RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2298-21

IN THE MATTER OF A.N.H. 

___________________________ 

Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided November 29, 2023 

Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Petition No. 0210-XTR2021-1.

Louis P. Nappen, attorney for appellant A.N.H. (Evan 

F. Nappen Attorney at Law, PC, attorneys; Louis P. 

Nappen and Andrew G. Bitar, on the briefs). 

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent State of New Jersey (K. Charles Deutsch,

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2298-21

 A.N.H.1 appeals from a March 24, 2022 order granting the State's petition 

for a Final Extreme Risk Protective Order (FERPO) entered under the Extreme 

Risk Protective Order Act of 2018 (Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:58-20 to -32. We affirm. 

 We recite the facts from the testimony presented to the trial judge and the 

judge's April 11, 2022 written amplification of reasons in support of her March 

24, 2022 order. 

In March 2020, A.N.H. applied for a firearms permit. In his application, 

A.N.H. represented he was never confined or committed to a mental institution 

or hospital for mental health treatment, nor treated or observed by a doctor or 

psychiatrists for a mental health condition. Based on the information in his 

application, A.N.H. received a firearms permit. In June 2020, A.N.H. bought a 

handgun. 

In August 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Joint Terrorism 

Task Force (JTTF) contacted the Dumont Township Police Department (DTPD) 

regarding suspicious messages posted by A.N.H. on an online messaging 

platform and a social media platform. Based on the JTTF's intelligence, the 

1

 We use initials because "[a]ll records related to proceedings for [Final Extreme 

Protective Orders] are confidential and may not be disclosed to anyone other 

than the respondent . . . , except if good cause is found by the court to release 

such records." Admin. Off. of the Cts., Administrative Directive #19-19, 

Guidelines for Extreme Risk Protective Orders, (Aug. 12, 2019) (Guidelines). 
3 A-2298-21

DTPD commenced a background investigation regarding A.N.H., which 

revealed his purchase of the handgun and undisclosed mental health issues. 

On August 18, 2021, the DTPD filed an ex parte petition for a Temporary 

Extreme Risk Protective Order (TERPO) against A.N.H. The municipal court 

judge for Dumont Township granted a TERPO. Thereafter, police officers with 

the DTPD went to A.N.H.'s home and confiscated his handgun in accordance 

with the TERPO. Later that same day, A.N.H. voluntarily went to the DTPD 

and relinquished his Firearm Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC). 

On March 22 and 24, 2022, a Superior Court judge conducted a plenary 

hearing to determine whether to issue a FERPO. The judge granted the State's 

petition for a FERPO on March 24, 2022. After A.N.H. appealed from that 

order, the judge provided an April 11, 2022 written amplification of reasons. 

During the hearing on the State's petition for a FERPO, the judge heard 

testimony from Detective Lieutenant Luke Totten with the DTPD. The judge 

also considered various police reports of incidents with A.N.H. and medical 

records from A.N.H.'s stay at the New Bridge Medical Center in Bergen County 

(formally known as Bergen Regional Medical Center). Additionally, the judge 

heard testimony from Dr. Elliot L. Atkins, a licensed clinical psychologist. 

Detective Lieutenant Totten testified regarding the DTPD's involvement 
4 A-2298-21

with A.N.H. In March 2014, the DTPD responded to a situation at the local high 

school involving a threat by A.N.H., who was then fifteen years old, to "throw 

[a classmate] out the window." A year later, the DTPD responded to a reported 

assault by A.N.H. on his father and his father's estranged wife. In May 2016, 

the DTPD responded to a report that A.N.H. threatened his sister with a 

"[s]amurai sword." 

As a result of the May 2016 incident, while A.N.H. was still a minor, his

mother took him to New Bridge Medical Center for a psychological evaluation 

and treatment.2 The attending physician at the hospital, Dr. Edward G. Hall, 

diagnosed A.N.H. with impulse control disorder with unspecified depressive

disorder. Dr. Hall noted that, while A.N.H. exhibited limited insight, poor 

judgment, and "[i]mpulsive aggressiveness," A.N.H. was "[i]ntelligent" and 

displayed "no clear clinical evidence of a danger to self or others." However, 

Dr. Hall further opined A.N.H. displayed superficial cooperation and provided 

"guarded" and "short standard answers" to the doctor's questions. 

2

 A.N.H. claims he committed himself voluntarily. Because A.N.H. was a minor 

at the time, he could not legally or voluntarily commit himself. A.N.H.'s mother 

signed the hospital admission paperwork. According to the hospital admission 

records, A.N.H. had a police escort upon arrival due to "extreme aggressivity 

and assaultiveness demonstrated at home." 
5 A-2298-21

According to the testimony, A.N.H. "pressured" his mother to sign the 

hospital's release form because A.N.H. was not legally authorized to sign release 

forms for himself. Dr. Hall discharged A.N.H. three days after his admission to 

the hospital and instructed A.N.H. to seek mental health treatment through a 

specific treatment program. A.N.H. did not seek mental health treatment per 

Dr. Hall's discharge instructions. 

Two days after A.N.H.'s release from the hospital, the DTPD responded 

to a report that A.N.H. brandished a knife at his fellow high school classmates. 

In June 2018, the DTPD responded to a local restaurant regarding a 

dispute between A.N.H. and his co-workers. According to the police report, 

A.N.H. "grab[bed his boss's] ponytail and pulled him to the ground." A.N.H. 

then retrieved a hammer from his vehicle and returned to the restaurant. The 

boss declined to press charges against A.N.H. 

Based on A.N.H.'s incidents involving the DTPD, and the information 

provided by the JTTF, Detective Lieutenant Totten testified there was "good 

cause to . . . pursue a TERPO." Additionally, the detective explained A.N.H. 

omitted information related to his mental health history in his FPIC application. 

The judge then heard testimony from Dr. Atkins, an expert in clinical and 

forensic psychology, who testified on behalf of A.N.H. Dr. Atkins conducted a 
6 A-2298-21

four-hour interview with A.N.H. and prepared a written report. Although Dr. 

Atkins had the DTPD reports regarding incidents with A.N.H., the doctor did 

not have A.N.H.'s hospital records at the time he rendered his report. Based on 

his subsequent review of the hospital's medical records, Dr. Atkins testified 

those records "reaffirm[ed]" his conclusions regarding A.N.H. 

Dr. Atkins further testified A.N.H. was not a danger to himself or others. 

The doctor discounted A.N.H.'s prior incidents with the police, attributing those 

incidents to A.N.H.'s "immaturity and his extremely turbulent family situation." 

Dr. Atkins had no information to determine whether A.N.H.'s hospitalization in 

May 2016 was voluntary or involuntary. Additionally, Dr. Atkins was unaware 

the hospital diagnosed A.N.H. with depressive disorder and impulse control 

disorder. Despite lacking important information, Dr. Atkins opined A.N.H. 

"never presented as a danger to himself or others," and "today . . . is neither 

depressed nor impulsive . . . [he] has grown up and matured." However, Dr. 

Atkins admitted there was a likelihood A.N.H. would experience depression in 

the future based on his prior depression diagnosis.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge found the State proved "by a 

preponderance of the evidence . . . [A.N.H.] poses a significant danger of bodily 

injury to [him]self or others by possessing, owning, or receiving a firearm." As 
7 A-2298-21

a result, the judge issued a FERPO. 

The judge found Detective Lieutenant Totten's testimony credible. She 

also found Dr. Atkins' testimony "credible in some respects and not credible in 

other respects." She noted the doctor "didn't appear to have a good working 

understanding or knowledge of the facts . . . in [A.N.H]'s history," and 

"minimized some of [A.N.H.]'s prior history." The judge also found from the 

testimony that it was "unclear whether . . . Dr. Atkins had a good understanding 

of whether there was a recommendation for follow-up treatment." 

The judge then considered the FERPO factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f) 

as applied to A.N.H. Factors one through eight under the Act require a judge to 

determine whether the subject displays any of the following characteristics: 

(1) has any history of threats or acts of violence by the 

respondent directed toward self or others; 

(2) has any history of use, attempted use, or threatened 

use of physical force by the respondent against another 

person; 

(3) is the subject of a temporary or final restraining 

order or has violated a temporary or final restraining 

order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic 

Violence Act of 1991," . . . ; 

(4) is the subject of a temporary or final protective order 

or has violated a temporary or final protective order 

issued pursuant to the "Sexual Assault Survivor 

Protection Act of 2015," . . . ; 
8 A-2298-21

(5) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or 

convictions for a violent indictable crime or disorderly 

persons offense, stalking offense pursuant to section 1 

of [L. 1992, c. 209] [(N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10)], or domestic 

violence offense enumerated in section 3 of [L. 1991, 

c. 261] [(N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19)]; 

(6) has any prior arrests, pending charges, or 

convictions for any offense involving cruelty to animals 

or any history of acts involving cruelty to animals; 

(7) has any history of drug or alcohol abuse and 

recovery from this abuse; or 

(8) has recently acquired a firearm, ammunition, or

other deadly weapon. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f).] 

If a judge finds at least one of the foregoing factors, the judge may 

consider four additional factors pertaining to a subject's mental health. 

Specifically, a judge may consider whether the subject: 

(12) has any prior involuntary commitment in a hospital 

or treatment facility for persons with psychiatric 

disabilities; 

(13) has received or is receiving mental health 

treatment; 

(14) has complied or has failed to comply with any 

mental health treatment; and 

(15) has received a diagnosis of a mental health 

disorder. 
9 A-2298-21

[Guideline 3(d).] 

