IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DISTRICT NO. 55, and HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT NO. 55-HI MUSSELSHELL 

COUNTY, MONTANA, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

MUSSELSHELL COUNTY and MARGARET 

REIGHARD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY 

AS SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, 

MUSSELSHELL COUNTY, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourteenth ~udicial ~istrict, 

In and for the County of Musselshell, 

The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellants: 

Laurence R. Martin and Sol Lovas; Felt, Martin, 

Frazier & Lovas, P.C., Billings, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Kenneth D. Tolliver and James C. Reuss; Wright, 

Tolliver & Guthals, Billings, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted: October 25, 1990 

Decided: December 12, 1990 I* 

Clerk 
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Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

School Districts No. 55 and No. 55-H of Musselshell County, 

Montana, appeal the order of the District Court of the Fourteenth 

Judicial District granting Musselshell County's cross-motion for 

summary judgment. The School Districts had filed this action to 

obtain damages for alleged loss of operating revenues resulting 

from miscalculations of the mill levy by the County Superintendent 

of Schools. We affirm. 

We frame the issues as follows: 

1. Should the action have been dismissed because the School 

Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages? 

2. Did the District Court correctly grant the County's motion 

for summary judgment based on legislative immunity? 

The facts are undisputed. The Superintendent of Schools for 

Musselshell County admits that she miscalculated the mill levy 

required to raise funds needed by the School Districts for fiscal 

year 1986-87. Through her faulty computations, she arrived at 8.37 

mills for the elementary school district general fund levy and 8.69 

mills for the high school district general fund levy. Correct 

figures were 17.14 mills for the elementary levy and 15.25 mills 

for the high school levy. 

The County Superintendent reported the incorrect number of 

mills to the Board of County Commissioners, which levied the 1986 

school tax based on her figures. As a result of the low millage 

levy, school district revenues were short by $187,498 for the 1986- 
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7 * . . 

87 school year. Due to use of reserve funds, operation of the 

schools was not impacted. Faculty and staff were paid, and no 

programs or personnel were cut. Since the millage levy was later 

adjusted, functioning of the school for the following school year 

was not affected. 

The School Districts sued the County for recovery of lost 

revenues and losses of investment income on decreased reserve 

funds. The School Districts also requested an injunction requiring 

the County to reimburse the Districts for costs and damages that 

might be incurred in a lawsuit asserting violations of 55 15-10- 

401 to -412, MCA, which limit property taxes to 1986 levels. Prior 

to this action, the District Court had issued an order authorizing 

the County to utilize correct 1986 mill levy figures for purposes 

of 55 15-10-401 to -412, MCA. 

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court 

granted the motion of the County on the basis that the County was 

immune from suit. From this decision, the School ~istricts appeal. 

Should the action have been dismissed because the School 

Districts had no legal authority to sue the County for damages? 

Summary judgment was granted on the basis of governmental 

immunity. When a case is disposed of below on a motion for summary 

judgment before a judge sitting without a jury and the facts are 

uncontested, lithe scope of review is much broader than in other 

appeals and the Supreme Court is free to make its own examination 
of the entire case and reach a conclusion in accordance with its 

findings." McCain v. Batson (1988), 233 Mont. 288, 298, 760 P.2d 

725, 731. Furthermore, this Court will uphold the district courtls 

decision, if correct, regardless of the reasons given below for the 

result. Jerome v. Pardis (1989), 240 Mont. 187, 192, 783 P.2d 919, 

922; Shimsky v. Valley Credit Union (1984), 208 Mont. 186, 190, 676 

P.2d 1308, 1310. 

In this case the facts are undisputed. The County concedes 

that the County Superintendent of Schools erred in computing the 

mill levy and that the County Board of Commissioners levied the 

incorrect tax based on her calculations. Before we address the 

question of governmental immunity, we need to decide the more basic 

issue of whether the School Districts, as governmental entities, 

were authorized to bring suit against the County, another 

governmental entity. 

Since this is a case of first impression, we have reviewed 

decisions of other jurisdictions concerning the issue of whether 

one governmental entity may sue another. In some jurisdictions 

courts have resolved the issue based on whether the governmental 

entity had standing to sue. See, e.g., East Grand County School 

District No. 2 v. Town of Winter Park (Colo. App. 1987), 739 P.2d 

862; capital View Fire District v. County of ~ichland (S.C. App. 

1989), 377 S.E.2d 122. 

At the threshold of every suit is the requirement that parties 

have standing to sue. The plaintiff is required to have "Isuch a 

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues.111 

Olson v. Department of Revenue (1986), 223 Mont. 464, 469, 726 P.2d 

1162, 1166 (quoting Baker v. Carr (1962), 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 

S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678). While the School Districts 

may or may not meet criteria to establish standing to sue, the real 

issue is whether the school district, as a political subdivision 

of the state, has legal authority to exercise standing. Harrison 

County v. City of Gulfport (Miss. 1990), 557 So.2d 780, 784. 

In examining decisions of other courts allowing suit on 

grounds other than standing, we note that most do not involve 

seeking damages from the other governmental entity. For example, 

courts have permitted challenges to the constitutionality of a 

statute; actions to oppose annexation of county lands by a city; 

suits for declaratory judgments construing state revenue laws; and 

actions to determine title to real property held by the state. See 

Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (Ky. 1989), 790 S.W.2d 

186 and Simons v. Laramie County School District No. 1 (Wyo. 1987), 

741 P.2d 1116 (challenging constitutionality of statutes); Harrison 

County v. City of Gulfport (Miss. 1990), 557 So.2d 780 (annexation 

opposition) ; State ex rel. Independence School District v. Jones 

(Mo. 1983), 653 S.W.2d 178. (declaratory ruling on construction of 

statute); Coos County v. State (Or. 1987), 734 P.2d 1348 (quiet 

title action). 

In most situations where a governmental entity has sought 

damages from another governmental entity, as here, the suit has not 

been allowed. See Carbon County School District No. 2 v. Wyoming 
State Hospital (Wyo. 1984), 680 P.2d 773; State v. Board of County 

Commissioners of Johnson County (Wyo. 1982), 642 P.2d 456; but see 

Board of Education v. Town of Riverdale (Md. 1990), 578 A.2d 207 

(local government tort immunity cannot be asserted as a defense 

when sued by the state or a state agency, the source of its 

immunity). 

School districts, municipalities, and counties are political 

subdivisions of the state. As creations of the state, "[elxcept 

as provided by the state, they have no existence, no functions, no 

rights and no powers." East Jackson public Schools v. State (Mich. 

App. 1984), 348 N.W.2d 303, 306. When a school district or other 

subdivision of state government attempts to bring an action against 

another governmental subdivision, the state, in effect, is suing 

itself. Carbon County, 680 P.2d at 774. The logic of this view 

cannot be denied. While the taxpayers, as represented by the 

School Districts, may benefit, the taxpayers, as represented by the 

County, must pay, through taxes or insurance, the deficient funds 

to the School Districts. 

Generally, courts will not allow suits between governmental 

entities unless express or implied statutory authority exists. The 

Missouri Supreme Court refused to permit a county assessor's appeal 

of a decision of a county board of equalization because no statute 

authorized such an appeal. OIFlaherty v. State Tax Commission of 

Missouri (Mo. 1984), 680 S.W.2d 153; see also City of Richmond 

Heights v. Board of Equalization (Mo. 1979), 586 S.W.2d 338 (city 

had no authority to appeal assessment by county board of 
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equalization) ; State ex rel. St. Francois County School District 

R-I11 v. Lalumondier (Mo. 1975), 518 S.W.2d 638 (school district 

not allowed to obtain review of county board of equalization 

decision). Similarly, ~ichigan courts have held that a school 

district has no power to challenge a state funding measure Iton 

behalf of residents within their boundaries, or to expend public 

funds to finance such litigation of, or on behalf of, private 

citizens." East Jackson public Schools, 348 N.W.2d at 306. 

We can find no statutory authority granting a school district, 

a governmental subdivision, the right to sue another governmental 

subdivision for damages. We hold that in the absence of a specific 

statutory or constitutional provision, one governmental subdivision 

may not sue another for damages. 

I1 

Did the District Court correctly grant the County's motion for 

summary judgment based on legislative immunity? 

Since we have concluded that the School ~istricts and the 

County are not proper parties to this action, we need not consider 

the immunity question. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: