alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

(2004/C 33 E/040)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0474/03

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(20 February 2003)

Subject:   Harsher punishment of incitement to hunger strike in Turkey instead of an improvement in the situation of political prisoners

Source: Netherlands edition of Metro, 7 February 2003.

Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(21 March 2003)

The Commission is aware of the human rights situation in the South-East of Turkey and of reports of various human rights organisations, including the Turkish branch of the Human Rights Organisation (IHD).

The Commission is monitoring closely the situation of hunger strikes in Turkey. In its Regular Report of 2001 (1), the Commission reported that in Autumn 2000, the Turkish Government decided to implement a reform of the prison system replacing large dormitories (up to 80 prisoners in one room) with a system of small cells shared by one to three inmates (F-type high security prisons). This led to violent demonstrations and hunger strikes, which related not merely to improvement of prison conditions but also to other demands. In its Regular Report of 9 October 2002 (2), the Commission noted that the hunger strikes protesting against the F-type prisons continued. The death toll is now at 64.

The Commission is of the opinion that the continuing loss of life as a result of hunger strikes is deplorable. The Commission is aware of efforts taken by the Turkish authorities to put an end to the hunger strikes. It is also aware of the recent legislation amending Articles 307/a and 307/b of the Turkish Penal Code related to prison sentences applying to people calling for hunger strikes.

The Commission will continue to monitor closely the situation of human rights in Turkey, including the hunger strikes and the situation in the South East of the country, and raise these issues as appropriate with the Turkish authorities.

The Commission will give an assessment of the human rights situation in Turkey in light of the Copenhagen political criteria in its annual Regular Report to be published later in 2003.

----

(1)  COM(2001) 700 final.

(2)  COM(2002) 700 final.

----
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CrownPacific Partners, L.P. (the “Partnership”) on Form 10-Q for the period endedSeptember 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, Steven E. Dietrich, Senior Vice President andChief Financial Officer of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.

 

 
| /s/ Steven E. Dietrich        |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|
| Steven E. Dietrich            |
| Senior Vice President  and    |
| Chief Financial Officer       |
| Crown Pacific Partners,  L.P. |
| November 13, 2003             |

 

This certification is made solely for thepurpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and not for any other purpose.  A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to Crown Pacific Partners, L.P. andwill be retained by Crown Pacific Partners, L.P. and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated financial statements of The Associated Group, Inc. included in 
Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 1998 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                             9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                      JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                        SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                  512,210
<SECURITIES>                                  0<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                             7,368
<ALLOWANCES>                              2,189
<INVENTORY>                               2,362
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        557,352
<PP&E>                                  175,807
<DEPRECIATION>                           35,984
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                        2,064,514
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                   259,829
<BONDS>                                 573,391
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                  3,814
<OTHER-SE>                              773,153
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>          2,064,514
<SALES>                                     373
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         23,364
<CGS>                                       255
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            61,087
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                         16,893
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            829
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       54,051
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         (99,820)
<INCOME-TAX>                             (9,242)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                     (90,578)
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                            (90,578)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             (2.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 0
<FN>
<F1>
Does not include $1,200,324 of noncurrent marketable equity 
securities and $81,594 restricted cash and investments.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
STATE v. Bardo Garcia LUGO.

No. 409P08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 11, 2008.

M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Chapel Hill, for Lugo.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 9th day of October 2008 by State of NC for extension of time to file response to Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference this the 11th day of December 2008."
# C_2023045EN.01002401.xml

| 6.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 45/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 45/24

---

Action brought on 12 December 2022 — Contorno Textil v EUIPO — Harmont & Blaine (GILBERT TECKEL)

(Case T-773/22)

(2023/C 45/32)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Contorno Textil, SL (Almedinilla, Spain) (represented by: E. Sugrañes Coca and C. Sotomayor Garcia, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Harmont & Blaine SpA (Caivano, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark GILBERT TECKEL — Application for registration No 18 148 635

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 October 2022 in Case R 372/2022-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | alter the contested decision by stating that application for registration no18 148 635 must be granted for all goods in class 25 due to the lack of likelihood of confusion between the trade marks under comparison, after giving due consideration to the differences between the signs;
  order EUIPO to pay the costs; or, in the alternative, |
| --- | --- |

—

alter the contested decision by stating that application for registration no18 148 635 must be granted for all goods in class 25 due to the lack of likelihood of confusion between the trade marks under comparison, after giving due consideration to the differences between the signs;

order EUIPO to pay the costs; or, in the alternative,

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty.

