J-S51004-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KYLE DOLAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 36 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001722-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2019

Kyle Dolan appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on 

December 13, 2018, in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas. Prior to 

sentencing, the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, convicted Dolan of one count 

of driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a Schedule II or Schedule III 

controlled substance – second offense, see 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii), one 

count of DUI impairing his ability to safely drive or operate his vehicle, see 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, 

see 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). The court sentenced Dolan to five years of 

intermediate punishment consecutively followed by twelve months of 

probation. On appeal, Dolan claims the trial court erred in failing to grant his 

motion to suppress his blood test results based on lack of consent. See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 4. After review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

As recounted by the trial court:
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On May 12, 2017[,] at approximately 4:04 p.m., Officer Kurt Stere 

was dispatched to a two-vehicle accident at the 1400 block of East 

College Avenue in State College[,] Pennsylvania. Officer Stere 

arrived at the accident scene at 4:11 p.m.[,] and EMS arrived at 

approximately the same time. When Officer Stere arrived, both 

vehicles were still in the roadway[,] and EMS determined that Kyle 

Dolan ... was in need of medical attention.

Officer Stere observed that one vehicle had rear end damage[,] 

and [Dolan’s] vehicle had damage to the front end. While EMS 

evaluated [Dolan], Officer Stere spoke to the driver of the other 

vehicle to obtain his version of events, obtain his information, and 

provide him with a crash notification form. Officer Stere also spoke 

with a witness to the accident.

[Dolan] vomited while being evaluated by EMS. At some point 

during the EMS evaluation, [Dolan] refused medical treatment. 

After [Dolan] declined medical treatment, Officer Stere 

approached [Dolan] to obtain his version of events. While Officer 

Stere was speaking with [Dolan], he observed [Dolan] to be 

confused, dazed, and on the nod. [Dolan]’s eyelids were droopy, 

[Dolan] had difficulty keeping his eyes open, and [Dolan] was 

unable to explain his version of events.

After making these observations, Officer Stere was concerned that 

[Dolan] was under the influence of some type of controlled 

substance. Officer Stere did not believe [Dolan] was under the 

influence of alcohol, as there was no smell of alcohol on his breath. 

Several times during Officer Stere’s conversations with [Dolan], 

[Dolan] asked if he could leave the scene. Officer Stere indicated 

that [Dolan] could not leave.

...

Officer Stere had only been on patrol for two weeks at the time of 

this incident and was not trained to conduct field sobriety tests. 

Because of this, Officer Stere contacted Officer Diedre Houck to 

assist his investigation of the accident as soon as he was notified 

that Officer Houck was available to respond to calls[.] Officer 

Houck was also not trained to conduct field sobriety tests, but as 

she travelled to the scene of the accident, she requested Patton 

Township Officer Brian Shaffer respond to the scene. Officer 

Shaffer documented in his [drug recognition expert] report that 

Officer Houck contacted him at 4:53 p.m.
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Officer Houck arrived at the scene within minutes[.] While Officers 

Houck and Stere waited for Officer Shaffer to arrive, they spoke 

to [Dolan]. [Dolan] claimed to be travelling from [the Central 

Pennsylvania Institute of Science and Technology] in Bellefonte to 

Texas Roadhouse in State College. Officers Houck and Stere noted 

that this information did not seem truthful, as it did not match the 

direction of travel of [Dolan]’s vehicle. At some point in this 

conversation, [Dolan] admitted to having taken Suboxone[,] 

which was prescribed to him by a doctor.

...

When Officer Shaffer arrived between five and ten minutes after 

Officer Houck, he spoke to [Dolan] and noted that [Dolan]’s story 

of events did not seem to make sense. Officer Shaffer observed 

[Dolan] to have a low, raspy voice, constricted pupils and droopy 

eyelids. Officer Shaffer [having much experience administering 

field sobriety tests] conducted three standard field sobriety tests 

on [Dolan].

...

Upon completion of the tests, Officer Shaffer determined that 

[Dolan] was impaired and informed Officer Stere that there was 

probable cause to arrest [Dolan] for driving under the influence. 

Officer Shaffer offered [Dolan] the opportunity to complete a[n] 

... evaluation at the station[,] and [Dolan] agreed.

[Dolan] was then placed under arrest for [DUI,] and Officer 

Shaffer conducted a search of [Dolan]’s person. Officer Shaffer 

found a glassine baggie with white residue in [Dolan]’s pocket. 

The packaging was consistent with the packaging for street-level 

heroin. After placing [Dolan] in the patrol car, Officers Stere and 

Shaffer then searched [Dolan]’s vehicle where they found a glass 

pipe with marijuana residue inside of a shoe in the back seat, two 

small Ziploc baggies in the center console, and blue glassine 

baggie under the driver’s seat.

Officer Stere transported [Dolan] to the Patton Township Police 

Department for the ... evaluation. The station was between three 

and five mile from the scene of the accident. Before beginning the 

exam, Officer Shaffer removed the handcuffs from [Dolan]’s wrists 

and read [Dolan] his Miranda warnings.
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[The] exam took between 40 and 45 minutes[.] ... During the 

exam, Officer Shaffer observed several signs of intoxication which

... allowed him to identify a category of substance causing 

[Dolan]’s intoxication. As a result of this exam [which uncovered 

at least eight signs of intoxication], Officer Shaffer opined that 

[Dolan] was under the influence of narcotic analgesics and 

cannabis.

...

Officer Stere then transported [Dolan] ... to Mount Nittany Medical 

Center. Once at the hospital, Officer Stere removed the handcuffs 

from [Dolan] and read him the DL-26B form. This version of the 

form did not indicate that [Dolan] would be subject to any increase 

in criminal penalties if he refused a blood test. Officer Stere did 

not raise his voice, draw his weapon, or use any other form of 

force to get [Dolan] to agree to a blood draw. When asked if he 

had any questions, [Dolan] responded that he did not. [Dolan] 

signed the form consenting to a blood draw. The blood draw was 

performed at 7:19 p.m.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 8/24/18, at 1-6 (formatting altered).

Several months later as a result of this incident, Dolan was charged with 

a total of three DUI and drug-related offenses. Thereafter, Dolan filed an 

omnibus pre-trial motion challenging, inter alia, the voluntariness of the 

warrantless blood draw performed on him. After a full briefing and hearing 

testimony, the trial court denied Dolan’s motion. Dolan’s case then proceeded 

to a non-jury trial, where he was found guilty of the three charged offenses. 

Dolan filed a timely notice of appeal. Moreover, Dolan and the trial court 

both complied with the dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In this appeal, Dolan raises 

one question for our review:

1) Did the lower court err in denying [Dolan’s] motion to suppress 

evidence obtained by a warrantless blood draw since any 
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purported consent given by [Dolan] was not rendered 

knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily, and was otherwise the 

product of intimidation, coercion, and/or duress?1

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

Dolan seeks suppression of the evidence obtained from the blood draw. 

Our standard of review as to this type of challenge is well-settled:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. The 

suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the [trial court's] 

conclusions of law [ ] are subject to our plenary review.

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1 Dolan does not suggest that there was a deficiency with the DL-26B form 

read to him. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016) (the 

United States Supreme Court holding that criminal penalties imposed on 

individuals who refuse to submit to a warrantless blood test violates the Fourth 

Amendment); see also Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d 635, 639 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (our Court employing the Birchfield holding by establishing that 

enhanced criminal penalties imposed for failure to consent to a blood draw 

constituted an illegal sentence).

After Birchfield and Giron, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804 was amended on July 

20, 2017, to provide for enhanced criminal penalties only when police have 

obtained a search warrant for the suspect’s blood. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3804(c). Although the events in question occurred two months prior to this 

amendment, the DL-26B form here did not mention any increase in criminal 

penalties for failing to submit to a warrantless blood draw. Accordingly, it was 

statutorily compliant under this new version of the law.
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Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a 

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.

Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal 

citation omitted).

In addition, we are guided by the fact that both the “Fourth Amendment 

to the [United States] Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of [the 

Pennsylvania] Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). “The administration of a blood test, performed by an agent 

of, or at the direction of the government, constitutes a search under both the 

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.” Id., at 328 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “A search conducted without a warrant is deemed 

to be unreasonable and therefore constitutionally impermissible, unless an 

established exception applies.” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 

888 (Pa. 2000). “One such exception is consent, voluntarily given.” Id. 

(citation omitted).

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth 

bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of 

an essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of 

duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne—under 

the totality of the circumstances. The standard for measuring the 

scope of a person's consent is based on an objective evaluation of 

what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange 

between the officer and the person who gave the consent. Such 

evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, 

sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant. 

