19-704-ag

Singh v. Garland

In the

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AUGUST TERM 2020

No. 19-704-ag

JAGDEEP SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.*

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

SUBMITTED: MAY 17, 2021

DECIDED: AUGUST 25, 2021

Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, and JACOBS and MENASHI,

Circuit Judges.

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 
2

Petitioner Jagdeep Singh, a citizen of India, petitions for review 

of a February 22, 2019, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

affirming a November 21, 2017, decision of an immigration judge 

denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture. We conclude that 

the agency properly determined that Singh could safely relocate 

within India to avoid the possibility of future persecution or torture 

and that it would be reasonable to expect him to do so. Singh cannot 

challenge the agency’s determination by relying on general country 

conditions evidence without showing how the evidence demonstrates 

that a person in his particular circumstances would be subject to 

persecution or torture. Singh’s allegation that he was mistreated by 

members of a political party that is aligned with a party in power 

nationally does not undermine the agency’s conclusion that he can 

safely relocate within the country. Accordingly, we DENY the 

petition for review.

Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights, New York, for Petitioner.

Genevieve M. Kelly, Office of Immigration Litigation 

(Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil 

Division, Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, on the brief), United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
MENASHI, Circuit Judge:

Jagdeep Singh petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The agency found that 

Singh suffered persecution when members of a rival political party

assaulted him after he refused to leave his own party. But the agency 

denied his application for relief because Singh could safely relocate 

within India. The issue before us is whether the agency erred in 

finding that Singh could safely relocate within India to avoid future 

persecution or torture and that it would be reasonable to expect him 

to do so. We conclude that the agency did not err. Accordingly, we 

deny the petition for review. 

BACKGROUND

Singh is a citizen of India who arrived in Hildago, Texas, on or 

about November 5, 2014, without a valid visa or entry document. In 

December 2014, Singh expressed a fear of returning to India and was 

placed in removal proceedings. The Notice to Appear charged Singh 

with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) as an alien 

who arrived in the United Sates without valid entry documents. Singh 

was released from the custody of the Department of Homeland 

Security (“DHS”) on bond.

I

Singh appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) in Los 

Fresnos, Texas, on December 14, 2014. He admitted the allegations in 
4

the Notice to Appear, conceding his removability, and filed the 

application for asylum. The IJ granted a change of venue to New York

City based on Singh’s place of residence.

On November 21, 2017, the IJ in New York held a hearing on 

Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the CAT. At the hearing, Singh testified that he left 

India because he feared being harmed by members of a rival political 

party. He said that he joined the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar 

(“Akali Dal Mann”) political party in India in 2013 and that he worked 

for the party in the Hoshiarpur district in the state of Punjab by 

serving food and setting up tents at events. He explained that the 

party supports the establishment of an independent state of Khalistan 

and the release of Sikh prisoners from Indian jails. He further stated 

that he had no leadership role in the party, that he never engaged in 

political activity outside of Hoshiarpur, and that members of other 

parties realized he was a member of Akali Dal Mann when they saw 

him putting up flyers for an event. He also testified that he did not 

know any fellow party members who were persecuted within Punjab 

other than himself.

Singh testified that in July 2014 while he was attending one of 

his party’s rallies, he received a call on his cell phone from an 

individual claiming to be a member of the rival Shiromani Akali Dal 

Badal (“Akali Dal Badal”) political party. The caller purportedly told 

Singh that he should work for the Akali Dal Badal “and sell drugs” if 

he wanted to avoid being killed. Cert. Admin. R. at 100. Singh said 

that he reported the conversation to the police near the rally but that 

the police officers responded that they could not respond to the threat 

because they were “working for the government” and could not “do 

anything about it.” Id.
5

Singh also testified that in August 2014 he was approached in 

person by five individuals claiming to be members of the Akali Dal 

Badal who similarly told him that “we want you to come and sell 

drugs for us and work for our party.” Id. at 102. When Singh refused 

to do that, the five individuals beat him until he lost consciousness.

Singh claimed that while he was unconscious, a passerby recognized 

him and took him home. After Singh woke up at home, his father took 

him to the hospital where he received intravenous fluid and “some 

ointment to put ... on my body.” Id. at 103. He was in the hospital for 

six or seven hours. Singh said that he never reported the beating to 

the police. He said that his father advised him not to contact the police 

because the police officers had not responded to the threatening 

phone call he had previously reported. Singh said he was “fearful for 

my life.” Id. at 104.

