Cle wis v . S tate , 922 S.W .2d 126 (1996). 1 W ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochra n, J ., dissenting)
. 2 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
N O . P D - 0210- 09

K EL V I N K I A N TA BR O O K S , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N A PPE LL A N T’ S A N D STA TE ’ S PET I TI ON S FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE TENTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

M CLENNAN CO UNTY C OCHR AN , J ., f

i l e d a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h W OMACK , J. , j oi ne d.

OP I NI ON I adher e t o m yvi ew t hatt he 1996 j udi ci al cr eat i on of t he “ C lew is fac t ual

- s uffi ci ency 1

r evi ew w as a w el l

- i nt ent i oned but ul t i m at el y unw or kabl e effor t t o i ncorpor at e ci vi l s t andar ds

o f re v ie w o n e le m e n ts o f

a c ri m e th a t m u s t b e p ro v e n b e y o n d a re a s o n a b le d o u b t.” 2Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page2

J ac k so n v . V irgini a , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 3 Broo k s v . S tate , N o . 1 0
- 0 7
- 0 0 3 0 9
- CR , 2 0 0 8 T e x. Ap p . L E X I S 7 3 6 4 at * 1 2 ( T e x. 4 Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 8) . T he ma jority op ini on in t he c ourt of a pp e a ls n ote d th e se a dd iti on a l f a c ts: (1 ) bo th t

he ba gof mari hu ana

and theba gof

c oc a inewe repa c ka g e d in thesame mann e r; (2) [appellant] was not in poss ession of any drugpara

pherna lia for e ither use or sale; (3) [the State’s DE A expert] testi fied that user s ty pically car ry some ty pe of he ating e le me nt, su c h a s a

c ra c k p ipe , b ut d e a le rs do no t; (4 ) at th e tim e of

his arr e st, [ap pe lla

nt] w a s n ot u

nd e r t he inf lue nc e of a na rc oti c ; (5) [appellant] has a previous convic tion for possession with intent to deliver; (6 ) [ap pe lla

nt] atte mpt e d to e va de c a ptu reand dis c ard e d c ontr a

ba nd in t he pr oc e ss; and (7) [appellant] was found in possession of three dif fer ent ty pes of dr ug s. I
. A . T h e E v id e n c e in T h is C a se E it h er Is o r Is N o t L eg a ll y S u ffi cien t to S u p p o rt a C onv i c t i on. T he evi dence i n t hi s cas e i s ei t her s uffi ci ent t o s uppor t appel l ant ’ s convi ct i on under t he cons t i t ut i onal l y - m andat ed Jack s on s ta n d a rd o r it is n o t. It c a n n o t b e “ s e m i- s u f f ic ie n t.” 3 Ap p e l l a n t wa s c h a r g e d wi t h p o s s e s s i o n o f c o c a i n e wi t h t h e i n t e n t t o d i s t r i b u t e i t
. At t r i al , he deni ed t hat t he baggi e cont ai ni ng 4. 72 gr ams of coca i ne and fi ve ec s t acypi l l s found i n t he pool t able p o ck et re t ur n w as hi s , al t hough he admi t t ed ow ner s hi p of t he baggi e of

m ar i j uana t hathe t os s ed undert hatpool t abl e. O n appea l , he ar gued t hat t he evi dence w as bot h l egal l yand fa ct ual l yi ns uffi ci ent t o pr ove t hat he pos s es s ed t he cocai ne w i t h t he i nt ent to d ist ri b u te i t. T h e c o u rt o f a p p ea ls fo u n d that the ev iden ce w as lega ll y su ff ici en t t o su p p o rt
a f in d in g , b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t, th a t ap p e llan t p o ss e ss e d th e c o c a in e w ith th e in ten t to di s t r i but e i t
. I n doi ng s o, i t r el i ed on a l i s t of sev en fac t s , bey ond t he mer e amount of

c o c a in e , th a t su p p o rte d th e ju ry ’s g u ilt yv e rd ict. B u t th e n , in f in d in g th e e v id e n c e f

a c tu a lly 4Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page3

Id. The majority

did not analy

ze the probative va lue of these fac ts to establish appellant’s intent or discuss what leg itimate infere nces, if a ny , might be dr awn f

rom them. It did not ex plain why the evidenc e wa s leg ally

sufficie nt when it announce d its conclusion. Id. at* 1 3
. C h i ef

J u s t i ce Gr ay

d i s s en t ed , n o t i n g th atth e m aj o ri ty fa i l edt o ac kn o wl ed ge 5 that there was “ more e vidence of intent to deliver than me rely the amount of c ocaine .” Id. at *19 (Gra y , C. J., d iss e nti ng ). Hea lso no te d th at th e ma jority did no t “ de ta il the e vid e nc e and c le arl y state why the evidenc e that is leg ally sufficie nt is neverthele ss fac tually insufficient.” Id. at *20. Gu y ton v . S tate , No. 10-07-00070- CR, 2009 Tex . App. L EXI S 839 (Tex. App.—W aco, 6 Feb. 6, 2009, pet. re f’d) (not designated f or publication). In Guyton , th e c ourt of a pp e a ls orig ina lly re ve rs e d th e c onvic tio n d ue to f a c tua l in su ff

ic ie nc y , b ut, on c e theState fi le d a PDR , it rec onsidered a

nd held that the evide nce w as both leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the defe ndant’s convic tion for possession of .40 grams of c ocaine with the intent to distribute it. Id. at *9-13. i ns uffi ci ent t o s uppor t a fi ndi ng of i nt ent t o di s t r i but e, t he maj or i t ys et out a t ot al l ydi ffe r ent l i s t of fa ct s t hatt he r ecor d di d not s how : T her e w as no evi dence t hat ( 1) appel l ant w as i n a hi gh cr i m e ar ea; ( 2) t he coc ai ne w as packa ged es peci al l yfor s al e; ( 3) he w as car r y i ng a l ar ge amount of ca s h; or ( 4) he had drug- deal i ng par apher nal i a on hi m . T he cour t us ed pos i t i ve 5 i nfer ence s for l egal s uffi ci ency( w hat t he evi dence di d s how ) and t hen nega t i ve i nfer ence s fo r fa ctua l suf

ficien cy (w h at t h e e v iden ce d id n o t sho w ). I agr ee t hatt hi s i s a cl os e ca l l on l egal s ufficiency , but I do not s ee how “mi s s i ng” fac t s can t r ans for m t he purpor t edl ylega ll y suffi ci ent evi dence i nt o fac t ual l yi ns uffi ci ent evi dence
. T her e i s no hi gher s t andar d t han “p roo f b ey ond a r eas onabl e doubt
. ” I f t he evi dence m eet s t hat s t andar d, how can i t fal l s hor t us i ng a l ow er s t andar d? I ndeed, t he W aco C our t of A ppeal s m ay have had s econd t hought s i t s el f about t hi s ques t i on becau se it hel d, in a su b se q u e n t (b u t alm o s t id e n tica l) c a se , tha t th e e v id e n c e w a s f a c tu a llya n d leg a lly

s uffi ci ent
. I f not hi ng el s e, t hes e t w o cas es demonst r at e t hat t he C lew is fac t ual s uffi ci ency

6Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page4

See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 426 (Cochr an, J., di ssenting)
. 7 State’s Petition for Discre tionary Review at 9. 8 Appellant’s Petition for Discr etionary Review at 6. Appellant re lies on sever al 9 ana log ou s f

e de ra l c a se s in

wh ic h th e c ourt s h e ld t

hat th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o su pp or t a fi nd ingof

“ int e nt t o d istribute ” a

c ontr oll e d s ub sta

nc e that th e de fe nd ant a dmi tte dly possessed. In these c ases, the inf ere nce of intent to distribute wa s not a rea sonable one g iven the paucity of circ umstantial evidence
. As appe llant notes, the leg al suffic iency standard of

revie w is that require d by the United States Consti tution as set out in J ac k so n v . V irgini a . T hat sa

me sta nd ard is a pp lie d in e ve ry state and fe dera l jurisdiction in America. It applies to all criminal convictions re g ardle ss of the ty pe or degreeof crime. This application of a single , constitutionally -mandated standar d has led to the cre ation of an e normous body of “suf ficienc y of evide nce”law and pr ece dent ac ross Americ a that any jud g e or lawye r m ay

e a sil y a c c e ss a nd a pp ly to a ny g ive n c onvic tio n h e rein T e xas. It is a c oh e re nt b od

y of law. It is ob

je c tiv e and

int e lle c tua lly

ri g or ou s. It se ts o ut a

pp e llate presumptions, permissible infere nces, a nd specific criteria to use whe n assessingthe leg al sufficie ncy

of the e vidence . It does not rely upon subjective notions of “shoc king the c on sc ie nc e ” of

ind ivi du a l a

pp e llate jud g e s, striki ngthe m a s “ manif e stl y un jus t,”or se e min gjus t re v ie w h a s le d to ra n d o m , in c o n s is te n t r e s u lts , b a s e d p ri m a ri ly o n “ t h e lu c k o f th e d ra w .” 7 T h is d o c trin e is n o t b a se d o n a so u n d lo g ica l o r h isto ric a l f o u n d a tio n , an d it se rv e s o n lyto

m uddl e cr i m i nal l aw . I t s houl d be over t ur ned. B . B ot h P art i es A gree T hat t he P roper Is s ue I s L egal Suff i ci ency of

t he E vi dence. F itt in g ly , b o th a p p e llan t an d th e S tate a g re e th a t th e p ro p e r iss u e in c a se s s u c h a s th is i s w hether t he ev i den ce i s leg a lly su ff ici en t. T h e S tat e a rgu es in it s P eti ti o n fo r D iscreti o n ary R e v i e w , “ E v i d e n c e t h a t i s f a c t u a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t d u e t o i t s i n h e r e n t w e a k n e s s s h o u l d a l w a ys b e leg a llyin su f

f icie n t; eith e r th e e v id e n c e is su c h th a t a ra tio n a l ju ro r c o u ld c o n v ict u p o n it

o r it is n o t, re g a r d le ss o f th e lig h t in w h ich it i s v iew e d .” A p p e llan t “s u g g e sts th a t in th is 8

s i t uat i on ( i
. e. a ques t i on of i nt ent ) , i f t he evi dence i s fac t ual l yi ns uffi ci ent it m u st al s o be leg a lly in su f ficie n t.” T h e y a re b o th c o rre c t: T h e re is n o “ s e m i- 9Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page5

plain “wr ong .” See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 421-26. 10 s u f f i c i e n t ” s t a n d a r d o f

r e v i e w. II. A . L og i c R eq u i res a S i n gle Stand ard of Su ff i ci en cy R eview i n C ri m i n al C ases. I have a l r eadys etout m yconce r ns about t he i n tel lectual l egi t i m acy , hi s t or i cal aut hent i ci t y , and appr opr i at enes s of t he C lew is fac t ual s uffi ci encyr evi ew i n T exas . I now 10 focus onl yupon t he most i m por t ant r eas on t o over r ul e C lew is : L ogi c. T he at t empt t o i m pos e Texas ci vi l s t andar ds of a s econd- r o u n d fac t ual s uffi ci ency
r evi ew i s l ogi cal l y i ncompat i bl e w i t h t he cons t i t ut i onal l y m andat ed l egal s uffi ci encyr evi ew of cr i m i nal convi ct i ons t hatr equi r es t he St at e t o pr ove al l el ement s of a c r i m e bey ond a

re a so n a b le d o u b t. P ili n g a f a c tu a l su f

f icie n c y sta n d a rd o f re v iew th a t w a s d e v e lo p e d f o r c iv il t r i al s empl oy i ng a pr eponder ance - of- t he- evi dence s t andar d of pr oof at op a l egal s uffi ci ency
s t andar d of r evi ew t hat w as devel oped for cr i m i nal t r i al s empl oy i ng a bey ond- a- r eas onabl edoubt s t andar d of pr oof does not w or k. T hati s w hy this C our t has s o fr equent l yt i nker ed

w i t h t he C lew is f

o rm u la tio n , a n d w h yw e h a v e a lw a y s b e e n u n s u c c e s s f u l. T he C lew is d o c trin e o f re -re v iew in g th e su f f icie n c yo f

th e e v id e n c e a f

ter th e a p p e llate

cour t h a s a l r e a d yh e l d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s a t i s f i e s t h e h i g h e s t s t a n d a r d o f p r o of p o ss ib le– b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t– to d e c id e if it i s n o n e th e les s f

a c tu a llysu f

f icie n t is i nt er nal l yi ncons i s t ent
. I f t he evi dence s uffi ces t o pr ove gui l t bey ond a r eas onabl e doubt , andBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page6

4 5 7 U
. S
. 3 1 , 4 2 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ( s t at i n gth atana p p e l l at e r e v e r s a l f

o r f a c tu a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n c y, 11
“ un lik e a re ve rs a l ba se d o n in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e , d oe s n ot m e an th at a c qu itt a l w a s th e on ly proper verdic t. Instead, the a

ppellate c ourt sits as a ‘thirtee nth juror’ a nd disagree s with the jury ’s re solution of the conflictingtestimony . This differ enceof opinion no more signifies acquittal than doe s a disagree ment amongthe jurors themselve s. . . . [A] n appellate court’s disagree ment with the jurors’ we ighingof the e vidence does not requir e the spe cial def ere nce acc orded ve rdicts of a cquittal.”). Tib bs v . S tate , 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981) (re jectingits former f

actua l 12 sufficie ncy

revie w bec ause “ the conc ern on a ppeal must be whe ther, a fter a ll conflicts in the evidenc e and a ll reasona

ble infer ence s theref

rom have been r esolved in favor of the ve rdict on appea l, there is substantial, compete nt evidenceto support the verdic t and judgment. L eg al su ff ic ie nc y a lon e , a s o pp os e d to e vid e nti ary we ight, is the a

pp ro priate c on c e rn

of an a pp e llate tribunal.”) ( footnote omitted). itsu p p o rt s a ra ti o n al, rea so n ab le ve rdict, as re q u ir ed u n d er Jacks on , t hat evi dence cannot lo g ica llyb e so lac k in g in p ro b a tiv e v a lu e a s to m a k e th e ju ry ’s v e rd ict “ m a n if e stlyu n ju st” under t he vague and s ubj ect i ve ci vi l

- l aw fac t ual

- s uffi cienc ys t andar d. T o decl ar e t he

e v id e n c e f

a c tu a ll y i n s u f

f icie n t n e c e ss a rilytu rn s a n a p p e llate ju d g e , v iew in g o n lyth e c o ld

w r i t t en r ecor d, i nt o a s el f- appoi nt ed t hi r t eent h j ur or w i t h abs ol ut e vet o pow erovert he t w el ve
c iti z e n s w h o a c tu a llysa w th e w itn e ss e s, h e a rd th e e v id e n c e , an d re a c h e d a ra tio n a l,

r eas onabl e ver di ct
. T he U ni t ed St at es Supr eme C our t r ecogni zed t hi s i n Ti bbs v. F l or i da , 11

a s d id th e F lo rid a S u p re m e C o u rt w h e n it ju d icia llyjettiso n e d f a c tu a l-su f

f icie n c yre v iew in t hats ame cas e. 12 B . L e g a lly S u ffic ien t E v id e n c e in a C r im in a l T r ia l. For m or e t han 150 y ear s , T exas appel l at e cour t s r ev iew ed t he s uffi ci encyof t he evi dence i n T exas cr i m i nal cas es un der a s i ngl e s t andar d ( al t hough t he pr eci s e w or di ng
v a rie d ), tak in g in to a c c o u n t b o th th e f a c ts th a t w e re p ro v e n a t trial a n d th e law a p p lica b le toBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page7

See W atson , 204 S.W .3d at 424-26 (Coc hran, J., dissenting) (disc ussing the history of 13 appellate revie w of suff

iciency of the e vidence in Texas). Id. 14Id. at 426 (c ollectingand discussingTexas criminal ca ses from 1841 f orwa rd and 15 c on c lud ing , “ Until Cle wis i n1 9 9 6 , th i s C o urth adco n s i s t en t l y u s eda s i n gl e s t an d ar d

(a l th o u gh the pre cise phra sing va

ried) a nd revie wed the e vidence in the light most favor able to the fac tfinder, g iving great defe renc e to the jury ’s cr edibility and we ight de terminations.”). 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 16 Id. at 312-13. 17 the p arti cu lar of

fe n se. T h is C o u rt (an d the in term ed iat e c o u rt s o f a p p ea ls on ce they w ere

13 gi ven j ur i s di ct i on overt he di r ectappea l of cr i m i nal cas es i n 1981) r evi ew ed t he fa ct s pr oven i n t he l i ght m os t favor abl e t o t he ver di ct , gi vi ng gr eatdefe r ence t o t he j ur y ’ s cr edi bi l i t yand

w ei ght det er m i nat i ons . B ut w e di d not hes i t at e t o r ever s e a c onvi ct i on i f t he evi dence fai l ed to p ro v e a d e f

e n d a n t’ s g u ilt “ w ith re a s o n a b le c e rt a in ty,” o r “ b e y o n d a re a s o n a b le d o u b t.” 14 T her e w er e neve r t w o di s t i nct“s uffi ci encyof t he evi dence ” hur dl es i n T exas cr i m i nal

a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w. 15 1. The cons t i t ut i onal l y r equi r ed J acks on s t andar d. I n 1979, t he U ni t ed St at es Supr eme C our t del i ver ed i t s opi ni on i n Jack s on v. V irg in ia , and s et t he nat i onal s t andar d for r evi ew of t he s uffi ci encyof evi dence under t he

16 D ue Pr oces s C l aus e of t he fe der al cons t i t ut i on. I n al l cr i m i nal t r i al s , s t at e and f eder al , t he gover nm entm us t pr oduce “s uffi ci ent evi dence t o j us t i fy a r at i onal t r i er of t he fa ct s t o fi nd g u il t bey o n d a re aso n ab le d o u b t. ” T h e C o u rt ex p li cit lyrejected the “ n o ev iden ce ” stan d ard 17Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page8

