IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA No. COA 15

- 146 Filed: 4 August 2015
North Carolina Industrial Commission , No s . EC

- 00017, 00021, 00022, 00024 THE ESTATE OF JERRY JACOBS, THE ESTATE OF ANN SHEPARD, THE ESTATE OF CONNIE TINDALL, and THE ESTATE OF JOE (WILLIAM DALLAS) WRIGHT, Plaintiffs,

v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA , Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 24 July 2014 by the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission

. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June
2015

. Ferguson Chambers & Sumter, P.A., by James E. Ferguson, II, and Irving Joyner, for plaintiffs

- appellants. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Amar Majmundar a nd Olga E. Vysotskya de Brito, for the State.

INMAN , Judge.
In this case, w e must determine wheth er the estates of four deceased persons
may recover from the government compensation for the wrongful convictions of decedents who received posthumous pard o ns of innocence. Although both the State and this Court solemnly acknowledge the profound harm caused by the wrongful imprisonment of any person , we affirm the Full Commission’s order dismissingE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

- 2

- plaintiffs’ claim s because the statute does not allow compen sation based upon posthumous pardons of innocence

. Background On 6 February 19 71, amidst a series of violent confrontations between black and white citizens following the court

- ordered desegregation of public schools, Mike’s Gro cery Store in Wilmington was firebombed , and the perpetrators attacked the police and fire rescue personnel who responded to the scene. In 1972, Jerry Jacobs, Anne Shepard, Connie Tindall, and Joe Wright, along with six others ( collective ly known as the “Wilmington Ten ” ), were ar rested, convicted, and sentenced to various prison terms for these crimes. In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned their convictions, holding that the members of the Wilmington Ten had been denied the constitutional r ight to due process of law through gross prosecutorial misconduct and myriad legal errors at trial. See Chavis v. State of N.C. , 637 F.2d 213 (4 th Cir. 1980). The principle witnesses for the State later recanted their testimony identifying the Wilmington Ten as the perpetrators

. On 31 December 2012, then

- Governor Beverly Perdue issued pardons of innocence for all members of the Wilmington Ten, including posthumous pardons for the deceased Jacob s, Shepard, Tindall, and Wright , for what she deemed to be

c onduct “utterly incompatible with basic notions of fairness and with every ideal thatE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- North Carolina holds dear

. ” The estates of Jacobs, Shepard, Tindall, and Wright (“plaintiffs”) and t he six living me mbers of the Wilmington Ten all filed petitions with the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 25 February 2013 under Article 8, Chapter 48 of the North Carolina General Statutes (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148

- 82 et seq. ), for c ompensation due to persons erroneously convicted of f elonies

. Although the State ful ly compensated the six members who were alive when their petitions were filed , it moved to dismiss plaintif fs’ claims on the ground that section 148

- 82 et seq. did not authorize estates to bring a statutory cause of action , especially where the decedents d id not receive pardon s of innocence prior to their deaths. By order entered 28 October 2013, Deputy Commissioner J. Brad Donovan denied the State’s motion s to dismiss, concluding that the legislative purpose for the enactment of section 148

- 82 et seq. wa s to allow remuneration for wrongful imprisonment, regardless of whether a pardon of innoc ence was issued posthumously. The State appealed that order to the Full Commission, which reversed and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims

. Writing for the Full Commissio n, Commissione r Linda Cheatham concluded that: (1) the language of section 148

- 82 et seq. was clear and unambiguous in its requirements , (2) plaintiffs did not meet the statutory conditions
necessary to bring claims under section 148

- 82 et seq. , and (3) because claims under section 148

- 82 et seq. accrue by the issuance of a pardon of innocence, and neitherE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- Jacobs, Shepard, Tindall, nor Wright received a pardon of innocence prior to their respective death s , no claims for remuneration survived to their pers onal representatives under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A

- 18

- 1 (2013). Plaintiffs filed timely notice of appeal from the Full Commission’s order. Plaintiffs’ sole argument on appeal is that the Full Commission erred by dismissing their claims for compensation br ought pursuant section 148

- 82 et seq. After careful review, we disagree. I. Standard of Review “We review an order of the Full Commission only to determine ‘whether any competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission’s conclusions of law.’ ” Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Const., LLC , 367 N.C. 414, 423, 760 S.E.2d 732, 738 (2014) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int’l. Corp. , 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000)). Because the facts of this c ase are not in dispute, they are binding on appeal. See Estate of Gainey v. S. Flooring & Acoustical Co. , 184 N.C. App. 497, 501, 646 S.E.2d 604, 607 (2007)

. The Full Commission’s conclusions of law, including those related to q uestions of statutory i nter pretation , are reviewed de novo . See In re Ernst & Young, LLP , 363 N.C. 612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009). II. AnalysisE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- Plaintiffs have no common law claims against the State arising from the decedents’ wrongful convictions. See Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth. , 307 N.C. 522,
534

- 36, 299 S.E.2d 618, 625

- 26 (1983). Their claims depend upon statutory rights created by section 148

- 82 et seq . Plaintiffs contend these statutes authorize their claims; the State contends that the plain meaning of the langu age of the statute s excludes p laintiffs’ claims. In matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature is accomplished. Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility , 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981). Legisla tive purpose is first ascertained from the words of the statute. See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh , 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). “When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give eff ect to the plain meaning of the statute[.]” In re Hamilton , 220 N.C. App. 350, 352, 725 S.E.2d 393, 396 (2012). “Moreover, when confronted with a clear and unambiguous statute, courts are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limit ations not contained therein.” Id. Finally, “statutes dealing with the same subject matter mu st be construed in pari materia and reconciled, if possible, so that effect may be given to each.” Media, Inc. v. McDowell County , 304 N.C. 427, 430

– 31, 284 S.E .2d 457, 461 (1981)

. Applying these canons of interpretation, as explained below, we conclude thatE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- the relief sought by plaintiffs conflicts with the plain meaning of the applicable
statute s . I t is helpful to set out those provisions in full. Pursuant to section 148

- 82(a): Any person who, having been convicted of a felony and having been imprisoned therefor in a State prison of this State, and who was thereafter or who shall hereafter be granted a pardon of innocence by the Governor upon the grounds that the crime with which the person was charged either was not committed at all or was not committed by that person, may as hereinafter provided present by petition a claim against the State for the pecuniary loss sustained by the person through his or her err oneous conviction and imprisonment, provided the petition is presented within five years of the granting of the pardon. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148

- 82(a) (2013). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148

- 83 (2013) then sets out the procedure for filing a petition: Such petition shall be addressed to the Industrial Commission, and must include a full statement of the facts upon which the claim is based, verified in the manner provided for verifying complaints in civil actions, and it may be supported by affidavits substantiating s uch claim. Upon its presentation the Industrial Commission shall fix a time and a place for a hearing, and shall mail notice to the claimant, and shall notify the Attorney General, at least 15 days before the time fixed therefor. Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148

- 84 (2013) describes the evidentiary, award, and compensation procedures:

(a) At the hearing the claimant may introduce evidence in the form of affidavits or testimony to support the claim, and the Attorney General may introduce counter affidavits or testimony in refutation. If the Industrial Commission findsE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- from the evidence that the claimant received a pardon of innocence for the reason that the crime was not committed at all, received a pardon of innocence for the reason that the crime was not comm itted by the claimant, or that the claimant was determined to be innocent of all charges by a three

- judge panel under G.S. 15A

- 1469 and also finds that the claimant was imprisoned and has been vindicated in connection with the alleged offense for which he or she was imprisoned, the Industrial Commission shall award to the claimant an amount equal to fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for each year or the pro rata amount for the portion of each year of the imprisonment actually served, including any time spen t awaiting trial. However, (i) in no event shall the compensation, including the compensation provided in subsection (c) of this section, exceed a total amount of seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000), and (ii) a claimant is not entitled to compe nsation for any portion of a prison sentence during which the claimant was also serving a concurrent sentence for conviction of a crime other than the one for which the pardon of innocence was granted.

. . . (c) In addition to the compensation provided under subsection (a) of this section, the Industrial Commission shall determine the extent to which incarceration has deprived a claimant of educational or training opportunities and, based upon those findings, may award the following compensation for loss of life opportunities: (1) Job skills training for at least one year through an appropriate State program; and (2) Expenses for tuition and fees at any public North Carolina community college or constituent institution of The University of North Carolin a for any degree or program of the claimant's choice that is available from one or more of the applicable institutions.

. . .E STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- The State contends that because section 148

- 82(a) explicitly waives the State’s sovereign immunity from suit, its provisions must be strictly construed, G uthrie , 307 N.C. at 537

- 38, 299 S.E.2d at 627 , and “ everything should be excluded from the statute’s operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the language used,” Izydore v. City of Durham (Durham B d. of Adjustment) , __ N.C. App. __, __, 746 S.E.2d 324, 326 ( 2013). On the other hand, p laintiffs argue that because section 148

- 82 et seq. is remedial in nature, it must be liberally construed “in a manner which assures fulfilment of the beneficial goals for which it is enacted and which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope.” Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing C

o. , 298 N.C. 520, 52 4 , 259 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1979). Both contentions have merit. This seems to be the rare case where precedent advises both a liberal and strict construction of the same statute s . B ut we need not attempt this task, n or must we choose wh ich interpretative method prevails. Even if we read section 148

- 82 et seq. liberally, as plaintiffs contend we should, we cannot conclude that plaintiffs’ claims “ fairly fall [] within its intended scope.” Burgess , 298 N.C. at 524 , 259 S.E.2d at 251. Th e best indications of that intended scope “are the language of the statute or ordinance, the spirit of the act[,] and what the act seeks to accomplish.” N.C. Dep't of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd. , 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009) (quotation marks o mitted). These considerations support the Full Commission’s conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend forE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- testamentary estates , like plaintiffs, to recover compensation under section 148

- 82 et
seq. First, t he language of section 148

- 82 et seq. is plain and unambiguous in its requirements. Section 148

- 82(a) provides that “any person ” who is convicted of a felony, imprisoned, and receives a pardon of innocence may “present by petition a claim against the State for the pecuniary loss sustained by the person through his or her erroneous conviction and imprisonment [].” (Emphasis added.) N.C. Gen. Stat. §
12

- 3 (2013), titled “Rules for construction of statutes,” defines the word “person” as “bodies politic and corporate, as well as . . . individual s, unless the context clearly shows to the contrary.” Rather than “clearly show[ing]” that the word “person” in section 148

- 82(a) is meant to also include a testamentary estate, the statutory requirements that the “person” be convicted of a crime, impris oned, and granted a pardon of innocence before petitioning the State for the pecuniary loss suffered

“ through his or her erroneous conviction and imprisonment ” significantly bolster s the State’s argument that the word “person , ” i n the context of section 14 8

- 82(a) , means the actual individual who was wrongfully incarcerated. The legislature’s use in context of the word “claimant” in sections 148

- 83 and

- 8 4 further strengthens the State’s position

. Particularly, the “claimant” is described in section 148

- 84(a) as having been “determined to be innocent”; “imprisoned”; and “vindicated in connection with the alleged offense for which he or she wasE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- imprisoned

. ” N one of these descriptions appl ies to plaintiffs or could ever apply to a testamentary estate. I n addition to pecuniary compensation, the Industrial Commission is required by section 148

- 84(c ) to “determine the extent to which incarceration has deprived a claimant of educational or training opportunities,” and based on those findings , may award job sk ills training or expenses for fees and tuition at any public North Carolina institution of higher learning. Plaintiffs’ interpretation of this chapter would render section 148

- 84(c) either superfluous or nonsensical, as it would be impossible for the Ind ustrial Commission to assess how an unconscious, inanimate legal entity like a testamentary estate was deprived “loss of life opportunities.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148

- 84(c). “[T]he rule of liberal construction cannot be extended beyond the clearly
expresse d language of the act.” Gilmore v. Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 222 N.C. 358, 366, 23 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1942). Thus , even under a liberal construction, we must give effect to each provision under section 148

- 82 et seq. where possible. Because plaintiffs’ interpretation runs counter to the plain and unambiguous language of these statutes , and would render certain portions unneeded, we must reject it. Accordingly, we affirm the Full Commission’s legal conclusion that section 148

- 82 et

se q. did not authorize plaintiffs, as the testamentary estates of Jacobs, Shepard, Tindall, and Wright, to petition the State for compensation on their behalf.E STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- We also affirm the Full Commission’s conclusion that plaintiffs may not avail themselves of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A

- 18

- 1 to assert claims under section 148

- 82 et seq

. Section 28A

- 18

- 1 provides:

(a) Upon the death of any person, all demands whatsoever, and rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding, existing in favor of or against s uch person , except as provided in subsection (b) hereof, shall survive to and against the personal representative or collector of the person's estate. (b) The following rights of action in favor of a decedent do not survive: (1) Causes of action for libel and for slander, except slander of title; (2) Causes of action for false imprisonment; (3) Causes of action where the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory after death. (Emphasis added.) At oral argument, plaintiffs conced ed that any claim under section 148

- 82 et seq. accrues only upon the issuance of a pardon of innocence. Because Jacobs, Shepard, Tindall, and Wright received no pardons of innocence during their lifetimes , no claim s under section 148

- 82 et seq. existed to survive to their estates

. See, e.g. , Carnahan v. Reed , 5 3 N.C. App. 589, 592, 281 S.E.2d 408, 410 (1981) (holding that only causes of action which had accrued in favor of the decedent prior to his death could survive his death under section 28A

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- 1). W e acknowledge plaintiffs’ assertion that “ [w]hen an innocent person has had his or her liberty and a portion of his or her life wrongfully taken, . . . [t]hat harm lives on after death

– especially in the lives of affected loved ones.” However , we areE STATE OF J ACOBS V
. S TATE Opinion of the Court

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- r equired by law to apply section 148

- 82 et seq. as it is written. See Gilmore , 222 N.C. at 366, 23 S.E.2d at 297 (“It is ours to construe the laws, and not to make them[.]”). These policy considerations are more appropriately raised with the legislative branch. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Full Commission dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for compensation under section 148

- 82 et seq.

AFFIRMED. Judges STROUD and MC CULLOUGH concur .