Singh said that he did not move to another part of India to 

avoid the rival party members because, when he rented a home or 

applied for a job, he would need to provide identification. If he 

showed his identification to anyone, he said, “[i]t’s a very strong 

possibility that ... I would [be] tracked down and I would have been 

killed.” Id. at 104. Counsel for the government asked Singh how 

someone would know from his identification card—which contained 

his name, address, and birthdate—that he supported the Akali Dal 

Mann. Singh responded that “[t]his is how it is all over India. That’s 

how they trace people and they kill them.” Id. at 111. He also 

suggested that members of an opposing party across India would 

recognize him because of his work hanging up posters and flyers in 

Hoshiarpur.

After considering Singh’s testimony and the documentary 

evidence in the record describing political and social conditions in 
6

India, the IJ issued a decision denying Singh asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the CAT. The IJ found that the 

“mistreatment” of Singh by “Badal party members” rose “to the level 

of persecution and that the assailants were motivated by [Singh’s] 

political opinion.” Id. at 61. Because the IJ found that Singh had been 

persecuted in the past, the IJ applied a rebuttable presumption that 

Singh had a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(1). The IJ concluded that the government had rebutted 

that presumption, however, by showing that Singh could safely 

relocate within India to avoid further mistreatment. See id. 

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).

Regarding Singh’s ability to relocate, the IJ observed that 

according to a State Department report, Indian law provides for 

freedom of movement and that the government generally respects 

that right. The IJ also examined other reports showing that police 

forces in each Indian state do not routinely communicate about the 

relocation of citizens. The IJ relied on a report of the Canadian 

Refugee Board stating that “several sources indicate that Sikhs do not 

face difficulties relocating to other areas of India.” Cert. Admin. R. at 

63. The IJ also noted that other reports indicated that “India is a 

country of some 1.2 billion people and that there are sizable Sikh 

populations through[out] the country.” Id.

In response to Singh’s claim that he would be discovered in a 

different region of India on account of his identification card, the IJ 

observed that a report by the United Kingdom’s Home Office 

explained that India lacks a national police force and a nationwide 

crime database. The Home Office found no “evidence that there is a 

central registration system in place which would enable the police to 

check the whereabouts of inhabitants in their own state, let alone in 
7

any other states or unions within the country.” Id. The IJ also 

described the Canadian Refugee Board’s finding that “there is little 

interstate police communication [in India] except for cases of major 

crimes like smuggling, terrorism, and some high profile organized 

crime.” Id. Based on this evidence, the IJ concluded that Singh “would 

be difficult to locate outside of Punjab even if Punjabi police were 

seeking him.” Id. Moreover, the IJ noted that Singh did not even claim 

to have been targeted by Punjabi police but only by supporters of a 

rival political party who threatened him over the phone and assaulted 

him once. The IJ found that even though local police did not respond

to the phone threats Singh reported, there was nothing in the record 

to show that the police were other than merely indifferent, let alone 

that the police would seek out Singh in another state or assist others 

in doing so.

Noting that Singh did not allege to be a high-profile member of 

the Akali Dal Mann, the IJ also relied on a report of the Library of 

Congress indicating that “only hardcore militants are of interest to 

Central Indian authorities” and that one does not qualify as a highprofile militant merely by holding pro-Khalistan views. Id. at 64. The 

IJ also observed that “neither the 2016 U.S. Department of State 

Human Rights Report for India nor the most recent International 

Religious Freedom Report mentions the persecution of Shiromani 

Akali Dal Amritsar members in Punjab or elsewhere in India.” Id.

II

Singh appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”), arguing that he was a prominent figure in the Akali 

Dal Mann, that the IJ erred by finding that Singh was not a member 

of the party, and that it was not reasonable for him to relocate within 
8

India given his political activity and education level and India’s 

various social problems, such as unemployment, poverty, corruption, 

and illness.

In a February 22, 2019, decision, the BIA dismissed the appeal. 

