claims were belied by the record because appellant personally waived his 

rights. To the extent that appellant argues that counsel was ineffective 

for advising him to do so, appellant failed to demonstrate that the State 

would have been unable to present slight or marginal evidence against 

him, Sheriff v. Hodes,96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d 178, 180 (1980), or that 

valuable witnesses or evidence were lost as a result of the waiver of the 

right to a speedy trial, State v. Fain, 105 Nev. 567, 569, 779 P.2d 965, 966 

(1989). We conclude that the district court did not err by denying these 

claims. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) 

(noting that we will affirm a decision of the district court if it reaches the 

right result, even if for the wrong reason). 

Second, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

denying his claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial 

to: (1) leading questions during the victim's testimony, (2) prejudicial 

statements made by the prosecutor, (3) hearsay testimony, and (4) 

speculative testimony. The district court determined that counsel was not 

deficient because the objections he argued counsel should have lodged 

would have either been futile, Ennis v. State,122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 

1095, 1103 (2006), or fell under the purview of counsel's tactical decisions, 

see Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167-68 (2002); see also 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. „ 131 S. Ct. 770, 790 (2011) ("There 

is a 'strong presumption' that counsel's attention to certain issues to the 

exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than 'sheer neglect.' 

(quoting Yarborough v. Gentry,540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003))). Appellant also 

failed to show a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 

different had counsel objected as suggested. We conclude that the district 

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court did not err in denying these claims. See Ennis, 122 Nev. at 705, 137 

P.3d at 1102. 

Third, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

denying his claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to fully 

investigate the case. Appellant argued that counsel did not sufficiently 

investigate because: (1) counsel did not locate a picture of the victim at the 

age in which the lewd acts occurred to determine whether she had 

developed breasts, (2) counsel did not seek to produce the mattress upon 

which the victim was assaulted, (3) counsel did not seek an expert to 

testify that DNA could potentially be located on the mattress, (4) counsel 

did not seek an expert who could provide medical testimony regarding the 

physical impact of anal penetration, (5) counsel did not seek a psychiatric 

expert who would have provided reasons why the victim may have 

fabricated her testimony, and (6) counsel did not interview the State's 

witnesses, including the victim. The district court found that appellant 

failed to demonstrate prejudice because he failed to establish that 

additional investigation would have changed the result at trial. See 

Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 357, 91 P.3d 39, 47 (2004) ("[S]peculation 

does not demonstrate prejudice."). We conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying these claims. 

Fourth, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

denying his petition because counsel was ineffective for not advising him 

regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the State's plea offer. The 

district court concluded that this was a bare assertion unsupported by 

specific facts that would have entitled appellant to relief if true. Even 

assuming that counsel did not provide appropriate advice, we conclude 

that appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice because he did not claim 

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that he would have accepted the plea offer and merely argued that he 

would have "been in a better position to determine whether he would have 

accepted the offer." See Missouri v. Frye,566 U.S. „ 132 S. Ct. 

1399, 1409 (2012) (a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability 

that he would have accepted a plea offer and that the plea would have 

been otherwise entered but for counsel's deficient performance). The 

record also reflects that appellant initially indicated that he would accept 

the plea offer, but subsequently decided to proceed to trial. We conclude 

that the district court did not err by denying this claim. See Wyatt,86 

Nev. at 298, 468 P.2d at 341. 

Fifth, appellant claims that the district court erred by denying 

his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make a legal argument 

after raising several Batsonchallenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

(1985). Although the district court erred by denying this claim on the 

ground that appellant failed to raise it on direct appeal, see Bolden v. 

State,99 Nev. 181, 183, 659 P.2d 886, 887 (1983) ("the appropriate vehicle 

for presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through postconviction relief' (internal quotation marks omitted), the district court 

reached the correct result. See Wyatt,86 Nev. at 298, 468 P.2d at 341. 

Because the State offered sufficient race-neutral justifications for striking 

each juror, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by 

counsel's failure to present further legal argument. See Foster v. State, 

121 Nev. 165, 172, 111 P.3d 1083, 1088 (2005). We conclude that the 

district court did not err by denying this claim. 

Sixth, appellant claims that the district court erred by denying 

his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate with him 

in preparation for his defense. The district court determined that 

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appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice because he failed to demonstrate 

that further communication would have changed the result at trial. We 

conclude that the district court did not err by denying this claim. 

Seventh, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare for 

sentencing. The district court determined that appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency because counsel argued on appellant's behalf at 

sentencing and prejudice because appellant failed to demonstrate how 

further mitigation would have changed the result. We conclude that the 

district court did not err by denying this claim. 

Eighth, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 

psychiatric evaluation of the victim. The district court determined that 

appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency because there was not a 

compelling need for an evaluation of the victim. Even assuming that 

counsel could have obtained a psychological evaluation of the victim, 

appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice because he did not establish that 

the outcome of the examination would have been favorable or that it would 

have changed the result at trial. We conclude that the district court did 

not err by denying this claim. 

Ninth, appellant argues that the district court erred by 

denying his request for discovery. Appellant concedes that NRS 34.780 

does not allow for discovery in this case, and his claim that the rule should 

be altered is better addressed to the legislature. See Mazzan v. State, 109 

Nev. 1067, 1072, 863 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1993). Because appellant was not 

entitled to discovery, the district court did not err by denying his request. 

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Parraguirre 

Hardesty 

,J. 

Cherry 

Tenth, appellant argues that the district court erred by 

denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. To warrant an evidentiary 

hearing, a petitioner must raise claims supported by specific factual 

allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him 

to relief. Hargrove v. State,100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 

(1984). Because appellant specified allegations that did not entitle him to 

relief if true or were belied by the record, the district court did not err by 

denying his petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Eleventh, appellant argues that cumulative error entitles him 

to relief. Because appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel was 

ineffective, there are no errors to cumulate. 

Having considered appellant's contentions and concluded that 

no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

,J. 

cc: Hon. Valorie J. Vega, District Judge 

Matthew D. Carling 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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