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[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3531 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3531

    To authorize assistance for Afghanistan, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

           September 22 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

   Mr. Lugar (for himself, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Hagel) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To authorize assistance for Afghanistan, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Afghan Freedom Support and Security 
Act of 2008''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) More than 6 years after the liberation of Afghanistan 
        from the Taliban, who provided Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
        with a safe haven for planning the attacks of September 11, 
        2001, Afghanistan remains highly unstable and the government of 
        President Hamid Karzai remains subject to attacks from remnants 
        of the Taliban who have regrouped in the region with other 
        insurgent groups, including foreign fighters associated with 
        Al-Qaeda.
            (2) The Government of Afghanistan supports the continued 
        deployment of international forces to supplement its own 
        nascent national security forces and North Atlantic Treaty 
        Organization (NATO) forces, which took over international 
        stability operations for the entire country through the 
        International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on October 5, 
        2006.
            (3) An insurgency that began in a relatively weak position 
        at the end of 2005 has expanded to pose a serious threat to the 
        Government of Afghanistan and the international NATO/ISAF and 
        Operation Enduring Freedom forces, whose casualties have 
        mounted significantly during 2008, while civilian casualties 
        have also increased substantially in Afghanistan, resulting in 
        significant popular disenchantment and concern about the 
        prospects of peace and stability in the near future.
            (4) A January 2008 issue brief published by the Atlantic 
        Council of the United States, entitled ``Saving Afghanistan: An 
        Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action'', states: ``On the security 
        side, a stalemate of sorts has taken hold. NATO and Afghan 
        forces cannot be beaten by the insurgency or by the Taliban. 
        Neither can our forces eliminate the Taliban by military means 
        as long as they have sanctuary in Pakistan. Hence, the future 
        of Afghanistan will be determined by progress or failure in the 
        civil sector. However, civil sector reform is in serious 
        trouble. Little coordination exists among the many disparate 
        international organizations and agencies active in Afghanistan. 
        Legal and judicial reform (including reducing corruption), and 
        control of narcotics are interdependent efforts and must 
        receive the highest priority. To add insult to injury, of every 
        dollar of aid spent on Afghanistan, less than ten percent goes 
        directly to Afghans, further compounding reform and 
        reconstruction problems.''.
            (5) Despite the establishment of a constitution and a 
        constitutionally-elected government in Afghanistan, the failure 
        to build the core institutions of the state and the market has 
        resulted in opportunities for massive corruption and the 
        mounting loss of trust of the Afghan people in their 
        government.
            (6) The Secretary of Defense clarified that the emphasis of 
        international effort must be far more than military assistance, 
        stating in testimony before Congress on September 10, 2008, ``. 
        . . additional forces alone will not solve the problem. 
        Security is just one aspect of the campaign, alongside 
        development and governance. We must maintain momentum, keep the 
        international community engaged, and develop the capacity of 
        the Afghan government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the 
        EU, NGOs, and other groups--our full military and civilian 
        capabilities--must be on the same page and working toward the 
        same goal with the Afghan government.''.
            (7) The international effort to retrain and help establish 
        an effective police force in Afghanistan has fallen well short 
        of expectations despite 4 distinct efforts over 7 years, 
        costing billions of dollars of investment. Respected 
        assessments over the last several years by the Government 
        Accountability Office, the International Crisis Group, and the 
        Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, have dramatically 
        noted the paramount importance of capable national and local 
        police forces in a stable and secure society and the abject 
        failure to achieve such an outcome in Afghanistan due to--
                    (A) entrenched corruption in the Ministry of 
                Interior;
                    (B) lack of consensus on strategic focus among 
                donors;
                    (C) a lack of accountability over police trained 
                and returned to their communities, including the dearth 
                of women police; and
                    (D) the failure to backstop policing with rule of 
                law institutions, such as courts and prisons.
            (8) The Government Accountability Office report released on 
        June 18, 2008 (GAO-08-883T) indicates that ``although the 
        [Afghan National Police] has reportedly grown in number since 
        2005, after an investment of nearly $6 billion, no Afghan 
        police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable 
        of performing its mission'' and there is not any verified 
        database of police personnel.
            (9) The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit released a 
        report in July 2007, entitled ``AREU-Cops or Robbers; The 
        Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police'', which observes 
        that the most consistent theme that emerged was that without 
        comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior, which is 
        notoriously corrupt, factionalized, and an increasingly 
        important actor in Afghanistan's illegal drug economy, police 
        reform efforts will fail and the money spent on reform will be 
        wasted.
            (10) The International Crisis Group report released in 
        August 2007, entitled ``ICG-Reforming Afghanistan's Police''--
                    (A) asserts that police training must stress 
                quality rather than quantity;
                    (B) quotes an experienced police adviser, ``I would 
                rather have a force of 20,000 credible and effective 
                police officers than 60,000 or even 80,000 men who have 
                been through some sort of nominal training process 
                which is not fully fit-for-purpose''; and
                    (C) reports that by July 2007, 71,147 rank and file 
                police had received training, of whom only 118 were 
                women.
            (11) The failure of the current counter-narcotics strategy 
        for Afghanistan has diminished Afghan political will to take on 
        the increasingly powerful drug interests in the country. The 
        lack of significant results is due to factors such as--
                    (A) the failure to have in place in Afghanistan the 
                essential institutional elements necessary to arrest 
                and prosecute mid- and high-level drug traffickers and 
                enablers; and
                    (B) the lack of economic mechanisms, such as 
                finance facilities and services and adequate land 
                rights, to enable Afghan farmers to develop 
                alternatives to opium production.
            (12) The violence and instability in Afghanistan is further 
        exacerbated by corruption and the flourishing trade in opium 
        and opium-related products, which--
                    (A) has reached record levels;
                    (B) fuels local militias;
                    (C) corrupts the national and local governments; 
                and
                    (D) provides funding for insurgent and terrorist 
                groups.
            (13) There is a consensus that the judiciary is ineffective 
        and corrupt, which--
                    (A) puts property rights at risk;
                    (B) prevents the prosecution of drug dealers and 
                criminals; and
                    (C) opens up a space for the Taliban's version of 
                arbitration and dispute settlement among ordinary 
                people.
            (14) On July 1, 2008, the Office of Inspector General of 
        the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
        released a report, which states ``USAID/Afghanistan's own 
        assessment identified three material weaknesses in its system 
        of management controls, all of which are related to the 
        country's difficult security situation:
                    ``1. Unsuitable working and living conditions.
                    ``2. Inability to readily travel to project sites.
                    ``3. Retention of personnel and delays in the 
                assignment of personnel.''.
            (15) The USAID mission in Kabul reported that because of 
        the 3 material weaknesses it identified--
                    (A) its ability to achieve objectives was 
                significantly impaired;
                    (B) its ability to obtain, report, and use reliable 
                and timely information for decision making was 
                impaired; and
                    (C) statutory or regulatory requirements could be 
                violated.
            (16) On July 1, 2008, the Office of Inspector General of 
        the United States Agency for International Development released 
        a report stating ``USAID obligations in Afghanistan for fiscal 
        years 2002 through 2006 totaled nearly $4.4 billion.'' and the 
        Office of Inspector General, operating from Manila, 
        Philippines, expended $1,992,282 in base appropriations and 
        supplemental funding to oversee USAID's activities in 
        Afghanistan.
            (17) The position and influence of Afghan women, although 
        improved since the removal of the Taliban, remains limited and 
        precarious. If Afghan women are to realize constitutionally 
        guaranteed legal rights, economic opportunities and legal 
        constructs will be essential.
            (18) Transparency International's Corruption Perception 
        Index places Afghanistan 172nd out of 179 countries in 2007, 
        joining Somalia, Burma, Iraq, and Sudan at the bottom of the 
        index, much worse than the situation in 2005, at which time 
        Afghanistan ranked 115th out of 159.
            (19) The Bonn Agreement and the process that brought it 
        about--
                    (A) provided legitimacy and initial stability in 
                Afghanistan between late 2001 and 2006; and
                    (B) enabled the drafting of a new constitution, the 
                first directly elected President in the history of 
                Afghanistan, and a sitting National Parliament.
            (20) The Bonn Agreement also provided the political 
        platform through which a series of benchmarks were set. These 
        benchmarks were met against a carefully sequenced timeline for 
        a narrow list of institutional priorities upon which the Afghan 
        Government, Afghan citizens, and their international supporters 
        could collaborate. National programs such as the National 
        Health System, the Afghan National Army, the National 
        Solidarity Program, the National Telecommunications program, 
        and the National Transportation System provided a clear 
        framework for the establishment and coordination of goals, 
        tasks, benchmarks, and allocation of responsibilities, and were 
        made possible through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
        Fund.
            (21) On February 1, 2006, the Government of Afghanistan and 
        the international community issued the Afghanistan Compact, 
        which sets forth both the international community's commitment 
        to Afghanistan and Afghanistan's commitment to state building 
        and reform.
            (22) The Afghanistan Compact, which is supported by the 
        Afghan National Development Strategy--
                    (A) provides the core framework for building an 
                effective, accountable state in Afghanistan;
                    (B) sets goals and standards for improvements in 
                security, governance, and development;
                    (C) includes measures for reducing the narcotics 
                economy, promoting regional cooperation, and making aid 
                more effective, particularly at the local and 
                provincial levels; and
                    (D) established a mechanism to monitor Afghanistan 
                and the international community's adherence to the time 
                lines, goals, and objectives set forth in the document.
            (23) In June, 2008, international donors pledged 
        $20,000,000,000 toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan, as 
        part of a $50,000,000,000 5-year development plan, of which the 
        United States pledged over 50 percent.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the Sense of Congress that--
            (1) following the liberation of Afghanistan from the 
        Taliban in 2001, the Federal Government underestimated--
                    (A) the nature of the challenge in Afghanistan;
                    (B) the time horizon for restoring political and 
                economic stability in Afghanistan; and
                    (C) the type of resources required to help ensure a 
                stable Afghanistan with effective and accountable state 
                institutions and developing economic opportunities;
            (2) In order to provide appropriate and forthright 
        expectations of the long and challenging commitment necessary 
        for success in Afghanistan and accurately estimate the nature 
        of the resources required, the international community must 
        concentrate efforts on--
                    (A) a full assessment of natural resources and a 
                profile of human capital required for the effective and 
                sustainable functioning of the Afghan state;
                    (B) a clear accounting of resources available to 
                achieve an effective and sustainable Afghan government, 
                as well as those expected to be required to maintain 
                its effectiveness in the future; and
                    (C) the development of human capital and an 
                investment in quality leaders and managers through the 
                establishment of upper level training and education, as 
                well as primary and secondary, including tertiary and 
                vocational institutions to ensure they meet regional 
                standards as well as at least two that meet global 
                standards;
            (3) Afghanistan remains a country of paramount importance 
        to our national security and building Afghanistan into an 
        effective state with political and economic stability is a goal 
        that the United States shares with the Government of 
        Afghanistan and its citizens;
            (4) the region in which Afghanistan is situated is of 
        paramount importance to the national security of the United 
        States and our diplomatic initiatives and foreign policy in 
        this region must be harmonized and coherent across the region;
            (5) the most important partners in the security, stability, 
        and development of Afghanistan are the people of that country, 
        who should remain a prime focus of our efforts to build their 
        sustained capacity to govern;
            (6) long-term, consistent, and coordinated international 
        support and assistance is required in Afghanistan to secure, 
        stabilize, and develop the country so that it is capable of 
        sustaining good governance and becoming a responsible and 
        valued partner in the international community;
            (7) setting appropriate expectations in Afghanistan and in 
        donor and partner capitals is essential to effective and 
        responsible foreign assistance policy; and understanding the 
        necessity for long-term engagement in such situations will 
        prevent short term, unsustainable outcomes;
            (8) Afghanistan and its neighbors have a mutual 
        responsibility to ensure that their territories are not the 
        source, and their policies are not complicit in, the 
        destabilization or deprivation of other countries in the 
        region;
            (9) the challenges Afghanistan faces stem more from weak 
        governance than from a strong enemy and can be overcome by the 
        unity and resolve of the Afghan people and the international 
        community;
            (10) American academic and policy institutions and several 
        respected outside organizations have conducted significant 
        close and prolonged studies of the Afghanistan situation, 
        generating reports and comprehensive reviews of post-conflict 
        reconstruction, counter-narcotics, economic development, 
        security force training, and counter-insurgency efforts that 
        warrant review and consideration by United States policy makers 
        to develop a more responsive United States strategy to address 
        the crisis in Afghanistan;
            (11) corruption--
                    (A) is one of the chief corrosive elements of 
                misgoverned countries, especially in those countries 
                confronted with the scourge of narcotics trafficking; 
                and
                    (B) if left unchecked, leads to failed states;
            (12) the Government of Afghanistan is riven with corruption 
        at every level, especially at the national level;
            (13) Afghanistan has been described by some as bordering on 
        being a narco-state, influenced by the traffickers, resources, 
        and abettors of illegal narcotics trafficking;
            (14) significant resources and significant measures must be 
        taken by international donors to mentor and enable current and 
        future government officials and institutions to eliminate 
        corrupt officials and practices in order to--
                    (A) combat corruption;
                    (B) improve transparency and accountability;
                    (C) increase the participatory nature of 
                governmental institutions; and
                    (D) promote other forms of good governance and 
                management in all levels of government in Afghanistan;
            (15) anti-corruption is as reliant on an effective and 
        engaged civil society as on an effective government;
            (16) United States assistance to Afghanistan should reflect 
        the intent to fight corruption and the influence of public 
        officials;
            (17) as Afghan line ministries prove capable of 
        administering services in their area of responsibility, they 
        should be further empowered and resourced to capitalize upon 
        such progress and better build incentives toward effective 
        management and oversight;
            (18) despite some delays in its broad deployment, the 
        Afghan National Army (ANA), which is an essential element in 
        the stability of Afghanistan in a volatile region, must 
        continue to be properly trained and equipped by a rededicated 
        effort from the international community to achieve effective 
        and independent operational capability that is sustainable;
            (19) the security of Afghanistan is closely intertwined 
        with those of its regional neighbors;
            (20) success in Afghanistan, both economic and political, 
        will be dependent on stability in the region;
            (21) chronic food insecurity is--
                    (A) a burden on Afghanistan and its neighbors;
                    (B) threatens life and stability in the country; 
                and
                    (C) diminishes the impact of other assistance 
                efforts;
            (22) the commitment of the international community to 
        provide significant resources over the long-term will help 
        establish a foundation for governance and commerce and 
        ultimately food security for tens of millions of people in the 
        region;
            (23) a comprehensive approach to food security should 
        encompass improvements in nutrition, education, agricultural 
        infrastructure and productivity, finance and markets, safety 
        net programs, household incomes, and emergency preparedness;
            (24) essential opportunities for achieving food security in 
        Afghanistan include--
                    (A) ensuring that any emergency response is linked 
                to, or helps to, establish the means and organization 
                for sustainable food security in the country, such as 
                through the National Solidarity Program;
                    (B) using community development councils as a 
                governance mechanism for--
                            (i) serving their communities in difficult 
                        decisions regarding development priorities, 
                        including water, energy, education, and 
                        agriculture; and
                            (ii) substituting legitimate crops for 
                        poppies; and
                    (C) creating a consortium of United States land 
                grant colleges and other agricultural schools--
                            (i) to strengthen Afghan institutions and 
                        share knowledge to build the agricultural 
                        sector, which consists of over 80 percent of 
                        the Afghan economy; and
                            (ii) to use as an instrument for rewarding 
                        provinces that have dropped opium cultivation 
                        and creating incentives for dropping opium in 
                        others;
            (25) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation should, in 
        accordance with its mandate to foster private investment and 
        enhance the ability of private enterprise to make its full 
        contribution to international development, exercise its 
        authorities under title IV of chapter 2 of part I of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2191 et seq.) to 
        further increase efforts to promote and support United States-
        sponsored private investment, including in the energy sector, 
        in Afghanistan;
            (26) it is essential that United States policy be 
        harmonized and complementary across the region; and
            (27) the magnitude of the resources devoted and 
        significance of our national interest in the effective and 
        accountable stabilization and reconstruction effort in 
        Afghanistan, including additional regional efforts to build 
        economic capacity such as that in the Pakistan, requires a 
        robust regional office presence for the Inspector General of 
        the United States Agency for International Development and the 
        Inspector General of the Department of State.

SEC. 4. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to render appropriate, long-term assistance to 
        Afghanistan in a consistent and coordinated fashion with 
        willing and responsible partners in the international 
        community;
            (2) to ensure that our foreign policy in this region is 
        responsive to and in partnership with the people of 
        Afghanistan;
            (3) to harmonize its assistance efforts in Afghanistan and 
        neighboring countries across--
                    (A) all associated Federal agencies; and
                    (B) to the maximum extent possible, with congruent 
                international partner assistance efforts;
            (4) to regularly, comprehensively, and openly review 
        stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in 
        Afghanistan to ensure flexibility and the most effective 
        utilization of resources toward specific, tangible outcomes, 
        including a review of the effectiveness of the Afghanistan 
        Reconstruction Trust Fund and associated programs and 
        mechanisms, in order to determine the relative benefit and 
        effectiveness of such funding vehicle, and its programs and 
        mechanisms, in comparison to other reconstruction and 
        stabilization efforts; and
            (5) to identify and utilize, to the greatest extent 
        possible, the most effective funding mechanism that--
                    (A) satisfies accountability and transparency 
                requirements; and
                    (B) has proven capable and sufficient to support 
                the implementation of national programs by the 
                government and people of Afghanistan for the benefit of 
                Afghans.

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    (a) In General.--In this Act, except as otherwise provided, the 
term ``congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives.
    (b) Amendment.--Section 1(c) of the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 7501) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(c) Definitions.--In this Act:
            ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--Except as 
        otherwise provided, the term `appropriate congressional 
        committees' means--
                    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    ``(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                Senate;
                    ``(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    ``(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
                of Representatives.
            ``(2) Government of afghanistan.--The term `Government of 
        Afghanistan' includes--
                    ``(A) the government of any political subdivision 
                of Afghanistan; and
                    ``(B) any agency or instrumentality of the 
                Government of Afghanistan.
            ``(3) International security assistance force; isaf.--The 
        terms `International Security Assistance Force' and `ISAF' 
        means the international security assistance force established 
        to assist in the maintenance of security in Afghanistan 
        pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 
        (2001), as amended by United Nations Security Council 
        Resolutions 1413 (2002), 1444 (2002), 1510 (2003), 1563 (2004), 
        1623 (2005), and 1707 (2006).''.

SEC. 6. PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.

    The purposes of United States assistance authorized by this Act 
are--
            (1) to help assure the security of the United States and 
        the world by--
                    (A) reducing or eliminating the likelihood of 
                violence against the United States and partners in 
                Afghanistan; and
                    (B) reducing the chance that Afghanistan will 
                become a source of international terrorism;
            (2) to signal our Nation's long-term commitment to 
        Afghanistan and its people, the region, and partners in the 
        international community;
            (3) to provide United States civilian agencies with the 
        appropriate resources to effectively plan, implement, and 
        monitor assistance programs in an exceptionally challenging 
        environment, including--
                    (A) expanding the presence of United States 
                diplomatic personnel in key provincial capitals and at 
                locations at which Provincial Reconstruction Teams are 
                to be sustained;
                    (B) integrating a more substantial, long-term 
                presence of experienced development experts; and
                    (C) establishing a robust regional office in the 
                South Asia subregion for the Inspector General of the 
                United States Agency for International Development;
            (4) to help Afghans realize a stable and secure country 
        with effective, accountable state institutions that effectively 
        administer the basic needs of the Afghan people for services, 
        safety, the rule of law, and increased economic opportunity, by 
        focusing United States efforts on--
                    (A) establishing viable Afghan security 
                institutions;
                    (B) building Afghan governance and rule of law 
                capacity, especially at the sub-national level;
                    (C) enabling a vibrant economic and social 
                environment through reconstruction of critical 
                infrastructure and focused development;
                    (D) investing in the capabilities of the growing 
                young generation of Afghans;
                    (E) promoting an accountable and transparent public 
                finance system for all Afghan revenues and 
                expenditures;
                    (F) combating insurgency as an ongoing, regionally-
                fueled, threat; and
                    (G) incorporating counter-narcotics as integral to 
                this mission; and
            (5) to realize, as milestones to Afghanistan's progress, 
        combined with sustained political will on the part of our 
        Afghan and international partners--
                    (A) Afghan National Security Forces that plan and 
                execute operations against Taliban and other 
                insurgents, with United States, NATO, and other partner 
                nations' forces in support and ensure that Afghan 
                citizens are protected from criminal elements;
                    (B) state-sponsored justice institutions in every 
                province and in key districts that provide the majority 
                of Afghans with access to formal justice;
                    (C) governors in every province dedicated to and 
                held accountable for delivery of services to the 
                district level;
                    (D) a strengthened, private sector friendly, legal 
                and commercial framework and basic infrastructure for 
                private sector development in every province, including 
                roads for commerce;
                    (E) reduced rates of poppy cultivation and 
                trafficking based on parallel strides made in improving 
                security, enhancing local-governing capacity and 
                justice institutions, and promoting economic 
                development nationwide as the security environment 
                dictates;
                    (F) the timely completion of the 2009 and 2010 
                scheduled presidential and parliamentary elections with 
                an improved level of competence, legitimacy, and 
                effectiveness in the administration of government for 
                the Afghan people;
                    (G) a multi-year human development plan for Afghan 
                capabilities that involves the leaders, managers, and 
                other professionals necessary for ensuring a 
                functioning state, modern economy, and a vibrant civil 
                society; and
                    (H) a public finance system that is capable of--
                            (i) conducting a full, system-wide 
                        assessment of potential sources of revenue in 
                        the country, including customs, which can 
                        establish a basis for payment of essential 
                        services;
                            (ii) conducting an assessment of revenue 
                        sources that are lost due to misappropriation, 
                        corruption, and mismanagement;
                            (iii) developing a plan for closing the 
                        gaps between potential revenue and actual 
                        revenue collected; and
                            (iv) maintaining the resources necessary 
                        for essential services, including the 
                        sustainability of the security sector 
                        institutions essential to regional stability 
                        and security within Afghanistan.

SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the 
President up to $3,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2009 
through 2013 to provide assistance to Afghanistan under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that up to 
$3,000,000,000 should be authorized to be appropriated for each of the 
fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to provide assistance to Afghanistan 
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

SEC. 8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF ASSISTANCE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall establish and implement a 
system to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
assistance provided under this Act on a program-by-program basis in 
order to maximize the long-term sustainable development impact of such 
assistance.
    (b) Requirements.--In carrying out subsection (a), the President 
shall--
            (1) establish performance goals for assistance authorized 
        under this Act and expresses such goals in an objective and 
        quantifiable form, to the extent practicable;
            (2) establish indicators to be used in measuring or 
        assessing the achievement of the goals described in paragraph 
        (1); and
            (3) provide a basis for recommendations for adjustments to 
        assistance authorized under this Act to enhance the impact of 
        such assistance.
    (c) Assistance To Enhance the Capacity of Afghanistan.--In carrying 
out subsection (a), the President shall provide assistance to enhance 
the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to monitor and evaluate 
programs carried out by the national, provincial, and local governments 
in Afghanistan in order to maximize the long-term development impact of 
such programs.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2009 through 2013 
to carry out this section.

SEC. 9. PROGRAM OVERSIGHT AUTHORIZATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress that--
            (1) the establishment of the Office of the Special 
        Inspector General for Afghanistan is a positive, although 
        insufficient, development in--
                    (A) the oversight and monitoring of United States 
                efforts in Afghanistan to meet the extensive needs of 
                the critical and expensive stabilization and 
                reconstruction operation; and
                    (B) recognizing the necessity to establish 
                permanent capacity within the Inspector General offices 
                of the Department of State and the United States Agency 
                for International Development; and
            (2) efforts by United States Inspectors General in 
        Afghanistan should seek ways to increase the capacity of the 
        Government of Afghanistan to build Afghan oversight and anti-
        corruption institutions.
    (b) Assistance Authorized.--
            (1) In general.--The Office of the Inspector General of the 
        Department of State and the Office of the Inspector General of 
        the United States Agency for International Development in 
        Afghanistan shall audit, investigate, and oversee the programs 
        authorized under this Act.
            (2) Office of technical assistance.--The Office of 
        Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury shall--
                    (A) conduct annual assessments of Afghanistan's 
                public finance system, broken down by line ministry and 
                by province;
                    (B) submit a report to Congress that describes the 
                results of each assessment conducted under subparagraph 
                (A); and
                    (C) make copies of the report submitted under 
                subparagraph (B) available to the Government of 
                Afghanistan and the Afghan people.
    (c) Requirement for In-Country Presence.--The Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of State and the Office of the 
Inspector General of the United States Agency for International 
Development, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the 
Administrator for the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall permanently deploy not fewer than 2 staff from each 
such Office in Afghanistan to carry out this section.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) Availability of funds.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated under section 7 for each of the fiscal years 2009 
        through 2013--
                    (A) not less than $3,000,000 shall be made 
                available to the Office of the Inspector General of the 
                Department of State to carry out this section; and
                    (B) not less than $5,000,000 shall be made 
                available to the Office of the Inspector General of the 
                United States Agency for International Development to 
                carry out this section.
            (2) Relation to other available funds.--Amounts made 
        available under paragraph (1) are in addition to amounts 
        otherwise available for such purposes.

SEC. 10. COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Congressional Finding.--Congress finds that the individual 
responsible for coordinating assistance for Afghanistan, as of the date 
of the enactment of this Act, has been constrained in achieving the 
objectives of an integrated approach to United States assistance 
programs for Afghanistan.
    (b) Appointment of Coordinator.--Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a coordinator. who--
            (1) shall report directly to the President;
            (2) shall have the rank and status of Ambassador; and
            (3) may not hold any other position within the United 
        States Government.
    (c) Duties of Coordinator.--The coordinator appointed pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall--
            (1) design an overall non-military strategy, in 
        coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies, including regional United States Ambassadors, to 
        advance United States interests in Afghanistan, including 
        policy coordination relating to--
                    (A) security and stability within Afghanistan;
                    (B) political and economic reconstruction and 
                development;
                    (C) counter-narcotics; and
                    (D) activities to equip and train the Afghan 
                National Security Forces;
            (2) ensure policy coordination among relevant Federal 
        departments and agencies, including the Department of Defense, 
        in carrying out the strategy described in paragraph (1);
            (3) coordinate with other countries and international 
        organizations with respect to assistance for Afghanistan, 
        especially in areas in which ground coordination and 
        collaboration is essential, such as activities to--
                    (A) equip and train the Afghan National Security 
                Forces;
                    (B) build the capacity of the Government of 
                Afghanistan at the local, district, province, and 
                national levels, with increased emphasis on the 
                subnational level; and
                    (C) undertake phased reconstruction and development 
                activities, especially activities associated with 
                sustainable counter-narcotics operations and programs;
            (4) coordinate the implementation of assistance programs 
        for Afghanistan described in paragraph (1) and oversight with 
        relevant Federal departments and agencies;
            (5) ensure expeditious resolution of policy disputes with 
        respect to United States assistance for Afghanistan described 
        in paragraph (1) among relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies;
            (6) ensure coordination among the United States, the 
        Government of Afghanistan, NATO-ISAF, the United Nations, and 
        other international partners that are supporting counter-
        terrorism, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics efforts; 
        and
            (7) carry out a review of major security and development 
        contracts in order to--
                    (A) evaluate the degree of effectiveness relative 
                to the perceived value of such contracts; and
                    (B) provide recommendations to enhance local 
                capacity and participation of Afghan organizations at 
                the highest levels of reconstruction and development.
    (d) Deputy Coordinators.--The coordinator may appoint up to 4 
deputy coordinators to assist the coordinator with the duties of the 
coordinator described in subsection (c), including duties relating to 
counter-narcotics, reconstruction and development, and equipping and 
training Afghan National Security Forces. A deputy coordinator may not 
hold any other position within the United States Government.

SEC. 11. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR WAR VICTIMS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the President should continue and expand programs of 
        assistance to innocent Afghan individuals, families, and 
        communities that suffered losses as a result of military 
        operations conducted by United States and NATO/ISAF forces; and
            (2) the programs described in paragraph (1) help innocent 
        civilians rebuild their lives and build goodwill for the United 
        States and our allies.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees on the feasibility of expanding 
assistance programs described in subsection (a) to include--
            (1) the provision of additional assistance to families of 
        Afghan civilians who--
                    (A) were injured or killed during such operations; 
                and
                    (B) were the primary source of income for their 
                families;
            (2) the provision of assistance in excess of $2,500 to 
        families of Afghan civilians described in subsection (a); and
            (3) the provision of other assistance that might be 
        required as a result of ongoing military operations in 
        Afghanistan.

SEC. 12. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING UNITED NATIONS MANDATE IN 
              AFGHANISTAN.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
        (referred to in this section as the ``UNAMA'') plays a vital 
        role in coordinating international assistance efforts and 
        should strengthen that role;
            (2) the UNAMA ensures that the emergency assistance it 
        coordinates is expended as part of the effort to build national 
        capacity in sustainable institutions and practices, including 
        emergency food assistance;
            (3) the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections 
        in Afghanistan are the most critical proximate event for which 
        the UNAMA should prioritize its efforts in order to help 
        solidify the political transformation begun during the 
        Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003 and further enshrined in 
        national elections in 2004 and 2005, and should do so by--
                    (A) providing a thorough review of lessons learned 
                from the Afghan elections of 2004 and 2005;
                    (B) preparing a detailed plan of how the UNAMA 
                intends to support free and fair elections in 2009 and 
                2010 in time to effectively implement such plan;
                    (C) including the consideration of a modern, fraud-
                resistant information management system to prevent 
                multiple voting; and
                    (D) building the capacity and consistency of the 
                Afghan Electoral Commission and enabling the Commission 
                to enforce stricter compliance with the guidelines for 
                participation by candidates in the elections to ensure 
                appropriate vetting to strengthen Afghan voter 
                confidence in their electoral system; and
            (4) the United Nations Security Council should expand the 
        United Nations mandate in Afghanistan by--
                    (A) authorizing international civilian law 
                enforcement missions in Afghanistan as a part of peace 
                operations of the United Nations in Afghanistan and as 
                a partner in the consolidation of the international 
                response to the challenge of building effective police 
                forces;
                    (B) authorizing the International Security 
                Assistance Force to participate in counter-drug 
                interdiction operations, to the extent appropriate, 
                practicable, and consistent with ongoing operational 
                activities and international law, against major 
                narcotic traffickers, their operations, and their 
                infrastructure in Afghanistan, with the concurrence of 
                the Government of Afghanistan; and
                    (C) amending and extending the authorization of the 
                International Security Assistance Force beyond October 
                2008.

SEC. 13. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL 
              ASIA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the national interest of the United States 
        that--
                    (A) the countries of South and Central Asia work 
                together to address common challenges hampering the 
                stability, security, and development of their region; 
                and
                    (B) appropriate resources and diplomatic personnel 
                are available to enhance, where possible, such 
                cooperation; and
            (2) the strategic importance of South and Central Asia, and 
        the particular challenges and threats represented by political 
        instability, terrorism, insurgencies, and nuclear 
        proliferation, warrant further resources and diplomatic 
        capacity to facilitate the efforts by United States Ambassadors 
        in the region.
    (b) Appointment.--The President [shall] appoint, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, a special envoy, who shall--
            (1) report through the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South 
        and Central Asian Affairs;
            (2) have the rank of Ambassador; and
            (3) shall harmonize United States efforts to enhance 
        cooperation between the countries of South and Central Asia.
    (c) Duties.--The special envoy appointed pursuant to subsection (b) 
shall--
            (1) coordinate United States policy on issues relating to 
        strengthening and facilitating relations between the nations of 
        South and Central Asia for the benefit of stability and 
        economic growth in the region;
            (2) advise the President and the Secretary of State, as 
        appropriate; and
            (3) in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State, 
        Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, make recommendations 
        regarding effective strategies and tactics to achieve United 
        States policy objectives to--
                    (A) stem cross-border terror activities;
                    (B) provide guidance and assistance to refugees to 
                ensure orderly and voluntary repatriation from 
                neighboring states;
                    (C) bolster people-to-people ties and economic 
                cooperation between the nations of South and Central 
                Asia, including bilateral trade relations;
                    (D) explore opportunities to anticipate and seek 
                solutions to critical cross-border issues, such as 
                transport, energy, food security, and water; and
                    (E) offer comprehensive review and advice to 
                support effective counter-narcotics strategies across 
                the region, including effective regional food security 
                assistance.

SEC. 14. REAUTHORIZATION OF RADIO FREE AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since January 30, 2002, RFE/RL, Incorporated (formerly 
        known as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) has provided 12 hours 
        of daily surrogate broadcasting services through Radio Free 
        Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto languages to the people of 
        Afghanistan.
            (2) Radio Free Afghanistan is the leading broadcaster in 
        Afghanistan with an audience of nearly 60 percent of the adult 
        population.
            (3) It is in the national interest to continue Radio Free 
        Afghanistan's surrogate broadcasts to Afghanistan in order to 
        provide accurate news and information, help give voice to 
        ordinary Afghans, and provide programs on the fundamentals of 
        democracy.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--For each of the fiscal years 
2009 through 2013, there are authorized to be appropriated to the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors such sums as may be necessary for 
grants to support 12 hours of daily surrogate broadcasting services 
through Radio Free Afghanistan in Dari and Pashto languages to the 
people of Afghanistan.

SEC. 15. REPORTS REQUIRED.

    (a) Report on Progress Toward Security, Stability, and Development 
in Afghanistan.--Not later than July 1, 2009, and annually thereafter 
through July 1, 2018, the President shall submit a report to the 
appropriate congressional committees that--
            (1) sets forth a comprehensive set of performance 
        indicators and measures of progress in order to establish a 
        baseline upon which to plan and build toward sustainable 
        security, stability, and development in Afghanistan and the 
        surrounding region;
            (2) describes the progress achieved based upon such 
        measures of performance in the previous 3 years; and
            (3) sets goals for such measures of performance over the 
        subsequent 3 years.
    (b) Comprehensive Strategy for Sustainable Security, Stability, and 
Development in Afghanistan.--Not later than October 1, 2009, and 
annually thereafter until October 1, 2018, the President shall submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees that sets forth a 
comprehensive interagency strategy for achieving sustainable security, 
stability, and development in Afghanistan and the surrounding region.
    (c) Government Accountability Office Report.--Not later than 270 
days after the submission of each report required under subsection (a), 
the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a report to 
the appropriate congressional committees that contains--
            (1) a review of, and comments addressing, the most recent 
        report submitted under subsection (a); and
            (2) recommendations relating to any additional actions the 
        Comptroller General determines to be necessary to improve on 
        United States efficiency and effectiveness in meeting the goals 
        set forth in the most recent report submitted under subsection 
        (a).
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