JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12546 

Austin, TX. 76711. 2546 

512l476-2501 

Telex 9101674-1367 

Telecopier 512/475.0260 

714 Jackson, Suite 700 

Dallas. TX. 752024% 

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El Paso, TX. 79905.2793 

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-M Texas, Suite 700 

Aston, TX. 77002.3111 

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Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479 

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5121682.4547 

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San Antonio. TX. 76205.2797 

512/2254191 

An Equal Opportunity/ 

Affirmative Action Employer 

The Attorney General of Texas 

August 18, 1986 

Honorable Rem Guerra 

Criminal District Mtorney 

Hidalgo County Courthouse 

Edinburg, Texas "8539 

Opinion No. JM-533 

Re: Whether a county clerk may 

deliver the services of his 

office on credit 

Dear Mr. Guerra: 

You have subm::tted the following question: 

Does it violate article III. sections 50 and 

52, of the Texas Constitution for the county clerk 

of Hidalgo County, Texas to maintain a policy of 

allowing the general public, including attorneys, 

title ccmpanies. individuals, partnerships, and 

corporat:.ons, to maintain credit accounts for 

paying f,ses due the county clerk? Stated in the 

convsrsez, must the county clerk adopt a cash only 

policy on all fees except the filing of lawsuits? 

The provisions of the Texas Constitution you cite, sections 50 

and 52 of article 'III, as well as article XI, section 3, prohibit the 

"lending of credit" by the state or its subdivisions. section 50 

prohibits lending the credit of the state, and section 52 prevents the 

legislature from authorizing political subdivisions to lend their 

credit -- thereby :.nhibiting counties indirectly. Article XI, section 

3, is a direct prohibition against the lending of its credit by a 

county. 

With exceptions not pertinent here, article III, section 52, 

reads: 

[T]he Le@lature shall have no power to authorize 

any county, city, town or other political corporation or :subdivision of the State to lend its 

credit or to grant public money or thing of value 

in aid of. or to any individual, association or 

corporatj.on whatsoever, or to become a stockholder 

in such corporation, association or company. 

(Emphasis, added). 

p. 2455 
Honorable Rene Guerra - Pagr 2 (ai-533) 

‘7 

Article XI, section 3, reads:: 

The other 

No county, city, or other municipal corporation 

shall hereafter bt!come a subscriber to the capital 

of any private corporation or association, or make 

any appropriation ,or donation to the same, or in 

anywise loan its ,credit; but this shall not be 

-- 

construed to in any way affect any obligation 

heretofore undertaken pursuant to law. (Emphasis 

added). 

provision, section 50 of article III, declaresi 

The Legislatum shall have no power to give or 

to lend, or to auxhorize the giving or lending. of 

the credit of the State in aid of, or to any 

person, associat:ion or corporation, whether 

municipal or othe::,, or to pledge the credit of the 

State in any mannm: whatsoever, for the payment of 

the liabilities, present or prospective, of any 

individual, association of individuals, municipal 

or other corpcration whatsoever. (Emphasis 

added). 

In each of these provtrions, the phrases “lend its credit,” “loan 

its credit,” and “lending #of the credit” appear to have the same 

meaning. The meaning of 1:h.e section 50 language was considered in 

Braden, The Constitution ~jf the State of Texas: An Annotated and 

Comparative Analysis (1977);volume 1 at page 225, where it was said: 

Section 50 states that the legislature may not 

‘give’ the credit of the state to anybody, ‘lend’ 

the credit of the state to anybody, or ‘pledge’ 

the credit of thlt state for anybody. . . . This 

is an involved and somewhat imprecise way of 

saying that the state may not aid anybody by 

lending him mone:r; by provtding him land, goods, 

or services on cl,edit; or by guaranteeing payment 

to a third party-z aids anybody by lending him 

money or providing him land, goods, or services on 

credit. (Emphasis added). 

See Attorney General 0pin:ton MW-461 (1982). The Supreme Court of 

Texas similarly concluded in City of Cleburne v. Brown, 11 S.W. 404 

(Tex. 1889) that the article XI, section 3, language specifying that a 

municipality could not in anywise “loan its credit” prevented a city 

from accepting, in lieu a:E cash, corporate bonds in payment for 

transferring its waterworks to a corporation. 

In construing the meai:Lng of particular words in a part of the 

Constitution of Texas, such as article III, section 52, resort may be 

p. 2456 
, 

Bonorable Rene Guerra - Pag, 3 (JM-533) 

had to other sections of the instrument for the sense in which the 

words are used. 

Comm'n App. 1928). 

State v. Gillette's Estate, 10 S.W.2d 984 (Tex. 

In the-tight of the 9 ' of Cleburnq holding, we 

believe the proscriptions of article III, section 52, and I article XI, 

section 3, mean that county officers are not authorized -- and cannot 

be authorized -- to deliver county services to individuals, associations or corporations on t,redit unless some other provision of the 

constitution authorizes it IO do so. . 

You have noted the provisions of Rule 142 of the Texas Rules of 

Civil Procedure, authorizing the clerk to require security for costs 

from the plaintiff before iissuing any process, but specifying that the 

clerk "shall file the'petitlon and enter the same on the docket." The 

emphasized provision, we tz;lieve, is necessary to comply with the 

command of article I, sectim 13. of the Constitution of Texas that 

[a]11 courts shall be open, and every person for 

and injury done him, in his lands, goods, person 

or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 

law. 

r 

See Dillingham v. Putnam, 14 S.W. 303 (Tex. 1890). See also Union 

Century Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 26 S.W. 982 (Tex. 1894). cf. 

Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2(r918 (Tex. 1984). 

Thus, the county clerk :nust file and docket a petition presented 

for filing without requir~ll: immediate payment therefor, because to 

refuse would deny the petttioner his constitutional right to open 

courts. Cf. LeCroy v. Hanlor!, _ S.W.2d 

opinion delivered July 2, -986). 

(Tex. 1986) (No. C-4745, 

But the= is no warrant to extend 

credit for county fees, fines and other charges not similarly 

impinging on constitutional rights and privileges. See Robinson v. 

State, 29 S.W. 788 (Tex Crim. App. 1895); Attorney General Opinions 

MW-461 (1982). S-42 (1953). Cf. Tex. R. Civ. Proc. 145 (affidavit of 

inability to give security). - 

SUMMARY 

County officers are not authorized -- and 

cannot be authorixed -- to deliver county services 

to individuals, ,xasociations or corporations on 

credit unless sore provision of the Constitution 

of Texas authoriza!a it to do so. 

Very ruly yours s /c;, /Y-JJ

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

p. 2457 
Honorable Rene Guerra - Pag#z 4 (JM-533) 

JACK HIGHTOWER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

MARY KELLER 

Executive Assistant Attornq General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Ccmnittee 

Prepared by Bruce Youngblood 

Assistant Attorney General 

. 

p. 2458