alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Julius Rose, Inc., Respondent, v David Durham, Appellant.

[799 NYS2d 920]

In an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the defendant appeals from an order of the *531Supreme Court, Richmond County (Minardo, J.), dated November 23, 2004, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and to vacate the notice of pendency.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. His letter stating that time was of the essence did not warn that failure to close would result in holding the plaintiff in default and terminating the contract *(see Karamatzanis v Cohen,*181 AD2d 618 [1992]; *Sohayegh v Oberlander,*155 AD2d 436, 438 [1989]; *Zev v Merman,*134 AD2d 555, 557 [1987], *affd*73 NY2d 781 [1988]). The letter merely stated that the plaintiff would be responsible for “any and all damages sustained” as a result of its failure to perform on the specified date.

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either without merit or unpreserved for appellate review. Prudenti, P.J., Goldstein, Crane and Mastro, JJ., concur.
#### Scalise Industries, Inc., Appellant, v Jeffery J. Murdock, Individually and Doing Business as Northern Propellers, Respondent. Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

[801 NYS2d 186]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Herkimer County (Michael E. Daley, J.), entered January 20, 2005. The order, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

It is hereby ordered that said appeal be and the same hereby *1346is unanimously dismissed without costs (see *Hughes v Nussbaumer, Clarke & Velzy,*140 AD2d 988 [1988]; *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v Roberts & Roberts,*63 AD2d 566, 567 [1978]; *see also*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Kehoe, Martoche and Lawton, JJ.
IN RE S.R.

No. COA08-707.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed November 18, 2008.

Certification Date December 8, 2008.

Appeal from Surry (06J4, 06J5, 06J6, 06J7).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00517-CR

Chad Wilson FISHER,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. CCL-08-0064

Honorable Frank Follis, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 27, 2008

MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; DISMISSED

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion is granted, and this appeal is

dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a).

PER CURIAM

Do not publish
STATE v. Marcus Dawnte GODWIN.

No. 489P08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 11, 2008.

Marilyn G. Ozer, Chapel Hill, for Godwin.

Susan Doyle, District Attorney, for State.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ____, 666 S.E.2d 890.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 1st day of December 2008 by State of NC to Deem State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Response to Petition Timely Filed:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference this the 11th day of December 2008."
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 683 

To amend section 9 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 to ensure 

that operating and capital assistance is provided for certain previously 

assisted public housing dwelling units. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 26, 2007 

Mr. SCHUMER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend section 9 of the United States Housing Act of 

1937 to ensure that operating and capital assistance 

is provided for certain previously assisted public housing 

dwelling units. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Public Housing Equal 

5 Treatment Act of 2007’’. 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
2 

•S 683 IS

1 SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PREVIOUSLY ASSISTED 

2 PUBLIC HOUSING. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 9 of the United States 

4 Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437g) is amended by 

5 adding at the end the following new subsection: 

6 ‘‘(o) ENSURING CORRECT ASSISTANCE.—Notwith7 standing any other provision of law, in determining the 

8 allocations for each public housing agency from the Oper9 ating and Capital Funds pursuant to this section, the Sec10 retary shall include as dwelling units eligible for such as11 sistance all public housing dwelling units that— 

12 ‘‘(1) are owned by the public housing agency at 

13 the time of such determination; and 

14 ‘‘(2) before the date of the enactment of the 

15 Public Housing Equal Treatment Act of 2007 have 

16 received development, operating, capital, or mod17 ernization assistance pursuant to the terms of any 

18 agreement with Department of Housing and Urban 

19 Development authorizing the agency to expend such 

20 funds on behalf of such units.’’. 

21 (b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendment made by sub22 section (a) shall apply with respect to assistance under 

23 section 9 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 for 

24 fiscal year 2008 and each fiscal year thereafter. 

Æ 


jcorcoran on PROD1PC62 with BILLS
STATE of North Carolina v. Leroy McLAUGHLIN.

No. COA15-528.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 17, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Reversed and Remanded.
**Exhibit 99.19****CONSENT OF N. PRUD’HOMME**     I hereby consent to the use of my name in connection with the following document, which isbeing filed as an exhibit to and incorporated by reference into the registration statement on Form40-F of Goldcorp Inc. (the “Company”) being filed with the United States Securities and ExchangeCommission: 1. The annual information form of the Company dated March 25, 2008, which includesreference to my name in connection with information relating to the Éléonore Project,and the properties described therein.Date: March 28, 2008         /s/ Nathalie Prud’homme   Name:  Nathalie Prud’homme, P.Geo.   Title:  Senior Geologist, Les Mines Opinaca Ltée
# CE2004078EN.01007802.xml

| 27.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 78/78 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 78/78

---

(2004/C 78 E/0077)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2111/03

by Proinsias De Rossa (PSE) to the Commission

(25 June 2003)

Subject:   Comparative study of special needs teaching

Subject:

EP resolution A5-0377/2001 (1) of 15 November 2001 called on the Commission to carry out a comparative study on the functioning, funding and results of the various systems of teaching for pupils with special needs in the European Union. What action has the Commission taken in response to this call and when will it be in a position, if it has not already done so, to release this study?

1

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(24 July 2003)

(24 July 2003)

The Commission pays great attention to the various approaches to teaching for pupils with special needs. Already in 1998, the European Agency for Special Needs Education carried out a study, co-financed by the Commission, on ‘Integration in Europe, Provision for Pupils with Special Educational Needs’. This study focussed on trends in 14 European countries. An update is currently being prepared.

With regard to the parliamentary resolution in question, the Commission co-financed a report on ‘Special Needs Education in Europe’ in 2003, carried out and published by the Agency in co-operation with Eurydice (Information Network on Education in Europe). The electronic version is already available in French and in English on the website of the Agency at the following address: www.european-agency.org. The study, which covers 26 European countries, is being translated into eleven other languages.

It examines current practice across Europe in five key areas:

| — | inclusive education policies and practices; |
| --- | --- |

—

inclusive education policies and practices;

| — | funding of special needs education; |
| --- | --- |

—

funding of special needs education;

| — | teachers and special needs education; |
| --- | --- |

—

teachers and special needs education;

| — | information and communication Technology in Special Needs Education; |
| --- | --- |

—

information and communication Technology in Special Needs Education;

| — | and early intervention. |
| --- | --- |

—

and early intervention.

The Commission intends to continue monitoring developments in the field of special needs education on a regular basis.

---

(1)  OJ C 140 E, 13.6.2002, p. 589.

1

---
EXHIBIT27**CONSENT OF A. STECHISHEN**     I hereby consent to the use of my name in connection with the following report and documents,which are being filed as exhibits to and incorporated by reference into the registration statementon Form 40-F of Goldcorp Inc. (the “Company”) being filed with the United States Securities andExchange Commission: 1. The technical report dated November 17, 2006, entitled “The Red Lake Gold MinesProperty, Red Lake Mining Division, Northern Ontario” (the “Red Lake Report”); and  2. The annual information form of the Company dated March 30, 2007, which includesreference to my name in connection with information relating to the Red Lake Report,and the properties described therein.March 30, 2007/s/ A. Stechishen
HUGHES v. FRITO LAY, INC.

No. COA07-1510.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed July 1, 2008.

Certification Date July 21, 2008.

Appeal from NC Industrial Commission (I.C. NO. 207477).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
Opinion issued March 2, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-23-00124-CV

———————————

IN RE JUNIPER CAPITAL II, LP, JUNIPER CAPITAL III, LP, JUNIPER 

PRE HOLDINGS, LLC, PECOS RIVER EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, 

LLC, BRAZOS RIVER EXPLORATION, LLC, AND STATE LINE 

EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, LLC., Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators have filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial 

court’s interlocutory order denying relators’ motion to compel arbitration.1In 

1 The underlying case is MLB Oil & Gas Management LLC and MLB Pecos River 

Exploration LLC v. Juniper Capital II, LP, Juniper Capital III, LP, Juniper PRE

Holdings, LLC, Pecos River Exploration Holdings, LLC, Brazos River Exploration, 

LLC, and State Line Exploration Holdings, LLC, cause number 2023-07326, pending in 

the 270th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Debra Davis presiding.
2

conjunction with the mandamus petition, relators have filed a motion requesting a 

stay of proceedings in the underlying case pending our decision on the petition.

To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must demonstrate that the trial 

court abused its discretion and there is no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re 

Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). Here, the interlocutory 

order relators seek to challenge by mandamus—the denial of a motion to compel 

arbitration—is subject to immediate appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 

51.016 (providing for appeal of interlocutory order denying motion to compel 

arbitration under Federal Arbitration Act); 171.098 (providing for appeal of 

interlocutory order denying application to compel arbitration under Texas 

Arbitration Act). Appeals from interlocutory orders are accelerated. TEX. R. APP. P.

28.1(a).

Relators have filed a notice appeal from the same order challenged in their 

mandamus petition and, as in this original proceeding, have filed a similar motion in 

the pending accelerated appeal requesting a temporary stay of proceedings during 

the appeal. After considering the parties’ briefs, our Court issued an order granting 

a temporary stay pending the appeal. Given relators’ pending accelerated appeal 

from the challenged order and our granting of a temporary stay pending the appeal, 

we conclude that relators have an adequate remedy by appeal.
3

Accordingly, we deny the mandamus petition because relators have an 

adequate remedy by appeal. See, e.g., In re Weitzel, 2019 WL 347176, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2019, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus 

petition challenging denial of motion to compel arbitration because order is 

appealable) (citing In re Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 445 S.W.3d 216, 218-19

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding)). Relators’ motion for a 

stay of proceedings pending our decision on the mandamus petition is dismissed as 

moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.
32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

 

          I, Ralph M. Amato, Chief Executive Officer of BoysToys.com, Inc. (the "Small Business Issuer") do hereby certify pursuant to Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code that:

          (1)  	The Small Business Issuer's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2005 (the "Report") to which this statement is filed as an exhibit, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

          (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Small Business Issuer.

By:  */s/ Ralph M. Amato*
1... See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-227-CV

$2,764.00 CURRENT MONEY APPELLANT

OF THE UNITED STATES AND

VARIOUS PERSONAL PROPERTY

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS APPELLEE

------------

FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

David Barela is attempting to appeal a post-answer default judgment of

property forfeiture dated April 2, 2007. Barela did not file his notice of appeal

until May 28, 2008, over a year after the date of the judgment. Because

appellant did not file any motions that would have extended the appellate
2... Appellant’s notice of appeal is also untimely for purposes of a

restricted appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c).

2

deadlines, his notice of appeal was due May 2, 2007.

2 See TEX. R. APP. P.

26.1(a).

On July 1, 2008, we notified appellant of our concern that we might not

have jurisdiction over the appeal and informed him that unless he or any party

desiring to continue the appeal filed with this court a response on or before July

11, 2008 showing a reasonable explanation for the late filing of the notice of

appeal, this appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. The State filed a motion to dismiss on July 2, 2008.

Appellant filed a response indicating that he received timely notice of the

judgment but contending that because he was unaware of the appellate

deadlines, the appeal should be continued.

The times for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in this court, and

absent a timely filed notice of appeal or a timely filed extension request, we

must dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b), 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner,

959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Because appellant’s notice of appeal was
3

not timely filed, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

 

PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 21, 2008
<PAGE>


                       RECKSON OPERATING PARTNERSHIP, L.P.
                                  EXHIBIT 32.2
             CERTIFICATION OF MICHAEL MATURO, PRESIDENT, TREASURER,
    CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER AND DIRECTOR OF RECKSON ASSOCIATES REALTY CORP.,
      THE SOLE GENERAL PARTNER OF THE REGISTRANT PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350
              OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE


I, Michael Maturo, President, Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer and Director of
Reckson Associates Realty Corp., the sole general partner of Reckson Operating
Partnership, L.P. (the "Company"), certify pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

     1)    The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
           period ended June 30, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the
           requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
           of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
           material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
           of the Company.


Dated: August 14, 2006
                                By                 /s/ Michael Maturo
                                  ----------------------------------------------
                                   Michael Maturo,
                                   President, Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer
                                   and Director of Reckson Associates Realty
                                   Corp., the sole general partner of the
                                   Registrant

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Reckson Operating Partnership, L.P. and will be furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
FERRELL v. PERRITT.

No. 407P14-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

Dwain Cornelius Ferrell, for Ferrell, Dwain Cornelius.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 9th of July 2015 by Defendant for Leave to Amend:

> "Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
STATE of North Carolina v. Dammion Lamont MARTIN.

No. 226P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, for Martin, Dammion Lamont.

*845Sherri Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Ernie Lee, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by State of NC on the 6th of July 2015 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 6th of July 2015 by State of NC in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
John Leroy ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. Racheal Ellen CAIN, Defendant.

No. COA15-181.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 20, 2015.

**Case Reported Without Published Opinion**

Vacated and Remanded.
STATE v. Larry James ATKINS.

No. 500P08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February 5, 2009.

John Keating Wiles, Raleigh, for Larry James Atkins.

C. Branson Vickory, III, District Attorney.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 19th day of December 2008 by State of NC to Deem Response Timely Filed:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference this the 5th day of February 2009."
STATE v. Donald G. BARNETTE, Jr.

No. 307P14-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 29, 2015.

Donald G. Barnette, Jr., pro se.

Rajeev K. Premakumar, Assistant Attorney General, for State of N.C.

*861Brandy Cook, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

**Opinion**

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 3rd of September 2015 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:

> "Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 29th of September 2015."
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GABRIEL ESQUIVEL BARAJAS and

ANA AZUCENA TORRES DIAZ,

Petitioners,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,

Respondent. No. 15

- 71603

Agency Nos. A201

- 056

- 062

A201

- 056

- 063

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 13, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and FEINERMAN

, **

District Judge.

Gabriel Esquivel Barajas and Ana Azucena Torres Diaz appeal the denial of

their applications for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We

DISMISS in part and DENY in part the petition for review.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Gary Feinerman , United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

APR 11 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

1. P etitioners’ argument that the agency committed legal error by failing to

consider their lack of criminal history is unpersuasive. To begin, the agency “does

not have to write an exegesis on every contention,” but rather must show “that it

consider[ed] the issues raised, and a nnounce its decision in terms sufficient to

enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely

reacted.” Lopez v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Efe v.

Ashcroft , 293 F.3d 899, 90 8 (5th Cir. 2002)). That standard was met here.

To the extent Petitioners challenge the agency’s weighing of the factors, we

lack jurisdiction to review this argument. See Moran v. Ashcroft , 395 F.3d 1089,

1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review discretionary

determinations of moral character.”)

, overruled on other grounds by Sanchez v.

Holder , 560 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) ; see also 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

. Because the agency analyzed P etitioner s ’ moral character under

the catch

- all provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), this determination was discretionary.

2. Torres also contends that her due process rights were violated when the

agency considered the fraudulent tax returns because “the BIA and IJ should have

considered the degree of fault committed with respect to the tax fraud committed

by Mrs. Torres and weigh it against the more positive factors of good moral

character.” “This argument is an abuse of discretion challenge re

- characterized as

an alleged due process violation.” Bazua

- Cota v. Gonzale s , 466 F.3d 747, 749 (9th3

Cir. 2006) ; see id. (“[A]buse of discretion challenges to discretionary decisions,

even if recast as due process claims, do not constitute colorable constitutional

claims.”). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review it.

Petition DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.