alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shariff Jackson, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 828]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Ronald H. Tills, A.J.), entered April 25, 2003. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of, inter alia, sodomy in the first degree.

*1356It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, sodomy in the first degree (Penal Law former § 130.50 [1]), two counts of rape in the first degree (§ 130.35 [1]), and three counts of robbery in the first degree (§ 160.15 [1], [3], [4]). We reject the contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel *(see generally People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Although “[a] single error may qualify as ineffective assistance, . . . [t]here can be no denial of effective assistance of trial counsel arising from counsel’s failure to ‘make a motion or argument that has little or no chance of success’ ” *(People v Caban,*5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005], quoting *People v Stultz, 2*NY3d 277, 287 [2004], *rearg denied*3 NY3d 702 [2004]). Here, “defendant failed to show that he suffered the requisite prejudice because of counsel’s failure to move for severance” of the counts involving one victim from those involving the other victim *(People v McNerney,*6 AD3d 1107, 1107 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 678 [2004], citing *People v Ruger,*288 AD2d 686, 687 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 733 [2002]).

We further reject the contention of defendant that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.10. The record supports the court’s determination that the identity of defendant as the sexual assailant, and thus his whereabouts, were not ascertainable by diligent efforts prior to July 1998 *(see People v Jones,*299 AD2d 283 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 655 [2003]; *see generally People v Seda,*93 NY2d 307, 311-312 [1999]). The sentence, which we note is reduced by operation of law to an indeterminate term of 25 to 50 years *(see*Penal Law § 70.30 [1] [e] [i], [vi]), is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Kehoe, Martoche and Lawton, JJ.
# C_2023296EN.01004401.xml

| 21.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 296/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 296/44

---

Action brought on 7 July 2023 — Washtower IP v EUIPO — LG Electronics (WASHTOWER)

(Case T-376/23)

(2023/C 296/49)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Washtower IP BV (Hengelo, Netherlands) (represented by: L. Fresco, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: LG Electronics, Inc. (Seoul, Republic of Korea)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark WASHTOWER — European Union trade mark No 18 193 675

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 April 2023 in Case R 412/2022-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and dismiss LG Electronics’ cancellation action or, alternatively, annul that decision and send the case back to the Board of Appeal for reconsideration; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and dismiss LG Electronics’ cancellation action or, alternatively, annul that decision and send the case back to the Board of Appeal for reconsideration;

| — | order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings to bear their own costs and pay those of the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings to bear their own costs and pay those of the applicant.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
STEWART v. WEBB.

No. 274P15-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 2015.

Robert K. Stewart, Marion, for Stewart, Robert K.

Amy Kunstling Irene, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Maureen Krueger, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 28th of October 2015 by Plaintiff to Appoint Counsel:

> "Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of December 2015."
Donna Jean PHILLIPS (f/k/a BROWN), Plaintiff, v. Robert Lee HAYNES, Jr. and Linda G. Haynes, Defendants.

No. COA15-245.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 178 (Thursday, September 15, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 54521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18291]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Forest Service


Notice of Sanders County Resource Advisory Committee Meeting

AGENCY: Forest Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the authorities in the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (Public Law 92-463) and under the Secure Rural Schools and 
Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-393) the Lolo 
and Kootenai National Forests' Sanders County Resource Advisory 
Committee will meet on September 15 at 7 p.m. in Thompson Falls, 
Montana for a business meeting. The meeting is open to the public.

DATES: September 15, 2005.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at the Thompson Falls Courthouse, 
1111 Main Street, Thompson Falls, MT 59873.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Randy Hojem, Designated Federal 
Official (DFO), District Ranger, Plains Ranger District, Lolo National 
Forest at (406) 826-3821.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Agenda topics include reviewing and making 
recommendations on proposed RAC projects for 2006, and receiving public 
comment. If the meeting location is changed, notice will be posted in 
the local newspapers, including the Clark Fork Valley Press, and 
Sanders County Ledger.

    Dated: September 2, 2005.
Randy Hojem,
DFO, Plains Ranger District, Lolo National Forest.
[FR Doc. 05-18291 Filed 9-14-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
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<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  102,147
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,128,222
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              19,276,604
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,718,420
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    22,926,545
<OTHER-SE>                                (12,221,590)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                19,276,604
<SALES>                                     18,941,217
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,941,217
<CGS>                                        9,407,861
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               23,759,689
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,022,201
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (5,817,093)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (5,818,693)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (5,818,693)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.65)
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 781 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

  1st Session
                                 S. 781

 To extend the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to collect Do-
     Not-Call Registry fees to fiscal years after fiscal year 2007.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 6, 2007

   Mr. Pryor introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to collect Do-
     Not-Call Registry fees to fiscal years after fiscal year 2007.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY.

    (a) Fees.--Section 2 of the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act (15 
U.S.C. 6101 note) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``for fiscal years 2003 through 2007,''; 
        and
            (2) by striking ``for such fiscal years''.
    (b) Reports.--Section 4(b) of that Act is amended by striking ``For 
each of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the'' and inserting ``The''.
                                 <all>
```
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-17-00836-CR

Larry Wayne THOMAS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CR12149W

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE ALVAREZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED.

SIGNED February 28, 2018.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Motion Granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed

November 3 , 2022

.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00504

- CV

VALARIS PLC , Appellant

V.

GORDON GILLIES , Appellee

On Appeal from the 270th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020

- 36729

MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from a judgment signed April 15, 2022 . On October 26, 2022, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and remand to the trial court for rendition of judgment in accor dance with the par t ies ’ agreement to settle

. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1 (a)(1)

– (2)

. We reinstate the appeal and grant the motion.2

The appeal is dismissed, and manda te is o rdered to issue immediat ely per the request of the parties.

PER CURIAM

P anel c onsists of Justices Wise, J ewell, and Poissant.
#### General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Respondent, v Grade A Auto Body, Inc., Defendant, and Amelia S. Cavanaugh, Appellant.

[799 NYS2d 748]

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant Amelia S. Cavanaugh appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Eerier, J.), dated July 29, 2003, which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a judgment of the same court entered December 2, 2002, upon her default in appearing or answering the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate her default in appearing or answering the complaint since she failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for her default *(see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v Dutton Lbr. Co.,*67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; *Taylor v Saal, 4*AD3d 467 [2004]; *Dominguez v Carioscia,*1 AD3d 396, 397 [2003]). The appellant’s mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint was insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service created by the affidavit of service *(see Carrenard v Mass,*11 AD3d 501 [2004]; *Truscello v Olympia Constr.,*294 AD2d 350, 351 [2002]; *Wieck v Halpern,*255 AD2d 438 [1998]). Even if the appellant’s motion were treated as one made pursuant to CPLR 317 *(see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v Dutton Lbr. Co., supra*at 143; *Mann-Tell Realty Corp. v Cappadora Realty Corp.,*184 AD2d 497, 498 [1992]), she failed to demonstrate that she did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend the action *(see 96 Pierrepont v Mauro,*304 AD2d 631 [2003]; *Waldon v Plotkin,*303 AD2d 581 [2003]). Moreover, the appellant failed to set forth facts sufficient to establish the existence of a meritorious defense *(see Florence Corp. v Penguin Constr. Corp.,*227 AD2d 442 [1996]; *Brewster Tr. Mix Corp. v McLean,*169 AD2d 1036 [1991]).

The appellant’s contention that the plaintiff failed to timely seek to enter a default judgment *(see*CPLR 3215 [c]) was not raised in her motion to vacate the default and, therefore, may not be considered for the first time on appeal *(see Zeballos v Zeballos,*104 AD2d 1033 [1984]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are either improperly *448raised for the first time on appeal or without merit. H. Miller, J.P., S. Miller, Goldstein, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.
# The English Coast (Isle of Wight) Order 2014

        - Previous
        - Next

E+W

Statutory Instruments

# 2014 No. 1940

Countryside, England And Wales

# The English Coast (Isle of Wight) Order 2014

Made

14th July 2014

Laid before Parliament

24th July 2014

Coming into force

1st October 2014

The Secretary of State, being satisfied that the coast of the Isle of Wight is of sufficient length to enable the establishment                           of one or more long-distance routes along its length capable of affording the public an extensive journey on foot, and in                           exercise of the powers conferred by section 300(2)(b) and (5) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009(1), makes the following Order.                        

## Citation, commencement and extentE+W

1.  This Order—                  

(a)may be cited as the English Coast (Isle of Wight) Order 2014;                  

(b)comes into force on 1st October 2014; and                  

(c)extends to England and Wales.                  

## Specification of the Isle of WightE+W

2.  The island known as the Isle of Wight is specified for the purposes of section 300(2)(b) of the Marine and Coastal Access                     Act 2009.                  

Dan Rogerson

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

14th July 2014

## EXPLANATORY NOTE

(This note is not part of the Order)

This Order specifies the Isle of Wight for the purposes of section 300(2)(b) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (c. 23), with the effect that the Isle of Wight is no longer an excluded island for the purposes of the description of “the English                     coast” contained in section 300(1) of that Act.                  

A full impact assessment has not been prepared in respect of this Order because the assumptions underlying the Order were                     reflected in the impact assessment which was prepared for the Act. It may be found at http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/marine/documents/legislation/marine-ia-0410.pdf .                  

1

2009 c. 23.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Mickeal Burgess, Appellant.

[800 NYS2d 516]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), rendered July 9, 2002, convicting him of attempted robbery in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of his plea allocution is unpreserved for appellate review because he failed to move to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction on this ground *(see People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636 [1983]; *People v Snare,*11 AD3d 823 [2004]; *People v Deyes,*3 AD3d 575 [2004]; *People v Konstantinides,*295 AD2d 537 [2002] ). Furthermore, while an exception to the preservation rule exists where the defendant’s factual recitation casts significant doubt upon his guilt or negates an essential element of the crime pleaded to *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]; *People v Deyes, supra; People v Konstantinides, supra),*we reject the defendant’s contention that this, exception applies here. The defendant’s admissions were sufficient to establish a factual basis for his plea of guilty to attempted robbery in the second degree, and did not suggest that he was intoxicated to such a degree as to negate intent *(see People v Jaworski,*296 AD2d 597 [2002]; *People v Harrell,*288 AD2d 489 [2001]; *People v Sierra,*256 AD2d 598 [1998]; *People v Farnham,*254 AD2d 767 [1998]). Krausman, J.P., Luciano, Spolzino and Lifson, JJ., concur.
Rodney Alan BACON v. UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. COA15-370.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Jan. 5, 2016.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 13.1

                                  CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
        (SUBSECTIONS (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18,
                               UNITED STATES CODE)

        Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each
of the undersigned officers of Industrias Bachoco, S.A. de C.V., a sociedad
anonima de capital variable organized under the laws of Mexico (the "Company"),
does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

        The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2004 (the "Form 20-F") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information
contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  June 29, 2005                        /s/  CRISTOBAL MONDRAGON FRAGOSO
                                             --------------------------------
                                             Cristobal Mondragon Fragoso
                                             Chief Executive Officer

Dated:  June 29, 2005                        /s/ DANIEL SALAZAR FERRER
                                             -------------------------
                                             Daniel Salazar Ferrer
                                             Chief Financial Officer

        A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Industrias Bachoco, S.A. de C.V. and will be retained by
Industrias Bachoco, S.A. de C.V. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
STATE v. David Matthew LOWE.

No. 278PA15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 16, 2016.

M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Chapel Hill, for Lowe, David Matthew.

Derrick Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 16th of February 2016 by State of NC:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 16th of February 2016."
STATE v. DYTANIA PAYNE-EL.

No. 43P08-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 26, 2008.

Robert Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, C. Colon Willoughby, Jr., District Attorney, for State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 25th day of April 2008 by Defendant to Proceed in Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference this the 26th day of August 2008."
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000931755
<NAME> AEI INCOME & GROWTH FUND XXI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
       
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