UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PRINCE JONES, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02821 (UNA) 

) 

) 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) 

)

) 

Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint and 

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court will grant the plaintiff’s 

application for leave to proceed IFP and dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(l). 

It appears that the plaintiff is serving a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of the 

District of Columbia for violations of the D.C. Code. See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 18. The plaintiff 

purports to bring this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia, 

the Mayor of the District of Columbia, members of the Council of the District of Columbia, and 

several federal employees affiliated with the United States Penitentiary located in Hazelton, West 

Virginia (“USP Hazleton”). See Compl. at 2. 

The complaint is comprised of several claims. First, the plaintiff generally alleges that the 

District of Columbia defendants have collectively violated his constitutional rights by enacting the 

criminal statutes pursuant to which he has been convicted and incarcerated. See id. at 8–10, 20–

10/15/2020 
44. As a result, the plaintiff alleges that he has had to endure severe restrictions inherent in his

incarceration at federal penitentiaries. See id. at 2–3, 7–8, 17. 

Second, the plaintiff, who was apparently at one point designated to USP Hazleton, alleges 

that the named prison employees committed several constitutional violations arising out of his 

treatment and other dangerous conditions at that facility. See id. at 3–6, 46–63. He alleges that 

his claims are interconnected by a coordinated conspiracy against him, orchestrated by both the 

local and federal government. See id. at 2–3. He seeks both a declaratory judgment and 

compensatory damages. Id. at 77. 

Insofar as the plaintiff is mounting a challenge to his Superior Court conviction or sentence, 

this court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. “Under D.C. Code§ 23-110, a prisoner 

may seek to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence on any of four grounds: (1) the sentence is 

unconstitutional or illegal; (2) the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence; 

(3) the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is subject to 

collateral attack.” Alston v. United States, 590 A.2d 511, 513 (D.C. 1991). Such a motion must 

be filed in the Superior Court, see D.C. Code§ 23-1 l0(a), and “shall not be entertained . . . by any 

Federal . . . court if it appears that the [prisoner] has failed to make a motion for relief under this 

section or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by 

motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” id. § 23-1 l0(g); see 

Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Section 23-1 l0(g)’s plain language 

makes clear that it only divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners 

who could have raised viable claims pursuant to [§] 23-1 l0(a).”).

With respect to the plaintiff’s demand for damages, the Supreme Court instructs:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 
would render a conviction or sentence invalid . . . plaintiff must prove that 

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 

such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of 

a writ of habeas corpus.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–487 (1994). The plaintiff does not demonstrate that his 

conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise invalidated, and, therefore, his claim for 

damages fails. See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 699 F. Supp. 2d 159, 171 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d sub 

nom. Johnson v. Fenty, No. 10-5105, 2010 WL 4340344 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2010).

Additionally, the plaintiff sues several individual defendants who are domiciled outside of 

the District of Columbia. Thus, the ability of this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over these

defendants is unclear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); Int’l Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 

316 (1945) (holding that due process of law requires that, in order to subject a defendant to a 

judgment in personam, the defendant must either (1) be present within territory of forum, or (2) 

have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The plaintiff has also failed to show that this venue is the appropriate forum for the claims 

relating to the conditions at USP Hazleton. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district 

where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is 

located, (2) in a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 

claim occurred (or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or 

(3) in a district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action 

may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Courts in this 

jurisdiction must examine personal jurisdiction and venue carefully to guard against the danger 

that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia. See Cameron v. Thornburgh, 
983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Here, the events relevant to the plaintiff’s claims allegedly 

transpired in West Virginia, rendering dismissal of those claims appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 

1406(a). 

For all of these reasons, the case will be dismissed. A separate order accompanies this 

memorandum opinion. 

________________________

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH

United States District Judge

Date: October 15, 2020