J-S27039-21

2022 PA Super 43

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JULIO FUENTES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1301 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 11, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006631-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.

OPINION BY COLINS, J.: FILED: MARCH 9, 2022

Julio Fuentes appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following 

a jury trial in which Fuentes was found guilty of rape of a child, unlawful 

restraint of a minor, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and unlawful 

contact with a minor.1 For these offenses, Fuentes received an aggregate 

sentence of fourteen to twenty-eight years of incarceration to be followed by 

fifteen years of probation. On appeal, Fuentes presents six issues for review, 

contending, inter alia, that his trial verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence and that the trial court improperly permitted an expert to testify. As 

we find one issue raised by Fuentes to warrant further adjudication by the 

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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(b)(2); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii); and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6318(a)(1), respectively. 
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lower court, we remand this matter in order to ascertain what amount of credit 

Fuentes is due for his time served prior and related to his trial.

By way of background, Fuentes lived in an apartment with his wife and

their four children.2 Fuentes’s mother-in-law, who had legal custody of the 

seven-to-eight-year-old victim, inhabited another apartment that was down 

the hall from Fuentes. The victim would split time between the two 

apartments, depending on the mother-in-law’s work obligations.

Through the victim’s testimony, she described one incident where 

Fuentes touched her genital area and thereafter proceeded to manipulate her 

hand to touch his genital area. In a separate event, the victim communicated 

that she had been handcuffed to a bed, gagged, blindfolded, and then raped 

by Fuentes. 

After these acts transpired, the victim confided in a mandated reporter 

at her school,3 which led to a forensic interview.4 However, because that 

interview did not yield a disclosure, the police took no further action on this 

first child line report. The victim would later indicate that she did not reveal 

anything at this interview because she was afraid of Fuentes. 

____________________________________________

2 The record indicates that Fuentes would only sometimes stay in this 

apartment. See, e.g., N.T., 11/20/19, at 74.

3 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6311(a)(4). 

4 Although the timeline is unclear, the victim seemingly first tried to tell 

Fuentes’s wife and a friend of the wife about her first sexual encounter with 

Fuentes, but neither believed nor helped the victim. See N.T., 11/20/19, at 

56.
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Just shy of two years later, another mandated reporter, this time at the 

Office of Children, Youth, and Families, sent a second child line report into the 

Allegheny County Police Department. Correspondingly, the victim participated 

in a second forensic interview, which resulted in Fuentes’s arrest. The victim 

believed that it was safe to disclose pertinent information about Fuentes’s 

treatment of her at this second interview because she was safely out of her 

previous living situation by that point. 

While she could not remember all the details about the second incident 

with Fuentes involving the handcuffs, she remembered that Fuentes’s wife 

told the victim to go get Halloween candy from the couple’s bedroom 

whereafter Fuentes followed her into the bedroom and then assaulted her. 

Fuentes’s wife had apparently left the apartment directly after allowing the 

victim to get the candy. Fuentes stopped when he heard his wife reenter the 

apartment. 

Ultimately, Fuentes was charged5 and convicted of the above-mentioned 

offenses. Prior to trial, Fuentes filed a motion to exclude expert testimony on 

the basis that the Commonwealth’s proposed expert allegedly had personal 

knowledge of the victim’s case insofar as she signed both reports generated 

after the victim’s forensic interviews. The trial court denied this motion.

A first and second jury trial resulted in hung juries. At the third jury trial, 

Fuentes was found guilty and sentenced to the aforementioned fourteen to 

____________________________________________

5 Several other charges were either withdrawn, demurred, or resulted in 

acquittal. See Order of Sentence, 3/11/20, at 1-2 (unpaginated). 
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twenty-eight years of incarceration followed by fifteen years of probation. 

Following sentencing, Fuentes filed a post-sentence motion, which was 

denied as a matter of law.6 After this denial, Fuentes filed a timely notice of 

appeal to this Court. The relevant parties have complied with their obligations 

under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, and as such, this appeal 

is ripe for review.

On appeal, Fuentes presents six issues:

1. Was the verdict as to all of his convictions against the weight 

of the evidence?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in constructing Fuentes’s 

sentence?

3. Was the mandatory minimum sentence corresponding to his 

rape conviction unconstitutional? 

4. Is the process by which sex offenders are paroled and provided 

treatment unconstitutional?

5. Did the trial court improperly permit one of the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses to testify as an expert?

6. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence by failing to give 

credit for time served?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 3.

____________________________________________

6 Several days after Fuentes was sentenced, Allegheny County went under a 

judicial emergency due to conditions surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic, 

which suspended time calculations and deadlines until June 1, 2020. 

Accordingly, while Fuentes’s post-sentence motion was facially untimely as it 

was filed more than thirty days after sentencing, it is of no moment, as it was 

still filed within the parameters as outlined under the order governing 

Allegheny County’s judicial emergency. 
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Fuentes first asserts that the verdict resulting in his convictions was 

against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, Fuentes contends that the 

victim’s “testimony pertaining to the facts and circumstances of the alleged 

assaults was contradictory and incredible. [The victim’s] account of the alleged 

assaults, taken together with all the other testimony, is implausible if not 

impossible.” Id., at 10.

We are guided by a well-settled set of precepts when addressing a 

weight-of-the-evidence claim. First, we note that “[t]he weight of the evidence 

is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of 

the evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses.” Commonwealth 

v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 667 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Second, 

a verdict will only be reversed on this basis where the evidence is “so tenuous, 

vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.”

Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 326 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Third, the fact-finder is charged with the 

responsibility to resolve contradictory testimony and questions of credibility, 

and we may not substitute our judgment in place of the fact-finder. See 

Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. 2018).

A motion for a new trial based on a weight-of-the-evidence claim, like 

what happened in this case, is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, 

and therefore, we review only the lower court's exercise of discretion and not 

the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 
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evidence. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1276 (Pa. Super. 

2021). When reviewing a trial court's determination on a weight claim, we 

give the “gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the 

trial judge” because it is the trial judge, not the appellate court, who had the 

opportunity to see and hear the evidence presented. Id. (citation omitted).

After laying out the testimony that was adduced at trial, the trial court 

found that [d]espite minor inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony, she 

testified credibly regarding two instances of sexual assault by [Fuentes].” Trial 

Court Opinion, 4/15/21, at 5. Therefore, [i]t was not unreasonable for the jury 

to conclude that [Fuentes] had committed the crimes for which he was 

convicted.” Id. 

In contrast, Fuentes illuminates inconsistences or apparent 

discrepancies between the victim’s first forensic interview, the second forensic 

interview, and the testimony the victim provided at trial. 

For example, Fuentes describes the victim’s first interview, which did 

not lead to any kind of crime-related disclosure, as one in which the victim 

indicated that she felt safe with Fuentes’s wife and mother-in-law. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 13. As it pertained to Fuentes, the victim merely stated

at that point that he was mean to her and would yell under certain 

circumstances. At the second interview, the victim stated that there had been 

multiple instances of sexual contact between Fuentes and her. However, at 

trial, the victim only testified to there having been two situations of a sexual 
J-S27039-21

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nature between Fuentes and her.7

Fuentes also highlights ambiguity between the victim’s reported age at 

the time of the handcuffing incident and the month that she stated it occurred. 

See id. (comparing an ostensible conflict between the victim’s second 

interview and the victim’s trial testimony). Moreover, Fuentes points to 

differences between the way the victim described how the two sexual 

encounters ended. For example, in the second interview, the victim relayed 

that Fuentes became tired and therefore stopped, but at trial, she conveyed 

that he had heard his wife come back into the apartment. 

Furthermore, Fuentes emphasizes the disparate nature of the victim’s 

reported positioning during the second sexual incident (e.g., how she was 

handcuffed and the orientation of her arms and legs) and relatedly, the 

injuries, or lack of injuries, she obtained as a result of Fuentes’s actions. 

Fuentes concludes by pointing to incongruities between the victim’s second 

interview and at trial related to: (1) how the victim came to be in the wife’s 

bedroom leading up to the second sexual assault, specifically when the wife 

typically kept the bedroom door locked; (2) where the wife was or what she 

was doing during the second sexual assault; and (3) the number of persons 

the victim opened up to about the incidents. See id., at 14-15. 

____________________________________________

7

It is unclear how the Commonwealth’s decision to limit the questions it asked 

of the victim to only two of the incidents inherently renders an unreliable 

verdict. Moreover, there is no indicia that Fuentes asked the victim at trial 

about the other incidents outlined in the second forensic interview.
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Relatedly, Fuentes compares the victim’s testimony with other 

testimonies provided at trial to further diminish the victim’s reliability. In 

particular, Fuentes cites to witnesses indicating that Fuentes had a limited 

presence in the apartment during the year the victim was assaulted and, 

apparently to cast doubt on Fuentes having had enough time to perform the 

sexual acts he was accused of, that family members would come and go as 

they pleased into the apartment and that his children were always present. 

