UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1751

GEIMY LORENE HILARIO-MOLINA,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: September 7, 2012 Decided: September 19, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Hilario Mercado, Jr., MERCADO & CASTILLO, P.L.L.C., Falls 

Church, Virginia, for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, Linda S. Wernery, Assistant 

Director, Susan Bennett Green, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Geimy Lorene Hilario-Molina (“Hilario”), a native and 

citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of an order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) sustaining the Attorney 

General’s appeal, vacating the immigration judge’s order, 

denying her motions to dismiss, and finding that she did not 

establish she was eligible for asylum or withholding of removal 

based on her membership in a particular social group. We deny 

the petition for review. 

We conclude that the Board’s decision denying 

Hilario’s motions to dismiss based on an untimely notice of 

appeal was not clearly erroneous. Substantial evidence supports 

the finding that the Government filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Hilario’s challenge to this finding is based in part on

speculation. We further conclude that the Board did not abuse 

its discretion in denying Hilario’s motion for summary 

dismissal. See Lapaix v. Attorney General, 605 F.3d 1138, 1144-

45 (11th Cir. 2010); Escobar-Ramos v. INS, 927 F.2d 482, 484 

(9th Cir. 1991).

The INA permits the Attorney General to grant asylum 

to any refugee who applies. The refugee must show that she is 

unwilling or unable to return to her country because she has a 

well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
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political opinion. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 

124 (4th Cir. 2011). The court will vacate the Board’s order if 

it is “‘manifestly contrary to law.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(C) (2006)). Factual findings are accepted unless 

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 

contrary, and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The 

Board’s order is accorded substantial deference. Id.

Neither the INA nor the associated regulations define 

“particular social group.” This court defers to the Board’s 

reasonable interpretation of the term. Lizama v. Holder, 629 

F.3d 440, 446-47 (4th Cir. 2011). A particular social group 

must meet three criteria: “(1) its members share common, 

immutable characteristics, (2) the common characteristics give 

its members social visibility, and (3) the group is defined with 

sufficient particularity to delimit its membership.” Id., 629 

F.3d at 447 (citing Matter of E–A–G–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 

(BIA 2008); In re A–M–E & J–G–U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–76 (BIA 

2007); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), 

overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 

Dec. 439 (BIA 1987)). Whether a group is a particular social 

group is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Malonga v. 

Mukasey, 546 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008).

We have reviewed the record and the Board’s opinion 

and conclude that Hilario did not establish that she was a 
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member of a particular social group with common, immutable 

characteristics for the reasons cited by the Board. We further 

conclude that Hilario’s group was not sufficiently particular. 

We also note that the Board did not improperly review the 

factual findings that supported the immigration judge’s 

conclusion that Hilario was a member of a particular social 

group. 

Because Hilario did not establish membership in a 

particular social group, the Board correctly found she was not 

entitled to asylum or withholding of removal. Accordingly, we 

deny the petition for review. We also deny the Attorney 

General’s motion to remand and deny as moot Hilario’s motion to 

remove the case from abeyance. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

PETITION DENIED