Rel: April 14, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

CL-2022-0687

_________________________

J.T.

v.

Chambers County Department of Human Resources

_________________________

CL-2022-0972

_________________________

L.T.

v.

Chambers County Department of Human Resources

Appeals from Chambers Juvenile Court

(JU-19-53.03)
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

2

PER CURIAM.

In appeal number CL-2022-0972, L.T. ("the mother") appeals from 

a judgment terminating her parental rights to I.M. ("the child"), one of 

her three children; the Chambers Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") 

entered that judgment in an action docketed as JU-19-53.03 ("the .03 

action"). In appeal number CL-2022-0687, J.T. ("the maternal 

grandmother"), the child's maternal grandmother, appeals from an order 

of the juvenile court denying her motion to intervene in the .03 action,

appeals from an interlocutory injunction that the juvenile court entered 

in the .03 action, and purports to appeal from the judgment terminating 

the mother's parental rights. We consolidated the appeals ex mero motu.

We dismiss the mother's appeal because the judgment from which 

she appeals is not a final one. We dismiss the maternal grandmother's 

appeal insofar as it challenges the denial of her motion to intervene 

because she did not timely file her notice of appeal with respect to that 

order, we dismiss her appeal insofar as she purports to appeal from the 

judgment terminating the mother's parental rights because the maternal 

grandmother does not have standing to appeal from that judgment, and 

we reverse the order granting an interlocutory injunction as to the 
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3

maternal grandmother because the juvenile court entered it without 

affording her due process.

Background

The mother, who was thirty-seven years old when the juvenile court 

tried this case on May 19, 2022, moved with the child from Georgia to 

Chambers County in January 2019. The child's father was a resident of 

Georgia before he died in December 2020. The mother gave birth to the 

child in April 2014, and the child was eight years old when the juvenile 

court tried this case. The mother has two other children that remained 

in Georgia when she moved to Alabama in 2019. Those children, who 

were fourteen and twelve years old when the juvenile court tried this 

case, have a different father than the child. They were living with the 

maternal grandmother in Georgia when this case was tried, although a 

court has not transferred custody to her. 

The mother testified that Georgia's Family and Children Services 

("FCS") in Cobb County, Georgia, became involved with her family in 

2016, apparently because the mother was using illegal drugs. FCS in 

Cobb County removed the child from the mother's custody and gave her 

a case plan requiring her to submit to random drug testing, submit to a 
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4

drug-and-alcohol evaluation, comply with the recommendations made by 

the drug-and-alcohol evaluator, attend parenting classes, maintain 

stable housing, and maintain employment. FCS in Cobb County placed 

the child with the maternal grandmother from June 2016 until June 

2017. However, the maternal grandmother did not want to be a long-term 

placement for the child, so FCS in Cobb County transferred the child to 

his maternal aunt's custody in June 2017. The mother testified that she 

had successfully completed the requirements of the case plan and that

FCS in Cobb County had returned the child to her custody later in 2017.

The mother testified that, in January 2018, she relapsed into using 

illegal drugs, and FCS in Cherokee County, Georgia, removed the child 

from her custody. Subsequently, after the mother moved to Troup 

County, Georgia, FCS in Cherokee County transferred the child's case to 

FCS in Troup County. After the mother completed the requirements of 

her case plan in August 2018, FCS in Troup County returned the child to 

her custody.

The mother moved to Alabama in January 2019. In February 2019, 

FCS in Troup County asked the Chambers County Department of 

Human Resources ("DHR") to locate the mother and the child to 
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5

determine whether the mother needed further services because, FCS 

said, she had an ongoing child-protection case in Troup County.

DHR located the mother and the child in March 2019 and sent a 

caseworker to the mother's residence to check on the mother and the 

child. The caseworker asked to see the child, but the mother refused and 

started to close the door. The caseworker put her foot in the doorway to 

block the door. The mother threatened to punch the caseworker if she did 

not remove her foot from the doorway. The caseworker, who was 

pregnant, backed away and called law enforcement. Before a lawenforcement officer could arrive, however, the mother climbed out of a 

window with the child and fled.

In April 2019, DHR learned that the child had been in Georgia with 

his father for several weeks and that the child had returned to Chambers 

County. Caseworkers from DHR went to the mother's residence; however, 

she would not let them enter the residence. The caseworkers sought 

assistance from law-enforcement officers, who came to the mother's 

residence, arrested her, and charged her with resisting arrest and 

obstructing governmental operations. Law enforcement later dismissed 

those charges.
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

6

When the caseworkers entered the mother's residence following her 

arrest, they found that the mother did not have any food in the residence, 

that the residence did not have water service, and that the only source of 

electricity was the battery from the mother's automobile, from which 

someone had run a cable to the residence. Aside from the child, no one 

else was in the residence. DHR placed the child in foster care and, on 

April 16, 2019, commenced a dependency action ("the .01 action") 

regarding the child in the juvenile court. In August 2019, the maternal 

grandmother filed a motion to intervene in the .01 action, which the

juvenile court granted on August 28, 2019.

DHR requested that FCS do a home study on the maternal 

grandmother pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 

Children ("ICPC"), § 44-2-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. FCS did the home 

study and recommended that DHR not place the child with the maternal 

grandmother because, according to the FCS caseworker, the maternal 

grandmother did not have the capacity to protect the child from the 

mother, had demonstrated a lack of commitment to the child when she 

had custody of him in 2016 and 2017, had expressed her belief that child-
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7

welfare authorities were corrupt, and may not cooperate with FCS in its 

efforts to ensure the child's safety and well-being. 

The maternal grandmother subsequently asked FCS to reopen her 

home study. A representative of FCS contacted DHR, informed DHR that 

the maternal grandmother had requested that FCS reopen her home 

study, and informed DHR that FCS could not reopen the home study 

without a request from DHR. DHR did not request that FCS reopen the 

home study. 

On April 8, 2020, after receiving FCS's home study regarding the 

maternal grandmother, DHR filed a motion asking the juvenile court to 

dismiss the maternal grandmother as a party to the .01 action. DHR 

sought to dismiss the maternal grandmother as a party because, DHR 

said, it could not place the child in the maternal grandmother's custody 

because, DHR said, FCS had recommended that DHR not place the child 

with the maternal grandmother and because, DHR said, the maternal 

grandmother had not visited the child or sought to visit the child since 

filing her motion to intervene in August 2019. On April 8, 2020, the 

juvenile court entered a judgment dismissing the maternal grandmother 

as a party to the .01 action. On April 15, 2020, the maternal grandmother 
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8

filed a postjudgment motion challenging her dismissal from the .01 

action. Her postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on April 

29, 2020. On June 29, 2020, more than fourteen days after the denial of 

her postjudgment motion, the maternal grandmother appealed to this 

court from the judgment dismissing her as a party to the .01 action.

This court docketed the maternal grandmother's appeal from the 

judgment dismissing her as a party to the .01 action as appeal number 

2190723. After calling for letter briefs regarding the timeliness of the 

maternal grandmother's notice of appeal, this court, on November 9, 

2020, dismissed that appeal because the maternal grandmother had not 

timely filed her notice of appeal from that judgment. This court issued its 

certificate of judgment in appeal number 2190723 on December 4, 2020.

In the meantime, the maternal grandmother had commenced a 

dependency action regarding the child ("the .02 action") in the juvenile 

court. The record does not indicate what occurred in the .02 action.

On April 16, 2020, DHR commenced the .03 action seeking the 

termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights to the child.

On October 30, 2020, the maternal grandmother filed a combined motion 

and pleading titled "Motion to Intervene, Petition for Termination of 
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9

Parental Rights and, in the alternative, Petition for Custody." The 

juvenile court treated the maternal grandmother's petition for 

termination of parental rights and petition for custody in that document 

as pleadings commencing a separate action, which the juvenile court 

docketed as the .04 action involving the child ("the .04 action"). On 

November 2, 2020, the juvenile court entered an order denying the 

maternal grandmother's motion to intervene in the .03 action on the 

ground that it was moot because, the juvenile court said, the maternal 

grandmother had commenced the .04 action seeking the termination of 

the mother's and the father's parental rights to the child and seeking 

custody of the child. The maternal grandmother did not file a notice of 

appeal from that November 2, 2020, order within fourteen days after the 

juvenile court entered it. As noted above, the father died in December 

2020.

On April 8, 2021, the mother filed a motion to dismiss all the actions 

in the juvenile court involving the child because, she alleged, the juvenile 

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Alabama's Uniform Child 

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 

1975, because, she said, the child had not lived in Alabama for six months 
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

10

before DHR commenced the .01 action. She submitted an affidavit in 

support of her motion in which she testified that the child had lived in 

Georgia from his birth in April 2014 until January 2019, when she and 

the child had moved to Alabama. She further testified that the child had 

lived in Alabama less than six months when DHR commenced the .01 

action on April 16, 2019. It appears that the juvenile court held the 

actions involving the child in abeyance pending a Georgia court accepting 

jurisdiction over the child.

The maternal grandmother subsequently commenced dependency 

actions regarding the child in the juvenile courts of three different 

Georgia counties: Cobb, Troup, and Cherokee. Each of those courts 

declined to exercise jurisdiction over the maternal grandmother's actions. 

On April 12, 2022, the Juvenile Court of Cherokee County, Georgia, not 

only declined to accept jurisdiction because it found that Cherokee 

County was not a convenient forum, but also ruled that the juvenile court 

in Chambers County, Alabama, was the most convenient forum and

should adjudicate actions involving the child.

On April 14, 2022, the juvenile court set the .03 action for trial on 

May 19, 2022. On May 4, 2022, the maternal grandmother filed a motion 
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11

to consolidate the .03 and .04 actions for trial. On May 9, 2022, the 

juvenile court entered an order denying the maternal grandmother's 

motion to consolidate. The juvenile court noted that, if DHR prevailed on 

the termination-of-parental-rights claim it had pleaded in the .03 action, 

that adjudication would render the .04 action moot. On May 12, 2022, the 

maternal grandmother filed a motion asking the juvenile court to

reconsider its May 9, 2022, order denying her motion to consolidate the 

.03 and .04 actions or, in the alternative, to reconsider its November 2, 

2020, order denying her motion to intervene. On May 17, 2022, the 

juvenile court entered an order denying the maternal grandmother's 

motion to reconsider.

On May 18, 2022, after the mother and the maternal grandmother 

had appeared as guests on a program broadcast on the Internet ("the 

Internet program") and discussed the .03 action, DHR filed a motion to 

hold the mother and the maternal grandmother in contempt, to impose 

sanctions on them, and to issue an ex parte order directing the mother 

and the maternal grandmother not to make any further public 

statements about the .03 action. The motion was not verified and was not 

accompanied by a written certification by DHR's attorney stating the 
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12

efforts, if any, that had been made to give the mother and the maternal 

grandmother notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice 

should not be required. Later on May 18, 2022, the juvenile court entered 

an order ("the May 18, 2022, order") in response to DHR's motion, without 

giving the mother or the maternal grandmother notice and without 

holding a hearing. In pertinent part, that order states:

"1. The mother and the [maternal] grandmother are 

hereby ordered to have no contact of any kind with [the 

Internet program], any representative of that [Internet

program], or any person at all about this case, except their 

legal counsel and those with whom their legal counsel is [sic] 

allowed to work.

"....

"3. The court will set this for hearing on the motion of 

any party. Until the court orders otherwise, this order shall 

remain in full force and effect and shall be given broad 

application to protect the dignity of the Court and the privacy 

of this child.

"4. The Court will set a sanction hearing for things 

already done by separate order.

"5. Any violation of this order will meet immediate and 

strict action by the Court."

(Emphasis added.)

The juvenile court tried the termination-of parental rights claim in 

the .03 action on May 19, 2022. After each party had rested their case at 
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

13

the trial, the juvenile court orally announced from the bench that it was 

going to terminate the mother's parental rights.

On May 23, 2022, the maternal grandmother filed a notice of appeal 

to this court in the .03 action. When the maternal grandmother filed her 

notice of appeal, no party had requested a hearing regarding the May 18, 

2022, order, the juvenile court had not yet held a hearing regarding the 

sanctions referred to in the May 18, 2022, order, and the juvenile court 

had not entered a final judgment adjudicating DHR's termination-ofparental-rights claim in the .03 action.

On August 24, 2022, the juvenile court entered a written judgment 

terminating the mother's parental rights and vesting DHR with legal 

custody of the child. That judgment stated that the May 18, 2022, order 

"remains in place." That judgment did not adjudicate DHR's motion to 

hold the mother and the maternal grandmother in contempt and to 

impose sanctions on the mother and the maternal grandmother and 

stated that a hearing on those issues had not been set.

The mother filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 2022.

Analysis

The Maternal Grandmother's Appeal
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14

The maternal grandmother first argues that the juvenile court 

erred in denying her motion to intervene in its November 2, 2020, order. 

" '[A] denial of a motion to intervene is always an appealable order.'" Jim 

Parker Bldg. Co. v. G & S Glass & Supply Co., 69 So. 3d 124, 130 (Ala. 

2011) (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Raine, 905 So. 2d 832, 833 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2004)). However, the maternal grandmother's notice of appeal did 

not invoke this court's jurisdiction to review the November 2, 2020, order

denying her motion to intervene because she did not file it within 

fourteen days after the juvenile court entered that order. See Rule 4(a)(1), 

Ala. R. App. P. (providing that the time for appealing a judgment in a 

juvenile case is fourteen days); Rule 28(D), Ala. R. Juv. P. (same). The 

timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. See R.P.M. v. P.D.A.,

112 So. 3d 49, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., 

provides that "[a]n appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of appeal was 

not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court."

Therefore, insofar as the maternal grandmother seeks review of the 

November 2, 2020, order denying her motion to intervene, we dismiss her 

appeal.
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

15

The maternal grandmother next argues that the juvenile court 

erred because, she says, as a relative of the child, she was entitled to a 

custodial preference that the juvenile court did not accord her. 

Apparently, the maternal grandmother is arguing that the juvenile 

court's judgment terminating the mother's parental rights is erroneous 

because, she says, the juvenile court did not accord her a custodial 

preference in making a custodial disposition of the child. "'One must have 

been a party to the judgment below in order to have standing to appeal 

any issue arising out of that judgment.'" Phoenix East Assoc., Inc. v. 

Perdido Dunes Tower, LLC, 295 So. 3d 1016, 1026 (Ala. 2019) (quoting 

Mars Hill Baptist Church of Anniston, Alabama, Inc. v. Mars Hill 

Missionary Baptist Church, 761 So. 2d 975, 980 (Ala. 1980)). The 

maternal grandmother does not have standing to appeal from the 

judgment terminating the mother's parental rights because the maternal 

grandmother was not a party to that judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the 

maternal grandmother's appeal insofar as she challenges the custodial 

disposition of the child in the judgment terminating the mother's 

parental rights.
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

16

Finally, the maternal grandmother argues, among other things,

that the juvenile court erred in entering the May 18, 2022, order

restraining her from discussing the .03 action, except with designated 

persons, without affording her notice and an opportunity to be heard. The 

May 18, 2022, order did not resolve all the claims in the action; therefore, 

it was interlocutory. Generally, an appeal will lie only from a final 

judgment -- i.e., one that adjudicates all the claims and controversies 

between the parties. See Logan v. Logan, 40 So. 3d 721, 723 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2009). However, "an interlocutory order granting an injunction is 

appealable." Ex parte State Dep't of Rev., 886 So. 2d 817, 819 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2003). Moreover, "when '[a] nonparty ... has been enjoined by an 

order of the trial court,' he or she may appeal from that order." T.C.M. v. 

W.L.K., 208 So. 3d 39, 43 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting D.F.H. v. J.D.G.,

125 So. 3d 146, 149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)).

Neither the portion of DHR's motion requesting an "ex parte gag 

order" binding the maternal grandmother nor the trial court's order 

granting that motion set forth a statutory basis for such relief. We agree 

with the maternal grandmother that §§ 12-15-131, 12-15-138, and 12-15-

141, Ala. Code 1975, do not support the issuance of the May 18, 2022, 
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17

order. Section 12-15-131 provides for the entry of an order "restraining 

the conduct of any party over whom the juvenile court has obtained 

jurisdiction," but the maternal grandmother was not a party to the .03 

action. Moreover, that section requires notice and a hearing before entry 

of a restraining order, neither of which the juvenile court provided to the 

maternal grandmother. Section 12-15-138 authorizes a juvenile court to 

enter an ex parte order of restraint "to protect the health or safety of a 

child subject to the proceeding," but DHR's motion did not allege that 

such an order was necessary to protect the health or the safety of the 

child in this case. Section 12-15-141 authorizes a juvenile court to enter 

an ex parte order of restraint on an emergency basis "upon a showing of 

verified written or verbal evidence of abuse or neglect injurious to the 

health or safety of a child subject to a juvenile court proceeding and the 

likelihood that the abuse or neglect will continue unless the order is 

issued," but DHR's motion did not contain verified allegations that an ex 

parte order of restraint was needed to protect the child from abuse or 

neglect.1

1We recognize that § 12-15-133(g), Ala. Code 1975, subjects a person 

to criminal and civil sanctions for, among other things, disclosing 

information that "is directly or indirectly derived from the records of the 
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18

The juvenile court stated that it entered the May 18, 2022, order "to 

protect the dignity of the Court and the privacy of this child." Every court 

in Alabama has the authority to issue orders to prevent hindrance of its 

proceedings, § 12-1-7(1), Ala. Code 1975, and "[t]o control ... all other 

persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter 

appertaining thereto." § 12-1-7(4), Ala. Code 1975. Furthermore, a 

juvenile court may admit a person other than a party, such as a witness, 

to a juvenile court hearing "on condition that the persons refrain from 

divulging any information which would identify the child under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court or family involved." § 12-15-129, Ala. 

Code 1975. Assuming, without deciding, that the juvenile court relied on 

these statutes, or the general intent of the legislature that juvenile court 

records shall be confidential, see § 12-15-216, Ala. Code 1975, we find 

nothing in these statutes that authorizes the juvenile court to enter an 

ex parte gag order against a non-party to protect the dignity of the court 

or the privacy of a child.

juvenile court or acquired in the course of official duties," but that Code 

section does not specifically provide for the entry of an "ex parte gag 

order." Thus, the procedure for obtaining injunctive relief related to this 

Code section is provided by Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., as discussed herein.
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972

19

Turning to the general authority of a juvenile court to enter ex parte 

orders of restraint, in pertinent part, Rule 1(A), Ala. R. Juv. P., provides: 

"If no procedure is specifically provided in these Rules or by statute, the 

Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable in those matters 

that are considered civil in nature ...." The .03 action is civil in nature,

and no rule of juvenile procedure or statute governs the procedure for an 

ex parte order of restraint such as the one DHR sought in this case. 

Therefore, Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., applies in the present case. See Ex 

parte S.L.P., [Ms. 2210005, Nov. 22, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 

2021) (applying Rule 65 in a juvenile action).

Rule 65(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "No preliminary injunction 

shall be issued without notice to the adverse party." In pertinent part, 

Rule 65(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:

"A temporary restraining order may be granted without 

written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party's 

attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown 

by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant 

before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard 

in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the 

court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to 

give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that 

notice should not be required."
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DHR did not adhere to the requirements for obtaining a 

preliminary injunction because it did not give the mother and the 

maternal grandmother notice of its motion seeking an order restraining 

them. See Rule 65(a)(1); Funliner of Alabama, L.L.C. v. Pickard, 873 So. 

2d 198, 219 (Ala. 2003) ("Notice to the adverse party before a preliminary 

injunction is issued is mandatory, pursuant to Rule 65(a), Ala. R. Civ. 

P."). DHR also did not adhere to the requirements for obtaining a 

temporary restraining order because DHR did not file an affidavit by its 

attorney certifying to the juvenile court the efforts, if any, that had been 

made to give the mother and the maternal grandmother notice and the 

reasons supporting DHR's claim that notice should not be required. See

Rule 65(b); Ex parte S.L.P., supra (holding that a juvenile court had 

erred in entering a temporary restraining order because the party 

seeking the temporary restraining order and his attorney had not 

complied with the requirements of Rule 65(b)). Accordingly, regardless 

of whether the May 18, 2022, order is characterized as a temporary 

restraining order or as a preliminary injunction, the juvenile court erred 

in entering it because DHR had not met the requirements for obtaining 

either. Therefore, we reverse the May 18, 2022, order to the extent it 
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21

purports to bind the maternal grandmother and remand the cause to the 

juvenile court.

The Mother's Appeal

Insofar as the juvenile court's August 24, 2022, judgment purported 

to maintain the May 18, 2022, order in effect, the August 24, 2022, 

judgment is void because the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction 

over the May 18, 2022, order. See Johnson v. Willis, 893 So. 2d 1138, 

1141 (Ala. 2004) (holding that the filing of a notice of appeal following 

the entry of a preliminary injunction deprived the trial court of 

jurisdiction to make the injunction permanent). The filing of the 

maternal grandmother's notice of appeal on May 23, 2022, deprived the 

juvenile court of jurisdiction over the May 18, 2022, order. "'[W]hile an 

appeal is pending, the trial court "can do nothing in respect to any 

matter or question which is involved in the appeal, and which may be 

adjudged by the appellate court." '" Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Colonial 

Bank, 874 So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Foster v. Greer & 

Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala. 1984)). Because the maternal 

grandmother's notice of appeal invoked our jurisdiction to review the 

May 18, 2022, order, the juvenile court could take no action regarding 
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22

that order. The maternal grandmother did not have standing to appeal 

any issue pertaining to the termination of the mother's parental rights 

and, therefore, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over DHR's 

termination-of-parental-rights claim despite the filing of the maternal 

grandmother's notice of appeal.

 As noted above, the general rule is that an appeal will lie only from 

a final judgment that adjudicates all the claims and controversies 

between the parties. See Logan, supra. The August 24, 2022, judgment 

terminating the mother's parental rights was not a final judgment 

because it did not adjudicate DHR's pending contempt claim. See A.C. v. 

C.C., 34 So. 3d 1281, 1287 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the 

pendency of an unadjudicated contempt claim rendered a judgment 

finding a child dependent nonfinal and, consequently, dismissing the 

appeal from that judgment). Accordingly, we dismiss the mother's 

appeal.

Conclusion

In summary, in the maternal grandmother's appeal, we reverse the 

juvenile court's May 18, 2022, order to the extent that it purports to bind 

the maternal grandmother, we remand the cause to the juvenile court, 
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23

and we dismiss all other aspects of the maternal grandmother's appeal. 

We also dismiss the mother's appeal because she has appealed from a 

nonfinal judgment. 

CL-2022-0687 -- APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED AND 

REMANDED.

Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., 

concur.

CL-2022-0972 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.