97-022

 No. 97-022

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v.

 

 RICHARD DARRELL LINDEMAN, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Sanders,

 The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 John E. Smith, Missoula, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Patricia J. Jordan, Assistant

Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Bob Slomski, Sanders County Attorney,

 Thompson Falls, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 5, 1997

 Decided: November 4, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice William E. Hunt delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 This is an appeal from the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Sanders County. 

On

September 25, 1996, the District Court entered judgment revoking Defendant Lindemanþs

suspended sentence and imposing the full sentence of four concurrent ten-year terms 

in

the Montana State Prison. From this judgment Defendant Lindeman appeals. We affirm

in part, reverse in part, and remand.

 We frame the issues raised on appeal as follows:

 1. Was the District Courtþs order modifying Lindemanþs condition of probation

res judicata on its subsequent order revoking Lindemanþs suspended sentence? 

 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it revoked Lindemanþs

suspended sentence?

 3. Did the District Court err in reserving its determination of Lindemanþs

parole eligibility?

 BACKGROUND

 In September 1989, Richard Darrell Lindeman (Lindeman) was arrested and

charged with two counts of felony sexual assault and two counts of felony incest of 

his

two minor stepdaughters. On October 10, 1989, Lindeman pleaded guilty, and on

December 19, 1989, the District Court sentenced him to four concurrent ten-year

sentences. All but 30 days were suspended, provided Lindeman abided by certain terms

and conditions of probation. Among those terms, Lindeman was prohibited from having

unsupervised contact with minors and was required to complete an approved sex 

offender

treatment program. 

 Lindeman began treatment in an approved program known as SABER (Sexual

Abusive Behavior Evaluation and Recovery), which was run by Dr. Michael Scolatti in

Missoula, Montana. Lindeman attended the weekly therapy sessions for about one and

a half years. 

 In March 1991, Dr. Scolatti terminated Lindeman from the program, because

Lindeman, who was approximately 40, had become sexually involved with a woman who

was about 20 years his junior. The program had a rule that those undergoing 

treatment

were not allowed to have a sexual relationship with anyone whose age differed by more

than 5 years. Even though the woman was of legal age, Dr. Scolatti considered a 

sexual

relationship to perpetuate the cycle of abuse. Dr. Scolatti testified that Lindeman 

had

originally assured him that the relationship was platonic, but when the woman became

pregnant, it was evident Lindeman had been lying. Dr. Scolatti refused to continue

working with him. He did, however, recommend another treatment program run by

Andy Hudak, called the Northwest Family Recovery Program. 

 Lindeman eventually married the young woman, and they had a daughter. Instead

of entering the treatment program recommended by Dr. Scolatti, he began counseling

sessions in April 1991 with Dr. Jack Oakwright in Sandpoint, Idaho. Lindemanþs

probation officer at that time was aware of those sessions.

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 Subsequently, Lindeman received a new probation officer, who also knew that

Lindeman was receiving treatment from Dr. Oakwright. At no time did that second

probation officer disapprove of the treatment. On January 6, 1992, Dr. Oakwright 

wrote

the probation officer a letter stating that Lindeman had þgraduated,þ although 

Lindemanþs

wife and he were continuing with additional counseling sessions. The probation 

officer

does not recall ever telling Lindeman that he had successfully completed the 

required sex

offender treatment program. It was his opinion that because Lindeman was still 

receiving

some counseling, he was still in the treatment mode. Additionally, the probation 

officer

testified that at some point he had expected to receive a copy of an official 

graduation

letter from Dr. Oakwright confirming that Lindeman had indeed successfully completed

sex offender treatment. The written confirmation was never received. 

 In July 1992, Lindeman and his wife moved to Great Falls, Montana, and he again

received a new probation officer. This third probation officer insisted that 

Lindeman

either move out of his home or make arrangements for his daughter to live elsewhere. 

Lindemanþs wife was attending school, and the probation officer was concerned that

Lindeman would be spending significant time alone with his daughter, in violation of 

the

condition of probation that he not have unsupervised contact with minors. 

 Additionally, this probation officer reviewed Lindemanþs file and saw no 

evidence

that Lindeman had completed any sex offender treatment program. He noticed that

Lindeman had attended a few brief sessions with Dr. Oakwright, whom he contacted. 

Dr. Oakwright informed him that Lindeman had not completed treatment and

recommended that Lindeman continue couples therapy with someone who was

knowledgeable of sex offender issues. In Dr. Oakwrightþs opinion, Lindeman had a

þsignificant sexual addiction which . . . survived throughout his treatment.þ 

 Accordingly, Lindeman was referred to Ron Silvers at the Montana Sex Offenders

Treatment Association. Silvers met with Lindeman in April 1993. After an 

evaluation,

Silvers found he was not amenable to outpatient treatment. He testified that 

Lindeman

had a poor attitude and refused to sign medical releases to enable him to obtain 

records

from Dr. Scolatti. He also found Lindemanþs behavior to be alarming. Lindeman 

denied

that he had a problem and did not want treatment. He sought an evaluation only 

because

he wanted Silvers to certify that he posed no risk to his daughter or other minor 

children. 

Silvers refused to accept Lindeman into treatment. 

 Lindeman did not enter any treatment program and did not move out of his home

to protect his daughter. Instead, in May 1993, just ten months after moving to Great

Falls, he moved to Plains, Montana. His earlier second probation officer became his

probation officer once again.

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 On August 19, 1993, Lindeman requested the District Court to modify his rules

of probation to allow him unsupervised contact with minors. He represented to the

District Court that he had successfully completed the required sex offender treatment

program. Additionally, he had passed a polygraph examination with questions 

formulated

to reveal any sex crimes committed since his conviction, any inappropriate contact 

with

his daughter, or any thought processes common among offenders towards his infant

daughter. At this point, his current probation officer apparently believed that 

Lindeman

had successfully completed a sex offender treatment program and concurred with

Lindemanþs request with one change. He requested that Lindeman be allowed

unsupervised contact only with his two-year old daughter rather than all minors. On

September 23, 1993, the District Court modified the condition to allow Lindeman

unsupervised contact with his daughter. It further ordered that Lindeman be 

subjected

to routine polygraph examinations. In all other respects, the original terms of the

probation remained unchanged. 

 In August 1993, Lindeman moved again, this time to Kila, Montana. Once there,

two or three probation officers were assigned to his case for various time periods. 

In

October, 1995, he received his latest probation officer, who reviewed his file. She 

found

no evidence that Lindeman had completed the required sex offender treatment program. 

 That probation officer also discovered that although Dr. Oakwright had provided

Lindeman with some treatment, Dr. Oakwright was not certified to provide sex offender

counseling as required by the terms of the probation. He was not a member of the

National Association for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, the Montana Sex Offenders

Treatment Association, or any other equivalent state program. Indeed, Dr. Oakwright

admitted to the probation officer that he was not qualified to provide sex offender

treatment services. 

 Additionally, the counseling Dr. Oakwright provided did not meet the standards

of the state and national organizations. Lindeman had attended only ten one-hour

sessions, and those were frequently accompanied by his wife. Lindeman had attended

one or two additional treatment sessions. He attended no group therapy sessions. 

 The probation officer further discovered that Lindeman had not completed the

treatment that even Dr. Oakwright had suggested. With regard to the 1992 letter 

stating

that Lindeman had þgraduated,þ Dr. Oakwright explained that Lindeman had only

completed an þeducational treatment programþ and nothing more. Lindeman had quit

counseling without giving Dr. Oakwright any notice. It remained Dr. Oakwrightþs

opinion that Lindeman required further counseling. 

 Thus, on January 3, 1996, the probation officer held an intervention hearing to

give Lindeman another chance to comply with the conditions of his probation. As a

result of that hearing Lindeman was ordered to enter and successfully complete an

approved sex offender treatment program. He was further ordered to contact an 

approved

therapist by January 15, 1996. He once again was referred to Andy Hudak of the

Northwest Family Recovery Program. 

 Lindeman contacted Hudak by January 15, as required. Hudak sent him an

evaluation packet to complete and return. Hudak had agreed to allow Lindeman to pay

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a reduced fee of $150.00. Moreover, Hudak gave him several months, until April 1,

1996, to pay. In spite of this, Lindeman failed to complete and return the packet, 

and

he failed to pay the fee. Hudak testified that if money was a problem, he would have

worked out a solution with Lindeman. However, Lindeman never communicated to him

that money was an issue, and Lindeman showed no motivation for treatment. By letter

dated May 13, 1996, Hudak notified his probation officer that Lindeman had failed to

follow through on the screening process for entering the treatment 

program. 

 On May 23, 1996, the State filed a petition to revoke Lindemanþs suspended

sentence. On September 25, 1996, the District Court entered judgment finding that

Lindeman had violated the condition of his suspended sentence by failing to complete 

sex

offender treatment with a certified specialist approved by the probation office. It

therefore revoked the suspended sentence and imposed the full four ten-year 

concurrent

sentences at the Montana State Prison without eligibility for parole until he 

successfully

completed the sex offender treatment program. On November 12, 1996, the District

Court denied Lindemanþs motion to reconsider. Lindeman now appeals. 

ISSUE ONE

 Was the District Courtþs order modifying Lindemanþs condition of probation res

judicata on its subsequent order revoking Lindemanþs suspended sentence?

 On September 23, 1993, the District Court entered an order modifying the terms

of Lindemanþs probation to allow him unsupervised contact with his minor daughter. 

In

so doing, it stated that Lindeman had completed a sex offender treatment program. 

Specifically, the order provided:

 The Court finding that the Defendant has successfully completed the

 sex offender treatment program, and thereafter passed a polygraph

 examination administered by Richard Stotts, and there being no objection

 from the State of Montana;

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendantþs condition of probation

 No. 3 contained in the Judgment of this Court, dated December 15, 1989,

 is stricken; and substituted in its place is the following condition:

 The Defendant may have unsupervised contact with his minor

 child. The Defendant will be subject to polygraph

 examination at the request of his probation officer. If the

 polygraph examination results show any deception by

 Defendant regarding inappropriate conduct with minors, the

 Defendant shall not have any further unsupervised contact

 with his minor child and shall be subject to a revocation

 proceeding before this Court. 

 In all other respects, the Judgment of this Court, dated December 15,

 1989 shall remain unchanged. 

(Emphasis added.)

 Lindeman argues that the foregoing constitutes a conclusive finding that he had

completed the required sex offender treatment program, and that the order actually

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removed that condition of probation. He contends that in the subsequent revocation

proceeding, the District Court was bound by this þfinding.þ According to his line 

of

reasoning, the doctrine of res judicata prohibited the District Court from revoking 

his

suspended sentence on the basis that he had failed to complete the treatment 

program. 

 þ[R]es judicata is a final judgment which, when rendered on the merits, is an

absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties or those in privity with

them, upon the same claim or demand.þ Scott v. Scott (Mont. 1997), 939 P.2d 998,

1001, 54 St.Rep. 548, 550 (citing Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc. 

(1979),

180 Mont. 434, 436, 591 P.2d 196, 197). It prevents a party from re-litigating a 

matter

that the party has already had the opportunity to litigate. Hollister v. Forsythe 

(1996),

277 Mont. 23, 27, 918 P.2d 665, 667 (citing Loney v. Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C.

(1995), 273 Mont. 506, 510, 905 P.2d 158, 161). A claim is res judicata when four

criteria are met: (1) the parties or their privies are the same; (2) the subject 

matter of the

claim is the same; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the same subject 

matter; and

(4) the capacities of the persons are the same in reference to the subject matter 

and the

issues. Hollister, 918 P.2d at 667 (citing Loney, 905 P.2d at 161).

 In this case, the issues in the two matters differed. The sole issue raised, 

litigated,

and decided in the motion to modify the conditions of Lindemanþs suspended sentence

was whether his third condition of probation should be altered to allow him 

unsupervised

contact with minors. Whether or not he had completed a sex offender treatment 

program,

in compliance with the second condition, was not before the court. Lindeman did not

request the District Court to remove that condition, and the parties did not litigate

whether that condition had been satisfied. The District Court heard no testimony

regarding whether Lindeman ever completed treatment or whether Dr. Oakwright was a

certified sex offender treatment specialist. 

 The District Courtþs sole decision was to allow Lindeman unsupervised contact

with his minor daughter so long as he passed polygraph examinations on the issue of 

his

sexual conduct towards minors. The court did not remove the condition that he 

complete

treatment. Indeed, it specifically held in the last sentence of its order that all 

other

conditions of probation remained unchanged. 

 Although the District Court mistakenly stated that Lindeman had completed

treatment, and Lindemanþs misrepresentations to the court in this regard must have

carried influence, such a þfindingþ was not necessary to the courtþs decision. 

Rather, the

District Court had the authority to modify the condition to allow him unsupervised 

contact

with his daughter þat any timeþ upon notice to the probation officer. Section 46-23-

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1011(4), MCA. In this case the District Court was apparently confident that a 

polygraph

examination would adequately monitor Lindeman. In short, the District Courtþs 

statement

that he had completed treatment does not constitute a conclusive, litigated 

finding. 

 Lindeman cites State v. Black (1990), 245 Mont. 39, 798 P.2d 530 and State v.

Perry (1988), 232 Mont. 455, 758 P.2d 268 in support of his argument. Both are

distinguishable. In Black, this Court held that the issue of whether the defendant 

had

been denied ineffective assistance of counsel was barred by the doctrines of res 

judicata

and law of the case, because the District Court had already rendered a decision on 

that

issue which we reviewed and affirmed. Black, 798 P.2d at 533. In Black, unlike this

case, an evidentiary hearing had been held before the District Court, and the issue 

was

fully litigated. Black, 798 P.2d at 533. 

 In Perry, the defendant had argued that he was entitled to a new trial because 

the

State had failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence. This Court held that 

the issue

was res judicata because the defendant could have, but failed, to raise the issue on 

his

initial appeal. Perry, 758 P.2d at 274. Unlike Perry, the issue as to whether or 

not

Lindemanþs sentence should be revoked for failing to complete a treatment program 

could

not have been decided by the District Court when ruling on the earlier motion. 

Whether

or not to modify the conditions of Lindemanþs probation was before the District Court

solely by way of Lindemanþs motion, and the only issue Lindeman presented was whether

he should be allowed unsupervised contact with minors. The only method by which the

Sate could have challenged whether Lindeman had violated the condition of probation 

and

request that his sentence be revoked was by filing a separate petition pursuant to 

õ 46-

18-203, MCA. In such a case, the defendant is entitled to a hearing, with two 

exceptions

not relevant here. Section 46-18-203(5), MCA. The State could not have tacked those

issues on to Lindemanþs earlier motion, which did not even require a full hearing 

under

õ 46-23-1011(4), MCA. 

 The State did subsequently file such a petition to revoke and the matter went 

to a

hearing. The issue as to whether Lindeman had completed the treatment program was

then litigated and decided for the first time. We hold that the prior order 

modifying

Lindemanþs condition of probation was not res judicata on the District Courtþs 

subsequent

order revoking his suspended sentence.

 ISSUE TWO 

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 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it revoked Lindemanþs suspended

sentence?

 It is within the District Courtþs discretionary power to revoke a suspended 

sentence

when a defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. 

Section 46-18-203(7), MCA, provides:

 If the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions

 of the suspended or deferred sentence, the court may:

 . . . .

 (c) revoke the suspension of sentence and require the defendant to serve

 either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence;

 Section 46-23-1013(2), MCA, similarly provides :

 If the violation [of a condition of probation] is established, the court may

 continue to revoke the probation or suspension of sentence and may require

 him to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence and, if imposition

 of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence which might

 originally have been imposed.

 The standard for revoking a suspended sentence requires that the District Court 

be

reasonably satisfied that the conduct of the probationer has not been what he agreed 

it

would be if he were given liberty. State v. Butler (1995), 272 Mont. 286, 289, 900 

P.2d

908, 910 (citing State v. Lundquist (1992), 251 Mont. 329, 331, 825 P.2d 204, 206.) 

A violation of the terms and conditions of probation need only be proved by a

preponderance of the evidence. Section 46-18-203(6), MCA. We review the District

Courtþs decision to determine whether it abused its discretion. Butler, 900 P.2d at 

910

(citing Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 206.) 

 The District Court revoked Lindemanþs suspended sentence because it found that

he failed to complete a sex offender treatment program with a certified specialist as

required by the second condition of his probation: 

 2) The Defendant shall continue to participate in sex offender treatment

 approved by the Probation department, and that he continue in the same

 treatment until he has been satisfactorily discharged by a certified treatment

 specialist and approved by the Probation Department.

 Lindeman argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it revoked 

his

suspended sentence because it failed to consider several þunique factorsþ including 

the

following: (1) he successfully completed a sex offender treatment program with the

approval of his probation officers; (2) he cannot afford to complete another sex 

offender

treatment program; (3) he has a terminal, rare form of asthma; (4) he is a benefit 

to the

community because he has devoted himself to a menþs church group; (5) the State made

no effort for over seven years after he left Dr. Scolattiþs program to have him 

removed

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from the community; and (6) he has consistently followed all other rules of his 

probation

and has committed no crime subsequent to his conviction. We examine each of these in

turn. 

(1) Alleged Completion of Treatment Program

 Although couched as merely the first þfactor,þ Lindeman is actually challenging

the District Courtþs finding that he failed to successfully complete the required sex

offender treatment program. But the evidence in support of the courtþs finding is

overwhelming and, for the most part, uncontroverted. 

 First, Lindeman does not dispute the fact that he failed to complete the SABER

program run by Dr. Scolatti. Dr. Scolatti terminated him when he violated the 

programþs

rule regarding a sexual relationship with a younger person. 

 Second, although he received some treatment from Dr. Oakwright, Dr. Oakwright

was not a certified treatment specialist as required by the condition of probation. 

He was

not a member of the National Association for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, the Montana

Sex Offenders Treatment Association, or any other equivalent state program. Indeed, 

Dr.

Oakwright himself admitted to one of his probation officers that he was not 

qualified to

treat sex offenders. Lindeman points to no evidence that Dr. Oakwright was a 

certified

specialist or otherwise qualified to treat sex offenders. 

 Additionally, the treatment Dr. Oakwright actually provided was insufficient. 

It

did not meet the standards of the state and national programs, and Dr. Oakwright had

described the treatment as only þeducationalþ in nature. Lindeman attended only ten 

to

twelve couples counseling sessions with his wife, and he attended no group therapy

sessions. The experts, including Dr. Scolatti, Andy Hudak and Ron Silvers testified 

that

the only type of sex offender treatment that meets Montana and national standards

involves group therapy with other sex offenders. Educational counseling in the 

presence

of a wife does not qualify and is ineffective. Additionally, treatment can take 

years. For

example, Silvers testified that his program lasts an average of three to five 

years. 

Lindeman points to no evidence that indicates that the treatment he received from Dr.

Oakwright was sufficient.

 Finally, Dr. Oakwright himself stated that Lindeman had not successfully

completed even the treatment that he recommended. Although there was some confusion

over a letter he had written stating that Lindeman had þgraduated,þ Dr. Oakwright

explained to subsequent probation officers, that Lindeman had dropped out his program

without notice and that he had not completed treatment. He had only completed a socalled educational treatment program and required more counseling. In his opinion,

Lindeman had a þsignificant sexual addiction which . . . survived throughout his

treatment.þ 

 Lindeman received no additional treatment from any other source. We hold that

the District Courtþs finding that Lindeman violated the condition of his probation is

supported by the preponderance of the evidence. 

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(2) Alleged Inability To Pay For Treatment

 Lindemanþs protests that he cannot afford treatment are equally without merit. 

At

no time was he denied treatment for monetary reasons. Although he still owed some

money to Dr. Scolatti when treatment was terminated, he was not terminated from the

program for that reason. Similarly, Silvers denied him entrance to his program not 

for

monetary reasons, but because Lindeman was uncooperative and unwilling to undergo

treatment. Lindeman refused to even sign a medical release to enable Silvers to 

obtain

records from Dr. Scolatti. Evidence in the record indicated that in the past Silver

accepted patients who could not pay. In this case, however, Lindeman never 

approached

him or anyone regarding an alleged inability to pay. 

 Finally, in January 1996, Hudak had agreed to allow Lindeman to undergo an

evaluation for a reduced fee of $150.00. He also gave Lindeman three months to pay.

Lindeman never indicated that paying this amount was out of his financial reach. The

evidence suggests that Lindeman was simply unwilling to undergo treatment. 

(3) Alleged Terminal Illness

 Lindeman argues that the District Court failed to adequately consider the fact 

that

he has a terminal form of asthma. Although there is some evidence that he has a 

medical

condition which might shorten his life expectancy, there is no evidence in the 

record that

the condition is terminal or that it prevented him from attending an approved sex 

offender

therapy program.

(4) Alleged Membership In Prayer Group

 Lindeman next contends that he belongs to a menþs prayer group and is therefore

a benefit to his community. This, however, is no substitute for the required 

therapy. It

does not excuse the requirement that he successfully complete an approved sex 

offender

treatment program. It does not justify his failure to take steps to enter Hudakþs 

program

in 1996. 

(5) Stateþs Delay In Filing Petition To Revoke Suspended Sentence

 Lindeman complains that the State made no effort for over seven years after Dr.

Scolatti terminated him from the SABER program to have him removed from the

community. Dr. Scolatti terminated Lindeman from the program in March 1991, and it

was not until January 1996 that the State held an intervention hearing and ordered

Lindeman once again to seek treatment. In May 1996, the State filed the petition to

revoke. Although it was thus five years, and not seven years as asserted by 

Lindeman,

Lindeman is nonetheless correct in noting that the State delayed for several years 

before

taking action. 

 There is no doubt but that Lindeman fell through the cracks in the system at 

nearly

every turn. The first occurred when Lindeman began treatment with Dr. Oakwright. 

His

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probation officer at the time neither verified whether Dr. Oakwright was a certified

treatment specialist as required by the condition of probation, nor ensured that the

program was approved by the probation department. A second major mistake occurred

when a different probation officer concurred with Lindemanþs request to modify the 

terms

of probation to allow him unsupervised contact with his then two-year old daughter. 

The

probation officer apparently failed to determine whether in fact Lindeman had 

actually

completed an approved sex offender treatment program by a certified specialist. 

Although Lindeman went through a string of probation officers, only two picked up on

the fact that he had not completed treatment. In 1993, one probation officer sought 

not

only to protect Lindemanþs daughter from unsupervised contact with Lindeman, but

attempted to get Lindeman back into treatment. But Lindeman once again slipped

through the cracks when he moved. Either this information was not communicated to 

the

next probation officer or the next probation officer did not follow through on the

information. In either case, there again was a breakdown in the system. It was not 

until

late 1995 that his latest probation officer again discovered Lindemanþs failure to 

complete

treatment. 

 When the State finally discovered this fact, Lindemanþs suspended sentence was

not immediately revoked. Rather, Lindeman was given yet one more chance to enter an

approved treatment program. Despite this new opportunity, he failed to so much as

complete the entrance evaluation, once again demonstrating his hostility and 

unwillingness

to undergo treatment. This time, however, the State did not delay. It took 

immediate

steps to have him removed from the community. 

 Regardless of the Stateþs original lengthy delay, the fact remains that Lindeman

was an untreated sex offender who posed a danger to the community and in particular 

to

his young daughter. He refused to get treatment in violation of the condition of his

probation, in spite of being given a third chance in 1996. The District Court did 

not

abuse its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence notwithstanding the Stateþs

original delay.

(6) Allegedly Following All Other Conditions of Probation 

 Sixth, Lindeman argues that he has consistently followed all other rules of his

probation and has committed no crime subsequent to his conviction. At the revocation

hearing, the State presented evidence that Lindeman had violated other conditions of

probation by possessing firearms in his basement and by allowing a teenage boy to 

live

in his home. The District Court made no findings of fact regarding those two alleged

violations. We need not address whether or not Lindeman in fact followed all other 

rules

of his probation. The fact remains that he already violated one condition of 

probation

when he refused to enter and complete a treatment program. We have held in the past

that þno violation of a probation agreement is minor.þ Butler, 900 P.2d at 911 

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(citing

State v. Rogers (1989), 239 Mont. 327, 330, 779 P.2d 927, 929). We hold that even

without other violations, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 

revoking his

suspended sentence based upon the one violation.

 Lindeman nonetheless insists that the facts in his case are analogous to 

those

in State v. Lundquist (1992), 251 Mont. 329, 825 P.2d 204, and that based upon that

case this Court should reverse the District Court. In Lundquist, the defendant had 

been

terminated from his sex offender treatment program because he had not paid the

outstanding balance of $1,260.00 owed his therapist. Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 205. 

Six

months after his termination from the program, the therapist provided a second reason

for his termination and stated that the defendant had not participated in the 

written

portion of the program. Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 206. At the revocation hearing, the

therapist also testified that he originally wondered whether Lundquist was psychotic,

because the defendant claimed to have undergone a religious metamorphosis and spoke

to angels who guided him. Eventually the therapist concluded that Lundquist was not

psychotic, but was simply following his system of religious beliefs. Lundquist, 825 

P.2d

at 206.

 Other evidence, indicated that the defendant in Lundquist had attempted to 

comply

with the condition of his suspended sentence. Prior to his termination from the 

program,

the defendant had faithfully attended seventy-six group therapy sessions and thirteen

individual sessions--each of which required a 150-mile round trip from Lundquistþs

residence in Philipsburg, Montana, to the therapist in Missoula, Montana. Lundquist,

825 P.2d at 205. Although he had an outstanding balance for the counseling 

sessions,

he had already paid the therapist a total of $2,450 in counseling fees. Lundquist, 

825

P.2d at 205. Finally, the therapist testified that the defendant realized that child

molestation is bad and that the defendant posed only a low to moderate probability of

reoffending. Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 206. 

 Based upon the facts in that case, we held that the District Court abused its

discretion in revoking the suspended sentence. To the extent the District Court 

based its

decision on the defendantþs failure to pay fees, we held that it was unreasonable in 

light

of his low income and the fees already paid. Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 206. We noted 

that

the District Court could simply have required the defendant to offer a payment plan 

or

to find another outpatient sex offender treatment program. Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 

207. 

To the extent revocation was based upon the defendantþs religious beliefs, we held 

that

the decision contravened his right to free exercise of religion. Lundquist, 825 

P.2d at

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206. We further noted that the defendant had complied fully with the terms of his

probation and that the State waited six months before taking steps to remove him from

the community. Lundquist, 825 P.2d at 206-07. 

 The facts in Lundquist differ significantly from those in this case. Unlike the

defendant in Lundquist, Lindeman was not terminated from the SABER program for

either financial or religious reasons. He was terminated because he failed to abide 

by the

programþs rules. Moreover, the defendant in Lundquist posed a low to moderate risk 

in

the community, whereas Dr. Scolatti characterized Lindeman as þone of the most

dangerous menþ with whom he had ever worked. Finally, in Lundquist, the defendant

offered to make a payment plan for readmission to the program or to seek another

treatment plan. In this case, Lindeman was unwilling and uncooperative. He 

insisted to

Silvers in 1993 that he did not need treatment and refused to sign a medical 

release. In

1996 when he was given one last chance to seek treatment from Hudak, he refused. 

This

is not a situation as in Lundquist where the defendant did everything he could to 

abide

by the terms of probation but simply had difficulty paying. 

 The one fact in this case that is similar to the Lundquist case is the fact 

that the

State waited a significant period of time after he was terminated from the SABER

program before taking steps to remove him from the community. However, the State

took immediate action in 1996 after Lindeman failed to enter treatment as ordered at 

his

intervention hearing. As we elaborated earlier, the Stateþs original delay does 

not

justify liberating an untreated sex offender, particularly when the State gave 

Lindeman

yet another opportunity in 1996 to comply.

 As we have stated in the past:

 The inquiry at any probation revocation hearing is whether the purposes of

 rehabilitation are being achieved, and whether, by virtue of subsequent

 criminal conduct or evidence that the defendantþs behavior was not in

 compliance with the rules and objectives of his probation, the purposes of

 probation are best served by continued liberty or by incarceration.

State v. Robinson (1980), 190 Mont. 145, 148, 619 P.2d 813, 815 (citation omitted). 

In this case, the purposes of rehabilitation were not being achieved, and Lindeman 

had

not complied with the rules of his probation. We hold that the District Court did 

not

abuse its discretion when it revoked Lindemanþs suspended sentence.

 ISSUE THREE

 Did the District Court err in reserving its determination of Lindemanþs parole

eligibility? 

 In its 1989 judgment, the District Court specifically reserved the right under 

õ 46-

18-202, MCA, to impose the restriction that Lindeman be ineligible for parole while

serving his term, in the event that Lindeman ever violated a condition of probation 

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that

resulted in revocation of his suspended sentence. Subsequently, upon revoking

Lindemanþs suspended sentence in 1996, the District Court ordered that Lindeman be

ineligible for parole until he successfully completed the sex offender treatment 

program

at the Montana State Prison.Lindeman cites State v. Finley (1996), 276 Mont. 126, 

915 P.2d 208, and contends that the District Court lacked statutory authority to 

reserve

the right to restrict his eligibility for parole and later impose the restriction 

upon revoking

the suspended sentence. The State concedes that Finley controls and that the 

District

Court had no such authority. We agree. 

 When a court revokes the suspended sentence, it has the authority to require the

defendant to serve either the sentence imposed or a lesser sentence. It has no 

authority

to impose additional restrictions. Section 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA. The restrictions 

of

Lindemanþs parole eligibility exceed the authority of õ 46-18-203(7), MCA. 

 Furthermore, õ 46-18-202, MCA, the statutory provision relied upon by the

District Court when reserving the right to impose the restriction, applies only to 

the

original sentence under õ 46-18-201, MCA. The District Court has no authority to

reserve the right to impose such a restriction upon subsequently revoking the 

suspended

sentence. For that very reason in Finley, we reversed the portion of the courtþs 

judgment

that reserved the right to restrict the defendantþs parole eligibility. Finley, 915 

P.2d at

222. In this case too, we hold that the District Court erred in reserving its

determination of Lindemanþs parole eligibility.

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 

consistent

with this opinion.

 /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

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