United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-40570

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Maria E. Garcia, 

Defendant—Appellant, 

consolidated with

_____________

No. 23-40145

_____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Liang Guo Yu, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 23, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC Nos. 7:18-CR-960-27, 

7:18-CR-960-23

______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Oldham and Ramirez, Circuit 

Judges.

Irma Carrillo Ramirez, Circuit Judge:

Defendants-appellants Maria E. Garcia and Liang Guo Yu appeal their 

convictions for money-laundering. Both contend that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed the 

offenses with which they were charged. Garcia also asserts that the district 

court erred in assessing an enhancement at sentencing, and Yu maintains that 

the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions for a new trial 

and to suppress. We AFFIRM.

I

These consolidated appeals arise out of the Drug Enforcement 

Agency’s (DEA’s) investigation of the Villalobos drug trafficking 

organization (DTO) in Houston, Texas. The primary targets were the heads 

of the DTO, brothers Juan and Santiago Villalobos. The DTO moved 

hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and had yearly profits in the millions. As 

relevant here, the investigation led to the seizure of large sums of cash during 

two searches: one involving Yu, and one involving Garcia.

A

In 2016, DEA agents began surveilling Tomas Villarreal, the head of 

one of the DTO’s money cells. Villarreal led agents to a potential stash house 

located on O’Mally street in Houston. While conducting surveillance of the 

O’Mally house on May 18, agents observed Ruby Guzman leave the house. 

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They followed her to a nearby Burger King, where she met with Michael

Anthony Tovar and picked up a package from him before returning to the 

O’Mally house. 

The following day, agents saw Guzman leave the house with a 

suitcase, place it in the trunk of her car, and drive to a Hilton hotel in 

downtown Houston. There, she spoke with Jonathan Xie,1 and he retrieved 

the suitcase from the trunk of Guzman’s car and carried it into the hotel. 

DEA Task Force Officer Alfonso Ceballos (TFO Ceballos) and DEA Agent 

Amin Rosado followed Xie into the hotel; TFO Ceballos rode in the elevator 

with Xie to the eleventh floor, and then Agent Rosado followed. They 

watched Xie enter a guest room. Roughly thirty minutes later, Xie and 

defendant Yu left the room. Yu was carrying the suitcase that Xie had 

retrieved from Guzman, and Xie was rolling a second suitcase. 

Xie and Yu reached the hotel lobby, where Agent Rosado approached 

them, identified himself as law enforcement, and asked what was in Yu’s 

suitcase. Yu responded, “my deposits.” Agent Rosado detained Xie and Yu 

and called a canine officer; approximately ten to twenty minutes later, the 

canine officer arrived, and the canine alerted to both suitcases. Agent Rosado 

opened them and discovered that the suitcase that Yu was carrying contained 

“five bundles individually wrapped with vacuum sealed bags and then two 

separate money bundles with rubber bands strapped in—inside the suitcase” 

totaling $269,000. The search was conducted without a warrant. 

Based on the agents’ suspicion that the suitcase Yu was carrying was 

the one that Guzman had transported to the hotel from the O’Mally house, 

they obtained a warrant and searched the house. They found several bags of 

_____________________

1 Xie was also charged as a co-conspirator and ultimately convicted. He appealed

his convictions, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal in August 2023. 

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money, money counters, rubber bands, vacuum sealing bags, and vacuum 

sealing machines. In total, agents found $432,116 hidden in the house.

B

The DEA task force continued to investigate the DTO in the months 

following the May seizure. TFO Ronathan Persaud testified at trial that the 

task force was informed that a man named Christian Benavides was traveling 

to Houston to pick up some of the DTO’s money. Agents located Benavides 

driving a white Range Rover and followed him to a Mi Tienda grocery store 

in Pasadena, Texas. Garcia then arrived at the grocery store, and Benavides 

followed her to a house on Tonkawa Circle in Pasadena. Garcia parked her 

car on the street in front of the house while Benavides pulled his car into the 

garage and closed the garage door. 

