In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 07-2438

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VIRGINIA CARTER,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 CR 308—Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 7, 2008—DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2008

____________

Before RIPPLE, WILLIAMS and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Virginia Carter was convicted by

jury of tax fraud, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), money

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and

engaging in monetary transactions knowing that the

property involved represents the proceeds of an unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. The district

court sentenced her to twenty-four months’ imprisonment,
2 No. 07-2438

The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See also 18 U.S.C. 2

§ 3742(b).

a sentence below the advisory guidelines range. The 1

Government timely appealed the sentence. For the 2

reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

Robert Carter embezzled money from his insurance

business over several years. In 1999 and 2000, his accountant prepared tax returns that reported a total income

from those years of less than $300,000. These returns

under-reported the Carters’ income by nearly $1,700,000.

His wife, Virginia Carter, signed those joint tax returns.

In 2002, Ms. Carter filed for a divorce from Robert. Her

divorce attorney was unaware that much of the couple’s

money had been obtained through fraud, and he recommended that she attempt to take control of the couple’s

liquid assets in order to secure those funds in the

pending proceedings. In that year, Ms. Carter transferred

more than $3,900,000 into new and previously existing

bank accounts bearing only her name.

Ms. Carter was charged with two counts of tax fraud for
No. 07-2438 3

26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) makes it a felony to “[w]illfully make[] and

3

subscribe[] any return, statement, or other document, which

contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made

under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe

to be true and correct as to every material matter.”

18 U.S.C. § 1956 states: 4

(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a

financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form

of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such

a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds

of specified unlawful activity—

(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of

specified unlawful activity; or

(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a

violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue

Code of 1986; or

(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or

in part—

(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,

the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds

of specified unlawful activity; or

(continued...)

under-reporting her income in 1999 and 2000. She was 3

also charged with twenty-three counts of money laundering, twenty-two of which went to trial. Eighteen of the

money laundering counts that went to trial were based

on allegations that, from March 29 to September 18, 2002,

Ms. Carter had engaged in monetary transactions to

disguise the proceeds of fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956. The other four counts of money laundering were 4
4 No. 07-2438

(...continued) 4

(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement

under State or Federal law,

shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or

twice the value of the property involved in the transaction,

whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than

twenty years, or both. For purposes of this paragraph, a

financial transaction shall be considered to be one involving

the proceeds of specified unlawful activity if it is part of a

set of parallel or dependent transactions, any one of which

involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and all

of which are part of a single plan or arrangement.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, it is illegal to “knowingly engage[] or 5

attempt[] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally

derived property of a value greater than $10,000.”

based on allegations that Ms. Carter had engaged in

financial transactions with the proceeds of fraud between

April 10 and April 29, 2002, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1957. Ms. Carter testified at her trial and denied the

5

tax fraud and money laundering allegations. The jury

found her guilty on all counts.

At sentencing, the district court heard arguments by

Ms. Carter and the Government regarding the presentence

investigation report (“PSR”) and the calculation of the

advisory guidelines range. The court then determined the

base offense level for Ms. Carter’s offenses to be 29, which

included a two-level increase for obstruction of justice.

The resulting advisory guidelines sentencing range was

87 to 108 months’ imprisonment. After considering the

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court
No. 07-2438 5

imposed a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. The

district court stated:

Well, I don’t see any legal basis for a departure, so

that leaves the issues raised by Section 3553 in determining a sentence that is proper under the facts of the

case, and not greater than necessary, to supply the

reasons for the penalties in our criminal justice system.

There is no question that the Federal law was broken

in this case. A jury so found that Mrs. Carter broke

the law on a number of occasions, I think there was

something like 30 counts.

As I looked over the counts to which she was found

guilty, the tax counts—the first year, 1999, certainly

I think that a spouse who is faced with a tax return

that is only $40,000 out of whack probably wouldn’t

notice it. But the next year when they went on the

wild spending spree it kind of defies reason that

you wouldn’t look at the return and say, Wait a minute, there is something wrong here.

I believe that at some point Mrs. Carter must have

known her husband was stealing money because

their spending went from one level to an entirely

different level.

There is no question that when her husband was on

his way to prison, or was about to go to prison, she

took it upon herself to try and take this money and

make it as difficult as possible for anybody, including

creditors and the government and the tax people, from

collecting it.
6 No. 07-2438

So, she violated the law, and the law she violated

was structuring and money laundering. Having said

that, this is obviously not a paradigm of the money

laundering cases.

The article in the sentencing guidelines by the

Commission indicates that Congress’ original purpose

was, in the context of organized crime, to prevent

proceeds from crimes from being used to commit

other crimes. However, it is still a violation of the

law, which she did.

Now, in considering what an appropriate sentence

in this case is, it does seem to me that it would be

entirely improper to give her a sentence that was

similar, or certainly higher, than what her husband

got. Her husband was the source of the illegal funds.

She did benefit from them though, there is no question about that.

Now, he got, I believe, 71 months, which is certainly

in my judgment an appropriate judgment in the

fraud conduct in which he engaged in. I think, on the

other hand, we do have the age of Mrs. Carter, she

is 61, and that is not the age of your normal criminal

that comes before the Court for sentencing.

I do think that she probably did freak out when she

found out that her husband was basically on his way to

prison and had stolen all this money, and I think she

acted to a certain extent out of an attempt to protect

herself, which I believe, if I remember correctly, I think

her divorce lawyer said that he had suggested that that

money be put in her name that she was aware of,

because I think they were contemplating a divorce.
No. 07-2438 7

Now, that is not an unusual recommendation.

Having never been a matrimonial lawyer it is my

understanding that matrimonial lawyers always tell

the wife, If you can do it, get the money in your name

and fight about it later in court rather than let your

husband take it and you have to fight for it. It is the

old, A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.

So, her actions are not—while certainly not legal,

were not wholly not understandable.

I believe also that she probably—I am certain she

didn’t anticipate the consequences of her actions. She

may have known they were illegal, but certainly didn’t

expect them to be to the extent where she would be

standing here possibly subjected to a sentence of

87 months.

I believe she also did not receive good advice. The

advice would have been to don’t do anything, this

money is tainted money. Whatever advice she received, that wasn’t it, and she certainly didn’t follow it.

There is no indication that she had anything to do

with the fraud. It does, however, seem to me that she

must have been aware at some point that her husband

was doing something illegal because of the vast

amount of money that all of a sudden came into

his hands, buying a piano, a ring, et cetera.

Her actions were over a relatively short period of

time and the Government did recover a good bit of

the money.

One of the comforting features of the guidelines was

that this type of question didn’t come up. It was a
8 No. 07-2438

guidelines case, if you don’t find a reason for a departure, you sentence. Now that we have the authority

and the discretion to sentence, we have to make a

conscious decision of what is a fair sentence, and it

is not an easy time.

Having considered everything, it seems to me that

a 24 month sentence is appropriate in this case.

. . . I think this case is a serious one, and I don’t think

that a 12 month or a 12 month and a day sentence

is appropriate.

I think under all the circumstances I think that when

one considers the age of—and I don’t mean to suggest that she is an old lady, I am considerably older

than she is, but I think it does reflect the seriousness

of the offense, I think it does reflect the characteristics

of the offense, which is not your paradigm instance of

money laundering, and I think it does protect the

public from further crimes from this defendant.

I don’t anticipate her breaking the law again, and

I think that certainly a sentence within the guidelines

would have been [disparate] from her husband’s

sentence.

Sent. Tr. at 29-33.

II

DISCUSSION

We review a sentence for procedural error and substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d
No. 07-2438 9

691, 696 (7th Cir. 2008). We therefore begin by ensuring

that the district court did not commit any significant

procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [section] 3553(a)

factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous

facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from

the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,

597 (2007); United States v. Gordon, 513 F.3d 659, 666 (7th

Cir. 2008).

If we determine the district court’s sentencing decision

to be procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. In reviewing the

district court’s decision on the issue of reasonableness, we

employ the deferential abuse of discretion standard.

Gordon, 513 F.3d at 666; United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d

606, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, our “task on reasonableness review is limited.” United States v. Wachowiak, 496

F.3d 744, 754 (7th Cir. 2007). We must consider the sentencing court’s explanation of its reasons for imposing a

particular sentence. That explanation need not be exhaustive but it must be adequate “to allow for meaningful

appellate review and to promote the perception of fair

sentencing.” Omole, 523 F.3d at 697, 698 (quoting Gall, 128

S. Ct. at 597). If the sentence imposed is outside the guidelines range, the district court must provide a justification

that explains and supports the magnitude of the variance.

Id.; see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.

In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence that falls outside the advisory guidelines range,
10 No. 07-2438

we must give due deference to the district court’s determination that the section 3553(a) factors, taken as a whole,

justified the extent of the variance. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597;

Gordon, 513 F.3d at 666. The fact that we “might reasonably

have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate

is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall,

128 S. Ct. at 597. Our review must take into account that

a “sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts

and judge their import under [section] 3553(a) in the

individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence,

makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of

the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.”

Id. (quotation omitted). Because the district court has

greater familiarity with the case and the individual defendant and therefore an institutional advantage over an

appellate court in making sentencing determinations, we

must defer, absent an abuse of discretion, to its ruling.

Id.; Gordon, 513 F.3d at 666.

In our consideration of the substantive reasonableness

of a sentence, it is important to bear in mind that “[t]he

concept of substantive reasonableness contemplates ‘a

range, not a point.’ ” Omole, 523 F.3d at 698 (citation

omitted). “Because the ‘contours of substantive reasonableness review are still emerging,’ we cannot target a

fixed point at which a sentence turns from reasonable to

unreasonable, or vice versa.” Id. (quoting Wachowiak, 496

F.3d at 750, 751). “A variant sentence based on factors

that are particularized to the individual defendant may

be found reasonable, but we are wary of divergent sentences based on characteristics that are common to similarly situated offenders,” id., and sentences that “deviate[]
No. 07-2438 11

from the guidelines solely on the basis of overstated

mitigating factors or ‘normal incidents’ of the offense,”

Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 754 (emphasis added). Even if a

judge overstates mitigating factors or considers “normal

incidents” of an offense, however, if such a consideration is “just one of many reasons the judge gave for [his]

below-guidelines sentence,” the sentence will be affirmed.

See id.

Here, there is a sizable difference between the advisory

range and the sentence imposed on Ms. Carter. The

sentencing court therefore was required to enunciate

persuasive reasons, based on the factors in section 3553(a),

for the variance. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97; Omole, 523

F.3d at 698. The Government contends that seven aspects

of the district court’s explanation of the variance were

either weak or impermissible justifications for mitigation,

or were factually incorrect. The Government submits

that any justifications properly relied on by the district

court were insufficient to support the extent of the variance and that the sentence therefore is substantively

unreasonable. We shall consider each of the Government’s arguments.

A.

The Government’s first two contentions relate to the

district court’s primary explanation for the sentence

variance. The district court’s stated explanation for the

below-guidelines sentence relied primarily on two

factors: the district court’s finding, based in part on

Ms. Carter’s age, that she was unlikely to commit future
12 No. 07-2438

Ms. Carter’s age at the time of sentencing is the relevant 6

comparison because the Sentencing Commission Report, on

which the Government relies, uses the offender’s age at the time

of sentencing. Appendix A to the 2006 Sentencing Commission

Report, Descriptions of Datafiles, Variables, and Footnotes, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/appendix_A.pdf.

According to the Sentencing Commission Report, the median 7

age of tax offenders in 2006 was 50 years.

According to the Sentencing Commission Report, the median 8

age of money launderers in 2006 was 40 years.

crimes, and its conclusion that the seriousness and characteristics of her offense were not part of the heartland of

money-laundering offenses that the guidelines were

designed to address. Sent. Tr. at 32-33. In our view, the

Government’s objections to the district court’s primary

justification for the variance are, under the circumstances presented here, without merit.

The Government first submits that Ms. Carter’s age

was a weak mitigating factor because her age, 61 years,

did not set her apart from the usual tax or money-laundering offender. It relies for this proposition on the 2006 6

Sentencing Commission Report, which found that 47.7

percent of tax offenders were over 50, and that, for 7

persons whose primary offense involved money laundering, 20.4 percent of offenders were over 50. U.S. Sen8

tencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing

Statistics, T.6 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/

ANNRPT/2006/table6.pdf.

Statistical evidence such as that proffered by the Government can no doubt be a helpful tool to a sentencing
No. 07-2438 13

We also note that the statistics regarding the age of offenders 9

whose primary offense category was money laundering might

be a more accurate benchmark than the statistics regarding those

who committed tax fraud. The Report defines a “primary offense

category” as “the offense code applicable to the count of conviction with the highest statutory maximum.” See Appendix A,

(continued...)

judge. Yet, there is certainly no evidence that Congress

ever intended that such evidence rigidly cabin the discretion of the district court in exercising its duty under

section 3553(a). In any event, the breadth of the statistical

categories tendered by the Government counsels in

favor of extreme caution in relying on such raw numbers

in the delicate task of sentencing. For instance, the Government notes that, in 2006, almost one-half of tax offenders were over 50 years old. This statistic conveys little

probative information, however, because it does not

provide the age distribution of offenders in the “over 50”

category. Furthermore, it includes all types of tax offenses,

not just the particular tax fraud committed by Ms. Carter,

again without describing the distribution of ages among

those different tax offenses. Nor does the statistic convey

any other relevant measure of the data, like the mean,

median and mode. Because of the caution with which

we approach statistical analysis generally, and because

of the particularly imprecise nature of this statistic in

particular, we cannot conclude on this basis alone that

the district court clearly erred when it found that Ms.

Carter was not a tax offender of the age that “usually”

comes before the courts.

9
14 No. 07-2438

(...continued) 9

available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/appendix_

A.pdf. Ms. Carter’s primary offense category would be money

laundering because it carries the higher statutory maximum

term of imprisonment. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (setting a

statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment for money

laundering), with 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (setting a statutory maximum

of three years’ imprisonment for tax fraud). Ms. Carter, whose

primary offense category would be money laundering, might

be more accurately compared to other offenders whose

primary offense also was money laundering than those offenders

whose worst offense was the comparatively lesser offense of tax

fraud. According to the Government’s statistics, for persons

whose primary offense involved money laundering, only 20.4

percent of offenders were over 50.

The Government additionally submits that Ms. Carter’s

age was an improper consideration because she is not

exceptionally elderly or infirm. It also submits that the

district court did not give a sufficient explanation for why

Ms. Carter’s age was significant. We cannot accept these

contentions. The district court’s discussion with counsel

and its statement of reasons make clear that it considered

Ms. Carter’s age to be a mitigating factor not because she

was infirm, but because her age set her apart from the

average offender and made it less likely that she would

commit these crimes again. See Sent Tr. at 30 (“I think, on

the other hand, we do have the age of Mrs. Carter, she

is 61, and that is not the age of your normal criminal that

comes before the Court for sentencing.”), 32 (“I think that

when one considers the age of—and I don’t mean to

suggest that [Ms. Carter] is an old lady, . . . but . . . I don’t
No. 07-2438 15

anticipate her breaking the law again.”). The likelihood

of recidivism is a proper sentencing consideration. 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (“The court, in determining the

particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the

need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public

from further crimes of the defendant.”). Indeed, we have

held specifically that a district court may properly consider a defendant’s age as it relates to the possibility of

her committing crimes in the future. See United States v.

