SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0770-19

LYNN HOUGHTON, and 

HELPING SENIORS OF THE

VALLEY, LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

HILL WALLACK, LLP, and

EVAN M. GOLDMAN, ESQ., 

Defendants-Respondents,

and

CHIPMAN BROWN CICERO

& COLE, LLP, JOSEPH B. 

CICERO, ESQ., and STEPHANIE

HABELOW, ESQ.,

Defendants.

____________________________

Argued May 20, 2021 – Decided June 24, 2021

Before Judges Yannotti, Haas, and Natali. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1081-18.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Terry E. Thornton argued the cause for appellants 

(O'Brien Thornton, LLC, attorneys; Merrill M. O'Brien 

and Terry E. Thornton, on the briefs). 

James G. O'Donohue argued the cause for respondents 

(Hill Wallack, LLP, attorneys; Victoria J. Airgood and 

James G. O'Donohue, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

In this appeal, plaintiffs Lynn Houghton and Helping Seniors of the 

Valley, LLC, challenge an October 9, 2019 Law Division order dismissing their

legal malpractice claims against defendants Evan Goldman and Hill Wallack, 

LLP. For the following reasons, we vacate the October 9, 2019 order and 

remand for further proceedings.

I.

To provide context for our opinion, we detail the salient facts and 

procedural history. Houghton is the sole owner of Helping Seniors, a 

Pennsylvania business dedicated to providing non-medical support services to 

the elderly. The business is a franchisee of Seniors Helping Seniors, LLC, 

(SHS), a company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Pennsylvania. 

Houghton executed an initial ten-year franchise agreement with SHS in 

November 2006. 
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Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiffs agreed not to compete with 

SHS for two years after termination of the agreement for any reason and agreed 

to pay attorney's fees to SHS "in connection with the enforcement of the 

[agreement's] covenants." Plaintiffs had the option to renew the agreement, 

which they did by sending a notice of renewal to SHS for an additional term of 

ten years commencing on November 18, 2016. On December 8, 2016, plaintiffs

executed a new franchise agreement "similar to the 2006 agreement," and which 

contained a Delaware choice-of-law and forum clause.

In 2017, Houghton sought legal counsel to review severing her franchise 

relationship with SHS so she could operate her business independently. 

Houghton received Goldman's name from a colleague who described him as "a 

successful New Jersey franchise attorney." After researching Goldman online, 

she learned from Hill Wallack's website that he was "[c]ounsel in the Princeton, 

[New Jersey] office" and chair of the firm's franchise law practice. At the time, 

Goldman was admitted to practice law in New Jersey and the District of 

Columbia and claimed to have litigated matters in at least seventeen different 

states. 

Houghton contacted Goldman on March 27, 2017 by calling the firm's 

New Jersey phone number and leaving a voicemail on his office phone, which 
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Goldman returned from his New York cell phone number. For the duration of 

their relationship, Houghton and Goldman communicated exclusively through 

telephone and email, primarily while Goldman was located outside New Jersey. 

Houghton never went to Goldman's Princeton office. 

During their initial call, Houghton told Goldman she "couldn't risk [her] 

business in any way," and Goldman responded he would recommend against 

action if he did not find a "winnable" way out of the franchise agreement. After 

reviewing the agreement and relevant federal franchise law, Goldman believed 

he found a "loophole" supporting termination of the agreement and sent 

Houghton a March 29, 2017 engagement letter limiting the scope of their initial 

engagement to "consult[ing] . . . regarding concerns with the . . . franchise 

agreement." 

Goldman sent the retainer letter to Houghton electronically on Hill 

Wallack letterhead that listed its Princeton address and New Jersey telephone 

number. Houghton returned the signed letter by mail to Goldman's Princeton 

office where Houghton sent all future checks for his legal services. 

On April 4, 2017, Goldman sent SHS a notice of rescission to its

Pennsylvania headquarters declaring the 2016 franchise agreement "void ab 

initio." Two days later, Goldman notified SHS that Houghton intended to 
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withhold franchise royalty payments. SHS's attorney responded in a letter 

addressed to Goldman's Princeton office disputing the allegations and seeking 

to resolve the dispute amicably. 

In an April 22, 2017 email, Goldman advised Houghton that SHS would 

"try to get an injunction potentially shutting [her] down." Alarmed, Houghton 

responded that it was of "great concern that they could shut [her] down!" In a 

May 2, 2017 email, Houghton told Goldman that she was "completely stressed 

out over [her] business and career potential." 

After settlement negotiations failed, Goldman sent Houghton a second 

engagement letter on May 15, 2017, again on Hill Wallack letterhead, expanding 

the scope of his and Hill Wallack's representation to include "litigation 

commenced by, or against, [SHS]." The letter also indicated that Houghton 

would have to "retain separate, local counsel who is licensed to practice in the 

[S]tate of Delaware," which plaintiffs did in an agreement with Chipman Brown 

Cicero & Cole, LLP, and its lawyers Joseph B. Cicero and Stephanie Habelow 

(CBCC defendants). 

Neither of plaintiffs' engagement letters with Goldman and Hill Wallack

included forum selection, arbitration, or choice-of-law provisions. Conversely, 

plaintiffs' engagement letter with CBCC included a provision in which the 
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parties agreed to resolve "any dispute arising out of or relating to [the 

engagement] . . . including but not limited to any alleged claims for legal 

malpractice . . . [through] binding arbitration in Wilmington, Delaware." 

Plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint against SHS in Delaware state court 

on June 27, 2017, later amended on September 25, 2017, alleging in part that 

SHS breached the agreement by failing to provide plaintiffs with necessary 

inspections, training, and support. Plaintiffs also contended that SHS 

committed fraud by omission by failing to provide them with a franchise

disclosure document prior to entering the 2016 franchise agreement. The 

complaint identified Goldman as plaintiffs' counsel along with the CBCC 

defendants.

SHS moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. On December 6, 2017, the 

court reserved decision until briefing was completed on jurisdictional issues but 

noted it was "not yet impressed by the [federal disclosure document] argument 

because when [it] read the code [and] federal regulations, [it] read it as [not] 

apply[ing] to renewal whether or not there has been an [i]nterruption in the 

business." Houghton terminated Goldman and Hill Wallack's services on 

December 28, 2017. On January 4, 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the

amended complaint against SHS. 
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SHS thereafter filed an application seeking attorneys' fees based on the 

2016 agreement and local Delaware rules, including that the Delaware action 

was filed and prosecuted in bad faith. During arguments, the Delaware judge 

noted the "wackiness of the complaint . . . was not something . . . plaintiff[s] 

did. It's something that [Goldman] did." The judge noted he would "hate to 

punish the plaintiff[s] for [this] when the [culpable party] . . . [was] the author 

of this complaint." Plaintiffs contend that during negotiations, SHS's attorney 

told the CBCC defendants that SHS would "shut [Houghton] down" if litigation 

continued. Plaintiffs ultimately agreed to reimburse SHS for $120,000 in 

attorneys' fees incurred in defending the litigation.

On May 17, 2018, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Goldman, Hill 

Wallack, and the CBCC defendants in the Law Division in Mercer County 

alleging legal malpractice in connection with their advice in the SHS litigation. 

Plaintiffs contended venue was proper in Mercer County because Goldman and 

Hill Wallack's Princeton office is where "the majority of the acts which 

constitute legal malpractice occurred." 

On November 27, 2018, the CBCC defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' 

complaint contending New Jersey courts lacked in personam jurisdiction over 

them. They also argued the arbitration agreement contained in their retainer 
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agreement mandated dismissal. Neither Goldman nor Hill Wallack joined 

CBCC's application.

