## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Suprem e Court

People v . Kladis , 2011 IL 110920

Caption in S upreme Court: THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Appellant, v. MARI NA KL ADI S, Appellee.

Docke t No. 110920

Filed Dec ember 30, 2011

Held ( Note : Thi s syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) A squad-c ar video rec ording of a misdemeanor DUI ar rest was discovera ble, and there was no abuse of discre t i o n in sanctioning its destruction, subsequent t o a timely reque st to produce
, by barr ing the

arr esting office r’s testimony as to what wa s on the tape.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the First District; hear d in that court on appea l from the Circuit C ourt of C ook County
, the Hon. W illiam H. Wis e, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med; cause rema

nded.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attor ney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and Anita Alvare z, State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (A la n J

. Spellberg
, Annette Colli ns and J ohn E. Nowak, Assistant St ate’ s Attorney s, of counse l), for the People.

Edwar d M. Maloney
, of Aher n, Maloney
, Moran & Bloc k, of Skokie, L ouis A

. Be rns, of Favil Da vid B erns & Associates, L L C, of Northlake
, Robert B. Marcu s and Michae l Maksimovich, of Ly ons, and Katie M. Ander son, of Chicago (R alph Ruebner, of Chicag o, of counsel), and Danielle L . Be rns and Nikki G. Ashmore , law students, for a ppellee.

J ustices J USTI CE FREEMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Chief J ustice Kil bride and J ustices Thom as, Ga rman, Ka rmeier , Bur

ke, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Def

endant, Marina K la d is
, w a s c h a r g e d with driving under the influence of alcohol (D UI ) (625 I L CS 5/11-501(a) (2) (West 2006)). She reque sted th at t h e S t ate produce the video

rec ording of the stop made by the came ra located in the arr esting office r’s vehicle. After the State destroy ed the rec ording
, the circ uit court of Cook County g rante d defe ndant’s motion for sanctions and barr ed th e St a te f r o m introducing testimony conce rning what was contained

on the videotape. The State filed a cer tificate of substantial i m p ai rm ent and a notice of
appea l. The appellate court aff irmed. 403 I ll. App. 3d 99. We g rante d the State’s petition for leave to appea l and now af firm the judg ment of the a ppellate c ourt.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On May 3, 2008, defe ndant was arr ested for DUI by Northlake police offic er P h i l l i p Gaske

. On May 8, 2008–five day s afte r her arr est and 25 day s prior to the first court date on J une 3, 2008–def

endant f iled and hand de livered to the State’ s Attorney ’s office a petition
to resc ind her statutory summary license suspension. Def endant also filed and delivere d on the same date a document captioned “Notice to Produce at Summary Suspension Hea ring .” The noti ce wa s premised upon our Rule 237 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 237 (ef f. J uly 1, 2005)) and
reque sted that at the first court date the State produce the arr esting office r along with copies of var ious reports and “ any and all video tape s of def endant” while she wa s in custody

. ¶ 4 On J une 3, 2008, at approxi mately 1:30 p.m., the parties appea red in court for the first

-2-t i m e. Be cause the State had not y et produce d the materia ls defe ndant had previously 1
reque sted, defe nse counsel made an oral motion for discov ery , pursuant to People v. Schmidt
, 56 I ll. 2d 572 (1974), which included the videotape. Be cause the State claimed that it did not know whether such a tape exis ted, Offic er Ga ske–who was prese nt for the hear ing–w as questioned. Gaske confirme d t h at h is squad car had a came ra mounted to the windshield which had r ecor ded his enc ounter with def endant. ¶ 5 T h e S t at e t h er ea ft er agr ee d t o produce all the reque sted materia ls–including the videotape–to defe nse counsel. L ater in the day on J une 3, the State mailed written discovery 2
to counsel and a reque st for the video re co rd i ng to the Northlake police depar tment. By
ag ree ment, the hear ing on defe ndant’s petition to resc ind the statutory summary suspension of her driver’ s license wa s entere d and continued to June 17, 2008. ¶ 6 When the parties returne d to court on that date , the State tender ed to def ense c ounsel a two-pag e business rec ord from the Northlake police depar tment. This document stated that pursuant to de partmenta l policy , video re cording s are automatically purg ed within 30 day s of arrest, and that t h e t ape reque sted by defe ndant had been era sed at 4:24 a.m. on J une 3, 2008, just hours before the parties first appe ar ed i n court. Be cause the requested evidence had bee n destroy ed, and in view of the fa ct that, but for its absenc e, def endant would have been rea dy to proce ed on her petition to resc ind the statutory summary suspension, the court g rante d her leave to file a written motion for sanctions ag ainst the State. The court schedule d 3

