IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DISTRICTNO. 55, and HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTNO. 55-HIMUSSELSHELL COUNTY, MONTANA, Plaintiffs and Appellants,

MUSSELSHELL COUNTY and MARGARET REIGHARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, MUSSELSHELL COUNTY, Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: DistrictCourt of the Fourteenth~udicial ~istrict, In and for the County of Musselshell, The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judgepresiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Laurence R. Martin and Sol Lovas; Felt, Martin, Frazier & Lovas, P.C., Billings, Montana For Respondents: Kenneth D. Tolliver and James C. Reuss; Wright, Tolliver & Guthals, Billings, Montana

Filed: Submitted: October 25, 1990 Decided: December 12, 1990 I*

Clerk? r > Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court.

School Districts No. 55 and No. 55-H of Musselshell County, Montana, appeal the order of the District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District granting Musselshell County's cross-motion for summary judgment. The School Districts had filed this action to obtain damages for alleged loss of operating revenues resulting frommiscalculations of themill levy by the County Superintendent of Schools. We affirm. We frame the issues as follows: 1. Should the action have been dismissed because the School Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages? 2. Did theDistrictCourt correctlygrant the County'smotion for summary judgment based on legislative immunity? The facts are undisputed. The Superintendent of Schools for Musselshell County admits that she miscalculated the mill levy required to raise funds needed by the School Districts for fiscal year 1986-87. Throughher faulty computations, shearrived at 8.37 mills for the elementary school district general fund levy and 8.69 mills for the high school district general fund levy. Correct figures were 17.14 mills for the elementary levy and 15.25 mills for the high school levy. The County Superintendent reported the incorrect number of mills to the Board of County Commissioners,which levied the 1986 school tax based on her figures. As a result of the low millage levy,school district revenueswere shortby $187,498for the 1986-r 7 *



### . . 87 school year. Due to use of reserve funds, operation of the schools was not impacted. Faculty and staff were paid, and no programs or personnel were cut. Since themillage levy was later adjusted, functioning of the school for the following school year
was not affected. The School Districts sued the County for recovery of lost

revenues and losses of investment income on decreased reserve funds. TheSchool Districtsalso requestedan injunction requiring the County to reimburse the Districts for costs and damages that might be incurred in a lawsuit asserting violations of 55 15-10- 401to -412, MCA, which limit property taxes to 1986 levels. Prior to this action, the District Courthad issued an order authorizing the County to utilize correct 1986 mill levy figures for purposes of 55 15-10-401 to -412, MCA. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted themotion of the County on the basis that the County was immune from suit. From thisdecision, the School~istricts appeal.

Should the action have been dismissed because the School Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages? Summary judgment was granted on the basis of governmental immunity. When a case isdisposed ofbelow on a motion for summary judgment before a judge sitting without a jury and the facts are uncontested, lithe scope of review is much broader than in other appeals and the Supreme Court is free to make its own examinationof the entire case and reach a conclusion in accordance with its findings." McCain v. Batson (1988), 233 Mont. 288, 298, 760 P.2d 725,731. Furthermore,thisCourt will uphold the district courtls decision, if correct,regardless of thereasons given below for the result. Jeromev. Pardis (1989), 240Mont. 187, 192,783 P.2d 919, 922;Shimskyv. Valley CreditUnion (1984), 208Mont. 186, 190, 676 P.2d 1308, 1310. In this case the facts are undisputed. The County concedes that the County Superintendent of Schools erred in computing the mill levy and that the County Board of Commissioners levied the incorrect tax based on her calculations. Before we address the question of governmental immunity,weneed todecide themore basic issue of whether the School Districts, as governmental entities,

were authorized to bring suit against the County, another governmental entity. Since this is a case of first impression, we have reviewed decisions of other jurisdictions concerning the issue of whether

one governmental entity may sue another. In some jurisdictions courts have resolved the issue based on whether the governmental entity had standing to sue. See, e.g., East Grand County School District No. 2 v. Town of Winter Park (Colo. App. 1987), 739 P.2d 862; capital View Fire District v. County of ~ichland(S.C.App. 1989), 377 S.E.2d 122. At the threshold of every suit istherequirement thatparties have standing to sue. The plaintiff is required to have "Isuch a personal stake 

### in the outcome of the controversy as 

### to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues.111 Olsonv. Departmentof Revenue (1986), 223Mont. 464, 469, 726 P.2d 1162, 1166 (quoting Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678). While the School Districts may ormay notmeet criteria to establish standing to sue, the real issue is whether the school district, as a political subdivision of the state, has legal authority to exercise standing. Harrison County v. City of Gulfport (Miss. 1990), 557 So.2d 780, 784. In examining decisions of other courts allowing suit on grounds other than standing, we note that most do not involve seeking damages from the other governmental entity. For example, courts have permitted challenges to the constitutionality of a statute; actions to oppose annexation of county lands by a city; suits fordeclaratory judgmentsconstruing state revenue laws;and actions todetermine titleto real property held by the state. See Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (Ky. 1989), 790 S.W.2d 186 and Simonsv. Laramie County School DistrictNo. 1 (Wyo. 1987), 741P.2d 1116 (challenging constitutionality of statutes);Harrison County v. City of Gulfport (Miss. 1990), 557 So.2d 780 (annexation opposition); State 

### ex rel. Independence School District v. Jones (Mo. 1983), 653 S.W.2d 178.(declaratoryruling on construction of statute); Coos County v. State (Or. 1987), 734 P.2d 1348 (quiet title action). In most situations where a governmental entity has sought damages fromanothergovernmental entity,ashere, the suit hasnot been allowed. See Carbon County School District No. 2 v. WyomingStateHospital (Wyo. 1984), 680 P.2d 773; Statev. Board of County Commissioners of JohnsonCounty (Wyo. 1982), 642 P.2d 456;but see Board of Education v. Town of Riverdale (Md. 1990), 578 A.2d 207

(local government tort immunity cannot be asserted as a defense when sued by the state or a state agency, the source of its immunity). School districts,municipalities, and counties are political subdivisions of the state. As creations of the state, "[elxcept

as provided by the state, they have no existence, no functions,no rights and nopowers." East Jacksonpublic Schoolsv. State (Mich. App. 1984), 348 N.W.2d 303, 306. When a school district or other subdivisionof stategovernment attemptstobring an action against another governmental subdivision, the state, in effect, is suing itself. Carbon County, 680 P.2d at 774. The logic of this view cannot be denied. While the taxpayers, as represented by the School Districts,may benefit, the taxpayers,as representedby the County, must pay, through taxes or insurance, the deficient funds to the School Districts. Generally, courts will not allow suits between governmental entities unless expressor implied statutory authority exists. The Missouri Supreme Court refused topermit a county assessor'sappeal of a decision of a county board of equalization because no statute authorized such an appeal. OIFlahertyv. State Tax Commission of Missouri (Mo. 1984), 680 S.W.2d 153; see also City of Richmond Heights v. Board of Equalization (Mo. 1979), 586 S.W.2d 338 (city had no authority to appeal assessment by county board of8 8 t equalization); State ex rel. St. Francois County School District R-I11 v. Lalumondier (Mo. 1975), 518 S.W.2d 638 (school district not allowed to obtain review of county board of equalization decision). Similarly, ~ichigancourts have held that a school district has no power to challenge a state funding measure Iton behalf of residents within their boundaries, or to expend public funds to finance such litigation of, or on behalf of, private citizens." East Jackson public Schools, 348 N.W.2d at 306. We can findno statutory authority granting a schooldistrict, a governmental subdivision, the right to sue another governmental subdivision fordamages. Wehold that in the absence of a specific statutoryorconstitutional provision,onegovernmental subdivision may not sue another for damages.

I1 Did theDistrictCourt correctlygrant the County'smotion for summary judgment based on legislative immunity? Since we have concluded that the School ~istrictsand the County are notproperparties to this action,

### we need not consider the immunity question. Affirmed.We concur: