UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JOSE ALEJANDRO VALERIO-LOPEZ, a/k/a Pedro Torres-Gamez, Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General,  Respondent. No. 20-9588 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

________________ _________________ Before MORITZ , BALDOCK , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Petitioner Jose Alejandro Valerio-Lopez filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), which an immigration judge (IJ) denied after a hearing. The Board of Immigrati on Appeals (BIA) affirmed on appeal.

 On March 11, 2021, Merrick B. Garl and became Attorney General of the United States. Consequently, his name ha s been substituted fo r William P. Barr as Respondent, per Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 16, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 Valerio-Lopez then filed a petition for revi ew. We dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction, and affirm in part the BIA’s decision denying Valerio-Lopez’s application. I. Background Valerio-Lopez is a native of Mexico w ho last entered the Un ited States without inspection in 2004. In April 2010, the Department of Homeland Security issued Valerio-Lopez a Notice to Appear in rem oval proceedings, char ging him with being subject to removal under 8 U. S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Valerio-Lopez appeared in immigrati on court in January 2011 and conceded removability. He indicated his intent to apply for can cellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Later that year Valerio-Lopez submitted that application, arguing that his removal would result in hardship to his four U.S.-born children. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The IJ held a hearing in June 2018. By that time, Valerio-Lopez’s two older children had reached the age of 21 and th erefore were not c onsidered qualifying relatives under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Valerio-L opez testified, however, that if he were removed to Mexico, his two younger dau ghters, E.V.M. and A.V.M., would suffer the requisite “exceptional and extremely unus ual hardship” under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). He testified that E.V.M., who was born in 2007, had received several months of counseling for anxiety in 2010 when Vale rio-Lopez was temporarily placed in immigration detention. Valerio-Lopez submitted a corroborating letter from the licensed professional counsel or who treated E.V.M. Valerio-Lopez acknowledged,3 however, that E.V.M. no longer requires a ny treatment or medication. He also testified that his youngest da ughter, A.V.M., has asthma th at was severe at one time but is now controlled with an inhaler. Finall y, Valerio-Lopez testified that if he were removed to Mexico his minor daughters woul d suffer financial hard ship because he is the sole financial provider fo r his family and his wife Eri ca, who plans to stay in the United States with E.V.M and A.V.M in th e event of her husband’s removal, would be forced to find employment. The IJ accepted as credible Valeri o-Lopez’s testimony and other evidence. The IJ also concluded Valerio-Lopez had sa tisfied three of the four elements of § 1229b(b)(1)—namely, he had been physi cally present in the United States for a continuous period of 10 years prior to the filing of his application; he had been a person of good moral character during that time; and he had not been convicted of any disqualifying criminal offenses. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(C). As to the fourth element, however, the IJ conclude d removal would not result in the requisite le vel of hardship. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The IJ noted that while E.V.M. had been diagnosed with anxiety, she had since recovered. She further observed that A.V.M.’s asthma was adequately managed with an inhaler. Finally, the IJ found that while E.V.M. and A.V.M. would face some emotional and financial hardship if their father were removed to Mexico, that hardship , even taken in the aggregate, would not meet the “exceptional and extremel y unusual” standard. On appeal, the BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning a nd affirmed in a two-page opinion. This petition followed.4 II. Discussion Valerio-Lopez makes four arguments. First, he contends the BIA failed to consider the hardship his removal would cause his two oldest children when the delay in hearing his application caused th ose children to “age out.” Second, he argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, he argues that in its hardship analysis, the BIA committed legal error in relying upon In re J-J-G- , 27 I. & N. Dec. 808 (BIA 2020). Finally, Valerio-Lopez argues the BIA comm itted legal error by mi scharacterizing or ignoring relevant hardship ev idence. We dismiss his first two arguments for failure to exhaust, and we reject his ot her two arguments on the merits.
A. Failure to Exhaust Valerio-Lopez did not raise before the agency his argument concerning the delay in having his application hear d and the resulting inability to c onsider hardship to his two older children. We may review only those arguments for which a petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Thus, “the failure to raise an issue on appeal to the BIA constitutes failu re to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to that question and deprives the C ourt of Appeals of jurisdiction to hear the
matter.” Robles-Garcia v. Barr , 944 F.3d 1280, 1283 (10t h Cir. 2019) (alterations, italics, and internal quotati on marks omitted). Because Va lerio-Lopez did not present this argument to the IJ or the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review it in the first instance. Similarly, Valerio-Lopez did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel argument before the BIA. “The BIA pe rmits an alien to move to reopen the administrative proceedings wh en his counsel’s incompetence has prevented him from5 reasonably presenting his case.” Akinwunmi v. INS , 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[ B]ecause the BIA provides a mechanism for hearing an ineffective assistan ce claim, an alien’s failure to raise the claim to the BIA deprives this court of jurisdiction to review it.” Id. We therefore lack jurisdiction over Valerio-Lopez’s ineffec tive assistance argument.
B. Cancellation of Removal Our jurisdiction over the remaining two arguments is limited. The Immigration and Nationality Ac t provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the gr anting of relief under section . . . 1229b.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). This provi sion precludes jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspects of a decision concerning cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1). Galeano-Romero v. Barr , 968 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020). “Such discretionary aspects include any under lying factual determin ations as well as the determination of whether . . . rem oval . . . would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The INA does, however, provide jurisdic tion to review “constitutional claims” and “questions of law” —including those arisi ng under § 1229b(b)(1). See § 1252(a)(2)(D). Valerio-Lopez attempts to raise two questions of law, both of which we reject. First, Valerio-Lopez observes that in re jecting his application, the BIA cited to
In re J-J-G- , 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, which he contends impermissibly redefines6 hardship beyond what § 1229b(b)(1 )(D) requires. We disagree. In re J-J-G- held that to the extent a cancellation application is ba sed on the health of a qualifying relative, the applicant must present “persuasive and su fficiently specific testimony regarding the seriousness of a qualifying re lative’s medical condition . . . .” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 811-12. Thus, In re J-J-G- does not redefine the hardship standard, but simply specifies the type of evidence required to meet it. The BIA cited
In re J-J-G- in support of its observation that the agency’s analysis must be based on a “consider[ation of] the hardship fact ors in the aggregate.” R. at 4; see In re J-J-G- , 27 I. & N. Dec. at 811 (observing that the hardship standa rd “is based on a cumulative consideration of all hardship fact ors”). We discern no error in the BIA’s reliance on In re J-J-G-

. Second, Valerio-Lopez asserts the BIA committed legal error by mischaracterizing and ignoring hardship ev idence. This argument, however, amounts to a disagreement with how the BIA weig hed the hardship factors in light of E.V.M.’s and A.V.M.’s medical conditi ons. We lack jurisdiction over such determinations. See, e.g., Galeano-Romero , 968 F.3d at 1182 n.8 (holding argument that BIA “improperly discount[ed] th e hardship his wife would suffer upon [petitioner’s] removal . . . boils down to a contention th at the [BIA] improperly weighed the” evidence). Even if Valerio- Lopez’s arguments could be characterized as questions of law, they are meritless. He contends the BIA erred in stating A.V.M.’s asthma was under c ontrol, but he himself tes tified that her asthma is controlled with an inhaler and that “[s]he’s not really using it” a nymore. R. at 185.7 Similarly, he argues the BI A mischaracterized E.V.M.’s anxiety as having been resolved, but the BIA actually found that while Valerio-Lopez’ s “removal may have some impact on [E.V.M.’s] life and devel opment,” the “record sh ow[ed] that with therapy, [E.V.M.] learned to successfully cope with her a nxiety even when her father was not present.” R. at 4. In short, we hold the BIA committed no legal error in denying the application for cancellation, and therefor e affirm the BI A’s decision.
III. Conclusion We dismiss in part Valerio-Lopez’s petition for failure to exhaust his arguments concerning hardship to his now -adult children and ine ffective assistance of counsel. As to his exhausted argumen ts, we affirm the BIA’s denial of the application for cancellation.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge