FILED 

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 MAY 20, 2003 

 THOMAS K. KAHN 

 CLERK

*Honorable Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of

Georgia, sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 02-15545

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 01-00068-CV-WCO-2

COLEMAN JACKSON,

Petitioner-AppellantCross-Appellee,

versus

STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, 

DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 

OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondents-AppelleesCross-Appellants.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

_________________________

(May 20, 2003)

Before ANDERSON and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and OWENS*

, District Judge.
1Although “the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid

discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” United States v. PerezHernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1385 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Therefore, “a classification [that] is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment . . . is also invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Coleman Jackson appeals the district court’s order granting in part and

denying in part his motion for attorney’s fees and his supplemental application for

attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and the Prison Litigation Reform

Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Jackson contends that § 1997e(d)

does not govern his motion for attorney’s fees and his supplemental application

for attorney’s fees, because his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenged the length of

his confinement and not “prison conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). 

Alternatively, he contends that § 1997e(d) violates his right to equal protection

under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.1

 The State Board of

Pardons and Paroles cross-appeals, contending that the court erroneously awarded

Jackson fees-on-fees, or attorney’s fees incurred in the course of litigating his

petition for attorney’s fees. These three arguments present issues of first

impression in this Circuit. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
2

Jackson did not appeal his conviction and sentence. 

3

On August 4, 1999, Jackson was convicted of aggravated assault and 

sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment with five years to serve in prison and

fifteen years of probation.2

 As of August 25, 1996, the date Jackson committed

the assault, a prisoner convicted of aggravated assault was required to serve a

minimum of one-third of his prison term before becoming eligible for a parole

hearing before the board. See O.C.G.A. § 42-9-45(f). On December 9, 1997,

however, the board amended its policy to provide that a prisoner convicted on or

after January 1, 1998 of certain crimes, including aggravated assault, must serve a

minimum of ninety percent of his term before becoming eligible for a parole

hearing. The board applied its ninety-percent policy retroactively – that is, the

board applied the new policy to all convictions entered on or after January 1, 1998

even if the underlying criminal conduct occurred before January 1, 1998. Thus,

under the new policy, the board postponed the date of Jackson’s initial parole

eligibility hearing. 

After his requests to reconsider his parole eligibility were denied twice by

the board and once by Georgia’s Superior Courts Sentence Review Panel, Jackson 

filed a joint motion for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a

complaint for damages pursuant to § 1983. He alleged that by applying the new
3The board also announced its intent to review the parole eligibility of 2200 similarly

situated prisoners throughout Georgia.

4

policy to his offense the board retroactively increased his punishment in violation

of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The magistrate

judge recommended that the district court dismiss his habeas corpus petition

without prejudice for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies, dismiss his

claim for damages under § 1983, and permit his claim for equitable relief under §

1983 to proceed. Jackson subsequently filed objections to the report and

recommendation and incorporated a motion for equitable judgment therein.

The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

and, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, granted Jackson’s motion for

equitable judgment, permanently enjoined the board from enforcing the new

policy against Jackson, and ordered the board to provide Jackson with an initial

parole eligibility hearing within forty-five days of the order. As a result, the board

held a hearing and subsequently notified the court that it granted Jackson parole.3

Thereafter, pursuant to § 1988(b), Jackson filed the instant motion for

attorney’s fees in the amount of $34,875 and costs in the amount of $335.21, for a

total award of $35,210.21. The board objected to his motion and asserted that

because Jackson filed a § 1983 claim “with respect to prison conditions,” 42
4The board raised the applicability of the PLRA to this litigation for the first time in its

objection to Jackson’s motion.

5Specifically, the court awarded Jackson attorney’s fees in the amount of $9194.82, and

costs in the amount of $113.96, for a total award of $9308.78. 

6

Jackson does not appeal the district court’s award of costs.

5

U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the motion for attorney’s fees and costs should be governed by

§ 1997e(d) of the PLRA.4 Thereafter, Jackson filed a reply brief and a

supplemental application for attorney’s fees incurred while litigating the

underlying motion in the amount of $2375.

The district court concluded that (1) § 1997e governed Jackson’s 

underlying § 1983 claim and thus his motion for attorney’s fees, because the

underlying claim challenged “prison conditions” within the meaning of §

1997e(a); (2) § 1997e(d)’s fees restrictions do not violate the equal protection

component of the Fifth Amendment; and (3) § 1997e(d) permits a prevailing

plaintiff to recover fees-on-fees. Thus, pursuant to § 1988 and § 1997e(d), the

court granted in part and denied in part Jackson’s motion for attorney’s fees and

costs and his supplemental application for attorney’s fees.5 Jackson appeals the

court’s application of § 1997e(d) to his motion for attorney’s fees and his

supplemental application for attorney’s fees,6 and the board cross-appeals,

challenging Jackson’s supplemental attorney’s fees award as impermissible fees-
7

“We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation.” United States v. Fischer, 168

F.3d 1273, 1276 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).

8Section 1988(b) provides in relevant part that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a

provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

6

on-fees. See id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (prohibiting attorney’s fees that are not “directly

and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights”).

DISCUSSION

I. Applicability of § 1997e(d)7

Under § 1988(b), a district court may, in its discretion, award reasonable

attorney’s fees to a successful § 1983 plaintiff. See id. § 1988(b).8

 Accordingly,

neither party disputes that, as a successful § 1983 plaintiff, Jackson may receive

reasonable attorney’s fees under § 1988. See id. The parties disagree, however,

on the applicability of § 1997e(d) to Jackson’s underlying § 1983 claim and thus

his motion for attorney’s fees. See id. § 1997e(d)(1) (restricting attorney’s fees

awards authorized under § 1988 “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner”). Jackson

contends that § 1997e(d) is not applicable to his motion for attorney’s fees,

because his § 1983 action challenged the length of his confinement and not

“prison conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). The board alleges that

because Jackson’s § 1983 action was “brought by a prisoner,” § 1997e(d) is

applicable to his motion for attorney’s fees.
9As we frequently have stated, “[w]hen the import of words Congress has used is clear 

. . . we need not resort to legislative history, and we certainly should not do so to undermine the

plain meaning of the statutory language.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d

1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, “we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

7

“We begin our construction of section 1997e[(d)] where courts should

always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should

end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision.”9 Harris v.

Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065

(2001). Section 1997e(d) provides,

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are

authorized under [42 U.S.C. §] 1988 . . ., such fees shall not be

awarded, except to the extent that – 

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in

proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a

statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 

. . . and

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately

related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in

enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Here, we

must determine the meaning of the phrase “any action brought by a prisoner” to

decide whether § 1997e(d) applies to Jackson’s underlying § 1983 action and thus

his motion for attorney’s fees and his supplemental application for attorney’s fees.
8

“In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to the common

usage of words for their meaning.” CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245

F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Often,

courts look to dictionary definitions to ascertain the common usage of words. Id.

at 1223. The dictionary definition of the word “action” is “a legal proceeding by

which one seeks to have a wrong put right; lawsuit.” Webster’s New World

College Dictionary 14 (Michael Agnes et al. eds., 4th ed. 1999); see also Black’s

Law Dictionary 28 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 7th ed. 1999) (defining “action” as

“[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding”). 

Furthermore, Congress chose “an expansive modifier – the word ‘any’ –

instead of a restrictive one.” CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223; see also United States v.

Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive

meaning . . . .”). We previously stated that “the adjective any is not ambiguous; it

has a well-established meaning.” Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332,

1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

without any language to limit the significance of this modifier, “any means all.” 

CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1223 (internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, the phrase

“any action” covers a lawsuit challenging the length of an inmate’s confinement.
9

Additionally, we have held that the term “brought,” as used in subsections

(a) and (e) of § 1997e, means filed. See Harris, 216 F.3d at 974 (interpreting the

term “brought” as used in § 1997e(e)’s “[n]o federal civil action shall be brought”

language to mean filed); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999)

(interpreting the term “brought” as used in § 1997e(a)’s “[n]o action shall be

brought” language to mean filed). Normally, identical words that appear in

various parts of the same act are meant to have the same meaning. See Atl.

Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“[T]here is a natural

presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are

intended to have the same meaning.”). Thus, the term “brought” as used in §

1997e(d)’s “[i]n any action brought” language means filed. See 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(d)(1).

Finally, we need not resort to common usage to determine the meaning of

the term “prisoner” in § 1997e(d), because Congress defined that term as it is used

within § 1997e as follows: “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility

who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,

violations of criminal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). As Jackson was convicted of

aggravated assault and sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment, he is a prisoner

within the meaning of § 1997e(h).
10The district court concluded that § 1997e(d) governed Jackson’s underlying § 1983

action and his motion for attorney’s fees, because the underlying action challenged “prison

conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). 

Although Congress included the term “prison conditions” in three of § 1997e’s

subsections, see id. § 1997e(a), (c)(1), (f)(1), it did not include that term in the remaining

subsections, see id. § 1997e(d)(1), (e), (g), (h). Clearly, Congress knew how to specify “prison

conditions” and purposefully chose where to do so and where not to do so. See In re Griffith,

206 F.3d 1389, 1394 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that “[w]here Congress knows how to

say something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling” (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). As Congress did not specify “prison conditions” in the subsection

addressed in this appeal, § 1997e(d), we render no decision as to whether Jackson’s § 1983 claim

challenges “prison conditions” within the meaning of § 1997e(a). Nevertheless, we affirm the

district court’s judgment, because § 1997e(d) applies to all lawsuits that are filed by a prisoner. 

See Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (per

curiam) (“[W]e may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground that finds support in the

record” (internal quotation marks omitted).).

11“We review the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo.” United States v. Jackson,

111 F.3d 101, 101 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

10

Therefore, it is apparent that § 1997e(d)’s phrase “any action brought by a

prisoner” means all lawsuits that are filed by a prisoner and is not restricted to

lawsuits challenging “prison conditions” that are filed by a prisoner. Accordingly,

§ 1997e(d) applies to Jackson’s underlying § 1983 action and thus his motion for

attorney’s fees and his supplemental application for attorney’s fees.10

II. Equal Protection11

Jackson contends that § 1997e(d) violates his right to equal protection under 

the Fifth Amendment by restricting the attorney’s fees awards of prisoners while
12Section 1997e(d) provides,

(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in

paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be

applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If

the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the

excess shall be paid by the defendant.

(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1)

shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate

established under section 3006A of title 18 for payment of court-appointed

counsel.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from entering into

an agreement to pay an attorney’s fee in an amount greater than the amount

authorized under this subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by

the defendant pursuant to section 1988.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2)–(4).

11

permitting other litigants to recover full attorney’s fees awards.12 Although we

previously have not addressed the constitutionality of § 1997e(d), several of our

sister circuits have addressed this issue and found § 1997e(d) in its entirety, or its

various subsections, constitutional. See Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 704 (8th

Cir. 2001) (concluding that § 1997e(d)(2) survives rational basis review); Walker

v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding the same), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 1095 (2002); Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2000)

(concluding that § 1997e(d)(3) survives rational basis review); Boivin v. Black,

225 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that § 1997e(d)(2) survives rational

basis review); Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995–96 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding

that § 1997e(d) passes constitutional muster). But see Collins v. Montgomery
13While none of the courts of appeals that have addressed the constitutionality of §

1997e(d) have found it unconstitutional, one district court found § 1997e(d) unconstitutional. 

See Johnson v. Daley, 117 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893 (W.D. Wis. 2000) (finding no rational

relationship between § 1997e(d)’s classification and the government’s interests).

12

County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 176 F.3d 679, 686 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc)

(declining to rule upon the constitutionality of § 1997e(d)(3) because the court

was divided equally on the issue).13 We conclude, like our sister circuits, that §

1997e(d) is constitutional.

Generally speaking, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be

sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a

legitimate [governmental] interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473

U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The level of scrutiny is heightened, however, “[i]f a

fundamental right or a suspect class is involved.” Gary v. City of Warner Robins,

311 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). As prisoners are not a suspect class,

heightened scrutiny is not warranted on that basis. Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719,

727 (11th Cir. 1998). Jackson contends, however, that § 1997e(d)’s attorney’s

fees restrictions violate the fundamental right of access to the courts by

discouraging attorneys from taking prisoners’ civil rights cases. 

Without question, “prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the

courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To have standing to seek
13

relief under this right, however, a plaintiff must show actual injury by

“demonstrat[ing] that a nonfrivolous legal claim ha[s] been frustrated or . . .

impeded.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996) (footnote omitted). As

Jackson was represented by counsel and was successful in his § 1983 action, he

does not have standing to seek relief under the right of access to the courts. See

Boivin, 225 F.3d at 43 n.5 (noting that a prisoner who was represented by counsel

and won his claim did not have standing to seek relief under the right of access to

the courts). Thus, Jackson has not demonstrated a violation of a fundamental

right, and, therefore, heightened scrutiny is not warranted on that basis.

As § 1997e(d) does not involve a suspect class nor infringe upon a

fundamental right, we review its constitutionality under the rational basis test. See

Gary, 311 F.3d at 1338. Under rational basis review, a classification within a

statute “is accorded a strong presumption of validity,” and we must uphold the

statute “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a

rational basis for the classification.” Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,

319–20 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government is not

required to provide evidentiary support for its classifications and may rely upon

conjecture. Hadix, 230 F.3d at 843. Thus, Jackson bears the heavy burden of

“negati[ng] every conceivable basis which might support [the statute], whether or
14It is irrelevant that Congress did not specify its purpose in making the classification. 

See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (“[A] legislature that creates these categories need not actually

articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification” (internal quotation

marks omitted).);see also Boivin, 225 F.3d at 44 n.6 (citing the legislative history of the PLRA

as evidence of Congress’s goals); Harris, 216 F.3d at 977 & n.5 (citing floor statements of the

PLRA’s principal architects to determine Congress’s intent because the PLRA was enacted “as a

rider to an appropriations bill” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

14

not the basis has a foundation in the record.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v.

United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Under this highly deferential standard, we conclude that § 1997e(d) survives

rational basis review. Apparently, by enacting § 1997e(d), Congress intended to

decrease “marginal or trivial lawsuits.”14

 Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845; see also Walker,

257 F.3d at 668–69; Boivin, 225 F.3d at 45; Madrid, 190 F.3d at 996. Before the

fee cap, there was nothing to dissuade attorneys from “adopt[ing] a ‘shotgun’

approach, filing numerous claims in the hopes that at least a minor violation would

likely be found, [thus] assuring the recovery of attorneys fees.” Hadix, 230 F.3d at

845. By lowering the fees recoverable for a successful claim, “a rational attorney

[is likely to] demand a greater likelihood of success before taking a prisoner’s

case.” Id. 

Additionally, by decreasing frivolous claims, “Congress could also . . . be

seeking to protect the state and federal treasuries, from which the majority of
15Jackson also contends that § 1997e(d)’s application has a disparate impact on African

American males, because they represent the majority of persons incarcerated in our prisons. As

Jackson has not demonstrated any evidence of discriminatory intent, we find that this claim lacks

merit. See Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 616 (11th Cir. 1995) (requiring “[p]roof

of racially discriminatory intent or purpose . . . to show a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause” (internal quotation marks omitted)). He further contends that § 1997e(d) violates his

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. As this issue was not raised before the district

court, we decline to address it on appeal. See United States v. S. Fabricating Co., 764 F.2d 780,

781 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“Generally, an appellate court will not consider a legal issue

or theory raised for the first time on appeal.”).

16“We review an award of attorney’s fees by the district court only for an abuse of

discretion.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002). 

15

prisoner civil rights awards are paid.” Id. In light of the “shotgun” approach

many attorneys utilized before the fee cap, “Congress could have rationally

concluded that [such] prisoner civil rights litigation leads to attorney fees which

are often disproportionate to the harm or injury. Thus, by reducing the number of

marginal, albeit meritorious claims, some government resources would be

preserved.” Walker, 257 F.3d at 669. 

As Jackson has failed “to negat[e] every conceivable basis which might

support” § 1997e(d), we must conclude that § 1997e(d) survives rational basis

review. Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1350 (internal quotation marks omitted).15

III. Fees-on-Fees16

On cross-appeal, the board contends that the district court erred in awarding

Jackson fees-on-fees, because the fees-on-fees were not “directly and reasonably

incurred in proving an actual violation” of Jackson’s rights. 42 U.S.C. §
16

1997e(d)(1)(A). Although we have not addressed whether § 1997e(d)(1) permits a

prevailing § 1983 plaintiff to recover fees-on-fees, the Third and Fifth Circuits

have concluded that fees-on-fees are recoverable under § 1997e(d)(1). See Volk v.

Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d

196, 200–01 (3d Cir. 1998). We agree.

Section 1988(b) permits reasonable attorney’s fees “[i]n any action or

proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983,” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and

§ 1997e(d)(1)(A) permits attorney’s fees for “proving an actual violation of the

plaintiff’s rights,” id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). It is well-settled that fees-on-fees are

permitted under § 1988 even though Congress did not explicitly provide for feeson-fees therein. Hernandez, 146 F.3d at 200; see also Jonas v. Stack, 758 F.2d

567, 568 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[A] prevailing party’s counsel is entitled to reasonable

compensation when he litigates his own claim for entitlement to § 1988 fees.”). 

As Congress has not “express[ed] an intent to change th[is] established

construction,” we will continue to follow that construction. Volk, 262 F.3d at 536

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Therefore, as § 1988(b)’s language permitting fees-on-fees does not differ

significantly from § 1997e(d)(1)(A)’s language, we join our sister circuits in
17

concluding that fees-on-fees are recoverable under § 1997e(d). See id.;

Hernandez, 146 F.3d at 200–01.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we conclude that § 1997e(d) applies to Jackson’s underlying § 1983

action and thus his motion for attorney’s fees and his supplemental application for

attorney’s fees. Furthermore, we find that § 1997e(d)’s attorney’s fees restrictions

survive rational basis review. Finally, we conclude that fees-on-fees are

recoverable under § 1997e(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.