This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1173 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Aaron Louis Olson, Appellant. Filed July 25, 2016 Reversed Rodenberg, Judge Washington County District Court File No. 82-VB-12-12765 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Rebecca Christensen, Lake Elmo City Atto rney, Joseph Van Thomme, Assistant City Attorney, Eckberg Lamme rs, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent) Aaron Louis Olson, Chisago City , Minnesota (pro se appellant) Considered and decided by Rodenberg , Presiding Judge; Pe terson, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N RODENBERG , Judge On appeal from his conviction for driving after suspension of his driver’s license, appellant Aaron Louis Olson argues that the evid ence is insufficient to prove either that he was operating a motor vehicle or that he had effective notice of the suspension of his2 driver’s license. Because the state failed to prove beyond a re asonable doubt that appellant had reason to know of his drive r’s license suspension, we reverse. FACTS In July 2012, Washington County Dete ctive Nicholas Loperfido approached a vehicle parked on a private-a ccess road frequently used by individuals to watch movies projected on a nearby drive-in movie screen without paying to do so. The detective observed two people in the vehicle. He identifi ed the person seated in the driver’s seat as appellant, who produced a Wisconsin driver’s license. Minnesota r ecords revealed that appellant’s Minnesota driver’s license had been suspended. Detective Loperfido cited appellant for misdemeanor driving with a su spended license under Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 1 (2010). The state later certified the citation as a petty misdemeanor, and a court trial was held in July 2015. 1 At the outset of the trial, and in the context of attempting to make a motion to suppress evidence, appellant explai ned that he was attempting to resolve a 2007 citation from Ramsey County based on an erroneously-issued suspension of his driving privileges in 2006. Appellant claimed that he had understood the license-suspension issue to ha ve been “administratively re solved” before the July 2012 citation was issued, but he ad mitted that he did not have any documentation supporting that claim. The district cour t declined to permit any pretri al motions, agreeing with the state that nothing “changed the fact that in 2012 in Lake Elmo, [appellant] didn’t have a

1 There were a number of pre-trial continuanc es, some of which concerned investigation into appellant’s initial license suspension.3 valid driver’s license, even if he wasn’t supposed to be su spended in the first place.” Appellant’s request for a continuance wa s denied and the court trial began. The district court asked whether the onl y trial issue was whether appellant was operating a vehicle with a suspended license in 2012. The prosecutor agreed, and appellant did not reply. The prosecutor indi cated that the Department of Public Safety had “blown [her] off” and did not send her a certified copy of the notices that had been sent to appellant. At trial, the state relied on a certified copy of a record showing that appellant was cited for driving after suspension in 2007 as proof that appellant had reason to know that he was su spended in July 2012. The only witness at trial was Detective Loperfido. Appellant did not testify, but argued in his own defense. The district court found appellant guilty of the charge, concluding that appellant had “reason to kno w” his license had been suspended because of the earlier citation in 2007, and that the circumstantial ev idence permitted no reasonable inference other than that appellant had driven to the location where he was cited. This appeal followed. 2
D E C I S I O N Appellant argues that the evid ence is insufficient to prove that he had notice of the suspension of his driver’s license at the time of the 2012 citation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the evidence to de termine whether the facts in

2 The state did not file a responsive brief. We therefore consider the appeal on the merits under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.4 the record and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [fact-finder] to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Palmer , 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (stating that, when evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, the same standard of review applies to court trials as to jury trials). We assume that the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013). The state must prove “t he existence of every element of the crime charged” beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Auchampach , 540 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn. 1995). We will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, “ac ting with due regard for the presumption of innocence” a nd the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude th at the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Bernhardt
v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Appellant was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 1, which provides that a person is guilty of the offense of driving after suspension if: (1) the person’s driver’s license or driving privilege has been suspended; (2) the person has been given no tice of or reasonably should know of the suspension; and (3) the person disobeys the orde r by operating in this state any motor vehicle, the operation of which requires a driver’s license, while the person’s license or privilege is suspended. The state did not present any evidence of official notices of suspension sent to appellant, nor did the detectiv e testify that appellant had any form of notice of his suspended license. The district court concl uded that appellant “had reason to know that5 [his] license had been susp ended as early as 2007” when he had received a driving-after-suspension citation. But the district court ba sed this determination not on any sworn testimony at trial, but on argumen ts that appellant made concerning his lack of notice of the suspension before the trial bega n. Because appellant’s statements were not made under oath at trial, they are only availabl e to be considered at trial if they qualify as a party admission under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d) (2)(A), or if they amount to a stipulation by appellant that he had reas on to have notice of the susp ension at the time of the 2012 citation. See State v. Tayari-Garrett , 841 N.W.2d 644, 656 (M inn. App. 2014) (holding that a prosecutor did not violate a defendant’ s privilege against self-incrimination when he told the jury th at the defendant’s unsworn statem ents during opening statements, cross-examination, and closing statements we re not evidence to be considered during deliberations), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 2014). Here, the state made no attempt to offer a ppellant’s statements as evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Appellant’s ar guments that he had properly challenged and resolved the 2007 citation do not amount to a stipulation to the notice element. To the contrary, appellant specifically disputed th at element. Although the district court believed that suspension notices are automatica lly sent to a driver’s last-known address, the trial record contains neither evidence of such a mailing to appellant, nor the content of any mailing that might have been sent. Th e prosecutor conceded that the state had no proof of mailing. The only witness at trial said nothing about notice to appellant. Because the state provided no evidence concer ning the second element of the offense, and because appellant disputed that he had reason to know that his license was6 suspended, the evid ence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had “been given notice of or reasonably should know” that his license was suspended as of July 2012. Minn. St at. § 171.24, subd. 1(2). Because we reverse appellant’s conviction for a failure of proo f on the essential element of notice, we do not address appella nt’s additional argument that he was not operating the motor vehicle. See State v. Bustos , 861 N.W.2d 655, 667 (Minn. 2015) (declining to address additional arguments wher e resolution of one i ssue is dispositive of the case).
Reversed.