NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ARTURO IBARRA, AKA Fat Boy, AKA 

Tury, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-10255 

D.C. No. 1:19-cr-00049-DKW-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Derrick K. Watson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 19, 2022**

Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Arturo Ibarra appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United States v. 

Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 25 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-10255 

Ibarra sought compassionate release on the grounds that his health 

conditions made him particularly vulnerable if he were to contract COVID-19 and 

that he should have been granted safety valve relief at sentencing. The district 

court denied the motion, concluding that the risk to Ibarra from COVID-19, 

whether considered alone or in combination with his alleged safety valve 

eligibility, was insufficient to establish extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances and did not justify relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ibarra argues 

that the district court abused its discretion because it (1) did not appreciate the 

difference between a substantial assistance departure and a safety valve reduction

when it applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and (2) failed to recognize that it 

was precluded from considering at the original sentencing whether the § 3553(a) 

factors justified a sentence lower than 63 months.

Ibarra’s claims are not supported by the record, which reflects that the court 

assumed Ibarra’s safety valve eligibility,1further assumed that Ibarra would have 

received a 4-level substantial assistance reduction in addition to the safety valve 

reduction, and then analyzed whether those circumstances, along with the 

mitigating arguments Ibarra asserted, justified a lower sentence under § 3553(a). 

That the court concluded that Ibarra’s sentence should not be reduced does not 

1 We assume, without deciding, that changes in sentencing law can be considered 

in evaluating a compassionate release motion.
3 21-10255 

reflect that it misunderstood its own § 3553(a) analysis from the original 

sentencing or failed to consider all of Ibarra’s mitigating arguments. Nor are we 

persuaded that the court was required to give less weight to the seriousness of the 

offense, and more weight to his mitigating circumstances, in light of his alleged 

safety valve eligibility. See United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a particular case is 

for the discretion of the district court.”). The court acknowledged Ibarra’s medical 

conditions and post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, and accepted Ibarra’s 

assertion of safety valve eligibility, but concluded that those circumstances did not 

justify relief in light of Ibarra’s vaccination status, his recovery from a prior 

COVID-19 infection, the low number of infections in his prison, and the applicable 

§ 3553(a) factors. It did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion.

AFFIRMED.