Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2010-194, 2010-195 & 2010-196 

JANUARY TERM, 2011 

State of Vermont } APPEALED FROM: 

} 

} 

 v. } District Court of Vermont, 

} Unit No. 2, Bennington Circuit 

} 

Todd E. Maddox, Sr. } DOCKET NOS. 918-8-09, 932-8-09 & 

 972-9-09 Bncr 

 

 Trial Judge: David Suntag 

In the above-entitled causes, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant appeals from a district court order finding that he violated two conditions of 

probation and imposing the underlying sentence of eighteen to thirty-six months with credit for 

time served. Defendant contends that one of the probation conditions was void for vagueness 

and consequently that the sentence must be vacated. We affirm. 

In November 2009, defendant pled guilty to several violations of abuse prevention orders 

obtained by his former wife, was sentenced to a total of eighteen to thirty-six months, all 

suspended except for forty-five days, and placed on probation. In early January 2010, 

defendant’s probation officer filed a complaint alleging that defendant had violated a probation 

condition requiring that he inform the officer “of the name and contact information of any person 

with whom you are planning to have a date or with whom you are planning to begin a dating or 

romantic relationship, prior to the date or beginning the relationship.” The complaint was based 

upon a report from an acquaintance of defendant that, on several occasions, defendant had 

appeared without notice at her home and place of employment offering her rides—and on one 

occasion a flower—and had sent her emails asking her to spend time with him. Defendant had 

told the complainant not to say anything about his visits with her because he was not allowed 

contact with females. 

Based on the report, the probation officer met with defendant on January 12, 2009, and 

directed him not to have any contact with the woman in question. Later that month, however, the 

probation officer filed another VOP complaint based upon defendant’s admission that he had 

given the woman a ride in direct contravention of the probation officer’s directive. 

Following a hearing in February 2010, the court found that defendant had committed both 

violations. The court rejected defendant’s assertion that the probation condition prohibiting a 

“dating” or a “romantic” relationship without prior notice was unconstitutionally vague, finding 

that the concept was reasonably clear, and that, in any event, defendant understood the 
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prohibition. The court further found that even if the condition was vague and unenforceable, the 

evidence clearly supported a finding that defendant had committed the additional violation of 

failing to comply with the probation officer’s directive not to contact the complainant, rejecting 

defendant’s claim that the contact was inadvertent. Moreover, the court observed that the latter 

violation was far from de minimus, finding that it was “precisely why he’s on probation,” that he 

“must follow court orders” and had not done so. “[H]e was specifically told not to have contact 

with her, and he did.” 

At the subsequent sentencing hearing in May 2010, the court indicated that it viewed 

imposition of the underlying sentence to be the only viable sentencing option based upon the 

underlying history of physical and violent confrontations that had resulted in the abuseprevention orders in the first place, the numerous violations of those orders that had followed, 

and the intimidating behavior defendant displayed toward the complainant, all of which 

suggested that he was unable to comply with court orders. Based on that history, the court 

concluded that a behavioral-counseling program in prison, followed by a transitional furlough or 

parole program on the outside, was the only reasonable option that remained. Accordingly, the 

court revoked probation and imposed the underlying sentence of eighteen to thirty-six months 

plus credit for time served. 

Defendant renews his claim that the probation condition requiring notice before 

beginning “a dating or romantic relationship” is unconstitutionally vague. He relies on a recent 

federal circuit decision invalidating as unconstitutionally vague a probation condition requiring 

notice before the supervisee enters into a “significant romantic relationship.” United States v. 

Reeves, 591 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2010). The federal court found that “[w]hat makes a 

relationship ‘romantic,’ let alone ‘significant’ in its romantic depth, can be the subject of endless 

debate that varies across generations, regions, and genders” and thus provided insufficient notice 

of the prohibited behavior. Id. at 81. The State responds that Reeves is distinguishable because 

the condition there required the additional showing of a “significant” relationship, and that 

defendant understood the prohibited conduct in any event. 

We are not persuaded that the probation condition at issue failed to provide adequate 

notice to defendant of the conduct prohibited. Unlike Reeves, the probation condition at issue 

here did not contain a qualitative element predicated upon a showing that defendant was seeking 

to initiate a “significant” romantic relationship; it merely required that defendant inform the 

probation officer of his intent to begin a romantic or dating relationship, and we are satisfied that 

these terms were sufficiently clear to put defendant on notice of the conduct subject to the 

requirement. See State v. Danaher, 174 Vt. 591, 593-94 (2002) (mem.) (holding due process 

satisfied where ordinary language of probation condition would put reasonable person on notice 

of conduct prohibited). Moreover, even if the condition were somehow unclear in the abstract, 

the facts here demonstrate that defendant plainly understood that it applied to this relationship, as 

evidenced by his request to the complainant not to say anything about his contact with her. 

Accordingly, we find no infirmity in the finding of a violation. 

Furthermore, the trial court here also found that defendant had unquestionably violated 

the probation officer’s additional order not to contact the complainant, a finding which defendant 

has not challenged on appeal. See State v. Hammond, 172 Vt. 601, 602 (2001) (mem.) (holding 

that defendant may be put on notice as to what may violate probation condition by instructions 
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and directions of probation officer). Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s decision to 

revoke probation and impose the underlying sentence, a decision predicated, in the court’s view, 

on the threatening nature of the underlying criminal behavior, defendant’s demonstrated history 

of noncompliance with court orders, and the need for institutional programming. 

Affirmed. 

 BY THE COURT: 

_______________________________________ 

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice