Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 

Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

BOGLE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., ET AL. 

v. Record No. 950065 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 November 3, 1995 

ROY BUIE 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 William Roy Buie suffered a work-related injury in 1988. 

The Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) determined 

that his injury was compensable, and that his statutory 

employer, Bogle Development Company, Inc., and its workers' 

compensation carrier, Rockwood Insurance Company (collectively 

"Bogle"), were liable for Buie's lost wages and medical 

expenses.1

 In 1991, Bogle refused to pay some of Buie's claims for 

reimbursement of medical expenses, asserting they were 

unauthorized expenses. On March 9, 1992, the Commission 

entered an order holding that the disputed medical treatment 

was justified and that "the defendants are responsible for 

payment of the treatment." Based on this order, Buie submitted 

a claim for reimbursement of medical expense payments which he 

and his insurance carrier, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tennessee 

(Blue Cross/Blue Shield) had made. In response to his request 

for payment, Bogle informed Buie that Guaranty Fund Management 

Services (the Fund) had taken over the handling of the claim2

 

 1Buie's employer, R.G. Excavating, had allowed its workers' 

compensation insurance to lapse. 

 2In August of 1991, Rockwood Insurance Company became 

insolvent and, pursuant to Code §§ 38.2-1600 through -1623, the 

Guaranty Fund Management Services assumed responsibility for 
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and had agreed to reimburse Buie for his "out-of-pocket 

expenditures" upon receipt of satisfactory documentation, but 

refused to reimburse Blue Cross/Blue Shield, asserting that it 

"does not reimburse third-party providers under any 

circumstances." 

 Buie again sought an order from the Commission requiring 

the Fund to pay his reimbursement claims. The chief deputy 

commissioner refused Buie's request, stating that the 

Commission did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute 

because it "involves interpreting Code Sections 38.2-1600 et 

seq." and because "the rights of the claimant are not at stake 

and therefore the litigants must resort to the common-law 

remedies." Following Buie's request for review, the Commission 

reversed the decision of the chief deputy commissioner and 

determined that it had jurisdiction to enforce its awards and 

"to order reimbursement of those payments both to Blue Cross 

and to the claimant." The Commission remanded the matter for a 

hearing. On January 21, 1993, the day after the Commission 

issued its opinion, the Fund paid Buie $1,897.35 as 

reimbursement of his out-of-pocket medical expenses. 

 On remand, the deputy commissioner held that the Fund was 

also required to reimburse Blue Cross/Blue Shield. This 

determination was affirmed by the full Commission in an opinion 

issued November 5, 1993. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 

 

payment of Rockwood's obligations. 
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decision of the Commission. Bogle Dev. Co. v. Buie, 19 Va. 

App. 370, 451 S.E.2d 682 (1994). Bogle and the Fund filed a 

petition for appeal in this Court. Finding that the petition 

presented matters of siginficant precedential value, we awarded 

Bogle and the Fund an appeal. Code § 17-116.07(B). 

 Bogle and the Fund raise five assignments of error. Under 

our analysis, however, the dispositive issue in this appeal is 

whether the Commission's jurisdiction over this controversy 

ceased when the Fund reimbursed Buie for his out-of-pocket 

medical expenses. Bogle and the Fund assert that the Court of 

Appeals erred in holding that the Commission had subject matter 

jurisdiction to consider Buie's request for reimbursement of 

Blue Cross/Blue Shield because, after the Fund paid Buie for 

his out-of-pocket payments for his medical expenses, no issues 

regarding the claimant Buie remained before the Commission. 

Thus, they conclude, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

affirming the Commission's order that the Fund reimburse Blue 

Cross/Blue Shield must be vacated. We agree and, for the 

reasons stated below, will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

 Code § 65.2-700 vests the Commission with jurisdiction to 

determine all questions "arising under" the Virginia Workers' 

Compensation Act. This grant of subject matter jurisdiction 

includes the authority of the Commission to enforce its orders 

and to resolve coverage and payment disputes. The jurisdiction 
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is not unlimited, however. As the Court of Appeals correctly 

stated in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 3 Va. App. 116, 

121, 348 S.E.2d 416, 419 (1986): 

 Questions between the insurer and the employer 

or another insurer do not "arise under" the Act 

except insofar as they affect the rights of an 

injured employee. Code § 65.1-92. When the rights 

of the claimant are not at stake, the Act clearly 

leaves the litigants to their common law remedies 

. . . 

Applying this analysis to the facts here, we conclude that once 

Buie was reimbursed for his out-of-pocket expenses, no right of 

the claimant was "at stake." The only remaining issue involved 

the reimbursement claims of Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 

 Buie was reimbursed on January 21, 1993. After that date, 

the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to 

consider Blue Cross/Blue Shield's claims for reimbursement or 

to enter its November 5, 1993 order requiring the Fund to 

reimburse Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 

 Buie maintains, however, that the jurisdictional issue 

cannot be considered here. Buie argues that the Fund's appeal 

is actually an untimely collateral attack on the March 1992 

order of the Commission holding that "the defendants are 

responsible for payment for the treatment rendered." Buie 

maintains that prior to entry of the 1992 order, the Fund knew 

that Blue Cross/Blue Shield had paid portions of the bills for 

the contested medical treatment and, therefore, could have 

asserted its position regarding reimbursement of Blue 
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Cross/Blue Shield at that time. The Fund failed to raise the 

issue or to appeal the decision of the Commission. Thus, Buie 

maintains, this appeal is no more than a collateral attack on 

that final, binding decision. 

 Buie's argument overlooks the nature of the 1992 

proceedings before the Commission. The issue in that 

proceeding was whether Buie had a right to coverage for certain 

medical expenses challenged by Bogle. A right of the claimant 

was at stake in that proceeding. Consequently there was 

clearly no basis for the Fund to question the jurisdiction of 

the Commission. The failure to appeal the 1992 order only 

precluded the Fund from challenging the claimant's right to 

coverage for the contested medical treatment. Accordingly, the 

jurisdictional issue which arose later and is now asserted by 

the Fund is not an untimely collateral attack on a final 

decision of the Commission. 

 For the above reasons, we conclude that the Court of 

Appeals erred in determining that the Commission had 

jurisdiction to consider whether Blue Cross/Blue Shield was 

entitled to reimbursement from the Fund when no right of the 

claimant remained in issue. Accordingly, we will reverse the 

decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the November 5, 1993 

order of the Commission, and dismiss the petition. 

Reversed and dismissed.