Holt, 486 F.3d 997, 1004 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming a belowguidelines sentence where the district court’s only

reason for the variance was that the defendant’s age made

it unlikely that the defendant again would be involved

in another violent crime). We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that,

based on her age and the totality of the circumstances,

Ms. Carter was unlikely to commit further crimes in the

future. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion

when it concluded that this factor counseled in favor of

a sentence significantly below an advisory guidelines

sentence. See id. (affirming a sentence of 200 months’

imprisonment, 62 months below the guidelines range,

where the variance was based solely on the offender’s

age); see also Omole, 523 F.3d at 698.

The Government’s second contention is that the district court erred when it determined that Ms. Carter’s

offenses were not typical money laundering offenses. The

Government relies on the following statement by the

district court:

So, [Ms. Carter] violated the law, and the law she

violated was structuring and money laundering.
16 No. 07-2438

Having said this, this is obviously not a paradigm of

the money laundering cases.

The article in the sentencing guidelines by the

Commission indicates that Congress’ original purpose

was, in the context of organized crime, to prevent

proceeds from crimes being used to commit other

crimes.

Sent. Tr. at 29-30. The Government also relies on another

statement that the court made after it determined and

announced Ms. Carter’s sentence: “I think under all the

circumstances . . . [the sentence] does reflect the seriousness of the offense, I think it does reflect the characteristics

of the offense, which is not your paradigm instance of

money laundering.” Id. at 32-33.

The Government submits that there are three types of

money laundering: spending, concealment and promotion. Ms. Carter committed two of those types of laundering, specifically spending and concealment. The third

type, promotion, refers to money laundering designed

to promote an underlying illegal activity, for instance,

drug smuggling or racketeering. In the Government’s

view, the district court’s statement reflected an improper

assessment that Ms. Carter’s spending and concealment

were less serious types of money laundering than promotion. The Government’s argument is twofold: first, that

the district court’s statement reflects a finding that concealment and spending are less serious than promotion,

and second, that such a finding is improper because

Congress intended to punish identically promotion,

concealment and spending offenses. The Government
No. 07-2438 17

contends that the only proper consideration is “the extent

and magnitude of the laundering—not a non-existent

distinction between promotion, concealment, and spending.” Br. at 27. It contends that Congress intended to

punish identically promotion, concealment and spending,

as demonstrated by the statutory scheme, which sets the

same maximum term of imprisonment for promotion

and concealment. See 18 U.S.C. 1956.

In stating that Ms. Carter’s offense was not the typical

case of money laundering, the district court referred to a

1997 report by the Sentencing Commission. See Sentencing Policy for Money Laundering Offenses, United

States Sentencing Commission (Sept. 18, 1997), available

at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/LAUNDER.PDF. That

report states that the “relatively high base offense levels

under the money laundering guidelines,” id. at 4, are

“inflexible and arbitrarily determined” without connection “to the seriousness of the defendant’s actual offense

conduct,” id. at 9. The Sentencing Commission conducted a multi-year study on money laundering sentences

and determined that “money laundering sentences are

being imposed for . . . conduct that is substantially less

serious than the conduct contemplated when the money

laundering guidelines were first formulated.” Id. at 5. The

Commission concluded from its investigation that the

sentencing structure was generating disproportionate

penalties for violations of federal laws in that serious

misconduct was not being punished more severely than

less serious offenses and that the structure should be

recalibrated to reflect directly the seriousness of the

underlying offense. Id. at 10. The Commission noted a
18 No. 07-2438

particular concern regarding offenses involving the

concealment of the proceeds of drug trafficking, the

promotion of further criminal conduct, and the use

of foreign banks, international transactions or other

sophisticated forms of money laundering. See id. at 10 &

n.22.

Here, the district court’s consideration of whether

Ms. Carter’s offense was a typical money laundering

offense was within the bounds of permissible interpretation. A sentencing court is required to consider “the need

for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of

the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

The district court concluded that Ms. Carter’s offense

was not in the heartland of offenses that the Sentencing

Commission intended to address when it set the guidelines. Its conclusion is supported by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement. The Government’s contention that promotional and concealment offenses carry

the same maximum term of imprisonment is correct, but

unavailing. The district court, in its analysis, did not

compare worst-case offenders who simply had undertaken different types of money laundering; instead, it

concluded that Ms. Carter’s offense, when viewed in

light of all the circumstances, was not of the sort that had

caused the guidelines to be set at the level at which

they had been set. The district court did not abuse its

discretion when it selected a sentence that “reflect[ed] the

seriousness of” and “provide[d] just punishment for the

offense” actually committed by Ms. Carter. See id.; see also

United States v. Walters, 87 F.3d 663, 672 (5th Cir. 1996)
No. 07-2438 19

(holding that a sentence reduction was not disproportionate in light of the district court’s conclusion that the

guidelines overstated the seriousness of the offender’s

actual money-laundering conduct).

B.

In addition to the Government’s first two objections,

which relate to the district court’s primary explanation

of the sentence, the Government makes several other

arguments with respect to the district court’s general

sentencing considerations.

The Government’s third contention is that Ms. Carter’s

reliance on her divorce attorney’s advice was not a solid

ground for mitigating her sentence because the attorney

did not advise her to protect illegally-obtained funds.

At sentencing, the district court stated:

I do think that she probably did freak out when she

found out that her husband was basically on his way to

prison . . . and I think she acted to a certain extent out

of an attempt to protect herself . . . I think her divorce

lawyer said that he had suggested that that money

be put in her name. . . . So, her actions . . . were not

wholly not understandable.

Sent. Tr. at 30-31. The court also said:

I believe she did not receive good advice. The advice

would have been to don’t do anything, this money is

tainted money. Whatever advice she received, that

wasn’t it, and she certainly didn’t follow it.

Sent. Tr. at 31.
20 No. 07-2438

The district court stated: “I believe she did not receive good 10

advice. The advice would have been to don’t do anything, this

(continued...)

The Government contends that the divorce attorney’s

advice is not a mitigating factor because the attorney was

not fully informed. The divorce attorney testified that he

told Ms. Carter on March 28, 2002, “to make certain

that you preserve the liquidity for as long as you can

because I don’t want the spouse to in any way try to take

the moneys and freeze her out or starve her out.” Tr. at 683,

689; see also id. at 690 (“Q. So you told her to protect [the

liquid] assets, right? A. Yes.”). He also testified that Ms.

Carter did not tell him that some of the couple’s liquid

assets were the proceeds of Robert’s fraud. Id. at 690 (“[I]t

never came up about any type of fraud whatsoever.”). The

attorney further stated that he would not have advised

her to transfer funds that were the proceeds of fraud. Id.

at 690-91.

The Government contends that the “district court did not

consider that [Ms. Carter’s] divorce attorney testified that,

if [she] had told him about the source of the money, he

never would have suggested that she ‘protect’ (notably

different from ‘conceal’) her assets.” Appellant’s Br. at 28.

The district court stated that her actions “were not

wholly not understandable,” Tr. at 31, based in part on

the conversations that Ms. Carter had with her attorney.

Nothing in the record suggests that the court misconstrued her attorney’s testimony or his advice to her. Nor

does the record suggest that the district court put undue

weight on this consideration. The district court acted 10
No. 07-2438 21

(...continued) 10

money is tainted money. Whatever advice she received, that

wasn’t it, and she certainly didn’t follow it.” Sent. Tr. at 31.

within the permissible bounds of discretion in considering evidence of the effect the advice had on Ms. Carter

as a factor affecting “the nature and circumstances of the

offense” she committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

The Government’s fourth contention is that the district

court’s comparison of Ms. Carter’s sentence with

her husband’s sentence was impermissible because Ms.

Carter was not similarly situated to her husband. Here, it

presumably relies on the following statement by the

district court:

Now, in considering what an appropriate sentence

in this case is, it does seem to me that it would be

entirely improper to give her a sentence that was

similar, or certainly higher, than what her husband got.