Fuentes also utilizes his own testimony to establish that “[t]here was never a 

time when [he] was alone with [the victim].” Id., at 15 (citation to the record 

omitted).

Preliminarily, we note that other than providing this Court’s standard of 

review when addressing a weight-of-the-evidence claim, Fuentes has not

provided any authority whatsoever to demonstrate the validity of his 

underlying assertion: that the victim’s testimony was so unreliable that it 

could not act as a basis on which to convict him. Absent any analogous 

precedent, Fuentes purely relies on a fact- or record-based approach. 

We note that “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting or 

denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was 

not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted 

in the interest of justice.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 

2013) (citation omitted). The trial court went through, in detail, the victim’s 

testimony at trial and the statements she made during her forensic interviews. 
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Ultimately, the court reached a conclusion that, instead of the verdict being 

against the weight of the evidence, it was “rather supported by it.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/15/21, at 3-5. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

reaching this conclusion.

First, the jury was well-apprised of the inherent difficulties associated 

with eliciting information pertinent to a sexual assault from a child, based both 

on a child’s verbal ability to express what has happened and also his or her 

willingness to report the same. In describing the disparate ways in which 

children disclose sexual assaults, one of the Commonwealth’s experts8

identified that 

[s]ometimes they tell that story and they may only tell a little bit 

of it and give only a little bit of details. Sometimes they may tell 

the story and give a little bit of details now or a little bit more 

details to the next person. That story may change a little bit in 

between based on the person they're talking with or a question or

prompt from that person. Some children just tell everyone about 

their story, every person they have an encounter with. So it's 

different for every child and no disclosure is the same.

N.T., 11/20/19, at 106. That same expert went on to describe how children 

will not disclose information if they believe it will lead to a negative reaction 

or a dismissive reaction. See id., at 107-08. Further, children may be driven 

by fear if they are having problems communicating something. See id., at 

108-09. In addition, “young children may not actually be able to put into words 

____________________________________________

8 Fuentes challenges the admission of this specific expert’s testimony in his 

fifth issue raised on appeal. 
J-S27039-21

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the acts that actually have occurred to them. It’s not until they get older and 

actually start to gain the reference and the more adult knowledge of those 

acts to actually speak about it.” Id., at 111. The expert then brought up the 

rationale behind a child recanting statements he or she has made, primarily 

predicated on a child wanting his or her life to return to normal. See id., at 

112-13. 

A second expert opined that:

[i]t’s a commonly known phenomena if the child has been sexually 

abused, [he or she] might have a delayed disclosure; meaning, 

[he or she] might not tell anybody what has happened to [him or 

her] for days, weeks, months or even years.

There’s a lot of reasons behind that. One of which might be a child 

might not have recognized what happened to [himself or herself] 

was wrong because it happened when [he or she was] so young 

and [he or she] didn’t know any different, et cetera, or [he or she] 

might have been scared or threatened by a person or shamed and 

made to believe that what happened to [himself or herself] was 

[his or her] fault.

So kind of under that subset, there’s often a delayed disclosure. 

So if a child had had injuries at any point, by the time we’re seeing 

a child, it might be years after something happened, and if there 

were an injury initially, it could have healed.

N.T., 11/20/19, at 139-40.

At trial, the victim explained that she did not disclose or admit to the 

sexual assaults at her first forensic interview because she “was scared, 

because at the time [she] was still living with [Fuentes’s wife] and [Fuentes].” 

Id., at 66. The victim further stated that she thought Fuentes “would do 

something,” id., if she were to say anything about what had happened. When 
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the victim sat for the second interview, she felt safer as she was not living 

with or around Fuentes. See id., at 66-67. The second interview also resulted 

in the victim explaining to the interviewer why she did not disclose the second 

sexual assault: because she did not think the wife would believe her, given 

that “she didn’t believe [the victim] whenever [she] told her the first time.” 

Forensic Interview 2, 4/6/18, at 37-38.

As to Fuentes pointing out an asserted inconsistency between the 

victim’s age as she reported the two sexual assaults and the particular months 

those incidents occurred, we find that Fuentes is asking this Court to ascribe 

too much weight to the victim’s use of the phrase “when I turned eight.”

Fuentes’s implication is that the victim uttering the word “when” implies the 

birthday and assault occurring in the same month.

At the second forensic interview, the victim stated that the first assault 

happened when she was “still seven,” id., at 38, but that the second event 

occurred “when [she] turned eight.” Id. During trial, the victim indicated that 

the second incident happened around the month of April. See N.T., 11/20/19, 

at 57. Although she did not disclose her age concurrent with making this trial 

statement, her previous use of the word “when” could have reasonably been 

interpreted as applying to the entirety of her year as an eight-year-old. 

Therefore, it is not inconsistent that she could have also been eight years of 

age in the month of April. 

Regarding the termination of the first incident, the victim specified that 
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it stopped when Fuentes’s wife came home. See id., at 77. Although the 

second interview is slightly inconsistent insofar as the victim described the 

events leading up to Fuentes’s wife entering the apartment, see Forensic 

Interview 2, 4/6/18, at 15, 17, 20, the fact remains that the assault concluded

based on Fuentes’s wife’s actions.

On the second assault, the victim relayed to the interviewer that Fuentes 

stopped after getting tired, but also explained that Fuentes told the victim his 

wife was on her way to take her to school. See id., at 47-48. At trial, the 

victim explained that Fuentes stopped because he had heard his wife come 

home. See N.T., 11/20/19, at 76-77. While, again, there are incongruities 

between the specific event that led to the cessation of the assault, both 

statements are predicated on the immediate presence of Fuentes’s wife. 

Insofar as Fuentes contends that the victim contradicted herself as to 

her hand and feet placement while handcuffed and further provided conflicting 

information as to the handcuffs’ tightness and corresponding pain, such 

disparities do not rise to the level of “shocking the conscience of the court” 

given the victim’s overarching ability to provide the salient facts relevant to 

what she had experienced, namely a sexual assault at the hands of Fuentes 

in a bedroom while being handcuffed, blindfolded, and gagged. See id., at 

58-59.

In short, given the victim’s age at the time of the two incidents, the 

number of years between those events and Fuentes’s trial, the steadfast 
J-S27039-21

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nucleus of facts underpinning the assaults as described by the victim, and the 

explanation provided to the jurors as to a child’s ability to report situations 

similar to those experienced by the victim, the lower court’s determination 

that the verdict reached in this case was not against the weight of the evidence 

was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Fuentes is due no relief on this 

basis. 

Fuentes next asserts that the sentencing court “abused its discretion by 

sentencing him consecutively at multiple counts while failing to consider the 

presence of substantial mitigating evidence.” Appellant’s Brief, at 16. Fuentes 

also contends that his sentence is manifestly excessive because his 

consecutive penalties at multiple counts were “without penological justification 

or proper reference to the [s]entencing [c]ode.” Id. (citations omitted).

“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014). “An 

appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court's jurisdiction when 

challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id.

An appellant has sufficiently complied with the four-part test when:

(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the 

time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the 

appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth 

a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises 

a substantial question for our review.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 
J-S27039-21

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omitted). To present a substantial question, an appellant must set “forth a 

plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing 

code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

omitted). 

After our thorough review of Fuentes’s brief, even assuming that he met 

the other three elements necessary for review of his claim, we are unable to 

find any concise statement, and the Commonwealth has objected to this 

deficiency. See Appellee’s Brief, at 33. As such, we are absent the jurisdiction 

to evaluate Fuentes’s assertions regarding the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence.9

Fuentes’s next argument is that his mandatory minimum sentence

corresponding with his rape conviction that was imposed pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9718 (stating that a sentence crafted for this type of offense shall 

____________________________________________

9 Even if we were to review this issue’s underlying merits, it would be without 

validity. While the gravamen of Fuentes’s argument is that the court failed to 

adequately consider the statutory factors as outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b), Fuentes underestimates the legal import of the court’s review of 

Fuentes’s pre-sentence report. See Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 

517, 526 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement 

of placing on the record the reasons for imposing sentence by indicating that 

he or she has been informed by a pre-sentence report. Having been fully 

informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing court’s discretion should 

not be disturbed.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Sentencing Hearing, 3/11/20, at 7, 13 (after being apprised of, inter 

alia, information of a mitigating nature regarding Fuentes, trial court stating 

that it “did read the Presentence Report”).
J-S27039-21

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be “not less than ten years”) is unconstitutional. Fuentes avers that such a 

sentence violates his due process rights. Specifically, he “asserts that the 

imposition of a statutory minimum penalty deprives him and other similarly 

situated defendants of due process at the sentencing stage.” Appellant’s Brief, 

at 21-22. Thereafter, he invokes the three-factor test as espoused by the 

United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 

(1976), to evaluate alleged violations of due process. Fuentes additionally 

suggests that mandatory minimum sentences violate the separation of powers 

doctrine because such sentences vest “the determination of a criminal 

defendant’s penalty in the executive branch (by allowance of the legislative 

branch)[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 23.

Taken broadly, Fuentes appears to be saying that all mandatory 

minimum sentences are unconstitutional. “[T]he legislature has the exclusive 

power to pronounce which acts are crimes, to define crimes, and to fix the 

punishment for all crimes.” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 

1283 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). In addition, there is “no constitutional 

requirement prohibiting the legislature from imposing a mandatory sentence 

where, in its judgment, such a sentence is necessary.” Id. (citation omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court has indicated that a “court may impose[] 

whatever punishment is authorized by statute for [an] offense, so long as that 

penalty is not cruel and unusual and so long as the penalty is not based on an 

arbitrary distinction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
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Amendment.” Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991). 

Although it was in the context of a mandatory maximum sentence, this Court 

“has explicitly held that such mandatory [sentences] do not violate the Eighth 

Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment or the mandates of 

individualized sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 217 A.3d 873, 

879 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

We further note that ”[a]s an intermediate appellate court, this Court is 

obligated to follow the precedent set down by our Supreme Court. It is not 

the prerogative of an intermediate appellate court to enunciate new precepts 

of law or to expand existing legal doctrines. Such is a province reserved to the 

Supreme Court.” Bell v. Willis, 80 A.3d 476, 479 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). To that end, our Supreme Court has routinely affirmed judgments 

of sentence that contain mandatory minimums. While there may be some 

merit to the notion that “[i]mmutable minimum penalties prevent judges from 

exercising discretion,” Appellant’s Brief, at 22, it does not follow that, 

therefore, a statute is inherently rendered unconstitutional because it carries 

with it a fixed sentence. 

Under Chapman, due process is not violated so long as there is a 

rational basis for the legislature’s choice of penalties. See 500 U.S. at 465. In 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, this Court wrote that:

[t]he crimes in question here, rape and involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse, committed against a minor, are crimes of great 

severity and the legislature in enacting this statute expressed its 

grave concern for the protection of minors. Specifically, this act is 
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designed to punish those criminals who prey on the helpless 

children in our society. Clearly, the nature and severity of the 

crimes justify the legislature's rationally based minimum 

sentence.

610 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. Super. 1992) citation omitted). As this case, too, 

deals with rape and related offenses against a minor, our determination is no 

different: given the nature of these types of crimes and attendant desire to 

protect children, the legislature’s construction of a minimum sentence was 

rational and not unconstitutional. Fuentes’s challenge fails.

Fuentes’s fourth issue asks this court to determine that the parole 

process for sex offenders is unconstitutional. In summary, Fuentes states that 

parole is predicated on some level of acceptance of responsibility or admission 

of guilt, which are incompatible with someone who maintains his or her 

innocence post-sentencing. This acceptance of responsibility “will almost 

certainly [lead to] hav[ing] that admission used against [him or her] should 

[he or she] ever be granted a new trial.” Appellant’s Brief, at 25.

In response, the Commonwealth presents two counterarguments. First, 

it states that Fuentes “attempted to raise th[is] issue at sentencing [via] an 

unsupported assertion that lacked any evidentiary support.” Appellee’s Brief, 

at 43. When the court indicated that it could not take judicial notice of 

Fuentes’s claim or framing of the parole system, he explained that “he would 

supply support when he filed his post[-]sentence motion[.]” Id. However, the 

post-sentence motion did not include any corroborative material. See id. 

Implicitly, given this dereliction, the Commonwealth is indicating that this 
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issue has not been preserved for review.

Second, the Commonwealth explicitly contends that this question is not 

ripe for review, given that Fuentes is not eligible for parole for at least ten 

more years. See id., at 44-45 (citing, further, to Commonwealth v. 

Shrawder, 940 A.2d 436, 439 (Pa. Super. 2007), for the proposition that a 

challenge is unripe if it concerns “abstract regulations or if it presents issues 

that may never arise[]”). 

However, broadly, we agree with the trial court’s overview of the nature

of parole, wherein the court indicated that it

is nothing more than a possibility, and, when granted, it is nothing 

more than a favor granted upon a prisoner by the state as a 

matter of grace and mercy shown by the Commonwealth to a 

convict who has demonstrated a probability of his ability to 

function as a law abiding citizen in society.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/15/21, at 8 (citations omitted). The court further 

identified that, with it being defined as a favor, “a prisoner has neither an 

absolute right to parole nor a liberty interest in receiving parole.” Id. (citations 

omitted). In short, Pennsylvania provides “no constitutionally protected liberty 

interest” to a prisoner who has the opportunity to be released from 

confinement prior to the expiration of his term of incarceration. Id. (citation 

omitted). While the basis of the trial court’s conclusion is derived from a case 

decided by our Sister Court, Weaver v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. Commw. 1997), we see no basis to deviate 

from its conclusions. 
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As the trial court indicated, at no point is Fuentes prohibited from 

maintaining his innocence. Given the lack of constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in one seeking parole, there could not have been a violation associated 

with his eligibility, should he choose to avail himself of such an opportunity 

years from now. Accordingly, Fuentes’s claim fails.

In his penultimate issue, Fuentes insists that one of the expert 

witnesses, the Director of the Child Advocacy Center at Children’s Hospital of 

Pittsburgh, should have been excluded at trial. Fuentes identifies that the atissue witness “was in fact a signatory of both of the reports generated ... after 

[the victim’s] forensic interviews.” Appellant’s Brief, at 27. “Because [this 

expert] signed these reports, it is impossible to claim that [she] had no 

knowledge of this case. Furthermore, any personal knowledge [she] did 

possess would allow her to tailor her testimony in a way that is not 

contemplated by ... Pa.R.E. 702.” Id. Fuentes also asserts that the expert’s 

testimony was not beyond the purview of the average layperson given that 

her testimony largely reinforced the notion that “different people respond to 

sexual assault in different ways.” Id. 

“When reviewing challenges to the admission of expert testimony, we 

leave such decisions largely to the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings 

thereon will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth 

v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 605 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).
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The trial court found the expert’s testimony to be admissible under 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b), which states, in part, that in a criminal proceeding, 

a witness may be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness 

has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average 

layperson based on the witness’s experience with ... behavioral 

sciences or victim services issues[] related to sexual violence[] 

that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the dynamics of 

sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the 

impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being 

assaulted.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1). Moreover, if qualified, an expert “may testify to 

facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim 

behaviors.” Id., at § 5920(b)(2). The court considered Fuentes’s motion to 

exclude this testimony, but ultimately determined that “expert testimony in 

victim behavior would, for example, explain why the victim would not disclose 

in the first forensic interview but disclose in the second one.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 4/15/21, at 9. We perceive no abuse of discretion based on this 

determination. 

As to Fuentes’s contention that this expert had specific knowledge of the 

facts of this case, insinuating that said knowledge formed the basis of her 

testimony, such an averment is not supported by the record. At trial, this 

expert stated that her Center conducts 800-900 forensic interviews a year, 

that she never evaluated the victim’s case or interviews, that she did not know

about the allegations against Fuentes, and that she had not discussed this 

case with the Commonwealth or with the victim. See N.T., 11/20/19, at 103, 

124. The expert made clear that she had “no particular opinion as to whether 
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[the victim] is impacted by any of the factors that [she] described[.]” Id., at 

127. Instead, in providing generalized testimony about a trial-relevant topic, 

the expert’s knowledge and experience related to child sexual victimology 

came from her many years of working and studying in that field. As such, on 

this basis, too, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny Fuentes’s 

motion. 

In his final issue, Fuentes claims that the trial court failed to give any 

sort of credit for the time he spent incarcerated prior to his trial, amounting 

to what Fuentes has ascertained to be 677 days. See Appellant’s Brief, at 28. 

Fuentes claims this time credit “is required by law pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A]. 

§ 9760(1).

In response, the Commonwealth concedes that its review has 

determined that Fuentes “did not receive any credit for time spent in pretrial 

incarceration as all relevant sections for [c]redit have the notation: ‘0 days.’” 

Appellee’s Brief, 53. The Commonwealth continues by stating that “the case 

should be remanded for the trial court to provide for time credit.” Id. 

Although Fuentes is raising this time credit assertion for the first time 

on appeal, it is a challenge to the legality of his sentence and therefore cannot 

be waived. See Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332, 336 (Pa. 2011). 

Given our review of the record, we reach the same conclusion as the 

Commonwealth: this case must be remanded.

Accordingly, in finding validity to Fuentes’s final argument, while we 
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affirm Fuente’s convictions, we vacate Fuentes’s judgment of sentence and 

remand for the court to determine what credit, if any, Fuentes is due as a 

result of his time spent in custody awaiting trial on these present convictions 

and to thereafter resentence accordingly.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/9/2022