COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick,* Judges Baker and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

THOMAS C. SHOOLTZ 

v. Record No. 2205-96-4 

JANE HOFFMAN SHOOLTZ OPINION BY 

 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JANE HOFFMAN SHOOLTZ APRIL 28, 1998 

 

v. Record No. 2209-96-4 

THOMAS C. SHOOLTZ 

 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jack B. Stevens, Judge 

 William M. Baskin, Jr. (Southy E. Walton; 

Baskin, Jackson & Hansbarger, P.C., on 

briefs) for Thomas C. Shooltz. 

 David H. Fletcher (Martin A. Gannon; Gannon, 

Cottrell & Ward, P.C., on briefs) for Jane 

Hoffman Shooltz. 

 Jane H. Shooltz (wife) and Thomas C. Shooltz (husband) both 

appeal the equitable distribution order of the trial court. Wife 

contends the trial court erroneously valued the husband's two 

businesses, erroneously reduced the monetary award based on tax 

consequences to husband, and erroneously refused to reopen the 

equitable distribution hearing to take further evidence on the 

business valuation issue. Husband contends the trial court 

erroneously counted a single asset twice in its equitable 

 

 *On November 19, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick succeeded Judge 

Moon as chief judge. 
 2 

distribution award. For the reasons which follow, we reverse. 

I. Motion to Reopen Hearing 

 The parties were married in September 1976, and separated in 

August 1993. Husband filed for divorce in December 1993, and 

wife responded with a cross-bill for divorce. The trial court 

referred the matter to a commissioner in chancery, who 

recommended a divorce based on the separation of the parties for 

more than one year. 

 The circuit court held an equitable distribution hearing on 

September 15 and 17, 1994, during which evidence was taken on the 

value of the husband's two start-up businesses, Gateway II 

Limited Liability Corporation ("Gateway II") and Highland Limited 

Partnership ("Highland"). The trial court granted husband's 

motion to strike as speculative the valuation testimony of the 

wife's expert in which he determined the present value of the 

businesses' future earnings based largely, not on historical 

earnings, which did not exist, but on husband's income 

projections. 

 The parties submitted written memoranda on November 3, 1994. 

 On January 22, 1996, sixteen months after the evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court rendered its decision by letter opinion. 

 Upon husband's Motion to Reconsider, in which he asked the court 

to reduce the monetary award made to wife in its January 22, 1996 

letter opinion, the trial court reduced the monetary award by 

letter opinion issued on May 20, 1996. 
 3 

 The matter had been held within the breast of the court for 

nearly twenty months, during which time husband's businesses had 

begun operations. The wife thereafter moved for reconsideration, 

asking, inter alia, that the court revalue the husband's 

interests in Gateway II and Highland. Wife argued that during 

the court's delay in reaching a decision, Gateway II had begun 

operations and that sufficient historical earnings were now 

available to warrant the application of the wife's expert's 

methodology for valuation. Wife's expert testified that, as of 

the hearing, Gateway II and Highland were earning profits, which 

were substantially consistent with the projections on which he 

had relied to project Highland's and Gateway II's future 

earnings. 

 In denying wife's motion to reopen the equitable 

distribution hearing to revalue the marital estate in 1996, the 

court concluded that it lacked the discretionary power under the 

provisions of Code § 20-107.3(A) to value the businesses as of a 

date other than that of the equitable distribution hearing. We 

disagree. 

 Motions to reopen a hearing to take further evidence are 

matters within the court's discretion. See Kirn v. Bembury, 163 

Va. 891, 900-01, 178 S.E. 53, 56 (1935) ("Such motions are 

addressed to the sound discretion of the court . . . . Usually, 

such motions are based upon error apparent on the face of the 

record, or for the purpose of introducing after-discovered 
 4 

evidence."); Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 144, 480 S.E.2d 760, 

770 (1997) (citing Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 307, 349 

S.E.2d 661, 663 (1986)).1

 In the present case, the trial court declined to exercise 

its discretion to reopen the hearing on the value of the 

husband's businesses after a sixteen-month delay in bringing the 

equitable distribution issue to closure and notwithstanding the 

wife's proffer that the circumstances had substantially changed. 

 In denying the motion to reopen, the court erroneously concluded 

that the provisions of Code § 20-107.3(A) abrogated the court's 

discretionary power and confined its review of the issue to the 

date of the initial evidentiary hearing.2

 

 

 1In addition to considering newly discovered evidence and 

legal error as the primary bases for the exercise of discretion 

in reopening a hearing, see, e.g., Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., Inc. 

v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 24 Va. App. 377, 386, 482 S.E.2d 

841, 845 (1997); Hughes v. Gentry, 18 Va. App. 318, 326, 443 

S.E.2d 448, 453 (1994) (citing Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va. App. 472, 

482, 375 S.E.2d 387, 393 (1987)), Virginia courts have also 

included among the factors to be applied in the analysis whether 

a party seeking rehearing had "ample opportunity to present 

evidence" at the initial hearing, see, e.g., Old Dominion Elec. 

Coop. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 237 Va. 385, 395, 377 S.E.2d 

422, 428 (1989); Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 144, 480 S.E.2d at 770 

(citing Morris, 3 Va. App. at 307, 349 S.E.2d at 663); whether 

the moving party's request to take additional evidence was 

timely, Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 144, 480 S.E.2d at 770; whether the 

moving party asserted the claim requiring rehearing at the 

initial hearing, Brown v. Brown ex. rel. Beacham, 244 Va. 319, 

324, 422 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1992); Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 

217, 436 S.E.2d 463, 472 (1993); and whether the grant of a 

motion to reopen a hearing would cause prejudice, delay, 

confusion, inconvenience, surprise or injustice to the opposing 

party. Old Dominion, 237 Va. at 397, 337 S.E.2d at 429; Fink v. 

Huggins Gas & Oil Co., 203 Va. 86, 91, 122 S.E.2d 539, 543 

(1961). 

 2In its current form, Code § 20-107.3(A) provides in 
 5 

 Prior to its amendment in 1988, Code § 20-107.3 did not fix 

a valuation date, and the trial court chose a valuation date if 

the parties could not agree to one. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 4 

Va. App. 113, 118, 355 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1987); see also Clements v.

Clements, 10 Va. App. 580, 584 n.4, 397 S.E.2d 257, 259 n.4 

(1990) (explaining the 1988 amendment). In Mitchell, 4 Va. App. 

at 118, 355 S.E.2d at 21, a pre-amendment case, this Court held 

that the trial court should generally value assets as of the date 

of the evidentiary hearing and not as of the date of separation, 

because "the date of trial will usually be the most current and 

accurate value available." 

 Following the 1988 statutory amendment, we held in Gaynor v. 

Hird, 11 Va. App. 588, 593 n.1, 400 S.E.2d 788, 791 n.1 (1991), 

that "the 1988 amendments to Code § 20-107.3(A) codified the rule 

announced in Mitchell." The adoption of the statutory rule 

fixing the evidentiary hearing as the presumptively proper date 

for valuation of property did not, however, change the 

fundamental policy objectives which underlie it, viz., that, in 

the interest of just and fair results, the trial court should use 

 

relevant part: 

 The court shall determine the value of any 

such property [of the parties] as of the date 

of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation 

issue. Upon motion of either party made no 

less than twenty-one days before the 

evidentiary hearing the court may, for good 

cause shown, in order to attain the ends of 

justice, order that a different valuation 

date be used. 
 6 

a valuation date which is most likely to provide the court with 

the most current and accurate information available. We do not 

interpret the amendment to Code § 20-107.3 to preclude this 

objective, and we find nothing in its provisions which supports 

the conclusion that the court's inherent authority to reopen a 

hearing to take additional evidence, including more current 

evidence, has been curtailed by this statutory provision.3

 Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in 

concluding that Code § 20-107.3(A) barred it from reopening the 

hearing on the valuation of assets. The trial court's error of 

law with respect to its discretion to reopen the hearing was 

itself an abuse of discretion. As the Supreme Court has 

recognized, a trial court "by definition abuses its discretion 

when it makes an error of law." Koon v. United States, 116 

S. Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the 

case for the trial court to consider the issue of reopening the 

hearing in light of the relevant factors which govern its 

exercise of discretion.4

 

 

 3Where, in the exercise of its discretion, the court 

concludes a reopening of the hearing to take more current 

evidence is warranted, it follows that the valuation date is the 

date of the reopened evidentiary hearing. 

 4We note that, on remand, the trial court retains the 

discretion to refuse to reopen the hearing on the valuation of 

assets, subject only to our possible later review for an abuse of 

that discretion. In the current appeal, we hold only that the 

trial court erred in concluding it had no such discretion. We 

make no comment on how the trial court should exercise that 

discretion on remand. 
 7 

 We address below the remaining claims of error regarding the 

valuation of husband's businesses as they may arise again in the 

course of the proceedings on remand. 

 II. 

 Admissibility of Expert Business Valuation Testimony 

 Wife appeals the valuation of two businesses developed by 

husband with marital funds: Gateway II, a family amusement 

center, and Highland, a mini-storage facility. Both parties 

presented the expert testimony of accountants at the equitable 

distribution hearing. At the time of the hearing, Highland had 

applied for building permits but had not begun construction, 

which husband's accountant stated would take a year. Gateway II 

had completed most of the development process and was scheduled 

to open for business in approximately six weeks, on December 1, 

1994. 

 Applying the "net assets value" method of valuation, 

husband's expert testified that Gateway II was largely financed 

by debt, except for an amount husband personally invested in the 

project, totalling $49,144. Applying the net assets value 

method, husband's expert concluded that Gateway II had no value. 

 He acknowledged, however, that Gateway II could be considered to 

have a value of $49,000, the amount of husband's personal 

investment not financed by loans. When asked how long Gateway II 

would have to be in operation before he could value the business 

using an income-based valuation method, husband's expert 
 8 

responded, "I guess you could get some indications after -- after 

a year." 

 Husband's expert testified that the Highland investment 

property was worth the same amount as its debt and, therefore, 

had no value. He also opined that years would pass before 

Highland would have a positive cash flow. 

 Wife's expert placed a value on Gateway II and Highland by 

determining the present value of the projected future earnings of 

the businesses. The expert arrived at the present value of the 

projected future earnings by evaluating payments to husband from 

his partners, the history of the projects, and projections of 

earnings developed by husband. Wife's expert calculated the 

present value of Gateway II's projected future earnings to be 

$1,381,303 and the present value of Highland's projected future 

earnings to be $1,982,958. 

 The court granted husband's motion to strike wife's evidence 

of the value of Gateway II and Highland. The court concluded, "I 

don't think it's the law that you can get somebody to get on the 

stand and project earnings of a company that has done no 

business, has no record of income. That's pure speculation. 

Couldn't be more pure." 

 On January 22, 1996, the trial court issued an opinion 

letter dividing the assets between the parties. The court later 

determined that the opinion letter contained clerical errors and 

issued a corrected opinion letter, also dated January 22, 1996. 
 9 

 

In the opinion letter, the court valued Gateway II at $49,144 and 

Highland at $0. 

A. Motion to Strike Expert Testimony 

 The trial court struck wife's expert's opinion of the value 

of Gateway II and Highland because the expert's projections and 

opinion testimony were overly speculative and, by implication, 

unreliable.5

 Based on the evidence presented to the court at 

trial, we find no error in this ruling.6

 The fundamental infirmity in the testimony of wife's expert 

is that the effort failed to establish the propriety of 

application of the "discounted future earnings" method to 

determine the value of a business which is on the threshold of 

beginning operations and which has no historical earnings and 

failed to establish that such methodology would render accurate 

results. "Expert testimony is admissible in civil cases to 

assist the trier of fact, if the evidence meets certain 

fundamental requirements, including the requirement that it be 

 5Husband and wife both refer to the methodology of wife's 

expert as the "capitalization of earnings" method. Strictly 

speaking, wife's expert used the "discounted future earnings" 

method, in which projected future income is given a present 

value, rather than the "capitalization of earnings" method, in 

which one year's earnings are multiplied by a capitalization 

rate. See Alan S. Zipp, Divorce: Valuation, Tax, and Financial 

Strategies 20-21 (Tax Advisors Planning Series 1995) (explaining 

methods of valuation). Both methods rely on the expectation of 

future earnings to determine the value of a business. 

 6This conclusion is based solely on the evidence presented 

at trial. We voice no opinion with respect to the admissibility 

of the evidence upon rehearing. 
 10 

based on an adequate foundation." Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. 

Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995) 

(citing, inter alia, Lawson v. Doe, 239 Va. 477, 482-83, 391 

S.E.2d 333, 336 (1990)). When a litigant claims that a 

particular scientific, technical or other specialized theory or 

technique is valid, there must be some basis for determining the 

validity of the proffered theory or technique. Satcher v. 

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 244, 421 S.E.2d 821, 835 (1992) 

("'Wide discretion must be vested in the trial court to 

determine, when unfamiliar scientific evidence is offered, 

whether the evidence is so inherently unreliable that a lay jury 

must be shielded from it, or whether it is of such character that 

the jury may safely be left to determine the credibility for 

itself.'" (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 98, 393 

S.E.2d 609, 621 (1990))). Where the expert's conclusion rests on 

sound methodology and theory, the conclusion is admissible. See

Code § 8.01-401.3.7

 In the present case, wife failed to produce any evidence to 

establish the validity of her expert's methodology in the context 

 

 7Code § 8.01-401.3(A) provides: 

 In a civil proceeding, if scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will assist the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a 

witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training, or education may 

testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 

otherwise. 
 11 

of this case. Indeed, the only evidence in the case on this 

issue was presented by husband's expert, who testified that 

valuation methods which depend on earnings, such as the 

discounted future earnings method, are never used for the 

valuation of a business with no operating history. This opinion 

remained wholly unrebutted by wife. While we recognize that 

"'[t]he court may not refuse or fail to give parties a reasonable 

opportunity to develop and present evidence of value,'" Gottlieb 

v. Gottlieb, 19 Va. App. 77, 93 n.6, 448 S.E.2d 666, 675-76 n.6 

(1994) (quoting Bowers v. Bowers, 4 Va. App. 610, 618, 359 S.E.2d 

546, 551 (1987)), in the absence of a proper foundation for the 

opinion proffered by wife's expert, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in striking the testimony. See Satcher, 244 Va. at 

244, 421 S.E.2d at 835. 

B. Valuation of Highland 

 Wife also challenges the trial court's valuation of 

Highland, contending the court used inconsistent methods in 

valuing Highland and Gateway II. We disagree that the trial 

court's reasoning was inconsistent. We will not disturb a trial 

court's finding of the value of an asset unless the finding is 

plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 

at 140, 480 S.E.2d at 768; Traylor v. Traylor, 19 Va. App. 761, 

763-64, 454 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1995). 

 Husband's expert testified that Highland owned a piece of 

property worth $1,150,000; the debt on the property equalled the 
 12 

asset's value. The expert, therefore, concluded that Highland 

had no net asset value because its debt matched the value of its 

assets. Husband's expert acknowledged that husband had invested 

$49,144 in Gateway II and initially stated that Gateway II had no 

value. He later changed his view and stated that the value of 

Gateway II was $49,000 because $49,000 of the value of Gateway II 

was not financed by debt. 

 Wife argues that the trial court determined that Highland 

had no value based on its net asset value but valued Gateway II 

according to husband's capital contributions. Starting from this 

premise, wife contends the court should have valued Highland at 

husband's capital contribution of $968,084, which she calls its 

"book value."8

 The book value and adjusted book value methods of 

valuation require a court to value a business at the net value of 

assets and liabilities, which is precisely what the trial court 

did in valuing both Highland and Gateway II. McDavid v. McDavid, 

19 Va. App. 406, 414-15, 451 S.E.2d 713, 719 (1994) (explaining 

that fair market value of assets is appropriate to value a real 

estate holding company); Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 8, 

384 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1989) ("[V]aluation based upon the 

 

 8The "book value" of a business refers to assets and 

liabilities at their actual historical cost, no matter what the 

current value of the assets and liabilities might be. The 

"adjusted book value" of a business adjusts the book value to 

reflect the current value of each asset and liability. Zipp, 

supra, at 19-20. The trial court purported to value Highland and 

Gateway II according to book value, although husband's expert 

testified to the current, rather than historical, value of the 

business assets and liabilities. 
 13 

corporation's net assets has gained wide acceptance in cases 

where the corporation is a real estate holding company."); see 

also Goldberg v. Goldberg, 626 A.2d 1062, 1066 (Md. Ct. Spec. 

App. 1993) ("[A]djusted historical cost . . . appears an entirely 

appropriate way to evaluate . . . interests in newly formed 

companies without any earning or profit history . . . ."); In re 

Marriage of Bors, 839 P.2d 272, 273 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) ("[B]ook 

value is an appropriate technique to value a corporation that has 

just been formed."). Neither book value nor adjusted book value, 

however, requires the court to value a business according to 

capital contributions without reference to liabilities. 

 Wife's premise that the trial court valued Gateway II 

according to husband's capital contributions is without merit. 

Although husband contributed $49,144 to Gateway II, the court 

considered that contribution because it represented the portion 

of Gateway II not financed by debt, and thus constituted a net 

asset. We find that the trial court did not use inconsistent 

valuation methods to determine the value of the two businesses. 

 III. 

Reduction in Marital Award 

 With respect to the potential tax liabilities to be 

addressed by the parties, wife's expert testified at the 

equitable distribution hearing that the parties had approximately 

$1,220,000 in suspended passive tax loss and $334,000 in 

carried-over investment interest. The expert testified that the 
 14 

parties could apply the approximately $1,555,000 in suspended 

passive losses and investment interest to offset income or 

capital gains for a tax benefit of $518,000. The husband's 

expert did not testify about the tax loss at the equitable 

distribution hearing. 

 Six months after the equitable distribution hearing, husband 

moved for permission to liquidate marital assets to pay 

approximately $100,000 in taxes. According to husband's 

attorney, the taxes arose from the husband's sale of stock as 

well as margin calls on the parties' margin account. Husband 

testified that, after the equitable distribution hearing, he sold 

$750,000 of stock in a Charles Schwab margin account to generate 

$250,000 to retire a debt acquired during the marriage in 

conjunction with husband's investment in a partnership called 

Birch's Crossroads. Husband thereafter filed a motion to reduce 

the value of the marital estate by the amount of tax liability 

incurred as a result of husband's court-approved sale of stock. 

 Granting the motion to reopen the hearing on this issue, the 

court took further evidence on the potential tax consequences 

faced by the parties as a result of the equitable distribution of 

their property. Husband maintained that the June 1995 sale of 

stock had generated an additional $307,000 in tax liability. In 

response to wife's expert's testimony that husband had $374,803 

of tax benefits from $1,135,766 in passive losses which he could 

use to offset the tax liability, husband's expert stated that 
 15 

 

most of the tax loss could not be used to offset tax liability 

because the tax loss from the defunct partnership named Birch's 

Crossroads would have to be reduced by husband's negative capital 

account in that partnership before the loss could be applied to 

offset other gains. Both experts relied on tax forecasts because 

the tax returns had not yet been filed. 

 The trial court ruled that any passive losses from Birch's 

Crossroads would have to be offset by the gains and income from 

Birch's Crossroads before the losses could be used to offset any 

other income. The court reduced the award from husband to wife 

from $200,000 to $50,000. The difference reflected husband's 

additional approximate tax liability of $307,000.9

 Code § 20-107.3(E) requires a trial court to consider the 

"tax consequences to each party" in fashioning an equitable 

distribution award. The primary conflict in the testimony over 

the parties' tax liabilities was whether husband could apply his 

accumulated passive losses to offset capital gains from the sale 

of stock. In its opinion letter of May 20, 1996, the trial court 

determined that the testimony of husband's expert with regard to 

tax consequences was more persuasive than that of wife's expert, 

and ordered that the award to wife be reduced from $200,000 to 

$50,000 to account for husband's tax liabilities. Wife contends 

 9During the hearing, husband's expert revised his opinion of 

husband's tax liability from $307,000 to $242,434. Wife does not 

argue that the court should have based its award on $242,000 

rather than $307,000. 
 16 

the court's determination of the parties' tax liabilities was 

erroneous because husband's tax consequences were speculative, 

were the result of husband's unilateral actions, and were offset 

by accumulated passive losses. 

 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

considering the tax consequences of the distribution of assets 

based on tax returns which had not yet been filed. After hearing 

testimony and receiving memoranda on the tax consequences of the 

disposition of assets, the trial court found: "I don't see that 

there is anything artificial or made up in this. These are real 

life taxes that have to be paid." This finding is supported by 

the record, and we will not disturb it on appeal. In Arbuckle v. 

Arbuckle, 22 Va. App. 362, 366, 470 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1996), 

relied upon by wife, we disapproved consideration of tax 

consequences based on a hypothetical sale of an asset. The 

present case involves actual dispositions of assets. In 

Arbuckle, we stated: "Every capital asset has a value basis and, 

thus, a potential liability for capital gain tax upon sale. That 

potential liability is a proper consideration in the 

determination of a property division and an award, if not 

speculative." 22 Va. App. at 367, 470 S.E.2d at 148; see also

Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98, 106, 428 S.E.2d 294, 300 (1993) 

(approving consideration of capital gains tax in equitable 

distribution). 

 The trial court in its discretion approved the sale of 
 17 

stock, which generated part of the capital gains liability, 

because the proceeds of the sale reduced marital debt. 

Furthermore, wife knew of husband's settlement of marital debt 

which created an additional capital gains liability. Finally, 

the sale of stock due to margin calls created the remainder of 

the tax liability. Wife's claim that the tax consequences for 

which husband sought relief resulted from his unilateral action 

was properly rejected by the trial court. Husband's action was 

not unilateral but was undertaken with the knowledge of wife and 

the court. 

 We also reject wife's contention that accumulated passive 

losses would offset the tax liabilities. "Where experts offer 

conflicting testimony, it is within the discretion of the trial 

judge to select either opinion." Rowe, 24 Va. App. at 140, 480 

S.E.2d at 768. The trial court considered the testimony and 

memoranda of both parties' experts on tax strategies and 

consequences and accepted the husband's position. This 

conclusion was firmly grounded in tax law, 26 U.S.C. 

§ 469(g)(1)(A), and was a proper exercise of the trial court's 

discretion. 

 IV. 

Distribution of $220,000 Reimbursement 

 At the equitable distribution hearing, both experts 

testified that husband's partner in the development of Highland 

had agreed to reimburse him up to $220,000 for expenses incurred 
 18 

in conjunction with the development of Highland. As of the date 

of the hearing, husband had incurred $147,000 in reimbursable 

expenses. Before the court reached its decision, it held a 

subsequent hearing on January 20, 1995, at which husband updated 

the court on his financial affairs. Husband testified he had 

received $220,000 in reimbursement for Highland development 

expenses in December 1994 or January 1995. In its accounting of 

the assets subject to equitable distribution, the court included 

$147,500 as a "Highland L.P. Loan Receivable," the amount due to 

be reimbursed as of the date of the equitable distribution 

hearing, and considered this amount when fashioning the award to 

wife. However, in fashioning the award, the court did not 

consider husband's receipt of the additional $72,500 in full 

payment of the $220,000 due him for Highland development 

expenses. 

 At a hearing on August 9, 1996, the trial court stated that 

it had not previously considered the reimbursement when making 

the equitable distribution award. Although the earlier testimony 

established that husband had received $220,000, husband and both 

attorneys became confused as to the amount of the reimbursement, 

and husband testified that he had received only $200,000 in 

reimbursement. The trial court increased its award to wife by 

$100,000, one-half of the amount supposedly reimbursed by 

husband's partner in Highland. 

 This Court will not disturb an equitable distribution award 
 19 

"unless it is plainly wrong and without evidence to support it." 

Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 

678 (1990). The trial court's $100,000 adjustment in the award 

was a factual error and plainly contrary to the evidence. The 

trial court mistakenly incorporated the $220,000 reimbursement in 

its award twice: once as $147,500, and a second time as 

$200,000. The credible evidence established that the total 

reimbursement was $220,000, but the trial court accounted for 

$347,500 of reimbursement ($147,500 plus $200,000). Rather than 

increasing the award to wife by $100,000 as one-half of $200,000, 

the trial court should have increased the award by $36,250 as 

one-half of the unaccounted-for $72,500, to bring the total 

reimbursement for Highland expenses to $220,000. 

 For the reasons stated, this case is reversed and remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.