a hear ing on the sanctions motion for J une 26, 2008, and further order ed that the hear ing on the petit ion to resc ind the s tatutory summary suspension would proce ed im mediately afte r the cour t ruled on the motion for sanc tions. ¶ 7 Upon their return to court on J une 26, the parties discovere d that the judge handling this

case had been transfe rre d, and they appea red befor e a differ ent judge who was unfamiliar with what had previously transpire d. The parties stipulated to the fac ts in the case up to that point, and then eng ag ed in brief arg ument on defe ndant’s sanc tions mot ion. ¶ 8 The c ourt found t hat t he “Notice to Produce” which accompanie d defe ndant’s petiti on to resc ind her statutory summary suspension place d the State on clea r notice that she wished
to have a copy of the vid eo re co rd i n g at the first court date–a fac t which the State did not

No tr ans cr ipt s exi st for the J une 3, 2008
, cou rt dat e or for the pro cee din gs sub seq uen tl y hel d 1

on J une 17, 2008

. However, dur ing a cou rt hea ri ng on J une 26, 2008
, the par ti es st ipu la te d as to what
tr ans pir ed o n t hos e e ar li erdat es.

We not e tha t at no ti m e did the Sta te dis put e that it re cei ved def end ant ' s Rule 237 req ues t 2 for pr oduc ti on o f the video re cor din g, no r did the Sta te obj ect to def end ant ’s or al Sch midt

m oti on to pre ser ve and pro duc e the same re cor din g re fe re nce d in her ear li er r e q u e s t for pro duc ti on. T he

re cor d, the re for e, unqu est ion abl y est abl is hes tha t the Sta te was ful ly on not ic e re gardi ng def end ant ' s

re pea te d re que st s to obt ai n the re cor din g, a fa ct sup por te d by it s re ady agree m ent dur ing thi s hea ri ng to pro duc e i t.

T his m oti on, whic h was pre m is ed on our Rule 219 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 219 (e ff

. J uly 1, 2002 ))
, 3

was fi le d on J une 20, 2008

.
-3-dispute. The State, howeve r, d i d n othing in response

. The court observe d that the State

“could have called the police depar tment and g ot the tape prior to the time that it ran out” or i t “c o uld have filed an answe r *** stating it’s not our obliga tion [t o produce the t ap e] y et beca use we don’t deem this to be a discovery motion *** [because it includes] things
reque sted in here that we don’ t have to supply to y ou.” ¶ 9 Noting that this was “the third case I have had like this in three wee ks” wher e a def endant asked the State to prese rve a video rec ording and it was destroy ed, the court found the

rec ording of d ef

en d an t ’s t raf

fic stop to be “an important piece of evidenc e” and held that imposit ion of a sanction ag ainst the State for its destruction was proper

. The court deter mined that it would bar the State from introducing testimony relating to what was contained on t h e t ape. Howeve r, beca use no one had seen the rec ording
, defe ndant called Offic er G aske to e stablish its contents and the reby clar ify the scope of the c ourt’s ruling

. ¶ 10 Gaske testified that the in-ca r v i d eo s y stem beg ins rec ording five seconds prior to the activation of the emer g ency lights. At that time, the microphone he wea rs is also activate d. 4 Acc ording to Gaske
, the tape would have captur ed the following : imag es of defe ndant’s car five seconds prior to the stop; the manner in which defe ndant pulled over and curbe d her vehicle; defe ndant’s actions when he approa ched her vehicle; the manner in which defe ndant opened her car door and exit ed her vehicle; and defe ndant’s perf ormanc e of the field sobriety
tests. Gaske stated that he turned off the emer g ency lights prior to transporting defe ndant to the station, and it was then that the r ecor ding e nded. ¶ 11 The court then clar ified its sanction ruling
, holding that “[t] he video may not be used for
any purpose from five seconds prior to the lights g oing on at the time that the defe ndant was stopped g etting out of

the car until she was taken awa y via the arr est.” The court specifie d, howeve r, that any driving or actions of defe ndant prior to this wer e admissible, as wer e any of her actions af

ter she w as plac ed under

arr est. ¶ 12 The court then proce eded to c onduct the hear ing on defe ndant’s petition for rec ision of
t h e statutory summary suspension of her driver’ s license. Although defe ndant answere d

rea dy
, the State reque sted leave to immediately file a notice of appea l of the sanctions ruling

. Howeve r, beca

use the State did not ask the co u rt t o ce rt ify an interlocutory appea l on the sanctions issue and beca

use there was no final judgme nt in the statutory summary suspension
matter at that time, the State’s reque st was denied. ¶ 13 The hear ing on defe ndant’s petition proce eded. Ba sed upon the evidenc e prese nted, the
court held that Offic er Gaske had no probable cause to stop , d et ain and arr est defe ndant. Acc ording ly
, defe ndant’s p e ti ti o n to r e s c in d th e statutory summary suspension of her driver’ s license w as g rante d. ¶ 14 De fense counsel then made an oral motion to quash arr est and suppress ev i d en ce i n

Aft er def end ant ’s ar re st , Gaske re al ized tha t the m ic rop hone was not on, and bel ie ved tha t 4 the re cor din g of t hat enc ount erwoul d no t h ave had aud io.

-4-defe ndant’s criminal DUI case . The c ourt instructed c ounsel to file a written pleading and 5 the parties set a return date by ag ree ment. The State then rene wed its reque st for leave to file

an appea l, which was g rante d. The State there afte r filed an appea l of the sanctions ruling in the statutory summary suspension case

. Howeve r, it later voluntarily dismiss ed that action. Acc ording ly , that ruling is not at issue here. ¶ 15 The parties retu rn ed on September 2, 2008. The court inquired of the State whether it wished t o “re litigate the sanctions for purposes of trial.” The State responde d that “[t] here is g oing to be a lot of the same testimony
, and we wer e here
, basica lly
, for arguments and for ruling [on] t h e criminal case at hand.” The court then g rante d defe ndant’s motion for sanctions in the DUI case , stating that its ruling would be “exactly the same” as on J une 26. The court held t hat “the video m ay not b e u s ed
, or any testimony reg arding what is on the video perta ining to just befor e the office r s t o p p ed the defe ndant and the time that the defe ndant was place d in the squad car , which would mean any t h i n g t h at happene d on the
street prior to her b eing place d in the squad car .” As it had in the summary suspension matter, the court ag ain clar ified that any rele vant evidenc e of defe ndant’s conduct which

occur red be fore and af

ter the r ecor ding w ould be admissible. ¶ 16 After the court had ruled, the State maintained that the court’s decision on the sanctions motion substantially impaired its abilit y t o prosec ute defe ndant. Ba sed upon the court’s understanding of the State’s position, it g rante d the State leave to file a cer tificate of substantial impairment and a notice of appe al of the sa nction order

. ¶ 17 The appellate court upheld the sanctions imposed by the trial court in the DUI case

. 403 I ll. App. 3d 99. Apply ing Schmidt
, the court held that the video rec ording was discovera ble, and that the State was place d o n n o t i ce that it should not be destroy ed. Neve rtheless, the State took no action in response to defe ndant’s discovery reque st, which set the stag e for the deletion of the rec ording

. The appellate court further deter mined that the sanction imposed by the trial court was proportionate to the State’s discover y violation a

nd that there was no abuse of discretion. ¶ 18 We g rante d the State’s petition for leave to appea l (I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010)).

¶ 19 ANALYSI S ¶ 20 The State does not dispute that it was plac ed o n n o t i ce b y defe ndant to produce the

rec ording of her stop and arr est in the civil statutory summary suspension proce eding s. The State also does not contest that its inaction resulted in the destruction of this rec ording
, and, in fac t, conce des that the sanc tion was proper in that matter. ¶ 21 T he State does contend, howeve r, that its conduct has n o i m p o rt wi t h re s p ec t t o defe ndant’s cr iminal DUIcase . Asserting that discovery in misdemeanor a ctions is strictly l i m i t ed b y our decision in People v. Schmidt
, 56 I ll. 2d 572 (1974), and noting that video

rec ording s are not included within Schmidt ’s list of discovera ble items, the State maintains

Def end ant fi le d her “M oti on to Quas h Arr est and Supp re ss Evidenc e I ll egall y Sei zed” on 5 J uly 10, 2008

.

-5-that it had no obligation to produce the rec ording

. The State ther ef o re co n cludes that its fail u re t o p re serve the rec ording was not sanctionable in the DUI case and the trial court abused its discre tion by

doing so. We disag ree

.

¶ 22 A. Discove ry Violation ¶ 23 The State contends that beca use the trial court had no discretion to or der discovery in a misdemeanor case bey ond the limit ed are as set forth in People v. Schmidt
, 56 I ll. 2d 5 72 (1974), it there fore err ed in imposing sanctions ag ainst the State. A trial court’s decision to impose sanctions is revie wed under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Ramsey
, 239 I ll. 2d 342, 429 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion wh en i ts decision is “fa nciful, arbitra ry , or unrea sonable to t h e d egr ee that no rea sonable person would ag ree with it.” People v . Ortega , 209 I ll. 2d 354, 359 (2004). ¶ 24 We must first deter mine whether the State’s failure t o p ro duce and prese rve the video

rec ording of the stop and arr est in defe ndant’s misdemeanor DUI case constitutes a discovery violation. This court addre ssed the scope of discovery require d in a misdemeanor case near ly 40 y ear s ag o in People v. Schmidt
, 56 I ll. 2d 572 (1974). There
, the defe ndant was char g ed with a m i s d em eanor DUI

. She soug ht pretria l discovery of various repor ts, including a “Dr iving While I ntox icated A rre st Report,” which the State ref used to produce

. Id . at 573. ¶ 25 I n hold i n g t h at t h e re q u est ed repor t should have been tender ed to the defe ndant, we observe d that it was only one of a number of items a misdemeanor defe ndant may discover:

“The State is require d to furnish defe ndants in misdeme anor case s with a list of witnesses (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par . 114-9), a ny confe ssion of the defe ndant (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 114-10), evidenc e neg ating the defe ndant’s g uilt ( Brady v. Maryland
, 373 U.S. 8 3
, 1 0 L

. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194), and, in this particula r case , the results of the breathaly zer test (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 951⁄2, par. 11-501( g )). Additionally
, the repor t which the defe ndant seeks will be available at trial for use in impeachment of the prosec ution witness who pre pare d it. (People v

. Cagle , 41 I ll. 2d 528.)” Id . at 575. This ruling was based on “the discovery provided [for] by case law and statute” at that time, and distinguished i t s limit ed scope from the broade r discovery available for felony case s under our Rule 411. Id

. at 574-75. Our decision to limit disc overy in misdeme anor matters

was based on “our awa

rene ss of the very substanti al v o l u m e o f less serious case s and the impact upo n their expeditious dispositi on” if broade r discovery wer e require d. Id

. We conclude d that there was “no rea son to depar t from th[ e] view” that the scope of discovera ble items noted in that opinion was “ade quate for the lesser offe nses” at the time of that ruling

. Id . at 575. ¶ 26 The State misapprehe nds our decision in Schmidt and in t erp re t s it in a far too narrow

manner

. Schmidt deter

mined th e scope of discovery in misdemeanor case s by considering rele vant decisions, statutes, and custom and prac tice as it exis ted in 1974. Fr om this survey , the Schmidt court drew toge ther a number of items which share important evidentiar y value and are relevant to those char g ed with offe n s es i n cra fting a defense. Indeed, our case law with respec t to discovery

at that time was c lear . We previously held that pretrial discovery

-6-“pre supposes a rang e of rele vance and materia lity which includes not only what is admissible

at the trial, but also that which leads t o what is admissible.” Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority
, 8 I ll. 2d 37, 41 (1956). The State overlo o ks the nature and rele vancy of these discovery items, instea d focusing on the incorre ct conce pt that Schmidt set forth a rig id list which it believes should rema in static and n o t t ak e into acc ount the fundame ntal chang es which have occur

red in lawand socie ty

since that ruling

. ¶ 27 Relevanc y is “dete rmined by ref ere nce to the issues, for g ener ally
, something is r eleva nt if it tends to prove or disprove som ething in issue. ” Bauter v. Reding
, 68 I ll. App. 3d 171, 175 (1979). I n the near ly four deca des since we decide d Schmidt
, video rec ording s made by in-squad car came ras in misdemeanor DUI case s h ave become as rele vant to the issue of proving or disproving g uilt as the materia ls specific ally mentioned in S ch mi dt

. As such, allowing their discover

y further s the objectives of pretria l discovery

to “enha nce the truthseeking proce ss, to enable attorney s to better prepa re for trial, to eliminate surprise and to promote an expeditious and final deter mination of controv er sies in acc ordanc e with the substantive rig hts of the par ties.” D.C. v. S.A. , 178 I ll. 2d 551, 561 (1997). ¶ 28 Since the time of Schmidt
, the use of video rec ording s as evidenc e at trial has become a

common prac tice to allow a defe ndant the opportunity to prese nt an eff ective defe nse and to further the t ruth-see king proce ss. We rec ently rea ffirme d the gene ral admissi bility of such evidenc e (

People v. Taylor
, 2011 I L 110067), and courts acr oss the country are incre asing ly relying on video rec ording s to prese nt an objective view of the fac ts in a case

. See, e.g. , Scott

v. Harr is , 5 5 0 U. S

. 372 (2007) (re ly ing on a squad car video rec ording
, Supreme Court

reve rsed lower court’s denial of summary judgme nt on claim ag ainst the office r for the use of excessive forc e; Court found that a videotape capturi n g the events in question clea rly
contra dicted the version of the story told by the driver and adopted by the court of appea ls, and stated that the court of appea ls should have viewed the fac ts in the light depicted by the videotape) ; United States v. Prokupek
, 632 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2011) (rever sing the district court’s denial of the defe ndant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the office r’s testimony
at the suppression hear ing was clea rly contra dicted by his contempora neous statements captur ed on the squa d-ca

r video re cording ). ¶ 29 I n sum, we conclude that the routine video rec ording of traff ic stops has now become an integ ral part of those encounte rs, objectively documenting what takes place by captur ing the conduct and the words of both parties. We there fore hold that this impor t an t and rele vant evidenc e falls within t h e scope of materia ls held to be discovera ble under Schmidt

. We there fore clar ify that under Schmidt
, these video rec ording s are discovera ble in misdemeanor DUI case s. ¶ 30 T h i s co n cl u s i o n i s s up p o rt ed b y s everal rec ent leg islative enac tments reg arding

rec ording s of traff

ic stops made by law enfor ceme nt office rs. Although the passag e of these laws occur

red subsequent to de fenda nt’s arr est in this case, the g reat importa nce place d by the Gene ral Assembly upon the production and prese rvation of video rec ording s made by squad car came ras during law enfor ceme nt actions confirms o u r re co gn ition of their signific ant evidentiar

y value a nd rele vance

. ¶ 31 I n l ate 2008 our leg islature mandated that I llinois State Police squad car s be equippe d

-7-with rec ording equipment. 20 I L CS 2610/30(b) (W est 2008) (Pub. Act 9 5 -1 0 0 9 (ef f. Dec. 15, 2008)). The law specifie d that both video and audio must be captur ed ( id. ) and require d that these rec ording s be maintained for a storag e p er i o d o f at least 90 day s befor e being destroy ed. 20 I L CS 2610/ 30(f) (West 2008). ¶ 32 The following y ear , the G en er al Assembly clar ified and broade ned the production and
prese rvation safe g uards f or police r ecor dings. I

t established the g ener al rule tha t when any law enfor ceme nt ag ency makes an in-squad video and audio rec ording in connec tion with

e it h e r law enfor ceme nt or investigative duties, that rec ording shall be reta ined for a minimum period of 90 day s. 720 I L CS 5/14-3(h-15) (W es t 2010) (Pub. Act 96-670 (ef f. Aug

. 25, 2009)). Significa

ntly
, the leg islature has also mandated an extended p er i o d o f storag e for

cer tain rec ording s. Where “the rec ording s *** are made as a part of an ar re s t o r * * * are deeme d evidenc e in any criminal, civil, or administrative pro cee ding” they cannot be destroy ed except “upon a final dispositi on and an order from the court.” Id

