# Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014Show full title

Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014 of 18 November 2014 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating            to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the European Union (Text with EEA relevance)         

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U.K.

# Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014                     

# of 18 November 2014

# concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of                        the European Union                     

# (Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the interoperability                           of the rail system within the Community(1), and in particular Article 6(1), second subparagraph, thereof,                        

Whereas:

(1)Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2) requires the European Railway Agency (‘the Agency’) to ensure that the technical specifications for interoperability (the                              ‘TSIs’) are adapted to technical progress, market trends and social requirements and to propose to the Commission any amendments                              to the TSIs which it considers necessary.

(2)By Decision C(2010)2576 of 29 April 2010, the Commission gave the Agency a mandate to develop and review the TSI's with a                              view to extending their scope to the whole rail system in the Union. Under the terms of that mandate, the Agency was requested                              to extend accordingly the scope of the TSI relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’.

(3)On 21 December 2012, the Agency issued a recommendation on the revised TSI relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’.

(4)In order to follow technological evolution and encourage modernisation, innovative solutions should be promoted and their                              implementation should, under certain conditions, be allowed. Where an innovative solution is proposed, the manufacturer or                              his authorised representative should state how they deviate from or how they complement to the relevant section of the TSI,                              and the innovative solution should be assessed by the Commission. If this assessment is positive, the Agency should define                              the appropriate functional and interface specifications of the innovative solution and develop the relevant assessment methods.

(5)In accordance with Article 17(3) of Directive 2008/57/EC, Member States are to notify to the Commission and other Member States                              the technical rules, the conformity assessment and verification procedures to be used for specific cases, and the bodies responsible                              for carrying out these procedures.

(6)Rolling stock currently operates under existing national, bilateral, multinational or international agreements. These agreements                              should not hinder current and future progress towards interoperability. The Member States should therefore notify such agreements                              to the Commission.

(7)This Regulation should apply to tunnels irrespective of their traffic volume.

(8)Some Member States already have safety rules in place which require a higher level of safety than that mandated in this TSI.                              This Regulation should allow Member States keeping such rules only concerning the infrastructure, energy and operation subsystems.                              Such existing rules are to be considered as national safety rules within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 2004/49/EC                              of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). In addition, in accordance with Article 4 of this Directive, Member States shall ensure that railway safety is generally                              maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved, taking into consideration the development of Union legislation                              and technical and scientific progress and giving priority to the prevention of serious accidents. However, no additional measures                              should be prescribed for rolling stock.

(9)Member States are competent to define the role and responsibility of the rescue services. For tunnels falling within the scope                              of application of this Regulation, Member States should arrange rescue access in coordination with the rescue services. It                              is important to specify measures in the field of rescue which are based on the assumption that rescue services intervening                              in a tunnel accident shall protect lives, not material values such as vehicles or structures.

(10)Commission Decision 2008/163/EC(4) concerning a TSI relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ should hereby be repealed.

(11)In order to prevent unnecessary additional costs and administrative burden, Decision 2008/163/EC should continue to apply                              after its repeal to the subsystems and projects referred to in Article 9(1)(a) of Directive 2008/57/EC.

(12)The measures provided for in this Regulation are consistent with the opinion of the Committee established in accordance with                              Article 29(1) of Directive 2008/57/EC,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

# Article 1U.K.

The technical specification for interoperability (TSI) relating to the ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the                     entire European Union, as set out in the Annex, is hereby adopted.                  

# Article 2U.K.

The TSI shall apply to the control-command and signalling, infrastructure, energy, operation, as well as rolling stock subsystems                     as described in [F1Annex II to Directive (EU) 2016/797] (5).                  

The TSI shall apply to these subsystems in accordance with Section 7 of the Annex.

Textual Amendments

F1Substituted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776 of 16 May 2019 amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 321/2013, (EU) No                                 1299/2014, (EU) No 1301/2014, (EU) No 1302/2014, (EU) No 1303/2014 and (EU) 2016/919 and Commission Implementing Decision                                 2011/665/EU as regards the alignment with Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the implementation                                 of specific objectives set out in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/1474 (Text with EEA relevance).

# Article 3U.K.

The technical and geographical scope of this Regulation is set out in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 of the Annex.

# Article 4U.K.

[F11.With regard to specific cases listed in Section 7.3 of the Annex, the conditions to be met for the verification of the essential                           requirements set out in Annex III to Directive (EU) 2016/797 shall be those laid down in Section 7.3 of the Annex or by national                           rules in force in the Member State which authorises the placing in service of the fixed subsystems or which is part of the                           area of use of the vehicles covered by this Regulation.]                  

2.Within six months of the entry into force of this Regulation, each Member State shall notify the other Member States and the                        Commission of:                  

(a)the national rules referred to in paragraph 1;                  

(b)the conformity assessment and verification procedures to be carried out to apply the national rules referred to in paragraph                        1;                  

[F1(c)the bodies designated to carry out the conformity assessment and verification procedures for the national rules relating to                           the specific cases set out in point 7.3 of the Annex.]                  

Textual Amendments

F1Substituted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776 of 16 May 2019 amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 321/2013, (EU) No                                 1299/2014, (EU) No 1301/2014, (EU) No 1302/2014, (EU) No 1303/2014 and (EU) 2016/919 and Commission Implementing Decision                                 2011/665/EU as regards the alignment with Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the implementation                                 of specific objectives set out in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/1474 (Text with EEA relevance).

# Article 5U.K.

1.Member States shall notify to the Commission the following types of agreement within six months of the entry into force of                        this Regulation:                  

(a)national agreements between the Member States and railway undertakings or infrastructure managers, agreed on either a permanent                        or a temporary basis and required by the very specific or local nature of the intended transport service;                  

(b)bilateral or multilateral agreements between railway undertakings, infrastructure managers or safety authorities which deliver                        significant levels of local or regional interoperability;                  

(c)international agreements between one or more Member States and at least one third country, or between railway undertakings                        or infrastructure managers of Member States and at least one railway undertaking or infrastructure manager of a third country,                        which deliver significant levels of local or regional interoperability.                  

2.The agreements which have already been notified under Commission Decision 2006/920/EC(6), 2008/231/EC(7), 2011/314/EU(8) or 2012/757/EU(9) shall not be notified again.                  

3.Member States shall forthwith notify to the Commission any future agreements or modifications of the existing and already                        notified agreements.                  

# Article 6U.K.

In accordance with Article 9(3) of Directive 2008/57/EC, each Member State shall communicate to the Commission within one                     year of the entry into force of this Regulation the list of projects being implemented within its territory and that are at                     an advanced stage of development.                  

# F2Article 7U.K.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Textual Amendments

F2Deleted by Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/912 of 9 June 2016 correcting Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014 concerning the technical specification                                 for interoperability relating to ‘safety in railway tunnels’ of the rail system of the European Union (Text with EEA relevance).

# Article 8U.K.

1.In order to keep pace with technological progress, innovative solutions may be required which do not comply with the specifications                        set out in the Annex and/or for which the assessment methods set out in the Annex cannot be applied. In that case, new specifications                        and/or new assessment methods associated with those innovative solutions may be developed according to the provisions of paragraphs                        2 to 5.                  

2.Innovative solutions may be related to the subsystems referred to in Article 2, their parts and their interoperability constituents.                  

3.If an innovative solution is proposed, the manufacturer or his authorised representative established within the Union shall                        declare how it deviates from or complements to the provisions of the relevant TSIs and shall submit the deviations to the                        Commission for analysis. The Commission may request the opinion of the Agency on the proposed innovative solution.                  

4.The Commission shall deliver an opinion on the innovative solution proposed. If this opinion is positive, the appropriate                        functional and interface specifications and the assessment method, which need to be included in the relevant TSIs in order                        to allow the use of this innovative solution, shall be developed and subsequently integrated into the relevant TSIs during                        the revision process pursuant to [F1Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2016/797]. If the opinion is negative, the innovative solution proposed cannot be applied.                  

5.Pending the review of the relevant TSIs, a positive opinion delivered by the Commission shall be considered as an acceptable                        means of compliance with the essential requirements of [F1Directive (EU) 2016/797] and may be used for the assessment of the subsystem.                  

Textual Amendments

F1Substituted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776 of 16 May 2019 amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 321/2013, (EU) No                                 1299/2014, (EU) No 1301/2014, (EU) No 1302/2014, (EU) No 1303/2014 and (EU) 2016/919 and Commission Implementing Decision                                 2011/665/EU as regards the alignment with Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the implementation                                 of specific objectives set out in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/1474 (Text with EEA relevance).

# Article 9U.K.

Decision 2008/163/EC is repealed with effect from 1 January 2015.

It shall however continue to apply to:

subsystems authorised in accordance with that Decision;

projects for new, renewed or upgraded subsystems which, at the time of publication of this Regulation, are at an advanced                              stage of development or are the subject of a contract which is being carried out.                           

# Article 10U.K.

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.                  

It shall apply from 1 January 2015.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

## ANNEXU.K.

### 1.INTRODUCTIONU.K.

#### 1.1.**Technical scope**U.K.

This TSI concerns the following subsystems as defined in [F1Directive (EU) 2016/797]: control-command and signalling (‘CCS’), infrastructure (‘INF’), energy (‘ENE’), operation (‘OPE’), and rolling stock (locomotives                              and passenger units ‘LOC&PAS’).                           

The purpose of this TSI is to define a coherent set of tunnel specific measures for the infrastructure, energy, rolling stock,                              control-command and signalling and operation subsystems, thus delivering an optimal level of safety in tunnels in the most                              cost-efficient way.                           

It shall permit free movement of vehicles which are in compliance with this TSI to run under harmonised safety conditions                              in railway tunnels.                           

Only measures, designed to reduce specific tunnel risks, are prescribed in the present TSI. Risks related to pure railway                              operation, such as derailment and collision with other trains, are addressed by general railway safety measures.                           

The existing safety level shall not be reduced in a country as stipulated in Directive 2004/49/EC Art 4.1. Member States can                              retain more stringent requirements, as long as these requirements do not prevent the operation of TSI compliant trains.                           

Member States can prescribe new and more stringent requirements for specific tunnels in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC                              Art 8; such requirements shall be notified to the Commission before they are introduced. Such higher requirements must be                              based on a risk analysis and must be justified by a particular risk situation. They shall be the result of a consultation                              of the Infrastructure Manager and of the relevant authorities for emergency response, and they shall be subject to a cost-benefit                              assessment.                           

##### 1.1.1.*Scope related to tunnels*U.K.

This TSI applies to new, renewed and upgraded tunnels which are located on the [F1network of the Union rail system], and which are in accordance with the definition in clause 2.4 of this TSI.                           

Stations that are in tunnels shall be in conformity with the national rules on fire safety. When they are used as safe areas,                              they shall comply only with the specifications for clauses 4.2.1.5.1, 4.2.1.5.2 and 4.2.1.5.3 of this TSI. When they are used                              as [F1evacuation and rescue points], they shall comply only with the specifications of clauses 4.2.1.7 (c) and 4.2.1.7 (e) of this TSI.                           

##### 1.1.2.*Scope related to rolling stock*U.K.

This TSI applies to rolling stock which is in the scope of the LOC&PAS TSI.

Rolling stock categorised ‘A’ or ‘B’ according to the previous SRT TSI (Decision 2008/163/EC) shall retain its category in                              this TSI as defined in clause 4.2.3.                           

##### 1.1.3.*Scope related to operational aspects*U.K.

This TSI applies to the operation of all units of rolling stock which are running in tunnels described in clause 1.1.1.

###### 1.1.3.1.Operation of freight trainsU.K.

When each vehicle of a freight train or dangerous goods train as defined in clause 2.4 complies with the structural TSIs which                     apply to it (LOC&PAS, SRT, NOI, CCS, WAG) and when the dangerous goods wagon(s) comply with Annex II of Directive 2008/68/EC,                     the freight train or dangerous goods train operated according to the requirements of the OPE TSI shall be allowed to circulate                     in all tunnels of the [F1network of the Union rail] system.                  

##### [F11.1.4.*Risk scope*U.K.

###### 1.1.4.1.*Risks covered by this TSI*U.K.

This TSI covers only specific risks to the safety of passengers and on-board staff in tunnels for the subsystems above.                            

Where a risk analysis comes to the conclusion that other tunnel incidents might be of relevance, specific measures to deal                                 with these scenarios shall be defined.                            

###### 1.1.4.2.*Risks not covered by this TSI*U.K.

Risks not covered by this TSI are as follows:                            

Health and safety of staff involved in maintenance of the fixed installations in tunnels.                                     

Financial loss due to damage to structures and trains, and consequently the losses resulting from non-availability of the                                          tunnel for repairs.                                     

Trespass into the tunnel through the tunnel portals.                                     

Terrorism, as a deliberate and premeditated act, which is designed to cause wanton destruction, injury and loss of life.                                     

Risks for people in the neighbourhood of a tunnel where collapse of the structure could have catastrophic consequences.]                                     

#### [F11.2**Geographical scope**U.K.

The geographical scope of this TSI is the network of the Union rail system as described in Annex I of Directive (EU) 2016/797                        with the exclusion of the cases referred to in Articles 1(3) and 1(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/797.]                   

### 2.DEFINITION OF ASPECT/SCOPEU.K.

#### 2.1.**General**U.K.

The line of defence for the promotion of safety in tunnels comprises four successive layers: Prevention, mitigation, evacuation                              and rescue.                           

The largest contribution is in the area of prevention followed by mitigation and so on.

The layers of safety combine to produce a low level of residual risk.

                            

A major feature of railways is their inherent ability to prevent accidents through the traffic running on a guide-way and                              generally being controlled and regulated using a signalling system.                           

#### 2.2.**The risk scenarios**U.K.

This TSI provides measures which could prevent or mitigate the difficulty of evacuation or rescue operations following a tunnel-specific                              railway incident.                           

                            

Relevant measures have been identified, which will control or significantly reduce the risks arising from the tunnel-specific                              incident scenarios identified above.                           

They have been developed, in the categories prevention/mitigation/evacuation/rescue; however they do not appear under these                              headings in this TSI but under the headings of the concerned subsystems.                           

The measures prescribed can be considered as a response to the following three types of incident.

##### 2.2.1.*‘Hot’ incidents: Fire, explosion followed by fire, emission of toxic smoke or gases.*U.K.

The main danger is fire. Fire is understood as a combination of heat, flames and smoke.

The fire starts on a train.