Plaintiffs opposed CBCC's motion and, on December 5, 2018, filed a 

separate application solely against Goldman and Hill Wallack. In that motion, 

plaintiffs sought a determination that New Jersey law applied to their 

malpractice claims. They specifically argued that Goldman and Hill Wallack

bore responsibility for the costs and attorneys' fees caused by their malpractice 

under the fee shifting principles espoused in Saffer v. Willoughby, 143 N.J. 256 

(1996). 

On February 19, 2019, the court held oral arguments on both applications

and reserved its decisions. The court resolved the outstanding motions by 

issuing four separate orders with accompanying written statements of reasons: 

three on September 19, 2019, and a fourth, "[f]inal" order on October 9, 2019. 

All three of the September 19, 2019 orders were captioned "order 

dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction and 

compelling arbitration in Wilmington, Delaware." Notably, in those orders, the 

court explicitly granted relief only to plaintiffs' claims against the CBCC 

defendants, and in the analysis section of the appended statements of reasons 

focused primarily on the claims and arguments against those defendants. For 
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example, without addressing Goldman or Hill Wallack's contacts with New 

Jersey, or New Jersey's possible interest in resolving plaintiffs' malpractice 

action, the court summarily concluded that "Delaware [is] the [S]tate with the 

first and foremost interest in adjudicating this matter" because CBCC and its 

attorneys "created the malpractice injury against [p]laintiff[s]," did the work, 

and filed the complaint in Delaware. 

The court also commented that CBCC "sponsored . . . Goldman['s] pro 

hac vice [application] in a Delaware court." The court therefore found Delaware 

had a "primary interest in adjudicating this matter because its residents/resident 

business created an injury against [plaintiffs] in the State of Delaware," and 

denied plaintiffs' motion to apply New Jersey law.

In a third "amended" order, also issued on September 19, 2019, the court 

dismissed plaintiffs' complaint against the CBCC defendants based on 

jurisdictional grounds and the arbitration provision contained in their 

engagement letter. The statement of reasons appended to that order was 

substantially different than the statements of reasons appended to the two other 

orders issued on September 19, 2019 discussed above.

Confused regarding the effect of the three orders on their choice-of-law 

application in light of the court's reliance on the CBCC defendants' contacts to 
10 A-0770-19

support its decisions, plaintiffs' counsel sought clarification from the court. In 

response, the court issued a fourth order on October 9, 2019, which it

characterized as "[f]inal" and "amended." That order explicitly denied plaintiffs' 

choice-of-law motion and dismissed the claims against Goldman and Hill 

Wallack. The court held:

1. For the reasons in the [s]tatement of [r]easons 

annexed to the prior orders entered on September 19, 

2019 . . . , the [c]ourt denies [p]laintiffs' motion to 

determine that New Jersey law under Saffer v[.]

Willoughby applies to plaintiffs' malpractice claim 

against defendants Evan Goldman and Hill Wallack[,] 

LLP; and

2. The [c]ourt having determined that "Delaware 

appears to be the most appropriate forum to address the 

injury to plaintiff[s]," plaintiffs' claims against Hill 

Wallack and Evan Goldman are dismissed without 

prejudice, because [the court] make[s] no determination 

of Delaware [l]aw as to the [a]rbitration [c]lause, and 

referred to litigation and or arbitration in Delaware; and

3. This constitutes the [f]inal [o]rder of the 

[c]ourt dismissing all of [p]laintiffs' claims and 

referring those claims to litigation and or arbitration in 

Delaware. 

This appeal followed in which plaintiffs challenge only the October 9, 2019

order dismissing the claims against Goldman and Hill Wallack.

Before us, plaintiffs first argue that the court's sua sponte dismissal of 

their complaint, relief which was never requested by Goldman or Hill Wallack, 
11 A-0770-19

was without notice and violated their due process rights. Second, plaintiffs 

contend that the court's choice-of-law decision was procedurally improper and 

substantively erroneous. 

As to the merits of the court's choice-of-law decision, plaintiffs maintain:

1) as a New Jersey attorney, the court had no basis to exclude Goldman and Hill 

Wallack from the Saffer rule, as it is intrinsic to the attorney-client relationship, 

and within the Supreme Court's exclusive rulemaking authority; 2) Goldman and 

Hill Wallack are subject to the Saffer rule because the recoverability of 

attorney's fees is a procedural remedy subject to the law of the forum; 3) the 

court failed to conduct properly a New Jersey choice-of-law analysis and 

seemingly gave insufficient weight to New Jersey's interests in the litigation; 

and 4) the matter should be reassigned to a different judge in the event of a 

remand.

Defendants argue that the court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under 

the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and that the court did not otherwise 

violate plaintiffs' due process rights. On the choice-of-law issue, defendants 

maintain Delaware, not New Jersey, has the most significant interest in resolving 

plaintiffs' alleged malpractice claims because that is where the relevant tortious 

conduct and alleged injury occurred. 
12 A-0770-19

We agree, in part, with plaintiffs' first point and accordingly vacate the 

October 9, 2019 order and remand for further proceedings. The court improperly 

dismissed plaintiffs' complaint in response to a routine application seeking a 

choice-of-law determination, and without Goldman or Hill Wallack ever filing 

a motion seeking affirmative relief, let alone a dismissal of plaintiffs' case. That 

dispositive decision was taken by the court without appropriate notice to 

plaintiffs and the opportunity to respond. In any event, the court's application 

of a foreign state's substantive law would not support dismissal of the complaint

on the record before the court. 

Further, we cannot determine from the court's multiple orders if its 

decision to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint was based on forum non conveniens 

grounds. To the extent that the court's orders could be reasonably interpreted to 

have granted such relief, we conclude the court failed to make appropriate 

factual findings as to Goldman and Hill Wallack's contacts with New Jersey and 

the unfairness, if any, in requiring a New Jersey-licensed lawyer and law firm 

to respond to claims of malpractice which, according to plaintiffs, occurred in

New Jersey. The court appeared to conflate the dearth of connections between 

New Jersey and the CBCC defendants with those among plaintiffs, Goldman,

and Hill Wallack. 
13 A-0770-19

The court's choice-of-law decision suffered from similar infirmities. The 

October 9, 2019 order and statement of reasons failed to correlate applicable and 

well-settled New Jersey choice-of-law principles to the facts in the motion 

record as they related to Goldman and Hill Wallack, rather than to the CBCC 

defendants, including the parties' relationship and the locus of the underlying 

malpractice. Finally, we decline to reassign the matter to a different judge on 

remand.

II.

"Due process is not a fixed concept . . . but a flexible one that depends on 

the particular circumstances." Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995) (citations 

omitted). "The minimum requirements of [procedural] due process of law are 

notice and an opportunity to be heard[,] . . . mean[ing] an opportunity to be heard 

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Klier v. Sordoni Skanska 

Constr. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2001). Consistent with these 

principles a trial court has no authority to dismiss an action, on its own motion, 

without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. 

Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); Feuchtbaum v. 

Constantini, 59 N.J. 167, 175 (1971); see also Curzi v. Raub, 415 N.J. Super. 1, 

28 (App. Div. 2010) (holding that due process required the trial judge to give 
14 A-0770-19

the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to reviewing a punitive 

damage award).

In addition, our Rules require that when resolving dispositive 

applications, a trial judge "by an opinion or memorandum decision, either 

written or oral, find the facts and state [his or her] conclusions of law thereon in 

all actions tried without a jury." The Supreme Court has stated "[n]aked 

conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4. Rather, the trial court 

must state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal 

conclusions." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). The "[f]ailure to 

perform that duty 'constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the 

appellate court.'" Id. at 569-70 (citation omitted).

Here, the court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint contravened 

these principles. The only applications before the court, and to which the parties 

had ample notice and opportunity to be heard, were the CBCC defendants'

motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint based on the lack of in personam 

jurisdiction and their retainer agreement's arbitration clause, and plaintiffs'

application for a choice-of-law determination as to Goldman and Hill Wallack. 

Neither Goldman nor Hill Wallack sought a dismissal of plaintiffs' malpractice 
15 A-0770-19

claims, based on forum non conveniens, lack of personal jurisdiction, or the 

existence of a mandatory arbitration provision in their engagement letter.

Further, in its decision on the choice-of-law motion and the motion to 

dismiss, the court failed to comply with Rule 1:7-4, which requires the court to 

clearly state its "factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal 

conclusions." Curtis, 83 N.J. at 570. Rather, in its September 19, 2019

statements of reasons, which it incorporated into the October 9, 2019 final order, 

the court exclusively referred to CBCC and its attorneys' contacts, except for a 

brief mention of CBCC's work to admit Goldman pro hac vice. 

When a civil action is brought in New Jersey, our courts apply New 

Jersey's choice-of-law rules in deciding whether this State's or another state's 

law governs. McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 227 N.J. 569, 583 (2017) 

(citation omitted). "The first step in a conflicts analysis is to decide whether 

there is an actual conflict between the laws of the states with interests in the 

litigation." Cont'l Ins. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 234 N.J. 23, 46 (2018) (citing 

P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 143 (2008)). We are to take a 

"defendant-by-defendant approach to choice of law" when performing this 

analysis. See Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 441 N.J. 

Super. 198, 230 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd, 227 N.J. 7 (2016).
16 A-0770-19

"If there is no actual conflict, then the choice-of-law question is 

inconsequential, and the forum state applies its own law to resolve the disputed 

issue." Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 189 N.J. 615, 621 (2007). "A 

conflict of law requires a 'substantive difference' between the laws of the 

interested states." Cont'l Ins., 234 N.J. at 46 (quoting DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 

N.J. 363, 383 (2015)). "A 'substantive difference' is one that 'is offensive or 

repugnant to the public policy of this State.'" Ibid. (quoting DeMarco, 223 N.J. 

at 383). 

New Jersey employs the most significant relationship test in resolving 

choice-of-law questions in tort actions. See In re Accutane Litig., 235 N.J. 229, 

260 (2018). In Calabotta v. Philbro Animal Health Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 38, 

57 (App. Div. 2019), we analyzed which state "has the most significant 

relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6"

of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Law. Those contacts include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury 

occurred,

(c) the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of 

incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the 

parties is centered.
17 A-0770-19

[Id. at 57 (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement 

(Second) of Conflict of Law § 145(2) (Am. Law Inst. 

1971)).]

Here, the trial court failed to provide a defendant-by-defendant analysis 

in its choice-of-law discussion, relying primarily on facts related to the CBCC 

defendants instead of those related to Goldman and Hill Wallack. Second, the 

court's choice-of-law analysis failed to address whether there was a conflict 

between the substantive laws of New Jersey and Delaware, or which state had 

the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. On remand, 

the court must determine whether there is such a conflict, and if so, address 

which state has the most "significant relationship" under the applicable

Restatement principles.

Finally, we note that even if the court concludes Delaware law should 

apply to defendants' alleged tortious conduct, any such decision would not settle 

issues of the appropriate forum. See Ginsberg, 441 N.J. Super. at 246, 250 

(finding New York law applied to defendants but remanding for continuation of 

proceedings in New Jersey). As such, this was not a situation in where the court 

properly exercised its discretionary authority to dismiss an action as resolution 

of the application before it resolved all remaining issues between the moving 

parties. See Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J. 563, 567 (1950) (holding a court has broad 
18 A-0770-19

authority to settle questions of law prior to trial and "[if] no issue remains[,] 

judgment must necessarily follow for one or the other party").

III.

Defendants also contend that the court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' 

complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In making this 

argument, defendants appear to request that we discern from the court's 

September 19, 2019 and October 9, 2019 orders its intention to dismiss the case 

based on the principles detailed in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-

09 (1947). We decline to do so.

The doctrine of forum non conveniens "is equitable in nature and, 

therefore, decisions concerning its application ordinarily are left to the sound 

discretion of the trial court." Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 164 N.J. 

159, 165 (2000) (citations omitted). An "appellate court should not substitute 

its judgment for that of the trial judge unless there is a showing of clear abuse 

of that discretion." Ibid. When a court granting a forum non conveniens 

dismissal "misconceives the applicable law, however, de novo review is required 

because the [trial court's] exercise of the legal discretion lacks a foundation and 

becomes an arbitrary act." Paradise Enters. Ltd. v. Sapir, 356 N.J. Super. 96, 
19 A-0770-19

102 (App. Div. 2002) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

In exercising its discretion in granting dismissal for forum non 

conveniens, the court is guided by: (1) preferential consideration to plaintiff's 

chosen forum; (2) the adequacy of the chosen forum, and that defendant be 

"amenable to process" there; and (3) the private- and public-interest factors set 

forth in Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-09. Yousef v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,

205 N.J. 543, 557-58 (2011). The private-interest factors are:

[1] the relative ease of access to sources of proof; [2] 

the availability of compulsory process; [3] the cost of 

obtaining the attendance of witnesses; [4] the ability to 

view an accident scene, if that would be beneficial to 

the factfinder; [5] the enforceability of a judgment; and 

[6] all other practical problems that make trial of a case 

easy, expeditious and inexpensive.

[Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]

The public-interest factors are:

[1] consideration of trial delays that may occur because 

of backlogs in a jurisdiction; [2] whether jurors should 

be compelled to hear a case that has no or little 

relationship to their community; [3] the benefit to a 

community of having localized controversies decided 

at home; and [4] whether the law governing the case 

will be the law of the forum where the case is tried.

[Ibid. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
20 A-0770-19

A court should not dismiss based on forum non conveniens unless the 

choice of forum is "demonstrably inappropriate." Ibid. (citing Kurzke, 164 N.J. 

at 171-72). In addition, "[a]s a general rule, a motion for dismissal due to forum 

non conveniens should not be heard unless the movant has made a good faith 

effort to obtain discovery and can provide the court with a record verifying that 

discovery is unreasonably inadequate for litigating in the forum chosen by the 

plaintiff." Kurzke, 164 N.J. at 168. 

Here, the court did not evaluate the Gulf Oil factors as it related to 

Goldman or Hill Wallack, or if plaintiffs' choice of a New Jersey forum, even as 

non-residents, was "demonstrably inappropriate." See Chubb Custom Ins. v. 

Prudential Ins. of Am., 394 N.J. Super. 71, 81-82 (App. Div. 2007) (reversing 

trial court's forum non conveniens dismissal as abuse of discretion because 

balance of factors did not favor defendant, discovery had not begun, and New 

Jersey-resident plaintiffs were entitled to deference in choice of forum), aff'd, 

195 N.J. 231 (2008). Because the court did not properly consider the Gulf Oil

factors, we reject defendants' contention that the court's dismissal was supported 

under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
21 A-0770-19

IV.

Finally, we have considered plaintiffs' arguments that the matter be 

reassigned to a different judge on remand and conclude they are of insufficient 

merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

In sum, we vacate the October 9, 2019 order dismissing plaintiffs' claims 

against Goldman and Hill Wallack and remand for the court to issue 

supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Rule 1:7-

4(a) as to plaintiffs' choice-of-law motion. Nothing in our opinion should be 

interpreted as an expression of our views as to the substantive law to be applied 

to plaintiffs' malpractice claims against Goldman and Hill Wallack, or the 

propriety of the matter proceeding in a New Jersey court.

Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.