J-S33021-18

______________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: F.P., A MINOR

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1421 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered April 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-JV-0000635-2017

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 08, 2018

Appellant, F.P., appeals from the dispositional order adjudicating him 

delinquent for violating the Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6127.

Specifically, F.P. argues that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress physical evidence. We affirm.

F.P. was arrested on March 31, 2017, and charged with violating 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106 (Firearms not to be carried without a license) and 6110.1 

(Possession of a firearm by a minor). Prior to his adjudicatory hearing, F.P. 

filed a Motion to Suppress the physical evidence against him, a handgun. On 

April 10, 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing on the Motion. 

At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Philadelphia Police Officer Ryan Waltman. Officer Waltman testified that on 

Friday, March 31, 2017, at 10:46 P.M., he was patrolling the area near 15th

Street and Allegheny Avenue, in uniform and a marked police vehicle, with his 
J-S33021-18

- 2 -

partner. The officer testified that the area he was patrolling is a high-crime 

area. He received a radio call describing two black males: one wearing a blue 

jacket with blue jeans, and one wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and black 

pants. The males were reported as armed with guns in their waistbands, and 

located at Broad Street and Allegheny Avenue, approximately two and onehalf blocks away from Officer Waltman.

Officer Waltman stated that the radio informed the officers that the tip 

received by the police was “verified,” meaning that the person who called 911

and reported the criminal activity also provided their name and telephone 

number to the 911 operator. See N.T., 4/10/17, at 8, 17-18, 24-25. The 

officer testified that he did not have any information identifying the source of 

the tip, or any details surrounding the origin of the tipster’s belief that the 

males were armed.

Officer Waltman testified that he arrived at Broad and Allegheny within 

a few minutes of receiving the call, and spotted two young men who fit the 

description. One (who was later determined to be F.P.) was wearing a blue 

jacket and “very, very dark jeans or pants,” and the other was wearing a gray 

hooded sweatshirt and black pants. Id. at 11. 

Officer Waltman stated that the suspects appeared to be violating the 

curfew ordinance,1 which he believed to be 10:00 P.M. The officer was unable 

____________________________________________

1 See Phila. Code § 10-303 (“Unlawful Conduct of Minors”); 53 P.S. § 13349 

(authorizing police to arrest persons observed violating ordinance in city of 

first class). 
J-S33021-18

- 3 -

to say the specific day of the week on which the events occurred, but he 

testified that in his recollection it was both a weekday and a school night. On 

cross-examination, he agreed that it was a Friday.

The officers stopped their vehicle, exited, and “asked both males to 

stop.” Id. at 12. Officer Waltman stated that he intended “to stop [F.P.] for 

the curfew violation as well as fitting the [radio call].” Id. The officer testified

that he did not see anything else of note before he asked the suspects to stop, 

aside from their similarity to the radio call description and the fact that they

appeared to be in violation of curfew. 

After Officer Walton told the suspects to stop, F.P. turned to look in his

direction, dropped a pair of socks, began tugging at his waistband, and

continued walking away. Officer Walton gave a second verbal command to 

stop, and F.P. “tugged harder” on his waistband and “took off running.” Id. at 

12, 20. During the resulting chase, F.P. dropped several items, including a 

nine-millimeter handgun. Officer Walton retrieved the gun and arrested F.P. 

Officer Walton acknowledged that at the time of his arrest, F.P. was less than

two months shy of turning 18 years old, stood six feet tall, and weighed 230 

pounds. 

No other evidence was presented by either party. At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the court denied the Motion. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court 

explained that it found that no investigative detention or investigatory stop 

had occurred. Trial Court Opinion, filed Aug. 1, 2017, at 5. In the court’s view, 

Officer Waltman had attempted to perform an investigative detention, but 
J-S33021-18

- 4 -

“F.P. tugged at his waistband and fled before the officer could approach.” Id.

at 9; see also id. at 5. 

Despite holding that no investigatory stop had occurred, the court also

found that Officer Waltman had reasonable suspicion to justify a detention of 

F.P., based on the combination of the officer’s beliefs that F.P. was violating 

the city curfew ordinance and that F.P. had a gun. 

Regarding the firearm possession, the court found that “the totality of 

circumstances were close to meeting the reasonable suspicion threshold that 

F.P. possessed a gun.” Id. at 6. The court determined that the tip received by 

Officer Waltman was not anonymous, as the testimony indicated that the 911 

dispatcher was “able to identify the caller and obtain a call-back phone 

number.” Id. at 6. In examining the totality of the circumstances, the court 

considered the non-anonymous tip, the appearance of two males matching 

the radio call’s clothing description within two minutes and two and a half 

blocks of the given location, the Officer’s knowledge of the area as a highcrime area, and the Officer’s observation of F.P. tugging at his waistband and 

taking flight. 

