F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

K A M A L P A L S I

N G H , P etitioner
,

v

.

E R I C H. H O L D E R , J R ., Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 10-71677

Ag ency No. A094-990-061

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Submitted F ebruary

13, 2014 * San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 26, 2014

B efore: Stephen Reinhardt and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit J udg es, and L loy d D. Georg e, Senior District J udg e

. * *

Opinion by

J udg e Reinhardt; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by J udg e Georg e

* T h e p a n e l u na n im o u sly co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

** T h e Ho n o rab l e Ll o y d D. Geo rg e, Sen io r District J u dg e f o r t h e U .S. District Co u

rt f o r th e District o f

Nev ad a, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 2

SUMMARY * * *

Im m igration

The panel g ranted a petition for review o f the B oard o f I mmig r a tio n Appeals’ denial of asy lum and withholding o f

r e m o v a l to a c itiz en of I ndia who asserted claims for p as t persecution and a fear of f uture pe r s e cu t ion by police on account of his imputed political opinion.

The p a n el held that the evidence compelled the conclusion that petitioner’s imputed political opinion was at least o ne central r eason police targ eted h i m w here during interrog ation police called him a t r a itor and repeatedly accused him of working

ag ainst the g o vernment.

The panel f

u r t h er held that indirect evidence o f petitioner’s association w ith a suspected terrorist supported the conclusion that he was p ersecuted because of a n imputed political o pinion. The panel ex plained that althoug h the REAL I D Act eliminated the presumption that persecution is politically motivated in the absence of any e vide n c e o f a leg itimate prosecutorial purpose, an applicant may still meet his burden of establishing nex us b y introducing evidence that he was wrong ly

accused of being

a terrorist.

The panel held that mix ed-motives an a l y sis applies to

cases g overned by the REAL I D Act, and that even if police

are eng ag ed in a leg itimate investig ation, an applicant may establish nex us by showing tha t he was persecuted both

*** T h is su

m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f

th e o p in io n

o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 3

because of leg itimate investig atory reasons and because of a protected g r o u n d

, so long as a protected g round was at least one central reason for the harm.

District J udg e Georg e concurred with the opinion insofar

as it remanded for the g r a n ting of r elief pursuant to the Con v e n t ion Ag ainst T o rture. J udg e G eorg e d issented from the majority ’s holding that the evidence compe ls the

co n clusion that a central reason for petitioner’s persecution

w a s an imputed political opinion. Georg e wrote that h e believe s that the e v idence, b oth d irect and circumstantial, shows that the reason police targ eted petitioner was an effort only to obtain information about a suspected terrorist.

COUNSEL

Pardeep Sing h Grewal, L aw O ffice of Pardeep Sing h Grewal, Castro Valley , California, for Petitioner.

Tony W e st, Assistant A ttorney General; J ames E. Grimes, S en i o r L itig ation Counsel; and J anice K. Redfern, Senio r L itig ation Counsel, Office o f I mmig ration L itig ation, United States Department of J ustice, W ashing ton, D

. C

. , for Respondent.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 4

OP INION

REI NHARDT, Circuit J udg e:

Kamalpal Sing h, a 51-y ear-old native and citiz en of I ndia, petitions for review from the B I A’s denial of his application for a sy lum and wi t h h olding of removal based on imputed political opinio n

. S i ng h entered the United States in 2006 af t e r fleeing eg reg ious phy sical abuse by the local police in his town o f J ullandar in the state of Punjab. A lthoug h the B I A aff i r med the immig ration judg e’s ( I J ) decision to g rant Sing h r elief under the Convention Ag a inst Torture ( CAT), it held that an imputed political opinion was not a central reason for the p olice brutality ag ainst him and denied his applications for asy lum and withholding of removal. Rely ing in part o n our decision in Dinu v. A shcrof t , 3 7 2 F .3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2004), the B I A concluded that t h e P u n j abi police had leg itimate reasons f

or their arrest and detention of Sing h. The g overnment did not c ontest the I J ’ s d e c i s ion to g rant Sing h relief u n der CAT, and the B I A
, a c cording ly

, affirmed this portion of the I J ’s decision. W e gr a n t Sing h’s petition and hold that the record compels the conclusion that Sing h is elig ible for asy

lum and entitled to withholding of removal.

I.

Sing h’s troubles beg a

n shortly after his domestic servant, J abed Khan, left for v a c ation and failed to return. After being introduced to Khan by a friend’s servant, Sing h hired K han to perform various domestic tasks, including caring for Sing h’s mother

, t ak i ng his children to school, r unning e rrands, a

nd cooking for the family

. Sing h testified a t h i s hearing that Khan was “a v ery nice m a n ,” who “never abused any one, [ and] never used bad lan gu a ge.” Sing h also testified thatS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 5

Khan r eceived visitors who appeared to be K h an’s friends and relatives from his h ome state of J ammu and K ashmir. I n addition to these visits, Khan occasionally used his vacation from work to visit his villa ge f o r periods of a week to ten day s. After two y ears o f employ ment with Sing h, however, Khan left for vacation and never returned.

Shortly after Khan’s dep a r t u r e in May 2006, the police

came to Sing h ’s home and arrested h im at around 4:30 in the morning

. F our police officers took him to the police station and detained him for two day s. They interrog ated him about Khan, and told him that Khan was a Kashmiri terrorist. They then accused Sing h of helping the terrorists and of knowing ly employ ing Khan despite his connections to te r r o r ism. They asked Sing h what terrorist activities were being planned and accused him o f being a “ traitor” wh o was “working ag ainst the g overnment.”

The police did not limit themselves to questioning

, however. D uring the course of the inte rrog ation, Sing h was repeatedly subjected to eg reg ious phy sical abuse. O ne officer
g rabbed his hair and struck him r e p e a t e d l y in the face. The other officers then pushed him to the g round while one h eld his hands tog ether and another restrained him by placing his knee on Sing h’s neck. At the same time, another officer beat Sing h with a bamboo stick and leather belt. The police beat him for ten to fif

t e en minutes at a time and then continued interrog at ing h im. W hen Sing h apparently persuaded them that h e had n o information to offer them, the officers stripped his pants off and used them as a p u l l ey by which they hung him upside down until he lost consciousness. The police then alternated between han gi n g Sing h upside down and beating him. H e was beaten about five or six times during the course of his two-day

detention.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 6

F ollowing the phy sical abuse and the ex tended questioning

, the officers refused to let Sing h g o, a nd he was released only whe n h is family and neig hbors b r ibed them with 50,000 rupees. 1 T he officers w arned Sing h not to talk about what ha d happened at the station. Once he was released, h e was not a

ble to w alk because of the beating s a nd he h a d to seek medical attention. Sing h’s doctor feared reprisal by the police, however, and refused to treat him at the hospital, ins t ead g o ing to Sing h’s house to provide medical

care.

A f ew weeks later, at four in the morning

, t he police returned to Sing h’s home and arrested him a second time. The f our officers beg an asking him about Khan a g ain, and he told them that he had already g iven them all the information he h a d

. The chief police officer slapped Sing h and told the other officers to take him to the station to “make a man out o f him there.” He was taken to the interrog ation room, thrown

on the g r ound, and b e a ten while the officers as k e d him questions about Khan’s w h ereabouts, his knowledg e o f terrorist activities, and his own r ole in assisting the terrorists. W h en he told the officers that he did not know any thing

, they threatened to k ill him if h e r e fused to answer. The officers
ag ain put Sing h on the g round and beat him with a bamb o o stick a nd leather b e l t

. O ver the c o u rse of his four day s in detention, Sing h was b e aten eig ht to ten times. This time, Sing h’s family bribed the officers with 80,000 rupees in order

1 In 2 0 06
, 5 0 ,0 0 0 ru

p ees w as th e eq u iv alen t o f ap p ro x im ately $ 1
, 1 0 0

. A t th e tim e, Sin g h ’s y e arly salary ap p ears to h av e b een aro u n d 9 5 ,0 0 0

ru p ees.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 7

to obtain his release. 2 Shortly afte r his second arrest a nd beating s, Sing h fled to the United States.

During his hearing b e f

o r e the I J
, Sing h testified that he feared returning to I ndia because the police continued to look for h im and to harass his family

. Sing h stated that the police
went to his h ome 12 t o 1 3 t imes after h is departure for the United States. Once Sing h had fled, the p o l i c e targ e ted his wife, Sarpreet Kaur. T h ey arrested her, took her to the police station, detained her for the nig h t, and beat her. They asked her a bout S i n g h’s whereabouts and about his a ctivities ag ainst the g overnment. S i n gh’s family and neig hbors bribed the police to have his wife released

, this time pay ing 20,000
rupees. 3

The facts described above are contained in S ing h’s testimony b efore the I J
, who found h is testimony to be credible. Nonetheless, the I J denied S i n g h’s request for
asy lum and withholding of r emoval, because he concluded that Sing h had not demonstrated a nex u s between his persecution and a protected g round. 4 Relatedly

, the I J f ound that it was more likely than not that Sing h would be tortured if returned to I ndia and therefore g r anted his request f o r relief under CAT.

2 In 2 0 0 6 , 8 0 ,0 0 0 ru

p ees w as th e eq u iv alen t o f ap p ro x im ately

$ 1 ,7 5 0.

3 In 2 0 0 6 , 2 0 ,0 0 0 ru

p ees w as th e eq u iv alen t o f ap p ro x im ately

$ 4 4 0

.

4 Sin g h o rig in ally claim ed th at h e h ad b een p ersecu ted on acco u n t of h is

r e lig i o n , h is m em

b ersh ip in a p articu lar so cial g ro u p, an d an i m

p u t e d
p o litical op in io n

. His p e t i t io n f o r rev i ew co n cern s o n ly h i s claim o f an im p u ted p o litical o p in i o n

.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 8

The B I A a gr e e d with the I J and a ffirmed his ruling that Sing h h ad not established that an i m p u ted political opinion

was a central reason for his persecution b y the Punjabi police. Rely ing in part on our decision in Dinu v. A shcroft

, the B I A held that the I ndian g ove r n m e n t had a “leg itimate reason to arrest, detain, and question” Sing h, and that he was therefore inelig ible f

or a sy lum. The g overnment did n ot appeal the I J ’s determination that Sing h was entitled to relief un d er CAT, and the B I A a ffirmed the portion of the I J ’s decision g ranting such relief. Sing h filed a timely petition for review.

II.

W e have j u r i s diction over Sing h’s petition for r eview under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. W e review t h e denial of asy lum o r withholding of removal for substantial evi d en c e. Kumar v

. Gonzales

, 4 4 4 F .3d 1043, 1049 ( 9th Cir. 2006). “Under that standard, the B I A’s determination mus t b e upheld if it is supported b y reasonable, substantial and probative evidence from the record.” Id. W h ere, a s here

, the B I A adopts the reasoning o f the I J and adds addition a l reasons, w e r eview both decisions. Lopez-Cardona v. Holder

, 662 F

. 3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

A.

“I t is settled law that an applicant may establish a political opinion for purposes of asy lum relief by showing an ‘imputed political o p i n ion.’” Kumar
, 444 F .3d at 1053 (citation omitted). To demonstrate a nex us between Si n gh ’s mistreatment and an imputed political opinion, Sing h “must show (1) that

. . . his persecutors b e l i e v e d t h a t he held

. . . a political opinion; and (2) that he was h armed because of that political opinion.” Baghdasaryan v. Holder

, 592 F

. 3d 1018,S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 9

1 0 2 3 (9th Cir. 2010). Sing h’s asy lum application w a s submitted after the enactment of the REAL I D A c t , and he
must therefore demonstrate that an imputed political opinion

w as “at least one central reason” f or his persecut i o n

. 8 U.S.C. § 11 5 8 ( b )(1)(B )(i); see also Parussimova v

. Mukasey

, 555 F .3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2008). B ecause the I J and the B I A determined that Sing h’s testimony was c redible,

we treat the facts to which he testifi e d a s t ru e. See Cole v

. Holder , 659 F

. 3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Punjabi police attributed a political opinion to Sing h during t h e i r interrog ation and abuse of him. Testimony
reg arding a persecutor’s statements serves as direct evidence that the persecution was motivate d by a political opinion imputed to the applicant. See Hu v. Holder

, 652 F .3d 1 0 11, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Li v

. Holder

, 5 59 F .3d 1096, 1 1 11–12 (9th Cir. 2009) (“ P er secutors’ motivation should not be questioned when the persec u t o r s specifically articulate their reason for attacking a victim.”). The police

c a lled Sing h a “traitor” and repeatedly accused h im of “working a g ainst the g overnment.” Even after Sing h departed, the police continued to attribute a political opinion
to him in their statements. Sing h testified that the p olice told his wife tha t S i n gh w as a “ dog ” and asked her about his “activities a g ainst the g overnment.” Such a c cusations o f “acting ag ainst the g overnment” constitute an imputed political opinion. See Hu
, 652 F .3d at 1017–18. B ecause the inquiry in an imputed political opinion case focuses on the views of the persecutor, Garcia-Milian v. Holder

, No. 09- 71461, 2014 W L 5 5 5 138, at *3 (9th Cir. F eb. 13, 2014), Sing h’s credible testimony r eg arding the police of f i ce rs’
statements about him persuasively demonstrates that a c entral motive for persecuting h im was that they b elieved th a t he opposed the g overnment.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 10

I n addition to the direct evi d en c e of his persecutors’ statements, the indirect evidence supports Sing h’s testimony that he was persecuted because of an impute d political opinion. Sing h testified that the I ndian police were interested i n him because of his relationship to Khan, his domes t i c servant. An “applicant’s association with, or relationship to, people who are known to hold a particular political opinion”
may serve a s indirect ev i d e n c e o f a n imputed political opinion. Garcia-Milian

, 2014 W L 555138, at *3 (quoting Navas v. INS
, 217 F .3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000)) ( internal quotation mark o mitted). That appears to be precisely the

case here. The Pu n

j ab i police asserted that Sing h was a “traitor” based solely

on his association with Khan, a reason

we have repeatedly held t o s u p port the conclusion that a political opinion has been imputed to the applicant. See, e.g. , Silaya v. M

ukasey

, 524 F .3d 1066, 1 0 7 0

– 7 2 (9th Cir. 2 008) (holding that persecutors’ statements indicating that they h ad chosen h er because of h er father’s relat i o n s h i p to the Philippine g overnment constituted persecution on account o f

an imputed political opinion). The police targ eted Sing h a nd imputed antig over n ment views to him because of his relationship with another individ u a l w h o they considered h eld antig overnment political beliefs.

Y et , under the facts determined to be true by the I J a nd affirmed as such by t h e B I A, Sing h was not a terrorist, nor did he eng ag e in antig overnment activities. He testified that he had no association with terrorists and did not participate in
any such activity

. He also stated th at h e did n ot know
any thing about Khan or have any information rega rding Khan’s involvement with terrorist activities. Taking Sing h’s
tes t i m o n y as true, as we must, Sing h w as falsely accused o f being a terrorist and holding antig overnment views because of his association with Khan. The Punjabi police beat himS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 11

and hung him upside d o w n u ntil h e lost consciousness because they imputed Khan’s alleg ed political beliefs to him. Under o ur cases, this constitutes a nex us to a p r o t e c ted
g round. See Kumar
, 4 4 4 F. 3 d a t 1053–54. I ndeed, Sing h independently meets the c a usal burden imposed by the REAL I D Act: “[ T] o demonstrate that a protected g round w as ‘at least one central reason’ f or persecution, an a p p l i cant must prove that such g round was a cause of the persecutor’s acts.” Parussimova
, 555 F

. 3d at 741.

Our conclusion that the Punjabi police’s mistaken belief that S i ng h was a terrorist c onstitutes an imputed political

o p i n ion is supported by the leg islative history of the REAL I D Act. The Act requires asy lum applicants t o d e m o nstrate that the p rotected g round is “at leas t o ne central reason” for the persecution. Id. at 740. As the B I A has noted, Cong ress intended this amendment to eliminate the presumption previously a

pplied by our court that persecution is politically motivated in the absence of a n y evidenc e of a leg itimate prosecutorial purpose. See In re J-B-N

- & S

- M-
, 2 4 I

. & N

. Dec. 208, 214 n.9 ( BI A 2 0 0 7 ). T h e elimination of the presumption restored the law to its p r i o r s t ate: the b urden is

on the asy lum applicant t o o f fer e vidence as to the persecutor’s motive.

Althoug h the REAL I D Act was intended to overrule our “presumption,” it affirmed our prior imputed politica l o p i n ion

cases in an imp o r t a n t respect. W e h ad previously held that persecution b ased on the mistaken belief that the individ ual is a terrorist is persecution on account of an imputed political opinion. See, e.g. , Kumar
, 444 F .3d at 1054. I n e x p laining its new standard, Congr e ss ex plicitly reiterated that an applicant sufficiently sh o ws a nex us to a protected g r ound when he provides evidence that law enforcement mistakenlyS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 12

believes him to b e a t e r rorist. I n e x plaining the effect o f eliminating the presumption that persecution is the r esult o f politic al o p i nion when there is no evidence as to the reason for the punitive treatment, Cong ress stated:

The “central reason” standard w ill eliminate this pr e s u mption, and require aliens who alleg e persecution because t hey have been erroneously identified as terrorists to bear the

same burden as al l o ther asy lum applicants, that is, they will have to offer direct o r circums t an t i a l e v i d e n c e of motive, in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.

H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 165 (2005). T hus, t h e d ifference under the REAL I D Act is that an ap plicant must n ow introduce evidence to demonstrate th a t he was wrong ly

a ccused of being a terrorist instead of rely ing on a presumption that he w as persecuted on a ccount of a political opinion when no e vidence as to motive is p r e s e n ted. The House Report accomp a n y ing the REAL I D A ct makes clear that, as long as the applicant meets his e videntiary burden, the mistaken belief that an indivi d ual is a terrorist constitutes a

nex us to an imputed political opinion. As we have ex plained, in lig ht of the I J ’s credibility finding

, we take as true Sing h’s testimony th a t h e was not associated with terrorists and h ad
not eng ag ed in any terrorist a c tivities. W e a lso tak e a s t r u e his testimony that his persecutors wrong ly accu s e d h i m o f working ag ain s t the g overnment and being associated with terrorists. Thus, under the standard approved by Cong ress in the R EAL I D Act, Sing h has demonstrated a nex us to an imputed political opinion.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 13

Our decision in Dinu v

. Ashcroft is not t o t h e contrary , and the I J a n d B I A’s r eliance o n that decision is misplaced. The fac t s a n d c ircumstances in D inu are far different and o f

no relevance here. Dinu, wh o served in the military during the Romanian revolution, was arrested and investig ate d for his role in the massacr e o f c i v ilians. 372 F .3d at 1 044. He had been a member of a s p ecial security unit widely suspected of participating in the murders, which occurred in his hometown. Id. D inu himself ex pl a i n e d the justification for the Romanian investig ation o f h i m: he testified that “it

was p ublicly known that the a uthorities concluded that the security units in those times were responsible for shooting in the people, so every

body , every

body believed that it was the security units that shot the demo n s t rators, and they were try ing t o find a g uilty party .” Id. at 1045. F inally

, Dinu offered no direct, o r e v en i n direct, evidence that his persecution was any

thing but a criminal investig ation o r that it w as on account of an imputed politica l o p i nion. I d

. at 1044–45.

Here, Sing h has presented direct evidence that he was arrested a

nd severely beaten o n account of the p olitical beliefs that the Punjabi police imputed to him, and there is no evidence that any investig ation of him was c onducted for any

o t h e r reason. The only connection between Sing h and any possible wrong doing was the mistaken belief that because he hired K han as a servant, he must be a terrorist. B ecause Sing h h as prese nted direct evidence that the Punjabi police mistakenly b elieved him to be a terrorist, and there is no evidence that Sing h was the subject o f a leg itimateS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 14

investig ation based on other g rounds, Dinu ’ s holding is of no relevance here. 5

I n sum, D inu does not control this case. 6 Dinu is of little value in assessing asy lum claims b ased on imputed political opinion. I t applies only to cases in which an asy lum applicant is the subject of a leg itimate law enforcement i n v estig ation and offers no direct or indirect evidence that he i s being

5 T h e g o v ern m en t also relies on S h a rma v. Ho ld

e r , 6 3 3 F

. 3 d 8 6 5 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ). T h at case is n o t co n tro llin g h ere f o r t h e sam e reaso n th at Din u d o es n ot co n tro l

. In S

h a r ma , th e co u rt stated th at “ th e m otiv atio n o f th e p o lice w as clear: sto p Sh a r m a ’s fa t h er f ro m p u b lish in g h i s b oo k

. T h e p o lice n ev er i n q u ired in t o Sh arm a’ s o w n p o litical v iew s. W h en th ey p ick ed h i m u

p , th eir so le in q u iry p ertain ed to t h e statu s o f h is f

ath er’ s b o o k .” 6 6 3 F.3 d at 8 70

. Mo reo v er, th e co u rt d ism issed Sh arm a’ s

co n ten tio n s th at th e p o lice im p u ted h is f

ath er’ s b elief

s to h im as “ iso lated ”

an d “ h earsay ,” an d th u s en titled to “ less w eig h t th an th e o th er ev i d en ce in th e reco rd .” Id

. at 8 7 7 & n .1

. Here, in co n tr a s t , th e IJ f ou n d Sin g h ’ s testim o n y an d h is ap p licatio n as a w h ole to be cred ib le, an d t

h e ref eren ces t o S i n g h ’ s o w

n p o litical o p in io n w ere f ar f ro m i so lated ; th e p o l ic e rep eated ly ask ed S i n g h

, an d later h is w if e, ab o u t Sin g h ’ s o w

n w ork
ag ain st th e g o v ern m en t. T h e B IA also relied o n its o w n d ecisio n in Ma tter of R-O-
, 2 0 I. & N

. Dec. 45 5 (B IA ). In M a tter o f R-O-
, h o w ev er, th e B IA ag ai n u l t i m a t ely co n clu d ed th at “ th ere is n o ev id en ce th at th e resp on den t h as receiv ed an y th reats f ro m th e Go v ern m en t o n th e g ro u n d s

o f p o litical o p in io n

. . . .” Id

. at 4 5 9

.

6 A lth o u g h

w e h av e stated th at a lack o f p ro p er p ro ced u res an d th e u s e

o f to rtu re m ay ren d er law en f o rcem en t activ ities illeg itim ate, w e n eed n o t

co n sid er th o se q u estio n s h ere. S ee Li
, 5 5 9 F. 3 d at 1 1 09 (lack o f pro per p ro ced u res); Nu ru v. Go n za les , 4 0 4 F.3 d 1 2 0 7
, 1 2 2 3

– 2 4 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 5) (to rtu re). No r n eed w e co n sid er th at Din u w as a p re- REA L ID A ct case

w h ile th is case i s p o st- REA L ID. In s tead

, w h at m atters is t

h at i n Din u th ere w as n o ev id en ce t

h at th e asy lu m seek er w as b eaten o n acco u n t o f h is
p o litical o p in i o n

w h ile th e ev id en ce is u n ref u ted th at su ch w as th e cau s e

o f th e b ru tal p h y sical assau lts o n Sin g h

.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 15

subjected to harsh treatment o n account of a protected
g round.

Althoug h there is little if a n y e vidence that the police in Sing h’s case were eng ag ed in a leg itimate investig ation, even if the investig a tion we re leg itimate, Sing h could establish a

nex us in this case. W e ha v e held that, under the REAL I D Act’s standard, a persecutor may be motivated by

more than one central reason, and “an asy lum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant.” Parussimova
, 555 F .3d at 741 (9th Cir. 2009). B e cause mix ed motive analy sis e x ists in

cases g overned by t h e R EAL I D Act, a petitioner may have been persecuted both b e c a use of leg itimate investig atory

reasons and because o f h i s p o litical opinion (imputed o r actual), his relig ion, or other prote cted g round. The dissent

se e m i n gly fails to g rasp this point. 7 I n short, e ven if a petitioner’s persecution occurs d u ring the course of a leg itimate investig ation or prosecution, neither D inu nor any of our other cases r equires that the B I A or our court ig nore d irect o r indirect evidence that a persecutor was a lso

7 Co n t rary to t h e d issen t, w e h o ld th at irresp ectiv e o f an y o th er re a s o n f o r th e p o lice’ s p ersecu tio n o f S in g h

, th e ev id en ce co m p els th e co n clu sio n th at o n e cen tra l r e a s o n f

o r th e p ersecu tio n in th is case w as th e belief on th e p art o f th e p o l ice th at Sin g h h eld an an tig ov ern m en t p o litical o pin io n

. T h at is th e o n ly reaso n ab le j u stif icatio n f o r w h y th e p o lice called h im a

“ t r aito r,” accu sed h im o f “ w ork in g ag ain st th e g o v ern m en t,” an d in terro g ated h is w if

e reg ard i n g h i s “ activ ities ag ain st th e g o v ern m en t.” T o th e ex ten t th at th e d issen t m ak es t h e e x t rao rd in ary claim th at th e p olice

co u ld n o t h av e im

p u t ed a p o lit i c a l o p in io n to Sin g h b ecau se th ey in terro g ated h im f

o r in f o rm atio n ab o u t K

h an , su ch a claim is f

latly at od d s

w ith o u r p reced en t. S

ee, e.g

. , Ku ma r , 4 4 4 F.3 d at 1 0 4 7
, 1 0 5 3 –5 4 (f in d in g

a n ex u s t o an im

p u ted po litical o p i n io n in a case in w h ich th e o f

f icers to ld th e p etitio n er th at “ h e w o u ld b e k illed if h e d id n o t d isclo se th e id en tities

o f Mu slim terro rists an d r ev eal i n f o rm atio n ab o u t th eir p lan n ed terro rist activ ities,” id

. at 1 0 4 7 ).S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 16

motivated to harm th e a p p licant on account of a protected
g round. Cf. Li
, 559 F .3d at 1109 (recog niz ing that police may be motivated by b oth “prosecutorial aims an d r e l ig ious hatred” in a p re-REAL I D case). I f a petitioner has presented evidence that an imputed political o pinion was a cent r al

r eason for the persecution, as Sing h has here, then t h e f a ct that the persecution occurred during the c ourse of a leg itimate criminal investig ation w oul d n o t preclude elig ibility for
asy lum.

F or these reasons, we hold that the evidence compels the conclusion that a central reason for the phy sical a buse to which Sing h w as subjected was a n imputed political opinion and that he has established a nex us b etween that abuse and a protected g round.

B.

B e cause the evidence compels the conclusion that Sing h has e stablished a nex us to a p rotected g round, t h e o n ly questions remaining with respect to his asy lu m cl a im a re whether the eg reg ious p hy sical abuse he ex perienced rose to the level of p ersecution and whethe r he has a w ell-founded fear of future persecution. U nder most cir c umstances, we would be required to remand the matter to th e BI A t o make these determ i n a t i o ns in the first instance. INS v. Ventura
, 537 U .S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam); see also Hu
, 652 F .3d at 1020 (remanding b ecause the nex us inquiry and the persecution inquiry

are “distinct”).

Here, as w e held in F

e dunyak v. Gonzales

, 477 F .3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2007), however, the posture o f Sing h’s case renders

a remand unnecessary

. Id. at 1130–31. As in Fedunyak

, the I J g ranted Sing h relief under CAT and found that it was moreS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 17

likely than not that he would be tortured by the g overnment,

or with its acquiescence, if he returned to the country h e fled. Id. The B I A affirmed this finding

. The evi d e nce that the I J weig hed to determine that Sing h is more likely than not to be subjected to torture upo n h i s r e turn to I ndia is the same evidence that Sing h offered to establish his refug ee status. Sing h has met the hig h bur d e n of demonstrating that h e is likely to b e tortured, so he necessarily meets the lower burden fo r e l i g ibility for asy lum that he h as a w ell-founded fear o f future persecution. See Nuru
, 404 F .3d at 1228–29. Having established a

nex us between his persecution and a n imputed political opinion, and having established a well-founded fear of future pe rs ecution, a V e ntura remand is unnecessary

. Fedunyak

, 477 F

. 3d a t 1130–31. Thus, we remand to the B I A with instructions that the Attorney General ex ercise his discretion w hether to g rant asy lum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). Id. at 1131.

C.

Sing h is also entitled to w ithholding of removal. I n order
to e stablish e n t i t lement to withholding of removal, an applicant must show that i t i s “ more likely than not” that he will be persecuted on a c co u n t o f a p rotected g round. I d. at 1130. The B I A has held that Sing h is more likely than not to be tortured if return e d to I ndia. Given our holding o n the

nex us question, Sing h has necessarily d emonstrated that he is

mo r e l ikely than n ot to b e persecuted on a ccount of an imputed poli t i cal opinion and is e ntitled to withholding o f removal. Id. at 1130–31.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 18

III.

W e conclude that Sing h’s credible testimony compels the conclusion that an imputed political opinion was a cen t r al

reason for his persecution by t h e Punjabi police, and that he has a w ell-founded fear of future persecution. Acco rd ing ly

, we r emand this case to the BI A with instructions that the Attorney General ex ercise h i s d iscretion whether to g rant Sing h asy lum. W e also r emand f o r an order withholding removal of Sing h and g r anting r elief under the Convention Ag ainst Torture.

The p etition f

o r r e v i e w i s G R

A N T E D and REMANDED for the purposes described in the above opinion.

GEORGE, Senior District J u dg e, d issen t i n g in part; concurring

in part:

I respectfully dissent from the majority ’s holding that the

e v i d e nce compels the conclusion that a central reason fo r Sing h’s persecution was an imputed political opini o n

. The evidence, bot h direct and circumstantial, shows that the reason for the police’s arrest and mistreatment of Sing h was

an effort only to obtain information a b out Khan, a suspected terrorist. Sing h’s own testimony confirmed it. The I J f ound that testimony credible, and integ rated it into his r u ling that Sing h h a d n o t demonstrated a nex us b etween the actions o f the p olice and protected political opinion. The B I A

concurre d w i t h the I J ’s determination. Now, the majority rejects it all. I cann o t ag ree to pay lip service to the I J ’s credibility determination while at the same time ig noring the record upon which that determination stands.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 19

“To reverse the B I A finding we must find t h a t t h e evidence not only supports that conclusion, b ut compels it,” INS v

. Elias-Zacarias

, 502 U.S. 478, 481(1992) (emphasis in orig inal), and that “no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear o f pe r s e cution.” Id

. at 483–84. “The applicant must establi sh his case by ‘credible, direct, a nd specific evidence’ i n t h e record.” Sangha v. INS
, 103 F .3d 1482, 1487 ( 9th Cir. 1997) ( ci t ing Prasad v. INS
, 47 F .3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)).

The I J f ound that Sing h testified credibly

. “ [ W ] ithout an adverse credibility finding we accept a petitioner’s testimony

as credible because ‘[ a] ny other rule w ould put us in the position of second-g

uessing the credibility

of the petition on appeal when no doubts have been raised by the I mmig r ation J udg e o r the B oard.’” Canjura-Flores v. INS
, 784 F .2d 885, 888–89 (9th Cir. 1985). We also must consider the record a s a whole. Ratnam v. INS , 154 F .3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1998).

At the r emoval hearing s b efore the I J
, Sing h testified that he “was only arrested because of J abed Khan and they said he

was a terrorist and police a lleg ed that I w as helping the terrorists.” During ex amination, the foll o w ing ex chang e s also took place:

[ Sing h ’s lawy er to Sing h] :

Q: Ho w were y ou treated [ a t the time of the second arrest] ?

A: I mmediately on arrival a t the police station, they took me to the interrog ation

room and they threw me on the g round

an d s tarted to beat me up and they wereS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 20

repeating

all those four questions all over ag ain. He

– they

, were asking those questions and I told them t h at I d o not know a n y

thing a bout J abed Khan a

nd their chief man, he said, beat this, this
person ag ain because he’s not telling us the truth or he’s not coming u p with – a nd then they threa t e ned say ing that if y ou don’t answer o r g ive us the information this time, we will kill y ou.

. . .
Q: Did the police say any thing to y ou besides accusing y o u of being linked with a terrorist?

A: No, t h e y were – they w ere focused on asking me about the terrorist and they

, they said, h o w d o y ou h e lp them, tell us all about it. I think because o f me being a Sikh, they were, they

, were doing that more and more with me.

. . .
[ Government lawyer to Sing h] :

Q: Okay

, sir, I just w ant to make sur e I understand, okay

. So the reason t he police a rrested y ou is because they w ant to find out information – one is to find out information about J abed Khan.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 21

A: Yes.

Q: Okay

, a

n d [ the] second reaso n was b e c ause they accused y ou of hiring h i m

even thoug h y o u k

now that he’s a terrorist?

A: I did not k

now any thing about his being a terrorist and he was not a terrorist.

The I J found Sing h’s testimony c r edible in the following
terms:

I n assessing the credibility of the respondent, I have taken into ac count the rationality

, i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y a n d i n h e r e n t persuasiv e n e s s o f his testimony

. I n considering the foreg o ing

, I find that the respondent h as testi f

ied credibly and his application is credible.

I n concluding that Sing h had fai l ed to f actually dem o n s t rate the n ex us between his mistreatment and a p r o tected g r ound, the I J centered ex clusively on Sing h ’s testimony that the police focused on him only because he h ad hired J abed K

han and m i ght h ave information a bout Khan. He wrote:

[ T] he Court noted that [ Sing h] was asked repeatedly by Go v e r nment counsel w hy he

was a rrested and h e consistently a nswered that he had b e e n arrested because he h ad employ ed [ Khan]

.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 22

. . .

I n the C o u rt’s view, the record is consistent
t h a t the police were interested in the respondent because of his c onnection w ith an individual from an area of I n dia where there is
te rr o rist activity

. The respondent confirmed as much in his testimony

. . . .

The I J ’s credibility determination and his protectedg round analy sis are thus inter t wined. The majority would pull them apart, and draw o ur attention away from the actual

r eason upon which the credibility determination i s g rounded–that Sing h did nothing more than employ Khan to provoke the police’s interest. See Mengping Lu v. Mukasey

, 275 F ed. Appx

. 6 3 6, 637 n.1
, 2 0 0 8 W L 1817727, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. April 23, 2008) (citing M a r c os v. Gonzalez

, 410 F .3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2 005) (“Ou r review [ of an I J ’s adverse credibility determination] focuses only on the actual reasons relied upon by

the I J ”)).

Shoafera v

. INS
, 228 F .3d 1070 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2000), is instructive o n the role of uncontroverted testimony a nd the I J ’s credibility de t e rmination in establishing the motivation of a persecutor. I n that case, Shoafera contended that she was raped by a Tig rean in her Ethiopian community on account o f her Amh a ra n e t h nicity

. L ike this case, the I J had f ound the alien’s testimony credible y et ruled that the alien’s claims did
not meet the requirements of showing that they were based on

a protected g round. See id. a t 1 0 7 4–75 n.3. The Shoafera
court g ranted Shoafera’s petition o v er the dissent’s arg ument that the I J had made a p artial a d v e r s e credibility determination reg arding the ethnic motivation of Shoafera’s

a ttacker when it found that “the respondent’s speculatio n s ,S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 23

however, and they ar e the Court b elieves speculations a nd conclusions, d o not prove her claim.” I d

. at 1079 (W a llace, J
, dissenting ). T h e court reasoned that the I J had not announced an adverse credibi l i ty d etermination, but instead had merely ex plained w hy

, despite S h oafera’s credible testimony

, she had not e stablished elig ibility f or asy lum. Id.
at 1074 n 3. The Shoafera court also noted that “ n e i t h e r the I J nor the I

NS e licited a

ny testi m o n y from Shoafera demonstrating that the nature o r basi s for her testimony was questionable.” Id. at 1075.

This ca s e presents a

n even more c lear-cut record on the I J ’s credibility determination than Shoafera. The record in this case does not include “ specu lations and conclusions” which r aised the issue of an adverse credibility determination and split the p a nel in Shoafera

. And here, as established b y the removal hearing transcript quote d a b o ve, both Sing h’s counsel an d counsel for the g overnment specifically

ex a mined Sing h o n what h e was c l aiming

. His uncontroverted answers show that he was persecuted “only ” b e c a u se he h ad employ ed Khan and because the poli c e

wa n t e d to find out information reg arding Khan. F or the majority in this case to r each a different conclusion would be
to rely o n the same sort of “ specu l a t i o n s and conclusions” that the Shoafera court f

o u n d out-of-place in considering a credibility

determination.

Even if we deemed that the fa c tual circumstances upon which the I J relied for his imputed p olitical opinion finding need n ot be taken as true, the B I A’s d ecision still w ould be supported by substantial evidence. The majority emphasiz e s the “ working ag ainst the g overnment” accusation as evidence that the persecution in this case is b ased on imputed political opinion. However, in th e c ases cited by the majority

, theS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 24

“ a g a i n s t t he g overnment” accusations, and similar statemen t s , have b e e n evaluated in the contex t of the surrounding circumstances upon which the accusation is made

, a n d not just because the phrases were spoken.

I n Zhiquang H

u v. Holder

, 652 F

. 3d 1 011 (9th Cir. 2011), the Chinese police accused Hu o f “g athering a crowd to cause trouble and disturb the order of society ,” along with acting
ag ainst the g overnment. Id. a t 1 0 1 7

. I n response to the police abuse, Hu told them that he w as “merely i n f av o r o f ‘the leg al rig hts of those laid o ff workers,’” id

. , a clearly political motivation. The case s c i ted by the Zhiquang Hu
court also share a link between the “ag ainst the g overnment” accusatio n a n d some identified act or conduct which constituted a protected g round. I n Y an Xia Zhu v. Mukasey

, 53 7 F. 3 d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008), the petitioner suffered harm on account of an imputed political o p i n ion, where the Chinese police arrested p etitioner and accuse d h e r of being “ag ainst the g overnment” after she sent a letter to th e local
town c ondemning the a

ppointment o f her rapist to a position of local p o litical power. And in Baghda s a r y an v

. H older

, 592 F .3d 1018, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2010), p olitical opinion

was imputed to a petitioner where a “top law enforc e m e n t official indicated that [ the petitioner] was detained a nd beaten because he was ‘defaming ’ and ‘raising his h e ad’” ag ainst
g overnment corruption.

Unlike those cases, there is no r eason here to believe that the basis for the accusations made a g ainst Sing h went bey ond what Sing h testified to. Th e o n e underly ing f actual circumstance that g ave the p olice their reason t o a r rest a nd interrog ate Sing h, as Singh h i mself acknowledg es, was that he had employ ed a suspected terrorist. And based on that, the police a ccused Sing h of helping the terrorists, harbo ringS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 25

information reg arding a ctivities of individuals planning
ag ainst the g overnment, being a tr a i t or and working ag ainst the g overnment. Police at no time accused Sing h of being a terrorist himself; at no time during S i n gh ’ s torture did they attempt to ex act from h im a confession to being a terrori s t ; and a t no time did their actions d e v i ate f rom what was, according to the evi d e n ce, an interrog ation to g ain information a

bout Khan, not one where Singh ’ s political opinion made him a terrorist suspect.

I do ag ree with the import of the majority ’s opinion, that the o nly way to find a nex us to imputed political opinion is to characteriz e Singh as a terrorist. “To e stablish an imputed political opinion, the a

pplicant must show that his persecutors actually imputed a political o pinion to him.” Sangha v. INS
, 103 F .3d a t 1 489 ( quoting A r reiaga-Barrientos v. INS
, 937 F

. 2d 4 11, 414 (9th Cir. 1991)). Yet, that characteriz ation of the police’s motives for persecuting Sing h is based on

s u p p osition. I n this c a se, Sing h insisted to police that Khan

was not a terrorist at all, let alone that h e knew that Khan was

one. The sing le fact that Sing h hire d Khan does n ot reflect sufficient motive for the conclusion that the g o v e rnment thoug ht that Sing h was politically a lig ned with the terrorists. This is not a case, like Singh v

. I lchert

, 63 F .3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute on o ther grounds a s stated by Parussimova v. Mukasey

, 555 F

. 3d 734, 739– 4 0 ( 9 t h Cir. 2009), wh e r e the g overnment concedes that police thoug ht that the petitioner was a militant because he had been visited overnig h t and o n six other o ccasions b y a g roup of known and armed militants. Singh v. I lchert

, at 1503–04, 1509. I t is

a case of the police taking Sing h’s hiring of a su s p e c t e d terrorist to its log ical ex tension–that Sing h would have useful i n f o r mation about that terrorist. That the police crossed al lS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 26

boundaries in pursuing that lead does n ot chang e the factor motivating them.

T he majority further reasons that the police’s interes t i n Sing h’s relationship to K

han serves a s indirect evidence o f an imputed political opinion. According to the majority

, b e c ause the police a ccused Sing h of being a “ traitor” based solely on his association with Khan, they imputed a political opinion to him. However, the police’s use o f the word “traitor,” according to Sing h, was connected to t he accusation o f working a g ainst the g overnment. As with the “working
ag ainst the g overnment” c h arg e, there is no reason to believe that the “ traitor” label applied by p olice reached bey ond the accusations that Sing h helped the terrorists, had information
reg arding their activities, and k nowing ly employ ed one. Nor would the poli c e ’ s use of a n epithet, such as calling Sing h a “dog ,” reveal a

n imputed political opinion. S ee Danilova v

. Holder

, — F ed. Appx

. —, 2014 W L 2211724, at *1 (9th Cir. May 2 9
, 2014) (“Substantial e v idence also supports the B I A ’s conclusion that ethnic slurs u sed by police while mistreating Danilova did not show that her interracial relationship, rather than investig ation of crime, w as the r eason for the Moldovan authorities’ interest in her”) (citing P arussimova v. Mukasey

, 555 F .3d at 741–42).

The majority cites Silaya v. Mukasey

, 524 F .3d 1066 (9th C i r

. 2008), for the conclusion that the police targ eted Sin gh and imputed antig o vernment views to him b ecause of his relations h i p with Khan. I n Silaya

, the petitioner was kidnapped, tortured and raped by members of a v i olent antig overnm e n t opposition g roup who knew who the petitioner was, knew that her f a t h e r was a veteran w ho supported the g overnment, and made c o m m e nts indicating that the petitioner “was chosen as a victim because of herS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 27

father’s ties to the g overnment.” Id

. at 1072. I n this case, no such link to the political views of a family member ex ists. I n fact, even if th e re was evidence that the police were motivated to punish Sing h simply because of his a ssociation with Khan, “‘evidence pointing to a nother motive,’ [ makes] Silaya [ ] not on point.” Sharma v. Holder

, 633 F .3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Navas v. INS
, 217 F .3d 646, 659 n.18 (9th Cir. 2000))

. I n Sharma

, the court found that “[ w] here police beat and threaten the spouse of a known dissident, it is log ical, in the absence of

evidence pointing to another motive,
to c o n clude that they did so because of the spouse’s presumed
g uilt by association.” Sharma v. Holder

, at 871 (citing Navas
, 217 F .3d at 659 n

. 1 8 ) ( em phasis added)). Here, there is no absence o f evidence that the police arrested and interrog ated Sing h only in their pursuit of information about Khan. The majority ’s hunt for c ircumstantial evidenc e to demonstrate otherwise comes up empty

- handed.

The majority also concludes that there i s little evidence that the police in Sing h ’s c ase were eng age d i n a leg itimate investig ation. I n summing up w hy he was arrested, Sing h testified that he “was only arrested b e c a use of J abed Khan and they said he was a terrorist and p olice alleg ed that I was helping the terrorists.” B ut, that falls short of “show[ ing ] that [ Sing h ’s] persecutors actually imputed a political opinion to him.” See Sangha v. INS
, 103 F .3 d a t 1 4 8 9. Certainly

, the police thoug ht that Singh

, w h e t h e r k n o w ing ly o r unknowing ly

, had helped a terrorist by employ in g K han for
two y e ars. B ut the evidence is devoid of any i n t e r e s t by the police about Sing h’s own political opinions, and the police’s brutality in interrog ation does n ot f ill the space i n the analy sis

. T h e lack of interest by police in Sing h’s political opinion is o nly punctuated by the fact that the police releasedS I N G H V

. H O L D E R 28

Sing h after e ach arrest and interrog ation upon the p ay ment o f a bribe.

F inally

, the majority claims that e ven if a leg itimate investig atory r eason ex is ted for Sing h ’s persecution, Sing h has p resen t ed sufficient evidence to show that imputed political opinion was also a central reason for it. “The task o f the alien is simply to demonstrate the reasonablen ess of a motivation which related to one o f the enumerated g rounds.” Singh v

. Ilchert

, 63 F .3d at 151 0 (citing Matter of R-
, I nt. Dec. 3195, 1 2–13 (B I A 1992) (Dunne, M.M. diss e n t i n g in part)); see also P a russimova v

. Mukasey

, 555 F

. 3d at 741 ( petitioner must “produce evidence from which i t i s reasonable to b elieve that the h a r m was motivated, a t least in part , by an actual or implied p rotected g round”) (citing Borga

v. INS
, 175 F .3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (first emphasis in orig inal)).

I submit that it is n ot reasonable to conclude that a c entral

reason for the I ndian police’s persecution of Sing h was based

on imputed politica l opinion. Sing h confirmed in his testimony that the only reason for his arrests a nd interrog ations was to g ain information a bout Khan and what Sing h had done to help terrorist gr o u p s

. The police never accused Sing h of being a terroris t , a n d never asked him to confess that he was. The police n ever accused Sing h o f being

a terrorist to any o n e else, including his wife, even thoug h after Sing h fled to the United States, the poli c e w e nt to Sing h’s house numerous times and arrested his wife to try to locate Sing h. And, had the police believed Sing h t o be a terrorist or hold political opinions a lig ning himself with the terrorists, one would no t ex p ect the police to release him on two separate occasions af t er t orture did not e x tract the information about Khan that they were seeking

.S I N G H V

. H O L D E R 29

W h ether or not we r es pect the I J ’ s credibility determinatio n , t he B I A had ample r eason to believe that Sing h did not meet his burden of proof. Certainly

, it was not compelled to do so. I would, therefore, deny the petition for review and application for withholding of removal.

I c oncur w ith the opinion insofar as it r emands for the
g ranting of relief pursuant to the Convention Ag ainst Torture.