Gauging the scope of a defendant's consent is an inherent and 

necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the 
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circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, 

or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Commonwealth v. Venable, 200 A.3d 490, 497 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

While there is no hard and fast list of factors evincing 

voluntariness, some considerations include: 1) the defendant's 

custodial status; 2) the use of duress or coercive tactics by law 

enforcement personnel; 3) the defendant's knowledge of his right 

to refuse to consent; 4) the defendant's education and 

intelligence; 5) the defendant's belief that no incriminating 

evidence will be found; and 6) the extent and level of the 

defendant's cooperation with the law enforcement personnel.

Id. (citation omitted).

Dolan suggests six reasons militate against a finding of voluntariness:

1) Excess police presence while Dolan was detained;

2) Police use of physical contact on Dolan;

3) Police directing Dolan’s movements;

4) Dolan was in custody for several hours and was required to 

perform multiple tests in different locations;

5) Police asked Dolan confusing questions, potentially as the 

result of a questionable motive;

6) The initial investigative detention, when looking at all of the 

available facts, was coercive.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 17-24.

To the extent Dolan challenges anything other than the voluntariness of 

the warrantless blood draw, those contentions are waived. See Boutte v. 

Seitchik, 719 A.2d 319, 326 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that “issues that are 

not set forth in the statement of questions presented or reasonably suggested 
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thereby are deemed waived”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will 

be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is 

fairly suggested thereby.”).

Dolan fails to cite to any authority for his first five reasons why the 

warrantless blood draw should be considered involuntary. Instead, Dolan 

asserts that having three law enforcement officers at the accident scene, a 

detention of more than an hour along the side of the road followed by two 

more hours of detention at two more locations, the multiple testing regimes 

performed on him, the physical directing of Dolan’s movements, and suspect 

statements made to Dolan by one of the officers created the situation where, 

once Dolan went to the medical center for testing, he was under duress or 

effectively coerced to consent to the blood draw. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17-

19. As to the sixth reason, that the initial investigative detention was coercive, 

the gravamen of Dolan’s argument is that the initial responding officer, Officer 

Stere, had nothing more than a legally insufficient “hunch” that Dolan was 

impaired, but not a reasonable suspicion of the same, so the entire detention 

was unlawful. See id., at 20-21 (pointing to the car accident having been 

minor and without damage to either vehicle, Officer Stere’s recent 

employment with the police force and lack of DUI recognition training, and 

Dolan’s inability to leave the scene); see also Commonwealth v. Freeman, 

757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).

The trial court denied suppression:
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[Dolan’s] consent was voluntary. Although [Dolan’s] detention 

was lengthy, much of this time was due to the [drug recognition 

expert] evaluation, which [Dolan] was not required to complete. 

When given the option to go to the hospital or complete the 

evaluation, [Dolan] agreed to complete the evaluation. During the 

course of the evaluation, [Dolan] did not object to any of the tests, 

including those that required Officer Shaffer to physically touch 

[Dolan]. At no point did any of the officers yell, draw their 

weapons, or threaten [Dolan] in any way. Before the [drug 

recognition expert] exam began, [Dolan] was read his Miranda 

warnings. Although there were three officers involved at some 

point in the interaction, Officer Houck’s involvement was brief and, 

at the time [Dolan] consent to the blood draw, only one officer, 

Officer Stere, was present. The DL-26B form read to [Dolan] did 

not threaten any criminal penalties, but did state that civil 

penalties could result from a refusal to provide a blood test. 

Although [Dolan] was not affirmatively told that he did not need 

to consent, an individual is presumed to know the law and the DL26B form specifically states that the officer is “requesting a blood 

draw.” Nothing in the form indicates that consent is mandatory. 

The [c]ourt finds from a review of the totality of the circumstances 

that [Dolan]’s consent was voluntary.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 8/24/18, at 13.

We agree with the trial court’s findings, as they are supported by the 

record. Further, the court’s legal conclusions do not constitute error. As 

adduced from his testimony, Officer Stere had more than a “hunch” when he 

proceeded to investigate Dolan. While Officer Stere obviously did not have a 

reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing when he approached the scene of the 

accident, after observing Dolan’s behavior, physical appearance, and 

disposition, he was able to acquire enough suspicion to proceed with DUI 

testing. The court did not err in finding that the initial stop was not coercive.

None of the actions of the police officers nor any of the temporal or locational 
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elements of this entire incident contradict the inherent power that Dolan had 

to reject the blood draw.

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police officers are allowed to 

stop and briefly detain an individual to conduct a limited investigation “if the 

officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts that 

criminal activity is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Dangle, 700 A.2d 538, 540 

(Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted). Our Commonwealth has established that, 

while there are no rigid time limits for these types of investigations, the key 

factor in analyzing if a “detention lasts too long to be justified as an 

investigative stop, is whether the police diligently pursued a means of 

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 

during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Commonwealth 

v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043, 1048 (Pa. 1995) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Unless a traffic stop becomes the functional equivalent of an arrest, 

ascertained by the totality of the circumstances, a traffic stop typically 

constitutes an investigative detention. Commonwealth v. Kiner, 697 A.2d 

262, 265 (Pa. Super. 1997). 

Although the entire course of events, taking place at three different 

locations, lasted for some time, we see no basis to conclude that the police 

and specifically Officer Stere acted with anything other than diligence in this 

situation. First, Officer Stere’s questioning of Dolan took place on the side of 

an active public highway, implying that it was not custodial in nature. Second, 
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because this was an automobile accident, Officer Stere had other safetyrelated and fact-finding obligations. Among other tasks, Officer Stere had to 

take Dolan’s information and make sure he was uninjured, which necessarily 

required conversation amongst the two. Third, Officer Stere did not handcuff 

Dolan nor use or threaten to use force during the initial investigative phase.

Officer Stere’s reasonable suspicion of Dolan’s impairment stemmed 

from his normal “course of action” duties associated with his handling of the 

car accident scene. In his attempt to obtain Dolan’s side of the story, Officer 

Stere remarked that he seemed “confused, dazed.” N.T., Suppression 

Hearing, 2/16/18, at 11. Officer Stere stated that Dolan “looked like he was 

just staring off into space” and “was on the nod. His eyelids were droopy. He 

was having a hard time keeping his eyes open. He was unable to tell [Officer 

Stere] what happened during the crash.” Id. Further, Dolan’s story as to 

where he was traveling did not make geographic sense. See id., at 13. 

Resultantly, Officer Stere was “concerned that [Dolan was] under the influence 

of some kind of controlled substance.” Id., at 12.

It is unrefuted that well over half an hour passed between the arrival of 

Officer Stere and the third officer who ultimately conducted the DUI testing 

on Dolan. See Appellee’s Brief, at 20. However, there is nothing in the record 

to objectively conclude that Dolan was under custodial detention prior to the 

DUI testing or that Officer Stere or the second officer lacked diligence in 

bringing this third officer to the scene. 
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Officer Stere and the second officer were not trained to do field sobriety 

testing. Therefore, the only way to act upon Officer Stere’s reasonable 

suspicion was to find an officer who was qualified to handle the incident, which 

they did as quickly as was possible under the circumstances and in conjunction 

with their other attendant responsibilities. See Commonwealth v. 

Douglass, 539 A.2d 412 (Pa. Super. 1988) (finding that a three and one half 

hour detention, under the totality of the circumstances, was investigative 

rather than custodial). 

As to whether there was probable cause to arrest Dolan, “[p]robable 

cause for an arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the 

officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 

the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth 

v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 883 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Here, we find that Officer Stere’s observations in addition to Dolan’s 

unsatisfactory performance on the field sobriety test provided the officers with 

enough to establish probable cause for an arrest. 

When Dolan was transported to the second location for additional testing

at his behest, he was Mirandized prior to the evaluation, did not object, was 

not handcuffed, and was not threatened. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 

2/16/18, at 39, 43-44, 48, 75-77, 79, 81-82, 109.

At the third location, the site of the blood draw, Officer Stere read the 

DL-26B form to Dolan verbatim. See id., at 18. Dolan “agreed to a blood draw 
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and signed the form.” Id., at 19. Dolan was not handcuffed, Officer Stere did 

not raise his voice at him, and the officer made sure that Dolan knew he was 

available to answer any questions Dolan may have had. See id., at 19-20. 

Further, the relevant form clearly indicates that it is merely making a

noncompulsory “request.” See Commonwealth’s Ex. 1. While Dolan was under 

arrest at the time of the blood draw, nothing in the record indicates that Officer 

Stere nor any other officer used any coercive tactics to compel Dolan to give 

in to blood testing. 

Therefore, based on our independent review of the record, we can find 

no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the totality 

of the circumstances weighed in favor of finding that Dolan provided knowing 

and voluntary consent to the blood draw. Although Dolan was in custody at 

the time of the blood draw, there is no objective evidence to suggest that his 

consent to such an act was the product of duress, threats, or coercion on the 

part of the police officers. After being read the information contained on the 

DL-26B form, Dolan agreed to submit to the test and underwent the blood 

draw. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/07/2019