alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE of North Carolina v. Jimmy Leon NICHOLSON.

No. 230P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 11, 2007.

Glenn Gerding, Southport, for Nicholson.

Kathleen M. Waylett, Special Deputy Attorney General, Peter S. Gilchrist, III, District Attorney, for State of NC.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 15th day of May 2007 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th day of October 2007."

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Defendant on the 15th day of May 2007 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, and the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question filed by the Attorney General, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the motion to dismiss the appeal is

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th day of October 2007."
# The Attorney General ofTexas November 21, 1979 MARKWHITE AttorneyGeneral

Honorable Ben Z.Grant, Chairman Judiciary Committee House ofRepresentatives P.0. Box2910 Austin, Texas 78769 Opinion No.MW- 07 Re: Salaries ofdistrict attorneys.

Dear Representative Grant: You have requested our opinion on the salary of district attorneys under section 3of the ProfeasIonaI Prosecutors Act, article 332b-4, V.T.C.S. That section provides:

Sec. 3.Each district attorney governed by this Act shall receive from the state compensation equal to 90 percent of the compensation that iv provided for a district judge in the General Appropriations Act. Each commissioners court may supplement the district attorney’s state salary, but shnJlinno event pay the district attorney an amount less than the compensation it provides its highest paid district judge. Your specific question is: In computing a district attorney% supplementary salary, should the commissioners court include the compensation provided to a district judge for service on the Juvenile Board? It is wall established that any compensation received by ajudge for his service on the @menIleboard is for services rendered as ajudge. Jones v. Alexander, 59 S.W.2d 1080 (Tex. 1933); Attorney General Opinions Ii-461 ml23 0973). In Holland v. Harris County, 102S.W.2d 196(Tex. 19371, the court was required to determine the amount of salary due a special ludge. The special judge was entitled to the same pay as a district judge. The district juc&s received a supplement for their services on the juvenile board, but the special judge had no duties with regard to the juvenile board. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the juvenile board compensation

p. 265Honorable Ben Z.Grant - Page Two (NW-87)

was for services as ajudge and that it was required to be included in computing the pay due the special judge. But cf. Allen v. Davis, 333 S.W.2d441(Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.1 (county court-at-law juee not entitled to additional compensation paid county judge for juvenile board service). Accordingly, since compensation paid bya county to adistrict judge byvirtue ofhis service on the juvenile board Ispart of his compensation within the meaning of section 3 of article 332b-4, V.T.C.S., the amount must be included in determining the minimum supplement which may bepaid the district attwneys. SUMMARY In determining the minimum pay due district attorneys covered by the Professional Prosecutors Act, which supplements the district attorney’s salary, a county must include any supplement it pays district judges for service on tha juvenile boar&

Attorney General ofTexas JOHN W.FAINTER, JR. First Assistant Attorney General TEDL. HARTLEY Executive Assistant Attorney General Prepared by C. Robert Heath Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE C. Robert Heath, Chairman Jim Allison David B.Brooks Walter Davis BobGammage Susan Garrison Rick Gilpin William GReid Bruce Youngblood

p. 266
# Uradni list C 293/2018

| | ISSN 1977-1045 |
| --- | --- |
| Uradni list
  Evropske unije | C 293 |
| | |
| Slovenska izdaja | Informacije in objave | Letnik 6120. avgust 2018 |

ISSN 1977-1045

Uradni list

Evropske unije

C 293

Slovenska izdaja

Informacije in objave

Letnik 6120. avgust 2018

---

| Vsebina | Stran |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Informacije |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2018/C 293/01 | Menjalni tečaji eura | 1 |

Vsebina

Stran

IV   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2018/C 293/01

Menjalni tečaji eura

1

---

| SL | |
| --- | --- |

SL

---

IV Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

| 20.8.2018 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 293/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2018

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 293/1

---

Menjalni tečaji eura (1)

17. avgusta 2018

(2018/C 293/01)

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Menjalni tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ameriški dolar | 1,1391 |
| JPY | japonski jen | 125,75 |
| DKK | danska krona | 7,4578 |
| GBP | funt šterling | 0,89575 |
| SEK | švedska krona | 10,4935 |
| CHF | švicarski frank | 1,1338 |
| ISK | islandska krona | 122,80 |
| NOK | norveška krona | 9,6795 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka krona | 25,729 |
| HUF | madžarski forint | 323,88 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 4,3115 |
| RON | romunski leu | 4,6558 |
| TRY | turška lira | 7,0282 |
| AUD | avstralski dolar | 1,5670 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,4976 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 8,9412 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,7254 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,5651 |
| KRW | južnokorejski won | 1 282,38 |
| ZAR | južnoafriški rand | 16,9966 |
| CNY | kitajski juan | 7,8420 |
| HRK | hrvaška kuna | 7,4225 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 16 674,15 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,6811 |
| PHP | filipinski peso | 60,876 |
| RUB | ruski rubelj | 76,8166 |
| THB | tajski bat | 37,869 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 4,5001 |
| MXN | mehiški peso | 21,7831 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 79,9195 |

Valuta

Menjalni tečaj

USD

ameriški dolar

1,1391

JPY

japonski jen

125,75

DKK

danska krona

7,4578

GBP

funt šterling

0,89575

SEK

švedska krona

10,4935

CHF

švicarski frank

1,1338

ISK

islandska krona

122,80

NOK

norveška krona

9,6795

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

češka krona

25,729

HUF

madžarski forint

323,88

PLN

poljski zlot

4,3115

RON

romunski leu

4,6558

TRY

turška lira

7,0282

AUD

avstralski dolar

1,5670

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,4976

HKD

hongkonški dolar

8,9412

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,7254

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,5651

KRW

južnokorejski won

1 282,38

ZAR

južnoafriški rand

16,9966

CNY

kitajski juan

7,8420

HRK

hrvaška kuna

7,4225

IDR

indonezijska rupija

16 674,15

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,6811

PHP

filipinski peso

60,876

RUB

ruski rubelj

76,8166

THB

tajski bat

37,869

BRL

brazilski real

4,5001

MXN

mehiški peso

21,7831

INR

indijska rupija

79,9195

---

(1)  Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

---
STATE v. BULLOCK.

No. COA07-559.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed January 15, 2008.

Certification Date February 4, 2008.

Appeal from Wilson (06CRS52945).

Case reported without published opinion. Vacated.
Andrew BROADBENT, and Rebecca Broadbent v. Kenneth T. ALLISON, Willie T. Allison, and wife, Patricia M. Allison, Transylvania County Airport, L.L.C.

No. 184P06.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 8, 2007.

Susan L. Hofer, Barbara J. Dean, Charlotte, for Kenneth Allison, et al.

*5James M. Kimzey, Brevard, for Andrew & Rebecca Broadbent.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the conditional petition filed on the 20th day of April 2006 by Plaintiffs in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th day of March 2007."
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANNA M. WOMACK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CINCINNATI BELL; AMERICAN 

EXPRESS, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-16051 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05765-MTL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 20, 2021**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Anna M. Womack appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing her action alleging discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII 

and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 22 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-16051 

In her opening brief, Womack fails to address the district court’s grounds for 

dismissal and has therefore waived her challenge to the district court’s judgment. 

See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[W]e will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s 

opening brief.”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues 

not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived); see also 

Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture 

arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim . . . .”).

We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. 

See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts 

not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Womack’s motion for default judgment (Docket Entry No. 17) is denied. 

AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-30793

Summary Calendar

JAMES TYLER,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JIMMY SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:12-CV-222

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

James Tyler, Louisiana prisoner # 372199, filed and subsequently 

amended a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against three officials of the Louisiana 

State Penitentiary. The relevant portion of the complaint was that Colonel 

Jimmy Smith used excessive force by sadistically and maliciously spraying

Tyler with mace while he was locked in his cell because Tyler had written a 

letter complaining about prison personnel. Smith moved for summary 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 26, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-30793 Document: 00512573985 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/26/2014
No. 13-30793

judgment, asserting qualified immunity among other things. The district court 

denied the motion finding that Tyler’s verified complaint and summaryjudgment affidavits established a genuine issue of material fact “regarding 

whether [Tyler] sustained an injury, the need for the application of force, the 

relationship between the need and use of force, the threat perceived by [Smith] 

and efforts made to temper the severity of the response.”

Smith appeals the denial of his summary judgment motion based on 

qualified immunity. The denial of summary judgment based upon qualified 

immunity is a collateral order that may be an appealable final decision. 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). However, the court’s jurisdiction 

to review the denial is “significantly limited,” extending to questions of law 

only. Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment, “the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 

and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 

Smith concedes that he released mace into Tyler’s cell, but he argues that there 

is no evidence other than Tyler’s allegations that he acted with a culpable state 

of mind. This argument is directed to the truth of the verified allegations made 

by Tyler that Smith acted without provocation and with malicious intent. See

Kinney, 367 F.3d at 346. Accordingly, the court does not have jurisdiction to 

review the district court’s conclusion that there was a genuine factual dispute

whether Smith used excessive force.

Tyler’s motion to dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, stay the 

proceedings because Smith did not comply with Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 10 is DENIED.

APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION DENIED.

2

 Case: 13-30793 Document: 00512573985 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/26/2014
Donald B. MITCHELL v. The Honorable Ripley E. RAND, Senior Resident Judge of Wake County.

No. 201P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 17, 2007.

Donald B. Mitchell, Pro Se.

Robert Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Plaintiff on the 19th day of April 2007 in this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Wake County:

*98"Dismissed by order of the Court in Conference this the 17th day of May 2007."
|   |   | NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC. |                                                             |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | By:                                       |  /s/ C.H. (Scott) Rees III, P.E.                            |   |
|   |   |                                      | C.H. (Scott) Rees III, P.E. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer |   |

| Please be advised that the digital document you are viewing is provided by Nethertand, Sewell & Associates Ina (NSAI) as a convenience to our clients. The digital document is intended to be substantively the same as the original signed document maintained by NSAI. The digital document is subject to the parameters, limitations, and conditions statedIn the original document In the event of any differences between the digital document and the original document the original document shall control and supersede the digital document |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
##### 



Exhibit No. 31.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTS OF 2002 I, Steven Vick, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10Q of Assisted
Living Concepts, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  (a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures,
or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control
over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit
committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in
the registrants internal control over financial reporting. Dated: May 11, 2004
    
    /s/ Steven VickSteven Vick, Chief Executive Officer and President
EXHIBIT 32.2

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

In connection with the Quarterly
Report of Guidant Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending
September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Keith E. Brauer, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 USC 1350), that:

(1)       
          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)       
          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/    Keith
E. BrauerChief Financial Officer
STATE of North Carolina v. Jonathan Denard BOYCE.

No. 129A06.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 8, 2007.

Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Jonathan Denard Boyce.

Amar Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorney General, Thomas J. Keith, District Attorney, for State of NC.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition for discretionary review, filed by Defendant on the 14th day of March 2006 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 and the Appellate Rule 16(b) as to issues in addition to those presented as the basis for the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the petition for discretionary review as to additional issues is

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th day of March 2007."

Accordingly, the new brief of the Defendant shall be filed with this Court not more than 30 days from the date of certification of this order.
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the accompanying Annual Report of Enviro Voraxial
Technology, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31,
2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Alberto DiBella, Principal Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fully presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


By: /s/Alberto DiBella
    ------------------
    Alberto DiBella
    Principal Executive Officer


    October 1, 2008
In the Matter of William Glenn ROGERS, Jr., Respondent.

Opinion No. 26403.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

December 12, 2007.

ORDER

Respondent was suspended on December 10, 2007, for a period of sixty (60) days, retroactive to August 17, 2007. He has now filed an affidavit requesting reinstatement pursuant to Rule 32, of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413, SCACR.

The request is granted and he is hereby reinstated to the practice of law in this state.

JEAN H. TOAL, CHIEF JUSTICE.

*s/ Daniel E. Shearouse* Clerk
# Commission Implementing Decision of 24 September 2014 on the extension of the designation of the Performance Review Body of            the single European sky (2014/672/EU) (repealed)         

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U.K.

# Commission Implementing Decision

# of 24 September 2014

# on the extension of the designation of the Performance Review Body of the single European sky

# (2014/672/EU) (repealed)

F1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                        

Textual Amendments

F1Repealed by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2296 of 16 December 2016 setting up the independent group of experts designated                                 as Performance Review Body of the single European sky.