Filed 9/11/23 P. v. Ramirez CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANGEL RAMIREZ JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B327842

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA181882)

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke, II, Judge. Affirmed. 

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal; and Angel Ramirez Jr., in pro. per., for Defendant and 

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
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A jury convicted Angel Ramirez Jr. in 2000 of first degree 

murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and found true specially 

alleged firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1), 

12022, subd. (a)). We affirmed Ramirez’s conviction on direct 

appeal. (People v. Ramirez (Oct. 3, 2001, B142800) [nonpub. 

opn.].)

On December 14, 2022, after appointing counsel for 

Ramirez and receiving a response from the prosecutor and a reply 

from Ramirez’s counsel, the superior court summarily denied 

Ramirez’s petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 

(since renumbered section 1172.6), ruling Ramirez was ineligible 

for relief as a matter of law because he was not prosecuted under 

theories of felony murder or natural and probable consequences 

or any other theory that imputed malice to him. 

No arguable issues have been identified following review of 

the record by Ramirez’s appointed counsel. We also have 

identified no arguable issues after our own independent review of 

the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Ramirez 

in his supplemental brief. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The evidence at trial established that Daniel Valenzuela, 

an associate of the Clover criminal street gang, was shot and 

killed while in the laundry room of his mother’s home. 

Valenzuela’s mother heard the gunshots and saw the shooter 

jump into an awaiting car. A nearby police helicopter spotted the 

assailant as he entered the car and followed the vehicle from the 

air. Almost immediately, the car pulled to the curb, and the 

passenger got out and ran. The police helicopter continued to 

1

Statutory references are to this code.
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follow the car, which stopped after being forced to do so by law 

enforcement officers in marked police cars. Ramirez, who later 

told the investigating officer he was an Eastlake gang member,

was in the driver’s seat. No other individuals were with him. 

The People argued the shooting was a planned killing by an 

Eastlake gang member committed in retaliation for an earlier 

shooting of an Eastlake gang member by a Clover gang member. 

The People argued Ramirez was an Eastlake gang member and

directly aided and abetted a premeditated murder. 

Ramirez testified in his own defense, denying he was an 

Eastlake gang member or associate. According to Ramirez, he 

was driving to get milk when he heard gunshots and a man he 

knew, but refused to identify, jumped into his car and told him to 

drive. When a police helicopter used its light to illuminate 

Ramirez’s vehicle, Ramirez’s passenger told him to stop the car 

and let him out. Ramirez complied, and the man fled. Ramirez 

continued driving because he was confused and wanted to get 

away from the area. 

The jury found Ramirez guilty of first degree murder and 

found true specially alleged firearm and gang enhancements.

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Ramirez on appeal from 

the denial of his postjudgment petition. After reviewing the 

record, appointed counsel did not identify any arguable issues 

and so informed this court. Appointed counsel advised Ramirez 

on July 26, 2023 that he was filing a brief stating he was unable 

to find arguable issues and that Ramirez could personally submit 

any contentions he believed the court should consider.

On August 17, 2023 we received a three-page handwritten 

supplemental brief from Ramirez in which he argued there was
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insufficient evidence to prove he knew the shooter’s intent as 

required to find him guilty of directly aiding and abetting a 

premeditated murder. He emphasized the police reports and 

witness accounts were inconsistent and no gun was ever found in 

his possession. He also argued the People’s gang expert was not 

qualified to provide expert testimony and his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call a gang expert to 

support his defense. Finally, Ramirez asserted that, because he 

was 19 years old at the time of the shooting, he qualified for a 

youth offender parole hearing under Senate Bill No. 261, effective 

January 1, 2016 (§ 3051, subd. (b)(3)).

None of Ramirez’s arguments relates to his eligibility for 

resentencing, nor does the record suggest he could have been 

found guilty under a now-invalid theory of imputed malice. To 

the extent Ramirez’s reliance on Senate Bill No. 261 indicates a 

desire to exercise his rights under People v. Franklin (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 261 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 to supplement 

the record in his case with information relevant to an eventual 

youth offender parole hearing, the correct procedural vehicle for 

an inmate to request a postjudgment evidence preservation 

proceeding, as the Supreme Court held in In re Cook, is a motion 

pursuant to section 1203.01, subdivision (a) (see In re Cook, at

pp. 451-454), not a petition or motion for resentencing. 

Because no cognizable legal issues have been raised by 

Ramirez’s appellate counsel or by Ramirez or identified in our 

independent review of the record, the order denying his petition 

for resentencing is affirmed. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022)

14 Cal.5th 216. 231-232; see generally People v. Kelly (2006) 

40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 

441-442.)
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DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order is affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. 

FEUER, J.