Filed 1/29/15 P. v. Littleton CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

STEVE DONNELL LITTLETON, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B254510 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. TA124049) 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, John 

Joseph Cheroske and Laura R. Walton, Judges. Affirmed. 

Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Nathan Guttman, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

—————————— 
2

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, appellant Steve Littleton pleaded 

no contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,1 § 29800, 

subd. (a)(1)), and admitted three prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, 

subdivision (b). He was sentenced to two years in state prison. Littleton contends the 

trial court erred in denying his section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence which he 

contends was seized pursuant to an illegal detention. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The following facts are shown by testimony at the suppression hearing. 

On July 12, 2012, Detective Matthew Landreth was assigned to the gang 

enforcement team within the operation safe streets task force of the Los Angeles County 

Sheriff’s Department (LASD). Detective Landreth asked a probation officer who was 

also assigned to the gang enforcement team to research the residence at 11635 Pope 

Avenue in Lynwood (Pope house) and find out if anyone residing there was on probation. 

Detective Landreth had previously been to the Pope house, and knew from LASD 

resources and from speaking with other officers who had investigated the residence that 

the Pope house was owned and operated by members of the Pope Avenue “Crips” street 

gang. The probation officer reported that a woman named Rayshaniece Richards had 

identified the Pope house as her residence. Richards was on probation and subject to 

search-and-seizure conditions, and had an outstanding “no-bail” arrest warrant for 

robbery issued on October 30, 2008. 

 On July 13, 2012, at 7:15 p.m., after confirming that Richards’s probation and 

warrant status remained unchanged, Detective Landreth and other deputies proceeded to 

the Pope house. As he and his partner approached in their patrol car, Detective Landreth 

saw Littleton and another man standing in front of the open door of the Pope house’s 

attached garage. Other people were also standing outside the home. The garage was 

about 30 feet from the sidewalk. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
3

The patrol car accelerated as the deputies approached, and Littleton and the other 

men on the property “started scattering.” Detective Landreth saw Littleton “[throw] a 

long object into the garage area” and walk away. Detective Landreth detained Littleton 

and ascertained his name. Three other men who had been outside the Pope house on the 

sidewalk or street were also detained. 

After detaining Littleton, Detective Landreth entered the open garage where he 

saw a sawed-off shotgun lying on a couch. Upon further inspection, Detective 

Landreth’s partner saw that the weapon’s serial number had been obliterated. Detective 

Landreth believed that the shotgun was the object he had seen Littleton discard as he 

approached. Both were the same length and color, and the shotgun was found in the area 

into which Littleton had tossed the long object. No one else was or had been inside the 

garage. 

Detective Landreth left the garage and headed to the front door where he asked 

Rosevelt Carter, the owner of the Pope house, whether Richards resided there. Carter 

denied knowing who Richards was. A few seconds later Detective Landreth noticed a 

woman (Imane Wallace) walking back and forth in the rear of the house. Detective 

Landreth spoke with Wallace who said she knew Richards, and told the detective that 

Richards “stayed” at the Pope house “often.” 

Detective Landreth then searched the house. He entered one bedroom which 

Carter identified as the room Littleton “had been staying” in. The door to the room was 

open and contained no locking mechanism. Because Richards had an outstanding arrest 

warrant, Detective Landreth searched under the bed in that room to ensure that no one 

was hiding there. After shoving some bags, shoes and other items aside, he saw a 

revolver which, upon inspection also had had the serial number removed. In the bedroom 

Detective Landreth found mail addressed to Littleton at the Pope house address. He also 

found mail dated July 12, 2012, addressed to Richards at the Pope house, lying on a 

coffee table elsewhere in the house. 
4

DISCUSSION 

 Littleton contends his detention was unlawful and unsupported by any objective 

manifestation that he was involved in any criminal activity and that, therefore, all 

evidence derived as a result of the illegal detention should have been suppressed as “fruit 

of the poisonous tree.” (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484–488 

[83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441].) We disagree. 

1. Standard of review 

 “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, 

select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as 

applied has been violated. [Citation.]” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 891.) In 

a hearing on a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence, “the power to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence 

and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor 

the exercise of that power, and the trial court’s findings on such matters, whether express 

or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. 

Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.) 

2. The investigative detention was justified. 

 “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining 

officer can point to specific, articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be 

involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 (Souza).) 

Although a person’s presence in a high-crime area is not by itself enough to create a 

reasonable suspicion the person is involved in criminal activity, the “setting is a factor 

that can lend meaning to the person’s behavior. [Citations.]” (People v. Limon (1993) 17 

Cal.App.4th 524, 532.) “The time of night is another pertinent factor in assessing the 

validity of a detention.” (Souza, at p. 241.) A person’s “evasive conduct” or “sudden 

flight” from police also tends to establish the existence of reasonable suspicion. (Id. at 

p. 242.) Furtive movements or gestures alone are insufficient to constitute reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. (People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) (1970) 3 
5

Cal.3d 807, 827–828, fn. 13.) However, furtive gestures coupled with other factors may 

provide reasonable suspicion that activity out of the ordinary has taken place. (People v. 

Flores (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 23, 27–28.) The concept of reasonable suspicion cannot be 

reduced to “‘a neat set of legal rules.’ [Citation.]” (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 

U.S. 1, 7 [109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1].) It “can arise from less reliable information 

than required for probable cause . . . .” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) 

“The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and 

unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.”’ [Citation.]” (Sokolow, at p. 7.) 

 The detention at issue was predicated on Detective Landreth’s reasonable, 

articulated suspicion. The specific facts articulated by Detective Landreth were: On the 

evening of July 13, after verifying Richards’s probation status and the fact that a warrant 

for her arrest remained outstanding, Detective Landreth and other officers headed to the 

Pope house—a residence he knew from personal experience and LASD resources was 

owned and operated by members of the Pope Avenue Crips, a criminal street gang—to 

search for Richards. As the patrol cars converged on the property, Detective Landreth 

saw Littleton immediately toss the “long object” he was holding through the open garage 

door just before he and others quickly scattered to avoid the deputies. 

 The experienced detective’s decision to detain Littleton was based on specific, 

articulable facts about the object he observed and the timing of Littleton’s rapid, furtive 

action immediately disposing of that object and dispersing just as officers converged on 

the scene, and was reasonable under the circumstances. (See People v. Superior Court 

(Vega) (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 383, 387–388 [driver’s suspicious act of driving at night 

without headlights coupled with furtive movements made just as red lights on patrol car 

pulling in behind his car were activated generated probable cause to justify detention and 

arrest]; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 235, 240–241 [finding reasonable suspicion to 

detain where suspect in unlit, high-crime area late at night fled when officer shined 

spotlight on him, and his companions also ducked to avoid spotlight].) 

We reject Littleton’s assertion that Detective Landreth lacked a reasonable 

suspicion to believe he was involved in any criminal activity because there could be an 
6

innocent explanation for his acts; the long object thrown into the garage might, for 

example, have been a wrench. First, Detective Landreth testified that he recognized the 

sawed-off shotgun lying on top of the couch in the garage precisely because it was the 

same size and color as the object Littleton discarded, and because it was found in the 

same area into which Littleton had tossed the object after seeing the officers converge. 

The visual information gleaned by the detective of Littleton’s furtive movements and his 

effort to distance himself as quickly as possible from the garage into which he had just 

tossed the object were sufficiently reliable to justify the detective’s reasonable suspicion 

that criminal activity was afoot. This is particularly so in light of Detective Landreth’s 

specialized knowledge as a seasoned member of the gang enforcement team and his 

knowledge that the Pope house was owned and operated by members of a criminal street 

gang, the routine activities of which include commission of gun-related or violent 

felonies. 

 Although Littleton posits there may have been an innocent explanation for his 

behavior, “[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the 

possibility of innocent conduct.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277 [122 

S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740]; see Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233–235; In re Tony C. 

(1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894 (Tony C.) [“The possibility of an innocent explanation does 

not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

conduct”].) Even if circumstances observed by the officer might have an innocent 

explanation, they may still give rise to a reasonable suspicion which entitles the officer to 

perform an investigative detention. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 

146; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 373; Souza, at p. 242.) The California 

Supreme Court has long recognized: “[E]xperienced police officers develop an ability to 

perceive the unusual and suspicious, and we recognize the right and duty of officers to 

make reasonable investigation of such activities.” (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 

473, 477.) Activities which in isolation may seem innocuous, in proper context, can 

indicate criminal activity to a specially trained, experienced officer. (People v. Carvajal

(1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 487, 495–496.) 
7

 It is true that the factors cited by Detective Landreth might not by themselves 

suggest criminality. However, those factors must be examined in their entirety, not in 

isolation. A factor such as “evasive behavior is . . . pertinent . . . in determining 

reasonable suspicion.” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124 [120 S.Ct. 673, 

145 L.Ed.2d 570].) So is the fact that the defendant makes gestures or hand movements, 

which, to an experienced officer, suggest furtive and illegal motives. (See, e.g., Souza,

supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 241–242.) Based on the totality of circumstances, Detective 

Landreth was justified in conducting an investigative detention: he had specific and 

articulable facts that would cause a reasonable officer to suspect that Littleton could be 

involved in criminal activity. The detective’s testimony showed: Littleton was standing 

with several other individuals on the property of a residence owned and operated by a 

criminal street gang and at which a violent felon with an outstanding arrest warrant was 

believed to reside; the entire group immediately dispersed as the officers converged; and 

Littleton made a furtive movement to dispose of the long object he held as soon as he saw 

the officers approach. “The possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the 

officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, 

the principal function of his [or her] investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and 

establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal . . . .” (Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at 

p. 894.) 

 The trial court was correct in finding the existence of reasonable suspicion to 

justify the detention and in denying Littleton’s motion to suppress. As a result of this 

conclusion, we need not and do not address respondent’s supplemental arguments as to 

why the motion to suppress was properly denied. 
8

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 JOHNSON, J. 

We concur: 

 CHANEY, Acting P. J. 

 BENDIX, J.*

 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.