PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1257

__________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

PATRICK SHAKNITZ,

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-20-cr-00359-001)

District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone

____________________________________

Submitted on Appellant’s Motion for Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 1, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 2, 2023)

Michelle Rotella
2

Office of the United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

Robert Epstein

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street

Suite 540 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Patrick Shaknitz (“Shaknitz”) filed an 

unopposed Motion for Summary Remand based on our recent 

decision in United States v. Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th 435 (3d Cir. 

2023). We will grant the Motion, vacate the sentence, and 

remand to the District Court for resentencing.

Shaknitz pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution 

and attempted distribution of child pornography, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (b)(1), and one count of possession 

of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4), 

(b)(1). Shaknitz was sentenced to a 170-month term of 

imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. 

During sentencing, the District Court orally imposed a 
3

condition on Shaknitz’s incarceration, limiting his contact with 

his five-year-old son to telephone only. In its written 

judgment, the District Court did not include its own 

previously-announced imposition of the condition; rather, the 

District Court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) impose the telephone-only condition. The judgment 

did not state that the recommendation superseded the District 

Court’s oral pronouncement.

Shaknitz timely appealed.

The District Court’s oral imposition of the telephoneonly condition conflicts with this Court’s holding in Diaz that 

a sentencing court lacks “inherent authority to impose a nocontact order during [a defendant’s] incarceration term.” 66 

F.4th at 446. Because a District Court’s oral pronouncement 

has controlling effect, and because it is unclear whether the 

judgment was intended by the District Court to replace its 

mandate with a recommendation, we must vacate Shaknitz’s 

sentence. See United States v. Chamser, 952 F.2d 50, 52 n.2 

(3d Cir. 1991) (“[I]n the event of a conflict between the oral 

pronouncement [of a sentence] and the judgment, the former 

... control[s].”); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

Though we held in Diaz that a District Court does not 

have inherent authority to impose no-contact orders as a 

condition of a defendant’s incarceration, we also noted that “a 

District Court has the authority to make recommendations to 

the BOP about [a defendant’s] conditions of 

confinement.” Diaz, 66 F.4th at 447. We reiterate here that 

Diaz did not disturb the authority of sentencing courts to 

recommend to the BOP that defendants’ contact with others be 
4

limited where necessary and appropriate.1 To the extent the 

District Court intended to make a recommendation to the BOP, 

that portion of the District Court’s judgment does not 

contravene the holding in Diaz, and we leave to the District 

Court on remand whether to renew its recommendation.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted, and 

we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing by the 

District Court in accordance with Diaz. 

1 Nor does Diaz preclude any interested party from seeking a 

no-contact order through other appropriate processes such as 

protection orders.