IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2020 WY 47

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2020

April 6, 2020

CLIFFORD GILES SPRINGSTEAD,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-19-0201

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public 

Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior 

Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney 

General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers 

are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in 

the permanent volume.
1

GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Clifford Springstead was charged with failure to register as a sex offender. He

entered into a plea agreement where in exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to

recommend a two- to three-year prison sentence, suspended in favor of two years’

probation. The agreement incorporated Mr. Springstead’s bond conditions which 

required he not be arrested or cited for a violation of the law and entitled the State to 

deviate from the agreement if Mr. Springstead violated its terms. Before sentencing, Mr. 

Springstead received two citations for criminal trespass and one citation for false 

reporting. The State recommended the maximum sentence of four and one-half to five

years, which the district court imposed. Mr. Springstead appeals, claiming the State 

breached the plea agreement. We affirm. 

ISSUE

[¶2] We rephrase the issue: 

Did Mr. Springstead’s breach of the plea agreement release 

the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced 

sentence?

FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Springstead was charged with failure to register as a sex offender under Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302.

1 At his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. He reached a 

plea agreement with the State under W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B)2 where he agreed to plead 

guilty to one count of failure to register as a sex offender in exchange for the State’s 

recommendation of not less than two years and not more than three years in prison,

suspended in favor of two years of supervised probation. The plea agreement also 

provided:

THE DEFENDANT understands and agrees to obey all laws, 

all court orders, including bond conditions, . . . and shall not 

commit any acts of violence pending sentencing. Defendant’s 

violations of any of these provisions are a basis for the State 

to deviate from the plea agreement. . . . The Defendant agrees 

1 Mr. Springstead’s duty to register arose from his 1989 conviction for first-degree sexual assault. He was 

also convicted of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. 

2 W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B) provides that when a defendant enters a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, 

the State will “[m]ake a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request, for a particular 

sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the 

court[.]”
2

that any violation of this agreement, any laws, or any court 

order, including bond conditions . . . may entitle the State to 

withdraw its sentencing recommendation and that the 

Defendant shall NOT be allowed to withdraw the plea(s) 

entered. 

(First and second emphasis added.) One of the conditions of Mr. Springstead’s bond was 

that he “not be arrested or cited for any violation of the law other than minor traffic 

offenses.” (Emphasis added.) At a change of plea hearing, after Mr. Springstead

acknowledged that he understood the terms of the agreement, the district court entered his

guilty plea. 

[¶4] Following the change of plea and before the sentencing hearing, Mr. Springstead 

received a citation for criminal trespass. The State moved to revoke his bond and the 

court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. By the time of his bond revocation hearing, 

Mr. Springstead had received two additional citations—one for criminal trespass and one 

for false reporting.3

 At that hearing, the State announced that it “would not be standing 

behind” the plea agreement. The State, later, filed a “Notice of State’s Intent to Deviate 

from Plea Agreement” making clear that it would seek the maximum sentence for Mr. 

Springstead. Mr. Springstead filed no response or objection. 

[¶5] At sentencing, the State recommended that Mr. Springstead be sentenced to four to 

five years in prison. Mr. Springstead urged the district court to reject the State’s 

recommendation and to ignore his pending misdemeanor citations. He did not argue that 

the sentencing recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement. Instead, Mr. 

Springstead conceded that the plea agreement was now inapplicable and said that he was 

“not going to necessarily ask that the Court follow [the original] recommendation.” He

argued for a sentence of four and one-half to five years, suspended in favor of five years’ 

probation. The court sentenced Mr. Springstead to four and one-half to five years in 

prison. Mr. Springstead filed a timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Did Mr. Springstead’s breach of the plea agreement release the State from its 

obligation to recommend a reduced sentence?

[¶6] Mr. Springstead argues that the State breached the plea agreement by refusing to 

recommend a two- to three-year sentence, suspended in favor of probation. He also 

claims there was no breach of the agreement because he had not been found guilty of the 

3 The motion for bond revocation was based on the first citation for criminal trespass. The district court 

acknowledged all three citations at the bond revocation hearing and again at the sentencing.
3

cited conduct; the State could not deviate from the agreement but was required instead to 

withdraw from it prior to sentencing; and the agreement was, essentially, a contract of 

adhesion. We reject these arguments. We find that Mr. Springstead violated the plea 

agreement by receiving citations in contravention of his bond conditions, and his breach 

released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence. 

[¶7] Generally, we review the question of whether the State violated a plea agreement 

de novo. Mendoza v. State, 2016 WY 31, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d 886, 894 (Wyo. 2016); Ford v. 

State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 8, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003); Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133, 

¶ 5, 53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo. 2002). “However, when a party fails to raise the issue of 

breach of a plea agreement with the district court, we review the alleged breach for plain 

error.” Christensen v. State, 2010 WY 95, ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1229, 1230 (Wyo. 2010); see 

also Fernandez v. State, 2006 WY 8, ¶¶ 18–19, 126 P.3d 111, 115–16 (Wyo. 2006). 

“[P]lain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) 

there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming 

the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him.” Mercer v. 

State, 2012 WY 54, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d 1100, 1102 (Wyo. 2012) (citations omitted). Mr. 

Springstead did not raise the issue of the State’s breach of the plea agreement or raise any 

of his other arguments to the district court. We therefore apply the plain error standard of 

review. Id.

[¶8] Under plain error, the appellant must first establish that “the record clearly shows 

the incident alleged as error[.]” Bazzle v. State, 2019 WY 18, ¶ 28, 434 P.3d 1090, 1097 

(Wyo. 2019). Here, the record clearly reflects that the State declined to stand behind the 

plea agreement in recommending the maximum sentence.

[¶9] We turn next to the question of whether the error transgressed a clear and 

unequivocal rule of law. Mercer, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d at 1102. A plea agreement is a contract 

between the State and the defendant. Mendoza, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d at 895 (quoting Deeds v.

State, 2014 WY 124, ¶ 14, 335 P.3d 473, 478 (Wyo. 2014)). As such, “[p]rinciples of 

general contract law guide our analysis of the [parties’] obligations under the agreement.” 

Gibbs v. State, 2008 WY 79, ¶ 10, 187 P.3d 862, 865 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted). 

[¶10] “As in a contract, courts will not release a party from its obligations under a plea 

agreement unless another party materially and substantially breaches the agreement.” 

Montano v. State, 2019 WY 34, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2019). 

A material or substantial breach is one that goes to the whole 

consideration of the agreement. Several factors are relevant 

to whether a breach is material or substantial, including the 

extent to which the non-breaching party will be deprived of 

the benefit it reasonably expected and the extent to which the 
4

breaching party’s conduct comports with the standards of 

good faith and fair dealing.

Schade, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d at 554 (quoting Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061,

1071 (Wyo. 2001)). To determine whether a party has breached a plea agreement, we 

“(1) examine the nature of the promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the 

defendant’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered.” 

Montano, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d at 842 (quoting Mendoza, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d at 895). 

[¶11] The first issue we must resolve is whether Mr. Springstead’s conduct constituted a 

material and substantial breach of the plea agreement, releasing the State from its

performance. In determining whether a breach occurred, we begin by examining the 

terms of the agreement. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 842. The plea agreement required 

Mr. Springstead to “obey all laws [and] all court orders, including bond conditions.” 

(Emphasis added.) The bond required, among other things, that Mr. Springstead “not be 

arrested or cited for any violation of the law other than minor traffic offenses.” The plea 

agreement included a provision that Mr. Springstead’s violation of any provision of the 

agreement was a basis for the State to deviate from it and that violation “may entitle the 

State to withdraw its sentencing recommendation . . . .” The nature of the promise was 

clear. When language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the agreement according to 

its terms without looking beyond the four corners of the contract. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 

P.3d at 842 (quoting Mendoza, ¶ 27, 368 P.3d at 895). 

[¶12] It is uncontested that Mr. Springstead received three citations after he entered into

the plea agreement with the State, in violation of his bond conditions. This conduct went 

“to the whole consideration of the agreement.” Browning, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d at 1071. It

“deprived [the State] of the benefit it reasonably expected”—namely, that Mr.

Springstead would comply with the agreement and receive no citations for violation of

the law in exchange for its recommendation of a reduced sentence. Id. It is well

established that “a defendant will be held to the clear terms of a lawful plea agreement.” 

Henry v. State, 2015 WY 156, ¶ 13, 362 P.3d 785, 789 (Wyo. 2015). Mr. Springstead 

materially and substantially breached the plain terms of the agreement. “It is axiomatic 

that, if a defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement, the state is not bound by that 

agreement.” Schade, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d at 555. The State did not violate a rule of law by 

deviating from the plea agreement in the face of Mr. Springstead’s breach, so we need

not reach the last prong of plain error—whether Mr. Springstead was materially 

prejudiced.

[¶13] Mr. Springstead raises several other arguments. He contends that the State did not 

provide proof that he breached the plea agreement, ignoring the copy of his citation 

attached to the State’s petition to revoke his bond conditions. Mr. Springstead 

alternatively claims that a citation alone, without an underlying adjudication, does not

prove guilt and therefore does not establish a violation of his bond conditions. We defer 
5

to the plain and unambiguous language of the plea agreement. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d 

at 842. The plea agreement required compliance with the bond conditions, one of which 

was that Mr. Springstead not be cited for any violation of the law. This Court has held 

that bond violations breach a plea agreement despite their being “unproven” at the time of 

sentencing. Gibbs, ¶¶ 6–7, 187 P.3d at 864–65. 

[¶14] Mr. Springstead next argues that the State’s remedy was to move to withdraw the 

plea agreement, not to deviate from it. This argument also overlooks the language of the 

agreement providing that the State could deviate from the agreement if Mr. Springstead 

violated its terms. The State’s “Notice of State’s Intent to Deviate from Plea Agreement” 

put Mr. Springstead on notice that the agreement would no longer control the sentencing 

recommendation. We enforce a plea agreement under the principles of contract law and 

adhere to the four corners of the agreement. Montano, ¶ 14, 437 P.3d at 842. While the 

agreement permitted the State to withdraw in the event of Mr. Springstead’s violation, it 

did not require withdrawal.

[¶15] In his final argument, Mr. Springstead contends that the plea agreement contained 

boilerplate terms and was analogous to a contract of adhesion, similar to insurance 

contracts. “A contract of adhesion is one in which one party to the agreement has little or 

no bargaining power to vary the terms thereof.” Durdahl v. Nat’l Safety Assocs., Inc., 

988 P.2d 525, 529 (Wyo. 1999). “Because insurance policies represent contracts of 

adhesion where the insured has little or no bargaining power to vary the terms, if the 

language is ambiguous, the policy is strictly construed against the insurer,” but “the 

language will not be ‘tortured’ to create an ambiguity.” Hurst v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. 

Ins. Co., 2017 WY 104, ¶ 12, 401 P.3d 891, 895 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting N. Fork Land & 

Cattle, LLLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2015 WY 150, ¶ 14, 362 P.3d 341, 346 (Wyo. 

2015)). We find no ambiguity in the plain language of the plea agreement. Mr. 

Springstead indicated he read and understood the terms of the agreement and was 

represented by counsel. Mr. Springstead knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea 

agreement which comported with the provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 11. See Henry, ¶ 18, 362 

P.3d at 790. A valid plea agreement under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure is 

not, per se, a contract of adhesion. 

CONCLUSION

[¶16] Mr. Springstead’s failure to comply with the bond conditions contained in the plea 

agreement released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence. His 

remaining arguments are without merit. Affirmed.