COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Petty Argued at Richmond, Virginia

MELVIN NATHANIEL HATCHER MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0317-09-2 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK FEBRUARY 23, 2010 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY Leslie M. Osborn, Judge Andrew J. Adams, Assistant Pub lic Defender (Offi ce of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Jennifer C. Willia mson, Assistant Attorney General (William C. Mims, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Melvin Nathaniel Hatcher, appe llant, was convicted, in a bench trial, of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. On appeal, he challe nges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the value of the item stolen, contending the evid ence did not prove the item stolen was valued at $200 or more. He also asserts the trial court er red in admitting the testim ony of two witnesses as to the value. For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND M.B. owned a pressure washer that he had inherited from his recently deceased grandfather. When he received it, the washer wa s “brand new” and was still in the original box. M.B. had only used the washer for a couple of hours prior to the theft. He had damaged the washer’s hose but repaired the damage with an insert and “C” clamps. M.B. testified that the washer was still new and “worked fine.”

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - When M.B. was asked the value, appellant objected because the Commonwealth had not laid a foundation to establish the source of M.B.’s knowledge. M.B. testified he worked in construction and had previously used pressure washers. He was familiar with the value of a pressure washer . He then testified, without objection, that the value of the stolen washer was “well over $200.” Additionally, M.B. later testified that given his line of work, he regularly looked at and pr iced all types of tools at Home Depot. Sometime in late June 2007, M.B. determined the power washer had been stolen from outside his residence. S.H., a clerk at a pawnshop in Chase City, testified that on June 22, 2007 appellant and another male entered her store with a pressure washer to pawn. She characterized the washer as essentially brand new, perhaps a month old. It had “never been used once, if that.” S.H. did notice the damaged hose but indicated the washer worked “just fine.” When the Commonwealth asked S.H. how she would arrive at a value, appellant objected on relevancy and hearsay grounds, contending any value based on outside research would be hearsay. The trial court allowed S.H.’s testimony. S.H. then testified she se arched the internet thro ugh Home Depot and Shopzilla 1 to determine a price range. S.H. determined the va lue of the pressure washer to be about $260 and pursuant to company policy, offered appellant $ 70, which represented appr oximately one-quarter of its value. The trial court was satisfied that the value of the stolen item was at least $200 and found appellant guilty of grand larceny. This appeal followed.

1 Shopzilla is an online shopping network. It delivers search results for products and services offered by third-party merchant s, including descriptions and prices. See www.shopzilla.com (last visited January 25, 2010).- 3 - ANALYSIS On appeal, appellant contends the trial cour t erred in allowing the testimony of M.B., the owner, and S.H., the pawnshop clerk, as to value. Appellant also challe nges the sufficiency of the evidence, maintaining the evidence did not prove that the value of the pressure washer was $200 or greater. “The admissibility of evidence is within th e broad discretion of th e trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in th e absence of an abus e of discretion.” Blain v. Commonwealth , 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988). Furthermore, when considering a challenge that the evidence presente d at trial is insufficient, we “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Davis v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002). Appellant contends that onl y expert testimony was admissible in order to establish the value of the stolen pressure wash er. However, appellant did not make this argument at trial. Under Rule 5A:18, “no ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated t ogether with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling.” Thus, this argument is waived and we will not consider it. Appellant further argues the victim’s testimony was inadmissible, because M.B. had no knowledge of value as he did not buy the washer and only knew the value from using similar equipment and shopping at Home Depot. Theref ore, he concludes the victim’s testimony was irrelevant and thus inadmissible. This argument is waived as well. Appellant objected to the victim’s initial testimony, arguing there was no foundation as to the source of the victim’s knowledge. Thereafter, the- 4 - Commonwealth laid a proper foundation, and the testimony was admitted. Appellant made no further objection. Appellant further contends the trial court er red in admitting the valuation testimony of the pawnshop clerk because she was not qualified as an expert witness. However, appellant made no objection at the time the clerk tes tified as to the value of the pre ssure washer. “To be timely, an objection to the admissibility of evidence must be made when the occasion arises – that is, when the evidence is offered, the statement made or the rulings given.” Harward v. Commonwealth , 5 Va. App. 468, 473, 364 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1988). Appellant’s failure to object to the testimony at the time it was offered violates the contemporan eous objection rule contained in Rule 5A:18. The primary purpose of requiring timely and specific objections is to allow the trial court an opportuni ty to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thereby avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. A specific, contemporan eous objection also provides the opposing party an opportunity to addr ess an issue at a time when the course of the proceedings ma y be altered in response to the problem presented. If a party fa ils to make a timely objection, the objection is waived for purposes of appeal. Shelton v. Commonwealth , 274 Va. 121, 126, 645 S.E.2d 914, 916 (2007) (citations omitted). Therefore, under Rule 5A:18, appellant’ s objection was waived and his argument regarding the necessity of expert testimony is defaulted. Appellant further argues th e clerk’s testimony of valu e was based on inadmissible hearsay, where she relied on info rmation obtained from her onlin e research, i.e. information obtained from third parties, when the original source was not admitted into evidence. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony, such error is harmless, because the victim’s testimony es tablished the requisite value.
In Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the Supreme Court adopted the test to be applied in determining if nonconstitutional e rror is harmless. The test is as follows:- 5 - If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand . . . . But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whol e, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. . . . If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. Id. at 764-65 (citation omitted). Applying the Kotteakos harmless error test, we can say, “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous acti on from the whole,” that it plainly appears appellant had a fair trial. Id. at 765. The verdict was not affected by the clerk’s testimony, because the victim had already establis hed the requisite value. Therefore, we hold that any error is harmless. Finally, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, as to value only. He does not dispute he was the perpetrator. “On appeal, ‘we review the ev idence in the light most fa vorable to the Commonwealth granting to it all reasonable inferenc es fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 1, 9-10, 492 S. E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth , 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). “[W]e presume th e judgment of the trial court to be correct,” Broom v. Broom , 15 Va. App. 497, 504, 425 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1992), and “will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without eviden ce to support it,” Dodge v. Dodge , 2 Va. App. 238, 242, 343 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1986). When considering a challenge that the eviden ce presented at trial is insufficient, we “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly wrong or w ithout evidence to support it.” Davis v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002). We do not “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Wactor v. Commonwealth , 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002).- 6 - “Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evid ence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the esse ntial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of th e trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, an d to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. To convict appellant of grand larceny, the Commonwealth was required to prove the property he unlawfully took was va lued at $200 or more. Code § 18.2-95(ii). The relevant value is the “current value” of the stolen items, Dunn v. Commonwealth , 222 Va. 704, 705, 284 S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981) ( per curiam ), “measured as of the time of the theft,” Parker v. Commonwealth , 254 Va. 118, 121, 489 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1997). M.B. testified he had inherited the Coleman pr essure washer from hi s grandfather, it was “brand new,” and he “took it out of the box [himself]. ” He also stated he had used the pressure washer for only a couple of hours and he had to repair a hose on it, but that it worked fine thereafter and “was still brand new.” M.B. test ified he was familiar with the value of pressure washers because he was in construction work and “sometimes you pressure wash houses and stuff,” and he had “been around that kind of stuff.” M.B. also te stified he frequently looked at and priced tools at Home Depot. Based on his experience, the victim estimated the pressure washer was worth “well over $200.” The victim was the owner of the property and was thus competent to state his opinion concerning the value of the pressure washer. See Walls v. Commonwealth , 248 Va. 480, 482, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994). Any argument that the victim lacked knowledge of the value went to the weight that the trial court gave th e victim’s testimony and not its admissibility. See Kern v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 84, 86, 341 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1986).- 7 - The trial court accepted the value evidence fr om the victim. “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence ar e matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth , 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995).
CONCLUSION The testimony of the victim was sufficien t to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the stolen pressure washer was at least $200 and that appellant was guilty of grand larceny. We therefore affirm th e judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.