Her husband was the source of the illegal funds. She

did benefit from them though, there is no question

about that.

Sent. Tr. at 30. After announcing Ms. Carter’s sentence, the

district court also stated: “I don’t anticipate her breaking

the law again, and I think that certainly a sentencing

within the guidelines would have been [disparate] from

her husband’s sentence.” Id. at 33.

The Government contends that Ms. Carter is not similarly situated to her husband because, unlike him, she

did not plead guilty but instead went to trial. It also
22 No. 07-2438

contends that, unlike her husband who pleaded guilty,

Ms. Carter lied on the stand and received a two-point

enhancement for obstruction of justice. At trial, however,

the Government agreed that Robert’s offenses were

much worse than Ms. Carter’s offenses. Tr. at 1042

(“I am not even here to tell [you that] she is wor[s]e

t[h]an Robert Carter. In fact she is not. Robert Carter is

much worse than she is.”).

The district court’s consideration of this factor was

proper. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 600 (holding that a sentencing court may properly consider “the need to avoid

unwarranted similarities among other co-conspirators

who were not similarly situated”). Additionally, the

court did not put unreasonable weight on the comparative sentences of the two; the court did not base the

extent of the variance from the guidelines solely on the

differences between Ms. Carter and Robert. See Wachowiak,

496 F.3d at 748. Nor was it unaware that some aspects

of Ms. Carter’s circumstances and offenses were different

from—and possibly worse than—Robert’s situation; the

court knew that, in contrast with Robert, Ms. Carter had

not accepted a plea agreement and had been found guilty

by a jury. In sum, the court reasonably compared Ms.

Carter’s conduct and circumstances to Robert’s conduct

and circumstances. Compare Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 600 (“[I]t is

perfectly clear that the District Judge considered . . . the

need to avoid unwarranted similarities among other

[defendants] who were not similarly situated.”).

We cannot say that its consideration of this factor was

erroneous.
No. 07-2438 23

One transaction occurred outside that time frame, on Septem- 11

ber 18, 2002, and involved a wire transfer of funds from an

account in Ms. Carter’s name to one held jointly by her and

her husband.

The Government’s fourth objection relates to the district court’s statement that Ms. Carter “freaked out when

she found out that her husband was basically on his way

to prison,” and that her “actions were over a relatively

short period of time.” Sent. Tr. at 30, 32. The Government

contends that this conclusion was factually erroneous

because Ms. Carter committed tax fraud on her 1999

and 2000 returns, although her concealment money

laundering occurred primarily over the forty days between

March 29 and May 7, 2002. Tr. at 577, 594-602. It submits 11

that this factor was, at most, a very weak mitigating factor.

We first note that the Government itself emphasized the

short time frame in which Ms. Carter’s money laundering

occurred. Tr. at 1010 (“This chart and the indictment

summarize 24 transactions in 60 days. If you take out

the September transaction, it is just 30 days.”). A fair

reading of the district court’s remarks would assume

that its consideration of this factor was limited to the

money laundering offenses which, as we have noted

earlier, were most operative in setting the offense level.

The criminal activity of which Ms. Carter was convicted

did involve fraudulent tax activity in 1999 and 2000, in

addition to her money laundering offenses in 2002. It is

doubtful, however, that the court would have considered

this factor to be a substantial one in determining the
24 No. 07-2438

sentence for those offenses. To the extent that the district court erred when it concluded that Ms. Carter’s tax

fraud offenses, as opposed to the money laundering

offenses, occurred over a relatively short period of time,

the other reasons offered by the district court for the

sentence imposed assure us that this error does not alone

render the district court’s conclusion unreasonable. See

Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 754 (holding that even if a judge

overstates mitigating factors or considers “normal incidents” of an offense, if the consideration is “just one of

many reasons the judge gave for [his] below-guidelines

sentence,” the sentence will be affirmed); see also United

States v. Cherry, 487 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding

that a “large downward variance” was not unreasonable

“in light of the other reasons offered by the district court

for the sentence imposed,” even where the court erroneously concluded that the defendant’s crimes had

occurred in a short period of time).

The Government’s fifth contention is that the district

court impermissibly considered Ms. Carter’s expectation

that she would not get a lengthy sentence. It points to a

statement by the district court at sentencing:

I believe also that she probably—I am certain she

didn’t anticipate the consequences of her actions. She

may have known they were illegal, but certainly

didn’t expect them to be the extent where she would

be standing here possibly subjected to a sentence of

87 months.

Sent. Tr. at 31. The Government contends that this consideration defies one goal of section 3553(a)—promoting

respect for the law.
No. 07-2438 25

The Government’s argument puts more weight on this

comment than it ought to have to bear. The statement

was made during the court’s discussion of Ms. Carter’s

decision to ensure that the funds from the marriage be

in her name rather than her husband’s. In context, the

district court was expressing its belief that, although she

knew that such unilateral action with respect to tainted

funds was illegal, she did not appreciate the seriousness

of the offense. Tr. at 32.

Finally, the Government contends that the district

court erred because its reasons for the reduced sentence

did not apply to the tax fraud convictions, which alone

merited a longer sentence than Ms. Carter received. In

this respect, the Government relies on its contention that

Ms. Carter’s age was standard for tax offenders. As we

have stated earlier, this contention is without merit.

Moreover, the district court’s determination that

Ms. Carter was unlikely to commit these crimes again

applies to the tax fraud convictions; consequently, we

cannot expect that the district court would have imposed a high sentence even if these crimes had been the

only ones charged. The court stated that the sentence

was sufficient to “protect the public from further crimes

from this defendant,” and that the court did not “anticipate

her breaking the law again.” Sent. Tr. at 32-33. These

factors were properly considered by the district court and

reflect the district court’s serious consideration of section

3553(a), including its stated purpose of “impos[ing] a

sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . to

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect

for the law, and to provide just punishment for the of-
26 No. 07-2438

fense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Furthermore, the Government’s arguments fail to take account of the fact that

Ms. Carter was sentenced to 36 months’ supervised release

in addition to her sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment.

Notably, the Supreme Court recently held that a term

of supervised release involves a “substantial restriction

of freedom.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595 (quotation omitted).

C.

In sum, the sentencing judge’s articulated reasons for

the variance from the advisory guidelines range assure

us that the sentencing process was a reasoned one. See

Omole, 523 F.3d at 698. The court’s justifications are

sufficient to explain the extent of the variance from the

advisory guidelines range. The Government’s arguments

that the sentence is unreasonable give too little effect to

the congressional command that a sentencing court

impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply with section 3553(a)(2). The issue here

is whether, as it pertains to this defendant and the

offenses she committed, the sentence comports with

the purposes of section 3553(a)(2)(A). In imposing the

24-month sentence, the district court stressed repeatedly

the seriousness of Ms. Carter’s offense and considered

her as an individual entitled to an individualized sentence. See Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 748, 754. It concluded

that Ms. Carter’s individual characteristics warranted a

sentence significantly below the advisory guidelines

range. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion

when it concluded that this sentence reasonably reflects
No. 07-2438 27

the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the

law and provides just punishment for the offense. See id.;

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The record makes clear that the

district court did not select the sentence arbitrarily, base

the sentence on impermissible factors, fail to consider

pertinent section 3553(a) factors or give an unreasonable

amount of weight to any pertinent factor. Its explanation

for its sentence was sufficient to allow for meaningful

appellate review and to promote the perception of fair

sentencing and its reasoning adequately justified the

extent of the variance from the advisory guidelines

range. See Omole, 523 F.3d at 697; see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. at

597. We might have adhered to the guidelines or imposed

a somewhat harsher sentence had we been sitting as

district judges. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Our review

is not de novo, however. Our authority is simply to

determine if the sentence is legal and, in the circumstances of the case, reasonable in light of the statutory

mandate contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Given those

limitations on our authority, the sentence of the district

court must stand.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this opinion,

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

8-19-08