. We note that this heig htened protec tion is trig g ere d eit h er wher e, as here
, an arr est occur red or wher e the

rec ording is considere d to be evidence in any criminal, civil or admini strative procee ding. Significa ntly
, the Gene ral Assembly place d no restric tion on this latter fac tor, encompa ssing all proce eding s. ¶ 33 The transcript of the de bates of the 2009 enac tment reve als that the Genera l Assembly intended that the routine rec ording of traff ic stops by squad car came ras would be of benef it
to both citize n s and law enfor ceme nt ag encie s by providing an objective rec ord of what

o cc u rr ed during the encounte r. This is illust rate d by rema rks made by the sponsor of t h i s provision, who explained that “[i] t’s a tool for law enfor ceme nt, but I also believe it is a tool for the c itiz ens, too, bec ause then there is actual proof of what was said or w hat was done

. So I think it’s a protec tion for bot h

. ” 9 6 t h I ll. Gen. Assem., House Procee dings, April 2, 2009, at 84-85 (statements of Repre sentative Dug an). ¶ 34 These enac tments express the clea r leg islative intent that the purpose of rec ording traff ic stops and prese rving these rec ording s for later production is to assist in the truth-see king
proce ss by providing objective evidenc e of what occur red between the law enfor ceme nt office r and the cit i z en

. As noted in the leg islative history
, the Gene ral Assembly enac ted these laws with the view that these rec ording s could be useful to both t h e S t at e and the defe ndant. I f the rec ording ref lects the defe ndant committing an offe nse, the State could use it to ceme nt his or her g uilt. The reve rse is also true: if the rec ording does not clea rly ref lect commission of a crime, the defe ndant could use it in support of his or her defe nse. I n either instance, the rec ording assists the trier of fac t in seeking the truth and at arr iving at a j u st result. ¶ 35 T h e S t at e co n t en d s, howeve r, that requiring discover y o f v i d eo re co rd i n gs i n misdemeanor DUI case s is unduly burdensome and wil l delay the j udicial process. Noting that the limit ed scope of misdemeanor discovery set forth in Schmidt was partially driven by consideration of the larg e number of misdemeanor actions and the desire to eff iciently move them throug h the sy stem, the State c o nte n d s these same considerations apply with equal forc e today

. We believe that the particula r fac ts o f this case undermine the State’s g ener al

asser tions.

-8-¶ 36 The re co rd i ndicates that defe ndant’s request was not one that was unique in any way

. The State never formally objected to the reque st, nor did i t co n tend that it fell outside of Schmidt

. Fur

ther, we note that during oral argument befor e this c ourt, counsel for the State

was asked to comment on the fac t that the State had rea dily agree d to produce and prese rve the videotape in this matter. He responde d: “We have no problem tender ing these videos in

a particula

r case

. I f the defe ndant asks for it, and it is available, we will do so. *** I t’s just
a matter of colleg iality .” ¶ 37 T h e v i d eo rec ording is rele vant and admissible evidenc e beca use i t re v ea l s wh at transpire d during the traff ic stop which serve s to further the truth-see king function of a trial. This evidenc e may be helpful to both the defe ndant and the State. I ndeed, the flow of case s actua lly g oing to trial may be eased up o n al l o wi n g defe ndants and their counsel to revie w these rec ording s: those which ref lect events favor able to the State may result in de fenda nts willing to enter pleas which they otherwise may not have contemplated. This also advanc es the purpose of our DUI statutes to ensure that our roads rema in safe from impaired drivers. ¶ 38 We there fore ag ree with the courts below that upon rec eiving the written Rule 237 notice
to produce the video rec ording five day s afte r defe ndant was arr ested–a nd 25 day s befor e it

was destroyed–the State was place d on notice and s h o u l d have taken appropr iate steps to

ensure that it was prese rved. 6 ¶ 39 I n sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discr etion in f inding that the video

rec ording of def

endant’ s stop and arr est was subject to disc overy in he r misdemeanor DUI

case and that the State committed a discovery violation by allowi n g t he destruction of the

rec ording

. We ne x t a ddress the question of whether the sanction imposed by the trial court

was a ppropriate for the disc overy violation.

