[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12439

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

SUSAN DENHAM, 

Dr.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00185-SMD

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Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this failure-to-promote discrimination case under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., 

Dr. Susan Denham, a white female, claims that her former employer, Alabama State University (ASU), discriminated against her 

on account of her race and sex in denying her a promotion to the

Associate Dean position in ASU’s College of Health Sciences 

(COHS). A Magistrate Judge (MJ) granted ASU summary judgment, and Denham appealed.1 Our task, consequently, is to determine whether the MJ correctly applied the summary judgment 

standard to the evidence presented. Holding that he did, we affirm.

I. Background

A. The Associate Dean Position 

On November 19, 2019, ASU posted a job listing advertising 

a vacancy for the Associate Dean in ASU’s COHS. The position 

required that applicants have the “[e]xperience and credentials to 

qualify for the rank of associate professor . . . in one of the College’s academic departments.” Under ASU’s Faculty Handbook, 

1 Both parties consented to a Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings. See 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United 

States magistrate . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury 

civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”).

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this meant “five academic years of successful teaching experience 

at an accredited college/university,” including three years as an “assistant professor.” The Handbook also provided exceptions to 

these requirements: 

B. Upon recommendation of the Provost and Vice 

President for Academic Affairs, the president may 

recommend to the Board of Trustees the assignment of academic rank for a new member of the 

faculty who serves in a combination of teaching 

and administrative roles.

C. Upon recommendation of the dean of the college 

involved and the Provost and Vice President for 

Academic Affairs, the president may recommend 

to the Board of Trustees the assignment of academic rank for a new member of the faculty solely 

on the basis of extraordinary and distinguished national service to the teaching field.

Dr. Susan Denham, a white female, and Dr. Dartrell Treadwell, an African–American male, both applied for the Associate 

Dean position. At the time of her interview, Denham was a tenured professor within the COHS, with over two decades of experience in various roles. Denham holds a Bachelor of Science in Occupational Therapy, a Master of Science in Human Resources Management, and a Doctorate in Educational Leadership, Policy, and 

Law. She has been a licensed occupational therapist since 1990.

At the time of Treadwell’s interview, he had one year of experience as an assistant professor in Arkansas State University’s 

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physical therapy department. He managed acute inpatient hospital, geri-psych, and outpatient departments; supervised a team of 

eighty therapists across nine nursing facilities; and established a 

home health service business offering physical and occupational 

therapy. Treadwell holds a Master’s in Public Service Management

and a Doctorate in Physical Therapy.

Dr. Carl Pettis, an African–American male, conducted interviews for the position and interviewed Denham and Treadwell. 

Pettis serves as ASU’s Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs. Following the interviews, Pettis recommended Treadwell for 

the position, resulting in Treadwell’s appointment.

On April 20, 2022, Denham sued ASU, arguing that she was 

passed over for Associate Dean due to her race and gender. The 

complaint was framed in one count under Title VII.2 ASU answered, denied liability, and, after discovery, moved the District 

Court for summary judgment.

In its motion, ASU argued that Treadwell’s selection was 

based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. ASU asserted that 

Treadwell met the minimum qualifications for the position outlined in the job posting and that his interview and experience made

him the preferable candidate.

2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (declaring it unlawful for an employer “to fail 

or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s race [or] 

sex.”).

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In response, Denham sought to prove her case through 

(1) the McDonnell Douglas framework, (2) the “convincing mosaic” 

standard, and (3) a mixed-motive framework. Denham argued that 

ASU’s proffered reasons for hiring Treadwell were pretext because 

she was more qualified for the position than Treadwell and Pettis’s 

subjective reasons for choosing Treadwell could reasonably be disbelieved.

Ultimately, the MJ granted ASU’s motion. Under the 

McDonnell Douglas framework, the MJ found that Denham established a prima facie case and that ASU provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Still, Denham failed to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether ASU’s proffered

reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Denham timely appealed.

II. Legal Standard

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, drawing 

all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc., 882 F.3d 1358, 1362 

(11th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is proper where “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine 

issue of material fact exists when ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” 

Bowen, 882 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

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III. Discussion

Denham advanced three theories for her Title VII claim: 

McDonnell Douglas, convincing mosaic, and mixed-motive. On appeal, Denham argues that the MJ failed to view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to her. Denham asserts that the evidence 

shows that (1) Treadwell did not meet the minimum qualifications 

for the Associate Dean position and (2) Pettis’s proffered reasons 

for hiring Treadwell are a pretext for discrimination.

A. McDonnell Douglas

Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff’s first task is establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. 

Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory basis for 

its decision. Id. at 767–68. “If the employer meets this burden, the 

inference of discrimination drops out of the case entirely, and the 

plaintiff has the opportunity to show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the proffered reasons were pretextual.” Id. at 768.

1. Denham’s Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show

(1) she “belonged to a protected class,” (2) she “was qualified for 

and applied for a position the employer was seeking to fill,” (3) she 

was rejected despite her qualifications, and (4) “the position was 

filled with an individual outside the protected class.” Id. ASU does

not dispute that Denham established a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, we assume

that Denham is in a protected class, applied and was qualified for 

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Associate Dean, was rejected for the position despite those qualifications, and Trewadwell was outside her protected class.

2. ASU’s Burden of Production

An employer’s burden to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason 

for failing to promote an employee is “exceedingly light.” Perryman 

v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1141 (11th Cir. 1983). Once an 

employer provides a clear and reasonably specific nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, it has met its burden of production. Vessels, 408 F.3d at 770. ASU’s proffered reasons for hiring Treadwell 

are that Treadwell interviewed better than Denham and possessed 

the clinical experience ASU sought for the position. We hold that 

these reasons are sufficient for ASU to have met its burden of production. Consequently, our focus shifts to determining whether 

these proffered reasons are pretext.

3. Evidence of Pretext

Denham argues that she has raised a genuine issue of material fact about ASU’s proffered reasons for hiring Treadwell. To 

show pretext, and thus survive summary judgment, the plaintiff 

must introduce significantly probative evidence allowing a reasonable fact finder to determine that the employer’s proffered reasons 

are not believable. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 

1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006). This can be done by pointing to weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered reasons. Id.

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i. Treadwell’s Qualifications for Associate Dean

First, Denham asserts that Treadwell did not qualify for Associate Dean. Denham argues Pettis improperly relied on the exceptions outlined in ASU’s Faculty Handbook to recommend 

Treadwell. She contends that Pettis unreasonably concluded that 

Treadwell’s clinical experience qualified as “extraordinary and distinguished national service to the teaching field.”

To qualify for Associate Dean, a candidate must possess the 

experience and credentials to qualify for the rank of associate professor. This includes five years of successful teaching at an accredited college or university, with at least three of those years at the 

assistant professor level. Treadwell, with only one year of teaching 

experience as an assistant professor, did not meet this requirement.

Still, the ASU Faculty Handbook permits the Provost and 

Vice President, here, Pettis, to recommend candidates based on alternative criteria: (1) if the candidate serves in both teaching and 

administrative roles, or (2) if the candidate has provided “extraordinary and distinguished national service to the teaching field.” 

Pettis relied on these exceptions to recommend Treadwell.

Denham has not provided evidence to challenge Pettis’s justification for relying on these exceptions. Pettis testified to Treadwell’s “extraordinary and distinguished national service to the 

teaching field,” emphasizing his clinical experience and its relevance to ASU’s student placements nationwide. Pettis testified that 

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he considered Treadwell’s managerial experience in physical therapy a significant contribution to the teaching field because of the 

clinical component of several of the COHS’s programs.

“We are not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets 

of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1999). “[O]ur sole concern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision.” Id. And Denham has not provided 

evidence that unlawful discriminatory animus motivated Pettis’s

recommendation.

Denham’s attempt to compare her case to Bass v. Board of 

County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 2001), is not convincing.

In Bass, this Court found sufficient evidence to overcome a summary judgment motion where the employer promoted an unqualified candidate over a qualified one. Id. at 1109. But the employer 

there also had a history of promoting employees based on race,

made a statement about race-conscious efforts, and deviated from 

established procedures. Id. at 1105–09. In contrast, Treadwell was 

qualified based on Pettis’s application of the exceptions in the 

Handbook, and none of the other factors in Bass apply.

Denham also likens her situation to Carter v. Three Springs 

Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 1998). She argues that 

circumventing established procedures can indicate pretext. See id.

at 644. This comparison also falls short. In Carter, the plaintiff provided evidence that the employer failed to adhere to its policy of 

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posting job vacancies and he submitted ten affidavits of former employees recounting instances of disparate treatment while on the 

job. Id. at 640–41. Denham, on the other hand, has not provided

evidence suggesting that “established rules were bent or broken to 

give [Treadwell] an edge in the hiring process.” See id. at 644.

Further, we cannot say that the disparity in Denham’s and 

Treadwell’s qualifications is “of such weight and significance that 

no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could 

have chosen” Treadwell. See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 12554 (11th 

Cir. 2000)). Merely showing that the plaintiff was more qualified 

than the selected candidate is not enough to show pretext. Id. Rather, the disparity must be “so apparent as virtually to jump off the 

page and slap you in the face.” Id. (quoting Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 

267 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir.2001)). Denham argues that she had 

twenty-nine years of clinical experience, while Treadwell had 

around fifteen—this does not jump off the page.

ii. ASU’s Proffered Reasons for Selecting Treadwell

Denham also argues that Pettis’s subjective reasons for 

choosing Treadwell were pretext. These reasons are that (1) Treadwell performed better in his interview, and (2) Pettis valued Treadwell’s clinical and managerial experience.

Under McDonnell Douglas, a subjective reason for an employer’s decision, such as a candidate’s poor interview performance, can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Chapman v. 

AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1033 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). Indeed, 

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“[a]n interview is frequently necessary to asses the qualities that 

are particularly important in supervisory or professional positions.” Bass, 256 F.3d at 1106. That said, the employer must provide

a clear and reasonably specific factual basis supporting its subjective 

opinion for it to be legally sufficient. Id.

Denham contends that Pettis failed to provide a sufficient 

factual basis for his subjective opinions. We disagree. Pettis testified to his impressions of Treadwell’s interview, noting Treadwell’s 

considerable “energy” and “passion,” his focus on student engagement, and his eagerness to establish a strong rapport with students.

Pettis believed Treadwell’s energy would be positively received by 

students, and he would be a bonus to the faculty. These are clear 

and reasonably specific factual bases. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1034 

(“[I]t might not be sufficient for a defendant employer to say . . . ‘I 

did not like his appearance’ with no further explanation. However,

if [it] said, ‘I did not like his appearance because his hair was uncombed and he had dandruff all over his shoulders’ . . . the defendant would have articulated a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ basis for 

its subjective opinion—the applicant’s bad (in the employer’s view) 

appearance.”).

In Chapman, the employer’s articulated reason for its employment action was partly based on the employee’s poor interview. 229 F.3d at 1033. We noted that the employer had provided 

a clear and reasonably specific rationale for considering it a poor 

interview. Id. at 1035. The applicant, however, failed to show that 

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a poor interview was pretext because he did not counter the “objective bases for the subjective reason proffered for not hiring him.” 

Id. at 1036. The employer critiqued the applicant for not asking 

questions during the interview, not explaining his past employment 

history, and not providing concise answers to the questions posed. 

Id. Without disputing these points, the applicant could not demonstrate that the employer’s justification was a pretext, and this Court 

affirmed. Id. at 1037.

Denham has failed to offer evidence to rebut Pettis’s testimony. Like the applicant in Chapman, Denham produced no affidavits or other evidence to dispute Pettis’s preference for Treadwell 

based on the interview. Her sole contradiction of Pettis’s account—that she responded “Why not?” when asked why she applied for the position—does not adequately address the detailed 

reasons Pettis provided for his decision Denham could have offered 

affidavits highlighting her interview strengths, that Pettis did not 

bring energy or passion, or statements indicating Pettis had biases. 

But she failed to present such evidence.

Further, Denham has not successfully demonstrated that 

Pettis’s preference for Treadwell’s clinical experience over hers constitutes a pretext. Pettis’s testimony provided a clear and specific 

rationale for this preference: Pettis viewed Treadwell’s clinical and 

leadership experiences as beneficial for students during their clinical rotations and valuable for the Associate Dean role. Pettis agreed 

that Denham had solid experience but highlighted Treadwell’s leadUSCA11 Case: 23-12439 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 05/16/2024 Page: 12 of 14
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ership in supervising a large team of therapists and managing multiple skilled nursing facilities as key factors in his decision. Denham 

did not contest Treadwell’s possession of significant clinical experience, nor did she claim that her own experience was valued by Pettis.

B. Convincing Mosaic

Denham also argues that the MJ erred in finding that she 

failed to create a triable issue of fact under the convincing mosaic 

theory. Under this theory, a plaintiff can defeat a summary judgment motion by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that “raises a reasonable inference that the employer 

discriminated against [her].” See Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 

F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). A convincing mosaic can be established by pointing to evidence that demonstrates: (1) suspicious 

timing, ambiguous statements, or other information from which 

discriminatory intent may be inferred; (2) systematically better 

treatment of similarly situated employees; and (3) pretext. Lewis v. 

City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019).

Like her McDonnell Douglas argument, she contends that a 

proper application of the evidence would have shown that (1) 

Treadwell was unqualified for the position, (2) Denham had superior qualifications, and (3) Pettis’s subjective reasons for choosing 

Treadwell were pretextual. As discussed, Denham has not provided 

evidence to challenge Pettis’s reliance on the Handbook’s exceptions for recommending Treadwell, the disparity in qualifications 

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between Denham and Treadwell is not enough to suggest discrimination, and Denham has not shown that Pettis’s reasons for hiring 

Treadwell were pretextual. Therefore, we are not convinced she 

has presented a convincing mosaic of evidence that would raise a 

reasonable inference of discrimination.

C. Mixed‐Motive

Last, Denham argues that the MJ erred in finding that she 

did not create a triable issue of fact under a mixed-motive theory. 

In mixed-motive cases, at summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that the employer took 

an adverse employment action against the plaintiff and that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Qui v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 

1232–33 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

Denham’s argument, under a mixed-motive theory, reiterates her previous claims that Treadwell was unqualified, Denham 

had superior qualifications, and Pettit’s subjective reasons for 

choosing Treadwell were pretextual. We reject these arguments 

because, as discussed above, Denham has not provided evidence 

sufficient to show that her race or sex was a motivating factor in 

ASU’s decision to hire Treadwell. 

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the MJ’s order granting 

ASU summary judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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