Filed 5/31/24 Maraziti v. Wilmington Trust, Nat. Assn. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

GABRIELA MARAZITI, as Successor 

Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

D081629

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-

00006282-CU-OR-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Webb & Carey and Kevin Alan Carey for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Fidelity National Law Group and Kevin R. Broersma for Defendant and 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from foreclosure proceedings initiated by 

Wilmington Trust, National Association (Wilmington) on a residential 

property (the Property) deeded, at the time, to The Maraziti Family Trust

(the Trust). Wilmington recorded a notice of default and election to sell the 
2

Property in late 2016. In early 2017, Jaclyn Preciado, acting as trustee of the 

Trust, filed a complaint against Wilmington seeking quiet title, among other 

causes of action. 

In January 2020, Wilmington filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings in which it asserted the grant deed conveying title to the Trust (the 

Grant Deed) was void because it conveyed title to the Trust itself and not to

Preciado as trustee. Preciado quickly obtained a judgment reforming the 

Grant Deed to name herself, as trustee of the Trust, as the grantee, and the 

trial court denied Wilmington’s motion. Shortly thereafter, Gabriela Maraziti

substituted in as the successor trustee and filed a supplemental complaint

adding factual allegations regarding the reformation. Wilmington filed a 

second motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which it argued the new 

allegations did not relate back to the original complaint and all causes of 

action were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the 

motion and entered a judgment of dismissal. 

Maraziti filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, which the 

trial court denied, and she now appeals from both the judgment of dismissal

and the ruling denying her subsequent motions. She asserts the trial court 

erred by concluding that the supplemental complaint did not relate back to 

the original complaint and that the statute of limitations barred her claims. 

Because we agree that the supplemental complaint relates back to the 

original complaint for the purpose of the statutes of limitations, we find that

the trial court erred in concluding that Maraziti’s claims are time-barred. 

Accordingly, we reverse. 
3

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Prior Ownership and Acquisition of Loans 

The previous owners, Rodolfo De La Rosa and his wife Amparo Haldos 

Turnauckas (collectively, the De La Rosas) purchased the Property in 2003

for $392,000. The De La Rosas took out a loan from Accredited Home 

Lenders, Inc. to purchase the Property, and then leased the Property to their 

real estate broker, Cynthia Geniza, who agreed to cover the monthly 

payments on the loan. In 2006, while living on the Property and allegedly 

without the De La Rosas’s knowledge or consent, Geniza changed the mailing 

address for loan-related document to the Property address. She then

refinanced twice, resulting in two new loans from Sierra Pacific Mortgage 

Inc. (Sierra Pacific) secured by the Property, in the respective amounts of 

$417,000 and $200,000.1 

The De La Rosas claim they first discovered the fraud in 2009, when

Sierra Pacific recorded a notice of default against the Property. The De La 

Rosas filed for bankruptcy that September, and filed a complaint against 

Sierra Pacific and several other related parties in the superior court a few 

months later. 

In a declaration filed in the superior court action, Rodolfo De La Rosa 

averred that he and his wife did not receive any proceeds from the two loans

held by Sierra Pacific. He said Geniza admitted she obtained the loans 

through fraudulent means and used the proceeds to purchase additional 

1 Wilmington contends there is evidence the De La Rosas were aware of 

and consented to this scheme. Because this appeal arises from a judgment on 

the pleadings, we accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true. (See 

Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 

Cal.App.4th 194, 198 (Lance Camper).)
4

properties, which she intended to “flip.” She was not successful, though, and 

“had no money.” Geniza likewise admitted, during a sworn deposition, that 

she forged the De La Rosas’ signatures to fraudulently secure the two 

refinance loans. 

The superior court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the sale 

of the Property in September 2010, but later dismissed the action because the 

claims had not been released by the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy 

trustee abandoned any interest in the Property in May 2012. The report of 

abandonment listed the fair market value of the Property as $330,000 and 

the related debt as $657,864. The bankruptcy was terminated a year later, in 

May 2013.

B. Transfers to the Trust and Wilmington 

In March 2014, the De La Rosas executed the Grant Deed, transferring

title to the Property to “The Maraziti Family Trust,” “[s]ubject to existing 

taxes, assessments, liens, [and] encumbrances,” “for and in consideration of 

One Dollar ($1.00) and other good and valuable consideration.” Richard 

Maraziti, the sole and only settlor of the Trust, prepared the Grant Deed. 

Richard had designated his oldest daughter, Preciado, as the sole trustee of 

the Trust and she was serving in that role when the Grant Deed was 

executed. Around the same time, Sierra Pacific assigned its interest in the 

underlying deed of trust to Wilmington, as successor indenture trustee to 

Citibank, N.A.

C. Notice of Default and Subsequent Litigation

On November 17, 2016, Wilmington recorded a notice of default and 

election to sell the Property. In January 2017, counsel for the Trust sent a 

letter to counsel for Wilmington. He said he represented the Trust, the 

successor-in-interest to the De La Rosas (the purported borrowers), and 
5

asserted the underlying promissory note and deed of trust were invalid and 

void, “having been fraudulently procured by a third party without the 

knowledge or consent of the [p]urported [b]orrowers.” He noted that the 

superior court had granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the 2009 

foreclosure proceedings, and that the Trust now had standing to claim 

wrongful foreclosure based on the void note and deed of trust. The letter did 

not mention Preciado as trustee.

On February 21, 2017, Preciado filed a complaint, in her capacity as 

trustee of the Trust, against Wilmington and several other related parties for 

wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instrument pursuant to Civil Code 

section 3412, quiet title, declaratory relief, and recission against Wilmington

(the Wrongful Foreclosure Action). In the complaint, Preciado acknowledged

that Wilmington had recorded the notice of default and election to sell, but 

asserted the underlying notes were fraudulently procured and the underlying 

trust deed was invalid as a matter of law.

A few weeks later, Preciado filed an ex parte application for a 

temporary restraining order and a motion for preliminary injunction. In 

both, Preciado alleged she had standing as the successor-in-interest to the De 

La Rosas with respect to all legal and equitable rights pertaining to the 

Property. In its opposition, Wilmington asserted Preciado’s claims were 

barred by res judicata, based on the prior litigation, and the statute of 

limitations. Wilmington did not assert that the Grant Deed was a nullity or 

that Preciado did not have standing. 

On September 15, 2017, the trial court, the honorable Eddie C. 

Sturgeon presiding, granted Preciado’s motion for a preliminary injunction,

precluding Wilmington from foreclosing on the Property during the pendency 

of the litigation.
6

D. Wilmington’s First Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the

Resulting Reformation of the Grant Deed

It is unclear from the record on appeal what happened in the case over 

the next two years. On January 13, 2020, Wilmington filed a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. Wilmington asserted Preciado could not pursue 

the asserted claims because the underlying Grant Deed was a legal nullity 

that granted title to the Trust—a collection of assets incapable of holding 

title—and not a trustee. The hearing for the motion was originally set for 

February 7, 2020.

Wilmington submitted a declaration from its attorney along with the 

motion, stating that he communicated with Preciado’s attorney regarding the 

basis for the motion for judgment on the pleadings in October 2019 but the 

parties were unable to reach a resolution. Around that same time, on 

October 17, 2019, each of the De La Rosas executed a declaration stating they 

intended to transfer ownership of the Property to the trustee of the Trust on 

March 6, 2014.

On January 17, 2020, Preciado filed a petition for reformation of the 

Grant Deed under a separate case number (the Reformation Action). The 

named respondents were Richard Maraziti, the Trust, and Does 1 to 10. 

Wilmington was not named in the petition, or otherwise notified of the 

proceedings. On January 31, 2020, Preciado, Richard Maraziti, and the Trust

filed a joint stipulation for entry of judgment in the Reformation Action. 

They stipulated that Richard Maraziti was the scrivener of the Grant Deed

and that he inadvertently listed the Trust, as opposed to Preciado as trustee 

of the Trust, as the grantee. They also attached a separate scrivener’s 

affidavit from Richard attesting to the error.

Preciado also submitted the declarations from the De La Rosas and the 

scrivener’s affidavit from Richard Maraziti in opposition to Wilmington’s 
7

motion for judgment on the pleadings in the Wrongful Foreclosure Action. 

Preciado asserted that, even if legally void, the Grant Deed could be reformed

and requested leave to amend the original complaint “to add a cause of action 

seeking a judicial reformation of said Grant Deed.” She did not mention that 

she had filed the separate reformation petition.

On February 5, 2020, the trial court in the Reformation Action, the 

honorable John S. Meyer presiding, issued a stipulated judgment of 

reformation. The judgment stated the Grant Deed “is reformed so as to 

correctly state the name of Grantee on the face of said instrument thereon to 

be ‘Jaclyn Preciado, Trustee of The Maraziti Family Trust.” 

Just two days later, and apparently unaware of the judgment in the 

Reformation Action, Judge Sturgeon issued a tentative ruling granting 

Wilmington’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in the Wrongful 

Foreclosure Action. In the tentative, the court denied Preciado’s request to

take judicial notice of the De La Rosa declarations and a new, subsequently 

executed grant deed, and stated, “[a]t this time, the deed upon which plaintiff 

holds title [h]as been challenged as void and there is no pending case or 

amendment to reform the deed.” The court concluded, “[Wilmington’s] 

motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted because the deed is void and 

[Preciado] is a stranger to title. In light [sic] [Preciado] paid $1.00 for the 

property and has had control of the property for over three years, defendant 

would be prejudiced by allowing leave to amend at this time.”

At the hearing that same day, counsel for Preciado alerted the court 

(and Wilmington) for the first time to the existence of the recently acquired 

judgment of reformation. Wilmington asserted it was a necessary party and 

should have been named in the reformation action. The court noted that it 

had previously thought its decision on the motion for judgment on the 
8

pleadings was “straightforward” but that the reformation judgment was “a 

concern for the court,” and took the matter under submission. 

Judge Sturgeon set the matter for additional briefing, but the 

proceedings were delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. On September 11, 

2020, Judge Sturgeon issued a tentative ruling denying Wilmington’s motion 

for judgment on the pleadings. The court noted the judgment of reformation 

and stated “[t]here was no appeal, nor a request to intervene or set aside the 

judgment. Accordingly, the judgment is final and binding on the two parties, 

the grantee and the grantors. [¶] The court declined to consider the 

reformed deed void.” That same day, the court continued the motion hearing 

to January 22, 2021. 

Wilmington then filed a motion to intervene and vacate the judgment 

in the Reformation Action. Wilmington asserted the trial court could not 

issue a judgment reforming the Grant Deed nunc pro tunc in Wilmington’s 

absence. Wilmington argued that Preciado had to choose; she could have a 

judgment that could not be used nunc pro tunc against Wilmington, or she

could “attempt to obtain a nunc pro tunc judgment fairly and honestly to 

establish standing to challenge Wilmington’s lien” by naming Wilmington in 

the action. 

On January 22, 2021, Judge Meyer denied Wilmington’s motion to 

intervene in the Reformation Action. The court explained that the 

reformation of the Grant Deed did not affect Wilmington’s security interest as 

a lienholder and thus Wilmington was not a necessary party. The court did 

not address whether the judgment of reformation was nunc pro tunc. 

Wilmington did not appeal that ruling. 

On March 5, 2021, Judge Sturgeon denied Wilmington’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings in the Wrongful Foreclosure Action. The court 
9

noted that the judgment in the Reformation Action was final and declined to 

consider the reformed deed void.

E. Substitution of Gabriela Maraziti as Successor Trustee and Motion to

File a Supplemental Amended Complaint

In May 2022, Richard Maraziti executed a declaration stating that 

Preciado had resigned as trustee of the Trust, and that he had designated his 

younger daughter, Gabriela Maraziti, as the successor trustee. In June, 

Preciado filed an ex parte application seeking to substitute Maraziti as the 

plaintiff, to shorten time to amend the complaint, and to clarify a previous 

order on the 5-year dismissal statute. The trial court granted the request to 

substitute Maraziti as the plaintiff and set a hearing on the other motions.

In advance of the hearing, Maraziti filed a memorandum of points and 

authorities in support of her motion to file and serve a “supplemental first 

amended complaint.” Maraziti stated that she was seeking to add material 

facts which arose “subsequent to the filing of the original Complaint on 

02/21/2017.” The proposed additions included facts regarding the 

reformation of the Grant Deed, an allegation that the reformed deed was 

retroactive back to the original date of recording the original Grant Deed, and 

facts related to the alleged tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Wilmington opposed the motion and asserted that the proposed 

additions constituted a supplemental complaint, and not an amended 

complaint, because they were based on events occurring after the filing of the 

original complaint. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in part, 

specifying that the new complaint was supplemental, and precluding

Maraziti from including the words “first amended.”
10

F. Wilmington’s Second Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Maraziti filed the first supplemental complaint in August 2022. Soon 

thereafter, Wilmington filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the 

supplemental complaint. 

Wilmington asserted Maraziti (now standing in the shoes of Preciado) 

had notice of the claims when she filed the original complaint in February 

2017, that the supplemental complaint did not relate back to the original 

complaint, and that the claims in the supplemental complaint were barred by 

the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

In response, Maraziti asserted the reformation of the Grant Deed was 

retroactive back to its original execution in March 2014, such that she did 

effectively have standing under the original complaint, and that the 

supplement complaint did not include any new or unrelated causes of action. 

Maraziti asserted further that the limitations period had not commenced in 

any event because the Trust had been in continuous, undisturbed possession 

of the property since the original execution of the Grant Deed.

In its reply, Wilmington clarified its position and explained, regardless 

of the retroactivity of the reformation of the Grant Deed, the facts remained 

that: “(1) [Maraziti] did not have a cause of action when this case was filed in 

February of 2017, and (2) [Maraziti did] not assert[ ] the causes of action she 

does have until August of 2022, more than five years after the claims were 

definitely known about.” (Underscoring omitted.)

After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted 

Wilmington’s motion. In doing so, the court made two significant findings:

(1) the limitations period began running on February 21, 2017 when Preciado 

filed the original complaint; and (2) the supplemental complaint did not 

relate back to the original. Thus, the court concluded that the supplemental 
11

complaint was filed more than five years after the limitations period began, 

beyond any applicable statutory period. 

Maraziti filed a motion for reconsideration shortly after the court’s 

ruling, and filed a motion for a new trial a couple of months later. Maraziti 

argued that Wilmington raised its assertion that the statute of limitations 

began to run with the filing of the original complaint for the first time in its 

reply brief, that she did not have an adequate opportunity to respond, and 

that the trial court made an error of law when it concluded that the 

limitations period began when Preciado filed the original complaint.

The trial court denied both motions. Maraziti now appeals from the 

judgment of dismissal and the denial of her motions for reconsideration and a 

new trial.

III. DISCUSSION

Maraziti asserts the trial court erred by concluding: (1) the limitations 

period began to run prior to the filing of the supplemental complaint; (2) the 

new complaint was supplemental only, and not amended; and (3) the new 

complaint did not relate back to the original complaint. She also contends

that Wilmington has no right to any relief because the underlying deed of 

trust was never properly assigned to Wilmington, and that the wrongful 

foreclosure cause of action could not have accrued absent a foreclosure sale. 

Finally, she contends the trial court also erred in denying her motions for 

reconsideration and a new trial, apparently for essentially the same reasons. 

A. Standard of Review and Burden on Appeal 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer in that 

it “ ‘attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters 

that can be judicially noticed.’ ” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 

Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064.) It is appropriate to grant such a motion in favor of 
12

the defendant when the complaint shows “on its face [it] is barred by the 

statute of limitations.” (Hunt v. County of Shasta (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 

440; see SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 

284, 316). The trial court’s task in reviewing the motion is to determine 

whether the complaint states a viable cause of action assuming the facts 

alleged in the complaint are true. (Lance Camper, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 

198.) 

On appeal, we review the court’s ruling on a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings de novo. (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside

(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 685.) We likewise apply our independent

judgment to review a motion for new trial following the grant of a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings, which necessarily presents a question of law. 

(Estill v. County of Shasta (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 702, 708.)

Notwithstanding the de novo standard of review, it remains the 

appellant’s burden to affirmatively establish reversable error. (Ballard 

v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574; Bianco v. California Highway Patrol

(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125.) As the party asserting such error, 

Maraziti “must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. 

‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it 

with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as 

waived.’ ” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 

857, 862; see In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 

830 [“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows 

this court to treat the contentions as waived”]; Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 

Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [court disregards argument for which no authority is 

furnished].)
13

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Concluding the Original Complaint 

Triggered the Limitations Period

We begin with the trial court’s findings that the applicable limitations 

period began to run with the filing of the original complaint in February

2017, and that the first supplemental complaint was filed more than five 

years later, in August 2022, beyond any applicable statute of limitation. Both 

the original complaint and the first supplemental complaint assert causes of 

action for wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instrument pursuant to Civil 

Code section 3412, quiet title, declaratory relief, and recission by fraud. 

Maraziti does not dispute that five years is the longest applicable 

statute of limitations, with one exception—she asserts there is no statute of 

limitations for cancellation of a void deed or quiet title based on fraud. 

Setting that argument aside for a moment, Maraziti’s primary assertion is 

that the limitations period never began because she always remained in 

undisturbed possession of the Property. She relies primarily on Salazar 

v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467 (Salazar) and Huang v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 431 (Huang) to support this claim, but 

neither case is directly applicable to the facts of this case or the trial court’s 

ruling.

In Salazar, the court acknowledged the general rule, subject to various 

exceptions, that the limitations period ordinarily begins to run “from the 

occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action,” at which point 

the “cause of action ‘accrues.’ ” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 477, fn.

10.) But the court explained further, special rules apply when determining 

the limitations period for claims to quiet title. (Id. at p. 477.) Specifically, as 

relevant here, the limitations period typically does not run against one in 

possession of land. (Ibid.) The rationale being that courts are generally 

“unwilling[ ] to convert a statute of limitations into a statute that works a 
14

forfeiture of property rights on the person holding the most obvious and 

important property right—namely, possession.” (Ibid.) 

However, the rule is not absolute. (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 477.) For the exception to apply, the possession must be exclusive, 

undisputed, and undisturbed. (Ibid.) In other words, mere notice of an 

adverse claim is not sufficient to start the running of the limitations period, 

but when another takes action to press or assert an adverse claim, at some 

point, the possession is no longer undisturbed and the limitations period does 

begin to run. (Salazar, at p. 478.) This makes sense as finality is important 

when considering claims to title or property. Applying these general 

principles, the court in Salazar concluded that the recording of a notice of 

default was not sufficient, on its own, to trigger the running of the limitations 

period, but suggested that a notice of tax or trustee’s sale might be sufficient. 

(Id. at pp. 478−482.)

The court in Huang took the analysis one step further and, relying on 

Salazar, concluded a recorded notice of trustee sale also was not sufficient to 

start the running of the limitations period. (Huang, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 434, 438.) In both cases, the notices indicated the property might be sold, 

unless the homeowner took certain steps to resolve the matter, and in both 

cases the relevant parties did take steps to prevent the sale. (Id. at p. 439.)

As the court in Huang explained, “Even when a party in possession knows 

there is a potential adverse claim, ‘there is no reason to put him to the 

expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim is pressed against 

him.’ ” (Id. at p. 438.) Thus, the court concluded that because neither notice 

called into question the homeowner’s right to stay in possession of the 

property, at least for the time being, neither adequately disturbed possession 

for the purposes of beginning the limitations period. (Ibid.)
15

However, in both Salazar and Huang, the court was considering the 

original complaint, and the only issue before the courts was whether the

claims were barred by the limitations period based on the relevant notices of 

default or sale. Neither court expressly considered whether the filing of such 

a lawsuit itself, or the defendant’s assertion of adverse claims in response, 

triggered the running of the limitations period. 

As the trial court here explained, “The policy of not requiring a party in 

possession of property to go to the ‘expense and inconvenience of litigation’ is 

not served on these facts because [Preciado and Maraziti] took it upon 

themselves to go to the expense and inconvenience of litigation. Accordingly, 

the latest the statutes of limitation began running on [Maraziti’s] claims was 

February 21, 2017 when [Preciado] filed the[ original] complaint.” (See 

Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 478; Huang, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 438.) 

By focusing on Wilmington’s alleged failure to adequately disrupt her 

possession through a notice of sale, Maraziti fails to directly address the trial 

court’s holding that her initiation of the litigation concerning the title to the 

Property caused the limitations period to begin to run. Maraziti presents no

argument or authority to dispute that conclusion, or to otherwise establish 

that the filing of the original complaint did not begin the running of the 

limitations period. In the absence of such argument or authority, we find no 

error in the trial court’s reasoning. As the trial court pointed out, once 

Preciado filed the original complaint, both her and Wilmington’s claims to 

title of the Property were affirmatively in dispute. (See, e.g., Preciado v. 

Wilde (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 321, 326 (Wilde) [“ ‘In a quiet title action the 

plaintiff must prove his title in order to recover’ ”].)
16

Although she does not dispute the trial court’s general conclusion that 

the limitations period begins running with the filing of a complaint, Maraziti

does assert that the limitations period could not have begun in this case, 

despite the filing of the original complaint, because, according to Wilmington,

she did not have standing to pursue her claims in the first instance. Again, 

though, Maraziti presents no legal authority suggesting that lack of standing 

precludes the limitations period from running, or put another way, that the 

limitations period does not begin simply because one has not perfected their 

claim. Rather, the cases she relies upon address what a party most prove in 

order to recover on a claim. (See, e.g., Wilde, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 321, 326

[concluding the plaintiffs did not prove their claim for adverse possession at 

trial].) But the statutes of limitation are not based on one’s ability to recover. 

Here, there is no dispute that Preciado asserted claims, including those 

for quiet title and cancellation of instrument, against Wilmington and, in 

doing so, alleged that she held title to the Property; it does not matter 

whether she ultimately could have prevailed on those claims, or whether she 

could have prevailed at the exact moment that she filed the complaint. As 

subsequent events have demonstrated, Preciado had the ability all along to 

rectify her own lack of standing by reforming the Grant Deed. Moreover, she 

either believed she held title when she filed the complaint, based on the 

intent of the parties in executing the Grant Deed, or knew of the scrivener’s 

error. Were we to conclude, as Maraziti suggests, that the limitations period 

did not begin to run until Preciado obtained the reformation judgment, a 

matter which Wilmington correctly asserts was entirely within her control, 

similarly situated parties could cause similar delays by intentionally 

introducing and then declining to correct errors to their own title. We decline 

to set such a precedent under these facts.
17

Maraziti also asserts that her or Preciado’s knowledge of the alleged 

forgeries to obtain the loans underlying Wilmington’s deed of trust was not 

sufficient to start the running of the limitations period. But the trial court 

never made such a finding. As we have explained, the trial court concluded 

the statute of limitations began to run when Preciado filed the original 

complaint, affirmatively putting the issues of title before the court. Preciado 

or Maraziti’s knowledge of the alleged forgeries is beside the point.

