alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
2019 UT App 180

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH SHAWN JOHNSON,

Appellant.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20180892-CA

Filed November 7, 2019

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Derek P. Pullan

No. 161402568

Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Marian Decker, Attorneys

for Appellee

Before JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN, JILL M. POHLMAN, and

DIANA HAGEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Joseph Shawn Johnson appeals his sentences after 

pleading no contest to two counts of child sexual abuse. We 

affirm.

¶2 Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion 

by not granting Johnson credit for the time he served while 

wearing a GPS monitor during the pre-trial proceedings.

However, “it is . . . the Board of Pardons [and Parole], and not 

the trial court, which has authority to grant defendant credit for 

the time he served prior to conviction.” State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 

207, 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also Rawlings v. Holden, 869 

P.2d 958, 960–61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“Under Utah’s sentencing 

scheme, ‘the trial judge has no discretion in fixing the term of 
State v. Johnson

20180892-CA 2 2019 UT App 180

imprisonment. He or she simply imposes the statutorily 

prescribed range of years, and the Board of Pardons determines 

exactly how long the prisoner is to be confined.”). “In other 

words, the Board, not the district court, ‘determines the actual 

number of years a defendant is to serve,’ . . . because the Board 

‘functions as a sentencing entity and decides the term of 

incarceration.’” State v. Cuttler, 2018 UT App 171, ¶ 17, 436 P.3d 

278 (quotation simplified). For this reason, the Utah Supreme 

Court has concluded that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant 

credit for time served during the course of pretrial detention. See 

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985). Therefore, 

because jurisdiction over the length of an indeterminate sentence 

lies exclusively with the Board of Pardons and Parole, the issue 

raised by Johnson would be ripe for consideration only if the 

Board of Pardons and Parole ultimately decides not to grant 

Johnson credit for time served before sentencing.

¶3 Affirmed.
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FREEMAN v. BULLARD.

No. COA06-58.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed March 4, 2008.

Certification Date March 24, 2008.

Appeal from Montgomery (01CVS274).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
`[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3711 Referred in House (RFH)]







110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3711


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 9, 2008

               Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT


 
  To authorize a cost of living adjustment for the Federal judiciary.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.

    Pursuant to section 140 of Public Law 97-92, justices and judges of 
the United States are authorized during fiscal year 2009 to receive a 
salary adjustment in accordance with section 461 of title 28, United 
States Code.

            Passed the Senate November 20, 2008.

            Attest:

                                                NANCY ERICKSON,

                                                             Secretary.`
HOLLIN v. COUNCIL ON AGING.

No. 79P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 6, 2008.

Brent Adams, Dunn, Sheila Chavis, for Hollin.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 7th day of February 2007 by Defendants for Temporary Stay:

"Motion for Stay Dissolved by order of the Court in conference this the 6th day of March 2008."

HUDSON, J., recused.
Exhibit 12.1

Computation of Ratios of Earnings to Fixed Charges  (Dollars in Thousands)

|                                   |                                          | Fiscal Year Ended |       
|---------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ------
|
|Fixed charges:                     |                                          |                   |       
|                                   | Interest expense                         |                   | $     
|                                   | Amortization of debt expense             |                   |       
|                                   | Rental expense included in fixed charges |                   |       
|                                   |                                          |                   |       
|Total fixed charges                |                                          | $                 | 14,748
|                                   |                                          |                   |       
|Earnings:                          |                                          |                   |       
|                                   | Pre-tax (loss) income                    |                   | $     
|                                   | Plus: fixed charges                      |                   |       
|                                   |                                          |                   |       
|                                   | Total earnings                           |                   | $     
|                                   |                                          |                   |       
|Ratio of earnings to fixed charges |                                          |                   | 1.2   

---

QuickLinks
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<PAGE>
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

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<CASH>                                          11,927
<SECURITIES>                                    31,169
<RECEIVABLES>                                  187,984
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<PP&E>                                           9,297
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,208
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,986
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           105
<OTHER-SE>                                     102,232
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   245,575
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                81,024
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (1,541)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,901
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<INCOME-TAX>                                    10,875
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.72
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.67


</TABLE>
In re M.M., Minor Child. appealed by Father.

