### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 20 WY 47

APRIL TERM, A.D. 20 20

April 6, 2020

CLIFFORD GILES SPRINGSTEAD,

Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee (Plaintiff). S

- 19

- 0201

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie Coun t y The Honor able Steven K. Sharpe , Judge

Representing Appellant:

Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public

Defender ; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel ; David E. W estling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

.

Rep resentin g A ppellee: Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig , Deputy Attorney General; Joshu a C. Eames , S en ior Assistant Attorney General

.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and F OX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal re v is ion before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of a n y typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final p u bl ication in the permanent volume.1 GRAY , Justice.

[¶1] Clifford Springstead was charged with failure to register as a sex offender . He entered into a plea agreement where i n exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to

recommend a two

- to thre e

- year p r ison sentence , suspended in favor of two years ’ probation

. The agreement incorporated Mr. Springstead’s bond conditions which required he not be arrested or cited for a violation of the law and entitled the State to

deviate fr om the agreement if Mr. Spri n gstead violated its terms

. Before sentencing, Mr. Springstead received two citations for criminal trespass and one citation for false reporting. T he State recommend ed the maximum sentence of four and one

- half t o five

years , which the district court impo s ed

. Mr. Springstead appeals, claiming the State breached the plea agreement

. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] We rephrase the issue :

Did Mr. Springstead’s breach of the plea agreement release the State from its oblig at i on to recommend a reduced

sentence ?

FACT S

[¶3] Mr. Springstead was charged with failure to register as a sex offender under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7

- 19

- 302

. 1 At his arraignment

, he en tered a plea of not guilty

. He reached a plea agreement with the Sta t e under W

. R

. C r .P. 11(e)(1)(B) 2 where he agreed to pl ead guilty to one count of failure to r egis te r as a sex offender i n exchange for the State ’s

recommendation of not less than two years and not more than th ree years in prison

, suspended in favor of two y e ars of supervised probation

. The plea agreement als o provided :

THE D EFEN DANT understands and agrees to obey all laws, all court orders, including bond conditions

, . . . and shall not commit any acts of violence pending sentencin g

. Defendant’s violations of any of these provisions are a basis for the Stat e to deviate from the plea agreement

. . . . The Defendant agrees

1 Mr. Spr ingstead’s d uty to register a rose from his 1989 conviction for first

- degree sexual assaul t. He was

also convicted of attempted second

- degree murder, a g gravated robbery, and kidnapping.

2 W.R.Cr. P. 11(e)(1)(B ) provides t hat when a defendant enter s a guil ty plea pursuant to a plea agr eement,
the State will “ [m] ake a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant ’ s reques t , for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendatio n or reque st shall not be binding upon the court[.]”2 that any violation of this agreement, any laws, or any court order, including bond conditions

. . . may entitle t h e State to withdraw its sentencing recommendation and that the

Defendant shal l NOT be allowed t o wi thdraw the plea(s )

entered.

( F irst and second emphasis added

. ) O ne of the conditions of Mr. Spring stead ’s bond was

that he “ not b e arrested or cited for any violation of the law other than minor traffic

offenses .” ( E mphasis added

. ) At a chang e of plea hea ring, after Mr. Springstead acknowledged that he understood the terms of the agreement

, the district court en t ered his guilty plea

.

[¶4] Following the chang e of plea and before the sentencing hearing

, Mr. Springstead

received a cita tion for criminal trespass

. The State moved to re v oke his bond and the

court issued a bench warran t for his arrest

. By t he t ime of his bond revocation hearin g , Mr. Springstead had received two additional citations

— one for criminal trespass and one for fa lse reporting. 3 At th at hearing

, t he State announced that it “would not be s tanding

behind ” the plea agreem ent

. The State

, later

, filed a “Notice of State ’ s Intent to Deviate from Plea Agreement” making clear that it would seek the maximum sentence for M r. Spring stead

. Mr . Sp ringstead filed no response or objectio n.

[¶5] At sentencing, t he State recommended that Mr. Springstead be sentenced to four to
five years in prison. Mr. Springstead urged the district court to reject the State’s

recom mend ation and t o ignore his pending misdemeanor c itations

. He did not argue that

the sentencing recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement

. Instead, M r. Springstead conceded that the plea agreement was now inapplicable and said that he was

“ not going to necessar ily as k that the Court follow [the original] recommendation

. ” H e argued for a sentenc e of four and one

- half to five years , suspended in favor of fi ve years’ probation

. The court sentenced Mr. Springstead to four and one

- half to five years in prison

. Mr. Springstead filed a timely appe a l.

DISCUSSION

Did Mr. Springstead’s breach of the plea agreement rele ase t he State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence ?

[¶6] Mr. Springstead argu es that the State breached the plea agreement by refusing to

r ecommend a t wo

- to th ree

- year sentence

, suspended in favor of probation

. He also

claims there was no brea ch o f the agreement because he had not been found guilty of the

3 T he motion for bond revocation was based on the first cit ation for criminal trespass

. T he district court acknowledg ed all thr e e citations at the bond revocation hearing and again at the sentencing

.3 cited conduct ; the State co uld not deviate from the agreement but was required instead to
withdra w from it prior to sentencing ; and the agreement was, essentially, a contract of

adhesion. W e reje c t these arguments

. W e find that Mr. Springstead violated the plea
agreement by receiving citations in contravention of his bond conditions

, and his breach

r eleased the State from its obligatio n to recommend a reduced sentence

.

[¶7] Generally, we review the question of whether the State violated a plea agreement

de novo. Mendoza v. State , 2016 W Y 31, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d 886, 894 (Wyo. 2016); Ford v.

Stat e , 2003 WY 6 5, ¶ 8, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003); Schade v. State , 2002 WY 133, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo

. 20 0 2). “ However, when a party fails to raise the issue of breach of a plea agreement with the district court, we review the alleged breach for plai n

error. ” C hristensen v. State , 2010 WY 95, ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1229, 1230 (Wyo. 2010) ; see also Fernandez v. S tate

, 2006 WY 8, ¶ ¶ 1 8

– 19, 126 P.3d 111 , 115

– 16 (Wyo. 2006)

.

“ [ P ] lain error exists when 1) the record is cle ar about the incident alleged as error; 2 )

there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming

the error wa s de n ied a substantial right whi ch materially prejudiced him. ” Mercer v.

State , 2012 WY 54, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d 11 00, 1102 (Wyo. 2012) (citations omitted)

. Mr. Sprin g stead did not raise the issue of the State’s breach of the plea agreement or raise any of his othe r arguments to the district court . We therefore apply the plain error standard of

review. Id

.

[¶8] Under plain error

, the appel l ant must first est ablish that “the record clearly shows the incident alleged as error [

. ] ” Bazzl e v. State

, 2019 WY 18, ¶ 28, 434 P.3d 1090, 1097 (Wyo. 2019). Here, the record clearly reflects that the State declined to stand behind the plea agreement in r e commend ing the m ax imum sentence.

[¶9] We turn next to the question o f wh e ther the error transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Mercer

, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d at 1102

. A plea agreement is a contract
between the State and the d e fendant

. Mendoza

, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d at 89 5 ( quot ing Deeds v. State , 2014 WY 124 , ¶ 14, 335 P.3d 473, 4 78 (Wyo. 2014) ). As such, “ [ p ] rinciples of general contract law guide our analysi s of the [ parties’ ] obligations under the agreement. ”

Gibbs v. State , 2008 WY 7 9 , ¶ 10 , 187 P.3d 862, 8 65 ( Wyo. 2008) (c itations omitted)

.

[¶10] “ As in a contract, courts will not release a party from i ts obligations under a plea agreement unless another party materially and substantially breaches the agreement .”

Montano v. State , 2019 WY 34, ¶ 13, 437 P. 3 d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2 01 9)

.

A material or subs tantial breach is one that goes to the whole

considera tion of the agreement. Several factors are relevant to whether a breach is material or substantial, including the

extent to which the non

- breaching party w i ll be deprived of

th e be nef it it reasonably ex pected and the extent to which the4 breaching party ’ s conduct comports with the standards of good faith and fair dealing.

Schade

, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d at 554 (quoting Browning v. State , 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P. 3d 1061,

1071 (Wyo. 2001) )

. To determine whether a party has breached a plea agreement, we

“ (1) examine the nature of the promise; and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the

defendant ’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time the plea was en tered .”

Montano

, ¶ 13, 437 P .3d at 842 (quoting Mendoza

, ¶ 26, 368 P.3d at 895 ).

[¶11] The first issue we must resolve is whether Mr. Springstead’s conduct constituted a

material and subst antial breach of the plea agreement

, releasing the State from its performance

. In determining whe th er a breach occurred, we begin by examining the terms of the agreement. Montan o , ¶ 1 4 , 437 P.3d at 842

. The plea agreeme nt required Mr. Springstead to “obey all laws [and] all court orders

, including bond conditions

. ” ( E mphasis adde d

. ) The bond requi re d , among other things, that Mr. Sp ring stead “ not be

arrest ed or cited for any violation of the law othe r than minor traffic offenses .” The plea

agreemen t included a provision that M r. Springstea d ’s violation of any provision of the
agreement was a basis f or the State to deviate from it and t hat violation “ may entitle the

State to withd r aw its sentencing recommendation . . . .” The nature of the promise was

clear

. When la n guage is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the agreement according to

its terms wi th out looking b eyond the four corners of the contract. Mont a no , ¶ 1 4 , 437

P.3d a t 842 (quoting Mendoza

, ¶ 2 7

, 3 6 8 P.3d a t 8 9 5 )

.

[¶12] It is uncontested that Mr. Springstead re c eived three cita tions after he entered into the plea agreement with the Stat e , in vi ol at ion of hi s bond con ditions. This conduct went

“ to the whole consideration of the agreement. ” Browning

, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d at 1071

. It “depr i ved [the State] of the benefit it reasonably expected”

— namel y, that Mr. Springstead would comply with the agreem en t and receive no citations for violation of

the law in exchange for its recommendation of a reduced sentence. Id. It is well

establishe d th a t “ a d efendant will be held to the clear terms of a lawful plea agreement .” Henry v. State , 2015 WY 156, ¶ 13, 36 2 P.3d 785, 789 (Wyo. 2015)

. Mr. Springstead materially and substa ntially breached the plain terms of the agreement

. “It is axiomatic

t hat, if a d efendant fails to comply with a plea agreement, the state is not bound by that agreement.” Schade

, ¶ 8 , 5 3 P .3 d at 555

. The State did not violate a rule of law by

devi ating from the plea agreement in the face of Mr. Sp r ingstead’s breach, so we nee d

not reach the last prong of plain error

— whether Mr. Springstead was materially prejudiced.

[¶13] Mr. Springstead rai se s several other arguments

. He contends that the State did not

pro vide proof that he breach ed the plea agreement

, ign o ring the copy of his citation attached to the State’s petition to revoke his bond conditions. Mr . Springstead

alt ernatively claims that a citation alone, without an underly ing adjudication, does not prove guilt and therefore does not establis h a violatio n of his bond conditions. W e defer5 to the plain and unambiguous language of the plea agree men t

. Montano

, ¶ 1 4 , 437 P.3d

at 84 2

. T he pl ea agreement r e quired complianc e with the bond c onditions, one of which was that Mr. Springstea d not be cited for an y violation of the law. T his Court has held

th at bond violation s breach a plea agreement de spite their being “unproven” at the time of

sent e ncing. Gibbs

, ¶ ¶ 6

– 7 , 187 P.3d at 864

– 65

.

[¶14] Mr. Springstead ne x t argues that the State’s remedy was to move to withdraw the plea agreement

, not to deviate from it. This argument also overlooks the language of the
agreement provid in g that the State coul d deviate from the agreement if Mr. Spr i ngstead

violated its terms. The State ’ s “Notice of State’s Intent to De viate from Plea A greement”
put Mr. S pringstead on notice th at the agreement would no longer control the se n tencing

recommendation. We enforce a plea agreemen t under the principles of contract law and adhere to the four corners of the agreement. Montano

, ¶ 1 4 , 437 P.3d at 842

. While the agreement permitted the State to with draw in the event of Mr. Springstead’s violation, it did not require with drawal.

[¶15] In hi s final argument, Mr. Springstead contends that the plea agreement contained boilerplate terms and was analogous to a cont ract of adhesion , s imilar to insurance

contract s

. “A contract of adhesion is one in which one party to the ag r eement ha s little or no bargaining power to vary the terms thereof.” Durdahl v. Nat ’ l Safety Ass o cs., Inc

. , 988 P .2d 525 , 529 (Wyo. 1999). “ B ecause insurance policies represent contracts of adhesion where the insured has little or no bargaining power to vary the terms, if the language is ambiguous, the policy is strictly construe d against the insure r ,” but “ the lang uage wi ll not be ‘tortured’ to create an ambiguity.” H urst v. Metro. Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co

. , 2017 WY 104, ¶ 12, 401 P.3d 891, 895 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting N. Fork Land &
Cattle, LLLP v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.

, 2015 WY 150, ¶ 14, 362 P.3d 341

, 346 (Wyo. 2015) )

. W e find no ambiguity in the plain la nguage of the plea agreement. Mr. Springstead indicated he read and u nderstood the terms of the agre e ment and was represented by counsel. Mr. Springstead knowingly and voluntarily entered into a pl ea agreement whic h com po rted with the provisions of W.R.C r.P. 11. See Henry

, ¶ 18, 362

P.3d at 790

. A valid plea ag r eement under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedu re is

not, per se , a contract of ad hesion.

CONCLUSION

[¶16] Mr. S prin gstead ’s failure to comply with the bond conditions contained in the p lea
agreement released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence

. His remaining arguments are wit hout merit. Affirmed.