United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-2047

___________________________

Diane E. Perkins

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General US Postal Service

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

James Jonathan Allen, in his capacity as employee & Manager; Mary A. Cheeney,

in her capacity as employee & Manager; Karen Marks, in her capacity as employee

&UnionRep;EqualEmployment OpportunityCommission, an InvestigativeAuthority

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________

 Submitted: January 3, 2018

Filed: January 10, 2018

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.
Diane Perkins appeals following the district court’s adverse grant ofsummary 1

judgment in her pro se employment-discrimination action against her employer, the

United States Postal Service (USPS). Perkins alleged that USPS discriminatorily

targeted her for harsher discipline than younger, white, male employees by issuing

a termination notice (later reduced to a suspension) for repeated time-and-attendance

violations. She argues that the district court erred by denying her motions for default

judgment, by granting summary judgment, and by denying her post-judgment motion. 

We affirm.

First, we find no abuse of discretion in the denials of default judgment, as

USPS timely answered once properly served. See Weitz Co., LLC v. MacKenzie

House, LLC, 665 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 4(i)(1)(A)-(B), 4(i)(2), 12(a)(2). Second, we conclude thatsummary judgment was

proper on the merits. See Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 852 (8th 2

Cir. 2012) (standard of review). We agree with the district court that, even assuming

Perkins stated a prima facie case of age, race, and sex discrimination, the evidence

revealed no genuine issue of material fact as to whether USPS’s proffered reason for

issuing the termination notice was a pretext for such discrimination. See Henry v.

Hobbs, 824 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 2016) (at pretext stage, test for determining

whether employees are similarly situated to plaintiff is rigorous); Forrest v. Kraft

Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2002) (evidence of disparate treatment

can support assertion of pretext, but comparable employee must have been similarly

situated to plaintiff in all relevant respects; comparator was not similarly situated

The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the

1

Western District of Missouri.

We note that Perkins contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) 2

counselor within 45 days of the date her termination was scheduled to become

effective. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (stating that “in the case of personnel

action,” employee must seek EEO counseling “within 45 days of the effective date

of the action” as prerequisite to filing complaint).

-2-
where plaintiff did not show “comparable disciplinary history”). Finally, the district

court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying the post-judgment motion. See

United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006)

(standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-3-