SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1219-14T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NATHAN CRAFT,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted October 26, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Accurso.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment 

No. 12-03-0551.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Elizabeth C. Jarit, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on 

the brief).

Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mary R. 

Juliano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel 

and on the brief; Kristen M. Pridgen, Legal 

Assistant, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence 

seized in a warrantless search, defendant Nathan Craft pled 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 10, 2017
2 A-1219-14T2

guilty to second-degree possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2), and was sentenced in accordance 

with an agreement negotiated pursuant to the Brimage Guidelines. 

As authorized by Rule 3:5-7(d), defendant appeals from the 

denial of his motion to suppress the drugs found in his car, 

raising only one issue:

BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 

CRAFT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS KNOWING AND 

VOLUNTARY, THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

Finding no basis to disturb Judge Oxley's factual findings or 

legal conclusions, we affirm.

Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses at the 

suppression hearing. The arresting officer testified he was 

driving south on Hope Road in Tinton Falls when he noticed a tan 

Buick with tinted windows traveling in the same direction. The 

officer checked the Buick's license plate and learned the 

registered owner had a suspended license. The officer pulled 

the car over and approached the driver, later identified as 

defendant Nathan Craft.

In the course of speaking to the driver, the officer 

noticed the smell of marijuana, and asked defendant whether he 

had been smoking the drug. Defendant admitted he had smoked 

marijuana an hour or two earlier. The officer asked defendant 
3 A-1219-14T2

to step out of the car and radioed his sergeant. The officer 

asked defendant whether he was armed, and if the officer could 

pat him down. Defendant said he was not armed and consented to 

a pat down. Noticing a bulge in one of defendant's pockets, the 

officer discovered a large wad of cash but no weapon. In 

response to the officer's question as to why he was carrying so 

much cash, defendant told the officer it was about $8000, which 

he had to pay bills. The officer returned the cash to 

defendant, and spoke to the sergeant who had arrived on the 

scene.

The officer approached defendant with a consent to search 

form, reviewed it with him and requested defendant's consent to 

search the car. The officer testified defendant refused to sign 

the form but told him he could search the car. The officer 

testified he spoke to defendant for about three to five minutes, 

making sure he had defendant's consent to search the car and 

trying to understand why, if defendant was consenting to the 

search, he was unwilling to sign the form. 

The officer testified defendant took issue with the 

language of the form authorizing the police "to remove and 

retain any items of evidential value which they consider 

pertinent to their investigation." Specifically, defendant told 
4 A-1219-14T2

the officer he had no objection to the officer searching his 

car, he just did not want the police to take his money. 

After confirming with defendant that he understood he had 

the right to refuse the search, and that he was consenting to 

the search but would not sign the form, the officer signed and 

dated the form, noting that defendant "[r]efused to sign 11-1-11 

5:54pm." Underneath the space provided for defendant's 

signature, the officer wrote, "gave permission[;] verbal 

consent[;] didn't want us to take money." The sergeant also 

signed and dated the form. On cross-examination, the officer 

conceded that although he was without basis to seize the cash 

when he handed it back to defendant after the pat-down, he knew 

if drugs were discovered in the car, he would seize the cash for 

forfeiture.

Following completion of the form, the officer searched the 

car and found part of a plastic bag sticking up between the 

cushions of the backseat. Inside was eighty-five grams of 

cocaine packaged in smaller bags. Defendant was arrested, his 

cash was seized, and he was transported to the police station

where he was processed and released on his own recognizance 

after giving a statement.

The detective who took defendant's videotaped statement 

also testified at the suppression hearing. He explained he was 
5 A-1219-14T2

directed to conduct the interview, "because it's not every day 

that you . . . have somebody say hey, search my car but I'm not 

going to sign the consent."1 After defendant executed the 

Miranda2 form, the detective asked him what had occurred during 

the course of the stop, whether he had consented to have his car 

searched, and why he refused to sign the form.

On the videotape, which was played in court and 

authenticated by the detective, defendant described the stop 

very similarly to the way the officer had described it in his 

testimony. Defendant several times conceded he gave the officer 

permission to search his car. He explained he refused to sign 

the form, which he reviewed with the detective, because he "[did 

not] know the law," and the language of the form "was subject to 

interpretation." Defendant told the detective he did not 

understand the full ramifications of the clause that allowed the 

police to seize evidence, and he did not want the officer to 

take his $8000. 

 

1 Although the detective testified he was not aware the stop had 

not been recorded at the time he was directed to take 

defendant's statement, the arresting officer testified he was 

driving a canine unit, which was not equipped with video or 

audio equipment in 2011 when the stop occurred.

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

694 (1966).
6 A-1219-14T2

When the detective pressed defendant as to why then had he 

consented to the search, knowing he had a right to refuse, 

defendant expressed the view that the officer was going to 

search no matter what defendant said.3 When the detective asked 

whether the Tinton Falls officer had said or done anything 

during the stop to indicate he was going to search defendant's 

car regardless of whether he got consent, defendant explained he 

based his belief on his and others' prior experiences. That 

comment led to an exchange in which the detective stressed that 

officers have to stop a voluntary search upon request and 

defendant expressing skepticism that any officer would ever do 

so. Defendant, who is black, told the detective, who is white, 

that their views on whether the police respected the rights of 

people pulled over in traffic stops likely differed because "we 

walk two different lives." 

After listening to the officer's testimony, viewing the 

video and the consent forms in evidence, and hearing the 

argument of counsel, Judge Oxley denied defendant's motion to 

suppress the drugs found in the car. The judge found the 

officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car after 

the license plate look-up revealed the owner's license was 

 

3 Defendant also told the detective he "didn't know what was in 

the car."
7 A-1219-14T2

suspended. See State v. Donis, 157 N.J. 44, 58 (1998). He 

further found the odor of marijuana emanating from defendant's 

car provided the officer with reasonable and articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity, thereby justifying the officer's 

request to search defendant's car. See State v. Carty, 170 N.J.

632, 647 (2002).

Based on the officer's "uncontradicted" and credible 

testimony that he advised defendant of his right to refuse 

consent, and that defendant thereafter consented to the search 

of his car, as defendant later confirmed to the detective, the 

judge found defendant's consent knowing and voluntary. See

State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 308-09 (2006). Despite 

acknowledging defendant's statement to the detective that 

defendant believed the officer would have searched the car 

regardless of whether defendant consented, the judge noted there 

was nothing in the record to suggest defendant had been 

pressured or coerced. See State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53

(1965) (listing factors to consider in determining whether 

consent to search was coerced). Finally, the judge rejected 

defendant's argument that he had conditioned his consent on the 

officer "not taking his money." Besides noting the officer had 

returned defendant's money to him after the pat down, the judge 

found the cash was not seized pursuant to defendant's consent to 
8 A-1219-14T2

search his car but was instead seized in a search incident to 

his lawful arrest.

Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is limited. 

See State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014). We defer to the 

trial court's factual findings on the motion, unless they were 

"clearly mistaken" or "so wide of the mark" that the interests 

of justice require appellate intervention. State v. Elders, 192 

N.J. 224, 245 (2007). "Deference to these factual findings is 

required because those findings 'are substantially influenced by 

[an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 

"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" 

Gamble, supra, 218 N.J. at 424-25 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 

N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Our review of the trial court's 

application of the law to the facts, of course, is plenary. 

State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).

Defendant argues because he "refused to sign the consent to 

search form, told the officer that he did not understand a 

portion of the form, placed a limitation on the search that 

would have negated any consent, and believed that the officer 

would have searched his car regardless of whether consent was 

obtained," the State failed to meet its burden and the court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress. We do not agree.
9 A-1219-14T2

"Consent is . . . a factual question to be determined from 

the relevant circumstances." State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 

264 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. 

Ed. 2d 803 (1989). Although the car stop was not recorded, the 

trial court had the benefit of the officer's testimony and both 

it and we have the benefit of defendant's videotaped interview,

in which he candidly and calmly discussed what happened on the 

road and his rationale for giving consent but refusing to sign 

the form. Although first-hand accounts in these situations are 

often wildly divergent, here they were remarkably similar.

Counsel's argument that defendant did not understand his 

right to refuse consent is completely belied by a view of the 

videotape. Although defendant did not finish high school, 

instead obtaining a G.E.D., he presents as an intelligent and 

thoughtful individual, self-respecting and forthright in the 

midst of what the detective described as "not a good time for 

[him]." Indeed, the judge surmised that defendant's demeanor 

was one of the chief reasons he was released on a summons. In 

the interview, defendant makes clear that what he did not 

understand was whether, by virtue of the language allowing the 

police "to remove and retain any items of evidential value which 

they consider pertinent to their investigation," he would be 
10 A-1219-14T2

giving consent to the officers to seize the cash in his pocket, 

which he did not wish to do.

Although there is no question but that "the scope of a 

consent search is limited by the terms of its authorization," 

State v. Santana, 215 N.J. Super. 63, 72 (App. Div. 1987), we 

cannot find that defendant somehow limited his unequivocal 

consent to search his car by his unwillingness to surrender the 

cash the detectives had already found in his pocket and returned 

to him. Neither are we aware of any requirement that would have 

the officer explain that if they found drugs in the car, they 

could lawfully seize the cash in his pocket, as well as his car,

on the theory it was integral to or utilized in furtherance of

illegal drug distribution, see N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1a(2)-(3), even 

though aware he did not want police to take his money. Although 

defendant's consent ultimately led to the seizure of the cash, 

the cash was not seized pursuant to defendant's unequivocal 

consent to search his car. 

As for defendant's statement to the detective that he only 

consented because of his belief that the police would have 

searched anyway, we do not find it undermined defendant's 

objective acknowledgement "that he had a choice in the matter." 

State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975). We are mindful of 

his concession to the detective that the Tinton Falls officers 
11 A-1219-14T2

treated him with respect and made no attempt to coerce his 

compliance. A defendant's subjective perception that his 

consent was coerced will not vitiate an otherwise valid given 

consent to search. State v. Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583, 589 

(App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988).

Because we concur with Judge Oxley's view of the law, and 

find no basis to second-guess his findings of fact, we affirm 

the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the 

drugs seized from his car pursuant to a valid consent search.

Affirmed.