alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# CE2004088EN.01029801.xml

| 8.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 88/298 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 88/298

---

(2004/C 88 E/0305)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3607/02

by Mary Banotti (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(16 December 2002)

Subject:   Interchangeability of postage stamps of the euro zone

Subject:

Given that postage stamps are now the same price in many countries of the euro zone, will there be a possibility of interchanging stamps within the euro zone (e.g. using an Irish stamp in Belgium)?

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(30 January 2003)

(30 January 2003)

It appears that there are a number of preconditions for stamps to become interchangeable. The prices would have to be identical, the services the same, and the possibility of easily administered and non controversial stamp revenue allocation between postal operators assured.

As the Honourable Member is aware, there remain differences in postal tariffs across the Community. This reflects the Postal Directive 97/67 requirement that tariffs should ‘be geared to costs’, in that different postal service providers incur different levels of cost in the provision of postal services, due for example to national conditions, such as geography or cost of living, and also to different domestic quality of service standards.

Further, some operators also price differently according to the weight, size or dimensions of the postal item.

Many postal operators now offer a wide range of services to their customers, with a wide range of prices. This would make it difficult to easily compare and price identically like- for-like services.

Finally, the allocation of stamp revenues across postal operators would be extremely difficult to assess were stamps to become interchangeable. For example, if Irish stamps were used in Belgium, the postal operator in Ireland would benefit from the stamp revenue but incur no costs towards the delivery of the postal item in Belgium. Tackling this distortion would imply a complex, costly and potentially controversial system of revenue reallocation between postal operators.

In light of the above, the preconditions for the ‘interchangeability’ of stamps do not seem to be present, or look likely to be present in the near future.

However, the Honourable Member question raises an interest point about one possible future development in the postal services market and the Commission will continue to monitor the issue.

---
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
adopted), David DeWalt, Chief Executive Officer of Documentum, Inc. (the
Company), and Mark Garrett, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each
hereby certify that, to the best of their knowledge:



|1. |  | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2003, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit
32.1 (the Quarterly Report) fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and
|-- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. |  | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.                                                                                                                          

In Witness Whereof, the
undersigned have set their hands hereto as of the 10th
day of November, 2003.

|                        |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|/s/ David DeWalt        |  | /s/ Mark Garrett       
|                        |  |                        
|David DeWalt            |  | Mark Garrett           
|Chief Executive Officer |  | Chief Financial Officer

*     This certification accompanies the Periodic Report to which it relates, it
is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to
be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (whether made before or after the date of the Period Report),
irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.

*     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Documentum, Inc. and
will be retained by Documentum, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

45
STATE v. SMITH.

No. COA08-160.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed December 16, 2008.

Certification Date January 5, 2009.

Appeal from Wake (05CRS9374, 05CRS9375, 05CRS59140, 05CRS59141).

Case reported without published opinion. No Error.
STATE v. NORWOOD.

No. COA08-317.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed October 21, 2008.

Certification Date November 10, 2008.

Appeal from Mecklenburg (05CRS255156).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
#### In the Matter of Richard T. DiStefano, an Attorney, Respondent. Committee on Professional Standards, Petitioner.

[799 NYS2d 624]

*641Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 1986. He maintains an office for the practice of law in the City of Albany.

Petitioner has filed nine charges of professional misconduct against respondent, including allegations of substantial conversion of client funds over a period of years which continued as late as April of this year. Simultaneously with the filing of the petition of charges, petitioner moves to suspend respondent from the practice of law pending consideration of the disciplinary charges against him, pursuant to this Court’s rules *(see*22 NYCRR 806.4 [f]). Respondent admits the charges and specifications, except for specification (1) of charge VI, which petitioner withdraws. Respondent has submitted an affirmation in opposition to petitioner’s motion.

We find that respondent is guilty of professional misconduct immediately threatening the public interest and therefore grant petitioner’s motion. Although respondent professes reform, the motive and means for continuing his pattern of misconduct are still present. We also note that respondent has been previously cautioned by petitioner on two occasions and censured by this Court in 2003 *(see Matter of DiStefano,*309 AD2d 1060 [2003]).

Mercure, J.E, Mugglin, Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur.

Ordered that petitioner’s motion is granted; and it is further ordered that respondent is suspended from practice, effective upon service on respondent of this decision and order and until further order of this Court; and it is further ordered that respondent, for the period of suspension, is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another; and respondent is forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority; or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice with relation thereto; and it is further ordered that respondent shall comply with the provisions of this Court’s rules regulating the conduct of suspended attorneys *(see*22 NYCRR 806.9).
STATE v. MILLS.

No. COA07-1197.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed May 6, 2008.

Certification Date May 27, 2008.

Appeal from Forsyth (06CRS54973, 06CRS8762, 07CRS8999).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-5179

_____________________________

STUART DELANCY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

February 19, 2018

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Stuart Delancy, pro se, Appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
ALLONGE TO PROMISSORY NOTE


Aspen, Colorado
December 15, 2006


PURSUANT TO a loan agreement dated August 1. 2003 (the "Loan Agreement"), Calais Resources, Inc., a British Columbia corporation ("Calais BC"), Calais Resources Colorado, Inc., a Nevada corporation ("Calais Colorado"), and Aardvark Agencies, Inc., a Washington corporation ("Aardvark" and, collectively with Calais BC and Calais Colorado, the "Borrowers") and subject to that certain Letter Agreement of September 22, 2005 (the “Initial Agreement") between Calais BC and Calim Private Equity, LLC ("Cailm") and that certain Letter Agreement dated July 27,2006 (the "Amendment") amending and clarifying certain of the terms of the Initial Agreement (the Initial Agreement and the Amendment, collectively, the "Letter Agreement"), executed and delivered the promissory note dated August 1,2003 in the original principal amount of US $4,500,000 as amended by that certain Allonge dated December 15,2005 increasing the outstanding principal amount to US $5,222,095.88 (the "2005 Allonge") to which this Allonge is attached (the "Note"), payable to the parlies described therein as the "Note Holder." The Borrowers hereby adopt this Allonge to reflect a 90-day extension of the term of the Note, the conversion and all other rights applicable thereto including those arising under the Letter Agreement to March 15, 2007. The term and maturity of the Note and all rights arising thereunder together with conversion and other rights set forth in the Letter Agreement are hereby extended to March 15, 2007. The Note, as amended hereby, remains in full force and effect.


This Allonge, the 2005 Allonge and the attached Note constitute collectively one and a singular instrument, and one shall not be negotiated, transferred or conveyed without the other; and the "Lender." within the meaning of the Loan Agreement, shall not effect any transferor replacement of the Note without attachment of the 2005 Allonge and this Allonge. Unless otherwise defined oi the context otherwise requires, capitalized terms used in this Allonge shall have the meanings assigned them in the Loan Agreement and the Letter Agreement


IN WITNESS OF THE ABOVE, the Borrowers have caused this Allonge to be executed as of the date shown above.




CALAIS RESOURCES, INC.By:
/s/ David K. YoungAuthorized Officer


CALAIS RESOURCES COLORADO, INC.By:
/s/Authorized Officer
STATE v. PACE.

No. COA07-1531.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed July 15, 2008.

Certification Date August 4, 2008.

Appeal from Henderson (07CRS50196, 07CRS1650, 07CRS50198, 07CRS50239, 07CRS50241).

Case reported without published opinion. Dismissed.
THEA~TORNEYGENERAI. 

OF TEXAS 

Ausnlv 1% TEXAS 

October 18, 1960 

Honorable William M. King 

Securities Commissioner 

State Securities Board 

State Office Building 

Austin 11, Texas 

Opinion No. WW-95 1 

Re: Whether the Securities Commissioner has authority to publish an 

administrative interpretation of Section 1 OA of the Securities Act. 