Regarding curfew, contrary to Officer Waltman’s belief, Philadelphia’s

curfew ordinance prohibits minors 13 years old and older from being in any 

public place on weekdays, barring exceptions not applicable here, after 10:30 

P.M. See Phila. Code § 10-303. The ordinance specifies that Fridays are to be 

considered weekend days, which extends the curfew for minors 13 years old 

and older to midnight. Id. at §§ 10-302, 10-303. However, the court found 
J-S33021-18

- 5 -

that although Officer Waltman was mistaken about the application of the 

ordinance, as a curfew of midnight, and not 10:00 P.M., applied to F.P., the 

officer was able to detain F.P. based on his “good faith belief” that F.P. was 

violating curfew. The court found that “it would be unfair to ask a police officer, 

responding to a ‘verified’ radio call of ‘two males with a gun’” to determine 

which curfew would apply “to the two possibly-armed minors he is about to 

encounter.” Id. at 4-5. 

The court stressed that it was the combination of suspicions of both 

crimes that justified the Officer’s actions, and that “F.P.’s youthful appearance 

only further added to the suspicion” created by the circumstances supporting 

gun possession. Id. at 6. The court concluded that “the instant matter has 

unprovoked flight in a high-crime area, matching descriptions provided by a 

known tipster, tugging at the waistband, and a good faith belief that the 

individuals were violating the City’s curfew ordinance.” Id. at 10. 

After it denied the Motion, the court held an adjudicatory hearing, at 

which the firearm was admitted as evidence. The court found that F.P. violated

the Uniform Firearms Act, and adjudicated him delinquent. The court 

thereafter committed F.P. to a juvenile facility.

F.P. filed a timely notice of appeal, and raises the following issue: 

Did the lower court err by denying [F.P.]’s [M]otion to [S]uppress 

where the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop [F.P.] 

based on what police described as a “verified” radio call, but 

actually amounted to no more than an anonymous tip, and the 

court erroneously relied on the officer’s “good faith belief” that 
J-S33021-18

- 6 -

[F.P.] was violating a curfew law to find that the officer possessed 

reasonable suspicion?

F.P.’s Br. at 3.

F.P. argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him 

because the tip received by police was anonymous, the police did not 

corroborate the tip with independent observations, and there is no “good faith” 

exception to the exclusionary rule. See F.P.’s Br. at 10-15.

Our standard of review on appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress 

is “to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual 

findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from 

those findings.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 24 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Pa.Super. 

2011) (citation omitted). If the record supports the factual findings of the 

suppression court, we reverse “only if there is an error in the legal conclusions 

drawn from those factual findings.” Id.

Both federal and state constitutional jurisprudence categorize three 

levels of interaction between police officers and citizens: (1) mere encounters, 

(2) investigative detentions, and (3) full arrests. Commonwealth v. Young, 

162 A.3d 524, 528 (Pa.Super. 2017). First, a “mere encounter can be any 

formal or informal interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will 

normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen.” Id. The encounter is 

consensual, meaning that there is no obligation by the citizen to stop or 

respond, and it need not be supported by any level of suspicion by the police.

Id. at 529. Second, an “investigative detention,” or “investigative stop,” 

“subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve 
J-S33021-18

- 7 -

such coercive conditions as to constitute an arrest.” Commonwealth v. 

Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 479 (Pa.Super. 2007). An investigative detention must 

be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Third, a 

“custodial detention,” or full arrest, must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014).

Whether an investigative detention has occurred is an objective 

“determination of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave 

or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Lyles, 97 A.3d at 303. “In evaluating 

the circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means of physical 

force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in some way 

been restrained.” Commonwealth v. Newsome, 170 A.3d 1151, 1155 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). A court must examine “all circumstances 

evidencing a show of authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of 

the police officer, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing 

the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements.” Id.

If an officer approaches a person in public and requests information, but 

does not convey that compliance is required, a seizure has not occurred, as 

“such individual still maintains the right to ignore the police and go about his 

business.” Lyles, 97 A.3d at 303 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). For example, requests for identification or verbal commands that 

individuals show their hands in the presence of the investigating officers do 

not of themselves elevate a police interaction above a mere encounter. See

Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 615 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[A]n 
J-S33021-18

- 8 -

arresting officer’s request for identification does not, by itself, transform his 

mere encounter with an individual into an unconstitutional investigatory 

detention”); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1116 (Pa.Super. 

2011) (holding that interaction was mere encounter where police questioned

defendant on the street and asked him to raise his hands).

Even when a police officer tells an individual to “stop,” such an 

interaction does not necessarily equate to a seizure, particularly when the 

individual does not stop. Newsome, 170 A.3d at 1156. In Newsome, an 

officer responded to an anonymous radio call that several individuals were 

passing around a firearm, and approached the individuals while in full uniform 

and a police vehicle. Id. at 1152-53. The officer asked one of the individuals 

“to come here” to talk to him; on cross-examination the officer stated that he 

told the defendant to “stop” several times. Id. at 1153, 1155-56. The officer 

did not engage his siren or lights, did not brandish his weapon, did not obstruct 

the defendant’s pathway, and did not tell the defendant that he was not free 

to leave. Id. at 1156. The defendant kept walking, and discarded a firearm in 

a flowerpot, at which point he was arrested. Id. at 1153, 1156. We held that 

the police officer had not substantially impaired the defendant’s liberty of 

movement, and that the defendant had not been seized prior to discarding the 

firearm. Id. at 1156; see also Coleman, 19 A.3d at 1116 (concluding that 

officer’s testimony that he “stopped” defendant referred to his asking 

defendant a question rather than indicating the officer forced the defendant 

to remain).
J-S33021-18

- 9 -

Howeover, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, which provides greater 

protection than its federal counterpart, “a seizure occurs when an officer gives 

chase” to a fleeing suspect. In re M.D., 781 A.2d 192, 196 (Pa.Super. 2001).

Therefore, any items abandoned by an individual being pursued by the police 

may only be admissible as evidence when the police possess reasonable 

suspicion prior to giving chase. Id.

In the instant case, two uniformed police officers got out of a marked 

police cruiser; Officer Walton approached F.P. and told him to stop. F.P. did 

not stop, but grabbed at his waistband, dropped a pair of socks, and continued 

walking. Officer Walton again told F.P. to stop, at which point F.P. began to 

run. Officer Walton then gave chase.

We conclude that F.P. was not subjected to an investigatory detention 

when Officer Walton first told him to stop. As in Newsome, Officer Walton 

approached F.P. and told him to stop, but did not indicate that compliance was 

required. The officer did not impede F.P.’s way, activate his police lights, or 

brandish a weapon. Moreover, as in Newsome, F.P. kept walking. However,

after Officer Walton again asked F.P. to stop, F.P. began to run, and Officer 

Walton pursued him; it was at that moment that Officer Walton “seized” F.P. 

M.D., 781 A.2d at 196. We therefore consider whether Officer Walton had 

reasonable suspicion to stop F.P. before he gave chase. 

“Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to articulate 

specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived 

from those observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his 
J-S33021-18

- 10 -

experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped 

was involved in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208, 

1215 (Pa.Super. 2012). “[W]hether the facts available to the officer at the 

moment of intrusion” amount to reasonable suspicion is an objective inquiry,

see id., and is based on the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth 

v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 77 (Pa.Super. 2014)

We have found no authority, and the Commonwealth has not suggested 

any, to support the trial court’s contention that where a police officer suspects 

an individual of involvement in two completely unrelated crimes, but the 

officer’s suspicion regarding both crimes is unreasonable, the unreasonable 

suspicion aggregates to create reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify 

detaining an individual. Nor can we countenance such a result in this case, 

where crimes related to gun possession are not indicative of curfew violation, 

and vice versa. See Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1130-

32 (Pa.Super. 2003) (examining each ground for stopping separately where 

officer stopped vehicle on three unrelated grounds—suspected driving without 

a license, illegal drug activity, and a parking violation). However, we are not 

bound by the trial court’s legal conclusion that the uncontradicted facts of the 

case do not support a finding that Officer Walton had reasonable suspicion 

that F.P. was involved in either gun possession or curfew violation, separately. 

Notwithstanding the trial court’s erroneous reasoning, we affirm 

because under the objective totality of the circumstances, the officer had 

reasonable suspicion that F.P. illegally possessed a firearm. Although certain 
J-S33021-18

- 11 -

factors considered by the police, taken alone, may not establish reasonable 

suspicion, a combination of the same factors may be sufficient. M.D., 781 

A.2d at 197. “[U]nprovoked flight in a high crime area is sufficient to create a 

reasonable suspicion to justify” an investigative detention. In re D.M., 781 

A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001). Similarly, flight coupled with an anonymous tip 

that an individual possesses a firearm is sufficient. Id. Finally, an anonymous 

tip that an individual possesses a firearm may be corroborated with evasive 

behavior and touching of the waistband. Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 

357, 359, 361 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc).

Here, at that time he began to chase F.P., Officer Walton’s suspicions 

were aroused not only due to the information he received on the radio—which 

announced that the tip was received from a “verified” source—but by his 

personal knowledge that F.P. was located in a high crime area and his 

independent observations that F.P. was tugging at his waistband and had 

taken flight upon approach by the police. See Foglia, 979 A.2d at 359, 361; 

D.M., 781 A.2d at 1164. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer 

Walton’s suspicions that F.P. possessed a gun were objectively reasonable, 

and he was justified in stopping F.P. to investigate.2

____________________________________________

2 F.P. argues that because the Commonwealth did not present any evidence 

regarding the origin of the tip or the basis of the tipster’s knowledge, the court 

should have treated the tip as anonymous, and therefore unreliable. See 

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (holding that “the bare report of an 

unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about 

the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about 
J-S33021-18

- 12 -

Because we conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop 

F.P. to investigate gun possession, we need not address whether Officer 

Walton was permitted to stop F.P. based on reasonable suspicion that F.P. was 

violating the curfew ordinance.

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold the juvenile court did not err 

in denying F.P.’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the adjudication of 

delinquent.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/18

____________________________________________

[the defendant]” was unreliable and insufficient to give rise to reasonable 

suspicion). Given the combination of factual circumstances present, we need 

not determine whether Officer Walton’s receipt of the radio call alone, gave 

rise to reasonable suspicion.