T h e D e fen d a n t’s ca se w a s se v e re d fro m he r c o -d e fen d a n t’s p rio r to trial. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 16, 200 6

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LA TON YA TA YLO R

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-A- 443 J. Randall Wyatt, Judge

No. M2005- 00313-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jul y 31, 2006

The De fenda nt, L atony a Yvonne Tay lor, was c onvicted by a Da v i dson Countyjury

of ag g ravated

ro bb e ry , es peci all y

a g g ra vate d kidn app ing , a ndtw o c ou nts of kid na pp ing . F or

the se c on vic tio ns , t h e D e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d a n e f

f e c t i v e t w e n t y

- t h r e e

- y e ar

s e n t e n c e i n t h e D e p ar t m e n to f C o rr e c t i o n

. In this appeal a s of rig ht, the Def endant pr esents the following issues for our review : (1) whe ther the trial court e rre d in de ny ing her motion to suppress her statement g iven to the police; (2) whether the trial court imprope rly

limit ed the sc op e o f t he De fendant’s mother’s testimony ; (3) whe ther the evidence i s s u ff

i cient to support her

conviction for e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping ; and (4) whether the trial court erre d by

imposing conse cutive sente nces. A fter r eview, w e find no e rror and aff irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

C. L eAnn Smith, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, L atony a Ta y lor.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th B . M arn e y , A ssi s t an t A tt orne y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J oh n s o n , District Attorney Gene ral; and A ng elita Dalton, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound On Marc h 8, 2002, a Da vidson Countyg rand jury returne d an i n d i ct m en t ag ainst the Def endant a nd her c ounsin, Melanie R. Tay lor, cha rg ing the m wi t h agg ravated robbe ry and thre e
c ou nts of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d kidn app ing

. A t wo -d a y tr ia l w a s c on du c te d o n th e c ha rg e s in Ap ri l 1 of 2004.-2-

The e vidence at trial established that, on Ma rch 15, 1997, Ms. Lynette Miche lle McGa rr wa s working at Ar

by ’s on Elm Hill P ike in Davidson County . At approximately 10:45 p.m., after the store had c losed, the De fenda nt “tapped on t he window” and re quested to come inside to make a phone c a ll

. A c c o r d in g to M s

. M c G arr , s h e w a s a c q u a in te d w ith th e D e f e n d a n t b e c a u s e the Def endant ha d worke d at the re staurant a few months prior t o t his tim e. Ms. McGa rr state d, the Def endant “ beg g ed and ple aded . . . to let he r use the phone . I said, y ou know, I can’ t open -- y ou kn ow , le t y ou in. An d sh e ke pt p le a din g wi th - - y ou kn ow , b e g g ing me , s o I sa id, ok a y . Co me in

rea l quickly

and use the phone.” M s

. M cG ar r l et the De fendant in to use the telephone, and she returne d to her wor

k. Shortlythere afte r, Ms. McGa rr obse rved the Def

endant wa lking towa

rd the sto re e xit. M s. Mc Ga

rr a tte mpt e d to ha ve the De fe nd ant wai t to ex it the sto re so that sh e c ou ld

“ c he c k, make su re the re wa s n ob od y ou t th e re ” bu t, b e fo re Ms. Mc Ga rr wa s a ble to r e a c h th e e xit, the Def endant wa s “bac king up” with “her hands up. ”

At that time, two individuals, a man and a w oman, enter ed t h e re s t au rant. The woman pointed a g un at Ms. McGa rr a nd order ed her, t wo ot her e mploy ees w ho wer e wor king at the restaur ant, and the D efe ndant to “g o to the back.” The Def endant and the other

two employ ees w ere forc ed into the fre ezer. Ms. McGa rr wa s forc ed into the restaurant’s office at gunpoint and orde red to open the saf

e. The robber s took the money from the sa fe, and Ms. McGar r wa s t ak en to the fre ezer with the De fenda nt and the other employ ees. The robber s then left t he restaura nt. Once they

wer e certain the robber s wer e gone, they exit ed the fre ezer, and Ms. McGar r telephone d the police.

