Filed 9/12/24 Certified for Publication 10/4/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DARREN KRAMER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

COINBASE, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A167779

 (San Francisco City & County

Super. Ct. No. CGC-23-604357)

Plaintiffs Darren Kramer, Manish Aggarwal, Mostafa El Bermawy, and 

Amish Shah filed a complaint against Defendant Coinbase, Inc. (Coinbase) 

for public injunctive relief under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. 

Code, § 1750 et seq.; CLRA), the California False Advertising Law (Bus. & 

Prof. Code, § 17500, et seq.; FAL), and the California Unfair Competition 

Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.; UCL). The trial court denied 

Coinbase’s motion to compel arbitration on the basis that plaintiffs sought 

public injunctive relief not subject to arbitration. We disagree with 

Coinbase’s argument on appeal that plaintiffs’ claims are subject to 

arbitration because they seek private injunctive relief, and we affirm the trial 

court order.

1

1 On September 9, 2024, Coinbase filed an unopposed request for 

judicial notice of two requests for dismissal without prejudice filed in the 

superior court by plaintiffs Kramer, El Bermawy, and Aggarwal. We grant 

the request. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1).) We do not opine on whether 

the superior court had jurisdiction to dismiss any plaintiffs while an appeal 
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Coinbase operates an online platform for buying, selling, and 

transferring cryptocurrencies. Prospective users create accounts to access 

Coinbase’s services. 

Plaintiffs are individuals who opened and utilized accounts on 

Coinbase’s cryptocurrency platform. As part of creating their accounts, users 

are required to accept the terms of a user agreement. Plaintiffs accepted 

updated user agreement terms in 2022 as part of maintaining their Coinbase 

accounts. That user agreement contained an arbitration provision, which 

states in relevant part, “you and Coinbase agree that any dispute, claim, 

disagreements arising out of or relating in any way to your access to or use of 

the Services or of the Coinbase Site, any Communications you receive, any 

products sold or distributed through the Coinbase Site, the Services, or the 

User Agreement and prior versions of the User Agreement, including claims 

and disputes that arose between us before the effective date of these Terms 

. . . will be resolved by binding arbitration, rather than in court . . . .” 

The Federal Action

Plaintiffs Aggarwal and El Bermawy filed a class action complaint in 

federal court (Aggarwal I) relating to various losses they sustained on 

Coinbase’s platform. Aggarwal and El Bermawy alleged hackers gained 

access to their respective accounts and stole funds, and Coinbase failed to 

protect the accounts, mitigate their losses, or provide support following the 

thefts. The federal complaint alleged thirteen statutory and common law 

claims, including violations of the CLRA, FAL, and UCL. It sought various 

remedies, including “[i]njunctive relief, including public injunctive relief,” 

was pending, and note none of the plaintiffs requested dismissal of this 

appeal.
3

declaratory relief, compensatory damages, statutory damages, treble 

damages, restitution, disgorgement, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees 

and costs. 

Coinbase moved to compel Aggarwal I to arbitration pursuant to the 

terms of its user agreement. The court granted the motion. (Aggarwal v. 

Coinbase, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2023) 685 F.Supp.3d 867, 882.) The court first 

concluded the unilateral contract modification provision did not render the 

arbitration provision illusory. (Id. at p. 877.) The court then concluded the 

parties delegated the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that 

delegation clause was not unconscionable. (Id. at pp. 879, 881–882.) The 

court did not address whether the complaint sought public injunctive relief 

and, if so, whether such a claim could be compelled to arbitration under 

existing California law.

The Current Action

While Aggarwal I was pending, plaintiffs filed a complaint in San 

Francisco Superior Court.2 The complaint, which arises from the same facts

set forth in Aggarwal I, asserts Coinbase misrepresented its security 

features, alleges claims under the CLRA, FAL, and UCL, and exclusively 

seeks “public injunctive relief.” 

Coinbase again moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its user 

agreement. Coinbase argued plaintiffs entered into valid and enforceable 

arbitration agreements, and, as relevant to this appeal, the complaint fell 

within the scope of the arbitration provision because plaintiffs sought private 

injunctive relief. 