362 U.S. 199, 199 (1960) (statingthat the “ultimate question pre sented to us is whether 18 thec ha rg e s a g a ins t pe tit ion e r w e reso tot a lly de vo id o f e vid e nti ary

su pp or t a s to re nd e r h is c onvic tio n unc on sti tut ion a l un de r t he Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of theF ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt. De c isi on of thi s q ue sti on tur ns no t on thesu ff ic ie nc y of thee vid e nc e , b ut o n whe the r t his conviction re sts upon any evidenc e at a ll.”). Jack son , 443 U.S. at 314. 19 Id. The Supreme Court expl ained that a “no evide nce”standard doe s not “protec t 20 ag ainst misapplications of the constitutional standard of r easona ble doubt” bec ause a

“no evidenc e” sta

ndard is satisfied by

a “me re modicum” of evide nce. “ But it could not seriously be argued that such a

‘modicum’ of e vidence could by itself rationally

support a convic tion beyond a re asonable doubt.” Id. at 320. Under a “no e vidence ” standa

rd, a r eviewingcourt would a ffirm the judgment if any

evidenc e supported the conviction. Se eGo lli ha r v . S tate , 46 S.W .3d 243, 2 4 6 n . 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Thompson , 362 U.S. at 199). Id. at 318 n.9. 21 of r evi ew t hati t had appl i ed ni net een y ear s ear l i eri n T h o m p so n v . L o u isv ill e . 18 I n Jack s on , t he C our t expl ai ned t hat t he Thom ps on “ n o e v id e n c e ” re v iew “ se c u re s to
an ac cu sed the m o s t e lem en tal o f d u e p roc ess righ ts: fre ed o m fro m a w h o ll yarb it rary d ep ri v ati o n o f lib e rt y [ ,]” b u t t h at st an d ard is i n ad eq u ate f o r “a q u esti o n o f e v iden ti ary 19

‘ s uffi ci ency . ’ ” I ns t ead, t he cor r ects t andar d m us t i ncorpor at e t he pr os ecut i on’ s bur den of 20 p r o o f

– b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t– in a d u e -p ro c e ss re v iew . T h e C o u rt n o ted th a t a

“‘ r eas onabl e doubt ’ has oft en bee n des cr i bed as one ‘ bas ed on r eas on w hi ch ar i s es fr om t he

ev iden ce o r l ac k o f e v iden ce . ’” 21 A r eas onabl e doubt m i ght ar i s e bec aus e t he v erd ict is m ani fes t l yagai ns t t he gr eat

w ei ght and pr eponder ance of t he cr edi bl e evi dence or beca us e t her e i s not hi ng m or e t han a

m er e s ci nt i l l a of evi dence t o s uppor t s om e el ement of t he offe ns e. B ut , of course , the

rev iew ing co u rt d o es n o t “ask it self w h ethe r it bel i eves t hat t he evi dence a t t he t r i alBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page9

Id. at 318-19 (c itation omit ted). 22 Id. at 319. 23 Id. 24 Go lli ha r v . S

tate , 46 S.W .3d 243, 246 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 25 Bu tle r v . S

tate , 769 S.W .2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en ba nc), overruled on 26 oth e r g ro un ds by Ge esa v . S

tate , 820 S.W .2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). es t abl i s hed gui l t bey ond a r eas onabl e doubt. ” R ather , i t m us t gi ve “f ul l pl ayt o t he 22

r es pons i bi l i t yof t he t r i erof fa ctfai r l yt o r es ol ve conf l i ct s i n t he t es t i m ony , t o w ei gh t he

e v id e n c e , a n d to d ra w re a s o n a b le in f e re n c e s f ro m b a s ic f

a c ts to u ltim a te f

a c ts .” T h u s , “ a ll

23 of t he ev i dence i s t o be cons i der ed i n t he l i ght m os t favor abl e t o t he pr os ecut i on” bec aus e t he

re v iew in g c o u rt m a yim p in g e u p o n “ ‘ju ry ’ d isc re tio n o n ly to th e e x ten t n e c e ss a ry to g u a ra n te e th e f

u n d a m e n ta l p ro te c tio n o f d u e p ro c e s s o f

la w .” 24 T her efor e, aft er 1979, T exas cour t s w er e pr ohi bi t ed fr om appl y i ng a “no e vi dence ” sta n d a rd o f re v iew to a leg a l-su f f icie n c yc h a llen g e b e c a u se th a t sta n d a rd a f f o rd s “ in a d e q u a te pr ot ect i o n agai ns t pot ent i al m i s appl i cat i on of t he r eas onabl e- doubt s t andar d” i n cr i m i nal

cas es . I n 1989, w e expl ai ned, “A dher ence t o t he no evi dence s t andar d i s now , and has been

25 f o r t h e l a s t d e c a d e , e x p r e s s l y f o r b i d d e n b y Jack

s on . It is no lo n g e r pe rm iss ib le to m e re ly q uot e t he Ja cks on s t andar d and t hen t o t ur n ar ound and appl yt he Thom ps on no evi dence

s t a n d a r d a s w e h a v e h i s t o r i c a l l yd o n e .” 26 2. Legals uf

f ici en cy in crim i nalcas es i s j udged by the qual i t y, nott he quant i t

y, of e v id e n c e su

p p o rtin g th e a c c u ra c

y o f th e v e rd ict. L egal s uffi ci encyof t he evi dence i s a t es t of adequac y , not m er e quant i t y . Suffi ci entBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page10

Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

1285 (5th ed. 1979). 27 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 28 Id. at 368. 29 Id. at 367-68 (quotingDorsen &Resneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juve nile Law , 30 1 F am. L . Q ua

rt e rl y No . 4 , 2 6- 27 (1 96 7) ) ( re

je c tin gthelow e r c ourt ’s su g g e sti on that th e reis o nly a “‘ tenuous diffe renc e’” betwee n the re asonable -doubt and prepondera nce sta ndards)
. evi dence i s “s uch evi dence , i n char act er , w ei ght , or amount , as w i l l l egal l yj us t i fyt he j udi ci al

o r o f f icia l ac tio n d e m a n d e d .” In c rim in a l ca se s, o n lyth a t ev id e n c e w h ich is su f f icie n t in 27 char act er , w ei ght , and amount t o j us t i fya fa ct fi nder i n concl udi ng t hat ever yel ement of t he offe ns e has been pr oven bey ond a r eas onabl e doubti s ad eq u ate to s uppor t a convi ct i on. T her e i s no hi gherbur den o f pr oof i n anyt r i al , cr i m i nal or ci vi l , and t her e i s no hi gher

s t a n d a r d o f

a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w t h a n t h e s t a n d a r d m a n d a t e d b y Jack s on . A l l ci vi l bur dens of p r o o f a n d s t a n d a r d s o f a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w a r e l e s s e r s t a n d a r d s t h a n t h a t m a n d a t e d b y Jack s on . I ndeed, t he Supr eme C our t expl i ci t l yhel d i n In re W in sh ip , t hat a j uveni l e coul d not

28

cons t i t ut i onal l ybe a d

jud i cat ed undert he ci vi l s t andar ds of pr oof ( or appel l at e r evi ew ) of p re p o n d e ra n c e o f

th e e v id e n c e . T h e C o u rt n o ted th a t “ ‘th e p re p o n d e ra n c e tes t is 29

s us cept i bl e t o t he mi s i nt erpr et at ion t hat i t cal l s on t he t r i erof fa ct m er el yt o per for m an abs t r actw ei ghi ng of t he evi dence i n or der t o det er m i ne w hi ch si de has pr oduced t he gr eat er quant um , w i t hout r egar d t o i t s eff ecti n convi nci ng hi s m i nd of t he t r ut h of t he pr opos i t i on
asse rt ed
. ’” 30 A s Just i ce H arl an ex plained i n h i s W in sh ip concur r ence , al t hough “t he phr as es ‘p repond erance of the evidence’ and ‘pr oo f bey on d a reasonab l e do ub t ’ ar e qu anti tativ e lyBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page11

Id. at 370 (Ha

rlan, J., concurring ). 31 Id. at3 7 1 n . 3 ( c i t i n gJ. M A G U I RE , E V I D EN CE , C OMMON S EN S E AND C OMMON LAW 180 32 (1947))
. That does not mea n, of cour se, that eve ry

fac tfinder or

ever y appellate judgeneed a gree 33 that th e e vid e nc e in a

pa rt ic ula r c a se is l e g a lly

su ff ic ie nt. As theSup re me Court e xpla ine d in Johnson v. Louisiana , 406 U.S. 356 (1972): In o ur vie w d isa gre e me nt o f t

hr e e jur or s d oe s n ot a lon e e sta bli shre a so na

ble doubt, particularly

when suc h a hea

vy majority of the jury , afte r havingconsidere d thedis se nte rs ’ v ie ws , r e ma ins c onvin c e d o f guil t. T hat r atio na l me n d isa gre e is no t in its e lf e qu iva le nt t o a

fa ilureof pr oo f b y theState , n or

do e s it ind ic ate infidelity to the rea sonable-doubt standa rd. Jury verdic ts finding guilt beyond a rea sonable doubt ar e re gularly sustained eve n though the evidenc e wa s such that the jury would have be en justified in havinga re asonable doubt, even though the i m pr eci s e, t heydo comm uni cat e t o t he fi nder of fa ct di ffe r ent not i ons conce r ni ng t he degr ee of conf i dence he i s expec t ed t o have i n t he cor r ect nes s of hi s fac t ual concl us i ons . ” J us t i ce 31 H ar l an not ed t hat “[t ] he pre ponder ance t es t has been c r i t i ci zed, j us t i fi abl yi n m yvi ew , w hen i t i s r ead a s as ki ng t he t r i er of fa ctt o w ei gh i n s om e obj ect i ve s ens e t he quant i t yof evi dence

su b m itt e d b ye a c h sid e ra th e r th a n a sk in g h im to d e c id e w h a t h e b e liev e s m o st p ro b a b ly happene d. ” I ndeed, t hati s pr eci s el y w hy t he st andar d of proof and r evi ew i n cr i m i nal cas es 32 has been e xp resse d, notbyt he quant i t yof evi dence pr oduced orhow i t m i ght be w ei ghed

w h e n v iew e d n e u tra lly , b u t ra th e r by th e q u a lit y o f th e e v id e n c e a n d th e lev e l o f c e rta in tyit

e n g e n d e rs in th e f

a c tf in d e r’ s m in d
. L e g a l s u f

f i c i e n c yo f t h e e v i d e n c e i n a c r i mi n a l p r o c e e d i n g ma y b e d i v i d e d i n t o t wo
z o n e s: e v id e n c e o f

su c h su f f icie n t stre n g th , c h a ra c ter , a n d c re d ib ili ty to e n g e n d e r c e rta in ty bey ond a re as onabl e doubt i n t he re as onabl e fact fi nder ’ s m i nd and evi dence t hat l acks t hat

s t r engt h. A ppel l at e r evi ew of a j ur y ’ s ver di ct of cr i m i nal convi ct i on focus es s ol el yon t hat

33Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page12

trial judg e might not have re ache d the same c onclusion as the jury , and eve n though a ppellate judg es ar e close ly divided on the issue whethe r therewas sufficie nt evidenceto support a conviction. Id. at 362-63 (c itations omi tted). The United States Supreme Court trusts juries when the y rea ch a rational verdict e ven though those same justices, the individual trial judg e, or a ppellate judg es may be c los e ly

div ide d o n th e iss ue of

wh e the r t he y be lie ve the rewa s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to support a convic tion. W. W endall Ha ll & Mar

k Emery , TheTe

x as Ho ld O ut: Tre nd

s in theRe v ie w of

Civ il 34 an d Cr im ina l J

ur yVe rd ic ts , 4 9 S. T EX . L. REV . 539, 540 (2008). Wil liam Powers, J r. & J ack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient 35 Evidenc e,”69 T EX . L. REV . 515, 516 (1991). Id. at 525. 36 “ei t her

- or ” char act er of evi dent i ar y s uffi ci ency beca us e a defe ndant i s ent i t l ed t o an ac qui t t al if th e e v id e n c e la c k s th a t s tr e n g th
. C . T exas C i vi l St andards of R evi ew . T e x a s is c o n sid e re d a “ h o ld -o u t” s tate b yh a v in g a tw o -tier e d sta n d a rd o f a p p e llate

re v iew f o r c iv il ca se s, a lth o u g h c o m m e n tato rs s tate th a t “ re c e n t d e c isio n s h in t th a t th e re is

su p p o rt fo r assim il ati o n into the sing le st an d ard o f rev iew u sed in m o st juri sd ict ion s. ” It 34 has l ong been a cknow l edged t hat“[f ] ew i s s ues of Texas l aw have c r eat ed m or e conf us i on
or s paw ned more appel l at e l i t i gat i on t han t he t r eat m ent of ‘ no evi dence’ a n d ‘ i ns uffi ci ent evi dence ’ poi nt s of er r or ” i n ci vi l cas es . T he di ffi cul t y i n di s t i ngui s hi ng t hes e t w o typ es 35

o f c la im s– w h ich re q u ire d ra m a tica llyd if f e re n t re su lts– is th a t ap p e llate c o u rts h a v e lit tle g u i d a n c e e x c e p t t h e i r o wn i n t u i t i o n t o g u i d e t h e m. 36 1. The “f

i ve z one” r evi ew f

orl egal and f act uals uf

f i ci ency . T ra d iti o n a lly , T e x a s a p p e llate c o u rts h a v e e m p lo y e d a f iv e -z o n e re v iew o f

c iv ilBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page13

See id. at 517-18 (disc ussing a nd using the concept of “a five zoned spec trum, with the 37 strength of the propone nt’s evidenc e incr easingin eac h succe ssive zone”). One might visualiz e these five zones as laid out on an imag inary football field, starting 38 from the lef

t-hand g oal line of the pa

rty with the burden of

proof. Z one 1, the “ no evidenc e” zon e , s tart s at th is g oa l li ne and , a s th e e vid e nc e su pp or tin ga vit a l f a c t or c la im s te a dil y incre ases, the zones mar ch down the f ield until z one 5, “c onclusive evide nce,”which is at the opposing pa

rty ’s g oal line. The 50 yard line w ould roughly corr espond to the line which must be cr o s s edb y

th e p arty wi thth e b urd eno f p ro o f b y th e “ p re p o n d er an ce o f th e e v i d en ce , ” l eav i n g a “zone of re asonable disagree ment” on either side of the midline. Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidenc e” Points of Error , 38 39 T EX . L. REV . 3 61 , 3 63 (1 96 0) . Just ic e Ca lve rt e xpla ine d th e sc int ill a

ru le a s f oll ow s: [W ]hen the evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t is so weak as to do no more than c re ate a me resurm ise or

su sp ic ion

of its e xiste nc e , th e e vid e nc e is, in l e g a l e ff e c t, no evidenc e, and w ill not s upport a ve rdict or judgment. The scintilla rule c annot apply when ther e is direc t evidenceof a vital fa ct; it applies only when the vital fac t must be inferre d from other rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s which ar e proved. I f the infe renc e is not a re asonable one a “ no evidenc e” point should be v e rd icts w h e n th e b u rd e n o f p ro o f a t tria l is th a t o f

“ p re p o n d e ra n c e o f

th e e v id e n c e .” In h is 37

m uch ci t e d l a w r e v i e w ar t i c l e , J u s t i c e Ca l v e r t d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h o s e f i v e z o n e s a n d d e f

i ned t h e m. 38 2

. Z o n e 1

– “ n o e v id e n c e .” Z one 1 i s t he “no e vi dence ” zone , s i m i l art o t he ol d l egal s uffi ci encys t andar d r ej ect ed byt he Supr eme C our t i n Jack s on f o r crim in a l c a se s. A “ n o e v id e n c e ” c h a llen g e b yth e p a rty

w i t hout t he bur den of pr oof i n a ci vi l cas e may be s us t ai ned onl yw hen:

C T her e i s a compl et e l ack of evi dence of s om e el ement of a c l ai m or defe ns e;

C T he evi dence offered at t r i al i s i nadmi s s i bl e undert he r ul es of l aw or of e v id e n c e a n d th u s c a n n o t b e g iv e n a n ye v id e n tiary va lu e o n a p p e a l;

C T her e i s no m or e t han a “m er e s ci nt i l l a” of evi dence t o pr ove s om e es s ent i al fac t of ei t hert he cl ai m or defe ns e; or 39Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page14

sustained. It follows that “no evidenc e” points base d on the scintilla rule re quire a car eful a naly sis of the fac ts proved for the purpose of

deter mining whe ther the vital fac t may

be re asonably

inferr ed. Id. (footnotes omitted). Id. at 362-63; see also Me rrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc . v. Havner , 953 S.W .2d 706, 40 71 1 ( Te x. 19 97 ); W I L L I AM V. D ORS ANEO , I I I , et al., T EX A S L I TI GATI ON G UI DE § 146.03[6] [e] [i i] [A] (2007). Havne r , 953 S.W .2d at 730. Justice Calver t expl ained that, in dec iding “ no evidenc e” 41 points, the appellate c ourt views the e vidence in the light most favor able to the ve rdict and considers only

that evidenc e and inf

ere nces that support the verdic t while ignoring a ll evidence and infe renc es that ar e contr ary to the verdic t. Calvert, 38 T EX . L. REV . at 364. Acc ordingto J ustice Calver t, “if the e vidence supporting the findingis so uncerta in, 42 inconsistent, improbable, or unbe lievable that, a lthough c onstitut ing some evidenc e of pr obative fo rc e wh e n c on sid e re d in its mos t f

avo ra blelight i n s up po rt

of thefi nd ing , it

wo uld ne ve rt he le ss be cle arly unjust to permit the judgment to stand.” Calve rt, 38 T EX . L. REV . at 367. Justice C al v ertap p ro p ri at el y

v i ew edth e e v i d en ce “i ni t s m o s tfav o rab l e l i ghti ns u p p o rto f th e f

i n d i n g” in assessingfac tual sufficie ncy ; he did not view it in a “neutr al light.” Ihave f ound no Texas Supreme Court ca se that has view ed the e vidence “in a ne utral light” when a ddressingfac tual su ff ic ie nc y c la ims
. C T h e e v id e n c e c o n c lu siv e lyd e m o n stra tes th e o p p o site o f th e e ss e n tial f

a c t. 40 If th e a p p e llate c o u rt f

in d s “ n o e v id e n c e ” to su p p o rt th e v e rd ict, th e e v id e n c e is le g a lly i n s u f f i c i e n t , a n d t h e o p p o n e n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g me n t i n h i s f a v o r a s a ma t t e r o f

l a w. 41 3

. Z o n e 2

– “

fa c tu a lly in s u

ffic ie n t e v id e n c e .” I n zone 2, t he par t y w i t h t he bur den of pr oof has offe r ed s om e evi dence i n s uppor t of hi s cl ai m or defe ns e and t he ca s e i s al l ow ed t o go t o t he j ur y for a ver di ct
. B ut t he evi dence

su p p o rtin g th e ju ry ’s v e r d ic t, w h ile m o re th a n a “ m e re sc in til la,” is s lim in d e e d
. In th is 42

sc e n a rio , the a p p e llate c o u rt m a yf in d th a t itis “ f

a c tu a llyin su f

f icie n t,” b u t itm u st c a re f u lly set ou t al l of the evidence sup po rt i ng t he v erdi ct and exp l ai n w hy t he ev i den ce i s non et heles sBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page15

J ustice Calver

t expl ains that, in this z one 2 sce nario, the a ppellate c ourt may

not find 43 that th e e vid e nc e is “ a g a ins t th e gre at w e ight a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of thee vid e nc e be c a

us e the reis no evidenc e of the nonexis tence of the fa ct.” Calve rt, 38 T EX . L. REV . at 366. That is, when revie wingan “insuff

icient evidenc e” point, the a ppellate c ourt looks only

to the evidenc e that supports the vital fac t and deter mines that this evidence is simply too meag er to support a

finding of its exi stence by

a prepondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id. Seenote 49 inf

ra . 44 Id. at 370. 45 Id. (“B y

producingthe evidenc e on re trial the par ty has fa ir assura

nce that a findingof 46 the exist enceof the vital fa ct will be per mitted to st and.”) . Strang ely , this same rule doe s not apply for leg ally

insufficient e vidence beca use “[p]resumptively , at least, a ll of the evidenc e available to the appelleehas bee n introduced.” Id. Justi c e Ca lve rt did no t e xpla in why

a pa rt y who produc ed no evide nce of a vital fa ct at the f

irst trial is not entitl ed to a se cond bite at the a pp le , whil e a

pa rt y wh o o ff e re d s ome , b ut f

a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt, e vid e nc e wo uld

be a bleto producemore e vidence and thus is entitled to a second bite at the apple. i ns uffi ci ent
. T hi s chal l enge i s al w ay s br ought by t he par t yw i t hout t he bur den of pr oof.

43 44 T h e ra tio n a le f

o r a llo w in g th e p a rty(w h o p re v a ile d a t trial b u t w a s f o u n d b yth e a p p e llate

c o u rt to h a v e p ro d u c e d in su f f icie n t ev id e n c e ) to trya g a in in a s e c o n d tr ial is “ th a t th e re is

a v a ilab le to th e a p p e llee o th e r ev id e n c e o f th e v ital fa c t w h ich w ill su p p o rt a f in d in g in h is fa v o r an d itw o u ld w o rk a n injusti ce to cut o ff h is ri g h t to p rod u ce it
. ” T h e a p p ell ate c o u rt 45

a ss u m e s tha t th e p a rtyw h o h a d th e b u rd e n o f p ro o f a n d w h o o rig in a llyp re v a iled m a yb e a b le t o p roduce add i t ional evi den ce at a secon d tr i al , evidence that he fa i l ed to offer at t he fir st trial. 46 4

. Z o n e 3

– “z o n e o

f r e a s o n a b le d is a g r e e m e n t.” Z one 3, t he zone of r eas onabl e di s agr eement , i s t he gr eatm i ddl e gr ound, i n w hi ch a

ver di ct w i l l be uphel d for ei t her t he par t yw i t h t he bur den of pr oof or t he oppos i ng par t yasBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page16

Id. 47 Texas courts usually

use the short-ha

nd term “great weight of the evide nce,”but the 48 Texas Supreme Court occ asionally reiter ates that it is, in reality , the great weight of the c re dib le evidenc e that it is refe rringto. Quality , not mere qua ntity , has bee n its hist orica l determining fac tor. See, e .g., Dawson v. St. Louis Expanded Me tal Fireproofing Co. , 6 1 S. W. 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 ( T e x. 1901) (“ It was within the power of [the court of c ivil appeals] to dis reg ard a findingof fa ct by

the jury if contra ry to the great weight of the cr edible testimony , and in ef fec t to set aside the finding and to re mand the ca

use, and w e under stand them to mean that unde r the fa cts as found by them un de r t he e vid e nc e , th e rewa s n o n e g lig e nc e .” ); McD onald v. New Y ork Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 38 0 S. W.2 d 5 45 , 5 48 (T e x. 19 64 ) ( “ [T]heins ur e d d oe s n ot r a ise in t he Court of Civ il A pp e a ls the point of ‘insuffic ient evidenc e’ to support the jury finding s or the point that the finding s are a g a ins t ‘ thegre at w e ight a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e ’ o f t hec re dib le e vid e nc e ” ); Darryl v. Ford M otor Co. , 440 S.W .2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969) (“N owher e in the ame nded motion for new trial did the responde nt, Ford Motor Company , state that the e vidence supporting the jury answe rs to any sp e c if ic sp e c ia l is su e wa s e ith e r i ns uf fi c ie nt o r a g a ins t th e gre at w e ight o f t he c re dib le e vid e nc e ” ); see also In ReG.A.T., 16 S.W .3d 818, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“Theevidenc e shows that the ve rdict wa s not contrar y to the great weight of the c re dib le e vid e nc e .” ); Town &Country Mobile Home s, Inc. v . Bilyeu , 6 9 4 S. W. 2 d 6 5 1 , 6 5 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 1 98 5, no writ) (“ In c on sid e ri ngan ‘ ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e ’ p oint, w e mus t rema in cognizant of the fac t that it is for the jur y , as the trier

of fa ct, to judgethe cr edibility of the witnesses, to assign the weight to be g iven their testimony , and to re solve any conflicts or inc on sis te nc ie s in

thete sti mony . T his Cou rt may no t su bs tit uteits jud gme nt f

or that of thejur y if the cha lleng ed findingis supported by some evidenc e of pr obative value and is not ag ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e.”) (citation omitted). t her e i s confl i ct i ng evi dence or i nfer ence s on ei t her s i de of t he vi t al fac t i s s ue or i s s ues , but th e ju ry ’s v e rd ict is re a so n a b le a n d d o e s n o t “s h o c k th e c o n sc ien c e ,” n o r it is n o t so “ c lea rly

un j ust ” t o indi cat e ob vious bi as. 47 5

. Z o n e 4

– “g r e a t w e ig h t a n d p r e p o n d e r a n c e .” In z o n e 4 , the p a rtyw ith th e b u rd e n o f p r o o f h a s o f f e re d sig n if

ica n t ev id e n c e to
s uppor t t he cl ai m or defe ns e; t he gr eatw ei ght and pr eponder ance of t he cr edi bl e evi dence

s uppor t s hi s pos i t i on. H ow ever , t he j ur yhas r et ur n ed a v er di ct i n favorof t he oppos i ng 48 p arty

– the p artyw i t hout t he bur den of pr oof. I n t hi s s cena r i o, t he par t yw i t h t he bur den ofBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page17

See Wil liam Powers, J r. & J ack Ratliff, 69 T EX . L. REV . at 518-19 (“ When the evidenc e 49 fa lls int o zo ne 2, thepr op e r t e rm ino logy is that th e reis ‘ ins uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e ’ o r ‘ fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e ’ t o s up po rt an a ff ir mativ e fi nd ing . In zo ne 4, thec le are st t e rm ino logy is that a findingcontra

ry to the evidenc e is ag ainst the “great weight and prepondera nce of the e vid e nc e ,” a lth ou gh th is t e rm ino logy is o c c a sio na lly

(a nd we thi nk c on fu sin g ly

) u se d to re fe r t o e vid e nc e in zo ne 2. De sp ite thedif fe re nc e s b e tw e e n zo ne s 2 and 4, atta c ks on

jur y fi nd ing s in these zones ar e usually

called ‘ fac tual sufficie ncy ’ points. The pre fer red te rminology

has the proponent [the party

with the burden of

proof] claim that an unfa vorable (neg ative) f

inding should be set aside be causeit is ‘contrary to the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e,’ and ha s th e op po ne nt [the pa rt y wi tho ut t he burd e n o f p ro of

] cl a im that an unf

avo ra ble (a ff ir mativ e ) f ind ingwa s b a se d o n ‘ ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e .’ ” ) ( fo otn ote s o mitte d) ; se eals o D ORS ANEO , T EX A S L I TI GATI ON G UI DE § 146.03[6] [e] [i i] [C ] (“A par ty who attac ks the fac tual su ff ic ie nc y of an a dv e rs e fi nd ingon

an is su e on

wh ic h th e pa

rt y ha s th e burd e n o f p ro of

mus t demonstrate on a

ppeal that the a dverse findingis ag ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e.”)
. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (“I n order that this court 50 may in the future de termine if a corr ect standa

rd of r eview of

fac tual insufficienc y

points has be e n util ize d, c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls, wh e n r e ve rs ingon ins uf fi c ie nc y gro un ds , s ho uld , in

the ir opinions, detail the evidenc e re levant to the issue in consider ation and cle arly state why

the jury ’s findingis factua lly

insufficient or is so ag ainst the great weight and prepondera nce a s to be manif e stl y un jus t; why it s ho c ks thec on sc ie nc e ; or c le arl y de mon str ate s b ia s. F ur

the r, tho se courts, in their opinions, should state in what re g ard the contra ry evidenc e greatly

outweighs the evidenc e in support of the ve rdict. It is only in this way

that we will be a

ble to deter

mine if the require ments of In ReKing’ s E sta te[244 S .W.2d 660 (Tex. 1951)] , have be en satisfied.” ). pr oof ma y c h a l l e n g e t h e r e s u l t , c l a i mi n g t h a t t h e v e r d i c t i s “ a g a i n s t t h e g r e a t w ei ght and pr eponder ance of t he evi dence
. ” I n t hi s “aga i ns t t he gr eatw ei ght and pr eponder ance ” 49

sc e n a rio , all o f

th e e v id e n c e , b o th p ro a n d c o n , is s e t o u t, an d th e a p p e llate c o u rt m u st e x p lain

w hyt he ver di cti s agai ns t t he gr eatw ei ght and pr eponder ance of t he evi dence
. 50 6

. Z o n e 5

– “ c o n c lu s iv e e v id e n c e .” A t the o ppos i t e end of

t he s pect r um fr om zone 1 i s zone 5–“ concl us i ve evi dence ”– i n w hi ch t he par t yw i t h t he bur den of pr oof has es t abl ishe d co n clus ive l y , or as a mat t er of l aw , t h at h e is e n ti t l ed t o a j udgm ent i n hi s favorbeca us e t he opponenthas offe r ed noBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page18

168 S.W .3d 802 (Tex. 2005). 51 Id. at 827. 52 See id. at 818-21. 53 evi dence i n oppos i t i on and t he propone nt has offe r ed suff i ci ent evi dence of t he vi t al fac t or
c l a i m. 7. The Texas Supr em e C our t ’s R ef or m ul at i on of

LegalSuf

f i ci ency . A l t hough t hi s fi ve- zone t heor y has been t he t r adi t i onal for m ul at i on of ci vi l l egal and fac t ual s uffi ci encys t andar ds i n ci vi l cas es , i n 2005, t he Texas Supr eme C our t ar t i cul at ed a

new for m ul at i on of t he t es t for l egal s uffi ci encyr evi ew i n C i t y of K el l erv. W

i l s on : 51 T he fi nal t es t for l egal s uffi ci encym us t al w ay s be w het her t he evi dence at t r i al w oul d enabl e r eas onabl e and f ai r - m i nded peopl e t o r each the ver di ctunder r evi ew . W het her a r evi ew i ng cour t begi ns by cons i der i ng al l t he evi dence or onl yt he evi dence s uppor t i ng t he ver di ct , l egal

- s uffi ci encyr e v i ew i n t he pr oper li g h t m u st c red it fa v o rab le e v iden ce if rea so n ab le ju rors co u ld, and d isr eg ard c o n tra ry e v id e n c e u n les s re a so n a b le ju ro rs c o u ld n o t. 52 T h u s, w hen reas on able j urors cou l d resol ve co nfli ct i ng evidence eit her w ay , an ap p e llate

cour t m us t as s um e t hatj ur or s r es ol ved al l s uch conf l i ct s i n acc or d w i t h t hei r ver di ct , and

w hen t he evi dence s uppor t s confl i ct i ng i nfer ence s , t he cour t m us t as s um e t hat j ur or s m ade al l i nfer ence s i n favorof t he ver di ct and d isr eg ard ot her pos s i bl e i nfer ence s . “I f t he 53

e vidence at t ri al w ou l d en able r easona ble and fair -m i nd ed p eop l e t o d i ffer i n the ir

c o n c lu sio n s, th e n ju ro rs m u st b e a llo w e d to d o so . A re v iew in g c o u rt c a n n o t su b stitu te its j udgm entfor t hatof t he t r i er - of- fac t , s o l ong as t he evi den ce fa ll s w i t hi n t hi s zone ofBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page19

Id. at 822 (footnote omitted). I n City of Keller , the Supreme Court a lso describe d three 54 kin ds of e vid e nc e that must

be disreg arde d when c onductinga leg al suffic iency analy sis: (1) cre dibility

evidenc e; (2) c onflictingevidenc e; and ( 3) conf licting infe renc es. Id. at 819-22. Thus, witness cre dibility

in civil cases, a s in criminal case s, is solely the pre rog ative of the fa c tf ind e r. An a pp e llate c ourt

may no t di sc ount a

wi tne ss’ s te sti mony

a s b e ing , in

its vie w, le ss cre dible than another

witness’s. Fur

thermore , the appe llate cour t may not choose be tween two c on fl ic tin ginf

e re nc e s if thee vid e nc e wo uld

re a so na bly su pp or t e ith e r o ne . “ It is wi de ly rec ognized that one of the most important attributes of the right to jury trial is the ability

of juries to draw, f rom circ umstantial evidence , infere nces that cannot be se t aside or se cond-guessed by revie wingcourts mer ely

beca use the re viewer s would have r eac hed a dif fer ent fa ctual conclusion.” William V. Dorsane o, I I I , Changing the Balance of Power: J uries, the Courts, and theLe gis lature , P RACTI CE B EF ORE THE S UPREME C O U RT 5 (State B ar of Texas 2004). City of Keller , 168 S.W .3d at 807. 55 See City of Keller , 1 68 S.W. 3d at 82 7- 28 (“ ‘T he ru le a s g e ne ra lly state d is that if 56 re a so na blemin ds c ann ot d if

fe r f ro m th e c on c lus ion

that th e e vid e nc e la c ks pr ob ativ e fo rc e it w ill be held to be the leg al equivale nt of no evidenc e.’” ) (quotingCalvert, 38 T EX . L. REV . at 364). SeeW. W endall Ha ll & Mar k Emery , 49 S.T EX . L. REV . at 559 (“ Some may conclude 57 that City of Keller

only addre sses leg al suffic iency challeng es, but the re asonable juror standa rd se e ms t o ma

ke thedis tin c tio n b e tw e e n le g a l and fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y me an li ttl e .” ); id. at 562 r eas onabl e di s agr eement
. ” T he appe l l at e cour t does not vi ew t he evi dence i n a neut r al 54 l i ght , but r at her “i n t he l i ght favor abl e t o t he ver di ct , ” j us t as i s done i n cr i m i nal cas es under 55 Jack s on and i n T exas ci vi l cas es under a fa ct ual s uffi ci encyr evi ew . U nder t hi s for m ul at i on,
z o n e 3 (th e z o n e o f

“ re a so n a b le d isa g re e m e n t”) w o u ld se e m to h a v e in c re a se d c o n sid e ra b ly i n s i ze, w hi l e zone s 2 and 4 ( t hos e of “ fac t ual i ns uffi ci ency ” and “aga i ns t t he gre at w ei ght

a n d p re p o n d e ra n c e ” ) h a v e d im in ish e d a s a v e rd ict th a t is o u tsid e th e z o n e o f re a so n a b le di s agr eement w oul d s eem t o be w i t hi n t he zone of l egal l yi ns uffi ci ent evi dence
. 56 Some c o mme n t a t o r s h a v e n o t e d t h a t t h i s n e w f o r mul a t i o n o f l e g a l s u f f i c i e n cy has

v irtu a llym e rg e d th e T e x a s le g a l su f f icie n c y sta n d a rd w ith th a t o f f a c tu a l su f

f icie n c yin c iv il

cas es . A nd i t has br ought T exas ci vi l s t andar ds “more cl os el y i n l i ne w i t h fede r al s t andar ds

57Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page20

(notingthat under the City of Keller “ re a so na bleand fa ir -m ind e d ju

ro r”sta nd ard , th e Sup re me Court may

avoid the “yo-yo eff

ect” of re versingand re mandingcase s for fa ctual insuffic iency revie w and instea d rende r judgment beca use the ve rdict is unrea sonable a nd there fore the evidenc e is leg ally

insufficient). Id. at 556. 58 Id. at 600. 59 L onny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the Ev er-Ex panding Scope of Legal Sufficiency 60 Rev iew , 4 9 S. T EX . L. REV . 611, 614 (2008). Id. 61 See W. We nd a ll H a ll &Mark Em e ry , 4 9 S. T EX . L. REV . at 610. 62 See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

at 42 9 n .4 7 ( Coc hr an, J., d iss e nti ng ); se eals o Wil liam 63 Powers, Jr., J

ud gean d J ur yin t heTe x as Su pre meCou rt , 75 Tex. L . Rev. 1699, 1699 n.3 (1997) (“ A h a llm ark

of [the ] entir e bo dy

of law [r e g ard ingle g a l and

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c la ims in c ivi l case s] however, is extraordinar y defe renc e to juries.”)
. for l egal s uffi ci encyr evi ew . ” T h es e comm ent at or s ar gue t hat t he l anguage of t he 58 “r eas onabl e j ur or ” s t andar d “pr ovi des a cl oak fort he r easo n ing of j udges , r at hert han pr eci s i on i n r eas oni ng. ” T heycont end t hat t he C i t y of K el l er sta n d a rd “ lea v e s c o n sid e ra b le 59 le e w a y f o r a n a p p e lla te c o u rt to in te rc e p t a ju ry’s v e rd ic t w h e n it f e e ls m o tiv a te d to d o s o .” 60 T hes e comm ent at or s compl ai n t hat t he “r eas onabl e j ur or ” s t andar d i s t oo fl exi bl e and

s ubj ect i ve, appar ent l ypr efe r r i ng t he purpor t edl ym or e obj ect i ve s t andar d of “s hocks t he

61

cons ci ence ” or“mani fes t l yunj us t
. ” O ne ca n cer t ai nl yagr ee w i t h t hei r ul t i m at e conc l us i on how ever , t h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s s h o u l d ma k e “ a f i r m r e d e d i c a t i o n t o a j u r i s p r u d e n c e of

r es t r ai nt and s t andar ds of re vi ew t hat r ecogni ze t he fundam ent al r i ght t o t r i al by j ur yand a concomi t ant har d- m i nded appl i cat i on of s t andar ds of r evi ew . ” Par t i cul ar l yi n T exas , t he 62

m o st jury -de fe ren ti al s tat e in the n ati o n , ap p ell ate co u rt s m u st d ef er to a “ rea so n ab le” jury 63Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page21

Se eCle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 129. 64 verdi ct i n b oth ci vil and cri m i nal cas es. D . T h e C r im in a l L e g a l S u ffic ien c y S ta n d a r d C a n n o t B e H a r m o n ize d w ith th e C iv il Fac t ual Suf

f i c i e nc y St anda r d. 1

. C lew is i s a chi m er a. I n C lew is , t h i s Co u r t a t t e mp t e d t o s u p e r i mp o s e t h e f i v e - z o n e c i v i l s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w, p red icated upon t r i al s i n w hi ch t he bur den of pr oof i s bya pr eponder ance of t he evi dence

u p o n th e tw o -z o n e c rim in a l sta n d a rd o f re v iew th a t re q u ire s p ro o f b e y o n d a re a so n a b le d o u b t. V isua li zing the f ive-z o n e c ivil stan d ard (“n o ev iden ce , ” “ insu ff ici en t evid en ce ,” 64

“ z o n e o f re a s o n a b le d is a g re e m e n t,” “ th e g re a t w e ig h t a n d p re p o n d e ra n c e o f th e e v id e n c e ,” and “c oncl us i ve evi dence ”) as a footbal l fi el d w it h the “no evi dence ” zone at one end a nd

w ith e a c h z o n e c o m p rise d o f a n e v e r g re a ter q u a n tu m o f e v id e n c e o f

f e re d b yth e p a rtyw ith th e b u rd e n o f p ro o f u n til th e “ c o n c lu siv e e v id e n c e ” z o n e a t th e o th e r e n d , rev iew in g c o u rts
ar e r equi r ed t o uphol d as fac t ual l y s uffi ci ent any ver di ct i n favor of t he par t y w i t h t he bur den

o f p r o o f th a t is a t lea st w ith in th e th ird z o n e , tha t o f re a so n a b le d isa g re e m e n t. B u t in

as s es s i ng t he l egal s uffi ci encyof evi dence i n a cr i m i nal cas e, t he St at e’ s evi dence m us t be p e rsu a siv e e n o u g h to a lm o st m a k e a to u c h d o w n ; re a c h in g th e m id f ield is n e v e r e n o u g h to

m eett he “be y ond a r eas onabl e doubt ” s t andar d. I n a ci vi l cas e, i f t he j ur y r et ur ns a ver di ct i n favorof t he par t yt hat di d not have t he b u rde n o f p roo f (u su all ythe d ef en d an t) , b u t that v erd ict is d eterm ined b y the ap p ell ate c o u rt to b e a g a in st th e g re a t w e ig h t a n d p re p o n d e ra n c e o f th e e v id e n c e o f f e re d b y th e p a rtyth a t d idBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page22

This situation does arise in those instance s in which the def endant be ars the burden of 65 production and pe rsuasion for aff irmative def

enses. See note 67 inf

ra . See note 42 supra. 66 have t he bur den of pr oof ( us ual l yt he pl ai nt i ff) , t hen t he appe l l at e cour t m ayr ev er s e t he j udgm ent and r emand f or a new t r i al
. T hi s gi ves t he pl ai nt i ff a s econd oppor t uni t yt o pr ove hi s cas e bef

or e a ne w j ur y , aft er the fi r s t j ur yhad r ej ect ed hi s cl ai m al t hough he had

o rig in a llyp ro d u c e d “ th e g r e a t w e ig h t an d p re p o n d e ra n c e o f th e e v id e n c e ” to su p p o rt its cl ai m . T hat s cena r i o w oul d not gener al l yar i s e i n cr i m i nal cas es beca us e i f t he j ur yr et ur ns 65

a ver di ctfa v o ri n g the p ar t yw i t hout t he bur den of pr oof ( t he def endant ) , t her e w i l l be no

a p p e a l b e c a u s e th e S ta te m a yn o t a p p e a l a n a c q u itta l. Si m i l ar l y , i f t he part y w it h the bur den of pr oof i n a ci vi l t r i al ( us ual l yt he pl ai nt i ff) obt ai ns a j ur y ver di ct i n i t s favor , but an appel l at e cour t det er m i nes t hat t her e i s i ns uffi ci ent evi dence , even w hen vi ew ed i n t he l i ght m os t favor abl e t o t he ver di ct , t o r eac h “t he zone 66 of r eas onabl e di s agr eement , ” t hen t he ap p ell ate cour t m ayr ever s e t he j ur yver di ctand

r emand for a new t r i al
. T hat s cena r i o al s o w oul d not ar i s e i n cr i m i nal cas es beca us e i f t he St at e’ s evi dence i s s o w eak i n s t r engt h, char act er , and cr edi bi l i t yt hat i t does n o t r eac h t he l evel of “ the zo n e o f re as onabl e di s agr eement , ” t hen i t m os t as s ur edl ydoes not m eett he “bey on d a reasonab l e do ub t ” st an dard of l egal s uff

i ci ency requi red i n all cri m i nal cas es. S u c h a lac k o f

e v id e n tiary su p p o rt is n o t m e re lyf a c tu a llyin su f

f icie n t, i t is leg a lly in su f f icie n t, an d th e d e f

e n d a n t ca n n o t b e re q u ire d to u n d e rg o a se c o n d trial. W hat t hi s C our t di d i n C lew is w as adopt t he l anguage of Texas ci vi l fac t ualBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page23

Se e, e .g., Me ra

z v . S tate , 785 S.W .2d 146, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (applying the 67 civil standards of f

actua l reviewof “a g ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e” in a ca se in which the de fenda nt appea led the jury ’s re

jection of his plea of

incompetenc e beca use the de fenda

nt had the burde n to prove incompe tence by a prepondera

nce of the e vid e nc e ); Bigby v. State, 89 2 S. W.2 d 8 64 , 8 75 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ) ( a pp lyingthec ivi l standards of

fac tual revie w bec ause de fenda nt had both the burde n of produc tion and persua sion for his af firmative de fense of insanity ). Se eJ on es v . S tate , 9 44 S.W. 2d

64 2, 64 7- 49 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ) ( de c idi ngthat a 68 fac tual-suffic iency

revie w re quires the a

ppellate c ourt to review

all of the e vidence , not just the e vid e nc e that su

pp or ts a ve rd ic t; r e

je c tin gc a pit a l murd e r d e fe nd ant’ s f a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c la im be c a us e the rewa s c on fl ic tin ge vid e nc e of wh e the r h e int e nd e d to sh oo t th e murde r v ic tim ); Cai n v . S tate , 958 S.W .2d 404, 407-09 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997) (re versinglower c ourt’s holdingof fa c tua l in su ff

ic ie nc y be c a us e that c ourt

fa ile d to de fe r t o th e jur

y ’s de te rm inatio n o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty

); J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 5-8 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000) (upholdinglower c ourt’s findingof fa ctual insuffic iency based on w itness’s express lack of c erta inty , but reminding appellate court that, “ [u] nless the ava ilable re cord c learly reve als a diff

ere nt result is appropriate, suffici e n c y review w i t ho ut fi rs t deter m i ning w hether t here w as a proper fi t betw een those ci vi l s t andar ds of r evi ew and t he di ffe r i ng evi dent i ar ys t andar ds of pr oof i n ci vi l and cr i m i nal

cas es . T hi s m i s t ake w as qui t e under s t andabl e w hen C lew is w a s d e c id e d in 1 9 9 6 b e c a u se th is C our t had r ece nt l yand pr oper l yadopt ed t he Texas ci v il s t andar ds of l egal and fa ct ual suffici ency for t ho se f

e w in sta nces i n cri m i nal cas es i n w hich t he b urden o f proo f i s a p re p o n d e ra n c e o f

th e e v id e n c e , as o c c u rs w ith a f f irm a tiv e d e f

e n se s. B u t as a p p e llate c o u rts

67
at t empt ed t o r econc i l e t he fi ve- zone ci vi l fac t ual

- s uffi ci encys t andar ds w i t h t he hei ght ened bur den o f p roo f in cr i m i nal cas es i n w hi ch t he St at e i s r equi r ed t o pr ove eve r yel ement bey ond a r eas onabl e doubt , w e began t o r eal i ze t hat t hi s ci vi l s t andar d of r evi ew di d not al i gn
w i t h t he cr i m i nal bur den of pr oof. A nd w e t i nker ed and t i nker ed w i t h var i ous r efor m ul at i ons
o f th is “ f a c tu a l su f

f icie n c y ” sta n d a rd o f

re v iew in c rim in a l ca se s in a v a in a tt e m p t to h a r mo n i z e t h e m. 68Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page24

an appe llate cour

t must defer to the jury ’s deter mination concer

ning what weight to give c ontr a dic tor

y te sti mon ia l e vid e nc e be c a us e re so lut ion

of te n tu rn s o n a n e va lua tio n o f c re dib ili ty and deme anor, a

nd those jurors we re in attendancewhen the te stimony was de livered.” ); Go od ma n v . S tate , 66 S.W .3d 283, 285-86 & n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (attemptingto follow Justi c e Ca lve rt ’s fi ve -zo ne ana ly sis of fa c tua l in su ff

ic ie nc y in c ivi l c a se s a

nd statin gthat, o nly when the e videntiary

scale s tip “radica lly” toward a neg ative findingon an esse ntial element may there vie wi ngc ourt

e xer c ise any

“ thi rt e e nth

jur or ” ro le and

c on c lud e that th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t is
“ c le arl y wr on g ” ); Swe ar inge n v . S tate , 101 S.W .3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (re iterating the importanceof g iving de fer enceto the fac tfinder’ s cre dibility and we ight de terminations); Zun iga v . S

tate , 144 S.W .3d 477, 483-84 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004) (re cognizi ngthat the diffe rent c ivi l and c ri min a l st and ard s o f p ro of arean im po rt ant s ourc e of

c on fu sio n in

any atte mpt to revie w criminal convictions for fa ctual suff iciency ; “Onceag ain, the prepondera nce- of-theevidenc e languag e cr eeps into a f actua l-sufficie ncy

revie w wher e the burden of pr oof at trial wa s be yon d a re a so na bledo ub t. And , th e Court ’s state me nt t hat th e re vie wi ngc ourt

mus t us e bo th standards is conf

using.” ). 204 S.W .3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 69 Id. at 415. 70 Iam unable to f

ind any Texas Supreme Court ca se that eve n mentions the word 71 “neutr al” in re lation to a fac tual sufficie ncy revie w. I

n In reKing’

s E sta te , 244 S.W .2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951), the Supreme Court se t out the applicable sta ndard f or re viewing“great weight and preponde ranc e” c omplaints. The court of a ppeals must “conside r and w eigh all of the e vidence in the case and to set aside the verdic t and re mand the ca use for a new trial, if it thus concludes that the ver dict is so ag ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e as to be manifestly

unjust-this, reg ardle ss of whethe r the re cord c ontains some ‘evide nce of probative fo rc e ’ i n s up po rt

of theve rd ic t. T he e vid e nc e su pp or tin gtheve rd ic t is to b e we ighe d a lon gwi th the other e vidence in the case , including that which is contrar y to the verdic t.” Id. at 664-65 2

. C lew is and W at s on r el i ed upon a f al s e prem i s e t hatevi dence s houl d be vi ew ed i n a n e u t r a ll ig h twh e n c o n d u c t i n g a f a c t u a ls u f f i c i e n c y r e v i e w. I n W a tso n v . S ta te , w e st at ed t hat t he onl ydi ffe r ence bet w een a fac t ual

- s uffi ci ency 69

r e v ie w a n d a leg a l-su f

f icie n c yre v iew is th a t, un d e r th e f o rm e r, an a p p e llate c o u rt sh o u ld

v iew th e e v id e n c e in a n e u tra l lig h t, rath e r th a n in th e lig h t m o st f a v o ra b le to th e v e rd ict. 70 B ut i t i s a s t r ange di s t i nct i on t hati gnor es t he qual i t yor cr edi bi l i t yof evi dence , and i t i s one t hat has never been a par t of Texas fac t ual

- s uffi ci encyr evi ew i n ci vi l cas es . I ns t ead, i t w as 71Br ooks ConcurringOpinion Page25

(citation omitted). Ther e is nothing in this case , or any other Te x as Supreme Court c ase, that sug g ests that all of the e vidence must be viewed “ neutra lly ,” as if the sheer quantity of evide nce wer e the only

criterion for fa ctual suff

iciency . How extraordinar y if the jury ’s ver dict should be held to be “a g ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e” if

seven g angmembers te sti fi e d th at th e ir

fe llo w g ang -m e mbe r d e fe nd ant w a s w iththe m th e night o f t he murde r whil e on ly tw o nun s te sti fi e d th at th e y saw the de fe nd ant c omm it the murde r. Any jur y is e nti tle d to dis be lie ve these ve n g angme mbe rs and c re dit thetw o n un s. 823 S.W .2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref ’d). In Stone , the cour

t of 72 appea ls stated: When the court of a

ppeals c onducts a fa ctual-suf ficienc y revie w, the cour

t does not ask if any

rational jury , afte r v ie wing th ee v ide nc ein t helig ht m os t fa v orab le to the prosecution, could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be yond a rea sonable doubt. F actua l-sufficie ncy revie w beg ins with the presumption that the evidenc e supportingthe jury ’s ver dict was leg ally sufficie nt, i.e., c on sti tution all y su ff ic ie nt f or thepurp os e s o f t

he Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of theF ourt e e nth Amendment. Rather , the cour t views all the evide nce w ithout the prism of “in the light most favor able to the pr osecution.” Be causethe cour t is not bound t o view the evidenc e in the light most favorable to the prosec ution, it m ay consider the testimony of def ense w itnesses and the e x istence of alternative hy

potheses. The court should set aside the verdic t only if it is so contrary

to the overwhelming we ight o f t

he e vid e nc e a s to be c le arl y wr on gand

un jus t. Id. The c ourt of appe als then cited Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (1986), a nd In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W .2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951), but neither of these c ases sa id any

thing a bout viewing thee vid e nc e “ in a

ne utr a l li ght”or

“ wi tho ut t

he prism of ‘i n th e light m os t f

avo ra ble ’ t o th e pa

rt y wi thth e b urd eno f p ro o f. T h ey s p o k e o n l y

o f r ev i ew i n g all

of the e vidence when de termining whether the ver dict was “ ag ainst the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidenc e.” And that is precise ly

what is requir ed under

the Jack son leg al suffic iency

revie w: an examination of all of the evidenc e, but in the light most favor able to the jury ’s ver dict beca use the jury , not the appellate court, wa s the chosen f actf inder. 253 S.W .3d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 73 cr eat ed byt he A us t i n C ou rt o f A p p eal s i n S to n e v . S ta te , and s i m pl yi m por t ed, w i t hout 72 fur t heranal y s i s , i nt o t hi s C our t ’ s deci s i on i n C lew is
. I ndeed, i n L a n c o n v . S ta te , a p o s t- 73 W at s on deci s i on i n 2008, w e aga i n r ej ect ed t he “ne ut r al ” l i ght anal y s i s and hel d t hat i t i s t he j ury ’s sol e prer og at i ve to m ake credibi l i t ydecis i on s. A pp el l at e cou rt s m ust def e r to t ho se
c re d ib ili tya ss e ss m e n ts ; th e ym a yn o t v iew a ll co n f lictin g w itn e ss tes tim o n ya s e q u a llyBr ooks ConcurringOpinion Page26

Id. at 705 (notingthat fac tual insufficienc y claim ca nnot be base d on contra dictory and 74 inconsistent witness testimony beca use “the jury

is the sole judgeof what weight to give suc h testimony . . . . Appellate c ourts should affor d almost complete def ere nce to a

jury ’s dec ision when that de cision is based upon an e valuation of c redibility .”). cr edi bl e. W i t nes s es ar e notfungi bl e, s om e ar e cr edi bl e and s om e ar e not
. N ei t her j ur i es

74

nor appel l at e cour t s m us t t al l yup t he number of w i t nes s es “n eu tr all y ” and t hen bas e a
su ff ici en cy d ec isi o n o n the g rea ter nu m b er. I n s um , w e have ne verbeen s ucce s s ful i n our at t empt s t o s uper i m pos e t he fi ve- zone ci vi l s t andar ds for s uffi cien cy r evi ew on t op of t he cons t i t ut i onal l ym andat ed l egal

s uffi ci encyr evi ew of a c r i m i nal convi ct i on. T hes e t w o s t andar ds of r evi ew depend upon t hei r di s t i nct l ydi ffe r entbur dens of pr oof. L i ke oi l and w at er , t hey do not m i x. T heyar e not l og i cal l ycon si st ent, a nd the ypr omote onlycon fusi on and con fl at i on of tw o d i st i nct concep t s. W e ar e re qui r ed t o fol l ow t he hei ght ened Jack s on l egal s uffi ci encyfor m ul at i on; w e ca nnot fol l ow a l es s er fac t ual s uffi ci encyfor m ul at i on. I a g re e th a t itis tim e to c o n sig n th e c iv il-law c o n c e p t o f f a c tu a l su f

f icie n c yre v iew in

c r i m i n a l c a s e s t o t h e d u s t b i n o f h i s t o r y. Fi l ed: O ct ober6, 2010 P ub l i sh