[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Farley v. Wainwright, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-670.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-670

FARLEY, APPELLANT, v. WAINWRIGHT, WARDEN, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Farley v. Wainwright, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-670.] 

Habeas corpus—Inmate’s claims not cognizable in habeas corpus—Court of 

appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed. 

(No. 2020-0459—Submitted January 26, 2021—Decided March 11, 2021.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-19-84. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In 2019, appellant, James R. Farley, filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeals alleging that he is entitled to 

immediate release from prison because the Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction (“DRC”) and the Bureau of Sentence Computation (“BSC”) failed to 

update their records after he was resentenced in 2000. The Third District dismissed 

the petition. We affirm. 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Background 

{¶ 2} In 1996, Farley was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to 

life in prison, with parole eligibility after 20 years. A few months after Farley was 

sentenced, the trial court issued a corrected sentencing entry imposing a life 

sentence, with parole eligibility after 20 “full years.” That designation prevented 

Farley from earning good-time credit, which can make an offender eligible for 

parole before he serves his full minimum term. See State v. Farley, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 96APA09-1247, 1997 WL 401947, *3-4 (July 15, 1997). On direct 

appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in 

imposing a term of 20 “full years” and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. In 

2000, the trial court reimposed Farley’s original sentence. 

{¶ 3} In December 2019, Farley filed a petition asking the Third District 

Court of Appeals to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering appellee, Lyneal 

Wainwright, warden of the Marion Correctional Institution, to immediately release 

him from custody. Farley alleged that DRC and BSC failed to remove the “full 

years” designation from their records until 2018 and that as a result, he was 

deprived of the opportunity to earn good-time credit and the possibility to be 

considered for parole earlier. 

{¶ 4} The Third District dismissed Farley’s petition. The court first held 

that Farley had failed to attach all pertinent commitment papers to his petition as 

required under R.C. 2725.04(D). The court went on to conclude that Farley’s 

petition failed to state a cognizable habeas claim because he had not alleged facts 

showing that he is entitled to immediate release from prison. 

{¶ 5} Farley appealed to this court as of right. We dismissed the appeal for 

want of prosecution after Farley failed to timely file a merit brief. 159 Ohio St.3d 

1409, 2020-Ohio-3255, 146 N.E.3d 585. But we later granted Farley’s motion for 

reconsideration and reinstated the appeal. 159 Ohio St.3d 1522, 2020-Ohio-4388, 

152 N.E.3d 328. 
January Term, 2021 

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Analysis 

Farley provided his commitment papers with his petition 

{¶ 6} When filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a person generally 

must provide “[a] copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person.” 

R.C. 2725.04(D). A petition that fails to comply with this requirement is defective 

and must be dismissed. Bloss v. Rogers, 65 Ohio St.3d 145, 145-146, 602 N.E.2d 

602 (1992). The Third District held that Farley’s petition was defective under R.C. 

2725.04(D) because he did not provide a copy of his 2000 sentencing entry when 

he filed his petition. 

{¶ 7} The Third District was wrong—Farley attached the 2000 sentencing 

entry to his complaint as “Exhibit 6.” The Third District may not have realized that 

Farley refiled Exhibit 6 in response to Wainwright’s argument in her motion to 

dismiss that she had not received a copy of the entry when she was served with 

Farley’s petition. The Third District interpreted Farley’s later filing as an 

impermissible attempt to cure a defect, but there was no defect that needed to be 

cured. We therefore do not affirm on this basis. 

Farley is not entitled to immediate release 

{¶ 8} A writ of habeas corpus “is warranted in certain extraordinary 

circumstances ‘where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there 

is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ ” Johnson v. TimmermanCooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001), quoting Pegan v. 

Crawmer, 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 666 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). The writ is appropriate 

if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from prison. State ex rel. Smirnoff 

v. Greene, 84 Ohio St.3d 165, 167, 702 N.E.2d 423 (1998). We review the Third 

District’s judgment dismissing Farley’s petition de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. 

Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. 

{¶ 9} Farley argues that DRC and BSC violated his due-process rights by 

failing to properly apply his sentence and therefore allow him to earn good-time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

credit. He contends that as a result of that error, he served a sentence that was 

contrary to law for more than 20 years. The Third District correctly concluded that 

Farley’s allegations do not state a claim that is cognizable in habeas corpus. 

{¶ 10} Farley does not allege that his life sentence is invalid. In fact, he 

alleges that the sentence imposed in 2000 should be enforced. Thus, even when 

taken as true, Farley’s allegations do not show that he is entitled to release from 

prison. Ultimately, Farley complains about a lost opportunity to earn good-time 

credit and the possibility that he could have been eligible for parole sooner, “[b]ut 

earlier consideration of parole is not tantamount to a legal right to release from 

prison,” Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 214, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998). 

“Ohio law gives a convicted inmate ‘no legitimate claim of entitlement to parole 

prior to the expiration of a valid sentence of imprisonment.’ ” State ex rel. Richard 

v. Mohr, 135 Ohio St.3d 373, 2013-Ohio-1471, 987 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 5, quoting State 

ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 633 N.E.2d 1128 (1994). 

{¶ 11} There appears to be no dispute that DRC and BSC made a mistake 

concerning Farley’s sentence. But “[h]abeas corpus is not the proper remedy to 

address every concern a prisoner has about his legal rights or status.” Rodgers v. 

Capots, 67 Ohio St.3d 435, 436, 619 N.E.2d 685 (1993). “[H]abeas corpus is 

generally available only when the petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired and 

he is being held unlawfully.” Heddleston at 214. Because Farley is serving a valid 

life sentence, he is not entitled to immediate release and has failed to state a claim 

cognizable in habeas corpus. 

{¶ 12} We affirm the Third District’s judgment because Farley failed to 

state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 

and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

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January Term, 2021 

5

James R. Farley, pro se. 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Daniel J. Benoit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee. 

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