NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-684

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

SOI KET DANG.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Soi Ket Dang, was indicted for murder in the 

first degree in connection with the stabbing death of Marissa 

Randall. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 

defendant was found guilty of murder in the second degree. 

Following a nonevidentiary hearing, a second judge (motion 

judge) denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. In this 

consolidated appeal, the defendant argues that 1) the motion 

judge erred in denying his motion for new trial based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, 2) the trial judge erred in

admitting a video recording depicting Randall performing a sex 

act on the defendant, 3) the evidence was insufficient to prove 

the absence of heat of passion induced by sudden combat, and 4) 

cumulative errors and the Commonwealth's closing argument denied 

him a fair trial. We affirm.
2

Background. We summarize the facts that the jury could 

have found while reserving certain facts for later discussion. 

The defendant first met Randall when he initiated contact with 

her online. On November 10, 2015, they met in person. In 

exchange for sex, the defendant gave Randall a tattoo and

approximately $120. Less than a week later, on November 16, 

2015, the defendant contacted Randall via text message and 

offered to pay her $350 in exchange for one hour of her time. 

The defendant later changed the arrangement to $350 for thirtyfive minutes; Randall ultimately agreed.

The defendant picked up Randall and took her to his

apartment. Randall asked the defendant if he wanted to make a 

video recording of her performing oral sex on him; she planned 

to sell the video recording for $100. The defendant agreed. 

After they made the video recording and had sex again, the pair 

argued over the amount of money that the defendant owed Randall. 

Ultimately the defendant fatally stabbed Randall with a large 

knife approximately twenty times.

The defendant went to work the next day, leaving Randall's

body in his apartment. While at work, the defendant was 

contacted via text message by S.W., a young woman he knew from a

website. S.W. asked to stay with the defendant. He agreed, but

said that he was "uncomfortable bringing [her] back to his house 

because he had done something bad," eventually admitting to S.W. 
3

that he killed Randall. Nevertheless, S.W. accompanied the 

defendant to his apartment. During this time Halifax police

were looking for S.W. They "pinged" her location from her

tablet and found her at the defendant's apartment. The police 

eventually discovered Randall's body in a partially opened 

closet, wrapped in a rug.

The defendant was handcuffed, provided his Miranda rights,

and brought to the police station, where he made a statement. A

redacted version of the recorded statement was admitted at 

trial. The defendant told investigators that a prostitute that 

he met online was in the rolled up rug. He said that they 

argued over money, Randall became upset, and said that she 

needed to get home. The defendant felt that Randall was 

"wasting time" making the video recording, and he became 

frustrated because she was "rush[ing] [him]." He then offered 

to give Randall "$80 or $60" rather than the previously agreed

amount of $350. He said that they continued to argue, and 

Randall pushed him because "she wanted [him] to pay her." He

eventually placed Randall in a headlock; she "tr[ied] to get 

away from [him]" by elbowing him. The defendant said that 

Randall "[was] screaming 'stop' and 'why are you doing this.'" 

He then grabbed a knife, and stabbed Randall. Once he realized 

that he had killed her, the defendant wrapped Randall's body in 

plastic tablecloths, zip tied her legs, and dragged her body 
4

into a closet. When asked, the defendant said that the knife

was in a bucket next to the refrigerator. The defendant had

some rug burns, but did not mention any other injuries, nor did 

the police observe any.

Investigators executed a search warrant on the defendant's 

apartment and car. Among other things, they found a knife that 

was later determined to have Randall's deoxyribonucleic acid on 

it, a Samsung phone, and a ZTE phone. The video recording of 

Randall performing oral sex on the defendant was found on the 

ZTE phone along with text messages between the two.

The defendant's theory at trial was that he stabbed Randall 

in self-defense. He testified that when Randall first arrived 

at his apartment, she seemed "happy because [he] said yes to 

helping her make the video." According to the defendant, after 

making the video recording and having sex, they argued over 

money. The defendant claimed that Randall was going through his 

personal belongings and demanding money, although he did not 

tell investigators that when he gave his statement. The 

defendant testified that Randall initiated the confrontation by 

shoving him, which prompted him to restrain her in a bear hug, 

although he stated that he did not have concerns about his 

safety at this point.

For the first time at trial the defendant claimed that 

Randall picked up a screwdriver and "jabbed" him on his right
5

knee with it.1 He then ran and grabbed a knife, pulled it out of 

its sheath, and "waved it in front of [Randall] . . . doing [a]

slashing motion in the air." He said Randall came at him with 

the screwdriver and "advanced and then retreat[ed]." Because 

Randall "got so close," the defendant ran, grabbed her, placed 

her in a second bear hug, and repeatedly stabbed her because she 

kept coming at him. The defendant said that he held Randall 

down with the weight of his body while he strangled her to keep 

the neighbors from hearing her screams.

The defendant called Dr. Carl Dahlberg, an emergency room 

physician who had reviewed Randall's toxicology report, as a 

witness. Dahlberg confirmed that amphetamines and marijuana 

were present in Randall's system, that the level of amphetamines 

was "pretty high," and that they can produce restlessness,

agitation, mania, impulsiveness, and psychosis.

Discussion. 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

defendant contends that the motion judge erred in denying his 

motion for new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel on two grounds: failing to move for a mistrial, and 

failing to timely investigate an abuse prevention order issued 

1 During execution of the search warrant, investigators did not 

recover a screwdriver in the defendant's apartment. They did 

find screwdrivers in the defendant's car, although none had 

visible stains on them.
6

pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A order) taken out by Randall's 

former boyfriend on behalf of their infant son.

We review the denial of a motion for new trial "only to 

determine whether there has been a significant error of law or 

other abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Duguay, 492 Mass. 

520, 531 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 

498 (2020). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show that trial counsel's 

representation fell "measurably below that which might be 

expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer," and that the 

defendant was "likely deprived . . . of an otherwise available, 

substantial ground of defence" as a result. Commonwealth v. 

Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). "If a defendant challenges 

the 'tactical or strategic decisions[]' of trial counsel, he 

must establish them as 'manifestly unreasonable.'" Commonwealth

v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 768 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 295 (1991). As is the case here, where 

"the motion judge did not preside at the trial, we defer only to 

the trial judge's credibility determinations and 'regard 

ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to assess 

the trial record.'" Commonwealth v. Wilson, 486 Mass. 328, 334 

(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 469 Mass. 447, 461 

(2014).
7

a. Failure to move for a mistrial. The defendant contends 

that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not move for a 

mistrial based on a police officer's unsolicited testimony that 

S.W. reported to police that she was "drugged and forced to have 

sex." Prior to trial, in response to the defendant's motion in

limine, the prosecutor made a proffer of S.W.'s anticipated 

testimony. The trial judge permitted S.W. to testify but ruled 

that any reference to child exploitation and S.W.'s age were 

excluded. Thereafter S.W. testified consistent with the trial 

judge's ruling. However, a police officer provided unsolicited 

testimony that S.W. reported "she was drugged and forced to have 

sex," which the prosecutor promptly interrupted.2 The defendant 

2 Specifically, the defendant pointed to this exchange:

"Q. Did you tell the defendant what statements [S.W.] had 

made --

"A. Yes.

"Q. -- regarding an individual in his home?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And what were those statements specifically about that

individual?

"A. The statements that were made [S.W.] passed on was 

that she was drugged and forced to have sex --

"Q. Not about her, just about the individual, the separate

individual in the home."
8

only challenges trial counsel's failure to move for a mistrial, 

not his failure to object in front of the jury.

Trial counsel submitted an affidavit in connection with the 

motion for new trial where he averred that he did not move to 

strike this testimony in open court, instead intending to move 

for a mistrial at sidebar, so as to not call more attention to 

this statement. See Commonwealth v. Haley, 413 Mass. 770, 778

(1992). Trial counsel did not so move, and his affidavit did 

not explain this inaction.3 We note that the testimony from the 

police officer was brief and unsolicited. It was nonresponsive 

to the question asked, was promptly cut off by the prosecutor, 

and was not repeated at any point during the remainder of the 

trial.4 As the motion judge observed, "when the jury have been 

exposed to inadmissible evidence in violation of a court order, 

the judge may rely on a curative instruction to remedy any 

prejudice." Therefore, had trial counsel requested a mistrial, 

3 The affidavit stated that he "[did] not recall if [he] moved 

for a mistrial as a result of that testimony, but [he] d[id] not 

know of any reason why [he] would not have, and [he] would 

expect that [he] so moved at sidebar at the earliest occasion." 4 The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Lavin, 42 Mass. 