2 Coinbase removed the initial complaint to federal court based on 

diversity jurisdiction, and plaintiffs dismissed the action. They then refiled 

the current complaint, adding a California plaintiff. 
4

The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. In so holding, 

the court rejected Coinbase’s argument that plaintiffs were seeking private 

injunctive relief. It explained, “Here, the complaint plainly shows that 

plaintiffs are only seeking public injunctive relief. . . . Plaintiffs do not 

request any sort of relief that would solely benefit them or existing Coinbase 

customers. In fact, . . . defendants’ allegedly misleading scheme has already 

harmed plaintiffs and plaintiffs are aware of defendants’ practice. It is thus 

unclear how the requested injunction will benefit plaintiffs.” The court 

further noted the “federal action buttresses plaintiffs’ contention that they 

are merely seeking public injunctive relief in this case since plaintiffs are 

seeking individual relief in [Aggarwal I].” 

Coinbase timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Coinbase argues plaintiffs’ claims are subject to arbitration 

because they seek private injunctive relief. It further contends plaintiffs

failed to prove otherwise.

An order denying a petition to compel arbitration is appealable. (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).) When, as here, a trial court’s order denying a 

petition to compel arbitration is based on a question of law, we review the 

denial de novo. (Clifford v. Quest Software Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 745, 

749 (Clifford).)

I. Injunctive Relief

“In McGill [v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945 (McGill)], the 

Supreme Court, relying on its earlier decisions in Broughton v. Cigna 

Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066 . . . (Broughton) and Cruz v. PacifiCare 

Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 . . . (Cruz), distinguished between 

the two types of injunctive relief: Private injunctive relief is ‘relief that 
5

primarily “resolve[s] a private dispute” between the parties . . . and 

“rectif[ies] individual wrongs” . . . and that benefits the public, if at all, only 

incidentally.’ [Citation.] Public injunctive relief is ‘relief that “by and large”

benefits the general public . . . and that benefits the plaintiff, “if at all,” only 

“incidental[ly]” and/or as “a member of the general public.” ’ [Citation.] ‘To 

summarize, public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false 

advertising law is relief that has “the primary purpose and effect” of 

prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the public. 

[Citation.] ‘Relief that has the primary purpose or effect of redressing or 

preventing injury to an individual plaintiff—or to a group of individuals 

similarly situated to the plaintiff—does not constitute public injunctive 

relief.’ ” (Ramsey v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC (2023) 99 Cal.App.5th 

197, 204–205 (Ramsey).) The court explained an arbitration provision that 

waives a plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive relief is invalid and 

unenforceable. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 951–952.)

The court then applied this framework to the case before it. The 

plaintiff, McGill, had filed a class action lawsuit against Citibank based on its

marketing of a credit protection plan and its handling of a claim she filed 

pursuant to the plan after she lost her job. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 953.) The complaint alleged various violations of California’s consumer 

protection laws, including the CLRA, UCL, and the false advertising laws, 

and sought “an injunction prohibiting Citibank from continuing to engage in 

its illegal and deceptive practices,” in addition to other relief. (McGill, at 

p. 953.) 

The court identified two examples of what constituted public injunctive 

relief. “[A]n injunction under the CLRA against a defendant’s deceptive 

methods, acts, and practices ‘generally benefit[s]’ the public ‘directly by the 
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elimination of deceptive practices’ and ‘will . . . not benefit’ the plaintiff 

‘directly,’ because the plaintiff has ‘already been injured, allegedly, by such 

practices and [is] aware of them.’ ” (McGill, at p. 955.) Likewise, “an 

injunction under the UCL or the false advertising law against deceptive 

advertising practices ‘is clearly for the benefit of . . . the general public’; ‘it is 

designed to prevent further harm to the public at large rather than to redress 

or prevent injury to a plaintiff.’ ” (McGill, at p. 955.) 

