SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5197-16T1

ONEWEST BANK, FSB,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ERROL JEFFERSON, his heirs, devisees,

and personal representatives, and

his, her, their successors in right,

title and interest, and MRS. JEFFERSON,

wife of ERROL JEFFERSON, HAMILTON PARK

HEALTHCARE CENTER, THE STATE OF NEW

JERSEY and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants,

and

JOANN JEFFERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted June 5, 2018 – Decided June 22, 2018

Before Judges Moynihan and Natali.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, General Equity Part, Hudson 

County, Docket No. F-014293-12.

Joann Jefferson, appellant pro se.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-5197-16T1

Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard, PC, attorneys for 

respondent (Douglas J. McDonough, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

This is a residential foreclosure action. Defendant Joann 

Jefferson appeals from the final judgment and order denying her 

motion to vacate that judgment. We affirm.

According to the foreclosure complaint, in 2007, Ena and 

Errol Jefferson1 executed a $175,000 promissory note to East Coast 

Mortgage Corp. (East Coast). The note was transferred three times 

by formal allonge2 and ultimately held by plaintiff OneWest Bank, 

FSB (OneWest). As security for repayment, Ena and Errol executed 

a mortgage in the same amount to Mortgage Electronic Registration 

Systems, Inc., as nominee for East Coast. The mortgage was duly 

recorded. The East Coast mortgage was assigned to OneWest on May 

24, 2012. 

Errol defaulted on the note in January 2011 and plaintiff 

filed a foreclosure complaint on July 24, 2012, naming only Errol 

as it was correctly believed Ena died in August 2010. Errol did 

 

1 We refer to Ena, Errol and Joann Jefferson by their first names 

in the interest of clarity. We intend no disrespect by this 

informality.

2 An allonge is "[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a 

negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving . . . 

indorsements." Black's Law Dictionary 92 (10th ed. 2014).
3 A-5197-16T1

not answer the complaint and default was entered. Plaintiff agreed 

to vacate the default and Errol's counsel filed an answer without 

a single affirmative defense. After the close of discovery and 

less than three months before the scheduled trial date, Errol and 

plaintiff entered into a consent order by which Errol agreed to 

withdraw his contesting answer conditioned upon plaintiff 

refraining from moving for final judgment until December 2013.

In January 2014, Errol died. Final judgment was entered on 

August 6, 2014, and vacated on plaintiff's motion on September 1, 

2015 to permit plaintiff to file an amended complaint. In January 

2016, plaintiff filed its first amended complaint to join new 

judgment creditors and unknown heirs and to plead Errol's death. 

In May 2016, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint to add

Joann as Errol’s heir and described her as the "only known heir 

[at] law and next of kin of the decedent, E[rrol] J[efferson]." 

On July 27, 2016, default was entered against all defendants. 

That same day, and on two separate occasions thereafter, Joann 

attempted to file contesting answers. Each time the Clerk rejected 

the answers for various procedural irregularities and issued 

deficiency notices. On August 30, 2016, Joann also attempted to 

file a motion to vacate default. That filing was also rejected 

because, at the time, Errol still had an attorney of record.
4 A-5197-16T1

On September 16, 2016, Joann moved to vacate default claiming 

she inadvertently failed to include the required filing fee and 

case information statement. Joann did not include a proposed 

contesting answer with her motion as required by Rule 4:43-3. On 

October 28, 2016, Judge Marybeth Rogers concluded that Joann had 

not satisfied the requirements of Rule 4:43-3 and denied the 

motion. She reasoned:

Here, the [c]ourt is compelled to deny 

[d]efendant's sought relief. Defendant has 

not demonstrated good cause. Defendant has 

certified about her mistake at filing her 

[a]nswer without the proper [case information 

statement] and filing fee. Defendant received 

deficiency notices from the Office of 

Foreclosure after the filings were made with 

notice to correct the mistake within ten days. 

Defendant did not attempt to correct her 

mistake and instead sent her filings to the 

Office of Foreclosure again. Defendant does 

not provide a reason as to why she did not 

rectify the errors. Moreover, [d]efendant has

not attached her proposed [a]nswer in her 

[m]otion papers for the [c]ourt to determine

whether there is a meritorious defense.

On May 9, 2017, plaintiff obtained final judgment for the

second time. Less than a month later, Joann moved to vacate the 

final judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. She supported her 

application with a non-compliant Rule 1:6-6 certification that 

improperly contained hearsay and speculated regarding the veracity 

of Ena's signature on the loan documents and her competence to 

execute those instruments. She also alleged numerous legal and 
5 A-5197-16T1

factual deficiencies including plaintiff's compliance with the 

Fair Foreclosure Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-53 to -73.

Judge Rogers denied Joann's motion and correctly observed 

that Joann's certification was not based on personal knowledge and 

ignored other critical facts from the extensive procedural 

history. The trial judge considered Joann's application pursuant 

to Rule 4:50-1(a) and determined she had established neither 

excusable neglect nor a meritorious defense: 

Here, the [c]ourt declines to grant 

[d]efendant's relief sought. . . . The 

[c]ourt does not find excusable neglect. As 

addressed in the [c]ourt's [o]rder dated 

October 28, 2016, [d]efendant was notified to 

correct her deficiency within ten days, but 

instead of doing that [d]efendant sent her 

deficient filings again to the Office of 

Foreclosure on multiple occasions. Defendant 

provided no reasoning as to why she did not 

rectify the errors. Now [d]efendant seeks to 

vacate [f]inal [j]udgment on the same basis,

which the [c]ourt has already denied. 

Moreover, [d]efendant lists numerous alleged 

meritorious defenses, however, there is no 

proof to substantiate these defenses and based 

on [d]efendant's submission as presented, 

these allegations are nothing more than 

hearsay statements.

Joann raises the following points on appeal:

POINT I

ONE WEST BANK FSB VIOLATED ALL APPLICABLE 

CONDITION PRECEDENTS. ONE WEST BANK FSB DID 

NOT FULFILL CERTAIN PRE-CONDITIONS PRIOR TO 

THE ONSET OF THIS FRAUDULENT FORECLOSURE 
6 A-5197-16T1

ACTION. ONE WEST BANK FSB ENGAGED IN 

DISREPUTALE AND ILLICIT PRACTICES.

POINT II

ORIGINAL LENDER ENGAGED IN PREDACIOUS ABUSE 

IN THE ORIGINATION OF THE ALLEGED MORTGAGE 

TRANSACTION. ONE WEST BANK FSB SUBMITTED 

DEFECTIVE DOCUMENTS AS PROOF OF STANDING TO 

FORECLOSE AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE 

PRESUMPTION OF ITS VALIDITY.

POINT III

RELIANCE ON FORGED AND FRAUDULENT EVIDENTIARY 

DOCUMENTS IS BRUTAL AND UNCONSCIONABLE. THE 

APPLICATION OF LAW TO SUCH DOCUMENTS MUST BE 

REVIEWED AND REVERSED.

After carefully reviewing the record in light of the written 

arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the issues 

presented by Joann are without sufficient merit to warrant 

extensive discussion in this opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), (E), and 

we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial 

judge in her written statements of reasons. We add the following. 

Our review is governed by Rule 4:50-1, which permits a court, 

in its discretion, to relieve a party from a final judgment for the 

following reasons:

(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered 

evidence which would probably alter the 

judgment or order and which by due diligence 

could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud 

(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
7 A-5197-16T1

misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the 

judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment 

or order has been satisfied, released or 

discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon 

which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 

equitable that the judgment or order should 

have prospective application; or (f) any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation 

of the judgment or order.

We review a trial court's grant or denial of a Rule 4:50-1 

motion with substantial deference and will not reverse "unless it 

results in a clear abuse of discretion." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n 

v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). "[A]n abuse of discretion

occurs when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, 

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis.'" Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 

428 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 2012) (alteration in original)

(quoting Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467-68). Here, we discern no 

abuse of discretion.