Ac c or din g to M s. Mc Ga

rr , th e De fend a nt c a me int o th e re staur a nt e arl ie r that e ve nin g to order food. She also saw the man and the woman who later robbed the store in the restaur ant at the same time as the D efe ndant and, a lthough they stood be hind the Def

endant, she did not observe a ny i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m

. T h e o t h e r t w o A r b y’ s e m p l o ye e s , C h r i s H a l p i n a n d C h r i s t o p h e r R i g s b y, g ave te stimonysimil ar to that of Ms. Mc Gar r.
Following interviews with the De fendant, she was de veloped a s a suspect in the crimes. On J u ly 1 9
, 2 0 0 1
, p o li c e c o n d u c te d v id e o s u r v e il lan c e o f th e D e f e n d a n t a n d a c o n f

id e n ti a l inf

ormant named B rook Na son in a hotel room at the Peachtr ee I nn. During a conve rsation betwe en the two women, the Defe ndant admit ted, “I plotted it all out.” The De fendant also admitted to sharing in the proce eds of the r obbery

.
There afte r, the Def

endant was interviewe d by TBI Ag ent Will ie Stout and confe ssed to her involvement in the crime. The Def endant tol d Ag ent Stout that they stole approximately

$4,000 from the Ar

by ’s.

The De fenda nt did not testify on her behalf at trial; she di d, howeve r, off er the testimonyof he r m oth e r, Ms. Di a ne Tay lor . H e r m oth e r t e st if ied that th e De fe nd a nt h a d p ro ble ms at sc ho ol, dropped out in the tenth g rade , and starte d drinking at a y oung ag e. M s

. T ay l o r described the relationship between he r daug hter a nd the co- defe ndant, Melanie Tay lor. She stated, “Me lanie wa s the leade r. She would just basically , tell L atony a, y ou know what to do.”T h e re c o rd d o e s c o n ta in a n a ff id a v it fro m th e c o u rt re p o rte r. In the a ff id a v it, the c o u rt re p o rte r sta te s tha t, in 2

order t o pr epar e t he t r ans cr i pt s , s he r eques t ed f r om t he D ef

endan t ’ s coun s el t he dat es of t he hea r i ng s an d t hat coun s el faile d to su p p ly t h o se d a te s.

-3- Th e jury fo un d th e De fe nd a nt g uil ty a s c ha rg e d f or the a g g ra vated robbe ry

a nde sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d kidn app ing of Ms. Mc Ga

rr a ndg uil ty

of the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of kid na

pp ing a s to the other two store employ ees. F ollowing a sentenc ing he aring , the trial court sentence d the Def endant to eig ht y ear s at 100% for the ag g ravated robbery conviction, fiftee n y ear s at 100% for the espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping co n v i ct ion, and three y ear s at 30% for eac h kidnapping conviction. The tria l court orde red the sentenc es for ag g ravated robbery and especially ag g ravated kidnapping to be serve d consec utively to one another , for a n eff

ective se ntence of twenty -three y ear s at 100%.

The De fenda nt f

iled a motion for new trial, which was denied. This timelyappea l followed.

AN AL YSI S I. M ot ion to Suppr e ss First, the De fenda nt arg ues that the trial court err ed by denying he r motion to suppress her statement g iven to Ag ent Stout. The State arg ues that the Def endant has waived this issue by failing to p re pa re a n ad e qu a te re c or d for re vie w, sp e c if ic a lly tr a ns c ri pts of the thr e e su pp re ssi on he ari ng s. 2 We a g re e . It app e ars that he ari ng s on the mot ion to su pp re ss we re he ld on Oc tob e r 30 , 2 00 2; Jul y 2, 2003; and April 5, 2004. Howe ver, the Def endant has failed to include any portion of the he aring tr a ns c ri pts in the re c or d be fo re thi s Court. “ Whe n a pa rt y se e ks app e llate re vie w the re is a du ty to prepa re a rec ord which c onvey s a fa ir, ac curate and complete a ccount of what tra nspired with re spect to the issues forming the basis of the a ppeal.” State v. Ba llard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993). I t is the du ty

of the app e a ling p art y

to p re pa re a n a de qu a te re c or d f

or app e llate re vie w. Te nn . R. Ap p

. P

. 2 4 (b ). W h er e t h e r ec o rd i s i n co m p l et e a n d d o es n o tco n t ai n a tr an s cr i p t o f t h e p ro ce ed i n gs rele vant to an issue pre sented for revie w, or portions of the rec ord upon which the pa rty relies, a n appellate court is pre cluded f rom considering the issue. State v

. Roberts, 755 S.W .2d 833, 836 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 88 ). I n the abs e nc e of a n ad e qu a te re c or d o n a pp e a l, this c ou rt

mus t pr e su me that the trial court’s actions below a re c orre ct and a

re supported by

sufficie nt ev i d en ce

. S t ate v. Oody , 823 S.W .2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). The State’s a rg ument that the Def

endant ha s
wa ive d th is i ssu e ha s me ri t.
Notwithstanding, the rec ord does c ontain an extensive order from the tria l court deta iling the fac ts presente d and re citing the various finding s of fa ct and c onclusions o f l aw made by the court in deny ing the motion. Also included in the re cord is the videota ped intervie w by

Ag ent Stout on July 19 , 2 00 1, a ndthe va

riou s e xpe rt

re po rt s e va luatin g the De fe nd a nt’ s me nta l c apc a ity . T hu s, despite an incomplete rec ord on appea l, we will revie w the propriety of the trial c ourt’s denia l of the mot ion to s up pr e ss.-4-

The De fenda nt arg ues that she lacke d the mental capa city to ma ke a voluntary waiver

of her Fifth Ame ndment rig hts. I n support, she cites the te stimonyof the e x pert witnesse s that she has low I Q score s, she is “ mildly mentally reta rded,” she has a

history of being instit utionaliz ed for mental problems, and he r sig nature on the waive r of rights form was bar ely leg ible. The State arg ues that the evidenc e supports the trial c ourt’s finding that the Def endant had the c apac ity

to make a know ing

an d i n t e l l i g e n t wa i v ero f h erri gh tt o re m ai n s i l en to r t o h av e c o u n s el p re s en td u ri n g q u es t i o n i n g. We ag ree with the State.

I n M ir a nd a

v. Arizon a , 3 84 U. S. 4 36 , 4 71 -7 5 ( 19 66 ), the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt he ld that a de fe nd a nt’ s sta te me nts ma de du ri ng a c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n a

re ina dmi ssi ble a t tria l un le ss the Sta te e sta

bli sh e s th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s in fo rm e d o f h is rig ht t o r e ma in si len t and his ri g ht t o counsel a nd that he knowing ly and voluntarily

waived thoserig hts. Whether t he def endant made a voluntary , knowing , and intellige nt waiver of those rig hts depends “‘upon the particula r fa cts and circ umstances surr ounding that case , in cl u d i ng the bac kg round, experienc e, and c onduct of the

acc used.’” Edwar ds v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (quoting J ohnson v. Z erbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) . The wa iver must be “‘ma de with full awar eness of both the nature of the rig ht being abandone d and the c onsequenc es of the de cision t o ab an d on it.’” State v. B lackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d 530, 544-45 (Tenn. 1994)). The State has the burde n of proving the waive r by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e. S tate v. Bush, 942 S.W .2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997)

.

I n deny ing the Def

endant’ s motion t o suppress on t h e basis of he r cla im of mental inc omp e te nc e , th e tr ia l c ou rt no te d, th e si gnatur e “ is v e ry le g ibl e [;]” the De fe nd a nt p ro mpt ly responde d to questioning a nd provided a clea r and log ical narra t ive; the videotape depicts the Def endant a s “cohe rent a nd lucid[; ] ” there was “ no conclusive e vidence that Def endant is eve n mentally reta rded[;] ” and the Def

endant, a ccor ding to Ag ent Stout, “did not present a ny indicators that she may

be mentally

reta rded.” Moreove r, eve n if the Defenda nt qualified a s mentally reta rded, that fac t is but one of a number of di ffe rent factors to be considered in the determination of whether the waive r of he r Miranda rig hts was knowing and voluntary

.

I n Bla ckstock, our supr eme c ourt observe d:

Al tho ug h th e re is li kely

to b e a le ve l of de fi c ie nc y

so g re a t th a t it

re nd e rs a de fe nd a nt u na

ble to m ake a

kn ow ing a ndint e lli g e nt waive r, ne arl y e ve ry c ou rt to consider the issue has held that mental impairments or mental re tardation are f actor s that mus t b e c o n s id e r e d a lo n g w ith th e to ta li ty o f th e c ir c u ms tan c e s

. A s o n e c o urt has said, “n o single fac tor, such as I Q, is nece ssarily determinative in deciding whether a per son was ca

pable of knowing ly and intelligently waiving , and do [sic] waive, the constitutional rig hts e mbrac ed in the Miranda rubric.” Fa irchil d v. L ockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1453 (E.D. Ar k

. 1 9 89). Among the circ umstances

co u rt s have c onsidered a

re the Def

endant’ s ag e, bac kg round, leve l of functionin g,
re a din g a ndwriti ng sk ill s, prior e xp erie nc e wi th the c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m, de me a n o r , r e s p o n s iv e n e s s to q u e s ti o n in g , p o s s ib le ma li n g e r in g , a n d th e man n e r,T h e D e fen d a n t’s ca se w a s tra n sfe rr e d fo llo w ing se v e ra n c e fro m he r c o -d e fen d a n t. 3

-5- de ta il, a ndla ng ua g e in w hic h th e Mir a nd a ri g hts are e xpla ine d. As a re su lt, c ou rt s tend to rea ch re sults that are somewhat fac t-specif ic.

B la c ks toc k, 19 S.W .3 d at 20 8 (fo otn ote omi tte d) . T he tot a lit y of the c ir c ums ta nc e s in thi s c a se supports the trial court’s finding that the Def endant knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily waived her Mira nda rig hts. Accor d i n gl y , we c onclude that the trial court did not err in deny ing the De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss h e r s ta te me nt.

II. Opini on Te st im ony The De fenda nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed in limiti ng the testimony of her mother. S p e c i f i c a l l y, t h e D e f

e n d a n tar g u e s t h a th e r

m o t h e r s h o u l d h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y

about the De fenda nt’s past history of being instit utionaliz ed. Ms. Taylor’s testimony was not being offere d to prese nt expert testimony , but rather dates a nd place s of the mental fa cilities she had bee n confine d. The Court re fu s ed t o al low any lay te sti mon y via he r p e rs on a l ob se rv a tio ns of he r d a u g h t e r

r e g a r d ing De fe nd a nt’ s a

bil ity to o rg a nize tho ug ht.

With re g ardto this iss ue , th e Defen dant f a ils to p ro vid e c itatio ns to any la w f or thi s pr op os ition

. “I ssue s w hic h a re no t su pp orte d b y

arg ume nt, c itatio n to a uth oriti e s, or app ro pria te ref ere nces to the r ecor d will be treated as waived in this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); see also State v. Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Even if not waived, howe ver, the Def endan t ’s ar gument is without m erit. The trial court, in limiti ng the Def endant’ s mother’s testimony , stated:

Well, Ithink when y ou -- when y ou say that she had problems i n school and that she just g ot out of school in the eleve nth g rade and -- and she was not the leade r type, y ou might be g etting into that. But, whe n y ou start g etting the fac t that she was instit utionaliz ed and had mental problems, and this and that and the other, all that’s doing is w ith o u t r e a ll y

p r o v in g it

o r h a v in g a me n ta l h e a lth e xp e r t h e r e , r aising questions that are not rea lly
, I don’t think, properly befor e this J ury

for them to think they ’ v e g o t to ma

k e a d e c is io n ab o u t h e r me n ta l il ln e s s o r h e r h is to r yof instit utionaliz ation, or whateve r the word would be. So I think y ou can te stify

or let her testify that -- about her daug hter a nd she had pr oblems in school and this and that and the other. And t hat ki nd of goes to her leaving and the intent, and this and that

a ndthe oth e r, bu t I-- I

do n’ t th ink

-- I thi nk if y ou g e t in to a ll o f this me nta l il lne ss, which Judge B lackburn has alre ady resolved, she had hearings on this and that and 3 the other, a nd that’s not an issue, then that’s trying to c ome in the bac k door in a way that ’s alre ady

been de cided by

the Trial Judge , who had origina lly had this case
, J udg e B lackburn, is not properly befor e this J ury

. . . .T h e D ef en dan t i n i t i al l y f

r ame s t h e i s s u e as ch al l en g i n g t h e s u f f i ci en cy of t h e ev i den ce for al l of t h e cr i mes for 4

w h ic h sh e w a s c o n v ic te d

. H o w e v e r, the a rg u m e n t se c tio n o f he r b rie f f o c u se s so le ly o n he r c o n v ic tio n fo r e sp e c ia lly
agg r ava t ed ki dnappi ng

. Accordi ng l y , t hi s opi ni on wi l l addres s he r s uf f i ci enc y ar gu ment onl y as i t per t ai ns t o her

c o n v ic tio n fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra v a te d kid n a p p ing

.
-6- The propriety , scope, ma nner, and control of testimon y an d other e vidence are matters entrusted to the sound discr etion of the trial c ourt. See St at e v

. Hu t ch i s on, 898 S.W .2d 161, 172 (Tenn

. 1 9 9 4 ) ; St a te v

. B ar n ar d
, 8 9 9 S. W. 2 d 6 1 7
, 6 2 4 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 9 4 ) ( c it in g State v. Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978) ); see a lso Tenn. R. Evid. 611. “Abs ent a c lear abuse, which has r esulted in manifest pre judice to the ac cused, this court wi l l n o t interfe re w ith the trial

cour t ’s ex erc ise of its discretion in matters pe rtaining to the examination of witnesses.” State v. Humphrey s, 70 S.W .3d 752, 766 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Coffee v. State, 216 S.W .2d 702, 703 (Tenn. 1948) ).

The trial c ourt permitted the Def endant’ s mother to testify about the De fendant’s social and int e lle c tua l pr ob le ms a ndde sc ri be the c o- de fe nd a nt as a le a de r. Th e De fe nd a nt didno t a tte mpt to of fe r e xpe rt te sti mon y

on the iss ue of me nta l capa c ity a t tria l. We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt did not abuse its discretion in limiti ng th e testi mony of the De fendant’s mother nor did any such limit ation aff

ect the ve rdict.

III. Su ff iciency Th e De fe nd a nt a lso a sse rt s that the re is ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e fo r any

ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t to find bey ond a re asonable d o ubt that she was g uiltyof the e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping of the victim, Ms. McGarr

. I n support of this assertion, the De fendant arg ues in her a ppellate brief: 4

[T] he testimony

from all the State’ s witnesses is th at at no time did the Def endant ha ve possession of a wea pon. The Def

endant’ s statement alone was not sufficie n t, b e y o n d a

r e a s o n ab le d o u b t, th a t D e f e n d a n t a c c o mp li s h e d th e a c t of kidnap p i n g. I t was the c o-def endant, Me lanie Ta y lor, who had posse ssion of the

we apo n. I t w a s th e c o- de fe nd a nt, Me la nie Tay lor , w ho or de re d th e vic tim , M s. McGa rr, into the re staurant of

fice to open the sa fe

. Defendant wa s locked in the fre ezer with the other

victims during this time.

Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate Proc edure 13(e) presc ribes that “[f]indings of g uilt in criminal actions whe ther by

the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evide nce is insuffic ient to support the finding s by

the trier of

fac t of g uilt bey ond a re asonable doubt.” A convic ted criminal defenda nt who cha lleng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e on appea l be ars the burden of demonstrating why the evidenc e is insufficient to support the ve rdict, bec ause a verdic t of g uilt destroy s the pre s u mption of innoce nce and imposes a presumption of g uilt. See State v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 2 )

. T h is Co u r t mu s t r e je c t a c o n v ic te d c r im in a l d e f e n d a n t’ s c h a ll e n g e to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence if, afte r considering the evidence in a lig ht most favorable to the-7-

prosec ution, we determine that any rational trier of fac t c ould have found the e ssential elements of the crime bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999).

On app e a l, the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e viden ce anda ll

rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces which may be drawn t here from. See Ca rruther s, 35 S.W .3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W .3d at 599. A g uilty verdic t by the trier of fac t a ccr edits the testimony of the State’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the pr os e c uti on ’s the ory . Se e State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . Questions about the cr edibility o f wi tnesses, the weig ht and value of

the evidenc e, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidence are r esolved by the trier of

fac t, and thi s Court will not re-w eig h or re -eva luate the e vidence . See Eva ns, 108 S.W .3d at 236; Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 6 5 9

. Nor will this Court subs titute its own infer ence s drawn f rom circ umstantial evidence for those dr awn by the trier of fa ct. See Evans, 108 S.W .3d at 236-37; Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d at 557.

Th e De fe nd a nt w a s con vic te d of e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kidn app ing , w hic h is de fi ne d a s f a lse imprisonment “[a] ccomplished with a deadly wea pon or by display of any article used or f

ashioned to lead the victim to rea sonably believe it to b e a de adly wea pon.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 30 5( a )( 1) . T he De fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t sh e c a nn ot b e fou nd gu ilt y of the c ri me of

e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping beca use she did not p er s o n al l yrob the victim at g unpoint; she did not persona lly

order the victim to open the safe ; nor did she possess a gun. I n short, the Def endant arg ues that she cannot be found guilty beca use she was not the principal in the crimes committed by her two c ohorts. The De fe n d an t’s arg ument is mispl ace d. Our law supports the Def endant’ s
c o n v i c t i o n s u n d e r

t h e t h e o r y o f

c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y.

Tenne ssee statutes pr ovide that a pe rson is “criminallyresponsible for a n offe nse committed by the conduc t of another if: [A] cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense
, or to b e nefit in the pr oc e e ds or re su lts of the of fe ns e , th e pe rs on so lic its , d ir e c ts, a ids , o r atte mpt s to ai d a n o t h e r

p e r s o n t o c o m m i tt h e o f f e n s e

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 4 0 2 ( 2 )

. T h i s s t a t u te codifies the long standing co mmon law theories of “ac cessories befor e the f act a nd aider s and

abe tto rs .” I d. , Se nte nc ing Com mis si on Com me nts . H ow e ve r, c ri min a l r e sp on sib ili ty is n ot i tse lf a sepa rate crime; rathe r, it is “solely a theory by which the State may

prove thedefe ndant’s g uilt of the alleg ed off

ense . . . ba sed upon the c onduct of a nother pe rson.” State v. L emac ks, 996 S.W .2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999)

.

Un de r a the ory of c ri min a l re sp on sib ili ty , a def e nd a nt’ s pre se nc e a ndc omp a nio ns hip wi th the per petrato r o f a felony

befor e and a fter the commission of the offe nse ar e cir cumstance s from which that def

endant’ s participation i n t h e cr i me may be infe rre d. See State v. B all, 973 S.W .2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . No particu l ar act ne ed be show n, and the de fendant need not have play ed a phy sical role in the crime in order to be held criminallyresponsible for the crime. See Sta te v. Ca ld wel l, 80 S.W. 3d31 , 3 8 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 02 ). Ra the r, to b e he ld c ri min a lly responsible for

the ac ts of another , the def endant need only “‘a ssociate hims elf with t he ventur e, ac tW e n ot e t hat t he l egi s l at ur e h as r ece nt l y amended s eve r al provi s i ons of t he C r i mi nal Sent enc i ng R eform Act 5

of 198 9, s ai d cha nges becomi ng ef fect i ve Jun e 7, 200 5. H owever , t he D ef endan t ’ s cr i mes i n t hi s ca s e, as wel l as he r

sen t en cing
, p red ate t he eff ec t i ve d ate of t he se a m en d m en t s. T he refo re, t his case i s no t aff ec t ed b y t he 2 0 0 5 am en d m en t s,

an d t h e s t at u t es c i t ed i n t h i s opi n i on a r e t h os e t h at w er e i n e f fec t a t t h e t i me t h e i n s t an t c r i mes w er e commi t t ed.

-8- wi th kno wl e dg e that the of fe ns e is to b e c omm itt e d, a ndsh are in the c ri min a l in te nt o f the princ ipl e in the first deg ree .’” I d. (citing State v. Maxey , 898 S.W .2d 756, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ).

I n this case, the r ecor d reve als that the De fendant both acted with intent to “assist [in] the commission of the offe n s e[ s ] ” and “be nefit[ed] i n the proc eeds or results of the of

fense .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 402(2). I n addition to her videotaped confession t o Ag ent Stout, the Defe ndant admitted her involveme nt in the commission of the offense s to Ms. Nason in the hotel room. The Def endant admitted, “I did the pl otting and they did the fix ing.” She further stated, “I ’m prete nding like I ’m g oing out the door and I open the door for them.” The Defendant also benef itted from the pr oc e e ds of

the of fe ns e s, statin g that sh e re c e ive d $ 1, 00 0 f or he r r ole in the c ri me s.

We conclude th at t h e De fe n dant’s aid in the c ommissi on of the off enses, a s well as her monetary benef

it, have rende red her criminallyresponsible for the espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping of Ms. McGa

rr. This issue is without merit.

IV . Se nt e nc ing As her f inal issue, the Def

endant contends that the trial court err ed in imposing consec utive

se nte nc ing . B e fo re a

tr ia l c ou rt

imp os e s a

se nte nc e up on a

c on vic te d c ri min a l de fe nd a nt, it m us t

c on sid e r ( a ) the e vid e nc e a dd uc e d at the tr ia l and the se nte nc ing he ari ng ; (b) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; (c) the principles of

sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) t h e n at u re a nd char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by

the parties

on the enhanceme nt and mitigating fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tions 40-35- 113 and 40-35- 114; and (f) an y s t at em ent t he def endant wishe s to make in the def endant’ s own behalf about sentenc ing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( b); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 5 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T o f

a c ili ta te app e llate re vie w, the tr ia l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to pla c e on th e reco rdits

rea sons for imp o s i n g the spec ific sentenc e, including the identification of the mitigating and enha n c e me n t f

a c to r s f o u n d
, th e s p e c if

ic f a c ts s u p p o r ti n g e a c h e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r f o u n d
, and the

me tho d b y

wh ic h th e mitig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s h a vebe e n e va luated and balanc e d in determining the se ntence . See State v. Samuels, 44 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001).

Upon a c halleng e to the sente nce imposed, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the sente nce w ith a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d). How ever , this presumption “is conditioned upon the aff irmative sh ow ing in the re c or d tha t the tr ia l cou rt c on sid e re d the se nte nc ing princ ipl e s and a ll r e le va nt f a c ts and cir cumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial court followed the statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, that the c ourt imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r having g iven due c onsideration and pr oper w eig ht t o the fa ctors and principles set out under the sentenc ing la w, and that the trial court’s findings of fac t are adequately supported by

the re cord,-9-

then th e p re s u m p t i o n is applicable, a nd we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pref err ed a differ ent re sult. S ee State v. F letcher , 805 S.W . 2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. We w ill uphold the sentenc e imposed by the trial court if ( 1) the sente nce c omplies with the purposes and princ iples of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, and ( 2) the trial c ourt’s finding s are adequately supported by the re cord. See State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b) pr ovides that it is within the trial court’s discretion to impose consec utive sentenc ing if it finds bya pre ponderance of the evidenc e that any

on e of the fo llo wi ng c ri te ri a

app lie s:
(1 ) The de fenda nt is a profe ssional criminal who has knowing ly devoted suc h defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a
c omp e te nt p sy chiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti g a tio n p ri or to sentenc ing that the defendant’s criminal conduct has been char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r whose behavior indicates l ittle or no reg ard fo r h um an lif

e , a ndno he sit a tio n a

bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk

to human life is hig h; (5) The defe ndant is c onvicted of two (2) or more statutory offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with co nsideration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re lationship between the defe ndant and victim or victi m s , t h e time span of defe n d a n t’ s u n d e te c te d s e xu a l a c ti v it y , th e n a tu r e a n d s c o p e o f th e s e xu a l acts a nd the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; or (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

.

Ten n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 5 ( b )

. T h e s e c r it e r ia ar e s tate d in th e a lt e r n a ti v e ; th e r e f o r e , onlyone need e x ist to support t he imposition of c onsecutive sentenc ing. I n State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995) , the supreme court imposed two add i t i o nal re quirements for consec utive sentenc ing w hen the “ dang erous of fende r” categ ory

is used: The court must find consecutive

se nte nc e s a

re re a so na

bly re la te d to the s e ve ri ty

of the of fe ns e s c omm itt e d a ndare ne c e ssa ry to protec t the public from further c riminal conduct. Wilkerson, 905 S.W .2d at 937-38.

Although the Def

endant’ s prese ntence report is included in the rec ord, the tra nscript of the sentenc ing hearin g is n o t. A g a in
, w e n o te th a t i t i s th e d u ty o f th e ap p e a li n g p ar ty

to p r e p ar e an adequate re cord f

or appe llate re view. Te nn. R. App. P. 24( b). I n the abse nce of an ade quate r ecor d on appea l, this court must presume that the trial court’s actions below are corr ect and are supported by sufficie nt evidence . Oody , 823 S.W .2d at 559.

I n the order imposing consec utive sentenc es, which is included in the rec ord, the trial c ourt state d th a t it

ha d impo se d c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s b a se d o n it s f ind ing s th a t t he Defen da nt w a s aT he r ecor d re f l ect s t hat t he D ef

endan t ’ s ef

fect i ve t wen t y

- t hr ee y ear s ent enc e wa s ord ere d to b e s er ved 6

c o n se c u tive ly t o a se n te n c e o f l ife w itho u t p a ro le im p o se d in R u the rfo rd C o u n ty.

-10- dang erous of

fende r whose be havior indicated lit t l e or no reg ard f or human life and no hesitation about committing a c rime in which t h e ri s kto human life wa s high. The trial c ourt furthe r 6 conclude d that consec utive sentenc ing was re asonably related to the seve rity

of the off enses a nd was

ne c e ssa ry to pr ote c t the pu bli c . We c on c lud e that th e re c or d in thi s c a se su ff ic ie ntl y su pp orts the se fi n d i n gs

. Ac co rd i n gl y , we af fi rm t h e t ri al co u rt ’s i m p o s i t i o n o f c o n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.

CO NC LU SION B a se d on the fo re g oin g a uth oriti e s and re a so nin g , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE