Docket No. 85409–Agenda 28–May 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

								LARRY SCOTT, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 26, 2000.

	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

	The defendant, Larry Scott, brings this appeal from an order

of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for post-

conviction relief. Because the defendant received the death

sentence for the underlying murder conviction, the present appeal

lies directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

	The defendant was charged with a number of offenses for the

murder and sexual assault of a woman in Chicago in August 1984.

Following a trial in the circuit court of Cook County, a jury found

the defendant guilty of murder and attempted robbery and guilty

but mentally ill of aggravated criminal sexual assault. After a bench

sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death

for the murder conviction and to 30 years’ imprisonment for the

aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction; the judge did not

sentence the defendant on the attempted robbery conviction. On

direct appeal this court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and

sentences. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479 (1992). The United States Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Scott v. Illinois, 507 U.S. 989, 123 L. Ed. 2d 156, 113 S. Ct. 1590 (1993).

	The defendant then initiated the present post-conviction action

in the circuit court of Cook County, challenging his convictions

and death sentence on a variety of grounds. The post-conviction

court allowed the defendant an evidentiary hearing on one of the

issues raised in the petition, concerning the defendant’s remorse for

the offenses; after the hearing, the judge denied all relief. The

defendant brings the present appeal to this court (134 Ill. 2d R.

651(a)), contesting the circuit court’s decision.

	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 through

122–7 (West 1994)) allows a defendant to challenge a conviction

or sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 157 (1994). An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding rather than an

appeal from the underlying judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a

defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or

state constitutional rights in the proceedings that led to the

judgment being challenged. 725 ILCS 5/122–1 (West 1994);

People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). Principles of res judicata and waiver will limit the range of issues available to a post-conviction petitioner “to constitutional matters which have

not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated.” People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992). Accordingly, rulings on issues that were previously raised at trial or on direct appeal are res judicata, and issues that could have been raised in the earlier proceedings, but were not, will ordinarily be deemed waived.

People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995).

	The defendant’s primary focus in this appeal, as it was in the

proceedings below, is on what effect his remorse for the offenses

should have on his death sentence. The defendant argues that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to present, at the capital

sentencing hearing, evidence of the defendant’s remorse. The

defendant observes that the sentencing judge, in deciding to impose

the death penalty in this case, found that there were no mitigating

circumstances at all in this case; at sentencing, the judge said that

the evidence did “not disclose one single iota of a mitigating

factor.” The defendant further contends that remorse is recognized

as a mitigating circumstance in death penalty jurisprudence and that

the evidence introduced at the post-conviction hearing

demonstrates that he was remorseful for these offenses. The

defendant deduces from these propositions that he must receive a

sentence other than death, given the presence of remorse in this

case.

	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must establish both that counsel’s performance was so

deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,

and that the defendant was so prejudiced by counsel’s conduct that

he was denied a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-65 (1984).

To satisfy the second part of the Strickland test, a defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

	At the post-conviction hearing, the defendant testified briefly

about his feelings regarding these offenses. The focus of his

testimony was his belief that he deserved the death sentence

because of the crimes he had committed. On direct examination,

defense counsel asked the defendant first about his feelings at the

time of trial, and then about his feelings at the time of the

evidentiary hearing:

			“Q. How did you then feel about what you did?

Whether it was right or wrong, how did you feel about it?

			A. I feeled [sic] like it was wrong.

			Q. How do you feel about it today?

			A. That it was wrong.

			Q. Do you feel that it was wrong just for you or wrong

for the lady you killed and her family? Do you have any

remorse? Did you have any remorse then? What do you

feel?

			A. I feel the same way I did, that it was wrong.

			Q. How wrong was it?

			A. It was wrong enough to get the death sentence.”

At the evidentiary hearing, the defense also presented affidavits

from the defendant’s two trial lawyers, Bob Lee and Don Paull.

Both of them stated that experts who examined the defendant for

fitness reported to counsel that the defendant said that he wanted

to receive the death penalty. The lawyers also stated that the

defendant said that he recognized that he what he did was wrong,

that he was sorry, and that he wanted to be punished.

	The same judge presided at both the defendant’s trial and the

post-conviction proceedings below. The judge therefore could

uniquely determine what likely effect the defendant’s additional

evidence of remorse would have had on the prior decision. In this case, the judge concluded that presentation of this evidence at the

sentencing hearing would not have altered his decision to sentence

the defendant to death. In making this ruling, the judge commented

on the brutality of the defendant’s offenses, including evidence that

the defendant bit off the victim’s nipples and bit her vagina during

the attack. The judge explained:

			“Fifteen years after this event happened, when I was

reading this file here this morning to refresh my

recollection as to the facts, my blood still runs cold with

the cruelty and the heinousness and the inhumanity and the

cannibalistic fervor that was exhibited by this man as he

killed this woman, bit off both her nipples, cannibalized

her vagina orally.

			He wasn’t satisfied with killing her, he had to

cannibalize her body. He desecrated, he had no feeling of

this woman as a human being.

			So, no, I don’t have any feeling that what I did then was

wrong and I don’t have any feeling that what I’m doing

now is wrong, and I say for the record that the question of

remorse, I accept it and I put it on the scales as I must,

and it still doesn’t outweigh the heinous act that this man

committed in taking that woman’s life.”

The judge’s findings demonstrate that he would not have imposed

a different sentence on the defendant even if the evidence of

remorse had been fully developed at the sentencing hearing, as the

defendant now contends it should have been.

	The post-conviction judge’s ruling must be affirmed unless it

is manifestly erroneous. See People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). We do not believe that it is. Our cases have previously held that the

presence or absence of remorse may be considered at a capital

sentencing hearing. People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 281 (1989); People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 80-81 (1984). The presence of remorse does not preclude a sentence of death, however. We

believe that the post-conviction judge’s determination in this case

is entitled to substantial deference, and we see no reason to reach

a different result. The judge carefully considered the defendant’s new evidence, yet he still concluded that his original sentencing

determination would not have been affected by that evidence. We

cannot say that the post-conviction judge’s conclusion was against

the manifest weight of the evidence. The offenses in the present

case were particularly brutal, as the judge noted. Moreover, the

expression by the defendant of his feelings regarding these crimes

focused more on the appropriateness of the death penalty as

punishment in this case, and less on a sense of contrition for his

actions.

	Even though the judge originally believed, at the time of the

sentencing hearing, that no mitigation at all existed in this case, the

new evidence of remorse, or of any other mitigating circumstance,

does not now automatically compel a sentence other than death. At

the conclusion of the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing,

after the presentation of evidence in aggravation and mitigation, a

sentence of death will be imposed unless the jury or judge, as the

case may be, finds that there is mitigation sufficient to preclude a

sentence of death. 720 ILCS 5/9–1(g), (h) (West 1996). Thus, the

existence of mitigating evidence does not by itself bar imposition

of a death sentence (People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 493 (2000)); rather, the mitigating evidence must be sufficient to

preclude a sentence of death, when considered together with the

evidence in aggravation. In this case, the post-conviction judge

found that the new evidence would not have precluded a sentence

of death, even if that evidence had been introduced at the

sentencing hearing.

	The defendant next raises two related arguments concerning

the scope and nature of the hearing conducted below. The

defendant first contends that the post-conviction judge erred in

limiting what evidence the defense could introduce at the hearing.

In essence, the defendant believes that the proceeding was in reality

a new sentencing hearing, and that the judge therefore should have

allowed the defense to introduce further mitigating evidence,

including, specifically, evidence about the defendant’s favorable

adjustment to prison life. The defendant notes that evidence of

good conduct while incarcerated is mitigating (Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 6-7, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1671 (1986); People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 345 (1998)), and he emphasizes that an individualized sentencing determination, based

on the full range of information known about a defendant, is

necessary in a capital proceeding (People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 243 (1997); People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 368 (1997)).

	We do not question the importance of an individualized

sentencing determination to the proper application of the death

penalty, nor do we dispute the possible mitigating force of evidence

of a defendant’s favorable adjustment to institutional life. We do

not agree with the premise of the defendant’s argument, however,

that the proceeding below was actually a new sentencing hearing.

Although the post-conviction judge on several different occasions

made comments suggesting that he was holding a fresh sentencing

hearing, we believe that the full measure of his remarks indicates

that he understood that he was conducting only an evidentiary

hearing on one part of the defendant’s post-conviction petition. For

example, in court on November 13, 1997, when the prosecutor

referred to the limited nature of the evidentiary hearing and

disputed the defendant’s assertion that it was a new sentencing

hearing, the post-conviction judge stated that he agreed with the

prosecutor’s assessment of the status of the proceeding.

	A brief consideration of the nature of post-conviction relief

and of the availability of review for post-conviction decisions offers

further support for our conclusion that the hearing below was not,

and could not have been, a new sentencing hearing. If a judge

hearing a post-conviction petition determines that a defendant

should receive a new sentencing hearing, the State is entitled to

appeal that determination, prior to the holding of a fresh hearing.

134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a); see People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. 2d 225, 227 (1953); People v. Andretich, 244 Ill. App. 3d 558, 559-60 (1993); see, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368 (1997) (affirming, on State’s appeal, judgment of circuit court granting defendant post-

conviction relief and ordering new sentencing hearing). Under the

approach suggested by the defendant, however, a new sentencing

hearing would be held, even before another court had an

opportunity to review the order granting post-conviction relief.

The defendant’s theory would thus deny the State review of the

post-conviction judge’s decision. The availability of review of

judgments granting post-conviction relief thus provides additional support for our conclusion that the judge below could not have

intended for the evidentiary hearing to be a new sentencing

hearing.

	The defendant raises the related contention that he was

entitled at the hearing below to elect whether the new evidence

would be considered by a jury. Again, the premise for this

argument is the notion that the proceeding was actually a new

capital sentencing hearing, at which a defendant has a statutory

right to a jury. 720 ILCS 5/9–1(d) (West 1996).

	This argument is without merit. As we have explained, the

proceeding below is properly characterized as an evidentiary

hearing on one claim in the defendant’s post-conviction petition,

and not a fresh sentencing hearing. The Post-Conviction Hearing

Act establishes “an original and independent remedy by a

proceeding, civil in nature” (People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 615 (1953)), that examines allegations of constitutional error, and its

procedures are controlled by statute. Unlike statutes that

specifically grant a defendant a right to a jury determination at

certain proceedings, such as a capital sentencing hearing (720

ILCS 5/9–1(d) (West 1996)) or a fitness hearing (725 ILCS

5/104–12 (West 1996)), the Post-Conviction Hearing Act makes

no provision for a jury. Accordingly, the defendant was not entitled

to present to a jury the matters raised in his post-conviction

petition. The correct procedure, which was followed in this case,

was to have any evidence submitted to the post-conviction court

alone, sitting without a jury. See 725 ILCS 5/122–6 (West 1996)

(“The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral

testimony, or other evidence”).

	The defendant next raises a series of arguments concerning the

jury instructions used at his trial, contending that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel by his attorneys’ failure to ensure

that the jury was properly instructed. The defendant elected to be

sentenced by the judge, so all the instructional questions arise from

the guilt phase of the proceedings. The post-conviction court

dismissed these allegations of error without an evidentiary hearing,

and therefore our review is de novo  (Pepople v. Coleman, People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89 (1998)) . The defendant raised many of the same

issues on direct appeal, when he contested the jury instructions used at his trial. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 532-39 (1992). Res judicata bars our reconsideration of those questions here. Other issues were not raised on direct appeal but could have been,

and the waiver doctrine precludes our consideration of those

matters. We briefly summarize these issues below, setting forth

what determination, if any, was made in the earlier appeal.

	The defendant first challenges the failure to include a reference

to the insanity defense within the issues instructions for each

offense. This court rejected the same argument on direct appeal,

however, concluding that the instructions used did not deny the

defendant a fair trial (Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 538), and we must therefore conclude that consideration of the issue here is barred by res judicata.

	The defendant next questions the wording of the insanity instruction used at trial, asserting that the jury might have believed

that the defense applied only to the charge of murder. Again, this

court rejected the same argument on direct appeal, noting that the

jury received four different verdict forms for each offense: not

guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty, and guilty but

mentally ill. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 538-39. Further consideration of the issue here is therefore barred by res judicata. Nor is this argument aided by the defendant’s additional contention that

counsel on direct appeal was ineffective because counsel failed to

cite a particular decision, People v. Wells, 110 Ill. App. 3d 700 (1982), in support of this allegation of error. We have examined

that opinion, and we do not believe that there is a reasonable

probability that our decision on this issue would have been different

if the case had been cited to us on appeal.

	The defendant also argues that the instructions used at trial

were defective because one of them told the jury to determine

whether he was insane on August 4, 1984, the day of the offenses,

rather than at the specific time when he committed the offenses.

This court considered the same contention on direct appeal and

concluded that the instructions in their entirety correctly informed

the jurors that they were to consider the defendant’s sanity at the

time of the offenses. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 539. Res judicata thus precludes us from reexamining the same question in this appeal.

	The defendant also argues that the guilty but mentally ill

(GBMI) instructions used at trial were defective and prejudicial.

On direct appeal, this court addressed in detail the propriety of the

instructions and agreed with the defendant that they were

erroneous. After carefully considering the evidence in this case, the

defense theory at trial, and the verdicts returned by the jury, the

court concluded that the error in the instructions was harmless.

Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 536-38. Again, principles of res judicata bar consideration of this issue here.

	The defendant next complains that the trial judge, in reading

the charges in the indictment to the jurors, stated that the defendant

was pleading not guilty but did not mention at the same time, in

referring to the plea, that the defendant was raising the insanity

defense. Unlike the preceding issues, this question was not raised

on direct appeal. We find, though, that the defendant has waived

consideration of this question, for he could have raised it on direct

appeal. The grounds for this issue were apparent from the trial

transcript, and nothing precluded the defendant from raising it on

direct appeal. We note, moreover, that the jury was fully aware of

the defense theory at trial, which involved the defendant’s

concession that he committed the present offenses and asserted

insanity as a defense to them. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 514. The trial judge instructed the jury on the insanity defense and provided the

jury with the relevant verdict forms.

	In his final challenge to the jury instructions used at trial, the

defendant argues that the trial judge inserted confusing surplusage

in one of them when he read it to the jury. Specifically, the judge

told the jurors:

		“A person is guilty but mentally ill at the time of the

commission of an offense, a person is guilty but mentally

ill if at the time of the commission of the offense, he was

not insane but was suffering from a mental illness.”

It is clear that the judge misspoke when he began reading the

instruction, omitting the word “if” when he said, “A person is

guilty but mentally ill [if] at the time of the commission of an

offense.” The judge then immediately corrected his error, repeating

the opening clause and adding the omitted conditional. Again, the

defendant failed to raise this issue on direct appeal, and it must therefore be deemed waived. In any event, we do not believe that

the jurors misunderstood the judge’s meaning.

	The defendant also raises a number of additional challenges to

his convictions and death sentence, arguing that the post-

conviction judge erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on

these questions. We will briefly summarize these additional issues.

	The defendant first argues that he was denied the effective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel when his lawyers failed to

argue that placing the burden of proving insanity on the defense in

a capital case violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment found in the eighth amendment. This court

has previously held that the provisions imposing this burden on the

defense do not violate due process under the federal or state

constitutions (Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 540-43), and the defendant has not presented us with any reason that would warrant our reaching

a different result under the eighth amendment.

	The defendant also contends that a person who is mentally ill

should not be subject to the death penalty. This court has

previously held, however, that a person found guilty but mentally

ill may be executed. People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 280-81 (1988). Here, the jury found the defendant guilty of two of the

offenses, murder and attempted robbery, and guilty but mentally ill

of the third, aggravated criminal sexual assault. On review, this

court concluded that death is not an excessive or inappropriate

sentence in this case, notwithstanding the evidence of the

defendant’s psychological problems. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 561. The defendant argues further that the Illinois statutes, by placing the

burden of proving insanity on the defense, fail to ensure that a

capital defendant who receives the death penalty is not insane. As

noted above, the assignment to the defense of the burden of

proving insanity does not violate due process.

	The defendant next contends that the Illinois death penalty

statute violates equal protection because blacks do not have equal

access to mental health treatment yet remain subject to the death

penalty even if they are mentally ill. We conclude that the

defendant has waived this objection. The defendant offers no data

in support of his assertion regarding the unavailability of mental health treatment to minorities, and he failed to raise this point

either at trial or on direct appeal.

	The defendant argues that counsel on direct appeal acted

under a per se conflict of interest because both she and the defendant’s two trial lawyers were from the office of the Cook

County public defender. This court has previously rejected the

argument that successive representation by members of the same

agency gives rise to a per se conflict (People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1996)), and the defendant has not presented any further

evidence that would cause us to reach a different result in his case.

	The defendant also contends that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance because of conduct that precluded this court

from finding reversible error on direct appeal with respect to a

number of issues. The defendant specifically refers to nine different

instances in which trial counsel’s conduct led this court to conclude

that the defendant had waived alleged errors or had otherwise

forfeited the opportunity to complain of certain rulings or

testimony. We will address these issues in the sequence in which

the defendant raises them; in several instances, we have combined

contentions relating to the same subject.

	The defendant first points to trial counsel’s acquiescence in the

prosecution’s use of patient progress notes made of the defendant

while he was receiving treatment at Cermak Hospital during his

incarceration in the Cook County jail. On direct appeal, this court

determined that the notes were not so unreliable that expert

witnesses could not make use of them in evaluating the defendant,

and the court also noted that the defense invoked the records to

help demonstrate the defendant’s lengthy history of mental illness.

As the State observes, insanity was the defense at trial, and counsel

acted appropriately in attempting to find within these records

evidence to support the defendant’s claim of mental illness.

	Also with respect to the psychiatric testimony, the defendant

complains that he was not advised of his rights before speaking to

two psychiatrists, and that counsel erred in failing to preserve the

issue in the trial court. On direct appeal, this court concluded that

the error was harmless, given the defense decision to present

psychiatric evidence. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 529-30. We continue to adhere to that decision. The defendant cannot show prejudice if the

error was harmless. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 266 (1999).

	The defendant next complains of counsel’s failure to object to

testimony that the defendant had been found fit for trial. On direct

review, this court concluded that any objection to the references to

the defendant’s fitness had been waived, noting that counsel did

not object to the testimony and, further, that much of the testimony

had been elicited by the defense. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 530-31. The court also concluded that these references to fitness were harmless.

Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 531. The defendant is unable to demonstrate prejudice from these rulings. Again, if the error was harmless, the

defendant cannot show prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise the

point. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d at 266.

	The defendant raises once again a complaint regarding the use

of the GBMI jury instructions at trial. The defendant now contends

that trial and appellate counsel should have argued that the

erroneous instructions could not be deemed harmless. We have

already addressed these issues at length, both on direct review and

in this appeal, and we do not believe that any further discussion is

necessary.

	The defendant next challenges trial counsel’s decision to

invoke favorable evidence about the victim’s character. In his

confession, the defendant stated that the victim used a racial slur

against him. The trial evidence showed, however, that the victim,

a student at the Moody Bible Institute, was quiet and polite.

Defense counsel attempted to use this evidence to the defendant’s

advantage by arguing that the defendant’s misperception was

evidence of delusive thinking. On direct appeal, in response to the

defendant’s challenge to the introduction of favorable evidence of

the victim’s character, this court found that the evidence did not

deprive the defendant of a fair trial because defense counsel argued

that it was relevant. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 545 (“Given the fact defendant argued the relevance of the character evidence, we find

that these references did not deny defendant a fair trial”). We

conclude that trial counsel’s decision to use the evidence in this

way was, in essence, a matter of trial strategy, and therefore it is

accorded substantial deference under the Strickland ineffectiveness standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).

	The defendant also contends that trial counsel erred in failing

to preserve an issue regarding the testimony of one of the

prosecution’s expert witnesses, Dr. James Cavanaugh. At one

point in his testimony, Dr. Cavanaugh gave an incorrect definition

of insanity, using the phrase “irresistibly driven” in defining the

term. Defense counsel objected to this definition but did not

include the issue in the post-trial motion. On direct appeal, this

court considered only whether the testimony was plain error, in

light of counsel’s failure to preserve the issue in the post-trial

motion, and concluded that it was not. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 547-48. The defendant complains that counsel’s inaction resulted in this

court’s deciding the issue under a plain error standard rather than

a more rigorous test. As this court noted on direct appeal, the

instructions given to the jury at the close of testimony correctly set

forth the applicable standard. We do not believe that there is a

reasonable probability that our result would have been different if

counsel had properly preserved an objection to the testimony.

	The defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to the prosecution’s comment in closing

argument at trial that the defendant had been truant while enrolled

in school. On direct review, this court held that the comment was

not plain error; the court employed that standard because of

counsel’s failure to properly object to the comment at trial. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 550. We do not believe that this brief and isolated

remark could have denied the defendant a fair trial.

	The defendant, in his brief before this court, also raises several

catch-all arguments, framing them in broad terms and invoking

issues he raised on earlier occasions. Thus, the defendant contends

that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel because they “failed to raise the issues raised in Points 3

through 9 of the Petition [citation] at trial, in post-trial motions,

and on appeal”; he also “reasserts all constitutional issues asserted

in defendant’s direct appeal and readopts those arguments”; finally,

he contends, as a general matter, that this court should apply

provisions of state constitutional law in any instance in this case in

which the result would be more favorable to him under the Illinois Constitution. We agree with the State that the defendant’s general

references to these issues, unsupported by argument or citation to

authority, are inadequate to justify their treatment here. See 177 Ill.

2d R. 341(e)(7).

*  *  *

	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of

Cook County is affirmed. The clerk of this court is directed to

enter an order setting Tuesday, January 16, 2001, as the date on

which the sentence of death, entered in the circuit court of Cook

County, is to be carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the

manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119–5 (West 1998). The

clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this

case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms

Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where the

defendant is now confined.

Judgment affirmed.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:

	I agree that the judgment of the circuit court should be

affirmed. I write separately, however, in order to make clear that

two different standards of review are applicable to this case.

	As the court correctly notes, defendant alleged multiple claims

in his post-conviction petition. The circuit court dismissed all but

one of the claims without an evidentiary hearing. As to that

remaining claim, in which defendant asserted that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to present evidence of defendant’s

remorse for the offenses at sentencing, the circuit court ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the circuit court ruled that post-conviction relief was not

warranted and denied relief.

	In his appeal to this court, defendant raises two distinct

challenges to the circuit court’s judgment. He first maintains that

the circuit court, following the hearing, erred in denying relief on

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning remorse. He

also contends that the circuit court erred by dismissing several of

his other post-conviction claims without an evidentiary hearing.

Today’s opinion correctly notes that the former argument is governed by the “manifestly erroneous” standard of review (see

slip op. at 4). The opinion, however, fails to state that the latter

arguments are reviewed de novo. See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 3656 (1998) (setting forth the standard of review to be used in

determining the propriety of a dismissal of claims for post-

conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing).

	I believe that it is unwise for the court note to note explicitly

the two different standards of review that operate in this appeal.

Whether the circuit court, at the conclusion of the evidentiary

hearing, erred in denying defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is a different question from whether the circuit court erred in dismissing defendant’s other claims without an evidentiary

hearing. Our decision in Coleman and in subsequent opinions (see, e.g., People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999)) mandates that we review de novo the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s claims without an evidentiary hearing, and today’s opinion and in no way

represents a departure from these principles. With that

understanding, I join in the court’s opinion.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

	I agree that Scott’s convictions should not be disturbed. In my

view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand.

For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial

dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the

United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and

article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,

art. I, §2). Scott’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated and the cause should be remanded for imposition of a sentence of

imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9–1(j).