SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3523-14T3

MARGARET BELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

RICHARD C. KLEIN, ESQUIRE,

RICHARD C. KLEIN, P.C., and

SPECTOR, GADON & ROSEN,

Defendants-Respondents.

_________________________________

Argued December 13, 2016 – Decided 

Before Judges Messano, Suter and Guadagno.

On appeal from New Jersey Superior Court, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-3121-

12.

Colleen Flynn Cyphers argued the cause for 

appellant (Levin Cyphers, attorneys; Ms. 

Cyphers, on the briefs).

Jason S. Feinstein argued the cause for 

respondents (Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & 

Mellott, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Feinstein, of 

counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Margaret Bell appeals the February 26, 2015 summary

judgment order, which dismissed her claims of legal malpractice 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

July 11, 2017
2 A-3523-14T3

against defendants Richard C. Klein, Esq., Richard C. Klein, P.C.

(P.C.), and Spector, Gadon & Rosen (SGR) (collectively, the

defendants). We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

I.

Bell retained Klein and his P.C. in September 2005 to 

represent her in a divorce action filed by her husband, Michael 

Bell (husband). Klein continued to represent Bell after he 

dissolved his P.C. on December 31, 2005 and became employed by 

SGR.

Bell and her husband were married for sixteen years. He 

worked full-time in a family-owned business. She was employed in 

the last few years of the marriage part-time as a realtor. The

divorce involved two parcels of real estate: the marital home in 

New Jersey and another property solely in Bell's name in Florida. 

A pendente lite order provided that Bell was to receive unallocated 

support of $600 per week. Her husband was to pay certain household 

expenses such as the mortgage, insurance and utilities on the 

marital home, and Bell's car payment.1

The couple was divorced by Dual Final Judgment of Divorce 

with Stipulations (Final Judgment) on February 26, 2007. The 

Final Judgment included their settlement agreement, and was signed 

 

1 This order was not included in the record.
3 A-3523-14T3

by both parties and their counsel. The parties were both 

questioned under oath about their willingness to voluntarily enter 

into the settlement. For her part, Bell acknowledged she was 

entering into the agreement freely and voluntarily and without

coercion. 

KLEIN: Thank you. Now, you understand that 

this is an agreement that both of 

you must be bound by and it is going 

to become an order of the Court, 

correct.

BELL: Yes.

KLEIN: All right, and you certainly intend 

to be bound by this agreement, 

correct.

BELL: Yes, I intend - -

KLEIN: Okay.

BELL: - - everything I said here.

. . . .

KLEIN: As you sit here today are you under 

the influence of any substance, 

medication, that would impair your 

ability to understand these 

proceedings?

BELL: No.

KLEIN: Okay. And do you understand that

[the judge] is making no 

determination today about the 

fairness of this agreement or the 

merits of this agreement, that all 

she is doing today is taking 

testimony and making a 
4 A-3523-14T3

determination that each of you have 

entered into this freely, 

voluntarily and willingly, is that 

correct?

BELL: That's correct.

KLEIN: Do you understand that?

BELL: Yes.

KLEIN: Okay. And you are - - nobody's 

forcing you or coercing you to enter 

into this agreement, correct? You 

had questions about it, we addressed 

those questions, correct.

BELL: Yes.

KLEIN: Okay.

BELL: You addressed them.

The trial judge found the parties "entered into the agreement 

voluntarily and intended to be fully bound by it."

The settlement had been achieved two weeks earlier following

a two-day, non-binding arbitration before a retired judge, who was 

well-versed in matrimonial law. Klein had submitted a lengthy 

memorandum to the arbitrator in advance that addressed alimony, 

real estate, equitable distribution and counsel fees. 

The Final Judgment provided for permanent alimony of $800 per 

week. Bell's husband was required to secure the alimony by 

maintaining life insurance with a face amount of $300,000 that 

would be reduced by $50,000 every five years. The Final Judgment 
5 A-3523-14T3

referenced two earlier agreements signed during the marriage. One 

agreement from 2000 was allegedly drafted by Klein. The second

"Indemnification and Hold Harmless Agreement," drafted by another 

lawyer not involved here, purportedly required Bell's husband to

be responsible for past due federal income taxes, and he allegedly

waived any rights to equitable distribution or possession of the 

premises.2 The Final Judgment provided the indemnification

agreements "shall be and are hereby declared unenforceable . . . 

past, present or future."

The Final Judgment addressed equitable distribution. The 

Florida home had been sold and a portion of the net proceeds after 

payment of mortgages, taxes and commissions were placed in escrow. 

The marital home was in foreclosure, having both a mortgage and 

home equity line of credit. Under the Final Judgment, Bell could 

refinance the property or the property would be sold. If sold, 

paragraph five of the Final Judgment described various deductions 

and credits from any resulting equity, the net balance of which 

was to be paid by Bell to her husband. "[U]npaid direct and 

indirect support" of $17,500 was to be deducted from the net 

equity.

 

2 These agreements (the indemnification agreements) are not part 

of the record on appeal.
6 A-3523-14T3

The parties were "equally responsible" for federal income 

taxes under the Final Judgment although Bell's husband agreed to 

be solely responsible for unpaid New Jersey income taxes. The 

Final Judgment required each party to maintain life insurance for 

their child's benefit. Each party was responsible for their 

attorney's fees. The parties agreed the Final Judgment was "final 

and binding," entered into "voluntarily" without "force, coercion 

and/or duress," was a "compromise" of their claims, and was "fair, 

adequate and satisfactory."

SGR sued Bell in September 2007 for unpaid attorney's fees. 

Bell filed a counterclaim against SGR and a third-party complaint

against Klein and P.C., alleging legal malpractice (the 2007 

complaint). The 2007 complaint alleged that Klein, P.C. and SGR

deviated from "customary standards and practices of lawyers" by 

not acting in her best interests; by forcing her under duress to 

sign the settlement agreement; by not conducting discovery prior 

to settling the case; by not enforcing the earlier indemnification

agreements; by not enforcing the pendente lite support order and 

by not using monies held in the attorney's escrow to pay her 

delinquent mortgage and taxes, as Klein allegedly promised. 

In March 2010, Bell voluntarily dismissed the 2007 complaint 

without prejudice. This dismissal did not conform with Rule 4:37-

1(a). Bell's counsel explained to the court that as a result of 
7 A-3523-14T3

post-trial motions, specifically one decided on February 19, 2010,

which allegedly involved a negative interpretation of the 

settlement agreement, Bell could not "raise the additional claim 

of negligence and damages as part of this action" because discovery 

was closed and thus, needed to dismiss the legal malpractice 

complaint to assert such claims. Bell then accepted the 

defendants' $30,000 Offer of Judgment, which dismissed with 

prejudice the attorney's fee portion of the case. The malpractice 

claim remained dismissed (voluntarily) without prejudice.

Bell filed another legal malpractice complaint in May 2012

(the 2012 complaint).

3 The 2012 complaint was similar to the 2007 

action, naming Klein, his P.C. and SGR as defendants. In the 

complaint, Bell alleged Klein failed to enforce the pendente lite 

order for support; did not file motions to amend her visitation 

rights; improperly distributed monies from the sale of the Florida 

house to her husband; did not enforce the earlier indemnification 

agreements; did not pay her mortgage arrears or property taxes as 

agreed; did not conduct discovery about her husband's income; and 

presented her with the settlement agreement just before going on 

the record in court, without the ability to review it, and that 

 

3 In the interim, we decided a post-divorce judgment appeal, where 

we rejected a request by Bell's ex-husband to reduce or terminate 

alimony, but we remanded the case for a recalculation of attorney's 

fees. Bell v. Bell, No. A-4003-10 (App. Div. June 1, 2012).
8 A-3523-14T3

it included terms with which she did not agree. The 2012 complaint 

alleged the Final Judgment required her to pay 100% of the equity 

from the marital home to her husband; 100% of the capital gains 

tax on the Florida home; and part of the federal income tax 

arrears. It did not include a clause requiring her husband to pay 

past due support payments or to pay the mortgage, taxes or 

utilities on either home. Bell objected to the alimony amount, 

contending it was based on inaccurate income figures. She also 

complained about certain allegedly inappropriate comments Klein 

made to her. The 2012 complaint did not make any reference to 

post-judgment motions. 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 2012 complaint,

alleging that because the 2007 complaint had been withdrawn in 

violation of Rule 4:37-1(a), Bell should not be able to relitigate 

the same issues. In April 2013, the motion judge denied the 

motion, but ordered Bell to pay defendants' litigation costs 

arising from the 2007 complaint in sixty days or the 2012 complaint

would be dismissed with prejudice. Bell paid $11,283.20 and the 

2012 complaint was reinstated in October 2013. 

Bell retained the same individual as an expert witness that

she utilized in connection with the 2007 complaint. The October 

23, 2014 report of Cary Cheifetz, Esq. (Cheifetz) identified six 

different "deviations" from "accepted standards of practice" that 
9 A-3523-14T3

constituted legal malpractice by defendants. The first deviation 

concerned the failure to incorporate into the settlement agreement

the indemnification agreements, which allocated tax liabilities

in Bell's favor. Klein allegedly did not aggressively seek

enforcement of those agreements, which were not "mid-marriage"

agreements according to Cheifetz, but enforceable "tax 

indemnification agreements." Klein allegedly deviated from 

accepted practice because there was no "downside exposure" to 

trying to enforce the agreements, and Klein should have sought a 

compromise or a ruling on their enforceability. Cheifetz opined

that Bell's damages constituted one-half the equity in the marital 

home and the income tax liabilities she had paid.

The second deviation concerned alimony. The "material 

deviation" was that Klein "used an insufficient income stream for 

[husband] in calculating the alimony for his client." He should 

have retained a "forensic accountant and [conducted] discovery,"

which should have included inquiry into the family-run books and 

records. Cheifetz asserted that Klein "settled the case far below 

his client's worst case scenario." Cheifetz opined that Bell was 

damaged through lost alimony of $35,950 per year. Cheifetz also 

took issue with the income that had been used for Bell in the 

alimony calculation.
10 A-3523-14T3

The third alleged deviation was Klein's failure to collect 

the pendente lite arrears for the mortgages, taxes and capital 

gains, which should have been collected at the time of the 

settlement.

The fourth alleged deviation involved the improper drafting

of the settlement agreement, which required "post-judgment 

litigation as well as the employment of a certified public 

accountant" to implement the agreement. Cheifetz found paragraph 

five's formula, which he asserted spawned post-judgment 

litigation, to be "incomprehensible." Cheifetz alleged the lack 

of clarity resulted in unspecified damages.

The fifth deviation alleged that Klein had a conflict of 

interest because of his purported involvement in drafting the 2000

indemnification agreement. Cheifetz opined that had Klein pressed 

for a trial, he could not have testified because of his conflict. 

This gave the other side "an unfair negotiation advantage" that 

damaged Bell.

The sixth deviation addressed miscellaneous issues. 

Cheifetz alleged there was no need for Bell to have life insurance 

for her daughter's benefit. He asserted the $300,000 insurance

that her husband was required to purchase was not adequate to 

secure the alimony and the $50,000 stepdown added to the problem. 

Cheifetz alleged Klein deviated from the standard of care when he
11 A-3523-14T3

failed to pay Bell's mortgage and taxes as promised. Klein also

was alleged to be rude and disrespectful contrary to the Rules of 

Professional Conduct. 

Cheifetz concluded that the "settlement agreement deviate[d]

materially from the reasonable expectations that a client would 

expect to receive if they were represented by competent counsel." 

He opined the settlement was, "as a whole," plaintiff's "worst 

case scenario with no consideration for compromise." The "alimony 

issue" was settled "far below" the worst case. Acceptance of the 

settlement was "incompetent." He opined that Klein committed 

legal malpractice by advising his client to settle the case instead 

of trying it where she would have received more in alimony and 

equitable distribution. In addition, Cheifetz concluded Bell 

incurred costs arising post-judgment that she "would not have

incurred."4

Defendants' summary judgment motion in October 2014 alleged 

that the 2012 complaint was barred by the entire controversy

doctrine and constituted fraud upon the court, because the case 

had been dismissed with prejudice in 2010, and Bell now was making 

the same allegations. Defendants alleged that Cheifetz's expert 

 

4 Defendants retained an expert in 2009, whose report is in the 

record. We do not know if that report was updated for the 2012 

litigation. 
12 A-3523-14T3

report offered only inadmissible net opinions. Defendants alleged 

Bell should be judicially estopped because she agreed to the 

settlement and now was taking a contrary, inconsistent position;

that the claims against the P.C. were time-barred, having been 

brought more than six years after the P.C. was closed; and that

the expert report was defective because it did not allege any 

damages.

The motion was opposed by Bell, who alleged there were 

disputed facts. Bell relied on Cheifetz's report about deviations 

involving "the improper allocation of outstanding income tax 

liabilities, equity in the former marital residence, the amount 

of alimony recommended[,] . . . failure to collect pendente lite 

arrears [and] numerous other issues."

On November 21, 2014, the trial judge granted partial summary 

judgment under the entire controversy doctrine and dismissed with 

prejudice "all claims [existing] on or prior to February 26, 2007."

For claims after that, the court denied defendants' motion, but 

invited additional briefing to address whether those claims should 

be dismissed. Both parties filed supplemental submissions.

Bell filed a motion to reconsider the November 21, 2014 order

and extend discovery to serve a supplemental expert report.

Discovery was extended, which permitted the service of expert 

reports. 
13 A-3523-14T3

On February 20, 2015, the trial judge granted Bell's motion 

for reconsideration, explaining that Bell's claims arising before 

February 2007 could go forward based upon the prior judge's ruling.

However, the judge then granted summary judgment to defendants,

finding Bell's claims were judicially estopped, as "[t]he only 

evidence of any coercion is the plaintiff's own words, some two 

years after the fact. It is a bootstrap attempt to deny what she 

said under oath." The judge also found summary judgment was 

appropriate because Cheifetz's opinion was a net opinion, as he 

"ha[d] a personal opinion that he could have done better for 

[plaintiff] if he were the attorney." 

Bell appealed the February 26, 2015 order that dismissed her 

complaint. Defendants have not filed a cross-appeal. As such, 

there is no appeal of the February 20, 2015 order that granted 

reconsideration nor of the December 19, 2014 order that allowed 

Bell to serve a supplemental report by Cheifetz.5 

On appeal, Bell contends summary judgment was erroneously 

entered because there was a dispute of fact regarding her state 

of mind when she was "forced, threatened and coerced" into settling 

her matrimonial case, because Klein disputes "such threats and 

allegations of duress." Moreover, Bell contends the trial court 

 

5 A supplemental report was served which addressed the issue of 

damages.
14 A-3523-14T3

erred as a matter of law in finding her expert report constituted 

a net opinion because the report was "replete with sound factual 

data," was supported by "legal foundation and citations," and 

explained the legal "deviations from the standard of care." Bell 

contends that post-judgment litigation regarding the equity from 

the marital home provided an independent basis to continue this 

malpractice litigation, despite the dismissal of the earlier 

litigation, because that issue arose after dismissal of the earlier 

case. 

II.

We review a trial court's order granting or denying summary 

judgment under the same standard employed by the trial court. 

W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237 (2012). The question is whether 

the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, raises genuinely disputed issues of fact sufficient 

to warrant resolution by the trier of fact, or whether the evidence 

is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. 

Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). 

Where there are claims of legal malpractice, "summary disposition 

is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute of material 

fact." Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 261 (1992) (citing 

Judson v. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co., 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954)).
15 A-3523-14T3

The trial judge dismissed the malpractice complaint on two 

grounds, namely that Bell was judicially estopped from raising the 

claims, and that her expert's report constituted a net opinion. 

We agree Bell is judicially estopped from raising certain claims,

but not others. We do not agree that Bell's expert offered net 

opinions on the remaining claims.

A.

"Public policy favors the settlement of disputes." 

Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave. L.L.C., 215 N.J.

242, 253 (2013). See also Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012)

(noting "New Jersey's strong public policy in favor of the 

settlement of litigation"). We also acknowledge a "'strong public 

policy favoring stability of arrangements' in matrimonial 

matters." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016) (quoting 

Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)). 

That said, "lawyers owe a duty to their clients to provide 

their services with reasonable knowledge, skill, and diligence. 

Ziegelheim, supra, 128 N.J. at 260. Necessary steps in the proper 

handling of the case "will include, among other things, a careful 

investigation of the facts of the matter, the formulation of a 

legal strategy, the filing of appropriate papers, and the 

maintenance of communication with the client." Id. at 261. "[T]he 

Court in Ziegelheim concluded that '[t]he fact that a party 
16 A-3523-14T3

received a settlement that was "fair and equitable" does not mean 

necessarily that the party's attorney was competent or that the 

party would not have received a more favorable settlement had the 

party's incompetent attorney been competent.'" Guido v. Duane 

Morris, L.L.P., 202 N.J. 79, 93 (2010) (alteration in original) 

(citations omitted). A "lawyer is obligated to give the client 

reasonable advice." Ziegelheim, supra, 128 N.J. at 261. 

"[A]ttorneys who pursue reasonable strategies . . . and who render 

reasonable advice to their clients cannot be held liable for the 

failure of their strategies or for any unprofitable outcomes 

. . . ." Id. at 267.

"[T]he existence of a prior settlement is not a bar to the 

prosecution of a legal malpractice claim arising from such

settlement." Guido, supra, 202 N.J. at 94. A narrow equity based 

exception to this exists "to prevent injustice by not permitting 

a party to repudiate a course of action on which another party has 

relied to his detriment." Ibid. (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J.

169, 178 (2003)) (other citation omitted). The Court applied this 

exception in Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428 (2005), where the 

client's malpractice claim was barred because the "second 

settlement had the effect of placing [the client] in the situation 

she contended she should have occupied at the outset." Gere, 

supra, 209 N.J. at 504. Actions by counsel after settlement may 
17 A-3523-14T3

also form the basis for a legal malpractice action. Ibid.

(finding that the malpractice claim was not barred where claims 

"revolved instead around" attorneys action after the settlement 

agreement was executed and the agreement reserved the ability to 

sue former attorney).

Here, the trial judge erred in concluding that all of Bell's

claims of legal malpractice were judicially estopped. "Judicial 

estoppel is an equitable doctrine precluding a party from asserting 

a position in a case that contradicts or is inconsistent with a 

position previously asserted by the party in the case or a related

legal proceeding." Tamburelli Props. Ass'n v. Borough of 

Cresskill, 308 N.J. Super. 326, 335 (App. Div. 1998). The doctrine 

is "meant to protect the integrity of the judicial system, designed 

to prevent litigants from 'playing fast and loose with the 

courts.'" Ibid. (quoting Scarano v. Cent. R.R. Co., 203 F.2d 510, 

513 (3d Cir. 1953)). 

We have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in upholding 

the dismissal of a legal malpractice action where a client 

voluntarily agreed to a settlement of the record, and later alleged 

she was forced to accept this settlement. See Newell v. Hudson, 

376 N.J. Super. 29, 46-47 (App. Div. 2005) (although agreeing with 

the settlement on the record, the client later asserted she was 

forced to agree to this to obtain a divorce). In Newell, we said
18 A-3523-14T3

that such "self-serving behavior is precisely the type of 

inconsistent judicial position-taking that the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel is designed to prevent." Id. at 47.

Here, the trial court was correct to judicially estop Bell's 

malpractice claim premised on duress. Bell now alleges she was 

coerced into the settlement, yet specifically told the court when

the settlement was placed on the record that she was not coerced. 

The settlement document itself stated that it was the final 

agreement entered into voluntarily. She has offered no proof of 

coercion. Her self-serving statements alone are insufficient to 

create a genuine issue of material fact to survive a summary 

judgment motion. See generally Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super.

388 (App. Div. 2013). 

Similarly, we agree with the trial judge that judicial 

estoppel applies to Bell's claim of legal malpractice regarding 

the incomes used to determine alimony and the alleged lack of 

discovery regarding that issue. The emails included in the record 

show that Bell was well aware her husband's income was not fully 

known prior to the arbitration. The issue was raised by Klein in 

the arbitration memorandum presented to the arbitrator. Klein 

provided Bell with the names of two experts, who could perform a 

forensic accounting, but warned her of the significant costs that 

such an analysis would entail. Similar to the plaintiff in Newell, 
19 A-3523-14T3

who was aware of a lack of financial information, Bell agreed to 

the settlement acknowledging that it was fair. Having settled the 

case with knowledge of the uncertainty about her husband's income, 

Bell should be estopped from asserting a different position now.

There was no basis, however, to conclude that Bell's legal

malpractice claims based on drafting errors in the settlement 

agreement itself are precluded by judicial estoppel. The agreement 

appears to require that 100% of the net equity from the marital 

home was to be paid to her husband, but the arbitrator's notes 

reflect the net equity should have been divided between the 

parties. The agreement seemed to reimburse only a portion of the 

pendente lite arrears although the arbitrator's notes tallied 

those pendente lite arrears at more than double. Bell could not 

know when she testified in support of the settlement what problems 

might arise in the implementation of the settlement based on 

alleged drafting errors. We are constrained to conclude the judge 

erred by preventing Bell from raising the alleged drafting errors 

in the settlement agreement as deviations from the standard of 

care. 

We cannot agree that the other alleged deviations should be 

judicially estopped by Bell's agreement to the settlement. The 

record is simply inadequate for us to determine what advice was 

or was not given to Bell about the indemnification agreements, the 
20 A-3523-14T3

life insurance, the alleged conflict of interest, or the alleged 

agreement to pay the mortgage and taxes. Therefore, we reverse

in part the trial court's order that granted summary judgment and 

dismissed Bell's complaint in its entirety, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

B.

We agree with Bell that the trial judge erred in determining 

Cheifetz's report constituted a net opinion. We review that 

determination under an abuse of discretion standard. Riley v. 

Keenan, 406 N.J. Super. 281, 295 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 200 

N.J. 207 (2009). 

A trial court must decide "whether [an] expert's opinion is 

based on facts and data." Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super.

385, 401 (App. Div. 2002) (citations omitted). "N.J.R.E. 703 

requires that an expert's opinion be based on facts, data, or

another expert's opinion, either perceived by or made known to the 

expert, at or before trial." Ibid. An expert must be able to 

point to generally accepted objective standards or practices, not 

merely standards personal to them. Koruba v. A. Honda Motor Co., 

396 N.J. Super. 517, 526 (App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 194 

N.J. 272 (2008). "Under the 'net opinion' rule, an opinion lacking 

in such foundation and consisting of bare conclusions unsupported 
21 A-3523-14T3

by factual evidence is inadmissible." Rosenberg, supra, 352 N.J.

at 401 (citations omitted).

Cheifetz opined, based upon case authority, that accepted 

standards required Klein to recognize the indemnification

agreements were enforceable.6 Klein took the same position in the 

arbitration memorandum. Having retreated from that position, 

Cheifetz opined the settlement agreement was below what reasonably 

could have been expected. Cheifetz quantified the alleged damages 

attributable to this alleged deviation. We cannot say, therefore,

that the opinion was a mere conclusion based on a personal 

standard. It provided the "why and wherefore" for the conclusion. 

See State v. One Marlin Rifle, 319 N.J. Super. 359, 370 (App. Div. 

1999) ("[T]he net opinion rule requires an expert witness to give 

the why and wherefore of his expert opinion, not just a mere 

conclusion."). 

On the alleged drafting errors, the standard as alleged by 

Cheifetz was to draft the document to reflect the parties'

agreement. He alleges the document varied from the agreement, 

causing Bell's equitable distribution to be below what could have 

been expected and resulting in litigation. This alleged deviation 

 

6 We limit our discussion to the issues that survived judicial 

estoppel.
22 A-3523-14T3

was not based on Cheifetz's personal opinion, but again his report 

provided the foundation for his conclusions. 

With respect to the amount of life insurance that Bell's 

husband was required to maintain, Cheifetz explained that it would 

not be adequate to secure the alimony. He supported his conclusion 

with facts, not personal opinion. He explained why Bell should 

not be required to obtain life insurance because there was no 

indication the child would be without support in the event of 

Bell's passing. Therefore, we do not agree with the trial judge 

that Cheifetz's report constituted impermissible net opinions.

7

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

 

7 Bell's reply brief did not contest defendants' claim that Bell 

could not proceed against P.C. because the statute of limitations 

had run. "An issue not briefed is deemed waived." W.H. Indus., 

Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 455, 459 (App. 

Div. 2008) (citation omitted). By not opposing the defense, Bell 

conceded it.