SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

In Division 

KEITH A. BEE, ) Arizona Supreme Court 

 ) No. CV-08-0199-AP/EL 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) Pima County 

 v. ) Superior Court 

 ) No. C2008-4100 

ANN DAY, RAMON VALADEZ, SHARON ) 

BRONSON, RAYMOND J. CARROLL, ) 

RICHARD ELIAS, THE DULY ELECTED ) 

OR APPOINTED MEMBERS OF THE PIMA ) O P I N I O N

COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ) 

ARE NAMED SOLELY IN THIER ) 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; THE PIMA ) 

COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THE ) 

HONORABLE F. ANN RODRIGUEZ, THE ) 

DULY ELECTED PIMA COUNTY ) 

RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY ) 

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; PIMA ) 

COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE, ) 

STATE OF ARIZONA; AND THE ) 

HONORABLE BRAD NELSON, THE DULY ) 

APPOINTED PIMA COUNTY DIRECTOR ) 

OF ELECTIONS, WHO IS SOLELY ) 

NAMED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ) 

PIMA COUNTY ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT ) 

 ) 

 Appellees, ) 

 ) 

WESLEY KENT, ) 

 ) 

 Real Party in Interest. ) 

 ) 

__________________________________) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County 

The Honorable John Kelly, Judge

REVERSED 

________________________________________________________________
2 

RISNER & GRAHAM Tucson

 By William J. Risner

Attorneys for Keith A. Bee

BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA COUNTY ATTORNEY Tucson

 By Daniel S. Jurkowitz, Deputy County Attorney

Attorneys for Ann Day, Ramon Valadez, Sharon Bronson, 

Ray Carroll, Richard Elias, Pima County Board of 

Supervisors, F. Ann Rodriguez, Pima County Recorder's 

Office, State of Arizona, Brad R. Nelson, and Pima County 

Division of Elections

WILLIAMS & ZINMAN P.C. Scottsdale

 By Scott E. Williams

 Mark B. Zinman

Attorneys for Wesley Kent

________________________________________________________________

B A L E S, Justice 

¶1 This case concerns elector Wesley Kent’s challenge to 

the nomination petitions of Keith Bee, a candidate seeking to 

become the Republican nominee for Pima County Justice of the 

Peace for Precinct 5. Bee appealed from a superior court 

judgment invalidating his nomination petitions and striking his 

name from the ballot. We issued an order reversing the superior 

court and stating that Bee’s name will appear on the primary 

ballot. This opinion explains our reasoning. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In 2007, Jim Green resigned from his position as Pima 

County Justice of the Peace for Precinct 5, although the term 

for which he was elected does not end until December 31, 2010. 

Bee was appointed to fill the position until the next general 

election, scheduled for November 4, 2008, when voters will 
3 

choose which candidate will serve the remainder of Green’s 

unexpired term. 

¶3 A partisan primary election is scheduled for September 

2, 2008. To obtain a place on a partisan primary election 

ballot, a candidate must file nomination petitions containing a 

sufficient number of valid signatures. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

(“A.R.S.”) §§ 16-314, -322 (2006). When a person is “seeking to 

fill an unexpired vacant term,” the nomination petitions “shall 

designate the expiration date of the term following the name of 

the office being sought.” A.R.S. § 16-314(D). 

¶4 Bee submitted nomination petitions with sufficient 

signatures, but none of his petitions “designate[d] the 

expiration date” of Green’s unexpired vacant term. See id. 

Kent challenged the validity of the petitions based on this 

omission. The superior court agreed that the petitions were 

invalid and ordered Bee’s name to be removed from the ballot. 

Bee timely filed a notice of appeal in the superior court within 

the five-day deadline provided by A.R.S. § 16-351(A), which 

provides for a direct appeal to this Court. 

II. Discussion 

A.

¶5 To facilitate expedited election appeals, this Court 

recently adopted Rule 8.1 of the Arizona Rules of Civil 

Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”). The rule requires appellants in 
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expedited election matters to file a copy of the notice of 

appeal and other materials in the appellate court “[n]ot later 

than the next business day after filing the notice of appeal in 

the superior court.” ARCAP 8.1(c). Although Bee timely filed 

his notice of appeal in the superior court, he was three days 

late in complying with ARCAP 8.1(c). Based on Bee’s late 

filing, Kent asks this Court to dismiss the appeal. 

¶6 In contrast to the requirement that an appeal be 

timely filed, the failure to timely file a copy of the notice of 

appeal in accordance with Rule 8.1 is not a jurisdictional 

defect to an expedited election appeal. See ARCAP 8(a) 

(“Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely 

filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the 

appeal.”); see also Edwards v. Young, 107 Ariz. 283, 284, 486 

P.2d 181, 182 (1971) (“[W]here the appeal is not timely filed, 

the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction other than to 

dismiss the attempted appeal.”). 

¶7 A failure to meet the filing requirements in ARCAP 

8.1(c) does not warrant dismissal absent prejudice to the 

appellee or an impediment to this Court’s ability to decide the 

case on the merits. Cf. Lubin v. Thomas, 213 Ariz. 496, 497 ¶ 

10, 144 P.3d 510, 511 (2006) (noting appeals in election matters 

may be dismissed for laches when unreasonable delay prejudices 

opponent or administration of justice). The minor delay here 
5 

neither prejudiced Kent nor impeded this Court in deciding the 

merits. We therefore decline to dismiss Bee’s appeal. 

B.

¶8 If there is a challenge to the form or content of a 

nomination petition, we normally review de novo whether “a 

petition substantially complies with the statutory requirements” 

before denying access to a ballot. Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 

94, 101-02 ¶ 40, 139 P.3d 612, 619-20 (2006). Kent contends 

that substantial compliance is irrelevant because the statute 

demands strict compliance. He notes that A.R.S. § 16-314(D) 

states that the nomination petition “shall designate the 

expiration date of the [unexpired] term,” (emphasis added), 

unlike § 16-314(C), which states that nomination petitions 

should contain “language . . . in substantially the following 

form.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Kent argues, the legislature 

intended § 16-314(D) to be mandatory. 

¶9 We have previously considered whether nomination 

petitions substantially complied with statutory requirements 

even though the statute did not expressly state that substantial 

compliance would suffice. See Marsh v. Haws, 111 Ariz. 139, 

140, 526 P.2d 161, 162 (1974). This approach comports with 

Adams v. Bolin, in which this Court rejected a strict 

interpretation of nomination petition requirements, although the 

legislature had removed the word “substantially” from a statute 
6 

using language similar to A.R.S. § 16-314(C). 77 Ariz. 316, 

319-22, 271 P.2d 472, 474-76 (1954). In Adams, the Court 

explained that a court should not interpret the statutes 

governing nomination petitions in a way that allows “purely 

technical departures from nominating form” to outweigh the 

electors’ right to nominate legitimate candidates. Id. at 322, 

271 P.2d at 475. 

¶10 Under our “substantial compliance” analysis, we do not 

remove candidates from the ballot for mere technical departures 

from the form. Instead, “[i]n determining whether a nomination 

petition form substantially complies with the statutory 

requirements, this [C]ourt has focused on whether the omission 

of information could confuse or mislead electors signing the 

petition.” Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102 ¶ 42, 139 P.3d at 620. 

Absent a clear statement that the legislature intended a 

particular form requirement to be indispensible, we will 

continue to evaluate petition form challenges in this manner. 

C.

¶11 We turn to whether Bee’s nomination petitions 

substantially comply with A.R.S. § 16-314. Kent argues they do 

not because they nowhere indicate that signers are nominating 

Bee for an unexpired vacant term or when that term expires, as 

A.R.S. § 16-314(D) requires. That is, the petitions do not 

comply at all on this point, much less substantially. We 
7 

disagree with Kent’s narrow approach. 

¶12 Section 16-314(D) must be construed in its statutory 

context. Under A.R.S. § 16-314(C), candidates generally must 

identify in their nominating petitions their name and county of 

residence, the office sought, and the date of the primary 

election. Subsection (D) does not require information 

independent from that required under subsection (C), but instead 

instructs candidates to modify the form by adding the expiration 

date “following the name of the office being sought.” A.R.S. § 

16-314(D). In reviewing non-compliance with any component of 

the form, the relevant inquiry is whether the form as a whole 

substantially complies with the statutory requirements. 

¶13 Thus, to determine whether Bee’s petitions 

substantially comply we look at the nomination petition form as 

a whole and focus on whether “the omission of” the date on which 

the vacant term expired “could confuse or mislead electors 

signing the petition.” Moreno, 213 Ariz. at 102 ¶ 42, 139 P.3d 

at 620. Moreno is instructive. There, a petition form left 

blank “the particular day and month of” that year’s primary 

election, listing only the election year. Id. ¶ 44. The form 

also listed the name of the office sought, an office for which 

there was “only one primary election” date possible that year. 

Id. Although there could have been different dates for other 

offices, we held that there was no risk of confusion because 
8 

“electors would automatically know for which primary election 

they were signing.” Id. ¶ 45 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

¶14 This situation is similar. Bee’s petitions listed the 

name of the office sought, and there is only one seat for that 

office contested in the upcoming election. His petitions could 

not have misled electors into believing that they were 

nominating Bee for a full term because no such seat will be on 

the ballot. These circumstances do not implicate the concerns 

that subsection (D) seems intended to address. The legislature 

apparently enacted subsection (D) to prevent confusion in 

elections with multiple openings for the same office, such as 

school board elections. See Hearing on H.B. 2020 Before the H. 

Comm. on Educ., 40th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1991); see also 

A.R.S. § 15-422(A) (2002) (“Nominating petitions for persons 

seeking to fill a vacancy on a [school district] governing board 

shall be designated as provided in § 16-314.”). We are 

confident that the nomination petition forms did not cause any 

elector to be confused about the candidate, office, or election 

for which they were signing. Bee’s petition forms substantially 

complied with the statutory requirements. 
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III. Conclusion 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of 

the superior court and order Bee’s name to appear on the primary 

ballot. 

 _______________________________________

 W. Scott Bales, Justice

CONCURRING: 

_______________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Michael D. Ryan, Justice