No. 476P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 6, 2007.

Christy E. Wilhelm, for Father.

Elizabeth Boone, for Iredell County DSS.

Holly Groce, Attorney Advocate, for Guardian ad Litem.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 27th day of September 2007 by Respondent in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 6th day of December 2007."
STATE of North Carolina v. Pierre Torez-Omar FARRAR.

No. COA05-1319-2.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 6, 2008.

*117Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 17 March 2005 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard originally in the Court of Appeals on 21 August 2006, and opinion filed 19 September 2006, finding no error in part and vacated in part and remanded for entry of judgment of non-felonious breaking and entering. Remanded to this Court by opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina filed 9 November 2007.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General David L. Elliott, for the State.

Parish & Cooke, by James R. Parish, Fayetteville, for defendant appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Previously, this Court reversed defendant's conviction for first-degree burglary finding a fatal variance between the indictment and the jury instructions given by the trial judge. *State v. Farrar,*179 N.C.App. 561, 634 S.E.2d 253 (2006). On 9 November 2007, our Supreme Court vacated that portion of this Court's decision which held that the variance was fatal, holding that where the variance is favorable to defendant no prejudice results. Thus, defendant's first-degree burglary conviction was reinstated. *State v. Farrar,*361 N.C. 675, 651 S.E.2d 865 (2007).

This case was remanded to this Court for consideration of the remaining assignment of error. That assignment of error alleged that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of first-degree burglary due to the insufficiency of the evidence.

The facts of this home invasion are more fully discussed in the prior opinions set forth above. The elements of burglary in the first degree are:

(1) the breaking (2) and entering (3) in the nighttime (4) into a dwelling house or a room used as a sleeping apartment (5) which is actually occupied at the time of the offense (6) with the intent to commit a felony therein.

*State v. Wells,*290 N.C. 485, 496, 226 S.E.2d 325, 332 (1976).

The evidence at trial showed that defendant and two other men went to the victim's residence around 9:30 p.m. on Avalon Road in Guilford County. The men went on the porch, put shirts over their faces, and latex gloves on their hands. One of the men had a gun, kicked in the door, and all three entered the house and confronted Darlene and Mollie Slade with their children. A chain necklace, a Play Station, some games, and a VCR were taken while the men asked, "where is the money?"

Taken in the light most favorable to the State, we believe substantial evidence on each element was presented and the motion properly denied. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.

As this Court has now considered all of defendant's assignments of error and found them to be without merit, defendant's trial was conducted free of prejudicial error.

No prejudicial error.

Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER concur.
NORTHLAND CABLE TELEVISION, INC. v. HIGHLANDS CABLE GROUP, LLC.

No. COA06-580.

North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Filed December 19, 2006.

Certification Date January 8, 2007.

Appeal from Macon (03CVS424).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

Certifications Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 

(18 U.S.C. 1350) 

 

In connection with the Annual Report of NovaDel Pharma Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), Steven B. Ratoff, Chairman, Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Michael E. Spicer, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do each hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350), that to his knowledge: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

| Date:  March 31, 2008 | By:    | /s/ STEVEN B. RATOFF                                    |
|-----------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------|
|                  |   | Steven B. Ratoff                                        |
|                  |   | Chairman, Interim President and Chief Executive Officer |
|                  |   |                                                    |
| Date:  March 31, 2008 | By:    | /s/ MICHAEL E. SPICER                                   |
|                  |   | Michael E. Spicer                                       |
|                  |   | Chief Financial Officer                                 |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 

 

This certification shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section. Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act or the Securities Exchange Act.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 96-20163

Summary Calendar

__________________

DAVID R. RUIZ, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

KELJER KING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

W.J. ESTELLE, TEXAS BOARD OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-78-987)

______________________________________________

April 2, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Inmate Keljer King appeals from the denial without prejudice

of his motion for contempt. King’s appeal is totally without

merit. Indeed, his brief is a total affirmation that his claim is

really an individual claim for damages and not one for equitable
2

relief for a systemic violation of the final judgment in the Ruiz

v. Estelle case. King’s brief presents no argument or authority in

support of his complaint that the district court abused its

discretion in denying his contempt motion. Appellant’s appeal is

without arguable merit and is DISMISSED as frivolous.
<PAGE>

                                                               EXHIBIT 23(b)


          CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of Directors
Solutia Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
(Nos. 333-34587, 333-34689, 333-34593, 333-34683, 333-51081, 333-74463, and
333-39972) on Form S-8 of Solutia Inc. and the registration statements
(Nos. 333-75812, 333-89818, and 333-99705) on Form S-3 of Solutia Inc. of
our report dated January 30, 2004, relating to the statement of operations,
changes in members' equity/(deficit), and cash flows of Astaris LLC and
subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in
the December 31, 2005 annual report on Form 10-K of Solutia Inc.


/s/ KPMG LLP
-----------------------
KPMG LLP
St. Louis, Missouri
March 14, 2006
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Joseph L. DAmicoJoseph L. DAmicoPresident, Chief Financial Officer
and Treasurer
(Principal Financial Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996  
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  114,796
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (17,119)
<INVENTORY>                                      2,665
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               116,059
<PP&E>                                         160,745
<DEPRECIATION>                                  22,514
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 326,895
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           25,354
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              238
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     283,458
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   326,895
<SALES>                                        160,762
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               169,097
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  141,594
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,121
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 26,382
<INCOME-TAX>                                    10,377
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             16,005
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    46,882
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .34
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .34
        

</TABLE>
STATE v. Jeffery Neal DUKE.

No. 57A04-2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January 24, 2008.

G. Patrick Murphy, Special Deputy Attorney General, Locke Bell, District Attorney, for State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 7th day of December 2007 by Defendant of Appeal and Denial of Writ of Mandamus:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference this the 24th day of January 2008."
STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher Bryan MATTHEWS.

No. 508P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 10, 2008.

Glenn Gerding, Sourthport, for Matthews.

Chris Z. Sinha, Assistant Attorney General, Garland N. Yates, District Attorney, for State of NC.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 9th day of October 2007 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

*891"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 10th day of April 2008."
IN RE R.C.H.

No. COA07-621.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed November 6, 2007.

Certification Date November 26, 2007.

Appeal from Burke (04J200, 04J201).

Cases Reported Without Published Opinion. Affirmed.
Dexter LOWERY v. W. David CAMPBELL d/b/a Campbell Interior Systems and Cisco of Florence; and Auto-Owners Insurance Company.

No. 502A07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 7, 2008.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 185 N.C.App. ___, 649 S.E.2d 453 (2007), affirming orders entered in Superior Court, Robeson County, on 13 October 2003 by Judge Gary L. Locklear, on 15 November 2005 by Judge James F. Ammons, Jr., and on 7 June 2006 by Judge Jack *355A. Thompson. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 February 2008.

Musselwhite, Musselwhite, Branch & Grantham, by W. Edward Musselwhite, Jr., Lumberton, for plaintiff-appellee.

Anderson, Johnson, Lawrence, Butler & Bock, L.L.P., by Lee B. Johnson, Fayetteville, for defendant-appellant Auto-Owners Insurance Company.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
STATE of North Carolina v. Shaheedah Darina RUSHDAN.

No. 287P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 23, 2007.

Kevin P. Bradley, Durham, for Rushdan.

Dennis Myers, Assistant Attorney General, R. Stuart Albright, District Attorney, for State of NC.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 644 S.E.2d 568.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 19th day of June 2007 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 23rd day of August 2007."
STATE of North Carolina v. William Glenn BAREFOOT and Timothy Lee Jordan.

No. 343P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 6, 2008.

Geoffrey Hosford, Wilmington, for Barefoot.

Anne Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Jordan.

Alexander McC. Peters, Buren Shields, III, Special Deputy Attorney Generals, Edward W. Grannis, Jr., District Attorney, for State of NC.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 19th day of July 2007 by Defendant (Barefoot) in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 6th day of March 2008."