PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 12-4623

PAUL BRYAN; BONNIE BRYAN, Husband and Wife, 

individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians on behalf 

of their minor child, KB, and KB, KENNETH BRYAN

v.

ERIE COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH; 

PAUL CANCILLA, individually and as an employee of Erie 

County Office of Children and Youth; CARMEN E. 

MERRITT, individually and as an employee of Erie County 

Office of Children and Youth; RENIE SKALKO, 

individually and as an employee of Erie County Office of 

Children and Youth; CINDY BAXTER, individually and as 

an employee of Erie County Office of Children and Youth; 

CINDY LEWIS, individually and as an employee of Erie 

County Office of Children and Youth; BRIGETTE 

SULLIVAN, individually and as an employee of Erie County 

Office of Children and Youth; JOHN PETULLA, 

individually and as an employee of Erie County Office of 

Children and Youth DPW Bureau of County Children and 

Youth Programs

Cindy Baxter and Renie Skalko,

Appellants.

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania
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(Case No. 1-03-cv-00259)

District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin

_____________

Argued: January 22, 2014

Before: FUENTES and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and 

STARK, District Judge



(Opinion Filed: May 20, 2014)

Pamela V. Collins

Walsh, Barnes Collins & Zumpella

707 Grant Street

Gulf Tower

Suite 1400

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Barbara S. Magen

Sheila A. Haren [Argued]

Post & Schell, P.C.

Four Penn Center, 14th Floor

1600 John F. Kennedy Boulevard

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorneys for Appellants

Jay Paul Deratany [Argued]

221 North LaSalle, Suite 2200

Chicago, IL 60601

Jeffrey G. Mashni

 



The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, U.S. District Judge for the

District of Delaware, sitting by designation.
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9245 Maple Court

Morton Grove, IL 60053

Timothy D. McNair

821 State Street

Erie, PA 16501

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge

In the midst of trial in the District Court, the parties 

agreed to a high-low settlement. Regardless of the verdict, the 

Bryan family was to receive at least $900,000. And regardless 

of the verdict, defendants Cindy Baxter and Renie Skalko

were to pay no more than $2.7 million. So when the jury 

returned an $8.6 million verdict for the Bryans, Baxter and 

Skalko tendered $2.7 million and asked the Bryans to end the 

action. The Bryans refused. They asserted that Baxter and 

Skalko had breached the settlement agreement’s 

confidentiality clause and thereby rendered the deal

unenforceable. The parties brought their dispute to the 

District Court. But the District Court refused to resolve it, 

reasoning that the Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction 

to decide whether to enforce the parties’ terms or the jury’s 

verdict. 

The District Court erred. The parties presented their 

dispute to the District Court in order to bring the action to a 

close. The case had not been dismissed, nor had the jury’s 

verdict been marked satisfied. Indeed, the action remained 

active and ongoing: the parties continued to litigate the effect 

of the jury’s verdict up to and after taking this appeal. The 
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case should have remained with the District Court. Ancillary 

jurisdiction exists, for example, for post-judgment 

proceedings related to the enforcement of the judgment.

Similarly, the District Court had jurisdiction to decide 

whether or not to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. A 

district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at the moment 

the jury’s deliberations do.

The parties raise two other matters that we do not decide: 

(1) the merits of the Bryan family’s allegation that Baxter and 

Skalko breached the settlement agreement and (2) Baxter and 

Skalko’s argument that the District Court ought to have 

granted summary judgment in their favor. The District Court 

has not had an opportunity to consider the first issue and 

Baxter and Skalko have not addressed the second issue in 

light of the trial record. Accordingly, we remand for further 

proceedings before the District Court. 

I. Background of the Case

A. After the Bryans adopted J.O., he assaulted one of 

their children.

During the summer of 2001, violence seized the Bryan 

family household. Their adopted son, J.O., repeatedly raped 

and molested his younger foster brother, K.B., in the room the

boys shared together. After suffering through weeks of abuse, 

K.B. eventually told his parents, Paul and Bonnie Bryan. The 

Bryans then contacted the Erie County Office of Children and 

Youth (“ECOCY”)—the agency that facilitated J.O.’s

adoption—and had J.O. removed from their home.

The Bryans blamed ECOCY for K.B.’s ordeal. Among 

others employed at ECOCY, the Bryans focused on Renie 

Skalko and Cindy Baxter. Skalko served as one of J.O.’s 
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caseworkers. Baxter helped coordinate the Supportive Host 

Program, which aimed to transition institutionalized children, 

such as J.O., into foster homes. Through that program, Skalko 

and Baxter introduced J.O. to the Bryans and, eventually, 

helped facilitate the adoption. According to the Bryans,

however, ECOCY and its employees concealed J.O.’s history

during this process. ECOCY staff had reports of J.O.’s history 

of violent behavior and sexual misconduct, but did not 

disclose them to the Bryans.

B. Proceedings in the District Court

The Bryans sued ECOCY and seven of its employees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of their 

Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. 

After an appeal to this Court for permission to amend the

complaint, see Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth 

Servs., 293 F. App’x 143 (3d Cir. 2008), the case proceeded 

on a state-created danger theory. That theory of liability 

permits a plaintiff to recover from state actors when “the 

state’s own actions create the very danger that causes the 

plaintiff’s injury.” See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167 

(3d Cir. 2013). The Bryans alleged that ECOCY employees 

had placed KB into harm’s way.

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

many defendants. But the Court did not grant summary 

judgment for Baxter and Skalko on the merits of the Bryans’

state-created danger claim or on Baxter and Skalko’s 

qualified immunity defense. The Court identified contested 

questions of fact that deserved the jury’s attention. In 

particular, the Court described the conflicting evidence about 

how much of J.O.’s history Skalko and Baxter knew, how 

much they told the Bryans, and whether, in light of that 
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knowledge, it was prudent to place J.O. into a foster home at 

all. (App’x 39-54, 69.)

C. During trial, the parties agreed to a high-low 

settlement.

The parties tried their case to a jury. During the trial, the 

parties reached a “Stipulated to High/Low Agreement.” This 

agreement constrained the parties’ financial risks by 

stipulating a recovery range between the low of $900,000 and 

the high of $2.7 million. If the jury returned a verdict of

$900,000 or less, the Bryans would receive $900,000. If the 

jury returned a verdict of $2.7 million or more, Skalko and 

Baxter would pay $2.7 million. If the jury returned a verdict 

between the high and the low, the parties had to accept that

result. The agreement contemplated that payment would 

terminate the action: “Upon payment of any of the 

aforementioned amount by the Defendants, the verdict is 

deemed satisfied and any and all of Plaintiffs [sic] claims 

which are the subject of this lawsuit are dismissed forever and 

any and all appellate rights are hereby waived by all the 

Plaintiffs; and defendants.” (App’x 188.)

In addition to the high-low terms, the agreement also 

contained confidentiality provisions. Paragraph 11 required 

the Bryans to “limit their public comments about ECOCY and 

the individual ECOCY Defendants” and to “say that the 

ECOCY and Defendants did the right thing by [the Bryans’

son] and the parties are satisfied with the outcome.” (App’x 

188.) Paragraph 15 forbade the agreement from being 

disclosed to the jury. Paragraph 16 stipulated that “[t]his 

Agreement shall be CONFIDENTIAL subject to the duties, if 

any, of the ECOCY and/or its employees under the 

Pennsylvania Right to Know Act.” (App’x 189.) And

Paragraph 18 required the parties to “put [the] Agreement on 
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the record with the court to memorialize the same following 

entry of the verdict or court order disposing of the case.” 

(App’x 189.) 

The jury returned a verdict of $8,654,769 in favor of the 

Bryan family. After the jury announced its verdict, the Court 

and the parties conferenced about what to do next. Skalko and 

Baxter stated their intention “to make an oral motion to mold 

the verdict consistent with our agreement to $2.7 million.” 

(App’x 742.) After discussing the matter, however, the 

parties’ attorneys and the Court agreed to enter a stipulation 

of dismissal instead:

[ECOCY’s Attorney]: Why don’t 

we do this. We have an agreement 

for a high/low that we previously 

signed, we’re going to issue 

checks for $2.7 million to you. If 

you accept that, once we’ve 

issued the checks, we will file a 

stipulation of dismissal.

[Bryans’ Attorney]: That’s fine.

The Court: All right, we’re done.

(App’x 743-44.) Shortly after the post-verdict conference, the 

District Court entered judgment in favor of the Bryans in the 

amount of $8,654,769.00. 

Defendants’ counsel then tendered $2.7 million to satisfy 

the agreement. The Bryans accepted the money “as only 

partial payment on the judgment.” (App’x 190.) In a letter to 

Skalko and Baxter, the Bryans questioned whether Baxter and 

Skalko had “violated the terms of the high/low agreement 

which would render the agreement void or voidable.” (App’x 

190.) In particular, the Bryans alleged that Skalko and Baxter, 
8

or their agents, had disclosed the terms of the agreement to 

county councilmen.

In response, Skalko and Baxter filed a “Motion to Satisfy 

Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60” and a “Motion for Leave to File 

Rule 59 Motions Under Seal.” (Doc. Nos. 361-62.) The Court 

directed the parties to brief the settlement dispute, and it

denied Baxter and Skalko’s motion to file the briefs under 

seal. The Court remarked: “I can’t imagine for the life of me 

why it’s appropriate to file anything under seal.” (App’x 750.) 

While briefing the Rule 60 motion, Skalko and Baxter also

filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Rule 

59(e), or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial Under Rule 

59(a)(1)(A).” (Doc. No. 363.) This motion identified 

numerous trial errors. It also purported to renew Skalko and 

Baxter’s argument that they were immune from liability.

D. The District Court denied Skalko and Baxter’s 

motion to enforce the high-low agreement.

The District Court denied Skalko and Baxter’s post-trial 

motions. The Court concluded that it lacked “jurisdiction to 

resolve the dispute relative to the enforceability of the 

agreement.” (App’x 7.) The District Court observed that the 

high-low agreement “was solely the product of counsels’ 

efforts with no involvement of the court,” that “[i]t was not 

made part of the record prior to the case being closed,” and 

that the Court “did not retain jurisdiction to resolve any 

dispute arising under it.” (App’x 12.) The District Court noted 

that it denied the motions “without prejudice to reassert them, 

as may be appropriate, after a ruling by the state court on the 

issues germane to the alleged breach of the Agreement.” 

(App’x 12.) 
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Skalko and Baxter filed a notice of appeal identifying two 

specific issues: the District Court’s decision regarding 

jurisdiction and its denial of summary judgment. They did not 

appeal from the judgment in favor of the Bryans, or brief the 

merits of their Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment or to 

receive a new trial. 

II. Jurisdiction

Defendants Skalko and Baxter’s “Motion to Satisfy 

Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60” seeks relief on the grounds that the 

judgment has been “satisfied, released or discharged.” See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion

may or may not constitute a final order. See Penn W. Assocs., 

Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2004). The one in 

this case does: The District Court’s decision, which followed 

the entry of judgment, ended the litigation on the merits. The 

District Court had nothing left to do but to execute the 

judgment it had entered on the record. See Catlin v. United 

States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). We therefore take 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. Analysis

A. The District Court’s jurisdiction over the high-low 

agreement1

The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the

Bryans’ lawsuit because it presented a federal question. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. The presence of a federal question confers

jurisdiction to a district court for an entire “civil action.” Id.

As part of its original jurisdiction over an action, a district 

court must consider the parties’ post-trial motions concerning 

the trial, the verdict, and the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 

54, 59, 62. A district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at 

the moment the jury’s deliberations do. 

In certain circumstances, a federal court has jurisdiction to 

consider claims or to conduct proceedings beyond those 

raised by the original action itself. For example, when the 

parties present “other claims that are so related to claims in 

the action . . . that they form part of the same case or 

controversy,” a federal court may exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over them. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Additionally, when

matters “incident to the disposition of the primary matter” 

arise before a court, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction 

permits district courts to decide them. United States v. 

Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus, the limits 

 

1

This Court usually reviews denials of Rule 60 motions for 

abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 

F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). But we review de novo whether 

the District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction. See 

Emerald Investors Trust v. Gaunt Parsippany Partners, 492 

F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2007).
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of a court’s original jurisdiction do not define the limits of the 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction. When a federal court has 

original jurisdiction over an entire action, it has limited 

authority to decide certain related claims or conduct 

incidental proceedings. See generally 13 Charles Alan Wright 

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3523 

(3d ed. 2013) (discussing supplemental, ancillary, and 

pendent jurisdiction, as well as their limits).

A federal court has jurisdiction to decide a Rule 60(b)(5)

motion made by a party to a pending action. A Rule 60 

motion does not “affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its 

operation,” see Rule 60(c)(2), so it does not form part of the 

original action. Indeed, Rule 60(b)(5) motions are used by a 

judgment-debtor to relieve itself of an already-final judgment 

that has been satisfied, released, or discharged. See, e.g., 

Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090 (3d 

Cir. 1978); see also Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 995-96 

(9th Cir. 2007); Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 157 

F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1998). But that does not mean that a 

federal court lacks the jurisdiction to decide a Rule 60(b)(5)

motion. To the contrary, a federal court may entertain 

garnishment, attachment, or other proceedings that “assist in 

the protection and enforcement of federal judgments.” 

Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 64, 69, 70 (providing various post-judgment 

enforcement and execution procedures). We conclude that the 

same ancillary jurisdiction that supports post-judgment 

enforcement proceedings supports proceedings to seek relief 

from the judgment. The jurisdiction to enforce a judgment 

necessarily includes the jurisdiction to declare the judgment 

satisfied.
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Accordingly, when Skalko and Baxter moved pursuant to 

Rule 60(b) to relieve themselves from the judgment, the 

District Court had jurisdiction to decide the motion. The 

nature of the defendants’ argument did not counsel otherwise. 

To show why the Court should grant Rule 60(b) relief, Skalko 

and Baxter pointed to a high-low settlement agreement. And 

to show why the Court should deny Rule 60(b) relief, the 

Bryans argued that the agreement had been materially 

breached. True, these arguments formed a contract dispute

distinct from the federal action. But this contract dispute 

stood between the Court and the resolution of the Rule 60 

motion, and, by extension, the enforcement of the jury’s 

verdict on the underlying claim. The Court, therefore, had

ancillary jurisdiction to decide the dispute. See Dunegan, 251 

F.3d at 478-79. 

The District Court’s contrary conclusion—that it lacked 

the subject matter jurisdiction to consider the enforceability 

of the high-low agreement—rested on Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). There, 

the U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court does not 

inherently have subject matter jurisdiction over disputes 

concerning “the breach of an agreement that produced the 

dismissal of an earlier federal suit.” Id. at 379. In so doing, 

“Kokkonen rejected any . . . resort to notions of ‘inherent 

power’ as surviving a dismissal order.” Shaffer v. GTE North, 

Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Kokkonen did, however, chart a procedure by which the 

parties could maintain a federal court’s jurisdiction after 

dismissal. To do so, the parties had to incorporate the terms of 

the settlement into the court’s dismissal order. Thus, “a 

breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, 

and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would 

therefore exist.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381; see In re Phar-
13

Mor, Inc. Secs. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1999)

(applying Kokkonen to conclude that district court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction over motion to enforce settlement 

agreement because it did not incorporate the terms of the 

settlement into its dismissal order or otherwise indicate that it 

retained jurisdiction).

Kokkonen does not yet have any bearing on this dispute.

In Kokkonen, the parties had dismissed their suit; in this case, 

the parties had not. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit observed, “this distinction is 

critical.” T Street Dev., LLC v. Dereje & Dereje, 586 F.3d 6, 

10 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The absence of an ongoing matter within 

the district court’s original jurisdiction left the district court in

Kokkonen without any basis on which to predicate ancillary 

jurisdiction. But here, of course, the Bryans never dismissed 

the case, notwithstanding the high-low agreement. Having 

frustrated dismissal, and thus maintained the action, the 

Bryans cannot contend that the District Court lacked 

jurisdiction to decide whether to enforce the parties’

agreement or the jury’s verdict. 

Finally, the procedural consequences of the District 

Court’s decision underscore its error. By holding that it 

lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ settlement agreement, the 

District Court made the outcome of a federal case contingent 

on a state proceeding. Were we to accept the Bryans’ 

argument on appeal, the enforceable worth of the federal 

judgment would be determined in a state proceeding. That 

outcome poses an obstacle to efficiency as well as to 

federalism, and we think it must be undone.
14

B. The District Court must decide the other issues in the 

first instance.

We do not reach the additional issues the parties call to 

our attention. Those two issues—whether Skalko and Baxter 

breached the settlement agreement and whether Skalko and 

Baxter are entitled to qualified immunity—ought to be 

addressed first by the District Court.

As to the breach of contract issue, the District Court has 

yet to evaluate the merits of the dispute. This Court 

“ordinarily decline[s] to consider issues not decided by a 

district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider 

them in the first instance.” Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros 

Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010). That policy suits 

this circumstance. The parties argue about whether Skalko 

and Baxter breached the agreement by disclosing its terms to 

third parties. Our record of those issues is incomplete and we 

are, therefore, unable to decide them.

As to qualified immunity, Skalko and Baxter purport to 

raise that issue before us by taking appeal from the District 

Court’s denial of their summary judgment motion. But Skalko 

and Baxter concede that they raised the same immunity

argument, in light of the trial record, in their Rule 59 motion

for a new trial. As a general matter, “[o]nce the case proceeds 

to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the 

record existing at the time of the summary judgment motion.” 

Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011). Skalko and 

Baxter have not briefed or argued the merits of the Rule 59 

motion, however, so we need not decide it. Moreover, Skalko 

and Baxter only seek to challenge the District Court’s 

qualified immunity ruling if the high-low agreement cannot 

be enforced. Otherwise, according to the agreement, “any and 
15

all appellate rights [have been] waived by all the Plaintiffs;

and defendants.” (App’x 188.) 

Because Baxter and Skalko have not briefed and argued 

the Rule 59 dispute, and because Skalko and Baxter may have 

waived any appeal of the issue at all, we will not review the 

qualified immunity defense now. Rather, we remand with 

instructions to consider the Rule 59 issues, if appropriate, 

following the Rule 60 decision.

IV. Conclusion

When the parties presented the District Court with a 

dispute about whether or not the judgment had been satisfied, 

the District Court had the subject matter jurisdiction to decide 

it. The District Court’s decision to the contrary rested, 

incorrectly, on the theory that no settlement agreement fell 

within a district court’s supplemental jurisdiction unless the 

court incorporated the terms of the agreement into an order. 

In ongoing litigation, district courts have the jurisdiction to 

decide whether the parties have settled the action or have 

satisfied the judgment. 

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s ruling with 

respect to its jurisdiction to consider the high-low agreement 

in the context of the Rule 60 motion. Because the District 

Court’s evaluation of that motion and the other post-trial 

motions rested on its erroneous conclusion that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider the existence and meaning of the 

high-low agreement, we vacate its order of dismissal. Finally, 

we remand to the District Court to consider the remaining 

post-trial motions in light of this opinion.