alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
302 CERTIFICATION

I, Robert A. Hildebrand, certify that:

         1. I have reviewed the annual report on Form 10-KSB of
Pinnacle Resources, Inc.;

         2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;

         3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in
all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;

         4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 12a-14) and internal
controls over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:

      a)  designed  such  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  to
ensure  that material  information  relating  to  the  registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries,  is made known to us by others
within those entities,  particularly  during the period in which this
annual report is being prepared;

      b) evaluated the  effectiveness of the registrant's  disclosure
controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing
date of this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

      c)  presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness  of the disclosure  controls and procedures based on our
evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

         5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):

         a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which
are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls over financial reporting.

Date: October 12, 2004              /s/Robert A. Hildebrand
                                   ----------------------------
                                   Robert A. Hildebrand
                                   Chief Financial Officer
WATTS v. E.I. DuPONT DE NEMOURS.

No. COA08-267.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed December 2, 2008.

Certification Date December 22, 2008.

Appeal from NC Industrial Commission (I.C. NO. 401888).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF UBICS, INC. AS OF 12/31/98 AND THE CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS OF UBICS, INC. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 12/31/98
INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL REPORT OF UBICS, INC. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 12/31/98
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          11,470
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,457
<ALLOWANCES>                                       305
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                19,397
<PP&E>                                           1,791
<DEPRECIATION>                                   (170)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  21,218
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,938
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            65
<OTHER-SE>                                      17,215
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    21,218
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,189
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   20,771
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,495
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 611
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,534
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,438
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,096
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,096
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.32
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of Virginia B. Krutell, Respondent, v New York State Board of Law Examiners, Appellant.

[799 NYS2d 680]

*675Crew III, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered October 14, 2004 in Albany County, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner a passing grade on the February 2003 bar examination.

Petitioner took the New York State bar examination in February 2003 and, on May 21, 2003, she was notified that she failed the exam. As a consequence, petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging respondent’s grading of her essay questions. Supreme Court found that petitioner’s answers to the essay questions were remarkably similar to the sample answers provided by respondent and ordered respondent to conduct a further review of petitioner’s answers. Respondent now appeals and we reverse.

Petitioner received an initial exam score of 656, four points shy of a passing grade. Consequently, her essay answers automatically were regraded because her preliminary score was within 10 points of passing *(see*22 NYCRR 6000.7 [a]). The regrading was done by six different graders who had not previously reviewed petitioner’s essay answers. Petitioner’s answers were scored based on a common grading scheme applicable to all candidates who took the exam. The initial essay answer scores and the regraded scores were averaged, producing petitioner’s final score, which again produced a failing grade.

We are of the view that there was a rational basis for respondent’s determination of petitioner’s examination grade. As we previously have stated, in a proceeding such as this, which challenges the pedagogical evaluation of test grades, judicial review is limited to the question of whether the challenged determination is arbitrary and capricious or irrational *(see Matter of Castelle v Commissioner of Educ.,*228 AD2d 866, 867 [1996], *lv dismissed and denied*88 NY2d 971 [1996]). Here, Supreme Court impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of respondent when ordering further review of petitioner’s exam answers. Petitioner’s answers were anonymously graded and regraded in accordance with a carefully structured and uniform procedure, and petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that the grading of her exam was different than the grading of the exams of the thousands of other applicants who took the bar exam such that it could be said that respondent’s conduct was irrational or an abuse of discretion.

Spain, Mugglin, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.
STATE v. Dammion Lamont MARTIN.

No. 226P15-1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, Attorney at Law, for Martin, Dammion Lamont.

Sherri Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Ernie Lee, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 6th of July 2015 by State of NC for Temporary Stay:

> "Motion Dissolved by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
IN RE N.L.O.

No. COA08-1014.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed February 17, 2009.

Certification Date March 9, 2009.

Appeal from Guilford (06JT794).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
hifr-ex102_141.htm



Exhibit 10.2

 

FIRST AMENDMENT

to Tenth Amended and Restated Rent Supplement

(Stanton/Brady/Celeste Lease)

June 20, 2016

 

This First Amendment to the Tenth Amended and Restated Rent Supplement (the “First Amendment”) between Sharyland Distribution and Transmission Services, L.L.C. (“Lessor”) and Sharyland Utilities, L.P. (“Lessee”) is executed and delivered on June 20, 2016 and is effective as of June 13, 2016.  Capitalized terms used herein that are not otherwise defined will have the meanings assigned to such terms in the S/B/C Lease (as defined below).

 

WHEREAS, Lessor and Lessee are Parties to a Third Amended and Restated Lease Agreement (Stanton/Brady/Celeste Assets) dated as of December 31, 2015 (as amended from time to time in accordance with its terms, the “S/B/C Lease”);

 

WHEREAS, on February 26, 2016, the Parties executed the Tenth Amended and Restated Rent Supplement (Stanton/Brady/Celeste Lease) effective as of January 1, 2016 (the “Tenth Amended Supplement”); and

 

WHEREAS, the Parties now desire to amend the Tenth Amended Supplement as set forth herein.

 

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties hereto agree to the following:

 

1.Amendment.  The table titled “ERCOT Transmission Rate Allocation” is hereby amended by deleting the table in its entirety and replacing the same with the following:

 

ERCOT Transmission Rate


	
Allocation:
	
before June 20, 2013:  0%

	
 
	
between June 20 and October 17, 2013:  6.9%

	
 
	
between October 17 and February 25, 2014:  3.4%

	
 
	
between February 25 and May 1, 2014:  8.5%

	
 
	
between May 1 and October 3, 2014:  8.3%

	
 
	
between October 3, 2014 and March 31, 2015:  7.3%

	
 
	
between April 1, 2015 and October 31, 2015:  10.5%

	
 
	
between November 1, 2015 and June 13, 2016:  17.8%

	
 
	
between June 13, 2016 and October 1, 2016:  20.4%

	
 
	
starting on October 1, 2016:  20.5%




 

2.Continuing Effect.  Except as expressly amended by this First Amendment, the provisions of each of the S/B/C Lease and the Tenth Amended Supplement are and shall remain in full force and effect.  

 

[Signatures on Following Page]

 




Stanton Brady Celeste Lease

 



The Parties have executed this First Amendment as of the date set forth above.

 

 


	
 
	
SHARYLAND UTILITIES, L.P.




 


	
 
	
By:/s/ Greg Wilks

	
 
	
Name:Greg Wilks

	
 
	
Title:Chief Financial Officer




 

 


	
 
	
SHARYLAND DISTRIBUTION &

	
 
	
TRANSMISSION SERVICES, L.L.C.




 


	
 
	
By:/s/ Brant Meleski

	
 
	
Name:Brant Meleski

	
 
	
Title:Chief Financial Officer




 

Stanton Brady Celeste Lease
| 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A of Official Payments Holdings, Inc.; and |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| January 28, 2013 | /s/ JEFF HODGES         |
|------------------|-------------------------|
|             | Jeff Hodges             |
|             | Chief Financial Officer |
PEERLESS INSURANCE COMPANY, a/s/o Anthony and Debra Adams v. GENELECT SERVICES, INC.

No. 575A07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 11, 2008.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.App. ___, 651 S.E.2d 896 (2007), affirming an order granting summary judgment for defendant entered on 10 August 2006 by Judge Ronald K. Payne in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Supreme Court 19 March 2008.

Cozen O'Connor, by Albert S. Nalibotsky and Peter F. Asmer, Jr., Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellant.

Van Winkle Law Firm, by Michelle Rippon, Asheville, for defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-02-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-01-1997
<CASH>                                          62,302
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               166,488
<PP&E>                                           7,500
<DEPRECIATION>                                  (4,625)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 169,363
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           50,982
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        21,181
<OTHER-SE>                                     116,139
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   169,363
<SALES>                                      1,640,151
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,640,151
<CGS>                                          931,789
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  931,789
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,370,656
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,186
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (662,303)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (662,303)
<DISCONTINUED>                                (393,741)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,046,461)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     (.49)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.49)
        

</TABLE>
Amendment, effective as of March 31, 2009, to Viacom Excess Pension Plan



  
 Exhibit 10.13

 AMENDMENT TO THE 

VIACOM EXCESS PENSION PLAN 

Effective as of March 31, 2009, the Preamble of the Plan is amended to add a new subsection (d) to read as follows: 

(d)        Effective as of March 31, 2009, there will be no additional accrual of benefits under the Plan.
Exhibit 32.2CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002          In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of LIN TelevisionCorporation. for the three months ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Vincent L. Sadusky, President andChief Executive Officer of the Company, and Bart W. Catalane, Senior Vice President and ChiefFinancial Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.           Dated: May 10, 2007 /s/ Vincent L. Sadusky   Vincent L. Sadusky   President and Chief Executive Officer         Dated: May 10, 2007 /s/ Bart W. Catalane   Bart W. Catalane   Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
STATE v. McCAIN.

