[Cite as State v. Maynard, 2014-Ohio-3978.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

JAMIE L. MAYNARD 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 13CA0045-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 13 CR 0106 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 15, 2014 

 

CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Jamie Maynard, appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of 

Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} This matter arises out of Maynard’s unauthorized use of a credit card belonging to 

her mother and stepfather. Maynard admitted to law enforcement that her illicit use of the card 

stemmed from an issue with substance abuse. On February 14, 2013, the Medina County Grand 

Jury indicted Maynard on one count of receiving stolen property. After initially pleading not 

guilty to the charge, Maynard appeared for a change-of-plea hearing and entered a plea of no 

contest. The trial court found Maynard guilty and requested a presentence investigation report. 

The trial court subsequently sentenced Maynard to a ten-month term of incarceration. 

{¶3} On appeal, Maynard raises one assignment of error. 
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II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO 

ADEQUATELY CONSIDER REQUIRED STATUTORY SENTENCING 

FACTORS IN IMPOSING A PRISON SENTENCE OF TEN (10) MONTHS ON 

THE DEFENDANT, WHERE DEFENDANT COOPERATED IN THE 

INVESTIGATION, SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CREDIT CARD 

COMPANY TO REPAY THE FUNDS, AND SUCH PRISON TERM WAS 

NOT MANDATORY FOR HER NON-VIOLENT FELONY OF THE FIFTH 

DEGREE OFFENSE. 

{¶4} In her sole assignment of error, Maynard argues that the trial court erred by not 

adequately considering the statutory sentencing factors prior to sentencing her to a ten-month 

term of incarceration. Although Maynard does not contest that the trial court considered the 

sentencing factors, she emphasizes that the trial court did not amply account for the fact that she 

admitted to the illegal use of the credit card, cooperated with authorities, and signed a financial 

responsibility form with CapitalOne causing the approximately $2000 in charges to be 

transferred from her mother and stepfather’s account to her own account. This Court disagrees. 

{¶5} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]rial courts have full discretion to 

impose a prison sentence within the [applicable] statutory range[.]” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus. “This Court continues to recognize 

that a trial court, after proper adherence to applicable rules and statutes, retains discretion in the 

imposition of sentences.” State v. Jordan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26598, 2013-Ohio-4172, ¶ 30, 

citing State v. Weems, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26532, 2013-Ohio-2673, ¶ 18-19. In exercising that 

discretion, “‘[a] court must carefully consider the statutes that apply to every felony case[,] * * * 

includ[ing] R.C. 2929.11, which specifies the purposes of sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which 

provides guidance in considering factors relating to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism 
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of the offender.’” State v. Davison, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009803, 2011-Ohio-1528, ¶ 12, 

quoting State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. 

{¶6} Maynard was convicted of receiving stolen property, a felony of the fifth degree. 

Accordingly, she was eligible for a prison term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve 

months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). The trial court imposed a ten-month term of incarceration. While 

Maynard notes that a prison sentence was not mandatory, she does not dispute that her sentence 

falls within the applicable statutory range. Instead, she argues that the trial court failed to give 

adequate consideration to R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and R.C. 2929.13. 

{¶7} The trial court stated in its judgment entry that it considered the record, oral 

statements by the parties, the victim impact statement, “as well as the principles and purposes of 

sentencing under [R.C.] 2929.11.” The trial court further stated that it weighed the seriousness 

and recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B), that a prison sentence was consistent with 

the purposes of sentencing, and that Maynard was not amendable to an available community 

control sanction. Moreover, the sentencing transcript reveals that the trial court reviewed the 

presentence investigation report, and expressed concern that Maynard had already been 

convicted of multiple felonies as an adult and served prison time. The trial court also noted that 

when asked why she had previously missed scheduled drug tests, Maynard laughed and told 

ACS lab personnel, “Yeah, I wasn’t doing all that.” When asked when she would be able to pay 

the $100 she owed in back drug testing fees, Maynard responded, “Good luck with that.” 

Maynard further remarked that she did not want to deal with the trial judge anymore, and that she 

preferred to deal with the probation department “[b]ecause they are pushovers.” While Maynard 

admitted to the criminal conduct and took the steps necessary to ensure that her mother and 

stepfather were not financially responsible for her transgressions, there were numerous additional 
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considerations lending credence to the conclusion that prison time was appropriate. It follows 

that Maynard’s assertion that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the relevant 

statutory factors is without support in the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing a ten-month term of incarceration. 

{¶8} This assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶9} Maynard’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 
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BELFANCE, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JOSEPH F. SALZGEBER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.