NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 14

- 3803

___________ JOSEPH CLIFFORD MALCOMB, Appellant

v. BEAVER COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA (PROTHONOTARY); PA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, (Central Office); PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2

- 13

- cv - 01772 ) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 11, 2015 Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 16, 2015)

___________ OPINION *

_ __________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Joseph Clifford Malcomb appeals two orders dismissing his civil rights lawsuit.
We will affirm. Malcomb, while an inmate at SCI Benner 1 , filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials refused to release him for s everal years after he completed his twenty

- year prison sentence. Malcomb named as defendants the Beavery County Prothonotary, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, and the Attorney General of Pennsylva nia. 2 The Department of Corrections, the Board of Probation and Parole, and the Attorney General’s Office moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that each defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court

a greed and granted the motion. The Beaver County Prothonotary separately moved to
dismiss. The District Court granted the motion , finding that the Prothonotary was immune from suit under the doctrine of quasi

- judicial immunity and, further, that the
comp laint failed to state a claim against the Prothonotary in her individual capacity. Malcomb timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s orders. See Allah v. Seiverling , 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by
the record. Brightwell v. Lehman , 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

1 Malcomb has since been released. 2 The parties consented to proceed before the Magistrate Judge.3

The District Court correctly ruled that the Department of Corrections, the Boar d of Probation and Parole, and the Attorney General’s Office are immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. “Since Congress expressed no intention of disturbing the states’ sovereign immunity in enacting § 1983, these suits, when brought against a sta te, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp. , 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1996). “ [T] he Eleventh Amendment . . . has been interpreted to render

states

— and, by extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the state is the real party in interest

— generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess , 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002). T he Department of Corrections, the Board of Probation and Parole, and th e Attorney General’s Office are immune from Malcomb’s § 1983 claims under the Eleventh
Amendment

. Therefore, t he District Court correctly granted those defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Moreover, as the District Court ruled, court Prot honotaries performing ministerial
duti es mandated by statute are entitled to quasi

- judicial immunity because t he i r “judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges

— that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of their function.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc. , 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (citations omitted). Malcomb did not allege that the Prothonotary acted beyond her discretion, outside the scope of her duties, or contrary to her direction as a judicial office r. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa. , 2114

F.3d 760, 772

- 73 (3d Cir. 2000); Kincaid v. Vail , 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992);
Lockhart v. Hoenstine , 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the Prothonotary is immune from Malcomb’s claims, and th e District Court properly granted her motion to
dismiss. Moreover, to the extent that Malcomb sued any defendants in their individual capacities, h e fail ed to state a claim as he did not allege that any defendant was personal ly involved in violating his civil rights. See Polk County v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that liability in a § 1983 action must be predicated on personal involvement, not on the basis of respondeat superior). Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 3

3 It becomes clear in Malcomb’s br ief that he is challenging the way in which his prison sentence was extended by a parole violation. To the extent that his complaint amounted to a challenge to his prison sentence, we agree with the Beaver County Prothonotary that it is barred under Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).