In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2965

Horace E. Smith, II, M.D.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

City of Chicago, a municipal corporation,

Milton M. Scott, employee of the Police

Department of the City of Chicago,

a municipal corporation and Randall Darlin,

employee of the Police Department of the

City of Chicago, a municipal corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 763--Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

Argued May 31, 2000--Decided March 6, 2001

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Bauer and

Harlington Wood, Jr., Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. Smith sued defendants, in

relevant part, for unreasonable search and

seizure, use of excessive force, and battery,

arising from a May 1996 traffic stop. After some

to and fro-ing, the case is before us again, so

a thumbnail sketch of the facts and case history

is needed.

 The district court entered summary judgment in

defendants’ favor on all counts, and Smith

appealed. Defendants motioned this Court for a

limited remand to allow the district court to

listen to an audio tape recording of the

conversation between the officers and the

dispatcher during this incident. A transcript of

the conversation was already part of the record.

The tape became critical, however, because a

dispute arose as to whether the officers had

played their siren while following Smith. Smith

is adamant that he did not hear the siren. He

claims that he did not know that the men in the

car trailing him were police officers because

they were plain-clothed and drove an unmarked

car. The officers contend that they followed

Smith after he had violated a traffic law and

played the siren, but that Smith refused to pull
over. Smith, although driving within the speed

limit, did not stop for twelve blocks until

marked police cars pulled in front of him. On

December 2, 1999, we granted defendants’ motion,

ordering the district court to consider: (1)

whether a copy of the tape had been tendered to

it; and (2) if a genuine issue of material fact

existed as to whether the officers played their

siren prior to the investigative stop.

 On February 24, 2000, defendants filed a

memorandum in light of our remand order asking

the district court to consider the tape in

deciding on summary judgment. The defendants

noted that Smith objected to its admission

because there were gaps and pauses in it and it

was unclear whose siren was audible on the tape.

In response, defendants pointed to the following:

(1) an affidavit signed by Officer Darlin, one of

the arresting officers, swearing that he had

listened to the tape, that the voice on it was

his, and that the siren heard on it sounded like

the one from the car on that day; (2) an

affidavit signed by Thomas Dugan, an employee of

the City of Chicago Office of Emergency

Communications, swearing that the office records

all conversations between police and dispatchers

and maintains these tapes in its ordinary course

of business, that he had listened to the tape,

that the office had made the tape from a master

tape in its regular business practice, and that

the recording had no "gaps" or "unexplained

pauses," and that the siren had to have come from

the officers’ car since it was only audible when

the officers spoke; and (3) deposition testimony

of Officer Scott, another one of the arresting

officers, recounting that Darlin had activated

the siren while following Smith and that it

remained on for twelve blocks. Defendants argued

that Smith offered no evidence creating a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the siren

was played. The only evidence Smith asserted was

that he did not hear the siren. On March 1, 2000,

Smith filed a memorandum in response. Smith

argued that the tape was inadmissible because it

had not been tendered to the court, the tape had

gaps and pauses, and no foundation or

authentication of the tape was presented.

 The district court’s order, issued on March 9,

2000, which strictly adhered to the language of

our December 2nd order, found that the tape had

not been tendered to the court, and thus could

not be considered as evidence. However, based on

the depositions and affidavits, the district

court found that the siren had been played. The

district court concluded that Smith’s mere

assertion to the contrary was insufficient to

raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Therefore, the district court again granted

summary judgment in defendants’ favor. Smith
appealed.

 Upon reading the district court’s order, we

realized the ambiguity in our December 2nd order

and set out to clarify it. On June 27, 2000, we

issued an order directing the district court to

supplement the record with the tape, listen to

it, and redetermine the grant of summary

judgment. Pursuant to this clearer directive, the

district court, on October 12, 2000, issued an

order stating that it had supplemented the record

with the tape and listened to it. The court noted

that the tape contained a recording of the

conversation between the officers and dispatcher

regarding a car that refused to pull over.

Throughout the tape, a siren is clearly audible

as the officers speak. (We too have listened to

the tape and agree with the district court that

a siren is clearly playing as the officers are

speaking.) The district court noted that the

defendants had offered the tape as authentic and

had indicated that the siren was theirs. The

court again found that no genuine issue of

material fact existed since Smith merely asserted

that he did not hear the siren and offered no

evidence that the tape was not what the

defendants claimed it to be. Therefore, the

district court decided that summary judgment was

still warranted in defendants’ favor.

 Today we consider two issues raised by Smith.

First, he raises questions about the tape’s

authenticity and admissibility, and second, he

alternatively argues that even if the tape was

properly admissible, it did not eliminate

disputes as to genuine issues of material fact.

 I. Admissibility and Authenticity of the Audio

Tape Recording

 In granting summary judgment, a "’court may

consider any material that would be admissible or

usable at trial,’ including properly

authenticated and admissible documents or

exhibits." Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d

979, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Aguilera v.

Cook County Police & Corrs. Merit Bd., 760 F.2d

844, 849 (7th Cir. 1985) and citing Martz v.

Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 135, 138 (7th

Cir. 1985)). Audio tape recordings are generally

admissible as evidence whether in original or

duplicate form. See United States v. Carrasco,

887 F.2d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 1989). However, a

duplicate may be inadmissible if "a genuine

question is raised as to the authenticity of the

original . . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 1003(1). In

determining authenticity we follow Fed. R. Evid.

901(a), which requires "evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the matter in question is

what its proponent claims." United States v.
Boyd, 208 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2000). Beyond

these basic parameters, "we have eschewed any

formalistic approach to the admission of tape

recordings or copies thereof." Stringel v.

Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 415,

420 (7th Cir. 1996).

 To authenticate a tape in a criminal case the

government must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the tape is a true, accurate, and

authentic recording of the conversation, at a

given time, between the parties involved. See id.

We have assumed, but not decided, that the

proponent in a civil case for admission of a tape

bears the same burden. See id. We decline to

squarely decide the question again today, resting

on the same assumption. Clear and convincing

evidence of the truth, accuracy, and authenticity

of a tape may be shown in two ways. The proponent

may show the tape’s chain of custody. See United

States v. Brown, 136 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir.

1998). If no proof as to chain of custody is

rendered, the tape may be admissible if a

foundation as to the "’accuracy and

trustworthiness of the evidence is laid.’" Id.

(quoting United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455,

478 (7th Cir. 1977)). "In this circuit, the

recollections of eyewitnesses to the events in

question are sufficient to establish a foundation

for the admission of tapes." Id. at 1182

(citations omitted).

 Our second remand ordered the district court to

admit the tape into the record and consider it in

its decision. In so doing, the district court

found that the tape was authentic and admissible

because the proponents laid a proper foundation.

They did so by submitting both Darlin’s

affidavit, which included eyewitness statements

identifying his voice and siren, and Dugan’s

affidavit, which included chain of custody

statements about how the tape was recorded and

handled in the office. Thus, based on these

attestations, the district court appropriately

shifted the burden to Smith to show

inauthenticity, because once the foundation is

laid by clear and convincing evidence, the

opponent of admission has the burden to rebut.

See United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 787

(7th Cir. 1979). The district court properly

found that Smith presented no evidence "to

dispute that the recording is what the defendants

claim[ed] it to be." Smith’s only rebuttal is

that he did not hear the siren, therefore there

may have been a problem with the fidelity of the

siren system or the siren was not played. Smith’s

contentions are merely "general, conclusory

allegations based upon mere suspicions," which

are not enough to rebut the proponent’s

foundation. Id. (quotation omitted). Stated
another way, "[m]erely raising the possibility

(however hypothetical) of tampering is not

sufficient to render evidence inadmissible."

Brown, 136 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted).

Therefore, it was appropriate to admit the tape

in determining summary judgment, and the district

court correctly found that the tape was authentic

and admissible. Smith raises an assortment of

other arguments regarding the authenticity and

admissibility of the tape, however, we decline to

address them for they are without merit.

 II. Review of the Summary Judgment Grant

 We review the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, construing all facts and

drawing all reasonable inferences from the record

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Summary judgment is proper when the record

reveals no genuine issue of material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

 A. Unlawful Search and Seizure Claim

 Smith claims that the officers violated his

rights by searching him and the car’s glove box,

passenger compartment, and trunk. The district

court held that the defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity because a reasonable person

would not find that the officers violated Smith’s

clearly established constitutional rights. Police

officers are entitled to qualified immunity for

actions taken during a stop or arrest "’insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’"

Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.

1993) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is

dissolved, however, if a plaintiff points to a

clearly analogous case establishing a right to be

free from the specific conduct at issue or when

the conduct is so egregious that no reasonable

person could have believed that it would not

violate clearly established rights. See Saffell

v. Crews, 183 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1999).

 The defendants acquired reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigatory stop of Smith when they

believed that he had committed a traffic offense

and then would not pull over for twelve blocks

while the officers played their siren. When the

dispatcher misinformed the officers that Smith

had thirteen aliases it was reasonable for the

officers to call Smith’s identity into question.

Furthermore, Smith could not produce proof of

valid insurance for his car. Smith’s arrest was
based on probable cause. Thus, the district court

found that it was not contrary to established law

for the officers to conduct a search incident to

the arrest. The district court found, however,

that the search of the trunk may have been

unlawful if the officers did not have probable

cause to believe the trunk contained contraband

or evidence of a crime, but held that the law was

not clear at the time of the incident such that

a reasonable official would not have known that

he or she may have been violating a clearly

established right. See New York v. Belton, 453

U.S. 454, 460, 460-61 n.4 (1981) ("When a

policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of

the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a

contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search

the passenger compartment of that automobile. .

. . Our holding encompasses only the interior of

the passenger compartment of an automobile and

does not encompass the trunk."); United States v.

Patterson, 65 F.3d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[A]

vehicle may be searched without a warrant if

there is probable cause to believe the car

contains contraband or evidence of a crime. A

search of an automobile based on probable cause

lawfully extends to all parts of the vehicle in

which contraband or evidence could be concealed,

including closed compartments and trunks.")

(quotations and citations omitted).

 Smith’s main contention is that such a search

was unlawful because he committed a minor traffic

violation. This contention is wholly wrong

because it ignores many facts, namely Smith’s

refusal to pull over, his invalid proof of

insurance, and the thirteen aliases he was said

to have. All of these facts combined gave the

officers probable cause to arrest him and conduct

a search incident to that arrest. Therefore, the

officers did not violate Smith’s clearly

established rights.

 Smith also contends that a search was

unnecessary because "a reasonable officer would

have immediately known that he had pulled a

physician and minister from his vehicle, and that

Dr. Smith was not a threat and posed no danger."

We disagree. Despite the fact that Smith is a

minister and physician, the officers had probable

cause to arrest and search him. Even though Smith

was driving a church-owned car and had hospital

records in the backseat, the officers were

reasonable in disregarding these clues as to

Smith’s identity since they were informed, albeit

incorrectly, by the dispatcher that he had

thirteen aliases. Besides, to hold that the

officers should have stopped searching Smith

because he is a minister or physician would be

sanctioning stereotyping of the most pernicious

sort. We agree with, and affirm, the district
court’s decision that the defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity and summary judgment on

this claim.

 B. Excessive Force Claim

 Whether an officer used excessive force during

an arrest is determined under the "objective

reasonableness" standard. We assess whether an

officer’s actions were objectively reasonable

"’in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.’" Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). We consider

"the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety

of the officers or others, and whether he [was]

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight." Id. at 396. We balance the

amount of force used in relation to the danger

posed to the community or to the arresting

officers. See Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d

758, 773 (7th Cir. 2000).

 Smith asserts that he did not commit a traffic

violation, he did not know that the men following

him were police officers, and he did not hear the

siren. However, these factual disputes are of no

matter because under this standard we consider

what happened from an officer’s point of view and

assess its reasonableness objectively. The

officers’ actions in this case were objectively

reasonable. From the officers’ vantage point,

Smith committed a traffic violation, whereupon

they followed him and played their siren

(confirmed by the tape) to signal him to pull

over, which Smith did not do for twelve blocks.

When Smith was finally stopped by marked police

cars, the officers pulled Smith out of the car,

pinned his arms behind his back, slammed him

against the hood of his car, and handcuffed him.

A reasonable officer would have thought that

Smith was trying to flee, thereby justifying the

use of a higher degree of force to protect the

community and the officers than that needed for

someone who committed only a minor traffic

violation. However, the officers’ use of force

here was not high, let alone excessive. The

factual disputes raised by Smith are not material

to his substantive excessive force claim as they

rest upon his view of the incident. Not all

factual disputes warrant the denial of summary

judgment; only disputes as to facts material to

the substantive claim require resolution by

trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 247-48 (1985). Since any factual

disputes are not material to the substantive

claim, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on this claim.
 C. Battery Claim

 A battery occurs when one "intentionally or

knowingly without legal justification and by any

means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or

(2) makes physical contact of an insulting or

provoking nature with an individual." 720 ILCS

5/12-3(a). A public employee is immune from

liability while enforcing the law unless their

acts are willful and wanton. See 745 ILCS 10/2-

202. Conduct is willful and wanton when it "shows

an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm

or which, if not intentional, shows an utter

indifference to or conscious disregard for the

safety of others or their property." 745 ILCS

10/1-210. 

 The district court held that the evidence did

not support a finding that Darlin’s actions in

effectuating the arrest were willful and wanton.

The court reasoned that pulling a suspect from a

car, pushing him against the car, and pinning his

arms behind his back to handcuff him were all

reasonable actions to take when arresting a

potentially dangerous suspect. While ostensibly

not pleasant, being handcuffed in this manner

does not rise to the level of willful and wanton

conduct. While determining whether one’s actions

are willful and wanton is a question of fact, the

court determined that Smith’s factual claims were

insufficient to support his claim. We agree with

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

this basis.

 Therefore, we find the admission of the audio

tape recording appropriate and AFFIRM the grant of

summary judgment in defendants’ favor on all

counts.