IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-20666

PRISON JUSTICE LEAGUE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

TRACY BAILEY, Warden, in their official capacity; BRYAN COLLIER, 

Executive Director, in their official capacity; TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CV-2985

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Prison Justice League (“PJL”) appeals its dismissal from the 

present suit for lack of associational standing. Because PJL does not satisfy 

the third associational-standing prong, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

judgment.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 12, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

PJL is a “membership-based, non-profit organization” whose mission is 

to “improve conditions of incarceration through ‘litigation, advocacy, and 

empowering [its] members.’” It claims to represent “over 700 inmates, over 100 

of whom are located in [the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s] Estelle 

Unit.” This so-called “medical unit” houses a large population of elderly and 

disabled inmates. 

In October 2014, PJL, along with inmate John Doe (“Doe”), sued the 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Warden Tracy Bailey, and other 

Department administrators (collectively “TDCJ”) for declaratory and 

injunctive relief, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 

et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. On September 30, 2015, 

the district court found that PJL did not satisfy the third prong of associational 

standing and dismissed it from the suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). From 

that judgment, PJL timely appeals. 

II.

We review PJL’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of associational 

standing de novo. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Texas Med. Bd., 

627 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2010). “[A]n association has standing to bring suit 

on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing 

to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to 

the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 

requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”

Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 

The parties do not contest that PJL satisfies the first two associationalstanding prongs. PJL contends, however, that the district court erred when it 

determined that the third prong was not met. To satisfy the third prong, a 

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party must show that “the nature of the case does not require the participation 

of the individual affected members as plaintiffs to resolve the claims or prayers 

for relief at issue.” Friends for Am. Free Enter. Ass’n v. Walmart Stores, 284 

F.3d 575, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2002). In particular, a party satisfies the third prong 

if its “claims can be proven by evidence from representative injured members, 

without a fact-intensive-individual inquiry.” Ass’n of Am. Physicians, 627 F.3d 

at 552.

In its complaint, PJL alleges that Estelle Unit officers used excessive 

force against inmates and retaliated against them for filing grievances. The 

complaint states specifically that “[o]fficers walking the halls of the Estelle 

Unit routinely exercise unbridled discretion to use physical force on inmates 

that is unnecessary to maintain discipline on the unit—striking them, twisting 

arms, slamming them into walls, or throwing them to the ground.” It also 

states that officers “us[ed] force, destroy[ed] property, and institut[ed] spurious 

disciplinary cases” when inmates filed too many grievances. Finally, it states 

that Warden Bailey was aware of the excessive force and retaliation but did 

nothing to stop it.

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical 

force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core 

judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). “To state a claim of retaliation 

an inmate must allege the violation of a specific constitutional right and be 

prepared to establish that but for the retaliatory motive the complained of 

incident . . . would not have occurred.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th

Cir. 1995). Consequently, to satisfy the third associational-standing prong, 

PJL would need to prove that Estelle Unit guards had a uniform retaliatory 

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motive, or acted uniformly or in a coordinated fashion to maliciously and 

sadistically cause harm. Ass’n of Am. Physicians, 627 F.3d at 550, 552–53.

We find, however, that PJL’s complaint alleges no facts suggesting 

uniformly malicious or sadistic force or uniform retaliatory motive. Even 

though PJL asserts that officers applied “excessive force,” retaliated against 

inmates, and “routinely exercise[d] unbridled discretion,” these allegations do 

not rise above “‘formulaic recitation[s]’ of the elements of a cause of action,” 

and thus “‘will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

In so holding, we recognize that in the prison context, “[e]xcessive force 

claims are necessarily fact-intensive; whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or 

‘unreasonable’ depends on ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular 

case.’” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham 

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). We also recognize that prison retaliation 

claims are necessarily fact-intensive. See Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. While

acknowledging that satisfying the third associational standing prong is 

difficult given the fact-intensive nature of such claims, we do not mean to imply 

that these difficulties are insurmountable. For example, where the complaint

sufficiently alleges that officers are uniform in their intent or coordinated in 

their methods, an association may be able to prove its excessive force or 

retaliation claim without “fact-intensive-individual inquiry.” See Ass’n of Am. 

Physicians, 627 F.3d at 552. Furthermore, where an association plausibly

alleges that inmates fear retaliation from officers if they were to be named in 

a complaint, that association’s standing claim is necessarily bolstered.

However, PJL does not plead such facts. Consequently, the district court did 

not err by dismissing it from the present suit. 

AFFIRMED. 

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