* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 97-10202

Summary Calendar

_______________

NORMAN LEATH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

AMERICAN MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-818-D)

_________________________

August 28, 1997

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

Norman Leath appeals the confirmation of an arbitration award

entered in an employment discrimination dispute. Concluding that

the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable, we affirm.

I.
2

In March 1993, American Medical International Incorporated

(“American Medical”) required Leath to sign an acknowledgment form

containing an arbitration clause (the “Clause”) as a condition of

his continued employment. The Clause stated, in relevant part:

I . . . understand that as a condition of employment and

continued employment, I agree to submit any complaints to

the published process and agree to abide by and accept

the final decision of the arbitration panel as ultimate

resolution of my complaint(s) for any and all events that

arise out of employment or termination of employment.

Leath was discharged in August 1993.

Leath sued American Medical under title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634;

and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that he was fired because of his

race, sex, and age and in retaliation for complaining about

American Medical’s discriminatory practices. Leath and American

Medical agreed to submit the claims to arbitration, although Leath

reserved the right to challenge the enforceability of the

arbitration agreement at a later time.

In December 1996, the arbitrator found, inter alia, that

American Medical’s actions were based on non-discriminatory reasons

and denied Leath’s claim in its entirety. In January 1997, the

district court confirmed the arbitral decision.

II.

A.
3

Contrary to Leath’s assertion, it is well-settled that we review the decision to confirm an arbitral decision de novo. See

Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,

996 (5th Cir. 1995). Our review of the arbitrator’s decision, on

the other hand, is extremely deferential. See Executone Info.

Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1994).

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, states

that an arbitration provision in “a contract evidencing a

transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in

equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Parties

may agree to arbitrate claims arising under the ADEA, see Gilmer v.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-33 (1991), and we

have extended this principle to title VII claims, see Alford v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).

Leath argues that the Clause is unenforceable because it is

not supported by consideration. Although Leath admits that he

received continued employment in exchange for agreeing to

arbitrate, he argues that this does not qualify as valid consideration.

Under Texas law, the employer and employee have the right to

condition continued employment on the modification of the terms of

employment. See Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227,

229 (Tex. 1986). That Leath remained an at-will employee is of no
4

moment; he received consideration in the form of continued salary

and employment.

Leath argues that this consideration is invalid because the

“new policy is itself illegal.” This assertion is meritless, as

the Supreme Court has held it is legally permissible to require

arbitration of statutory rights. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.

B.

Leath also avers that the Clause is unenforceable because it

“does not specifically put Leath on notice that he was waiving his

right to the judicial remedies provided to redress the violation of

his statutory rights.” Leath signed an agreement to arbitrate any

complaints “for any and all events that arise out of employment or

termination of employment.” It is obvious that the conduct that

forms the basis of his complaint arises out of the “termination of

employment.”

The notion that an arbitration agreement must state

specifically that statutory rights are covered is contrary to

precedent. For example, the Gilmer Court ordered arbitration when

the agreement referred, by adoption, to “[a]ny controversy . . .

arising out of the employment or termination of employment.”

500 U.S. at 23. In fact, we have held that an employment contract

that requires the arbitration of “any action contesting the

validity of this Agreement, the enforcement of its financial terms,
5

or other disputes” was sufficient under the FAA. Rojas v.

TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 746 (5th Cir. 1996); see

Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834-35 (8th Cir.

1997) (enforcing an arbitration clause identical to the instant

one).

AFFIRMED.