The BIA accepted the IJ’s finding that Singh suffered past persecution, 

but it also agreed with the IJ that the government had shown that

Singh could avoid future persecution by safely relocating within 

India and that it would be reasonable for him to do so. The BIA

observed that the IJ properly shifted the burden to the government to 

demonstrate Singh’s ability to relocate safely and that the government 

met that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The BIA 

concluded that the record supported the IJ’s findings that Indian law 

provides for freedom of movement and that there was no central 

registration system in India that would enable police to monitor the 

whereabouts of inhabitants throughout the country. The BIA also said 

the record supported the IJ’s findings that there is no national police 

force in India, that police stations are unconnected, and that there is 

little communication between stations except in cases involving major 

crimes such as smuggling, terrorism, and organized crime. The BIA 

also found support in the record for the IJ’s finding that Sikhs do not 

face difficulty relocating within India.

The BIA further concluded that the IJ properly found that Singh 

held no special position in the Akali Dal Mann and that his activities 

were limited to attending events and posting flyers. The BIA also 

found no error in the IJ’s determination that only high-profile 

militants are of interest to Indian authorities and that “simply holding 

pro-Khalistan views would not make someone fit this description.” 

Cert. Admin. R. at 4. The BIA also said the IJ properly found that the 

2016 State Department report does not mention persecution of 
9

members of the Akali Dal Mann either in Punjab or elsewhere in India 

and that Singh did not know anyone else who had been persecuted 

for membership in that party.

In light of the record evidence, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial 

of immigration relief. It explained that the IJ’s findings “demonstrate 

that there are areas in India where [Singh] does not have a wellfounded fear of persecution and these locations present 

circumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise to a 

well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of [his] claim,” 

according to the BIA. Id. Moreover, the IJ “permissibly relied on his

findings concerning country conditions in determining that it would 

be reasonable for [Singh] to relocate there” and “properly evaluated 

the background evidence with respect to both [Singh’s] Sikh faith and 

his membership in a political party.” Id. at 4-5.

Singh timely petitioned this court for review. He argues that 

the government failed to show that internal relocation would be 

reasonable and that he established his eligibility for relief under the 

CAT.

DISCUSSION

We have jurisdiction to review the decision of the BIA under 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), which authorizes judicial review of a final order 

of removal. When the decision of the BIA is consistent with the 

decision of the IJ, we may consider both decisions “for the sake of 

completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). 

In this context, Congress has specified that “the administrative 

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. 
10

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, we review the agency’s decision for 

“substantial evidence” and “must defer to the factfinder’s findings 

based on ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 

81 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938)). The scope of review “under the substantial evidence standard 

is exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless 

the petitioner demonstrates that the record evidence was so 

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him eligible 

for relief.” Mu Xiang Lin v. DOJ, 432 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005)

(internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). By 

contrast, we review legal conclusions de novo. Gallina v. Wilkinson, 

988 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2021).

A recent decision from our court suggested that 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B)’s “language presents special problems when the 

finding of fact is an adverse credibility determination” and therefore 

determined that the standard of review for factual findings provided 

in § 1252(b)(4)(B) “does not apply literally” to judicial review of 

agency “adverse credibility findings.” Singh v. Garland, No. 17-2368, 

2021 WL 3176764, at *3 (2d Cir. July 28, 2021).1 In this case, we are 

reviewing factual findings other than adverse credibility findings, 

1 That decision admittedly created some tension with our earlier 

precedents. See Singh, 2021 WL 3176764, at *3 (noting that “our Court has 

frequently cited the ‘unless ... compelled’ standard in decisions upholding

adverse credibility findings”); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 

165 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We review the agency’s factual findings, including 

adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence 

standard, treating them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”); Majidi, 430 F.3d at 81.
11

and there is no basis for extending the holding and reasoning of the 

recent Singh case beyond that limited context. Accordingly, we apply 

the ordinary meaning of § 1252(b)(4)(B) as it has been interpreted in 

cases such as Majidi and Mu Xiang Lin.2 As a unanimous Supreme 

Court recently emphasized, “The only question for judges reviewing 

the BIA’s factual determinations is whether any reasonable 

adjudicator could have found as the agency did.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 

141 S. Ct. 1669, 1678 (2021). We follow that mandate here.

2 To the extent our court was concerned about the “inconsisten[cy]” a 

“literal reading” of § 1252(b)(4)(B) would create “with the statutory 

mandate in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e),” the judicial review provision of the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), we do not think that concern can 

justify a refusal to apply the INA as written in this case. Singh, 2021 WL 

3176764, at *3. If the express language of the INA conflicts with similar 

provisions of the APA, the INA controls. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 

133-34 (1991); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306-10 (1955). Although the 

INA originally did not suggest that the APA’s judicial review provisions 

should not apply to review of immigration decisions, see Shaughnessy v. 

Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1955), that does not prevent Congress from 

amending the INA and thereby limiting the APA’s application, see 

Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998). The standard provided 

by § 1252(b)(4)(B), which was enacted in 1996, appears to be more restrictive 

than the INA’s previous standard. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)

(“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”), with 

8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1994) (“[T]he Attorney General’s findings of fact, if 

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 

considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.”). We apply that specific 

provision of the INA rather than the APA’s general judicial review standard

to the extent that those standards conflict.
12

I

Asylum is a discretionary form of relief that the Attorney 

General may grant to an applicant who qualifies as a refugee. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b). To qualify as a refugee, an applicant must show that he or 

she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality 

because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 

An applicant who has established past persecution is 

“presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of 

the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). That presumption will be 

overcome, and asylum accordingly will be denied, if (A) “[t]here has 

been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant 

no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution,” or (B) “[t]he 

applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part 

of the applicant’s country of nationality ... and under all the 

circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do 

so.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(A)-(B). When there has been a finding of past 

persecution, the government bears the burden of establishing, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that an applicant could avoid 

persecution through internal relocation and that it would be 

reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(ii).

Withholding of removal, meanwhile, is mandatory “if the 

Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 

threatened” in the country to which the alien would be removed 

“because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 

“[T]o establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an alien must 
13

show ... that it is more likely than not that he or she would be subject 

to persecution” in the country to which the alien would be removed

and “must demonstrate that race, religion, nationality, membership 

in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be ‘at least 

one central reason’ for the claimed persecution.” Matter of C-T-L-, 25 

I. & N. Dec. 341, 343, 348 (BIA 2010). If the applicant is determined to 

have suffered past persecution in the proposed country of removal, 

“it shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or freedom would be 

threatened in the future in the country of removal on the basis of the 

original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). As with asylum, that 

presumption will be overcome if there is either a fundamental change 

in circumstances or “[t]he applicant could avoid a future threat to his 

or her life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed 

country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be 

reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” Id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A)-

(B). Again, the government bears the burden by a preponderance of 

the evidence. Id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(ii).

Both asylum and withholding of removal depend on a showing 

of persecution. “To qualify as ‘persecution’ the conduct at issue must 

be attributable to the government, whether directly because engaged 

in by government officials, or indirectly because engaged in by 

private persons whom the government is ‘unable or unwilling to 

control.’” Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Pan 

v. Holder, 777 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 2015)); see also Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 

F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that persecution may “be found 

when the government, although not itself conducting the persecution, 

is unable or unwilling to control it”). Under the unwilling-or-unable 

standard, “a finding of persecution ordinarily requires a 

determination that government authorities, if they did not actually 
14

perpetrate or incite the persecution, condoned it or at least 

demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.” Galina 

v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000); see also De Castro-Gutierrez v. 

Holder, 713 F.3d 375, 381 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n alien seeking to 

establish persecution based on the violent conduct of private actors 

... must show that the government condoned it or at least 

demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); Shehu v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 

437 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that private party violence “cannot be 

labeled ‘persecution’ absent some proof that the ... government 

condoned it or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to 

protect the victims”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Singh also seeks protection under regulations implementing 

the CAT. Under those provisions, removal will be withheld or 

deferred if the applicant establishes that “it is more likely than not 

that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country 

of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); accord id. § 1208.17(a). The 

torture need not be on the basis of a protected ground, but the 

showing must be of “torture[] by, or with the acquiescence of, 

government officials acting in an official capacity.” Mu Xiang Lin, 432 

F.3d at 159. This court “has stated that acquiescence is demonstrated 

by evidence that ‘government officials know of or remain willfully 

blind to an act of torture and thereafter breach their legal 

responsibility to prevent it.’” Scarlett, 957 F.3d at 334 (quoting 

Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)) (alteration 

omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), (7).
15

II

In this case, we decide whether the agency erred in finding that 

Singh could safely and reasonably relocate within India and how that 

determination affects Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding, and 

CAT relief. 

We conclude that the agency’s finding that Singh could 

internally relocate was supported by substantial evidence. Singh 

argues that the agency erred because internal relocation would not

help him avoid future persecution. He claims that he “was persecuted 

by the government” because he was harmed by members of “the 

Akali Dal Badal party which is in coalition with the [Bharatiya Janata 

Party (“BJP”)] that is the ruling party in India.” Petitioner’s Br. 15-16. 

