IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2020 WY 118

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2020

September 10, 2020

CLINTON RAY WOODS,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-19-0279

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Clinton Ray Woods, pro se.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers 

are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in 

the permanent volume.
1

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Clinton Ray Woods was convicted of three counts of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in 

the Second Degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i), and one count of

Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the Third Degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-

316(a)(i). See Woods v. State, 2017 WY 111, ¶ 1, 401 P.3d 962, 965 (Wyo. 2017).

1

[¶2] Mr. Woods filed a pro se “Petition for Exoneration Based on Factual Innocence” 

under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-401 through -407.

2

 The district court dismissed the 

petition without prejudice. It found Mr. Woods was “merely relitigating facts, issues or

evidence presented in previous proceedings or presenting issues that appear frivolous or 

speculative on their face . . .” in contravention of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-404(b). It also 

found Mr. Woods did not produce any “newly discovered evidence.” 

[¶3] Mr. Woods appeals the district court’s order of dismissal. After examining the 

briefs, appellate record, and controlling law, this Court unanimously agreed to an 

abbreviated opinion affirming the district court’s order pursuant to W.R.A.P. 9.06.3 See 

Hardman v. State, 2018 WY 24, ¶ 2, 413 P.3d 116, 117 (Wyo. 2018).

[¶4] Mr. Woods raises a number of issues on appeal; however, the threshold question is 

whether he has properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction. We conclude he did not. “The 

existence of jurisdiction is a question of law” which we review de novo. Matter of Estate

of Inman, 2016 WY 101, ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 67, 69 (Wyo. 2016) (citing Brown v. City of 

Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 8, 248 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Wyo. 2011)).

[¶5] We recently held that “the dismissal of a Factual Innocence Act petition without 

prejudice following an initial determination of statutory noncompliance is not a final 

judgment which can be appealed.” Uden v. State, 2020 WY 109, ¶ 16, 470 P.3d 560, 

563–64 (Wyo. 2020); see also W.R.A.P. 1.05 (defining an appealable order). In Uden, 

1 Mr. Woods appealed his conviction and this Court affirmed. Woods, 401 P.3d 962. He then filed a 

petition for post-conviction relief, which the district court denied. Mr. Woods petitioned this Court to 

review the district court’s denial of the post-conviction relief petition, and we declined to review that 

decision. 2 “The legislature passed the Factual Innocence Act in 2018 to allow a person convicted of a felony 

offense to petition the court for exoneration if the person can establish that he is factually innocent of the 

convicted crime(s).” Parkhurst v. State, 2019 WY 63, ¶ 10, 443 P.3d 834, 836–37 (Wyo. 2019). 3 (a) The supreme court by unanimous vote may, sua sponte, enter an 

abbreviated opinion affirming or reversing the judgment or order of the 

district court for the reason that it is clear that affirmance or reversal is 

required because:

(1) the issues are clearly controlled by settled Wyoming law or 

federal law binding upon the states[.]

W.R.A.P. 9.06(a)(1).
2

the district court conducted an initial review of Mr. Uden’s Factual Innocence Act 

petition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12-403(b), (c) and 404(b), found it failed to comply 

with the statute, and dismissed the petition. We held that the dismissal was without

prejudice and that therefore this Court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Uden’s appeal. Uden, 

¶¶ 13–16, 470 P.3d at 562–64.

[¶6] Our decision in Uden controls here. The district court performed an initial review 

of Mr. Woods’s petition and determined it was statutorily noncompliant before 

dismissing it without prejudice. “Our jurisdiction ‘is limited to appeals from final 

appealable orders.’” Uden, ¶ 13, 470 P.3d at 562 (quoting Painter v. McGill ex. rel. Wyo. 

Bd. of Med., 2019 WY 108, ¶ 10, 450 P.3d 1243, 1245 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Inman, ¶ 9, 

382 P.3d at 69)). 

An “appealable order” is “[a]n order affecting a substantial 

right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the 

action and prevents a judgment[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(a); see 

also Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1029 (Wyo. 1979); In 

re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 17, 287 P.3d 757, 761 

(Wyo. 2012) (“The more rigorous requirement of W.R.A.P. 

1.05 . . . is that the order affects a ‘substantial right.’”); Inman 

v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶¶ 11, 17–18, 187 P.3d 868, 875, 

876 (Wyo. 2008) (concluding the trial court’s order was not 

appealable because it did not affect a substantial right). “To 

be final, the order must determine all liabilities of all parties 

and leave nothing for future consideration.” Est. of McLean 

ex rel. Hall v. Benson, 2003 WY 78, ¶ 8, 71 P.3d 750, 753 

(Wyo. 2003); see also Lower v. Peabody Powder River

Services, LLC, 2020 WY 33, ¶¶ 11–12, 459 P.3d 443, 446–47 

(Wyo. 2020) (the order “must affect a substantial right, 

determine the merits of the controversy, and resolve all 

outstanding issues”); Painter, ¶ 10, 450 P.3d at 1246 (same).

Uden, ¶ 14, 470 P.3d at 563.

[¶7] The dismissal of Mr. Woods’s Factual Innocence Act petition following initial 

review under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-404(b) is not a final appealable order. We lack 

jurisdiction over his appeal. W.R.A.P. 1.05; Uden, ¶¶ 16, 18, 470 P.3d at 563–64.

4

 

4 As we noted in Uden, if Mr. Woods “could credibly document the existence of newly discovered 

evidence that establishes a bona fide issue of his factual innocence, he would be free to file a petition that 

satisfied all the Act’s requirements. Anything short of that, however, would again be subject to dismissal 

following the court’s initial review.” Uden, ¶ 17, 470 P.3d at 564. Further, “a petitioner who can support 

a claim that the district court erred by dismissing his petition following initial review under Wyo. Stat. 
3

[¶8] Dismissed.

Ann. §§ 7-12-403(b), (c) and 404(b) may apply to this Court for a writ of review within 15 days after 

entry of the dismissal order. See W.R.A.P. 13.02.” Uden, ¶ 16, 470 P.3d at 564 n.4.