Filed 5/24/21 P. v. Ochoagomez CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JULIO OCHOAGOMEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B304504

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA467555)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Sergio C. Tapia, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard B. Lennon and Melissa L. Camacho-Cheung, 

under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. 

Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant Julio OchoaGomez challenges the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic 

stop that ultimately resulted in OchoaGomez’s conviction for 

possession of a controlled substance. OchoaGomez argues that 

the police unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time 

in which a reasonably diligent officer would have completed the 

mission of the stop, thereby violating his Fourth Amendment 

right to be free of unreasonable seizure under Rodriguez v. 

United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348 (Rodriguez). We hold that, 

based on the factual findings supported by substantial evidence 

in the record, the detaining officer was diligent in his efforts 

to complete the mission of the traffic stop and had not yet 

completed that mission at the time his police dog alerted him 

to the presence of drugs in OchoaGomez’s vehicle. As such, the 

court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. 

OchoaGomez also challenges the court’s use of his prior 

juvenile adjudication to increase his sentence under California’s 

“Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)−(i), 1170.12, 

subds. (a)−(d)). He acknowledges that People v. Nguyen (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 1007 (Nguyen) permits use of a juvenile adjudication 

as a prior strike, but argues Nguyen is no longer controlling law,

because its reasoning has been fatally undermined by subsequent 

United States and California Supreme Court decisions regarding 

judicial factfinding and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial. (See Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct.

2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604] (Mathis); Descamps v. United States

(2013) 570 U.S. 254 (Descamps); People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 

Cal.5th 120 (Gallardo).) We disagree that these decisions are 

inconsistent with Nguyen, as they address judicial factfinding on 

previously unadjudicated facts, an issue implicated neither in 
3

Nguyen, nor in the instant appeal. As such, the trial court 

did not err in its application of OchoaGomez’s prior juvenile 

adjudication as a strike at sentencing. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Traffic Stop Resulting in OchoaGomez’s Arrest 

The following facts related to the traffic stop leading to

OchoaGomez’s arrest are reflected in the police body camera

footage from the stop, as well as the detaining officer’s 

uncontradicted testimony at the preliminary hearing.

At about 9:30 in the morning of April 24, 2019, California 

Highway Patrol Officer Richard Cheever initiated a traffic stop 

of OchoaGomez’s vehicle based on OchoaGomez following a 

tractor trailer too closely and having tinted front windows, 

both violations of the Vehicle Code. (See Veh. Code, §§ 21703, 

26708, subdivision (a)(1).) Cheever is a K-9 handler and had his 

trained police dog in the car with him. After both Cheever and 

OchoaGomez exited the freeway and parked, Cheever approached 

the right front passenger side door of the car. Cheever told 

OchoaGomez the reason for the stop and asked for his driver’s 

license, vehicle registration, and insurance. Cheever noticed 

that OchoaGomez’s hands were trembling as he handed over his 

documents and noticed a “strong odor of air freshener emitting 

from the interior of the vehicle.” Cheever later testified that, in 

his experience, most individuals have trembling hands or other 

signs of nervousness at the beginning of a traffic stop, and that 

“air freshener is commonly used by drug traffickers to mask the 

odor of a substance that they may be transporting in the vehicle.”
4

Three minutes and 44 seconds into the body camera 

footage of the traffic stop, Cheever returned to his patrol car

with OchoaGomez’s documents. Approximately two minutes 

later, he initiated a check of the vehicle registration. A Bell 

Gardens police officer then arrived as standby, but did not 

interact with OchoaGomez. Approximately a minute after 

Cheever had requested the registration check, he also requested 

a check on OchoaGomez’s license. Approximately a minute after 

that—and approximately eight minutes and 30 seconds into the 

traffic stop—Cheever also requested a check for any outstanding 

warrants. Cheever later testified he requested the warrant check 

because it is what he “normally [does] in a traffic stop.” While in 

the car, Cheever filled out a consent to search form. He did not 

write a traffic citation at that time, because he “inten[ded] to 

wait for the completion of the warrant check before [he] started 

writing anybody a ticket.”

Around three minutes after he requested the warrant 

check—and approximately 11 minutes and 20 seconds into the 

traffic stop—Cheever returned to OchoaGomez’s car, directed him 

to exit, and frisked him. He then led OchoaGomez back toward 

his patrol car and asked him what he was doing in Bell Gardens, 

if he had any firearms, and whether he was on probation. 

OchoaGomez said he had been on probation for a gun charge 

when he was younger. Cheever then asked OchoaGomez if he 

would consent to a search of his vehicle with the police dog. 

OchoaGomez replied, “whatever . . . go ahead.” This occurred 

approximately 12 minutes and 15 seconds into the stop, at which 

point Cheever “was still waiting for the warrant check to return.” 

Cheever then confirmed OchoaGomez could read and understand 

English, and asked him to review the consent form, and stated “if 
5

you have any [sic] understanding you can ask me some

questions.” OchoaGomez indicated that he had read and 

understood the form, but refused to sign. Cheever wrote “

‘declined to sign the consent form’ ” across the form.

Cheever then retrieved his dog from the patrol car and 

began an exterior sniff of the car. He walked the dog around the 

car, and the dog looked in the open right front window and sat 

down. Based on the dog’s training and Cheever’s experience with 

him, Cheever understood sitting to mean the dog detected the 

presence of drugs. At this point—approximately 15 minutes into 

the traffic stop and approximately six and a half minutes after 

Cheever had asked dispatch to check for outstanding warrants—

the body camera footage does not reflect that Cheever had 

received a response to the warrant check.

Cheever let the dog into the interior of the car, then 

opened the trunk. Inside the trunk, Cheever found a duffel 

bag, which contained twenty packages of what appeared to be 

methamphetamine. Cheever ultimately arrested OchoaGomez. 

The body camera footage does not reflect a response to Cheever’s 

request for a warrant check. 

B. Preliminary Hearing and Motion to Suppress 

OchoaGomez moved to suppress all physical evidence 

obtained as a result of the traffic stop, pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1538.5. The court heard the motion at the preliminary 

hearing, during which Cheever testified and the court watched 

the body camera footage of the traffic stop. No other evidence 

was offered regarding the motion to suppress. 

The court denied the motion. The court found Cheever’s 

testimony credible and more specifically stated it believed 

Cheever’s testimony that he was “still waiting for the return of 
6

the warrant check” approximately 15 minutes into the traffic 

stop when the police dog alerted Cheever to the presence of

drugs. The court concluded Cheever had conducted the dog 

sniff within the time reasonably necessary to complete the 

initial purpose of Cheever’s traffic stop, and thus that the dog 

sniff had not prolonged the stop in a manner that would violate 

OchoaGomez’s federal constitutional rights.

Following the preliminary hearing, OchoaGomez was 

charged with possession for sale of a controlled substance in 

violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378 (count 1), 

and sale/offer to sell/transportation of a controlled substance in 

violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a) 

(count 2). The information further alleged that, as to both 

counts, the substance containing methamphetamine exceeded 

10 kilograms within the meaning of Health and Safety Code 

section 11370.4, subdivision (b)(3). The information also alleged 

a juvenile adjudication (see Pen. Code, § 211) as a strike under 

California’s Three Strikes law.

C. Plea Agreement and Sentencing 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, OchoaGomez waived his 

right to a jury trial, pleaded guilty to count 1, and admitted to 

having a prior juvenile adjudication. Also pursuant to the plea 

agreement, the second count in the information was dismissed.

The court sentenced appellant to a total of six years in state 

prison, calculated as follows: the middle term of three years for 

the single count, doubled to six years for the strike prior.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal based on the denial 

of his motion to suppress evidence and the sentence imposed by 

the trial court.
7

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

OchoaGomez first challenges the court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress. In reviewing the denial of a motion to 

suppress, we must accept all facts in favor of the ruling, including 

all reasonable inferences and deductions, if supported by 

substantial evidence. (People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 

1222, 1227.) “[T]he ‘ “reasonableness in all the circumstances 

of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal 

security” ’ is the guiding principle.” (People v. Grant (1990) 217 

Cal.App.3d 1451, 1458.)

1. Applicable law

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

ensures the right of all “people to be secure in their persons . . . 

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th

Amend.) Temporary detention of individuals during the stop 

of an automobile by the police constitutes a seizure of persons 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Whren v. 

United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809−810.) “[T]he tolerable 

duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is 

determined by the [stop’s] ‘mission[,]’ ” which is “to address the 

traffic violation that warranted the stop, [citation] and attend to

related safety concerns, [citations] . . . Authority for the seizure 

thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or 

reasonably should have been—completed.” (Rodriguez, supra, 

575 U.S. at p. 354.) In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme 

Court expressly identified tasks that serve the mission of a traffic 

stop as follows: “Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic 

ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to
8

[the traffic] stop.’ [Citation.] Typically such inquiries involve 

checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are 

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 

automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” (Id. at p. 355.) 

The Supreme Court explained that such checks are included 

in the scope of an officer’s mission in conducting a traffic stop

because they “serve the same objective as enforcement of the 

traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated 

safely and responsibly,” given that, for example, “[a] ‘warrant 

check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent 

traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic 

offenses.’ ” (Ibid.) Rodriguez also ties warrant checks to 

officer safety concerns during traffic stops by citing authority 

it describes as “recognizing [the] officer safety justification 

for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks.” (Id. at 

p. 356, citing United States v. Holt (10th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 

1215, 1221-1222.) 

Under these principles, the scope or duration of a traffic 

stop “ ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket 

for the [traffic] violation” leading to the stop (Rodriguez, supra, 

575 U.S. at pp. 350–351), a mission that includes the tasks 

of checking the driver’s license, registration, and insurance,

checking for outstanding warrants, and those minimally 

burdensome measures necessary to assure the officer’s safety. 

(Id. at p. 355; see People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 

1087−1088 (Vera) [officer conducting traffic stop “obtained 

[defendant]’s identification documents from his car and 

performed a warrant check, both of which were within the 

mission” of the stop].) 
9

Rodriguez does not foreclose the police from performing 

investigative efforts during a traffic stop that are unrelated to 

the stop’s mission, however. (See Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. 

at pp. 355−356.) Rather, “[a]n officer . . . may conduct certain 

unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop” as 

long as the officer does “not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, 

absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify 

detaining an individual.” (Id. at p. 355.) For example, a dog sniff 

of a vehicle to detect the presence of drugs is not related to the 

mission of any traffic stop, but “[d]uring the execution of a lawful 

traffic stop, the police may have a trained dog sniff the driver’s 

vehicle . . . without implicating the Fourth Amendment,” as long 

as the traffic stop is not “ ‘prolonged’ by the dog sniff ‘beyond the 

time reasonably required’ to complete the mission of the traffic 

stop.” (Vera, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1085–1086.) 

2. Cheever did not prolong the traffic stop 

beyond the time reasonably necessary

to complete its mission, as Rodriguez

defines it

OchoaGomez argues that the traffic stop at issue here 

exceeded the reasonable amount of time necessary for Cheever 

to complete the mission of the traffic stop, because (1) Cheever 

prolonged the stop beyond the amount of time reasonably 

necessary to complete its mission by seeking consent to search 

the vehicle and performing an external dog sniff of the vehicle, 

and (2) Cheever did not diligently pursue the mission of the stop. 

We disagree. 

The trial court found Cheever was still waiting for the 

results of the warrant check when he prepared the consent 

form, when he asked OchoaGomez questions unrelated to the 
10

traffic stop mission, and when he had his dog sniff the outside 

of the vehicle. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise; to 

the contrary, the body camera footage and Cheever’s testimony, 

which the court deemed credible, constitute substantial evidence 

to support the court’s finding. Because, under Rodriguez, 

performing a warrant check is within the proper scope of an 

officer’s mission in conducting a traffic stop, Cheever did not 

prolong the stop by conducting additional investigative activities 

while still waiting for the results of that search to return—

even absent reasonable suspicion to separately justify those 

investigative activities. (See Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355; 

Vera, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088−1089 [performing a dog 

sniff of defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop did not violate 

Fourth Amendment under Rodriguez because the dog alerted 

when “[t]he mission of the traffic stop was in fact not finished” 

and before it “reasonably should have been” finished, italics 

omitted].) 

OchoaGomez argues that running warrant checks is only 

sometimes within the proper scope of a traffic stop, relying on 

the Supreme Court’s use of the word “typically” to introduce 

the list of ancillary efforts involved in such a stop. (Rodriguez, 

supra, 575 U.S. at p. 355 [“[A]n officer’s mission includes 

‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ [Citation.] 

Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, 

determining whether there are outstanding warrants against 

the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and 

proof of insurance,” italics added.].) Under OchoaGomez’s 

interpretation, however, checking to assure a motorist has 

a valid driver’s license would also only sometimes be within 

the scope of a traffic stop, and—perhaps more troubling—the 
11

Supreme Court’s detailed discussion of a traffic stop’s mission

in Rodriguez would provide no guidance as to when this is

the case. OchoaGomez’s proposed interpretation of Rodriguez

is also inconsistent with the opinion’s clear statement that 

warrant checks serve the purpose of a traffic stop (ensuring 

compliance with the Vehicle Code by checking for outstanding 

traffic violations), as well as its citation to the proposition that 

warrant checks promote officer safety during a traffic stop. 

(Id. at pp. 355−356.) We decline to adopt OchoaGomez’s forced 

interpretation of Rodriguez. 

In arguing to the contrary, OchoaGomez argues that 

Rodriguez’s discussion of an officer needing to be diligent in

pursuing the mission of a traffic stop (Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. 

at p. 357), “breathes new life in[to] a line of pre-Rodriguez 

California cases,” which hold that all warrant checks reflect 

investigative activity unrelated to the mission of a traffic stop. 

(See People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 585−587

(McGaughran); People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 

498 [citing McGaughran for the proposition that “investigative 

activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop, including 

warrant checks, are permissible as long as they do not prolong 

the stop”]; see, e.g., People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 

234, 238 [same]; People v. Castaneda, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1228 [same].) But this idea is inherently inconsistent 

with Rodriguez’s express conclusion that warrant checks are 

“typical[ ]” components of a traffic stop. (Rodriguez, supra, at 

p. 355.) Post-Rodriguez, these cases are thus of no assistance 

to OchoaGomez in arguing a warrant search is not part of the 

mission of a traffic stop.
12

We must also consider, however, whether Cheever was

diligent in pursuing the mission of the traffic stop, such that the

stop did not last longer than the amount of time in which the

mission “reasonably should have been” completed. (Rodriguez, 

supra, 575 U.S. at p. 354; see Vera, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1089 [that dog sniff occurred before mission of traffic stop 

completed does not end Fourth Amendment inquiry under 

Rodriguez].) OchoaGomez argues Cheever was not diligent, 

because Cheever never even started writing a citation during 

the approximately 15 minutes before the dog alerted.

1 But 

the court credited Cheever’s testimony that he did not want to 

prepare a citation until he had confirmed whether OchoaGomez 

had any outstanding warrants. We must defer to the trial 

court on the credibility of this uncontradicted testimony. (See 

People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596–597). In any event, 

nothing in the record suggests Cheever’s stated reason for not 

immediately writing a citation was disingenuous. OchoaGomez 

does not cite any authority suggesting that, as a general rule,

waiting for the results of a warrant check before writing a 

citation reflects a lack of diligence in pursuing the mission of a 

traffic stop. Nor does OchoaGomez cite any authority suggesting 

that the amount of time Cheever waited for the results of the 

warrant check was so long that it might render his decision not 

to start writing the ticket unreasonable.

1 OchoaGomez does not dispute that, once the dog alerted 

Cheever to the possible presence of drugs in the vehicle, Cheever 

had reasonable suspicion to justify further detention. (See Vera,

supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089 [“[o]nce the dog alerted to the 

vehicle, there was independent reasonable suspicion for [the 

officer] to prolong [defendant’s] detention to search for drugs”].)
13

OchoaGomez repeatedly notes that the results of the

warrant check “never produced an answer at all,” apparently

implying that this somehow renders the warrant search 

pretextual. But it makes sense that law enforcement’s focus 

shifted away from the warrant search when Cheever found a 

large quantity of what appeared to be methamphetamine and 

arrested OchoaGomez. Thus, the fact that no response to the 

warrant check is reflected in the record—at least absent some 

other indication that the warrant search request was pretextual

or that Cheever facilitated such lack of results—does not assist 

OchoaGomez’s arguments. 

Finally, the overall time of the traffic stop—approximately 

15 minutes—is not, absent some other indication of delay or

improper motive, inherently too long for a diligent officer to 

complete the mission of explaining a traffic violation, obtaining 

an individual’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, 

running checks on these documents as well as a check for 

outstanding warrants, and executing a citation, all while 

taking reasonable measures to maintain the officer’s safety. 

3. Cheever did not exceed the permissible 

scope of the traffic stop by ordering 

OchoaGomez to exit the car

As noted, minimally burdensome measures that may be 

necessary to assure the officer’s safety in pursuing the mission 

of a traffic stop, such as requesting the individual to exit 

the vehicle, are also within the scope of an officer’s mission. 

(Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at pp. 350–351; see Vera, supra, 

28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088.) The United States Supreme Court 

has contrasted such precautions taken to complete the traffic 

stop safely with “safety precautions taken in order to facilitate” 
14

“[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes,” noting the 

latter variety “detours from th[e] mission [of the traffic stop].” 

