FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KAMALPAL SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 10-71677

Agency No.

A094-990-061

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2014*

San Francisco, California

Filed August 26, 2014

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit

Judges, and Lloyd D. George, Senior District Judge.

**

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge George

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Lloyd D. George, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
2 SINGH V. HOLDER

SUMMARY***

Immigration

The panel granted a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum and withholding of

removal to a citizen of India who asserted claims for past

persecution and a fear of future persecution by police on

account of his imputed political opinion.

The panel held that the evidence compelled the

conclusion that petitioner’s imputed political opinion was at

least one central reason police targeted him where during

interrogation police called him a traitor and repeatedly

accused him of working against the government.

The panel further held that indirect evidence of

petitioner’s association with a suspected terrorist supported

the conclusion that he was persecuted because of an imputed

political opinion. The panel explained that although the

REAL ID Act eliminated the presumption that persecution is

politically motivated in the absence of any evidence of a

legitimate prosecutorial purpose, an applicant may still meet

his burden of establishing nexus by introducing evidence that

he was wrongly accused of being a terrorist.

The panel held that mixed-motives analysis applies to

cases governed by the REAL ID Act, and that even if police

are engaged in a legitimate investigation, an applicant may

establish nexus by showing that he was persecuted both

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SINGH V. HOLDER 3

because of legitimate investigatory reasons and because of a

protected ground, so long as a protected ground was at least

one central reason for the harm.

District Judge George concurred with the opinion insofar

as it remanded for the granting of relief pursuant to the

Convention Against Torture. Judge George dissented from

the majority’s holding that the evidence compels the

conclusion that a central reason for petitioner’s persecution

was an imputed political opinion. George wrote that he

believes that the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,

shows that the reason police targeted petitioner was an effort

only to obtain information about a suspected terrorist.

COUNSEL

Pardeep Singh Grewal, Law Office of Pardeep Singh Grewal,

Castro Valley, California, for Petitioner.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; James E. Grimes,

Senior Litigation Counsel; and Janice K. Redfern, Senior

Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.
4 SINGH V. HOLDER

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Kamalpal Singh, a 51-year-old native and citizen of India,

petitions for review from the BIA’s denial of his application

for asylum and withholding of removal based on imputed

political opinion. Singh entered the United States in 2006

after fleeing egregious physical abuse by the local police in

his town of Jullandar in the state of Punjab. Although the

BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision to grant

Singh relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), it

held that an imputed political opinion was not a central reason

for the police brutality against him and denied his

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Relying

in part on our decision in Dinu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 1041

(9th Cir. 2004), the BIA concluded that the Punjabi police

had legitimate reasons for their arrest and detention of Singh. 

The government did not contest the IJ’s decision to grant

Singh relief under CAT, and the BIA, accordingly, affirmed

this portion of the IJ’s decision. We grant Singh’s petition

and hold that the record compels the conclusion that Singh is

eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of removal.

I.

Singh’s troubles began shortly after his domestic servant,

Jabed Khan, left for vacation and failed to return. After being

introduced to Khan by a friend’s servant, Singh hired Khan to

perform various domestic tasks, including caring for Singh’s

mother, taking his children to school, running errands, and

cooking for the family. Singh testified at his hearing that

Khan was “a very nice man,” who “never abused anyone,

[and] never used bad language.” Singh also testified that
SINGH V. HOLDER 5

Khan received visitors who appeared to be Khan’s friends

and relatives from his home state of Jammu and Kashmir. In

addition to these visits, Khan occasionally used his vacation

from work to visit his village for periods of a week to ten

days. After two years of employment with Singh, however,

Khan left for vacation and never returned.

Shortly after Khan’s departure in May 2006, the police

came to Singh’s home and arrested him at around 4:30 in the

morning. Four police officers took him to the police station

and detained him for two days. They interrogated him about

Khan, and told him that Khan was a Kashmiri terrorist. They

then accused Singh of helping the terrorists and of knowingly

employing Khan despite his connections to terrorism. They

asked Singh what terrorist activities were being planned and

accused him of being a “traitor” who was “working against

the government.”

The police did not limit themselves to questioning,

however. During the course of the interrogation, Singh was

repeatedly subjected to egregious physical abuse. One officer

grabbed his hair and struck him repeatedly in the face. The

other officers then pushed him to the ground while one held

his hands together and another restrained him by placing his

knee on Singh’s neck. At the same time, another officer beat

Singh with a bamboo stick and leather belt. The police beat

him for ten to fifteen minutes at a time and then continued

interrogating him. When Singh apparently persuaded them

that he had no information to offer them, the officers stripped

his pants off and used them as a pulley by which they hung

him upside down until he lost consciousness. The police then

alternated between hanging Singh upside down and beating

him. He was beaten about five or six times during the course

of his two-day detention.
6 SINGH V. HOLDER

Following the physical abuse and the extended

questioning, the officers refused to let Singh go, and he was

released only when his family and neighbors bribed them

with 50,000 rupees.1 The officers warned Singh not to talk

about what had happened at the station. Once he was

released, he was not able to walk because of the beatings and

he had to seek medical attention. Singh’s doctor feared

reprisal by the police, however, and refused to treat him at the

hospital, instead going to Singh’s house to provide medical

care.

A few weeks later, at four in the morning, the police

returned to Singh’s home and arrested him a second time. 

The four officers began asking him about Khan again, and he

told them that he had already given them all the information

he had. The chief police officer slapped Singh and told the

other officers to take him to the station to “make a man out of

him there.” He was taken to the interrogation room, thrown

on the ground, and beaten while the officers asked him

questions about Khan’s whereabouts, his knowledge of

terrorist activities, and his own role in assisting the terrorists. 

When he told the officers that he did not know anything, they

threatened to kill him if he refused to answer. The officers

again put Singh on the ground and beat him with a bamboo

stick and leather belt. Over the course of his four days in

detention, Singh was beaten eight to ten times. This time,

Singh’s family bribed the officers with 80,000 rupees in order

1

In 2006, 50,000 rupees was the equivalent of approximately $1,100. 

At the time, Singh’s yearly salary appears to have been around 95,000

rupees.
SINGH V. HOLDER 7

to obtain his release.2 Shortly after his second arrest and

beatings, Singh fled to the United States.

During his hearing before the IJ, Singh testified that he

feared returning to India because the police continued to look

for him and to harass his family. Singh stated that the police

went to his home 12 to 13 times after his departure for the

United States. Once Singh had fled, the police targeted his

wife, Sarpreet Kaur. They arrested her, took her to the police

station, detained her for the night, and beat her. They asked

her about Singh’s whereabouts and about his activities against

the government. Singh’s family and neighbors bribed the

police to have his wife released, this time paying 20,000

rupees.3

The facts described above are contained in Singh’s

testimony before the IJ, who found his testimony to be

credible. Nonetheless, the IJ denied Singh’s request for

asylum and withholding of removal, because he concluded

that Singh had not demonstrated a nexus between his

persecution and a protected ground.4 Relatedly, the IJ found

that it was more likely than not that Singh would be tortured

if returned to India and therefore granted his request for relief

under CAT.

 

2

 In 2006, 80,000 rupees was the equivalent of approximately $1,750.

 

3

 In 2006, 20,000 rupees was the equivalent of approximately $440.

4 Singh originally claimed that he had been persecuted on account of his

religion, his membership in a particular social group, and an imputed

political opinion. His petition for review concerns only his claim of an

imputed political opinion.
8 SINGH V. HOLDER

The BIA agreed with the IJ and affirmed his ruling that

Singh had not established that an imputed political opinion

was a central reason for his persecution by the Punjabi police. 

Relying in part on our decision in Dinu v. Ashcroft, the BIA

held that the Indian government had a “legitimate reason to

arrest, detain, and question” Singh, and that he was therefore

ineligible for asylum. The government did not appeal the IJ’s

determination that Singh was entitled to relief under CAT,

and the BIA affirmed the portion of the IJ’s decision granting

such relief. Singh filed a timely petition for review.

II.

We have jurisdiction over Singh’s petition for review

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum or

withholding of removal for substantial evidence. Kumar v.

Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006). “Under that

standard, the BIA’s determination must be upheld if it is

supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence

from the record.” Id. Where, as here, the BIA adopts the

reasoning of the IJ and adds additional reasons, we review

both decisions. Lopez-Cardona v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110,

1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

A.

“It is settled law that an applicant may establish a political

opinion for purposes of asylum relief by showing an ‘imputed

political opinion.’” Kumar, 444 F.3d at 1053 (citation

omitted). To demonstrate a nexus between Singh’s

mistreatment and an imputed political opinion, Singh “must

show (1) that . . . his persecutors believed that he held . . . a

political opinion; and (2) that he was harmed because of that

political opinion.” Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018,
SINGH V. HOLDER 9

1023 (9th Cir. 2010). Singh’s asylum application was

submitted after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, and he

must therefore demonstrate that an imputed political opinion

was “at least one central reason” for his persecution. 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Parussimova v.

Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the IJ

and the BIA determined that Singh’s testimony was credible,

we treat the facts to which he testified as true. See Cole v.

Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 770 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Punjabi police attributed a political opinion to Singh

during their interrogation and abuse of him. Testimony

regarding a persecutor’s statements serves as direct evidence

that the persecution was motivated by a political opinion

imputed to the applicant. See Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011,

1017–18 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Li v. Holder, 559 F.3d

1096, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Persecutors’ motivation

should not be questioned when the persecutors specifically

articulate their reason for attacking a victim.”). The police

called Singh a “traitor” and repeatedly accused him of

“working against the government.” Even after Singh

departed, the police continued to attribute a political opinion

to him in their statements. Singh testified that the police told

his wife that Singh was a “dog” and asked her about his

“activities against the government.” Such accusations of

“acting against the government” constitute an imputed

political opinion. See Hu, 652 F.3d at 1017–18. Because the

inquiry in an imputed political opinion case focuses on the

views of the persecutor, Garcia-Milian v. Holder, No. 09-

71461, 2014 WL 555138, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2014),

Singh’s credible testimony regarding the police officers’

statements about him persuasivelydemonstrates that a central

motive for persecuting him was that they believed that he

opposed the government.
10 SINGH V. HOLDER

In addition to the direct evidence of his persecutors’

statements, the indirect evidence supports Singh’s testimony

that he was persecuted because of an imputed political

opinion. Singh testified that the Indian police were interested

in him because of his relationship to Khan, his domestic

servant. An “applicant’s association with, or relationship to,

people who are known to hold a particular political opinion”

may serve as indirect evidence of an imputed political

opinion. Garcia-Milian, 2014 WL 555138, at *3 (quoting

Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal

quotation mark omitted). That appears to be precisely the

case here. The Punjabi police asserted that Singh was a

“traitor” based solely on his association with Khan, a reason

we have repeatedly held to support the conclusion that a

political opinion has been imputed to the applicant. See, e.g.,

Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that persecutors’ statements indicating that they had

chosen her because of her father’s relationship to the

Philippine government constituted persecution on account of

an imputed political opinion). The police targeted Singh and

imputed antigovernment views to him because of his

relationship with another individualwho theyconsidered held

antigovernment political beliefs.

Yet, under the facts determined to be true by the IJ and

affirmed as such by the BIA, Singh was not a terrorist, nor

did he engage in antigovernment activities. He testified that

he had no association with terrorists and did not participate in

any such activity. He also stated that he did not know

anything about Khan or have any information regarding

Khan’s involvement with terrorist activities. Taking Singh’s

testimony as true, as we must, Singh was falsely accused of

being a terrorist and holding antigovernment views because

of his association with Khan. The Punjabi police beat him
SINGH V. HOLDER 11

and hung him upside down until he lost consciousness

because they imputed Khan’s alleged political beliefs to him. 

Under our cases, this constitutes a nexus to a protected

ground. See Kumar, 444 F.3d at 1053–54. Indeed, Singh

independentlymeets the causal burden imposed by the REAL

ID Act: “[T]o demonstrate that a protected ground was ‘at

least one central reason’ for persecution, an applicant must

prove that such ground was a cause of the persecutor’s acts.” 

Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741.

Our conclusion that the Punjabi police’s mistaken belief

that Singh was a terrorist constitutes an imputed political

opinion is supported by the legislative history of the REAL

ID Act. The Act requires asylum applicants to demonstrate

that the protected ground is “at least one central reason” for

the persecution. Id. at 740. As the BIA has noted, Congress

intended this amendment to eliminate the presumption

previously applied by our court that persecution is politically

motivated in the absence of any evidence of a legitimate

prosecutorial purpose. See In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N.

Dec. 208, 214 n.9 (BIA 2007). The elimination of the

presumption restored the law to its prior state: the burden is

on the asylum applicant to offer evidence as to the

persecutor’s motive.

Although the REAL ID Act was intended to overrule our

“presumption,” it affirmed our prior imputed political opinion

cases in an important respect. We had previously held that

persecution based on the mistaken belief that the individual

is a terrorist is persecution on account of an imputed political

opinion. See, e.g., Kumar, 444 F.3d at 1054. In explaining

its new standard, Congress explicitly reiterated that an

applicant sufficiently shows a nexus to a protected ground

when he provides evidence that law enforcement mistakenly
12 SINGH V. HOLDER

believes him to be a terrorist. In explaining the effect of

eliminating the presumption that persecution is the result of

political opinion when there is no evidence as to the reason

for the punitive treatment, Congress stated:

The “central reason” standard will eliminate

this presumption, and require aliens who

allege persecution because they have been

erroneously identified as terrorists to bear the

same burden as all other asylum applicants,

that is, they will have to offer direct or

circumstantial evidence of motive, in

accordance with Supreme Court precedent.

H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 165 (2005). Thus, the difference

under the REAL ID Act is that an applicant must now

introduce evidence to demonstrate that he was wrongly

accused of being a terrorist instead of relying on a

presumption that he was persecuted on account of a political

opinion when no evidence as to motive is presented. The

House Report accompanying the REAL ID Act makes clear

that, as long as the applicant meets his evidentiary burden, the

mistaken belief that an individual is a terrorist constitutes a

nexus to an imputed political opinion. As we have explained,

in light of the IJ’s credibility finding, we take as true Singh’s

testimony that he was not associated with terrorists and had

not engaged in any terrorist activities. We also take as true

his testimony that his persecutors wrongly accused him of

working against the government and being associated with

terrorists. Thus, under the standard approved by Congress in

the REAL ID Act, Singh has demonstrated a nexus to an

imputed political opinion.
SINGH V. HOLDER 13

Our decision in Dinu v. Ashcroft is not to the contrary,

and the IJ and BIA’s reliance on that decision is misplaced. 

The facts and circumstances in Dinu are far different and of

no relevance here. Dinu, who served in the military during

the Romanian revolution, was arrested and investigated for

his role in the massacre of civilians. 372 F.3d at 1044. He

had been a member of a special security unit widely

suspected of participating in the murders, which occurred in

his hometown. Id. Dinu himself explained the justification

for the Romanian investigation of him: he testified that “it

was publicly known that the authorities concluded that the

security units in those times were responsible for shooting in

the people, so everybody, everybody believed that it was the

security units that shot the demonstrators, and they were

trying to find a guilty party.” Id. at 1045. Finally, Dinu

offered no direct, or even indirect, evidence that his

persecution was anything but a criminal investigation or that

it was on account of an imputed political opinion. Id. at

1044–45.

Here, Singh has presented direct evidence that he was

arrested and severely beaten on account of the political

beliefs that the Punjabi police imputed to him, and there is no

evidence that any investigation of him was conducted for any

other reason. The only connection between Singh and any

possible wrongdoing was the mistaken belief that because he

hired Khan as a servant, he must be a terrorist. Because

Singh has presented direct evidence that the Punjabi police

mistakenly believed him to be a terrorist, and there is no

evidence that Singh was the subject of a legitimate
14 SINGH V. HOLDER

investigation based on other grounds, Dinu’s holding is of no

relevance here.5

In sum, Dinu does not control this case.6 Dinu is of little

value in assessing asylum claims based on imputed political

opinion. It applies only to cases in which an asylum applicant

is the subject of a legitimate law enforcement investigation

and offers no direct or indirect evidence that he is being

5 The government also relies on Sharma v. Holder, 633 F.3d 865 (9th

Cir. 2011). That case is not controlling here for the same reason that Dinu

does not control. In Sharma, the court stated that “the motivation of the

police was clear: stop Sharma’s father from publishing his book. The

police never inquired into Sharma’s own political views. When they

picked him up, their sole inquiry pertained to the status of his father’s

book.” 663 F.3d at 870. Moreover, the court dismissed Sharma’s

contentions that the police imputed his father’s beliefs to him as “isolated”

and “hearsay,” and thus entitled to “less weight than the other evidence in

the record.” Id. at 877 & n.1. Here, in contrast, the IJ found Singh’s

testimony and his application as a whole to be credible, and the references

to Singh’s own political opinion were far from isolated; the police

repeatedly asked Singh, and later his wife, about Singh’s own work

against the government. The BIA also relied on its own decision in

Matter of R-O-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 455 (BIA). In Matter of R-O-, however,

the BIA again ultimately concluded that “there is no evidence that the

respondent has received any threats from the Government on the grounds

of political opinion . . . .” Id. at 459.

 

6

 Although we have stated that a lack of proper procedures and the use

of torture may render law enforcement activities illegitimate, we need not

consider those questions here. See Li, 559 F.3d at 1109 (lack of proper

procedures); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2005)

(torture). Nor need we consider that Dinu was a pre-REAL ID Act case

while this case is post-REAL ID. Instead, what matters is that in Dinu

there was no evidence that the asylum seeker was beaten on account of his

political opinion while the evidence is unrefuted that such was the cause

of the brutal physical assaults on Singh.
SINGH V. HOLDER 15

subjected to harsh treatment on account of a protected

ground.

Although there is little if any evidence that the police in

Singh’s case were engaged in a legitimate investigation, even

if the investigation were legitimate, Singh could establish a

nexus in this case. We have held that, under the REAL ID

Act’s standard, a persecutor may be motivated by more than

one central reason, and “an asylum applicant need not prove

which reason was dominant.” Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741

(9th Cir. 2009). Because mixed motive analysis exists in

cases governed by the REAL ID Act, a petitioner may have

been persecuted both because of legitimate investigatory

reasons and because of his political opinion (imputed or

actual), his religion, or other protected ground. The dissent

seemingly fails to grasp this point.7In short, even if a

petitioner’s persecution occurs during the course of a

legitimate investigation or prosecution, neither Dinu nor any

of our other cases requires that the BIA or our court ignore

direct or indirect evidence that a persecutor was also

7 Contrary to the dissent, we hold that irrespective of any other reason

for the police’s persecution of Singh, the evidence compels the conclusion

that one central reason for the persecution in this case was the belief on

the part of the police that Singh held an antigovernment political opinion. 

That is the only reasonable justification for why the police called him a

“traitor,” accused him of “working against the government,” and

interrogated his wife regarding his “activities against the government.” To

the extent that the dissent makes the extraordinary claim that the police

could not have imputed a political opinion to Singh because they

interrogated him for information about Khan, such a claim is flatly at odds

with our precedent. See, e.g., Kumar, 444 F.3d at 1047, 1053–54 (finding

a nexus to an imputed political opinion in a case in which the officers told

the petitioner that “he would be killed if he did not disclose the identities

of Muslim terrorists and reveal information about their planned terrorist

activities,” id. at 1047).
16 SINGH V. HOLDER

motivated to harm the applicant on account of a protected

ground. Cf. Li, 559 F.3d at 1109 (recognizing that police may

be motivated by both “prosecutorial aims and religious

hatred” in a pre-REAL ID case). If a petitioner has presented

evidence that an imputed political opinion was a central

reason for the persecution, as Singh has here, then the fact

that the persecution occurred during the course of a legitimate

criminal investigation would not preclude eligibility for

asylum.

For these reasons, we hold that the evidence compels the

conclusion that a central reason for the physical abuse to

which Singh was subjected was an imputed political opinion

and that he has established a nexus between that abuse and a

protected ground.

B.

Because the evidence compels the conclusion that Singh

has established a nexus to a protected ground, the only

questions remaining with respect to his asylum claim are

whether the egregious physical abuse he experienced rose to

the level of persecution and whether he has a well-founded

fear of future persecution. Under most circumstances, we

would be required to remand the matter to the BIA to make

these determinations in the first instance. INS v. Ventura,

537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam); see also Hu, 652 F.3d at

1020 (remanding because the nexus inquiry and the

persecution inquiry are “distinct”).

Here, as we held in Fedunyak v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 1126

(9th Cir. 2007), however, the posture of Singh’s case renders

a remand unnecessary. Id. at 1130–31. As in Fedunyak, the

IJ granted Singh relief under CAT and found that it was more
SINGH V. HOLDER 17

likely than not that he would be tortured by the government,

or with its acquiescence, if he returned to the country he fled. 

Id. The BIA affirmed this finding. The evidence that the IJ

weighed to determine that Singh is more likely than not to be

subjected to torture upon his return to India is the same

evidence that Singh offered to establish his refugee status. 

Singh has met the high burden of demonstrating that he is

likely to be tortured, so he necessarilymeets the lower burden

for eligibility for asylum that he has a well-founded fear of

future persecution. See Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1228–29. Having

established a nexus between his persecution and an imputed

political opinion, and having established a well-founded fear

of future persecution, a Ventura remand is unnecessary. 

Fedunyak, 477 F.3d at 1130–31. Thus, we remand to the BIA

with instructions that the Attorney General exercise his

discretion whether to grant asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). 

Id. at 1131.

C.

Singh is also entitled to withholding of removal. In order

to establish entitlement to withholding of removal, an

applicant must show that it is “more likely than not” that he

will be persecuted on account of a protected ground. Id. at

1130. The BIA has held that Singh is more likely than not to

be tortured if returned to India. Given our holding on the

nexus question, Singh has necessarily demonstrated that he is

more likely than not to be persecuted on account of an

imputed political opinion and is entitled to withholding of

removal. Id. at 1130–31.
18 SINGH V. HOLDER

III.

We conclude that Singh’s credible testimony compels the

conclusion that an imputed political opinion was a central

reason for his persecution by the Punjabi police, and that he

has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Accordingly,

we remand this case to the BIA with instructions that the

Attorney General exercise his discretion whether to grant

Singh asylum. We also remand for an order withholding

removal of Singh and granting relief under the Convention

Against Torture.

The petition forreviewisGRANTEDand REMANDED

for the purposes described in the above opinion.

GEORGE, Senior District Judge, dissenting in part;

concurring in part:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the

evidence compels the conclusion that a central reason for

Singh’s persecution was an imputed political opinion. The

evidence, both direct and circumstantial, shows that the

reason for the police’s arrest and mistreatment of Singh was

an effort only to obtain information about Khan, a suspected

terrorist. Singh’s own testimony confirmed it. The IJ found

that testimony credible, and integrated it into his ruling that

Singh had not demonstrated a nexus between the actions of

the police and protected political opinion. The BIA

concurred with the IJ’s determination. Now, the majority

rejects it all. I cannot agree to pay lip service to the IJ’s

credibility determination while at the same time ignoring the

record upon which that determination stands.
SINGH V. HOLDER 19

“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the

evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it,” 

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481(1992) (emphasis in

original), and that “no reasonable factfinder could fail to find

the requisite fear of persecution.” Id. at 483–84. “The

applicant must establish his case by ‘credible, direct, and

specific evidence’ in the record.” Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d

1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d

336, 338 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)).

The IJ found that Singh testified credibly. “[W]ithout an

adverse credibility finding we accept a petitioner’s testimony

as credible because ‘[a]ny other rule would put us in the

position of second-guessing the credibility of the petition on

appeal when no doubts have been raised by the Immigration

Judge or the Board.’” Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885,

888–89 (9th Cir. 1985). We also must consider the record as

a whole. Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1998).

At the removal hearings before the IJ, Singh testified that

he “was only arrested because of Jabed Khan and they said he

was a terrorist and police alleged that I was helping the

terrorists.” During examination, the following exchanges

also took place:

[Singh’s lawyer to Singh]:

Q: How were you treated [at the time of the

second arrest]?

A: Immediately on arrival at the police

station, they took me to the interrogation

room and they threw me on the ground

and started to beat me up and they were
20 SINGH V. HOLDER

repeating all those four questions all over

again. He – they, were asking those

questions and I told them that I do not

know anything about Jabed Khan and

their chief man, he said, beat this, this

person again because he’s not telling us

the truth or he’s not coming up with – and

then they threatened saying that if you

don’t answer or give us the information

this time, we will kill you.

. . .

Q: Did the police say anything to you besides

accusing you of being linked with a

terrorist?

A: No, they were – they were focused on

asking me about the terrorist and they,

they said, how do you help them, tell us

all about it. I think because of me being a

Sikh, they were, they, were doing that

more and more with me.

. . .

[Government lawyer to Singh]:

Q: Okay, sir, I just want to make sure I

understand, okay. So the reason the

police arrested you is because they want

to find out information – one is to find out

information about Jabed Khan.
SINGH V. HOLDER 21

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, and [the] second reason was

because they accused you of hiring him

even though you know that he’s a

terrorist?

A: I did not know anything about his being a

terrorist and he was not a terrorist.

The IJ found Singh’s testimony credible in the following

terms:

In assessing the credibility of the respondent,

I have taken into account the rationality,

internal consistency and inherent

persuasiveness of his testimony. In

considering the foregoing, I find that the

respondent has testified credibly and his

application is credible.

In concluding that Singh had failed to factually

demonstrate the nexus between his mistreatment and a

protected ground, the IJ centered exclusively on Singh’s

testimony that the police focused on him only because he had

hired Jabed Khan and might have information about Khan. 

He wrote:

[T]he Court noted that [Singh] was asked

repeatedly by Government counsel why he

was arrested and he consistentlyanswered that

he had been arrested because he had

employed [Khan].
22 SINGH V. HOLDER

. . .

In the Court’s view, the record is consistent

that the police were interested in the

respondent because of his connection with an

individual from an area of India where there is

terrorist activity. The respondent confirmed

as much in his testimony. . . .

The IJ’s credibility determination and his protectedground analysis are thus intertwined. The majority would

pull them apart, and draw our attention away from the actual

reason upon which the credibility determination is

grounded–that Singh did nothing more than employ Khan to

provoke the police’s interest. See Mengping Lu v. Mukasey,

275 Fed. Appx. 636, 637 n.1, 2008 WL 1817727, at *1 n.1

(9th Cir. April 23, 2008) (citing Marcos v. Gonzalez, 410

F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Our review [of an IJ’s

adverse credibility determination] focuses only on the actual

reasons relied upon by the IJ”)).

Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000), is

instructive on the role of uncontroverted testimony and the

IJ’s credibility determination in establishing the motivation

of a persecutor. In that case, Shoafera contended that she was

raped by a Tigrean in her Ethiopian community on account of

her Amharan ethnicity. Like this case, the IJ had found the

alien’s testimony credible yet ruled that the alien’s claims did

not meet the requirements of showing that theywere based on

a protected ground. See id. at 1074–75 n.3. The Shoafera

court granted Shoafera’s petition over the dissent’s argument

that the IJ had made a partial adverse credibility

determination regarding the ethnic motivation of Shoafera’s

attacker when it found that “the respondent’s speculations,
SINGH V. HOLDER 23

however, and they are the Court believes speculations and

conclusions, do not prove her claim.” Id. at 1079 (Wallace,

J, dissenting). The court reasoned that the IJ had not

announced an adverse credibility determination, but instead

had merely explained why, despite Shoafera’s credible

testimony, she had not established eligibility for asylum. Id.

at 1074 n3. The Shoafera court also noted that “neither the

IJ nor the INS elicited any testimony from Shoafera

demonstrating that the nature or basis for her testimony was

questionable.” Id. at 1075.

This case presents an even more clear-cut record on the

IJ’s credibility determination than Shoafera. The record in

this case does not include “speculations and conclusions”

which raised the issue of an adverse credibility determination

and split the panel in Shoafera. And here, as established by

the removal hearing transcript quoted above, both Singh’s

counsel and counsel for the government specifically

examined Singh on what he was claiming. His

uncontroverted answers show that he was persecuted “only”

because he had employed Khan and because the police

wanted to find out information regarding Khan. For the

majority in this case to reach a different conclusion would be

to rely on the same sort of “speculations and conclusions”

that the Shoafera court found out-of-place in considering a

credibility determination.

Even if we deemed that the factual circumstances upon

which the IJ relied for his imputed political opinion finding

need not be taken as true, the BIA’s decision still would be

supported by substantial evidence. The majority emphasizes

the “working against the government” accusation as evidence

that the persecution in this case is based on imputed political

opinion. However, in the cases cited by the majority, the
24 SINGH V. HOLDER

“againstthe government” accusations, and similar statements,

have been evaluated in the context of the surrounding

circumstances upon which the accusation is made, and not

just because the phrases were spoken.

In Zhiquang Hu v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2011),

the Chinese police accused Hu of “gathering a crowd to cause

trouble and disturb the order of society,” along with acting

against the government. Id. at 1017. In response to the

police abuse, Hu told them that he was “merely in favor of

‘the legal rights of those laid off workers,’” id., a clearly

political motivation. The cases cited by the Zhiquang Hu

court also share a link between the “against the government”

accusation and some identified act or conduct which

constituted a protected ground. In Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey,

537 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008), the petitioner suffered

harm on account of an imputed political opinion, where the

Chinese police arrested petitioner and accused her of being

“against the government” after she sent a letter to the local

town condemning the appointment of her rapist to a position

of local political power. And in Baghdasaryan v. Holder,

592 F.3d 1018, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2010), political opinion

was imputed to a petitioner where a “top law enforcement

official indicated that [the petitioner] was detained and beaten

because he was ‘defaming’ and ‘raising his head’” against

government corruption.

Unlike those cases, there is no reason here to believe that

the basis for the accusations made against Singh went beyond

what Singh testified to. The one underlying factual

circumstance that gave the police their reason to arrest and

interrogate Singh, as Singh himself acknowledges, was that

he had employed a suspected terrorist. And based on that, the

police accused Singh of helping the terrorists, harboring
SINGH V. HOLDER 25

information regarding activities of individuals planning

against the government, being a traitor and working against

the government. Police at no time accused Singh of being a

terrorist himself; at no time during Singh’s torture did they

attempt to exact from him a confession to being a terrorist;

and at no time did their actions deviate from what was,

according to the evidence, an interrogation to gain

information about Khan, not one where Singh’s political

opinion made him a terrorist suspect.

I do agree with the import of the majority’s opinion, that

the only way to find a nexus to imputed political opinion is to

characterize Singh as a terrorist. “To establish an imputed

political opinion, the applicant must show that his persecutors

actually imputed a political opinion to him.” Sangha v. INS,

103 F.3d at 1489 (quoting Arreiaga-Barrientos v. INS,

937 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1991)). Yet, that characterization

of the police’s motives for persecuting Singh is based on

supposition. In this case, Singh insisted to police that Khan

was not a terrorist at all, let alone that he knew that Khan was

one. The single fact that Singh hired Khan does not reflect

sufficient motive for the conclusion that the government

thought that Singh was politically aligned with the terrorists. 

This is not a case, like Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir.

1995), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by

Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739–40 (9th Cir.

2009), where the government concedes that police thought

that the petitioner was a militant because he had been visited

overnight and on six other occasions by a group of known

and armed militants. Singh v. Ilchert, at 1503–04, 1509. It is

a case of the police taking Singh’s hiring of a suspected

terrorist to its logical extension–that Singh would have useful

information about that terrorist. That the police crossed all
26 SINGH V. HOLDER

boundaries in pursuing that lead does not change the factor

motivating them.

The majority further reasons that the police’s interest in

Singh’s relationship to Khan serves as indirect evidence of an

imputed political opinion. According to the majority, because

the police accused Singh of being a “traitor” based solely on

his association with Khan, they imputed a political opinion to

him. However, the police’s use of the word “traitor,”

according to Singh, was connected to the accusation of

working against the government. As with the “working

against the government” charge, there is no reason to believe

that the “traitor” label applied by police reached beyond the

accusations that Singh helped the terrorists, had information

regarding their activities, and knowingly employed one. Nor

would the police’s use of an epithet, such as calling Singh a

“dog,” reveal an imputed political opinion. See Danilova v.

Holder, — Fed. Appx. —, 2014 WL 2211724, at *1 (9th Cir.

May29, 2014) (“Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s

conclusion that ethnic slurs used by police while mistreating

Danilova did not show that her interracial relationship, rather

than investigation of crime, was the reason for the Moldovan

authorities’ interest in her”) (citing Parussimova v. Mukasey,

555 F.3d at 741–42).

The majority cites Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066 (9th

Cir. 2008), for the conclusion that the police targeted Singh

and imputed antigovernment views to him because of his

relationship with Khan. In Silaya, the petitioner was

kidnapped, tortured and raped by members of a violent

antigovernment opposition group who knew who the

petitioner was, knew that her father was a veteran who

supported the government, and made comments indicating

that the petitioner “was chosen as a victim because of her
SINGH V. HOLDER 27

father’s ties to the government.” Id. at 1072. In this case, no

such link to the political views of a family member exists. In

fact, even if there was evidence that the police were

motivated to punish Singh simply because of his association

with Khan, “‘evidence pointing to another motive,’ [makes]

Silaya []not on point.” Sharma v. Holder, 633 F.3d 865, 872

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 659 n.18

(9th Cir. 2000)). In Sharma, the court found that “[w]here

police beat and threaten the spouse of a known dissident, it is

logical, in the absence of evidence pointing to another motive,

to conclude that they did so because of the spouse’s presumed

guilt by association.” Sharma v. Holder, at 871 (citing Navas,

217 F.3d at 659 n. 18) (emphasis added)). Here, there is no

absence of evidence that the police arrested and interrogated

Singh only in their pursuit of information about Khan. The

majority’s hunt for circumstantial evidence to demonstrate

otherwise comes up empty-handed.

The majority also concludes that there is little evidence

that the police in Singh’s case were engaged in a legitimate

investigation. In summing up why he was arrested, Singh

testified that he “was only arrested because of Jabed Khan

and they said he was a terrorist and police alleged that I was

helping the terrorists.” But, that falls short of “show[ing] that

[Singh’s] persecutors actually imputed a political opinion to

him.” See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d at 1489. Certainly, the

police thought that Singh, whether knowingly or

unknowingly, had helped a terrorist by employing Khan for

two years. But the evidence is devoid of any interest by the

police about Singh’s own political opinions, and the police’s

brutality in interrogation does not fill the space in the

analysis. The lack of interest by police in Singh’s political

opinion is only punctuated by the fact that the police released
28 SINGH V. HOLDER

Singh after each arrest and interrogation upon the payment of

a bribe.

Finally, the majority claims that even if a legitimate

investigatory reason existed for Singh’s persecution, Singh

has presented sufficient evidence to show that imputed

political opinion was also a central reason for it. “The task of

the alien is simply to demonstrate the reasonableness of a

motivation which related to one of the enumerated grounds.” 

Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d at 1510 (citing Matter of R-, Int.

Dec. 3195, 12–13 (BIA 1992) (Dunne, M.M. dissenting in

part)); see also Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d at 741

(petitioner must “produce evidence from which it is

reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in

part, by an actual or implied protected ground”) (citing Borga

v. INS, 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (first emphasis

in original)).

Isubmit that it is not reasonable to conclude that a central

reason for the Indian police’s persecution of Singh was based

on imputed political opinion. Singh confirmed in his

testimony that the only reason for his arrests and

interrogations was to gain information about Khan and what

Singh had done to help terrorist groups. The police never

accused Singh of being a terrorist, and never asked him to

confess that he was. The police never accused Singh of being

a terrorist to anyone else, including his wife, even though

after Singh fled to the United States, the police went to

Singh’s house numerous times and arrested his wife to try to

locate Singh. And, had the police believed Singh to be a

terrorist or hold political opinions aligning himself with the

terrorists, one would not expect the police to release him on

two separate occasions after torture did not extract the

information about Khan that they were seeking.
SINGH V. HOLDER 29

Whether or not we respect the IJ’s credibility

determination, the BIA had ample reason to believe that

Singh did not meet his burden of proof. Certainly, it was not

compelled to do so. I would, therefore, deny the petition for

review and application for withholding of removal.

I concur with the opinion insofar as it remands for the

granting of relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.