Dear Sir: 

You have requested our opinion as to whether the Securities Commissioner has authority to publish an administrative interpretation of 

Section 1 OA of the Securities Act. Article 58 1, V. C. S. For brevity’s 

sake, we do not now quote the language detailed on the four pages of 

your request, but rather state that this interpretation defines and interprets the key phrases of Section 1 OA and, in addition, lists some seven 

factors illustrative of those to be considered in determining whether or 

not the proposed plan of business appears to be “fair, just and equitable” 

and some six factors illustrative of those not to be considered. 

The application of the doctrine of “fair, just and equitable” to a 

particular proposed plan of business requires the exercise of discretionary judgment by the Securities Commissioner, based on the particular 

fact situation presented. There are a multitude of factors which may 

be considered with respect to any individual case and the relative weight 

to be given these factors is a matter within the discretion of the Commissioner. However, in determining whether or not a particular proposed 

plan of business is “fair, just and equitable, ” the Commissioner, by necessity, must test such a plan with a definite set of factors in mind. Certainly the Commissioner has authority to publish and thereby notify the 

securities industry of these standards of general application he will take 

into consideration in guiding his judgment in a determination under Section 1 OA. 

We do not find that the Securities Commissioner is without authority to issue this administrative interpretation. However, in the absence 

of a particular fact situation by which to test the propriety of the illustrative factors contained in your request, this office cannot determine whether 

or not these facts are contrary to the intent of the Securities Act in an 

individual case. 
Hon. William M. King, page 2 (WW-951) 

SUMMARY 

The Securities Commissioner has authority to 

publish an administrative interpretation of Section 1 OA 

of the Texas Securities Act, but the Attorney General, 

by this opinion, does not pass on the propriety of the 

illustrative factors contained therein as used in determining whether or not a particular proposed plan of 

business is “fair, just and equitable. ” 

Very truly yours, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

RAWlpe 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE: 

BY 

Richard A. Weils 

Assistant Attorney General 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Virgil Pulliam 

Robert T. Lewis 

Grundy Williams 

Tom I. McFarling 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: 

Leonard Passmore
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 18




January 17, 2000


Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc.
Thomson, Georgia

Pursuant to your request, we have read the statements contained in note 5 to the
consolidated financial statements included in the Form 10-KSB of
Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1999. As
stated in note 5, "the Bank prospectively changed methods of accounting for
depreciation from accelerated methods to the straight-line method for all
depreciable assets placed in service on or after January 1, 1999." In addition,
as stated in note 5, "Management of the Bank believes that utilizing the
straight-line method is preferable as it more closely matches the methods
utilized by peer institutions." You have requested a letter from us as your
independent certified public accountants that you can file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission indicating whether or not we believe the aforementioned
change in method of accounting is preferable under your particular
circumstances. This letter is submitted to you solely for that purpose.

Based on our reading of the information set forth in the Form 10-KSB of
Georgia-Carolina Bancshares, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1999, we
believe (a) the newly adopted accounting principle is a generally accepted
accounting principle, (b) the method of accounting for the change is in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, (c) the Company has
justified the use of the newly adopted accounting principle on the basis that it
is preferable as required by Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20 and the
Company's justification for the change is reasonable, and (d) there are no
unusual circumstances such that the selection and application of the newly
adopted accounting principle would make the financial statements taken as a
whole misleading.

While there are a number of methods of computing depreciation that are
acceptable under generally accepted accounting principles, we believe that,
under your particular circumstances, the aforementioned change is to a
preferable alternative accounting principle.

Very truly yours,

CHERRY, BEKAERT & HOLLAND, L.L.P.
NORTH CAROLINA ALLIANCE FOR TRANSPORTATION REFORM, INC. and Herb Zerof v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

No. 308P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 23, 2007.

Marsh Smith, Southern Pines, for Alliance for Transportation.

Lisa C. Glover, Scott Conklin, Assistant Attorney Generals, for DOT.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 645 S.E.2d 105.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 6th day of July 2007 by Plaintiffs in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 23rd day of August 2007."
STATE v. Wesley David BOLLINGER.

No. 449A08.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

November 24, 2008.

Jarvis Edgerton, IV, for Bollinger.

Robert Wlkins, Assistant Attorney General, Roxann Vaneekhoven, District Attorney, for State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 20th day of November 2008 by State of NC for Extension of Time to File Brief.

"Motion Allowed. State of NC shall have up to and including the 23rd day of December 2008 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court. By order of the Court in conference this the 24th day of November 2008."
Amendment No. 2 to Independent Contractor Agreement dated July 1, 2010



  
 Exhibit 10.1

 Amendment No. 2 
 INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment No. 2 to Independent Contractor
Agreement (“Agreement”) is effective July 1, 2010 and is between GEOVIC Ltd. (“Company” or “Geovic”) and Mineral Services, LLC, (“Contractor”) 142 Stratford Avenue, Garden City, New York 11530. The
Company and the Contractor are in some places herein referred to individually as a Party and collectively as the Parties. 
 WHEREAS:

  

	 	A.	Contractor and Company entered into the Independent Contractor Agreement effective June 15, 2009 (“Original Agreement”), following approval by the Board
of Directors of Geovic Mining Corp.; 

  

	 	B.	The Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors approved the material terms of this Amendment No.1 in December 2009; 


 

	 	C.	The Parties intend that the Original Agreement shall be amended to change the compensation arrangements for the Contractor commencing October 2009, the beginning of the
third fiscal quarter of the Company as set forth herein, 

  

	 	D.	The parties intend to extend the term during which compensation at the rate described in Section 1.3.1 below is paid; and 


 

	 	E.	Except as set forth in this Agreement, all other terms and conditions of the Original Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 


WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows: 
 1.
Change in Compensation. Section 1.3 of the Original Agreement shall be further revised and amended to provide as follows: 
  

	 	1.3	The Geovic shall pay the Contractor (“Contractor Fees”) against delivery of an invoice by the Contractor containing such details of Services as the Geovic
shall reasonably request, as follows: 

  

	 	1.3.1	Fixed Fee. Twenty-eight Thousand US dollars ($28,000) per calendar quarter, payable calendar quarterly in arrears for all Services provided by Contractor
during the quarter; 


  
 1 








  

	 	1.3.2	Timeliness of Invoices. Invoices in reasonable detail shall be provided to Geovic within 20 days of each calendar quarter end shall be payable upon
receipt. 

  

	 	1.3.3	Unless extended by mutual agreement of the Parties, the quarterly compensation payable to Contractor under this Agreement shall revert to the rate payable under the
Original Agreement for calendar quarters commencing January 1, 2011. 

 2. No Other Changes. Except as set forth in
this Agreement, all other terms and conditions of the Original Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the Parties hereto have executed the Agreement effective as of the date first above written. 
  

					
		  	Geovic Ltd.,
		  	A corporation organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands


 

					
		 	By:	 	 /s/ John E. Sherborne

		 	John E. Sherborne
		 	Authorized officer

  

					
		 	Mineral Services, LLC
		 	Contractor
			
		 	By:	 	 /s/ Michael Mason

		 	Michael Mason
		 	Authorized Member

  

			
	Tax I.D. #	 	  



 

					
		
		 	 /s/ Michael Mason

		 	Michael Mason, Individually


  
 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7167

OSCAR LENTON, SR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN OF FCI EDGEFIELD,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock 

Hill. David C. Norton, District Judge. (0:21-cv-01513-DCN)

Submitted: December 16, 2021 Decided: December 20, 2021

Before WYNN and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Oscar Lenton, Sr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Oscar Lenton, Sr., a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Lenton’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

petition in which Lenton sought to challenge his convictions by way of the savings clause 

in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Pursuant to § 2255(e), a prisoner may challenge his convictions in a 

traditional writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 if a § 2255 motion would be inadequate 

or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. 

[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a 

conviction when: (1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or 

the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent 

to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law 

changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed 

not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping 

provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000).

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

for the reasons stated by the district court. Lenton v. Warden of FCI Edgefield, No. 0:21-

cv-01513-DCN (D.S.C. July 22, 2021). We also deny Lenton’s motions to assign counsel 

and amend his petition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED