NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARILYNN THOMASON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

GREGORY W. MOELLER, an individual in 

his personal capacity; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35030 

D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00141-BLW 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 22, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Marilynn Thomason appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing her action alleging constitutional claims and claims under the Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 26 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-35030 

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Thomason’s claims against defendants 

Moeller, Simpson, Lansing, Gratton, Gutierrez, J. Jones, Burdick, Eismann, 

Horton, and W. Jones because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing proper 

application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View 

Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred 

plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to 

determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”). Contrary to 

Thomason’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply to her claims. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Thomason’s 

claims against defendant Washington Federal Savings for insufficient service of 

process because Thomason failed to demonstrate that service was valid under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (once service is challenged, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

that service was valid); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 

(9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), 
3 18-35030 

4(h); Idaho R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).

The district court properly dismissed Thomason’s claims against the 

remaining defendants because Thomason failed to allege facts sufficient to state 

plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681 (2009) (to avoid 

dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and conclusory allegations are 

not entitled to be assumed true (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 

Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, 

plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for 

relief); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (a 

party’s conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences need not be accepted as true).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of 

Idaho state court proceedings because the documents were matters of public record 

or otherwise “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also 

Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record); 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth 

standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thomason’s 
4 18-35030 

motions for reconsideration because Thomason failed to demonstrate any basis for 

relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 

1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for 

reconsideration). 

We reject as without merit Thomason’s contentions regarding summary 

judgment, denial of a jury trial, and bias or misconduct on the part of the district 

court.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.