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[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3563 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]

                                                      Calendar No. 1074
110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3563

                          [Report No. 110-496]

 To authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 
                 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

           September 24 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

    Mr. Dodd, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the 
    following original bill; which was read twice and placed on the 
                                calendar

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 
                 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Security 
Assistance Act of 2008''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
                TITLE I--MILITARY AND RELATED ASSISTANCE

                   Subtitle A--Funding Authorizations

Sec. 101. Foreign military financing program.
Sec. 102. International military education and training.
   Subtitle B--Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 Amendments and Related 
                               Provisions

Sec. 111. Waiver of net proceeds resulting from disposal of United 
                            States defense articles provided to a 
                            foreign country on a grant basis.
Sec. 112. Additions to war reserve stockpiles for allies for fiscal 
                            years 2009 and 2010.
Sec. 113. Assistance for law enforcement forces.
Sec. 114. Database of United States military assistance.
Sec. 115. Annual report on foreign military training.
Sec. 116. Demining programs.
Sec. 117. Special waiver authority.
Sec. 118. Military coups.
Sec. 119. Focus on international military education and training.
 Subtitle C--Arms Export Control Act Amendments and Related Provisions

Sec. 121. Thresholds for advance notice to Congress of sales or 
                            upgrades of defense articles, design and 
                            construction services, and major defense 
                            equipment.
Sec. 122. Clarification of requirement for advance notice to Congress 
                            of comprehensive export authorizations.
Sec. 123. Transfers of small arms and light weapons.
Sec. 124. Plan regarding cluster munitions sold to foreign countries.
Sec. 125. Authority to provide cataloging data and services to non-NATO 
                            countries.
Sec. 126. Haitian Coast Guard.
Sec. 127. Security cooperation with the Republic of Korea.
             TITLE II--AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER NAVAL VESSELS

Sec. 201. Short title.
Sec. 202. Transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign recipients.
    TITLE III--NONPROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM, AND EXPORT CONTROL 
                               ASSISTANCE

                   Subtitle A--Funding Authorizations

Sec. 301. Nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related 
                            programs.
Sec. 302. Contributions to international organizations supporting key 
                            nonproliferation goals.
   Subtitle B--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

Sec. 311. Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
                   Subtitle C--Reporting Requirements

Sec. 321. Amendments to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Sec. 322. Adequate funding for IAEA safeguards.
Sec. 323. Amended annual report on nuclear nonproliferation.
Sec. 324. Amended additional reports on nonproliferation.
Sec. 325. Consolidation of reports on non-proliferation in South Asia.
Sec. 326. Repeal of annual report on Russian debt reduction for 
                            nonproliferation.
Sec. 327. Annual assessments of nonproliferation and disarmament fund 
                            projects.
Sec. 328. Reports on 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
                            Conference.
                TITLE IV--NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SUPPLY

Sec. 401. Short title.
Sec. 402. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
         Subtitle A--Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Fuel Supply

Sec. 411. Findings.
Sec. 412. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 413. Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.
Sec. 414. Safeguards technology development program.
Sec. 415. Safeguards Cadre Program.
                    Subtitle B--Nuclear Fuel Supply

Sec. 421. Authority for bilateral and multilateral nuclear fuel supply 
                            mechanisms.
Sec. 422. Report on the establishment of an international fuel 
                            authority.
Sec. 423. Sense of the Senate on IAEA fuel supply.
                 TITLE V--GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE

Sec. 501. Short title.
Sec. 502. Findings; purpose.
Sec. 503. Definitions.
Sec. 504. Eligibility for assistance.
Sec. 505. Restriction.
Sec. 506. Fellowship program.
Sec. 507. In-country training in laboratory techniques and disease and 
                            syndrome surveillance.
Sec. 508. Assistance for the purchase and maintenance of public health 
                            laboratory equipment and supplies.
Sec. 509. Assistance for improved communication of public health 
                            information.
Sec. 510. Assignment of public health personnel to United States 
                            missions and international organizations.
Sec. 511. Expansion of certain United States Government laboratories 
                            abroad.
Sec. 512. Assistance for international health networks and expansion of 
                            Field Epidemiology Training Programs.
Sec. 513. Reports.
Sec. 514. Authorization of appropriations.
             TITLE VI--INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PAYMENTS

Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Authority to make certain extraordinary payments in 
                            connection with the International Space 
                            Station.

                TITLE I--MILITARY AND RELATED ASSISTANCE

                   Subtitle A--Funding Authorizations

SEC. 101. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President for grant assistance under section 23 of 
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), $4,982,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2009 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010.
    (b) Assistance for Israel.--Section 513(c) of the Security 
Assistance Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-280; 114 Stat. 856), as amended 
by section 1221(a) of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 (division B 
of Public Law 107-228; 116 Stat. 1430), is further amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2002 and 2003'' and 
        inserting ``2009 and 2010'';
            (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``Funds authorized'' and 
        all that follows through ``later.'' and inserting ``Funds 
        authorized to be available for Israel under subsection (b)(1) 
        and paragraph (1) for fiscal year 2009 shall be disbursed not 
        later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of an Act 
        making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, 
        and related programs for fiscal year 2009, or October 31, 2008, 
        whichever is later''; and
            (3) in paragraph (4)--
                    (A) by striking ``2002 and 2003'' and inserting 
                ``2009 and 2010''; and
                    (B) by striking ``$535,000,000 for fiscal year 2002 
                and not less than $550,000,000 for fiscal year 2003'' 
                and inserting ``$2,550,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 and 
                not less than $2,550,000,000 for fiscal year 2010''.
    (c) Assistance for Egypt.--Section 514 of the Security Assistance 
Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-280; 114 Stat. 857), as amended by section 
1221(b) of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 (116 Stat. 1430), is 
further amended--
            (1) in subsection (c) by striking ``2002 and 2003'' and 
        inserting ``2009 and 2010''; and
            (2) in subsection (e), by striking ``Funds estimated'' and 
        all that follows through ``of the respective fiscal year, 
        whichever is later'' and inserting ``Funds estimated to be 
        outlayed for Egypt under subsection (c) during fiscal year 2009 
        shall be disbursed to an interest-bearing account for Egypt in 
        the Federal Reserve Bank of New York not later than 30 days 
        after the date of the enactment of an Act making appropriations 
        for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs 
        for fiscal year 2009, or by October 31, 2008, whichever is 
        later''.

SEC. 102. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--Section 542 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347a) is amended by striking ``There 
are authorized'' and all that follows through ``fiscal year 1987'' and 
inserting ``There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to 
carry out the purposes of this chapter $91,500,000 for fiscal year 2009 
and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010''.
    (b) Authority to Provide to International Organizations.--Section 
541 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2347) is amended in the first sentence by 
inserting ``and comparable personnel of international organizations'' 
after ``foreign countries''.

   Subtitle B--Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 Amendments and Related 
                               Provisions

SEC. 111. WAIVER OF NET PROCEEDS RESULTING FROM DISPOSAL OF UNITED 
              STATES DEFENSE ARTICLES PROVIDED TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY ON 
              A GRANT BASIS.

    Section 505(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2314(f)) is amended by striking ``In the case of items which were 
delivered prior to 1985, the'' in the second sentence and inserting 
``The''.

SEC. 112. ADDITIONS TO WAR RESERVE STOCKPILES FOR ALLIES FOR FISCAL 
              YEARS 2009 AND 2010.

    Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ``for each of fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008'' and inserting ``for each of fiscal years 2009 and 
2010''.

SEC. 113. ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES.

    Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420) 
is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``or'';
                    (B) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and the 
                provision of professional'' and all that follows 
                through ``democracy'' and inserting ``including any 
                regional, district, municipal, or other subnational 
                entity emerging from instability'';
                    (C) by striking the period at the end of paragraph 
                (7) and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (D) by adding at the end the following new 
                paragraphs:
            ``(8) with respect to assistance to combat corruption in 
        furtherance of the objectives for which programs are authorized 
        to be established under section 133 of this Act;
            ``(9) with respect to the provision of professional public 
        safety training, including training in internationally 
        recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, and the 
        promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy;
            ``(10) with respect to assistance to combat trafficking in 
        persons; or
            ``(11) with respect to assistance for constabularies or 
        comparable law enforcement authorities in support of developing 
        capabilities for and deployment to peace operations.''; and
            (2) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following 
        new subsection:
    ``(d) Subsection (a) shall not apply to assistance for law 
enforcement forces for which the President, on a case-by-case basis, 
determines that it is important to the national interest of the United 
States to furnish such assistance and submits to the committees of the 
Congress referred to in subsection (a) of section 634A of this Act an 
advance notification of the obligation of funds for such assistance in 
accordance with such section.''.

SEC. 114. DATABASE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

    Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2415) 
is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new 
subsection:
    ``(c) Availability of Report Information on the Internet.--
            ``(1) Requirement for database.--The President shall make 
        available to the public the unclassified portion of each such 
        report in the form of a database that is available via the 
        Internet and that may be searched by various criteria.
            ``(2) Schedule for updating.--Not later than April 1 of 
        each year, the President shall make available in the database 
        the information contained in the annual report for the fiscal 
        year ending the previous September 30.''.

SEC. 115. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING.

    Subsection (a)(1) of section 656 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2416) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``January 31'' and inserting ``March 1''; 
        and
            (2) by striking ``and all such training proposed for the 
        current year''.

SEC. 116. DEMINING PROGRAMS.

    (a) Clarification of Authority.--Section 551 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348) is amended--
            (1) in the second sentence, by striking ``Such assistance 
        may include reimbursement'' and inserting ``Such assistance may 
        include the following:
            ``(1) Reimbursements''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(2) Demining activities, clearance of unexploded 
        ordnance, destruction of small arms, light weapons, and other 
        conventional weapons, and related activities, notwithstanding 
        any other provision of law.''.
    (b) Disposal of Demining Equipment.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, demining equipment available to the United States 
Agency for International Development and the Department of State and 
used in support of the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance 
for humanitarian purposes, may be disposed of on a grant basis in 
foreign countries, subject to such terms and conditions as the 
President determines appropriate.

SEC. 117. SPECIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.

    (a) Revision of Authority.--Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) is amended in subsection (a)--
            (1) by striking paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting the 
        following new paragraph:
    ``(1) The President may authorize any assistance, sale, or other 
action under this Act, the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
seq.), or any other law that authorizes the furnishing of foreign 
assistance or the appropriation of funds for foreign assistance, 
without regard to any of the provisions described in subsection (b) if 
the President determines, and notifies the Committees on Foreign 
Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on 
Foreign Affairs and Appropriations of the House of Representatives in 
writing--
            ``(A) with respect to assistance or other actions under 
        chapter 2 or 5 of part II of this Act, or sales or other 
        actions under the Arms Export Control Act, that to do so is 
        vital to the national security interests of the United States; 
        and
            ``(B) with respect to other assistance or actions, that to 
        do so is important to the security interests of the United 
        States.''; and
            (2) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) as 
        paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), respectively.
    (b) Increased Limitation on Single Country Allocation.--Subsection 
(a)(3)(C) of such section, as redesignated, is amended by striking 
``$50,000,000'' and inserting ``$75,000,000''.
    (c) Repeal of Provisions Relating to Germany and a Certification 
Requirement.--Section 614 of such Act is further amended by striking 
subsections (b) and (c).
    (d) Inapplicable or Waivable Laws.--Such section, as amended by 
subsection (c), is further amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(b) Inapplicable or Waivable Laws.--The provisions referred to in 
subsection (a) are those set forth in any of the following:
            ``(1) Any provision of this Act.
            ``(2) Any provision of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
            ``(3) Any provision of law that authorizes the furnishing 
        of foreign assistance or appropriates funds for foreign 
        assistance.
            ``(4) Any other provision of law that restricts assistance, 
        sales or leases, or other action under a provision of law 
        referred to in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
            ``(5) Any provision of law that relates to receipts and 
        credits accruing to the United States.''.

