United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-60499

Summary Calendar

____________

Bernice Rutland, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Robinson Property Group, L.L.C.; Cynthia Janie Scott, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:21-CV-234

______________________________

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Bernice Rutland appeals the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Robinson Property 

Group. We AFFIRM.

On September 14, 2019, Rutland and her sister-in-law went to the 

Robinson-owned Horseshoe Casino in Tunica, Mississippi. While playing a 

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* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 15, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-60499

2

slot machine, Rutland was hit from behind by a motorized scooter. The 

scooter was operated by another patron, Cynthia Scott, who had rented it 

from Horseshoe for the day. Rutland complained to casino security of pain in 

her right leg but refused medical treatment and left the premises. She sued

Robinson, Scott, and Desert Medical Equipment (“DME”), the 

Horseshoe’s scooter supplier, for negligence. After DME was dismissed for 

failure to serve, the district court granted judgment in favor of Robinson and 

Scott.1 Rutland appeals.2 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

On appeal, we review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Canon, Inc., 9 F.4th 269, 273 (5th Cir. 

2021). Summary judgment is proper when the record shows that “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of 

material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

In response to Robinson’s motion for summary judgment, Rutland 

proffered only a single sworn declaration which consisted of the facts above 

plus conclusional allegations regarding Robinson’s involvement. Rutland did 

not offer any other evidence of duty, breach, causation, or damages, elements 

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1 In ruling on Robinson’s motion for summary judgment, the district court also sua 

sponte dismissed Rutland’s claims against Scott, who is apparently deceased. Rutland does 

not appeal the district court’s ruling as to Scott.

2 Rutland was represented in the district court, but appeals pro se.

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required to sustain a negligence claim in Mississippi.3 See Clinton Healthcare, 

LLC v. Atkinson, 294 So.3d 66, 71 (Miss. 2019). An affidavit is insufficient to 

defeat summary judgment when its factual averments are conclusional or 

based on mere belief. Clark v. Am.’s Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 

(5th Cir. 1997); see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) 

(noting that a party cannot defeat summary judgment by “replac[ing] 

conclusory allegations of the complaint . . . with conclusory allegations of an 

affidavit”). Rutland thus failed to meet her burden to “come forward with 

competent summary judgment evidence establishing the existence of a 

material factual dispute.” See Clark, 110 F.3d at 297.

Rutland contends that the district court erroneously ignored three 

issues of material fact in granting summary judgment: whether Robinson (1) 

rented the scooter to Scott, (2) owed Rutland a duty of care under premises 

liability law, and (3) failed to disclose the proper witness for depositions. As 

Robinson points out, however, even if these issues were disputed, they are

not material because their resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes 

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law 

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). This is because 

Rutland fails to offer sufficient evidence as to any of the required elements of 

negligence beyond her conclusional affidavit. See, e.g., Watson v. Johnson, 848 

So.2d 873, 878 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a grant of summary 

judgment when the plaintiff relied only on his sworn statement in opposition 

and failed to provide any medical evidence of injury, as “bare assertions are 

simply not enough to avoid summary judgment”). “[A] complete failure of 

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3 Rutland brought claims against Robinson for negligence and negligent 

entrustment. These four elements are required for both causes of action. See Warren ex rel. 

Warren v. Glascoe, 852 So.2d 634, 640 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).

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proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case 

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Even if the three issues identified by Rutland were 

disputed, they are not material because they would not affect the outcome of 

the suit, given Rutland’s failure to offer competent evidence of any of the 

essential elements of her claims.

AFFIRMED.

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