The fire is detected, either by on-board fire detectors, or by persons on-board. The driver is notified of a problem, either                              that there is a fire by an automatic notification or that there is a problem in general by passengers using the passenger                              alarm.                           

The driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances.

Ventilation is shut down to prevent smoke distribution. For rolling stock of category B, the passengers in the affected area                              will move to a non-affected area of the train where they are protected from fire and fumes                           

Whenever possible the train leaves the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to                              a safe area in the open air.                           

If appropriate, the train may stop at a [F1evacuation and rescue point] inside the tunnel. Passengers are evacuated, directed by the train crew, or by self-rescue, to a safe area.                           

If a fire extinguishing system can extinguish the fire, the incident will become a ‘cold’ incident.

The fire starts in the tunnel.

If fire starts in a tunnel or in a technical room, the driver is instructed to act appropriately depending on the local circumstances                              in compliance with the tunnel-specific incident scenarios, described in the Emergency Plan.                           

##### 2.2.2.*‘Cold’ incidents: collision, derailment*U.K.

The tunnel specific measures concentrate on access/egress facilities to support evacuation and the intervention of the emergency                              response services.                           

The difference compared to the hot incidents is that there is no time constraint due to the presence of a hostile environment                              created by a fire.                           

##### 2.2.3.*Prolonged stop*U.K.

Prolonged stop (an unplanned stop in a tunnel, without the occurrence of a hot or cold incident, for longer than 10 minutes)                              is not by itself a threat to passengers and staff.                           

However it may lead to [F3panic and to] spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation that exposes people to dangers present in a tunnel environment.                           

Textual Amendments

F3Deleted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776 of 16 May 2019 amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 321/2013, (EU) No                                 1299/2014, (EU) No 1301/2014, (EU) No 1302/2014, (EU) No 1303/2014 and (EU) 2016/919 and Commission Implementing Decision                                 2011/665/EU as regards the alignment with Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the implementation                                 of specific objectives set out in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/1474 (Text with EEA relevance).

##### 2.2.4.*Exclusions*U.K.

The scenarios that have not been dealt with are listed in clause 1.1.4.

#### 2.3.**The role of emergency response services**U.K.

The definition of the role of the emergency response services is a matter for the relevant national legislation.

The measures specified in this TSI for rescue are based on the assumption that the emergency response services intervening                              in a tunnel incident shall protect lives as a priority.                           

It is assumed that they are expected to:

In a ‘hot’ incident type
                      -  Rescue people unable to reach a safe area 
                      -  Provide initial medical support to evacuees 
                      -  Fight a fire insofar as required to protect themselves and people caught in the incident 
                      -  Conduct evacuation from safe areas [F3inside the tunnel] to the final place of safety                                           

In a ‘cold’ incident type
                      -  Rescue people 
                      -  Provide initial help to people with critical injuries 
                      -  Free trapped people 
                      -  Conduct evacuation to the final place of safety 

No demands on time or performance requirements are included in this TSI.

Considering that incidents in railway tunnels involving multiple fatalities are rare, it is implicit that there might be events,                              with an extremely low probability, for which even well-equipped emergency response services would be restricted, such as a                              major fire involving a freight train.                           

[F1If the expectations of the emergency response services expressed in emergency plans go beyond the assumptions described above,                                 the need for additional measures or tunnel equipment can be considered.]                            

#### 2.4.**Definitions**U.K.

For the purpose of this TSI the following definitions are used:

Railway tunnel: A railway tunnel is an excavation or a construction around the track provided to allow the railway to pass                              for example higher land, buildings or water. The length of a tunnel is defined as the length of the fully enclosed section,                              measured at rail level. A tunnel in the context of this TSI is 0.1 km or longer. Where certain requirements apply only to                              longer tunnels, thresholds are mentioned in the relevant clauses.                           

Safe area: a safe area is a temporary survivable space, inside or outside the tunnel, for passengers and staff to find refuge                              after they have evacuated from a train.                           

[F4Final place of safety: the final place of safety is the place where passengers and staff will no longer be impacted by the                                 effects of the initial incident (e.g. smoke opacity and toxicity, temperature). It is the termination point of the evacuation.]                            

[F1Evacuation and rescue point: an evacuation and rescue point is a defined location, inside or outside the tunnel, where fire                                 fighting equipment can be used by the emergency response services and where passengers and staff can evacuate from a train.]                            

Technical rooms: Technical rooms are enclosed spaces with doors for access/egress inside or outside the tunnel with safety                              installations which are necessary for at least one of the following functions: self-rescue, evacuation, emergency communication,                              rescue and fire fighting, signalling and communication equipment, and traction power supply.                           

Freight train: A freight train is a train composed of one or more locomotive(s) and one or more wagon(s). A freight train                              including at least one wagon carrying dangerous goods is a dangerous goods train.                           

All definitions related to rolling stock are defined in the LOC&PAS TSI and the WAG TSI.

[F4CSM on risk assessment: this term is used to designate the Annex I of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 402/2013                                 of 30 April 2013 on the common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment and repealing Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 (OJ L 121, 3.5.2013, p. 8).]                            

Textual Amendments

F4Inserted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776 of 16 May 2019 amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 321/2013, (EU) No                                 1299/2014, (EU) No 1301/2014, (EU) No 1302/2014, (EU) No 1303/2014 and (EU) 2016/919 and Commission Implementing Decision                                 2011/665/EU as regards the alignment with Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the implementation                                 of specific objectives set out in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/1474 (Text with EEA relevance).

### [F13.ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTSU.K.

The following table indicates basic parameters of this TSI and their correspondence to the essential requirements as set out                                 and numbered in Annex III to Directive (EU) 2016/797.                            

For meeting the essential requirements, the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 shall apply.                            

#### 3.1**Infrastructure and energy subsystems**U.K.

In order to meet the essential requirement ‘Safety’ applying to the Infrastructure and Energy subsystems, the CSM on risk assessment may be applied as an alternative to the                                 corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.                            

Accordingly, for the risks identified in point 1.1.4 and the scenarios listed in point 2.2, the risk can be assessed by:                            

a comparison with a reference system;                                     

an explicit risk estimation and evaluation.                                     

For meeting the essential requirements other than ‘Safety’, the corresponding parameters of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 shall apply.                            

#### 3.2**Rolling stock subsystem**U.K.

For meeting the essential requirements, the corresponding parameters of section 4.2.3 shall apply.                            

### 4.CHARACTERISATION OF THE SUBSYSTEMU.K.

#### 4.1.**Introduction**U.K.

The [F1Union rail system], to which [F1Directive (EU) 2016/797] applies and of which the subsystems are parts, has been developed to become an integrated system for which the consistency                              must be verified.                           

This consistency has been checked in relation to the development of the specifications within this TSI, its interfaces with                              respect to the systems in which it is integrated and also the operating rules for the railway.                           

Taking account of all the applicable essential requirements, the basic parameters related to safety in railway tunnels are                              set out for the subsystems infrastructure, energy and rolling stock in section 4.2 of this TSI. The operational requirements                              and responsibilities are set out in the OPE TSI and in section 4.4 of this TSI.                           

#### 4.2.**Functional and technical specifications of the subsystems**U.K.

In the light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the functional and technical specifications of those aspects specific                     to tunnel safety in the above-mentioned subsystems are as follows:                  

##### 4.2.1.*Subsystem Infrastructure*U.K.

###### 4.2.1.1.Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and technical roomsU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels.

Unauthorised access to technical rooms shall be prevented.

Where emergency exits are locked for security purposes, it shall always be possible to open them from inside.

###### 4.2.1.2.Fire resistance of tunnel structuresU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels.

In the event of fire, the integrity of the tunnel lining shall be maintained for a period of time that is sufficiently long                              to permit self-rescue, evacuation of passengers and staff and intervention of the emergency response services. That period                              of time shall be in accordance with the evacuation scenarios considered and reported in the emergency plan.                           

[F3. . . . .]                            

###### [F14.2.1.3*Fire reaction of building material*U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels.                   

This specification applies to construction products and building elements inside tunnels. These products shall fulfil the                                 requirements of Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/364 (10) :                            

Tunnel building material shall fulfil the requirements of classification A2.                                     

Non-structural panels and other equipment shall fulfil the requirements of classification B.                                     

Exposed cables shall have the characteristics of low flammability, low fire spread, low toxicity and low smoke density. These                                          requirements are fulfilled when the cables fulfil at least the requirements of classification B2ca, s1a, a1.                                     

If the classification is lower than B2ca, s1a, a1, the class of cables may be determined by the infrastructure manager after                                 a risk assessment, taking into account the characteristics of the tunnel and the intended operational regime. For the avoidance                                 of doubt, different classifications of cable may be used for different installations within the same tunnel provided that                                 the requirements of this point are met.                            

Materials that would not contribute significantly to a fire load shall be listed. They are allowed to not comply with the                                 above.]                            

###### [F14.2.1.4.*Fire detection in technical rooms*U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.                   

Fire in technical rooms shall be detected in order to alert the infrastructure manager.]                            

###### 4.2.1.5.Evacuation facilitiesU.K.

###### 4.2.1.5.1Safe areaU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.

A safe area shall allow the evacuation of trains that use the tunnel. It shall have a capacity corresponding to the maximum                              capacity of the trains planned to be operated on the line where the tunnel is located.                           

The safe area shall maintain survivable conditions for passengers and staff during the time needed for the complete evacuation                              from the safe area to a final place of safety.                           

In case of underground/undersea safe areas, the provisions shall allow people to move from the safe area to the surface without                              having to re-enter the affected tunnel tube.                           

The lay-out of an underground safe area and its equipment shall take into account the control of smoke, in particular to protect                              people who use the self-evacuation facilities.                           

###### 4.2.1.5.2Access to the safe areaU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.

Safe areas shall be accessible for people who commence self-evacuation from the train as well as for the emergency response                              services.                           

One of the following solutions shall be selected for access points from a train to the safe area:

Lateral and/or vertical emergency exits to the surface. These exits shall be provided at least every 1 000 m.

Cross-passages between adjacent independent tunnel tubes, which enable the adjacent tunnel tube to be employed as a safe area.                                       Cross-passages shall be provided at least every 500 m.                                    

[F3. . . . .]                                     

Doors giving access from the escape walkway to the safe area shall have a minimum clear opening of 1,4 m wide and 2,0 m high.                              Alternatively it is permitted to use multiple doors next to each other which are less wide as long as the flow capacity of                              people is demonstrated to be equivalent or higher.                           

After passing the doors, the clear width shall continue to be at least 1,5 m wide and 2,25 m high.

The way in which the emergency response services access the safe area shall be described in the emergency plan.

###### 4.2.1.5.3Communication means in safe areasU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.

Communication shall be possible, either by mobile phone or by fixed connection from underground safe areas to the control                     centre of the Infrastructure Manager.                  

###### 4.2.1.5.4Emergency lighting[F3 on escape routes]U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 0,5 km in length.

Emergency lighting shall be provided to guide passengers and staff to a safe area in the event of an emergency.

Illumination shall comply with the following requirements:

Single-track tube: on the side of the walkway

Multiple-track tube: on both sides of the tube

Position of lights:
                      -  above the walkway, [F3as low as possible,] so as not to interfere with the free space for the passage of persons, or                                           
                      -  built into the handrails. 

The maintained illuminance shall be at least 1 lux at a horizontal plane at walkway level.

[F1Autonomy and reliability: an alternative electricity supply shall be available for an appropriate period of time after failure                                 of the main supply. The time required shall be consistent with the evacuation scenarios and reported in the Emergency Plan.]                            

If the emergency light is switched off under normal operating conditions, it shall be possible to switch it on by both of                              the following means:                           

manually from inside the tunnel at intervals of 250 m

by the tunnel operator using remote control

###### 4.2.1.5.5Escape signageU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels.

The escape signage indicates the emergency exits, the distance and the direction to a safe area.

All signs shall be designed according to the requirements of Directive 92/58/EEC of 24 June 1992 concerning the provision                              of health and/or safety signs at work and to the specification referenced in appendix A, index 1.                           

Escape signs shall be installed on sidewalls along escape walkways.

The maximum distance between escape signs shall be 50 m.

Signs shall be provided in the tunnel to indicate the position of emergency equipment, where such equipment is present.

All doors leading to emergency exits or [F1cross-passages] shall be marked.                           

###### 4.2.1.6.Escape walkwaysU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 0,5 km in length.

Walkways shall be constructed in a single track tunnel tube on at least one side of the track and in a multiple track tunnel                              tube on both sides of the tunnel tube. In tunnel tubes with more than two tracks, access to a walkway shall be possible from                              each track.                           

The width of the walkway shall be at least 0.8 m.

The minimum vertical clearance above the walkway shall be 2.25 m.

The height of the walkway shall be at [F1bottom]-of-rail level or higher.                                    

Local constrictions caused by obstacles in the escape area shall be avoided. The presence of obstacles shall not reduce the                                       minimum width to less than 0,7 m, and the length of the obstacle shall not exceed 2 m.                                    

Continuous handrails shall be installed between 0.8 m and 1.1 m above the walkway providing a route to a safe area.

Handrails shall be placed outside the required minimum clearance of the walkway.

Handrails shall be angled at 30° to 40° to the longitudinal axis of the tunnel at the entrance to and exit from an obstacle.

###### 4.2.1.7.[F1Evacuation and rescue points]U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.

For the purpose of this clause, two or more consecutive tunnels will be considered as a single tunnel unless both of the following                              conditions are met:                           

The separation between tunnels in open air is longer than the maximum [F1length of the passenger train] intended to be operated on the line + 100 m and                                    

The open air area and track situation around the separation between tunnels allow passengers to move away from the train [F3along a a safe space]. The [F1open air area] shall contain all passengers of the maximum capacity of the train intended to be operated on the line.                                    

[F1Evacuation and rescue points] shall be created                           

Outside both portals of every tunnel of > 1 km and

Inside the tunnel, according to the category of rolling stock that is planned to be operated, as summarized in the table below:

Requirements for all [F1evacuation and rescue points]:                           

The [F1evacuation and rescue points] shall be equipped with water supply (minimum 800 l/min during 2 hours) close to the intended stopping point of the train.                                       The method of supplying the water shall be described in the emergency plan.                                    

The intended stopping position of the affected train shall be indicated to the train driver. This shall not require specific                                       on-board equipment (all TSI compliant trains must be able to use the tunnel)                                    

The [F1evacuation and rescue points] shall be accessible to the emergency response services. The way the emergency response services access the [F1evacuation and rescue point] and deploy equipment shall be described in the emergency plan.                                    

[F1It shall be possible to switch off and earth the contact line, either locally or remotely.]                                     

Requirements for [F1evacuation and rescue points] outside the portals of the tunnel                           

In addition to the requirements in 4.2.1.7 (c), [F1evacuation and rescue points] outside the portals of the tunnel shall comply with the following requirements:                           

The open air area around the [F1evacuation and rescue point] shall offer a minimum surface of 500 m2.                                    

Requirements for [F1evacuation and rescue points] inside the tunnel                           

In addition to the requirements in 4.2.1.7 (c), [F1evacuation and rescue points] inside the tunnel shall comply with the following requirements                           

A safe area shall be accessible from the stopping position of the train. Dimensions of the evacuation route to the safe area                                       shall consider the evacuation time (as specified in clause 4.2.3.4.1) and the planned capacity of the trains (referred to                                       in clause 4.2.1.5.1) intended to be operated in the tunnel. The adequacy of the sizing of the evacuation route shall be demonstrated.                                    

The safe area that is paired with the [F1evacuation and rescue point] shall offer a sufficient standing surface relative to the time passengers are expected to wait until they are evacuated to                                       a final place of safety.                                    

There shall be an access to the affected train for emergency response services without going through the occupied safe area.

The lay-out of the [F1evacuation and rescue point] and its equipment shall take into account the control of smoke, in particular to protect people who use the self-evacuation                                       facilities to access the safe area.                                    

###### 4.2.1.8.Emergency communicationU.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.

Radio communication between the train and the infrastructure manager control centre shall be provided in each tunnel with                              GSM-R.                           

Radio continuity shall be provided for permitting the emergency response services to communicate with their on-site command                              facilities. The system shall allow the emergency response services to use their own communication equipment.                           

###### [F44.2.1.9.*Electricity supply for emergency response services*U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km length.                   

The electricity supply system in the tunnel shall be suitable for the emergency response services equipment in accordance                        with the emergency plan for the tunnel. Some national emergency response services groups may be self-sufficient in relation                        to electricity supply. In this case, the option of not providing electricity supply facilities for the use of such groups                        may be appropriate. Such a decision, however, must be described in the emergency plan.]                   

###### [F44.2.1.10.*Reliability of electrical systems*U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km length.                   

Electrical systems identified by the Infrastructure Manager as vital to the safety of passengers in the tunnel shall be kept                                 in use as long as necessary according to the evacuation scenarios considered in the emergency plan.                            

Autonomy and reliability: an alternative electricity supply shall be available for an appropriate period of time after failure                                 of the main supply. The time required shall be consistent with the evacuation scenarios considered and included in the emergency                                 plan.]                            

###### [F44.2.1.11.*Communication and lighting at switching locations*U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km in length.                   

When the contact line is divided into sections that can be locally switched, a means of communication and lighting shall be                                 provided at the switching location.]                            

##### 4.2.2.*Subsystem Energy*U.K.

This section applies to the infrastructure part of the subsystem Energy.

###### [F14.2.2.1.*Sectioning of contact line*U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km length.                   

The traction power supply system in tunnels may be divided into sections.                            

In such case, it shall be possible to switch off each section of the contact line, either locally or remotely.]                            

###### 4.2.2.2.[F1Earthing of contact line]U.K.

This specification applies to all tunnels of more than 1 km length.

Earthing devices shall be provided at tunnel access points and, if the earthing procedures allow the earthing of a single                              section, close to the separation points between sections. These shall be either portable devices or manually or remotely controlled                              fixed installations.                           

Communication and lighting means necessary for earthing [F3operations] shall be provided.                           

[F3. . . . .]                            

###### F34.2.2.3.Electricity supplyU.K.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

###### F34.2.2.4.Requirements for electrical cables in tunnelsU.K.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

###### F34.2.2.5.Reliability of electrical installationsU.K.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

##### 4.2.3.*Subsystem rolling stock*U.K.

In the context of this TSI the subsystem rolling stock is subdivided into the following categories.

Category A passenger rolling stock (including passenger locomotives) for operation on lines within the scope of this TSI,                                       where the distance between [F1evacuation and rescue points] or the length of tunnels does not exceed 5 km.                                    

Category B passenger rolling stock (including passenger locomotives) for operation in all tunnels on lines within the scope                                       of this TSI, irrespective of the length of the tunnels.                                    

Freight locomotives and self-propelling units designed to carry payload other than passengers, such as mail and freight for                                       example, for operation in all tunnels on lines within the scope of this TSI, irrespective of the length of the tunnels. Locomotives                                       designed to haul freight trains as well as passenger trains fall under both categories and shall respect the requirements                                       of both categories.                                    

Self-powered on-track machines, when in transport mode, for operation in all tunnels on lines within the scope of this TSI,                                       irrespective of the length of the tunnels.                                    

The rolling stock category shall be recorded in the technical file and will remain valid regardless of future revisions of                              this TSI.                           

###### 4.2.3.1.Measures to prevent fireU.K.

This section is applicable to all categories of rolling stock.

###### 4.2.3.1.1Material requirementsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.2.1. These requirements shall also apply to the on-board CCS equipment.

###### 4.2.3.1.2Specific measures for flammable liquidsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.2.2.

###### 4.2.3.1.3Hot axle box detectionU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.2.3.

###### 4.2.3.2.Measures to detect and control fireU.K.

###### 4.2.3.2.1Portable fire extinguishersU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.3.1.

###### 4.2.3.2.2Fire detection systemsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.3.2.

###### 4.2.3.2.3Automatic fire fighting system for freight diesel unitsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.3.3.

###### 4.2.3.2.4Fire containment and control systems for passenger rolling stockU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.3.4.

###### 4.2.3.2.5Fire containment and control systems for freight locomotives and freight self-propelling unitsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.3.5.

###### 4.2.3.3.Requirements related to emergenciesU.K.

###### 4.2.3.3.1.Emergency lighting system in the trainU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.4.1.

###### 4.2.3.3.2Smoke controlU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.4.2.

###### 4.2.3.3.3.Passenger alarm and communication meansU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.4.3.

###### 4.2.3.3.4Running capabilityU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.4.4.

###### 4.2.3.4.Requirements related to evacuationU.K.

###### 4.2.3.4.1Passenger emergency exitsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.5.1.

###### 4.2.3.4.2Driver's cab emergency exitsU.K.

Requirements are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI clause 4.2.10.5.2.

#### 4.3.**Functional and technical specifications of the interfaces**U.K.

##### 4.3.1.*Interfaces with the Control-Command-Signalling subsystem*U.K.

##### 4.3.2.*Interfaces with the Traffic Management and Operation subsystem*U.K.

#### 4.4.**Operating rules**U.K.

Operating rules are developed within the procedures described in the Infrastructure Manager safety management system. These                              rules take into account the documentation related to operation which forms a part of the technical file as required in [F1Article 15(4)] and set out in [F1Annex IV] of [F1Directive (EU) 2016/797].                           

The following operating rules do not form any part of the assessment of the structural subsystems.

##### 4.4.1.*Emergency rule*U.K.

These rules apply to all tunnels.

In light of the essential requirements in Chapter 3, the operating rules specific to tunnel safety are:

The operational rule is to monitor the train condition before entering a tunnel in order to detect any defect detrimental                              to its running behaviour and to take appropriate action.                           

In the case of an incident outside the tunnel, the operational rule is to stop a train with a defect that could be detrimental                              to its running behaviour before entering a tunnel.                           

In the case of an incident inside the tunnel the operational rule is to drive the train out of a tunnel, or to the next [F1evacuation and rescue point].                           

##### [F14.4.2.*Tunnel emergency plan*U.K.

These rules apply to tunnels of more than 1 km in length                   

An emergency plan shall be developed under the direction of the Infrastructure Manager(s), in cooperation with the emergency                                 response services and the relevant authorities for each tunnel. Station managers shall be equally involved if one or more                                 stations are used as a safe area or an evacuation and rescue point. In case the emergency plan concerns an existing tunnel,                                 Railway Undertakings already operating in the tunnel must be consulted. In case the emergency plan concerns a new tunnel,                                 Railway Undertakings planning to operate in the tunnel may be consulted.                            

The emergency plan shall be consistent with the self-rescue, evacuation, fire-fighting and rescue facilities available.                            

Detailed tunnel-specific incident scenarios adapted to the local tunnel conditions shall be developed for the emergency plan.                            

Once developed, the emergency plan shall be communicated to Railway Undertakings intending to use the tunnel.]                            

##### 4.4.3.*Exercises*U.K.

These rules apply to tunnels of > 1 km.

Prior to the opening of a single tunnel or a series of tunnels, a full-scale exercise comprising evacuation and rescue procedures,                              involving all categories of personnel defined within the emergency plan, shall take place.                           

The emergency plan shall define how all organisations involved can be familiarised with the infrastructure and how often visits                              to the tunnel and table top or other exercises have to take place.                           

##### [F14.4.4.*Switching off and Earthing procedures*U.K.

These rules apply to all tunnels.                   

In the case it is required to switch off the traction power supply system the infrastructure manager shall make sure that                                 relevant sections of the contact line have been switched off, and inform the emergency response services before they enter                                 the tunnel or a section of the tunnel.                            

It is the responsibility of the infrastructure manager to switch off the traction power supply.                            

Procedures and responsibilities for earthing of the contact line shall be defined between the Infrastructure Manager and the                                 emergency response services, and reported in the emergency plan. Provision shall be made for switching off the section in                                 which the incident has taken place.]                            

##### 4.4.5.*Provision of on-train safety and emergency information to passengers*U.K.

Railway undertakings shall inform passengers of on board emergency and safety procedures related to tunnels.

When such information is in written or spoken form, it shall be presented in the language of the country the train is running                              in as a minimum, plus English.                           

An operating rule shall be in place describing how the train crew ensures the complete evacuation of the train when this is                              necessary, including those people with hearing impairments that may be in closed areas.                           

##### 4.4.6.*Operational rules related to trains running in tunnels*U.K.

Vehicles in conformity with the TSI as defined in clause 4.2.3 shall be permitted to operate in tunnels in accordance with                              the following principles:                           

Category A passenger rolling stock shall be deemed to comply with the tunnel safety requirements for rolling stock on lines                                       where the distance between [F1evacuation and rescue points], or the length of tunnels does not exceed 5 km.                                    

Category B passenger rolling stock shall be deemed to comply with the tunnel safety requirements for rolling stock on all                                       lines.                                    

Freight locomotives shall be deemed to comply with the tunnel safety requirements for rolling stock on all lines. However,                                       Infrastructure Managers of tunnels longer than 20 km are permitted to require locomotives with a running capability equivalent                                       to that of category B passenger rolling stock for hauling freight trains in such tunnels. This requirement shall be clearly                                       stated [F3in the Register of Infrastructure defined in clause 4.8.1 and] in the Network Statement of the IM.                                    

On-track machines shall be deemed to comply with the tunnel safety requirements for rolling stock on all lines.

Freight trains shall be admitted in all tunnels according to the conditions specified in clause 1.1.3.1. Operational rules                                       may manage the safe operation of freight and passenger traffic, by separating these types of traffic for example.                                    

Operation of Category A rolling stock is permitted on lines where the distance between [F1evacuation and rescue points], or the length of tunnels exceeds 5 km, in the case where there are no passengers on board.                           

Operational rules shall be put in place to avoid [F3panic and] spontaneous, uncontrolled evacuation in the case of a prolonged stop of a train in a tunnel without the occurrence of a hot                              or cold incident.                           

#### 4.5.**Maintenance rules**U.K.

##### 4.5.1.*Infrastructure*U.K.

Before placing a tunnel into service a maintenance file shall be prepared setting out at least:

Identification of elements which are subject to wear, failure, ageing or other forms of deterioration or degradation,

Specification of the limits of use of the elements under (1) and a description of the measures to be taken to prevent these                              limits being exceeded,                           

Identification of those elements which are relevant to emergency situations and their management,

Necessary periodic checks and servicing activities to ensure the proper functioning of the parts and systems under (3).

##### 4.5.2.*Maintenance of rolling stock*U.K.

The maintenance requirements for rolling stock are set out in the LOC&PAS TSI.

#### 4.6.**Professional qualifications**U.K.

The professional qualifications of staff required for operations specific to tunnel safety within the subsystems covered by                     this TSI and in accordance with the operating rules in clause 4.4 of this TSI are as follows:                  

##### 4.6.1.*Tunnel specific competence of the train crew and other staff*U.K.

All professional staff driving and accompanying a train, as well as staff that authorise train movements, shall have the knowledge                              and ability to apply that knowledge to manage degraded situations in the event of an incident.                           

For staff undertaking the tasks of accompanying trains, the general requirements are specified in the OPE TSI.

Train crew as defined in the OPE TSI shall have knowledge of the appropriate safety behaviour in tunnels and in particular                              be able to evacuate the people on board a train, when the train is stopped in a tunnel.                           

This involves in particular instructing the passengers to go to the next coach or to exit the train, and to lead them outside                              the train to a safe area.                           

Auxiliary train staff (e.g. catering, cleaning), who do not form part of the train crew as defined above shall, in addition                              to their basic instruction, be trained to support the actions of the train crew.                           

Professional training of engineers and managers responsible for maintaining and operating the subsystems shall include the                              subject of safety in railway tunnels.                           

#### 4.7.**Health and safety conditions**U.K.

The health and safety conditions of staff required for operations specific to tunnel safety for the subsystems concerned by                     this TSI and for the implementation of the TSI are as follows:                  

##### 4.7.1.*Self-rescue device*U.K.

Manned traction units of freight trains shall be equipped with a self-rescue device for the driver and other persons on board,                     satisfying the specifications of either the specification referenced in appendix A, index 2 or the specification referenced                     in appendix A, index 3. The RU shall choose one of the two solutions defined in these specifications.                  

#### F34.8.**Infrastructure and Rolling stock registers**U.K.

##### F34.8.1.*Register of infrastructure*U.K.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

##### F34.8.2.*Rolling Stock Register*U.K.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

### 5.INTEROPERABILITY CONSTITUENTSU.K.

There are no interoperability constituents defined in the SRT TSI.

### 6.ASSESSMENT OF CONFORMITY AND/OR SUITABILITY FOR USE OF THE CONSTITUENTS AND VERIFICATION OF THE SUBSYSTEMU.K.

#### 6.1.**Interoperability constituents**U.K.

Not applicable, since no interoperability constituents have been defined in the SRT TSI.

#### 6.2.**Subsystems**U.K.

##### 6.2.1.*EC verification (general)*U.K.

The EC verification of a Subsystem shall be performed according to one or a combination of the following modules as defined                              in Decision 2010/713/EU:                           

:

EC-type examination

:

EC verification based on quality management system of the production process

:

EC verification based on product verification

:

EC verification based on unit verification

:

EC verification based on full quality management system plus design examination

The approval process and the contents of the assessment shall be defined between the applicant and a Notified Body according                              to the requirements defined in this TSI and in conformance with the rules set out in section 7 of this TSI.                           

##### 6.2.2.*Procedures for EC verification of a subsystem (modules)*U.K.

The applicant shall choose one of the modules or module combinations indicated in the following table.

###### Assessment procedures

The characteristics of the subsystem to be assessed during the relevant phases are indicated in appendix B.

##### 6.2.3.*Existing solutions*U.K.

If an existing solution is already assessed for an application under comparable conditions and is in service, then the following                              process applies:                           

The applicant shall demonstrate that the results of tests and verifications for the previous assessment of the application                              are in conformity with the requirements of this TSI. In this case the previous type assessment of the subsystem related characteristics                              shall remain valid in the new application.                           

##### 6.2.4.*Innovative solutions*U.K.

Innovative solutions are technical solutions which do meet the functional requirements and spirit of this TSI, but are not                              fully in compliance with it.                           

If an innovative solution is proposed, the manufacturer or his authorised representative established within the European Union                              shall apply the procedure described in Article 8.                           

##### 6.2.5.*Assessment of maintenance*U.K.

According to [F1Article 15(4)] of [F1Directive (EU) 2016/797], [F1the applicant] shall be responsible for compiling the technical file, containing the documentation requested for operation and maintenance.                           

The notified body shall verify only that the documentation requested for operation and maintenance, as defined in clause 4.5                              of this TSI, is provided. The notified body is not required to verify the information contained in the documentation provided.                           

##### [F16.2.6.*Assessment of conformity to the Safety requirements applying to the Infrastructure and Energy subsystems*U.K.

This clause applies when a comparison with a reference system or an explicit risk estimation is used to meet the essential                                 requirement ‘Safety’ applying to the Infrastructure and Energy subsystems.                            

In such case, the applicant shall:                            

determine the risk acceptance principle, the methodology for the risk assessment, the safety requirements to be fulfilled                                          by the system and the demonstration that they are fulfilled;                                     

determine the risk acceptance levels with the relevant national authority/authorities;                                     

designate the independent assessment body as defined in the CSM on risk assessment. This assessment body can be the notified                                          body selected for the Infrastructure or Energy subsystem if recognised or accredited as per Section 7 of the CSM on risk assessment.                                     

A safety assessment report shall be provided in compliance with the requirements defined in the CSM on risk assessment.                            

The EC certificate issued by the notified body shall explicitly mention the risk acceptance principle used for meeting the                                 ‘Safety’ requirement of this TSI. It shall also mention the methodology applied for the risk assessment and the risk acceptance levels.]                            

##### 6.2.7.*Additional requirements for assessment of specifications concerning the IM*U.K.

###### [F16.2.7.1.U.K.

Not used]                   

###### 6.2.7.2.Fire resistance of tunnel structuresU.K.

The Notified Body shall assess conformity with the fire protection requirements for structures, defined in 4.2.1.2, by using                     the results of calculations and/or tests made by the applicant, or by an equivalent method.                  

To demonstrate that the integrity of the tunnel lining is maintained during a period of time that is sufficiently long to                              permit self-rescue, evacuation of passengers and staff and intervention of the emergency response services, demonstration                              that the tunnel lining can withstand a temperature of 450 °C at ceiling level during that same period of time is sufficient.                           

[F3. . . . .]                            

This verification is not needed for rock tunnels without additional support.

###### 6.2.7.3.Fire reaction of building materialU.K.

For the assessment of [F14.2.1.3 (b)], the Notified Body shall only check that the list of material that would not contribute significantly to a fire is present.                  

###### 6.2.7.4.Facilities for self-rescue, rescue and evacuation in the event of an incidentU.K.

The Notified Body shall check that the solution adopted is clearly identified by a statement in the technical file and is                              in conformity with the requirements of clause 4.2.1.5. For assessing the evolution of the conditions in the safe area during                              an incident, the Notified Body shall verify that doors and structures separating the safe area from the tunnel can withstand                              the elevation of temperature in the closest tube.                           

[F3. . . . .]                            

###### [F16.2.7.5.*Emergency lighting in upgraded/renewed tunnels*U.K.

In case of upgraded/renewed tunnels as required by clause 7.2.2.1, the assessment consists in the verification of the existence                        of the lighting. It is not necessary to apply detailed requirements.]                   

###### 6.2.7.6.Reliability of electrical [F1systems]U.K.

The Notified Body shall confirm only that a failure mode assessment complying with the functional requirements of [F14.2.1.10.] has been carried out.                  

##### 6.2.8.*Additional requirements for assessment of specifications concerning the RU*U.K.

###### 6.2.8.1.Self-rescue deviceU.K.

The conformity assessment is described in the specifications referenced in Appendix A, indexes 2, 3, 4.

### 7.IMPLEMENTATIONU.K.

This section defines the implementation strategy for the SRT TSI.

This TSI does not require modifications of subsystems which are already in service unless they are upgraded or renewed.

If not defined otherwise in section 7.3 ‘Specific Cases’, all new TSI compliant category B rolling stock is deemed to achieve                              a higher fire and tunnel safety level than non-TSI compliant rolling stock. This assumption is used to justify the safe operation                              of new TSI-compliant rolling stock in old non-TSI compliant tunnels. Therefore, all TSI compliant category B trains are deemed                              to be [F1technically compatible with all non-TSI compliant tunnels within the geographical scope of this TSI in accordance with Article                                 21(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/797.]                            

Notwithstanding the above, measures over and above those set out in this TSI may be necessary to achieve the desired tunnel                              safety level. Such measures may only be imposed on the subsystems Infrastructure, Energy and Operations and shall not restrict                              the authorisation or use of TSI compliant rolling stock.                           

#### 7.1.**Application of this TSI to new subsystems**U.K.

##### 7.1.1.*General*U.K.

This TSI is applicable to all subsystems in its scope which are placed into service after the date of application of this                              TSI, except when defined otherwise in the sections below.                           

The application of this TSI to on-track machines is voluntary. Where on-track machines are not assessed and declared to be                              in conformity with this TSI, they shall be subject to national rules. [F3In the latter case Articles 24 and 25 of Directive 2008/57/EC apply.]                            

##### 7.1.2.*New rolling stock*U.K.

For new rolling stock, the implementation rules set out in clause 7.1.1 of the LOC&PAS TSI shall be applied.

##### 7.1.3.*New Infrastructure*U.K.

This TSI is applicable to all new Infrastructure in its scope.

#### 7.2.**Application of this TSI to subsystems already in service**U.K.

##### 7.2.1.*Upgrade or renewal of rolling stock*U.K.

In case of renewal or upgrade of existing rolling stock, the implementation rules as set out in the clause 7.1.2 of LOC&PAS                     TSI shall be applied.                  

##### [F17.2.2.*Upgrade and renewal measures for tunnels*U.K.

In case of the upgrade or renewal of a tunnel, according to Article 15(7) and Annex IV of Directive (EU) 2016/797, the notified                        body issues certificates of verification for those parts of the subsystem composing the tunnel under the scope of the upgrade                        or renewal.                   

###### 7.2.2.1.*Upgrade or renewal of a tunnel*U.K.

A tunnel is considered to be upgraded or renewed in the context of this TSI when any major modification or substitution work                                 are carried out on a subsystem (or part of it) composing the tunnel.                            

Assemblies and components that are not included in the scope of a particular upgrade or renewal programme do not have to be                                 made compliant at the time of such a programme.                            

When upgrading or renewal works are carried out, the following parameters apply if they are in the scope of work:                            

Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and technical rooms                                     

Fire reaction of building material                                     

Fire detection in technical rooms                                     

Emergency lighting: where provided, it is not necessary to apply detailed requirements                                     

Escape signage                                     

Emergency communication.                                     

The tunnel emergency plan shall be revised.                            

###### 7.2.2.2.*Extension of a tunnel*U.K.

A tunnel is considered to be extended in the context of this TSI when its geometry is affected (e.g. extension in length,                                 connection to another tunnel).                            

When a tunnel extension is carried out, then the following measures shall be implemented for assemblies and components included                                 in the extension. For their application, the tunnel length to consider is the total tunnel length after extension:                            

Prevent unauthorised access to emergency exits and technical rooms                                     

Fire resistance of tunnel structures                                     

Fire reaction of building material                                     

Fire detection in technical rooms                                     

Emergency lighting                                     

Escape signage                                     

Escape walkways                                     

Emergency communication                                     

Electricity supply for emergency response services                                     

Reliability of electrical systems                                     

Communication and lighting at switching locations                                     

Sectioning of contact line                                     

Earthing of contact line.                                     

The CSM on risk assessment shall be implemented as described in point 6.2.6 for defining the relevance of applying other measures                                 of clause 4.2.1.5 and the measures of clause 4.2.1.7 to the complete tunnel resulting from the extension.                            

When applicable, the tunnel emergency plan shall be revised.]                            

##### 7.2.3.*Operation subsystem*U.K.

Operational aspects and their implementation are set out in the OPE TSI.

When commissioning an upgraded or renewed tunnel, the requirements for new tunnels in this TSI apply.

##### 7.2.4.*Operation of new rolling stock in existing tunnels*U.K.

The category of new rolling stock intended to be operated in existing tunnels shall be selected according to clause 4.4.6                              (a).                           

However, a Member State may allow operation of new rolling stock of category A in existing tunnels longer than 5 km under                              the condition that the operation of such new rolling stock offers an equivalent or improved level of fire safety compared                              to the operation of previous rolling stock. The equivalent or improved level of safety to passengers and staff shall be demonstrated                              using the Common Safety Method on risk assessment.                           

#### 7.3.**Specific cases**U.K.

##### [F17.3.1.*General*U.K.

###### (1)The specific cases, as listed in the following clause, describe special provisions that are needed and authorised on particular                           networks of each Member State.U.K.

###### (2)These specific cases are classified as:U.K.

          -  ‘P’ cases: ‘permanent’ cases.                          
          -  ‘T0’: ‘temporary’ cases of indefinite duration, where the target system shall be reached by a date still to be determined.                          
          -  ‘T1’ cases: ‘temporary’ cases, where the target system shall be reached by 31 December 2025.                          
          -  ‘T2’ cases: ‘temporary’ cases, where the target system shall be reached by 31 December 2035.                          

All specific cases and their relevant dates shall be re-examined in the course of future revisions of the TSI with a view                        to limiting their technical and geographical scope based on an assessment of their impact on safety, interoperability, cross                        border services, TEN-T corridors, and the practical and economic impacts of retaining or eliminating them. Special account                        shall be given to availability of EU funding.                   

Specific cases shall be limited to the route or network where they are strictly necessary and taken account of through route                        compatibility procedures.                   

###### (3)Any specific case applicable to rolling stock within the scope of this TSI in detailed in the LOC&PAS TSI.U.K.

##### 7.3.2.*Operational rules related to trains running in tunnels (clause 4.4.6)*U.K.

###### 7.3.2.1*Specific case Italy (‘T0’)*U.K.

Additional prescriptions for rolling stock intended to be operated in non TSI compliant tunnels in Italy are detailed in the                        LOC&PAS TSI, clause 7.3.2.20.                   

###### 7.3.2.2*Specific case Channel Tunnel (‘P’)*U.K.

Additional prescriptions for passenger rolling stock intended to be operated in the Channel Tunnel are detailed in the LOC&PAS                        TSI, clause 7.3.2.21.]                   

### Appendix AStandards or Normative Documents Referred to in this TSI

### Appendix BAssessment of the Subsystems

For rolling stock, the sub-system characteristics that must be assessed in the different phases of design, development and                     production are specified in the LOC&PAS TSI.                  

For infrastructure and energy, the sub-system characteristics that must be assessed in the different phases of design, development                     and production are marked by X in the following table.                  

1

OJ L 191, 18.7.2008, p. 1.                           

2

Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European Railway                              Agency (Agency Regulation) (OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 1).                           

3

Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways                              and amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation                              of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification                              (OJ L 164, 30.4.2004, p. 44).                           

4

Commission Decision 2008/163/EC of 20 December 2007 concerning the technical specification of interoperability relating to                              ‘safety in railway tunnels’ in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail system (OJ L 64, 7.3.2008, p. 1).                           

5

[F1Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the interoperability of the rail system within the European Union (OJ L 138, 26.5.2016, p. 44).]                            

6

Commission Decision 2006/920/EC of 11 August 2006 concerning the technical specification of interoperability relating to the                              subsystem Traffic Operation and Management of the trans-European conventional rail system (OJ L 359, 18.12.2006, p. 1).                           

7

Commission Decision 2008/231/EC of 1 February 2008 concerning the technical specification of interoperability relating to                              the operation subsystem of the trans-European high-speed rail system adopted referred to in Article 6(1) of Council Directive                              96/48/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2002/734/EC of 30 May 2002 (OJ L 84, 26.3.2008, p. 1).                           

8

Commission Decision 2011/314/EU of 12 May 2011 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the                              operation and traffic management subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system (OJ L 144, 31.5.2011, p. 1).                           

9

Commission Decision 2012/757/EU of 14 November 2012 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to                              the operation and traffic management subsystem of the rail system in the European Union and amending Decision 2007/756/EC                              (OJ L 345, 15.12.2012, p. 1).                           

10

[F1Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/364 of 1 July 2015 on the classification of the reaction to fire performance of construction products pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 305/2011                                 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 68, 15.3.2016, p. 4).]                            

Textual Amendments

F1Substituted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/776 of 16 May 2019 amending Commission Regulations (EU) No 321/2013, (EU) No                                    1299/2014, (EU) No 1301/2014, (EU) No 1302/2014, (EU) No 1303/2014 and (EU) 2016/919 and Commission Implementing Decision                                    2011/665/EU as regards the alignment with Directive (EU) 2016/797 of the European Parliament and of the Council and the implementation                                    of specific objectives set out in Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2017/1474 (Text with EEA relevance).