NO. COA13-447

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 February 2014

MOUNT ULLA HISTORICAL 

PRESERVATION SOCIETY, INC., 

et al.,

Petitioners

v. Rowan County

No. 11 CVS 2793

ROWAN COUNTY, DAVIDSON COUNTY 

BROADCASTING, INC., RICHARD and 

DORCAS PARKER, and MAURICE E. 

and MARY LEE PARKER,

Respondents

Appeal by respondent from order entered 27 September 2012 by 

Judge W. David Lee in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the 

Court of Appeals 23 October 2013.

Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Thomas E. Terrell, Jr. and 

Elizabeth Brooks Scherer; Kluttz, Reamer, Hayes, Randolph, 

Adkins & Carter, L.L.P., by Richard R. Reamer; and Sherrill 

and Cameron, PLLC, by Carlyle Sherrill, for petitionerappellees.

Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Anthony Fox and Benjamin 

Sullivan, for respondent-appellant Rowan County.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Respondent Rowan County (“the County”) appeals from the trial 

court’s order reversing the decision of the Rowan County Board of 

Commissioners (“the Board”) to issue a conditional use permit 
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(“CUP”) to respondent Davidson County Broadcasting, Inc. (“DBCI”) 

on the basis that the CUP application was barred by the doctrines 

of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We affirm.

I. Background

On 18 January 2005, DCBI applied to the Board for a CUP (“the 

2005 CUP application”) to construct a 1,350 foot radio tower (“the 

tower”) on property owned by respondents Richard and Dorcas Parker 

(“the Parkers”). After conducting a public hearing regarding the 

application, the Board voted to deny the CUP. The written decision 

denying the application indicated that it was denied because the 

proposed tower would pose an air safety hazard to Miller Airpark, 

a nearby private airport.

DCBI and the Parkers then filed a petition for writ of 

certiorari in Rowan County Superior Court to review the Board’s 

decision. The court granted the petition and affirmed the denial 

of the CUP. DCBI and the Parkers appealed to this Court, which 

affirmed the decision of the superior court. Davidson Cty. 

Broadcasting, Inc. v. Rowan Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 186 N.C. App. 81, 

649 S.E.2d 904 (2007)(“DCBI I”).

On 26 May 2010, DCBI applied to the Board for a CUP for a 

1,200 foot radio tower (“the 2010 CUP application”) in 

substantially the same proposed location as the tower in the 2005 
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application that had been denied. On 24 March 2011, DCBI filed a 

supplemental application to include property owned by respondents 

Maurice E. Parker and Mary Lee Parker as a fall zone. Petitioners1

moved to dismiss the 2010 CUP application as being barred by the 

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Board 

denied the motion on 5 July 2011. Beginning 1 August 2011, the 

Board held a quasi-judicial hearing to consider the new 

application. On 6 September 2011, the Board entered a written 

decision approving the CUP. The Board found, inter alia, that the 

proposed tower would not create any hazardous safety conditions.

On 3 October 2011, petitioners filed a petition for writ of 

certiorari in Rowan County Superior Court, seeking review of the 

Board’s CUP approval. Petitioners once again argued that the 2010 

CUP application was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. 

Petitioners also alleged that the approved CUP did not conform to 

the Rowan County Zoning Ordinance.

On 27 September 2012, the superior court entered an order 

reversing the Board’s approval of the 2010 CUP application. The 

 

1 Petitioners consist of Mt. Ulla Historical Preservation Society, 

Inc., Miller Air Park Owners Association, and several dozen private 

individuals.
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court concluded that the 2010 CUP application was barred by res 

judicata and collateral estoppel. Respondents appeal.2

II. Standard of Review

“Special and conditional use permit decisions are quasijudicial zoning decisions.” County of Lancaster v. Mecklenburg 

County, 334 N.C. 496, 508, 434 S.E.2d 604, 613 (1993). “Our task, 

in reviewing a superior court order entered after a review of a 

board decision is two-fold: (1) to determine whether the trial 

court exercised the proper scope of review, and (2) to review 

whether the trial court correctly applied this scope of review.” 

Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnston County Bd. of Adjust., 132 N.C. 

App. 465, 468, 513 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1999).

The proper standard for the superior court’s 

judicial review depends upon the particular 

issues presented on appeal. When the 

petitioner questions (1) whether the agency’s 

decision was supported by the evidence or (2) 

whether the decision was arbitrary or 

capricious, then the reviewing court must 

apply the whole record test. However, [i]f a 

petitioner contends the [b]oard’s decision was 

based on an error of law, de novo review is 

proper. Moreover, the trial court, when 

sitting as an appellate court to review a 

[decision of a quasi-judicial body], must set 

forth sufficient information in its order to 

reveal the scope of review utilized and the 

application of that review. 

 

2 While all respondents entered notice of appeal from the superior

court’s order, only respondent Rowan County filed a brief with 

this Court.
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Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 

565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted).

III. Res Judicata

The County argues that the superior court erred by reversing 

the Board’s approval of the 2010 CUP application because the 

application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We 

disagree.

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the 

merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction 

precludes a second suit involving the same claim between the same 

parties or those in privity with them.” Nicholson v. Jackson Cty. 

School Bd., 170 N.C. App. 650, 654, 614 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2005) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). “The purpose of the 

doctrine of res judicata is to protect litigants from the burden 

of relitigating previously decided matters and to promote judicial 

economy by preventing unnecessary litigation.” Holly Farm Foods

v. Kuykendall, 114 N.C. App. 412, 417, 442 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1994). 

“[W]hether the doctrine of res judicata operates to bar a cause of 

action is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.” Housecalls 

Home Health Care, Inc. v. State, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 738 S.E.2d 

753, 758 (2013).
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Our Supreme Court has specifically held that res judicata “is 

available with respect to the proceedings and final decision of a 

judicial or quasi-judicial body.” Little v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 793, 

795, 143 S.E. 827, 828 (1928). In Little, a building permit to 

construct a gasoline filling station was denied by the building 

inspector and the board of adjustment, and the denial was upheld 

by our Supreme Court. See Harden v. Raleigh, 192 N.C. 395, 135 

S.E. 151 (1926). The property owner then petitioned the building 

inspector to reopen the case. Little, 195 N.C. at 793, 143 S.E. 

at 827. The building inspector reversed his prior determination 

and the previously-denied building permit was issued. Id. The 

issuance of the permit was upheld by the board of adjustment and

the superior court. Id. at 793-94, 143 S.E. at 827-28. On appeal, 

our Supreme Court reversed the issuance of the building permit on 

the basis of res judicata:

There is no allegation, no proof, and no 

finding by the trial court that the facts in 

the case at bar are in anywise different from 

the facts in the case of Harden v. Raleigh. 

Indeed, the trial judge finds that Mrs. Harden 

applied to the building inspector “to reopen 

and rehear its former decision upon the 

building of the filling station upon her said 

lot.”

Upon these circumstances we are constrained to 

hold that the plea of res judicata, duly filed 

in apt time by the petitioners, was available, 

and therefore that the owner of the lot is not 
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entitled to reopen and rehear the case upon 

the identical facts presented in the former 

record.

Id. at 795, 143 S.E. at 828.

Little was subsequently distinguished by In re Broughton 

Estate, 210 N.C. 62, 185 S.E. 434 (1936). In Broughton, a permit 

was issued to construct a filling station. Id. at 62, 185 S.E. at 

434. The permit issuance was challenged because, inter alia, a 

similar application had been denied three years earlier. Id. The 

superior court reversed the granting of the permit based upon 

Little, concluding that there had been “no substantial change in 

conditions” since the prior permit denial. Id. at 62-63, 185 S.E. 

at 434. That decision was then appealed to our Supreme Court, 

which reversed the superior court after determining that Little

was inapplicable:

The trial court held that the case was 

controlled by the decision in Little v. 

Raleigh, 195 N. C., 793, 143 S. E., 827. The 

two cases are not alike. In the first place, 

the cited case was on application “to reopen 

and rehear” a former decision which had 

received judicial approval sub nomine Harden 

v. Raleigh, 192 N. C., 395, 135 S. E., 151. 

Not so here. In the next place, Little's case, 

supra, was not only identical in allegation 

and fact with the original case, but was in 

truth the same case. Here, the traffic 

conditions as found by the board, “have 

materially changed since the former 

application was acted on . . . .”
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Id. at 63, 185 S.E. at 435. 

The County contends that, when read together, Little and 

Broughton stand for the proposition that res judicata applies to 

quasi-judicial land use decisions only when the applicant is 

attempting to “reopen and rehear the case upon the identical facts 

presented in the former record.” Little, 195 N.C. at 795, 143 

S.E. at 828. However, the County reads the Broughton Court’s 

interpretation of Little too narrowly.

The Broughton Court determined that the use of res judicata by 

the trial court was improper based upon two differences between 

the permit approval before it and the permit approval at issue 

in Little. First, the permit issued in Little was based upon an

“application ‘to reopen and rehear’ a former decision which had 

received judicial approval . . . .” Broughton, 210 N.C. at 63, 185 

S.E. at 435. Second, the Court noted that “the traffic conditions 

as found by the board, ‘have materially changed since the former 

application was acted on . . . .’” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, 

the Broughton Court did not conclude that res judicata did not 

apply merely because the two applications at issue in that case 

were not exactly the same. The Court’s conclusion also depended 

upon the board’s finding that there was a material change in 

conditions between the prior permit application and the subsequent 
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permit application. This requirement of a material change in order 

to preclude the use of the defense of res judicata for quasijudicial land use decisions is consistent with the law in other 

jurisdictions which have considered the question, see, e.g., 

Curless v. County of Clay, 395 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 

App. 1981); Whittle v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 125 A.2d 41, 46 

(Md. 1956); Fisher v. City of Dover, 412 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.H. 

1980); and Cohen v. Fair Lawn, 204 A.2d 375, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 1964), as well as with general res judicata principles. 

See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. f. (1982)(“Material 

operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with 

respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in 

conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction 

which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by 

the first.”).

Although our Courts have not specifically defined what 

constitutes a material change, the consensus among other 

jurisdictions which have analyzed whether res judicata bars a 

quasi-judicial land use decision appears to be that 

[t]he change in conditions or circumstances 

which would justify the reconsideration of an 

action must be a change in the particular 

circumstance or condition which induced the 

prior denial. The change in circumstances must 

be such that the application for the same or 
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a substantially similar special exception or 

variance no longer can be characterized as the 

same claim.

83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 700 (2013)(footnotes omitted). 

This definition of material change makes sense in the context of 

quasi-judicial land use decisions because

[w]hen the facts and circumstances which 

actuated an order or a decision are alleged 

and shown to have so changed as to vitiate or 

materially affect the reasons which produced 

and supported it and no vested rights have 

intervened, it is reasonable and appropriate 

to the functions of the board that the 

subject-matter be re-examined in the light of 

the altered circumstances.

St. Patrick's Church Corp. v. Daniels, 154 A. 343, 345 (Conn. 

1931).

We find the preceding authorities persuasive and utilize them 

to formulate the following definition of “material change” in the 

context of quasi-judicial land use decisions in North Carolina: a 

material change which precludes the use of the defense of res 

judicata occurs when the specific facts or circumstances which led 

to the prior quasi-judicial land use decision have changed to the 

extent that they “vitiate . . . the reasons which produced and 

supported” the prior decision such that the application “can no 

longer can be characterized as the same claim.” Id.; 83 Am. Jur. 

2d Zoning and Planning § 700.
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In the instant case, the 2005 CUP application was denied 

because the proposed tower was determined to be a safety hazard to 

Miller Airpark. See DCBI I, 186 N.C. App. at 91-92, 649 S.E.2d at 

912. Accordingly, in order to avoid being barred by res judicata, 

DCBI’s 2010 CUP application must have materially changed the design 

of the proposed tower in such a way as to vitiate the concerns 

regarding air safety which led to the denial of the 2005 CUP 

application.

Although the Board denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss on 

the basis of res judicata, it did not include, as part of its 

written decision approving the 2010 CUP application, any findings 

which suggest that there was a material change from the denied 

2005 CUP application. However, by denying petitioners’ motion to 

dismiss, the Board necessarily found that there was a material 

change between the two applications. This inference is consistent 

with Rowan County Commissioner Jim Sides, Jr.’s explanation of his 

motion to deny petitioners’ motion to dismiss:

[t]here has been considerable change in this 

application from the previous application, and 

I realize that the previous decision was made 

based primarily on safety factors. We do not 

know, at this point, based on a 1200 feet (sic) 

tower versus a 1350 feet (sic) tower, what the 

facts would be in relation to safety. Based 

on that, I would move against the motion to 

dismiss . . . .” 
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The County makes substantially the same argument to this Court, 

contending that the lowering of the tower by 150 feet in the 2010 

CUP application was a material change that would preclude the use

of res judicata.

Prior to determining whether the Board’s finding of a material 

change was correct, we must first determine the proper standard of 

review, which our Courts have not explicitly considered 

previously. The consensus from other jurisdictions is that the 

determination of whether a subsequent application demonstrates a

material change from a prior application is a factual question, 

with deference given to the quasi-judicial body’s finding. See 

Russell v. Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Tenafly, 155 A.2d 83, 

88 (N.J. 1959)(“Whether the requirement [of a material change] has 

been met is for the board, in the first instance, to determine. 

This finding, as any other made by the board, will be overturned 

on review only if it is shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary or 

capricious.” (internal citation omitted)); Freeman v. Ithaca 

Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 403 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 

1978)(“[I]t is for the board to determine whether or not changed 

facts or circumstances are presented and, in so doing, it may give 

weight even to slight differences not easily discernible[.]”

(internal quotations and citation omitted). This deferential 
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standard is consistent with Broughton, in which our Supreme Court 

overturned the superior court’s conclusion “that there had been no 

substantial change in conditions” based upon the board of 

adjustment’s finding that “traffic conditions . . . ‘have 

materially changed since the former application was acted on . . 

. .’” 210 N.C. at 63, 185 S.E. at 434-35. Accordingly, we conclude

that the deferential whole record test applies to the Board’s 

finding of a material change. We note that the superior court 

correctly applied this standard of review below, holding that “[a] 

whole record review . . . fails to disclose competent, material or 

substantial evidence that the height variance materially alters 

the proposed use from that use proposed in the earlier 

application.”

“When utilizing the whole record test, . . . the reviewing 

court must examine all competent evidence (the “whole record”) in 

order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by 

substantial evidence.” Mann Media, 356 N.C. at 14, 565 S.E.2d at 

17 (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The ‘whole record’ 

test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board’s 

judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though 

the court could justifiably have reached a different result had 
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the matter been before it de novo.” Thompson v. Board of Education, 

292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977).

The County is correct that the lowering of the tower by 150 

feet constituted a change from the denied 2005 CUP application. 

However, a review of the whole record does not reveal any evidence 

that this change would undermine the reasoning behind the denial 

of the 2005 CUP application. The County points to general evidence

presented during the 2010 CUP application hearing that the proposed

1,200 foot tower would be safe for air travel, but fails to connect 

this evidence in any way to the change in the height of the tower 

from the 2005 CUP application. The safety evidence cited by the 

County would be equally applicable to both a 1,350 foot tower and 

a 1,200 foot tower. As this Court explicitly recognized in DCBI

I, the 2005 CUP application was supported by “evidence from which 

the Board could have found that the tower would not pose an 

unreasonable or unjustifiable safety hazard” to air travel, but 

the Board nonetheless found that evidence to be outweighed by other 

evidence that the tower would create such a hazard. 186 N.C. App. 

at 92, 649 S.E.2d at 913. Since there is nothing in the whole 

record which suggests that the prior evidence regarding the tower’s

potential safety hazard to air travel from the 2005 CUP application 

hearing was vitiated by lowering the tower by 150 feet, the Board’s 
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finding in the instant case that there was a material change in 

the 2010 CUP application was not supported by the evidence. See 

St. Patrick’s Church, 154 A. at 345. The whole record reflects

that the Board essentially considered the same information in both 

the 2005 and 2010 CUP applications and reached different decisions. 

Res judicata forbids such a result. See King v. Grindstaff, 284 

N.C. 348, 355, 200 S.E.2d 799, 804 (1973)(“(W)hen a fact has been 

agreed upon or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties 

shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over 

again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree 

stands unreversed.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

Ultimately, as there was no material change between the 2005 and 

2010 CUP applications, res judicata barred the Board from 

reconsidering its previous decision. Therefore, the superior 

court properly concluded that res judicata required the Board to 

dismiss the 2010 CUP application. This argument is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

Res judicata generally applies to quasi-judicial land use 

decisions unless there is a material change in the facts or 

circumstances since the prior decision was rendered. In the 

instant case, a whole record review provides no evidence that the 

lowering of the proposed tower by 150 feet in the 2010 CUP 
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application constituted a material change. Therefore, the 

superior court properly concluded that the 2010 CUP application 

was barred by res judicata. The superior court’s order is 

affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges BRYANT and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concur.