[Cite as Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio1970.] 

EPPLEY, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. TRI-VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 

BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLANT, ET AL. 

[Cite as Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 

 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970.] 

Wrongful-death actions — R.C. 2125.04 — Saving statute — The saving statute 

for wrongful-death actions, R.C. 2125.04, does not violate the right to 

equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 

(No. 2008-0366 — Submitted January 21, 2009 — Decided May 5, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Muskingum County, 

No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

The saving statute for wrongful death actions, R.C. 2125.04, does not violate the 

right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio 

Constitution. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J. 

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine the constitutionality of R.C. 

2125.04, the wrongful death saving statute. Because we hold that the statute does 

not violate the right to equal protection of the law, we reverse the judgment of the 

court of appeals insofar as it holds that the statute is unconstitutional. 

I. Case Background 

{¶ 2} Joshua M. Eppley, a student in the Tri-Valley Local School 

District, died on November 26, 2003, in an accident while a passenger in a car 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

driven by Corey W. Jenkins. Appellee, Randy J. Eppley, the administrator of 

Joshua’s estate, initially filed a complaint on August 3, 2005, for wrongful death 

against Tri-Valley Local School Board and Tri-Valley Local School District.1 

Eppley dismissed the case without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) on 

September 15, 2005. He refiled the case the following year on September 7. 

{¶ 3} The refiled complaint alleged that unnamed employees of the 

school district engaged in willful, wanton, and reckless conduct by allowing 

Corey to remove Joshua from school premises without the permission of Joshua’s 

parents and that Joshua’s death was the result of that conduct. The school board 

and the district filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the 

statute of limitations had run on the complaint before refiling and that they were 

immune from liability. 

{¶ 4} Eppley responded that the general saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, 

rather than the wrongful death saving statute, R.C. 2125.04, applied to the refiled 

action. He argued in the alternative that R.C. 2125.04 violated his right to equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court dismissed the 

complaint with prejudice under Civ.R. 12 but did not state a reason for the 

dismissal. 

{¶ 5} Eppley appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed 

the judgment. It held, inter alia, that R.C. 2125.04 violates the right to equal 

protection because there is no legitimate state interest to which the wrongful death 

saving statute is rationally related. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist., 5th 

Dist. No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32, ¶ 38. We accepted the discretionary 

 

1. The complaint also named as defendants John Does 1 through 5. Since John Does 1 through 5 

have not been served with a complaint, we need not treat them as parties in this appeal. 
January Term, 2009 

3

appeal of the school board2 on whether R.C. 2125.04 denies wrongful death 

claimants the equal protection of the law. 

II. Legal Analysis 

A. The Saving Statutes, R.C. 2305.19(A) and 2125.04 

{¶ 6} The parties have raised two statutes as potentially applicable. The 

first, the general saving statute relied upon by appellee and the court of appeals, 

states: “In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due 

time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than 

upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action 

survives, the plaintiff’s representative may commence a new action within one 

year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure 

otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable 

statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This division applies to any claim 

asserted in any pleading by a defendant.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2305.19(A). 

{¶ 7} The second statute, specifically referring to wrongful death actions, 

states: “In every civil action for wrongful death commenced or attempted to be 

commenced within the time specified by division (D)(1) or (D)(2)(c), (d), (e), (f), 

or (g) of section 2125.02 of the Revised Code, if a judgment for the plaintiff is 

reversed or the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and if the time limited 

by any of those divisions for the commencement of the action has expired at the 

date of the reversal or failure, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of 

action survives, the personal representative of the plaintiff may commence a new 

civil action for wrongful death within one year after that date.” (Emphasis 

added.) R.C. 2125.04. 

 

2. The court of appeals held that the school district could not be sued. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local 

School Dist., 5th Dist. No. CT2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32, ¶ 49. We denied appellee’s crossappeal, which also challenged the court of appeals’ judgment. Therefore, the school board is the 

only appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4 

{¶ 8} As the Fifth District Court of Appeals observed, before 2000, both 

statutes granted a plaintiff an additional year in which to refile an action 

dismissed without prejudice only if dismissal occurred after the original statute of 

limitations had run. Eppley, 2008-Ohio-32, at ¶ 16. Sometimes referred to as the 

“malpractice trap,” this meant that a plaintiff whose case had been dismissed 

without prejudice before the original statute of limitations had run was required to 

refile the action within the original statutory time, regardless of how much time 

was left. Id. 

{¶ 9} The General Assembly amended the general saving statute in 2004, 

closing the malpractice trap and permitting a plaintiff to refile within one year 

after dismissal or within the time remaining under the statute of limitations, 

whichever is longer. Eppley, 2008-Ohio-32, at ¶ 17. The General Assembly, 

however, did not similarly amend the saving statute pertaining to wrongful death 

actions. Id. at ¶ 18. In making its determination that R.C. 2125.04, rather than 

R.C. 2305.19, applies, the court of appeals noted that the specific statute takes 

precedence over a general statute. Id. at ¶ 22. See State v. Volpe (1988), 38 Ohio 

St.3d 191, 194, 527 N.E.2d 818.3

{¶ 10} Since the wrongful death saving statute is the specific statute, R.C. 

2125.04 applies, and the complaint was untimely filed. The fatal accident 

occurred November 26, 2003, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on 

September 15, 2005. Under R.C. 2125.04, Eppley’s refiling deadline was not

extended to September 15, 2006. Because the action was dismissed before the 

two-year statute of limitations ran, Eppley still had only two years from the date 

of the accident, until November 26, 2005, to bring suit. The question then is 

whether R.C. 2125.04 violates the right to equal protection. 

 

3. We declined jurisdiction over Eppley’s cross-appeal, which argued that R.C. 2305.19 is the 

appropriate statute, and so we will proceed on the basis that the wrongful death saving statute, 

R.C. 2125.04, applies. 
January Term, 2009 

5

B. Constitutionality of R.C. 2125.04 

{¶ 11} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that “[n]o State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 

equal protection of the laws.” Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause in turn provides 

that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for 

their equal protection and benefit * * *.” Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution. 

We have held that the equal protection provisions of the Ohio and federal 

Constitutions are functionally equivalent and require the same analysis. State v. 

Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 11, citing Am. 

Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1999), 

87 Ohio St.3d 55, 59, 717 N.E.2d 286. 

{¶ 12} We first recognize that statutes are presumed to be constitutional 

and that courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes in order to save them 

from constitutional infirmities. Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 

538, 706 N.E.2d 323. 

{¶ 13} Because of the presumption of constitutionality, we must consider 

the nature of rights that are claimed to be at issue, for these determine the nature 

of our review. When challenging a statute on constitutional grounds, a party may 

present a facial challenge to the statute as a whole or challenge the statute as 

applied to a specific set of facts. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-

Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37; Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1944), 

143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629. See United States v. Salerno

(1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697. The court of appeals 

treated Eppley’s constitutional challenge as an as-applied challenge. Eppley at ¶ 

38. We agree. Eppley therefore has the burden of presenting a presently existing 

state of facts that make the statute unconstitutional under the appropriate level of 

scrutiny. See Belden, 143 Ohio St. 329, 28 O.O. 295, 55 N.E.2d 629. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

{¶ 14} In an equal protection claim, government actions that affect 

suspect classifications or fundamental interests are subject to strict scrutiny by the 

courts. See Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), 539 U.S. 306, 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 

L.Ed.2d 304; Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), 521 U.S. 702, 720-721, 117 S.Ct. 

2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772; see also Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 

767 N.E.2d 251, at ¶ 13. A wrongful death action, however, does not implicate 

either a suspect classification or a fundamental interest. See Keaton v. Ribbeck

(1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 443, 12 O.O.3d 375, 391 N.E.2d 307 (applying rational 

basis review to a wrongful death statute). 

{¶ 15} Under the rational basis review, a statute that implicates neither a 

fundamental right nor a suspect classification does not violate the Equal 

Protection Clause if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government 

interest. Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 

181. We grant “substantial deference” to the judgment of the General Assembly 

in a rational basis review. State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 

N.E.2d 342. Therefore, we must determine whether there is a legitimate reason to 

treat a plaintiff who sues for wrongful death under R.C. 2125.04 differently from 

any other plaintiff. 

{¶ 16} Eppley argued before the court of appeals that strict scrutiny is 

appropriate because parents have a fundamental right to enjoy a loving 

relationship with their children. However, R.C. 2125.04 does not implicate this 

right because, on its face, it addresses only the right to refile a wrongful death 

lawsuit. It does not address the parent-child relationship. Furthermore, an action 

for wrongful death is governed solely by the terms of the wrongful death statute. 

See Keaton, 58 Ohio St.2d at 446, 12 O.O.3d 375, 391 N.E.2d 307. Therefore, it 

is not a fundamental right that merits strict scrutiny. 

{¶ 17} Eppley argues that there is no rational basis for the General 

Assembly to extend the general saving statute in R.C. 2305.19 but not to do so in 
January Term, 2009 

7

R.C. 2125.04 and that the different language is a drafting error. This argument is 

speculative at best. The General Assembly explained that it amended R.C. 

2125.04, and other portions of the Revised Code, to further the state’s “rational 

and legitimate * * * interest in making certain that Ohio has a fair, predictable 

system of civil justice that preserves the right of those who have been harmed by 

negligent behavior, while curbing the number of frivolous lawsuits.” Section 

3(A)(3), Am.Sub.S.B. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7,915, 8,024. If a statute bears 

a rational relationship to a government interest, our role is not to cross-check the 

General Assembly’s findings to ensure that we would agree with its conclusions. 

Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 

420, ¶ 58. 

{¶ 18} The school board suggests several differences between general tort 

claims and wrongful death claims that provide a rational basis for a different 

wrongful death saving statute. General tort claims are direct actions, while 

wrongful death claims are derivative in nature, brought on behalf of the 

decedent’s next of kin; wrongful death claims are statutory, while claims for 

personal injury are common-law claims; the proceeds in wrongful death claims 

are recovered for distribution to the beneficiaries designated under the statute of 

descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, whereas personal injury awards are made 

directly to the injured party; and although damages in general tort actions have 

been limited by R.C. 2315.18, damages recoverable in wrongful death claims 

cannot be limited. Section 19a, Article I, Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 19} We find these last two differences to be persuasive. Resolving 

claims expeditiously is a legitimate government interest. Unlike the general 

saving statute, the wrongful death saving statute prevents a plaintiff who has 

dismissed his or her claim before the expiration of the initial statutory period from 

refiling after expiration and thereby extinguishes the claim. The more restrictive 

wrongful death saving statute prevents delaying the timely disbursement of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

estate of the deceased when damages are recovered for distribution to the 

beneficiaries of the estate. It also protects defendants against claims that cannot 

be limited statutorily. R.C. 2125.04 is therefore constitutional because it is 

rationally related to the legitimate government interest of resolving cases 

expeditiously. It applies equally to all who are similarly situated and does not 

violate equal protection. 

C. Statutory Immunity Claim 

{¶ 20} When the trial court dismissed the complaint, it did not indicate 

whether the dismissal was because the action had been untimely filed or because 

the school board had statutory immunity. The court of appeals remanded the 

case, holding both that R.C. 2125.04 is unconstitutional and that because the issue 

of statutory immunity had not been fully developed on the record, the court had 

no basis to dismiss the action. Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School District, 5th 

Dist. No. CT 2007-0022, 2008-Ohio-32, ¶ 38, 49. Because we hold R.C. 2125.04 

to be constitutional as applied to this action, the trial court properly dismissed the 

action. 

{¶ 21} We need not reach the issue of statutory immunity. Having upheld 

the constitutionality of R.C. 2125.04, we have found that the action was untimely 

filed. While we have been asked to consider the nonconstitutional issue of 

statutory immunity, jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court’s ability to 

hear a case. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 

N.E.2d 1002. The timely filing of a complaint is essential to prosecute a wrongful 

death cause of action. R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) (“a civil action for wrongful death 

shall be commenced within two years after the decedent’s death”); see also 

Brookbank v. Gray (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 279, 291, 658 N.E.2d 724. Because 

R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) is a restriction that qualifies the cause of action, we have no 

occasion to reach the school board’s second and third propositions of law once the 

constitutionality of R.C. 2125.04 has been upheld. 
January Term, 2009 

9

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 22} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the 

saving statute for wrongful death actions, R.C. 2125.04, does not violate the right 

to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 

Judgment reversed. 

 MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and 

CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 PFEIFER, J., dissents. 

__________________ 

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 23} I prefer to see the distinction between the saving clauses contained 

in R.C. 2125.04 and 2305.19(A) as the result of legislative inadvertence. The 

General Assembly fixed the “malpractice trap” associated with the saving statute 

in R.C. 2305.19, and given that R.C. 2305.19(A) applies “[i]n any action that is 

commenced or attempted to be commenced,” the General Assembly could have 

assumed that it would apply to wrongful-death actions. (Emphasis added.) 

Everyone makes mistakes, even the Ohio General Assembly. 

{¶ 24} The amendment of R.C. 2305.19(A) was meant to fix inequitable 

treatment of certain plaintiffs: “The framers of the amendment expressed concern 

that the pre-amendment version treated arguably * * * similarly situated plaintiffs 

differently, by giving a plaintiff who exercises a Rule 41(A)(1) dismissal a full 

year to refile, while a plaintiff who dismisses before the statute [of limitations] 

runs possibly only one or two days to refile. The amendment permits plaintiffs 

one year to refile, or the time left (if any) on an unexpired statute of limitations, 

whichever is later.” (Footnote omitted.) 3 Anderson’s Ohio Civil Practice (2008) 

148-40, Section 148.13. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

{¶ 25} If the General Assembly’s inaction in failing to make the same 

change to R.C. 2125.04 was purposeful, that is more disturbing than a mistake. 

There is no rational basis to distinguish between wrongful-death plaintiffs and all 

other plaintiffs in fixing the malpractice trap. Is there a rational basis to fix a 

disparity that existed between plaintiffs that dismissed civil claims within a few 

days of each other but to not have that fix apply to wrongful-death plaintiffs? If 

the General Assembly’s aim is to speed along wrongful-death claims, as the 

majority posits, it has not adopted a rational method to achieve that end. 

Wrongful-death plaintiffs still have the ability to extend the lives of their claims, 

as long as they wait to dismiss their claims until the statute of limitations has 

passed. To encourage prompt dismissals and refilings, the General Assembly 

should have made the same amendment to R.C. 2125.04 as it made to R.C. 

2305.19(A). If the General Assembly’s aim was to perpetuate a malpractice trap 

only for wrongful-death plaintiffs in order to limit overall damages awarded in 

wrongful-death cases, that would constitute an illegitimate attempt to limit the 

damages recoverable in wrongful-death claims and would violate Section 19a, 

Article I, of the Ohio Constitution. 

{¶ 26} The majority has attempted to attribute rationality to the General 

Assembly’s unintentional act. The General Assembly thus emerges worse than if 

it had been merely mistaken. 

__________________ 

Elk & Elk Co., Ltd., Martin S. Delahunty, John W. Gold, and Peter D. 

Traska, for appellee. 

Britton, Smith, Peters & Kalail Co., L.P.A., David Kane Smith, and 

Michael E. Stinn, for appellant. 

______________________