The court thus noted (1) the complaint was brought under the 

consumer protection statutes, (2) it alleged “ ‘unfair, deceptive, untrue, and 

misleading’ ” advertising and marketing, and “ ‘false, deceptive, and/or 

misleading’ ” representations and omissions, and (3) it sought an injunction 

“ ‘to ensure compliance’ ” with these laws, and to enjoin Citibank from 

“ ‘continuing to falsely advertise or conceal material information and conduct 

business via the unlawful and unfair business acts and practice complained 

herein.’ ” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 956–957.) “In light of these 

allegations and requests for relief,” the court concluded the complaint sought 

public injunctive relief and the plaintiff adequately explained “ ‘how the 

public at large would benefit from’ that relief.” (Id. at p. 957.)

A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Seeks Public Injunctive Relief

Several courts have analyzed whether a complaint asserts public or 

private injunctive relief under the framework set forth in McGill.

In Mejia v. DACM Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 691 (Mejia), the plaintiff 

purchased a used motorcycle, with most of the purchase financed with a 

“WebBank-issued Yamaha credit card” he obtained through the dealership. 

(Id. at p. 694.) Mejia subsequently sued the defendant, alleging it violated 

various state laws, including the CLRA and UCL, by “failing to provide its 

customers with a single document setting forth all the financing terms for 
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motor vehicle purchases made with a conditional sale contract.” (Id. at 

p. 695.) The complaint requested an injunction requiring the defendant to 

provide consumers with a single document containing all required 

information. (Id. at p. 696.) On appeal, the defendant argued McGill was 

inapplicable. It asserted the complaint sought a private—not public—

injunction because the injunction would “benefit only a ‘narrow group of Del 

Amo customers’––the class of similarly situated individuals who, like Mejia, 

would buy a motorcycle from Del Amo with a conditional sale contract.” 

(Mejia, at p. 702.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected this 

argument, quoting the following analysis with approval from Mejia’s brief: 

“ ‘[T]he prayer is plainly one for a public injunction given that Mejia “seeks to 

enjoin future violations of California’s consumer protection statutes, relief 

oriented to and for the benefit of the general public.” [Citation] . . . Mejia’s 

prayer does not limit itself to relief only for class members or some other 

small group of individuals; it encompasses “consumers” generally.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 703.)

Maldonado v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 710

(Maldonado) reached a similar conclusion. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged 

violations of the CLRA, UCL, and FAL based on the defendant charging

unconscionable interest rates on loans. (Id. at p. 713.) The plaintiffs 

requested injunctive relief ordering the defendant to “cease and desist its 

unlawful practices” and prohibiting future violations. (Id. at pp. 715–716.) 

On appeal, the defendant argued “the relief sought ‘is private because it will, 

at best, benefit [the Customers] and a discrete, narrowly-defined group of 

other . . . customers.’ ” (Id. at p. 720.) The court rejected this argument, 

explaining the “operative allegations and specific requests for relief” alleged 

(1) the defendant’s misconduct “was ongoing and ‘injurious to the public and 
8

consumers,’ ” (2) the defendant “was continuing to provide high interest loans 

without proper licensing,” and (3) the “ ‘unlawful conduct will continue’ ” 

injunctive relief prohibiting “ ‘future violations.’ ” (Id. at p. 721.) The court 

thus held the complaint sought public injunctive relief: “In short, the 

Customers’ complaint and prayer does not limit the requested remedies for 

only some class members, but rather encompasses all consumers and 

members of the public. Moreover, an injunction under the CLRA against 

Lender’s unlawful practices will not directly benefit the Customers because 

they have already been harmed and are already aware of the misconduct.” 

(Maldonado, at p. 721.) 

