UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4269

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY PYOS, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00178-GBL-1)

Submitted: December 5, 2022 Decided: December 13, 2022

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Gregory B. English, ENGLISH LAW FIRM, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, J. Tyler McGaughey, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Christopher Catizone, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Alexandria, Virginia, Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Joseph Attias, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Larry Pyos, Jr., appeals from the criminal judgment imposed after a jury convicted 

him of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; Hobbs 

Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, also in violation of § 1951; discharging a 

firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); using a firearm 

during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and being a felon 

in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Pyos asserts that the 

district court erred when it denied his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal 

as to the Hobbs Act robbery counts and the § 924(c) convictions predicated on the Hobbs 

Act robbery counts because (1) Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery are 

no longer crimes of violence sufficient to support a § 924(c) conviction after Johnson v. 

United States, 576 U.S. 591, 602 (2015) (declaring residual clause of Armed Career 

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), unconstitutionally vague); and (2) the Government failed 

to establish that Pyos’ conduct effected interstate commerce to support the Hobbs Act 

robbery counts. Pyos also asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion for 

disclosure of the Government’s star witness’ presentence report (PSR) because the “ruling 

ignored the fact that Brady v. Maryland[, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] compels the prosecution 

and court to disclose exculpatory evidence regardless of what the defendant might already 

know.” (ECF No. 26 at 18). We affirm in part and vacate in part.

First, we discern no error in the district court’s decision to deny Pyos’ motion to 

compel disclosure. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for abuse 

of discretion “and we will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and 

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irrational.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Although due process requires that the Government disclose to the 

accused any favorable evidence in its possession that is material to guilt or punishment, 

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, “[o]n occasion, the government may possess potential Brady

material that it deems privileged or that is otherwise confidential,” United States v. Trevino, 

89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1996). “If the accused does not specifically request that [such 

confidential evidence] be produced, this material is treated much like everything else in the 

government’s file, i.e., the prosecutor’s decision on disclosure is final.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, this court has recognized that PSRs “represent a special subcategory of 

potentially discoverable confidential information,” id. at 190, and, thus, “PSRs are entitled 

to a greater degree of protection from examination and disclosure” than other sensitive 

records, id. at 192. Accordingly, “as a prerequisite to an in camera review” by the district 

court, the defendant “must plainly articulate how the information contained in the PSR will 

be both material and favorable to his defense[,]” id. at 192-93, and we will review the 

district court’s decision “only to see whether. . . [it] was clearly erroneous,” id. at 193. 

Having reviewed Pyos’ reasons for requesting the witness’ PSR, and considering the 

district court’s observations after its in camera review of information contained in the PSR, 

we discern no error in the district court’s decision to bar disclosure.

We next review de novo the district court’s denial of Pyos’ motion for judgment of 

acquittal. See United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018). “[W]e will 

uphold the verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment, 

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it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact 

could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence to 

support the conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. United 

States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir. 2012). 

“Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

In making this determination, we may not resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate 

witness credibility. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012). Moreover, 

“[a] defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy burden, as appellate 

reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s 

failure is clear.” Savage, 885 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We discern no error in the district court’s rejection of Pyos’ Rule 29 motion as to 

the Hobbs Act robbery counts. The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to commit robbery or 

extortion to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce or the movement of any commodity in 

commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). To establish a § 1951(a) offense, the Government need 

only prove: “(1) that the defendant coerced the victim to part with property; (2) that the 

coercion occurred through the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear 

or under color of official right; and (3) that the coercion occurred in such a way as to affect 

adversely interstate commerce.” United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2015) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

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As is most relevant here, “the jurisdictional predicate of the Hobbs Act requires only 

that the government prove a ‘minimal’ effect on interstate commerce.” United States v. 

Taylor, 754 F.3d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 2014). And as we have expressly recognized, “[s]uch 

an impact is not difficult to show” and “[t]he effect may be so minor as to be de minimis 

and may be demonstrated by proof of probabilities.” Id. (cleaned up). “Moreover, the 

government is not required to prove that the defendant intended to affect commerce or that 

the effect on commerce was certain; it is enough that such an effect was the natural, 

probable consequence of the defendant’s actions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and considering that 

“it would violate the principles of common sense to find that robbing a legitimate place of 

business would not have even a minimal effect on interstate commerce, especially when 

we have to view such activities in the aggregate,” United States v. Tillery, 702 F.3d 170, 

174-75 (4th Cir. 2012), we find that the Government presented substantial evidence to 

support the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act robbery counts.

We also discern no error in the district court’s decision to deny Pyos’ Rule 29 

motion as to his § 924(c) convictions premised on the substantive Hobbs Act robbery 

counts. This court has expressly held that “Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of 

violence under the force clause of Section 924(c)[,]” see United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 

242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019), and, thus, Johnson does not invalidate Pyos’ § 924(c) convictions 

premised on the substantive Hobbs Act robbery counts. 

We nonetheless agree with the parties that Pyos’ conviction on Count 11, which was 

predicated on a count charging attempted Hobbs Act robbery, is no longer valid. Under 

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federal law, a person who uses or carries a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of 

violence” or who “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime” may be 

convicted of both the underlying “crime of violence” and the additional crime of utilizing 

a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 

924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” as “an offense that is a felony” and:

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against 

the person or property of another may be used in the course of 

committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). “Courts typically refer to § 924(c)(3)(A) as the ‘force clause’ and 

§ 924(c)(3)(B) as the ‘residual clause.’” United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203, 206 (4th 

Cir. 2020) (“Taylor I”), aff’d, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (“Taylor II”). “In view of the 

Supreme Court’s invalidation of the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, [Pyos’] 

§ 924(c) conviction [on Count 11] may stand only if attempted Hobbs Act robbery 

constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under the force clause.” Taylor I, 979 F.3d at 206-07 

(citation omitted).

After Pyos filed his appeal, we concluded in Taylor I that attempted Hobbs Act 

robbery is not categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. Id. at 210; 

see id. at 209 (holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is no longer a “crime of violence” 

under § 924(c) because the defendant may commit a substantial step by such nonviolent 

means as “passing a threatening note to a store cashier” or “cas[ing] the store that he intends 

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to rob”). The Supreme Court agreed.∗

 Taylor II, 142 S. Ct. at 2021 (“Simply put, no 

element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery requires proof that the defendant used, attempted 

to use, or threatened to use force.”). Pyos’ conviction on Count 11 is therefore no longer 

supported by a valid predicate and, thus, that conviction must be vacated. 

Accordingly, we vacate Pyos’ conviction on Count 11 and remand for resentencing. 

See Taylor I, 979 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301, 309 (4th 

Cir. 2017) (holding that, under the sentencing package doctrine, “if some counts [of a 

multicount criminal judgment] are vacated, the judge should be free to review the efficacy 

of what remains in light of the original [sentencing] plan” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). We affirm the remainder of the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED IN PART,

AFFIRMED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

∗ This appeal was held in abeyance pending this court’s decision in United States v. 

Ali, 991 F.3d 561 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 486 (2021), and Taylor I, as well as 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor II. After Taylor II issued, we directed the parties 

to file supplemental briefs addressing what effect, if any, Taylor II has on Pyos’ § 924(c) 

convictions. 

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