1 Filed 5/2/13 In re Junior N. CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JUNIOR N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JUNIOR N., Defendant and Appellant. A136155
(San Franci sco City & County Super. Ct. No. JW10-6554)

The juvenile court adjudged defendant a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). After a cont ested restitution hearing, the court ordered defendant to pay victim restitu tion in the amount of $3,246.80. Defendant
contends the lower court abused its discre tion in issuing the re stitution order because
insufficient evidence in the r ecord supports this amount. We affirm the lower court’s
order. BACKGROUND On August 1, 2011 , a supplemental wardship petiti on (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) was filed alleging defendant comm itted assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (P en. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), a nd that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on another duri ng the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.7). In count 2, the petition alleged that defendant ma de criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422).2 The underlying offense, as set forth in the probation report, stated that on July 1, 2011, the mother of Jermaine B. (the vic tim’s mother) heard yelling outside her home and noticed that her 14-year-old son was on the ground. He was being kicked and punched by five youths, including defendant. A passe rby rescued Jermaine and people detained the suspects. At a lineup, the victim’s mother identifie d defendant as the primary aggressor in the assault of her son. The police reports described Jermaine as slipping in and out of consciousness after the assault. He was diagnosed with a fractur ed nose and a fractured orbital bone below his left eye. He was thro wing up uncontrollably during disc harge from the hospital and it
was discovered that he had a blood clot be hind his left eye that had ruptured. On February 15, 2012, defe ndant admitted the allegation that he committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bod ily injury and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. The criminal threat a llegation was dismissed. The probation officer submitted a claim for restitution on Apr il 18, 2012. The
mother of the victim submitted a handwritten cl aim that indicated sh e paid out-of-pocket
medical bills in the amount of $8,067.62, she paid an ey e doctor bill of $400, and she spent $50 for nasal spray and Visine. She also claimed that she lost $1,500 for missing a
month of work to care for her son. Additiona lly, she requested $300 in gas expenses for transporting her son to his ma ny medical appointments. An “emergency rebill” from St. Luke’s Hosp ital dated February 26, 2012, set forth charges in the amount of $8,067.62, and indicated a balance of zero due. The bill provided that the charge of $8,067.62 cons isted of $61.62 for “NO HCPCS,” $6,259 for “CT SCAN/HEAD,” and $1,747 for “Emergency Room.” This bill did not indicate that there had been any payments but clearly stated that a balance of zero was due.
Defendant’s counsel subm itted another “emergency rebill” from St. Luke’s Hospital, dated April 26, 2012. This bill lis ted total charges in th e amount of $8,067.62, consisting of $61.62 for “NO HCPCS,” $6,259 for “CT SCAN/HEAD,” and $1,747 for “Emergency Room.” The b ill indicated that the hospita l had received payment of $410.59, and that there was an adjustment to deduct $7,657. 03 for a balance of zero due.3 The document named the San Francisco Health Plan as the insuran ce company and stated next to the payment of $410.59, “Payment SFHP Hill PHYS.” The prosecution argued that St. Luke’s Hosp ital was paid a total of $646.80. It submitted a letter dated April 3, 2012, fro m the San Francisco Health Plan, which attached its record indicating that the San Francisco Health Plan had paid $236.21 to St. Luke’s Hospital on July 1, 2 011, for a “CT scan” of Jermai ne’s “head/brain” in the “Emerg[ency] Room Hospital.” The prosecu tion argued that the total medical expenses paid to St. Luke’s Hospital was the $236.21 on the San Francisco Health Plan’s document plus the $410.59 indicated as paid on the bill from St. Luke ’s Hospital for a total of $646.80. The juvenile court held the contested hearing on restitution on July 11, 2012. Defense counsel argued that the total medical restitution should be $410.59, the sum St. Luke’s Hospital reported it was paid on the “rebill” dated April 26, 2012. Defense counsel argued that $236.21 wa s paid by the San Francisco Health Plan and the balance of $174.38 was paid by Medi-Cal. The prosecution countered that the cour t should award a total of $1,236.80 in medical expenses. This sum included $600 for eye care and medical supplies, plus the $236.21 paid by the San Francisco Health Plan, and the $410.59 paid to St. Luke’s Hospital. The prosecution insi sted that the $236.21 was “not subsumed in the $410.59” and represented a se parate amount. At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court found that the prosecution’s evidence supported a restitution award of $1,246.80 for medical costs. The court explained that the severity of the injuries and the numer ous hospital visits and necessary treatments made this “an extremely reasonable amount.” The court added: “So this is a reasonable amount in addition to supporting documents th at have been provided by the district attorney.” This sum include d $236.21 paid by the San Fr ancisco Health Plan, $410.59 paid to St. Luke’s Hospital, $400 for services at Premier Eye Care, and $200 for medical supplies. The court also aw arded Jermaine’s mother $1,50 0 in lost income, $300 in4 transportation costs, and $200 for ongoing medical costs. Thus, the court ordered defendant to pay victim restitution of $3,246.80. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is th at the $3,242.86 vic tim restitution award should be reduced by $236.21 and thus the award should be $3, 006.65. He maintains that
insufficient evidence supports a finding that St. Luke ’s Hospital received $646.80 in payment and that the record demonstr ates that it received only $410.59. “In 1982, by initiative, the voters of Ca lifornia added a provision to the state Constitution establishing a new c onstitutional right: the right of every crime victim to obtain restitution from the perpetrator of the crime for lo sses suffered.” ( People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 956.) This constitutional provision directed the Legislature to enact implementing legislation. ( Ibid. ) Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 is one of the implementing statutes. 1 ( In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App. 4th 1580, 1587.) Section 730.6 “governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602.” ( In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131.) When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the juvenile court must order
restitution to reimburse a vi ctim for “any eco nomic loss” resulting from the minor’s conduct bringing him within the court’s jurisdiction. (§ 73 0.6, subd. (a)(1).) Economic loss includes medical expenses. (§ 730.6, subd. (h)(2).) In de termining the amount of the victim’s economic loss, subdivision (h) of sec tion 730.6 declares that restitution “shall be imposed in the amount of the losse s, as determined. . . . A res titution order . . . shall be of
a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined
economic losses incurred as the result of the minor’s conduct . . . .” Courts have broad power to impose cond itions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety. ( In re I.M. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 11 95, 1208-1209.) In a juvenile case, the purposes of ordering victim restitution are to rehabilitate the defendant,

1 All further unspecified code sections re fer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.5 deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole through compensation for his or her economic losses. ( In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.) “[T]he standard of proof at a restituti on hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” ( People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 469.) A res titution order will not be overtu rned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. ( In re T.C. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) When there is a
factual and rational basis for the restitution or dered, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court. ( In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App. 4th 1128, 1132.) “[T]he court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to ma ke the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation. In doing so ‘ “ ‘[s ]entencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider and
the source from whence it comes.’ . . .” . . . [¶] This is so because a hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other ph ases of a criminal prosecution.’ ” ( In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391-1392, fns. omitted.) Thus, the restitution order must be in an am ount sufficient to reimburse the victim fully
for economic losses in curred as a result of the juvenile’s criminal conduct without regard to potential reimbursement to the victim fro m sources distinct and independent of the defendant ( People v. Bernal (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 155, 166), such as payment by the victim’s private insurance carrier ( In re Brittany L., at p. 1389) or by Medi-Cal ( People v.
Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1272). Defendant argues that the record is de void of any evidence to support a finding that St. Luke’s Hospital received $646.80. He maintains that the evidence shows that it received no more than $410.59. Courts, accord ing to defendant, have consistently held
that restitution for medical bills must be the amount accepted by the provider, not the amount billed. (See In re Eric S. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 15 60, 1563-1566 [modified
restitution order to include as the cost of medical services the amount the hospital was willing to accept rather than the total amount billed]; People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1539 [amount of restitution cannot exceed the amount the hospital6 would accept as full payment for medical services to victim]; People v. Millard (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 7, 27-29 [restitu tion for medical expenses shoul d be limited to expenses actually paid by the victim or others on the victim’s behalf]; People v. Bergin (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1169- 1172 [restitution award should be limited to amounts paid by medical insurer, rather than the amou nts billed by the medical providers]; In re Anthony
M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017 [reversed restitution of mo re than $1 million and
limited the amount ordered to the sums paid by Medi-Cal].) In the cases cited by defendant, there was no dispute regarding the actual medical bills paid. Rather, the issu e was whether the restitution or der should be limited to the medical expenses actually paid to prevent a windfall to the victim. Here, the juvenile court issued an or der based on what it determined was the amount paid to St. Luke’s Hospital. The c ourt clearly did not base the order on the amount charged, as that amount exceeded $8 ,000. After examining the documents and hearing argument, the court rejected defend ant’s argument that the amount paid to St. Luke’s Hospital was $410.50 rather than $646.80. Defendant produced the reb ill from St. Luke’s Hospital stating that $410.59 had been paid and there was a bala nce of zero remaining. The bill indicated that the total charges were $8,067.62, the adjustments we re minus $7,657.03, and the payment was minus $410.59, leaving the amount due as zero. The rebill further st ated that the total “AR Adjustments and Payments” were $8,06 7.62. Defendant maintains that this document shows that the $8,067 .62 was adjusted and that St. Luke’s Hospital accepted a settlement offer for payment of $410.59. He asserts that the prosecution presented no
evidence to refute that a settlement occurred. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the reco rd does not demonstrate that St. Luke’s Hospital accepted $410.59 as full payment for the services the victim received. There is no requirement “that the victim must s upply a sworn proof of loss or detailed documentation of costs and expenses.” ( In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 547, fn. 2.) Here, the prosecution met its burden of presen ting prima facie eviden ce of payments for emergency care costs for the to tal of $646.80 when it subm itted St. Luke’s Hospital bill7 indicating $410.59 had been paid and th e San Francisco Health Plan document establishing that it paid $236.21. The burden then shifted to defendant to show that St. Luke’s Hospital received the su m of $410.59, and no more.
Defendant’s sole evidence consisted of the bills from St. Luke’s Hospital and these bills did not prove that the hospital received only $410.59. The bill from St. Luke’s Hospital dated February 26, 2012, indicate d total medical expenses in the sum of $8,067.62. This bill had no indication that a payment was made but stated that the amount due was zero. Thus, the fact that th e bill dated April 26, 2 012, also indicated a balance of zero after receiving a payment of $410.59, did no t establish that no further payments or adjustments were to be made to the account. The amount of $410.59 clearly
did not match the amount the San Francisco He alth Plan reported paying in its document submitted on April 3, 2012. Thus, it is unclear what entities paid the $410.59 and
whether this sum excluded or included the $236,21 paid by the Sa n Francisco Health Plan. Defendant argued in the juvenile cour t that Medi-Cal paid the balance of $174.38, but presented no eviden ce to support this assertion. De fendant also failed to produce any settlement agreement establishing that St. Luke’s Hospital acce pted $410.59, and no more, as full payment fo r the victim’s care. We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
medical cost incurred included the amount of $410.59, reflected in the bill from St. Luke’s Hospital, plus the amount of $236. 21, set forth in the doc ument submitted by the
San Francisco Health Plan. A ccordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defe ndant to pay victim restitu tion of $3,246.80.8 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Lambden, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Kline, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Haerle, J.