United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10419

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Garmon Coats, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:93-CR-128-1

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Garmon Coats filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Motion”), which the district court denied. We 

AFFIRM.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 9, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 20-10419 Document: 00515892837 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/09/2021
No. 20-10419

2

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1994, a jury convicted Coats of one count of bank robbery in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), three counts of obstructing commerce by 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and three counts of using and 

carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). Coats received a total sentence of 802 months. 

In April 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Coats

filed the Motion pro se, arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warrant a sentence reduction or commutation of his sentence for two reasons.

First, because the First Step Act altered (albeit non-retroactively) how 

§ 924(c) sentences are consecutively stacked, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 132 

Stat. 5194, 5221–22 (2018), Coats asserted that his prison sentence would 

have been reduced by 30 years had he been sentenced under the Act.1

Second, relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Coats 

contended that his 262-month prison term for the bank robbery conviction 

was predicated on factual findings that were improperly made by the district 

court.

The district court denied the Motion, reasoning that Coats had not 

presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction as described 

in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. It added that even “[i]f the court is mistaken and 

movant has spelled out extraordinary and compelling reasons for his early 

release, the court still would not reduce his sentence” because the factors 

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh against granting relief. 

Coats timely appealed. 

1 More specifically, instead of the 540-month mandatory sentence he received for 

the three § 924(c) convictions, he would have received a 180-month sentence. 

Case: 20-10419 Document: 00515892837 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/09/2021
No. 20-10419

3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

“Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may reduce the 

defendant’s term of imprisonment, after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors, if the court finds that (1) ‘extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant such a reduction’ and (2) ‘a reduction is consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” United 

States v. Okpalobi, 831 F. App’x 715, 715 (5th Cir. 2020)(per curiam) (quoting 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). This court has previously considered § 1B1.13 an 

applicable policy statement when the prisoner, rather than the Bureau of 

Prisons, moves for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See, e.g., id.; United States 

v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).

In United States v. Shkambi, this court joined our sister circuits in 

holding that § 1B1.13 does not actually apply to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions 

brought by the inmate. See 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021). And in United 

States v. Cooper, the court remanded a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion 

in light of Shkambi so that “the district court [could] consider, in the first 

instance, whether the nonretroactive sentencing changes to [the 

defendant’s] § 924(c) convictions, either alone or in conjunction with any 

other applicable considerations, constitute extraordinary and compelling 

reasons for a reduction in sentence.” 996 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 2021). At 

first glance it might appear that we should remand this case as the court did 

in Cooper since the district court there, like here, incorrectly found itself 

bound by § 1B1.13 when considering whether the First Step Act’s nonretroactive modifications to § 924(c) constitute an extraordinary and 

Case: 20-10419 Document: 00515892837 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/09/2021
No. 20-10419

4

compelling reason justifying a shortened sentence. See id. at 288.

2 But

remand in Cooper was proper since it was not “a case where, notwithstanding 

the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons, the district court 

nonetheless determined that § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors militate against a 

sentence reduction.” See id. As noted, this is such a situation. 

Thus, even assuming the post-sentencing legal developments on 

which Coats relies could be considered as extraordinary and compelling 

reasons for a sentence reduction, we must affirm the district court’s denial of 

the Motion unless the lower court “base[d] its decision on an error of law or 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence” when applying and balancing 

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693 (citation

omitted). Coats’s “disagree[ment] with how the district court balanced the 

§ 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for reversal.” See id. at 694. 

Nor would be ours. See United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 

2017).

The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and sufficiently 

articulated reasons for denying the Motion, in particular the seriousness of 

Coats’s offenses and the need to protect the public. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d 

at 693–94. Specifically, the district court noted that Coats (1) was tried by a 

jury and convicted on seven counts related to four robberies; (2) “threatened 

to blow [a victim’s] brains out” with a gun during one robbery; (3) shoved a 

“big bore automatic pistol” in another victim’s face during a second robbery; 

(4) did not accept responsibility for his crimes and attempted to flee from 

custody after the verdict was read; (5) oversaw the criminal activity at issue; 

and (6) participated in other serious offenses, including aggravated robbery 

2 The same could perhaps be said for Coats’s reliance on Apprendi since this court 

has not previously ruled on whether the change in law espoused by that case may be 

considered an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. 

Case: 20-10419 Document: 00515892837 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/09/2021
No. 20-10419

5

and aggravated kidnapping. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against a sentence 

reduction. See id. Given this, the district court did not err in denying the

Motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 20-10419 Document: 00515892837 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/09/2021