alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 24.1

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY
                        For Executing Form 10-K for 1998

     KNOW  ALL BY THESE  PRESENTS,  that  theundersigned  director  of  Electric
Lightwave,  Inc.  constitutes  and  appoints  Robert J.  DeSantis and Kerry Rea,
jointly and  severally,  for him in any and all  capacities to sign on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year 1998 for Electric Lightwave, Inc., and any ad all amendments
to said  Form  10-K,  and to file the same,  with the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission,   hereby   ratifying   and   conforming   all  that   each  of  said
attorneys-in-fact,  or his substitute or substitutes  may do or cause to be done
by virtue hereof.

Dated February 23, 1999

                                                      /s/ Guenther E. Greiner
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                          Guenther E. Greiner

                                                       /s/ Stanley Harfenist
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           Stanley Harfenist

                                                       /s/ Robert A. Stanger
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           Robert A. Stanger

                                                      /s/ Maggie Wilderotter
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                          Maggie Wilderotter

                                                       /s/ David B. Sharkey
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                           David B. Sharkey

                                                         /s/ Leonard Tow
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                             Leonard Tow
Arthur O. ARMSTRONG v. Michael F. EASLEY, et al.

No. 329P08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 11, 2008.

Arthur O. Armstrong, Pro Se.

Grady L. Balentine, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, for Easley.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Plaintiff on the 11th day of July 2008 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Nash County, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court of Nash County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th day of December 2008."
BAILEY v. WINSTON-SALEM STATE UNIVERSITY.

No. COA08-167.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed November 4, 2008.

Certification Date November 24, 2008.

Appeal from Forsyth (07CVS1315).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                             42,906,000
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<DEPRECIATION>                                              111,288,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                              907,502,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                       161,046,000
<BONDS>                                                     127,062,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                        43,836,000
<PREFERRED>                                                           0
<COMMON>                                                        303,000
<OTHER-SE>                                                  268,663,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                907,502,000
<SALES>                                                     317,050,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                            317,050,000
<CGS>                                                        26,808,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                               225,039,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                             51,434,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                           39,382,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            (43,007,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                               (15,057,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        (27,950,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                       0
<CHANGES>                                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                               (32,322,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                                    (1.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                    (1.07)


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50966

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICARDO BURCIAGA-JIMENEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(P-97-CR-100-1)

June 15, 1998

Before JOHNSON, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ricardo Burciaga-Jimenez (Burciaga) entered a conditional

guilty plea to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He appeals his conviction,

challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress

the marijuana found in his automobile at the time of his arrest.

Specifically, he contends that the Border Patrol’s search violated

his Fourth Amendment rights because the Border Patrol did not have

a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity when they stopped his
2

vehicle.

This court employs a two-tiered standard of review in

evaluating a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress:

findings of fact are accepted unless clearly erroneous and

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. United States v. ChavezVillarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1993). This court reviews

the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing in the light

most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Ponce, 8

F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1993).

The totality of the evidence demonstrates that prior to the

Border Patrol stopping Burciaga’s automobile, the Border Patrol was

aware of specific, articulable facts together with rational

inferences from those facts. These facts and inferences raised a

reasonable suspicion that Burciaga’s automobile was involved in

illegal activities. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.

873, 884-85 (1975); United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 722

(5th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the district court did not err in

denying Burciaga’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.
110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3352 

AN ACT 

To temporarily extend the programs under the Higher 

Education Act of 1965. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•S 3352 ES

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION PRO2 GRAMS. 

3 (a) EXTENSION OF PROGRAMS.—Section 2(a) of the 

4 Higher Education Extension Act of 2005 (Public Law 

5 109–81; 20 U.S.C. 1001 note) is amended by striking 

6 ‘‘July 31, 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘August 15, 2008’’. 

7 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec8 tion, or in the Higher Education Extension Act of 2005 

9 as amended by this Act, shall be construed to limit or oth10 erwise alter the authorizations of appropriations for, or 

11 the durations of, programs contained in the amendments 

12 made by the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 

13 (Public Law 109–171), by the College Cost Reduction and 

14 Access Act (Public Law 110–84), or by the Ensuring Con15 tinued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008 (Public Law 

16 110–227) to the provisions of the Higher Education Act 

17 of 1965 and the Taxpayer-Teacher Protection Act of 

18 2004. 

19 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

20 subsection (a) shall take effect as if enacted on July 31, 

21 2008. 

Passed the Senate July 28, 2008. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3352 

AN ACT 

To temporarily extend the programs under the 

Higher Education Act of 1965.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 515 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 515

   To provide a mechanism for the determination on the merits of the 
   claims of claimants who met the class criteria in a civil action 
relating to racial discrimination by the Department of Agriculture but 
                  who were denied that determination.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            February 7, 2007

   Mr. Grassley (for himself, Mr. Obama, Mr. Biden, and Mr. Kennedy) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide a mechanism for the determination on the merits of the 
   claims of claimants who met the class criteria in a civil action 
relating to racial discrimination by the Department of Agriculture but 
                  who were denied that determination.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Pigford Claims Remedy Act of 2007''.

SEC. 2. DETERMINATION ON MERITS OF PIGFORD CLAIMS.

    (a) In General.--Any Pigford claimant who has not obtained a 
determination on the merits of a Pigford claim before the date of 
enactment of this Act may, in a civil action, obtain that 
determination.
    (b) Intent of Congress as to Remedial Nature of Section.--It is the 
intent of Congress that this section be liberally construed so as to 
effectuate its remedial purpose of giving a full determination on the 
merits for each Pigford claim denied that determination.
    (c) Definitions.--In this Act--
            (1) the term ``Pigford claimant'' means an individual who 
        submitted, before the date of enactment of this Act, a late-
        filing request under section 5(g) of the consent decree in the 
        case of Pigford v. Glickman, approved by the United States 
        District Court for the District of Columbia on April 14, 1999; 
        and
            (2) the term ``Pigford claim'' means a discrimination 
        complaint, as defined by section 1(h) of that consent decree 
        and documented under section 5(b) of that consent decree.
                                 <all>
```
# CE2004078EN.01009201.xml

| 27.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 78/92 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 78/92

---

(2004/C 78 E/0091)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2207/03

by Charles Tannock (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(2 July 2003)

Subject:   Labelling of animal, including poultry, products and problems posed for members of religious minorities eating these products

Subject:

The UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) has recently urged the Commission to cap the amount of water that may be added to chicken products to 15 % and to ban the use of non-chicken proteins such as beef and pork in those products. This follows the carrying-out of two surveys during December 2001 and March 2003 which revealed that some chicken pieces had as much as 55 % added water. There is no other use for these additional non-chicken animal proteins except to retain very high levels of added water. This practice, in turn, is liable not only to deceive consumers but to cause problems for members of religious communities such as Jews, Hindus and Muslims who do not eat beef or pork even if they do not specifically buy meat products prepared and approved by their respective religious authorities.

Can the Commission indicate whether or not it is correct that there is no limit to the amount of water that can be added to chicken and poultry products, and, if so, whether the Commission believes that some kind of limit should be set? Further, does the Commission accept that this would be entirely compatible with WTO rules, given that Article 2.2 of the Agreement to technical barriers to trade (TBT) require only that labelling requirements be ‘not more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’ and that such objectives include inter-alia ‘the prevention of deceptive practices’?

Can the Commission also clarify whether or not it is compulsory or voluntary to indicate on the label of any food product whether or not animal ingredients have been added to the product or, in the case of livestock, nurtured on food containing animal protein? If not, does the Commission believe that consumers have a right to be informed in this way?

---
Alice Bins RAINEY, Michele R. Rotosky and Madeline Davis Tucker v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION and State Board of Education.

No. 143P07-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February 5, 2009.

Thomas J. Ziko, Special Deputy Attorney General, Laura E. Crumpler, Assistant Attorney *362General, for NC Dept. of Public Instruction, et al.

Thomas R. West, Pamela A. Scott, Raleigh, for Rainey, et al.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 667 S.E.2d 237.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 10th day of November 2008 by Respondents in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S, 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 5th day of February 2009."
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alan Jordan, Appellant.

[800 NYS2d 850]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carroll, J.), rendered September 18, 2002, convicting him of burglary in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the Supreme Court, which was entitled to rely, inter alia, on its own observations of and interactions with the defendant, providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s repeated applications for competency examinations *(see*CPL 730.30 [1]; *People v Tortorici,*92 NY2d 757, 765-766 [1999], *cert denied*528 US 834 [1999]; *People v Morgan,*87 NY2d 878, 879-880 [1995]; *People v Gelikkaya,*84 NY2d 456, 459 [1994]; *People v Gensler,*72 NY2d 239, 244 [1988], *cert denied*488 US 932 [1988]; *People v Boundy,*10 NY2d 518, 521 [1962]; *People v Smyth,*3 NY2d 184, 186-187 [1957]).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the procedure under which he was sentenced as a persistent felony offender did not violate either his Sixth Amendment or due process rights *(see People v Rivera,*5 NY3d 61 [2005]; *People v Rosen,*96 NY2d 329 [2001]). Furthermore, the sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]), without merit, or do not require reversal. Florio, J.P., H. Miller, Ritter and Rivera, JJ., concur.
STATE v. CEESAY.

No. COA07-897.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed October 7, 2008.

Certification Date October 27, 2008.

Appeal from Wake (01CRS29491, 01CRS29492, 01CRS29493, 01CRS29494).

Case reported without published opinion. Vacated in part and remanded for resentencing.
# C_2023329EN.01003702.xml

| 18.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/37

---

Action brought on 7 August 2023 — Erzeugergemeinschaft Winzersekt v EUIPO — Milz (Hinterland)

(Case T-470/23)

(2023/C 329/55)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Erzeugergemeinschaft Winzersekt GmbH (Sprendlingen, Germany) (represented by: C. Düchs, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Martin Milz (Hergensweiler, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark Hinterland — EU trade mark No 18 121 682

Proceedings before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 June 2023 in Case R 2413/2022-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | uphold the decision of the Cancellation Division (No 52 519 C) of 27 October 2022 declaring EU trade mark No 18 121 682 invalid in its entirety; |
| --- | --- |

—

uphold the decision of the Cancellation Division (No 52 519 C) of 27 October 2022 declaring EU trade mark No 18 121 682 invalid in its entirety;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the other party to pay the costs of the cancellation and appeal proceedings before EUIPO. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the other party to pay the costs of the cancellation and appeal proceedings before EUIPO.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---
#### Earlean W. Bozeman, Appellant, v Joanne K. Jaffey, Respondent.

[801 NYS2d 187]

from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (William P Polito, J.), entered June 16, 2004. The judgment dismissed the complaint upon a jury verdict in favor of defendant.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the complaint upon a jury verdict rendered in favor of defendant. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, the verdict is supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence and thus is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally Lolik v Big V Supermarkets,*86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]). Also contrary to plaintiffs contention, Supreme Court did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to conduct further discovery after the filing of the note of issue and statement of readiness. “It is settled that a trial court has broad discretionary power in controlling discovery and disclosure, and only a clear abuse of discretion will prompt appellate action” *(Geary v Hunton & Williams,*245 AD2d 936, 938 [1997]; *see Saratoga Harness Racing v Roemer,*274 AD2d 887, 888 [2000]). Here, no clear abuse of discretion was shown. We have reviewed plaintiffs remaining contentions and conclude that they either are unpreserved for our review or are without merit. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Kehoe, Martoche and Lawton, JJ.
EXHIBIT 31.4

 

CERTIFICATION

 

I, Paul W. Kopsky, Jr., certify that:

 

1.        I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form 10-K of RAIT Financial Trust;

 

2.        Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

 

Date:        May 1, 2017

 

|        |        |                                                                                                        |        |
|--------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | By:    | /s/ PAUL W. KOPSKY, JR.                                                                                |   |
|   |   | Name:  Paul W. Kopsky, Jr.                                                                   |   |
|   |   | Title:    Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer                                    |
|   |   |              (Principal Financial Officer) |   |