No. 13924 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1978 

DAVID B. CfiACiFORD and 

JOHN ISAACSON, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

-vsPHILIP E. ROY, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellants: 

Dola N. Wilson argued, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Philip E. Roy argued, Browning, Montana 

Submitted: January 27, 1978 

Decided: APR 1 2 wB 

Filed: Bp& j 1878 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Glacier County 

~istrict Court dismissing their complaint without prejudice against 

defendant on an action in debt. 

Defendant Roy is an attorney in Browning, Montana, which 

is located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian 

Reservation. Roy is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Indian 

Tribe. Plaintiffs Crawford and Isaacson are investigators who 

had offices in Great Falls at the time this action commenced. They 

performed investigations and legal research for Roy, which involved 

work both on and off the Blackfeet reservation. Their work involved 

another Montana Indian tribe, the Belknap, and Federal Court cases 

involving both Indian and non-Indian parties in this state. 

The parties negotiated an initial agreement for services 

in a series of meetings which took place in Roy's law office and 

in Great Falls, The investigators reported to Roy in Browning. 

Prior to the contract in dispute here, Roy had given the investigators a note for $18,000.00 in payment for their services. The 

investigators surrendered this note to Roy at the time the contract 

in dispute was signed. 

The parties signed the contract in Roy's law office in 

Browning on December 26, 1975. It provided in relevant part that 

Roy owed the investigators $24,000.00; that he was paying them 

$10,800.00; that the $18,000.00 note was returned to him by the 

investigators; and that Roy would pay the balance due of $13,200.00 

in installments sent to the investigators at a post office box in 

Great Falls. 

The investigators filed an action in ~istrict Court on 

November 16, 1976, to collect the debt of $13,200.00 plus interest 

and costs. Roy moved to dismiss the complaint on December 9, 1976, 

on the grounds that the state ~istrict Court lacked jurisdiction 
over the subject matter. The contention was that only the Blackfeet Tribe had jurisdiction. The court received affidavits and 

documentary evidence and on June 17, 1977 entered its findings 

and conclusions and dismissed the complaint. 

In concluding that Williams v. Lee, (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 

79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L ed 2d 251, precluded the District Court from 

asserting jurisdiction, the District Court made the following 

findings: That the parties entered into and signed the agreement 

in Roy's law offices on the reservation; that some of the services 

to be performed were on the reservation and others off the reservation; that Roy was to make payment to the plaintiffs' assignee 

through the United States mail and delivery was completed upon 

posting within the reservation; and that no testimony was introduced 

to vary the terms of the written agreement. 

It is agreed that the federal government did not expressly 

grant jurisdiction to the state, nor has the state expressly assumed 

jurisdiction over the subject matter under federal law. Even so, 

this does not preclude state jurisdiction. The United States 

Supreme Court stated in Williams v. Lee, supra: 

" * * * Essentially, absent governing Acts of 

Congress, the cpestion has always been whether 

the state action infringed on the right of 

reservation Indians to make their own laws and 

be ruled by them. * * * " 3 L ed 2d at 254. 

This Court, quoting from Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 

(1960), 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L ed 2d 573, stated in Iron 

Bear v. Dist. Court, (1973), 162 Mont. 335, 344, 512 P.2d 1292: 

" * * * 'even on reservations state laws may 

be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or would 

impair a right grabed or reserved by federal 

law.' * * *I' 

Absent federal law, this state has asserted jurisdiction over 

a transaction involving an Indian party when that transaction involved significant contacts with the state outside reservation 
boundaries. When the transaction in dispute, or any part of it, 

has occurred outside the reservation but within the geographic 

boundaries of the state, this Court in several cases has held an 

Indian party has voluntarily subjected himself to state jurisdiction over that transaction. Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, (1976), 

Mont . , 555 P.2d 211, 33 St.Rep. 959, cert.den. U.S. 

, 97 S.Ct. 1171, 51 L ed 2d 580 (where Indian parties had obtained a loan from non-Indians off the reservation); State ex rel. 

Old Elk v. District Court, (1970), Mon t . , 552 P.2d 1394, 

33 St-Rep. 637 (where the reservation Indian was a suspect in an 

off-reservation shooting); and Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, (1974), 163 

Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert-den. 419 U.S. 847, 95 S.Ct. 83, 42 

L ed 2d 76 (where the Indian couple had been married off the reservation). See also United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, (9th Cir. 

1974), 503 F.2d 790, where the Federal District Court for Montana 

upheld continuing state jurisdiction over a child custody conflict 

when the Indian couple had obtained a divorce in State District 

Court; and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, (1973), 411 U.S. 145, 

93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L ed 2d 114, where the Indian-operated ski area 

located off the reservation was held subject to state income tax. 

Here, we have a situation where two non-Indians outside 

reservation boundaries were hired by Roy to perform services both 

on and off the reservation; negotiations leading up to the contract 

were made through phone calls and correspondence outside the 

reservation; and payment on the contract was to be made to a post 

office box outside the reservation. These activities are sufficient 

to give a state court jurisdiction and cannot be held to infringe 

on the rights of the reservation Indians to make their own laws 

and to be ruled by their own laws. The reservation provides no 

sanctuary to Roy in this situation. 

We note also that Roy employed these people to aid him in 
his law practice. To maintain his law practice, Roy not only had 

to be initially licensed by the State of Montana and be qualified 

by the State of Montana, but he also must pay his annual license 

fee to the State. (Section 93-2010 and 93-2012, R.C.M. 1947). 

Moreover, as an attorney, Roy is subject to the rules of this Court 

under Art. VII, Section 2, 1972 Montana Constitutution. Roy was 

not acting as an individual at the time, but was acting in his 

capacity as an attorney. He employed these people to work on legal 

matters off the reservation as well as on the reservation. 

It is clear, therefore, that one licensed to practice law 

in this state cannot make a contract as an attorney to be performed 

both on and off the reservation and then use his status as an Indian 

to defeat state jurisdiction when he is sued on the contract involved. 

It is equally clear that there were sufficient contacts in this case 

to allow state jurisdiction even if Roy had not made the contracts 

in his capacity as a lawyer. The hiring of the investigators, the 

negotiations on the contract and payment for services all occurred 

off the reservation. It is immaterial that the actual signing of 

the contract occurred on the reservation in Roy's law office. 

Accordingly, we hold that Roy's status as an attorney 

licensed by this state and the nature of the transaction involved, 

are both reasons to allow proceedings in State District Court 

rather than on the Indian reservation. 

The order of the District Court is reversed, and the case 

remanded for further proceedings. 

n 

We Concur: 

~LAIJL~~~~ Chief Ju tice