Rule 4:50-1 is "designed to reconcile the strong interests in 

finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable 

notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result 

in any given case." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467 (quoting Mancini 

v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 

334 (1993)). Relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 "is 

not to be granted lightly." Cho Hung Bank v. Kim, 361 N.J. Super. 
8 A-5197-16T1

331, 336 (App. Div. 2003). Rather, Rule 4:50-1 "provides for 

extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a showing of 

exceptional circumstances." Ross v. Rupert, 384 N.J. Super. 1, 8 

(App. Div. 2006) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 393 

(1984)). Indeed, the discretionary authority afforded to the 

trial court under Rule 4:50-1 is to be "exercised with equitable 

principles in mind, and will not be overturned in the absence of an 

abuse of that discretion." Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. 

Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1964).

In addition, "the showing of a meritorious defense is a 

traditional element necessary for setting aside . . . a default 

judgment." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on 

R. 4:43-3 (2018); see also Marder, 84 N.J. Super. at 318-19. That 

is so because when a party has no meritorious defense, "[t]he time 

of the courts, counsel and litigants should not be taken up by such 

a futile proceeding." Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 469 (quoting Schulwitz 

v. Shuster, 27 N.J. Super. 554, 561 (App. Div. 1953)).

Joann does not identify the specific section of Rule 4:50-1 

in which she bases her request for relief. The trial judge 

considered the application pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(a) and 

correctly determined that Joann had not demonstrated excusable 

neglect or a meritorious defense. For purposes of completeness, 
9 A-5197-16T1

we have reviewed the record and do not find support under any 

section of Rule 4:50-1, including subsection (f).

Subsection (f) is a catch-all provision that authorizes a 

court to relieve a party from a judgment or order for "any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or 

order." R. 4:50-1(f). "Because of the importance that we attach 

to the finality of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is

available only when 'truly exceptional circumstances are 

present.'" Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 

(1994) (quoting Baumann, 95 N.J. at 395). "The rule is limited 

to 'situations in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice 

would occur.'" Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 484 (quoting Little, 135 

N.J. at 289).

On appeal, Joann renews the same arguments that were properly 

rejected by the trial court. Joann has made no showing to justify 

vacating the final judgment under any provision of Rule 4:50-1 and 

has not established a meritorious defense. As the trial judge 

correctly noted, Joann was not a party to the loan transaction and 

failed to provide competent evidence to challenge the note or 

mortgage. Indeed, her "certification" submitted to the trial court 

substantially violated Rule 1:6-6 and 1:4-4(b) as it was unsworn and 

based almost entirely on speculation, legal arguments and 

inadmissible hearsay. Further, Joann's appendix contains 
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unauthenticated medical records that do not appear to have been 

presented to the trial court and which contain inadmissible embedded 

hearsay. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), 805, 808; Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. 

Super. 391, 402-03 (App. Div. 2012). 

Finally, Joann ignores the fact that according to the 

foreclosure complaint, both Ena and Errol paid on the note for years 

before Ena died, a fact not disputed in the trial court. Further, 

after her death, Errol, a co-signatory to the disputed loan 

transaction, retained counsel and filed an answer without affirmative 

defenses. Facing a trial date, he further agreed to withdraw his 

answer in exchange for plaintiff's forbearance until December 2013. 

With Errol's counsel's consent, plaintiff filed an amended complaint 

to name additional parties, but again Errol's counsel did not

challenge service, standing, default or any other element of 

plaintiff's prima facie case for foreclosure. See Thorpe v. 

Floremoore Corp., 20 N.J. Super. 34, 37 (App. Div. 1952); see also

Great Falls Bank v. Pardo, 263 N.J. Super. 388, 394 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 

273 N.J. Super. 542 (App. Div. 1994).

The record on appeal presents no facts from which we can 

conclude the trial judge clearly abused her discretion or that a 

grave injustice would occur if the orders under review are not 

vacated. Accordingly, we affirm the final foreclosure judgment 

as well as the order denying Joann's motion to vacate the judgment.
11 A-5197-16T1

Affirmed.