NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 

revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 

volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical 

error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 

Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-

1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

17-P-1050 Appeals Court

COMMONWEALTH vs. ELISABETH TELCINORD.

No. 17-P-1050.

Norfolk. February 7, 2018. - October 17, 2018.

Present: Trainor, Blake, & Lemire, JJ.

Abuse Prevention. Protective Order. Practice, Criminal, 

Instructions to jury. Arrest. Words, "Stay away."

Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of 

the District Court Department on August 5, 2016.

The case was heard by Mark S. Coven, J.

Meredith Shih for the defendant.

Marguerite T. Grant, Assistant District Attorney (Sean P. 

Riley, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 

Commonwealth.

TRAINOR, J. After a jury trial in the Quincy Division of 

the District Court Department, the defendant, Elisabeth 

Telcinord, was convicted on a criminal complaint charging her 

with one count of violating an abuse prevention order pursuant 
2

to G. L. c. 209A, § 7.1 On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) 

there was insufficient evidence that she violated the stay-away 

provision of the order; (2) the judge's instruction to the jury 

to use their common understanding of the phrase "stay away from 

the plaintiff's residence" when the jury asked for a legal 

definition was error; and (3) testimony about the defendant's 

arrest created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 

We affirm the judgment.

On August 3, 2016, the Brockton Division of the District 

Court Department issued a G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order 

directing the defendant to stay at least fifty yards away from 

the victim, not contact him, stay away from his workplace, and 

stay away from his residence located at 13 Hall Street in 

Randolph.2

At 8:15 P.M. on August 4, 2016, a Brockton police officer 

served the defendant with a copy of the c. 209A order in hand. 

At about 3 A.M. on August 5, 2016, a Randolph police officer was 

dispatched to Hall Street. The officer drove on North Main 

 

1 The defendant was sentenced to one year of probation with 

the condition that she complete a batterer's program.

2 The Commonwealth did not proceed against the defendant for

a violation of the no-contact portion of the order.
3

Street, turned onto Hall Street, and parked his marked cruiser 

at 15 Hall Street.3

The officer observed two vehicles drive onto Hall Street 

from North Main Street. The first vehicle was driven by a man, 

later identified as the victim and the subject of the abuse 

prevention order. The second vehicle was operated by the 

defendant and was traveling about three car lengths behind the 

victim's vehicle. As the vehicles approached the cruiser, the 

defendant pulled her vehicle over to the right side of the 

street and stopped. The victim stopped his vehicle in front of 

the cruiser and got out to speak to the officer, who described

the victim as "upset." The officer thereafter drove his cruiser 

back to the defendant's vehicle to speak with her.4

The defendant told the officer that "she thought that she 

was in compliance with the order by the distance she was away 

from the [victim's] house." She also said that she was married 

to the victim, and admitted that she was following him; she was 

trying to deal with a family issue involving the victim having 

contacted her father. The officer described the defendant as 

 

3 Hall Street is a residential street of mostly singlefamily homes. The street is not a "cut-through," and has 

minimal traffic -- "mostly people who live on the street."

4 Based on the testimony and exhibits submitted at trial, we 

infer that the distance to the defendant's vehicle was very 

short. The officer presumably wanted to keep his cruiser close 

to him.
4

"upset." The officer spoke again with the victim, who was still 

upset, and then returned to the defendant's vehicle and arrested 

her. She identified herself by name, birthdate, and address at 

the booking.

Discussion. 1. Statutory framework. The Legislature 

enacted G. L. c. 209A in 1978. The original version of G. L. 

c. 209A, § 7, criminalized only a defendant's violation of an 

order to "refrain from abus[e]" or "vacate the household." See 

St. 1983, c. 678, § 5. In 1990, the Supreme Judicial Court 

considered the question whether a trial court judge's order 

requiring the defendant to "leave and remain away from the 

[marital household]" was authorized under the statute, because 

the statute, at that time, only contained the provision to 

"vacate forthwith the household." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 

Mass. 340, 344-345 (1990). The defendant argued that the order 

could only be violated by failing to vacate the household, and 

not by his returning to visit it. Id. at 345-346. The court 

concluded that the defendant had misconstrued the purpose and 

scope of the term "vacate" as used in G. L. c. 209A.5,6 Id. at 

346-348.

 

5 The Legislature acted quickly and, in agreement with the 

court, enacted St. 1990, c. 403, § 2, which amended G. L. 

c. 209A, § 1, to define "vacate order" as a "court order to 

leave and remain away from the premises . . ." (emphasis added). 

General Laws c. 209A, § 3 (c), as amended by St. 1990, c. 403, 

§ 3, allows the court to "[order] the defendant to vacate 
5

The court proceeded to elaborate on the harm that the 

Legislature was attempting to prevent, and why it was essential 

that the defendant be required to stay away from the residence 

and workplace of the victim.

"An order to 'vacate the household' . . . creates a haven 

for the abused party in which no further abuse need be 

feared and provides a temporary, partial separation of the 

abused and abusive party, thereby leaving fewer 

opportunities for abusive contact.

"Were we to adopt the defendant's definition of 'vacate,' 

an abusive party, having surrendered occupancy of the 

household, would be free to return to the house at will. 

The abused party would have no ability to lessen the 

abusive party's prerogative to initiate contact and could 

expect no refuge from the possibility of further abuse. 

That the Legislature intended the word 'vacate' to include 

the concept of 'remain away' is demonstrated by the 

 

forthwith and remain away from the household, multiple family 

dwelling, and workplace" (emphasis added).

6 "In determining the range of activity the Legislature 

intended to prohibit by authorizing courts to issue orders 

requiring defendants to 'vacate' the marital home, this court 

must look to the words of the statute 'construed by the ordinary 

and approved usage of the language, considered in connection 

with the cause of [the statute's] enactment, the mischief or 

imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 

accomplished.' . . . Chapter 209A, while allowing an order to 

'vacate,' provides no particular definition for the term. 

Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 2810 (2d ed. 1957) defines 

'vacate' as '3. [t]o make vacant, as an office, post, house, 

etc.; to deprive of an incumbent or occupant.' While this 

definition makes clear the fact that the Legislature intended an 

abusive defendant to depart from the house, it provides no 

guidance in either a negative or affirmative direction whether 

the Legislature intended to require such a defendant to stay 

away from the house subsequent to the initial departure. The 

Legislature's intention, however, becomes clear when we consider 

the 'mischief or imperfection' with which c. 209A is concerned 

and 'the main object' which c. 209A seeks to accomplish." 

Gordon, 407 Mass. at 346.
6

authority of a judge to issue a 'vacate' order for a period 

of one year. G. L. c. 209A, § 3 (b)."

Id. at 347.

The Gordon court read into the statutory language the 

requirement that the defendant not only vacate the residence but 

also remain away from it. The Legislature responded by amending 

the statute and making the court's interpretation explicit in 

the statutory language. See note 5, supra. The purpose of this 

interpretation, significantly, is the recognition of the core 

purpose of an abuse prevention order, that is, the creation and 

maintenance of a safe haven from the threat of continued abuse.

To establish a violation of G. L. c. 209A, § 7, the 

Commonwealth must prove that (1) a valid G. L. c. 209A order was 

issued by a judge, (2) the order was in effect on the date of 

the alleged violation, (3) the defendant had knowledge of the 

order, and (4) the defendant violated the order. See

Commonwealth v. Collier, 427 Mass. 385, 388 (1998); Commonwealth

v. Delaney, 425 Mass. 587, 595-597 (1997), cert. denied, 522 

U.S. 1058 (1998). Only the fourth requirement is in dispute 

here, i.e., whether the defendant violated the order.

2. Stay away. The defendant argues that the phrase "stay 

away" is so vague that without the judge defining specific 

geographic boundaries for the meaning of "stay away," the jury 
7

were allowed to speculate in reaching their decision on an 

essential element of the crime.7

Our courts have not required this kind of mathematical 

specificity in order to find a statute enforceable and a 

defendant's due process rights protected. In Commonwealth v. 

Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368, 369 (1978), the Supreme Judicial Court 

addressed a similar issue where the defendants challenged their 

convictions of wilfully interrupting or disturbing a school in 

violation of G. L. c. 272, § 40.8 The defendants contended that 

the statute was unconstitutionally vague and therefore void, and 

that their convictions under the statute were denials of their 

right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. Id. at 371. The court answered 

their contentions while upholding the constitutionality of the 

statute.

"Due process requires that a criminal statute be 

sufficiently clear to give notice of the conduct that it 

prohibits. A statute which either forbids or requires the 

doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 

 

7 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 41 

Mass. App. Ct. 115, 118 (1996), overruled on other grounds, 

Delaney, 425 Mass. at 597 n.9, is misplaced, as we do not agree 

that it established the outer boundary of the meaning of "stay 

away."

8 General Laws c. 272, § 40, was rewritten by St. 2018, 

c. 69, § 159, to prohibit the interrupting and disturbing of "an

assembly of people meeting for a lawful purpose." This 

amendment, however, does not affect the holding in the Bohmer

opinion.
8

differ as to its application, violates the first essential 

of due process of law. Due process requirements also 

mandate that no statute have such a standardless sweep that 

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police and 

the courts is permitted. It would certainly be dangerous 

if the [L]egislature could set a net large enough to catch 

all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step 

inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who 

should be set at large.

"However, since words are the elements that constitute a 

statute, mathematical precision in the definition of 

legislative enactments is not required. A statute is 

satisfactory so long as it clearly indicates what it 

prohibits as a whole. . . . Uncertainty as to whether 

marginal offenses are included within the coverage of a 

statute does not render it unconstitutional if its scope is 

substantially clear." (Citations and quotations omitted.)

Id. at 371-372.

In Commonwealth v. Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 733-736 (1977), 

the court previously addressed this principle when upholding the 

constitutionality of G. L. c. 272, § 53, which provides 

punishment for disturbers of the peace.9

"A law is unconstitutionally vague if it is not 

sufficiently explicit to give clear warning as to 

proscribed activities. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 

Mass. 580, 586-587 (1975). Connally v. General Constr. 

Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). A law is not vague, 

however, if it requires a person to conform his conduct to 

an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard so that 

men of common intelligence will know its meaning. 

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973). Coates v. 

Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). Moreover, even when 

the outer boundaries of a law are imprecise, such 

imprecision does not permit a facial attack on the entire 

law by one whose conduct 'falls squarely within the "hard 

core" of the [statute's] proscriptions,' [Broadrick, 

 

9 The statute "proscribes conduct which tends to annoy all 

good citizens and does in fact annoy anyone present not favoring 

it." Orlando, 371 Mass. at 734.
9

supra], particularly if greater specificity in the law is 

impractical." (Emphases added.)

Id. at 734.

Approximately fifty per cent of our country's State 

Legislatures have adopted the general "stay away" from a

specified location provision in their domestic violence 

prevention statutes.10 Various States use different phraseology

for their general stay-away provisions but all result in the 

same prohibition. Arizona, for example, prohibits "coming near"

the residence (or place of employment or school), Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 13-3602 (2018); Texas prohibits "going to or near 

the residence or place of employment," Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 85.022(b)(3) (2017); Louisiana prohibits "going near the 

residence or place of employment," La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 46:2135(A)(1) (2018); and Maine prohibits "[b]eing at or in 

the vicinity of" the plaintiff's residence, place of employment,

or school. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 4007(1)(C)(2)

(2017).

 

10 Those States requiring a specified distance have either

specified a distance in the statute, left it entirely to the 

discretion of the judge, or both. Idaho and Montana, for 

example, specify that a defendant must stay 1,500 feet away from 

the plaintiff's residence or other specified location, or any 

other appropriate distance. See Idaho Code § 39-6306(1)(i) 

(2018); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201(2)(d) (2017). Washington 

has upheld a one-mile stay-away order, see State v. Chapman, 140 

Wash. 2d 436, 451, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 984 (2000); Wash. Rev. 

Code § 26.50.060(1)(c) (2018), while Kentucky has required that 

a stay-away order not exceed 500 feet. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 

§ 403.740(1)(a)(3) (2018).
10

States have interpreted the meaning of, and the parameters

of, "stay away" from a fixed location. In State v. Williams,

226 N.C. App. 393, 408 (2013), the court distinguished between a 

domestic violence protective order prohibiting the defendant 

from visiting the protected person's workplace and a more 

general domestic violence protective order requiring the 

defendant to stay away from the protected person's workplace.

"[W]here a court orders a defendant to 'stay away' from a 

particular location, it does so to prevent the defendant 

from threatening, abusing, following, interfering with, or 

harassing the protected party. It is possible that a 

defendant may not actually set foot upon the workplace 

premises but could harass or interfere with a victim by 

lurking so near as to impede the victim's ability to travel 

from place to place -- indeed, defendant herein did just 

that several times . . . -- but the area to 'stay away'

from is not without boundaries. . . . The indictment 

alleges defendant was 'outside' [the protected person's] 

workplace, and although technically the area 'outside of 

[the protected person's] workplace could include any place 

in the world outside the walls of the salon, obviously such 

an interpretation is absurd. Certainly the order must mean 

that defendant could not be so close to [the protected 

person's] workplace that he would be able to observe her, 

speak to her, or intimidate her in any way, but we cannot 

define the exact parameters of the term 'stay away.'"

Id. at 409-410.11,12

 

11 Notably, the defendant's conviction in Williams was 

reversed for a number of reasons, including that there was 

insufficient evidence to show that the defendant had violated 

the stay-away order or any of the order's purposes as discussed 

by the court. Williams, 226 N.C. App. at 411-412.

12 In Residences at the Jewel, LLC vs. Tiedeman, Minn. Ct. 

App., No. C5-03-45 (Aug. 5, 2003) (unpublished decision), the 

court considered the question whether a defendant could be 

ordered to stay away from a location directly across the road

from where he lived. The defendant argued that the stay-away 
11

Our case law is replete with examples of upholding 

statutory language that is not precise but nevertheless 

"requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but 

comprehensible normative standard so that men of common 

intelligence will know its meaning." Orlando, 371 Mass. at 734. 

For example, in Orlando, we applied a two-pronged test to define 

what is disruptive conduct pursuant to G. L. c. 272, § 53. See 

id. at 734-735. General Laws c. 272, § 53, prohibits conduct, 

"which, first, most people would find to be unreasonably 

disruptive, and second, [which] did in fact infringe on 

someone's right to be undisturbed. The first prong is normative 

and protects potential defendants from prosecutions based on 

 

order was "vague and overbroad." He argued that because he 

lived directly across the road from the plaintiffs, it was "not 

feasible" for him to stay away, and claimed that he was "running 

the risk of contempt by simply staying in his home or, more 

seriously, every time he ventures out from his property onto 

[the road]." The court's answer to this alleged problem is an 

illustration of how a general stay-away order can be 

appropriately flexible when a specific distance would be 

inappropriate and unworkable.

"As [the plaintiffs] assert, 'common sense dictates that 

the "stay away" language . . . does not apply to one who is 

in his own house, or to one who is simply using a public 

road to get to and from his own house.' [The defendant's] 

reading of the language is an unreasonable interpretation, 

in light of the fact that there is a county road between 

the [plaintiffs'] property and [the defendant's] home and 

those of his neighbors. [The defendant] continues to drive 

the road regularly and has encountered [the plaintiffs] in 

a civil manner since the order was issued. He has never 

been found in contempt. We conclude that the language 

'stay away' is not overly broad or vague in this context."
12

unreasonable individual sensitivities. The second prong 

requires that the crime have a victim, and thus subjects 

potential defendants to criminal prosecution only when their 

activities have detrimental impact." Id. at 735.

"A more specific standard is impractical because the 

conduct proscribed by this law necessarily varies according 

to its location and timing. . . . A disturbing the peace 

standard which attempted to define more precisely the 

levels of noise and types of conduct permitted in various 

places at varying times would be both underinclusive and 

overbroad. The void for vagueness doctrine does not 

require this result. Rather, for offenses such as this, it 

permits the use of a normative standard which informs a 

potential defendant that his common sense in most cases 

will define proscribed conduct" (emphasis added).13

Id.

 

13 Similar statutes have withstood challenges for vagueness. 

See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 621, 630 (2014), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 Mass. 245, 249 (2013) (addressing 

accosting or annoying person of opposite sex in violation of 

G. L. c. 272, § 53; "legislative language need not be afforded 

'mathematical precision' in order to pass constitutional 

muster'"); Commonwealth v. Daly, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 48, 51 

(2016), quoting Orlando, 371 Mass. at 734 (animal cruelty 

statute, G. L. c. 272, § 77, "sets forth a perhaps 'imprecise 

but comprehensible normative standard'" which is sufficiently 

exacting when viewed in context and in conjunction with case 

law); Commonwealth v. Nee, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 449-450 (2013) 

(addressing common-law crime of affray; "person of common 

intelligence would have little difficulty understanding" conduct 

that law proscribes). Similar analysis and results have 

occurred regarding the interpretation of reckless endangerment

of a child under G. L. c. 265, § 13L, see Commonwealth v. 

Figueroa, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 265-266 (2013); open and gross 

lewdness and lascivious behavior under G. L. c. 272, § 16, see 

Commonwealth v. Coppinger, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 234, 235-239 

(2014); and indecent assault and battery on a child under the 

age of fourteen under G. L. c. 265, § 13B, see Commonwealth v. 

Rosa, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 626-627 (2004).
13

There certainly will be circumstances involving location 

and timing, within which a specific distance to stay away from a 

fixed location will be adequate to maintain a safe haven for the 

protected party. However, there are certainly also locations 

within which a general stay-away order is more appropriate to 

provide a safe haven for the protected party. The person 

ordered to stay away is required to conduct themselves so as not 

to contact or abuse the protected party.14

We do not think that the preferred practice should be to 

require the trial judge to determine a specific distance that 

the abuser must stay away from the protected person's residence 

or workplace. Rather, the decision whether to impose a specific 

distance, if any, should be left to the sound discretion of the 

trial judge, who is in the best position to determine what the 

 

14 A defendant in Pennsylvania challenged, for vagueness, 

the statute punishing the failure of a disorderly person to 

disperse upon official order. See Commonwealth v. DeFrancesco, 

75 Pa. D. & C. 2d 502, 508 (1975). The defendant argued that he 

could not know "when he ha[d] satisfactorily dispersed." Id. 

The court held that adequate dispersal occurs "when he is no 

longer a threat to cause substantial harm, serious 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. The time and distance may 

vary under the particular circumstances surrounding the 

incident, but we believe that it is clear to any person of 

reasonable intelligence that he has not dispersed if he remains 

in a position that poses the threat and danger the statute seeks

to prevent." Id.
14

circumstances require to create a safe haven for the protected 

party.15

Here, the defendant argues that the stay-away order could 

only be violated by her intruding onto the property of the 

victim's residence.16 We reject this contention. When the 

defendant drove her vehicle onto Hall Street and parked near and 

in clear sight of the victim's residence at 3 A.M., it seems 

clear that she intended to confront the victim.17 Her presence 

 

15 We consider, here, a judicial order requiring the 

defendant to "stay away from the plaintiff's residence." The 

statute, G. L. c. 209A, § 3 (c), allows the court to order the 

defendant "to vacate forthwith and remain away from the 

household." For the purpose of our construction of the 

legislative purpose of c. 209A, we perceive no difference 

between the terms "stay away from" and "remain away from." Both 

terms promote the core purpose of the abuse prevention order and 

the statute, to create and maintain a safe haven from the threat 

of continued abuse. See Gordon, 407 Mass. at 346-347.

16 The defendant seems to be arguing that the stay-away 

order could only be violated by means of a criminal trespass. 

Such an argument fails simply because the Legislature has 

enacted two separate and distinct statutes, i.e., criminal 

trespass (G. L. c. 266, § 120) and abuse prevention (G. L. 

c. 209A, § 3), which serve to effectuate different purposes. 

See generally State v. Gilley, 135 N.C. App. 519, 527-530 (1999) 

(distinguishing between North Carolina's domestic criminal 

trespass statute and domestic violence protective order statute 

while analyzing double jeopardy clause).

17 "While intent is an element of criminal contempt 

proceedings," G. L. c. 209A, § 7, has no such requirement. 

Delaney, 425 Mass. at 596. A conviction of violating an order 

issued pursuant to c. 209A requires proof "beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant knew of the order. . . . Th[e] statute 

. . . requires no more knowledge than that the defendant knew of 

the order. We decline to read any additional mens rea 

requirements into the statute." Id. at 596-597. However, "[a] 
15

on the victim's street near the victim's residence was not an 

accident, mistake, or otherwise the result of innocent conduct. 

This conduct violated the c. 209A order's directive to stay away 

from the victim's residence.

Next, the defendant argues that the judge committed 

reversible error when he provided the supplemental instruction 

in response to the jury's question regarding the "legal 

definition of stay away from the plaintiff's residence." Where, 

as here, the defendant failed to object to the instruction at 

trial, we review the instruction to determine whether any error 

in the instruction created "a substantial risk of a miscarriage 

of justice." Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 564 

(1967).

"The proper response to a jury question must remain within 

the discretion of the trial judge, who has observed the evidence 

and the jury firsthand and can tailor supplemental instructions 

accordingly." Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 488

(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 n.11 

 

long-standing common law principle requires that, in the absence 

of specific words saying so, it is not supposed that the 

[L]egislature intended to make accidents and mistakes crimes"

(quotation omitted). Collier, 427 Mass. at 388. "The policies 

that are advanced by means of the remedies available under 

c. 209A do not require that restrained parties be convicted for 

what would generally be considered innocent activities. To hold 

otherwise would incorporate into the statute a concept of strict 

liability, and there is no basis for believing that this was the 

Legislature's purpose." Commonwealth v. Raymond, 54 Mass. App. 

Ct. 488, 493 (2002).
16

(1996). Here, even if the instruction was error, it did not 

create a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.

In the future, however, it would be better practice for the 

judge to explain to the jury what the stay-away order is 

intended to accomplish. Such instruction would assist the jury 

in applying their common experience, in determining whether the 

defendant has violated the purpose of the order. The distance 

will vary under different circumstances and can only be 

determined, as will a violation of the order, by what is 

necessary to prevent the defendant from contacting or abusing 

the protected party.18 The stay-away order is violated not only 

when a defendant actually commits an act of contacting or 

abusing the protected party, but also when the defendant is 

positioned within sufficient proximity to the property so that 

he would be able to contact or abuse the protected party if that 

party were on the property or entering or leaving it. See 

Commonwealth v. Goldman, 94 Mass. App. Ct. , (2018); 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 94 Mass. App. Ct. , (2018). The 

protected party need not be present for a violation of the order 

to occur.

3. Arrest testimony. Finally, we conclude that there is 

no merit in the defendant's contention that testimony about her 

 

18 Each of these prohibitions can be accomplished, under the 

circumstances, by the potential for physical, visual, or vocal 

contact.
17

arrest created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 

The police officer testified that he arrested the defendant, and 

that at the defendant's booking she gave her name, birthdate,

and address. The officer identified the defendant by comparing 

her appearance to her registry of motor vehicles photograph. 

See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 242 (2014) 

(identification testimony of arresting officer admissible to 

prove defendant "is the person who was arrested for the charged 

crime"). The defendant also attacked the adequacy of the police 

investigation, thereby placing her arrest at issue. See

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 13, 27 (2016);

Commonwealth v. Philyaw, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 730, 733 (2002) 

("officer should not be put in the false position of seeming 

just to have happened upon the scene," but should be allowed to 

explain conduct [quotation omitted]). Finally, the judge's 

instructions would have countered any possible prejudice that 

could have flowed from evidence of the defendant's arrest. The

judge instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence on 

three separate occasions. He specifically instructed that "[a] 

complaint against the defendant's [sic] only an accusation. 

It's not evidence." There was no substantial risk of a 

miscarriage of justice here.

Judgment affirmed.