Opinion filed Au gust 20, 20 09



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

____________ 

### No. 1 1- 07 -0 03 07 -CV

____ ____ __ BETTYL. SM ITH, AS IND EP END ENT AD MIN ISTR ATRIX OF THE ESTAT E OF OSCAR D. GALLO WAY, DECEASED; DAVID S. BROW N AND WIFE, CHARLA D. BROW N,

Ap pellants
V.
NA NC Y L . H ODG ES A ND NE D L . G ALL OWAY , A ppellee s

On App eal from the 39th Distric t Court Stonew all Coun ty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 4448

O P I N I O N Osca r D. Ga lloway

died in 2002. Be tty

L . Smit h, Nanc y

L . Hodg es, and N ed L . Galloway

ar e G a ll o w ay ’ s s ib li n g s an d h e ir s a t la w . O n A u g u s t 8 , 2 0 0 2 , th e c o u n ty c o u rt is s ued an or der g ranting an indepe ndent administration and naming Smit h independe nt administratrix of the estate

. On No ve mber

29 , 2 00 6, Smith f

ile d a n a pp lic a tio n w iththe c ounty c ourt to s e ll approximately

164 acr es in Stonewall County . The only rea son g iven by

Smit h for the a

pplication to s e ll r e a l e state wa s tha t “[ t] he pr op e rt y c ann ot b e pa

rt iti on e d. ” On

Janu ary 4, 20 07 , th e c ountyT EX
. P ROB
. C O D E A NN . §§ 331- 353 (Ve rnon 2003 & Supp. 2008). 1 2 judge ref used to set a h ea ri n g o n the application, ex plaining that Smi th was an inde pendent administratrix and that “[c]ourt ove rsig ht of I ndepende nt administration is l imited.” On Fe bruar y 9, 2007, Smit h convey ed 164 acr es in Stonewall County to David S. Brow n and wife , Charla D. B rown, Smit h’s son-in-law and daughte r. Hodg es and Galloway filed sui t in the county court a lleg ing that Smit h had bre ache d her f

iduciary duty , failed to a ccount f

or funds fr om a sale of

rea l estate in Ke nt County , a nd fa ile d to ob ta in c ourt

a pp ro va l f or the sa le of

the 16 4 a c re s to the B ro wn s. Th e y a lso

a lle g e d th a t Smi th h a d inc ur re d e xce ssi ve and un ne c e ssa ry a dmi nis tr a tiv e and le g a l f e e s o n b e ha lf of the e state. The la

wsuit was transf

err ed to the district cour

t and filed a s Cause Number 4440. Hodg es and Galloway filed a motion for partial summary judgme nt seeking to have the de ed to t he B ro wn s dec la

re d void or vo ida

ble . The ir

so le g ro un d f

or su mma ry jud g me nt w a s th a t Smi th had fa iled to comply with Sections 331 throug h 353 of the Te x as Probate Code and obtain appr oval 1 of the probate cour

t for the sa le of the r eal e state. The district court gra nted the motion for par

tial summary judgme nt and dec ree d that the specia l w arr anty deed dated Fe bruar y 9, 2007, convey

ing the 164 a cr es t o the B rowns wa s null and void. The district court then se vere d Hodg es’s a nd Ga llo wa y ’s c la im f

or c anc e llatio n o f t

he de e d an d th e pa

rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt. Th e se ve re d c la im

was a ssigne d Cause Number 4448. Smit h and the B rowns appe aled. We hold that the i ndepende nt administratrix was not re quired to comply with Sections 331 throug h 353 in the sale of the rea l estate to the B rowns. See Stanley M. J ohanson, Te

x as Pr ob ate Code Annotated § 331 Commentary (2008 ed.) (implicitly

rec og nizi ng that an indepe ndent executor has t h e au t h o rity

to sell land without prior court appr oval by descr ibing the pur chase r’s potential burden of proof if that sale is s u b s eq u en tly challeng ed). Those sections do not “spec ifically and

e x p l i c i t l y” p r o v i d e f

o r a c t i o ni nt h e c o u n t y c o u rta s r e qu i r e d b y T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE A NN . § 145(h) (Ve rno n 2 0 0 3 ), t he sec tion gove rning independe nt administrations. Theref ore, the district court

err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt. We rever se and r emand. Indepe ndent Administrations The Te x as L eg islature has pr ovided in T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE ANN . § 145(c) (Ve rnon 2003) that all the distributees of a

dece dent dyi n g intestate may ag ree on the advisability of havingan3

independe nt administration. Gallow ay ’s heirs did so i n this case, a nd Smit h was a

ppointed independe n t ad minist ratrix. Section 145(h) provides the guidelines for a n independe nt administration: When an independe nt administration has been c re at ed, and the order appoint ing a

n independe nt executor has bee n enter ed by the county

court, a nd the inventory , appra isement, and list afore said has bee n filed by the executor a

nd approve d by the county court, as long as the estate is re prese nted by an indepe ndent executor, fur

ther a ction of any

nature shall not be had i n t he county court e x cept wh e re thi s Co de sp e c if

ic a lly and e xplic itl y

pr ov ide s f

or so me a c tio n in

the c ounty c ourt

. T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE ANN . § 3( q) (V e rn on Sup p. 20 08 ) d e fi ne s th e te rm “ ind epen den t e xec uto r” to mean the pe rsonal re prese ntative of a n estate unde r indepe ndent administration as provided in T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE ANN . § 145 (Ve rnon 2003). Thus, the e state of Osc ar D. Galloway was to be

a d mi n is te r e d

in ju s t th e s a me w ay

a s if th e in d e p e n d e n t a d mi n is tr a ti o nh a d b e e nc r e a te d

b y w il l. We view Smith as an independe nt executor in terms of her ability to sell real e state. Property devised unde r a w ill, duly probate d, is deemed to ve st tit le in the devisee as of the

mom e nt o f d e a th o f t

he te stator . T he same is true w hen th e deced e nt d ie s in te state – ti tle ve sts immediately

in his or her he irs at law. How ever , t h e proper ty is subject to administration. T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE ANN . § 37 (V e rn on 20 03 ); see Laas v. Se idel , 6 7 S. W. 1 01 5 ( Te x. 19 02 ); Freem an v. Banks , 91 S.W .2d 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1936, writ ref’ d). The probate cour t has no

con tr ol ov er i nd epen den t ex ecut ors ex cept as ex pres sl y pro vi dedby

law . S ect io n 1 45 (h ); D’Unge r v. De Pe na , 9 31 S.W. 2d

53 3, 53 4 ( Te x. 19 96 ); Colli ns v. Bake r , 8 2 5 S. W. 2 d 5 5 5 , 5 5 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 1992 , n o w ri t) ; Metting v. Me tting , 431 S.W .2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1968, no wr it). And there are controls expressly provided by

law. An independe nt executor’s authority to sell real e state without court orde r is not unlimi ted. An independe nt executor may , without order of the probate cour

t, do any act that an ordina ry executor or a dminist rator c ould do with or under a n order of the probate cour

t. See Rowland

v. Mo or e , 174 S.W. 2d 24 8, 25 0 ( Te x. 19 43 ); Gatesville Redi-M ix, Inc. v. Jone

s , 787 S.W .2d 443, 445 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 1 99 0, wr it d e nie d) ; Dallas Se rvs. for Visually Impaired Children, I n c. v. B r o a dmoor II

, 6 3 5 S. W. 2 d

5 7 2 , 5 7 6 ( T e x. A p p
. — D a ll a s 1 9 8 2 , w r it r e f ’ d n
. r
. e
. )

. Se c ti o n341(2)

a uth or ize s th e pr ob a te c ourt to d ir e c t a

sa le of an y in ter e st i n r e a l pr op e rt y wh e n it is t o th e be st4

interest of the estate. B eca use the statute ha s direct a pplication only

to sales by

executors and

a dmi nis tr a tor s und e r c ourt c on tr ol, it wo uld a uth or ize a sa le by an ind e pe nd e nt e xec uto r w he n it is deeme d to be to the best intere st of the estate

. Despite this implied authorization to act without court order , an indepe ndent executor c ould file a suit to construe th e wi l l or an a ction for de clar atory judgme nt and there by obtain instructions f rom the district c ourt or a statutory probate court. See 17 Ger ry W. Bey er, Texas Practice : Probate and De cede nts’ Estates § 499 (2009). A will ma y provide broad authority for the independe nt executor to sell property of the e state, and that powe r is valid as aga inst a specific devisee of the property sold. Harper v. Swov eland , 591 S.W .2d 629, 630-31 (Te x . Civ. App.—Dallas 19 7 9 , n o writ ). Also, an indepe ndent executor ha s
a uth or ity to s e ll p ro pe rt

y a pa rt fr om a ny e xpre ss a uth or ity in t he wi ll i f t

he re are ou tst and ingde bts

o r cl ai m s ag ainst the estate. Lesik ar v . R ap pe po rt , 8 0 9 S. W. 2 d

2 4 6 , 2 5 1 ( T e x. A p p
. — T e xa rkana 19 91 , no w ri t) ; Broadmoor II , 6 35 S.W. 2d

a t 57 6; Buck

ner Orphans Homev. Mabe n , 252 S.W .2d 72 6 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Ea stl and 19 52 , n o w ri t) ; Freem an , 91 S.W .2d at 1080. Th e re are tw o r e a so ns wh y Se c tio n 3 31 do e s n ot a

pp ly to i nd e pe nd e nt e x ecut or s. F ir st, Section 331 does not “spec ifically and explicitly ” provide that the sec tion applies to independent executors. Section 145(h) provides that, when an independe nt administration has bee n cre ated, a fter the inv e nto ry , a

pp ra ise me nt, and

lis t of c la ims have been fi le d a nd a pp ro ve d b y

the c ounty

c ourt ,

“ fu rt he r a c tio n o f any

natur e sh a ll n ot b e ha d in

the c ounty

c ourt e xce pt w he re thi s Co de sp e c if ic a lly and expli citly provides for some action in the county court.” Thus, the probate cour t has jurisdiction

ov e r a n in de pe nd e nt e xec uto r o nly if the Pr ob a te Code sp ecif ic a lly and e xplic itl y

so pr ov ide s. Bunting v. Pearson , 430 S.W. 2d 47 0, 47 3 ( Te x. 19 68 ); Sweene y v. Swe eney , 668 S.W .2d 909, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1984, no writ). Second, Sec tion 331 states that no sale of a ny pr op e rt y of an e state sh a ll b e ma de wi tho ut a n o rd e r o f t

he c ourt a uth or izin g the same . I f a

pp lie d to an indepe ndent executor, a testator could not author ize his i ndepende nt executor to sel l rea l or pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y wi tho ut a c ourt or de r. Th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ho ldi ngthat Smi th h a d to c omp ly wi th S e c tio ns 33 1 thro ug h 3 53 in t he sa le to t

he B ro wn s. Although Smith did not have to comply with Section 331, a cour

t order w as re quired. The only rea son g iven by

Smit h for selling the 164 acr es was that the pr operty could not be par

titioned. An independe nt executor may not sell real e state t o partition proper ty when the w ill does not confer5

such powe r. See Clark v . Posey , 329 S.W .2d 516, 518-19 (Tex

. Civ. App.—Austin 1959, writ ref ’d

n. r. e .) ; Te rri ll v . Te rri ll , 189 S.W .2d 877, 87 9 (T ex
. C i v . App.—San Antonio 1945, writ ref ’d). Her e, ther e wa s no will. I n the abse nce of a will confe rringsuch authority , an indepe ndent executor must follow the require ments of Section 150 to partition proper t y o r t o s ell proper ty if the cour

t deter mines that the proper

ty is incapable of a f

air a nd equal pa

rtition and distributi on: I f the will does not distribute the entire estat e of the testator, or pr ovide a me an s f o r p arti ti o no f

s a id e s tate , o r

if n o w il l w a s p r o b a te d , th e inde pendent executor may

file his fi n al ac co u nt in the county court in which the will was probate d, or if no will wa s p ro b ated, in the c ounty court in which the order appointing the independe nt executor was entered, a nd ask for

either pa rtition and distribution of the estate or an order of sale of any portion of the estate alleg ed by the independe nt executor and foun d b y t h e court to be incapable of a f air a nd equal pa rt iti on and dis tr ibutio n, or

bo th; and the same e ither shall be p a rtiti oned and distribut ed or shall b e s o l d , o r both, in the manner provided for the partition and distribut ion of p r o

p er t y and the sale of property incapable of division in estates ad mi nis te re d u nd

e r th e dir e c tio n o

f th e c ou nty

c ou rt (empha sis added). As independe nt administratrix , Smit h did not follow Section 150 in the sale of the 164 acr es to the Br owns. Under Section 150, Smit h was required to seek partition and dis tribution or sale of the 164

acr es in the manne r set forth in T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE ANN . §§ 373-387 (Ve rnon 2003 & Supp. 2008) found in Part 8 of the Probate Code “Par tition and Distributi on of Est ates of D ece dents.” Those are the sec tions that apply to “estates administered under t he direction of t he county court.” Section 150; In re Estate of Spindor , 840 S.W .2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1992, no wr it). Th e so le g ro un d f

or the su mma

ry jud g me nt g ra

nte d H od g e s and

Ga llo wa y wa s tha t Smi th failed to c omply with Sec tions 331 throug h 353. The trial c ourt err ed in g ranting summary judgme nt on that g round. Appellants’ first issue is sustained. Although we need not addre ss appellants’ other iss ue s, we wi ll a dd

re ss t wo argume nts ma de by

a pp e lla nts

. Probate Code Sec tion 188 The B rowns first a

rg ue that the sa le to them is voidable, not void. W e ag ree . An ind e pe nd e nt e xec uto r m ay se ll r e a l e state wi tho ut c ourt or de r u nder cert a in c on dit ion s. Section 341(2) pr ovides authority for a n independe nt executor to sell land i f a sale would be to the best interest of the estate. An i ndepende nt executor m ay sell land to pay

debts. Be cause devisee s
and he ir s ma y sh owtha t th e sa le wa s n ot t o th e be st i nte re st o f the e sta te or the re we re no de bts , ti tle6

to the rea l e state sold by an independe nt e x ecutor without c ourt order is voidable. We have r ever sed the su mma

ry jud g me nt, and

the iss ue of

wh e the r conditi on s e xiste d a uth or izin g the sa le by

Smith may be litigated on re mand. T EX
. P R OB
. C ODE ANN . § 188 (Ve rnon 2003) also is a uthority for finding that the sale to the Br owns is voidable. The Br owns argue that the sale to them should be held valid bec ause the y wer e innocent purc haser s that are rec og nized under Section 188:

When an executor or a dminist rator, le g ally qualified a s such, has pe rfor med any acts as such executor or administrator in c onformity with his authority and the law, such a cts shall continue to be valid to all intents and purposes, so far a s reg ards the rig hts of innocent purc haser s of any of the prop er t y of the e state fr om such executor or a dminist rator, f or a va luable conside ration, in g ood faith, and w ithout notice of a n y

illega lity in the title to the same, notwithstanding suc h acts or the authority under which they wer e per formed ma y afte rwa rd be se t aside, annulled, a nd decla red inva lid.
On rema nd, the Br owns may show that Smit h’s ac t was in confor mity with the law and that the y a c te d in g oo d f a ithwi tho ut n oti c e of

any ill e g a lity in c on ne c tio n w iththe sa le

. Al tho ug h Sm ith did not comply with Sec tion 150, we have pointed out that a n independe nt executor may sell land without cou

rt order under c erta in circumstanc es. Howe ver, w here a sale of prope rty is not authorized by a wi ll, a s in thi s c a se , the purc ha se r ha s th e burd e n o f p ro of to s ho w the e xiste nc e of

de bts a g a ins t the estate or other such conditions that w ould ha ve authorized a sale. Se e Ga te sv ill e Re di-

Mi x , 787 S.W. 2d a t 44 5; Buck

ner Orphans Home , 2 52 S.W. 2d a t 72 9. I f t

he purc ha ser sh ows that de bts

e xiste d at th e time of

sa le , th e purc ha se r i s e nti tle d to pr e su me that th e e xec uto r w ill us e the sa le proce eds to pay

the debt. Buck

ner Orphans Home , 252 S.W .2d at 729. This Court’s Ruling The summary

judgme nt gr anted by

the trial cour

t to Hodg es and Galloway is rever sed, and the c a us e is r e mand e d to the tr ia l c ourt

.

T E R RY M c C A LL JUSTI CE Aug ust 20, 2009 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.