(Rodriguez, supra, at p. 356.) In Rodriguez, for example, the 

officer ordered the defendant to exit his car in order to facilitate 

the dog sniff the court ultimately concluded violated the Fourth 

Amendment. OchoaGomez argues this case presents a similar 

situation. But in Rodriguez, the Fourth Amendment violation 

stemmed from the fact that these efforts investigating other 

crimes (the exit order and dog sniff) prolonged the traffic stop 

beyond the amount of time necessary to complete the mission 

of the traffic stop (see id. at pp. 356−357); indeed, in Rodriguez, 

the officer had already issued the citation when he ordered the 

defendant to exit the car and performed the dog sniff. (Id. at 

p. 352.) Here, by contrast, even if Cheever ordered OchoaGomez 

out of the vehicle purely to facilitate the dog sniff, this occurred 

before Cheever had completed the mission of the traffic stop

and within an amount of time reasonably necessary to complete 

the mission of the traffic stop. (See Discussion ante, part A.2.) 

It thus does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment under 

Rodriguez. (See Vera, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088−1089.)

B. Use of Prior Juvenile Adjudication as a Strike 

at Sentencing 

OchoaGomez also challenges the court’s sentencing order. 

He argues that consideration of his prior juvenile adjudication 

as a strike violated his right to a jury trial, because juvenile

adjudications are not made by a jury. OchoaGomez’s argument 

presents a purely legal issue, which we review de novo. (See 

People v. Brooks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 932, 941.)

The California Supreme Court in Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th 

1007, held that juvenile adjudications may be used as strikes
15

“even though there was no right to a jury trial in the juvenile 

proceeding.” (Id. at p. 1010.) The court rejected the defendant’s 

claim that Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi)

barred the use of a juvenile adjudication as a strike. Apprendi

held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490, italics added.) In Nguyen, 

the literal rule of Apprendi had not been violated, and the 

defendant had waived his right (under California law) to a 

jury determination on the question of whether he had suffered 

the prior juvenile adjudication.

2 (Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th 

at p. 1015.) Nevertheless, the defendant claimed—as does 

OchoaGomez in the instant appeal—that “the lack of a jury-trial

right in the prior juvenile proceeding precludes all use of the 

resulting adjudication to enhance the maximum sentence for his 

current offense.” (Id. at p. 1016.) The California Supreme Court

disagreed, explaining that “Apprendi and its progeny concern an 

adult’s right to jury findings, in the adult case, of all previously 

unadjudicated facts that bear upon the maximum sentence 

for the adult offense.” (Id. at p. 1024.) Since the facts of the 

2 California law provides that “[w]henever, for purposes 

of enhancing the sentence on current charges, the prosecution 

alleges a prior conviction sustained by the defendant, and the 

defendant disputes the allegation, the question whether he or she 

‘has suffered’ the prior conviction must, unless a jury is waived, 

be submitted to a jury in the current proceeding. (§§ 1025, 

subds.(a), (b), 1158.) This jury-trial requirement would extend, 

of course, to a prior juvenile adjudication included within the 

Three Strikes law’s definition of a ‘prior felony conviction.’ ” 

(Nguyen, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1015.)
16

adult defendant’s juvenile offense in Nguyen had been previously 

adjudicated in the prior juvenile proceedings, the use of the 

juvenile adjudication as a strike did not violate the defendant’s 

Sixth Amendment rights. (Ibid.)

OchoaGomez argues that Nguyen has been fatally 

undermined by the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent 

decisions in Descamps, supra, 570 U.S. 254, and Mathis, supra,

136 S.Ct. 2243, as well as the California Supreme Court’s 

subsequent decision in Gallardo, supra, 4 Cal.5th 120.

Division Two of this court rejected these exact arguments 

in People v. Romero (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 381, 389 (Romero), 

review denied Apr. 15, 2020, S260356, cert. denied sub nom.,

Romero v. California (2020) 141 S.Ct. 633. Romero explained 

that Gallardo, Descamps and Mathis “do nothing to undermine 

the premise of . . . Nguyen because they did not concern the 

possibility of using the fact that a defendant incurred a juvenile 

adjudication to enhance a defendant’s sentence for a subsequent 

crime. Instead, those cases strictly prohibited factfinding by the 

sentencing court beyond the fact of a prior conviction.” (Romero, 

supra, at p. 389, italics added.) We agree with our colleagues in 

Division Two and reject OchoaGomez’s arguments for this same 

reason.
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.