More recently, in Ramsey, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 197, the plaintiff

alleged Comcast misrepresented its pricing and discounts in violation of the 

CLRA and UCL. (Id. at pp. 201–202.) The complaint sought to: “(1) enjoin 

Comcast from engaging in ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices and correcting 

all false and misleading statements and material omissions . . . to prevent 

future injury to the general public’; (2) require Comcast to ‘halt their practice 

of issuing secret discounts’; (3) require Comcast to ‘comply with their legal 

obligations and utilize only truthful and complete advertisements, 

statements, and representations’; and (4) enjoin Comcast from ‘continuing 

their unlawful and unfair business practices.’ ” (Id. at p. 206.) The court 

concluded “[a]n injunction that seeks to prohibit a business from engaging in 

unfair or deceptive practices and marketing, requires it to provide enhanced 

pricing transparency, and requires it to comply with our consumer protection 

laws, does have the primary purpose and effect of protecting the public, and 

thus falls within McGill’s definition of public injunctive relief.” (Ramsey, at 

p. 206.)
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The court then addressed the question of “whether an injunction that 

benefits both existing and potential Comcast subscribers qualifies as a public 

injunction under McGill.”

3 (Ramsey, at p. 207.) The court followed Mejia, 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 691, and Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 710, and 

concluded “[w]hile the requested injunction in those cases and here may not 

benefit the entire public as a ‘diffuse whole,’ we agree with the court in 

Maldonado that ‘a requested injunction cannot be deemed private simply 

because [a business] could not possibly advertise to, or enter into agreements 

with, every person in California . . . .’ . . . McGill did not require that public 

injunctive relief have such a universal reach.” (Ramsey, supra, 99 

Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)

We find the reasoning in Mejia, Maldonado, and Ramsey equally 

applicable here. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges violations of the CLRA, UCL, 

and FAL. The complaint asserts Coinbase is aware of the importance of 

security to consumers and thus advertises itself to the public as the “ ‘most 

trusted’ and ‘most secure’ cryptocurrency platform.” It does so via 

information on its website and in online, television, and newspaper

advertisements. The complaint further alleges ongoing harm toward the 

public, including: (1) “Coinbase’s misrepresentations about its security 

continue to deceive members of the general public;” (2) “These 

misrepresentations are targeted to entice consumers into creating accounts

and depositing their hard-earned funds with Coinbase”; (3) “Coinbase knew 

3 The court rejected Comcast’s argument that the injunctive relief 

would only benefit “a ‘limited group of existing Comcast subscribers,’ ” noting 

the complaint asserted that consumers “ ‘rely on the representations made by 

service providers in determining whether to purchase their services’ ” and 

truthful advertisements would also benefit “any member of the public who 

considers signing up with Comcast.” (Ramsey, at p. 207.)
10

that its various claims about being a ‘secure’ platform were false and 

misleading but made those statements to induce members of the general 

public (including Plaintiffs) to do business with Coinbase”; and (4) “If 

Coinbase is permitted to continue its deceptive and misleading practices, 

members of the public will suffer irreparable injuries beyond the harm of 

losing substantial sums of money.” All three causes of action then state they 

exclusively seek public injunctive relief. 

These allegations assert harm against the general public. While the 

complaint contains allegations specific to the individual harm suffered by 

each plaintiff, those allegations exemplify how Coinbase’s actual conduct 

differs from its marketing statements to the public. And the complaint does 

not seek relief for those plaintiff-specific injuries. As explained in Ramsey, 

“[a]n injunction that seeks to prohibit a business from engaging in unfair or 

deceptive practices and marketing . . . does have the primary purpose and 

effect of protecting the public, and thus falls within McGill’s definition of 

public injunctive relief.”4 (Ramsey, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)

In response, Coinbase asserts plaintiffs’ complaint seeks relief for 

themselves and similarly situated individuals. It contends plaintiffs’ 

allegations are more analogous to those in Clifford, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 

745, Torrecillas v. Fitness International, LLC (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 485

(Torrecillas), Cottrell v. AT&T Inc. (9th Cir., Oct. 26, 2021, Case No. 20-

16162) 2021 WL 4963246 (Cottrell), and Croucier v. Credit One Bank, N.A. 

(S.D. Cal., Jun. 11, 2018, Case No. 18CV20-MMA (JMA)) 2018 WL 2836889

4 Coinbase asserts false advertising claims do not per se affect the 

public interest. We need not address this argument because we conclude the 

specific allegations here adequately demonstrate that the complaint asserts 

public injunctive relief.
11

(Croucier), all of which concluded the plaintiffs were seeking private 

injunctive relief. 

