[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2024-Ohio-2003.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

ERIC ANDERSON

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29990

Trial Court Case No. 23-CRB-1517

(Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on May 24, 2024

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DAVID R. MILES, Attorney for Appellant

 

ALISSA SCHRINER, Attorney for Appellee

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LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Eric Anderson appeals from his conviction for 

aggravated menacing following a bench trial in the Dayton Municipal Court. Anderson 

contends that the trial court’s judgment was not supported by sufficient evidence and was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because he was more credible than the 

complaining witness. For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
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court.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On May 5, 2023, a criminal complaint was filed in Dayton Municipal Court 

alleging that Anderson had committed the offense of aggravated menacing, a first-degree 

misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A). Anderson filed a demand for a jury trial 

and waived his right to be tried within the time provided by R.C. 2945.71. Anderson 

subsequently filed a waiver of his right to a jury trial.

{¶ 3} A bench trial was held on August 21, 2023. Steve Smith, the information 

technology manager at the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, testified first. Tr. 5-7. 

He verified that the video recording presented by the State was a true and accurate 

recording from cameras positioned on Second Street in downtown Dayton.

{¶ 4} Bruce May testified next. Id. at 7-51. May was a cold case investigator with 

the Dayton Police Department and was the complaining witness in this case. He had

worked for over 40 years in law enforcement. On the morning of May 4, 2023, shortly 

before 8:00 a.m., May was traveling northbound on Main Street in downtown Dayton. 

After passing through some construction, May noticed Anderson driving a white truck and 

coming up next to his vehicle on Main Street. May eventually turned left onto Monument 

Street and then left onto Ludlow Street. As he turned onto Ludlow Street, May noticed 

in his rear-view mirror that Anderson’s vehicle was turning onto Monument Street. As 

he proceeded down Ludlow, May turned right onto Second Street. He then stopped in 

the right-hand lane at the first stop light on Second Street. At that time, Anderson’s 
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vehicle pulled up in the lane next to May’s vehicle, and Anderson raised his middle finger 

at May while saying something to him. May rolled his window down so he could hear 

what Anderson was saying. May testified that Anderson said, “You are an asshole and 

I’m going to whip your ass.” May tried to de-escalate the situation and responded, “If I 

did anything wrong to you, I’m sorry I didn’t mean that.” Anderson then stated, “I don’t 

believe you. You think you have a newer car than I do. I retired from G.M. and I’m 

going to kill you. Do you understand that I’m going to kill you?”

{¶ 5} The traffic light changed to green, and May proceeded to pull forward away 

from the light. As he did so, May took his gun out of his pocket and put it in a more 

accessible place in case he needed it. May crossed Perry Street and slowed down 

behind vehicles that were waiting to turn into a parking lot. Anderson passed by May’s

vehicle and again yelled at May while raising his middle finger at him. Anderson did a 

U-turn and headed in the opposite direction on Second Street. May took out his cell 

phone and took a picture of Anderson’s vehicle. Anderson then did another U-turn and 

approached May’s vehicle from the rear. May decided to park to try to de-escalate the 

situation. After parking, May exited his truck and entered property that Anderson could 

not access with his vehicle. May saw Anderson pointing something black at him but 

could not determine what it was. May ultimately lost sight of Anderson and did not see 

him again that day. May then filed a police report about the incident.

{¶ 6} May testified that Anderson was uncontrollable and argumentative during 

their brief interaction. May made the decision to park in what was not his normal parking 

spot in order to get to safety and de-escalate the situation more quickly. May was fearful 
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for his own life and the safety of others around the situation. According to May, “I was 

completely threatened by his actions of saying he was going to kill me and he sounded 

very [passionate] about that when he said, ‘do you understand me?’. I’ve never had 

anybody say that to me in my life and it’s very threatening.”

{¶ 7} Anderson testified last at the trial. Tr. 53-60. He was 63 years old at the 

time of the trial. On the morning of May 4, 2023, Anderson was heading home after 

dropping off a friend. According to Anderson, he was driving his white truck in downtown 

Dayton when May drove left of center and cut off Anderson’s vehicle. This caused 

Anderson to have road rage. Anderson testified that people cut him off three or four 

times a day when he drives his truck. As a result of being cut off, Anderson repeatedly 

cursed at May and gave him the middle finger. He testified that he does the same thing 

when other people cut him off on the road. Anderson denied that he had threatened

May. Rather, he stated that he said the following to May:

I remember exactly what I said. Again, I told him – I gave him the 

finger, I told him he was – I called him an M.F. or S.O.B. and I told him he 

don’t need to be driving no truck no better than that if you can’t drive. I also 

told him that I used to work for G.M. and I never told him I retired. I been 

laid off four or five years now and I know what I’m doing and I know when 

people do it on purpose. That’s what I told him.

Id. at 59-60.

{¶ 8} Anderson stated that he was too old to be threatening others. He explained 

that he did not own a gun and he did not have a cell phone with him during the incident. 
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Anderson had never met May prior to that day.

{¶ 9} On September 5, 2023, the trial court found Anderson guilty of aggravated 

menacing. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Anderson to 180 

days in jail but suspended all 180 days. Anderson was placed on supervised probation 

for up to one year with the conditions that he complete the MAD Program through the 

probation department and comply with any treatment through the Drew Health Center. 

The trial court imposed a fine of $25 plus court costs. Anderson filed a timely appeal 

from the trial court’s judgment.

II. Anderson’s Conviction Was Supported by Sufficient Evidence and Was Not 

Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶ 10} Anderson raises the following two assignments of error:

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED MENACING IS 

BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED MENACING IS 

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶ 11} Anderson’s assignments of error assert that his conviction for aggravated 

menacing was against the manifest weight of the evidence and not supported by sufficient 

evidence. Because these assignments of error are interrelated, we will address them 

together.

{¶ 12} “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the 

evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio 
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St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). “An appellate court's function when reviewing 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence 

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the 

average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant 

inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 

61 L.Ed.2d 560.

{¶ 13} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the court does not engage 

in a determination of the witnesses' credibility.” State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 139, 

694 N.E.2d 916 (1998), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 

(1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the 

evidence presented, if believed, was sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Jones, 

166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 16, citing Thompkins at 390. 

The verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless “the appellate court finds that 

reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” State v. 

Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing Jenks at 273

{¶ 14} “[A] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the 

evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more 

believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 12. When evaluating whether a conviction is against the 
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manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court must review the entire record, weigh 

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and 

a new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 

485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). The fact that the evidence is subject to different 

interpretations does not render a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Wilson at ¶ 14. A judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.” (Citations omitted.) Martin at 175.

{¶ 15} Based on the record before us, we must conclude that the conviction was 

supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Anderson was charged with and found guilty of aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 

2903.21(A), which provides, in part: “No person shall knowingly cause another to believe 

that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other 

person, the other person's unborn, or a member of the other person's immediate family.” 

Anderson contends that May’s “beliefs must be rational or reasonable under the 

circumstances of the case.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 5. According to Anderson, he neither 

possessed nor brandished a gun, and “[t]hreats without the ability to carry out the threats 

is insufficient for a conviction of aggravated menacing.” Id. Anderson believes May was 

not fearful for his life and only testified that he was in order to secure a conviction. Id. at 

5-6.
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{¶ 16} Anderson cites three cases in support of his contention that the facts of this 

case did not establish aggravated menacing. Anderson first cites Garfield Hts. v. Greer, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87078, 2006-Ohio-5936, which involved a road rage incident. 

The Eighth District noted, “The victim did not testify to any subjective belief that Greer 

would cause him serious physical harm. There was no evidence that the victim was 

scared or rattled from the incident. The victim merely testified that Greer ‘pops a gun 

out,’ not that Greer had pointed the gun at him.” Id. at ¶ 7. Anderson next cites Walton 

Hills v. Tate, 2016-Ohio-697, 60 N.E.3d 611 (8th Dist.), which also involved an incident 

of road rage. There, the Eighth District concluded that “no testimony was adduced that 

established that [the victim] believed she would suffer serious physical harm at the hands 

of Tate. Tate’s actions while foreboding, do not constitute a threat of serious physical 

harm. [The victim] only testified that Tate screamed ‘pretty provocative and mean things 

at me.’ She never testified that she believed she was in danger of serious physical harm 

from Tate.” Id. at ¶ 15. Finally, Anderson cites State v. Britton, 181 Ohio App.3d 415, 

2009-Ohio-1282, 909 N.E.2d 176 (2d Dist.), which involved a pharmacy employee who 

was confronted in her employer’s parking lot by a customer over an incident that had 

occurred a year prior. Based on a review of that record, we stated that “no testimony 

was adduced that established that [the victim] believed that she would suffer serious 

physical harm at the hands of Britton. * * * [Her] testimony that Britton’s statement only 

made her ‘a little nervous’ further demonstrates that [she] did not believe that she was in 

danger of serious physical harm from Britton.” Id. at ¶ 51. We then concluded, 

“[a]lthough the evidence was that [the victim] was intimidated and justifiably unnerved, it 
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cannot support a finding of a belief that Britton would cause her or her property ‘serious 

physical harm.’ ” Id.

{¶ 17} The cases cited by Anderson are inapposite to the facts before us in this 

appeal. In accordance with R.C. 2903.21(A), the State was required to prove that 

Anderson knowingly caused May to believe that Anderson would cause May serious 

physical harm. Unlike the victim testimony in the cases cited by Anderson, May testified 

at trial that Anderson had threatened to kill him after following May’s vehicle. May 

described Anderson as passionate, uncontrollable, and argumentative. May stated that 

he was fearful for his own life. As a result of Anderson’s threats, May was concerned 

enough about his safety that he took his gun out of his pocket to prepare to protect himself 

and parked where he normally did not park in order to get to safety more quickly. Further, 

Anderson conceded that he exhibited road rage during his interaction with May on May 

4, 2023. Given this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Anderson knowingly caused May to believe that Anderson would 

cause serious physical harm to May. Therefore, Anderson’s conviction was supported 

by sufficient evidence.

{¶ 18} Finally, Anderson argues that his conviction was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence because his “trial testimony was more credible than witness May.” 

Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. May testified in detail how the events unfolded on the morning of 

May 4, 2023, and what effect Anderson’s actions had on May. The only real dispute in 

the record was over what exactly Anderson said to May when they both were stopped at 

the red light on Second Street just east of Perry Street. May testified that Anderson had 
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threatened to kill him and that he was passionate about that statement. Anderson stated 

that he had simply cursed repeatedly at May due to road rage caused by May’s cutting 

off Anderson’s vehicle. Anderson did not dispute that he had pursued May that morning 

and that he had been very upset with May. In the end, this case came down to witness 

credibility. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that this is one of those 

exceptional circumstances in which the evidence weighed heavily against the conviction.

{¶ 19} The assignments of error are overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 20} Having overruled both of Anderson’s assignments of error, the judgment of 

the trial court will be affirmed.

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EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.