Singh contends that “[w]hen the persecutor is the government, ‘it has 

never been thought that there are safe places within a nation.’” Id. at 

16 (quoting Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1995)) 

(alteration omitted). 

Contrary to his contention, however, Singh was not persecuted 

by the government. An applicant’s allegation that he was persecuted 

by members of a political party—even one that is in power nationally 

or, as Singh alleges of the Akali Dal Badal, is aligned with a party in 

power nationally 3 —does not establish that the applicant was 

persecuted by the government. Members of a political party are not 

the government; for mistreatment inflicted by party members to 

amount to persecution, an applicant must show that the government 

3 The alliances of the relevant political parties have changed since Singh 

filed his briefs in this case. See ‘Akali Story with BJP Over’—Sukhbir Badal 

Calls for Tie-Up of Regional Parties for 2024 Polls, ThePrint.in (July 25, 2021).

We do not believe this case turns on those shifting coalitions.
16

was unwilling or unable to control the attackers. Pan, 777 F.3d at 543; 

Galina, 213 F.3d at 958. 

In this case, the agency determined that Singh had been 

subjected to past persecution based on his mistreatment by Akali Dal 

Badal members without finding that the government had condoned 

the mistreatment or was unable to control the attackers. Cert. Admin. 

R. at 61. We doubt that the finding of past persecution was correct, 

but we need not disturb that unchallenged finding in order to reject 

Singh’s argument that “there are [no] safe places” for him “within” 

India because he “was persecuted by the government.” Petitioner’s 

Br. 15-16. Neither the IJ nor the BIA was required to attribute an attack 

by members of a regional party in Punjab to the national government 

of India. Instead, the IJ properly concluded that Singh had not been 

targeted even by local authorities. See Cert. Admin. R. at 63 

(“[R]espondent has not claimed that he was ever targeted by Punjabi 

police. Instead, he claims that it was supporters of a rival political 

party who made threats over the phone and then beat him on one 

occasion.”). While Singh testified that the police failed to assist him in 

connection with his report of a telephone threat, “it does not follow

that police in Punjab would seek to find him if he returned to the 

country and lived in another state or that they would assist others in 

doing so.” Id. at 64.4

4 We therefore disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions in Singh v. 

Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2019), that harm inflicted by political party 

members is tantamount to persecution “at the hands of the government” 

and that persecution by “local authorities” creates a “rebuttable 

presumption ... that the threat exists nationwide.” Id. at 661. Individuals 

who are merely members of a ruling political party are not part of the 

government, and the extent to which persecution by actual governmental 
17

Next, Singh argues that the record demonstrates that he will 

face persecution even if he relocates within India. He points to 

country-conditions evidence showing various harms that have 

purportedly occurred in India: “corruption,” “reports of political 

prisoners in certain states,” “instances of censorship and harassment 

of media outlets,” “[l]egal restrictions on religious conversion,” and 

“discrimination based on religious affiliation, caste or tribe.” 

Petitioner’s Br. 11. He notes other country-conditions evidence 

suggesting that “[m]any police officers refuse to register crime 

complaints,” “use illegal detention, torture, and ill treatment to 

punish criminals against whom they lack of time or inclination to 

build cases,” and “arrest and detain individuals on false charges at 

the behest of powerful local figures or due to other forms of 

corruption.” Id. at 15-16.

This evidence, however, does not compel the conclusion that 

internal relocation would not avert future persecution. First, an 

applicant challenging a finding that internal relocation would avert 

future persecution—like all applicants challenging an adverse agency 

determination regarding future persecution or torture—cannot 

simply point to general country-conditions evidence without 

showing how that evidence compels the conclusion that a person in 

the applicant’s “particular circumstances” would be unable to 

relocate to avoid persecution. Zhong v. DOJ, 480 F.3d 104, 126 n.26 (2d 

Cir. 2007); see also Mu Xiang Lin, 432 F.3d at 160 (noting the importance 

of “particularized evidence”). General country-conditions evidence 

authorities affects the feasibility of internal relocation depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Here, the agency reasonably 

concluded that—even assuming that Singh faced a threat of persecution in 

his locality—that threat does not exist nationwide. 
18

does not on its own compel the conclusion that an individual will be 

persecuted or that internal relocation is insufficient to avert 

persecution. Singh fails to show how the country-conditions evidence 

establishes that he—that is, a person in his particular circumstances—

would be persecuted even after relocating internally. Instead, his 

argument suggests that living conditions generally throughout India 

are intolerable and amount to persecution. Asylum and other forms 

of immigration relief are individual remedies designed to avoid 

persecution inflicted on particular persons. General countryconditions evidence is insufficient to overcome an agency finding that 

a particular applicant would avoid future persecution through 

internal relocation. 

Finally, Singh’s evidence does not compel the conclusion that it 

would be unreasonable to expect him to relocate internally to avoid 

future persecution. Under the regulations in place at the time of 

Singh’s proceedings, the agency determined the reasonableness of 

internal relocation by considering “whether the applicant would face 

other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing 

civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial 

infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural 

constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties.” 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (2017). The regulation provided that “[t]hose 

factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the 

circumstances of the case, and are not necessarily determinative of 

whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate.” Id.5

5 This regulation was in force from July 18, 2013, to November 8, 2018, and 

has since been amended. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of 
19

The agency’s decision that it would be reasonable to expect 

Singh to relocate was supported by substantial evidence. The record 

contained evidence that there are 1.2 billion people, including 19 

million Sikhs, living in India and that Indian citizens—Sikhs in 

particular—do not face difficulties relocating within the country. 6

The record also reflected that there is no central countrywide 

registration system or nationwide police database that members of 

the Akali Dal Badal could use to track rivals and that only high-profile 

militants—not local party organizers such as Singh—are of interest to 

national authorities. As the IJ noted, there have been no recent reports 

of persecution against members of the Akali Dal Mann anywhere in 

India and Singh did not identify any, let alone enough to be arguably 

nationwide. Moreover, evidence of police abuse of prisoners was not 

material to the analysis because Singh did not claim to be a target of 

police or establish that he was likely to become a prisoner.

Singh additionally argues that it would not be reasonable for 

him to relocate because he was a farmer in Punjab and Sikhs cannot 

own land in the state of Gujarat, language barriers exist in some states, 

and unskilled Sikhs face difficulties finding employment. Singh does 

Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, 80,387

(Dec. 11, 2020).

6 Singh objects to the agency’s consideration of evidence related to the 

ability of Sikhs to relocate because, he contends, “[t]he IJ and the BIA 

overlooked that Petitioner suffered persecution because of his ‘political 

opinion’ not because of his ‘religion’ i.e. Sikh.” Petitioner’s Br. 14. In the 

context of internal relocation, whether Sikhs are able safely to move 

throughout India was a relevant consideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) 

(noting that the agency may consider, inter alia, “whether the applicant 

would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation”). It was 

not erroneous for the agency to consider that evidence.
20

not provide evidence suggesting that such issues are widespread, and 

indeed not limited to a few Indian states. Moreover, these arguments 

are not compelling given that Singh was able to move to the United 

States and currently works in construction in New York City.

In the end, what we recognized fifteen years ago remains true 

today: An Indian citizen such as Singh “is unlikely to face persecution 

for his Sikh beliefs and his membership in Akali Dal Mann” and “any 

threat faced by [such an applicant] in India is not country-wide.” 

Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006). We hold again, on a

current record, that these conclusions of the agency are supported by 

substantial evidence. The agency therefore did not err in deciding 

that, in this case, the government rebutted the presumption that Singh 

has a well-founded fear of persecution by showing that he could 

safely and reasonably relocate to avoid future persecution. See 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)-(ii).

This determination is dispositive of Singh’s application for 

asylum and eligibility for withholding of removal. Id. 

§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B). The determination also 

disposes of Singh’s claim for relief under the CAT because Singh’s 

ability to relocate internally means that he cannot establish a 

likelihood of torture. “In assessing whether it is more likely than not 

that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of 

removal,” the agency considers “all evidence relevant to the 

possibility of future torture ... including ... [e]vidence that the 

applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he 

or she is not likely to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). The agency 

properly relied on such evidence here.
21

CONCLUSION

“Asylum in the United States is not available to obviate relocation to sanctuary in one’s own country.” Singh, 435 F.3d at 219. 

Here, the agency did not err in finding that Singh could safely and 

reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution or 

torture and that it would be reasonable to expect him to do so. We 

therefore DENY the petition for review. All pending motions and 

applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.