NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 09a0298n.06 Filed: Apr il 22, 2009 No. 08-6087 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
SHARON HAZ EL WOOD, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,

v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAF ETY, et al., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

B e fo re : SU HRHE I

NR I CH , B AT CH EL DE R and SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s.
PER C UR I AM

. Sharon Ha zelwood appea ls the district court’s dec ision rejectingher po lit ic a l- a ff

ili a tio n r e ta liatio n c la im a s a ma tte r o f l aw. We a ff

ir m.
I.
Hazelwood wor

ked for the Tenne ssee Hi gh way Patrol, a compone nt of the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Safe ty , starting in 1986. See JA 53 4. Duri ng 20 03 and 20 04 , h e r atte nd anc e be c a me sporadic, missing work (a s she ac knowledg es) “ approximately half the time.” J A 114. I n November 2 0 0 4 , Fr edP h i l l i p s , t h e C o m m i s s i o n er o f th e De p ar t m en to f S af et y , o rd er edHa z el wo o d

t o u n d er go a “f itness-for- duty evaluation.” J A 37. The de partment’s psycholog ist concluded that Ha zelwood was “ unfit for duty ” in her curr ent position becaus e s h e s u ff ered from “ an anxiety

disorder” that included “pa

nic attac ks” and that “compromise[d] her ability to perfor m the essential duties of the job.” J A 342. Based on this report, her immediate supervisor, Cha rles L axton, recommended that she be dis ch arge d. Depa rtment offic ials conducte d sever al hea ring s to review L axton’s

rec ommendation, and eve ntually Commi ssioner Philips adopted it.No. 08-6087

Ha ze lwo od v . Te nn esse e De

pa rtm e nt o

f Sa fe ty

- 2 - Hazelwood sued the Depa rtment of Safe ty , Phill ips, L axton and numerous other De partment of Safe ty officia ls, a lleg ing that she was fired in retaliation for protec ted spee ch and a ssociation and without sufficie nt proce dural protections. The dist rict court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of the def endants.
I I

. I n challeng ing the district court’s de cision, Hazelwood has f iled an appe llate brief

that larg e ly du pli c a te s h e r s umm ary

jud g me nt br ie f be low

—mu c h o f i t, i nd e e d, is c ut a nd pa ste d d ir e c tly from it. Be cause Hazelwood raised these same arguments in f ront of the district court, bec ause she failed to e laborate in any meaning ful way how t he dis trict court erre d in resolving these issues and beca use the a rg uments at any

rate have little to rec ommend them, we r ely in larg e par

t on the district court’s w ell-re asoned opinions in reje cting these same arguments here . To those dec isions, we add the se br ie f c omm e nts
. Hazelwood, first of all, does not c halleng e the district c ourt’s ruling that she “a bandoned he r substant i v e an d proce dural due proce ss claims and punitive damag es cla ims” by failing to defe nd them in her summ ary judgme nt response . J A 662. The closest she comes to addre ssing this ruling is when she r epea

ts a claim she r aised for

the first time in her summary j u d gm ent re sponse: She argues that she wa s fired be cause she s t o o d up for a “close friend[]” who was the subjec t of an internal-a ffa irs invest ig a

ti o n , v io la ti n g h e r s u b s ta nti v e d u e p r o cess r ight to intimate association under the 14th Amendment. Appe llant’s Br . at 16.
I f, by copying this a

rg ument from her summary judgme nt r esponse into her appellate brief, Ha z el wo o d

m ea n s t o s u gges tt h at t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt erre d b y fa i l i n g t o ad dre s s i t , s h e i s wr o n g. Ha zel wo od

did no t inc lud e thi s c la im in he r c omp la int

. Th e re thu s w a s n o r e a so n f or the de fe nd ants to d e a l w ithit i n th e ir

su mma ry jud g me nt mot ion s or fo r the dis tr ic t c ourt to a dd re ss t he po int in i tsNo. 08-6087

Ha ze lwo od v . Te nn esse e De

pa rtm e nt o

f Sa fe ty

- 3 - opinions. See W

innett v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 5 53 F .3 d 10 00 , 10 06 –0 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 9) . N or

wo uld it be a pp ro pri ate for us to a dd

re ss t he c la im n ow . A s a

g e ne ra l matte r, our f

un c tio n a s an a

pp e llate court is to “re view the c ase pr esente d to the di strict court,” not to consider the mer its of claims never proper ly prese nted below. Ar

ms tro ng v . Ci ty of M e lv ind ale , 432 F.3d 695, 700 ( 6th Cir. 2006).
Ha zel wo od

do e s n o b e tte r w he n she argue s tha t the dis tr ic t court e rr e d in r e je c tin g he r c la im that the def

endants terminated her in reta liation for her aff iliation with t he Republica n Party . The district court conc luded that she “ failed to set f orth evidenc e that is sufficient to [show] that L axton kn e w o r h a d r e a so n to kn owof he r R e pu

bli c an s tat us .” J A 659 . H a zel wo od pr ov ide d a lmo st nothing that c ould be descr ibed as evide nce of L axton’s knowledge : She presente d a vague re port of a c o n v e r s a ti o nin

w h ic h p e o p le “ k id d e d ” h e r a b o u t a nu n d e s c r ib e d

b u mp e r s ti c k e r in L a x ton’s pr e se nc e —p re su ma

bly ind ic a tin g he r s up po rt

fo r a Re pu bli c an c and idate , a lth ou g h she ne ve r s pe lls that out in her deposition—coupled with the f act that L axton “didn’t laugh” at these jokes. J A 230. I n co nc lus or

y fa sh ion , she a dd s tha t “e ve ry bo dy a t the Hi g hw ay Pa tr ol kno ws wh a t e ve ry bo dy e lse is.” JA 1 8 3

. T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt c o g e n tl y e xp la in e d w h y s u c h e v id e n c e c o u ld n o t c o n v inc e a
rea sonable fa ctfinder

that L axton knew of Hazelwood’s political a ffiliation, see Hall v. Tollet , 128 F.3d 418, 425 ( 6th Cir. 1997), m uch less acted upon that af filiation in recommendingher discha rg e, and we see no ne ed to re peat it.
III

. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.