting.” J. Leaphart, concurrence ¶ 57, 59. 

Under this approach, all conversations, wherever and however conducted, would be 

blanketed with a privacy right. Courts would no longer need to consider the “particular 

facts of the case.” This may be what the author desires, but is categorically not a 

principle of American law. No jurisprudential authority can be cited for it. Although the 

concurrence cites Justice Harlan’s dissent in White, Justice Harlan was clearly not 

advocating for the extreme position taken by the concurrence, asserted to be necessary for 

a “free society.” J. Leaphart, concurrence ¶ 58. 

¶119 Such notions of a “free society” are not consistent with the free society established 

by the constitutional history of this country and state. As explained herein, this dissent 

joins the position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court on electronic monitoring under the 

federal constitution. This Court likewise interpreted the Montana Constitution for the 

past twenty years and, more importantly, the delegates of the 1972 Montana 

Constitutional Convention took the position of this dissent. Further, and which should 

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give the Court pause, the high courts of our sister states, consistent with federal authority, 

have repeatedly reached the conclusion advocated by this dissent when interpreting their 

state constitutions. See Hammond v. State, 354 So. 2d 280, 292-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 

1977); Smithey v. State, 602 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Ark. 1980); People v. Phillips, 711 P.2d 

423, 437 (Cal. 1985); People v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 943, 949 (Colo. 1982); State v. 

Grullon, 562 A.2d 481, 489 (Conn. 1989); Morningstar v. State, 428 So. 2d 220, 221 n.1 

(Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); Green v. State, 299 S.E.2d 544, 546 (Ga. 

1983); State v. Lester, 649 P.2d 346, 350-51 (Haw. 1982); People v. Richardson, 328 

N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ill. 1975); Lawhorn v. State, 452 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Ind. 1983); Carrier 

v. Commw., 607 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Ky. App. 1980); State v. Reeves, 427 So. 2d 403, 410 

(La. 1983); Lee v. State, 489 So. 2d 1382, 1386 (Miss. 1986); People v. Collins, 475 

N.W.2d 684, 698 (Mich. 1991); State v. Engleman, 653 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Mo. 1983); 

State v. Kilgus, 519 A.2d 231, 240-41 (N.H. 1986); State v. Levan, 388 S.E.2d 429, 438 

(N.C. 1990); State v. Geraldo, 429 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Ohio 1981); Commw. v. 

Blystone, 549 A.2d 81, 87-88 (Pa. 1988); State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081-82 

(R.I. 1981); Clariday v. State, 552 S.W.2d 759, 768-69 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); State v. 

Boone, 581 P.2d 571, 573-74 (Utah 1978); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22, 32 (W. Va. 

1982). Still further, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice, Electronic 

Surveillance of Private Communications Standard 2-5.1(a), states as follows: 

A law enforcement officer should be permitted to intercept the contents of a 

private communication with the consent of one of the parties to the 

communication without a court order, provided that the officer intercepts 

and uses the communication in the proper performance of the officer’s 

official duties. 

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¶120 These authorities and sources make clear that Justice Leaphart’s “free society” 

theory runs counter to our nation and state’s constitutional principles as enunciated in 

countless cases. Indeed, the concurrence’s theory is more akin to traditional anarchist 

thought than our constitutional history: “[A]narchism is based upon the idea of the 

sovereign individual, the belief that individual conscience and the pursuit of self-interest 

should not be constrained by any public body or collective authority.” Andrew 

Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics, 46, (MacMillan Press 2000). Though we all desire 

privacy, our system was not formed upon, nor has ever endorsed, an absolute privacy 

right premised upon the sovereign individual which would permit a limitless pursuit of 

self-interest. However good it may sound in theory, doing “whatever one wants” without 

government interference is not a free society. It is anarchy. Such thinking would not 

have allowed American free society to survive for over two hundred years. Under our 

constitutions, freedom means the right to pursue one’s own life within the confines of the 

solemn principles upon which the democracy was founded. 

¶121 Upon the collective judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court, the delegates to the 1972 

Montana Constitutional Convention, the justices of the Montana Supreme Court for the 

past twenty years, and the high courts of our sister states, I would affirm the District 

Court. 

 /S/ JIM RICE 

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Justice John Warner dissents. 

¶122 I emphatically agree with the dissent of Justice Rice. The only real world result of 

the Court’s decision today will be to increase the use of a perpetrator’s home for all types 

of criminal transactions. 

¶123 For the sake of safety, law enforcement might opt to continue equipping officers 

and citizen informants with electronic transmitting devices when they undertake the 

dangerous task of securing evidence against drug dealers, white-slavers and other 

offenders, who naturally decline to conduct their flagitious business out in the open. It is 

possible that such recordings could be used in redirect examination. U.S. v. Burns, 432 

F.3d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 2005). And, in the event a criminal defendant chooses to testify 

and contradicts the testimony of a State’s witness to a criminal transaction, a recording of 

what actually happened might come in handy for impeachment purposes. See e.g. U.S. v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3414 (1984); Walder v. U.S., 347 U.S. 62, 65, 

74 S. Ct. 354, 356 (1954); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S. Ct. 643, 646 

(1971). 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 

Justice Patricia O. Cotter concurs. 

¶124 The Dissent, which stands for the proposition that there is no expectation of 

privacy in a commercial transaction where a product is sold to a non-confidant (Dissent, 

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¶ 94), has surface appeal on a first read. However, in my judgment, the analysis is 

problematic, wherever on the spectrum of application it might fall. 

¶125 While the Dissent complains that the Court’s decision is unnecessarily broad and 

sweeping, so too is its own reach. If the Dissent’s rationale is intended to apply equally 

to the criminal and the law-abiding alike—which I submit, it must—then it stands for the 

proposition that virtually any commercial transaction may be surreptitiously recorded 

without a warrant and with only one party’s consent, with the resulting recording being 

admissible in evidence against the speaker. It would, in essence, gut any expectation of 

privacy one might reasonably have in his commercial conversation, regardless of the 

lawfulness of the transaction. If, on the other hand, the analysis is intended to apply to 

only those transactions that are criminal in nature, as is repeatedly suggested throughout 

the Dissent (i.e., Dissent, ¶ 109, addressing the impact of such monitoring upon “people 

commercially marketing illegal drugs to the public . . . in a highly risky venture”; 

Dissent, ¶ 114, the Declaration of Rights was not intended “to be applied to such risky 

non-private behavior,” etc.), then it runs afoul of our duty to treat all persons the same 

before the law, without distinction for criminal/non-criminal behavior. See Opinion, 

¶ 32. Respectfully, either result is unacceptable. 

¶126 It bears repeating that the Court is not imposing an outright ban on electronic 

monitoring of conversations with the consent of only one participant. All we are saying 

is that there should be sufficient probable cause that a criminal enterprise is about to 

occur to support the issuance of a warrant allowing such monitoring. In my view, this is 

a far preferable alternative than an expansive rule which would permit the introduction 

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into evidence of surreptitious non-consensual recordings conducted in virtually any and 

every commercial setting. I therefore concur. 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

Justice James C. Nelson joins in the Concurrence of Justice Patricia O. Cotter. 

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

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