¶ 40 B. Rea sonablene ss of the Discove ry Sanction ¶ 41 The State contends that the discovery sanction imposed by the trial court was too harsh for the circ umst an ce s prese nted in this case and, there fore
, amounted to an abuse of discretion. According to the State, the sanc tion was “ef fec tively a dis missal of t he charg es

as it preve nted the officer from testifying about all of the rele vant fac ts showing that defe ndant was dr iving unde r the influenc e of a lcohol.” We re ject the State’ s contentions. ¶ 42 The corre ct s an ct i o n t o be applied for a discovery violation is a decision appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court, a nd its judg ment shall be g iven g reat w eig ht. People

v. Morgan
, 112 I ll. 2d 111, 135 (1986). The trial court is in the best position to deter mine an appropr iate sanction based upon the eff ect t h e discovery violation will have upon the

Alt hough the Rule 237 not ic e was fi le d in the ci vil summ a r y s u s p e n s ion pro cee din g, t he 6 Sta te exp la ine d at ora l ar gum ent tha t the summ ar y sus pen si on pro cee din g and the cr iminal DUI cas e pro cee d in ta nde m , bef

ore the same j udge and wit h the same Sta te ’s Att orn eys han dli ng bot h m at te rs

. Alt hough the bet te r pra ct ic e woul d be for the def end ant to re que st pro duc ti on of the video re cor din g in bot h proce edi ngs, we have no doub t tha t in thi s cas e the Sta te was awar e of the nee d to pre ser ve the re cor din g. I nde ed, def end ant al so m ade an ora l m oti on for dis covery pur sua nt to Sch midt dur ing the pr oce edi ngs on t he f

ir st cou rt dat e.

-9-defe ndant. P eople v. Koutsakis
, 255 I ll. App. 3d 306, 314 (1993). As stated, an abuse of

discretion exis ts only wher e the decision of the trial court i s fa nciful, arbitra ry , or

unrea sonable to the deg ree that no rea sonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court. Ortega , 209 I ll. 2d at 359. ¶ 43 The rec ord clea rly establishes that the discovery sanction imposed by the trial court did
not prec lude the State from prosec uting defe ndant. The court’s sanction ruling was narr owly tailored, and provided that “[t] he video may not be used for any purpose from five seconds prior to the lights g oing on at the time that the defe ndant was stopped g etting out of the car until she was taken awa

y via the arr est.” Notably
, the court also clea rly specifie d that any driving or a ct i o n s of defendant prior to the s tart of the recording wer e admissi ble, as wer e any of her actions af

ter she w as plac ed under

arr est. ¶ 44 Acc o rd i n gl y , u n d er t he court’s ruling
, Offic er Gaske was not barr ed from testifying; rathe r, his testimony was limit ed to observations reg arding events other than those captur ed

on the purg ed rec ording

. Thus, the State could have questioned Offic er Gaske conce r n in g a ny

err atic driving on the part of defe ndant prior to her b ei n g s t opped. Gaske could also have been questioned about defe ndant’s behavior afte r he deac tivated the lights and place d her in his squad car to transport her back to the pol ice station, which occurred i m m ed i ately afte r defe ndant perf

ormed the field sobriety tests. G aske could have offe red a ny observations of indications of intox ication at that time, including whether defe ndant exhibi ted bloodshot and
g lassy ey es, s l urre d speec h or an odor of alcohol. He also could have testified to any problems with balanc e or dexterity defe ndant m ay have had as she arr ived at the police station for proce ssing. Th u s , co n t ra ry to the State’s asser tion that the court’s sanction “re moved all possible proof that defe ndant had been driving under the influence of alcohol,” the State could have questioned Ga ske on any of these points. It declined to do so. ¶ 45 As stated, the authority to impose rea sonable sanctions for discovery v i o l at i o n s l i es within the sound discretion of the trial court. Her e, the court proper ly exercised its discretion in choosing from the spectrum of available options and narr owly tailoring its sanction to bar the State from introducing testimony reg arding what was contained in the video rec ording

. Contrary to the State’s asser tion that the sanction was disproportionate t o the discovery violation because it “excluded all evidenc e that defe ndant was guilty bey ond a rea sonable doubt,” the re cord e stablishes that the S tate made the conscious decision not to participate in the trial and to forg o the opportunities available to prese nt evidenc e apar t from that which was ba rre d under the sanction. ¶ 46 Acc o rd i n gl y , we h old that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sanction ag ainst the State. We theref ore a ffirm the sa

nction order

enter ed by

the trial cour

t ag ainst the State. We rema nd this cause to the trial court for further proce eding s on the State’s prosec ution of defe ndant’s misdemea nor DUI case

.

¶ 47 CONCL USI ON ¶ 48 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the appellate court is aff irmed. This cause is

rema nded to the cir cuit court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

-10-¶ 49 Affir med; ¶ 50 cause rema

nded.

-11-