Finally, as noted, Maraziti asserts there is no statute of limitations for 

cancellation of a void deed or quiet title based on fraud, and that an action to 

cancel a void instrument can be brought at any time. She relies on Civil Code 

section 34122 and Hironymous v. Hiatt (1921) 52 Cal.App. 727 as support. 

But Hiatt did not address a statute of limitations for a void deed. The court 

in Hiatt considered whether a promissory note executed in favor of certain 

trustees in trust for a minor without any consideration was enforceable. (Id. 

at p. 730.) The court found that the note could be voided by the donor at any 

time, and, in that context, concluded there was no applicable statute of 

limitations. (Id. at p. 736−737.)

More recently, the court in Robertson v. Superior Court (2001) 90 

Cal.App.4th 1319 found that Hiatt’s holding that “ ‘an action to cancel a 

wholly void instrument can be brought at any time,’ ” was both without merit

and “especially inappropriate” when applied to a claim involving title to real 

property. (Robertson at pp. 1324, 1327.) In reaching that conclusion, the 

2 Civil Code section 3412 states: “A written instrument, in respect to 

which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may 

cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, 

upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or 

canceled.”
18

court explained, “Civil Code section 3412 is not a statute of limitations, nor 

does it contain one within it.” (Robertson, at p. 1325.) Maraziti does not 

acknowledge or address the holding in Robertson. We are not persuaded that 

there is no statute of limitations in this context.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding the New Complaint Was 

Supplemental, Not Amended

Maraziti next asserts that, even if the limitations period did begin with 

the filing of the original complaint, the trial court erred by refusing to allow

her to file an amended complaint to cure her lack of standing. We disagree. 

“Matters which occur after the filing of a complaint may not be alleged 

by amendment to the complaint, but must be brought into the action by 

means of a supplemental complaint.” (Hebert v. Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd.

(1991) 23 Cal.App.4th 414, 426; Code Civ. Proc., § 464.) In other words, a 

“ ‘supplemental’ pleading is used to allege facts occurring after the original 

pleading was filed,” while “the additional allegations in an ‘amended’ 

pleading address matters that had occurred before the original pleading was 

filed.” (Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1032.) “As a general rule, 

where an original pleading is filed before the cause of action has arisen, that 

defect cannot be cured by a supplemental complaint addressing matters that 

occurred after the original pleading was filed.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court 

determined that the new complaint was supplemental because Maraziti 

explicitly sought “leave to file the supplemental pleading ‘to allege material 

facts which occurred after the filing of the original Complaint’ (ROA 314, 

Declaration of Kevin A. Carey, ¶ 4).”

Maraziti asserts this was error, and that courts have consistently 

allowed plaintiffs to file amendments to cure defects in standing. She relies 

on a line of cases, beginning with Klopstock v. Superior Court of San 

Francisco (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13 (Klopstock), addressing substitution of a real 
19

party in interest in place of a prior named plaintiff that lacked the authority 

to sue. (Id. at pp. 17−19.) The claims at issue in Klopstock arose from 

allegations concerning the wrongful withdrawal of funds from a corporation 

held by three brothers. (Id. at p. 15.) After one of the brothers and his wife 

passed, the executor of their will commenced an action on behalf of the 

corporation, naming the other two brothers as defendants. (Ibid.) The trial 

court sustained a demurrer, finding that the executor could not legally 

maintain the action on behalf of the corporation, but allowed an amendment 

to the complaint to substitute the correct nominal plaintiff, the administrator 

of the estate of the deceased stockholder. (Id. at p. 19.) 

Finding no error in that result, the appellate court in Klopstock 

explained, although the original complaint stated a cause of action on behalf 

of someone, it was not the named plaintiff; but, it was proper to allow an

amendment to assert the same causes of action by the correct named plaintiff

since doing so did not change the claims asserted against the defendants.3 

(Klopstock, supra, 17 Cal.2d. at pp. 19−21.) At the same time, the Klopstock

court acknowledged that an amendment cannot be used to introduce a wholly 

different cause of action, and clarified, “the test is not whether under 

technical rules of pleading a new cause of action is introduced, but rather, the 

3 The other cases Maraziti relies on follow Klopstock and likewise 

address the addition or substitution of a named plaintiff. (See, e.g., Garrison 

v. Board of Directors (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1670, 1678 [amendment “merely 

‘substituted’ one plaintiff for another on the same cause of action”]; 

Foundation of Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. 

(2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 131, 136 [trial court abused discretion by not allowing 

amendment to add member of injured group as a plaintiff]; Branick v. 

Downing Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242−243 [trial courts 

have discretion to permit amendments adding or striking named plaintiffs].)
20

test is whether an attempt is made to state facts which give rise to a wholly 

distinct and different legal obligation against the defendant. The power to 

permit amendment is denied only if a change is made in the liability sought 

to be enforced against the defendant.” (Id. at p. 20.) 

Here, Maraziti did not simply seek to substitute a named plaintiff in 

the supplemental complaint,4 nor did she seek to assert a whole new cause of 

action. However, there is no dispute that she did seek to add facts related to 

events that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. Thus, we are 

not persuaded that the trial court erred in characterizing the complaint as 

supplemental rather than amended. Regardless, as we explain next, we focus 

on the substance of the new complaint, and not its label, in determining 

whether it relates back to the original.

D. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding the Supplemental Complaint Did 

Not Relate Back to the Original Complaint

The trial court concluded that the supplemental complaint could not 

relate back to the original complaint for purposes of the statutes of 

limitations because, “ ‘[a]s a general rule, where an original pleading is filed 

before the cause of action has arisen, the defect cannot be cured by a 

supplemental complaint.’ ” Maraziti asserts that this was error, and 

regardless of whether the new complaint was labeled as amended or 

supplemental, it did relate back to the original complaint, because the 

original complaint gave Wilmington notice of the same wrongs as asserted in 

the supplemental complaint. 

4 Notably, the trial court did permit Maraziti to substitute in for 

Preciado as successor trustee, without dispute from Wilmington. 
21

As an initial matter, we reject the notion that a supplemental 

complaint can never relate back to the original for purposes of the statutes of 

limitation. As our high court has explained, “[f]acts occurring after filing of a 

complaint . . . should be pleaded by supplemental rather than amended 

complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 464) but courts regard substance and not labels 

in determining the sufficiency of a pleading.” (Hutnick v. United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 464, fn. 6.) This includes 

whether the new pleading is subject to a new limitations period. (Id. at 

p. 464 [“Once an action has been timely commenced by the filing of a 

complaint, the filing of a supplemental or amended complaint which does not 

introduce a new cause of action is not subject to the statute of limitations”].)

In its order granting judgment on the pleadings, the trial court here 

relied on ITT Gilfillan, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 581

(ITT) for the proposition that “[s]upplemental pleadings do not relate back to 

the original complaint and must stand on their own for the purposes of 

limitations periods.” (Id. at p. 589.) As we explain, we decline to follow ITT. 

Hutnick was decided after ITT and is controlling to the extent that the court 

there reached the opposite conclusion. In addition, there are other more 

recent cases, including Bendix Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 150 

Cal.App.3d 921 (Bendix), that reject the bright-line rule set forth in ITT, and 

focus instead on the nature of the claims, consistent with the analysis in

Hutnick. 

Bendix was decided just over a year after ITT and arose out of the same 

underlying litigation, concerning the alleged overpayment of taxes based on 

an improper classification that impacted government contracts. (Bendix,

supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 923.) There were numerous lawsuits 

surrounding the issue, many of which were consolidated and decided in a test 
22

case, the predecessor to ITT. (Bendix, at p. 923.) After that case was 

decided, the city refunded Bendix for the tax years 1961 through 1975 but 

refused to refund payments for 1976 and 1977 based on its alleged failure to 

make a timely claim for those years. (Id. at pp. 923−924.) Disagreeing with 

ITT, the court in Bendix concluded that a supplemental and amended 

complaint that Bendix filed alleging overpayment for those two additional tax 

years related back to the prior pleadings for purposes of the statute of 

limitations. (Id. at p. 924−926.) The court explained that the original 

pleadings gave the city adequate notice of Bendix’s claims and, although the 

supplemental complaint was based on new events, the new events were 

simply “ ‘a continuation of the old cause of action.’ ” (Id. at p. 926.)

Likewise, here, the allegations in the original complaint gave 

Wilmington adequate notice of the asserted claims. Although the additional 

allegations do not relate to additional instances of the same, ongoing conduct 

or harm as in Bendix, they also do not present an entirely different cause of 

action or basis for recovery. Rather, they relate to the reformation of the 

Grant Deed. While the reformation is undisputedly an additional action 

taken by the plaintiff after the initiation of the litigation, it did not change 

the underlying nature of the claims in any material way. Preciado simply 

fixed a common defect in the Grant Deed, soon after Wilmington first notified 

her of the oversight. The reformation of the Grant Deed to grant title to the 

trustee of the Trust rather than the Trust did not create an entirely separate 

or new cause of action and should not have been surprising to Wilmington. 

Nevertheless, Wilmington asserts the supplemental complaint cannot 

relate back to the original because neither Preciado nor Maraziti had a cause 

of action when Preciado filed the original complaint. Wilmington relies on

two cases as support for this equally determinative rule, Cohn v. Cohn (1941) 
23

47 Cal.App.2d 683 (Cohn) and Wittenbrock v. Bellmer (1880) 57 Cal. 12 

(Wittenbrock), but neither case addresses the issue in the context of the 

statutes of limitation.

Cohn, supra, 47 Cal.App.2d 683 was an appeal from “an interlocutory 

decree of divorce” and subsequent order denying a motion for a new trial. (Id. 

at p. 685.) In what the court characterized as “an unusual state of facts not 

appearing in the ordinary case,” after agreeing to a legal separation, the 

parties stipulated to supplemental complaint seeking divorce based on

desertion. (Id. at p. 687, 689.) After the trial court entered a decree of 

divorce finding the allegations in the supplemental complaint true, the 

defendant asked to withdraw the stipulation, and the trial court denied the 

request. (Id. at pp. 687.) The defendant asserted the action commenced in

1936, and the admitted desertion occurred in 1937, so no cause of action could 

have accrued at the time of the original filing. Quoting Wittenbrock, the 

appellate court stated, generally, “ ‘ “[i]f a party has no cause of action at the 

time of the institution of his action, he cannot maintain it by filing a 

supplemental complaint founded on matters which have subsequently 

occurred.” ’ ” (Cohn, at p. 689.) However, the court went on to conclude that 

that the stipulated supplemental complaint was really a substituted pleading

and affirmed the judgment. (Id. at pp. 689, 693.) 

Wittenbrock, in turn, was an appeal from an order granting a new trial

and, in reviewing the evidence before the trial court, the appellate court 

concluded it was improper to consider a ratification of an assignment that 

occurred while the action was pending. (Wittenbrock, supra, 57 Cal. at p. 13.) 

But there, the plaintiff was attempting to foreclose on a mortgage that, 

allegedly, had not been validly assigned to him. (Ibid.) Notably, the court 

did not comment on whether the plaintiff could initiate a new foreclosure 
24

proceeding following the ratification of the assignment. (Ibid.) Thus, we do 

not find either case to be particularly helpful in resolving the issue that is 

now before us, namely, whether the supplemental complaint can relate back 

to the original complaint for purposes of the statute of limitations. 

In answering that question, we consider that the policy behind statutes 

of limitation is to ensure defendants are adequately notified of the need to 

prepare a defense against the asserted claims. (Pointe San Diego Residential 

Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 

Cal.App.4th 265, 277 (Pointe).) Thus, “the critical inquiry” in determining 

whether a supplemental complaint relates back to the original for the 

purposes of statute of limitations, “is whether the defendant had adequate 

notice of the claim based on the original pleading.” (Ibid.) 

In Pointe, this court addressed a situation in which the plaintiff filed an

amended complaint providing detailed factual allegations after originally 

filing only a form complaint that provided minimal details regarding the 

asserted claims. (Pointe, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 277−278.) The 

defendant demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer on the basis 

that the claims were time-barred, and that “the relation-back doctrine was 

inapplicable because the original complaint did not contain sufficient factual 

allegations” to state the asserted causes of action. (Id. at p. 273.) The Court 

of Appeal reversed and explained that “courts have long recognized that the 

fact that an original complaint contained pleading deficiencies does not 

preclude the application of the relation-back doctrine.” (Id. at p. 281.) “If ‘the 

original complaint defectively states a cause of action, it may be amended 

after the running of the statute [of limitations] [to add additional factual 

allegations] as long as the cause of action stated in the amended pleading can 

trace its descent from the original pleading.’ ” (Ibid.) 
25

Here, the additional allegations in the supplemental complaint 

similarly address deficiencies in the original complaint and, specially, the 

now-corrected error in the underlying Grant Deed. The property at issue, the 

name of the plaintiff Trust, the purported trustee of that Trust, and the 

causes of action remained the same. The only material change in the 

supplemental complaint was to establish that the Grant Deed granted title to 

Preciado (named in the original complaint), as the trustee of the Trust, as the 

parties always intended. Considering the allegations in the original 

complaint, we cannot conclude that Wilmington did not have adequate notice 

to prepare a defense against those claims. Indeed, although the trial court 

ultimately did grant a preliminary injunction, Wilmington presented a 

defense in response to that motion and, notably, did not raise the issue of the 

defect in the underlying Grant Deed until sometime later. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the supplemental complaint does 

adequately relate back to the original complaint for the purpose of the 

statutes of limitations, and therefore the trial court erred in concluding that 

Maraziti’s claims are time-barred.5

5 Because we reverse the trial court’s order granting judgment on the 

pleadings for this reason, we need not address Maraziti’s remaining 

arguments.
26

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court 

with instructions to reverse its prior order granting judgment on the 

pleadings and enter a new order denying Wilmington’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings. Appellant is awarded costs on appeal. 

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.