* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-40395

Summary Calendar

LUIS ERNEST SANCHEZ, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

FRIENDSWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(G-96-CV-608)

December 9, 1997

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

L uis Sanchez, Jr. filed a complaint against the Frien dswood

Independent Sch ool District in which he alleged that the school

district, in violation of federal and state law, (1) refused to

allow him to graduate, (2) improperly placed him in an alternative

and isolated learning environment, and (3) denied him various

educati onal rights, including the right to receive academic,

psychological, and developmental testing. Without reaching the

merits, the district court dismissed Sanchez’s compl a int with2 The Southern District of Texas Rule 6 re quires oppositions

to be filed within 20 days of the filing of a motion. Failure to

respond to a motion will be taken as a representation of no

opposition.

3 See J ohn v. State of La. Board of Trustees for State

Colleges and Universities

, 757 F.2d 698, 707-8 (5th Cir. 1985); see

also Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz , 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991).

4 See Johnson v. Sawyer

, 120 F.3d 1307, 1316 (5th Cir. 1997).

5 Jones v. Houston Independent School District

, 979 F.2d 1004,

1007 (5th Cir. 1992)

6 See Guthrie v. Tifco Industries

, 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir.

1991).

2 prejudice on the ground that he had violated a local c o urt rule. 2

Sanchez appeals.

Though the district court erred in dismissing the complaint on

the basis of its finding that Sanchez violated a local court rule, 3

we affirm the dismissal on other grounds. 4 Sanchez failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In paragraphs 6 and 10 of his complaint, Sanchez appears to

assert claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress

based upon the school district’s refusal to allow him to graduate.

The school district is immune from such intentional tort suits. 5

Furthermore, Sanchez has not alleged facts that rise to a level of

outrageousnes s sufficient for a finding that the school district

intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. 6

Sanchez’s claim that he was improperly deprived of academic,

psychological and developmental testing appears to fall under the

rubric of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”). Even if7 Honig v. Doe

, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988); Gardner v. School

Board Caddo Parish , 958 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1992)

8 See Nevares v. San Marcos Consolidated Independent School

District , 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997).

3 Sanchez were entitled to IDEA’s protections, his claim must be

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 7

Finally, Sanchez did not plead facts sufficient to constitute

a substantive or procedural due process violation. The school

district did not violate Sanchez’s subs tantive or procedural due

process rights by transferring him to an alternative learning

environment for disciplinary reasons. 8

The district court’s dismissal of Sanchez’s claim with

prejudice is AFFIRMED.