In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-3673

Beth B. and Susan and Tom B.,

individually and as next friends

of Beth B.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Mark Van Clay, individually

and in his official capacity as

superintendent, and Lake Bluff

School District # 65,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 4771--James B. Moran Judge.

Argued January 17, 2002--Decided March 5, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Bauer, and

Easterbrook, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. Thirteen-year-old

Beth B. and her parents appeal the

district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the Lake Bluff School

District, affirming an administrative

decision that upheld the school

district’s recommendation to place Beth

in a special education classroom. Beth is

severely mentally and physically

challenged. Her parents have long been

fighting a battle to keep her in the

regular education classroom: In 1997, the

school district first recommended that

Beth continue her schooling in a special

education, or Educational Life Skills

("ELS"), program--a placement with which

her parents disagreed. When it became

clear that they and the district could

not reach a mutually satisfactory

solution, they requested a due process

hearing under sec.1415(f) of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act ("IDEA," or "the Act"), 20 U.S.C.

sec.1400 et seq. The hearing commenced on

October 25, 1999; in May 2000, the

hearing officer ruled in favor of the

school district. Beth’s parents sought
review in the district court and, on

September 10, 2001, the court affirmed

the hearing officer’s conclusion,

granting Lake Bluff’s motion for summary

judgment. Beth and her parents now appeal

to us. We recognize the difficult

decisions that Beth’s parents face, and

we appreciate the care and commitment

with which they participate in their

daughter’s education. However, after

looking to the language of the IDEA and

the congressional intent behind it, we

conclude that the school district’s

placement does not violate the Act. For

the reasons stated herein, we affirm the

decision of the district court.

I. Background

 Beth has Rett Syndrome, a neurological

disorder that almost exclusively affects

girls. It results in severe disabilities,

both cognitive and physical. Beth is

nonverbal; she uses an instrument called

an eye gaze, a board with various

pictures and symbols that she singles out

with eye contact, to communicate her

wants and needs, as well as other

communication devices that allow her to

choose among symbols or to hear messages

recorded by others. She relies on a

wheelchair for mobility. She, like nearly

all Rett sufferers, has an extreme lack

of control over body movement. Although

her mental capacity is difficult to

assess precisely, due to her extreme

communicative and motor impairments, some

experts contend that she has the

cognitive ability of a twelve-toeighteen-month old infant. Others

estimate that she has the ability of a

four-to-six-year old. She is unable to

read or recognize numbers.

 Beth has been educated in regular

classrooms at her neighborhood public

school for seven years. She is currently

in the seventh grade at Lake Bluff Middle

School with other thirteen-year-old

children. Students in the seventh grade

attend six 42-minute classes a day. They

have three-minute passing periods between

class. Beth’s aides help her travel from

room to room during the passing periods,

although it is extremely difficult for

her to do so in such a short time frame.

Since the first grade, Beth has worked

with a one-on-one aide at all times and

has used an individualized curriculum

tied in subject matter, as much as
possible, to that of the other students

in the class. Beth’s current curriculum

is geared toward someone at a preschool

level. When her peers worked on

mathematics, she was exposed to various

numbers. When the class studied

meteorology and weather patterns, she

looked at pictures of clouds. Beth cannot

participate in class discussions or

lectures.

 The school district held an annual

conference with Beth’s parents, teachers,

and district administrators to review

Beth’s individualized education program

("IEP"). After her second grade year, the

school district recommended at her IEP

meeting that Beth be placed in an ELS

setting. No appropriate special education

environment exists in the Lake Bluff

District; Beth would have to attend

school in a neighboring school

district/1. The ELS program recommended

by the district would be located in a

public school building and would serve

students between the ages of six and

twenty one with mild, moderate, or severe

handicaps. Generally, six to eight

students comprise one ELS classroom, and

the student-teacher ratio is one-to-one.

ELS students in the program are

mainstreamed into regular education

classrooms during music, library, art,

computer, and certain social studies and

science classes, and join other students

at the school during lunch, recess,

assemblies, and field trips.

Additionally, reverse mainstreaming is

employed; that is, regular education

students come into the ELS classroom to

allow for interaction between ELS and

non-ELS students.

 Beth’s parents disagreed with Beth’s

placement in an ELS program, requested a

due process review under the IDEA, and

invoked the Act’s stay-put provision,

which has allowed Beth to remain in the

regular classroom at her neighborhood

school pending the resolution of this

litigation. 20 U.S.C. sec.1415(j).

II. Discussion

 Beth’s parents argue that the school

district’s placement of Beth in an ELS

classroom violates the IDEA./2 The

district court erred, they contend, in

upholding the administrative decision

finding otherwise. Although we review the

school board’s ultimate decision de novo
because it is a mixed question of law and

fact, we will reverse only if the

district court’s findings were clearly

erroneous, absent a mistake of law.

LaGrange, 184 F.3d at 915.

A. Deference to the Findings of the

Administrative Hearing Officer

 We find as an initial matter that the

district court gave proper weight to the

findings of the hearing officer at the

administrative proceedings. Because

school authorities are better suited than

are federal judges to determine

educational policy, the district court is

required, in its independent evaluation

of the evidence, to give due deference to

the results of the administrative

proceedings. Id. (citing Heather S. v.

Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir.

1997)). The hearing officer correctly

applied the burden of proof and found

that the district satisfactorily showed

that its proposed IEP was adequate under

the IDEA. The district was not required

to prove that Beth received no

educational benefit at her local school,

as her parents suggest. We also find that

the hearing officer did not err as a

matter of law in failing to consider

whether the ELS placement was the least

restrictive environment;/3 he did

consider whether it was the least

restrictive appropriate environment, that

is, whether Beth would be mainstreamed to

the maximum extent appropriate--the

proper question under the LRE analysis

discussed below. The district court,

therefore, did not err in giving

deference to the administrative decision

after independently evaluating the

evidence and even, in this case, updating

it with an evidentiary hearing.

B. The IDEA

 The IDEA, enacted in 1975 as The

Education of All Handicapped Children’s

Act, entitles all children with

disabilities to access to public

education. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.

773 (1975). It conditions federal funding

for educating disabled children on a

state’s compliance with certain

conditions. A school district must

provide such children with a free

appropriate public education ("FAPE"), 20

U.S.C. sec.1412(1), together, to the

maximum extent appropriate, with
nondisabled children ("least restrictive

environment" or "LRE"). 20 U.S.C.

sec.1412(5). The FAPE provision and LRE

provision are two sides of the same IEP

coin. The first requirement is absolute

and focuses on the school district’s

proposed placement--here, the ELS

program; the second is relative and

concentrates on other placement options--

here, keeping Beth in the regular

classroom. The LRE requirement shows

Congress’s strong preference in favor of

mainstreaming, LaGrange, 184 F.3d at 915,

but does not require, or even suggest,

doing so when the regular classroom

setting provides an unsatisfactory

education. 34 C.F.R. sec.300.550(b)(2)

("[S]pecial classes, separate schooling

or other removal of children with

disabilities from the regular educational

environment occurs only if the nature or

severity of the disability is such that

education in regular classes with the use

of supplementary aids and services cannot

be achieved satisfactorily.").

1. FAPE

 We agree with the district court and the

hearing officer, and find that the

district’s recommendation to place Beth

in an ELS classroom satisfies the FAPE

requirement. In determining whether the

district’s placement of Beth meets the

standard, we must ask: "First, has the

State complied with the procedures set

forth in the Act? And second, is the

individualized educational program

developed through the Act’s procedures

reasonably calculated to enable the child

to receive educational benefits?" Bd. of

Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07

(1982). No one contests that the program

recommended during Beth’s IEP review

passes muster under this test; the FAPE

mandate is, therefore, not at issue. Its

discussion is required, however, because

of the confusion that ensues when

language from the FAPE requirement and

analysis is misapplied to the LRE

inquiry.

 Beth’s parents confuse the FAPE side of

the coin with the LRE side. They contend

that Beth’s current placement satisfies

the Rowley standard because she received

an educational benefit at Lake Bluff

Middle School. So long as the regular

classroom confers "some educational

benefit" to Beth, they argue, 458 U.S. at
200, the school district cannot remove

her from that setting. This language is

misplaced. The Rowley holding applies

only to the school district’s

responsibility to provide a FAPE--a

requirement that analyzes the

appropriateness of the district’s

placement--not the appropriateness of the

ELS alternatives, including the regular

education classroom. As the district

court properly noted, the FAPE

determination is at the threshold of the

placement inquiry. Only with the

subsequent LRE analysis does the question

of the educational benefit to Beth in the

regular classroom arise; in that context,

the Rowley language does not apply. See

also Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874

F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989); A.W. v.

Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d 158,

163 (8th Cir. 1987); Roncker v. Walter,

700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).

2. LRE

 The core of this dispute involves

whether the school district’s decision to

place Beth in an ELS classroom violates

the LRE provision of the IDEA. Under this

clause, the district must mainstream

Beth--that is, provide her an education

with her nondisabled peers--to the

"greatest extent appropriate." 20 U.S.C.

sec.1412(5). Again, Congress used the

modifier "appropriate" in stating the

requirements of the Act, limiting its

mainstreaming mandate. The regular class

room would be a less restrictive

environment than the ELS classroom. That

point is not at issue, however, because

the Lake Bluff school district is not

required to educate Beth in such an

environment unless doing so would be

appropriate. The Supreme Court, although

it has not yet interpreted the language

of the LRE provision, has stated that

"[t]he Act’s use of the word

’appropriate’ thus seems to reflect

Congress’ recognition that some settings

simply are not suitable environments for

the participation of some handicapped

children." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n. 21.

This case turns, then, on whether

educating Beth in the regular classroom

(or, more appropriately in the middle

school setting, classrooms) would be

appropriate.

 The relevant IDEA regulation provides

that children may not be removed from the

regular classroom unless their education
there, with the use of supplementary aids

and services, cannot be achieved

satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R.

sec.300.550(b)(2). This preference for

mainstreaming demands a hard look and a

careful analysis of the education Beth

was receiving at Lake Bluff Middle

School. Beth’s parents rely on misplaced

language from Rowley to argue that so

long as she was receiving any benefit--

improvement in eye contact, or progress

in responding to a request to "look" or

"touch"--her removal would violate the

LRE requirement. We cannot agree with

this definition of satisfactory

education.

 Rowley requires, in its analysis of the

FAPE provision, "that the education to

which access is provided be sufficient to

confer some educational benefit upon the

handicapped child." 458 U.S. at 200. The

Court’s rationale behind using this

standard was "to leave the selection of

educational policy and methods where they

traditionally have resided--with state

and local school officials." Daniel R.R.,

874 F.2d at 1044 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S.

at 207). The standard is intended to give

school districts "flexibility in

educational planning." Id. By applying it

to the LRE directive and arguing that the

school district cannot remove Beth from

the regular classroom if she receives any

benefit there, Beth’s parents turn the

"some educational benefit" language on

its head. Instead of granting flexibility

to educators and school officials, it

places an extreme restriction on their

policymaking authority and the deference

they are owed; it essentially vitiates

school districts’ authority to place any

disabled children in separate special

education environments. Neither Congress

nor the Supreme Court intended such a

result. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181, fn. 4

("Congress recognized that regular

classrooms simply would not be a suitable

setting for the education of many

handicapped children.").

 Each student’s educational situation is

unique. We find it unnecessary at this

point in time to adopt a formal test for

district courts uniformly to apply when

deciding LRE cases. The Act itself

provides enough of a framework for our

discussion; if Beth’s education at Lake

Bluff Middle School was satisfactory, the

school district would be in violation of
the Act by removing her. If not, if its

recommended placement will mainstream her

to the maximum appropriate extent, no

violation occurs. In this case we can say

with confidence that the Lake Bluff

school district’s decision to remove Beth

from her regular school did not violate

the IDEA’s mandate to mainstream disabled

children to the maximum extent

appropriate. Beth was in class for about

fifty percent of each day. Her academic

progress was virtually nonexistent and

her developmental progress was limited.

Although the school district provided her

with aides, communication devices,

computerized books, and an individual

curriculum, she was receiving very little

benefit from her time there.

 We agree with the school district’s

decision that a modicum of developmental

achievement does not constitute a

satisfactory education. The ELS

classroom, so long as it includes reverse

mainstreaming opportunities, as well as

time spent with nondisabled peers in

nonacademic classes, during special

projects, lunch, and the like, is at an

acceptable point along the "continuum of

services" between total integration and

complete segregation, and satisfies the

requirement that Beth be mainstreamed to

the maximum extent appropriate. 34 C.F.R.

sec.300.551; 20 U.S.C. sec.1412(5). The

school officials’ decision about how to

best educate Beth is based on expertise

that we cannot match. They relied on

years of evidence that Beth was not

receiving a satisfactory education in the

regular classroom. The placement shows a

concern both for her development and for

keeping her mainstreamed, to an

appropriate extent, with her nondisabled

peers. We cannot hold that the Lake Bluff

School District has failed to provide her

with the free, appropriate public

education where she is mainstreamed to

the maximum extent appropriate, to which

she is entitled under the IDEA. Although

we respect the input Beth’s parents have

given regarding her placement and the

their continued participation in IEP

decisionmaking, educators "have the power

to provide handicapped children with an

education they consider more appropriate

than that proposed by the parents."

Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.,

852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir. 1988). We

find that the district’s proposed IEP,

which includes reverse mainstreaming and
provides that Beth will take part in

certain regular-education classes, does

not violate the statutory LRE mandate.

III. Conclusion

 For the reasons stated herein, we find

that the school district’s recommendation

to place Beth in an ELS classroom does

not violate the IDEA. We AFFIRM the

decision of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

/1 It is not yet determined at which school Beth’s

classroom will be. The district has recommended

that she be placed in an ELS class at a public

junior high school, several of which are under an

hour from Beth’s home.

/2 Although the motion granted by the district court

was properly labeled one for summary judgment,

this type of IDEA decision does not fit neatly

into the generic definition of such a disposition. Due to the unique procedural posture of

these cases, however, summary judgment has been

deemed appropriate even when facts are in dispute, and is based on a preponderance of the

evidence. Bd. of Educ. of LaGrange School Dist.

No. 105 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 184 F.3d

912, 914-15 (1999) (hereinafter LaGrange); A.P.

v. McGrew, 1998 WL 808879 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16,

1998). As the district court below noted, its

decision is perhaps better described as judgment

on the record.

/3 In fact, it is undisputed that keeping Beth

mainstreamed in the regular classroom would be

less restrictive than placing her in the ELS

program.