J-S17013-24 

 2024 PA Super 156 

 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

 v. 

AUDLEY D. PRINCE 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1836 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 8, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000279-2020 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. 

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2024 

In this issue of first impression, the Commonwealth appeals the 

judgment of sentence ordering Appellee to serve his sentence of one to seven 

years of incarceration in the county jail, arguing that the trial court was 

required to commit Appellee to a state correctional facility. We disagree with 

the Commonwealth’s analysis of the statutory text. Nonetheless, we agree 

that the requisite factual finding authorizing that commitment is not supported 

by the record. We therefore vacate and remand for resentencing. 

 The facts are straightforward. Appellee was charged with two counts of 

driving under the influence (“DUI”) and several summary offenses. A jury 

found Appellee guilty of violating the controlled substances version of DUI and 

acquitted him of the other count. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence drug 

and alcohol (“D&A”) evaluation, “which recommended no treatment.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/31/23, at 1. The trial court opted to sentence Appellee 
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pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804, which permitted the court to sentence Appellee 

to the county jail instead of state prison if the offender “is determined to be 

in need of additional treatment[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(d). 

The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that § 

3804(d) was legally inoperable due to the evaluator’s finding. The trial court 

denied the motion and the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal. The 

Commonwealth filed a concise statement of issues complained of on appeal 

as ordered by the trial court, and the trial court filed its opinion in response. 

We now address the sole claim: “Did the trial court err by sentencing 

[Appellee] to a county prison sentence pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(d) 

where the evaluation provided for in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3814(2) determined that 

[Appellee] was not in need of further treatment?” Commonwealth’s brief at 

4. 

A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of the 

court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge to 

the legality of the sentence. If no statutory authorization exists 

for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to 

correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. When the 

legality of a sentence is at issue on appeal, our standard of review 

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Mendozajr, 71 A.3d 1023, 1027 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(cleaned up). As this claim implicates the legality of Appellee’s sentence, the 

Commonwealth’s appeal is of right. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(a) (“The defendant or 

the Commonwealth may appeal as of right the legality of the sentence.”). 
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We begin our discussion by addressing how § 3804(d) departs from the 

usual sentencing procedure. This was Appellee’s third DUI conviction within 

ten years.1 The Vehicle Code contains recidivist provisions, with § 3804 

mandating that an individual convicted of violating § 3802(d)2 as a third or 

subsequent DUI offense must “undergo imprisonment of not less than one 

year[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(3)(i). The offense is graded as a felony of the 

third degree. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(b)(4.1)(i) (“An individual . . . who 

violates [§] 3802(c) or (d), commits . . . [a] felony of the third degree if the 

individual has two prior offenses.”). Additionally, the offender must “comply 

with all drug and alcohol treatment requirements imposed under [§§] 3814 

and 3815.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(3)(iii). 

Normally, a minimum period of one year of total confinement must be 

served at a state correctional facility, as opposed to the local jail. Section 

9756 of the Sentencing Code specifies that the minimum sentence imposed 

shall not exceed one half of the maximum sentence imposed, i.e., the 

maximum period must be at least twice the length of the minimum. Thus, 

had the trial judge imposed the bare minimum of one to two years of 

incarceration, Appellee would be committed to the Department of Corrections, 

subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9762(b)(2). 

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1

 Appellee filed a notice of appeal challenging the constitutionality of counting 

his 2011 Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition as a prior offense. We dispose 

of that appeal in a separate memorandum. 

2

 Appellee was convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i). 
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The statute at issue here, § 3804(d), overrides § 9762’s general rule. 

As noted above, in addition to a mandatory term of imprisonment, 

§ 3804(c)(iii) requires the defendant to comply with all drug and alcohol 

treatments imposed under §§ 3814 and 3815 of the Vehicle Code. Within 

§ 3814 (“Drug and alcohol assessment”), the General Assembly mandated an 

initial drug and alcohol assessment in every DUI case under paragraph one, 

and a full assessment pursuant to paragraph two in a subset of cases: 

If a defendant is convicted or pleads guilty or no contest to a 

violation of [§] 3802 (relating to [DUI] of alcohol or controlled 

substance), the following apply prior to sentencing: 

(1) The defendant shall be evaluated under [§] 3816(a) 

(relating to requirements for [DUI] offenders) and any other 

additional evaluation techniques deemed appropriate by the 

court to determine the extent of the defendant’s 

involvement with alcohol or other drug and to assist the 

court in determining what type of sentence would benefit 

the defendant and the public. 

(2) The defendant shall be subject to a full assessment for 

alcohol and drug addiction if any of the following 

subparagraphs apply: 

(i) The defendant, within ten years prior to the offense 

for which sentence is being imposed, has been 

sentenced for an offense under: 

(A) [§] 3802; 

. . . . 

(ii) . . . 

(A) the evaluation under paragraph (1) indicates 

there is a need for counseling or treatment . . . . 

. . . . 
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(4) The assessment under paragraph (2) shall consider 

issues of public safety and shall include recommendations 

for all of the following: 

(i) Length of stay. 

(ii) Levels of care. 

(iii) Follow-up care and monitoring. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3814. 

 The initial assessment referenced by the first paragraph proceeds 

pursuant to § 3816(a), which states, in pertinent part, that the assessment is 

“to assist the court in determining what sentencing, probation or conditions of 

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition would benefit the person or the public.” 

Thus, while the results of the § 3814(1) assessment are not relevant to the 

applicability of § 3804(d), the sentencing court still has that information at its 

disposal. 

With that background information, we have reached the statute at issue 

here, namely § 3804(d), which states in full as follows: 

(d) Extended supervision of court.--If a person is sentenced 

pursuant to this chapter and, after the initial assessment required 

by [§] 3814(1), the person is determined to be in need of 

additional treatment pursuant to [§] 3814(2), the judge shall 

impose a minimum sentence as provided by law and a maximum 

sentence equal to the statutorily available maximum. A sentence 

to the statutorily available maximum imposed pursuant to this 

subsection may, in the discretion of the sentencing court, be 

ordered to be served in a county prison, notwithstanding the 

provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9762 (relating to sentencing 

proceeding; place of confinement). 
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75 Pa.C.S. 3804(d).3 

Here, the trial court sentenced Appellee in accordance with this statute 

and imposed the required minimum one-year period of imprisonment, with a 

maximum sentence of seven years as required for a felony of the third degree,

and then opted to order Appellee to serve the sentence in the county prison. 

The Commonwealth maintains that there was no statutory authorization 

for this sentence. Specifically, it submits that a straightforward plainlanguage analysis illustrates that § 3804(d) cannot apply. The Commonwealth 

rejects the notion that the statute confers upon the trial court discretion to 

conclude that a defendant requires additional treatment. Instead, it contends 

that the trial court may not impose a sentence pursuant to § 3804(d) “where 

the D&A [assessment] determined that the defendant was not in need of 

further treatment.” Commonwealth’s brief at 12 (emphasis in original). The 

Commonwealth further argues that Appellee “was not determined to be in 

need of additional treatment pursuant to [§] 3814(2),” and therefore “the 

remainder of [§] 3804(d) . . . is inapplicable.” Id. at 13. Citing the statutory 

interpretation principle that courts cannot deem statutory language 

superfluous, the Commonwealth asserts that a contrary interpretation reads 

out the “need for additional treatment” component of § 3804(d). See 

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3

 The first clause is not at issue, as Appellee was sentenced under the Vehicle 

Code. See Commonwealth v. Popielarcheck, 190 A.3d 1137, 1144–45 

(Pa. 2018) (holding that § 3804(d) is not implicated when trial court sentences 

defendant to a county intermediate punishment sentence, which is imposed 

under the Sentencing Code). 
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Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1168 (Pa. 2009) (“We are not 

permitted to ignore the language of a statute, nor may we deem any language 

to be superfluous.”). 

Appellee does not suggest that the plain language is in his favor. 

Instead, in a brief argument, he cites the presumption that the General 

Assembly does not intend absurd results. “In ascertaining the intention of the 

General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, 

among others, may be used . . . That the General Assembly does not intend 

a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 

1922(1). He asserts: “It would be nonsensical for the legislature to intend to 

punish [Appellee] more harshly than someone who was in need of treatment, 

merely because at the time of the [D&A] evaluation he was no longer in need 

of treatment.” Appellee’s brief at 13. 

Appellee’s argument follows the conclusion of the trial court, which 

explained in its opinion that the Commonwealth’s interpretation “absurdly, 

and unreasonably, punishes [Appellee] for not needing treatment.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/1/23, at 5. Additionally, we note that at the sentencing 

proceeding, wherein the Commonwealth asserted that the statute does not 

apply, the trial court responded, “Well . . . that’s been our practice in 

Northampton County, for the sentence to be served locally.” N.T. Sentencing, 

2/8/23, at 9. 

The Commonwealth’s challenge to the legality of this sentence “requires 

us to engage in statutory interpretation and, therefore, presents a question of 
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law.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 311 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa. 2024). In 

matters of statutory interpretation, our scope of review is plenary and our 

standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Gerald, 47 A.3d 858, 859 

(Pa.Super. 2012). “The object of all interpretation and construction of 

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 

Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 

1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). 

 For ease of reference, we reproduce the salient portion of the statute at 

issue. The trial court may commit an offender to county prison “If . . . after 

the initial assessment required by section 3814(1), the person is determined 

to be in need of additional treatment pursuant to[§] 3814(2)[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3804(d). The critical question is whether the General Assembly intended, 

as the Commonwealth urges this Court to hold, for the evaluator performing 

the D&A assessment to bind the trial judge to accept his or her decision as to 

whether “additional treatment” is needed. We conclude that it does not, as 

the plain language dictates that the factual determination of the offender’s 

need for additional treatment is for the sentencing judge to render upon 

consideration of the evaluator’s opinion. The Commonwealth’s statutory 

analysis overlooks both the sequential nature of the assessment-thensentencing scheme, as well as the phrasing of the “is determined” language 

within § 3804(d). Reading all these provisions together, as we must, § 3814 

and § 3804(d) interact in such a way that the trial court is legally permitted 

to impose a county sentence in its discretion. 
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As our Supreme Court made clear in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 104 

A.3d 479 (Pa. 2014), “by phrasing the requirement in mandatory language, 

the General Assembly left no doubt that the [a]ssessment is a mandatory part 

of the sentencing scheme that cannot be dispensed with at the sentencing 

court’s discretion.” Id. at 491. The Commonwealth’s argument ignores key 

language in the assessment statutes. Section 3814(1), the initial assessment 

that precedes any DUI sentencing, requires an evaluation “under section 

3816(a)” as well as “any other additional evaluation techniques deemed 

appropriate by the court[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 3814(1). Then, depending on the 

result of that evaluation—or, as here, if the offender is otherwise required to 

do so—the full evaluation pursuant to § 3814(2) occurs. Id. 

The plain text of the statute indicates that the assessments are designed 

to help the court in determining an appropriate sentence. Section 3814(1) 

explicitly provides that the assessment is meant “to determine the extent of 

the defendant’s involvement with alcohol or other drug and to assist the 

court in determining what type of sentence would benefit the defendant and 

the public.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3814(1) (emphasis added). Notably, § 3804(d) 

does not apply based on the results of this assessment, as the statute looks 

only to the results of the § 3814(2) evaluation. See Commonwealth v. 

Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1256 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“The results of [§] 

3814(1)’s initial evaluation do not trigger [§] 3804(d)’s mandatory maximum 

sentence.”). However, a similar purpose underlies the full assessment: “The 

assessment under paragraph (2) shall consider issues of public safety and 
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shall include recommendations” as to length of stay, levels of care, and 

follow-up care and monitoring. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3814(4) (emphasis added). 

The unambiguous language makes clear that the evaluators who 

perform both types of assessments are doing so to help the court fashion an 

appropriate sentence. From its analysis of § 3804(d), it appears that the 

Commonwealth would have us conclude that assistance and recommendations 

are relevant only if the offender needs treatment in the first place. It follows 

that the Commonwealth’s position is that when the assessment concludes that 

no treatment is recommended, there is no corresponding need for “additional” 

treatment and, thus, § 3804(d) does not apply. 

Reexamining § 3804(d) forecloses this reading. The General Assembly

chose the phrase “is determined,” not “has been determined.” See 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3804(d) (providing that if, “after the initial assessment . . . the person is 

determined to be in need of additional treatment,” the judge may, in his or 

her discretion, order the sentence to be served in a county prison). A 

straightforward parsing of this term means that the determination has yet to 

be made. The “after . . . is determined” phrasing indicates that the 

determination does not occur until after both assessments have been 

completed, with “is” telling us that the determination has yet to be made. This 

is broadly consistent with the Taylor Court’s holding that such assessments 

are mandatory, and why that is so. For instance, the Court stated: 

By requiring the full [a]ssessment under certain, specified 

circumstances “prior to sentencing,” [§] 3814(2) plainly and 

unambiguously requires its completion prior to the court’s 
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imposition of the sentence, and demonstrates the legislative 

intent that the sentencing court utilizes the [a]ssessment as a 

sentencing tool in creating a sentence for the benefit of the 

offender and the public. 

Taylor, 104 A.3d at 491. This observation, that a D&A assessment is a “tool” 

for the court to use in deciding what sentence is appropriate, tracks our 

analysis of the statutory language. 

Relatedly, had the General Assembly intended for the D&A evaluator’s 

assessment to be dispositive, it could have used the past tense, e.g., the 

statute could have said “after the initial assessment . . . the person has been 

determined” or “was determined” to be in need of additional treatment. The 

Commonwealth’s suggestion that our interpretation treats some of the 

language of § 3804(d) as surplusage assumes that the evaluator is exclusively 

entitled to decide whether the defendant needs treatment. If, however, the 

trial court decides that issue with the assistance of the evaluator’s input, the 

language is not superfluous. By incorporating the results of the § 3814 

assessment within § 3804(d), the General Assembly instructed the trial court 

to consider the D&A evaluator’s opinions and recommendations. Indeed, this 

is consistent with the overarching legislative mandate to impose a sentence 

that is consistent with “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense 

as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). In making 

that determination, the trial court has, in addition to the results of the D&A 

evaluation, the benefit of a pre-sentence report, the parties’ arguments, and 

whatever the defendant may wish to say at sentencing. 
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One final indicator of legislative intent, related to the preceding 

observation, supports our interpretation. It would be highly unusual for the

General Assembly to delegate the determination of whether an offender 

requires additional treatment to a non-judicial actor.4 For example, in 

Commonwealth v. Elliot, 50 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2012), our Supreme Court held 

that the Parole Board and its agents “cannot impose any condition of 

supervision it wishes, carte blanche. This would, of course, interfere with a 

court’s well-established sentencing authority.” Id. at 1291. However, the 

Board and its agents “may impose conditions of supervision that are germane 

to, elaborate on, or interpret any conditions of probation that are imposed by 

the trial court,” because that framework “maintains the sentencing authority 

solely with a trial court[.]” Id. at 1292. 

We need not decide the lawfulness of delegating to a non-judicial actor 

the power to decide whether Appellee is barred from serving his sentence in 

a county jail. We raise the point only to show that the General Assembly, had 

it intended to make such an unusual departure from entrusting sentencing 

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 It would also raise constitutional questions. While the Commonwealth 

argues only that the trial court may sentence under this statute upon the 

required factual finding, its argument logically extends to the proposition that 

the trial judge must sentence an offender if the evaluator concludes that the 

defendant requires additional treatment. Notably, the statute requires the 

judge to sentence the defendant to the statutory maximum penalty, thus 

implicating Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (“Any fact 

that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be 

submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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decisions to a judge, would surely have expressed that intent in clearer 

language. The evaluator’s role is advisory, not adjudicatory. 

 In sum, the § 3814 assessment statute indicates throughout that the 

evaluators perform their tasks solely to assist the trial court in determining 

what sentence is appropriate. Section 3804(d)’s use of “after . . . is 

determined” is consistent with the evaluator having only an advisory role as 

well as general sentencing practices, whereby the trial court is afforded broad 

discretion to impose a sentence that considers the defendant’s rehabilitative 

needs and the protection of the public. That naturally includes whether the 

offender’s rehabilitative needs are best served through treatment at a local 

facility. If the General Assembly had intended to divest the judge of that 

power, it would have used precise language. We therefore conclude that the 

plain language does not support the Commonwealth’s conclusion that an 

evaluator’s finding is necessary for the statute to apply. The trial court retains 

the authority to impose the sentence notwithstanding the evaluator’s findings. 

 This conclusion raises the question of whether the sentence is legal in 

the absence of that finding. We conclude that this legality of sentence claim 

includes our de novo review of whether the requisite fact exists. As our 

Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 562 

(Pa. 2022), there are “[f]our broad categories” of illegal sentencing claims. 

“The second category encompasses allegations that a sentence was imposed 

without the fulfillment of statutory preconditions to the court's 

sentencing authority.” Id. (emphasis added). Our textual analysis 
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demonstrates that the trial court’s authority is preconditioned on the finding 

of a triggering fact, namely, that the offender is in need of further treatment. 

“In other words, if the sentencing statute at issue conditions the court's 

authority to impose a sanction upon the existence of attendant circumstances, 

and if those circumstances were not present, then the court lacked statutory 

authority to impose the sentence[.]” Id. 

The trial court’s comments at sentencing and its opinion establish that 

the trial court interpreted the statute, as a categorical matter, to authorize a 

sentence at the county jail in all cases. While certain portions of the trial 

court’s analyses suggest that the court implicitly concluded that Appellee was 

not in need of further treatment, in context the trial court may have been 

responding to the Commonwealth’s now-rejected assertion that a drug and 

alcohol evaluator must, as a necessary condition, make that finding. In other 

words, it is not clear that the trial court agreed with our conclusion that the 

trial court’s own factual finding is sufficient. Due to this ambiguity, we remand 

to the trial court for a factual finding regarding Appellee’s need for further 

treatment. If the trial court finds that fact, he shall reimpose the sentence. 

If the trial court finds, after review of all the sentencing considerations 

discussed hereinabove, that Appellee is not in need of further treatment, it 

shall resentence Appellee without reference to § 3804(d). 

Judgment of sentence vacated. Remanded for further proceedings. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 
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Date: 7/24/2024