### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE June 15, 200 4 S es sio n

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v

. TI M OT HY WA D E D A V IS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 69067 Richard Baumgar tner, Judge

No. E2003-02162-CC A-R3- CD - F iled October 25, 2004

The de fenda nt, TimothyWade Davis, wa s convicted by a jury of four counts of rape of a child and

one c o u n t o f a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l e xp lo it a ti o n o f a mi n o r

. Se n te n c e s o f tw e n ty

- tw o y ear s were imposed for e ach c hild rape conviction and ten y ear s for a g g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor. Three of the c hild rape c onvictions and the espe cially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor wer e order ed to run c onsecutively for an eff ective se ntence of seve nty -six y ear s at 100%. The defe ndant

app e a ls h is c on vic tio ns a nd se nte nc ing a nda lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in the fo llo wi ng re sp e c ts: (1) in fa iling to suppress the se arc h war rant a nd the def

endant’ s statements; (2) by deny ing the defe ndant the rig ht to repre sent himself; (3) by ref using to instruct the jury

on insanity ; (4) in finding the d efendant compe tent to stand trial; and (5) in r eg ard to sente ncing . After revie w of the issues prese nted and the r ecor d as a w hole, we conclude that no reve rsible err or was prese nt and af firm the

co n v i ct i o n s an d s en t en ci n g.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J
., joined. J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J
., filed a se parate conc urring opinion.

Br uce Poston, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee; Mar k E. Steph en s, District Publi c De fende r; and John Ha lst e a d, As sis ta nt P ub lic De fe nd e r, fo r the app e lla nt, Ti mothy Wad e Da vis

.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ra nd all E. Ni cho ls , Di st ri ct A tt orn ey Gen eral ; an d L ela nd P ri ce, A ss is tan t D is tr ict Atto rn e y Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The de fenda nt, Timothy Wade Davis, was indicted in an eig ht-count indictment. Counts one throug h six wer e for

rape of a c hild, a Class A fe lony ; count seven c harg ed espe cially ag g ravated

s e xu a l e xp lo it a ti o n o f

a mi n o r , a Cl a s s B f

e lo n y ; an d c o u n t e ig h t c h ar g e d e xh ib it io n o f h ar mf ul

ma te ri a ls to min or s, a

Cla ss Amis de me a no r. Th e tr ia l c ou rt g rante d th e Sta te ’s mot ion to d ism iss-2-

in two counts of rape of a child and order ed the defe ndant’s acquittal on count e ight, e x hibition of ha rm fu l mate ri a ls t o mi no rs . A jury re turne d g uil ty

ve rd ic ts o n a ll r e ma ini ng c ha rg e s.

The defenda nt was sente nced to twe nty -two y ear s on eac h of the four child rape convictions and ten y ear s for the e specia lly ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor. Three of the child rape convictions wer e order ed to r un consec utively
, as wa s the espec ially ag g ravated sexual ex ploitation of a minor, f

or a total e ffe ctive sente nce of seventy -six y ear s at 100%.

The de fenda nt appea ls his convictions and sentencing and pre sents five issues for revie w: 1) The va lidityof the sea rch w arr ant issued for the d ef en d an t ’s re sidence and the failure to suppress the def endant’ s statements as fr

uits of an invalid sear ch; 2) Wheth er t h e t rial court properly denied the de fenda nt’s reque st to repre sent him se lf ; 3) Whether the trial court err ed in r efusing to instruct the jury on the def

inition of ins a nit y ; 4) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in ruling that the def endant wa s competent to stand trial; and 5) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in se nte nc ing the de fe nd a nt.

F acts

This case conce rns sexual abuse of a very y oung fema le vi ctim by a trusted adult friend of the vic tim ’s pa

re nts . T he vic tim ’s mothe r t e sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd ant had be e n a frie ndof the ir family for ove r twenty

y ear s. She said the defendant was a reg ular visitor in their home on we ekends and once had g one on vac ation wit h t h e fa m ily . Her daug hter, the vic tim herein, wa s born September 28, 1990. The defe ndant had built a swing for the victim a nd would eng ag e in play ing ball an d o th e r

p lay f u l a c ti v it ie s w ith th e v ic ti m. A f te r th e v ic ti m e n te r e d th e f ir s t g r a d e , the de fe nd a nt b e g a n ta

kin g the vic tim

to F ou ntain C ity

Park wi th the pe rm iss ion of the vic tim ’s pa

re nts

. The visits to the park occ urre d on numerous u n s p ec i fi ed date s betwee n May of 1997 and June of 1999.

Th e de fe nd a nt ha d li ve d w ith his pa re nts un til mid -1 99 8, wh e n h e a c qu ir e d h is o wn ho me in H a lls . T he vic tim ’s mothe r l e arn e d in Ma y of 19 99 that the de fe nd a nt h a d b e e n ta kin g the vic tim to h is ho me

. Th e se vis its ha d no t be e n wi th the pe rm iss ion of the vic tim ’s pa re nts

. Du ri ng the la st

wee k in J une of 1999, the victim made statem en t s t o her mother of possible sexual abuse by the defe ndant. The mot her reporte d the allegations to the Knox ville Police, and she was refe rre d to a counselor at Chil dhelp USA.

O n c r o s s

- e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e v i c t i m ’ s m o t h e r s t a t e d t h a tt h e d e f

e n d an t d i d c h o r e s f o r h e r f a m i l y, such as c utting the law n. She admitted t h at s h e and her husband conta cted a civil lawy er be fore meeting with DCS or the police. S h e st ated that she and the victim provided information to the police that wa s used to obtain a sea rch w arr ant for the defe ndant’s home.-3-

The victim was twe lve y ear s old at the time of t rial. She testified s he was six or seve n when the de fe nd a nt b e g a n to uc hin g he r private pa rt s. She state d that th e de fe nd a nt e xpos e d h is p e nis to her w hile at the def

endant’ s residenc e. She said the de fenda nt attempted to p en et ra t e h er “ front private” with his penis and did so to the l eng th of her fing erna il. The defe ndant desisted whe n she tol d h i m it hurt. She testified that the defe ndant also attempted pe nile penetr ation of her “bac k private,” as well as placing his pe nis in her mouth. These occur renc es happene d “[ a] b o u t every
wee kend” a ccor ding to the vic tim. The victim rec ounted one incident at her house when she and the defe ndant wer e alone . The de fenda nt had her pull down her pa nts and press her re ar to the w indow, exposi ng her to drive -by

traff ic. The de fenda nt had his pants down then but the victim could not

rec all whether he touched her on this oc casion. She described another occa sion when the de fenda nt ha d h e r g e t in to a fi lle d ba thtub wh ile he ru bb e d his pe nis un til he e ja c ulate d in the sin k. She c ou ld

no t re c a ll wh e the r a ny tou c hin g s oc c ur re d on that date

. Th e de fe nd a nt a lso sh ow e d t he v ict im

ma g a zine s w ith “ nake d p e op le .” She sa id the de fe nd a nt ke pt the ma g a zine s in a big bo x u nd e r h is too l be nch. S he st ate d th a t th e de fe nd a nt s ho we d h e r m ov ie s o f p e op le ha vin g se x. Th e vic tim related that the defe ndant had a Polaroid came ra that they used to photog raph e ach othe r nake d and sometimes touching e ach othe r, with his penis in her mouth and o n h er “front private.” The defe ndant kept these pictures in a shoe box in a nig ht stand by his bed.

On cr oss-examination, the victim said she believed th at p ic tu r e s w e r eta k e n at the def

endant’ s house “any

time some thing was done.” She rec alled being able to te ll the investiga t o rs t h e e x act number of picture s kept in the shoe box. S he did not rec all the number of occa sions pictures wer e taken. She de nied that the def endant e ver hit her

.

Detec tive P er ry M o y ers with the Knox CountySheriff’ s Depa rtment testified that he w as assig ned to assist with the sear ch of the defe ndant’s home on July14, 1999. He pa rticipated in the

sear ch and w as re sponsible for finding a box of “pornog raphic mag azines.” The defenda nt had bee n taken i n to c u s to d y p r io r to th e s e ar c h a n d w a s h a n d c u f f e d in a s q u a d c ar p ark e d o u ts ide the defe ndant’s home. Moy ers wa s asked to question the de fenda nt w h i l e t h e sear ch continued. T he defe ndant indicated he would make a statement and was tra nsported to the sheriff’s de partment. The de fe nd a nt w a s p re se nte d a writt e n M ir a nd a

wa ive r o f ri g hts fo rm a nd sig ne d it a t 12 :13 a .m. on July 15 , 1 99 9. Th e de fe nd a nt o bje c te d to tape re c or din g his state me nt, a ndit w a s n ot r e c or de d. Mo y e rs ’ partne r, Lieutenant Grissom, made notes from the de fenda nt’s statements. The defe ndant claimed his “involvement” with the victim had be en occ urring for two months

. He admitted to taking pictures a nd showing the vi ctim a pornogr aphic movie. The de fenda nt denied kissing the victim’s

va g ina bu t a dmi tte d pla c ing his pe nis a g a ins t it . T he de fe nd a nt a dmi tte d atte mpt ing pe ne tr a tio n w ith his pe nis a nda dmi tte d th e pe nis in the vic tim ’s mou th i n o ne of the pic tur e s w a s h is.

On cr oss-examination, Detective Moy ers sa id that the defe ndant denied any vag inal penetr ation of the victim. The de fenda nt did not deny t h at t h e v i cti m performed ora l sex or that pictures we re taken.

Detec tive L arry

G. Moore w ith the Kn o x C o u nty Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment was the le ad investigator in this case. He testified that he had participated in an inter view with the victim and her-4-

pare nts on J uly

13, 1999. As a re sult of the information re ceive d, Detec tive Moore, with the assistance of Carle ton Bry ant, a leg al advisor f or the sheriff’s de partment, dra fted a sear ch wa

rra nt for the de fenda nt’s home. Detective Moore and other office rs executed the se arc h war rant during the e ve nin g of July 14 th. Pho tog ra ph s we re fo un d in a ni g ht s ta ndin the de fe nd a nt’ s b e dr oo m. A lso found we re ma g azines of “Penthouse a nd Playboy type” and a video labe led “B est of B loopers.”

On J anuary

15, Detec tive Moore a nd Mr. B ry ant visited the defe ndant who wa s confined at the jail. Four

of the c onfiscate d photogr aphs we re shown to the defe ndant. The de fenda nt identified the child in the photos as the victim and stated that he took the picture s.

Carleton B ry ant testified that he a ssisted D etec tive Moore in dra fting the sea rch w arr ant and

a f t e r w ar d s a c c o m p a n i e d t h e o f f i c e r s t o c o n d u c tt h e s e ar c h

. A f t e r t h e d e f e n d a n tw a s i n c u s t o d y, B ry a nt andDe te c tiv e Mo or e vis ite d th e de fe nd a nt at th e ja il t o a sk abo ut o ne of

the ph oto g raph s. Bry ant said that the victim was identifia ble but the male adult wa s not. Bry ant aske d the def endant if the per son display ing his pe nis in the photog raph w as the de fenda nt, and the def endant a ffirme d that it wa s.

At the c on c lus ion of the Sta te ’s pr oo f, the Sta te a nn ou nc e d th a t du e to a la c k o f s pe c if

ic ity by the victim, counts two and three , both child rape char g es, we re to be dismiss ed. The State relied on the photog raphs to show that the pic tures we re taken on diffe rent occa sions and would support the re ma ini ng fo ur

c ou nts of c hil d r ape . T he tr ia l c ou rt g rante d the de fe ns e mot ion pu rs ua nt to Ru le 29 to d ism iss c ou nt e ig ht o f the ind ic tme nt, e xhibi tio n o f h arm fu l mate ri a ls t o mi no rs

.
Dr. Clifto n R

. T en n i s o n , a p s y ch i at ri s tan d ch i ef ad m i n i s tra t o r a tHe l en R o s s McNabb Ce nter, was the f irst witness called by

the def ense. H e had done two evaluations of the defe ndant pursuant to court orde rs for c ompetency evaluations. The first eva luation was on J an u ar y 4, 2001. I t was brief and was terminated due to the de fendan t ’s re fusal to participate. Dr . Tennison then

rec ommended hospitalization i n order to observe the defe ndant in an in-patient setting.

The sec ond evaluation was done J uly 18, 2002. I n prepa

ration, Dr. T ennison revie wed the

re po rt s o f D r. Eric En g um, a ps y c ho log ist wh o h a d e va luate d th e de fe nd a nt t wi c e . D r. Te nn iso n a lso revie wed the r ecor ds of L akeshor e Menta l Health I ns t i t u t e wh ere the def endant ha d been hospitaliz ed. A g ener al psy cholog ical eva luation by Dr. Dia na McCoy

was a lso considere d. Of the I Q tests made or

estimated as to the defe ndant, the rang e varie d betwee n 77 and 88. Dr . Tennison conclude d that the def

endant ha d border line intellectual func tioning betwe en 71 and 84 I Q.
During the sec ond evaluation, Dr. Tennison inte rv ie w ed the de fenda nt for an hour , then spent

a no the r h ou r with the de fe nd a nt’ s cou ns e l pr e se nt t o d e te rm ine if the de fe nd a nt h a d th e c apa c ity to pa rt i c i p at em e a nin g fu lly

wi th h is atto rn e y s. He te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt d id n ot t ake re sp on sib ili ty fo r h is a c tio ns wh ic h le a d to the c ri min a l c ha rg e s.

He sa id Dr. McCoy ’s re port ref lected that the defe ndant suffe red from depr ession and met the criteria of sc hizoi d persona litydisorder. H e def ined schizoid personali t y as being marke d by-5-

isolation, suspi cion, and withdra wal. The disorder is char acte rized by blaming thing s that happen on other pe ople and by

a fa ilure to ac knowledg e re sponsibili ty . L akeshor e staff diag nosis was for

a vo idant p e rs on a lit y

dis or de r andpe do ph ili a . H e c ha ra c te ri z ed a vo idant p e rs on a lit y a s si mil ar t o schizoid personality

but that avoidant types desire to have f riends and contact with other s, where as the sc hizo id p e rs on a lit y

do e s n ot. Dr . Eng um ha d dia g no se d the de fe nd a nt a s h a vin g so c ia l a nxie ty disorder, bor derline intellec tual functioning , mix ed per sonality disorder w ith schiz oid and avoidant features, and de pression. Dr. E ng um ruled out pedophilia as a diag nosis. I n his ow n evaluation, Dr. T e n n is o nd ia g n o s e d

p e r s o n a lity

disorder w ith schiz oid and avoidant f eatur es, social a nx iety

disorder, and chro n i c l o n g-t erm tendency toward de pression. He found it doubtful the defe ndant met the

c ri te ri a fo r p e do ph ili a . F urth e r, he op ine d th a t th e de fe nd a nt s uf fe re d a mil d impa ir me nt i n h is capa city to testify rele vantly

. Dr. Tennison attributed t his to the defendant’s belief that his version of e ve nts wo uldbe fu til e a ndus e le ss. Dr . Te nn iso n be lie ve d the de fe nd a nt c ou ld t e sti fy re le va ntl y bu t c ho se ins te a d to blame oth e rs

.
On cr oss-ex amination, Dr. Te nnison stated that his ulti mate conc lusion was that the de fe nd a nt w a s c omp e te nt t o s ta nd tr ia l. He no te d th a t w a s th e c on c lus ion of Dr . E ng um a s w e ll i n his first evaluation. Dr. Te nnison found no prese nce of psy chosis, disabling a nx iety or depr ession, or formal thought disorde r.

Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t he wa s f orty -s ix y e ars old . H e ha d kn ow n th e vic tim ’s pa re nts fo r o ve r t we nty

y e ars . H e statedthat he sp e nt a lot of tim e a t th e ir

ho me , w or

ke d o n th e ir

c ars , painted their house inside twice a nd outside once, a nd perf ormed a lot of y ard w ork. He testified that the vic tim ’s pa

re nts a llo we d the vic tim to watc h se xua lly e xplic it mov ie s on the Pla y bo y c ha nn e l. The de fenda nt stated he ref used to sign the summarized statement he made to the sheriff ’s detec tives be c a us e he c ou ld n ot r e a d it

. During cross-e x amination, the def endant a dmitted that he knew the victim’s ag e. He stated that he had lost a ll of

his possessions due to a civil suit brought by the victim’s pare nts. He admitted that pictures of

the victim and himself wer e take n at his home.

Ana lys is

Searc h Warrant

The de fenda nt contends that the trial c ourt err ed by its failure to suppre ss the evidenc e seized pursuant to the sea

rch w arr ant. The f

irst basis of the def

endant’ s arg ument is t h at t h er e wa s nonc omp lia nc e wi th T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re 41 (c ). Th e pe rt ine nt po rt ion of the ru le is: Th e ma g ist

rate sh a ll pr e pa

re a n ori g ina l andtw o e xac t c op ie s o f the se arc h w arr a nt,

on e of wh ic h s ha ll b e ke pt b y

the ma g ist

rate a s a pa rt of his or he r o ff ic ia l r e c or ds
, and one of

which shall be left with the person or persons on whom the se arc h war rant is se rved. The mag istrate shall endor se upon the sea rch w arr ant the hour, date, and name of the offic er to whom the war rant wa s delivere d for e x ecution; and the e x act copy of the sea rch w arr ant and the e ndorsement ther eon shall be admissibl e evide nce.-6-

Fa ilure of the ma g istrate to make sa id orig inal and two copie s of the sear ch wa rra nt

or failure to endorse the reon the date a nd time of issuance and the na me of the of fice r to whom issued, or the fa ilure of the se rving office r whe re possible to lea ve a c opy with the person or persons on whom the se arc h war rant is being serve d, shall make any sear ch conduc ted under

said sear ch wa

rra nt an illeg al sea

rch a nd any

seizure there under a n illega l seizure.

“[W ]hen a trial court’s finding s of fac t at a suppression hearing a re ba sed on evide nce that does not involve issues of credibility , a re viewing court must examine the rec ord de novo w ithout

a pr e su mpt ion of c or

re c tne ss. ” Sta te v. B ine tte , 3 3 S. W.3 d 2 15 , 2 17 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . Wh e the r R ule 41 (c ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Cri min a l Proc e du re re qu ir e s supp re ssi on of the e vid e nc e in thi s c a se is a question of law w hich we re v i ew de novo with no pre sumption of corre ctness af forde d to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s.

I ndisputably , there are differ ence s in the orig inal aff idavit to the sear ch warra nt and the c opy reta ined by

the executing office r and the copy left at the de fenda nt’s residenc e. The differ ence s are that on the orig inal aff

idavit the issuing mag istrate’s name i s omitted from the blank s pace left for t h at p u rp o s e. The mag istrate’s na me is written in at this space on the copy left at the de fenda nt’s home. A handw ritten ins er t o f “inappr opriate se x ual” a nd separ ately , the word “ of” w as initialed on the def endant’ s copy , but not on the orig inal copy

. Pag e three of the aff idavit ha d initials bythe word “ brag ” on the de fenda nt’s and off icer s’ copy , but were not on the original affidavit. The sea rch

war rant itself c ontained the f ollowing lang uag e in prominent ty pe: AFFI ANT ’S AFFI DAV I T I S HER EBY E XP RE S S L Y I NC OR P OR ATE D BY RE FER ENC E AN D M ADE A P AR T HE RE OF.
The State urg es us to consider the aff idavit as a separ ate document exempt from the technical

re qu ir e me nts of

Rul e 41 (c ), de sp ite the la ng ua g e of inc or po ratio n. I t is we ll s e ttl e d th a t a n a ff ida vit upon which a se arc h war

rant is issued does not bec ome a pa rt of the sear ch warra nt even if it appe ars
on the same form. Minton v. State, 186 Tenn. 541, 212 S.W.2d 373, 374 (1948); State v. Price, 46 S.W .3d 785, 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Smit h, 836 S.W .2d 137, 141 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). B ut to ignore clea r and une quivocal lang uag e of inc orporation by ref ere nce w ould rende r plain lang uag e mea ningle ss. O’B rien v. State, 158 Te nn. 400, 14 S.W .2d 51 (1929), held that when an af fidavit is incorporated by the war rant with prope r re fer ence , then i t i s a p ar t of the sea rch

wa rr a nt.

Affida vits, when properly incorporated by

ref ere nce, ha ve bee n util ized to satisfy insufficienc ies of desc ription in the searc h war rant. Hac kerma n v. State, 189 Tenn. 130, 135, 223 S.W .2d 194, 196 (1949); O’ Brien, 158 Tenn. at 403, 14 S.W .2d 51; se e Smit h, 836 S.W .2d at 141

We c on c lud e that in c or

po ratio n of an a ff

ida vit by the se arc h w arr a nt e mbo die s th e a ff ida vit as a pa rt of the se arc h war

rant a nd is thus subj ect to the r equi rements of Rule 41(c). N ext, we consider w hether

the anomalies de scribed in the inc orporated af fidavit are fata l unde r the mandatory require ments of Rule 41(c)

.-7-

Rule 41(c) derive s from a pr edec essor statute, T ennessee Code Annotated sec tion 40-518 (r e pe a le d 1 97 9) . O ur

app e llate c ou rt s hav e sc ru pu lou sly a dh e re d to the ma nd a tory la ng ua g e of bo th the prior statute a nd the cur rent Rule 41(c ) and ha ve suppre ssed evidenc e whe n a v i o l at i o n of the provisions was shown. See State v. Coff ee, 54 S.W.3d 231 (Tenn. 2001 ); J o h n son v. State, 208 Te nn . 6 20 , 3 48 S.W. 2d29 5 ( 19 61 ); Ta lle y v. Sta te , 2 08 Te nn . 2 75 , 3 45 S.W. 2d86 7 ( 19 61 ); Sta te v. Steele, 894 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Gra pel Simpson, et al., No. 02C01- 9508-CC-00240, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Sept. 30, 1996).

The rationale for this zealous protec tion has been se t fo rth in our appe llate opinions. The proce dural saf

eg uards a re intende d “to sec ure the citizen ag ainst car elessness an d ab u s e in the issuance and execution of sear ch wa rra nts.” Talley , 208 Tenn. at 278, 345 S.W .2d at 869. The provision at issue, that a mag istrate pre pare and re tai n a co py of the sea

rch

war rant, e ndeavor s to prevent imprope r sea rche s and fa cilitate judicial re view of wh e the r a se arc h w a s e xec ute d w ith in the sc op e of the wa rr a nt. Th e ru le a c hie ve s it s g oals in that a written r ecor d of the spec ifics of the se arc h sti fl es t h e ever-pr esent temptation fo r an office r to conduc t a sea rch a nd justify

it later. Additionally , the copy of the wa rra nt enables r eview of

the orig inal boundarie s of a se arc h; without an exact copy

of the wa

rra nt, review is compromis ed beca use the c ritical fa cts and de ta ils of the wa rr a nt c a nn ot b e pr e c ise ly

de te rm ine d. I t is fo r the se re a so ns that it is important to re tain an exact copy of the wa rra nt identify ing the property or per son to b e se arc he d, a ndit is for the se sa me re a so ns that th is r e qu ir e me nt h a s b e e n s tr ic tly

e nf or c e d b y ou r c ou rt s f

or ma ny y e ars

. Coffee , 54 S.W .3d at 233-34.

“The purpose of

having the mag istrate re tain a copy of the sea

rch w arr ant is t o i n s u re the purity of the sea

rch pr ocess.” State v. Gambre l, 783 S.W .2d 191, 192 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)

.

I t is appare nt that these saf eg uards ex i s t t o g uard a g ainst the possibili ty of af ter-the -fa ct manipulation of the sea

rch doc uments. When the discrepancies in the copies in this case are viewed in that light, they

are insignificant. The varia nces neither expand the scope of the sea rch, c ast doubt

on the su pp ortin g pr ob able c a us e or in any way a ff e c t th e “ pu ri ty

of the se arc h. ” W e con ti nu e to adher e to the mandatory

require ments of Rule 41(c) and do not intend to erode the safe g uards protec ted by

its provision. However, suppr ession of the e vidence due to the insig nificant va rianc es under the se fa cts would, in our opinion, be hy per- technica l and counter -produc tive.

The de fenda nt’s next i ssue is that the sear ch wa rra nt violated the provisions of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-1007. The sear ch wa rra nt was iss ued, in part, for violations of the Tenne ssee Protec tion for Children Ag ainst Sex ual Ex ploitation Act of 1990 (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39 -1 7- 10 01 - 3 9- 17 -1 00 7) . T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 17 -1 00 7 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: No proc ess except as other wise provided shall be issued for the violation of §§ 39-17 -1 0 0 3 - 3 9 -17-1005 unless it is issued upon the application of the district

a tto rn e y g e ne ra l of

the dis tr ic t.-8-

I t is undisput ed that the District Attorne y Gene ral’s of

fice had no involvement in seeking or obtaining issuanc e of the sear ch wa rra nt. The def

endant c ontends that this failing r ender s the sear ch

war rant invalid for

all purposes a nd susceptibl e to s uppression of the items seized pursua nt to the

se arc h w arr a nt.

The State responds that the “proc ess” ref ers to the immediate pre ceding section, Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-1006, de aling with injunctions and indi ctments for violators and not to searc h war

rants. The State further

argue s t h at i n t h e conte x t of the subject statutes, a sear ch

war rant is not contemplated a s “proc ess.” B oth the defe ndant and the State pu rp o rt t o rely on statut ory c on str uc tio n to re a c h th e ir

div e rg e nt c on c lus ion s.

The trial court held that a sear ch war rant was within the meaning of “proc ess” u n d er t he subject ac t but noted that the sear ch wa rra nt was justified under violations of chil d rape and ag g ravated sexual battery and not depe ndant solely on the sexual e x ploitation of minors. The trial

cou rt also held the sea

rch w arr ant was le g ally

g rante d under the “except as othe rwise pr ovided” lang uag e of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-3007.

I n p e rt ine nt p art , th e se arc h w arr a nt r e a ds a s f oll ow s: Th a t a ff ia nt h a s r e a so n to bel ie ve a nd do e s bel ie ve that TI MO TH Y WA DEDA VI S, ALI AS, (s us pe c t) is (St a te the ill e g a l ac tiv ity a nd the e vid e nc e or c on tr aba ndso ug ht) I N POSSES SI ON OF

CERTAI N EVIDENCE OF ACRI ME, TO-WI T: VI OLATI ONS OF T .C.A. 39-13-504 (RAPE OF A C HIL D) AND 39- 13-504 (AGG RAVATED SEXUAL BA TTERY) AN D THE TEN NESSEE PR OTECTI ON OF CHIL DREN AGAI

NST SEXUAL

EXPL OI TATI ON ACT OF 1990, AND TH E E V ID E N C E T O B E S E A R C H E D F O R A S IS F O LLO W S : O N E P O LA R O ID CA M E RA
, PH O T O G RA PH S O F [T H EV I CT I

M /A FF IA N T ], P HOTOG RAPHS OF TIMOTHY WADE DAVI S, MOV I ES O R V I DEOTAPES OFNAKED MEN AND NAKED WOMEN, AND MAGA Z I NES CO NTAINING PI CTURES OF NUDE MEN AND N UDE WOMEN . . .

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-17-1007 is broad enoug h to include a searc h war rant and that involvement of the district attorney g ener al was r equire d under the Sex ual Ex ploitation of Minors Act, but we a

re unc o n v i n ce d t h at this flaw is fata l to the searc h war rant’s va lidity . The

sear ch wa rra nt is independently

justified by the allege d violations of rape of a child and ag g ravated sexual battery

. The inclusion of the alleg ed violation of the sexual e x ploitation of minors does not act to nullify

these va lid assertions. Nor doe s i t s er ve to g rant immunityto the defe ndant for prosec ution un d er the sexual ex ploitation act. The sea rch w arr ant was inde pendently justified by valid alleg ations, fr ee of any taint from statutory

prohibitions or constituti onal violations. The subsequent sea

rch, e ven if sexual exploi tation of minors was not invoked, would i nevitably have resulted in discove ry

of the photog raphs whic h supported the de fenda n t ’s co n viction for sexual exploi tation of a minor. See N ix v. Wil liams, 467 U.S. 431, 433, 104 S. Ct . 2501, 2509, 81 L . Ed. 2d 377 (1984); State v. Ha rmon, 775 S.W .2d 583, 586-87 (Te nn. 1989).-9- De fe nd a nt’ s State me nts

The de fenda nt’s next contention is that his statements, taken during and af ter the c onduct of the sea rch, w ere fruits of the poisonous t ree and, therefor e, deserving of suppression. For purposes of further re view, we will consider the de fenda nt’s arg uments.

I f, upon further re view, the se arc h war rant is dee med invalid, then we w ould conclude that the statements g iven by

the def endant we re inde ed induce d by an invalid sea

rch.

Detec tive Moore testified at the suppression hea ring that at t he ini tiation of the execution of the se arc h w arr a nt, the of

fi c e rs “ tol d h im b a sic a lly wh a t we we re loo kin g fo r. ” De te c tiv e Mo or e a lso stated that the war

rant was rea d to the defe ndant. The de fenda nt was then ha ndcuff ed, ar rested, and place d in a police c ruiser w hile the office rs beg an their sea rch. D etec tive Moy ers pa rticipated in the initial stag es of the s ear ch before being dispatched to a scertain whether the def endant wa s willing to m ake a state me nt. Mo y e rs fi rs t g a ve the de fe nd a nt Mir a nd a wa rn ing s a nd a sk e d the de fe nd a nt i f he would spea

k about the circumstance s. The defenda nt responde d by say ing, “You alr eady know what’s g oing on.” Although Moy ers ha d not seen the pictures seized in the def endant’ s home, he

was a war e of the ir alleg ed existence. Moy ers ha d taken the de fenda nt to the sheriff’ s department and

re- administered the Miranda wa rnings

. Moy ers spe cifica lly asked the defe ndant if he ha d taken pic tur e s a ndif

the pe nis pic tur e d in the vic tim ’s mou th w a s th a t of the de fe nd a nt’ s.

On July 15 , 1 99 9, the da y a ft e r the de fe nd a nt’ s ar re st, the de fe nd a nt wa s in te rv ie we d a g a in by Detec tive L arry

Moore a nd Carleton Bry ant. On that occa sion, the defe ndant was shown pic tures seized from his home and was spec ifically questioned about them. The defe ndant made c onfessions du ri ng bo th i nte rv ie ws

.
The trial c ourt ruled that should the sea rch w arr ant be invalid, the first interview was not based on the evid en ce s ei z ed from the se arc h and would, ther efor e, be a dmissibl e, but expressed

re se rv a tio ns a s t o t h e s e c o n d i n t e r v i e w

. H a v i n g h e l d t h e s e ar c h v a l i d
, t h e tr i a l c o u r td i d n o tru le specific ally

on the sec ond interview.

Unless the evide nce pr eponder ates aga i n s t t h em, the trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct in a

s u p p r e s s i o n h e ar i n g w i l l b e u p h e l d o n ap p e a l

. S t a t e v

. O d o m , 9 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 8
, 2 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 )

. If the issue involves an a

pplication of law to undisputed f acts, the a ppellate c ourts conduct a

de novo revie w as to the que stion of law. State v. Troxell, 78 S.W .3d 866, 870 (Tenn. 2002)

.
The “ fruit of the poisonous tree ” ana ly sis is t he test for d et ermini ng admissibili ty of a

c on fe ssi on e lic ite d b y

us e of a n il le g a l se arc h. B ro wn v. I ll in oi s, 42 2 U .S. 59 0, 59 1- 92 , 9 5 S. Ct. 22 54
, 45 L . E d. 2d41 6 ( 19 75 ); Sta te v. Hu dd le sto n, 92 4 S. W.2 d 6 66 , 6 74 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . U nd e r this

a na ly sis , th e fo c us is on whe ther the e vid e nc e wa s o btaine d b y e xploi ta tio n o f the F ou rth Amendment illeg ality . Huddleston, 924 S.W .2d at 674. The bur den of pr oving a dmissibi lityof the challeng ed evide nce is on the prosec ution by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standard. I d. at 675. Th e ult imate fi nd ing sh ou ld b e re a c he d b y c on sid e ratio n o f f

ou r f a c tor s:-10-

1. Th e pr e se nc e or

abs e nc e of

Mir a nd a wa rn ing s; 2. The tempora l prox imityof the sea rch a nd the conf

ession; 3. The pre sence of interve ning c ircumstance s; and 4. The purpose and fla g ranc y of the off icial misconduct. State v. For d, 30 S.W .3d 378, 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Huddleston, 924 S.W .2d at 675).

Under the instant facts we note that the def endant r ece ived his Miranda w arning s prec eding

eac h interview a nd confe ssion. However , the warnings do not break the c ausal c hain betwe en an illega l searc h and a subse quent conf ession. For d, 30 S.W .3d at 382.

The fir st statement taken from the de fenda nt was beg un during the ong oing se arc h but after some incriminating items were found. The de fenda nt was rea d the sear ch war rant at the onset of the

se arc h a ndwa s ma de a wa

re of wh a t ite ms the of

fi c e rs we re se e kin g

. Th e de fe nd a nt’ s in iti a l r e sp on se to Detect i v e Moy ers, “ y ou alre ady know what’ s g oing on,” strong ly indicated the de fenda nt’s

a ssu mpt ion that th e inc ri min a tin g p ho to g ra ph s h a d b e e n o r s oo n w ou ld b e fo un d. Th is w e ig hs in the def endant’ s favor

.
There wer e no interve ning c ircumstance s of sig nificanc e that would re move t h e taint of illega lly seized evidenc e. I n fac t, the second interview on the day afte r the de fenda nt’s arr est, he wa s confr onted with and questioned a bout certain seized photogr aphs. This fac tor weigh s i n fa v or of suppression.

The last fa ct o r, flag ranc y of the misconduct, we ighs in fa vor of a dmissibi lity . Fr om our revie w, it appea

rs that the off

icer s involved took every rea sonable pre caution to protec t the de f e n d a n t ’ s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n

. T ak i n g a l l f a c t o r s i n to

c on sid e ratio n, we c on c lud e that th e c on fe ssi on s sh ou ld be su pp re sse d. Th e de fe nd a nt w a s c le arl y convince d that the incriminating evidenc e had be en or w ould ine vitably be found during the sea rch. That re alization would have serve d as sig nificant e ncoura g ement fo r t he def endant to spea

k. The S t at e, u n d ert h i s s ce n ar i o , h as n o t s h o wn t h e co n fe s s i o n s t o b e a n ac to f f re e w i l l t h at wo u l d p u rge the taint of an a ssumed invalid searc h.
Self Repre sentation

The de fenda nt next contends th at t h e t rial court erre d in refusing his request to re prese nt himself or alternatively

failed to c onduct an inquiry conce rning the re quest. At the conclusion of the defe ndant’s compe tency

hearing on N ovember

15, 20 0 2, wher ein the def endant wa s found

c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l, the de fe nd a nt a dd re sse d th e c ou rt in the fo llo wi ng e xch a ng e : TH E D EF EN DA NT : I f I ’m c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l, the n I do n’ t w a nt h im o r h im to be my lawy er. I will de fend my self, will not allow a ny of these -- beca

use he didn’t do his job. He ’s supposed to appe al the war rant that this detec tives had on me and -- a nd -- the first lawy er that y ou appointed to me -- said that he was-11- supposed t o have appea led what y ou had on the wa rra nt, but he didn’t do it. He didn’t do his job.

THE COURT: Well, that is sue is not before me today . The c ase is --

THE DEF ENDAN T: Well --

THE COURT: --se t for Mar ch 31st. Thank y ou, g entlemen.

[C OUNSEL ]: Thank y ou, Your Honor

.

T H E D E F E N D A N T : Well, I do n ’ t w a n t th e m f o r my la w y e r

. I

a lr e a d y told y ou that.

[B A I L I F F ]: L e t’ s g o , [t h e d e f e n d a n t]

.

T HE DE FE ND AN T : I ’m go i n g.

The ne x t occa sion that the defe ndant asserted a de sire to re prese nt himself was on March 31, 2003, the day of trial. After being advised of the def endant’ s reque st by

the def endant’ s counsel, the trial court attempted to disc u s s t h e p erils of self-re prese ntation. The trial court rec ounted the defe ndant’s past hist ory in reg ard to his attorney s. Due to the defendant’s state d desire, his orig inal reta ined attorne y

was a llowed to withdraw and the publ ic defender was appointed as the de fenda nt’s

c o u n s e l

. A m o n t h l a t e r , a n o t h e r p r i v a t e a t t o r n e y w a s ap p o i n t e d a s c o

- c o u n s e l

. T h e s e a t t o r n e ys reque sted a continuance on Dec ember 3, 2001, due to the def

endant’ s failure to cooper ate or meet with them in prepar ation of his defe nse. As a result, the def endant’ s orig inal bond was re voked and a higher bond set. The defenda nt had been i n custody since that time. The trial court c onducted a leng thy colloquy with the defe ndant. The de fenda nt stated he c ould not read but should have a leg al

a ide . The de fe nd a nt co mpl a ine d tha t he wa s har a sse d b y his ne ig hb or s p ri or

to h is b e ing pla c e d in

c us tod y . T he tr ia l c ou rt att emp ted to expl a in that th e de fe nd a nt w ou ld h a ve to a bid e by a ll evidentiary

and proc edura l rules in self-r epre sentation. The defenda nt responde d that nobody had helped him and that he could not do anything while in jail. The colloquy conclude d in the following

manner : THE COURT: Mr. Davis, ag ain -- Mr. Davis, ag ain, sir, y ou’re g etting r eady

to g o to tr ia l.

THE DEF ENDAN T: Yeah.

T H E CO U RT : And an a ttempt to represe n t y o urself is a g rave , serious

mistake.-12-

THE DEF ENDAN T: I should have the rig ht to be able to de fend -- to pr epar e for a trial. I don’t have the rig ht to defend f or a trial when I ’m l o c k e d u p i n a

j a i l f o r 2 4 h o u r s a

d a y.

THE COURT: Mr. Davis, are y o u go i n g t o re p re s en t y o u rs el f, or y ou’re

g oing to a llow these lawy ers to re prese nt y ou?

TH E D EF EN DA NT : Do I ha ve a c ha nc e to p re pa

re fo r a tr ia l?

T H E C O U R T : N o , s i r

. T o d a y -

- t o d a y i s tr i a l d a y.

TH E D EF EN DA NT : Wel l, I c a n’ t a c c e pt that.

Th e de fe nd a nt’ s c ou ns e l w e re a sk e d b y the tr ia l cour t for th e ir

a sse ssm e nt. Th e ir

re ply indicated doubt that the de fenda n t was c ompetent to stand trial and that the de fenda nt was not

c apa ble of de fe nd ing him se lf . T he tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d b y

statin g that th e de fe nd a nt’ s f a ilu re t o
co o p er at e w i t h co u n s el wa s wi l l fu l an d t h en m ad e t h e f o l l o wi n g fi n d i n g: THE COURT: We l l
, Id o n o t fi n d t h at t h i s i s a v o l u n t ar yd ecision on [t he

defe n d an t’s] part to attempt to represe nt himself. So I ’m not g oing to g rant that re quest. I d o n ’t t h i nk he -- I

don’t think he understands, a nd without an understanding , I don’t think he ca n make a knowing , voluntary

waiver of his rig ht to counsel.

A criminal defenda nt has a c ons t i t u tional rig ht to repre sent himself. Fa retta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533-34, 45 L

. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); State v. Northing ton, 667 S.W .2d 57, 60 (Tenn. 1984). State v. He rrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), sets f o r th “ th r e e ( 3 ) e s s e n ti a l p r e r e q u is it e s w h ic h mu s t b e p r e s e n t b e f o r e th e r ig h t of

selfrepr esentation becom es ab s o l u te. Fir st, the acc used must assert the r ight to self- repr esentation ti m e l y

. S e c o n d
, t h e a c c u s e d ’ s r e q u e s t m u s t b e c l e ar a n d u n e q u i v o c a l

. T h i r d
, t h e a c c u se d mu st knowing ly

and intellige ntly

waive the rig ht to the assistance of counse l.” (c itations omi tted). The

acc used’s “ technica l leg al knowledg e” is i rr el ev an t to the inquiry as to whethe r an a ccuse d be permitted self- repr esentation. Far etta, 422 U. S. at 836, 95 S. Ct. at 2541, 45 L . Ed. 2d at 582.

I n t h e c as e a th an d
, t h e t ri al co u rt fo u n d t h at t h e d ef en d an th ad n o tm ad e ak n o wi n g, voluntary waiver of counse l. The colloquy also illustrates that the def endant’ s reque st was not unequivocal . His reque st on the day of trial wa s not tim ely

and wa s seeming ly

conditioned on a rele ase f rom jail, additional time for trial pre paration a nd appointment of a le g al aide f or assistance

. I t is significa nt that the trial court r elied on the testimon y o f Dr

. T ennis on during the compete ncy he ari ng . D r. Te nn iso n ha d c on c lud e d that the de fe nd a nt’ s imp a ir me nt in re la tin g to his a tto rn e y s in trial prepa

ration wa s due to the def endant’ s choice not to cooperate. The de fenda nt’s history of pla c ing imp e dim e nts in the way of his va ri ou s a tto rn e y s wa s e xten siv e

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s a tte mpt s to d isc us s th e natur e of the c ha rg e s, the statut ory

of fe ns e s in c lud e d, the rang e of a llowab le punishment, and possi b l e defenses w ere met with irrelevant complaints by the def endant of-13-

hara ssment or self-inf

licted disabilities, such as hi s incar cer ation. The defenda nt himself rec og nized that he c ou ld no t pr oc e e d e ff e c tiv e ly wi tho ut the app oin tme nt of a le g a l a ide a nd oth e r c on dit ion s. A criminal defe ndant may implicitl y

waive or forf eit the rig ht of counsel by

utiliz ing that rig ht in an eff ort to manipulate, dela y , or disrupt trial proc eeding s. State v

. C ar ru t h er s, 35 S.W .3d 516, 549 (Tenn. 2000) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the rec ord supports the trial court’s finding a lac k of a knowing and voluntary

waiver and an implicit waiver

by the def endant’ s actions to delay

or disrupt the trial proc eeding s.

J ury I nstruction

Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt as se rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fail ure to instr uc t th e jury

on the ins a nit y de fe ns e re su lte d in a vio la tio n of the de fe nd a nt’ s c on sti tut ion a l ri g hts to d ue pr oc e ss anda fair tr ia l.

I nsanity is pursuant to statute, an affirmative defense
, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39- 11-501: (a) I t is an aff

irmative defe nse to prosec ution that, at the time of the commission of t he ac ts c o n s ti tu ti n g th e o f f e n s e , th e d e f

e n d a n t, a s a

r e s u lt o f a s e v e r e me ntal disease or

def ec t, was unable to appre ciate the nature or wrong fulness of suc h defe ndant’s ac ts. Mental di sease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defe nse. The de fenda nt has the burde n of provin g t h e d ef ense of insanity by clea r and convincing evidenc e. (b) As use d in this section, “mental disease o r d ef ect” does not include a ny
abn orma lit y

ma nif e ste d o nly

by re pe a te d c ri min a l or

oth e rw ise a nti so c ia l c on du c t.

I n order for submission of an af

firmative defe nse to be submitt ed to a jury , the issue must be

“ fa i r l y r a i s e d b y t h e p r o o f

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 2 0 4 ( d )

. T o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e i s su e is f a ir ly raised by the proof, “ a court must, in eff ect, consider the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the defe ndant, including draw ing a ll reasona ble infer ence s flowing from that evide nce.” State v. Shropshire, 874 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); see State v. B ult, 989 S.W .2d 730, 732- 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

. Dr. Clifton Tennison, a psy chiatrist, was c alled on beha lf of the de fense . His testimonywas previously s u m m ariz ed in this opinion. Dr. Tennison based his diag nosis on his t wo per sonal evaluations and a re view of four other evaluations by mental health experts. Dr. Tennison found that the def endant ha d border line intellectual func tioning but was not re tarde d. Dr. Te nnison found that the def endant suff

ere d from seve ral pe rsonality disorders including b oth schizoi d and avoida nt persona lityfeatures. Signif icantly though, neither Tennison or any other evaluation found evide nce
o f a p s y c h o s i s d i s s o c i a t i o n o r d i s ab l i n g a n x i e t y o r d e p r e s s i o n o r

f o r m a l t h o u g h td i s o r d e r

. In summary , there was no proof prese nted of a

sever e mental disea se or de fec t t h at d i s ab l ed the defe ndant from a n ability to appre ciate the nature or wro n gfu lness of his acts. The defe nse fa iled to c arry the bu rd e n o f p ro vin g ins a nit y by c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e . T he de fe ns e wa s n ot f a ir ly raised by the evidenc e, and the trial court pr operly ref used to submit the affirmative defe nse to the j u r y.-14- Competency

The de fenda nt’s next i ssu e al l ege s that the trial court erre d in finding the defe ndant competent to stand trial.

The trial of mental incompetents is barre d by the Fourteenth Amendme nt to the United States Constit ution and article I , section 8 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct . 836, 15 L . Ed. 2d 815 (1966); State v. B lackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2000) . The standard f or dete rmining c ompetency is whether the acc used has ‘ the ca pacity t o understand the nature and objec t of the proce eding s ag ainst him, to consult wit h counsel a nd to assist in preparing his defense .’ State v. B lack, 815 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Tenn. 1 9 9 1 ) (q u o t i n g Macke y v. State, 537 S.W. 2d70 4, 70 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 75 )) . T he bu rd e n is on the de fe nd a nt to est abli sh his incompetenc y

to stand trial by

a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. State v. L eming
, 3 S.W .3d 7, 13-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.
Th e iss ue of

the de fe nd a nt’ s c omp e te nc y to s ta ndtr ia l w a s d ili g e ntl y e xplo r e d in tw o s e pa

rate competenc y

hearings. In the first, testimony from Dr . Eric Engum, a psy cholog ist, was heard. Dr

. Eng um st at ed t h at he ha d orig inally found the de fenda nt competent but had on a subsequent

e va luatio n o bs e rv e d tr ou bli ng fe a tur e s o f the de fe nd a nt’ s d ist ru st of his a tto rn e y s, re fu sa l to di sc us s a plea barg ain, and a n inabilityto understand that his ac tions constitu t ed cr i minal offense s. Dr. Eng um rec ommended further evaluation, a nd the trial court order ed another competenc y

evaluation. The subsequent competenc y evaluation wa s conducte d by Dr. Tennison. During t h e s econd

c omp e te nc y

he ari ng , D r. Te nn iso n te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s: My finding was that he had no inca pacity with reg ard to 10 of the 15 are as that w e e xami ne de fe nd a nts on . T ho se inc lud e his c apa c ity to u nd e rs ta ndthe arr e st proce ss; the appre ciation of the c harg es ag ainst him; underst anding of court proce dure; unde rstanding of the leg al proc ess; appra isal of ke y fi gures in the courtroom; ca

pacity to disclose to his attorney th e p er t i n ent fa cts surrounding the

a lle g e d o ff

e ns e s; h is a

pp reciat io n of the rang e in n a tur e of po ssi ble pe na lti e s; h is

app raisa l of

the lik e ly

ou tc ome ; hi s cap aci tyto c ha lle ng e the pr os e c uti on ; a ndhis

c apa c ity to m a na g e his be ha vio r a pp ro pria te ly

in the c ou rt

ro om.

I fo un d a mil d de g re e of inc apa c ity wi th re g ard to tw o are a s: h is c apa c ity to testify rele vantly

and whe ther or

n o t he has a se lf-def

eating or self- serving motivation in the le g a l se ns e . I

fo un d a mod e rate de g re e of inc apa c ity in thr e e a re a s: the qu a lit y of relatin g to h is a tt o r n e y ; h is c ap a c it y to r e a li s ti c a ll y

ap p r a is e a v a il ab le le g al defe nses; and his ca

p ac i t y t o as sist in t he planning of leg al strateg y . The fina l

ou tc ome of

a ll o f this wa s th a t I

fo un d th a t he wa s mi ldly im pair e d w ith re g ardto these -- with reg ard to these i n ca p ac i t i es, but that overa ll he met the criteria for fi tne ss t o s ta ndtr ia l.-15-

Dr. Te nnison stated that the def endant’ s inabilityto relate to his attorney s appea red to be the defe ndant’s choic e base d on his c hara cter ologic sty le, but not from dementia or psy chosis. Ba sed

on thi s te sti mon y , th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y ru le d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s c omp e te nt t o s ta ndtr ia l.
Sentencing

The defenda nt’s final issue on appe al conc erns a lleg ed er rors in sentenc ing. T he def endant maintains that the trial court er roneouslyfailed to a pply two mitigating fac tors: (1) that the defe ndant’s mental c ondition si g nifican tl y r e d u c e d h is c u lp ability , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(3)
, and (2) absenc e of a criminal rec ord, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(13). Additionally , the def endant contends tha t i t wa s improper to impose conse cutive sente nces pur suant to Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(5)

.
Th e tr ia l cou rt fo un d two e nh a nc ing fa c tor s: T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (8 ), the of fe ns e
was c ommitt ed to g ratify

the def endant’ s desire for pleasure or excitement, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 16), the de fenda nt abused a position of private trust. The de fenda nt does not dispute the applicability

of the e nhance ment fac tors.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

imp os e d s e nten c e s o f t we nty -t wo y e ars fo r e a c h o f the fo ur ra pe of a c hil d convictions and ran three consec utively with one running concur rently

. A sentenc e of ten y ear s for ag g ravated sexual expl oitation of a minor was imposed to run c onsecutively . The total ef fec tive sentenc e wa s seventy -six y ear s.

This Court’s review of the sentenc e imposed by the trial court is de novo with a pre sumption of cor rec tness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . This presumption is conditioned upon an

a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ip les a nda ll rele vant fa ct s and cir cumstance s. State v. Pettus, 986 S .W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1999). I f the trial court fails to complywith t h e s t atut ory direc tives, there is no pre sumption of corre ctness and our revie w is de novo. State v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997)

.
The burde n is upon the appea ling pa rty to show that the sentenc e is improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d), Sentenc ing Commission Com ments

. I n conducting our re view, we are
r e q u ir e d
, p u r s u a n t t o T e n n e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d s e c ti o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 ( b )
, to c o n s id e r th e f o llowing fa ct o rs i n s en t en ci n g: (1) [t] he evide nce, if

any , rec eived at t h e t ri al and the se ntencing hearing; ( 2) [t] he prese ntence report; (3) [t] he princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing alternatives; (4) [t ]he nature and cha rac teristics of the c riminal conduct involved; (5) [e] vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; and (6) [a]nystatement the de fenda nt wishes to make in the def

endant’ s own beha lf about sentenc ing.-16-

I f no mitigating or

enhanc ement fa ctor s for sentencing are prese nt, Tennesse e Code Annotated section 40-35-210( c) provides that the presumptive sentenc e for most offenses sha ll be the minimum sentenc e within the applica ble ra ng e. State v. L avende r, 967 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). How ever , if such fa ctors do exis t, a trial co u rt s h o u l d enhanc e the minimum sentence within the rang e for enhanc ement fac tors and then r educe the sentenc e within the ra ng e for the mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e); State v. Arnett, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . No particular wei gh t for e ach fac tor is prescribed by

the statute, as the w eig ht give n to e ach f actor is left to the discretion of the trial court as long as the t rial court complies with the purposes and principles of the sentenc ing a ct

a nd its fi nd ing s are su pp orte d by the re c or d. Sta te v. Ma dd e n, 99 S.W. 3d 12 7, 13 8 (T enn . C ri m. Ap p. 20 02 ); see Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . N e ve rthe le ss, should the re be no mitigating fac tors, but enhanc ement fa ctors ar e pre sent, a trial c ourt may set the sentenc e above the minimum wit hin the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002)

. Rape of a child is a C lass A felony
, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522, for which the presumptive sentenc e is the midpoint of the rang e, Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(c) . The sente nce r ang e for a Ran ge I o ff

en der f or a Class A f

elony is fifteen to twe nty -five y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 13- 5 2 2 (b ), 40-35- 112(a) (1). The sentenc e rang e for espec ially ag g ravated sexual e x ploitation of a minor, a Class B f

elony , is eig ht to twel v e y ea rs . Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 17-1005(c ), 40-35- 112(a) (2). After finding two enhanc ement fac tors and no mitigating fac tors, the trial court incr ease d the sentenc es for

rape of a c hild from the pre sumptive twenty y ear s to twenty -two y ear s and incre ased the presumptive sente nce of eig ht y ear s for ag g ravated s exual exploi tation of a minor from eig ht to ten y ear s.

The trial court ag ree d that the defendant suffere d from a va riety of emotional problems but found no nexus between the se disabiliti es and the criminal offe nses. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35- 113(8) r eads a s follows: “The de fenda nt was suffe ring from a men t al o r phy sical condition that signific antly

reduc ed the de fenda nt’s culpabili ty for the of

fense ; however

the voluntary

use of intox icants does not fa ll within t he purvie w of this fac tor.”

Th e re c or d c le arl y e sta

bli sh e s that the de fe nd a nt su ff e re d fr om a lis t of

pe rs on a lit y

dis or de rs , including char acte ristics of avoidant and sc hizoi d persona lity . The de fenda nt lived an isolated life with few c lose friends. The proof evince d that the defendant’s perspec tive was skewed by oddities of thoug ht and distortions. He was diag nosed as externalizi ng his problems and blaming others or rationalizing his own off enses. He had borde rlin e intellectua l functioning with an I Q estimated be tw e e n 7 1 a nd84 . T he de fe nd a nt c la ime d h e c ou ld n ot r e a d a ndwa s d e scr ibe d b otha s il lit e rate and as ha ving a

rea ding disorde r.

De sp ite wh a t mo st w ou ld c on sid e r a biza rr e lif e sty le a ndou tlo ok , th e de fe nd a nt m a na g e d h is own af fairs. H e held e mploy ment, owned a nd maintained a house hold, acquired v eh i cl es , and presumably

held a driver’s lice nse. De spite the defe ndant’s various disorde rs, we a re unc onvinced that they “s ignif icantly reduc ed the de fenda nt’s culpability ” for the eg reg ious offense s that he-17-

inflicted on a si x or seven-y ear -old child. Acc ording ly
, we ag ree with the t rial court’s finding that this mi tigating f

actor was not applica

ble.

T h e f ac tt h at t h e d ef

en d an th ad n o p ri o r cr i m i n al h i s t o ry wa s k n o wn b y t h e t ri al co u rt t h ro u gh the pr e -s e nte nc e re po rt

de sp ite no t be ing raise d at th e se nte nc ing he ari ng

. Th e de fe nd a nt n ow a sse rt s that it sh ou ld h a ve be e n a

pp lie d u nd e r T e nn e ss ee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 13 (1 3) . T his Court has previously

held that this aspect is not requir ed to be a pplied in miti g ati o n

. S ee State v. Wil liams, 920 S.W .2d 247, 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Howe ver, it is “appr opriately considere d in miti g ation.” State v. Gutier rez, 5 S.W .3d 641, 646-47 (Tenn. 1999). We there fore conclude that thi s mi tig a tin g fa c tor

sh ou ld h a ve be e n c on sid e re d in s ent encin g . H ow e ve r, the tr ia l c ou rt on ly enhanc ed ea ch sente nce two y ear s as opposed to a possible five y ear s for a g g ravated sexual exploi tation of a minor. The statutes presc ribe no pa rticular weig ht for an enhanc ement or mitig ating fa c tor . St a te v. Go sn e ll, 62 S.W. 3d 74 0, 75 0 (T e nn . Crim . App . 200 1) . In th e fa c e of the str e ng th of the enhance ment fac tors afte r considering the one mitigating fac tor, we c onclude in our de novo revie w that the sente nces, a s imposed, are appropriate.

Consecutive Sentenc ing

The de fenda nt’s conclu d i ng issue is to take issue with the trial court’s imposit ion of

c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing . T e nn e sse e Cod e a nn otate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) I f a d ef

en d ant i s convicted of more than one (1) criminal offense, the court shall order

sentenc es to run consecutively or conc urre ntly

as provided by

the criteria in this section.

( b ) T h e c o u r t m a y o r d e r s e n t e n c e s t o r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s b y a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e that:

. . . (5) The de fenda nt is convicted o f t wo (2 ) or more statutory offe nses involving sex u al abuse of a minor with consider ation of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the defe ndant and victim or victims, the time span of de fen d an t’s undetec ted sexual activity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim

or vic tim s.

I n imposing consec utive sentenc es, the trial court considere d ag g ravating c ircumstance s and

ma de the fo llo wi ng ob se rv a tio ns :

We have a n abuse o f a private trust position, a period of time a nd -- a n extended period of time unde r which the re ha ve been m ultiple acts. Clearly there ’s been r esidual phy sical and me ntal damag e to the vi ctim, and it went undete cted f or-18-

this period of time that -- the se ac ts were being committed and photog raphs were being taken.
The time span of

the undetec ted offenses is uncertain. The testim ony of the victim indicated that th e tou c hin g by

the de fe nd a nt be g a n whe n she wa s bet we e n fir st an d sec on d g ra de s. Th is w ou ld ha ve be e n in 19 97 a ndc ov e re d a n a pp ro xima te tw o- y e ar p e ri od . T he de fe nd a nt a rg ue s th a t th e tim e period wa s approximatel y t wo months. Rega rdless, it is undisput ed that the de fenda nt took advanta g e of his close relationship with the victim and her f amily for his own sexual g ratification. Due to his twenty -y ear

friendship with the victim’s fa mily
, he was g iven ex traordina ry trust which he abuse d. The picture s of the defe ndant and victim e ng ag ed in sexuallyexpli cit acts, whic h wer e kept by his bedside and fre quently shown to the vi ctim, serve d as a further ag g ravating c ircumstance

. The victim impact statement by the mother of the victim indicated that the fa milyhad bee n
a tte nd ing we e kly

c ou ns e lin g se ssi on s f

or a lmo st fo ur y e ars . She state d th e vic tim sti ll h a d tr ou ble

conce ntrating , rema ined fe arf ul and had been irreg ular in sc hool attendanc e. The victim’s impact statement indicate d that she fe lt alone, diffe rent, a nd has n i ghtmares. She f ear ed the de fenda nt would hurt her a g ain.

Th e de fe nd a nt ha s su bmi tte d tw o c a se s in su pp ort of his c on te nti on fo r c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e s; State v. Hay es, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), and State v. James M. Powers, No. E2001-02363-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Te nn. Crim. App

. L E XIS 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, Oct. 23, 2002). We find both case s rea dily distinguishable from the i nstant case

. Both off enses we re char acte rized by

this Court as non-ag g ravated conduc t. The photog raphs in thi s re co rd of the

s e xu a ll y e xp li c it a c ts b e li e a n y

s u c h a tt e mp te d c h ar a c te r iz a ti o n h e r e in

. We f in d St a te v. L ane, 3 S.W .3d 456 (Tenn. 1999) , more a pposite t o o u r ca s e at hand. L ane involved an appea l of

c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s f

or statut ory ra

pe a nd un la wf

ul e xer c ise of

of fi c ia l po we r. Th e de fe nd a nt i n L ane w as a D epartment of Human Service s counselor who had sex ual i nterc ourse for “ove r a month” with a six teen- y ear -old fema le in state custody . Our Supreme C o urt found the c onduct “re prehe nsible”; that the rec ord supported that the victim suff ere d from “r esidual mental da mag e,” and found those fac ts suf

ficient ag g ravating circ umstances to uphold conse cutive sente nces. L ane, 3 S.W .3d at 459-60. See also State v. Woodcock, 922 S.W.2d 904, 915 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Conclusion

Ba sed upon the for eg oing analy sis and the rec ord as a whole, we a ffirm the c onvictions and the sentenc es as imposed.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE