Appellee s are the City of Sunset Valley , Texas; Save Ba rton Creek Association, I nc.; and Save 1 Our Spring s Alliance, Inc. We will refe r to “a ppellees” collectively , unless d i s cu ssing matter s rele vant to only one appellee. Although the City of Austi n is a defenda nt in the underlying litig ation, the tempora

ry injunction restraine d only L owe’ s construction activities. Austin did not file a notice of a pp e a l. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00411- CV

Lowe ’s Hom e Ce nt e r s, Inc ., App e lla nt

v. City of Su nset Valley, Texas; Save Bart on Cree k Association, In c.;

and S ave Our Springs Alliance, Inc., Appellees

F ROM THE DIST RICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 201ST JUDICIAL DIST RICT NO. GV 400101, HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDG E PRESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

L owe ’s Home Center s, I nc., bring s an interlocutor y appea l challeng ing the district court’s order g ranting a temporar y injunction. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a )(4) (West 2003). Appellee s obtained a te mporary injunction to prevent appe llant from continuing 1 construction ac tiviti es on a thirty -one a cre trac t of land (“ Gar za Trac t”). In one issue, appe llant claims that the district court e rre d in f inding that appellee s showed a probable rig ht to relief on the merits and g ranting the tempora ry injunction. W e will aff

irm the district court’s or der.The Save Our Spring s (SOS) ordinance w as d es i gn ed t o p rot ect wa ter qua lity

in the Ba rton 2 Springs Edw ards Aquif

er w ater shed re g ion by

imposing re strictions such as l imiti ng “impervious cover ” on any

g iven site. Austin Cit y

Code, art. 12, § 25- 8-512. “Impervious cove r” i s the total h o r iz o n ta l a r e a o f c o v e r e d s p a c e s , p a v e d a r e a s , w a lk w a y s , a n d dr iv e way s. S

ee Cit y of Austin v. Ga rza , 1 24 S.W. 3d

86 7, 86 9 n .2 (T e x. App .— Aus ti n 200 3, no pe t.) . SO S’ s p ro vis ion s a pp ly to those ar ea s wi thin Austin and Austin’s ex trater ritorial jurisdiction that contain wate rsheds contributing to Ba

rton Springs. Se e Qu ic k

v . Ci ty of A us tin , 7 S.W .3d 109, 112 (Tex. 1998). See Te x. L oc . G ov ’t

Cod e Ann. § 4 2. 02 1 ( Wes t 19 99 ); City of San Antonio v. Ci ty of Boerne , 3 111 S.W .3d 22, 26 (Tex. 2003). The purpose of ex trater ritorial j urisdiction is to promote and protect th e g e n e r a l h e a lt

h , s a f e ty , a n d w e lf a r e o f p e r s o n s r e s id in g in a n d a d ja c e n t to th e mu

n ic ip a li ti e s . T e x. L oc . G ov ’t

Cod e § 4 2. 00 1; City

of S an An ton io , 111 S.W .3d at 26. Cities acquire d extraterritorial jurisdiction in 1963. See Act of April 25, 1963, 58th L eg ., R.S., ch. 160, § 3, 1963 Tex. Gen. L aws 447-48. 2 F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound The unde rly ing suit ar o s e o u t of a se ries of e vents surrounding appellant’ s attempt to construct a “ L owe’ s Home Center” on the Gar za Trac t. The hea rt of the dispute is whethe r the Gar za Trac t lies within t he City of Austin’s extraterr itorial jurisdiction. I f it does, Austin’s Save Our Sprin g s ( SO S) o r d in a n c e ma y g o v e r n a p p e ll a n t’ s p r o

je c t, r e s u lt in g in

th e a p p li c a ti o n o f

more stringen t water

quality standards to the de velopment than those imposed by any other jurisdiction that mi g ht h a ve a

uth or ity ov e r t he pr oje c t. 2 Ex trater ritorial jurisdiction refe rs to the uni ncorpor ated a rea that is contiguous to the

c or po rate bo un da

ri e s of a mun ic ipa lity a nd is loc a te d wi thi n a sp e c if ie d dis tanc e of

tho se bo un da

ri e s, de pe nd ing up on the nu mbe r of inh a bit a nts wi thi n th e mun ic ipa lity . I n 1 96 3, the ET Js of the City 3 of Austin and Sunset Valley overla pped. Pursuant to state-la w authorization to do so, Suns et Valley and Austin apportioned the ir ETJs in a 1978 ag ree ment. The Garza Tract was a llocated to Sunset V a l l e y ’ s E T J.The re cord is not clea r what prompted appe llant’s filing with Austin. Appellant contende d that 4 sections 242.001 and 245.002 of the Texas L ocal Gove rnment Code mea nt that the Sunset Valley regulations in effe ct as to the Ga rza Tra ct at the time it filed its plat application with Sunset Valley in N ov e mbe r 2 00 2 c on tr oll e d. Se c tio n 24 2. 00 1 de a ls g e ne ra lly wi th the e xpans ion or re du c tio n in a municipality ’s ETJ and its e ffe ct, or lac k there of, on a pe nding plat application. Section 245.002 de a ls w iththe int e ra c tio n o f a se ri e s o f p la t a

pp lic a tio ns wi th c ha

ng ingre g ulatio ns . 3 Ap pe lla nt b e g a n p lann ing to c on str uc t on e of its sto re s on the Ga rza Tr a c t, w hic h it had acquir ed. I n September 2002, appellant submitt ed a “conc ept plan” to Sunset Valley , based on i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f

S u n s e tV a l l e y’ s l a n d

d e v e l o p m e n tc o d e i n e f

f e c ta tt h e t i m e . S u n s e tV a l l e y, d i s agr ee i n g t h at s u ch a c o n ce p tp l an wa s re qu i re d , re j ec t edt h e f

i l i n g. On No v em b er 4 , 2002, appellant f iled what it considere d to be its second plat application with Sunset Valley . A spec ial council mee ting ha d been c alled on Nove mber 1 a nd was set for the eveningof Nove mber 4. At that mee ting, Sunset Va lley passed a resolution rele asing the Gar za Trac t from its ETJ . On November 6, Sunset Valley returne d appellant’ s application and c heck ba se d o n a

va ri e ty of de fi c ie nc ie s. The mea ning of that November 2002 resolution beca me central t o the di spute over whose re g ulations controlled deve lopment on the Gar za Trac t. I n December 2002, appellant submitt ed a r equest to the Ci ty of Austin to have de velopment on the Ga rza Tra ct “g randf

ather ed”

so that th e re g ulatio ns of Sun se t Va lle y in ef fe c t on Nov e mbe r 4 , 2 00 2, wo uld a pp ly

. City

of Au sti n 4 staff r ejec ted ap p el l an t ’s re quest. I n Fe bruar y 2003, appellant f

iled suit for dec laratory

judgme nt

conce rning wh ic h

ju r is d iction’s regulations controlled that land. Austin took the position that S unset Va lle y ha d r e le a se d th e land

fr om i ts E TJ ba c k in to Aus ti n’s ETJ and so Aus tin ’s re g ulatio ns , including SOS, applied. In Marc h 2003, appar ently based on its interpre tation that Sunset Valley ’s4

ETJ rele ase meant that the Gar za T rac t w as not in the ETJ of either Sunset Valley

or Austin and that

on ly Tr a vis County

re g ulatio ns c on tr oll e d d e ve lop me nt, a pp e lla nt f i l e d a p l a t a pp lic a tio n w ithTr a vis C o u n t y. I n r e s p o n s e to th is s p e c if ic d is p u te , th e T e xa s L e g is latu r e p a s s e d H o u s e B il l 1204. Act of J une 20, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch.523, § 4, 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 1790-93 ( now codifie d as Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code An n . § 2 4 2

. 001(i) (West Supp. 2004-05)). Sec tion 242.001(i) states that proper ty subject to pending approva l of a pre liminary or final plat a

pplication filed af

ter Septembe r 1, 2002, which is r elea sed fr om a municipality ’s ETJ, shall be subject only to county approva l of the plat a pp lic a tio ns a nd

re la te d p e rm its a nd

c ounty re g ulatio n o f t

hat pl a t. Th e pa ssa g e of

HB 12 04 c a

used A us tin

to b e c ome c on c e rn e d th a t a pp e lla nt w ou ld preva il in the declar atory judgme nt suit, l ea v i n g Travis County as the re g ulatory

authority for the Gar za Trac t. Even i f t he Garza Trac t was withi n Austin’s ETJ and SOS would otherwise a pply , HB 12 04 m i g h tb e i n t e r

p r e t e d t o “ g r a n d f

a t h e r ” a p p e l l a n t ’ s d e v e l o p m e n to u to f S O S

. T r a v i s C o u n ty regul at i o n s i m posed no limitations on i mpervious cove r and minimal controls on other f actor s

a ff e c tin g wate r q

ua lity . T he se c on c e rn s c a us e d A us tin

to e nte r i nto ne g oti a tio ns wi th a pp e llan t. These ne g otiations resulted in the Gar za Settlement that resolved the pe nding de clar atory judgme nt suit. The settlement requir ed appe llant to pay money to Austin so it could purc hase la nd for

e nv ir on me nta l mi tig a tio n a nd re qu ir e d a

pp e lla nt t o f oll owc e rt ain env ir on me nta l g uid e lin e s in developing the trac t, but allowed a much gre ater “impervious cove r” pe rce ntag e on the land tha n that

a llo we d b y

SOS

. Th e Ga

rza Se ttl e me nt wa s pas se d by a sim ple ma jor ity of the Au sti n Ci ty

Counc il

on De c e mbe r 1 2, 20 03 , b ut the SOS or din a nc e re qu ir e s a su pe rm a jor ity vo te . A us tin

City Cod e , a rt

.5

12 , § 25 -8 -5 12 (7 5% or

6 o f 7 c ounc il me mbe rs ). Ap pe lla nt the n re -f

ile d its plat a

pp lic a tio n w ith Tr a vis County , wh ic h a

pp ro ve d the a

pp lic a tio n. Ap pe lle e s the n br ou g ht t he c ur re nt s uit , s e e kin g to have the Gar za Settlement declar ed void for its fa ilure to comply with the SOS ordinance. The tria l c o u

r t g r a n te d plaintiffs-appe llees’ motion for pa rtial summary

judgme nt that urg ed that the Ga

rza Settlement violate d the SOS ordinance (her eaf ter “ the summary

judgme nt”). The court also denied appellant’s mot ion for summary judgme nt. L ater , in the temporar y injunction pr oc e e din g s, the c ourt

fo un d ir re pa ra ble inj ur y in t he fo rm of e nv ir on me nta l de g ra datio n th a t c ou ld

no t be re me die d b y

law i f con st ructio n c on tin ue d. Th e c ourt

fo un d th e a

pp e lle e s h a d a

“ pr ob a ble rig ht of rec overy

on the merits of their c laims . . . where by Plaintiffs a ssert a violation of the City of Austin’s SOS Ordinance a nd that all conditions pr ece dent to the g ranting of such injunctive re lief have be en satisfied.”

Discussion

I nju nc tiv e re lie f may be g ra

nte d if “ ir re pa ra ble inj ur y to r e a l or

pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y is thr e a te ne d, ir

re sp e c tiv e of

a ny re me dy a t la w. ” Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 6 5. 01 1 ( Wes t 2003). To obtain a temporary injunction, the petitioner must prove three elements: (1) a ca use of

a c tio n a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt; (2 ) a pr ob a ble ri g ht to the re lie f sou g ht; a nd (3 ) a p ro ba ble , im min e nt,

a nd ir re pa ra ble inj ur y in t he int e ri m. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W .3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); W all ing v . M e tc alf e , 863 S.W .2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993)

. Appellant does not c ontest that appellee s have

a ca use of a ct i o n n o r that they would suffe r irre para

ble har m. There fore , the cr

ucial issue for

our revie w i s the t rial court’s deter mination that appellee s have a probable rig ht to the relief soug ht. See Bu tna ru , 84 S.W .3d at 204.6

“P ro ba ble Rig ht” Thr oug h the Abus eof Di sc re tio n Le ns A tri a l c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n is re ve rs e d only if the re is a c le a r a bu se of discre tion. Id .; Iran ian Mu sli m Org . v. City of S an An ton io , 615 S.W .2d 202, 208 (Tex. 1981). Th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se s it s d isc re tio n w he n it a c ts a rb itr a ri ly or un reas on a

bly wi tho ut r e fe re nc e to g uiding r ules or princ iples. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller , 8 0 6 S

. W

. 2 d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Do wne r v . A qu am ar ineOp e ra tor s , Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Tex

. 1985). A trial c ourt abuses its discretion if it mis appli es t he law to the e stablished fac ts of the ca se. Reagan Nat’l Adve r. v. Va nd e rh oo f F am ily Tru st , 82 S.W .3 d 3 6 6 , 3 7 0 (T ex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). We view the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the trial court’ s order , indulging ever y rea sonable infe renc e in i ts f a vo r, a nd de te rm ine wh e the r t

he or de r w a s so arb itr a ry

a s to e xce e d the bo un ds of re a so na ble discretion. Brammer v. K.B. Home Lone Star , L.P. , 1 14 S.W. 3d 10 1, 10 5- 06 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; Un iv e rsa l He alt h S e rv s. , Inc. v . Thompson , 2 4 S. W.3 d 5 70 , 5 76 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 00 , n o p e t.) . We c a nn ot r e ve rs e a tr ia l co urt ’s ord e r i f t

he tr ia l c ourt

wa s p re se nte d w ith conflict in g e v id e n c e a n d th e r e c o r d

in c lu d e d e v id e n c e th a t r e a s o n a

b ly s u p p o rts th e tr ia l c o u rt’s decision. Un iv e rsa l H

e alt h S e rv s. , 24 S.W .3d at 576. The pa rty seekingan injunction must have at lea st one valid leg al theory to support a proba ble rig ht to recove r. Brammer , 114 S.W .3d at 110. I f a pa rty does no t d es erve injunctive relief under a ny theory of law, imposing a tempora ry injunction is an abuse of discretion. See City of Houston v. W

oolley , 51 S.W .3d 850, 8 5 4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (tempora ry i n

j unction enjoining statutorily permitted par

t of g rieva

nce pr ocedur e wa s abuse of dis c re tio n) ; San Antonio v. B ee -J a y Enters. Inc. , 626 S.W .2d 802, 804 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an7

Antonio 1981, no writ) (a buse of discr eti on when injunction er roneously attempted to bar

e nf or c e me nt o f c ri min a l st a tut e wh ic h wa s no t un c on sti tut ion a l or oth e rw ise vo id) ; City of Pasadena v. Houston Endowment , 4 38 S.W. 2d 15 2, 15 8 ( Te x. Ci v. App .— Ho us ton [14t h D ist .] 19 69 , w ri t

re f’ d n .r .e .) (a

bu se of dis c re tio n to e njo in a c tio ns a uth or ize d b y

statut e ); cf. Iranian Muslim Org. , 615 S.W. 2d a t 20 2 ( de nyinginj un c tio n to pr ote c t exer c ise of c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d s pe e c h w a s a

bu se of discre tion when cour

t had no evidenc e, just spec ulation, of fer ed in opposition to the injunction). A ruling on temporar

y injunctive relief may not be used to obta in a n advanc e ruling on the merits. Iranian Musl i m Org. , 6 15 S.W. 2d a t 20 8; Davis v. H

uey , 571 S.W .2d 859, 861-62 (T e x. 19 78 ). Th e pa

rt y se e kin g th e in

ju nct io n doe s n ot n e e d to pr ov e that it wi ll p re va il at tr ia l. Bu tna ru , 8 4 S

. W

. 3 d

at 2 1 1 (c i t i n g Sun Oil Co. v. W hitaker , 424 S.W .2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968)).

The e x pression “pr obable r ight to re cover ” is a ter m of art; it does not imply any kind of dete rmination that become s the law of the case , and the district court did not, by its det er m i n ations, find the truth and a pply the law ba sed on “pr obabilities” in the meaning that word ha s in ordinary usag e. Instead, concer

ning both the facts and the law, appe llee wa s only

require d to show “that a bona f ide issue exist s as to his right to ultim ate r emedy .”

18 3/6 20Gr ou p J oin t V e ntu re v . S

PF J oin t V e ntu re , 765 S.W .2d 901, 904 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (quoting 6 L owe, Reme dies §1 14 , a t 18 8 (T e xas Pr a c tic e 2d e d. 19 73 ))

. Th e pa rt y seekingthe tempora

ry injunction must only adduce evidenc e that tends to support a right to rec over

on the me ri ts . Id. (

citing Camp v. Shannon , 348 S.W .2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1961)).8

App lic ation t

o th eCas e Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e su mma ry jud g me nt d oe s n ot s up po rt a pp e lle e s’ pr ob a

ble rig ht to relief. Indeed, a ppellant urg es that as a

matter of la

w appe ll ee s are not entitled to a temporar y injunction. Appellant arg ues t hat t he S OS ordinanc e cannot apply to the Gar za Trac t beca

use the that trac t has not been within Austin’s ETJ since the 1978 apportionment between Sunset Valley and Au sti n. Ap pe lla

nt u rg e s th a t Suns e t V a lle y ’s 20 02 re le a se of the tr a c t di d n ot c a

us e it t o r e ve rt

to Austin’s ETJ . There fore , appellant argues, Austin ha s no leg al authority over the Gar za T rac t and cannot impose SOS’s regulations. I f the S OS ordinanc e is irre levant as a matter of la

w to the

ou tc ome of

the c a se , urg e s a

pp e lla nt, the n it wo uld be un reason a

ble to b a se a

pr ob a ble ri g ht t o

r e c o v e r s o l e l y o n t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h a t i s s u e i n t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i n v a l i d a t i n g th e G a r za Settlement. Appellant claims that the c ourt simply relied on the summary judgme nt a s the basis for appellee s’ proba

ble rig ht to recove r. Ac cordi n gly , appellant a sserts that we must re view that summary ju d g me n t. T h is w e ma

y n o t d o in an in te r lo c u to r

y c h a ll e n g e to a

te mp o r a r y in ju n c ti o n. Se e Da v is , 571 S.W .2d at 862.

Fur ther, both the languag e of the order and the r ecor d from the tempor ary injunction hear ing showthat the trial cour t did not base its decision sol ely on the s ummary judgme nt. The orde r state s: [H] aving considere d the applica ble authorities, the evidence admitted at hea ring , and the ar g ument of counse l for all par ties . . . .

. . . .Judg e L ivi ng sto n d isp os e d o f b oth a pp e lla nt’ s and a pp e lle e s’ mot ion s f

or su mma ry jud g me nt, 5 g ra nti nga pp e lle e s’ a nd

de nyinga

pp e lla nt’ s. I twa s ar gu edt h at t h e G ar z a T ra ct l i es wi t h i n Au s t i n ’s E T J u n d er t h e ge n er al ru l e d ef

i n i n g a 6 city ’s ETJ. See Tex. L oc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 42.021 (West 1999). Acc ording ly , the only way for t h e G a r z a T r a c tt o b e o u t s i d e A u s t i n ’ s E T J i s t h r o u g h a n a p p o rt i o n m e n tt o a n o t h e r

j u r i s d i c t i o n . In the alter native, it was also argued that the e ffe ct of Sunset Valley ’s re lease of the Ga rza Tra ct was t o r e tu r n i tt o A u s t i n ’ s E T J. 9 Th e Court fu

rt he r fi nd s tha t Plai nti ff

s hav e a pr ob a

ble ri g ht o f r e c ov e ry

on the me ri ts of their c laims ag ainst Defe ndant L owe’ s where by Plaintiffs assert a violation of the City of Austin’s SOS Ordinance and that all conditions prece dent to the g ranting of such injunctive re lief have been satisfied.

The he aringthat resulted in this order was vigorously contested. Although the c ourt had a letter fr om J udg e L iv in g s to n s tati n g th a t th e mo ti o n f o r s u mm a r

y ju d g me n t w a s g r a n te d a n d d ir e c ti n g the 5 parties t o d ra ft a judgment, the re cord indicates that it did not have the orde r g ranting summary judgme nt in front of it at the hea ring on the tempora

ry injunction as the orde r h ad n o t y et been signe d. The pa

rti e s c o n tr o v e rte d th e s c o p e o f th e matt e r s th a t h a d b e e n a t is s u e a t th e ti me o f the summary judgme nt. At the temporar y injunction hearing , the cour t review ed both pre vious moti ons for summary judgme nts and responses i n order to deter mine what had been decided in the summary j u d g m e n t

. It a l s o h e a r d

e v i d e n c e a n d

a r g u m e n tc o n c e r

n i n g t h e qu e s t i o n o f

w h o s e E T J , i f

an y, contained the Gar za Trac t. I t hear d ev i d en ce and arg ument conce rning the agree ment betwee n Sunset Valley

and Austin and how the Garza Trac t might still belong in Austin’s ETJ. The pa rties 6 also argued over

the possible applicability of var ious “g randf

ather ing” laws that would take the land

o u t s i d e t h e a

p p l i c a t i o n o f

S O S e v e n i f

i tw e r e i n A u s t i n ’ s E T J. Al tho ug h th e tr ia l c ourt

ind ic a te d th a t it

wa s n ot i nc li ned to disturb the pr e vio us ly decide d summary judgme nt, it did have to revie w t he same summary judgme nt materia l to determine10

what had be en at issue. Ba sed on its revie w of the s ummary judgme nt materia l and other evidenc e de ve lop e d a t the he a ri ng on the te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n, it c on c lud e d th a t th e a pp e lle e s h a d a

pr ob a ble rig ht to recove r base d on the possible applicability of the SOS ordinance

. (As noted by appellant at the hea ring , there was no re ason to enjoin unless the Court found the trac t might be in Austin’s ETJ and SO S a

p p li e d

. ) A p p e ll e e s d id n o t n e e d to e s ta b li s h th a t th e y w o u ld u lt im a te ly p r evail on the merits. They

simply had t o s h o w a bona

fide issue e x ists as to their rig ht to ulti mate re lief. See 18 3/6 20Gr ou p J oin t V e ntu re , 7 65 S.W. 2d

at 90 4. On th is i nte rl oc uto ry a pp e a l th a t su ff

ic e s to support the trial cour

t’s decision to impose a tempora ry injunction. Id

. Appellant make s a var iety of other a

rg uments on appea l. The ar g uments conce rn matters that we re r aised in its motion for summary judgme nt that w as denied. We do not review the tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of

that mo tio n in

thi s in te rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l.

Conclusion Appellee s did not have to p ro v e t h at t h ey would ultimately

preva il at a trial on the merits. Bu tna ru , 84 S.W .3d at 211. Appellee s prese nted at least one valid leg al theory to support a proba ble rig ht to recove r: the possible applica bility of the SOS ordinanc e and the City ’s fa ilure to comply

with it in reachingthe Garza Settlement. See B rammer , 114 S.W .3d at 110. The tria l court c onsidered c onflicting evidenc e that re asonably supports its decision. Se e Un iv e rsa l H e alt h Se rv s. , 24 S.W .3d at 576. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favor able to the court order a nd ind u l g i n g e v e r

y r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e i n i t s f

a v o r , w e c a n n o t s a y t h e o r d e r w a s s o a r b i t ra ry a s toAppella n t ’s p en d i ng motion to ex pedite disposition of the motion t o incre ase te mporary 7 injunction bond and motion to incre ase temporar y injunction bond are dismiss ed. Ap p el l ant’s motion for leave to file supplemental brie f is g rante d. 11 exceed the bounds of rea sonable discretion. Brammer , 1 14 S.W. 2d a t 10 5; Un iv e rsa l H

e alt h S e rv s. , 24 S.W .3d at 576. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r. 7

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice B e fo re Chi e f Jus tic e L a w, Justi c e s B . A . Sm ithand Pe mbe rt on : O pin ion

by Chi e f Jus tic e L a w; ConcurringOpinion by J ustice Pemberton Affir med Filed: De cembe r 9, 2004