No. 13924 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978

DAVID B. CfiACiFORD and JOHN ISAACSON, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vsPHILIP E. ROY, Defendantand Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judgepresiding. Counsel of Record: ForAppellants: Dola N. Wilson argued, Great Falls,Montana For Respondent: Philip E. Roy argued, Browning,Montana

Submitted: January 27, 1978 Decided: 

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## 1878Mr. Justice Daniel J. Sheadelivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Glacier County ~istrict Court dismissing their complaintwithout prejudice against defendant on an action in debt. DefendantRoy is an attorney in Browning, Montana,which is located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Roy is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe. PlaintiffsCrawford and Isaacson are investigators who had offices in Great Falls at the time this action commenced. They performed investigations and legal research for Roy, which involved work both on and off the Blackfeet reservation. Theirwork involved another Montana Indian tribe, the Belknap, and Federal Court cases involving both Indian and non-Indian parties in this state. The parties negotiated an initial agreement for services in a series of meetings which took place in Roy's law office and in Great Falls, The investigators reported to Roy in Browning. Prior to the contract in dispute here, Roy had given the investigators a note for $18,000.00 in payment for their services. The investigatorssurrendered this note to Roy at the time the contract in disputewas signed. The parties signed the contract in Roy's law office in Browning on December 26, 1975. Itprovided in relevant part that Roy owed the investigators $24,000.00; that he was paying them $10,800.00; that the $18,000.00 note was returned to him by the investigators;and that Roy would pay the balance due of $13,200.00 in installments sent to the investigators at a post office box in Great Falls. The investigators filed an action in ~istrict Court on November 16, 1976, to collect the debt of $13,200.00 plus interest and costs. Roy moved to dismiss the complaint on December 9,1976,

on the grounds that the state ~istrict Court lacked jurisdictionover the subjectmatter. The contentionwas that only the BlackfeetTribe had jurisdiction. The court received affidavits and documentary evidence and on June 17, 1977 entered its findings and conclusions and dismissed the complaint. In concluding thatWilliams v. Lee, (1959),358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251,precluded the DistrictCourt from asserting jurisdiction, the District Court made the following findings: That the parties entered into and signed the agreement in Roy's law offices on the reservation; that some of the services to be performed were on the reservation and others off the reservation; that Roy was tomake payment to the plaintiffs' assignee through the United Statesmail and deliverywas completed upon posting within the reservation; and that no testimonywas introduced to vary the terms of the written agreement. It is agreed that the federal government did not expressly grant jurisdiction to the state,nor has the state expressly assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter under federal law. Even so, this does not preclude state jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court stated inWilliams v. Lee, supra: 

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## * * Essentially, absent governingActs of Congress, the cpestionhas always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians tomake their own laws and be ruled by them. 

## * * * " 3 L ed 2d at 254. This Court, quoting from Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, (1960), 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 

### 7L ed 2d 573, stated in Iron Bear v. Dist. Court, (1973),162Mont. 335, 344, 512 P.2d 1292: 

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## * * * 'evenon reservations state lawsmay be applied unless such applicationwould interfere with reservation self-governmentor would impair a right grabed or reserved by federal law.' 

## * * *I' Absent federal law, this state has asserted jurisdictionover

a transaction involving an Indianparty when that transaction involved significant contacts with the state outside reservationboundaries. When the transaction in dispute, or any part of it, has occurred outside the reservation but within the geographic boundaries of the state, this Court in several cases has held an Indianparty has voluntarily subjected himself to state jurisdiction over that transaction. Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, (1976), Mont

# . , 555 P.2d 211, 33 St.Rep. 959,cert.den. U.S.



## , 97 S.Ct. 1171, 51L ed 2d 580 (where Indianparties had obtained a loan fromnon-Indians off the reservation); State ex rel. Old Elk v. District Court, (1970), Mont

# . , 552 P.2d 1394, 33 St-Rep.637 (where the reservation Indianwas a suspect in an off-reservation shooting); and Bad Horsev. Bad Horse, (1974),163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert-den.419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 83, 42 L ed 2d 76 (wherethe Indian couple had been married off the reservation). See also United States ex rel. Cobellv. Cobell, (9thCir. 1974), 503 F.2d 790,where the Federal DistrictCourt for Montana upheld continuing state jurisdictionover a child custody conflict when the Indian couple had obtained a divorce in State District Court; and Mescalero Apache Tribev. Jones, (1973),411U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L ed 2d 114,where the Indian-operated ski area located off the reservationwas held subject to state income tax. Here, we have a situation where two non-Indians outside reservation boundarieswere hired by Roy toperform servicesboth

on and off the reservation; negotiations leading up to the contract

were made throughphone calls and correspondence outside the reservation; and payment on the contractwas to be made to a post office box outside the reservation. These activities are sufficient to give a state court jurisdiction and cannotbe held to infringe

on the rights of the reservation Indians to make their own laws and to be ruled by their own laws. The reservationprovides no sanctuary to Roy in this situation. We note also that Roy employed these people to aid him inhis lawpractice. Tomaintain his lawpractice,Roy not only had to be initially licensed by the State of Montana and be qualified by the State of Montana, but he alsomust pay his annual license fee to the State. (Section 93-2010 and 93-2012,R.C.M. 1947). Moreover, as an attorney,Roy is subject to the rules of this Court under Art. VII, Section 2, 1972 Montana Constitutution. Roy was not acting as an individual at the time,but was acting in his capacity as an attorney. He employed thesepeople towork on legal matters off the reservation as well as on the reservation. It is clear, therefore, that one licensed to practice law in this state cannot make a contract as an attorney to be performed both on and off the reservation and then use his status as an Indian to defeat state jurisdiction when he is sued on the contract involved. It is equally clear that therewere sufficient contacts in this case to allow state jurisdiction even if Roy had notmade the contracts in his capacity as a lawyer. The hiring of the investigators,the negotiations on the contract and payment for services all occurred off the reservation. It is immaterial that the actual signing of the contract occurred on the reservation in Roy's law office. Accordingly, we hold that Roy's status as an attorney licensed by this state and the nature of the transaction involved, are both reasons to allowproceedings in State District Court rather than on the Indian reservation. The order of the DistrictCourt is reversed,and the case remanded for furtherproceedings.

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We Concur: 

# ~LAIJL~~~~ Chief Ju tice