* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-60265

Summary Calendar

CHARLES L. STRINGER

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

KATHY B. FUNCHESS; GENEVA 

LINDSEY; LENGELL WILLIAMS; 

TAMMIE MACK; REGINA LAURY; 

LORRAINE STEPHENS; UNKNOWN 

OR; UNKNOWN APXICIL; DONALD 

TAYLOR; CHARLES BARBOUR; DOUGLAS 

ANDERSON; GEORGE SMITH; PEGGY

HOBSON CALHOUN; RONNIE CHAPPELL; 

CITY OF JACKSON; SIDNEY JOHNSON; 

CHARLES T. DAVIS; JOHN DOES

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:06-CV-223

Before SMITH, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 29, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-60265

2

Plaintiff-Appellant, Charles L. Stringer (“Stringer”), appeals the district

court’s final judgment of dismissal, arguing that (1) the magistrate and district

court judges should have been disqualified; (2) the Defendants-Appellees

violated the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101

et seq.; (3) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as frivolous; and

(4)the magistrate judge failed to conduct an omnibus hearing. For the following

reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Stringer brought this suit against several defendants under the ADA and

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The crux of the complaint relates to Stringer’s

attempt to obtain more food stamps and grants for utility bills. Stringer alleged

that certain defendants conspired to violate his civil rights and other defendants

failed to write policies and procedures to prevent the conspiracy among

defendants. Stringer requested, inter alia, that the district court “[i]ssue a

Preliminary Injunction or a Temporary Restraining Order directing the

defendants to pay the gas bill as they are already supposed to do!” 

Stringer moved to recuse the magistrate and district court judges.

Stringer stated several reasons for the recusal, including that neither judge

“would be fair to any white person.” The magistrate judge entered an order

denying the motion seeking her recusal. The district court judge did not enter

an order expressly addressing the motion seeking his recusal. 

Stringer sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The magistrate judge

granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and recommended that the

complaint be dismissed as frivolous. The district court adopted the Report and

Recommendation (“R &R”) and entered a final judgment dismissing the action

as frivolous. Stringer filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment, and the
No. 08-60265

1 Stringer’s notice of appeal does not mention the orders denying the motions for

recusal, but we will review those orders as sufficiently related to the final judgment. See Trust

Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1485 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n appeal from a final

judgment sufficiently preserves all prior orders intertwined with the final judgment.”). 

3

district court denied the motion for reconsideration. Stringer now appeals the

judgment and orders denying the motions for recusal.1

II. Discussion

A. Motions to Recuse

Stringer filed motions to recuse both the district court judge and the

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Both judges denied the

motions to recuse, although the district court judge’s denial was implicit in the

final judgment dismissing the action. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d

1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Webber v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 200 Fed.

App’x 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“The denial of the recusal motion

was implicit in the entry of final judgment dismissing the complaint.”) (citation

omitted). We review denials of motions to recuse for abuse of discretion.

Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2003). 

Under § 455, a federal judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A

judge must also disqualify himself under various circumstances enumerated in

§ 455(b). See id. § 455(b). Under § 144, a judge must reassign a case when a

party “makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before

whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him

or in favor of any adverse party.” Id. § 144; see Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 517

F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he judge must pass on the legal sufficiency

of the affidavit, but may not pass on the truth of the matters alleged.”) (citations

omitted). 
No. 08-60265

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The facts stated in Stringer’s affidavits are notlegally sufficientto support

a recusal motion under either recusal statute. Therefore, the district court did

not abuse its discretion by denying the motions to recuse. 

B. Dismissal

We review a district court’s dismissal as frivolous for abuse of discretion.

Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997). We find that Stringer’s

claims are legally frivolous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Stringer’s remaining assignments of error are without merit. Accordingly, this

appeal is dismissed. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

III. Conclusion

We AFFIRM the district court’s final judgment, including the denial of

Stringer’s motions for recusal. Stringer also filed a motion for appointment of

counsel, which is DENIED. This appeal is DISMISSED.