2023 IL App (4th) 220573 

NO. 4-22-0573 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

TROY BROWN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Winnebago County 

No. 19CF3094 

Honorable 

Jennifer J. Clifford, 

Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Turner and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Troy Brown, pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 

5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2018)) and was sentenced to three years in prison. Defendant moved to 

withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The trial court appointed new counsel to represent defendant on his motion, and the court 

ultimately denied it. Defendant appeals, contending that his postplea counsel failed to comply with 

the duties outlined in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On November 22, 2019, the State charged defendant by complaint in case No. 19-

CF-3094 for offenses he allegedly committed against his ex-wife three days earlier. One of the 

four charges was aggravated domestic battery. Defendant was already on probation in three 

FILED

April 17, 2023 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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separate Winnebago County cases for offenses committed against his ex-wife, including criminal 

trespass to a residence, domestic battery, violation of an order of protection, and harassment. 

¶ 4 After defendant was charged in case No. 19-CF-3094, he stopped reporting to 

probation and was not arrested until October 2021. Meanwhile, in March 2021, a grand jury

indicted defendant in case No. 19-CF-3094. The State also filed petitions to vacate probation in 

defendant’s other cases. Attorney Frank Perri began representing defendant on all open cases after 

defendant was discharged unsuccessfully from drug court in late 2021. 

¶ 5 On February 3, 2022, the parties presented the trial court with a partially negotiated 

plea agreement. Specifically, defendant would plead guilty to the charge of aggravated domestic 

battery in case No. 19-CF-3094. The minimum sentence for aggravated domestic battery is 

probation with 60 days in jail, though the court instead may impose a prison sentence of between 

3 and 7 years. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(b) (West 2020) (providing the minimum penalties for a 

conviction of aggravated domestic battery, a Class 2 felony); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020) 

(authorizing a prison term of three to seven years for Class 2 felonies). Here, the parties agreed to 

a sentencing cap of four years in prison. The parties also agreed the State would dismiss the 

petitions to vacate probation. 

¶ 6 After being presented with this plea agreement, the trial court questioned defendant 

about his general background. Defendant stated he was 44 years old and had attended some 

college. Defendant assured the court that his prescription medications did not interfere with his 

comprehension. The court read to defendant the allegations in the aggravated domestic battery 

charge. The court explained the potential sentencing consequences for that offense, including the 

four-year sentencing cap to which the court agreed to bind itself. Defendant said he understood the 

sentencing consequences of the plea. The court asked defendant: “And you understand that right 
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now, there’s no agreement as to what the sentence will be and it will be set for a sentencing hearing 

and it will be up to me, the Court, to decide what your sentence will be ***?” Defendant confirmed 

he understood this. 

¶ 7 The trial court asked the prosecutor for a statement of facts in support of the guilty 

plea. The prosecutor represented as follows. As of November 19, 2019, defendant and his ex-wife 

had been separated for two years, and she had an order of protection against him. The ex-wife told 

the police that defendant arrived at her residence on November 19 and “beat on her door.” The 

ex-wife opened the door so defendant would not break it. Once inside, defendant asked to borrow 

his ex-wife’s car, but she refused. According to the ex-wife, defendant then “punched her multiple 

times in the head,” “hit her in the head with his elbows,” and strangled her with a belt to the point 

she could not breathe and began to see “brown spots.” A police officer later observed bruising on 

the ex-wife’s face and arms, along with a cut on the top of her head. 

¶ 8 The trial court asked defendant whether, after hearing this statement of facts, it was 

still his decision to plead guilty to “that charge.” Defendant responded, “Yes.” Defendant told the 

court he understood he had the right to plead not guilty, to have a trial, and to require the State to 

prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also said he understood the numerous 

potential collateral consequences of his guilty plea, such as not being able to possess a firearm.

Defendant confirmed he still chose to plead guilty.

¶ 9 Defendant told the trial court he had a chance to talk about this case with Perri, and 

defendant said he was satisfied with Perri’s representation. Defendant indicated he did not need 

more time to talk to Perri before going through with the plea. Defendant denied being forced or 

threatened to plead guilty, and he said that nobody made any promises to him. Defendant

acknowledged he was pleading guilty of his own free will. 
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¶ 10 The trial court then stated it had been tendered a written guilty plea. Defendant 

confirmed that his signature was on this document. The court asked defendant whether he wished 

the court to accept his guilty plea, and defendant responded in the affirmative. The court accepted 

the plea, determining it was “knowingly[,] intelligently[,] and voluntarily made and supported by 

a factual basis.” 

¶ 11 Immediately thereafter, Perri asked for defendant to be released on bond pending 

his sentencing hearing. The State objected. The trial court denied the motion, expressing concern 

about defendant returning to court in light of his history of going “AWOL” from his probation. 

The court also noted that defendant had “probably the highest domestic violence screening 

assurance score” the court had ever seen. The court continued the matter to April 11, 2022, for a 

sentencing hearing. The court advised defendant to tell Perri in advance of the sentencing hearing 

whether there were any classes he had taken or whether he had any witnesses to present. Defendant 

responded: “That ain’t what we agreed on.” Perri said he would visit defendant and prepare him 

for the sentencing hearing. 

¶ 12 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, defendant again told the trial court that 

his prescription medications did not affect his comprehension. Defendant also indicated he was 

still satisfied with Perri’s representation. The State presented no evidence, and defendant presented 

his mother as a witness. Defendant made a statement in allocution. The State requested a sentence 

of four years in prison, while defendant requested probation. The court sentenced defendant to 3 

years in prison, to be served at 85%, with credit for 186 days served in jail. Some of the reasons 

the court mentioned for ordering prison rather than probation were that defendant had a “lengthy 

criminal history,” he had gone “AWOL” while on probation, and he repeatedly victimized his exwife. The court informed defendant he would need to move to withdraw his plea and vacate the 
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judgment before appealing. The court asked defendant if he had any questions. Defendant 

responded: “Yeah, I am questioning him [(Perri)] about my trial.” Perri said: “We’ll talk about 

that.” 

¶ 13 On April 14, 2022, Perri filed on defendant’s behalf a motion to withdraw the plea 

and vacate the judgment, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, 

defendant alleged Perri “promised that [defendant] would receive probation at sentencing.” 

Defendant also claimed he “did not understand that he had the option to take the case to trial,” nor 

did he “understand that he pled guilty to aggravated domestic battery.” 

¶ 14 On May 16, 2022, the trial court appointed Paul Vella to represent defendant in 

connection with the postplea motion. On June 15, 2022, Vella informed the court he had reviewed 

the transcripts and spoken with defendant. Vella said he would adopt defendant’s motion “as 

written,” and requested a hearing. The court set the matter for a hearing on June 27, 2022. 

¶ 15 On June 27, 2022, Vella filed a certificate that complied with Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Specifically, Vella attested as follows:

“(1) I have consulted with the Defendant in person, by mail, by phone or by 

electronic means to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the entry of the 

plea of guilty and in the sentence; 

(2) I have examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea 

of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing; and 

(3) I have made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate 

presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” 

¶ 16 At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, defendant confirmed that the motion 

on file covered everything he desired. Defendant testified in support of his motion, explaining why 
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he believed Perri provided ineffective assistance. According to defendant, he never discussed the 

facts of the case with Perri. Defendant also testified he did not understand he was pleading guilty 

to the charge of aggravated domestic battery. Defendant claimed he pleaded guilty because Perri 

told him he would receive probation or, if not, a trial. Defendant testified he lied to the trial court 

at the plea hearing when he said his medications did not affect his comprehension. Defendant 

testified that Perri coerced him into pleading guilty by telling him not to worry about medications 

and just to agree to what the judge said so he would get probation. Defendant denied understanding 

what an “open plea” or a “sentencing hearing” was. 

¶ 17 The State initially told the trial court it did not have any witnesses to counter 

defendant’s motion. When the court asked if the State would call Perri, the State requested to 

continue the matter so Perri could review his case file before testifying. Over defendant’s 

objection, the court continued the hearing to July 11, 2022. 

¶ 18 On July 11, 2022, Vella filed another Rule 604(d) certificate that was identical to 

the one filed on June 27. Perri then testified for the State. He asserted that he spoke with defendant 

numerous times, both in person and over the telephone. Perri denied promising defendant he would 

receive probation. According to Perri, he instead said he would advocate for probation. Perri 

testified he explained to defendant multiple times what an open plea meant and what defendant 

was “exposed to.” In Perri’s opinion, there was no way defendant could reasonably have left their 

meeting thinking it was certain he would be sentenced to probation. Perri believed that defendant 

understood the plea he entered, including the possibility of being sentenced to prison. 

¶ 19 On cross-examination, Vella stated for the record that he would ask Perri questions 

drafted by defendant. Of note, Perri denied telling defendant there would be a trial if defendant did 

not get probation. Perri also testified that defendant “absolutely” mentioned wanting to go to trial. 
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However, Perri clarified on redirect examination that defendant desired a trial “prior to the 

negotiated resolution that was reached.” Perri attested that defendant wanted to accept whatever 

negotiated plea counsel could arrange. 

¶ 20 On questioning by the trial court, Perri denied either encouraging defendant to lie 

to the court or telling defendant to answer “yes” to all of the questions at the plea hearing. Perri 

insisted he did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty. Perri maintained there was never a time 

when he had concerns about defendant not understanding their conversations. Perri believed it was 

defendant’s decision to plead guilty. 

¶ 21 On redirect examination by Vella, Perri testified he discussed with defendant the 

definition of an open plea and the terms of his plea. The trial court then heard argument from the 

parties. Vella requested, and the court allowed, defendant to present his arguments personally. 

After defendant spoke, Vella briefly argued in favor of defendant’s motion. 

¶ 22 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the 

judgment. The court explained that it went through “every admonishment” with defendant at the 

plea hearing and “made sure repeatedly that [defendant] understood what was going on.” The court 

noted that defendant neither expressed confusion at the plea hearing nor indicated he was being 

coerced. The court also recalled that, at the sentencing hearing, defendant expressed satisfaction 

with Perri’s representation. Based on the court observing defendant to be intelligent and articulate, 

the court believed defendant would have spoken up at the plea hearing had he not understood 

something. The court determined defendant’s professed belief that he could plead guilty and then 

have a trial if he did not get probation “doesn’t make sense.” The court noted that defendant was 

“not new to the criminal justice system” and had entered pleas in other cases. Ultimately, the court 

did not “see anything in the record or in [defendant’s] testimony” supporting defendant’s motion. 
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¶ 23 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 On appeal, defendant acknowledges that Vella’s Rule 604(d) certificates facially 

comply with that rule. Nevertheless, defendant contends the record refutes the certificates, as Vella 

adopted and failed to amend defendant’s deficient postplea motion. Defendant maintains Vella

should have amended the motion so that it pleaded a “legally cognizable” claim. Based on Vella’s

failure to comply strictly with Rule 604(d), defendant requests vacating the judgment denying his 

postplea motion and remanding for further postplea proceedings. 

¶ 26 The State responds that no remand is necessary. The State reframes the issue as 

whether Vella had an obligation to procure affidavits in support of defendant’s motion. According 

to the State, any technical defect in defendant’s motion does not require a remand, as the trial court 

rejected defendant’s meritless ineffective-assistance claim after a full evidentiary hearing. 

¶ 27 In his reply brief, defendant seems to broaden his argument to include that Vella 

should have procured affidavits in support of defendant’s motion. However, defendant reiterates 

his primary contention that Vella should have amended defendant’s motion to include sufficient 

facts to plead a proper claim. Defendant also maintains that the issue of whether Vella strictly 

complied with Rule 604(d) is unrelated to whether defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim has 

merit. 

¶ 28 Here, defendant’s guilty plea was considered “negotiated,” as the State agreed to a 

sentencing cap below the statutory maximum. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) (defining 

a “negotiated plea of guilty” to include a plea where the State binds itself to recommending a 

specific sentencing range). As a prerequisite to appealing the judgment, within 30 days of 

sentencing, Perri filed on defendant’s behalf a motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the 
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judgment. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) (requiring a defendant who enters a negotiated 

guilty plea to move to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment before taking an appeal). In that

motion, defendant asserted ineffective assistance of counsel. In relevant portion, defendant alleged 

Perri “promised that [defendant] would receive probation at sentencing.” Defendant also claimed 

he “did not understand that he had the option to take the case to trial” or “that he pled guilty to 

aggravated domestic battery.” 

¶ 29 A claim of ineffective assistance requires a defendant to demonstrate both that 

counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and that such deficiency prejudiced the 

defendant. People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 14. “To establish prejudice in the guilty plea 

context, ‘the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Valdez, 2016 

IL 119860, ¶ 29 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). In his postplea motion, 

defendant did not allege—let alone offer facts supporting such an allegation—that he would not 

have pleaded guilty but for Perri’s conduct. See Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29 (“A conclusory 

allegation that a defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have demanded a trial is 

insufficient to establish prejudice.”). Thus, as defendant emphasizes on appeal, his postplea motion 

did not plead the required elements of an ineffective-assistance claim. Additionally, defendant did 

not provide affidavits in support of his motion. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) (“When 

the motion is based on facts that do not appear of record[,] it shall be supported by affidavit ***.”).

¶ 30 Because defendant expressed grievances against Perri, the trial court appointed 

Vella to represent defendant in connection with the postplea motion. Rule 604(d) imposes the 

following duties on an attorney in Vella’s position: 
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“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the 

attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means 

or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the 

entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of 

proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing 

hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate 

presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 

2017).

Rule 604(d) demands “strict compliance.” People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 6. 

Where counsel’s certificate fails to comply strictly with Rule 604(d), the appellate court must 

remand the matter to the trial court to allow the defendant the opportunity to file a new postplea 

motion and hold a new hearing on the motion. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 6. We review 

de novo counsel’s compliance with Rule 604(d). People v. Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 30. 

¶ 31 Defendant recognizes that Vella filed two certificates that facially complied with 

Rule 604(d). However, even where there is a facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate, remand is 

required if the record shows that counsel did not comply with his or her obligations under that rule. 

Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 36. In arguing that the record refutes Vella’s Rule 604(d) 

certificates, defendant notes that Vella adopted “as written” defendant’s deficient postplea motion. 

The State, on the other hand, emphasizes the trial court rejected defendant’s ineffective-assistance 

claim after a full evidentiary hearing.

¶ 32 We note defendant does not meaningfully dispute that he received a full and fair 

hearing on his ineffective-assistance claim. In his opening brief, defendant briefly asserts that Vella 

did not provide the trial court with the “essence” of defendant’s allegations. In support of that 
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assertion, defendant claims that Vella “actually stopped [defendant] from discussing [(at the 

evidentiary hearing)] the facts of his case and possibly defenses and claims to raise against the 

charges.” Defendant also notes that he personally argued his motion to the court. In his reply brief, 

defendant again asserts in passing that Vella “did not fully develop the record on the issue of 

prejudice for [defendant’s] ineffective-assistance claim.”

¶ 33 Contrary to what defendant suggests, the record shows that he had a full and fair 

opportunity to present his claim at the evidentiary hearing. Vella never stopped defendant from 

expressing his grievances against Perri at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant merely directs our 

attention to one example of Vella refocusing defendant’s attention on the question being asked

after defendant provided a nonresponsive answer. Indeed, at the end of direct examination, Vella 

asked defendant an open-ended question inviting defendant to share any other information about 

his request to withdraw the guilty plea. Additionally, the fact that defendant presented his own 

argument to the trial court increases our confidence that defendant had a full opportunity to present 

his ineffective-assistance claim. 

¶ 34 Furthermore, it is clear that defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim was meritless. 

At the plea hearing, defendant indicated he understood the sentencing consequences of his plea, 

including the charge to which he pleaded guilty and the potential for a prison sentence of up to 

four years. In light of the trial court’s comprehensive admonishments, defendant could not 

reasonably have believed he was guaranteed to receive probation as a result of the plea. Moreover, 

at the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s postplea motion, the court discredited defendant’s 

testimony. Thus, there is no question that defendant’s claim was meritless.

¶ 35 To recap, (1) defendant filed a bare-bones postplea motion alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel, (2) Vella adopted defendant’s motion without amending it, (3) Vella filed 
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facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificates, and (4) the trial court properly determined defendant’s 

claim was meritless after a full and fair evidentiary hearing. The question, then, is whether we 

must remand under these circumstances due to the pleading defects in defendant’s motion.

¶ 36 The only case defendant cites with a similar procedural posture is People v. 

Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289. In Winston, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery 

for throwing a bottle and books at a pregnant woman, and the defendant was sentenced to 

conditional discharge. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶¶ 1, 3. The defendant then filed a 

motion to “ ‘change plea.’ ” Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 3. The trial court reappointed 

the defendant’s plea counsel to represent her in connection with that motion. Winston, 2020 IL 

App (2d) 180289, ¶ 3. Counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the plea, alleging that the 

defendant (1) was unaware of how a felony conviction could adversely affect her and (2) pleaded 

guilty under duress. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 3. At an initial hearing, the defendant’s 

counsel also argued that the State could not have proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 3. 

¶ 37 After two appeals and two remands for noncompliance with Rule 604(d), counsel 

filed a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate, and the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. 

Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶¶ 3-4. At that hearing, the defendant challenged whether the 

State could have proved her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant claimed she was 

not the aggressor and she did not know the victim was pregnant. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 

180289, ¶¶ 4-5. The defendant also testified on cross-examination that she was not satisfied with 

her counsel’s performance. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 7. After the defendant concluded 

her testimony, her counsel attempted to admit hearsay on the reasonable-doubt issue in the form 

of statements from police reports. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 8. The trial court sustained 
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the State’s objection but offered defense counsel the opportunity to continue the hearing to produce 

the declarants as witnesses. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 9. Counsel declined the offer to 

continue the hearing. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 9. The trial court denied the postplea 

motion, and the defendant appealed. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 10.

¶ 38 The appellate court remanded for further proceedings, determining that, contrary to 

what counsel indicated in the Rule 604(d) certificate, counsel did not amend the defendant’s 

motion “to adequately present defects in the entry of the plea.” Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, 

¶¶ 15, 21. The appellate court emphasized that counsel challenged at the evidentiary hearing 

whether the State could have proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, yet counsel 

neither included that issue in the defendant’s motion nor supported that claim with affidavits. 

Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 15. Although the court acknowledged it “may be true” that 

the defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim lacked merit, the court said this “has no bearing 

on whether counsel complied with Rule 604(d).” Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 18. 

Furthermore, the court noted that “the specter of a violation of defendant’s right to the effective 

assistance of counsel hovers over the trial court proceedings.” Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, 

¶ 19. To that end, the appellate court was troubled that the defendant’s counsel raised a claim at 

the evidentiary hearing without pleading that claim and “without having secured the attendance of 

witnesses who arguably could have supported it.” Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 19. The 

court could discern no strategic reason for counsel offering inadmissible written statements rather 

than presenting testimony. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 19.

¶ 39 The concerns that prompted the third remand in Winston do not apply here. Vella

did not raise a new claim at defendant’s evidentiary hearing. Rather, Vella presented support at the 

evidentiary hearing for a claim that had been alleged in broad strokes in defendant’s postplea 
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motion. Additionally, Vella did not attempt to rely on hearsay in lieu of admissible evidence. Thus, 

defendant has cited no case directly supporting his request for a remand.

¶ 40 The State relies primarily on five cases: (1) Curtis, (2) People v. Diaz, 2021 IL App 

(2d) 191040, (3) People v. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, (4) People v. Jones, 2021 IL 

App (4th) 180497-U, and (5) People v. Jackson, 2022 IL App (5th) 200042-U. The two published 

cases the State cites—Curtis and Diaz—involved allegations on appeal that postplea counsel 

improperly omitted claims from the postplea motion. Here, by contrast, defendant’s

ineffective-assistance claim was expressly included in the postplea motion, though it was 

deficiently pleaded. The three unpublished cases the State cites—Kocher, Jones, and Jackson—

involved circumstances that are more factually analogous to what happened here. Ultimately, we 

determine that the reasoning of those cases is persuasive and supports a conclusion that a remand 

is not required.

¶ 41 In Kocher, the defendant pleaded guilty to predatory criminal sexual assault of a 

child and was sentenced to 23 years in prison. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 2. The 

defendant sent a pro se letter to the trial court alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel, and 

the defendant later filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 

200610-U, ¶ 2. The trial court refused to consider the defendant’s letter and determined the motion 

was untimely. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 2. In an initial appeal, we remanded on the 

basis that the trial court should have treated the pro se letter as a timely postplea motion. Kocher, 

2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 2. 

¶ 42 On remand, the trial court appointed the defendant new counsel, who filed an 

amended postplea motion. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 13. The amended motion 

alleged a bare-bones ineffective-assistance claim without accompanying affidavits or exhibits. 
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Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 14. Postplea counsel filed a facially compliant Rule 604(d) 

certificate. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 22. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing 

on the defendant’s amended motion, and both defendant and his plea counsel testified. Kocher, 

2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶¶ 14-15. The trial court denied the defendant’s amended motion, 

deeming plea counsel’s testimony more credible than the defendant’s. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 

200610-U, ¶ 16.

¶ 43 On appeal from that judgment, the defendant argued that, despite the facially 

compliant Rule 604(d) certificate, postplea counsel’s amended motion was both deficiently 

pleaded (“ ‘legally incognizable’ ”) and unsupported by affidavits. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 

200610-U, ¶¶ 19, 22. We declined to remand the case, as the “defendant received a full and fair 

hearing on his motion where the trial court received evidence relating to all of defendant’s 

allegations of error, which showed that defendant could not, under the circumstances presented, 

establish a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 

200610-U, ¶ 22. Addressing the allegation of defective pleading, we determined that “no 

amendments [to the motion] were necessary because no amendments could have salvaged [the 

defendant’s] meritless claims.” Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 26. 

¶ 44 We further acknowledged that Rule 604(d) required the defendant to provide 

affidavits substantiating any factual allegations that were outside of the record. Kocher, 2021 IL 

App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 27. However, we invoked the reasoning of People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 

359, 369 (1998), where our supreme court held that multiple remands for technical violations of 

Rule 604(d) may be unnecessary where a defendant receives a full and fair hearing on his or her 

claims. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶¶ 29, 31. We concluded that postplea counsel’s 
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“failure to file an affidavit in support of defendant’s claims constitutes a technical rather than a 

substantive error.” Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 31. 

¶ 45 We emphasized that the “defendant was not deprived of the due process protections 

that Rule 604(d) was intended to provide,” as he was “provided a meaningful opportunity to 

present evidence in support of” the allegations in his postplea motion. Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 

200610-U, ¶ 31. Where the trial court “rightly” rejected the defendant’s claims on the merits after 

a full and fair evidentiary hearing, “a second remand requiring a second hearing on defendant’s 

claims would be an empty and wasteful formality.” Kocher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200610-U, ¶ 32.

¶ 46 Defendant asserts that Kocher is distinguishable because counsel in that case

pleaded a deficient claim in an amended motion, whereas Vella adopted defendant’s deficient

claim. That is not a compelling reason to depart from Kocher’s reasoning. Similar to Kocher, it 

would be an “empty and wasteful formality” to remand the present case for repleading when the 

trial court rejected defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim on the merits after a fully litigated 

evidentiary hearing.

¶ 47 We recognize that Kocher involved a defendant’s request for a successive remand, 

whereas defendant here requests his first remand. In Jones, we applied logic similar to Kocher in 

a case where the defendant requested his first remand based on alleged Rule 604(d) 

noncompliance. The defendant in Jones pleaded guilty to aggravated driving under the influence 

of alcohol, received a 15-year sentence, and then filed a pro se motion challenging the plea. Jones, 

2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶ 2. The trial court ultimately appointed the defendant new counsel, 

who filed an amended motion raising six claims without accompanying affidavits. Jones, 2021 IL 

App (4th) 180497-U, ¶¶ 6, 8. Postplea counsel filed a facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate. 

Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶ 8. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at which both 
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the defendant and plea counsel testified. Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶¶ 9-10. The court 

denied the defendant’s motion, and he appealed. Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶¶ 12-13.

¶ 48 On appeal, the defendant argued that postplea counsel failed to comply with Rule 

604(d)’s requirement to substantiate claims with affidavits. Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, 

¶ 16. We determined that a remand was unnecessary. Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶ 22. 

We emphasized that the “[d]efendant was afforded the due process Rule 604(d) seeks to provide,” 

because “either the facts supporting defendant’s claims are of record or because he was afforded 

the opportunity in a full meaningful evidentiary hearing to present evidence supporting his claims.” 

Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶ 22. Under the circumstances, “an affidavit would not have 

provided the trial court with any information that was not or could not have been presented at the 

hearing.” Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶ 23. We added that the “[d]efendant is not entitled 

to two bites at the apple when he had every opportunity at the full evidentiary hearing to present 

facts during his testimony that would have supported his claim that his guilty plea should be 

withdrawn.” Jones, 2021 IL App (4th) 180497-U, ¶ 24.

¶ 49 In Jackson, the Fifth District applied similar reasoning to Kocher and Jones. In 

Jackson, the defendant presented his postplea claims at an evidentiary hearing, and the trial court 

rejected those claims. Jackson, 2022 IL App (5th) 200042-U, ¶¶ 23, 25. On appeal, the defendant 

argued that the record refuted the facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate because postplea 

counsel provided “mere conclusory allegations” and failed to submit affidavits. Jackson, 2022 IL 

App (5th) 200042-U, ¶ 30. The appellate court in Jackson determined that, “despite any alleged 

inadequacy in the amended motion to withdraw guilty plea, postplea counsel developed the 

defendant’s claims at the hearing on the amended motion and made argument as to why the 

defendant had a defense worthy of consideration.” Jackson, 2022 IL App (5th) 200042-U, ¶ 37. 
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Accordingly, the court held that remand was unwarranted. Jackson, 2022 IL App (5th) 200042-U, 

¶ 37.

¶ 50 The reasoning and holdings of Kocher, Jones, and Jackson are sound. Where 

postplea counsel files a facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate and the trial court determines 

after a full and fair hearing that the defendant’s claims are meritless, defects in the pleadings do 

not justify a remand for further proceedings. We certainly expect that attorneys will ensure 

postplea motions are in proper form before signing Rule 604(d) certificates. However, it would be 

an exercise in futility and a waste of judicial resources to remand for an attorney to replead a claim 

that has already been adjudicated meritless. Accordingly, we hold that a remand is unwarranted 

under the circumstances of this case.

¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 52 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 53 Affirmed.
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People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 19-

CF-3094; the Hon. Jennifer Clifford, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Edward J. Wittrig, of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

J. Hanley, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, David 

J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.