Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

WEXFORD HEALTH, ET AL. v. KAREEM GARRETT 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 19–867. Decided May 18, 2020 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),

prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before 

challenging prison conditions in federal court. 110 Stat. 

321–71, 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a). This case presents the question whether a prisoner who fails to comply with that exhaustion requirement may cure the defect by filing an 

amended or supplemental complaint after his release. Because the Circuits are divided on this important question of 

federal law, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

While incarcerated, respondent brought this pro se action 

against prison medical personnel under 42 U. S. C. §1983, 

but he did not complete the prison’s grievance process before filing suit. After he was released, respondent filed an

amended and supplemental complaint. The District Court 

dismissed respondent’s claims against petitioners for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the 

PLRA. 

The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment, 

concluding that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement no 

longer applied to respondent’s claims in light of his postrelease filing. 938 F. 3d 69 (2019). The court rejected petitioners’ argument that the plain language of the statute,

which speaks to when an “action [may] be brought,” requires courts to assess PLRA compliance at the time of the 

initial filing. §1997e(a). Noting that our decision in Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199 (2007), characterized this language 
 

2 WEXFORD HEALTH v. GARRETT 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

as “boilerplate,” id., at 220, the court determined that the 

statute’s text did not clearly displace normal procedural 

rules. The court further concluded that, under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15, the amended and supplemental complaint related back to respondent’s initial filing and therefore superseded the original complaint. Because respondent was no longer a prisoner when he amended and

supplemented his complaint, the court reasoned that he 

was no longer subject to the PLRA’s prefiling requirements. 

The Third Circuit noted that its holding was consistent 

with the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Jackson v. Fong, 870 

F. 3d 928 (2017), but conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit’s 

en banc decision in Harris v. Garner, 216 F. 3d 970 (2000). 

In Harris, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the same statutory language in a related PLRA requirement and held that 

prisoners could not cure their initial filing defects by

amending or supplementing their complaints after release. 

Id., at 981–982; see also Smith v. Terry, 491 Fed. Appx. 81, 

83 (CA11 2012) (applying Harris to the PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement). The Third Circuit’s position also conflicts

with that of the Fifth Circuit, which has recently explained 

that a complaint must be dismissed and refiled postrelease 

in order for a prisoner to avoid the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Bargher v. White, 928 F. 3d 439, 447–448 

(2019). Thus, four Courts of Appeals are evenly divided on 

the question presented.* 

Respondent suggests that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits may revisit their view in light of our decision in Jones. 

As an initial matter, both Circuits have affirmed their positions in decisions that postdate Jones. See Bargher, 928 

F. 3d 439; Smith, 491 Fed Appx. 81. But more importantly, 

respondent reads our “boilerplate” dicta for far more than

it is worth. In Jones, we rejected court-made pleading rules 

—————— 

*A panel of the Sixth Circuit has also agreed with the Eleventh Circuit 

in dicta. See Cox v. Mayer, 332 F. 3d 422, 428 (2003). 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

for pro se litigants, explaining that “the PLRA’s screening

requirement does not—explicitly or implicitly—justify deviating from the usual procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the PLRA itself.” 549 U. S., at 214 (emphasis added). Thus, that decision actually confirms that 

the PLRA’s prefiling requirements displace the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 15. We characterized the phrase “‘no action shall be brought’” as “boilerplate” solely for the purpose of explaining that the PLRA 

speaks to the dismissal of defective claims, not necessarily

entire complaints. Id., at 220. We have never addressed 

the meaning of that language as applied to the context at 

issue here. 

Finally, this question warrants our review because its 

resolution will have significant ramifications for not only 

prisoners and prison officials but also federal courts. In recent years, nearly 10,000 lawsuits have been filed annually 

by prisoners challenging prison conditions. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial 

Caseload Statistics, U. S. District Courts—Civil Cases 

Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit 

(2019) (Table C–2). And nearly twice as many lawsuits are 

filed annually raising other civil rights claims, ibid., which 

are subject to similarly worded prefiling requirements under the PLRA, see, e.g., §1997e(e). Recognizing the PLRA’s

important role in curtailing the proliferation of abusive

prisoner litigation, we have repeatedly rejected lower 

courts’ attempts to create end-runs around the statute’s exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Ross v. Blake, 578 U. S. 

___, ___–___ (2016) (slip op., at 5–8); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U. S. 81, 91, n. 2 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S. 516, 520 

(2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U. S. 731, 741, n. 6 (2001).

The same may be warranted here. 

Because this petition presents an important question

that has divided the Circuits, it deserves our review. See 

this Court’s Rule 10(a). I see no reason to continue allowing 
 

4 WEXFORD HEALTH v. GARRETT 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

certain prisoners in the Third and Ninth Circuits to proceed 

unencumbered by the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

while those in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits are required

to comply. I therefore respectfully dissent from the denial 

of certiorari.