Approximately twenty minutes later, Benavides left the Tonkawa 

house in his Range Rover and drove to a hotel. TFO Persaud approached 

Benavides, identified himself as law enforcement, and asked for consent to 

search the vehicle, which Benavides provided. TFO Persaud and other 

agents discovered cocaine and, in a hidden compartment, $196,715 cash in 

food saver bags.

The agents returned to the Tonkawa house, where Agent Rosado 

obtained Garcia’s consent to search the house. Garcia gave the agents a black 

duffle bag that she said Luis Reyes, a DTO member who was the husband of 

her cousin, had delivered to her earlier that day with money in it. Agent 

Rosado asked Garcia how she had gotten involved with the DTO. She

explained she had met Benavides in Mexico and he “recruited her to the 

organization.” She had received a call two days before the search with 

instructions to go to the Tonkawa house and wait for someone to pick up 

some money. Garcia informed Agent Rosado that this happened 

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approximately twice a month, and she was paid between $500 and $600 each 

time and permitted to stay at the Tonkawa house for free. 

C

A federal grand jury returned a twenty-count indictment charging 

twenty-eight individuals for their participation in the DTO. Yu and Garcia 

were charged with conspiring to launder monetary instruments in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1956(a)(2)(A), and 1956(a)(1)(B)(I)2 and aiding and 

abetting money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(A) and 2. 

Before trial, Yu moved to suppress the evidence agents obtained 

during the May search. The district court denied Yu’s motion before the 

Government responded and without a hearing. 

At trial, the Government presented testimony from ten witnesses and 

introduced dozens of exhibits. Four agents, two canine unit officers, 

Guzman, Villarreal, Tovar, and Juan Villalobos testified regarding the 

DTO’s activities and the details of the May and July searches. Based on his 

training and experience, TFO Persaud testified about the relationship 

between money laundering and drug smuggling activities. He specifically 

noted that the DTO was located in Mexico, so “money laundering is 

connected in it’s the way that money is returned for the purchase of 

narcotics[.]” TFO Persaud and Agent Rosado also testified about 

information they obtained using Title III intercepts (wire taps), including a 

text message exchange between DTO members on May 19 referring to Xie 

and Yu transporting money on behalf of the DTO. The exchange also alluded 

to the “Chinos”—which the Government posits was a reference to Xie and 

_____________________

2 Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(I) prohibits concealment money laundering. Yu and Garcia 

were indicted under this section, but ultimately the jury was not asked to consider it. 

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Yu—having been caught by law enforcement, and one DTO member asked 

if they were okay. 

Juan Villalobos testified about the DTO’s operations, his 

involvement, and how money deliveries were arranged. He explained that he 

worked for his brother, Santiago Villalobos, who was located in Mexico, and 

that Santiago coordinated the movement of money from Houston to Mexico. 

In order to verify Xie’s and Yu’s identities, Santiago would send the picture 

of a one- or five-dollar bill to Juan, and Xie and Yu would have to present the 

matching bill before they received the money to transport. Juan testified that 

he delivered over a million dollars to Xie and Yu in April or May of 2016, and 

Villarreal testified that he delivered more than a million dollars to Xie and Yu 

over three transactions. The Government also presented hotel records 

showing that Xie had reserved rooms at the Hilton hotel four times between 

December 2015 and January 2016. 

Yu presented no witnesses in his defense. Garcia testified on her own 

behalf, rebutting the testimony of Agent Rosado; she presented no other 

witnesses. The jury found Yu and Garcia guilty of both charges. Both moved 

for a new trial and Yu also moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground 

that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts. The district court 

denied all three motions.

Garcia was sentenced to two concurrent 78-month terms of 

imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. Yu was 

sentenced to two concurrent 151-month terms of imprisonment and two 

concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. After sentencing, Yu filed a 

second motion for a new trial, asserting due process and ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims. He averred that his first language was Cantonese, and his 

trial counsel did not do an adequate job of ensuring that Yu understood every 

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stage of his proceedings. Four days later—before the Government 

responded—the district court denied Yu’s motion as untimely.

Garcia and Yu timely appealed.

II

Garcia and Yu argue that the evidence presented to the jury was 

insufficient to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

We review properly preserved sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments 

de novo. See United States v. Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 2007)

(citing United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Under 

this standard, we determine whether a reasonable jury could find that the 

evidence establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. (citing United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Even 

when examined de novo, ‘review of the sufficiency of the evidence is highly 

deferential to the verdict.’” United States v. Davis, 735 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 

2013) (quoting United States v. Moreno-Gonzalez, 662 F.3d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 

2011)). Accordingly, we evaluate all evidence and draw all inferences in favor 

of the prosecution. United States v. Freeman, 56 F.4th 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 

2023) (citing United States v. Terrell, 700 F.3d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 2012)). But 

“a verdict may not rest on mere suspicion, speculation, or conjecture, or on 

an overly attenuated piling of inference on inference.” United States v. 

Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. 

Fitzharris, 633 F.2d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[A] conviction cannot rest on 

an unwarranted inference, the determination of which is a matter of law.”).

Yu and Garcia properly preserved their challenges to the sufficiency 

of the evidence below. They were both convicted of conspiracy to launder 

monetary instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1956(a)(2)(A) 

and aiding and abetting money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1956(a)(2)(A) and 2. Their convictions were based on the same substantive 

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money laundering offense—often termed “promotion money laundering,”

see, e.g., United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation 

omitted)—which prohibits the transportation of money to or from another 

country “with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 

activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). Here, the indicted “specified unlawful 

activity” was “the distribution of a controlled substance.”

To convict a defendant of promotion money laundering, the 

Government must prove the defendant (1) transported or attempted to 

transport money between the United States and another country (2) “with 

the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.” 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A); see also Trejo, 610 F.3d at 313–14. To establish 

conspiracy to commit money laundering, the Government must prove the 

defendant “(1) conspired (2) to transport funds between the United States 

and another country; (3) with the intent to promote the carrying on of a 

specified unlawful activity.” Trejo, 610 F.3d at 313–14.

A

Garcia argues the Government failed to present sufficient evidence as 

to every element of both convictions.

1

Garcia first contends that the Government did not present sufficient 

evidence that she engaged in a conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. 

She maintains that the indicted conspiracy pertained only to the events 

surrounding the May search, and that she therefore was not involved in the 

conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. 

Count Two of the indictment is not limited—expressly or impliedly—

to the May search. It lists a number of co-conspirators—including, but not 

limited to, Garcia, Yu, Xie, Tovar, and Guzman—and sets out the conduct 

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they engaged in that violated § 1956, without any reference to exact dates or 

locations. Moreover, nothing in the jury instructions pertaining to this count 

narrowed its reach to only the May search. Garcia’s first argument is 

unavailing.

2

Garcia next maintains there is no evidence to support the jury’s 

conclusion she entered into an agreement to transport money between the 

United States and another country. 

“We have specifically stated in the context of a sufficiency challenge 

to a money-laundering conspiracy that direct evidence ‘is unnecessary; each 

element may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. 

Cessa, 785 F.3d 165, 174 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Fuchs, 467 

F.3d 889, 906 (5th Cir. 2006)). In particular, “the agreement element ‘may 

be inferred from a concert of action.’” Id. (quoting Fuchs, 467 F.3d at 906). 

Agent Rosado testified at trial that Garcia informed him that she was 

recruited into the DTO by Benavides in Mexico. Approximately twice a 

month, she said, she would receive a phone call from someone named El 

Viejo with instructions to go to the Tonkawa house and wait for money to be 

delivered. She did so in July 2016, and she received a bag full of money from 

her cousin’s husband, Luis Reyes. Additionally, Agent Rosado and TFO 

Persaud testified they witnessed Garcia meet with Benavides and lead him

back to the Tonkawa house. There, Benavides pulled into the garage and 

closed the garage door; when he left twenty minutes later, agents followed 

him to a hotel, searched his vehicle, and discovered $196,715 in a hidden 

panel in his car. This testimony is sufficient circumstantial evidence of an 

agreement between Garcia, El Viejo, and Benavides to transport the money 

that was found in Benavides’s car. A reasonable jury could infer from this 

evidence that the purpose of that agreement was to transport money from the 

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United States to another country—Mexico—based on the fact that Garcia 

was recruited by Benavides in Mexico. 

The Government presented sufficient evidence that Garcia entered 

into an agreement to transport money between the United States and 

Mexico. 

3

Garcia contends that the Government did not present sufficient 

evidence of her intent to promote the distribution of a controlled substance. 

Section 1956(a)(2)(A)’s intent requirement is “stringent.” Trejo, 610 

F.3d at 315. In Trejo, we held a guilty plea that “unmistakabl[y] demonstrated 

that [the defendant] entered into a paid arrangement with a drug dealer . . . to 

load [the defendant’s] car with drug money and transport it from Florida to 

a presumed trafficker in Mexico” was insufficient to support a finding the 

defendant intended to promote the drug trafficking activity. Id. at 318. We 

explained:

“knowing promotion” is not enough for a conviction under the 

federal money laundering statute. . . . Instead the facts must 

demonstrate that, in transporting the funds, [the defendant] 

not only promoted the underlying drug trafficking business but 

that his intended purpose in so doing—an end-goal, if you 

will—was to further the progress of the drug business. . . . In 

other words, there must be “more” than simply the bare act of 

knowingly transporting the drug money. Otherwise, every 

mere transportation of drug money in this manner would also 

qualify as a money laundering offense.

Id. at 317 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brown, 

186 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1999)). 

We also indicated, however, that evidence the defendant 

“knew something about the inner workings of the drug organization” 

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or of “the defendant’s direct involvement in the illegal enterprise” 

may support a finding of the requisite intent. Id. at 316. In many of our 

cases addressing § 1956(a)(2)(A)’s intent element and those of 

analogous statutes, the defendants have been exposed to or told about 

drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 602–03 (5th Cir. 

2013); United States v. Calderon, 665 F. App’x 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2016) 

(per curiam) (unpublished). But several of our sister circuits have held 

a defendant’s extensive participation in an organization is sufficient 

circumstantial evidence that he knew of the organization’s illicit 

activities. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 618 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 

2010); United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir. 2008).

Juan Villalobos’s testimony established that the DTO was 

engaged in drug trafficking. Garcia was recruited to join the DTO by 

Benavides in Mexico and subsequently made several trips to the 

Tonkawa house. She knew that large sums of money were delivered to 

the house, and she interacted with at least three different people as 

part of the events leading up to the July search. Circumstantial 

evidence suggests Garcia knew that the money was then concealed 

inside Benavides’s vehicle. Although the Government did not present 

direct evidence tying Garcia, Benavides, El Viejo, or Reyes to the 

DTO specifically, it did provide circumstantial evidence linking the 

July search to the DTO’s activities. For example, agents testified to 

the DTO’s practice of transporting money in vacuum-sealed bags 

placed in hidden compartments inside cars. This evidence, though 

limited, is sufficient to prove that Garcia intended to promote the 

DTO’s unlawful ends. 

Garcia’s sufficiency challenge to the specific intent element of 

her conviction under § 1956(a)(2)(A) fails.

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4

Finally, Garcia argues that the evidence of her aiding and abetting 

money laundering was insufficient.

“To prove that a defendant aided and abetted money laundering, the 

government must show that the defendant ‘associated himself with the 

unlawful financial manipulations, that he participated in them as something 

he wished to bring about, and that he sought, by his actions, to make the effort 

succeed.’” United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1383 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

United States v. Termini, 992 F.2d 879, 881 (8th Cir. 1993)). “A defendant 

associates himself with the unlawful financial manipulations if he shares in 

the criminal intent of the principal. . . . And he participates in those 

manipulations if he engages in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the 

conduct.” United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 276 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(internal citation omitted) (citing United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 753 

(5th Cir. 1998)). 

The evidence discussed above in the context of Garcia’s challenge to 

the specific intent element of her conspiracy conviction is also probative of 

her association with the unlawful financial manipulations involved here. 

Because we conclude that the Government proved, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that Garcia intended to promote the distribution of a controlled 

substance, it presented sufficient evidence to prove the first element of the 

aiding and abetting charge. 

A defendant participates in the unlawful conduct if she affirmatively 

acts to aid it. Delgado, 256 F.3d at 276. Agent Rosado’s testimony regarding 

Garcia’s involvement with the DTO and Agent Rosado’s and TFO 

Persaud’s testimony about her interaction with Benavides support this 

element of the aiding and abetting charge. From this evidence, a reasonable

jury could find that Garcia affirmatively acted to aid the unlawful financial 

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manipulations. This evidence is also sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Garcia “sought, by [her] actions, to make the effort succeed.” 

Willey, 57 F.3d at 1383. 

Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict Garcia of aiding and 

abetting money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(A) and 2.

B

Yu argues that there was insufficient evidence as to the specific 

intent element of both offenses.

As discussed, Trejo established that the requisite intent to support a 

conviction under § 1956(a)(2)(A) is difficult to prove. 610 F.3d at 315. But 

again, extensive involvement in the organization can suggest an intent to 

promote its unlawful goals. See Huezo, 546 F.3d at 182 (“Based on the 

complexity and scale of the money laundering scheme, common sense and 

experience would support an inference that the principals in the conspiracy 

would not have trusted an outsider (with no knowledge of their criminal 

purpose) to transport $1 million in laundered funds[.]”). And in the closely 

related transaction money laundering context, we have noted that “the 

Government must present either direct proof of an intent to promote such 

illegal activity or proof that a given type of transaction, on its face, indicates 

an intent to promote such illegal activity.” United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 

472, 477 (5th Cir. 2004). 

Yu’s statement that the suitcase contained his “deposits” indicates 

that he was aware of the contents of the suitcase. Testimony from Villarreal 

and Juan Villalobos revealed Yu regularly interacted with several members of 

the DTO, and he transported large sums of money for the organization on at 

least three separate occasions. Given the scale of the DTO’s operations, that 

it trusted Yu with millions of dollars multiple times, and Yu’s interactions 

with several different members of the DTO, a reasonable jury could infer that 

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Yu was aware of the DTO’s drug trafficking activity and intended to promote 

it. The evidence was sufficient to establish, at the least, that Yu engaged in 

“a given type of transaction [that], on its face, indicates an intent to 

promote” drug trafficking. Miles, 360 F.3d at 477.

Yu relies on three circuit court decisions in arguing that the evidence 

was insufficient to establish intent, but all three are distinguishable. In Trejo, 

the defendant “signed on for a one-time trip to transport drug money for a 

dealer he did not know and, except for the one trip, had never worked for in 

the past.” 610 F.3d at 318 (emphasis added). Additionally, “[e]vidence 

regarding the inner workings of the organization that hired him—assuming

that an operation existed beyond [one drug dealer]—[was] virtually 

nonexistent in the record.” Id. Finally, “the record lack[ed] facts regarding 

the individuals to whom [the defendant] was delivering the money and the 

nature of their ongoing activities, if any, beyond the one delivery.” Id. Here, 

the Government presented evidence as to each of these facts. Witnesses 

testified that Yu engaged in multiple transactions with the DTO, that the 

DTO was extensively involved in the drug trafficking business, and that Yu 

interacted with several individuals within the organization. These facts 

differentiate Yu’s circumstances from those of the defendant in Trejo.

Yu’s actions are also meaningfully different from the defendant’s 

actions in Cessa. There, we vacated the conviction of a horse trainer for a 

concealment money-laundering conspiracy because there was insufficient 

evidence to show he knew his horse training services were designed to 

conceal drug money. 785 F.3d at 179. Unlike horse training—which, without 

more, does not raise suspicions that it is furthering the goals of a drug 

trafficking organization—Yu’s actions involved transporting large sums of 

vacuum-sealed money with no apparent legitimate source. Cessa is therefore 

inapposite. 

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Finally, in United States v. Adams, the Seventh Circuit vacated a 

conviction for a promotional money-laundering conspiracy based on 

insufficient evidence the defendant’s co-conspirator had the intent to 

promote the carrying on of an unlawful activity. 625 F.3d 371, 382 (7th Cir.

2010). The defendant instructed his purported co-conspirator to purchase 

postal money orders in structured amounts and at different locations. Id. at 

381. Unlike Yu, the co-conspirator in Adams was operating under instructions 

from one individual who used the money at issue for a “variety of purposes, 

some related to his drug trafficking . . . and some not . . . for example, the 

purchase of a restored Fleetwood Cadillac automobile and the rent on his 

apartment.” Id. at 375. The evidence here indicates Yu knew he was moving 

money for an organization, presumably with a unifying purpose, rather than 

just one individual with mixed motives. 

For these reasons, Yu’s sufficiency challenge fails as to both his 

conspiracy to commit money laundering conviction and his aiding and 

abetting money laundering conviction. 

III

Garcia maintains that the district court erred in assessing a six-level 

sentencing enhancement.

We review a trial court’s application and interpretation of the 

sentencing guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United 

States v. Chavez-Hernandez, 671 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United 

States v. Gharbi, 510 F.3d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 2007)). “A sentence within the 

properly calculated Guidelines range is presumed reasonable on appeal.” 

United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 319 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1), if the defendant “knew or believed that 

any of the laundered funds were the proceeds of, or were intended to promote 

[] an offense involving the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a 

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controlled substance[,]” the base offense level for that defendant should be 

increased by 6 levels. For this enhancement to apply, the district court must 

“find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the defendant] knew the 

laundered funds were the proceeds of drug sales[.]” United States v. 

Pendleton, 761 F. App’x 339, 355 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing U.S.S.G. 

§ 2S1.1(b)(1)). 

Here, Garcia argues that there is no evidence that she knew any of the 

laundered funds were proceeds of or were intended to promote a drug 

trafficking offense. This issue overlaps considerably with our analysis above 

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Garcia’s underlying 

conviction. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict 

Garcia of money laundering, including evidence that she intended to promote 

the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, we also hold that the 

district court properly imposed a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 

2S1.1(b)(1). See Fernandez, 559 F.3d at 320 (“The jury had to find that [the 

defendant] was aware the proceeds stemmed from controlled-substance 

violations in order to convict him of the money laundering counts. It was not 

error for the district court to make the same finding.”). Additionally, the 

district court expressly imposed a sentence on the lower end of Garcia’s

Guidelines range; the sentence is therefore presumed reasonable on appeal,

and we find no basis in the record to disturb it. 

IV

Yu contends that the district court improperly denied his motion to 

suppress without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

A

We review a district court’s declination to conduct a suppression 

hearing for abuse of discretion, subject to a harmless error analysis. United 

States v. Smith, 977 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. 

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Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1983)). “A district court abuses its 

discretion ‘if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 

840, 860 (5th Cir. 1998)). A hearing on a motion to suppress is “not granted 

as a matter of course” and is required “only when necessary to receive 

evidence of an issue of fact.” Harrelson, 705 F.3d at 737. To be entitled to a 

hearing, the movant must “allege[] sufficient facts which, if proven, would 

justify relief.” Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 546 F.2d 1275, 1279–80 (5th 

Cir. 1977)). 

Here, Yu presented only a vague three-sentence affidavit in support 

of his motion to suppress. It stated, in its entirety: 

On May 19, 2016, the Defendant was detained at the lobby of a 

hotel in Harris County, Texas. 

Agents detained the Defendant and proceeded to search a large 

black suitcase in his possession. The agents discovered a large 

amount of cash in the suitcase.

The Defendant claims he did no [sic] consent to his detention 

nor to the search of the suitcase.

This evidence does not suggest that relief was warranted. For example, it 

does not establish what was happening directly before the search, and it does 

not even establish that a warrantless search took place. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion to suppress. See United States 

v. Regan, 832 F. App’x 898, 899 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (affirming 

district court’s decision not to conduct a hearing where movant provided 

only “bare assertions, with no supporting details or facts”). 

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B

Yu further maintains that the court improperly denied his motion to 

suppress because it reversed the applicable burden of proof.

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review 

questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. 

McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Bolden, 

508 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). The evidence is, again, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Government, as the prevailing party below. United 

States v. Jefferson, 89 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023). In reviewing the district 

court’s decision, we may “consider all of the evidence presented at trial, not 

just that presented before the ruling on the suppression motion[.]” United 

States v. Ibarra, 493 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007). The decision is also subject 

to a harmless error analysis. See United States v. Willingham, 310 F.3d 367, 

372 (5th Cir. 2002). “In the context of suppression of evidence, the test for 

harmless error is whether the trier of fact would have found the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the evidence had been suppressed.” 

United States v. Aucoin, 964 F.2d 1492, 1499 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal 

quotations omitted and alterations adopted). 

“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of proving, 

by a preponderance of evidence, that the evidence in question was obtained 

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Smith, 978 

F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1992). To do so, the movant must show two things: 

First, he must show that a government activity intruded upon 

a reasonable expectation of privacy in such a significant way 

that the activity can be called a “search.” Second, if a search 

has in fact occurred, [the movant] must show that the 

government intrusion was unreasonable given the particular 

facts of the case.

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Id. (citing United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1990)). This 

may require the movant to present evidence of the circumstances 

surrounding the search, for instance to establish that he had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the object of the search. See id. at 180–81 (noting 

that the movant has the burden of showing that the search violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights and that he failed to allege sufficient particularized facts

to prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone 

conversation). 

Yu correctly argues that we have previously employed a burdenshifting framework when analyzing motions to suppress. But he overlooks the 

critical first step in that framework: Yu, as the proponent of the motion to 

suppress, must first “produce[] evidence that he was arrested or subject to 

search without a warrant” and only then will “the burden shift[] to the 

government to justify the warrantless search.” United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 

894, 897 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 

533 (5th Cir. 1977)). 

Here, Yu’s affidavit did not even establish that the search occurred 

without a warrant. Although the motion to suppress alleged a warrantless 

search, “counsel’s statements in [a] motion and subsequent briefs are not 

evidence.” See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984). It was first 

Yu’s burden to “produce[] evidence” that the search violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights. Roch, 5 F.3d at 897 (emphasis added). His skeletal 

affidavit did not suffice, so the district court correctly denied his motion to 

suppress.

Even if the district court improperly denied the motion, any error in 

doing so was harmless. When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, 

we are free to consider all evidence presented at trial to determine “whether 

the trier of fact would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

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doubt if the evidence had been suppressed.” Aucoin, 946 F.2d at 1499. As we 

have noted already, testimony from several witnesses at trial established Yu’s 

connection to the DTO. He moved millions of dollars for the organization on 

at least three occasions, and agents testified to the events leading up to the 

May search, corroborating the contents of the suitcase and Yu’s involvement 

in transporting it. The evidence was sufficient to convict Yu even if the 

motion to suppress had been granted. 

V

Finally, Yu argues that the district court erred in denying his motion 

for a new trial as untimely. He specifically objects to the district court’s sua 

sponte dismissal of his motion based on timeliness before the Government 

responded. 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(citing United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 554 (5th Cir. 2001)). Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 requires a defendant to file a motion for new 

trial that is based upon grounds other than newly discovered evidence within 

fourteen days after a verdict is rendered. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2). The 

Supreme Court has characterized Rule 33 as a non-jurisdictional claimprocessing rule; as a result, the defense of untimeliness can be forfeited if the 

Government fails to raise it in response to a motion for new trial. Eberhart v. 

United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005). In an unpublished opinion, we have 

held that “[a] district court does not err, after Eberhart, if it enforces an 

inflexible claim processing rule, and we may not reverse its decision to do 

so.” United States v. Bouldin, 466 F. App’x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(unpublished) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

United States v. Leijano-Cruz, 473 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also 

Leijano-Cruz, 473 F.3d at 574 (noting that Eberhart established only the 

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principle that “a district court’s decision to permit an untimely document to 

be considered could not be reversed in the absence of an objection by the 

government in the district court[,]” and not the principle “that a 

defendant . . . has a right to have [his] untimeliness disregarded”). 

Here, Yu was convicted on April 14, 2022. He filed his second motion 

for a new trial on February 27, 2023. In it, he asserted only due process and

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Because his motion for new trial was 

not based on newly discovered evidence, it had to be filed within fourteen

days of the date of the verdict. Because it was not, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely, even absent a 

response from the Government. 

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are 

AFFIRMED. 

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