J-S42018-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYRONE A. PECK, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1808 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0003391-2005

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 17, 2018

Tyrone Peck, Jr. appeals from the order entered on November 8, 2017, 

denying his request for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On November 14, 2005, Peck pled guilty to third-degree murder and 

firearms not to be carried without a license.1 He did not file a post-sentence 

motion or a Notice of Appeal to this Court. 

Peck filed several PCRA petitions that were all denied. On November 1, 

2017, Peck filed the PCRA petition giving rise to this appeal. On November 8, 

2017, the trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. This timely appeal 

followed. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 6106, respectively. 
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On appeal, Peck raises two issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused it[s] discretion by not stating on the 

record the reasons for the sentence imposed[?]

II. Whether the trial court abused it[s] discretion by imposing an 

excessive sentence out[side] the guideline range[?]

Peck’s Br. at 4. 

“Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 

(Pa.Super. 2014). Before we address the merits of Peck’s claims, we must first 

address the timeliness of his petition. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 

A.3d 516, 519 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

A defendant must present all claims cognizable under the PCRA within 

one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless a 

statutory exception to the one-year time bar applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). 

“[A] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). A PCRA petitioner filing after the one-year 

deadline must plead and prove at least one of the three limited time-bar 

exceptions:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 
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or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws 

of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court 

to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner must raise the exception within 

sixty days of the date on which he or she could have first raised it. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(2). Unless the petitioner establishes that a PCRA petition was timely 

or qualified for at least one time-bar exception, the PCRA court lacks 

jurisdiction to entertain it. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 

(Pa. 1999) (holding PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address merits of 

untimely PCRA petition where defendant did not satisfy any time-bar 

exception).

Peck’s sentence became final on December 14, 2005, when his thirty

days to appeal to this Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). He thus had until 

December 14, 2006, to file a timely PCRA petition. Peck filed the instant PCRA 

petition on November 1, 2017, almost 11 years after the one-year deadline. 

It was therefore untimely, and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction unless Peck 

pleaded and proved that at least one of the exceptions applied. 
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Peck did not allege below nor does he allege on appeal that one of the 

time–bar exceptions applies here. As such, we find no error by the trial court 

in denying his petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/17/18