No. COA07-1115.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed May 6, 2008.

Certification Date May 27, 2008.

Appeal from Guilford (05CRS97513, 05CRS97514, 05CRS97515, 05CRS97518).

Case reported without published opinion. No prejudicial error.
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00452- CV
Andrea R. Biller, Appellant

v. NNN M et C enter15 5, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 6, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 7, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 8, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 10, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 11, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 16, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 18, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 19, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 21, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 22, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 23, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 25, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 26, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 27, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 28, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 29, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 30, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 31, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 32, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 33, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 35, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 36, LLC; NNN M et C enter15 38, LLC;

NNN M et C enter15 39, LLC; NNN 1 & 2 M et C enterTIC; and L exington Ins urance Com pany, Ap pellees

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 201 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 2-0 0127 1, H ONO RAB LE AMY CLARK MEACH UM, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellee s filed a status re port in this a bated appea l r equesting that we continue the abate ment of this appea l until October 6, 2014, while the parties finalize a settlement ag ree ment. Appellant does not oppose t his reque st. We abate the appea l until October 6, 2014. All appe llate deadlines will be tolled during the period of abate ment. The parties shall submit either a motion to reinstate, a motion to dismiss , or a joint status repor t conce rning the status of settlement neg otiations no later tha

n October 6, 2014._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Field Abated Filed: August 8, 2014

2
STATE v. LYVERS.

No. COA07-1400.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed June 17, 2008.

Certification Date July 7, 2008.

Appeal from Wilkes (07CRS1060).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
Kerry WATTS v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES.

No. 191A07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 11, 2007.

Preston O. Odom, III, John R. Buric, Charlotte, for Watts.

Dahr Tanoury, Assistant Attorney General, for NCDENR.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 641 S.E.2d 811.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition for discretionary review, filed by Attorney General on the 24th day of April 2007 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 and the Appellate Rule 16(b) as to issues in addition to those presented as the basis for the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the petition for discretionary review as to additional issues is

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th day of October 2007."

Accordingly, only those issues which are the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals shall be presented to this Court in briefs. The Attorney General's new brief so limited in scope shall be filed with this Court not more that 30 days from the date of certification of this order.
**Exhibit99.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connectionwith the Quarterly Report of ERP Operating Limited Partnership (“ERPOP”) onForm 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,Bruce W. Duncan, Chief Executive Officer of Equity Residential,general partner of ERPOP, certify, pursuant to 18.U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of myknowledge:

 

(1)                                  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of ERPOP.

 

 
| /s/ Bruce W.  Duncan                            |   |
|-------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Bruce W.  Duncan                                |
| Chief  Executive Officer of  Equity Residential |
| May 13, 2003                                    |

 

**Asigned original of this written statement required by Section 906 has beenprovided to ERPOP and will be retained by ERPOP and furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.**

 

----
# C_2023189EN.01002501.xml

| 30.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 189/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 189/25

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 30 March 2023 — AX

(Case C-208/23, Martiesta (1))

(2023/C 189/33)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: AX

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 1(2) and (3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant (2) be interpreted as meaning that the executing judicial authority must refuse or, in any event, defer the surrender of a pregnant woman or a mother who has minor children living with her? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 1(2) and (3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant (2) be interpreted as meaning that the executing judicial authority must refuse or, in any event, defer the surrender of a pregnant woman or a mother who has minor children living with her?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are Article 1(2) and (3) and Articles 3 and 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible with Articles 3, 7, 4, 24 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, taking account also the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, in so far as they require the surrender of the pregnant woman or the mother, thus severing ties with the minor children living with her without considering the ‘best interest of the child’? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are Article 1(2) and (3) and Articles 3 and 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible with Articles 3, 7, 4, 24 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, taking account also the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, in so far as they require the surrender of the pregnant woman or the mother, thus severing ties with the minor children living with her without considering the ‘best interest of the child’?

---

(1)  The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

(2)  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

---