* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 00-40858 Summary Calendar

_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LUIS C. ENCINAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas USDC No. C-98-CR-41-1

_________________________________________________________________ April 10, 2001

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Luis C. Encinas appe als the sentence imposed following his

guilty plea conviction of possessing marijuana with the intent to

distribute. We have reviewed the record, the briefs of the

parties, and the applicable law, and find no reversible error.

Encinas argues that the district court violated Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) by failing to make a finding in

response to his objection regarding the quantity of marijuana

involved in his offense. The district court found that Encinas did2

not object t imely to the drug quantity calculation in the

presentence report (“PSR”). Accordingly, the drug quantity

calculation was not in controver sy as that term is used in Rule

32(c)(1) and the court was not required to make a finding. U nited

States v. Myers , 198 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

,

120 S.Ct. 2230 (2000).

Encinas argues for the first time in his reply brief that the

district court erred in overruling his objection to the PSR as

untimely. We need not address Encinas’s argument because issues

raised for the first time in the reply brief are waived. S ee

Conkling v. Turner
, 18 F.3d 1285, 1 305 (5th Cir. 1994); Y ohey v.

Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

Encinas contends that the district court erred in determining

the quantity of marijuana attributabl e to him for sentencing

purposes. Encinas’s fact-based argument could have been resolved

by the district court if he had properly raised the issue. Encinas

has not shown plain error. See Robertson v. Plano City of Texas

,

70 F.3d 2 1, 23 (5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, Encinas has not shown

that the district court committed error, plain or otherwise, in

determining the drug quantity for sentencing purposes. The

district court was entitled to adopt the PSR’s drug quantity

calculation without further inquiry because Encinas did not present

any evidence to refute the PSR’s finding that he possessed3

approximately 43 kilograms of marijuana. U nited States v. Puig

Infante , 19 F.3d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1994).

Encinas argues that the district court violated Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) by failing to make a finding as to

whether he committed the instant offense while serving a criminal

justice sentence. To the extent a finding was required, the

district court met its obligation by adopting the PSR. S ee United

States v. Duncan
, 191 F.3d 569, 575 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied

,

120 S.Ct. 1991 (2000).

Encinas argues that the district court erred by assigning him

two criminal histor y points because he committed the instant

offense while serving a criminal justice sentence. Even if the

district court erred in calculating Encinas’s sentence, any error

was harmless. The sentencing judge made it clear that she would

impose a 46-month sentence even if the two additional points were

not included in the calc ulation. S ee United States v. Tello

, 9

F.3d 1119, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1993)(quoting Williams v. United

States
, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (defining

harmless error as “[a]ny error, defect, irregularit y or variance

which does not affect substantial rights”).

A F F I R M E D.