### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE June 2000 Session
JILL MARIE FREETHY v. STEVEN MACONI
Interlocutory Appeal from the Circuit Court, Juvenile Division, for Montgomery County No. 90-180 Raymond Grimes, Judge

No. M2000-00107-COA-R9-CV - Filed July 31, 2000

This Rule 9 interlocutory appeal cons ist s of the singular issue of whether Steven Maconi has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, thus requiring him

to defend a paternity action brought in Tennessee. The Trial Court held that Mr. Maconi had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennesse e, and thus, it could

exercise personal jurisdiction over him. We reverse the finding of the Trial Court andhold that Mr. Maconi does not have sufficient minimum contac ts with the state of Tennessee for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over h

im. Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Inter locutory Appeal; J

udgment of the Circ

uit Court Revers

ed, Dismissed and Remanded

H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H ERSCHEL P. F RANKS and C HARLES D. S USANO , J R ., JJ. , joined.
Deborah S. Evans,

Clarksville, Tenn

essee, for the a

ppellant, Steven Ma

coni.

Vanessa Saenz and Roland Robert Lenard, Clarksville, Tennessee, for t he appellee, Jill Mar

ie Freethy.
OPINION

Steven Maconi, the Appellant, is before this Court pursuant to an interlo cutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennesse

e Rules of Appella

te Procedure. Hi

s only issue, which w

e restate, is whether his capacity as a licensed stockbroker in Tennessee prior to 1998 co nstitu tes sufficient minimum contacts

that he should be required to defend a paternity suit brought in Tennessee. The Trial Court did not he

ar any oral testim

ony, but relied on a

ffidavits and inte

rrogatories.

### -2- We hold that Mr. Maconi does not ha ve sufficient mini

mum contacts

with the state of Tennessee for i

t to exercise personal

jurisdiction over him. Therefore, we vacate the findings of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion.

Mr. Maconi and Donna Freethy, J ill Freethy' s mother, admit that they had a brief relationship

during the summer of

1980 in New Jersey. Although Donna Freethy was married at the time, she contends that Mr. Maconi is the father of her daughter, Jill Freethy, who was born on March 27, 1981. Donna Fre ethy maintains that aft er she told Mr. Mac oni that she was pr

egnant, he moved to Pennsylvania and has never taken any responsibility for J il l Freethy. Accor ding to Donna Freethy, she and Mr. Maconi had a short relationship in 1982, and then in 1993, she moved to Clarksville, Tennessee. She asserts that in November 1 998 she initiated te lephone contact

with Mr. Maconi regard ing Jill Freethy. Donna Freethy contends that she has "exchanged numerous telephone calls and photographs of Jill with Mr. Maconi since [she has] been a resident o f Montgomery County, TN." Donna Freethy further argues that "[i]n one of our conversations Mr. Maconi admi t ted to me that as a Me rrill Lynch Stock Br

oker he has numer

ous clients in the Sta

te of Tennessee an

d conducts busines s with residents of this State."

While Mr. Maconi does not dispute the existenceof a relationship with Ms. Freethy in 1980, he has denied through the years that he is the father of Jill Freethy. He co ntend s that he terminated his relationship with Donna Freethy when he learned th at she was married, and he maintains that he di d no t believe that he was the father of Jill Freethy because Donna Freethy's husband had returned home from his work in construction overseas.

Mr. Maconi maintains th at he has never in

itiated any telephone co

ntact with Jill Free thy or Donna Freethy. Mr. Maconi does state that he called Donna Freethy when he was notified of t he paternit

y suit against him and that they spoke for approximately one minute. Mr. Maconi contends that Donna Freethy's "infrequent tele phone calls would

sometimes span a period of years in between them." Moreover, Mr. Maconi asserts that he has never exchanged photographs withDonna Freethy an

d that he has neve

r visited the state

of Tennessee to s

ee Donna Freeth

y. His only visit to the state of

Tennessee was approximately ten yearsago for a family reunion at a rental home in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee.1 The DNA test indi cates a 99. 94% probabilit y that Mr. Maconi is the f ather of J

ill Fr eethy. 

### -3- Mr. Maconi argues that he has never visited Tennessee t o conduct a

ny personal or professional business. He expla ins th at a s a stockbroker with Merrill Lynch, he is "sometimes required . . . to receive client accounts when ano ther broker leaves Merrill Lynch or retires." He note s that he had at one time seven accounts in Tennessee: four of these were client s that ha d lived/workedin the New Jersey and Delaware a

rea and who relo

cated to Tennessee upon retirement, two of the clients were referrals by DuPont in Delaware, and one client was received f rom a retiring broker. Mr. Maconi asser ts that these acc

ounts were not obta

ined as a result of

soliciting business in the state of Tennessee. He adds that he does a significant amount of work on the DuPont accoun

t. He notes that "[t]he t

emporary assignm

ent of th ese accounts to me primarily consisted of general advice to these clients

over the phone." Mr. Maconi denies ever telling Donna Freethy that he had numerous clients in Tennessee.

Regarding the DNA test which was obtained to determine Jill Freethy's paternity and which was analyzed

by a laboratory in Tennessee, Mr. Maconi asserts that he never entered into a contract for such services in Tennessee. He claims that he "was told that Jill Freethy had a serious injury as a result of an a

utomobile accide

nt and it was necessary that [he] undergo the DNA test in order that proper family medical records could be compiled, therefore, [he] agreed to the tests. . . . Mrs. Freethy lead me to believe that the onl y purpose for t his testing was to acquire information regarding medic

al history since he

r daughter had be

en in an acciden

t." Mr. Maconi states that the test was administered

in Wilmington, Delaware. He further states that he had contacted a laboratory in North Carolina to conduct the DNA test, but was informed that Genetic Assays, which is located in Tennessee, had been contacted by Donna Freethy and that "they were quick, readily available, and relatively inexpensive." 1 Mr. Maconi asserts that he "had no knowled

ge of their wher

eabouts or headquarter

s location."

T he Trial Court in its ord er states that "[t] here have been at least four minimu m contacts in this matter," although the Court does not elaborate on wha

t the "four minimum co

ntacts"
are.

Due process requires that a nonresident de

fendant have ce

rtain "minimum contacts" withthe forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend the "traditional notion s of fair play and substantial jus

tice." International Shoe Company v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

### -4-

"In the case of Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985), the Court stated that a defendant must have "fair warning" that a particular activity might subject him to jurisdiction in the forum and that requirement is sa tisfied if the def

endant has "'purp

osefully directe

d' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' thos

e activities." Burger King , 471 U.S. at 472.

In Shelby Mutual Insurance Company v. Moore , 645 S.W.2d 24 2, 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), this Court noted that three primary factors are to be considered when determining whether the requisite minimum contacts were present: the quantity of the contacts, their nature and quality, and the source and connection of the cause of ac

tion with those

contacts. Two lesser factors to be considered are the interest of the forum state and convenience.

We are of the opinion that Mr. Maconi's contacts with T ennessee do not meet the minimum contacts requir

ement. With the ex

ception of one visi

tto a relative's rental home ten years ago, Mr. Maconi ha

s never been to Te

nnessee. All

contact with Mr. Ma

coni was initiated

by Jill Freethy or Donna Freethy in Tennessee. While Mr. Maconi was licensed in Tennessee as a stockbroker

by Merrill Lynch until 1998, his business dealings with Tennessee clients consisted of telephone conversations with clients who had moved from another state to T ennesse e upon their retirement, not as a result of his solicitation of business in Tennessee. Perhaps moreimportantly, Jill Freethy's patern

ity suit is not relate

d in any respect to

Mr. Maconi's profession as a stockbroker. Therefore, we believe that the maintenance of t he paterni ty suit would offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

For the foregoing rea sons the judgment of the Trial Court is reversed, the case dismissed, and the cause remanded for collection of costs below. Costs of the appeal areadjudged against Jill Freethy.

__________________________________________ HOUSTON M. GODDARD, PRESIDING JUDGE