[Cite as State v. Koreisl, 2011-Ohio-6438.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 90950

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

MARK KOREISL 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

APPLICATION DENIED 

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court 

Case No. CR-502332 

Application for Re-opening 

Motion Nos. 449097 and 450082 

RELEASE DATE: December 13, 2011 

FOR APPELLANT 
Mark Koreisl, pro se 

Inmate No.: A542166 

Trumbull County Correctional Inst. 

5701 Burnett 

Leavittsburg, OH 44430 

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Pinkey S. Carr 

Asst. County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.: 

{¶ 1} Mark Koreisl has filed an application for reopening pursuant to 

App.R. 26(B). Koreisl is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, as 

rendered in State v. Koreisl, Cuyahoga App. No. 90950, 2009-Ohio-1238, which 

affirmed his conviction and sentence for the offenses of rape, gross sexual 

imposition, and importuning. We decline to reopen Koreisl’s appeal. 

{¶ 2} App.R. 26(B)(2)(b) requires that Koreisl establish “a showing of good 

cause for untimely filing if the application is filed more than 90 days after 

journalization of the appellate judgment,” which is subject to reopening. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio, with regard to the 90-day deadline as provided by App.R. 

26(B)(2)(b), has firmly established that: 

{¶ 3} “We now reject [applicant’s] claim that those excuses gave him good 

cause to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B). The rule was amended to 
include the 90-day deadline more than seven months before [applicant’s] appeal 

of right was decided by the court of appeals in February 1994, so the rule was 

firmly established then, just as it is today. Consistent enforcement of the rule’s 

deadline by the appellate courts in Ohio protects on the one hand the state’s 

legitimate interest in the finality of its judgments and ensures on the other hand 

that any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are promptly 

examined and resolved.

{¶ 4} “Ohio and other states ‘may erect reasonable procedural 

requirements for triggering the right to an adjudication,’ Logan v. Zimmerman 

Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265, and that is 

what Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of applications to 

reopen. [Applicant] could have retained new attorneys after the court of appeals 

issued its decision in 1994, or he could have filed the application on his own. 

What he could not do was ignore the rule’s filing deadline. * * * The 90-day 

requirement in the rule is ‘applicable to all appellants,’ State v. Winstead (1996), 

74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 658 N.E.2d 722, and Gumm offers no sound reason why 

he – unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants – could not comply with that 

fundamental aspect of the rule.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio 

St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, at ¶7. 

{¶ 5} See, also, State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 

N.E.2d 970; State v. Cooey, 73 Ohio St.3d 411, 1995-Ohio-328, 653 N.E.2d 252; 

State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 1995-Ohio-249, 647 N.E.2d 784. 
{¶ 6} Herein, Koreisl is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment that 

was journalized on March 19, 2009. The application for reopening was not filed 

until November 3, 2011, more than 90 days after journalization of the appellate 

judgement in State v. Koreisl, supra. In an attempt to establish “good cause” for 

the untimely filing of his application for reopening, Koreisl argues that he relied 

upon appellate counsel and was unable to obtain his appellate file. Koreisl, 

however, has failed to raise or establish “good cause” for the untimely filing of his 

application for reopening. 

{¶ 7} “Good cause” does not include reliance upon appellate counsel, 

difficulty in obtaining a transcript, and limited access to legal materials. State v. 

Hudson, Cuyahoga App. No. 91803, 2009-Ohio-6454, reopening disallowed, 

2010-Ohio-2979, Motion No. 434149. In addition, lack of knowledge or 

ignorance of the time constraint, applicable to an application for reopening per 

App.R. 26(B), does not provide sufficient cause for untimely filing. State v. Klein

(Mar. 28, 1991), Cuyahoga App. No. 58389, reopening disallowed (Mar. 15, 

1994), Motion No. 249260, affirmed (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 1481; State v. 

Trammell (July 13, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67834, reopening disallowed 

(Apr. 22, 1996), Motion No. 270493; State v. Travis (Apr. 5, 1990), Cuyahoga 

App. No. 56825, reopening disallowed (Nov. 2, 1994), Motion No. 251073, 

affirmed (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 317. See, also, State v. Torres, Cuyahoga App. 

No. 86530, 2006-Ohio-3696, reopening disallowed, 2007-Ohio-9, Motion No, 

390254; State v. Gaston (Feb. 7. 2002), Cuyahoga App. No. 79626, reopening 
disallowed (Jan 17,2007), Motion No. 391555. 

{¶ 8} The failure to establish “good cause” mandates that this court deny 

the application for reopening. State v. White (Jan. 31, 1991), Cuyahoga App. 

No. 57944, reopening disallowed (Oct. 19, 1994), Motion No. 249174; State v. 

Allen (Nov. 3, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65806, reopening disallowed (July 8, 

1996), Motion No. 267054. See, also, State v. Moss (May 13, 1993), Cuyahoga 

App. Nos. 62318 and 62322, reopening disallowed (Jan. 16, 1997), Motion No. 

275838; State v. McClain (Aug. 3, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67785, reopening 

disallowed (Apr. 15, 1997), Motion No. 276811; State v. Russell (May 9, 1996), 

Cuyahoga App. No. 69311, reopening disallowed (June 16, 1997), Motion No. 

282351. 

{¶ 9} Accordingly, Koreisl’s application for reopening is denied. 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, J., and 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR