UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4944

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

DOUGLAS THOMAS PERSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:03-cr-00170-BO) 

Submitted: October 20, 2008 Decided: November 6, 2008 

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, 

Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, 

United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Banumathi Rangarajan, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Douglas Thomas Person pled guilty to possession with 

intent to distribute five grams or more cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2000), and possession of a firearm during and in 

relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 

(2006). He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, Person challenges his sentence, alleging the Government 

breached the plea agreement in failing to inform the district 

court at sentencing of the full extent of his cooperation. 

Finding no plain error, we affirm. 

 A defendant alleging the Government’s breach of a plea 

agreement bears the burden of establishing that breach by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 

187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000). Where a party raises the alleged 

breach for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. 

United States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 64, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1997). 

Accordingly, Person must not only establish that the plea 

agreement was breached, but also that “the breach was ‘so 

obvious and substantial that failure to notice and correct it 

affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the 

judicial proceedings.’” See id. at 66 & n.4 (quoting United 

States v. Fant, 974 F.2d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 1992)). 

 “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a 

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said 

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to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must 

be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 

(1971). “It is well-established that the interpretation of plea 

agreements is rooted in contract law, and that ‘each party 

should receive the benefit of its bargain.’” United States v. 

Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting United 

States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1993)). “A 

central tenet of contract law is that no party is obligated to 

provide more than is specified in the agreement itself.” Id.

“Accordingly, in enforcing plea agreements, the government is 

held only to those promises that it actually made,” and “the 

government’s duty in carrying out its obligations under a plea 

agreement is no greater than that of ‘fidelity to the 

agreement.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 

461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Benchimol, 

471 U.S. 453, 456 (1985) (holding “it was error for the Court of 

Appeals to imply as a matter of law a term which the parties 

themselves did not agree upon” by requiring recommendation to be 

made “enthusiastically”); but see United States v. Brown, 500 

F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974) (concluding “government failed to keep 

its bargain” by expressing doubts about its agreed-upon 

recommendation which “could reasonably be expected to be . . . 

expressed with some degree of advocacy”). 

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4 

 We have reviewed the record and conclude the 

Government did not breach the plea agreement. Under the plea 

agreement, the Government was obligated to make known to the 

district court at sentencing the full extent of Person’s 

cooperation. At sentencing, the Government informed the 

district court that Person had signed a plea agreement, that he 

had been debriefed, and that he provided complete and truthful 

information. The Government added that it believed the 

information Person provided would be used at a later time to 

calculate another individual’s guideline range and that Person 

would hopefully be eligible for a sentence reduction under Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 35. We find that the Government satisfied its 

obligation to apprise the court of the extent of Person’s 

cooperation. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Person’s sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED