NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

KEVIN MICHAEL MURPHY, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0484 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-001189-001

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-14-2019
STATE v. MURPHY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge James P. Beene joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Kevin Michael Murphy appeals his convictions and sentences 

for aggravated taking the identity of another, three counts of forgery, and 

two counts of taking the identity of another. Murphy’s counsel filed a brief 

in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the record, he 

found no arguable question of law that was not frivolous. Counsel asks this 

court to search the record for reversible error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 

530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). Murphy filed a supplemental brief raising 

multiple issues, none of which establish a basis for relief. Accordingly, and

for reasons that follow, we affirm Murphy’s convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2015, Murphy opened an account with an 

Arizona credit union. One week later, he deposited a forged check made 

payable to himself in the amount of $499. The check appeared to be issued 

by Benchmark Interiors LLC and displayed the company’s actual bank 

account and routing numbers, but incorrectly listed its telephone number, 

bank name, and logo and contained a forged, unauthorized signature of the 

company’s owner, D.L.

¶3 About two months later, Murphy deposited another forged 

check payable to himself, this time for $4,000. The next day, he deposited a 

third forged check, this one for $2,500. Both of these checks appeared to be 

issued by L.A.W., but L.A.W.’s middle name was misspelled, his address 

was incorrect, and the signature was forged. The incorrect address listed 

on the checks matched the address Murphy provided in his application to 

open his account.

¶4 At trial, Murphy testified that he cashed the three checks as 

repayment for loans and payment for items he sold and that he was 

unaware that the checks were forged.
STATE v. MURPHY

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The jury convicted Murphy as outlined above, and the 

superior court sentenced him to concurrent terms, the longest of which is 

6.5 years, with 41 days of presentence incarceration credit. Murphy timely 

appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Murphy’s Supplemental Brief.

¶6 Murphy asserts that the superior court erred by denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal. We review the denial of a motion for 

judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the verdict, and we will not reverse unless there is 

a complete absence of probative facts to support a conviction. State v. West, 

226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶¶ 15–16 (2011); State v. Johnson, 215 Ariz. 28, 29, ¶ 2 

(App. 2007).

¶7 Here, the superior court did not err by denying Murphy’s

motion for judgment of acquittal. Murphy’s counsel argued that the motion 

should be granted because none of the State’s witnesses made an in-court 

identification of Murphy. But every instance of Murphy cashing a forged 

check was caught on surveillance footage. A reasonable factfinder thus 

could have compared that footage to Murphy’s appearance in the 

courtroom and concluded that it was the same individual.

¶8 Murphy also contends that the State did not put forth any 

direct evidence of intent and knowledge, instead relying on circumstantial 

evidence and conflicting testimony. But the law makes no distinction as to 

the weight afforded direct and circumstantial evidence. See State v. Harvill, 

106 Ariz. 386, 389–91 (1970). And the existence of conflicting testimony

does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence if probative evidence

supports the verdict. See State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 

2004). The jury thus could have properly concluded that the evidence, even 

if circumstantial and conflicting, supported a conviction on all counts.

¶9 Murphy next argues that the superior court erred by denying 

his motion to sever the counts involving Benchmark Interiors from the 

counts involving L.A.W. We review the denial of a motion to sever for an 

abuse of discretion. See State v. Prince, 204 Ariz. 156, 159, ¶ 13 (2003). A 

denial of a motion to sever is reversible “only if the evidence of other crimes 

would not have been admitted at trial for an evidentiary purpose anyway.” 

State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 51, ¶ 38 (2004) (citation omitted).
STATE v. MURPHY

Decision of the Court

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¶10 Here, evidence of Murphy’s crimes involving Benchmark 

Interiors would have been admissible at a separate trial for his crimes 

involving L.A.W. Under Rule 404(b) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, 

evidence of other crimes may be admissible to prove intent and knowledge. 

Murphy testified that he was unaware that the checks were forged, and 

thus, evidence of the forged Benchmark Interiors check would have been 

admissible as evidence of Murphy’s knowledge that the checks involving 

L.A.W. were also forged and that he intended to defraud the credit union. 

See State v. Buot, 232 Ariz. 432, 434, ¶ 6 (App. 2013).

¶11 Next, Murphy argues that he was never read his Miranda1

rights after being arrested. But even assuming a Miranda violation, the only 

remedy would be suppression of the defendant’s statements, see State v. 

Schinzel, 202 Ariz. 375, 381, ¶ 25 (App. 2002), and here, the State never 

introduced any statements Murphy made to law enforcement. 

Accordingly, Murphy’s argument is unavailing.

¶12 Murphy also makes several arguments about the perceived 

failings of his defense counsel. But ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

can only be brought in post-conviction proceedings, not on direct appeal. 

State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 415, ¶ 20 (2007). Consequently, 

we do not address these arguments.

¶13 Additionally, Murphy argues that the prosecutor committed 

misconduct, as evidenced by his use of coercion to “extort” a plea 

agreement. Murphy did not accept a plea agreement, however, so any 

analysis of the prosecutor’s “coercive” plea tactics is unnecessary. Cf. State 

v. Horning, 158 Ariz. 106, 111 (App. 1988). Moreover, our independent 

review of the record does not support a finding of prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

¶14 Finally, Murphy claims that the Arizona criminal justice 

system discriminates against the indigent. He has not offered any evidence, 

however, that his economic status biased the pretrial proceedings, trial, or 

sentence, and absent evidence of purposeful discrimination, we reject his 

claim. See State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 516 (1995).

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
STATE v. MURPHY

Decision of the Court

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II. Fundamental Error Review.

¶15 We have read and considered counsel’s brief and have 

reviewed the record for reversible error. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300. We find 

none.

¶16 Murphy was present and represented by counsel at all stages 

of the proceedings against him. The record reflects that the superior court 

afforded Murphy all his constitutional and statutory rights, and that the 

proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. The court conducted appropriate pretrial hearings, 

and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s 

verdicts. Murphy’s sentences fall within the range prescribed by law, with 

proper credit given for presentence incarceration.

CONCLUSION

¶17 Murphy’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. After the 

filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations pertaining to Murphy’s 

representation in this appeal will end after informing Murphy of the 

outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless counsel’s review 

reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court 

by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). On 

the court’s own motion, Murphy has 30 days from the date of this decision 

to proceed, if he desires, with a pro se motion for reconsideration or petition 

for review.