NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-56

MARY REGAN

vs.

DEBORAH HOOPER & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Mary Regan, appeals from a Superior Court 

judgment entered following the grant of summary judgment in 

favor of her former employer and two supervisors on her claims 

of gender discrimination, retaliation, interference, and aiding 

and abetting under G. L. c. 151B. We vacate the judgment on the 

claim of gender discrimination and remand for further 

proceedings. We affirm the judgment on the claims of 

retaliation, interference, and aiding and abetting.

Background. We summarize the basic facts in the light most 

favorable to Regan, as the party opposing summary judgment,

drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Bulwer v. 

1 President and Fellows of Harvard College and Denis Collet.
2

Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 680 (2016). In August 2011, 

President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard) hired Regan 

as Associate Portfolio Director for the Executive Education 

program at Harvard Business School (HBS). Her responsibilities 

included ensuring the overall success of a portfolio of open 

enrollment and global programs that provided seminars taught by 

HBS faculty to business executives. In July 2013, Regan was 

promoted to portfolio director. Throughout Regan's employment 

at HBS, Deborah Hooper directly supervised her, and Denis Collet 

was the Associate Director or Director of Human Resources.

In January 2016, Hooper told Regan that certain HBS faculty 

members were unhappy with her performance. Hooper met with 

Regan and raised issues about her "aggressive" style, 

"inappropriate body language," "angry" appearance, and having 

her office door closed. She directed Regan to meet with Collet. 

On January 25, 2016, Regan met with Collet and expressed 

"concern[] about the stereotypical gender-related critiques made 

about [her]." After the meeting, Collet emailed his supervisor 

that

"[i]t is going to be a longer process with [Regan]. She 

expressed concern about a lack of process and the fact that 

concerns with her performance haven't been clear or 

documented as a part of a performance improvement 

plan . . . she's stated she hasn't heard negative feedback 

and at the very least deserves the opportunity to improve 

on aspects of her personality that are not meeting 

expectations."
3

On February 11, 2016, Regan emailed Collet, "I want to put on 

record that the way I have been treated by my manager, Deborah 

Hooper, and by HBS is discriminatory, based on my being a 

female." She also stated that she had hired legal counsel and

that if her employment situation was not resolved amicably, she 

expected to file a complaint for sex discrimination with the 

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

In March 2016, Harvard provided Regan with the option to 

resign with a separation package or stay in her position subject 

to a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Regan remained in her 

job and accepted the PIP. On May 13, 2016, Regan received the 

PIP from Hooper. According to Harvard, the PIP identified areas 

of concerns and expected improvements Regan must make. Regan 

believed that the PIP was "harsh and punitive, made false 

statements about [her] job performance and [] used as a means to 

terminate [her] employment." The PIP stated Regan would have to 

show marked improvement by July 8, 2016 "or disciplinary action 

may be taken." After receiving the PIP, Regan met weekly with 

Hooper.

On June 3, 2016, Regan submitted a written rebuttal to the 

PIP. During that week, Harvard began to plan to terminate 

Regan’s employment. On June 14, 2016, Hooper emailed her direct 

supervisor that she and Collet "discussed whether final 
4

conversation [regarding terminating Regan] would happen next 

week or [the] week after." Harvard terminated Regan's employment 

on July 12, 2016.

Discussion. "Our review on summary judgment is de novo."

Yee v. Massachusetts State Police, 481 Mass. 290, 294 (2019). 

"In considering a motion for summary judgment, we review the 

evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party." Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, 

Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 395 (2016), 

quoting Drakopoulos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 465 Mass. 775, 777 

(2013). The moving party has "the burden of establishing that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it 

is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (citation omitted).

Verdrager, supra, quoting Drakopoulos, supra.

1. Discrimination. Regan contends that the judge used an 

incorrect standard in determining that she had failed to 

establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination against 

Harvard for the purposes of summary judgment. We agree.

To prove employment discrimination at trial, an employee 

must demonstrate (1) membership in a protected class, (2) harm 

by being subject to an adverse employment action by an employer, 

(3) discriminatory animus by the employer in taking that action, 

and (4) a causal relationship between the animus and the adverse 
5

action. See Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680. At summary judgment, 

there are two distinct paths available to a plaintiff to prove 

the third and fourth elements of discrimination. A plaintiff 

"may survive a motion for summary judgment by providing [d]irect 

evidence of [the] elements of discriminatory animus and 

causation" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 680-681. 

However, because direct evidence to support these elements

"rarely exists," a plaintiff may also survive such a motion by 

providing "indirect or circumstantial evidence [of 

discriminatory animus and causation] using the familiar threestage, burden-shifting paradigm first set out in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973)" (quotation 

and citation omitted). Bulwer, supra.

The first stage of this paradigm requires the plaintiff to 

prove a prima facie case of discrimination. See Bulwer, 473 

Mass. at 681. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the second 

stage requires the employer to rebut the presumption of 

discrimination established by the plaintiff by "articulating a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse action 

(citation omitted). Id. If the employer meets its burden, the 

third and final stage requires the plaintiff to present evidence 

that "the employer's articulated justification . . . is not true 

but a pretext" (citation omitted). Id.
6

Here, the judge began her analysis by acknowledging the 

proper standard, stating that the case "must be approached using 

the three-part burden-shifting analysis." However, the judge 

then analyzed Regan's discrimination claim based on the 

evidentiary burden required at trial, including the element of 

causation. See Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680. In a discrimination 

case arising from a termination, the plaintiff's prima facie 

case at summary judgment has only three elements: (1) membership 

in a class protected by G. L. c. 151B, (2) job performance at an 

acceptable level, and (3) termination. See id. at 680-681. 

Causation is not one of these elements. Rather, causation is 

relevant at the third stage of the burden-shifting paradigm. 

Additionally, although applicable to a plaintiff's burden of 

proof of causation at trial, see Trustees of Health & Hosps. of 

Boston, Inc., v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 

449 Mass. 675, 682-683 (2007), evidence that Regan was treated 

differently than a male comparator was not required as part of 

her prima facie case.2 Thus, it was also error for the judge to 

consider comparator evidence.

2. Retaliation. Regan also argues that summary judgment 

was improper on her retaliation claim against Harvard. "A claim 

2 Because the judge determined that Regan did not 

demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, she did not 

reach the other stages of the burden-shifting paradigm. 
7

of retaliation is separate and distinct from a claim of 

discrimination." Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 405. To make out a

prima facie case of retaliation, Regan was required to show 

(1) her engagement in protected conduct, (2) the infliction of 

some adverse action by Harvard, and (3) a causal connection 

between the two. See Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. 

Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 260 (2021).

The chronology of events is one method to prove causation, 

see Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 407, but Regan's effort to do so 

here fails. Although a causal link may be inferred "[w]here 

adverse employment actions follow close on the heels of 

protected activity, . . . as the elapsed time between those two 

events becomes greater, the inference weakens and eventually 

collapses." Mole v. University of Mass., 442 Mass. 582, 595

(2004). "The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between 

an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse 

employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to 

establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal 

proximity must be 'very close.'" Id., quoting Clark County Sch. 

Dist. V. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001). Generally, the 

adverse employment action must be "in the immediate aftermath of 

the employer's becoming aware of the employee's protected 

activity," Mole, supra, at 592, and periods of multiple months 
8

are insufficient. See Dube v. Middlesex Corp., 59 Mass. App. 

Ct. 734, 741 n.3 (2003) ("one event following another is not, by 

itself, sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima 

facie case of unlawful retaliation, particularly where . . . the 

two events are separated by months, not days"). Here, where 

approximately five months separated Regan's February 2016

written complaints of discrimination from her July 2016

termination, a causal connection between the events cannot be 

established by temporal proximity.3 We thus conclude that 

summary judgment was proper on Regan's claim of retaliation.

3. Interference and aiding and abetting. Finally, Regan 

argues that we "should uphold [her] claims against the 

individual defendants." Her brief does not identify the 

elements for the claims of interference and aiding and abetting 

under G. L. c. 151B or offer legal authority supporting her 

position. Instead, Regan merely quotes the portion of the 

statute that states that individuals may be held liable for 

perpetuating or assisting another who violates G. L. c. 151B; 

baldly asserts that Hooper and Collet knew that Regan had 

claimed that "the allegations against her [of substandard job 

3 We are not persuaded by Regan's argument that the 

calculation of temporal proximity effectively "restarted" after 

her rebuttal email in June 2016 in response to receiving the PIP 

from Harvard.
9

performance] were false, discriminatory, and pretextual, but 

they did not investigate;" and suggests that a jury should be 

allowed to evaluate the evidence. We therefore decline to 

consider Regan's implicit argument that the judgment on these 

claims was in error because briefing on the issue does not rise 

to the level of appellate argument. See Commonwealth v. 

Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 16 (2020), citing Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) 

(9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). In any event, 

we agree with the motion judge that there was no evidence that 

Hooper or Collet committed a "wholly individual [and] distinct 

wrong," separate from the discrimination and retaliation claims 

against Harvard, see Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 713 

(2012), and thus affirm the judgment on the claims of 

interference and aiding and abetting.

Conclusion. The judge used an incorrect standard in 

determining that Regan had failed to establish a prima facie 

case of gender discrimination, therefore we vacate the judgment 

for Harvard and remand for further proceedings on the gender 

discrimination claim. Because Regan failed to establish a 

causal relationship between her protected conduct and 

termination of her employment, we affirm the judgment on her 

claim of retaliation against Harvard. Finally, declining to 

consider Regan's argument, but noting that there was no evidence 
10

to support the claims against the individual defendants, we 

affirm the judgment on the claims of interference and aiding and 

abetting.4

So ordered.

By the Court (Meade, Blake & 

Brennan, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: August 16, 2024.

4 The parties' requests for fees, damages, and costs are 

denied.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.