COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Annunziata 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WILLIAM THOMAS GIBSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0130-95-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 APRIL 23, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 Barbara Hudson for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 William Thomas Gibson (appellant) appeals his convictions 

for forging a public record and uttering a forged public record, 

each in violation of Code § 18.2-168. Appellant asserts that the 

trial court erred in ruling that the evidence proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt a violation of Code § 18.2-168. Because the 

trial court did not err, we affirm appellant's convictions. 

 On December 30, 1993, appellant paid an unidentified woman 

to sign his ex-wife's name as surety to a bail bond for his son's 

release from state custody. The bond had a surety of $650 

secured by property jointly owned by appellant and his ex-wife. 

The document bore the signatures of appellant, appellant's son, 

and the person that appellant hired to sign his ex-wife's name. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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The document also bore the signature of the magistrate who, 

relying on the signatures of the sureties, admitted appellant's 

son to bail. The bond was filed in the Juvenile and Domestic 

Relations District Court of Pittsylvania County on January 3, 

1994. 

 Appellant was charged with forging a public record and 

uttering a forged public record, each in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-168. On November 23, 1994, in a bench trial in the 

Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County, appellant moved to strike 

the charges. Appellant argued that the indictments should have 

been brought under Code § 18.2-172, relating to forgery of 

private records. The trial court overruled appellant's motion 

after concluding that a bail bond is a public record. It also 

ruled that the Commonwealth could have charged appellant under 

the private record statute because appellant's ex-wife's rights 

were prejudiced. The trial court convicted appellant of the 

charged crimes. Appellant now appeals to this Court. 

 Appellant raises two inter-related arguments on appeal. 

First, appellant asserts that a bail bond is not a public record. 

 Second, appellant asserts that because the forgery prejudiced 

the rights of his ex-wife, instead of the rights of the 

Commonwealth, he should have been charged with violating Code § 

18.2-172. We disagree with both assertions. 

 First, we hold that a bail bond is a public record. At the 

time of the offense, Code § 42.1-77 defined "public record" to 
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mean: 

 all written books, papers, letters, 

documents, photographs, tapes, microfiche, 

microfilm, photostats, sound recordings, 

maps, other documentary materials or 

information in any recording medium 

regardless of physical form or 

characteristics, including electronically 

recorded data, made or received in pursuance 

of law or in connection with the transaction 

of public business by any agency or employee 

of state government or its political 

subdivisions. 

See Reid v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 468, 470, 431 S.E.2d 63, 64 

(1993)(fingerprint card is a public record). The forged bail 

bond in question was approved and signed by a magistrate, 

pursuant to the magistrate's duties, and resulted in the filing 

of the document with the court. Upon its execution, appellant's 

son was released from custody on a pending criminal matter. As 

such, the bail bond fits squarely within the definition of a 

public record. It is no less a public record under this 

definition simply because the bail bond required the signatures 

of appellant and his ex-wife to secure appellant's son's release. 

Reid, 16 Va. App. at 470, 431 S.E.2d at 64. "[H]arm or 

prejudice to the right of another person has never been and is 

not now an element of the crime of forgery of public records in 

this Commonwealth." Campbell v. Commonwealth, 246 Va, 174, 184, 

431 S.E.2d 648, 654 (1993). 

 Second, even if the Commonwealth could have charged 

appellant with private records forgery to the prejudice of his 
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ex-wife's rights under Code § 18.2-172, see Linton v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 476 (1825)(involving the forgery 

of a civil bond, where the rights of third parties were 

prejudiced by the defendant's alteration of the bond), it was not 

required to do so. Appellant incorrectly argues that when the 

"locus of harm" is upon a third party's rights, the Commonwealth 

must charge a defendant with forging a private document. The 

cases appellant cites in support of this flawed argument are 

inapposite. In none of the cases that appellant cites was this 

Court or the Supreme Court called on to decide whether the 

defendant was properly charged under the public record forgery 

statute as opposed to the private record forgery statute, or 

vice-versa. See Hanbury v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 182, 122 S.E.2d 

911 (1961); Pope v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 130, 449 S.E.2d 269 

(1994); Deer v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 730, 441 S.E.2d 33 

(1994); Tucker v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 520, 438 S.E.2d 492 

(1993); Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 425 S.E.2d 101 

(1992). 

 Because appellant was properly charged and convicted of 

forging a public document and uttering a forged public document, 

we affirm his convictions. 

Affirmed.