---
----

(2004/C 33 E/221)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2106/03

by Christopher Huhne (ELDR) to the Commission

(25 June 2003)

Subject:   Food legislation

Can the Commission state whether there is any legislation that prevents some British food chain stores from donating food to charities that they would normally throw away?

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(23 July 2003)

The general principles and requirements of food law are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 (1), which covers all stages of production, processing and distribution to the final consumer. In particular, article 14 establishes a general food safety obligation (2):

Circumstances, which shall be taken into account in determining whether any food is unsafe, injurious to health or unfit for human consumption, are laid down in paragraphs 3 to 9 of the same article.

Article 3.8 of the said Regulation defines ‘placing on the market’ as the holding of food or feed for the purpose of sale, including offering for sale or any other form of transfer, whether free of charge or not, and the sale distribution and other forms of transfer themselves.

The donation of food by a food chain store to charities constitutes a form of free of charge transfer of food. Consequently, it must be considered as placing on the market and as such is subject to the requirements established in the aforementioned article 14.

It follows that, in the light of article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, food business operators may not donate to charities food, which they would normally throw away because of non-compliance of the food in question with the food safety requirements.

However, it should be noted that article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 does not prevent food business operators from donating to charities safe food, which they would normally throw away, because of its non-compliance with private quality standards voluntarily adopted by the operators in question.

----

(1)OJ L 31, 1.2.2002.

(2)  Although, according to the Regulation, article 14 shall apply only from 1 January 2005, it should be considered to apply also at present, given that it does not create a new legal obligation for food business operators but it simply confirms an overriding principle of food legislation. In any case, until 1 January 2005, the general food safety requirement is covered by the equivalent provisions (article 3) of the general product safety Directive 92/59/EEC, which will be repealed the 15 January 2004 by Directive 2001/95/CE. The provisions of this Directive apply in so far as there are no specific Community rules governing the products concerned.

----
# CE2004065EN.01003801.xml

| 13.3.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 65/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.3.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 65/38

---

(2004/C 65 E/038)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0637/03

by Baroness Sarah Ludford (ELDR) to the Commission

(4 March 2003)

Subject:   Reception conditions for asylum-seekers

Subject:

The English High Court ruled on 19 February 2002 that the application of section 55(1) of the UK Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is in breach of the European Convention of Human Rights. This provision allows the UK Government automatically to refuse food and shelter to an asylum-seeker who has not made their asylum claim ‘as soon as reasonably practical’. The court ruled that refusing food and shelter is a breach of the applicant's human rights and the ban on inhumane and degrading treatment if it poses a real risk of destitution and injury to the asylum- seeker's health.

Since the wording in the UK Act is the same as in Article 16(2) of Council Directive 2003/9/EC (1) laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers, the risk may be that other Member States might fall foul of the ECHR if they also impose an automatic denial of benefit on delayed claims. Given the interest in a uniform application of EU law, will the Commission ensure that all Member States follow the guidance that this English judgment offers so that asylum-seekers are not left destitute?

1

Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission

(3 Avril 2003)

(3 Avril 2003)

Following a ruling by the English High Court, the Honourable Member has requested clarification from the Commission about the implementation of Article 16(2) of Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (2).

2

The Commission has no competence to intervene in matters for which Community legislation has not yet entered into force. The provisions of this Directive still need to be transposed by the Member States. The deadline for transposition is 6 February 2005.

The Honourable Member is undoubtedly aware of the fact that the Home Secretary appealed the decision of the High Court and that the Court of Appeals has rendered its judgement.

A preliminary reading would suggest that this ruling follows the same lines as the principles laid down in the Directive.

The Directive provides for the possibility to refuse conditions in cases where an asylum seeker has failed to demonstrate that the asylum claim was made as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival in a Member State. It also requires that decisions to refuse conditions shall be taken individually, objectively and impartially and reasons shall be given. Moreover, the Directive provides that such decisions shall be based on the particular situation of the person concerned, especially with regard to certain categories of vulnerable persons and it ensures that such decisions may be the subject of an appeal.

---

(1)  OJ L 31, 6.2.2003, p. 18.

1

(2)  OJ L 31, 6.2.2003, p. 18.

2

---
Exhibit
      8.1




**Subsidiaries
      of Industrias Bachoco S.A.B. de C.V.**




The
      following chart lists each of our subsidiaries which we owned, directly or
      indirectly, as of December 31, 2005, and April 30, 2006:




1. Acuícola
      Bachoco, S.A. de C.V.




2.
      Aviser, S.A. de C.V.




3.
      Bachoco, S.A. de C.V. (“BSACV”)




4.
      Campi
      Alimentos, S.A. de C.V.




5.
      Huevo
      y Derivados, S.A. de C.V.




6.
      Operadora de Servicios de Personal, S.A. de C.V.




7.
      Pecuarius Laboratorios, S.A. de C.V.




8.
      Secba,
      S.A. de C.V.




9.
      Sepetec, S. A. de C.V.




10.
      Servicios de Personal Administrativo, S.A. de C.V.




11.
      Induba Pavos, S.A de C.V.




Each
      of
      the Subsidiaries listed is incorporated under the laws of México.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00427

- CR

Charles Edward Wilkinson

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 271st District Court

o f Wise County (CR15973 )

January 9, 2014

Opinion by Justice Meier

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DIS TRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

_________________________________ Justice Bill Meier
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           APR-3-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-27-1998
<CASH>                                           5,409
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   35,839
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,580
<INVENTORY>                                     69,731
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               114,945
<PP&E>                                          30,883
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,395
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 135,870
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           63,529
<BONDS>                                          2,537
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            57
<OTHER-SE>                                      69,627
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   135,870
<SALES>                                         51,086
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                51,086
<CGS>                                           39,943
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   39,943
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 630
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    864
<INCOME-TAX>                                       317
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                547
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       547
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.10
        

</TABLE>
## COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00047

- CR

Shawn Wayne Ross

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From Criminal District Court No. 3

o f Tarrant County ( 1249242D )

February 28 , 2013
Opinion by Justice Meier

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By______________

___________________ Justice Bill Meier2 

## COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00047

- CR

SHAWN WAYNE ROSS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT CO URT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------


### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant Shawn Wayne Ross entered an open plea of guilty to

possession of one gram or more but less than four grams of methamphetamine.

See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(c) (West 2010). The trial court

found Ross guilty, accepted his plea of true to the indictment ’ s enhancement

paragraph, ordered and reviewed a presentence investigation report, and

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.3

conducted a sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Ross to four years ’

confinement.

Ross ’ s court

- appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, in

his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous. Counsel ’ s brief a nd motion

meet the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396
(1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating
why there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Stafford v. State , 813
S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State , 904 S.W.2d 920, 922

– 23 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Ross filed a pro se brief in response,
the State filed a reply brief, and Ross filed a rebuttal brief.

Once an appellant ’ s court

- appo inted attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders , this
court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See

Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 511; Mays , 904 S.W.2d at 922

– 23. Only then may we

grant counsel ’ s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83,

109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel ’ s brief. We agree with

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in

the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State , 178

S.W.3d 824, 827

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State , 206 S.W.3d4

684, 685 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant couns el ’ s motion to

withdraw and affirm the trial court ’s judgment.

BILL MEIER JUSTICE

PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App

. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 28 , 201 3
RIVERPOINTE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Tanya MALLORY.

No. 130A08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 26, 2008.

John W. Gresham, Charlotte, for Mallory.

Michelle Massingale, Charlotte, for Homeowners Asso.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 656 S.E.2d 659.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by Respondent on the 25th day of March 2008 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30 (substantial constitutional question), the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the notice of appeal is

"Retained by order of the Court in conference, this the 26th day of August 2008."

Respondent shall forthwith submit an appeal bond to this Court, as provided by Appellate Rule 17(b). The bond may be in cash or by a written undertaking with good and sufficient surety in the sum of $250.00.

Therefore the case is docketed as of the date of this order's certification. Briefs of the respective parties shall be submitted to this Court within the times allowed and in the manner provided by Appellate Rule 15(g)(2).