This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1431

Vickie Williams and o/b/o M. W., petitioner,

Respondent,

vs.

Phillip A. Rimmer,

Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2015

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Larkin, Judge

Anoka County District Court

File No. 02-CV-14-4042

Andrew Larson-Wille, Batten & Beasley, PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Vickie M. Williams (confidential address) (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Minge, 

Judge.



 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

LARKIN, Judge

In this appeal from the grant of a harassment restraining order (HRO), appellant 

challenges the district court’s determination that he engaged in harassment and argues 

 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

that it is impossible for him to comply with a provision in the HRO that prohibits him 

from being within a two-block radius of an undisclosed location. Because the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by granting the HRO, we affirm in part. But we reverse 

the provision in the HRO that prohibits appellant from being within two blocks of an 

undisclosed location and remand for a modified HRO consistent with this opinion. 

FACTS

Appellant Phillip Rimmer was respondent Vickie Williams’s landlord from 

September 2013 until July 2014. The parties had a contentious relationship, and the 

police were called on multiple occasions by both parties. In October 2013, Williams 

petitioned for an HRO against Rimmer, which was denied. In July 2014, Williams again

petitioned for an HRO against Rimmer, and she included a request for relief on behalf of 

her 17-year-old daughter, M.W. 

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Williams’s petition. Testimony 

was limited to events that occurred after the first petition was denied. Williams testified 

that Rimmer appeared at the house that she rented from him without notice on at least six 

occasions and that while he was there, he cursed at her and acted aggressively and 

violently. She also testified that Rimmer addressed her and M.W. using racial slurs and 

derogatory terms. M.W. testified that Rimmer constantly screamed obscenities and was 

“getting in [their] face[s]” while yelling. She also stated that he threatened to “take 

[them] to court and wipe [their] a--[es] across the floor.” 

Although most of the testimony concerned Rimmer’s ongoing behavior and 

general treatment of Williams and M.W., Williams and M.W. testified about two specific 
3

verbal altercations. The first incident occurred on July 2, 2014, the day that Williams and 

M.W. vacated the rental property. M.W. testified that Rimmer yelled at them, got very 

close to her, and had to be asked more than once to back away. She also testified that 

Rimmer continued to yell louder and louder as they attempted to leave and that he called 

Williams “the devil.” The second incident occurred on July 7, 2014, the day of a district 

court hearing regarding Rimmer’s eviction action against Williams. Williams testified 

that after the action was dismissed, Rimmer saw Williams and M.W. in the hallway and 

screamed obscenities at them. He also yelled “I’m going to get you.”

Rimmer testified that the HRO petition was retaliatory because he filed a trespass 

order against Williams after she vacated the rental property. He also testified that he 

always gave proper notice before going to the rental property. He denied that he had ever 

called Williams and M.W. names. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court issued an HRO that prohibits

Rimmer from (1) harassing Williams and M.W., (2) having direct or indirect contact with 

Williams and M.W., and (3) being within a two-block radius of Williams’s home. The 

HRO describes Williams’s address as “confidential.” Rimmer appeals. 

D E C I S I O N

The district court may grant an HRO if “the court finds . . . that there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. 

Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2014). Harassment includes “repeated incidents of 

intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are 
4

intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of 

another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2014).

“An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of a harassment restraining 

order under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843 

(Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). The district court’s findings of 

fact “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 

opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. 

P. 52.01. To determine if findings are clearly erroneous, this court examines the record 

to see if “there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the [district] court’s 

findings.” Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013) 

(quotation omitted). “[T]his court will reverse the issuance of a restraining order if it is 

not supported by sufficient evidence.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844.

Rimmer asserts that the district court erred in determining that he engaged in 

harassment and by excluding him from an area surrounding an undisclosed location. We 

address each assertion in turn. 

I.

We first consider Rimmer’s challenges to the district court’s grant of the HRO. 

Rimmer contends that the district court erred by determining that he “repeatedly made 

uninvited visits to [Williams’s] home, and that this behavior constituted harassment.” 

Rimmer argues that he and Williams were in a landlord-tenant relationship and that 

residential landlords may visit their property so long as they attempt to give “reasonable 

notice.” See Minn. Stat. § 504B.211, subd. 2 (2014) (stating that a landlord may enter the 
5

rented premises “only for a reasonable business purpose and after making a good faith 

effort to give the residential tenant reasonable notice”). He further argues that unnoticed 

visits are allowed under certain circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.211, subd. 4(1)-

(3) (2014) (listing situations in which a landlord may enter the rented premises without 

giving prior notice). Rimmer acknowledges that the district court found that he called 

Williams and M.W. names during his visits, but he argues that this “factual determination 

does not constitute uninvited visits under the meaning of [the harassment statute].” 

The district court credited Williams’s testimony that Rimmer made numerous 

visits to the rental property without notice, but the district court referred to those visits as 

a “minor issue.” The district court went on to say, “more significantly I’m finding that 

[on] some of these occasions when Mr. Rimmer was at the premises, the leased premises, 

that he called [Williams and M.W.] names. He called them wh-res, b-tches, n-ggers.” 

Thus, although the district court’s form HRO states that “[t]here are reasonable grounds 

to believe that [Rimmer] has engaged in harassment . . . by . . . [making] uninvited 

visits,” the district court explained that it did not base its harassment determination solely 

on the uninvited nature of the visits. Instead, the district court based its harassment 

determination on Rimmer’s behavior during the visits. And that determination was not 

erroneous. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 844-46 (finding harassment based, in part, on faceto-face confrontations, use of crude and profane language, and use of abusive and profane 

names). 

Rimmer next contends that the district court erred by finding that he threatened to 

“wipe [Williams’s and M.W.’s] a--[es] across the floor.” M.W. testified that Rimmer 
6

said “he’d take us to court and wipe our a-- across the floor.” Rimmer admits that he 

made the statement, but he argues that the harassment statute requires proof of 

“objectively unreasonable conduct or intent” on his part and “an objectively reasonable 

belief on the part of [Williams and M.W.].” See Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 

(Minn. App. 2006) (requiring such proof and noting that there must be “reasonable, rather 

than merely subjective, grounds to believe” harassment has occurred), review denied

(Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). He argues that his objective intent was clear: he “intended to 

prevail in a court proceeding, [and] not [to] physically wipe [Williams’s and M.W.’s] a--

es across a floor.”

This court has previously upheld an HRO that was based, in part, on threats to take 

a party to court. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 845 (affirming harassment determination 

based, in part, on the harassing party’s threats to take petitioner to court). Moreover, 

according to M.W.’s testimony, immediately before Rimmer made the statement he was 

“yelling and screaming at [Williams] and spitting in [Williams’s] face and calling her 

once again b-tches.” When considered in its context, the statement that allegedly was 

meant to convey an intent “to prevail in a court proceeding” was threatening. In sum, 

there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that 

Rimmer made the statement, and the district court did not err by basing its harassment 

determination on the statement. See id. at 843 (upholding harassment determination 

based, in part, on the harassing party’s statement to petitioner that “You’re going to regret 

the day you ever bought this f---ing place.”). 
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We note that this court will not reverse the grant of an HRO if it is supported by 

sufficient evidence. Id. at 846. Even if we were to ignore the district court’s findings 

regarding Rimmer’s conduct during the uninvited visits and Rimmer’s statement 

regarding his intent to prevail in court, the remaining findings establish that Rimmer 

engaged in harassment.1 As support for its harassment determination, the district court 

also found that Rimmer threatened, “I’m going to get you,” and engaged in name calling 

after a court hearing; “got in [M.W.’s] face” while yelling and shouting on another 

occasion; and called Williams and M.W. “abusive names,” such as “n-gger,” “b-tch,” and 

“wh-re,” “numerous times” from October 2013 to July 2014. Those findings support the 

district court’s determination that Rimmer engaged in harassment. See id. at 844-46 

(finding harassment in the context of an ongoing dispute between neighbors that included 

face-to-face confrontations, use of crude and profane language, and use of abusive and 

profane names). 

In conclusion, “[t]he determination of what constitutes an adequate factual basis 

for [an HRO] is left to the discretion of the district court.” Id. at 846. We note counsel’s 

statements that appellant is a military veteran and that he suffers from a head injury. We

are grateful for Rimmer’s service as a veteran and sympathetic regarding his head injury. 

But his conduct crossed the line. See id. (“[T]he harassment laws place carefully limited 

restraints on individuals whose conduct goes beyond an acceptable expression of outrage 

 

1 Rimmer challenged the remaining findings for the first time at oral argument before this 

court. Because Rimmer did not raise those challenges in his appellate brief, we do not 

consider them. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating that an 

issue not briefed on appeal was waived). 
8

and civilized conduct, and instead causes a substantial adverse effect on another’s safety, 

security or privacy.”). On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

granting an HRO. 

II.

We next consider Rimmer’s challenge to the provision in the HRO that prohibits 

him from being within a two-block radius of Williams’s home, the address of which is 

described as “confidential” in the HRO.2 Rimmer’s argument on this issue is succinct but 

persuasive: “On its face, there is no way for [him] to comply with the [HRO]. Without 

knowing where [he] is ordered to stay away from, [he] risks violating the [HRO] 

whenever [he] travels anywhere.” 

The harassment statute authorizes a district court to “issue a restraining order that 

provides any or all of the following: (1) orders the respondent to cease or avoid the 

harassment of another person; or (2) orders the respondent to have no contact with 

another person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(1)-(2) (2014). Unlike the Domestic 

Abuse Act, which specifically provides that the district court may “exclude the abusing 

party from a reasonable area surrounding the [petitioner’s] residence,” the harassment 

statute does not explicitly authorize such relief. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 

6(a)(3) (2014) (describing available relief in a domestic abuse case), with Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.748, subd. 5(a)(1)-(2) (describing available relief in a harassment case).

 

2

The record does not explain why Williams’s address is described as “confidential” in 

the HRO. Although Minnesota has an address confidentiality program, Minn. Stat. 

§§ 5B.01-12 (2014), there is no indication that Williams is a participant in that program. 

Instead, it appears that Williams simply wrote “confidential address” in all of the HRO 

forms and documents.
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Even though the harassment statute does not explicitly authorize the district court 

to exclude a harassing party from an area surrounding the petitioner’s residence, such a 

restriction is consistent with an order prohibiting the harassing party from having contact 

with the petitioner, which is authorized. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(2). 

Moreover, this court has previously upheld such a restriction. See Welsh v. Johnson, 508 

N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn. App. 1993) (concluding, in the context of a First Amendment 

challenge, that a provision in an HRO that prohibited the harassing party from coming 

within two blocks of the petitioner’s residence was a “permissible” restriction). But we 

are not aware of any case upholding an HRO provision that excludes a harassing party 

from an area surrounding an unidentified address. Under the circumstances, we look to 

the Domestic Abuse Act for guidance. See Anderson v. Lake, 536 N.W.2d 909, 911 & 

n.1 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating that “[the Domestic Abuse Act] and [the harassment 

statute] are sufficiently similar so that we may recognize caselaw construing the former 

as applicable to the latter” and finding “the parallels between . . . the two statutes helpful 

in defining” a term under the harassment statute). 

Although an order for protection under the Domestic Abuse Act may exclude an 

abusing party from “a reasonable area surrounding the [petitioner’s] residence,” the order 

must “specifically” describe the area of exclusion. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(3). 

We discern no reason why an exclusionary order under the harassment statute should not 

be subject to the same specificity requirement, especially when a violation of either order 

exposes the violator to criminal sanctions. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14 

(2014) (listing criminal penalties for violation of an order for protection), with Minn. Stat. 
10

§ 609.748, subd. 6 (2014) (listing criminal penalties for violation of an HRO). In 

addition, a specificity requirement is consistent with a notice provision under the 

harassment statute that requires an HRO to contain “a conspicuous notice” to the 

harassing party “of the specific conduct that will constitute a violation of the order.” 

Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 8(a)(1) (2014). The district court’s order excluding Rimmer 

from being within a two-block radius of Williams’s home does not satisfy the specificity 

requirement because Williams’s home address is not identified in the order and the record 

does not indicate that Rimmer knows where Williams resides. 

Because the provision in the HRO that prohibits Rimmer from being within a twoblock radius of “Petitioner’s home at: (confidential address)” is not adequately specific, 

we reverse in part and remand for the district court to modify the HRO consistent with 

this opinion. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.