NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 18-2151

_____________

ROGER VANDERKLOK,

 Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION (TSA); CHARLES KIESER, (TSA); CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 

RAYMOND PINKNEY, (PHILADELPHIA POLICE); MICHAEL WOJCIECHOWSKI, 

(PHILADELPHIA POLICE); KENNETH FLAVILLE, (PHILADELPHIA POLICE); 

JEH JOHNSON, (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY); JOHN S. PISTOLE, 

(TSA) 

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-00370)

District Judge: Hon. Gerald J. Pappert

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 11, 2019

Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 12, 2019)

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OPINION∗

_______________

 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Roger Vanderklok appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his suit against 

Philadelphia police officers Raymond Pinkney, Michael Wojciechowski, and Kenneth 

Flaville (the “police officer defendants”). He contends that the District Court erred by 

concluding that the police officer defendants, whom he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had 

probable cause to arrest him, and that the Court further erred in its alternative conclusion

that they were entitled to qualified immunity. This is not Vanderklok’s first appeal. We 

previously ruled that Vanderklok was not entitled to a remedy against Transportation 

Security Administration (“TSA”) agent Charles Kieser on his First Amendment 

retaliation claim. Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 209 (3d Cir. 2017). Having 

been denied relief against Kieser, Vanderklok now seeks a recovery from the police 

officer defendants who, based on Kieser’s complaint, made the arrest. For the following 

reasons, we will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

As described in our earlier opinion, Vanderklok was flying from Philadelphia to 

Miami, where he planned to run a marathon. He proceeded to the TSA security 

checkpoint and sent his carry-on bag through the X-ray screening device. A section of 

PVC pipe, containing a heart monitoring watch, and some Power Bars (an energy 

supplement), were packed in his bag. That evidently prompted TSA agents to ask 

Vanderklok to step aside for additional inspection. The interaction did not go well, and

Kieser called the Philadelphia Police. Officer Pinkney responded. Kieser reported that 

Vanderklok had “angrily said to [Kieser] that ‘anybody can bring a bomb and you 
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wouldn’t even know it.’” (App. at 46.) Pinkney then arrested Vanderklok. Vanderklok

was placed in a cell and later transported to the Philadelphia Police District, where he was 

processed by Officer Wojciechowski. Pinkney prepared the Complaint Report, and 

Wojciechowski completed the Investigation Report, which Officer Flaville approved. 

Vanderklok was charged with “Threatening Placement of a Bomb[,]” “Terroristic 

Threats[,]” and “Disorderly Conduct.” (App. at 46-47.) But, at his criminal trial, the 

court granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case. 

Vanderklok then sued the police officer defendants for claims including ones: (1) 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unconstitutional search and seizure in violation of his 

Fourth Amendment rights; (2) pursuant to § 1983 for infringement of his freedom of 

speech in violation of his First Amendment rights; (3) pursuant to Pennsylvania state law 

for false arrest, false imprisonment, battery, and assault; and (4) pursuant to Pennsylvania 

state law and § 1983 for malicious prosecution and retaliatory prosecution. 

The police officer defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court 

granted. The Court centered its reasoning on what Pinkney, the arresting officer, knew at 

the time of the arrest, because the propriety of “a warrantless arrest is fundamentally a 

factual analysis that must be performed by the officers at the scene.” (App. at 18 

(quoting United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir. 1984)).) According to 

the Court, “the ‘objective facts available to’ Pinkney were provided by Kieser[,]” and 

“Vanderklok has not alleged that Pinkney did not find, or should not have found, Kieser 

to be credible at the time Pinkney made the arrest.” (App. at 18-19.) Therefore, the 

Court concluded, “Pinkney had the ‘requisite basis to seize’ Vanderklok” and
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“Wojciechowski and Flaville were entitled to rely on [Keiser’s] specific statements.” 

(App. at 21 (quoting Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 1997)).) 

In finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Vanderklok, the District 

Court only analyzed the disorderly conduct charge because “[p]robable cause need only 

exist as to any offense that could be charged under the circumstances.” (App. at 18 

(quoting Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994)).) It found 

probable cause existed because “[m]entions of possessing a bomb or sneaking a bomb 

through airport security—particularly those [mentions] made ‘angrily’—may be cause for 

alarm and the basis of a disorderly conduct charge.” (App. at 20 (citation omitted).) In 

this case, that statement was “made in a public area with several other passengers 

nearby.” (App. at 11-12 (citation omitted).) Thus, the Court concluded that 

Vanderklok’s words “risked causing a disturbance.” (App. at 19 (emphasis in original).) 

In the alternative, it held that, “[i]n the absence of prior case law showing that the 

decision made by the [police officer defendants] to arrest Vanderklok violated a ‘clearly 

established’ Fourth Amendment right, qualified immunity would shield them from 

liability even if probable cause was missing.” (App. at 23.) The Court therefore 

dismissed all claims against them. 

Vanderklok timely appealed. 
5

II. DISCUSSION1

Vanderklok argues the District Court erred both in determining that his rights were

not violated and that the police officer defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 

We need not address Vanderklok’s first argument, however, because the District Court 

properly determined that the police officer defendants were entitled to immunity from 

this suit.

“[Q]ualified immunity is in part an entitlement not to be forced to litigate the 

consequences of official conduct[.]” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). 

Thus, “law enforcement officers acting within their professional capacity are generally 

immune from trial insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. 

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In order to determine if a right is clearly established, courts “look at the 

circumstances that confronted [the officer] and ... compare [them to] the circumstances 

present in those cases [in] which [courts] have concluded that there was an absence of 

probable cause.” Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 2000). Only “[i]f there 

are cases that would make it ‘apparent’ to a reasonable officer in [the defendant’s] 

position that probable cause was lacking, [is] qualified immunity ... not available.” Id. 

 1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 

U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a 

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Phillips v. Cty. of 

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).
6

(citation omitted). It is not sufficient that the right be established in a general sense;

instead, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 

would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 

U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Here, Vanderklok has not brought forward any authority, and we 

can find none, establishing that probable cause to arrest an individual for disorderly 

conduct is lacking when that individual has made an angry statement about bombs in an 

airport’s TSA screening area. For that reason alone, Vanderklok’s argument against 

immunity fails. 

Far from it being clearly established that probable cause was lacking, the most 

persuasive authority we are aware of supports the conclusion that making comments of 

the sort Kieser reported would be enough to establish probable cause for a disorderly 

conduct charge. In Mustafa v. City of Chicago, a passenger at an airport was reported to 

the police for being “unruly” and stating, “Maybe I have a bomb[.]” 442 F.3d 544, 546 

(7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit concluded “it was reasonable for the officers to 

conclude that [the passenger] had committed disorderly conduct by stating that she might 

have a bomb in her purse.” Id. at 548. Vanderklok attempts to distinguish Mustafa by 

contending that the passenger’s statement was made in a different manner than 

Vanderklok’s, as he “was not described as screaming or otherwise creating a 

‘commotion.’” (Opening Br. at 19 (quoting Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 547).) But the manner 

of the passenger’s statement was only one ground for determining probable cause existed

in Mustafa. The other independent ground was the statement itself. 442 F.3d at 547. 

Moreover, it is undisputed that Kieser told Pinkney that Vanderklok was indeed agitated 
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and angry. In light of Mustafa, it is difficult to see how it could be clearly established 

that Pinkney did not have probable cause to arrest Vanderklok.

Nonetheless, Vanderklok argues that the District Court erred in finding there was 

probable cause. He asserts that, for two reasons, it was clearly established that the police 

officer defendants could not legally arrest him. First, he contends that it is clearly 

established “that the statement ‘anybody can bring a bomb and you wouldn’t even know 

it,’ when made to a TSA agent at an airport security checkpoint” is a statement protected 

by the First Amendment. (Opening Br. at 22.) Second, he contends that it is clearly 

established that a mention of a bomb in an airport security line, without more, “does not 

establish[] probable cause for an arrest for disorderly conduct[]” in Pennsylvania.

(Opening Br. at 13.) 

The first of those arguments looks like an effort to move the merits of 

Vanderklok’s First Amendment argument ahead of the qualified immunity defense. But 

we are focused on the defense, and it requires us to ask not whether Vanderklok had First 

Amendment rights but whether the law clearly establishes that he had a right to angrily 

talk about explosives in an airport’s security screening area. That is the factual context as 

Pinkney understood it, and it is the pertinent context for our analysis. See Merkle v. 

Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 790 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The question therefore 

becomes whether a reasonable person in [the officer’s] position could have concluded, 

based on th[e] knowledge [he had], that [the plaintiff] had committed a crime.”). For the 

reasons already discussed, existing law does not appear to support the right that 

Vanderklok claims, let alone clearly establishing it. Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 548.
8

As for the second argument – that the mere mention of a bomb in an airport 

security line does not create probable cause for a disorderly conduct charge under 

Pennsylvania law – it too is unpersuasive. “Whether any particular set of facts 

...[establishes] probable cause requires an examination of the elements of the crime at 

issue.” Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005). “A person is 

guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or 

alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: ... creates a hazardous or physically 

offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 18 Pa. 

Cons. Stat. § 5503(a)(4). Based on that catch-all provision, “words or acts [can] rise to 

the level of disorderly conduct” if “they cause or unjustifiably risk a public disturbance.” 

Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. 1999). Vanderklok points out that a 

charge of disorderly conduct requires at least reckless intent to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 490 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 1985). And he argues that for words to support such a charge, they “must be 

uttered with the intent and in a manner to ‘cause or unjustifiably risk a public 

disturbance[,]’” neither of which, he says, applies to his statement. (Opening Br. at 20 

(quoting Hock, 728 A.2d at 946).) 

“The probable cause inquiry looks to the totality of the circumstances[.]” Wright, 

409 F.3d at 603. Within those circumstances, police officers may “make a judgment call 

regarding [a] plaintiff[’s] state of mind.” Paff, 204 F.3d at 437. In this case, the police 

officer defendants were entitled to infer that Vanderklok’s angrily making a statement 

about a bomb in a TSA screening area recklessly created an unjustifiable risk of public 
9

disturbance. It is common sense, in light of the shared reality of air travel today, that the 

risk of a public disturbance by angrily talking about explosives is greatly heightened at an 

airport’s passenger screening area. Cf. Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 207 (noting that security 

screening is “a critical aspect of national security”). 

Despite that, Vanderklok asserts that the manner in which he made his statement 

clearly establishes that there was not probable cause to arrest him. To support that 

assertion, Vanderklok cites to Commonwealth v. Weiss, a decision of the Superior Court 

of Pennsylvania, for the proposition “that statements made to a single police officer – as 

opposed to epithets broadcast to all passers-by – [are] too attenuated from the statutory 

requirement that the conduct be done ‘with intent to cause public inconvenience, 

annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.’” (Opening Br. at 17 (quoting 

Weiss, 490 A.2d at 855).) He further asserts that Weiss stands for the view that “the mere 

potential that a statement made to a law enforcement officer might be overheard does not 

transform that statement into a deliberate – or even reckless – effort to create public 

alarm or annoyance.” (Opening Br. at 17-18 (citing Weiss, 490 A.2d at 855-57).) 

The statement in Weiss, however, was made on the plaintiff’s own property, id. at 

857, not at a crowded airport security screening area – a vastly different context –

meaning Weiss cannot clearly establish that the manner in which Vanderklok’s statement 

was made precludes an officer having probable cause to arrest him. And again, the 

reliance on Weiss ignores that Pinkney was operating on the report of Vanderklok’s 

statement as given by Kieser, which described a heated exchange. For the same reason, 

Vanderklok’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Hock is misplaced. See 728 A.2d at 944, 946 
10

(finding probable cause was not present due to a single epithet uttered in a normal tone of 

voice in an apartment building parking lot in the presence of only the speaker and the 

officer). 

In light of all the circumstances, the District Court rightly determined that the 

police officer defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.