### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 330 -CR

The St at e of Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v . Milton Dwayn e G obert, A ppellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D1DC06- 9040 06 , HO NORAB LE B OB PERK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
The State a

ppeals the district c ourt’s orde r g r a n ti n g a p p e ll e e M il to n Dway

ne Gobe rt’s motion to s uppress stateme nts. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West 2006). At iss ue is t he a dmi ssi bil ity

of Go be rt ’s vid e ota

pe d c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n b y Aust in p oli c e of

fi c e rs . The trial c ourt deter m i ned that the of fice rs conduc ting the inter rog ation failed to honor Gober t’s i n vocation of the rig ht to counsel. We ag ree with the court’s c onclusion and af firm the suppression orde r.

To eff ectuate the F if

th A me n d me nt privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination, a suspect has the rig ht to consult with an attorney and to have counsel pre sent during custodial interrog ation, and the police must expl ain this right to the suspec t before questioning be g ins. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 4 36 , 4 79 (1 96 6) . Wh e n a su sp e c t a sse rt s h is r ig ht t o c ouns e l, a ll i nte rr og a tio n mu st c e a se un til2

counsel is provided or until the suspect persona lly reinitiates the conve rsation. Edwards v. Arizona , 45 1 U .S. 47 7, 48 4- 85 (1 98 0) ; Di nk ins v . S tat e , 894 S.W .2d 330, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The suspect’s r equest for

counsel must be unambig uous, that is, he must articulate his desire to have

c ouns e l pr e se nt s uf

fi c ie ntl y c le a rl y that a reas on able po lic e of fi c e r i n th e c ir c ums tanc e s w ou ld understand the statement to be a re quest for a n attorney
. Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1 99 4)

. I f the su sp e c t ma ke s a n a mbi g uo us or e qu ivo c a l re fe re nc e to a n a tto rn e y that a re a so na ble of fi c e r in the c ir c ums tanc e s wou ld h a ve un de rs too d o nly a s p os sib ly

inv ok ingthe ri g ht t o c ou ns e l, questioning ne ed not ce ase. Id

. Although it may be g ood police pra ctice f or interview ing of

fice rs to clarify a suspect’s ambig uous statement reg arding counsel, both to protec t the rig hts of the suspect and t o mi n im iz e th e c h a n c e o f a c o n f e s s io n b e in g s u

p p r e s s e d d u e to s u b s e qu e n t j u d ic ia l s e c ondg uessing as to the mea

ning of the suspect’ s statement, clar ify ing questions a re not re quired, a

nd the office rs have no obligation to st op questioning. Id . a t 46 1; Dinkins , 894 S.W .2d at 351-52.

The relevant facts are not i n dispute. Gobert, who w as suspec ted of c ommitt ing the murder f or which he now stands indicted, wa s arr ested for a parole violation a nd for the assault of

a wo man n a me d Ch ri sti ne or Chr ist ina . F oll ow inghis a rr est , Gob e rt wa s q ue sti on e d b y

Au sti n detec tives Bur g h and Scanlon. B urg h beg an the inter view by advising Gober

t of his constituti onal and statutory

rig hts. See M

iranda , 384 U.S. at 479; Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, §§ 2, 3 (West 2005)

. Asked if he understood his rig hts, Gobert re plied that he did and then sa id, “I don’t want to g ive up any rig ht, thoug h, if I don’t g ot no lawy er.” Scanlon immediately asked, “ You don’t want to talk? ” The question was re peate d by Bur g h, “You don’ t want to talk to us? ” Gobe rt

answe red, “ Imean, I ’ll talk to y ’all. I mean, I know, y ou know, what she had said a bout it, y ou3

know. I ’ll speak with y ’all, but ( inaudible), man. I mean, I ’ll speak with y ’all, y ou know.” Sca nlon t h e n s a i d , “ O k a y , s i g n i n g t h i s

— s i g n i n g t h i s i s n o t g i v i n g u p y o u r r i g h t
. S i g n ing thi s is

a c kn ow le dg ingthat th is w a s r e a d to y ou .” He the n a dd e d, “ Ok a y ? Yo ur c ho ic e to t a lk t o u s is differ ent. This—all this is, i s acknow ledg ing that y ou wer e wa rned.” Bur g h then beg an to que stion Gobert re g arding his relationship with Christi na. Af ter a number of questions wer e aske d and answ ere d, Scanlon interrupte d to ask, “I wa nt to clear something up, though, because ear lier y ou said y ou don’t want to give up y our rig ht to a lawy er. I want y ou—I want y ou—I want to clea r up the fact that y ou want to talk to us about this. Okay ? You understand w hat I ’m saying?” Gobe rt answe red, “Ye ah.” Scanlon continued, “ Iwant to clea r it up. I m ea n , that’s—that’s what y ou want to do, rig ht? ” Gobe rt ag ain answe red, “ Yea h.” The interrog ation continued for sever al hours and ultimately resul t ed in appellant conf essing to the murder of Mel Ker nena Cotton. At issue is Gobert’s state ment, “I don’t want to give up any rig ht, though, if I don’t g ot no law y e r. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d th a t th is w a s an une qu ivo c a l in vo c a tio n o f t he ri g ht t o counsel during qu es t i o n i n g. The c ourt orally announce d its findings and c onclusions in the repor ter’s r ecor d:

Ijust don’t find any

thing that is unequivoc al [si c] a bout the statement “I ’m not goingto waive a

ny rig hts if I don’t g ot no lawy er.” I mean, I think that that’s as u n eq u i v o ca l as Ica n i m agi n e a s t at em en tb ei n g. I m e a n , i f I w e r e a d e f e n s e l a w ye r

a n d I w a s a d v i s i n g m y c l i e n tw h a tt o s a y, Ican ’t i mag ine what a dvice I ’d g ive him to say any thing be tter than that. I

mean, he’s sa y ing that he’s not g oi n g t o wa i v e any rig hts until he has a

lawy er. U nder Edwards , once he makes that stateme nt, he’s g ot a rig ht to a lawy er be fore any thing else ha ppens, y ou know.4 I just—y ou know, and he was not pr ovided a law y er. The y just—as soon as he say s that, instead of say ing, oka y , y ou want a lawy er, w e will g et y ou a lawy er, or ins te a d o f— ins te a d o f a sk inghim a bo ut t he lawy e r q

ue sti on , they

jus t g o to ta lly around tha t and they

sta rt saying, w ell, y ou don’t want to talk to us, which is not rea lly what he ha d asked. The rig ht that he aske d to invoke was his rig ht to a lawy er, and he say s at the same time he doe sn’t want to waive any rig hts until he’s got one. Ithink the fac t that the y tot a lly ig no re d w ha t he sa id a

nd ke pt o n ta lki ng to h im a

bo ut do es he wa

nt t o make a statement, I t h i n k t hat that implies . . . they rea lly don’t believe in the war nings the y

have g iven him . . . .

. . . . And that’s what he’s say ing, is he doesn’t wa

nt to give up any

rig ht. He doesn’t wa

nt to give up his rig ht to remain silent; he doesn’t wa nt to g ive up his rig ht to have a lawy e r a

pp oin te d fo r him ; he do e sn ’t wa nt to g ive up his ri g ht to t e rm inate the int e rv ie w. Yo u kno w, that’ s wha t he say s. Ia ssume tha t th a t’ s w ha t he me a ns . Now, the thing is, at that time what he say s, “if I don’t g ot no lawy er,” may be they might have some question at that point a bout w hether

he wa nted a law y er f

rom that. Idon’t know how they could have that question. But if they wer e going to ask any question, at t hat poi nt, it seems to me, it was incumbent upon them to ask, okay , so y ou’re saying you want a la wy er r ight now? I s that what y ou’re say ing? They want him to repe at hi s assertion that he w anted a lawy er, a nd then they could proce ed along that line. But they don’t ask that. The y tot a lly blo w b y the qu e sti on

of the lawy e r d e a l.

. . . . Well, either Edwards means what it say s or it doesn’t. Either y ou can invoke y o u r r ig h t to a la

w y e r o r y o u c a n ’ t. I d o n ’ t kn o w w h a t h e c a n s a y to them that invokes his rig ht to a lawy er a ny more than this. He say s he doesn’ t want to waive any rig hts unless he’s g ot a lawy er, a nd at that time, it seems to me , under Edwards , they have g ot to respec t that rig ht . . . . Under Edwards , it se ems to me that once he say s, Iwant a la

wy er, tha t’s it. I mean, that’ s the end of the ball g ame.5

Be cause the issue is a mix ed question of law and fac t, w e conduc t a de novo r eview. See M aestas

v . S tat e , 9 87 S.W. 2d

59 , 6 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 1999 ); Gu zm an v . S

tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

Th e Sta te a rgue s th a t G ob e rt ’s state me nt w a s n ot a cle ar as se rt ion of the ri g ht t o
c ouns e l. T he Sta te ’s po sit ion is s umm a ri zed

in t his pa ssa g e fr om i ts b ri e f t o th e Court : [Gobert] neve r ex pressly

asked f or a la wy er. H e neve r expressly stated he wan t ed an attorne y

there . The State maintains that [Gobert’s] statement “I don’t want to give up any

rig ht, though, if I

don’t g ot no lawy er,” was not a c lear , unequivoca l, unambiguous invoc ation of the r i ght to counsel. [Gobert] may have meant he did not wa

nt to waive his rig ht to silence since there was no law y er the re. Th a t is no t a

re qu e st f or a n a tto rn e y . O r [G ob e rt ] ma y have me a nt he wa nte d to ta lk to a lawy e r b e fo re he de c ide d w he the r or no t he would w a ive his ri g ht t o r e ma in silent. W hat exactly

he mea nt is just not clear . His statement being subject to more tha n o ne int e rp re ta tio n, the Sta te su bmi ts i t di d n ot c on sti tut e a n unambi g uo us , unequivoca l reque st for counse l, nor did it constitute an unambig uous, unequivoca l asser tion of his right to re main sil en t
. W hen the de tectives immediately asked [Go be rt ] fo r c lari fi c a tio n, [Go be rt ] pr omp tly a nd de fi nit e ly ind ic a te d h is w ill ing ne ss to t a lk t o th e m.
Th e Sta te ’s a rgume nt c on fu se s th e ri g ht t o c ouns e l wi th the ri g ht t o r e ma in s ile nt. I t ma y hav e b e e n u n c l e a r , a s t h e S t a t e a r g u e s , w h e t h e r G o b e rt “ d i d n o t w a n t t o w a i v e h i s r i g ht t o silence s in c e th e r e w a s n o la w y e r th e r e ” o r w h e th e r G o b e rt “ w a n te d to ta lk to a la w y e r b efor e he decide d whether or not he would waive his right to re main silent.” But Gobe rt did not contend and the trial court did not find that Gober t’s rig ht to rema in silent was violated during the interrog ation, and it is theref

ore irr eleva

n t whether

Gober t’s statement to the off

icer s was or w as not a c lear inv oc a tio n o f t

ha t r ig ht. Simi larl y , it is i rr e le va nt t ha t G ob e rt

su bs e qu e ntl y

e xpre sse d a

wi lli ng ne ss to t a lk t o th e of

fi c e rs .After

Gober t had conf essed to the killing a

nd the interrog ation was winding down, B urg h asked 1 if Gober t would be willing to sig n a wr itten statement. Gober t became ag itated and sa id, “I ’m telling y ou that I done it , man. Why y ou have to ty

pe up a sta tement and a ll of that? ” He later a dded, “O h, man, Ime a n w hy we have to g o ba c k th ro ug h a ll this , y ou kn ow , th is i s ju st l ike wh a t to pr e se nt t o t h e j u d g e o r

s o m e t h i n g , t o t h e D

. A

. , m a k e y o u r j o b e a s i e r

o r s o m e t h i n g ?” 6 The rig ht to consult with counse l be fore and during any interrog ation is independent of the ri g ht t o r e ma in s ile nt. Al tho ug h Go be rt did no t e xpre ssl y sa y that he wa

nte d a lawy e r p re se nt, he unambig uously , if ung rammatica lly , told the office rs t hat he did not g ive up any rig ht “if I don’t g ot n o la wy e r. ” Th is w a s a

c le a r s ta te ment th at Gob e rt wa s u nw ill ingto w a ive a ny of his ri g hts under Miranda a nd a rt ic le 38 .2 2 wi tho ut fi rs t c on su lti ng c ouns e l. At le a st on e of the of fic e rs , Sc a nlo n, a

pp e a re d to un de rs tand

thi s w he n he sa id, “ I wa

nt to cle a r som e thi ng up , thou g h, be c a us e
e a rl ie r you

sa id you do n’ t w a nt to g ive up y our ri g ht t o a lawy e r. ” Go be rt ’s wi lli ng ne ss t o s pe a k to the officers was not inconsistent with or a waive r of his rig ht to counsel. Gober t appar ently

believed that having invoked his r ight to an attorney , nothing he there afte r said to the off icer s could be used ag ainst him unti l counsel had be en provide d. Under the holding in E

d wa rds , t h i s b el i ef w as 1 justified in the circumstanc es shown her e.

The opini ons cited by the di ssent are distinguishable on their fac ts. I n Davis v. U

nited States , the Supreme Court held that a suspect’s state ment, “May be I should talk to a lawy er,” uttered

ov e r a n h our a nd a ha lf int o a c us tod ia l int e rr og a tio n a nd a ft e r the su sp e c t ha d p re vio us ly wa ive d h is Miranda rig hts was an a

mbiguous a ssertion of the r ight to counse l. 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994)

. The suspec t’s question in Ro bin so n v . S tat e , “D o I n ee d t o talk to a lawy er be fore Isign? ” wa s plainly ambig uous; it was neither an asser tion of the rig ht to counsel nor a reque st for counse l. 851 S.W .2d 216, 223-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Ha rp e r v . S tat e , afte r the suspec t said “I don’t eve n7

want to talk unless I

have me a lawy er,” no further interroga t i o n t o o k place until after one of the office rs aske d, “Ar e y ou telling us you want to terminate this int ervie w and spe ak to an attorney or do y ou want us to continue to discuss this matter? ” and the s uspect e x presse d his desire to continue wi tho ut c ou ns e l. N o. 03 -0 0- 00 67 7- CR, 20 01 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 74 97 , a t *4 -6 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin Nov. 8, 2001, no pet.).

The dissent asse rts that our holding in this case “blurs the bounda ries” of the holding in Da v is and “r eq u i re s p olice off icer s to cea se questioning when a statement is made that mig ht po ssi bly be a re qu est for

c ouns e l.” To the c on tr a ry , w e a c kn ow le dg e that a su sp e c t mu st unambig uously

reque st counsel and that an interrog ation need not c ease following an ambig uous or equivoca l refe renc e to an attorney . Fa r fr om blurring the boundar ies of this ru l e, we uphold the venerab le line dra

wn by long- standing prec edent. To a void difficulties of proof and to provide g uidance to office rs conduc ting inter rog ations, this is an objec tive inquiry

. Da v is , 512 U.S. at 458- 59. I nvocation of the Miranda rig ht to counsel “re qu i re s , at a minimum, some statement that can

rea sonably

be construe d to be an e x pression of a desire for the assistance of a n attorney .” Mc

Ne il

v . W isco ns in , 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991). The Supreme Court in Miranda held that if a de fenda nt indicates “ in any

manner ” that he w ishes an attorne y befor e spea

king or that he does not wish to be int e rr og a te d f

ur the r, qu e sti on ing must c e a se . 3 84 U. S. at 44 4- 45 . A lth ou g h a su sp e c t mu st

“ a rt ic ulate his de sir e to ha ve c ouns e l pre se nt suf fi c ie ntl y c le a rl y that a r e a so na ble po lic e of

fi c e r i n the circ umstances would unde rstand the state ment to be a reque st f or an attorney ,” Da v is , 5 12 U. S. at 459, h e need not spe ak with the leve l of clar ity or “discr imination of an Oxford don.” Id

. (Souter, J., concurring ). Whether view ed as in invocation of hi s rig ht to remain silent or to invoke8

his ri g ht t o c ouns e l, w e a g re e wi th t he dis tr ic t c ourt

tha t a pp e lla nt a de qu a te ly

c omm unica te d h is desire to spe ak t o an attorne y befor e g iving a

statement that could be used ag ainst him. That the offic e r s r e c o g n iz e d

th is is c le a r

f r o m t h e ir r e to rt “ Y o ud o n ’ t w a n t t o ta lk to u s ?” a n d th e ir r e tu rn,
a ft e r q ue sti on ing , to c lari fy

Go be rt ’s int e nt. We h old that G ob e rt ’s state me nt, ma de imm e diate ly a ft e r he wa s adv ise d of h is r ig hts under Miranda and ar

ticle 38.22, that “I

don’t want to give up any rig ht, though, if I

don’t g ot no lawy er” was a

clea r invoca tion of the rig ht to counsel. Under Edwards , all interrog ation should have

cea sed until counsel was pr ovided. B eca use the interr og ation continued in violation of Edwards , Gober t’s statements to the police are inadmissible ag ainst him on the trial of any criminal ca se. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.23 (West 2005).

The district cour

t’s order g ranting Gober

t’s motion to s uppress is af firmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear ; Dissenting O pinion by

J ustice Pury ear Affir med Filed: Apr il 19, 2007 Pub lis h