Regarding factors one, two, and eight, the judge found there was no 

question those factors applied in A.N.H.'s case. Regarding the mental health 

factors, based on A.N.H.'s medical records, the judge found A.N.H. "was 

voluntarily committed," "received mental health treatment" while at a hospital, 

"received a diagnosis" of depression, and "upon his discharge . . . was 

recommended to receive mental health treatment." 

A.N.H. filed an appeal. Pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b), the judge issued a 

written statement of reasons amplifying her decision to issue a FERPO. In her 

amplification, the judge repeated her findings that Detective Lieutenant Totten 

was a credible witness and that "Dr. Atkins' testimony [was] credible in some 

respects and not credible in other[]" respects, due to his lack of a "clear 

understanding of the facts which le[d] to [A.N.H.]'s mental health 

hospitalization." For those reasons, the judge explained she "did not place great 

weight on Dr. Atkins's conclusion . . . that [A.N.H.] did not pose a danger to 

[him]self or others and was able to safely possess firearms." Additionally, the 

judge set forth a detailed analysis for her application of factors one, two, eight, 

twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen in issuing the FERPO. 

In finding factor one, the judge explained there was no dispute A.N.H. had 
10 A-2298-21

a "history of threats and acts of violence." Regarding factor two, the judge relied 

on her analysis under factor one and determined A.N.H. had a "history of both 

threatened and actual violence." In applying factor eight, the judge found 

A.N.H. acquired a firearm in June 2020, the JTTF became involved in August 

2021, and A.N.H., "at wors[t] . . . falsified his application; at 

best . . . minimized his mental health issues" when he applied for his FPIC. 

Turning to the mental health factors, regarding factor twelve, the judge 

stated A.N.H. was committed to the hospital "voluntarily." However, the judge 

noted his commitment was a direct result of the incident with the samurai sword; 

A.N.H. was escorted to the hospital by the DTPD; and A.N.H. was committed 

to the hospital by his mother for a mandatory seventy-two hours. The judge 

found factor thirteen applied because A.N.H. received mental health treatment 

at the hospital in May 2016. In applying factor fourteen, because A.N.H. failed

to seek the recommended follow-up mental health treatment per Dr. Hall, and 

Dr. Atkins testified "no one can predict with 100% certainty whether a person 

will [again] experience past [mental health] symptoms," the judge concluded 

A.N.H. failed to comply with mental health treatment. Finally, because A.N.H. 

was diagnosed by Dr. Hall with impulse control disorder and an unspecified 

depressive disorder, the judge found factor fifteen applied. 
11 A-2298-21

 On appeal, A.N.H. raises the following arguments: 

 POINT I 

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY FINDING THAT 

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(8) APPLIES SINCE 

APPELLANT HAS NOT RECENTLY PURCHASED 

A FIREARM. 

 POINT II 

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY APPLYING 

FACTOR 12, WHICH CONCERNS INVOLUNTARY 

COMMITMENTS, TO APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY 

COMMITMENT FOR THREE DAYS AT A MENTAL 

HEALTH FACILITY. 

 POINT III 

THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY GRANTING THE 

FERPO WHERE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO 

PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF 

HEARSAY THAT APPELLANT POSED A 

SIGNIFICANT, IMMEDIATE, AND PRESENT 

DANGER OF CAUSING BODILY INJURY TO 

HIMSELF OR OTHERS. 

POINT IV 

PER BRUEN, DENIAL OF SECOND AMENDMENT 

RIGHTS UPON N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(8)'S 

"RECENTLY ACQUIRED A FIREARM, 

AMMUNITION, OR ANOTHER DEADLY 

WEAPON" STANDARD SHOULD BE FOUND 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
12 A-2298-21

 "The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is 

limited." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We are bound by the trial 

court's findings "when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." 

Id. at 411-12. Where evidence is testimonial, as in this case, and involves 

credibility questions, deference is "especially appropriate" because the trial 

judge observed the witnesses first-hand. Id. at 412. 

Our review of a FERPO is guided by our holding in In re D.L.B., 468 N.J. 

Super. 397 (App. Div. 2021). As we explained in D.L.B., the Act is intended to 

address the growing number of mass shootings by removing firearms from those 

who have shown "red flags" indicative of future violence. Id. at 400-02.

 There are eight factors under the Act to be considered by the trial judge 

when deciding whether to issue a FERPO. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-23(f)(1) to (8). No 

single factor is determinative. After weighing each of the factors, "[t]he court 

shall issue the FERPO . . . if it finds 'by a preponderance of the evidence at the 

hearing that the respondent poses a significant danger of bodily injury to the 

respondent's self or others' by possessing a firearm." D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. at 

406-07 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b)). If one of the eight statutory factors is 

found by a judge, the Guidelines list consideration of additional factors related 

to a subject's mental health. 
13 A-2298-21

 Here, the judge issued the FERPO finding factors one, two, eight, twelve, 

thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen applied. Having reviewed the record, we are 

satisfied the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding the State met its burden 

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that A.N.H. was a danger to himself 

and others for the reasons set forth in the judge's written amplification of reasons 

in support of the FERPO. 

 A.N.H. specifically challenges the judge's findings that FERPO factors 

eight, twelve, and fourteen applied. A.N.H. also contends there was insufficient 

evidence to support the judge's finding that he was a "significant, immediate and 

present danger" to himself and others. 

The State agrees the judge's finding that factor eight applied was mistaken 

because A.N.H. had not recently acquired a firearm. However, A.N.H. does not 

challenge the judge's findings under factor one, history of threats or acts of 

violence directed toward self or others, and factor two, history of use, or 

threatened use of physical force against others. Thus, the judge properly then 

considered A.N.H.'s mental health under factors twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and 

fifteen. 

In considering factor twelve, the judge had to determine if A.N.H. had a 

prior involuntary commitment in a hospital or treatment facility for persons with 
14 A-2298-21

psychiatric disabilities. The judge found this factor applied because A.N.H.'s 

mother took A.N.H., who was a minor at the time, to the local hospital for a 

psychiatric evaluation based on the May 2016 sword incident with his sister. 

This matter is similar to a civil commitment of a minor under Rule 4:74-

7A. Under that Rule, a parent may request admission of a minor under the age 

of fourteen to a hospital for mental health treatment without a court order. 

A.N.H.'s own expert, Dr. Atkins, agreed A.N.H.'s mother took her son, with a 

police escort, to the local hospital for a psychiatric evaluation and that A.N.H. 

remained in the hospital for a seventy-two hour "mandatory hold" because the 

hospital "found a reason to keep him." Based on these discrete facts, the judge 

did not err in finding factor twelve applied. 

Regarding factor thirteen, receipt of mental health treatment, factor 

fourteen, failure to comply with any mental health treatment, and factor fifteen, 

diagnosis of a mental health disorder,3 we are satisfied the record supported the 

judge's findings in support of the FERPO. Based on the medical records, A.N.H. 

received mental health treatment at a local hospital in May 2016, thus satisfying 

factor thirteen. The same medical records indicated A.N.H. was directed to 

3

 Contrary to A.N.H.'s argument, the Act does not require the mental health 

diagnosis to be rendered at or around the date of the FERPO. 
15 A-2298-21

participate in continued mental health treatment following his discharge from 

the hospital and failed to do so, thus satisfying factor fourteen. Additionally, 

the hospital records revealed a diagnosis of unspecified depressive disorder and 

impulse control disorder upon A.N.H.'s discharge on May 17, 2016, thus, the 

judge did not err in applying factor fifteen. 

The judge carefully reviewed the police and medical records, considered 

the trial testimony, and rendered credibility findings in support of the issuance 

of the FERPO. Given the ample evidence in support of finding factors one, two, 

twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen applicable, we are satisfied the judge did 

not abuse her discretion in issuing the FERPO. Except as to the finding of factor 

eight, the judge's application of the factors under the Act and the Guideline was 

correct, and the weight accorded to each factor by the judge was supported by 

the evidence. 

We next consider and reject A.N.H.'s argument that the judge 

impermissibly relied on hearsay in issuing the FERPO. "[T]he rules governing 

admissibility of evidence at trial shall not apply to the presentation and 

consideration of information at the [FERPO] hearing." D.L.B., 468 N.J. Super. 

at 406 (quoting Guideline 5(c)) (second alteration in original). Moreover, the 

judge did not rely solely on hearsay evidence. Rather, the judge considered and 
16 A-2298-21

relied on Detective Lieutenant Totten's personal knowledge regarding A.N.H.'s 

interactions with the DTPD in support of the FERPO. 

We also reject A.N.H.'s claimed violation of his Second Amendment 

rights based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in N.Y. State Rifle 

& Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022). Prior to the 

United States Supreme Court's decisions in Bruen, the Court approved of stateimposed limitations on the right of mentally ill people to possess firearms. See 

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (stating "nothing in 

our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 

possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill"); see also McDonald v. City of 

Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) ("We made it clear in Heller that our holding 

did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as 'prohibitions on 

the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill.'") Indeed, Bruen recognized 

that laws prohibiting possession of a firearm by a mentally ill individual are 

"presumptively lawful." Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2162, n.26 (Kavanaugh, J., 

concurring). Based on United States Supreme Court precedent, we discern no 

violation of A.N.H.'s Second Amendment rights under the Act. 

Affirmed.