United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 07-1709

LLOYD'S OF LONDON; GOTHAER VERSICHERUNGEN AG; GREAT

LAKES REINSURANCE (UK) PLC; ING INSURANCE SA,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

WILLIAM PAGÁN-SÁNCHEZ; CARMEN MALDONADO VENTURA;

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PAGÁN-MALDONADO,

Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

CARIBBEAN BOAT MFG & SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Sea Rescue and/or

Vessel Assist Puerto Rico; INSURANCE COMPANY XYZ; JANE DOE,

Third-Party Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Lynch, Chief Judge,

Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges.

Ian P. Carvajal with whom Francisco J. Vizcarrondo and Saldaña

& Carvajal, P.S.C. were on brief for appellants.

Daliah Lugo-Auffant with whom Pérez Vargas & Lugo Auffant Law

Offices, P.S.C. was on brief for appellees.
August 21, 2008
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LYNCH, Chief Judge. This maritime insurance case from

Puerto Rico arises on interlocutory appeal from the denial of the

plaintiff insurers' motion for summary judgment that payment under

its policy was excused by the insured's breach of warranty. The

prevailing view, both in federal law and state maritime insurance

law, is that a breach of a warranty will excuse the maritime

insurer from payment regardless of any causal connection to the

loss. The district court erroneously applied a different view. We

reverse the district court and direct entry of judgment for

plaintiff insurers.

I.

As this comes to us on appeal from a motion for summary

judgment, we review the district court's ruling de novo, taking the

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, the

defendants. Rosado-Quiñones v. Toledo, 528 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2008); Littlefield v. Acadia Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.

2004).

The plaintiffs, a group of insurance companies and

underwriters including Lloyd's of London, Gothaer Versicherungen

AG, Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC, and ING Insurance SA, issued

an insurance policy to William Pagán-Sánchez which provided hull,

machinery, and liability coverage for his recently purchased fortythree-foot pleasure boat, the Gabriella. The effective dates of

the policy were from January 31, 2003 to January 31, 2004. The
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policy was embodied in a twelve-page insuring agreement which

includes a three-page section entitled "General Conditions &

Warranties." 

On July 19, 2003, as the Gabriella was traveling to

Culebra, an island off of Puerto Rico, an exhaust hose came loose

and the Gabriella began taking on water through the boat's exhaust

system. Attempts to pump out the water were unsuccessful, and the

Gabriella flooded and sank. The insured later submitted a claim to

the plaintiffs for $175,000 for the loss of the boat and $100,000

for the costs incurred during salvage operations. 

The insurers began an investigation into the

circumstances surrounding the accident. The investigation found,

inter alia, 1) that the loss of the Gabriella was caused by wear

and tear, gradual deterioration, and lack of maintenance; and 2)

that the vessel's fire extinguishing equipment had not been

inspected or certified within the preceding year, and that the

automatic engine room fire extinguisher system had been

disconnected prior to the loss. There was no finding, and it has

never been asserted by the insurers, that the condition of the fire

extinguishing equipment had any relation whatsoever to the sinking

of the boat. However, the insurers do assert that the lack of

maintenance of the fire extinguishing equipment violated an express

warranty of the insurance contract providing that "such [fire
The plaintiff insurers also alleged that the insured was 1

in breach of other warranties -- all unrelated to the loss itself

-- but none of those allegations are raised on appeal.

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extinguishing] equipment is properly installed and is maintained in

good working order."

The plaintiff insurers then sought a declaratory judgment

in federal district court in Puerto Rico that the breach by the

insured of the fire extinguisher warranty in the insurance 1

contract precluded payment of the insured's claim. The defendants

denied all the allegations and counterclaimed under the insurance

contract for the amount of their original insurance claim.

Plaintiff insurers moved for summary judgment. The

motion was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended that

summary judgment be denied and that triable issues of material fact

existed. In an unpublished order, the district court adopted in

part the magistrate judge's recommendations and denied the motion

for summary judgment. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for

reconsideration which was also denied in another unpublished order.

We describe below the portions of the district court's reasoning

that are pertinent to our analysis.

II.

Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(3), which provides this court with jurisdiction over

interlocutory appeals in admiralty cases of orders determining the

rights and liabilities of the parties.
The district court initially found it unnecessary to 2

decide whether the fire extinguisher warranty clause was ambiguous

because it held that even if the insured were in breach of the

clause, that breach would have no effect on the insured's ability

to recover under the policy. But in its denial of the insurers'

motion for reconsideration, the court changed its position and

ruled that the clause was a warranty clause, not a representation,

and that it was ambiguous. 

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Our review of the district court's summary judgment

ruling is de novo. Littlefield, 392 F.3d at 6. As framed by the

parties and the district court, two key issues must be addressed

for summary judgment purposes. The first issue is whether the

contested maritime insurance warranty clause is ambiguous. The

second is whether, if the clause is not ambiguous and has been

breached by the insured, the breach excuses the insurer from

payment.

A. Ambiguity of the Fire Extinguisher Warranty Clause

The district court erroneously held the fire extinguisher

warranty clause was ambiguous. Subsection 9 of the policy is 2

entitled "General Conditions and Warranties." Subsection 9(l) of

the policy provides:

If the scheduled vessel is fitted with fire

extinguishing equipment, then it is warranted

that such equipment is properly installed and

is maintained in good working order. This

includes the weighing of tanks once a year and

recharging as necessary.

This clause follows after subsection 9(k), which provides:

It is warranted that covered persons must at

all times comply with relevant Statutes, Laws,

by-laws and US Coast Guard and other
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regulations, governing the use of the

scheduled vessel.

It is clear that subsection 9(l) is a warranty provision. The

clause plainly states that it is a warranty and it is located in

the section of the policy where warranties are set forth.

The contract interpretation question of whether there is

an ambiguity in the warranty clause is one for the court. See

Littlefield, 392 F.3d at 6 ("Whether there is any ambiguity in

[provisions of a maritime insurance contract] is a question of law

for the court to determine."); see also Tropeano v. Dorman, 441

F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The question of whether a contract is

ambiguous is one for the courts."); 2 L.R. Russ & T.F. Segalla,

Couch on Insurance § 21:13 (3d ed. 2008) ("Whether or not a

contract of insurance is ambiguous is a question of law for the

court . . . ."). It is a question we review de novo. Littlefield,

392 F.3d at 6; Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir. 2004).

There is no ambiguity in the warranty clause at issue here.

The first sentence of subsection 9(l) is a warranty from

the insured that if the vessel is fitted with fire extinguishing

equipment, as the vessel here was, such equipment is properly

installed and maintained in good working order. The second

sentence provides the further definition that such proper

installation and maintenance includes "the weighing of tanks once

a year and recharging as necessary." This is a promissory warranty

on the part of the insured. See 6 Couch on Insurance, supra, §
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81:14 (promissory warranty is "one by which the insured stipulates

that something shall be done or omitted after the policy takes

effect and during its continuance"); see also Commercial Union Ins.

Co. v. Flagship Marine Servs., Inc., 190 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1999)

(defining warranty as "a promise 'by which the assured undertakes

that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some

condition shall be fulfilled'" (quoting L.J. Buglass, Marine

Insurance & General Average in the United States 27 (2d ed.

1981))).

The date that the parties entered into the insurance

contract does not matter. The insured warrants upon entering into

the policy that the tanks have been weighed once a year and, if

necessary, recharged, as part of the insured's warranty of proper

maintenance of fire extinguishing equipment. That this is a clear

obligation is reinforced by the introductory clause in the contract

that states: "We will provide the insurance coverage described in

this insuring agreement, in return for payment to us of the premium

due and compliance by covered persons with the provisions,

conditions and warranties of this insuring agreement." (Emphasis

added.)

Since the warranty is clear and unambiguous, it must be

enforced as written under usual insurance law. See 2 Couch on

Insurance, supra, § 21:11 ("[I]t is a well settled rule . . . that

clear and unambiguous clauses must be accepted as the expression of
Chapter 11 provides that for cases within its coverage 3

(that is, non-maritime insurance policies) misrepresentations,

omissions, concealment of acts, and incorrect statements only

prevent coverage when, inter alia, they materially alter the risk

assumed by the insurer. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 1110. We do not

reach the question of whether the breach would prevent coverage

under that provision.

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the intent of the parties, and enforced by the courts as

written.").

It is also undisputed that the insured failed to produce

any evidence of compliance with the promissory warranty relating to

the fire extinguishers. Thus, the insured was in breach of the

promissory warranty.

B. Consequences of the Breach of Warranty

In light of the insured's breach, the question, then, is

the effect of this breach.

The district court reasoned that Puerto Rico law would

apply. It acknowledged that Chapter 11 of Puerto Rico's Insurance

Code, which covers contract interpretation and construction,

expressly excludes maritime insurance contracts from its coverage.3

See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 1101(1) ("The applicable provisions

of this chapter shall apply to insurances other than ocean marine

. . . insurances . . . ."). The court reasoned it should turn by

default to the Puerto Rico Civil Code. In the absence of any

statute or case law on point, the court predicted that under the

Puerto Rico Civil Code the breach of a warranty clause in a
Unfortunately, neither of the parties called this case to 4

the attention of either this court or the district court.

There is general agreement that maritime insurance 5

contracts fall within federal maritime jurisdiction, and as such,

Congress and the courts have the power to fashion federal rules.

Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 314. As we have noted before,

[b]eneath this surface agreement on general

principles lies an abyss of confusion. One

might think that construing a maritime

insurance policy, in relation to damage

occurring on the high seas, would be a

paradigm case for a uniform body of federal

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contract of maritime insurance would not excuse payment by an

insurer unless the breach was related to the cause of the loss.

The insurers agree with the district court that "Puerto

Rico law is silent on the issue" and that "the majority rule with

respect to warranty breaches is similar to the federal admiralty

rule inasmuch as[] both treat any breach as having the effect of

voiding coverage in its entirety." Op. and Order Den. Mot. for

Recons., at 6. That being so, the insurers argue, even if Puerto

Rico law would apply, it would apply as substantive law the

majority rule that a breach of a promissory warranty excuses the

insurer from coverage.

We turn to the relevant principles of choice of law

analysis as most recently set forth by the Supreme Court in Norfolk

Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004). Norfolk 4

Southern clarified the Supreme Court's earlier choice of law

analysis for maritime insurance contracts set forth in Wilburn Boat

Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955).5
law . . . . But the tensions in Supreme Court

precedents are legendary . . . with regard to

the reach of state law in federal maritime law

generally . . . .

Cent. Int'l Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Cos., 202 F.3d 372, 373 (1st

Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

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Norfolk Southern stated the general rule that "[w]hen a contract is

a maritime one, and the dispute is not inherently local, federal

law controls the contract interpretation." Id. at 22-23. This

lawmaking power in the federal courts stems from the Constitution's

grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts. See id. at 23;

Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 314; see also U.S. Const. art. III, §

2, cl. 1. This choice of law principle applies regardless of

whether the basis for federal jurisdiction is admiralty

jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), or diversity, under id. §

1332. See Norfolk S. Ry., 543 U.S. at 23; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.

Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953) ("[S]ubstantial rights . . . are not

to be determined differently whether [a] case is labelled 'law

side' or 'admiralty side' on a district court's docket.").

There is no dispute this is a maritime insurance

contract. We also agree that the prevailing view, under federal

law and the law of most states, is that a breach of a promissory

warranty in a maritime insurance contract excuses the insurer from

coverage. See Commercial Union, 190 F.3d at 31 ("Under the federal

rule and the law of most states, warranties in maritime insurance

contracts must be strictly complied with, even if they are
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collateral to the primary risk that is the subject of the contract,

if the insured is to recover."); see also Yu v. Albany Ins. Co.,

281 F.3d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "rule that a marine

insurer can avoid liability for breach of a . . . warranty,

regardless of whether that breach caused the loss[,] . . . is in

place in most states"); 6 Couch on Insurance, supra, § 83:20 ("In

marine insurance, there is historically no requirement that the

breach of warranty relate to the loss, so that any breach bars

recovery even though a loss would have happened had the warranty

been carried out to the letter."); 2 T.J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and

Maritime Law § 19-15 (4th ed. 2008) (noting that while courts tend

to differ on whether the rule is a function of state law or federal

law, most courts agree that in a maritime insurance contract, "[i]f

the warranty is breached, the insurer is discharged").

Given this well-established general rule, in our view,

the question becomes whether Puerto Rico has either clearly stated

a contrary rule or demonstrated a strong interest in having a

different rule. Only if so, would we address the question of
As Wilburn Boat recognized, not "every term in every 6

maritime contract can only be controlled by some federally defined

admiralty rule," and the federal government has "left much

regulatory power" in the states "in relation to insurance companies

and the contracts they make." 348 U.S. at 314-15. And so

sometimes terms in a maritime insurance contract so implicate local

interests as to lead to the application of state law to interpret

the contract.

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whether this is inherently a local dispute to Puerto Rico. Puerto 6

Rico has done neither.

Here, the Puerto Rico legislature has expressed its

intent to exclude maritime insurance contracts from its statutory

provisions governing the interpretation and construction of

insurance contracts. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 1101(1). In

addition, in twelve other provisions of its Insurance Code, the

Puerto Rico legislature has excluded maritime insurance contracts

from its insurance regulation. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, §§

329(4)(c), 406, 412(4), 414(6), 905(1), 1001(1)(c), 1007a, 1007b,

1101(1), 1119(1)(c), 1202(1)(e), 3701(1), 3803(6). There is no

Puerto Rico statute which expressly sets forth an interpretive rule

for maritime contracts, much less an interpretive rule which

expressly states that in such maritime contracts, a breach of an

express promised warranty by the insured does not excuse the
This is in distinct contrast with states which have 7

statutes adopting the minority rule. See, e.g., Fla. Stat.

§ 627.409(2) ("A breach . . . by the insured of any warranty . . .

of any wet marine . . . insurance policy . . . does not void the

policy . . . unless such breach . . . increased the hazard by any

means within the control of the insured.").

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insurer from its payment obligations. Moreover, there is no case 7

law from the Puerto Rico Supreme Court supporting such a rule.

Nor is it clear as a matter of policy that Puerto Rico

law would craft such a rule. It is true that Puerto Rico has some

interest in protecting insureds who are residents and that it has

adopted an insurance code to do so. But the Puerto Rico

legislature has chosen rather emphatically to exclude maritime

insurance contracts from the special protections it offers its

insureds under its Insurance Code. That choice may well reflect

Puerto Rico's desire not to impose special burdens on maritime

insurers, who are crucial to the island's commerce, and, in turn,

to encourage them to do business in Puerto Rico. See Commercial

Union, 190 F.3d at 31-32 ("The rule of strict compliance with

warranties in marine insurance contracts stems from the recognition

that it is peculiarly difficult for marine insurers to assess their

risk, such that insurers must rely on the representations and

warranties made by insureds regarding their vessels' condition and

usage."); 7 Couch on Insurance, supra, § 99:1 ("The added

strictness [of the rule for maritime insurance contracts] is, in

many ways, a consequence of the fact that marine insurers
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historically have been in a poorer position to ascertain for

themselves the true state of affairs."). This interest is served

by not imposing more burdensome rules on maritime insurers than are

imposed in the majority of jurisdictions.

Because Puerto Rico has not stated a contrary rule, we

see no reason to apply anything other than the majority rule here:

that the insured's breach of a promissory warranty excuses the

insurers from payment.

We add a final note. This analysis has proceeded by

reference to Puerto Rico law, despite an express choice of law

clause in the insurance contract which states that if federal law

does not apply, then New York law would apply. For reasons we do

not understand, counsel for the insurers argued that New York law

and Puerto Rico law were essentially equivalent and so consented to

the court analyzing the case under Puerto Rico law. The district

court suggested that the two laws are very different and that New

York law follows the majority rule and would strictly enforce the

warranty but Puerto Rico law would not. In light of the concession

by counsel for the insurers, the court analyzed the matter under

Puerto Rico law.

We are not certain that counsel, as a matter of

litigation strategy, may vary the express terms of a choice of law

clause. The issue has not been briefed to us. The concession

greatly complicated this litigation. We agree with the district
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court that under New York law, the insured's breach excuses the

insurer from performance. See Commercial Union, 190 F.3d at 32

(noting that New York law requires strict compliance with

warranties in marine insurance contracts). This fact demonstrates

that there is no unfairness to the insured here from the result.

The insured were on notice that they would face strict compliance

with the warranty.

We reverse and remand to the district court for entry of

summary judgment for the insurers. No costs are awarded.