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Filed 11/5/21 P. v. Lynn CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yuba)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SAXON DANIEL LYNN,

Defendant and Appellant.

C093473

(Super. Ct. No. CRF2001917)

Defendant Saxon Daniel Lynn pled no contest to making criminal threats and 

admitted a prior conviction enhancement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the probation 

officer told the trial court the victim was requesting a criminal protective order (the 

order). The trial court issued the order and advised defendant regarding the prohibited 

conduct identified therein. Defendant did not object. Defendant’s sentencing hearing 

was held approximately two months later, during which the trial court sentenced 

defendant to two years eight months in prison.
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Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion for 

various reasons when it issued the order. The People argue defendant forfeited the 

argument by failing to object to the imposition of the order or, alternatively, the issue is 

moot because the order is no longer in effect. We agree with the People that the issue is 

forfeited.

Defendant acknowledges that, “ ‘[a]s a general rule, an appell[ant] waives issues 

on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court.’ ” (Citing People v. 

Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378.) Defendant asserts, however, that the exception to 

the forfeiture rule “ ‘for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in 

excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction’ ” should apply. (Citing ibid.) 

It is clear the argument is forfeited unless the exception applies because defendant 

did not object to the imposition of the order. (People v. Ponce, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 381.) The problem with defendant’s argument is that the imposition of the order was 

not an unauthorized sentence and did not form part of the trial court’s sentencing

decisions. While the trial court did not select the statutory basis for the order on the 

form, the parties agree the only applicable statute pursuant to which the trial court could 

have granted the order was Penal Code section 136.2. A criminal protective order issued 

pursuant to that statute is operative only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings

and as prejudgment orders. (People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118-119.) 

Consistent with the foregoing, the back of the order stated it was valid only “as long as 

the court has jurisdiction over the case” and it was “not valid after imposition of a state 

prison commitment,” citing People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153. Further, the 

order was imposed prior to sentencing and was not mentioned by the trial court during 

the sentencing hearing. 

Based on the foregoing, the order terminated by operation of law and based on the 

plain language on the back of the order when the trial court sentenced defendant. The 
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exception to the forfeiture rule upon which defendant relies thus simply does not apply 

under the facts presented. Defendant’s argument is forfeited.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ 

Robie, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Mauro, J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.