App. Ct. 711 (1997), is misplaced. In Lavin, we held that a 

defendant was prejudiced by testimony of a prosecution witness 

in violation of an agreement between the prosecutor and the 

defense attorney when the testimony "destroyed defense counsel's 

strategy . . . [and] seriously [undermined] the credibility of a 

key defense witness" because the police officer stated that the 

witness was arrested as part of the same incident at issue in 

the case. Id. at 713. The passing, nonspecific reference to 

S.W.'s statement did not undermine the defendant's testimony.
9

the trial judge likely would have denied the motion and opted to 

give the jury a curative instruction instead. See Commonwealth

v. Paige, 488 Mass. 677, 684 (2021). In fact, the trial judge 

did precisely that in connection with other testimony from this 

same witness.

From this we conclude that a request for a mistrial was 

likely to fail, and therefore trial counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to move for one. See Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 

Mass. 255, 264 (1983) ("It is not ineffective assistance of 

counsel when trial counsel declines to file a motion with a 

minimal chance of success"). Moreover, the defendant has failed 

to show that "better work might have accomplished something 

material for the defense." Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 

Mass. 109, 115 (1977).

b. Failure to investigate. The defendant next argues that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a 209A 

order obtained by Randall's former boyfriend (on behalf of their 

infant son) that issued against Randall as potential Adjutant

evidence.5 The affidavit submitted in support of the 209A order 

claimed that Randall "threatened to take her life and the life 

5 "[W]here a claim of self-defense has been asserted and the 

identity of the first aggressor is in dispute . . . trial judges 

have the discretion to admit in evidence specific incidents of 

violence that the victim is reasonably alleged to have 

initiated." Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 650 

(2005).
10

of [her] son." Trial counsel raised this issue for the first 

time on the third day of trial. He advised the judge that he 

did not believe the 209A order qualified as Adjutant evidence 

because it involved "just threats," and that he sought to use 

the 209A order as impeachment evidence.

After initially stating that the 209A order was "backdoor 

Adjutant material" and therefore inadmissible,6 the trial judge 

revisited his ruling and admitted the 209A order and supporting 

affidavit for the limited purpose of impeaching Randall's 

mother. The 209A order was admitted and the jury were provided 

a limiting instruction as to its use. The judge denied trial

counsel's request to admit the 209A order substantively.

The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to timely locate and produce evidence contained 

within the 209A order prior to trial to support his claim of 

self-defense. Trial counsel's affidavit set forth the steps he 

took to obtain the 209A order and his efforts to summons 

Randall's former boyfriend as a witness.7 In concluding that 

trial counsel was not ineffective, the motion judge noted that a 

6 The trial judge stated that he would have admitted the 209A 

order as Adjutant evidence if the defense had provided proper 

notice. The judge's "thinking out loud" and "musings" from the 

bench are not a final ruling. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 

Mass. 32, 45 & n.18 (2013).

7 This included hiring an investigator to locate Randall's former 

boyfriend and securing a court order to obtain the 209A order.
11

threat of future violence, without evidence of follow through, 

is not probative of the first aggressor issue of self-defense. 

See Commonwealth v. Deconinck, 480 Mass. 254, 267 (2018) 

(victim's threats to girlfriend in violation of restraining 

order not Adjutant evidence where threats were different in 

nature from violence at issue, and no evidence victim followed 

through on threats). The judge further concluded that, even if 

the 209A order qualified as Adjutant evidence, the defendant 

could not establish prejudice under the second prong of 

Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. We agree.

Moreover, the fact that Randall threatened to kill herself 

and her infant some twelve days before her murder, and did not 

act on it, would not likely have affected the jury's 

deliberations as it went to a collateral issue, and thus the 

defendant has failed to show "that better work might have 

accomplished something material for the defense." Satterfield, 

373 Mass. at 115. In any event, the 209A order was admitted to

impeach Randall's mother's testimony about her daughter's 

general "bubbly" disposition and demeanor. Because the 209A 

order was not probative of the issue of the first aggressor, its 

exclusion as Adjutant evidence did not "[deprive] the defendant 

of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence." 
12

Commonwealth v. Souza, 492 Mass 615, 636 (2023) (quotation 

omitted).8

2. Admission of video recording. The defendant next 

argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting 

the video recording depicting Randall performing oral sex on him 

as it constituted improper bad act evidence with minimal 

probative value and was "severely prejudicial." In general, a 

"court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice." 

Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2023). See Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 

Mass. 131, 144 (2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 906 (2016). 

"Determinations whether proffered evidence is more prejudicial 

than probative are entrusted to the trial judge's broad 

discretion and are not disturbed absent palpable error." 

Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 52 (2013) (quotation 

omitted).

Here, the video recording depicted acts that were

inextricably intertwined with the description of the events of 

8 For the first time on appeal, the defendant contends that had 

his trial attorney timely investigated the 209A order, he would 

have discovered out of state records relating to Randall. He 

did not, however, include this claim in his motion for a new 

trial and does not identify what evidence would be gleaned from 

these records. Accordingly, this claim does not rise to the 

level of appellate argument, see Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), 

as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), and is waived, see Mass. 

R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (2), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).
13

the night of the killing as it unfolded, and thus was part of 

the "full picture of the events surrounding the crime." 

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 Mass. 731, 736 (2019). It was "part 

of the movie unfolding during the time leading up to" and 

immediately preceding the killing. Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 

450 Mass. 144, 159 (2007). Indeed, the argument over payment 

began after the defendant and Randall made the video recording.

The video recording was also properly admitted to rebut the 

defendant's claim of self-defense, see Commonwealth v. Anestal, 

463 Mass. 655, 665 (2012), and was probative of the defendant's 

motive to kill Randall and of his state of mind. See 

Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 551 (2017). It was also 

probative of Randall's state of mind and disposition prior to 

her death. Commonwealth v. Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 579 (2001). 

This is particularly so where the defendant called an expert 

witness who testified that the high levels of amphetamines in 

Randall's system could produce "mania or even psychosis," 

consistent with his claim that she was the first aggressor and 

that he acted in self-defense because she came at him with a 

screwdriver. The video recording, which was made nearly 

contemporaneously with the killing, depicted Randall in a calm 

and unagitated state thereby rebutting the defendant's 

contentions at trial. See Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 Mass. 52,
14

67 (2018) (prior bad act evidence admissible to rebut 

defendant's contentions made in course of trial).9

Furthermore, the judge took steps to minimize the 

prejudicial effect of the video recording by ordering redactions

of it, asking potential jurors about their ability to be 

impartial when viewing graphic evidence of sexual activity, and 

by providing a limiting instruction contemporaneously with the 

showing of the video recording and again in his final charge to 

the jury.10 We therefore conclude that the judge did not abuse 

his discretion in admitting the video recording and took 

appropriate steps to mitigate any prejudicial effect. See 

Commonwealth v. Alleyne, 474 Mass. 771, 780 (2016), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 Mass. 354, 358 (2015) ("judge may 

mitigate prejudice" by "alerting the venire" that graphic 

evidence might be shown, asking potential jurors about potential 

difficulty with evidence, and "by instructing the jury that they 

should not be swayed by emotion").

3. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant next argues 

that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of 

9 In addition, the prosecutor limited references to the video 

recording in closing argument and discussed it in a "technical, 

analytical manner, without drama or undue emphasis that might 

have released its potential for unfair prejudice." Commonwealth

v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 487 (2017) (quotation omitted). 10 Trial counsel did not object to the limiting instructions, and 

the defendant does not raise their sufficiency on appeal.
15

murder in the second degree because the Commonwealth did not 

meet its burden to show the absence of heat of passion induced 

by sudden combat. As a result, he argues that his murder 

conviction must be reversed or reduced to a conviction of 

voluntary manslaughter.11 In a murder case, if "evidence has 

raised the possibility of provocation and voluntary manslaughter 

may be at issue," the Commonwealth is required to prove the 

absence of provocation. Commonwealth v. Whitman, 430 Mass. 746, 

751-752 (2000). "The mitigating circumstance of sudden combat 

contemplates a scenario in which two meet, not intending to 

quarrel, and angry words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs 

up in which blows are given on both sides, without much regard 

to who is the assailant." Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 

202, 209 (2017), S.C., 482 Mass. 1017 (2019) (quotation 

omitted). In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we 

evaluate whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).

11 "Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing arising not 

from malice, but from . . . sudden passion induced by reasonable 

provocation, sudden combat, or excessive force in self-defense" 

(quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 

242, 257 (2022).
16

According to the defendant, the only evidence as to how the 

altercation began was that Randall "shoved" him during an 

argument over payment for sex, but the jury were not required to 

credit this testimony. See Commonwealth v. Gomez, 450 Mass. 

704, 710-711 (2008). He posits that there was insufficient 

evidence for the jury to convict him of murder in the second 

degree where the evidence with regard to heat of passion as a 

result of sudden combat was not "of sufficient force to bring 

minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of 

[guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677

(quotation omitted). We are not persuaded.

Contrary to his contention, the defendant's statement that 

Randall pushed him is not sufficient provocation to explain 

stabbing Randall twenty times, and strangling her. This is 

particularly true where the jury could have concluded, based on 

the lack of injuries to the defendant, that Randall was unarmed. 

See Commonwealth v. Brown, 387 Mass. 220, 227 (1982) (unarmed 

victim choking defendant with shirt insufficient provocation to 

explain stabbing victim twenty-seven times). There was no 

evidence that the alleged "wrestling" between the two was the 

type of physical contact that would warrant a reasonable person 

to doubt that Randall presented a threat of serious harm to the 

defendant. See Commonwealth v. Lennon, 463 Mass. 520, 525 

(2012).
17

The Commonwealth's evidence included the fact that the 

defendant retrieved a knife, removed it from its sheath, and 

repeatedly stabbed Randall twenty times -- according to the 

defendant -- all in response to being pushed by her. And the 

defendant strangled Randall to keep her quiet when she yelled 

for him to stop. While "by no means the only conclusion 

available to the jury," the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence such that a reasonable jury could have found an absence 

of heat of passion induced by sudden combat. See Grassie, 476 

Mass. at 212 (sufficient evidence of murder even if other 

evidence introduced from which jury could have "embraced any of 

[defendant's] theories of mitigation").

Although the defendant claimed that Randall stabbed him 

with a screwdriver and threw items at him, the sufficiency of 

the Commonwealth's evidence did not deteriorate merely because 

the defendant presented a contrary version of critical events. 

See Gomez, 450 Mass. at 710-711. The defendant's testimony did 

not demonstrate that the Commonwealth's proof was "incredible or 

conclusively incorrect." Id. at 710 (quotation omitted). 

Instead, the defendant's testimony presented a credibility 

question for the jury to resolve. See Commonwealth v. Ruci, 409 

Mass. 94, 97 (1991). The evidence sufficed for a conviction of 

murder in the second degree.
18

4. Cumulative errors and closing argument. Finally, the 

defendant argues that "the cumulative weight of these errors," 

in conjunction with statements made during the prosecutor's 

closing argument, require a new trial. As discussed supra, 

there were no errors by the trial judge or the motion judge that 

warrant a new trial.

Because trial counsel objected to two remarks in the 

prosecutor's closing argument, we review them for prejudicial 

error.12 Commonwealth v. Lugo, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 229, 234 

(2016). The defendant challenges the prosecutor's statements

regarding the testimony of Randall's roommate regarding a plan 

to rob the defendant, and her suggestion that the jury disregard 

the 209A order because Randall was unable to challenge it in 

court. Though the prosecutor did misquote the roommate's 

testimony, this brief mischaracterization, which went to a 

collateral issue, was not prejudicial. This is particularly 

true where the judge gave the jury a preliminary instruction 

that closing arguments are not evidence, a curative instruction 

after the defense attorney lodged his objection, an instruction 

in his final charge to the jury, and gave repeated instructions 

that the jury's recollections of the evidence controlled. See

12 The trial judge instructed the jury that closing arguments are 

not evidence. Trial counsel objected and asked that the judge 

give "specific references, and indicate that there are no basis 

for [the prosecutor's] claims [in closing]."
19

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 400 Mass. 676, 683 (1987) (prosecutor's 

"slip of the tongue" did not risk misleading jury when judge 

"fully instructed the jury that closing arguments are not 

evidence"). As further evidence that the jury were not swayed 

by emotion or hyperbole, the defendant was convicted of murder 

in the second degree (a lesser included offense of murder in the 

first degree) despite the brutality of the killing. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Sosnowski, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 372 (1997) 

(difficult to find prejudice where defendant acquitted of 

certain charges).

As to the 209A order, the prosecutor was entitled to 

marshal the evidence and argue reasonable inferences from it to 

the jury. See Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 22 (2014). 

In any event, these remarks did not prejudice the defendant. 

They went to a collateral issue and the trial judge repeatedly 

instructed the jury regarding the limited purpose of the 209A
20

order. Because "the jury are presumed to follow [the judge's]

instructions," Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 465 Mass. 672, 681 

(2013), we discern no prejudice.

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for a 

new trial, dated May 26, 

2022, affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J.,

Blake & Henry, JJ.13),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: February 7, 2024.

13 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.