*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-10936

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIE FRANK KING, a.k.a. FRANK KING, a.k.a. WILLIE F. JAMES,

a.k.a. FRANK JORDAN, a.k.a. PENNY; ROY LEE TAYLOR,

Defendants-Appellants,

Appeal from the decision of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:97-CR-83-D)

October 13, 1998

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:*

Willie Frank King (“King”) and Roy Lee Taylor (“Taylor”)

appeal their convictions of conspiracy to possess, with intent to

distribute, cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii);

and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2. King also appeals his

conviction for the use of a communication facility in order to

facilitate a felony, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Likewise, Taylor appeals

his individual conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in

possession of a firearm. Based on our review of the record and
2

briefs and girded with the assistance of counsels’ statements at

oral argument, we affirm.

Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

as it relates to their convictions. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could

have found each of the essential elements of the charged offenses

beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d

1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting extrinsic evidence of King’s prior drug trafficking

activities in order to demonstrate knowledge or intent. See United

States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1997). When a

defendant contests the existence of knowledge or intent with

respect to a charged crime, the government may introduce extrinsic

evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 404(b) in order to establish

the requisite elements. See United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d

1261, 1268 (5th Cir. 1991).

The admission of the evidence seized from King’s truck

pursuant to an inventory search, if error at all, was harmless.

See United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993).

Substantial evidence of King’s guilt, including recorded

conversations, documentation, and testimony of his supplier,

existed in the record. Accordingly, we cannot say that the

admission of the small amount of circumstantial evidence found in

King’s truck during the inventory search had a “substantial impact”

on the jury’s verdict. Id. (citing United States v. El-Zoubi, 993
3

F.2d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Reviewing the district court’s denial of Taylor’s motion

to suppress, we examine factual findings for clear error and legal

conclusions de novo. See United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200,

1212 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d

157, 162 (5th Cir. 1996) (denial of Franks hearing reviewed de

novo). Preliminarily, the district court did not abuse his

discretion in holding that Taylor’s motion to suppress and request

for a Franks hearing was untimely. But even if, like the district

court, we review this issue on the merits, a misrepresentation made

in a probable cause affidavit will not invalidate a warrant so long

as a sufficient basis exists for the warrant’s issuance once the

inaccurate statements are omitted. See United States v. Privette,

947 F.2d 1259, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1991). A sufficient factual basis

existed here without the erroneous assertions. Moreover, because

the district court found that misstatements made in this affidavit

were merely negligent and not intentional, and that finding is not

clearly erroneous, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary

rule applies to the evidence seized from Taylor’s home pursuant to

the search warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-

23, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420-21 (1984); see also United States v.

Webb, 950 F.2d 226, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing restrictions

on Leon good-faith exception). Thus, the district court neither

erred in failing to conduct a Franks hearing nor in admitting the

seized evidence.

Finally, King maintains that the district court committed
4

clear error at sentencing by affixing an offense level of thirtyeight based on the 170 kilograms of cocaine attributed to the

conspiracy. See United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1230, 1231

n.17 (5th Cir. 1994) (factual findings regarding drug amounts

reviewed for clear error). We find no error in the district

court’s factual determination.

AFFIRMED.