## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E S E C O N D D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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P ER CURIAM

Section 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code require s that in actions for damag es arising from the p ro v i sion of profe ssional service s by a licensed or reg istered arc hitect, eng ineer , or survey or, the plaintiff must file an aff idavit attesting t o t h e cl ai m’s merit. Section 150.002(e) states: “The plaintiff’s failure to file t he affidavit i n ac corda nce with this section shall result in dismiss al of the complaint ag ainst the defe ndant. This dismiss al may be with prejudice .” The issue here is whether a defe ndant’s appea l from a trial court’s ref usal to dismiss an action under Section 150.002(e) is mooted by the plaintiff’s nonsuit. We hold it is not and conseque ntly reve rse the judgme nt of the court of appea ls and rema nd the case to that court. ___ S.W .3d ___ (Tex. App.– For t Worth 2011). Respondent Starwood Homeowne r’s Association sued petitioner CTL/Thompson Texas for providing defic ient g eotec hnical eng ineer ing service s. Starwood attache d to its petition an aff idavitthat it believed complied with Section 150.002. CTL moved for dismiss al with prejudice on t he

g round that the af

fidavit was de ficient. The trial court denied CTL ’s motion, and CTL broug ht a n interlocutory appea l. See T E X . C I V . P R A C . & R E M . C O D E § 150.002(f)

. But befor e the appea l could be decide d, Starwood nonsuited its claims ag ainst CTL

. The court of appea ls held that the nonsuit mooted the appea l, depriving the court of jurisdiction. 352 S.W .3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.– For t Worth 2011). CTL then broug ht a petition for revie w. Ordinar ily , this Court has limit ed jurisdiction over int er l o cu t o ry appea ls. See T E X . G O V ' T C O D E § 22.225(b)( 3). But we alway s have jurisdiction to deter mine whether the court of appea ls had jurisdiction. Austin State Hosp. v. Graham , 347 S.W .3d 298, 300 (Tex. 2011); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Margulis , 11 S.W .3d 186, 187 (Tex. 2000) (per curia m). A p l ai n tiff has an absolute rig ht to nonsuit a claim befor e resting its case -in-chie f, but a nonsui t “shall not prejudice the rig ht of an adver se party to be hear d on a pending claim for aff irmative re lief,” T E X . R. C I V . P. 162, such as a c ounterc laim, Klein v

. Dooley , 949 S.W .2d 307, 307 (Tex. 1997) (per curia m), or a cross-c laim, N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge , 400 S.W .2d 893, 897 (Tex. 1966). A motion for sanctions is a claim for aff irmative relief that survives nonsuit if the nonsuit would defe at the purpose of sanctions. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Specia , 849 S.W .2d 805, 80 6 -8 07 (Tex. 1993). For example, a sanction excluding witnesses for failure to supplement discovery does not sur

vive nonsuit be cause its purpose is f ully serve d by protec ting the fairne ss of the trial of the a ction in w hich it is imposed. Id. But a sanction for

filing a frivolous lawsuit does survive nonsuit, else its imposit ion would rest completely in the plaintiff’s hands, defe ating its

2purpose. Scott & W hite Mem ’l Hosp. v. Schex nider , 9 40 S.W .2d 594, 596-597 (Tex. 1996) (per curia m). I n V i l l a f a ni v. Trejo , 251 S.W .3d 466, 467 (Tex. 2008), a health car e liability claim, t h e defe ndant asser

ted that the plaintiff’s expert repor ts did not satisfy statutory require ments and moved for a dismiss al with prejudice and attorney fee s. The trial court denied the motion, and wh en the plaintiff nonsuited any

way , dismiss ed the a ction without prejudice. Id. The c ourt of appe als held that the nonsuit mooted the defe ndant’s appea l and dismiss ed it for want o f j u ri s diction. Id. We

reve rsed. Dismissal with prejudice and attorney fee s, we stated, wer e sanctions mandated by statute, t h e purpose of which is to deter claimants from filing meritless suits. Id. at 470. “R em o v i n g a defe ndant’s ability to appea l a denial of a motion for sanctions afte r a nonsuit frustra tes this purpose;

a claimant could simply nonsuit a meritless claim and later re- file the claim with impunity .” Id. There fore , we conclude d, the defe ndant’s motion surv i v ed the nonsuit and its denial could be appea led. Id. at 471. Section 150.002(e) dismiss al is a sanction with the same purpose, to deter meritless claims and bring them quickly to an end. Neve rtheless, Starwo o d ar gu es that a motion to dismiss under Section 150.002(e) cannot survive a nonsuit beca use the nonsuit g ives the movant all the relief the statute mandates — dismiss al wit hout p rejudice. But S ection 150.002(e) authoriz es further relief

— dismiss al wit h prejudice — and while g ranting it is discretion ar y , the t rial court cannot act “in

an ar bitrary or unre asonable manner

without ref

ere nce to g uiding rules or principles.” Samlowski

v. W ooten , 332 S.W .3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011). CTL moved for dismiss al with prejudice , and if denial of that re lief wa s an abuse of discre tion, St arw ood’s nonsuit did not m oot CTL ’s appe al.
3Starwood argu es t h at to allow a motion for dismiss al with prejudice to survive a nonsuit

would be inconsist ent wit h Univ. of Tex. Med. B r a nch at Galveston v. Estate of Darla Blackm on , 195 S.W .3d 98 (Tex. 2006) (per curia m). There , we h el d t h at a p l ea to the jurisdiction based on

sovere ign immunit y was not a claim for aff irmative re lief that survived nonsuit. See id . at 101. As Starwood notes, such a plea, if sustained, would result in a dismiss al with pr ejudice if the plaintiff could not re- plead to avoid the jurisdictional bar, Harris Cnty. v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004). But d i s m issal based on immunit y is not a sanction to deter frivolous lawsuits; rathe r, it is simply a ter mination of the litigation on jurisdictional g rounds. Blackm on is inapposite. L ike the statute in Samlowski , section 150.002(e) “provide s no particula r g uidance on how the court should exercise its discretion,” 332 S.W .3d at 410, in deciding whether to dismiss an action with pre j u d i ce ra ther than without. There fore , “[g]uidance must come instead from the broade r purposes” of the statute. Id. These ma tters re main for the c ourt of appe als to consider. Starwood’s nonsuit did not moot C TL ’s appe al. Acc ording ly , we g rant CTL ’s petition for revie w, and without hear ing oral arg ument, T E X . R. A P P . P. 59.1, reve rse the judgme nt of the court of appe als and re mand the ca se to that court.

Opinion delivere d: J anuar y 25, 2013

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