We disagree. The cases cited by Coinbase involved complaints that 

focused on harm to the plaintiff and did not seek broader injunctive relief. 

For example, both Clifford and Torrecillas involved alleged wage and hour 

violations. In Clifford, the plaintiff alleged his employer misclassified him as 

an exempt employee. (Clifford, at p. 748.) The Torrecillas plaintiff 

challenged the employer’s failure to pay him certain wages and business 

expense reimbursements. (Torrecillas, at pp. 499–500.) In both cases, the 

courts noted the alleged violations were directed at the plaintiff, the 

complaint did not allege similar conduct toward the general public, and the 

complaint only sought injunctive relief related to the plaintiff or similarly 

situated employees. (Clifford, at p. 753 [complaint alleged violations 

“directed at Clifford only,” “does not allege Quest directed similar conduct at 

other employees, much less the public at large,” and the “requests for 

injunctive relief under the UCL are similarly limited to [Clifford] as an 

individual.”]; Torrecillas, at pp. 499–500 [complaint sought “an injunction 

prohibiting [the employer] from ‘continuing to engage in the practices 

described above,’ ”—i.e., failing to pay Torrecillas certain wages and business 

expense reimbursements—and noting any injunctive relief would only benefit 

“Torrecillas and possibly [the employer’s] current employees, not the public at 

large.”].)

Similarly, the claims in Cottrell and Croucier addressed conduct 

directed solely at existing customers who were similarly situated to the 

plaintiffs, not conduct directed at potential customers or the general public. 

In Cottrell, the plaintiff alleged AT&T improperly charged customers for 

accounts without authorization and sought “an injunction requiring AT&T ‘to 
12

provide an accounting of all monies obtained’ through unauthorized accounts 

and services; to give customers ‘individualized notice’ of the violations 

committed and of their legal rights; and to refrain from committing future 

violations of the California law by signing customers up for products or 

services without authorization.” (Cottrell, supra, 2021 WL 4963246 at p. *1.) 

The court found this requested relief constituted private injunctive relief 

because it would only benefit “AT&T customers—‘a “group of individuals 

similarly situated to” ’ Cottrell.” (Id. at p. *2.) Likewise, in Croucier, the 

plaintiff alleged Credit One Bank engaged in improper debt collection 

methods by utilizing an “ ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ ” after he 

revoked his consent to be contacted by such a system. (Croucier, supra, 2018 

WL 2836889 at p. *1.) The court concluded the plaintiff’s UCL claim sought 

private injunctive relief because the alleged violations focused on “unlawful 

conduct directed only at the Plaintiff, rather than the public at large.” (Id. at 

p. *4.) In so holding, the court noted the complaint “does not specifically 

allege similar conduct directed at . . . the public at large.” (Id. at p. *4.)

As noted above, and unlike the claims in Clifford, Torrecillas, Cottrell, 

and Croucier, plaintiffs’ pending complaint alleges that Coinbase directed its 

conduct toward the public. The complaint asserts Coinbase is continuing to 

misrepresent its security measures precisely to deceive the general public 

into creating accounts, investing money, and utilizing its services.5 The 

5 Coinbase asserts statements regarding its security are “primarily 

directed at existing Coinbase users,” not the public. But the complaint 

alleges otherwise. It identifies numerous statements on Coinbase’s publicfacing website and asserts such advertising regarding its security is designed 

to encourage individuals to create accounts and deposit funds. Likewise, the 

complaint identifies marketing statements in Coinbase’s “social media 

advertising” and “search engine marketing,” X (formerly Twitter) statements 

by company executives, and online, television, and newspaper 

advertisements. While the complaint identifies some statements that are 
13

complaint seeks injunctive relief to bar Coinbase from continuing to make 

such statements to the public. 

Coinbase also contends the requested relief primarily benefits users or, 

at most, potential users, of its platform and not the general public. Similar 

arguments have been considered and rejected. In McGill, for example, the 

California Supreme Court concluded that enjoining deceptive marketing 

constituted public relief, rather than benefitting only those individuals who 

use the bank’s services. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 957; see also Mejia, 

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 702–703 [rejecting as “illogic[al]” the argument 

that requiring a defendant to give disclosure forms when selling vehicles 

would benefit only “the class of similarly situated individuals who . . . would 

buy a motorcycle from [the defendant]” under the same type of contract].) 

And as discussed in Part I.A., ante, the Ramsey court explained an injunction 

benefiting existing and potential customers was sufficient to constitute public 

relief; the requested injunction did not need to “benefit the entire public as a 

‘diffuse whole.’ ” (Ramsey, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)

Next, Coinbase contends plaintiffs’ statements that they would like to 

continue utilizing Coinbase if the security lapses were remedied indicates the 

requested relief is private in nature. However, such statements are 

irrelevant because the complaint does not seek any relief that would require 

Coinbase to alter its security measures. Here, the causes of action focus on 

Coinbase’s misrepresentation regarding the quality of its security: 

(1) “Defendants have violated the CLRA by, among other things, representing 

only accessible once an individual initiates the sign-up process, the majority 

of statements identified in the complaint are directed to the general public. 

At this stage, the question is what relief is being sought by the complaint, not 

whether plaintiffs can ultimately prove Coinbase engaged in such conduct or 

whether they are ultimately entitled to such relief.
14

that its services have ‘characteristics,’ ‘uses,’ and ‘benefits’ ‘that they do not 

have’ ”; (2) “Defendants violated the FAL by seeking to induce consumers, 

including Plaintiffs, to do business with Defendants by disseminating false 

and misleading statements regarding Defendants’ products and services”; (3) 

“Defendants’ conduct is fraudulent because it is likely to deceive reasonable

consumers, whether because certain statements are literally false or because 

Defendants’ conduct otherwise has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to 

deceive or confuse the public.” The complaint asserts these 

misrepresentations are “likely to deceive reasonable consumers.” The 

requested injunctive relief is thus focused on prohibiting Coinbase’s 

misrepresentations regarding its security features—not altering those 

features. This is relief that primarily benefits the public. (See McGill, supra, 

2 Cal.5th at pp. 951.) And it does not benefit plaintiffs because they are 

already aware of Coinbase’s security features. 

Stout v. Grubhub Inc. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2021, Case No. 21-cv-04745-

EMC) 2021 WL 5758889 (Stout) provides a useful discussion of how to 

classify different types of injunctions. In that case, the plaintiff alleged 

Grubhub induced individuals to sign up for a Grubhub+ subscription based 

on the promise of “ ‘Unlimited Free Delivery,’ ” which Grubhub then breached 

by adding a “ ‘CA Driver Benefits Fee’ ” to every Grubhub delivery order. (Id.

at p. *1.) The complaint then sought two different injunctions: (1) “an order 

enjoining Grubhub from charging the CA Driver Benefits Fee on Grubhub+ 

subscribers”; and (2) “an order enjoining Grubhub ‘from continuing to engage, 

use, or employ [its] practice of misrepresenting [its] delivery fees.’ ” (Id. at 

pp. *1–2.)

In assessing whether the complaint sought public injunctive relief, the 

court found that an injunction prohibiting Grubhub from continuing to 
15

charge Grubhub+ subscribers would constitute private injunctive relief. The 

court explained this requested relief “is not public injunctive relief because it 

is primarily designed to benefit Grubhub+ subscribers only, even if the public 

may incidentally benefit.” (Stout, supra, 2021 WL 5758889 at p. *7.) 

Conversely, the court found the second requested injunction—an order 

enjoining Grubhub from its misrepresentation of delivery fees—constituted 

“public injunctive relief; the relief sought is a prohibition of false advertising 

which affects not just existing Grubhub customers but the broader public.” 

(Ibid.) 

Here, Coinbase appears to confuse an injunction requiring it to modify 

its security features—which has not been requested—with an injunction 

requiring it to cease misrepresentations regarding its security features. And 

such an injunction, like the second injunction requested in Stout, constitutes 

public injunctive relief because it would affect the broader public.6

B. Plaintiffs Did Not Fail to Meet Their Burden of Proof

Coinbase asserts plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof by 

failing to offer any evidence regarding how the public would benefit from the

injunctive relief. 