SEC. 118. MILITARY COUPS.

    Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370) 
is amended by inserting after subsection (l) the following new 
subsection (m):
    ``(m)(1) No assistance may be furnished under this Act or the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) for the government of a 
country if the duly elected head of government for such country is 
deposed by decree or military coup. The prohibition in the preceding 
sentence shall cease to apply to a country if the President determines 
and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
after the termination of assistance a democratically elected government 
for such country has taken office.
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to assistance to promote 
democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes.
    ``(3) The President may waive the application of paragraph (1), and 
any comparable provision of law, to a country upon determining that it 
is important to the national security interest of the United States to 
do so.''.

SEC. 119. FOCUS ON INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

    Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347) 
is amended--
            (1) by striking ``or (iv)'' and inserting ``(iv)''; and
            (2) by striking ``rights.'' and inserting ``rights, or (v) 
        improve the protection of civilians, especially women and 
        children, including those who are refugees or displaced 
        persons.''.

 Subtitle C--Arms Export Control Act Amendments and Related Provisions

SEC. 121. THRESHOLDS FOR ADVANCE NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF SALES OR 
              UPGRADES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION 
              SERVICES, AND MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.

    (a) Letters of Offer to Sell.--Subsection (b) of section 36 of the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended--
            (1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraph (6), in'' 
                and inserting ``In'';
                    (B) by striking ``Act for $50,000,000'' and 
                inserting ``Act for $100,000,000'';
                    (C) by striking ``services for $200,000,000'' and 
                inserting ``services for $350,000,000'';
                    (D) by striking ``$14,000,000'' and inserting 
                ``$50,000,000''; and
                    (E) by inserting ``and in other cases if the 
                President determines it is appropriate,'' before 
                ``before such letter'';
            (2) in the first sentence of paragraph (5)(C)--
                    (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraph (6), if'' 
                and inserting ``If'';
                    (B) by striking ``costs $14,000,000'' and inserting 
                ``costs $50,000,000'';
                    (C) by striking ``equipment, $50,000,000'' and 
                inserting ``equipment, $100,000,000'';
                    (D) by striking ``or $200,000,000'' and inserting 
                ``or $350,000,000''; and
                    (E) by inserting ``and in other cases if the 
                President determines it is appropriate,'' before ``then 
                the President''; and
            (3) by striking paragraph (6).
    (b) Export Licenses.--Subsection (c) of section 36 of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended--
            (1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraph (5), in'' 
                and inserting ``In'';
                    (B) by striking ``$14,000,000'' and inserting 
                ``$50,000,000'';
                    (C) by striking ``services sold under a contract in 
                the amount of $50,000,000'' and inserting ``services 
                sold under a contract in the amount of $100,000,000''; 
                and
                    (D) by inserting ``and in other cases if the 
                President determines it is appropriate,'' before 
                ``before issuing such'';
            (2) in the last sentence of paragraph (2), by striking 
        ``(A) and (B)'' and inserting ``(A), (B), and (C)''; and
            (3) by striking paragraph (5).
    (c) Presidential Consent.--Section 3(d) of the Arms Export Control 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2753(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraphs (1) and (3)(A)--
                    (A) by striking ``Subject to paragraph (5), the'' 
                and inserting ``The'';
                    (B) by striking ``$14,000,000'' and inserting 
                ``$50,000,000''; and
                    (C) by striking ``service valued (in terms of its 
                original acquisition cost) at $50,000,000'' and 
                inserting ``service valued (in terms of its original 
                acquisition cost) at $100,000,000''; and
            (2) by striking paragraph (5).

SEC. 122. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ADVANCE NOTICE TO CONGRESS 
              OF COMPREHENSIVE EXPORT AUTHORIZATIONS.

    Subsection (d) of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2776) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(1)'';
                    (B) by striking ``this subsection'' and inserting 
                ``this subparagraph''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
    ``(B) Notwithstanding section 27(g), in the case of a comprehensive 
authorization described in section 126.14 of title 22, Code of Federal 
Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation) for the proposed 
export of defense articles or defense services in an amount that 
exceeds a limitation set forth in subsection (c)(1), before the 
comprehensive authorization is approved or the addition of a foreign 
government or other foreign partner to the comprehensive authorization 
is approved, the President shall submit a certification with respect to 
the comprehensive authorization in a manner similar to the 
certification required under subsection (c)(1) of this section and 
containing comparable information, except that the last sentence of 
such subsection shall not apply to certifications submitted pursuant to 
this subparagraph.''; and
            (2) in paragraph (4), by striking ``Approval for an 
        agreement subject to paragraph (1) may not be given under 
        section 38'' and inserting ``Approval for an agreement subject 
        to paragraph (1)(A), or for a comprehensive authorization 
        subject to paragraph (1)(B), may not be given under section 38 
        or section 126.14 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
        any corresponding similar regulation), as the case may be,''.

SEC. 123. TRANSFERS OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS.

    (a) Letters of Offer to Sell Defense Articles or Services.--
Subsection (b)(1) of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2776) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (O), by striking ``; and'' and 
        inserting a semicolon;
            (2) in subparagraph (P), by striking the period at the end, 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (P) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                    ``(Q) for any proposed sale of firearms listed in 
                category I of the United States Munitions List that 
                require a license for international export under this 
                section--
                            ``(i) an analysis of the impact of the 
                        proposed sale on efforts by the United States 
                        relating to the collection and destruction of 
                        excess small arms and light weapons; and
                            ``(ii) a detailed description of any 
                        provision or requirement for the recipient 
                        state to dispose of firearms that would become 
                        excess as a result of the proposed sale.''.
    (b) Applications for Export Licenses.--The second sentence of 
subsection (c) of such section is amended by inserting after ``such 
offset agreement.'' the following: ``Each numbered certification 
regarding the proposed export of firearms listed in category I of the 
United States Munitions List shall include an analysis of the impact of 
the proposed sales on efforts by the United States relating to the 
collection and destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and a 
detailed description of any provision or requirement for the recipient 
state to dispose of firearms that would become excess as a result of 
the proposed export.''.
    (c) Transfers of Certain Excess Defense Articles.--Subsection 
(f)(2) of section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2321j) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and 
        inserting a semicolon;
            (2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); 
        and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                    ``(D) for any proposed transfer of firearms listed 
                in category I of the United States Munitions List that 
                would require a license for international export under 
                section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
                2776)--
                            ``(i) an analysis of the impact of the 
                        proposed sale on efforts by the United States 
                        relating to the collection and destruction of 
                        excess small arms and light weapons; and
                            ``(ii) a detailed description of any 
                        provision or requirement for the recipient 
                        state to dispose of firearms that would become 
                        excess as a result of the proposed transfer; 
                        and''.

SEC. 124. PLAN REGARDING CLUSTER MUNITIONS SOLD TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Use by recipient countries of United States-origin 
        cluster munitions that result in high rates of unexploded 
        ordnance can damage the reputation of the United States, even 
        if the United States no longer controls how such weapons are 
        used, because of the human and economic damage such unexploded 
        ordnance can cause.
            (2) According to a 2005 report by the Defense Science Board 
        Task Force on Munitions System Reliability, cluster munitions 
        from a weapon acquisition program that reached the production 
        and deployment phase by the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 
        are a major contributor to unexploded ordinance from cluster 
        munition submunitions.
            (3) According to the same 2005 report, cluster munitions 
        are more likely to fail, and therefore leave unexploded 
        ordnance, as they age past their design life.
            (4) On June 19, 2008, the Secretary of Defense issued a 
        memorandum on Department of Defense policy on cluster munitions 
        and unintended harm to civilians.
            (5) Under the June 2008 policy, the Department of Defense 
        may, consistent with United States law and policy, seek to 
        transfer cluster munitions that do not meet a specified 
        performance rate for unexploded ordnance only if the receiving 
        foreign government agrees not to use such cluster munitions 
        after 2018.
            (6) The June 2008 policy does not address cluster munitions 
        that are past their design life.
    (b) Plan Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall provide to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 
annex as necessary, that--
            (1) identifies those cluster munitions that have been sold 
        or transferred pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
            (2) identifies the countries to which cluster munitions 
        have been transferred pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, 
        and the numbers of such munitions in such countries that are, 
        or will soon be, beyond their design life;
            (3) identifies those countries that received cluster 
        munitions that are, or will soon be, beyond their design life 
        and have destroyed, deactivated, or refurbished such munitions 
        or will not use such munitions, except for purposes of training 
        or development of detection and clearing methods; and
            (4) details a plan to eliminate from operational stockpiles 
        of other countries the risks to innocent civilians posed by 
        United States-origin cluster munitions that are past their 
        design life.

SEC. 125. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE CATALOGING DATA AND SERVICES TO NON-NATO 
              COUNTRIES.

    Section 21(h)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
2761(h)(2)) is amended by striking ``to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization'' and all that follows through ``provides'' and inserting 
``to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to any member government 
of that Organization, or to the government of any other country if that 
Organization, member government, or other government provides''.

SEC. 126. HAITIAN COAST GUARD.

    The Government of Haiti shall be eligible to purchase defense 
articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard under the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), subject to the prior notification 
requirements under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2394-1).

SEC. 127. SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Close and continuing defense cooperation between the 
        United States and the Republic of Korea continues to be in the 
        national security interest of the United States.
            (2) The Republic of Korea was designated a Major Non-NATO 
        Ally in 1987, the first such designation.
            (3) The Republic of Korea has been a major purchaser of 
        United States defense articles and services through the Foreign 
        Military Sales (FMS) program, totaling $6,900,000,000 in 
        deliveries over the last 10 years.
            (4) Purchases of United States defense articles, services, 
        and major defense equipment facilitate and increase the 
        interoperability of Republic of Korea military forces with the 
        United States Armed Forces.
            (5) Congress has previously enacted important, special 
        defense cooperation arrangements for the Republic of Korea, as 
        in the Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the transfer of items 
        in the War Reserves Stockpile for Allies, Korea'', approved 
        December 30, 2005 (Public Law 109-159; 119 Stat. 2955), which 
        authorized the President, notwithstanding section 514 of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), to transfer 
        to the Republic of Korea certain defense items to be included 
        in a war reserve stockpile for that country.
            (6) Enhanced support for defense cooperation with the 
        Republic of Korea is important to the national security of the 
        United States, including through creation of a status in law 
        for the Republic of Korea similar to the countries in the North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan, Australia, and New 
        Zealand, with respect to consideration by Congress of foreign 
        military sales to the Republic of Korea.
    (b) Special Foreign Military Sales Status for Republic of Korea.--
Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b), by inserting ``the Republic of 
        Korea,'' before ``Japan'' each place it appears;
            (2) in subsection (c), by inserting ``the Republic of 
        Korea,'' before ``Australia'' both places it appears; and
            (3) in subsection (d)(2)(A), by inserting ``the Republic of 
        Korea,'' before ``Australia''.

SEC. 128. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AGREEMENTS RELATING TO ASSISTANCE, 
              TRANSFER, OR SALE OF CERTAIN MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES.

    It is the sense of Congress that it is the responsibility of the 
United States Government, not a private entity, to negotiate with 
foreign governments any agreement pursuant to section 646(b)(2) of the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2008 (division J of Public Law 110-161; 121 Stat. 
2336) specifying that qualifying cluster munitions or cluster munitions 
technology will only be used against clearly defined military targets 
and will not be used where civilians are known to be present.

             TITLE II--AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER NAVAL VESSELS

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 
2008''.

SEC. 202. TRANSFER OF NAVAL VESSELS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN RECIPIENTS.

    (a) Transfers by Grant.--The President is authorized to transfer 
vessels to foreign recipients on a grant basis under section 516 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j), as follows:
            (1) Pakistan.--To the Government of Pakistan, the OLIVER 
        HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigate MCINERNEY (FFG-8).
            (2) Greece.--To the Government of Greece, the OSPREY class 
        minehunter coastal ships OSPREY (MHC-51) and ROBIN (MHC-54).
            (3) Chile.--To the Government of Chile, the KAISER class 
        oiler ANDREW J. HIGGINS (AO-190).
            (4) Peru.--To the Government of Peru, the NEWPORT class 
        amphibious tank landing ships FRESNO (LST-1182) and RACINE 
        (LST-1191).
    (b) Grants Not Counted in Annual Total of Transferred Excess 
Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to a recipient on 
a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by subsection (a) shall 
not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles 
transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
    (c) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the United States 
in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be 
charged to the recipient (notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e))).
    (d) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.--To the 
maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition 
of the transfer of a vessel under this section, that the recipient to 
which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of 
the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of 
the recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States, 
including a United States Navy shipyard.
    (e) Expiration of Authority.--The authority to transfer a vessel 
under this section shall expire at the end of the 2-year period 
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

    TITLE III--NONPROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM, AND EXPORT CONTROL 
                               ASSISTANCE

                   Subtitle A--Funding Authorizations

SEC. 301. NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING, AND RELATED 
              PROGRAMS.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President $578,500,000 for fiscal year 2009 and 
such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2010 for 
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs and 
activities under--
            (1) chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.), for anti-terrorism assistance;
            (2) chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.), for export control and related 
        border security assistance, for preventing diversion of 
        scientific and technical expertise related to nuclear, 
        chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery, 
        and for other global proliferation threat reduction efforts;
            (3) paragraph (2) of section 551 of the Foreign Assistance 
        Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348), as added by section 116 of this 
        Act, for humanitarian demining;
            (4) section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 
        5854), for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund;
            (5) section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2763) and section 11 of the Department of State Authorities Act 
        of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb-6), for conventional weapons 
        destruction;
            (6) section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2221), for a voluntary contribution to the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency and a United States contribution to the 
        Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory 
        Commission; and
            (7) the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2008 (title V 
        of this Act).
    (b) Suballocation.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
under subsection (a)--
            (1) for fiscal year 2009, $45,000,000 is authorized to be 
        available until expended, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums 
        as may be necessary are authorized to be available until 
        expended, for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, to 
        promote, notwithstanding any other provision of law, bilateral 
        and multilateral activities relating to nonproliferation and 
        disarmament, including, when in the national security interests 
        of the United States, with respect to international 
        organizations and in countries other than the independent 
        states of the former Soviet Union;
            (2) for fiscal year 2009, $41,300,000 is authorized to be 
        available until September 30, 2010, and for fiscal year 2010, 
        such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available 
        until September 30, 2011, for export control and related border 
        security assistance;
            (3) for fiscal year 2009, $69,000,000 is authorized to be 
        available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be 
        necessary are authorized to be available, for global threat 
        reduction;
            (4) for fiscal year 2009, $66,000,000 is authorized to be 
        available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be 
        necessary are authorized to be available, for a voluntary 
        contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency;
            (5) for fiscal year 2009, $10,000,000 is authorized to be 
        available until September 30, 2013, for a voluntary 
        contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency's 
        Nuclear Security Fund, to support measures to protect against 
        nuclear terrorism, provided--
                    (A) that such amounts may be deposited in the Fund 
                only to the extent of deposits of matching amounts in 
                that Fund by other governments, entities, or persons in 
                excess of the amounts contributed by such governments, 
                entities or persons to the Nuclear Security Fund in 
                2007; and
                    (B) that there are no conditions attached to the 
                contributions being matched that would prevent the IAEA 
                Office of Nuclear Security from using such 
                contributions on any project that accords with a 
                Nuclear Security Plan already approved by the IAEA 
                Board of Governors;
            (6) for fiscal year 2009, $31,000,000 is authorized to be 
        available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be 
        necessary are authorized to be available, for a United States 
        contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
        Preparatory Commission, to pay the current and outstanding 
        United States share of construction and provisional operation 
        of the International Monitoring System and related functions;
            (7) for fiscal year 2009, $160,000,000 is authorized to be 
        available until September 30, 2010, and for fiscal year 2010, 
        such sums as may be necessary are authorized to be available 
        until September 30, 2011, for anti-terrorism assistance, of 
        which--
                    (A) $8,900,000 is authorized to be available for 
                fiscal year 2009 and such sums as are necessary are 
                authorized to be available for fiscal year 2010 for the 
                Terrorist Interdiction Program;
                    (B) $1,200,000 is authorized to be available for 
                fiscal year 2009 and such sums as are necessary are 
                authorized to be available for fiscal year 2010 for 
                counterterrorism engagement with allies; and
                    (C) $8,425,000 is authorized to be available for 
                fiscal year 2009 and such sums as are necessary are 
                authorized to be available for fiscal year 2010 for 
                counterterrorism financing; and
            (8) for fiscal year 2009, $151,200,000 is authorized to be 
        available, and for fiscal year 2010, such sums as are necessary 
        are authorized to be available, for conventional weapons 
        destruction.
    (c) Availability.--Amounts authorized under this section for the 
purposes specified in this section are in addition to amounts otherwise 
available for such purposes.

SEC. 302. CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING KEY 
              NONPROLIFERATION GOALS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United Nations Security Council, in Security 
        Council Resolution 1540 (2004), affirmed that ``proliferation 
        of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their 
        means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace 
        and security''.
            (2) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and 
        entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the 
        ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' or ``NPT'') and the 
        effective functioning of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
        (IAEA) are of critical importance to international peace and 
        security and United States national security.
            (3) President George W. Bush told the 46th General 
        Conference of the IAEA in 2002, ``The threat from nuclear 
        proliferation remains real, immediate, and dangerous. We must 
        ensure that the IAEA has the resources it needs to carry out 
        its mission effectively.''
            (4) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
        Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
        Their Destruction, done at Paris January 13, 1993, and entered 
        into force April 29, 1997 (commonly known as the ``Chemical 
        Weapons Convention'' or ``CWC'') and the effective functioning 
        of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
        (OPCW) furthers United States national security by verifying 
        that stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed and by 
        ensuring that declared peaceful chemical activities are not 
        diverted to weapons purposes.
            (5) On April 29, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
        offered her congratulations on the tenth anniversary of the CWC 
        to Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the OPCW. In 
        that message, Secretary Rice stated, ``The Organization for the 
        Prohibition for Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its staff continue 
        to make important contributions to increasing security for 
        every nation against the threat of chemical weapons.'' 
        Secretary Rice also assured Director-General Pfirter of ``the 
        United States government's continued strong support for and 
        commitment to the Convention and the OPCW''.
            (6) Before fiscal year 1982, the United States paid its 
        assessed contributions to the IAEA by making quarterly payments 
        with funds appropriated for the fiscal year ending in the same 
        year that contributions were due.
            (7) At the request of the Executive Branch, Congress in 
        fiscal year 1982 began deferring payments so that contributions 
        to several international organizations, including the IAEA, are 
        paid in one lump sum near the end of the organization's 
        calendar year (or even later), with funds appropriated for the 
        fiscal year ending in the following year.
            (8) For those contributions paid under the deferral policy, 
        in the best case no appropriated funds are available to pay the 
        United States assessment before the final quarter of an 
        international organization's budget year. As early as February 
        1983, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 
        later United States payments as a result of the deferral policy 
        ``contributed to existing cash flow problems [at the relevant 
        international organizations]''.
            (9) The deferral policy leaves very little overlap between 
        the calendar year for which international organizations need 
        the funds and the United States fiscal year in which payments 
        are appropriated. The deferral policy therefore exacerbates the 
        negative impact of failing to appropriate funds before the 
        beginning of a given fiscal year. As a result of the deferral 
        policy, the United States is often unable to pay its dues 
        before the end of organizations' budget years.
            (10) Late payment of United States dues can impair the 
        ability of the IAEA and the OPCW to carry out critical 
        missions.
            (11) After entry into force of the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention, the United States did not apply the formal deferral 
        policy to assessed payments to the OPCW. Recent budget 
        shortfalls and exchange rate losses in the ``Contributions to 
        International Organizations'' account have led the United 
        States in recent years to defer, however, approximately 70 
        percent of its assessed payment to the following fiscal year.
            (12) For 2008 the OPCW has approved its third straight 
        budget of zero nominal growth. Nevertheless, for five straight 
        years OPCW has had to return unspent cash surpluses to Member 
        States, in large part because the organization was unable to 
        carry out budgeted activities when assessed dues were not paid 
        in a timely manner. OPCW Director-General Pfirter in August 
        2007 stated, ``The shortfall in cash receipts could, of course, 
        severely undermine the financial health of the OPCW.''
            (13) Large portions of both the OPCW Verification and 
        Inspections budget and the IAEA safeguards budget are allocated 
        to paying fixed staffing costs for already-hired inspectors. 
        These organizations have few other choices than to cut back on 
        budgets for recruitment and training of new inspectors and 
        investments in verification technology if cash is not available 
        in a timely manner.
            (14) The short-term budget gains created by the 1981 
        deferral switch have long since disappeared, while the damage 
        both to the performance of organizations of vital importance to 
        United States nonproliferation goals and to the standing and 
        influence of the United States in those organizations 
        continues. Ending the deferral policy for organizations serving 
        missions of critical importance to international peace and 
        security would entail higher budget costs for a small number of 
        transition years but would pay benefits for many years to come.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to any other 
amounts authorized for contributions to international organizations, 
there is authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for fiscal year 
2009, for contributions to international organizations, to meet 
obligations for membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
assessed by those organizations for calendar year 2008.
    (c) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2009, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a 
report that includes the following:
            (1) The amounts of any assessments by the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition 
        of Chemical Weapons for calendar year 2009 or any prior year 
        that the Secretary determines will remain unpaid by the United 
        States on October 1, 2009.
            (2) The reason or reasons such assessments will not have 
        been paid by October 1, 2009.

   Subtitle B--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

SEC. 311. AMENDMENTS TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954.

    (a) Information to Accompany Proposed Agreements for Nuclear 
Cooperation.--Section 123(b) of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 
2153(b)) is amended by inserting after ``Nuclear Proliferation 
Assessment Statement'' the following: ``and a report on the actions 
taken and planned by the United States with the country identified in 
the proposed agreement for cooperation to fulfill the purposes of the 
program authorized in Section 502 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3262)''.
    (b) Subsequent Arrangements Under Agreements for Nuclear 
Cooperation.--Section 131(b)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160(b)(1)) is 
amended by inserting after ``elapsed'' the following: ``, except that 
for any such subsequent arrangement under an agreement for cooperation 
which did not, pursuant to section 123(d) of this Act, become effective 
until there was enacted a joint resolution favoring such agreement, the 
Secretary of Energy may not enter into any such subsequent arrangement 
until Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution 
approving such subsequent arrangement, which resolution shall be 
considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130(i) of 
this Act''.
    (c) Amendments to Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation.--Section 
123(d) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is amended--
            (1) by inserting after ``in connection therewith)'' the 
        following: ``, or an amendment to such agreement,'';
            (2) by inserting after ``contained in that subsection'' the 
        following: ``, or an agreement with a nation or group of 
        nations that does not have in force an additional protocol to 
        its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for 
        the application of safeguards,''; and
            (3) by inserting after ``the Henry J. Hyde United States-
        India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006'' the 
        following: ``, or an amendment to such agreement,''.

SEC. 312. BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM.

    Chapter 9 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 584 the 
following new section:

``SEC. 584A. GLOBAL PATHOGEN SECURITY PROGRAM.

    ``(a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
program to combat bioterrorism world-wide by providing training, 
equipment, and financial and technical (including legal) assistance in 
such areas as biosecurity, biosafety, pathogen surveillance, and timely 
response to outbreaks of infectious disease, and by providing increased 
opportunity for scientists who possess expertise that could make a 
material contribution to the development, manufacture, or use of 
biological weapons to engage in remunerative careers that promote 
public health and safety.
    ``(b) Activities Included.--Activities in the program established 
pursuant to subsection (a) may include such activities as the 
Biosecurity Engagement Program of the Office of Cooperative Threat 
Reduction in the Department of State.''.

                   Subtitle C--Reporting Requirements

SEC. 321. AMENDMENTS TO THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT.

    (a) Verification of Compliance.--Section 306(a) of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577(a)) is amended by inserting ``or 
other formal commitment'' after ``agreement'' each place it appears in 
paragraphs (1) and (2).
    (b) Annual Reports to Congress.--Section 403 of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a) is amended to read as follows:

                      ``annual reports to congress

    ``Sec. 403.  (a) Report on Objectives and Negotiations.--Not later 
than April 15 of each year, the President shall submit to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
Energy, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the status of United States policy and 
actions with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and 
disarmament. Such report shall include--
            ``(1) a detailed statement concerning the arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives of the executive 
        branch of Government for the forthcoming year; and
            ``(2) a detailed assessment of the status of any ongoing 
        arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament negotiations, 
        including a comprehensive description of negotiations or other 
        activities during the preceding year and an appraisal of the 
        status and prospects for the forthcoming year.
    ``(b) Report on Compliance.--Not later than April 15 of each year, 
the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Secretary of State 
with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence and in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the status of United 
States policy and actions with respect to arms control, 
nonproliferation, and disarmament compliance. Such report shall 
include--
            ``(1) a detailed assessment of adherence of the United 
        States to obligations undertaken in arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, including 
        information on the policies and organization of each relevant 
        agency or department of the United States to ensure adherence 
        to such obligations, a description of national security 
        programs with a direct bearing on questions of adherence to 
        such obligations and of steps being taken to ensure adherence, 
        and a compilation of any substantive questions raised during 
        the preceding year and any corrective action taken;
            ``(2) a detailed assessment of the adherence of other 
        nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments, 
        including the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which the 
        United States is a participating state, including information 
        on actions taken by each nation with regard to the size, 
        structure, and disposition of its military forces in order to 
        comply with arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament 
        agreements or commitments, including, in the case of each 
        agreement or commitment about which compliance questions 
        exist--
                    ``(A) a description of each significant issue 
                raised and efforts made and contemplated with the other 
                participating state to seek resolution of the 
                difficulty;
                    ``(B) an assessment of damage, if any, to United 
                States security and other interests;
                    ``(C) recommendations as to any steps that should 
                be considered to redress any damage to United States 
                national security and to reduce compliance problems; 
                and
                    ``(D) for states that are not parties to such 
                agreements or commitments, a description of activities 
                of concern carried out by such states and efforts 
                underway to bring such states into adherence with such 
                agreements or commitments;
            ``(3) a discussion of any material noncompliance by foreign 
        governments with their binding commitments to the United States 
        with respect to the prevention of the spread of nuclear 
        explosive devices (as defined in section 830(4) of the Nuclear 
        Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(4)) by 
        non-nuclear-weapon states (as defined in section 830(5) of that 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 6305(5)) or the acquisition by such states of 
        unsafeguarded special nuclear material (as defined in section 
        830(8) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 6305(8)), including--
                    ``(A) a net assessment of the aggregate military 
                significance of all such violations;
                    ``(B) a statement of the compliance policy of the 
                United States with respect to violations of those 
                commitments; and
                    ``(C) what actions, if any, the President has taken 
                or proposes to take to bring any country committing 
                such a violation into compliance with those 
                commitments; and
            ``(4) a specific identification, to the maximum extent 
        practicable in unclassified form, of each and every question 
        that exists with respect to compliance by other countries with 
        arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and 
        other formal commitments with the United States.
    ``(c) Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Report Requirement 
Satisfied.--The report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) shall 
include the information required under section 2(10)(C) of Senate 
Resolution 75, 105th Congress, agreed to April 24, 1997, advising and 
consenting to the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, with annexes, done at Paris January 13, 1993 and 
entered into force April 29, 1997 (popularly known as the `Chemical 
Weapons Convention'; T.Doc. 103-21).
    ``(d) Classification of Report.--The reports required by this 
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, with classified 
annexes, as appropriate. The report portions described in paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall summarize in detail, at least in 
classified annexes, the information, analysis, and conclusions relevant 
to possible noncompliance by other countries that are provided by 
United States intelligence agencies.
    ``(e) Reporting Consecutive Noncompliance.--If the President in 
consecutive reports submitted to the Congress under subsection (b) 
reports that any country is not in full compliance with its binding 
nonproliferation commitments to the United States, then the President 
shall include in the second such report an assessment of what actions 
are necessary to compensate for such violations.
    ``(f) Additional Requirement.--Each report required by subsection 
(b) shall include a discussion of each significant issue described in 
paragraph (4) of such subsection that was contained in a previous 
report issued under this section during 1995, or after December 31, 
1995, until the question or concern has been resolved and such 
resolution has been reported in detail to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.''.

SEC. 322. ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

    (a) Section 201(b) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 
U.S.C. 3241(b)) is amended to read as follows:
    ``(b) ensure that the IAEA has the financial, technical, and 
personnel resources available to fully carry out its safeguards mission 
and that, to the maximum extent possible, safeguards activities are 
financed by the regular budget of the IAEA and not by voluntary 
contributions to the Agency;''.

SEC. 323. ANNUAL REPORT ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than March 1 of each year, except 
in 2009 and every fourth year thereafter not later than June 1, the 
President, shall, submit to Congress a report on the efforts of Federal 
departments and agencies to prevent nuclear proliferation. The report 
shall include--
            (1) a description of the progress made toward--
                    (A) negotiating the initiatives contemplated in 
                sections 104 and 105 of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
                of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3223 and 3224);
                    (B) negotiating the international arrangements or 
                other mutual undertakings contemplated in section 403 
                of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 
                2153b);
                    (C) encouraging non-nuclear-weapon states that are 
                not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to 
                adhere to the Treaty or, pending such adherence, to 
                enter into comparable agreements with respect to 
                safeguards and to foreswear the development of any 
                nuclear explosive devices, and discouraging nuclear 
                exports to non-nuclear-weapon states which have not 
                taken such steps;
                    (D) strengthening the safeguards of the IAEA as 
                contemplated in section 201 of the Nuclear Non-
                Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3241), 
                particularly including ensuring that IAEA safeguards 
                programs are adequately funded and reducing the 
                proportion of IAEA funding for safeguards activities 
                covered by voluntary contributions; and
                    (E) renegotiating agreements for cooperation as 
                contemplated in section 404(a) of the Nuclear Non-
                Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 U.S.C. 2153c);
            (2) an assessment of the impact of the progress described 
        in paragraph (1) on the non-proliferation policy of the United 
        States;
            (3) an explanation of the precise reasons why progress has 
        not been made on any particular point and recommendations with 
        respect to appropriate measures to encourage progress;
            (4) a statement of the President's general and specific 
        nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives and how the 
        efforts of Federal agencies will be coordinated most 
        effectively, pursuant to section 1334 of the Foreign Relations 
        Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 2357b), to 
        achieve those objectives;
            (5) a statement of what legislative modifications, if any, 
        are necessary in the President's judgment to achieve the 
        nonproliferation policy of the United States;
            (6) a determination as to which non-nuclear-weapon states 
        with which the United States has an agreement for cooperation 
        in effect or under negotiation, if any, have--
                    (A) detonated a nuclear device;
                    (B) refused to accept the safeguards of the IAEA on 
                all of their peaceful nuclear activities;
                    (C) refused to give specific assurances that they 
                will not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear 
                explosive device; or
                    (D) engaged in activities involving source or 
                special nuclear material and having direct significance 
                for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive 
                devices;
            (7) an assessment of whether any of the policies set forth 
        in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-
        242) have, on balance, been counterproductive from the 
        standpoint of preventing proliferation;
            (8) a description of the progress made toward establishing 
        procedures to facilitate the timely processing of requests for 
        subsequent arrangements and export licenses in order to enhance 
        the reliability of the United States in meeting its commitments 
        to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to 
        effective non-proliferation policies;
            (9) a description of the implementation of nuclear and 
        nuclear-related dual-use export controls in the preceding 
        calendar year, including a summary by type of commodity and 
        destination of--
                    (A) all transactions for which--
                            (i) an export license was issued for any 
                        good controlled under section 309(c) of the 
                        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (42 
                        U.S.C. 2139a(c));
                            (ii) an export license was issued under 
                        section 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
                        (42 U.S.C. 2139(b));
                            (iii) approvals were issued under the 
                        Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 
                        App. 2401 et seq.) or section 109 b.(3) of the 
                        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
                        2139(b)(3)), for the retransfer of any item, 
                        technical data, component, or substance; or
                            (iv) authorizations were made as required 
                        by section 57 b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
                        1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)(2)) to engage, directly 
                        or indirectly, in the production of special 
                        nuclear material;
                    (B) each instance in which--
                            (i) a sanction has been imposed under 
                        section 821(a) or section 824 of the Nuclear 
                        Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 
                        6301(a)) or section 102(b)(1) of the Arms 
                        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1(b)(1));
                            (ii) sales or leases have been denied under 
                        section 3(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
                        U.S.C. 2753(f)) or transactions have been 
                        prohibited by reason of acts relating to 
                        proliferation of nuclear explosive devices as 
                        described in section 40(d) of that Act;
                            (iii) a sanction has not been imposed by 
                        reason of section 821(c)(2) of the Nuclear 
                        Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 
                        6301(c)(2)) or the imposition of a sanction has 
                        been delayed under section 102(b)(4) of the 
                        Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-
                        1(b)(4)); or
                            (iv) a waiver of a sanction has been made 
                        under--
                                    (I) section 821(f) or section 824 
                                of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
                                Act of 1994;
                                    (II) section 620E(d) of the Foreign 
                                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
                                2375(d)), or paragraph (5) or (6)(B) of 
                                section 102(b) of the Arms Export 
                                Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1(b));
                                    (III) section 40(g) of the Arms 
                                Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(g)) 
                                with respect to the last sentence of 
                                section 40(d) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 
                                2780(g)); or
                                    (IV) section 614 of the Foreign 
                                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) 
                                with respect to section 620E of that 
                                Act (22 U.S.C. 2375) or section 3(f), 
                                the last sentence of section 40(d), or 
                                102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control 
                                Act; and
                    (C) the progress of those independent states of the 
                former Soviet Union that are non-nuclear-weapon states 
                and of the Baltic states towards achieving the 
                objective of applying full scope safeguards to all 
                their peaceful nuclear activities.
    (b) Form.--Portions of the information required by subsection 
(a)(6) may be submitted in classified form, as necessary. Any such 
information that may not be published or disclosed under section 
12(c)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
2411(c)(1)) shall be submitted as classified.
    (c) Incorporation by Reference.--
            (1) Cooperative threat reduction programs.--Information 
        relevant to the report required under this section that is 
        already contained in an annual report on activities and 
        assistance under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs 
        submitted to Congress under section 1308 of the Floyd D. Spence 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public 
        Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654-341) for the year for which the 
        report required under this section is submitted may be cited by 
        reference in the report required under this section.
            (2) Implementing recommendations of the 9/11 commission act 
        of 2007.--Information relevant to the report required under 
        this section that is already contained in an annual report on 
        the strategy and policies developed pursuant to section 1841 of 
        the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
        2007 (50 U.S.C. 2931) for the current and future fiscal years 
        during which the report required under this section is 
        submitted may be cited by reference in the report required 
        under this section.
            (3) Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.--
        Information relevant to the report required under this section 
        that is already contained in an annual report on the status of 
        United States policy and actions with respect to arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament developed pursuant to section 
        403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a) 
        for the year for which the report required under this section 
        is submitted may be cited by reference in the report required 
        under this section.
            (4) Nuclear weapons security.--Information relevant to the 
        report required under this section that is already contained in 
        an annual report on the security of nuclear weapons and related 
        equipment and formula quantities of strategic special nuclear 
        material outside of the United States developed pursuant to 
        section 3134 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2008 (22 U.S.C. 3244 note) for the year for which 
        the report required under this section is submitted may be 
        cited by reference in the report required under this section.

SEC. 324. AMENDED ADDITIONAL REPORTS ON NONPROLIFERATION.

    Section 602(c)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 
U.S.C. 3282(c)(1)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'';
            (2) by inserting ``, Armed Services,'' after ``Foreign 
        Relations''; and
            (3) by striking ``Committee on International Relations'' 
        and inserting ``Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed 
        Services''.

SEC. 325. CONSOLIDATION OF REPORTS ON NON-PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA.

    (a) In General.--Section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
``Such report shall also include a description of the efforts of the 
United States Government to achieve the objectives described in 
subsections (a) and (b) of section 1601 of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 116 Stat. 
1459), the progress made toward achieving such objectives, and the 
likelihood that such objectives will be achieved within the year 
following the reporting period.''.
    (b) Elimination of Duplicative Reporting Requirements.--Section 
1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 
(Public Law 107-228; 116 Stat. 1459) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``by September 30, 
        2003'';
            (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``not later than 
        September 30, 2003''; and
            (3) by striking subsection (c).

SEC. 326. REPEAL OF ANNUAL REPORT ON RUSSIAN DEBT REDUCTION FOR 
              NONPROLIFERATION.

    Section 1321 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note), is hereby 
repealed.

SEC. 327. ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS OF NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FUND 
              PROJECTS.

    (a) In General.--No later than September 1, 2009, and annually 
thereafter for the following two years, the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations in the House of 
Representatives an assessment of projects and project proposals carried 
out under the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (hereinafter, 
``NDF'') authorized under section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act 
(Public Law 102-511; 22 U.S.C. 5854). The first such assessment shall 
apply to projects approved to be carried out during the previous 5 
calendar years, and to project proposals not carried out by the NDF 
that were submitted to it between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 
2007. Each subsequent assessment shall cover projects approved to be 
carried out by the NDF during the previous calendar year.
    (b) Content.--The first such assessment under subsection (a) shall 
include--
            (1) An examination of each project proposal, including--
                    (A) the purpose of such proposal;
                    (B) the name of the requesting Federal agency or 
                drafting office;
                    (C) the reason or reasons why the Federal agency or 
                drafting office requesting that the NDF carry out such 
                proposed project was not able to undertake such 
                project;
                    (D) a statement as to whether such project proposal 
                was--
                            (i) fully funded;
                            (ii) funded at a different amount than the 
                        Federal agency or drafting office submitting 
                        such proposal requested;
                            (iii) deferred (including the reason why 
                        such proposal was deferred); or
                            (iv) not funded (including the reason or 
                        reasons why such proposal was not funded).
            (2) An examination of each project approved to be carried 
        out under the NDF, including the information required under 
        subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (1) and--
                    (A) the date on which the project was approved;
                    (B) an assessment of whether the approved project 
                included a schedule for completion;
                    (C) a review of the contract for the project, 
                including whether the contract is consistent, or, for 
                those projects with respect to which NDF 
                notwithstanding authorities were used, would have been 
                consistent, with the Federal Acquisition Regulations;
                    (D) an examination, in consultation with the Office 
                of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State, of 
                whether and to what extent it was necessary to rely on 
                NDF notwithstanding authorities to carry out such 
                project;
                    (E) if the contract for the project involves 
                design, construction, or acquisition of equipment, a 
                listing of the private entities associated with such 
                activities;
                    (F) an estimate of whether the project can be 
                completed within the funding amounts previously 
                notified to Congress;
                    (G) the name of any international organization 
                receiving funds from the NDF and the purposes for which 
                such funds are being made available to that 
                organization; and
                    (H) the office that serves as the executive agent 
                for such project.
            (3) A summary of all funds that have been de-obligated for 
        any NDF project previously notified to Congress.
            (4) An examination of any funds previously notified to 
        Congress that will not be expended on the originally notified 
        project, and an assessment of the reasons why the amounts 
        notified to Congress were not expended on that project, 
        including whether such project was completed, withdrawn, or the 
        funds were otherwise no longer needed.
            (5) A summary of the unobligated and obligated balances of 
        the NDF.
            (6) An assessment, for those projects carried out by the 
        NDF, of the extent to which the Federal agency or drafting 
        office effectively coordinated draft project proposals with all 
        Federal agencies with applicable policy responsibilities.
            (7) A review of NDF project implementation and mission 
        management, including the following:
                    (A) The roles and functions with respect to NDF 
                project implementation and mission management of each 
                of the following NDF officers:
                            (i) The Director.
                            (ii) The Deputy Director.
                            (iii) The Comptroller.
                            (iv) NDF Policy Officers.
                            (v) NDF Negotiators.
                            (vi) The Executive Secretary.
                            (vii) The Chief of Operations.
                            (viii) Program managers.
                            (ix) Contract administrators.
                            (x) Project support specialists.
                            (xi) Financial Specialists.
                    (B) The extent to which any of the positions set 
                forth in subparagraph (A) rely on or are performed by 
                private entities.
                    (C) The extent to which accounting and fund control 
                programs and offices of the Department of State, 
                including the NDF Comptroller, have the necessary 
                information technology and oversight tools to ensure 
                that NDF funds are used in an efficient and accountable 
                manner.
                    (D) Whether NDF has adequate internal audit 
                capabilities.
    (c) Subsequent Assessments.--Each subsequent assessment under 
subsection (a) shall include only the matters addressed under 
paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (b).

SEC. 328. REPORTS ON 2010 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW 
              CONFERENCE.

    (a) Report on Comprehensive Objectives, Strategy, and Policies.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than October 31, 2009, the 
        President shall submit to Congress a report, in classified and 
        unclassified forms, that details the comprehensive objectives, 
        strategy, and policies of the United States regarding the 2010 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
            (2) Content.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        describe--
                    (A) overall changes or revisions to the 
                international nuclear nonproliferation framework, 
                including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that 
                may be needed to realize a more robust and effective 
                global nuclear nonproliferation system;
                    (B) the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, 
                in particular uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel 
                reprocessing;
                    (C) country-specific nuclear proliferation 
                concerns;
                    (D) efforts to uphold Article IV commitments on 
                peaceful nuclear use, including the establishment of a 
                nuclear fuel bank or authority;
                    (E) accelerated implementation of obligations and 
                commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
                or pursuant to resolutions supported by the United 
                States and adopted at previous Nuclear Non-
                Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences for the purpose 
                of reducing the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
                and weapons-grade fissile material;
                    (F) nuclear and other nonproliferation initiatives 
                such as the Proliferation Security Initiative;
                    (G) the United States assessment of the objectives 
                and strategies of other states with regard to the 2010 
                Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, 
                including the Nuclear Weapons States under the Treaty, 
                members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and leading 
                States Parties associated with the Non-Aligned 
                Movement; and
                    (H) the United States diplomatic strategy leading 
                up to the Conference to build and strengthen the 
                international consensus regarding United States 
                objectives.
    (b) Report on Outcomes of Conference.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the 
        conclusion of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
        Conference, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in 
        classified and unclassified forms, regarding the outcomes of 
        the Conference.
            (2) Content.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        provide an assessment of the overall outcome of the Conference 
        as well as United States consultations and negotiations and 
        outcomes regarding the items listed in subsection (a)(2).

                TITLE IV--NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SUPPLY

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act 
of 2008''.

SEC. 402. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

         Subtitle A--Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Fuel Supply

SEC. 411. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards 
        system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are 
        indispensable to international peace and security.
            (2) Congress has long supported efforts aimed at effective 
        and efficient assurances of nuclear fuel supply, the 
        strengthening of IAEA safeguards, and assistance to the 
        developing world for nuclear and non-nuclear energy sources, as 
        embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 
        U.S.C. 3201 et seq.).
            (3) The February 22, 2005, Report of the IAEA Experts Group 
        on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle found 
        that, in addition to increased verification activities in 
        various nations such as Iran, another factor contributing to 
        significant and troubling demands on the IAEA safeguards system 
        was that ``the civilian nuclear industry appears to be poised 
        for worldwide expansion'' and that ``[r]apidly growing global 
        demand for electricity, the uncertainty of supply and price of 
        natural gas, soaring prices for oil, concerns about air 
        pollution and the immense challenge of lowering greenhouse gas 
        emissions, are all forcing a fresh look at nuclear power. As 
        the technical and organizational foundations of nuclear safety 
        improve, there is increasing confidence in the safety of 
        nuclear power plants. In light of existing, new and reawakened 
        interest in many regions of the world, the prospect of new 
        nuclear power stations on a large scale is therefore real. A 
        greater number of States will consider developing their own 
        fuel cycle facilities and nuclear know-how, and will seek 
        assurances of supply in materials, services and technologies.''
            (4) The same report also found, ``Two primary deciding 
        factors dominate all assessments of multilateral nuclear 
        approaches namely `Assurance of non-proliferation' and 
        `Assurance of supply and services'. Both are recognised overall 
        objectives for governments and for the NPT community. In 
        practice, each of these two objectives can seldom be achieved 
        fully on its own. History has shown that it is even more 
        difficult to find an optimum arrangement that will satisfy both 
        objectives at the same time. As a matter of fact, multilateral 
        approaches could be a way to satisfy both objectives.''
            (5) The same report also found, ``The non-proliferation 
        value of a multilateral arrangement is measured by the various 
        proliferation risks associated with a nuclear facility, whether 
        national or multilateral. These risks include the diversion of 
        materials from [a multilateral nuclear approach or MNA] 
        (reduced through the presence of a multinational team), the 
        theft of fissile materials, the diffusion of proscribed or 
        sensitive technologies from MNAs to unauthorized entities, the 
        development of clandestine parallel programmes and the breakout 
        scenario. The latter refers to the case of the host country 
        `breaking out', for example, by expelling multinational staff, 
        withdrawing from the NPT (and thereby terminating its 
        safeguards agreement), and operating the multilateral facility 
        without international control.''
            (6) The 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary-
        General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
        found that creating incentives for countries to forego the 
        development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
        facilities is essential, and that such suggestions, if 
        implemented swiftly and firmly, offer a real chance to reduce 
        the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by states or non-state 
        actors, and that such proposals ``should be put into effect 
        without delay''.
            (7) On February 11, 2004, President George W. Bush stated, 
        ``The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that 
        states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for 
        civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment 
        and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary 
        for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful 
        purposes.''
            (8) According to some experts, global energy demand will 
        grow by 50 percent in the next 20 years, predominantly in the 
        developing world.
            (9) Nuclear power may play an increasing role in 
        electricity supply to both the developed and the developing 
        world over the next several decades.
            (10) The Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in 
        testimony before Congress in September 2006 that a significant 
        factor limiting the effectiveness of the current IAEA 
        safeguards system is that ``more than half, or 111 out of 189, 
        of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional 
        Protocol into force, including the United States''.
            (11) The GAO also testified that an additional ``weakness 
        in implementing strengthened safeguards is that safeguards are 
        significantly limited or not applied in about 60 percent, or 
        112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries--either because 
        they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol) 
        with IAEA, and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or 
        because they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards 
        agreement with IAEA''.
            (12) The GAO also testified that ``while IAEA is 
        increasingly relying on the analytical skills of its staff to 
        detect countries' undeclared nuclear activities, the agency is 
        facing a looming human capital crisis. In the next 5 years, 
        IAEA will experience a large turnover of senior safeguards 
        inspectors and high-level management officials. Delays in 
        filling critical safeguards positions limit IAEA's ability to 
        implement strengthened safeguards.''
            (13) Outdated and unnecessary staff restrictions have 
        prevented the IAEA from maintaining and equipping a well-
        trained cadre of professional staff at the IAEA's Safeguards 
        Analytical Laboratory (SAL), located at Seibersdorf, Austria.
            (14) A goal of the Department of State's budget request for 
        fiscal year 2007 for United States voluntary contributions to 
        the IAEA was ``[s]trengthening quality control and sensitivity 
        of analyses by the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and 
        the Network of Analytical Laboratories, and reviewing needs for 
        possible refurbishment or replacement of SAL''.
            (15) Considerable investment is needed for SAL to meet 
        future IAEA requirements as its workload is growing, the 
        laboratory's infrastructure is aging, and IAEA requirements 
        have become more demanding, and while initial plans have been 
        made for laboratory enhancement and are currently pending 
        budgetary approval (sometime in 2009), the simple fact is that, 
        as more countries implement IAEA safeguards, many more nuclear 
        samples come to SAL for analysis.
            (16) Any proposals for the creation of bilateral or 
        multilateral assurances of supply mechanisms must take into 
        account, and be achieved in a manner that minimizes, the risk 
        of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and maximizes 
        adherence to international nonproliferation regimes, including, 
        in particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
        (NSG), and the IAEA Additional Protocol.
            (17) Any proposal to create an assurance of supply 
        mechanism in or with a certain country or group of countries 
        should not result in decreased emphasis on existing nuclear 
        safeguards verification efforts and compliance challenges.
            (18) The existing funding, planning, and execution of IAEA 
        safeguards is not sufficient to meet the predicted growth in 
        the future of civilian nuclear power, and therefore any growth 
        in civilian nuclear power must be evaluated against the 
        challenges it poses to verification of the assurances of peace 
        and security provided by the IAEA safeguards system.
            (19) The existing IAEA safeguards system, and the 
        Additional Protocol and the Guidelines of the NSG, represent 
        the current, minimum standards for controlling access to and 
        trade in civilian nuclear technology and should continue to be 
        improved, expanded, and strengthened.

SEC. 412. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

    (a) Continuation of Existing Policy.--It shall remain the policy of 
the United States--
            (1) to create mechanisms to provide adequate supplies of 
        nuclear fuel consistent with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), in 
        particular title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 3221 et seq.);
            (2) to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system consistent 
        with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 
        1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), in particular title II of such 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 3241 et seq.); and
            (3) to cooperate with other nations, international 
        institutions, and private organizations to assist in the 
        development of non-nuclear energy resources under title V of 
        the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3261 et 
        seq.).
    (b) Declaration of New Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to discourage the development of enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, encourage the 
creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear fuel 
supply, and ensure that all supply mechanisms operate in strict 
accordance with the IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any 
additional unmet verification burdens for the system.

SEC. 413. SAFEGUARDS ANALYTICAL LABORATORY.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to the amount 
requested by the President for United States Voluntary Contributions to 
the IAEA for Fiscal Year 2009, an additional $10,000,000 is authorized 
to be appropriated under this Act for the refurbishment or possible 
replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the refurbishment or 
possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory 
pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 414. SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

    The Secretary of State is authorized, in cooperation with the 
Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the National Laboratories and 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
National Intelligence, to pursue a program--
            (1) to strengthen technical safeguards research and 
        development;
            (2) to increase resources, identify near-term technology 
        goals, formulate a technology roadmap, and improve interagency 
        coordination on safeguards technology; and
            (3) to examine proliferation resistance in design and 
        development of all future nuclear energy systems.

SEC. 415. SAFEGUARDS CADRE PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the 
Secretary of Energy and the Directors of the United States Department 
of Energy National Laboratories and Technology Centers (in this title 
referred to as the ``Directors of the National Laboratories''), is 
authorized to develop, in accordance with section 3343 of title 5, 
United States Code, a program to create a dedicated cadre of 
professionals assigned to the task of promoting, strengthening, and 
providing technical assistance to the IAEA safeguards system.
    (b) Content.--The program authorized under subsection (a) shall 
ensure that--
            (1) necessary incentives are in place to ensure that any 
        United States persons serving within the IAEA are not 
        professionally disadvantaged by such service when returning to 
        the Federal workforce;
            (2) high priority is placed on safeguards positions within 
        the IAEA by the United States;
            (3) budget authority is provided to train and retain those 
        personnel designated to be a part of the safeguards cadre 
        program; and
            (4) safeguards professionals retain appropriate security 
        clearances during any work they undertake while serving in the 
        IAEA safeguards system.

                    Subtitle B--Nuclear Fuel Supply

SEC. 421. AUTHORITY FOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY 
              MECHANISMS.

    (a) In General.--The President is authorized to create, consistent 
with title I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 
3221 et seq.), and other applicable provisions of law, bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to 
those countries and groups of countries that adhere to policies 
designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that 
decide to forgo a national uranium enrichment program and spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing facilities.
    (b) Purpose of Mechanisms.--The mechanisms authorized under 
subsection (a) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take into 
account the following:
            (1) The economic rationale for a country or countries 
        pursuing nuclear power, including existing sources of power for 
        such country or countries.
            (2) Whether such country or countries are in compliance 
        with their obligations under applicable safeguards agreements 
        and additional protocols with the IAEA.
            (3) Whether or not the development in such country or 
        countries of the complete nuclear fuel cycle would impose new, 
        costly IAEA safeguards measures that cannot be supported by 
        current IAEA safeguards implementation in such country or 
        countries, such that there is a reasonable assurance that all 
        nuclear materials in such country or countries are for peaceful 
        purposes and that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or 
        activities in such country or countries.
            (4) An evaluation of the proliferation dangers of such 
        country or countries developing nuclear fuel cycle facilities 
        for the production and disposition of source and special 
        nuclear materials.
            (5) Whether or not the country or countries that would be 
        recipients of nuclear fuel or other assistance provided by the 
        United States are or have ever been designated as state 
        sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or section 6(j) of the 
        Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)).
            (6) If done under a bilateral supply mechanism, whether 
        IAEA safeguards are being applied or will be applied to any 
        facility, site, or location where international nuclear fuel 
        supply activities are to be carried out.
            (7) Whether, in the case of a multilateral supply 
        mechanism, procedures are in place to ensure that when United 
        States funds are used or when United States nuclear materials 
        are to be used, exported, or reexported, all applicable 
        provisions of United States law are followed.
            (8) Whether the recipient country or countries of any fuel 
        provided under this Act are or will become a party, prior to 
        the commencement of any nuclear fuel supply under this Act, 
        to--
                    (A) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                    (B) in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party 
                to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a 
                comprehensive safeguards agreement that is in force, 
                pursuant to which the IAEA has the right and obligation 
                to ensure that safeguards are applied, in accordance 
                with the terms of the agreement, on all source or 
                special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
                activities within the territory of such country, under 
                its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
                anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that 
                such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or 
                other nuclear explosive devices;
                    (C) an additional protocol;
                    (D) the Convention on Nuclear Safety, done at 
                Vienna September 20, 1994, and entered into force 
                October 24, 1996;
                    (E) the Convention on Physical Protection of 
                Nuclear Materials, done at Vienna October 26, 1979, and 
                entered into force February 8, 1987; and
                    (F) the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
                for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna September 12, 1997.
            (9) The extent to which the recipient country or countries 
        have or will have prior to the commencement of any nuclear fuel 
        supply under this Act effective and enforceable export controls 
        regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear technology and other 
        sensitive materials comparable to those maintained by the 
        United States.
            (10) The conformity of the safety and regulatory regimes in 
        the recipient country or countries regarding the nuclear power 
        sector with similar United States laws and regulations.
            (11) The history of safety or environmental problems 
        associated with any nuclear site, facility, or location in the 
        recipient country or countries in the past, and the potential 
        for future safety or environmental problems or issues in 
        connection with the civilian nuclear power development plan of 
        the country or countries.
            (12) Whether the recipient country or countries have 
        resident within them any persons or entities involved in the 
        illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, or 
        dual-use nuclear technology.
            (13) Whether the recipient country or countries have or 
        will have sufficiently open and transparent civilian power 
        markets such that United States firms may benefit from any such 
        bilateral or multilateral supply mechanisms.
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to provide any authority with respect to bilateral cooperation with 
another country or countries or any international organization or 
organizations in atomic energy that is additional to the authority 
provided under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) 
and all other applicable laws and regulations in effect on the date of 
the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 422. REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUEL 
              AUTHORITY.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report detailing the feasibility of 
establishing an International Nuclear Fuel Authority (INFA) as called 
for in section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
(22 U.S.C. 3223(a)(1)).
    (b) Content.--Without regard to any previous reports submitted 
under section 104 (a)(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
(22 U.S.C. 3223), the report required under subsection (a) shall 
evaluate, with respect to the feasibility of the establishment of the 
International Nuclear Fuel Authority, the following:
            (1) United States laws and regulations that could be 
        affected by the establishment of an INFA.
            (2) What the cost to the United States Government could be 
        of establishing an INFA.
            (3) Potential locations for the INFA.
            (4) The potential for creating a fuel supply bank under the 
        control of the INFA.
            (5) Nuclear materials that should be placed within the 
        control of the INFA, including which nuclear activities should 
        be carried out by the INFA for the production of nuclear fuel 
        or for use as fuel.
            (6) Whether the INFA should provide nuclear fuel services 
        to recipient countries.
            (7) Whether a multilateral supply mechanism, such as the 
        INFA, is, in the judgment of the President, superior to 
        bilateral mechanism for nuclear fuel supply.
            (8) How such an international organization should operate 
        to preserve freedom of markets in nuclear fuel and avoid undue 
        interference in the efficient operation of the international 
        nuclear fuel market.
            (9) The degree and extent to which such a multilateral 
        supply mechanism should be under the control of, or a 
        subordinate organization within, the IAEA, including whether 
        establishing such an INFA would be superior or preferable to 
        allowing the IAEA, pursuant to Article IX of the Statute of the 
        IAEA, to become an international broker of nuclear fuel and 
        nuclear fuel services, including with respect to an examination 
        of the costs to IAEA Member States of effectively carrying out 
        clauses (1) through (4) of paragraph (H) of such Article.
            (10) The likely receptivity of the major countries involved 
        in the supply of nuclear fuel and nuclear services to the 
        creation of a multilateral supply mechanism such as the INFA or 
        one under the IAEA.

SEC. 423. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IAEA FUEL SUPPLY.

    It is the sense of the Senate that--
            (1) consistent with the long-standing support provided by 
        Congress for the nuclear verification and technical cooperation 
        projects of the IAEA, and with a view toward effective 
        verification of safeguards and a desire to ensure that the 
        expansion of nuclear power remains only for peaceful purposes, 
        the United States should support, either in annual voluntary 
        and off-budget contributions to the IAEA, or in the provision 
        of nuclear fuel to the IAEA, a nuclear fuel bank within the 
        IAEA;
            (2) the Senate commends the President for the September 26, 
        2005, announcement at the 49th Session of the General 
        Conference of the IAEA that the United States will reserve up 
        to 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium for an IAEA 
        verifiable assured supply arrangement;
            (3) the Senate commends the efforts of the Nuclear Threat 
        Initiative (NTI) to contribute $50,000,000 to the IAEA to help 
        create a low enriched uranium stockpile owned and managed by 
        the IAEA; and
            (4) a combination of public and private efforts, including 
        the provisions of law previously enacted in the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) and other 
        applicable laws, initiatives supported by the President, 
        efforts provided for by private groups, and the recommendations 
        of many relevant studies, such as those cited in section 101, 
        will be necessary to effectively and flexibly manage the growth 
        of civilian nuclear power in a manner that does not result in 
        undue burdens on the IAEA safeguards system.

                 TITLE V--GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE

SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Global Pathogen Surveillance Act 
of 2008''.

SEC. 502. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The frequency of the occurrence of biological events 
        that could threaten the national security of the United States 
        has increased and is likely increasing. The threat to the 
        United States from such events includes threats from diseases 
        that infect humans, animals, or plants regardless of if such 
        diseases are introduced naturally, accidentally, or 
        intentionally.
            (2) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security threat to 
        the United States. The insidious nature of a bioterrorist 
        attack, the likelihood that the recognition of such an attack 
        would be delayed, and the underpreparedness of the domestic 
        public health infrastructure to respond to such an attack could 
        result in catastrophic consequences following a biological 
        weapons attack against the United States.
            (3) The ability to recognize that a country or organization 
        is carrying out a covert biological weapons programs is 
        dependent on a number of indications and warnings. A critical 
        component of this recognition is the timely detection of 
        sentinel events such as community-level outbreaks that could be 
        the earliest indication of an emerging bioterrorist program in 
        a foreign country. Early detection of such events may enable 
        earlier counterproliferation intervention.
            (4) A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon 
        and developed, tested, produced, or released in a foreign 
        country could quickly spread to the United States. Considering 
        the realities of international travel, trade, and migration 
        patterns, a dangerous pathogen appearing naturally, 
        accidentally, or intentionally anywhere in the world can spread 
        to the United States in a matter of days, before any effective 
        quarantine or isolation measures could be implemented.
            (5) To combat bioterrorism effectively and ensure that the 
        United States is fully prepared to prevent, recognize, and 
        contain a biological weapons attack or emerging infectious 
        disease, measures to strengthen the domestic public health 
        infrastructure and improve domestic event detection, 
        surveillance, and response, while absolutely essential, are not 
        sufficient.
            (6) The United States should enhance cooperation with the 
        World Health Organization, regional international health 
        organizations, and individual countries, including data sharing 
        with appropriate agencies and departments of the United States, 
        to help detect and quickly contain infectious disease outbreaks 
        or a bioterrorism agent before such a disease or agent is 
        spread.
            (7) The World Health Organization has done an impressive 
        job in monitoring infectious disease outbreaks around the 
        world, notably in the April 2000 establishment and subsequent 
        operation of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network.
            (8) The capabilities of the World Health Organization 
        depend on the timeliness and quality of the data and 
        information the Organization receives from the countries that 
        are members of the Organization, pursuant to the 2005 revision 
        of the International Health Regulations. Developing countries, 
        in particular, often lack the necessary resources to build and 
        maintain effective public health infrastructures.
            (9) Developing countries could benefit from--
                    (A) better trained public health professionals and 
                epidemiologists to recognize disease patterns;
                    (B) appropriate laboratory equipment for diagnosis 
                of pathogens;
                    (C) disease reporting systems that--
                            (i) are based on disease and syndrome 
                        surveillance; and
                            (ii) could enable an effective response to 
                        a biological event to begin at the earliest 
                        possible opportunity;
                    (D) a narrowing of the existing technology gap in 
                disease and syndrome surveillance capabilities, based 
                on reported symptoms, and real-time information 
                dissemination to public health officials; and
                    (E) appropriate communications equipment and 
                information technology to efficiently transmit 
                information and data within national, international 
                regional, and international health networks, including 
                inexpensive, Internet-based geographic information 
                systems and relevant telephone-based systems for early 
                recognition and diagnosis of diseases.
            (10) An effective international capability to detect, 
        monitor, and quickly diagnose infectious disease outbreaks will 
        offer dividends not only in the event of biological weapons 
        development, testing, production, and attack, but also in the 
        more likely cases of naturally occurring infectious disease 
        outbreaks that could threaten the United States. Furthermore, a 
        robust surveillance system will serve to deter or contain 
        terrorist use of biological weapons, mitigating the intended 
        effects of such malevolent uses.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this title are as follows:
            (1) To enhance the capability of the international 
        community, through international health organizations and 
        individual countries, to detect, identify, and contain 
        infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of those 
        outbreaks is intentional human action or natural in origin.
            (2) To enhance the training of public health professionals 
        and epidemiologists from eligible developing countries in 
        advanced Internet-based disease and syndrome surveillance 
        systems, in addition to traditional epidemiology methods, so 
        that such professionals and epidemiologists may better detect, 
        diagnose, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, especially 
        such outbreaks caused by the pathogens that may be likely to be 
        used in a biological weapons attack.
            (3) To provide assistance to eligible developing countries 
        to purchase appropriate communications equipment and 
        information technology to detect, analyze, and report 
        biological threats, including--
                    (A) relevant computer equipment, Internet 
                connectivity mechanisms, and telephone-based 
                applications to effectively gather, analyze, and 
                transmit public health information for infectious 
                disease surveillance and diagnosis; and
                    (B) appropriate computer equipment and Internet 
                connectivity mechanisms--
                            (i) to facilitate the exchange of 
                        Geographic Information Systems-based disease 
                        and syndrome surveillance information; and
                            (ii) to effectively gather, analyze, and 
                        transmit public health information for 
                        infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis.
            (4) To make available greater numbers of public health 
        professionals who are employed by the Government of the United 
        States to international regional and international health 
        organizations, international regional and international health 
        networks, and United States diplomatic missions, as 
        appropriate.
            (5) To expand the training and outreach activities of 
        United States laboratories located in foreign countries, 
        including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or 
        Department of Defense laboratories, to enhance the public 
        health capabilities of developing countries.
            (6) To provide appropriate technical assistance to existing 
        international regional and international health networks and, 
        as appropriate, seed money for new international regional and 
        international networks.

SEC. 503. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) Eligible developing country.--The term ``eligible 
        developing country'' means any developing country that--
                    (A) has agreed to the objective of fully complying 
                with requirements of the World Health Organization on 
                reporting public health information on outbreaks of 
                infectious diseases;
                    (B) has not been determined by the Secretary, for 
                purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 
                6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in 
                effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
                Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), to have repeatedly 
                provided support for acts of international terrorism, 
                unless the Secretary exercises a waiver certifying that 
                it is in the national interest of the United States to 
                provide assistance under the provisions of this title; 
                and
                    (C) is a party to the Convention on the Prohibition 
                of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
                Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
                Their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and 
                Moscow April 10, 1972 (26 UST 583).
            (2) Eligible national.--The term ``eligible national'' 
        means any citizen or national of an eligible developing country 
        who--
                    (A) does not have a criminal background;
                    (B) is not on any immigration or other United 
                States watch list; and
                    (C) is not affiliated with any foreign terrorist 
                organization.
            (3) International health organization.--The term 
        ``international health organization'' includes the World Health 
        Organization, regional offices of the World Health 
        Organization, and such similar international organizations as 
        the Pan American Health Organization.
            (4) Laboratory.--The term ``laboratory'' means a facility 
        for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, 
        immunohematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological, 
        pathological, or other medical examination of materials derived 
        from the human body for the purpose of providing information 
        for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or 
        impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human 
        beings.
            (5) Secretary.--Unless otherwise provided, the term 
        ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State.
            (6) Disease and syndrome surveillance.--The term ``disease 
        and syndrome surveillance'' means the recording of clinician-
        reported symptoms (patient complaints) and signs (derived from 
        physical examination and laboratory data) combined with simple 
        geographic locators to track the emergence of a disease in a 
        population.

SEC. 504. ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.

    (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), assistance 
may be provided to an eligible developing country under any provision 
of this title only if the government of the eligible developing 
country--
            (1) permits personnel from the World Health Organization 
        and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to 
        investigate outbreaks of infectious diseases within the borders 
        of such country; and
            (2) provides pathogen surveillance data to the appropriate 
        agencies and departments of the United States and to 
        international health organizations.
    (b) Waiver.--The Secretary may waive the prohibition set out in 
subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that it is in the national 
interest of the United States to provide such a waiver.
    (c) Prior Notice of Waivers.--A waiver pursuant to subsection (b) 
may not be executed until 15 days after the Secretary provides to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives written notice of the 
intent to issue such waiver and the reasons for doing so.

SEC. 505. RESTRICTION.

    (a)  In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
title, no foreign national participating in a program authorized under 
this title shall have access, during the course of such participation, 
to a select agent or toxin described in section 73.4 of title 42, Code 
of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation) or an 
overlap select agent or toxin described in section 73.5 of such title 
(or any corresponding similar regulation) that may be used as, or in, a 
biological weapon, except in a supervised and controlled setting.
    (b) Relationship to Regulations.--The restriction set out in 
subsection (a) may not be construed to limit the ability of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to prescribe, through 
regulation, standards for the handling of a select agent or toxin or an 
overlap select agent or toxin described in such subsection.

SEC. 506. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established a fellowship program under 
which the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security and subject to 
the availability of appropriations, shall award fellowships to eligible 
nationals to pursue public health education or training, as follows:
            (1) Master of public health degree.--Graduate courses of 
        study leading to a master of public health degree with a 
        concentration in epidemiology from an institution of higher 
        education in the United States with a Center for Public Health 
        Preparedness, as determined by the Director of the Centers for 
        Disease Control and Prevention.
            (2) Advanced public health epidemiology training.--Advanced 
        public health training in epidemiology for public health 
        professionals from eligible developing countries to be carried 
        out at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an 
        appropriate facility of a State, or an appropriate facility of 
        another agency or department of the United States (other than a 
        facility of the Department of Defense or a national laboratory 
        of the Department of Energy) for a period of not less than 6 
        months or more than 12 months.
    (b) Specialization in Bioterrorism.--In addition to the education 
or training specified in subsection (a), each recipient of a fellowship 
under this section (in this section referred to as a ``fellow'') may 
take courses of study at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
or at an equivalent facility on diagnosis and containment of likely 
bioterrorism agents.
    (c) Fellowship Agreement.--
            (1) In general.--A fellow shall enter into an agreement 
        with the Secretary under which the fellow agrees--
                    (A) to maintain satisfactory academic progress, as 
                determined in accordance with regulations issued by the 
                Secretary and confirmed in regularly scheduled updates 
                to the Secretary from the institution providing the 
                education or training on the progress of the fellow's 
                education or training;
                    (B) upon completion of such education or training, 
                to return to the fellow's country of nationality or 
                last habitual residence (so long as it is an eligible 
                developing country) and complete at least 4 years of 
                employment in a public health position in the 
                government or a nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity 
                in that country or, with the approval of the Secretary, 
                complete part or all of this requirement through 
                service with an international health organization 
                without geographic restriction; and
                    (C) that, if the fellow is unable to meet the 
                requirements described in subparagraph (A) or (B), the 
                fellow shall reimburse the United States for the value 
                of the assistance provided to the fellow under the 
                fellowship program, together with interest at a rate 
                that--
                            (i) is determined in accordance with 
                        regulations issued by the Secretary; and
                            (ii) is not higher than the rate generally 
                        applied in connection with other Federal loans.
            (2) Waivers.--The Secretary may waive the application of 
        subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1) on a case by case 
        basis if the Secretary determines that--
                    (A) it is in the national interest of the United 
                States to provide such a waiver; or
                    (B) humanitarian considerations require such a 
                waiver.
    (d) Agreement.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security, is 
authorized to enter into an agreement with the government of an 
eligible developing country under which such government agrees--
            (1) to establish a procedure for the nomination of eligible 
        nationals for fellowships under this section;
            (2) to guarantee that a fellow will be offered a 
        professional public health position within the developing 
        country upon completion of the fellow's studies; and
            (3) to submit to the Secretary a certification stating that 
        a fellow has concluded the minimum period of employment in a 
        public health position required by the fellowship agreement, 
        including an explanation of how the requirement was met.
    (e) Participation of United States Citizens.--On a case-by-case 
basis, the Secretary may provide for the participation of a citizen of 
the United States in the fellowship program under the provisions of 
this section if--
            (1) the Secretary determines that it is in the national 
        interest of the United States to provide for such 
        participation; and
            (2) the citizen of the United States agrees to complete, at 
        the conclusion of such participation, at least 5 years of 
        employment in a public health position in an eligible 
        developing country or at an international health organization.
    (f) Use of Existing Programs.--The Secretary, with the concurrence 
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may elect to use 
existing programs of the Department of Health and Human Services to 
provide the education and training described in subsection (a) if the 
requirements of subsections (b), (c), and (d) will be substantially met 
under such existing programs.

SEC. 507. IN-COUNTRY TRAINING IN LABORATORY TECHNIQUES AND DISEASE AND 
              SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.

    (a) Laboratory Techniques.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary, after consultation with the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of 
        Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and in 
        conjunction with elements of those departments that engage in 
        activities of this type overseas, and subject to the 
        availability of appropriations, shall provide assistance for 
        short training courses for eligible nationals who are 
        laboratory technicians or other public health personnel in 
        laboratory techniques relating to the identification, 
        diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens responsible for possible 
        infectious disease outbreaks.
            (2) Location.--The training described in paragraph (1) 
        shall be held outside the United States and may be conducted in 
        facilities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
        located in foreign countries or in Overseas Medical Research 
        Units of the Department of Defense, as appropriate.
            (3) Coordination with existing programs.--The Secretary 
        shall coordinate the training described in paragraph (1), where 
        appropriate, with existing programs and activities of 
        international health organizations.
    (b) Disease and Syndrome Surveillance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary, after consultation with the 
        Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of 
        Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security and in 
        conjunction with elements of those departments that engage in 
        activities of this type overseas, and subject to the 
        availability of appropriations, shall establish and provide 
        assistance for short training courses for eligible nationals 
        who are health care providers or other public health personnel 
        in techniques of disease and syndrome surveillance reporting 
        and rapid analysis of syndrome information using geographic 
        information system tools.
            (2) Location.--The training described in paragraph (1) 
        shall be conducted via the Internet or in appropriate 
        facilities located in a foreign country, as determined by the 
        Secretary.
            (3) Coordination with existing programs.--The Secretary 
        shall coordinate the training described in paragraph (1), where 
        appropriate, with existing programs and activities of 
        international regional and international health organizations.

SEC. 508. ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
              LABORATORY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

    (a) Authorization.--The President is authorized to provide, on such 
terms and conditions as the President may determine, assistance to 
eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain the public 
health laboratory equipment and supplies described in subsection (b).
    (b) Equipment and Supplies Covered.--The equipment and supplies 
described in this subsection are equipment and supplies that are--
            (1) appropriate, to the extent possible, for use in the 
        intended geographic area;
            (2) necessary to collect, analyze, and identify 
        expeditiously a broad array of pathogens, including mutant 
        strains, which may cause disease outbreaks or may be used in a 
        biological weapon;
            (3) compatible with general standards set forth by the 
        World Health Organization and, as appropriate, the Centers for 
        Disease Control and Prevention, to ensure interoperability with 
        international regional and international public health 
        networks; and
            (4) not defense articles, defense services, or training, as 
        such terms are defined in the Arms Export Control Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from 
compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    (d) Limitation.--Amounts appropriated to carry out this section 
shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of 
equipment or supplies that, if made in the United States, would be 
subject to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or 
likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    (e) Procurement Preference.--In the use of grant funds authorized 
under subsection (a), preference should be given to the purchase of 
equipment and supplies of United States manufacture. The use of amounts 
appropriated to carry out this section shall be subject to section 604 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2354).
    (f) Country Commitments.--The assistance provided under this 
section for equipment and supplies may be provided only if the eligible 
developing country that receives such equipment and supplies agrees to 
provide the infrastructure, technical personnel, and other resources 
required to house, maintain, support, secure, and maximize use of such 
equipment and supplies.

SEC. 509. ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
              INFORMATION.

    (a) Assistance for Purchase of Communication Equipment and 
Information Technology.--The President is authorized to provide, on 
such terms and conditions as the President may determine, assistance to 
eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain the 
communications equipment and information technology described in 
subsection (b), and the supporting equipment, necessary to effectively 
collect, analyze, and transmit public health information.
    (b) Covered Equipment.--The communications equipment and 
information technology described in this subsection are communications 
equipment and information technology that--
            (1) are suitable for use under the particular conditions of 
        the area of intended use;
            (2) meet the standards set forth by the World Health 
        Organization and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Health and 
        Human Services, to ensure interoperability with like equipment 
        of other countries and international organizations; and
            (3) are not defense articles, defense services, or 
        training, as those terms are defined in the Arms Export Control 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from 
compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    (d) Limitation.--Amounts appropriated to carry out this section 
shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of 
communications equipment or information technology that, if made in the 
United States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or likely be barred or subject to special 
conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 
1701 et seq.).
    (e) Procurement Preference.--In the use of grant funds under 
subsection (a), preference should be given to the purchase of 
communications equipment and information technology of United States 
manufacture. The use of amounts appropriated to carry out this section 
shall be subject to section 604 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2354).
    (f) Assistance for Standardization of Reporting.--The President is 
authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President 
may determine, technical assistance and grant assistance to 
international health organizations to facilitate standardization in the 
reporting of public health information between and among developing 
countries and international health organizations.
    (g) Country Commitments.--The assistance provided under this 
section for communications equipment and information technology may be 
provided only if the eligible developing country that receives such 
equipment and technology agrees to provide the infrastructure, 
technical personnel, and other resources required to house, maintain, 
support, secure, and maximize use of such equipment and technology.

SEC. 510. ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL TO UNITED STATES 
              MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Upon the request of the chief of a diplomatic 
mission of the United States or of the head of an international 
regional or international health organization, and with the concurrence 
of the Secretary and of the employee concerned, the head of an agency 
or department of the United States may assign to the mission or the 
organization any officer or employee of the agency or department that 
occupies a public health position within the agency or department for 
the purpose of enhancing disease and pathogen surveillance efforts in 
developing countries.
    (b) Reimbursement.--The costs incurred by an agency or department 
of the United States by reason of the detail of personnel under 
subsection (a) may be reimbursed to that agency or department out of 
the applicable appropriations account of the Department of State if the 
Secretary determines that the agency or department may otherwise be 
unable to assign such personnel on a non-reimbursable basis.

SEC. 511. EXPANSION OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES 
              ABROAD.

    (a) In General.--Subject to the availability of appropriations and 
with the concurrence of the government of each host country, the 
Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
Secretary of Defense shall each--
            (1) increase the number of personnel assigned to 
        laboratories of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
        or the Department of Defense, as appropriate, located in 
        eligible developing countries that conduct research and other 
        activities with respect to infectious diseases; and
            (2) expand the operations of such laboratories, especially 
        with respect to the implementation of on-site training of 
        foreign nationals and activities affecting the region in which 
        the country is located.
    (b) Cooperation and Coordination Between Laboratories.--Subsection 
(a) shall be carried out in such a manner as to foster cooperation and 
avoid duplication between and among laboratories.
    (c) Relation to Core Missions and Security.--The expansion of the 
operations of the laboratories of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention or the Department of Defense located in foreign countries 
under this section may not--
            (1) detract from the established core missions of the 
        laboratories; or
            (2) compromise the security of those laboratories, as well 
        as their research, equipment, expertise, and materials.

SEC. 512. ASSISTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH NETWORKS AND EXPANSION OF 
              FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING PROGRAMS.

    (a) Authority.--The President is authorized, on such terms and 
conditions as the President may determine, to provide assistance for 
the purposes of--
            (1) enhancing the surveillance and reporting capabilities 
        of the World Health Organization and existing international 
        regional and international health networks; and
            (2) developing new international regional and international 
        health networks.
    (b) Expansion of Field Epidemiology Training Programs.--The 
Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to establish new 
country or regional international Field Epidemiology Training Programs 
in eligible developing countries, with the concurrence of the 
government of each host country.

SEC. 513. REPORTS.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Homeland 
Security of the House of Representatives a report on the implementation 
of programs under this title, including an estimate of the level of 
funding required to carry out such programs at a sufficient level.

SEC. 514. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--Subject to subsection (c), 
there are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out 
activities under this title the following amounts:
            (1) $40,000,000 for fiscal year 2009.
            (2) $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2010.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--The amounts appropriated pursuant to 
subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.
    (c) Limitation on Obligation of Funds.--Not more than 10 percent of 
the amount appropriated pursuant to subsection (a)(1) may be obligated 
before the date on which a report is submitted, or required to be 
submitted, whichever first occurs, under section 513.

             TITLE VI--INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PAYMENTS

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``International Space Station 
Payments Act of 2008''.

SEC. 602. AUTHORITY TO MAKE CERTAIN EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN 
              CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.

    Section 7(1)(B) of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria 
Nonproliferation Act (Public Law 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``except that such term does not mean 
        payments'' and inserting the following: ``except that such term 
        does not mean--
                            ``(i) payments'';
            (2) by striking ``or contract related thereto.'' and 
        inserting ``or contract related thereto; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new clause:
                            ``(ii) payments in cash or in kind made or 
                        to be made by the United States Government 
                        between January 1, 2012, and reentry into 
                        Earth's atmosphere of the International Space 
                        Station at its end of life, for work to be 
                        performed or services to be rendered during 
                        that period necessary to meet United States 
                        obligations under the Agreement Concerning 
                        Cooperation on the Civil International Space 
                        Station, with annex, signed at Washington 
                        January 29, 1998, and entered into force March 
                        27, 2001, or any protocol, agreement, 
                        memorandum of understanding, or contract 
                        related thereto, except that this clause does 
                        not allow for payments in cash or in kind to be 
                        made by the United States Government for--
                                    ``(I) any cargo services provided 
                                by a Progress vehicle; or
                                    ``(II) any crew transportation or 
                                rescue services provided by a Soyuz 
                                vehicle after--
                                            ``(aa) the Orion Crew 
                                        Exploration Vehicle reaches 
                                        full operational capability; or
                                            ``(bb) a United States 
                                        commercial provider of crew 
                                        transportation and rescue 
                                        services demonstrates the 
                                        capability to meet mission 
                                        requirements of the 
                                        International Space Station.''.
                                                      Calendar No. 1074

110th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 3563

                          [Report No. 110-496]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 To authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 
                 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

           September 24 (legislative day, September 17), 2008

                 Read twice and placed on the calendar
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