[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-14803

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00069-RV-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DEMETRIUS L. SPRINGS,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

________________________

(November 18, 2020)

Before GRANT, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 1 of 9
2

Defendant Demetrius Springs pleaded guilty to one count of perjury. In the 

plea agreement, he also agreed to pay a $100 special assessment on or before the 

date of sentencing; he agreed that if he could not pay at that time he would

participate in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. He now argues for the 

first time on appeal that he was denied the right to allocution, and that the district 

court improperly delegated its judicial function in permitting his $100 special 

assessment to be discharged via the IFRP. Because the district court did not 

commit plain error, we affirm.

I.

According to Springs, the crimes at issue here started as an attempt to 

preserve evidence. At all times relevant to this appeal, Springs had been housed by 

the Florida Department of Corrections, and apparently by 2014 he had undergone 

mistreatment at the hands of the prison officials. So in February 2014, he filed for 

an emergency injunction. Per prison policy, camera footage is overwritten after 30 

days, so it is understandable that Springs wanted to get the court’s attention. 

Less understandable is how he went about doing so. In response to 

Springs’s filing, a magistrate judge held a two-day hearing in June 2014 to 

determine whether Springs was under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

It was in that hearing where Springs testified to shocking instances of abuse. He 

claimed that he was gassed, beaten, sprayed with chemicals, shot with a “beanbagtype device,” palm punched, and body slammed. He also claimed to have had his 

hand shut in a door flap. The magistrate judge, however, found that this testimony 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 2 of 9
3

was “belied by other evidence of record, and likely crafted by the defendant for the 

purpose of furthering this litigation.” 

Springs’s testimony gave rise to an indictment for eight counts of perjury in 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The 

indictment was returned on June 18, 2019. At first, Springs was represented by 

attorney Ronald Johnson, but then Springs requested that he be allowed to 

represent himself. The court granted his request. 

A little more than two weeks later, Springs entered into a plea agreement 

with the government. In the agreement, he pleaded guilty to only one of the eight 

counts of perjury—the count in which Springs claimed to have been shot with a 

“beanbag-type device.” The agreement provided that Springs “agrees to pay the 

special monetary assessment on or before the date of sentencing.” Further, the 

agreement stated that if “the Defendant is unable to pay the special assessment 

prior to sentencing due to indigence, the Defendant agrees to participate in the 

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.” The Inmate Financial Responsibility 

Program refers to a program in which the Bureau of Prisons staff assists “the 

inmate in developing a financial plan” to meet “his or her legitimate financial 

obligations.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. 

At the change of plea hearing, the district court reappointed the same 

counsel upon Springs’s request, and accepted Springs’s guilty plea. The district 

court also acknowledged that portion of the plea agreement which mentioned the 

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, and Springs affirmed that he understood 

that provision. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 3 of 9
4

The sentencing hearing was in November 2019. After a brief discussion 

about the Presentence Report, the district court asked, “Mr. Springs, would you 

like to speak personally?” Mr. Springs responded by apologizing to the court, by 

explaining his perjured testimony as stemming from an attempt “to get some help 

from ongoing mistreatment” at the prison, and by requesting to be placed in the 

REAP program, a program that would help him become reintegrated into society 

following his long incarceration. 

At that point, counsel began to talk more about Springs’s specific 

circumstances and the benefits the REAP program could provide. Next up was the 

Government, which noted the absence of violence and serious infractions from 

Springs’s record, but still asked for a “reasonable sentence that’s not greater than 

necessary for both specific and general deterrence.” 

That was when counsel prompted Springs to talk about the specific purpose 

for his perjury—the preservation of camera footage. Springs asked, “Well—may I 

speak, Judge?” The court allowed him to speak, but went on to say that “we’re not 

here to go into a whole series of complaints, but go ahead.” After Springs clarified 

that he “just wanted to ask” the court’s “permission to speak,” he went on to 

explain how, because of the 30-day policy on recording over camera footage, 

“there was nothing” he “could do but continue to come to the court asking for 

help.” 

The district court then handed down a prison term of 27 months, noting that 

it was “at the bottom of the guideline range.” The prison term was to be followed 

by three years of supervised release. Noting that Springs did “not have the 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 4 of 9
5

financial ability to pay a fine,” the district court waived it. But the district court 

also declared that “as the law requires, a monetary assessment of $100 must be and 

is ordered, which is due and payable immediately.” 

The hearing concluded without any objections from Springs or his counsel. 

But that did not end this matter, because Springs now brings two issues for the first 

time on appeal. He argues that the district court denied his right to allocution when 

it stated that it was “not here to go into a whole series of complaints.” He also 

argues that the plea agreement, insofar as it incorporates the IFRP, constitutes an 

improper delegation to the Bureau of Prisons of the district court’s authority to 

schedule the payments of fines and monetary penalties. 

II.

“When a party does not object to an issue at sentencing, we review only for 

plain error.” United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020). 

Because Springs did not raise either issue before the district court, we review the

district court’s alleged failure to allow allocution and imposition of a fine for plain 

error.1

 Id.; United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2017). To find 

plain error, Springs must show that “(1) there is an error; (2) that is plain or 

obvious; (3) affecting his substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and not 

1 Springs claims that he was ignored when he tried to object at the sentencing hearing. But the 

only time that claim appears is in Springs’s reply brief, and the sentencing transcript provides no 

indication that Springs attempted to object. We require that parties “submit all issues on appeal 

in their initial briefs.” May v. Morgan Cnty. Georgia, 878 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.5 (11th Cir. 2017) 

(quotation marks omitted). And in any event, “[s]tatements by counsel in briefs are not 

evidence.” Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 5 of 9
6

harmless; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 

of the judicial proceedings.” Cingari, 952 F.3d at 1305 (quotation marks omitted).

III.

A.

The right to allocution, as codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, requires that the sentencing court “address the defendant personally in 

order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the 

sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). But we do not require “a specific 

script”; rather, we ask “whether the district court’s colloquy with the defendant is 

the ‘functional equivalent’ of what Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) prescribes.” United States 

v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 584–85 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. De Alba 

Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)). And to show functional equivalency, 

“the record must demonstrate that the court, the prosecutor, and the defendant must 

at the very least have interacted in a manner that shows clearly and convincingly 

that the defendant knew he had a right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior 

to the imposition of sentence.” Id. at 585 (punctuation altered) (emphasis in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the hearing, the district court began by telling Springs that “before I 

impose sentence this afternoon, I think you know you’ll have an opportunity to 

speak, both personally and through your attorney, about anything at all that you 

believing I should know.” Shortly thereafter, the court asked Springs if he “would

. . . like to speak” personally. Springs took the court up on the offer, and after a 

conversation regarding a letter Springs sent to the court, he told the court, “As far 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 6 of 9
7

as with reference to a punishment or punitive, I respect your wisdom.” He 

requested to be placed in the REAP program, and ended by saying that “if you 

have any anything aside from that, Judge, that you would like for me to answer, 

inquiries, I’m going to do my best to shoot straight with you and give you the 

truth.” 

That is how he ceded the floor, and that is why his argument that the court’s 

statement that “we’re not here to go into a whole series of complaints” was a denial 

of the right to allocution fails. Before the district court even made that statement, 

Springs was told in no uncertain terms that he should know he had a right to speak 

personally with regard to his sentence. He exercised that option, and ceased 

speaking of his own accord. All of this was before the district court made the 

statement that Springs objects so strenuously to. The right to allocution does not 

confer the right to allocute twice. 

Springs argues that the court’s statement that he should not go into “a whole 

series of complaints” intimidated him, and dissuaded him from sharing with the 

court information that would have lessened his sentence. But Springs fails to point 

us to any binding caselaw which suggests that would be enough to constitute a 

denial of the right to allocution. In United States v. Prouty, the district court failed 

to afford Prouty an opportunity to allocute, and could not comply with Rule 32 by 

“directing comments to the lawyers.” 303 F.3d 1249, 1251, 1251 n.1 (11th Cir. 

2002). In other cases, we found plain error where the court failed to personally 

address the defendant in the allocution context. see Doyle, 857 F.3d at 1118 (11th 

Cir. 2017); United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 2008). That is a far 

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 7 of 9
8

cry from Springs’s argued subjective intimidation, especially since it was not 

apparent in the sentencing hearing transcript. 

Springs was personally addressed, and invited to exercise his right of 

allocution. The only alleged wrongs occurred well after he of his own volition 

ceased to speak. The district court did not commit error, let alone plain error.

B.

Springs also argues before us (but not before the district court) that the 

district court improperly delegated its judicial function to the Bureau of Prisons 

with regard to the special assessment. As he sees it, the part of the plea agreement 

where he agreed to participate in the IFRP gives the Bureau of Prisons an authority 

to schedule his payments that it simply cannot exercise. But Springs must show 

plain error to receive his requested relief, and the only binding case he cites to is 

United States v. Prouty. 303 F.3d 1249.

And for Springs’s case, Prouty is not all that it seems. In Prouty, we 

interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(2), which provides that if the order “permits other 

than immediate payment, the length of time over which scheduled payments will 

be made shall be set by the court.” 303 F.3d at 1254. In that case, the district court 

had ordered restitution “due and payable immediately,” but then told the defense 

counsel that a payment schedule would be left “to the discretion of the Probation 

Office or whoever does that.” Id. at 1253–54. We held that “we cannot endorse a 

restitution order requiring ‘immediate’ payment with an informal understanding 

that the probation office shall set a repayment schedule.” Id. at 1255.

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 8 of 9
9

The most important difference between the case before us and Prouty, 

though, is this: The sentence in Prouty was reviewed de novo, while the standard 

of review here is plain error. “It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the 

explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there 

can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this 

Court directly resolving it.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 

(11th Cir. 2003). And unlike in Prouty, the involvement of the Bureau of Prisons 

and the IFRP came from the plea agreement that Springs entered into with the 

government. We have no case law establishing that including the IFRP in a plea 

agreement is improper, which means that Springs cannot establish plain error.2

IV.

The arguments Springs raised were raised for the first time before this Court. 

Showing plain error is difficult, and Springs has failed to do so. Springs’s sentence 

is AFFIRMED.

2 We do not read Springs’s briefs as challenging the Bureau of Prison’s regulations themselves. 

If Springs wants to bring such a challenge, he may do so via a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. See 

Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 236 (2001).

USCA11 Case: 19-14803 Date Filed: 11/18/2020 Page: 9 of 9