alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0493n.06

No. 14-1995

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE YONO and SALWA YONO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL 

TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE 

FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE 

TRUST 2004-6, and JPMORGAN 

CHASE BANK, NA, SUCCESSOR TO 

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,

Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: CLAY and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; and WATSON, District Judge.



PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs George and Salwa Yono filed an amended complaint in the 

Oakland County Circuit Court in Michigan seeking, among other relief, quiet title to property 

located in West Bloomfield, Michigan. Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 

(“Deutsche Bank”), as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2004-6, and JPMorgan Chase 

Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”), successor to Washington Mutual Bank, removed the complaint to the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on July 26, 2013. On February 

28, 2014, the district court issued an order granting Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss and 

JPMorgan’s motion for summary judgement. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ subsequent 

 

 The Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting 

by designation. 
No. 14-1995

2

motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs failed to file a timely notice of appeal; rather, on June 6, 

2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file their notice of appeal out of time. After receiving 

briefing by the parties, the district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs now argue that the

district court abused its discretion in so doing. 

Plaintiffs contend that a “setting change” in their counsel’s electronic filing system and a 

“computer glitch” experienced by Plaintiffs’ counsel should excuse their failure to file their

notice of appeal by the specified deadline. However, the explanations and arguments put 

forward by Plaintiffs fall far short of the “unique or extraordinary circumstances” that Plaintiffs 

must demonstrate in order to be granted leave to file an untimely notice of appeal. Marsh v. 

Richardson, 873 F.2d 129, 130 (6th Cir. 1989). After carefully considering the record, the 

parties’ arguments, and applicable law, we find that the district court’s reasoning and 

conclusions are sound. We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a notice of appeal out of time. We AFFIRM on the 

basis of the district court’s order dated July 11, 2014.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND AS OF
MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                  0000919604
<NAME> KERATOPLANETES CORP
<MULTIPLIER>                    1
<CURRENCY>                      US dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Mar-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 Apr-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,388
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1274
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,483)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   5
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  110
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (110)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (110)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (110)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.00)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.13
 CONSENT OF MARYSE BELANGER
   1.
    
    The technical report dated March 26, 2011, entitled Cerro Negro Gold Project Santa Cruz
Province, Argentina NI 43-101 Technical Report (the Cerro Negro Report);2.
    
    The technical report dated March 21, 2011, entitled Goldcorp Inc., Peñasquito
Polymetallic Project, Zacatecas State, Mexico NI 43-101 Technical Report (the Peñasquito
Report); and3.
    
    The 40-F, the MD&A and the AIF, which include references in connection with information
relating to (i) the Cerro Negro Report and the Cerro Negro Gold Project, and the properties
described therein and (ii) the Peñasquito Report and the Peñasquito Project, and the
properties described therein.
  Date: March 31, 2011/s/ Maryse BelangerName:
    Maryse Belanger, P. Geo.
In the Matter of: D.L.B.

No. COA15-531.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 6, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-50530

Conference Calendar

 

THOMAS D. TINER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

FNU TREON, Warden, Terrell Unit,

Texas Department of Corrections; ET AL,

Respondents,

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. MO-98-CV-149

--------------------

August 23, 2000

Before KING, Chief Judge, and POLITZ and WIENER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Thomas D. Tiner, Texas inmate #706290, appeals the district

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as timebarred. Tiner’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

Tiner admits that his § 2254 petition was not filed timely. 

He contends, however, that equitable tolling should be applied in

his case. Tiner asserts that the State, the district attorney,
No. 99-50530

-2-

and his attorney on direct appeal would not provide him a copy of

his state records. Tiner contends that his inability to obtain

the record prevented him from filing a timely § 2254 petition.

The statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), is

subject to equitable tolling in rare and exceptional

circumstances. Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811-12 (5th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1474 (1999). “[E]quitable

tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively

misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented

in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Felder v.

Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000)(internal quotations

and citation omitted). Tolling should not be applied “unless the

circumstances presented in a particular case are on a par with

the conditions listed in § 2244(d).” See Felder, 204 F.3d at

172.

Tiner’s allegations do not constitute rare and exceptional

circumstances warranting equitable tolling. Tiner has not shown

that the State actively misled him or prevented him from filing a

timely § 2254 petition. Accordingly, the district court’s

judgment dismissing Tiner’s § 2254 petition as time-barred is

AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

FURNISHED PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(b) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT

AND SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18

OF THE UNITED STATES CODE (18 U.S.C. 1350)



I, James R. Tolonen, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of
Business Objects S.A. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly
presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Business Objects S.A.



By:

/s/ James R. TolonenJames R. Tolonen Chief Financial Officer and Senior Group Vice President
STATE v. Kawamie Shonta COLE.

No. 378P09-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 2015.

Catherine F. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Jason T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General.

Kawamie Shonta Cole, Lillington, for Cole, Kawamie Shonta.

Maureen Krueger, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 29th of October 2015 by Defendant to Amend Petition for Writ of Certiorari with Addendum:

> "Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of December 2015."
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOMINGO MAXIMO IZAGUIRRE,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 19

- 71839

Agency No. A070

- 183

- 442

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 8, 2020 * *

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Domingo Maximo Izaguirre, a citizen and native of Honduras, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to

reopen proceedings conducted in absentia. Our jurisdiction is governed by

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to

reopen and review de novo questions of law

. Bonilla v. Lynch , 840 F.3d 575, 581

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 71839

(9th Cir. 2016). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denyi ng Izaguirre’s unopposed

motion to reopen , where it has the authority to do so

. See Limsico v. INS , 951 F.2d

210, 213 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. Konstantinova v. INS , 195 F.3d 528, 530

- 31 (9th Cir.

1999) ( abuse of discretion where denial of unopposed motion to remand was based

on procedural error)

. Izaguirre has not raised, and therefore waive s, any challenge

to the BIA’s determination that Pereira v. Sessions , 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), does

not apply in this case. See Lopez

- Vasquez v. Holder , 706 F.3d 1072, 10 79

- 80 (9th

Cir. 2013) (petitioner waives a contention by failing to raise it in the opening

brief).

We lack jurisdiction to review Izaguirre’s unexhausted contention that,

because his hearing notice was not accompanied by a certificate of service,

jurisdiction did not vest with the immigration court. Tijani v. Holder , 628 F.3d

1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010)

.

Izaguirre’s contention that the BIA did not properly address the reason for

his request for sua sponte reopening is not supported, and we otherwise lack

jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening. See Bonilla

, 840

F.3d at 588.3 19

- 71839

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the

mandate. The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 2 1 WY 34

October Term, A.D. 20 20

February 24, 202 1

TONI LYNN OLESON,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff). S

- 20

- 0209



### O RDER 

### A FFIRMING THE 

### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### ’ S 

### J UDGMENT AND 

### S ENTENCE

[¶ 1 ] This matter came before the Court upon its own motion following notification that

Appellant has not filed a pro se brief in the time allotted. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Appellant entered an unconditional guilty plea to one count of possession of

methamphetamine, a third offense felony

. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35

- 7

- 10 31( c )

. The district

court imposed a sentence of 18 to 24 months, suspended in favor of two years of probation

. Appellant filed this appeal to challenge the district court’s August 14

, 20 20 , “ Judgment

and Sentence

. ”

[¶ 2] On December 29 , 20 20 , Appellant’s court

- appointed appellate counsel filed a

“Motion to Withdraw as Counsel,” pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87

S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). This Court subsequently ordered that Appellant

may “file with this Co urt a pro se brief specifying the issues he would like the Court to

consider in this appeal.” This Court also provided notice that, after the time for filing a

pro se brief expired, this Court would “make its ruling on counsel’s motion to withdraw

and, if appropriate, make a final decision” on this appeal. A ppellant’s pro se brief was due

for filing on or before February 16 , 202 1 . Appellant did not file a pro se brief or other

pleading in the time allotted.[¶ 3] Now, f ollowing a careful review of the record and the “ Anders brief” submitted by

appellate counsel

, this Court finds that appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw should be

granted and the district court’s “ Judgment and Sentence ” should be affirmed

. It is,

therefore,

[¶ 4 ] ORDERED that the Wyoming Public Defender’s Office, court

- appointed counsel

for A ppellant Toni Lynn Oleson , is hereby permitted to withdraw as counsel of record for

A ppellant; and it is further

[¶ 5 ] ORDERED that the S heridan County D istrict C ourt’s August 14

, 20 20

, “ Judgment

and Sentence ” be , and the same hereby is , affirme d

.

[¶ 6 ] DATED this 24 th day of February , 20 2 1

.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

MICHAEL K

. D A VI S

Chief Justice
IN RE K.T.B., JR.

No. COA08-766.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed October 21, 2008.

Certification Date November 10, 2008.

Appeal from Moore (06JT01).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
STATE of North Carolina v. John Thomas PATTERSON, Jr.

No. COA15-138.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 17, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

No Error.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We
hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-42082, 333-47259, 333-68255, 333-77051) of Tier Technologies, Inc. of our reports dated
November 30, 2003, except for the 1st and 2nd paragraphs of Note 16 and Note 17 which are as of December 12, 2003 relating to the financial statements and
financial statement schedules, which appears in this Form 10-K.

/s/
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP
San Jose, California
December 18, 2003

---

QuickLinks
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

AUG 25, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-12575

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 06-00088-CV-WTM-5

MINISTER WILLIE DAVIS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus 

DONALD BARROW, Warden, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

_________________________

(August 25, 2008)

Before WILSON, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Minister Willie Davis appeals the district court’s dismissal of his § 2254
2

habeas petition. The petition was dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of

limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On appeal, Davis argues that his

Georgia state motion to reconsider his sentence tolled the statute of limitations. 

Upon careful review of the record and the parties’s briefs, and after hearing oral

argument, we affirm. 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act imposes a one-year

statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Davis’s

limitations period began running on September 30, 2002, the date on which the

challenged judgment became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see Bridges v.

Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that a judgment becomes

final “on the date that the time for seeking direct review expire[s]”).

Once triggered, the limitations period is tolled pending the resolution of a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Alexander v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corrs., we held that a state court motion is not an application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review for purposes of § 2244(d)(2) unless it

attacks the legality of the sentence. 523 F.3d 1291, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2008).

Davis’s Georgia state motion to reconsider his sentence, filed pursuant to

Ga. Code Ann. §17-10-1(f), did not raise any legal arguments or otherwise attack
3

the legality of his sentence. Instead, Davis made a plea to reduce his sentence,

offering “to leave the county and not contact the victim as an alternative to some of

the prison time.” Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations was not tolled

pending consideration of Davis’s §17-10-1(f) motion and his § 2254 petition is

untimely.

AFFIRMED.
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-15-0000772

22-OCT-2019

07:55 AM
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 175 (Monday, September 12, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 53804]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-17997]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[FEMA-1603-DR]


Louisiana; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Louisiana (FEMA-1603-DR), dated August 29, 2005, and 
related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 4, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Magda Ruiz, Recovery Division, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2705.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Louisiana is hereby amended to include the following 
areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by 
the catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his 
declaration of August 29, 2005:

    The parishes of Ascension, Assumption, East Baton Rouge, Iberia, 
Iberville, Jefferson, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, 
St. Bernard, St Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John, St. 
Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Washington, 
and West Baton Rouge for Public Assistance [Categories C-G] (already 
designated for Individual Assistance and debris removal and 
emergency protective measures [Categories A and B] under the Public 
Assistance program, including direct Federal assistance.)

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community 
Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund Program; 97.032, Crisis 
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services Program; 97.034, 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management 
Assistance; 97.048, Individuals and Households Housing; 97.049, 
Individuals and Households Disaster Housing Operations; 97.050 
Individuals and Households Program-Other Needs, 97.036, Public 
Assistance Grants; 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.)

Michael D. Brown,
Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of 
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 05-17997 Filed 9-9-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-10-P
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER



I, Ralph M. Amato, Chief Executive Officer of BoysToys.com, Inc. (the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:



1. This Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Registrant for the period ending September 30, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.





|Date:November 14, 2007 | By:/s/ Ralph M. Amato 
Ralph M. Amato
Chief Executive Officer
|---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------
|                       |