6 Coinbase asserts a different conclusion was reached in Woody v. 

Coinbase Global, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Oct. 17, 2023, Case No. 23-CV-00190-JD) 

2023 WL 6882750 (Woody). While that court concluded the plaintiff sought 

private injunctive relief, it did so based on its finding that the damages and 

equitable relief sought “would . . . affect only Coinbase customers.” (Id. at 

p. *4.) The court presumably reached this conclusion because the complaint 

involved misrepresentations regarding an “airdrop” of new digital assets to 

Coinbase customers holding a specific digital currency unit, XRP, in their 

accounts. (Woody v. Coinbase Global, Inc. (Case No. 23-CV-00190-JD) 2023 

WL 6476303 [First Amended Complaint].) As such, the misrepresentations 

only related to existing customers holding XRP in their accounts—i.e., 

plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals.
16

This argument has been rejected by the California Supreme Court in 

McGill. In McGill, the defendant, Citibank, argued “that ‘ “the party 

resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims at issue are 

unsuitable for arbitration.” ’ ” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 958.) The 

Supreme Court first noted “Citibank cites no authority—and we are aware of 

none—applying this principle, which governs an effort to resist arbitration of 

a claim the parties agreed to arbitrate, to an effort to pursue a claim the 

parties excluded from arbitration.” (Ibid.) The court then rejected Citibank’s 

argument, explaining, “[a]t this stage of the proceeding—a motion to compel 

arbitration—it is premature to consider whether [the plaintiff] ‘has . . . 

established’ these allegations with proof or how her failure to do so would 

ultimately affect her request for injunctive relief.” (Ibid.) The California 

Supreme Court resolved the question of whether the plaintiff sought public 

injunctive relief based solely on the complaint’s “allegations and requests for 

relief.” (Id. at p. 957.) 

Multiple courts of appeal have followed this approach. (See, e.g., 

Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 721 [“Customers’ complaint and 

prayer does not limit the requested remedies for only some class members, 

but rather encompasses all consumers and members of the public.”]; Ramsey, 

supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 212 [“Because the relief Ramsey requests both 

‘seeks to enjoin future violations of California’s consumer protection statutes,’

and is ‘oriented to and for the benefit of the general public,’ it falls within 

McGill’s definition of public injunctive relief.”].) Even those courts that 

concluded plaintiffs were seeking private injunctive relief have likewise relied 

on complaint allegations. (See, e.g., Clifford, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 754 

[“Our review of Clifford’s complaint discloses no request for injunctive relief 

that would impact the public”]; Hodges v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC (9th 
17

Cir. 2021) 21 F.4th 535, 549 [evaluating complaint allegations and concluding 

“these requests [for injunctive relief] on their face stand to benefit only 

Comcast ‘cable subscribers.’ ”]; California Crane Sch., Inc. v. Google LLC

(N.D. Cal. 2022) 621 F.Supp.3d 1024, 1032 [addressing specific claims and 

relief as alleged in the complaint].)

To the extent cases have required additional evidence, those cases 

involve plaintiffs who seek to avoid enforcement of an arbitration provision 

by alleging fraud (see Strauch v. Eyring (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 181, 187; 

Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413), or other 

challenges to the circumstances under which the arbitration agreement was 

executed (see Owens v. Intertec Design, Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 72, 74

[challenging validity of arbitration provision based on numerous grounds, 

including his location, location of witnesses, location where contract was 

executed, and assertion of economic coercion]). 

While we agree with Coinbase that courts should not blindly rely on a 

complaint’s prayer for public injunctive relief, such is not the case here. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint does not superficially request such relief but contains 

supporting allegations and facts. The complaint identifies specific 

statements at issue, how those statements were conveyed by Coinbase, and 

why those statements would allegedly mislead the public. These statements, 

if ultimately proven at trial, would support a claim for public injunctive 

relief. McGill indicates such statements are sufficient at this stage to oppose 

arbitration. (See McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 958.) 

In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding the complaint seeks 

public injunctive relief and may not be compelled to arbitration.7 

7 We thus do not reach Coinbase’s arguments regarding prejudice or 

whether it is appropriate to affirm on other grounds. 
18

II. Aggarwal I Does Not Compel a Different Conclusion

Finally, Coinbase appears to suggest that the order compelling 

arbitration in Aggarwal I should impact this court’s analysis. Coinbase 

asserts the existence of Aggarwal I indicates this action was filed for 

“gamesmanship.” It contends plaintiffs’ delay in filing this complaint, along 

with the similar factual allegations, indicates the complaint is for the purpose 

of obtaining financial compensation and leverage in the federal action. 

While both actions may involve substantially the same plaintiffs and 

arise from the same set of facts, Aggarwal I alleges various causes of action 

and seeks relief not sought in this matter. For example, Aggarwal I alleges 

violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, related Regulation E, and the 

California Uniform Commercial Code. It also alleges causes of action for 

bailment, conversion, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and unjust enrichment. The 

complaint, apart from seeking injunctive relief, also seeks declaratory relief, 

compensatory damages, statutory damages, restitution, disgorgement, and 

punitive damages. 

The fact that Aggarwal I also asserts CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims does 

not alter our analysis. In Croucier, supra, 2018 WL 2836889, the original 

complaint focused on conduct against the plaintiff and sought compensatory 

and statutory damages. (Id. at p. *5.) When the plaintiff amended the 

complaint to add a claim under the UCL, the court declined to find that the 

requested injunction sought public relief. The court explained, “Plaintiff did 

not cite new facts or reasoning supporting the additional claim. . . . The 

addition of the public relief claim in the absence of new factual information, 

and its use as a means to avoid arbitration, further indicates that the 

purpose of the relief sought is unique to Plaintiff.” (Ibid.) Here, as explained 
19

above, the causes of action and requested relief in the pending complaint are 

focused solely at Coinbase’s misrepresentations directed to the public. 

Accordingly, the current complaint contains allegations supporting its public 

relief claim.8

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Plaintiffs may recover their costs on appeal.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

8 While not specifically argued by Coinbase, we note the California 

Supreme Court held in McGill that there is no FAA preemption. (McGill, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 963.) We, like various other appellate courts to 

consider the issue, are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. (See, e.g., 

Ramsey, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 213 [concluding FAA does not preempt 

McGill]; Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 724 [same]; Jack v. Ring 

LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1208 [same].) We do so here, concluding 

that the FAA does not preempt McGill. Moreover, the “procedural 

complexity” concerns raised in Hodges that the Ninth Circuit claimed could 

still be preempted by the FAA, such as “requir[ing] evaluation of . . .

individual claims,” are not present here. (Hodges, supra, 21 F.4th at p. 547.)

This case involves alleged misrepresentations regarding the security of its 

platform as generally asserted by Coinbase to the public, as compared to

Coinbase’s actual security features.
20

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P.J.

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

A167779/Kramer et al., v. Coinbase Inc. et al.
1

Filed 10/4/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DARREN KRAMER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

COINBASE, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A167779

 (City and County of San 

 Francisco Super Ct.

 No. CGC-23-604357)

ORDER CERTIFYING 

OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

 [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on September 12, 2024, 

was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now 

appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is 

so ordered.

There is no change in judgment. 

Date___October 4, 2024____ ___TUCHER, PJ_____________ P. J.
2

Kramer et al. v. Coinbase, Inc. et al. (A167779)

Trial Court: City and County of San Francisco Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Richard B. Ulmer

Attorneys:

Norton Law Firm, William Fred Norton, Gabrielle Hann, Nathan

Walker, Josephine Petrick, Celine Purcell, Gilbert Walton, Ashley Nakai, for 

Defendants and Appellants. 

BraunHagey & Borden, Matthew Borden, Jonas Noah Hagey, 

John Tobias Rowe, Ronald J. Fisher, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.