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Calendar No. 19 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 470 

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 31, 2007 

Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. SALAZAR, Ms. LANDRIEU, and Mr. 

NELSON of Florida) introduced the following bill; which was read the first 

time 

FEBRUARY 1, 2007 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

A BILL 

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find5 ings: 

6 (1) We respect the constitutional authorities 

7 given a President in Article II, Section 2, which 

8 states that ‘‘The President shall be commander in 

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1 chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;’’ 

2 it is not the intent of this Act to question or con3 travene such authority, but to accept the offer to 

4 Congress made by the President on January 10, 

5 2007, that, ‘‘if members have improvements that can 

6 be made, we will make them. If circumstances 

7 change, we will adjust’’. 

8 (2) The United States’ strategy and operations 

9 in Iraq can only be sustained and achieved with sup10 port from the American people and with a level of 

11 bipartisanship. 

12 (3) Over 137,000 American military personnel 

13 are currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of oth14 ers since March 2003, with the bravery and profes15 sionalism consistent with the finest traditions of the 

16 United States armed forces, and are deserving of the 

17 support of all Americans, which they have strongly. 

18 (4) Many American service personnel have lost 

19 their lives, and many more have been wounded, in 

20 Iraq, and the American people will always honor 

21 their sacrifices and honor their families. 

22 (5) The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, includ23 ing their Reserve and National Guard organizations, 

24 together with components of the other branches of 

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1 the military, are under enormous strain from mul2 tiple, extended deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

3 (6) These deployments, and those that will fol4 low, will have lasting impacts on the future recruit5 ing, retention and readiness of our nation’s all vol6 unteer force. 

7 (7) In the National Defense Authorization Act 

8 for Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ‘‘cal9 endar year 2006 should be a period of significant 

10 transition to full sovereignty, with Iraqi security 

11 forces taking the lead for the security of a free and 

12 sovereign Iraq’’. 

13 (8) United Nations Security Council Resolution 

14 1723, approved November 28, 2006, ‘‘determin[ed] 

15 that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a 

16 threat to international peace and security’’. 

17 (9) Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and 

18 ever-widening problem of sectarian and intra-sec19 tarian violence based upon political distrust and cul20 tural differences between some Sunni and Shia Mus21 lims. 

22 (10) Iraqis must reach political settlements in 

23 order to achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the 

24 Iraqis to reach such settlements to support a truly 

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1 unified government greatly contributes to the in2 creasing violence in Iraq. 

3 (11) The responsibility for Iraq’s internal secu4 rity and halting sectarian violence must rest pri5 marily with the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Secu6 rity Forces. 

7 (12) U.S. Central Command Commander Gen8 eral John Abizaid testified to Congress on November 

9 15, 2006, ‘‘I met with every divisional commander, 

10 General Casey, the Corps Commander, [and] Gen11 eral Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in 

12 your professional opinion, if we were to bring in 

13 more American troops now, does it add considerably 

14 to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they 

15 all said no. And the reason is, because we want the 

16 Iraqis to do more. It’s easy for the Iraqis to rely 

17 upon us to do this work. I believe that more Amer18 ican forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from 

19 taking more responsibility for their own future’’. 

20 (13) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stat21 ed on November 27, 2006, that ‘‘The crisis is polit22 ical, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggrava23 tion and bloodletting of innocents are the politi24 cians’’. 

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1 (14) There is growing evidence that Iraqi public 

2 sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence 

3 in Iraq, much less increasing the troop level. 

4 (15) In the fall of 2006, leaders in the Adminis5 tration and Congress, as well as recognized experts 

6 in the private sector, began to express concern that 

7 the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and required 

8 a change in strategy; and, as a consequence, the Ad9 ministration began an intensive, comprehensive re10 view by all components of the Executive branch to 

11 devise a new strategy. 

12 (16) In December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq 

13 Study Group issued a valuable report, suggesting a 

14 comprehensive strategy that includes ‘‘new and en15 hanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and 

16 the region, and a change in the primary mission of 

17 U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United 

18 States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq 

19 responsibly’’. 

20 (17) On January 10, 2007, following consulta21 tions with the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President 

22 announced a new strategy (hereinafter referred to as 

23 the ‘‘plan’’), which consists of three basic elements: 

24 diplomatic, economic, and military; the central com25 ponent of the military element is an augmentation of 

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1 the present level of U.S. military forces through ad2 ditional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S. 

3 military troops to Iraq. 

4 (18) On January 10, 2007, the President said 

5 that the ‘‘Iraqi government will appoint a military 

6 commander and two deputy military commanders for 

7 their capital’’ and that U.S. forces will ‘‘be embed8 ded in their formations;’’ and in subsequent testi9 mony before the Armed Services Committee on Jan10 uary 25, 2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of 

11 the Army, it was learned that there will also be a 

12 comparable U.S. command in Baghdad, and that 

13 this dual chain of command may be problematic be14 cause ‘‘the Iraqis are going to be able to move their 

15 forces around at times where we will disagree with 

16 that movement,’’ and called for clarification. 

17 (19) This proposed level of troop augmentation 

18 far exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the 

19 reinforcements that would be necessary to implement 

20 the various options for a new strategy, and led many 

21 members of Congress to express outright opposition 

22 to augmenting our troops by 21,500. 

23 (20) The Government of Iraq has promised re24 peatedly to assume a greater share of security re25 sponsibilities, disband militias, consider Constitumstockstill on PROD1PC62 with BILLS

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1 tional amendments and enact laws to reconcile sec2 tarian differences, and improve the quality of essen3 tial services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite those 

4 promises, little has been achieved. 

5 (21) The President said on January 10, 2007, 

6 that ‘‘I’ve made it clear to the Prime Minister and 

7 Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is 

8 not open-ended’’ so as to dispel the contrary impres9 sion that exists. 

10 (22) The recommendations in this Act should 

11 not be interpreted as precipitating any immediate re12 duction in, or withdrawal of, the present level of 

13 forces. 

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con15 gress that— 

16 (1) the Senate disagrees with the ‘‘plan’’ to 

17 augment our forces by 21,500, and urges the Presi18 dent instead to consider all options and alternatives 

19 for achieving the strategic goals set forth below; 

20 (2) the Senate believes that the United States 

21 should continue vigorous operations in Anbar prov22 ince, specifically for the purpose of combating an in23 surgency, including elements associated with the Al 

24 Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists a safe 

25 haven; 

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1 (3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq 

2 would present a threat to regional and world peace, 

3 and the long-term security interests of the United 

4 States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, 

5 govern, and defend itself, and serve as an ally in the 

6 war against extremists; 

7 (4) the Congress should not take any action 

8 that will endanger United States military forces in 

9 the field, including the elimination or reduction of 

10 funds for troops in the field, as such action with re11 spect to funding would undermine their safety or 

12 harm their effectiveness in pursuing their assigned 

13 missions; 

14 (5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. 

15 strategy in Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders 

16 to make political compromises that will foster rec17 onciliation and strengthen the unity government, ul18 timately leading to improvements in the security sit19 uation; 

20 (6) the military part of this strategy should 

21 focus on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, 

22 denying international terrorists a safe haven, con23 ducting counterterrorism operations, promoting re24 gional stability, supporting Iraqi efforts to bring 

25 greater security to Baghdad, and training and 

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1 equipping Iraqi forces to take full responsibility for 

2 their own security; 

3 (7) United States military operations should, as 

4 much as possible, be confined to these goals, and 

5 should charge the Iraqi military with the primary 

6 mission of combating sectarian violence; 

7 (8) the military Rules of Engagement for this 

8 plan should reflect this delineation of responsibil9 ities, and the Secretary of Defense and the Chair10 man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should clarify the 

11 command and control arrangements in Baghdad; 

12 (9) the United States Government should trans13 fer to the Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, 

14 such equipment as is necessary; 

15 (10) the United States Government should en16 gage selected nations in the Middle East to develop 

17 a regional, internationally sponsored peace-and-rec18 onciliation process for Iraq; 

19 (11) the Administration should provide regular 

20 updates to the Congress, produced by the Com21 mander of United States Central Command and his 

22 subordinate commanders, about the progress or lack 

23 of progress the Iraqis are making toward this end; 

24 and 

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1 (12) our overall military, diplomatic and eco2 nomic strategy should not be regarded as an ‘‘open3 ended’’ or unconditional commitment, but rather as 

4 a new strategy that hereafter should be conditioned 

5 upon the Iraqi government’s meeting benchmarks 

6 that must be delineated in writing and agreed to by 

7 the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should 

8 include, but not be limited to, the deployment of 

9 that number of additional Iraqi security forces as 

10 specified in the plan in Baghdad, ensuring equitable 

11 distribution of the resources of the Government of 

12 Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipi13 ents, enacting and implementing legislation to en14 sure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit Sunni 

15 Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens 

16 in an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi 

17 commanders to make tactical and operational deci18 sions without political intervention. 

19 (c) FREQUENCY OF REPORTS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS

20 OF POLICY AND OPERATIONS.—The United States Policy 

21 in Iraq Act (section 1227 of Public Law 109–163; 119 

22 Stat. 3465; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is amended by adding 

23 at the end the following new subsection: 

24 ‘‘(d) FREQUENCY OF REPORTS ON CERTAIN AS25 PECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY AND MILITARY OPERmstockstill on PROD1PC62 with BILLS

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1 ATIONS IN IRAQ.—Not later than 30 days after the date 

2 of the enactment of this subsection, and every 30 days 

3 thereafter until all United States combat brigades have 

4 redeployed from Iraq, the President shall submit to Con5 gress a report on the matters set forth in paragraphs 

6 (1)(A), (1)(B), and (2) of subsection (c). To the maximum 

7 extent practicable each report shall be unclassified, with 

8 a classified annex if necessary.’’. 

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Calendar No. 19 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 470 

A BILL 

To express the sense of Congress on Iraq. 

FEBRUARY 1, 2007 

Read the second time and placed on the calendar 

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