IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

January 2024 Term

_____________________

No. 22-916

_____________________

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY BOARD, 

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERY A. DAVIS, 

Respondent.

___________________________________________________________

Lawyer Disciplinary Proceeding

Nos. 21-03-363 and 22-03-255

LAW LICENSE SUSPENDED AND OTHER SANCTIONS IMPOSED

_________________________________________________________

Submitted: February 7, 2024

Filed: March 21, 2024

Rachael L. Fletcher Cipoletti, Esq. Michael D. Dunham, Esq.

Chief Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel Shuman McCuskey Slicer PLLC

Renee N. Frymyer, Esq. Winchester, Virginia

Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel Counsel for the Respondent

Office of Disciplinary Counsel

Charleston, West Virginia

Counsel for the Petitioner

JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

FILED

March 21, 2024

released at 3:00 p.m.

C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
i

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record 

made before the [Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to 

questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of 

appropriate sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel 

Subcommittee’s] recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent 

judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the [Hearing Panel 

Subcommittee’s] findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, 

probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal 

Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 377 (1994).

2. “This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems and must make 

the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments of attorneys’ 

licenses to practice law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.Va. State Bar v. Blair, 

174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984).

3. “Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary 

Procedure enumerates factors to be considered in imposing sanctions and provides as 

follows: ‘In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise 

provided in these rules, the Court [West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] or Board 

[Lawyer Disciplinary Board] shall consider the following factors: (1) whether the lawyer 
ii

has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; 

(2) whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of 

the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of 

any aggravating or mitigating factors.’” Syl. Pt. 4, Off. of Law. Disciplinary Couns. v. 

Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998).

4. “Aggravating factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are any

considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 

imposed.” Syl. Pt. 4, Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 

(2003).

5. “Mitigating factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are any 

considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be 

imposed.” Syl. Pt. 2, Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d 550 

(2003).

6. “In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical 

violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the 

respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an 

effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public

confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.” Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal 

Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).
1

WOOTON, Justice:

This is a lawyer disciplinary proceeding brought against the respondent 

Jeffrey A. Davis, a member of the West Virginia State Bar, arising out of a two-count 

Statement of Charges issued against him by the Investigative Panel of the Lawyer 

Disciplinary Board (“the Board”) and brought to this Court by the Office of Disciplinary 

Counsel (“ODC”) on behalf of the Board. The Board’s Hearing Panel Subcommittee 

(“HPS”) determined that the respondent committed multiple violations of the West 

Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”).

1

 The HPS recommended that the 

respondent’s law license be suspended for a period of three years, served retroactively 

based on this Court’s March 14, 2022, mandate suspending the respondent’s law license 

for a six-month period in a separate disciplinary matter,

2

in addition to other sanctions.3

1 Specifically, the HPS found that the respondent violated Rule 1.4(a)(4) and Rule 

8.4(a) and (d) in regard to Count I and Rules 1.3, 3.2, and 1.16(d) in regard to Count II. 

2 At the time the subject charges were filed, the respondent’s law license had been 

suspended for a six-month period pursuant to a March 14, 2022, mandate issued by this 

Court in a separate disciplinary matter. See Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Davis, 2022 WL 

421119 (W. Va. filed Feb. 11, 2022) (memorandum decision) (involving six violations of 

the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct arising from a single disciplinary 

complaint filed on November 20, 2020, concerning respondent’s failure to communicate 

and timely file motions in a privately retained criminal matter). Following completion of 

the six-month suspension, on August 26, 2022, the respondent filed a petition seeking to 

reinstate his law license pursuant to Rule 3.32 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer 

Disciplinary Procedure. On March 30, 2023, the HPS filed its report with the Court in 

which it recommended that the respondent’s license not be reinstated. On May 12, 2023, 

the Court entered an order adopting the HPS’s recommendation to deny the respondent’s 

petition for reinstatement.

3 See infra discussion. 
2

The ODC consented to the HPS’s recommendation. The respondent objected to the 

recommendation and, accordingly, this Court scheduled the matter for oral argument with 

briefs to be submitted by the parties in support of their respective positions.

This Court has now carefully considered the parties’ written and oral 

arguments, the submitted record, and the pertinent authorities. Upon our review, we find 

that the record and law support the HPS’s report, and we adopt the report and recommended 

sanctions contained therein.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

The respondent was admitted to the practice of law in West Virginia in 1993, 

and last practiced in Spencer, West Virginia. He has a lengthy disciplinary history.

After two formal charges, as described more fully below, were filed against 

the respondent, the HPS conducted a hearing in May, 2023, wherein the respondent and 

the two complainants testified. In addition, the ODC submitted several exhibits and the 

parties submitted stipulations regarding certain findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation as to discipline, which were admitted into evidence during the hearing 

without objection. The following is a summary of the evidence regarding the two counts. 
3

A. Count I 

This count involved the respondent’s court-appointed representation of a 

defendant, Samantha Shafer, in a criminal case.4 The evidence established that on October 

25, 2021, Ms. Shafer submitted a document to the circuit court, which the court referred to 

as a “pro se motion,” following a hearing involving Ms. Shafer’s entry of a guilty plea and 

sentencing.5 In the motion, Ms. Shafer stated that the respondent made sexual overtures 

toward her and had asked her “if [she] wanted to go to the beach with him while [she] was 

his client.” She requested that the court appoint her a new public defender. The court 

replaced the respondent as Ms. Shafer’s counsel the next day. On November 2, 2021, the 

circuit court sent Ms. Shafer’s motion to ODC, which opened a complaint. 

The respondent answered the complaint, denying any wrongdoing. He 

indicated that his representation of Ms. Shafer had resulted in a plea agreement whereby 

she entered a guilty plea. After the plea was entered, but before she was sentenced, she 

reviewed her pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report and became angry. She was told by 

4The evidence showed that Ms. Shafer was charged with several counts in two 

different indictments: the first indictment included counts for third offense shoplifting, 

conspiracy to commit a felony, obtaining money by false pretense, and conspiracy to 

commit a misdemeanor; the second indictment included counts for burglary, grand larceny, 

and two counts of conspiracy to commit a felony. 

5 The respondent negotiated a plea deal for Ms. Shafer in which she pled guilty to 

one count of grand larceny, one count of third offense shoplifting, and one count of first 

offense shoplifting, which was a misdemeanor. Communications broke down when Ms. 

Shafer’s bond was revoked and she was placed in jail due to a failed drug test. 
4

a probation officer that in order to be considered for alternative sentencing she had to enroll 

in a drug rehabilitation facility because she had failed a prior drug screen.

6

 The respondent 

indicated that he discussed this issue with Ms. Shafer on October 25, 2021, and she told 

him that she regretted entering the plea because she did not want to go to drug 

rehabilitation. Ms. Shafer then filed the “pro se motion” seeking his removal from her case

and the circuit court replaced him as her counsel. 

At the respondent’s disciplinary hearing, Ms. Shafer testified that while 

representing her, the respondent picked her up in his vehicle and took her and her son7to 

get food. After getting food, the respondent then drove to an abandoned school parking lot

and parked the car so that they could talk. She stated that the respondent never discussed 

her case with her but they talked about trips, and he offered to take her on an all-expense 

paid trip to the beach. She felt the conversation was inappropriate and unprofessional. She 

stated that he also gave her compliments on her looks. She testified that she was under the 

impression the respondent was flirting with her and had she reciprocated, she would have 

been given different legal representation: “I feel like if I would have went along with it, 

that I would have been represented differently.” Instead, she stated that he would not 

6 While Ms. Shafer was out on bond before she entered the guilty plea she had a 

positive drug screen and the circuit court revoked her bond. Her bond was later reinstated 

as a result of the respondent filing a motion to reinstate bond.

7 Ms. Shafer’s son was not called as a witness at the disciplinary hearing. Also, the 

respondent disputed that Ms. Shafer’s son was with her when he picked her up.
5

discuss her case with her despite her case involving several serious felony charges. Further, 

after Ms. Shafer’s bond was revoked, she was incarcerated for about six weeks before she 

was re-released when her bond was reinstated. She testified that during this time, the 

respondent made no attempt to contact her and he never answered her phone calls even 

though she placed a call to his office every day.

8

 She stated that she was able to speak with 

the respondent on three occasions while she was incarcerated, when another individual 

called the respondent on her behalf with her on the line as a third party.9 

The respondent also testified at the hearing and denied making flirtatious 

comments to Ms. Shafer or offering to take her on an all-expense paid trip to the beach. In 

regard to the comments, he stated that on one occasion he told Ms. Shafer that she looked 

nice because she was dressed appropriately for court. In regard to the beach trip, the 

respondent testified that he never offered to take Ms. Shafer to the beach. However, he 

stated that in an attempt to calm Ms. Shafer down when she was nervous and upset about 

going to prison, he told her to think of a place that made her happy and where she could 

forget her troubles. When Ms. Shafer responded that she liked the beach, he told her to 

think about the beach. The respondent also testified that he believed that he had adequately 

communicated with Ms. Shafer during her incarceration and that it would have been a 

8 Ms. Shafer testified that prior to her incarceration the respondent would return her 

calls when she left messages within “a couple days later.” 

9 There is no evidence that these three telephone conversations concerned anything

other than her case.
6

“waste of time and the state’s money” to visit with her while she was in jail. He stated that 

he did not accept collect calls from jail and only communicated with her as a result of a 

three-way call in which she was joined into the call. Specifically, the respondent denied 

that he engaged in any misconduct in regard to Ms. Shafer.10

Based upon evidence offered in regard to Count I, the HPS found that

because the respondent failed to respond to Ms. Shafer’s phone calls while she was 

incarcerated, he violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4.

11 The HPS also found that the 

respondent made “unwelcome advances in an attempt to create an inappropriate 

relationship of a sexual nature with his court-appointed client” in violation of “Rule 8.4(a) 

and (d)12 [attempted violation of Rule 1.8(j) of the Rules of Conduct].”

13 (Footnote added.). 

10 The respondent and the ODC entered into “Stipulations Regarding Certain 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendations as to Discipline” 

(“stipulations”), which were admitted into evidence at the respondent’s disciplinary 

hearing. See infra discussion. The respondent declined to stipulate to any violation of the 

Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining to Ms. Shafer. 

11 Rule 1.4 (a) provides, in part: “(a) A lawyer shall: . . . (4) promptly comply with 

reasonable requests for information[.]”

12 Rule 8.4 provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or 

attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another 

to do so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . [or] (d) engage in conduct that is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”

13 Rule 1.8 (j) provides:

A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client 

whom the lawyer personally represents during the legal 

representation unless a consensual sexual relationship existed 

between them at the commencement of the lawyer/client 
7

B. Count II

The second count arose from a complaint that ODC received from Cletis W. 

Rogers on July 7, 2022, in which Mr. Rogers stated that he had entered into an agreement 

with the respondent to represent him in a civil matter and that he had paid the respondent 

$500 to file an injunction on his behalf. Mr. Rogers claimed that the respondent had not 

filed the injunction and he wanted his money refunded. 

In response to Mr. Rogers’ complaint, the respondent stated that he had 

agreed to represent him in September, 2021, to seek an injunction in regard to a blocked

right of way involving Mr. Rogers’ property. Mr. Rogers told the respondent that he 

wanted to use the right of way to haul timber cut on his land. Mr. Rogers paid the 

respondent $500 for his representation. The respondent stated that Mr. Rogers told him in 

the fall or early winter of 2021 that there was no rush in filing the action because the 

weather would be bad until spring. The respondent admitted that he had had no 

communications with Mr. Rogers until Mr. Rogers filed suit against him in magistrate court 

in December of 2021. Mr. Rogers testified in magistrate court that he never instructed the 

respondent to wait until spring to bring the action. On March 7, 2022, the magistrate court 

relationship. For purposes of this rule, “sexual relations” 

means sexual intercourse or any touching of the sexual or other 

intimate parts of a client or causing such client to touch the 

sexual or other intimate parts of the lawyer for the purpose of 

arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party or as a 

means of abuse. 
8

awarded Mr. Rogers $700 ($500 refund plus $200 filing fee). The respondent did not 

satisfy the civil judgment owed to Mr. Rogers until December 8, 2022. 

Unlike the allegations involving Ms. Shafer, the respondent stipulated that 

he had “neglected Mr. Rogers’ case and failed to take appropriate action” in violation of 

Rule 1.3,14“failed to make reasonable efforts consistent with the stated and agreed upon 

objectives of Mr. Rogers” in violation of Rule 3.2,15 and “failed to promptly return the 

unearned fee paid to him by Mr. Rogers upon termination of representation” in violation 

of Rule 1.16(d).

16

 

14 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 

promptness in representing a client.”

15 Rule 3.2 provides that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite 

litigation consistent with the interest of the client.”

16 Rule 1.16(d) provides:

(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall 

take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a 

client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, 

allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering 

papers and property to which the client is entitled and 

refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned

or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client 

to the extent permitted by other law. 
9

Based on the evidence, the HPS proceeded to consider the appropriate 

sanctions to be imposed in light of the violations it found.17 See Syl. Pt. 4, Off. of Law.

Disciplinary Coun. v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998) (setting forth factors 

to be considered in imposing sanctions and discussed infra in greater detail); accord W. 

Va. R. Law. Disciplinary Proc. 3.16. Specifically, the HPS found that the clear and 

convincing evidence established that the respondent violated the duties that he owed to his 

clients and the profession. The HPS also found that the respondent “acted in a negligent 

manner in these matters.” The HPS considered the fact that the respondent’s actions 

“caused frustration and delay on the part of Mr. Rogers[,]” and Ms. Shafer testified that 

she felt “abandoned” and “did not feel Respondent was on her side.” In regard to the 

aggravating and mitigating factors, the HPS found the respondent had aggravating factors 

of prior disciplinary offenses, including thirty-three complaints, eight disciplinary 

sanctions consisting of six admonishments and two suspensions over a fifteen-year period,

and substantial experience in the practice of law. The HPS found the respondent’s

cooperative attitude towards the proceedings to be a mitigating factor. 

17 We note that the respondent and ODC agreed to recommended sanctions that 

included, inter alia, a one-year license suspension, “served retroactively based on the

Supreme Court’s Mandate of March 14, 2022, which suspended Respondent’s license to 

practice for six months.” However, the parties also stipulated that this Court is “the final 

arbiter in lawyer disciplinary matters” and that we can impose sanctions “which may differ 

from those stipulated or those recommended by the [HPS].” For reasons discussed infra

in greater detail, the HPS (and this Court) declined to adopt the recommended one-year 

suspension as a sanction.
10

The HPS then recommended the following sanctions: 

1) Respondent’s law license be suspended for a period of three 

years, served retroactively based upon the Supreme Court’s 

Mandate of March 14, 2022, which suspended Respondent’s 

license to practice law for six months. 

2) That Respondent[’s] petition for reinstatement pursuant to 

Rule 3.32 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure [be 

denied [until] . . . [he] undergo[es] a psychological evaluation 

with confirmation of his ability to practice law. Should he be 

reinstated to the practice of law pursuant to those proceedings, 

that Respondent’s practice be supervised for a period of two 

years by an attorney agreed upon by the ODC and 

Respondent;18

3) Respondent shall pay the costs of this disciplinary 

proceeding to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary 

Procedure.

(Footnoted added). 

The ODC consented to the HPS’s recommendation and the respondent filed 

a general objection to the “recommended disposition, findings and conclusions” by the 

HPS, which caused the case to be placed on the Court’s docket. 

18 The language of the HPS’s sanction in regard to the reinstatement read, in part, 

as follows: “That Respondent petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 3.32 of the Rules 

of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure be denied. That Respondent undergo a psychological 

evaluation with confirmation of this ability to practice law.” This phrasing is awkward, at 

best, and necessitated the modification indicated above. 
11

II. Standard of Review

In lawyer disciplinary proceedings, this Court reviews the report by the HPS, 

including its recommended sanctions, under the following standard of review: 

A de novo standard applies to a review of the 

adjudicatory record made before the [Hearing Panel 

Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to 

questions of law, questions of application of the law to the 

facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives 

respectful consideration to the [Hearing Panel 

Subcommittee’s] recommendations while ultimately 

exercising its own independent judgment. On the other hand, 

substantial deference is given to the [Hearing Panel 

Subcommittee’s] findings of fact, unless such findings are not 

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on 

the whole record.

Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 

452 S.E.2d 377 (1994). While affording respectful consideration to the recommendations 

made by the HPS, we have held that “[t]his Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics problems 

and must make the ultimate decisions about public reprimands, suspensions or annulments 

of attorneys’ licenses to practice law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.Va. 

State Bar v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671 (1984). With these standards in mind, 

we proceed to the merits of this matter.

III. Discussion

The respondent argues that the HPS erred in its factual findings and in 

concluding that he violated Rules 1.4 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
12

involving Ms. Shafer.

19

 In regard to the factual findings made by the HPS, the respondent 

contends that they “were incorrect, unsound, and not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence on the whole adjudicatory record and should thereby be overturned.” He 

specifically targets the HPS’s credibility determinations, contending that the HPS 

“surprisingly found” Ms. Shafer’s testimony to be more reliable than his despite his 

contention that “much of Shafer’s testimony was verifiably false or unreliable[]” and 

“unsubstantiated.” In support of this argument, the respondent rehashes the evidence that 

was considered by the HPS and arbitrarily selects various statements made either by him 

or Ms. Shafer to show that the HPS erred in affording Ms. Shafer’s testimony more weight 

because, according to the respondent, she was not being truthful and he was. The 

respondent also contends that Ms. Shafer’s memory of the events was “vague” and he 

insinuates that her testimony pertaining to events that transpired before her incarceration 

was hindered by her “testing positive for marijuana and methamphetamines.” 

This Court gives “substantial deference . . . to the [HPS’s] findings of fact, 

unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on 

the whole record.” See McCorkle, 192 W. Va. at 287, 452 S.E.2d at 378, Syl. Pt. 3. Further, 

the HPS “hears the testimony of the witnesses firsthand and, being much closer to the pulse 

of the hearing, is much better situated to resolve such issues as credibility.” Id. at 290, 452 

19 The respondent stipulated to the factual findings and rule violations pertaining to 

Count II involving Mr. Rogers and therefore makes no argument as to the HPS’s report in 

regard to Count II. 
13

S.E.2d 377 at 381. Based on our review of the record in this case, we find that the findings 

of fact made by the HPS were supported by “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence”; 

therefore, we decline the respondent’s invitation to disturb them.

Next, the respondent argues that the HPS erred in determining that he 

violated Rules 1.420 and 8.421 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent 

contends that he did not violate Rule 1.4 – which requires a lawyer to “promptly comply 

with reasonable requests for information” – simply because he “failed to respond to 

Shafer’s phone calls while she was incarcerated” as found by the HPS. The respondent 

argues that he communicated with Ms. Shafer on multiple occasions while she was 

incarcerated. Thus, he contends that his failure to answer her daily phone calls is not a 

violation of the requirement of Rule 1.4 to comply with “reasonable requests for 

information.” (Emphasis added). 

We are mindful of the fact that the HPS found that the evidence supported 

that the respondent did speak with Ms. Shafer on three occasions during the six-week 

period in which she was incarcerated and that the respondent “testified that he believed he 

had adequately informed her on the status of the matter[.]” However, in support of its 

determination that the respondent violated Rule 1.4, the HPS focused upon the 

20 See supra note 11.

21 See supra note 12.
14

respondent’s failure to visit Ms. Shafer while she was incarcerated, stating that it “would 

just be a waste of time and the state’s money[,]” the respondent’s explanation that “he did 

not accept collect calls from jail and that he did not believe that his landline could take 

collect calls[,]” and his failure “to respond to Ms. Shafer’s phone calls while she was 

incarcerated[.]” The HPS found that “the only time she was able to speak with Respondent 

was when another individual called him on her behalf with her on the line as a third party[]” 

and that “they spoke in this manner on maybe three occasions.” Thus, the HPS’s 

determination that a violation of Rule 1.4 occurred in this case was based on its factual 

findings that the respondent failed to “promptly comply” with her repeated phone calls to 

him seeking information about her case, in that he never initiated a return phone call to Ms. 

Shafer or visited with her while she was incarcerated. See W. Va. R. Pro. Conduct 

1.4(a)(4). The Court declines to find that the HPS erred in regard to its determination that 

the respondent violated Rule 1.4.22

Also, in regard to the respondent’s contention that the clear and convincing 

evidence failed to establish that he “attempted to create an inappropriate relationship of a 

sexual nature with Shafer[,]” he again focuses on Ms. Shafer’s credibility by arguing that 

she was being untruthful and he was being truthful. It was within the purview of the HPS 

to determine whether a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) and (d) occurred, based upon its 

22 Our adoption of the HPS’s determination that Rule 1.4 was violated is limited to 

the specific facts of this case and should not be read to suggest that three phone calls with 

a client over a six-week period is per se evidence of a violation of that rule.
15

consideration of Ms. Shafer’s description of the respondent’s comments to her about going 

to the beach while they were meeting in the respondent’s car that was parked in the parking 

lot of an abandoned school, as well as his comments to her about her clothing, which she 

viewed as flirtatious. The HPS determined that these comments were “unwelcome 

advances in an attempt to create an inappropriate relationship of a sexual nature with his 

court-appointed client” in violation of Rule 8.4(a) and (d). Ms. Shafer was the respondent’s

client in a felony criminal matter, and she was depending on him to protect her liberty. 

Under our de novo review, we conclude that the “reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence” supports the finding that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) and (d) of the Rules 

of Professional Conduct, as determined by the HPS. See McCorkle, 192 W.Va. at 287, 452 

S.E.2d at 378, Syl. Pt. 3. 

Finally, with no supporting legal authority or discussion of facts supporting 

his position, the respondent argues that the recommended disposition of suspension for 

three years is two years “greater than the stipulated proposed disciplinary recommendation, 

[and] is excessive as it gives deference to [Ms.] Shafer’s testimony and is not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, [the respondent] has taken accountability for 

his actions that did violate the Rules of Professional Responsibility . . . .”

In regard to the HPS’s recommended sanction of a three-year suspension, we 

are guided by our holding in syllabus point four of Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel 

v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495, 513 S.E.2d 722 (1998):
16

Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer 

Disciplinary Procedure enumerates factors to be considered in 

imposing sanctions and provides as follows: “In imposing a 

sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, unless otherwise 

provided in these rules, the Court [West Virginia Supreme 

Court of Appeals] or Board [Lawyer Disciplinary Board] shall 

consider the following factors: (1) whether the lawyer has 

violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal 

system, or to the profession; (2) whether the lawyer acted 

intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of the 

actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; 

and (4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors.”

Based on the factors set forth in Rule 3.16 and Jordan, the HPS found that 

the respondent violated duties he owed to his clients and the profession. The respondent 

admitted that he violated the duty he owed to Mr. Rogers to diligently pursue the injunction 

action he was retained to pursue. Further, the HPS determined that the respondent failed

to “reasonably communicate” with Ms. Shafer and “initiat[ed] intimate and unprofessional 

conversations with her,” falling short of his “duties and fiduciary role” with his client in a 

felony case. As discussed supra in greater detail, we agree with the HPS’s conclusions 

that the respondent violated duties owed to his client and the profession.23 We also agree 

with the HPS’s determination that “[t]he evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent 

23 In regard to the duties owed to the profession, the HPS relied upon a lawyer’s 

“duties of candor, loyalty, diligence and honesty to their clients,” the fiduciary duties owed 

to clients and the obligation to act in their best interests, the duty to maintain the integrity 

of the profession, and that “[m]embers of the public should be able to rely on lawyers to 

protect their property, liberty, and their lives[,]” finding that “[t]he evidence in this case 

establishes by clear and convincing proof that Respondent violated these duties.” We adopt 

HPS’s determination in this regard. 
17

acted in a negligent manner in these matters.” As to the amount of injury caused by the 

respondent’s misconduct, the HPS determined that his conduct “caused frustration and 

delay” on Mr. Rogers’ part, and because Mr. Rogers indicated that he no longer trusts 

lawyers, the respondent “brought the legal system and legal profession into disrepute.” In 

regard to Ms. Shafer, the HPS found that she suffered “emotional injuries,” that were 

“intangible,” but “nonetheless significant.” The HPS based this conclusion, in part, on her 

testimony that “she did not feel Respondent was on her side.” We agree with the HPS’s 

findings and conclusions in regard to the first three Jordan factors. See id. 

Finally, the HPS considered the aggravating and mitigating factors present. 

This Court held in syllabus point four of Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Scott, 213 W. Va. 

209, 579 S.E.2d 550 (2003), that “[a]ggravating factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding 

are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to 

be imposed.” In regard to aggravating factors, the HPS found that the respondent had a 

long history of prior disciplinary offenses. The respondent had been the subject of thirtythree complaints and eight disciplinary sanctions, including six admonishments and two 

suspensions. The HPS also found the respondent’s substantial experience in the practice 

of law to be an aggravating factor. We also held in syllabus point two of Scott, that

“[m]itigating factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are any considerations or factors 

that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” Id. at 209, 579 

S.E.2d at 550, Syl. Pt. 2. The HPS noted that the respondent’s “cooperative attitude toward 

the proceedings may be considered in mitigation.” We also agree with the HPS’s 
18

evaluation of the aggravating and mitigation factors present in this case. See Jordan, 204 

W. Va. at 497, 513 S.E.2d at 724, Syl. Pt. 4. 

Based on its assessment of the Jordan factors, the HPS recommended that a 

three-year suspension be imposed and served retroactively to the Supreme Court’s Mandate 

of March 14, 2022, which suspended the respondent’s license to practice law for six 

months. In syllabus point three of Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar 

v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987), this Court held:

In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for 

ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps 

would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also 

whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an 

effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same 

time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the 

legal profession.

In addition, a fundamental purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to 

safeguard the public’s interest in the administration of justice. See Off. of Law. 

Disciplinary Couns. v. Albers, 214 W. Va. 11, 13, 585 S.E.2d 11, 13 (2003) (“Because of 

the enormous amount of trust that the public places in its lawyers, this Court must insure 

that the public’s interests are protected and that the integrity of the legal profession is 

maintained.”). Here, the respondent and the ODC agreed that the respondent should be 

suspended based on his conduct, and proposed a nonbinding recommended disposition of 

a one-year suspension. However, in its report the HPS recommended a three-year 

suspension as a more appropriate sanction, due to the “long history of misconduct exhibited 
19

by the Respondent, including 33 complaints, 8 disciplinary sanctions, 6 admonishments, 

and 2 suspensions over a 15-year period.” The HPS noted that “[t]he entire record 

demonstrates an ongoing pattern of misconduct that has not been corrected by past minimal 

sanctions[]” and found the parties’ proposed stipulated sanction of one year to be 

“insufficient.” 

We agree; the HPS’s recommended sanctions, including a three-year 

suspension, are consistent with this Court’s obligation to protect the public interest and 

dissuade similar conduct in the future. See, e.g., Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State 

Bar v. Keenan, 189 W. Va. 37, 427 S.E.2d 471 (1993) (imposing suspension for an 

indefinite period for engaging in a pattern and practice of failing to communicate with 

clients, to act with reasonable diligence, to keep clients reasonably informed, and to return

unearned fees); Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Morgan, 228 W. Va. 114, 717 S.E.2d 898 (2011) 

(imposing one year suspension for violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and other 

violations); Law. Disciplinary Bd. v. Rossi, 234 W. Va. 675, 769 S.E.2d 464 (2015) 

(imposing three-year suspension for violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and other 

violations). Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances in this case, we agree with 

the HPS that the public, the legal system, and the profession will be best served by the 

imposition of the sanctions recommended by the HPS, and accordingly adopt each 

recommended sanction, including a three-year suspension of the respondent’s law license. 
20

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, we order the following sanctions:

A. Respondent’s law license be suspended for a 

period of three years, served retroactively based upon the 

Supreme Court’s Mandate of March 14, 2022, which 

suspended Respondent’s license to practice law for six 

months.24

B. That Respondent’s petition for reinstatement 

pursuant to Rule 3.32 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary 

Procedure be denied until he undergoes a psychological 

evaluation with confirmation of his ability to practice law. 

Should he be reinstated to the practice of law pursuant to those 

proceedings, that Respondent’s practice be supervised for a 

period of two years by an attorney agreed upon by the ODC 

and Respondent;

C. Respondent shall pay the costs of this 

disciplinary proceeding to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of Lawyer 

Disciplinary Procedure.

Law License Suspended and Other Sanctions Imposed.

24 The respondent’s law license shall not be reinstated before March 14, 2025.