NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

COREY ROYALTY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0389 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2010-007912-007

The Honorable Howard D. Sukenic, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson

By Karen Moody

Counsel for Appellee

Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Michael J. Dew

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 9-26-2023
STATE v. ROYALTY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Corey Royalty appeals his convictions and sentences for three 

counts each of first-degree felony murder and attempted armed robbery

and one count each of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and conspiracy 

to possess marijuana for sale. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On July 28, 2010, the Chandler Police Department initiated a

"reversal" drug operation in which three undercover detectives posed as 

drug sellers. The detectives were unaware that the "buyers" planned to lure 

them with counterfeit money and then rob them in a "drug rip." When one 

of the buyers pulled a firearm during the transaction, a shootout erupted

leaving one detective and two buyers dead, and two other detectives

wounded. 

¶3 Seven defendants were charged with crimes relating to the 

incident: Doarnell Jackson, Eldridge Gittens, Jerry Cockhearn Jr., Thandika 

Singleton, John Webber, Corey Royalty, and Anthony Wright. Royalty and 

Cockhearn were jointly tried. Because Royalty challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence against him, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining his convictions. See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989).

¶4 In the summer of 2010, the narcotics unit of the Chandler 

Police Department ("Chandler Narcotics") was working with a confidential 

informant ("CI") to make drug arrests. On July 27, the CI received a call 

from someone he knew to broker drug deals ("Broker"). The Broker said he 

had some buyers for 500 pounds of marijuana. 

¶5 That night, Wright summoned Gittens to his house on 

Maldonado in south Phoenix ("Maldonado house"). Gittens had known 

Wright a long time and knew many of his friends, including Royalty.

¶6 The next morning, the CI met the buyers in a Burger King 

parking lot not far from the Maldonado house. Tatum, one of the buyers,
STATE v. ROYALTY

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showed the CI a bag of money that he represented as $250,000 ("money 

flash") and asked to see a sample of the marijuana ("marijuana flash").

¶7 Gittens arrived at the Maldonado house later that morning.

Wright, Royalty, Tatum, Webber, and Singleton were there. Royalty asked 

Gittens, "Where you been? . . . [Y]ou don't want to make no money?" and 

said they "flashed [the sellers] already." Royalty removed a bundle of 

counterfeit money he had provided for the deal from a bag and commented 

on "how realistic the money . . . looked" as he circulated it among Gittens, 

Jackson, Webber, and Singleton.

¶8 Chandler police offers ran the operation. Sergeant C. put a 

team together to proceed with a marijuana flash. Detective C.L. and 

Detective B.A.,

1 posing as Mexican drug sellers, drove to the same Burger 

King parking lot around 12:30 p.m. with a bale of marijuana. Other officers, 

including Sergeant C., Detective F., and Detective H., conducted 

surveillance and monitored the interaction. Tatum, Singleton, and Webber 

arrived on behalf of the buyers. Royalty drove separately in his Chevy 

Silverado truck to observe the meetup. When Royalty returned to the 

Maldonado house after the flash, he reported that "everything looked good"

and "nothing was out of the ordinary."

¶9 The buyers agreed to go forward with the deal and insisted it 

be done at the Maldonado house. That afternoon, Cockhearn and Markiese, 

Royalty's nephew, arrived at the Maldonado house.2

¶10 At the Maldonado house, Wright told Gittens that the plan 

was to steal the marijuana from the sellers. Gittens, Cockhearn, Markiese, 

and Jackson were to hide in a closet—all carrying firearms. Tatum—who 

was also armed—would lead the sellers into the house at which point 

Gittens and the others would "take them down and secure the marijuana." 

Wright first instructed Gittens that he should take the keys to the load 

vehicle and drive it to a house that Wright rented nearby. But at Royalty's 

insistence, the plan changed to Gittens driving the marijuana to Royalty's

house. 

1 We refer to the officer victims by two initials, to distinguish them 

from nonvictim officers, to whom we refer with one initial.

2 We refer to Markiese by his first name to avoid confusion with the 

defendant.
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¶11 As Detective F. monitored the Maldonado house, he saw five 

cars including a Silverado with Diamondback plates. The detective then 

photographed Royalty talking to others outside the house and driving 

away in the Silverado with Singleton in the front passenger seat.

¶12 Not long after Detective F. saw Royalty and Singleton leave, 

detectives observed the Silverado park in the shopping center parking lot

next to their undercover vehicle. Detective M. could see the Silverado 

driver, and he later identified Royalty as the driver in a photo lineup. 

¶13 Detective D.B., an "undercover seller," the CI, and the Broker 

met Webber in the Burger King parking lot and followed him to the 

Maldonado house. Royalty's Silverado left the parking lot around the same 

time. 

¶14 When Detective D.B. arrived, Tatum would not produce the 

money and expressed concern about doing the deal. To reassure the 

buyers, Detectives B.A. and C.L. drove the load vehicle to the Maldonado 

house and flashed the load in the driveway to Tatum. The detectives then

left. As these events were occurring, Royalty's Silverado was seen driving 

around the neighborhood. 

¶15 After the buyers insisted on doing the transaction at the 

Maldonado house, Detective D.B. returned with the CI and the Broker. 

Royalty and Wright left the house during that time.

¶16 When the sellers arrived sooner than expected, Gittens called 

Wright about the sellers arriving before they were "staged," and Wright told 

him not to worry because "[Tatum] and Jackson and those guys" would 

"take care of it." As Detective D.B. walked into the front room of the house, 

Jackson opened a bag from a distance and flashed the money. Detective 

D.B. then called in the load vehicle. 

¶17 As the load vehicle was arriving at the Maldonado house, 

Detective H. saw Royalty's Silverado drive by him in the neighborhood. 

When the load vehicle pulled into the garage of the house, Chandler police 

approached the house. The approaching officers saw a vehicle matching 

Royalty's Silverado driving in the opposite direction. 

¶18 Jackson indicated that he wanted to see the marijuana again 

so Detective D.B. led him back into the garage. After Detective D.B. 

returned inside the house, someone said something about counting the 

money. Detective D.B. walked toward the front room where the money bag 

was located. As soon as he crossed the threshold, Jackson brought "a rifle 
STATE v. ROYALTY

Decision of the Court

5

up to [his] head." Detective D.B. turned, yelled, and reached for his firearm 

as he ran back to the kitchen where Detectives B.A. and C.L. were located. 

Detective B.A. saw a "wall of Black males" approaching the kitchen with 

guns, and a shootout erupted.

¶19 When the shooting stopped, all three detectives had been hit. 

Detective C.L. did not survive. Of the buyers, Tatum was dead of a gunshot 

wound to the torso and Markiese had been shot in the thigh and was 

bleeding heavily. Police arrived about one minute after the shooting began. 

The CI, who was uninjured, opened the door to the house and summoned 

them inside. As other police moved toward the Maldonado house, they

apprehended suspects fleeing the scene. 

¶20 Around the time of the shooting, Royalty stopped at a friend's 

residence near the Maldonado house. He was on the phone and did not 

stay long. When Royalty left, helicopters could be heard overhead. While 

Jackson and Cockhearn were being taken into custody, Royalty tried to call 

Markiese. Despite emergency medical efforts, Markiese died at the scene. 

¶21 Officers retrieved the bag of money at the Maldonado house. 

It contained bundles of genuine $1 bills sandwiched between counterfeit 

$100 bills. In total, the bag contained 999 genuine and 318 counterfeit bills. 

¶22 Royalty stowed his Silverado at a friend's house. He then

drove to Las Vegas, where he boarded a flight to Tennessee. There, he 

stayed with a friend, C.R., and obtained documents to change his identity. 

Royalty told C.R. that they used counterfeit money to get the sellers to bring 

the marijuana, which they planned to steal, but the sellers showed up early 

and people were not in the closet as planned. Royalty also made it known 

to C.R. that he was one of the "bosses" and that his family blamed him for

Markiese's death. 

¶23 Royalty was apprehended in Tennessee a few weeks after the 

shootings. The State charged him with three counts of attempted armed 

robbery (Detectives B.A., C.L., and D.B.), three counts of first degree felony 

murder (Detective C.L., Tatum, and Markiese), and one count each of 

conspiracy to commit armed robbery, conspiracy to sell marijuana, and 

conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale. After the State rested its case, the 

trial court dismissed the charge of conspiracy to sell marijuana. The jury 

convicted Royalty of the other counts as charged after considering 30 days 

of testimony and more than 13,000 exhibits. 

¶24 The trial court sentenced Royalty to concurrent and 

consecutive prison terms that amount, in the aggregate, to life 
STATE v. ROYALTY

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imprisonment with no possibility of release until after 43 years. We have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for New Trial.

¶25 Royalty moved for a new trial under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure ("Rule") 24.1 subsections (c)(1), (4), and (5). The trial court denied 

the motion, and Royalty now argues we should reverse its decision because 

the verdicts were "contrary to . . . the weight of the evidence" under 

subsection (c)(1). 

¶26 We review the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial 

under Rule 24.1(c)(1) for an abuse of discretion, and we will find no abuse 

if the evidence was sufficient to support the challenged verdict. State v. 

Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 406, ¶ 11 (App. 2015).

¶27 In considering the sufficiency of evidence to support a 

verdict, we view all facts in favor of the verdict and resolve all evidentiary 

conflicts against the defendant. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). 

Our review is confined to determining whether there is substantial 

evidence to support the verdict. Id. "Substantial evidence is more than a 

mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt." State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 134, ¶ 65 (2006) (cleaned 

up). If reasonable people "could differ as to whether the evidence 

establishes a fact in issue, that evidence is substantial." State v. Mincey, 141 

Ariz. 425, 432 (1984). We do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] 

would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact." State v. Barger, 167 

Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990). Substantial evidence may be direct or 

circumstantial. State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 7 (App. 2005).

¶28 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Royalty's motion for new trial because substantial evidence supports each

verdict. 

¶29 A defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery 

if the defendant intends to promote or aid the commission of armed 

robbery, the defendant agrees with one or more persons that one of them 

or another person will commit armed robbery, and one of the conspirators

commits an overt act in furtherance of the armed robbery. A.R.S. §§ 13-

1003(A), -1904(A). Evidence was presented that Royalty agreed with, and 

participated in, the plan to rob the sellers of marijuana by (1) luring them
STATE v. ROYALTY

Decision of the Court

7

with counterfeit money; (2) having several armed "buyers" emerge from a 

closet to take down the sellers; and (3) having Gittens drive the stolen 

marijuana to Royalty's house. There was also evidence that Royalty was 

one of the "bosses" of the operation, that he supplied the counterfeit money 

used in the transaction, and that he conducted surveillance as the operation 

proceeded throughout the day. Viewed in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the conviction, there was substantial evidence that Royalty 

committed conspiracy to commit armed robbery. 

¶30 A defendant is guilty of conspiracy to possess marijuana for 

sale if the defendant intends to promote or aid the possession of marijuana 

for sale, the defendant agrees with one or more persons that one of them or 

another person will commit possession of marijuana for sale, and one of the 

conspirators commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense. A.R.S. 

§§ 13-1003(A), -3405(A)(2). As described above, the evidence shows that 

Royalty agreed with others to commit, and provided counterfeit money 

toward, a plan to steal 500 pounds of marijuana that would be stored at 

Royalty's house. Such evidence is sufficient to establish that Royalty

committed conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale. 

¶31 Royalty's other convictions are based on accomplice liability. 

A defendant acts as an accomplice if the defendant has "the intent to 

promote or facilitate the commission of an offense" and either "[s]olicits or 

commands another person to commit the offense," "[a]ids, counsels, agrees 

to aid or attempts to aid another person in planning or committing an 

offense," or "[p]rovides means or opportunity to another person to commit 

the offense." A.R.S. § 13-301. A defendant is criminally responsible for the 

conduct of another if the defendant "is an accomplice of such other person 

in the commission of an offense including any offense that is a natural and 

probable or reasonably foreseeable consequence of the offense for which 

the person was an accomplice." A.R.S. § 13-303(A)(3).

¶32 A defendant is guilty of attempt to commit armed robbery if 

the defendant acts as an accomplice to one who attempts, while armed with 

a deadly weapon or simulated deadly weapon, to take the property of

another from his person or immediate presence and against his will by 

threatening or using force against such other person. A.R.S. §§ 13-

1001(A)(2), -1902(A), -1904(A)(1). The defendant is further guilty of firstdegree felony murder if "in the course of and in furtherance of" the attempt 

to commit armed robbery, the defendant's confederate "or another person 

causes the death of any person." A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). "A death is 'in 

furtherance' of an underlying offense if the death resulted from any action 
STATE v. ROYALTY

Decision of the Court

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taken to facilitate the accomplishment of the felony." State v. Herrera, 176 

Ariz. 21, 29 (1993).

¶33 Substantial evidence supports the verdicts for attempted 

armed robbery and felony murder. Royalty did not just agree to the plan 

to commit armed robbery; he also acted as an accomplice to the men tasked 

with carrying out the crime—Tatum, Jackson, Cockhearn, Gittens, and 

Markiese. The evidence shows that Royalty aided his confederates in 

committing the offense by supplying counterfeit money and surveillance

with the intent that the armed robbery be achieved. Three people died "in 

the course of and in furtherance of" the attempted armed robbery because 

those deaths directly resulted from Jackson pointing a rifle at Detective D.B.

to steal the marijuana. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2); see State v. Howes, 109 Ariz. 

255, 257 (1973) ("We have . . . held that a person engaged in the commission 

of the crime of robbery which calls into action defensive forces against him 

the activity of which results in the death of a human being is guilty of 

murder in the first degree.").

¶34 Royalty complains that Gittens was an unreliable witness, 

C.R.'s testimony did not make clear whether Royalty described events 

based on his personal knowledge or obtained from other sources, and 

police testimony about seeing Royalty's vehicle throughout the day 

established no more than mere presence. His argument is unconvincing. 

In Arizona, "the jury is tasked with weighing the evidence and determining 

the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 341, ¶ 109 

(2022) (cleaned up); cf. State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996) ("This 

court is not empowered to impose its own determination as to the 

credibility of [witnesses] in deciding a Rule 20 motion."). And "one witness, 

if relevant and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction." State v. 

Montano, 121 Ariz. 147, 149 (App. 1978). Even if the testimony of any 

individual witness might not have provided substantial evidence to 

support the convictions, the testimony of different witnesses taken together 

corroborated each individual account and created a cohesive portrait of 

Royalty's criminal involvement. Viewing the totality of admissible 

evidence, including Royalty's flight and attempt to conceal his identity, we 

conclude that a reasonable person could find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Royalty committed the charged crimes. See State v. Fulminante, 193 

Ariz. 485, 494, ¶¶ 26–28 (1999) (finding sufficient evidence to sustain a 

guilty verdict based on "a web of suspicious circumstances tight enough 

that a reasonable person could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Defendant was the perpetrator").
STATE v. ROYALTY

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II. Jury Instructions.

¶35 Royalty contends the trial court committed reversible error by 

denying his requests to instruct the jury that (1) the State's failure to obtain 

location information for his cellphone could warrant an inference adverse 

to the State under State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184 (1964); (2) jurors should 

evaluate the testimony of cooperating witnesses with greater caution than 

other witnesses; and (3) jurors could find that the State failed to prove his

guilt if they found that a superseding intervening event caused the deaths 

in this case. 

¶36 "[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction on any theory of 

the case reasonably supported by the evidence." State v. Richter, 245 Ariz. 

1, 6, ¶ 24 (2018) (quoting State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104 (1983)). But a 

"Willits instruction is not given merely because a more exhaustive 

investigation could have been made." State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 33 (1995). 

We review the denial of a requested instruction for an abuse of discretion.

Richter, 245 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 11. 

A. Willits Instruction.

¶37 Law enforcement collected cellphones and phone numbers 

associated with the defendants, the CI, and the Broker. They tried to extract 

information from phones in their possession. They also submitted court 

orders to cellphone service providers to obtain call detail and cell site 

location information. The State used such information at trial to 

corroborate testimony about who participated in the drug rip and how. 

Although the State submitted a court order to AT&T for information from

Royalty's phone number ending in -7474, the State never received that 

information. Carriers only retain such information for a limited time, and 

the State was unaware they lacked Royalty's phone information until it was 

too late to obtain it.

3 

¶38 Royalty argued he was entitled to a Willits instruction based 

on the absence of cellphone location records for his -7474 number. The 

standard instruction informs jurors: 

If you find that the State has lost, destroyed, or failed to 

preserve evidence whose contents or quality are important to 

the issues in this case, then you should weigh the explanation, 

3 The State extracted information from the physical phone associated 

with the -7474 number, but the data amounted to thousands of pages, it did 

not include location information, and the records were not admitted at trial. 
STATE v. ROYALTY

Decision of the Court

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if any, given for the loss or unavailability of the evidence. If 

you find that any such explanation is inadequate, then you 

may draw an inference unfavorable to the State, which in 

itself may create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 

guilt. 

Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. ("RAJI") Stand. Crim. 42 (lost, destroyed, or 

unpreserved evidence) (4th ed. 2016).

¶39 "To be entitled to a Willits instruction, a defendant must prove 

that (1) the state failed to preserve material and reasonably accessible 

evidence that could have had a tendency to exonerate the accused, and (2) 

there was resulting prejudice." State v. Glissendorf, 235 Ariz. 147, 150, ¶ 8 

(2014) (cleaned up). The trial court denied Royalty's request for the 

instruction, ruling that he failed to establish the first prong of Glissendorf. 

The court reasoned that the State never came into possession of the AT&T 

records, Royalty could have independently obtained them, and Royalty did 

not substantiate his claim that he detrimentally relied on the State acquiring 

the records. See State v. Geotis, 187 Ariz. 521, 525 (App. 1996) (finding no 

Willits instruction warranted where the State never took possession of the 

evidence at issue and the defendant could have independently sought to 

obtain it). 

¶40 The trial court's ruling shows no abuse of discretion. The 

court gave Royalty an opportunity to show that he tried to obtain the 

records after learning that the State never received them. Royalty does not 

dispute the court's finding that he could have independently obtained the 

records—or at least tried to do so. 

¶41 Royalty also fails to show the records' absence prejudiced 

him. See State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984) ("We are obliged to affirm 

the trial court's ruling if the result was legally correct for any reason."). 

Royalty offers no evidence to support his argument that the records would 

have provided him an alibi for the events of July 28, and his assertion to the 

contrary conflicts with the testimony of many trial witnesses, photographic 

evidence, and his implicit acknowledgment that he was seen outside the 

Maldonado house a couple of hours before the shooting. Under the 

circumstances, Royalty does not establish that admission of the phone 

records at trial would have aided his defense. See id. (concluding that the 

destruction of a videotape did not prejudice the defendant where an 

eyewitness unequivocally identified the defendant as the perpetrator and 

the defendant offered no proof that the tape "would have proven his 

mistaken identity defense"); see also State v. Hernandez, 250 Ariz. 28, 33–34, 
STATE v. ROYALTY

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¶ 20 (2020) (explaining that a defendant must offer more than speculation

about how lost or destroyed evidence could have had a tendency to 

exonerate him). 

B. Cooperating Witness.

¶42 Gittens and C.R. both provided information to the State, and 

agreed to testify at Royalty's trial, in order to receive benefits in their own 

criminal proceedings.4 Royalty and codefendant Cockhearn both asked for 

a jury instruction, apparently modeled after one used in some federal 

courts, that informed jurors they should consider the testimony of a 

cooperating witness "with greater caution than that of other witnesses." 

The trial court denied the request—agreeing with the State's argument that 

the proposed instruction would put a "finger on the scale" by asking jurors 

to evaluate the testimony of cooperating witnesses different from all other

witnesses. 

¶43 Royalty challenges the court's ruling on appeal. He argues 

that the proposed instruction reflects a decision of this court describing 

"police informants" as "often inherently unreliable." See State v. Collins, 21 

Ariz. App. 575, 577 (1974) (explaining why a search warrant affidavit based 

on a tip from a confidential informant must include facts showing why the 

tip is reliable). He also points to jury instructions given in other state courts, 

and the Ninth Circuit, that direct jurors to consider whether the testimony 

of an informant or cooperating witness has been influenced by benefits 

from the government. 

¶44 The trial court did not abuse its discretion because it correctly 

observed that the proposed instruction would conflict with other jury 

instructions. Indeed, our supreme court has held that an "instruction 

requiring the jury to scrutinize more closely the testimony of a witness who 

provides evidence because of [an agreement with the government] than it 

would the testimony of an ordinary witness" is "contrary to the law of this 

state and would amount to an impermissible comment on the evidence." 

State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 410 (1980).

C. Superseding Intervening Event.

¶45 Royalty also sought an instruction on superseding cause. The 

standard instruction informs jurors that they must find that the defendant 

4 C.R. was found to possess a large amount of drugs when authorities 

came to his house in Tennessee in search of Royalty. C.R. was not charged 

with any crimes relating to this case.
STATE v. ROYALTY

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proximately caused the victim's death or injury and that "[p]roximate cause 

does not exist if the chain of natural effects and cause . . . is broken by a 

superseding intervening event that was unforeseeable by the defendant 

and, with the benefit of hindsight, may be described as abnormal or 

extraordinary." RAJI Stat. Crim. 2.03 (causation instruction—intervening 

event) (4th ed. 2016). Royalty and codefendant Cockhearn proposed 

several possible intervening events, but the trial court declined to give the 

instruction. The court found there was no intervening event and that even 

if there were, such event was not "unforeseeable" or "extraordinary." Id.

¶46 Royalty argues on appeal that the instruction was warranted 

by Detective D.B.'s reaction to seeing Jackson aim at him with a 

semiautomatic rifle. The CI testified that he felt Detective D.B. was 

inexperienced and that if he had stayed calm upon seeing Jackson with the 

rifle, the shootout would not have occurred. 

¶47 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give 

a superseding cause instruction because Detective D.B.'s conduct was not a

superseding intervening event. As the Arizona Supreme Court recently 

explained, an event must first be found to be "intervening," and if so, then 

"superseding," to break the chain of causation. State v. Aragón, 252 Ariz. 

525, 529, ¶ 10 (2022). An intervening event is one "of independent origin"

that "actively operates in producing harm after the original actor's . . . act or 

omission has been committed." Id. at ¶ 11 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The intervening event must "in no way [be] connected"

with the defendant. State v. Dodd, 244 Ariz. 182, 185, ¶ 10 (App. 2017). 

Detective D.B.'s conduct was not an intervening event because it did not 

arise from an "independent origin" but instead resulted from Jackson's 

conduct with which Royalty is connected. Aragón, 252 Ariz. at 529, ¶ 10. 

Royalty's argument that an intervening event may be "dependent" on the 

original actor's wrongful conduct is contrary to the law of this state. Id. 

¶48 Even if Detective D.B.'s reaction was an intervening event, the 

trial court correctly found that the detective's conduct was not a 

superseding cause because it was not "unforeseeable and extraordinary." 

Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 506 (1983) (defining superseding cause as 

"an intervening act of another [that] was unforeseeable by a reasonable 

person in the position of the original actor" and that "appears 

extraordinary" to one "looking backward, after the event"). Royalty and his 

confederates planned an armed robbery in circumstances where most, if not 

all, parties were assumed to be armed. It should have been no surprise, in 

foresight or hindsight, that the targets of the robbery might react in selfdefense when guns were pulled on them. See State v. Lopez, 173 Ariz. 552, 
STATE v. ROYALTY

Decision of the Court

13

555 (App. 1992) ("It was reasonably foreseeable that the robbery attempt 

would meet resistance. This set into motion the chain of events which 

caused the death of [the victim]." (quoting State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747, 

752 (Mo. 1979), in a discussion about the foreseeability of a shooting death 

provoked by an attempted robbery)). 

CONCLUSION

¶49 We affirm Royalty's convictions and sentences.