J-S16019-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DUAUNE-MARC SHIRA BALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1481 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-14-CR-0000986-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 04, 2018

Duane-Marc Shira Ball (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered after the trial court convicted him of possession of a 

controlled substance, possession with the intent to manufacturer or deliver a 

controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We affirm.

This case stems from a traffic stop conducted by Corporal Reed Grenci

(Corporal Grenci) of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). Corporal Grenci is 

an 18-year veteran of the PSP and is presently the Central Supervisor in the 

Safe Highways Initiative for Effective Law Enforcement (SHIELD) Unit. The 

SHIELD Unit specializes in criminal highway interdiction in an effort to make 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30), (32).
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Pennsylvania’s motorways safer by enforcing the Vehicle Code and 

investigating suspected criminal activity.

On May 26, 2016, at approximately 1:20 p.m., Corporal Grenci stopped

Appellant’s vehicle along Interstate 80 in Snow Shoe Township, Centre 

County, based on his belief that Appellant’s windows were illegally tinted. See

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). As Corporal Grenci approached the vehicle, he 

noticed that Appellant was the sole occupant, that the vehicle contained an 

air freshener, that there were no keys accompanying the single key in the 

ignition, and that there was no clutter in the vehicle. When Corporal Grenci 

asked Appellant his destination, Appellant stated that he was travelling to 

Canton, Ohio to visit his cousin.

While verifying Appellant’s license, registration, and insurance 

information, Corporal Grenci learned that Appellant possessed a Brooklyn, 

New York address, that the vehicle was registered to a third party in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,2 and that the vehicle’s insurance became active 

on February 10, 2016 and was to expire on May 31, 2016, just a few days 

later. Additionally, while Corporal Grenci verified Appellant’s driver’s license, 

he learned that Appellant’s name was an alias for “Orlando Parker,” whom the 

Federal Drug Enforcement Agency had arrested in 2009 on suspicion of 

marijuana trafficking. Corporal Grenci testified, “[a]t that point I got my tint 

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2

 Appellant later identified the owner of the vehicle as his paramour.
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meter and took the tint meter reading.” N.T., 1/31/17, at 102. Corporal 

Grenci confirmed that the tinted windows were in violation of the Vehicle Code, 

but told Appellant he would receive a warning rather than a ticket. Id. In an 

effort to verify Appellant’s identity, Corporal Grenci asked Appellant about 

“Orlando Parker” and whether Appellant had ever been arrested. Appellant 

initially responded by stating that he had never been arrested and that he had

discovered that his name was associated with another person, but had cleared 

up the confusion up by visiting a “federal building.” Id. at 27. However, 

Appellant subsequently admitted that he had been arrested and questioned in

a marijuana trafficking investigation but claimed he was not charged with any 

crime.

At this point, Appellant became extremely nervous and began shaking 

and trembling. In addition, he was unable to recall his social security number 

and unable to give Corporal Grenci the name of the cousin he was on his way 

to visit without first pausing to think for several seconds. Corporal Grenci also 

noticed during the stop that Appellant made two separate cellphone calls, one 

of which was on speakerphone.

Based on this information, Corporal Grenci suspected that Appellant was 

involved in drug trafficking and asked Appellant if he could search the vehicle. 

When Appellant refused, Corporal Grenci contacted a canine unit to conduct a

sniff search of the outside of the vehicle.
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During the canine sniff search, the canine alerted the troopers to the 

presence of contraband in the vehicle’s trunk. Corporal Grenci proceeded to 

manually search the vehicle’s trunk and recovered approximately 50 pounds 

of marijuana, two cellphones, and $370.00 in cash. Appellant was arrested

and charged with the aforementioned offenses.

On July 27, 2016, Appellant filed a pre-trial suppression motion in which 

he argued that Corporal Grenci impermissibly extended the traffic stop in the 

absence of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. On August 

16, 2016, Appellant also served a subpoena on Corporal Grenci that sought to 

compel Corporal Grenci’s attendance at the hearing on Appellant’s suppression 

motion and directed Corporal Grenci to bring with him any training or 

educational material that he had received related to traffic stops and drug 

interdiction and all reports related to drug possession arrests that he had 

made on a highway in the last three years. On December 14, 2016, the Office 

of the Attorney General filed a motion to quash Appellant’s subpoena. On 

January 4, 2017, the trial court granted the motion to quash in part as it 

related to Appellant’s demand that Corporal Grenci bring with him documents 

related to his prior drug arrests and any other educational information that he 

possessed.

On January 31, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s 

suppression motion; it denied the motion on April 27, 2017. On June 1, 2017, 

the trial court conducted a stipulated bench trial, at the conclusion of which it 
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found Appellant guilty of all charges. On September 7, 2017, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to 9 to 18 months of incarceration followed by one year 

of probation.

Appellant filed this timely appeal. On October 3, 2017, the trial court 

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On October 

20, 2017, Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the lower court denied [Appellant] the opportunity 

to present a complete defense and compel the attendance of 

witnesses in his favor when it quashed the subpoena[] issued to 

the Pennsylvania State Police?

2. Whether the lower court erred by allowing Corporal [] Grenci 

to subvert the protections of Article I, [S]ection 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution when it concluded 

that “Indicators” established probable cause to believe that 

criminal activity was afoot and accordingly denied [Appellant]’s 

motion to suppress.

3. Whether the lower court erred by concluding that Corporal 

[] Grenci did not exceed his authority during a routine traffic stop 

(i.e., to check documentation, ask a few brief questions, issue a 

citation or warning, and allow [Appellant] to continue on his way) 

when he engaged in aggressive questioning and otherwise held 

[Appellant] beyond the time necessary to complete the stop.

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in quashing his 

subpoena that directed Corporal Grenci to bring with him to the suppression 

hearing any training or educational material that he had received related to 
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traffic stops and drug interdiction and all reports related to drug possession 

arrests he had made on a highway in the last three years. “Typically, the 

standard of review regarding a motion to quash a subpoena is whether the 

trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. McClure, 172 A.3d 

668, 683 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted). Where the 

issue raised, however, “is purely a question of law, this Court’s standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id. (quotations and 

citation omitted).

The trial court concluded that the documentation Appellant sought was 

“investigative information” under the Pennsylvania Criminal History Record 

Information Act (CHRIA), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9101-9183, and that only a 

“criminal justice agency” could request and receive such information. Trial 

Court Opinion, 11/22/17, at 3-4. Section 9102 of CHRIA defines “investigative 

information” as, “Information assembled as a result of the performance of any 

inquiry, formal or informal, into a criminal incident or an allegation of criminal 

wrongdoing and may include modus operandi information.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9102.

Section 9106(c)(4) of CHRIA restricts the dissemination of “investigative 

information” unless the party requesting the information is a criminal justice 

agency:

Investigative and treatment information shall not be disseminated 

to any department, agency or individual unless the department, 

agency or individual requesting the information is a criminal 

justice agency which requests the information in connection with
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its duties, and the request is based upon a name, fingerprints, 

modus operandi, genetic typing, voice print or other identifying 

characteristic.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9106(c)(4) (emphasis added).

CHRIA defines a criminal justice agency as:

Any court, including the minor judiciary, with criminal jurisdiction 

or any other governmental agency, or subunit thereof, created by 

statute or by the State or Federal constitutions, specifically 

authorized to perform as its principal function the administration 

of criminal justice, and which allocates a substantial portion of its 

annual budget to such function. Criminal justice agencies include, 

but are not limited to: organized State and municipal police 

departments, local detention facilities, county, regional and State 

correctional facilities, probation agencies, district or prosecuting 

attorneys, parole boards, pardon boards, the facilities and 

administrative offices of the Department of Public Welfare that 

provide care, guidance and control to adjudicated delinquents, 

and such agencies or subunits thereof, as are declared by the 

Attorney General to be criminal justice agencies as determined by 

a review of applicable statutes and the State and Federal 

Constitutions or both.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9102 (footnote omitted).

Appellant argues that his subpoena “did not compel the State Police to 

provide the documents to counsel or [Appellant],” but instead directed 

Corporal Grenci to bring them to the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, 

a criminal agency under Section 9102. Appellant’s Brief at 23. Upon review, 

we conclude that the trial court did not err in quashing Appellant’s subpoena.

This court has held “that records of the PSP relating to a criminal 

investigation of an accused who wished to inspect these records could not be 

disclosed through the testimony of a subordinate PSP officer at trial.” 

Commonwealth v. McElroy, 665 A.2d 813, 818 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citing 
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Commonwealth v. Friday, 90 A.2d 856, 860 (Pa. Super. 1952)). “The 

proper mode of procedure” for requesting such records is “the service of a 

subpoena duces tecum upon the Commissioner of the PSP as the legal 

custodian of records[.]” Id. We explained that the Commissioner of the PSP 

is “the legal custodian of the records” and consequently, a criminal defendant 

may only “obtain evidence [that] s/he deems material and [that] cannot be 

obtained through other avenues by service of a subpoena duces tecum upon 

the custodian of the record or other evidence sought.” Id.

In this case, Appellant concedes that he served his subpoena on 

Corporal Grenci, a supervisor in the SHIELD unit of the PSP, not the 

Commissioner of the PSP. Appellant’s Brief at 23. Corporal Grenci is, without 

question, subordinate to the Commissioner. Thus, Appellant improperly 

issued the subpoena. Although counsel for Appellant has claimed, both before 

the trial court and in his appellate brief to this Court, that he either had or was 

going to take the necessary measures to cure this procedural defect, there is 

no evidence in the certified record that such measures occurred. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the trial court did not err in quashing Appellant’s subpoena.

3

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3

 The trial court quashed Appellant’s subpoena on substantive grounds, 

concluding that the documentation Appellant sought was “investigative 

information” and that only a “criminal justice agency,” not Appellant, could 

request and receive such information. Trial Court Opinion, 11/22/17, at 3-4. 

Although our reasoning differs from that of the trial court, it is well settled 

that an appellate court can affirm on any basis. In re Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509, 

n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[This Court is] not bound by the rationale of the trial 

court, and may affirm on any basis.”).
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Next, we address Appellant’s second and third issues together because

they challenge the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. Specifically, 

Appellant argues that Corporal Grenci did not possess the reasonable 

suspicion necessary to detain him for the purpose of conducting a canine sniff. 

Appellant asserts that the facts relied upon by the trial court in concluding that 

Corporal Grenci had reasonable suspicion to conduct a canine search of 

Appellant’s vehicle were wholly innocent, “innocuous,” and provided Corporal 

Grenci with “nothing more than a hunch that [Appellant] was involved in 

criminal activity.” Appellant’s Brief at 25.

The standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

is as follows:

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge 

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before 

the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] 

findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 

erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the determination of the 

suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). Our review is limited to the suppression hearing record. In re L.J.,
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79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013). “[I]t is the sole province of the suppression 

court to weigh the credibility of witnesses,” and “the suppression court judge 

is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” 

Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 685 A.2d 151, 157 (Pa. Super. 1996) (quotation 

and citation omitted), affirmed, 713 A.2d 1117 (Pa. 1998).

Instantly, Appellant does not dispute the legality of the initial traffic stop 

based on the dark tint of the vehicle’s windows. Instead, Appellant contends 

that Corporal Grenci impermissibly extended the traffic stop and improperly 

conducted a canine sniff of the vehicle because he lacked reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity beyond the initial reason for the stop – in this case the 

illegally tinted windows.

During a traffic stop, an officer “may ask the detainee a moderate 

number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information 

confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 

U.S. 420, 439 (1984). “[I]f there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation ... 

additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s purpose has been 

fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to investigate the new 

suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 n.5 (Pa. 2008). 

This Court has held that such investigations, including a canine sniff of the 

exterior of a vehicle, must be supported by reasonable suspicion. 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(“[C]onsidering the relatively minor privacy interest in the exterior of the 
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vehicle and the minimal intrusion occasioned by a canine sniff, ...mere 

reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, [is] required prior to [a dog] 

sniffing the exterior of [a] vehicle.”).

Our Supreme Court has explained:

A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an 

investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual 

is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v. Cook, [] 735 

A.2d 673, 676 ([Pa.] 1999). “This standard, less stringent than 

probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion.” Id.

In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable 

suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. 

In re D.M., [] 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 ([Pa.] 2001). In making this 

determination, we must give “due weight ... to the specific 

reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from 

the facts in light of his experience.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 [] (1968)). Also, the 

totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an 

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal 

conduct. Rather, “[e]ven a combination of innocent facts, when 

taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police 

officer.” [Id.]

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004).

We conclude that Corporal Grenci possessed reasonable suspicion to 

detain Appellant and request a canine sniff of the vehicle. Corporal Grenci, 

who had extensive training and experience in drug interdiction as a member 

of the PSP’s SHIELD Unit, testified that he stopped Appellant along Interstate 

80, which is widely known as a major drug trafficking corridor in the United 

States. N.T., 1/31/17, at 10. He explained that he immediately observed in 

the car an air freshener, two cans of Red Bull, a single key in the ignition

unaccompanied by house keys, and a clean interior of the vehicle with no 
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visible luggage or clutter beyond a sweatshirt in the backseat. Id. at 17. 

Corporal Grenci stated that based on his experience, drug traffickers often use 

air fresheners to mask the smell of controlled substances, and energy drinks 

for long trips with immediate turnarounds. Id. at 18. Corporal Grenci testified 

that the single key in the ignition also indicated that the vehicle was owned 

by a third party and that, in his experience, drug traffickers commonly use 

third-party vehicles so that the driver can claim that he did not know the 

vehicle contained drugs. Id. at 17-18.

When Corporal Grenci verified Appellant’s license, registration and 

insurance information, he discovered that Appellant resided in Brooklyn, New 

York, that the car was registered to a third-party in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

and that the car’s insurance became active on February 10, 2016 and was set 

to expire on May 31, 2016, just a few days later. Id. at 13-18. Corporal 

Grenci testified that based on his experience, drug traffickers often use 

vehicles with registrations or insurance that are only active for a short period 

of time because it makes it more difficult for the police to track and conduct 

surveillance on the vehicles. Id. at 16-18.

As Corporal Grenci was in the process of verifying Appellant’s license in 

his computer, he learned that Appellant’s name was an alias for another 

identity, “Orlando Parker,” whom the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency had 

arrested in 2009 for marijuana trafficking. Id. at 24-25. At this point, 

Corporal Grenci was unable to verify Appellant’s actual identity. Id. at 25-26. 
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Consequently, Corporal Grenci questioned Appellant about the name “Orlando 

Parker” and whether Appellant had ever been arrested. Id. at 26-27. While 

Appellant initially claimed that he had never been arrested, he eventually 

admitted to Corporal Grenci that he had been arrested and questioned in 

connection with a marijuana trafficking ring. Id. at 27-28, 32-33. Corporal 

Grenci testified that based on his experience, Appellant’s behavior was 

consistent with a person engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 32.

From this moment forward, Corporal Grenci indicated that Appellant 

became extremely nervous to the point that he was shaking and trembling 

and was unable to properly recount his social security number and had to 

pause several seconds before answering when Corporal Grenci asked him for 

the name of the cousin he was planning to visit. Id. at 28-33. Corporal Grenci 

reiterated that Appellant’s demeanor, based on Corporal Grenci’s training and 

experience, was suspicious for criminal activity. Id. at 33.

Further, Corporal Grenci testified Appellant was talking on his cellphone 

on two different occasions during the traffic stop, with one of the calls being 

on speakerphone. Id. at 37-38. Although he did not hear what was discussed 

during those phone conversations, Corporal Grenci testified that in his 

experience, drug traffickers will make calls during a traffic stop to inform their 

suppliers or trail cars that they have been stopped. Id.

Corporal Grenci testified that based on the totality of this information, 

he believed that Appellant was trafficking drugs and therefore asked for 
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Appellant’s consent to search the vehicle. Id. at 34. When Appellant declined, 

Corporal Grenci called the canine unit. Id. at 35.

The trial court credited Corporal Grenci’s testimony and concluded:

While no single factor would necessarily suffice to establish 

reasonable suspicion, viewing Corporal Grenci’s testimony in its 

totality supplies a valid basis upon which he could extend the 

traffic stop to continue his investigation. The [c]ourt finds the 

totality of the circumstances supported Corporal Grenci’s 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and thus 

permitted him to investigate his suspicion by requesting a canine 

unit to conduct a sniff search of the exterior of [Appellant]’s 

vehicle.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/17, at 6. After careful consideration, we agree.

We are aware that, when viewed on their own, several of the indicators 

upon which Corporal Grenci relied appear innocuous. For example, we would 

not conclude that a police officer could detain a vehicle on suspicion for drug 

trafficking and subject it to a canine sniff merely because the vehicle contained 

an air freshener or energy drinks, because it was free from clutter, or because 

the officer stopped the vehicle along Interstate 80. We are, however, required 

to view the totality of the circumstances. Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1189. In doing 

so, considering these indicators along with other factors including that this 

stop involved a vehicle owned by a third party with insurance set to expire 

only a few days after the stop, Appellant’s prior arrest for marijuana 

trafficking, and his escalating nervousness when Corporal Grenci questioned 

him about that arrest, lead us to conclude that the record supports the trial 
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court’s determination that Corporal Grenci’s detention of Appellant was 

supported by reasonable suspicion. Recent case law supports our conclusion.

This Court, in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32 (Pa. Super. 

2016), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2017), held that an investigative 

detention and canine sniff search of a vehicle was supported by reasonable 

suspicion under circumstances factually similar to this case. In Freeman, a 

Pennsylvania State Trooper stopped a vehicle along Interstate 80 for an 

unsafe lane change and following another vehicle too closely. Id. at 33. 

During the stop, the trooper observed air fresheners, that the vehicle was a 

single-day rental, that the defendant was verbally inconsistent as to where he 

was traveling and why he was traveling to that location, that defendant was 

acting nervous and “somewhat shaky,” and that the defendant had been 

arrested previously for a gun crime. Id. at 37.

Based on these observations, this Court affirmed the trial court’s 

determination that the state trooper possessed the reasonable suspicion 

necessary to detain the vehicle and request a canine sniff search. Id. at 40-

41. We explained:

We recognize that, when viewed in isolation, many of the facts on 

which the troopers relied appear innocuous. We would hesitate to 

hold that a vehicle may be detained for more than an hour and 

subjected to a canine search merely because it had been rented 

for a one-way trip from New York to Binghamton, a purported drug 

destination, or because the driver, when stopped, appeared 

agitated. But we are required to review the circumstances in their 

totality, and, upon doing so, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the 
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troopers’ detention of Appellant was supported by reasonable 

suspicion.

Id. at 41.

Here, as with Freeman, Corporal Grenci stopped Appellant along 

Interstate 80 and observed that Appellant’s vehicle was registered to a third 

party, was exceptionally clean and contained an air freshener, that Appellant 

had an arrest history, and became progressively more nervous during the 

encounter. Additionally, with respect to Appellant’s prior arrest for marijuana 

trafficking, Corporal Grenci had even greater reason to believe that Appellant 

was involved in drug activity than the trooper in Freeman, given that (1) the 

defendant in Freeman only had a prior arrest for a gun violation while

Appellant was previously arrested for a drug crime, and (2) Appellant lied 

about his prior arrest. See id. at 33.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining 

that the totality of the circumstances in this case supported Corporal Grenci’s 

suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity. While this may be 

a close case, we discern no basis upon which to reverse the trial court’s denial 

of Appellant’s suppression motion.

Appellant contends that this case is analogous to this Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Dales, 820 A.2d 807 (Pa. Super. 2003). In Dales, a 

police officer stopped a vehicle for excessive window tinting. Id. at 809. 

During that stop, the officer observed several air fresheners in the vehicle and 

detected a smell that “he described as medicine, something like Bactine.” Id.
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at 810. The officer also noted that the defendant appeared nervous when 

answering his questions. Id.

After the officer verified the defendant’s license, registration, and 

insurance – without issue – he gave the defendant a written warning for the 

tinted windows and explained to him the appropriate amount of tinting on a 

vehicle’s windows. Id. The officer then began asking the defendant questions 

about where he was travelling and who he was visiting. Id. at 811. Noticing 

inconsistencies in the defendant’s answers, the officer asked the defendant if

there was anything illegal in the vehicle. Id. The driver responded in the 

negative and consented to a search of the vehicle. Id. Upon searching the 

vehicle, the officer discovered approximately one pound of crack cocaine in 

the trunk. Id.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the crack 

cocaine discovered by the officer and this Court affirmed. Id. at 811, 815. 

We explained:

Initially, we note that the reason for the initial traffic stop was 

the excessive tinting on Defendant’s vehicle's windows. When 

Officer Clee approached Defendant and requested his license, 

registration, and proof of insurance, Defendant complied and gave 

Officer Clee the requested documents. Officer Clee then returned 

to his police car, radioed the information in, and established that 

everything was in order. He then wrote up a warning slip advising 

Defendant of the excessive tinting and returned to Defendant’s 

vehicle. Officer Clee then instructed Defendant to accompany him 

back to the police vehicle so that he could instruct Defendant on 

the proper amount of tinting, as demonstrated by the tinting of 

the police vehicle’s windows. Defendant complied and followed 

Officer Clee to the police vehicle, where Officer Clee took 

approximately 20-30 seconds to point out the permissible amount 
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of tinting. Following this exchange, Officer Clee returned 

Defendant’s various documents to him along with the warning 

regarding the excessive tint. We conclude that the purpose of the 

initial traffic stop ended at this point.

Nonetheless, Officer Clee continued with a “second ... round of 

questioning.” ... [W]e conclude that this second round of 

questioning constituted an investigative detention, and that 

Officer Clee lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to support 

it. ...

* * *

[A]t the point in time that the second round of questioning 

began, Officer Clee had only observed the following facts: (1) 

there was a smell of bactine emanating from Defendant’s vehicle; 

(2) there were several air fresheners in the vehicle; and (3) 

Defendant appeared nervous.

We conclude that these facts were insufficient to establish 

anything more than a hunch of possible criminal activity being 

afoot. Thus, we find that Officer Clee lacked the reasonable 

suspicion necessary to conduct the second round of questioning, 

and consequently, the continued investigative detention was 

illegal.

Id. at 814-815.

Dales stands for the proposition that where a police officer seeks to 

detain a vehicle beyond the initial purpose of a traffic stop, the officer must 

have reasonable suspicion that the defendant is engaged in criminal activity. 

Appellant’s case is distinguishable from Dales. Corporal Grenci observed 

several factors which together coalesced and caused him to believe Appellant 

was engaged in drug trafficking (e.g., the stop occurred on Interstate 80, the 

air freshener, the two cans of Red Bull, a third party owned the vehicle, the 

insurance of the vehicle was set to expire in a few days and was only active 

for a short period of time, and Appellant’s arrest for marijuana trafficking). 
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Corporal Grenci learned of each of these indicators before completing 

verification of Appellant’s identity. Further, because of the confusion 

surrounding “Orlando Parker,” Corporal Grenci questioned Appellant about his 

identity, at which time Appellant initially lied about his past arrest and became 

increasingly nervous. All of this occurred before Corporal Grenci had a chance 

to issue a citation for the excessively tinted windows of the vehicle. Unlike 

the police officer in Dales, Corporal Grenci never established that “everything 

was in order.” Id.

After careful review, and for the above reasons, we conclude that the 

trial court did not err in determining that the investigative detention was 

supported by reasonable suspicion. We therefore affirm Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2018