F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

F L O & E D D I E , I

N C ., a California corporation, individually and on behalf of all others similarly

situated, Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v.

P A N D O R A M E D I A , I

N c., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant

. No. 15-55287

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07648-PSG-RZ

ORDER REQUESTI

N G CERTI F I CATI ON TO THE CAL I F ORNI A SUPREME COURT

F iled March 15, 2017

B efore: Stephen Reinhardt and Richard A. Paez , Circuit J udg es, and Paul L . F riedman, * District J u d g e

.

Order

* T h e Ho n o rab le P au l L

. Fried m an , U n i t ed States District J u d g e f or th e District o f

Co lu m b ia, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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SUMMARY * *

Certif ication to Calif

ornia Suprem e Court

The panel certified the f

ollowing questions of state law to the California Supreme Court:

1. Under section 980(a)(2) o f the California Civil Code, do copy rig ht ow n e rs o f pre-1972 sound r e cording s that w ere sold to the p u b lic before 1 982 possess an

ex c lusive rig ht of public performance?

2. I f not, does Cal i f

o rnia’s common law o f property o r tort o therwise g rant copy r ig ht owners of pre-19 72 sound rec o r d ing s an ex clusive rig ht o f public performance?

ORDER

W e certify the questions set forth in Part I I o f this order
to the California Supreme Court. All further proceeding s in this c ase are stay ed pending final action b y t h e California Supreme Court, and this case is withdrawn from submission until further order of this court.

I. Adm inistrative Inf

orm ation

W e provide the following information in accordance with Rule 8.548(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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The caption of this case is:

No. 15-55287

F lo & Eddie, I nc.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
Pandora Media, I

nc.,
Defendant and Appellant.

The names and addresses of counsel are:

For Plaintiff-Appellee Flo & Eddie : Henry G r a dstein, Mary ann R. Marz ano, Harvey G eller, D a n i e l B

. L ifschitz
, Gradstein & Marz ano, P.C., 6310 San Vicente B ou l e v a rd, Suite 510, L os Ang eles, California, 90048.

For Defendant

-

Appellant Pandora Media : J a mes K

. L y nch, A ndrew M. Gass, L atham & W atkins L L P, 505 Montg omery Street, Suite 2000, San F rancisc o , California, 94111; Greg ory G. Garre, J o n athan Y

. Ellis, L atham & W a tkins L L P, 555 Eleventh S t r eet, NW
, Suite 1000, W a shing ton, D.C., 20004.

II. Certif ied Questions

Pursuant to Rule 8.548(b)(2) of the California R u l e s o f Court, we respectfully r equest the Supr e m e Court o f California to decide the c ertified questions presented below. T h ere is no c ontrolling precedent reg arding the c erti fi e dF L O & E D D I E , I N C

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q u estions, the answers to which will d etermine the o u tcom e of this appeal, dispose of F lo & E d d i e’s underlying claims, and r esolve an important area o f C alifornia state law. The questions certified are as follows:

1. Under section 980(a)(2) of the California Civil Code, d o copy rig ht owners of pre-1972 sound r ecordings that w ere sold to the publi c b efore 1 982 possess an

ex c lusive rig ht of public performance?

2. I f not, does Californ i a ’ s common law o f property o r tort o therwise g rant copy r ig ht owners of pre-1972 sound recording s a n ex clusive rig ht o f public performance?

III. Statem ent of F acts

Appellee F lo & Eddie is a corporation created by two founding members of The Turtles, a 1960s fo l k ro c k band best known for the h it song “Happy Tog ether.” F lo & E d die alleg edly acquired the r ig hts to a number of The T urtles’ pre1972 sound recording s, which it has licensed to music, film, and internet companies for various uses.

A p p e llant Pandora is an online r adio service that a llows

users to stream music on internet-co n n ected devices, including
, until recently
, The Turtles’ music. Pandora has not paid F lo & Eddi e f

o r the public performance 1 of its sound

1 C alif o rn ia c o u r t s h av e n o t def in ed “ p u b lic p erf o rm an ce.” Un der

cu rren t f ed eral law , p u

b lic p erf orm an ce m ean s “ to perf

o rm o r d i s p lay [a

reco rd in g ] at a p lace o p en to th e p u b l ic o r at an y p lace w

h ere a su b stan tial

n u m b er o f perso n s o u t s i d e o f a n o rm al circle of a f am ily an d i ts so cial
acq u ain tan ces i s g ath ered ,” o r “ to tran sm it o r o t h erw ise co m m u n icate aF L O & E D D I E , I N C

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recording s, nor does it g enerally do so for performers of pre1972 sound recording s.

O n October 1, 2014, F lo & Eddie filed an action 2 f o r damag es a g ainst Pandora for publicly performi n g The Turtles’ pre-1972 sound recording s on its services w i t h o ut pay ing roy a lties. F lo & Eddie alleg ed that these sound record i n g s were protected under section 980(a)(2) of the California Civil Code, as well as the state’s common law.

Orig inally enacted in 1 8 7 2
, and amended in 1947 a nd 1982, section 980 has underg one, at times, substanti al revision that may bear o n the merits of F lo & Eddie’s claims.

p erf o rm an ce o r d isp lay of th e w o rk to

. . . th e pu b lic, b y m ean s o f a n y d ev ice o r p ro cess, w

h eth er t h e m em b ers of th e pu

b lic cap ab le o f receiv in g th e p erf o rm an ce o r d i s p l a y receiv e it in th e sam e p lace o r in sep arate p laces an d at th e sam e tim e o r at d if f eren t tim es.” 1 7 U.S.C. § 1 0 1

.

2 P rio r to f

ilin g th i s case, Flo & Ed die f i led sim i l a r a c t i o n s ag ain st

o n lin e rad i o serv ice Siriu s XM in f ed eral co u

rt in Calif o rn ia, see Flo & Ed d ie In c. v. S i riu s X

M R a dio In c. , No

. CV 1 3

- 5 6 9 3 P SG (RZ x ), 2 0 1 4 W L 4 7 2 5 3 8 2 (C.D. Cal. S ep t. 2 2, 20 1 4); in New Yo rk
, see Flo & Ed d ie, In c. v. S iriu s XM Ra d io

, In c ., 8 2 1 F .3 d 2 6 5 (2 d Cir. 2 0 1 6 ); an d in Flo rid a, see Flo & Ed

d ie, In c. v. Siriu s XM Ra d io

, In c ., 82 7 F.3 d 1 0 1 6 (1 1 th Cir. 2 0 1 6 ). Siri u s X M ap p ealed ad v erse ru lin g s in b o th th e New Yo rk an d Flo rid a cases, af

ter w h i ch th e Seco n d an d Elev en th Circu i t s c e rtif ied q u e s t i o n s o f s tate law to th e New Yo rk Co u rt o f A p p eals an d Flo rid a Su p rem e Co u

rt, resp ectiv ely

. T h e N e w Yo rk Co u rt o f A p p eals recen tly

an sw ered th e certif

ied q u estio n , h old in g th at New Yo rk ’ s co m m o n law of

co p y rig h t d o es n o t reco g n ize an ex clu siv e rig h t of p u b l ic perf o rm an ce f or

co p y rig h t h o ld ers. S

ee Flo & Ed

d ie, In c. v. Siriu s XM Ra d io

, I n c ., No

. 1 7 2
, 2 0 1 6 W L 7 3 4 91 8 3 (N.Y. Dec. 2 0
, 2 01 6 ). A s a resu lt, t h e Seco n d Circu it rev ersed th e d i strict co u rt’ s o r d e r d en y in g su m m ary j u d g m en t to Siriu s XM an d d irected th e d istrict co u rt t o g ran t su m m ary j u d g m en t an d d ism iss th e case w i t h p rej u d i ce. Flo & Ed d ie, In c. v. Siriu s XM Ra d io

, In c ., No . 1 5

- 1 1 6 4- CV, 2 01 7 W L 6 2 9 2 6 1 , at * 2 (2 d Cir. Feb . 1 6 , 2 0 17 ).F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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W e therefore b riefly summariz e the evolution o f state a nd related federal law, as relevant to the parties’ arg uments.

A.

At the time The Turtles we r e recording and r eleasing music in the 1960s, section 980(a) codified what was known

as “comm o n law copy

rig ht.” I t g ranted the “ author o r proprietor of any composition in letters or art

. . . an ex clusive ownership in the representation or ex pression thereof a s ag ainst all persons ex c e pt” cover artists. Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a) (1949). A t the same t i m e, section 983(a) of the California Civil Code divested any common law rig hts once “the owner of a composition in letters or arts publishe[ d ] it.” Cal. Civ. Code § 983(a) (1949). Upon publication, “the same [ could] be used in any manner b y any person, without responsibility to the o wner, insofar as the law of this State is concerned.” Id.

T he California leg islature orig inally a d o p t e d t h i s l a n g u a g e in 1947, seeming ly “to remove a mbig ui t i e s i n the State law and to bring the California stat u t e into accord with federal law and judicial precedent within an d w i thout California.” Memorandum from B each Vasey
, L eg islative Sec’y
, State o f Cal., to Governor Earl W arren ( J uly 3
, 1 9 47) (emphasis added). The “federal law” in force at time of adoption a nd throug h the 1960s was the Copy r ig ht Act of 1909, which, like the California copy

rig ht statutes, d id not ex pressly mention sound recording s.

Rather, the 1909 Act differentiated b etween unpublished and published works. U npublished works were left to the
p r o t ection of the common law, u nless r e g istered for federal protection. See Twin Books C o r p

. v. W alt Disney Co
., 83F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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F .3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Under t h e 1 9 0 9 Act, an unpublished work was protected by state common law copy rig ht from the moment of its creation until it was either published or until it receiv ed protection under the federal copy rig ht scheme.”). Upon p u

blication with proper copy rig ht notice, federal protection automatically attached an d c o m m o n law protection terminated. W orks that were publishe d without proper copy

rig ht notice irrevocabl y e n tered into the public do m a i n

. See Batjac Prods. I nc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp
., 160 F .3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (ex plaining that, under the 1909 Act, “[ s] tate ‘common law’ p ro t e ction attached upon creation of the wo rk and ended with publication of the work. O nce published, the only protection available wa s federal statutory copy rig h t. Publication of a work with proper notice secured the statutory copy rig h t

. ”). The 1947 amendments to California’s copy rig ht statutes therefore reflected this schema b y d ivesting common law copy rig ht protection at the point of publication. Cal. Civ. Code § 983(a) (1949).

I n 1978, h owe v e r , this schema c hang ed. Cong ress overhauled federal copy rig h t law. Rather than limiting fed e r al copy

rig ht protection o nly to works that were published w ith proper notice, the Fe d e ra l Copy rig ht Act o f 1976 3 ex panded federal protection to any works fix ed in a tang ible med i um of ex pression—thereby preempting

c ommon law p rotection for fix ed, but still unpublished work s

. Se e F ederal Copy

rig ht Act of 1 976, Pub. L

. No. 9 4-553, § 102(a), 9 0 Stat. 2541, 2592 (1976); Batjac Prods
., 160 F .3d
at 1226 ( “Under the 1 976 Act
, u n p u blished works lost their common law protection but g ained statutory protection.”).

3 T h e 1 9 7 6 A ct b ecam e ef f ectiv e o n J an

u ary 1
, 1 9 7 8

. 17 U

. S.C. § 3 0 1 (a).F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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The 1976 Act ex pressl y ex empted pre-1972 sound recording s from this n e w federal protection, however. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). I nstead, the 1976 Act left the common law in place to protect pre-1972 s o u n d recording s. Id. (“W ith respect to sound recordin gs f i x ed before F ebruary 15, 1972, any rig hts or remedies under the common law or statutes o f any State shall not be annulled or limited by t h i s title until F ebruary 15, 2067.”).

I n response, the C a lifornia leg islature repealed the divestiture-by

- p u b l ication rule of section 983 and ag ain amended section 980(a), d ividin g i t into two subsections. Since then, section 980(a)(2) has g ranted the “author of

. . . a sound recording initially fix e d prior to F ebruary 15, 1972

. . . an ex clusive ownership therein until F e brua r y 1 5
, 2047, a s ag ainst a ll pe r s o n s e x cept” cover a rtists. 4 Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(2). Whether section 980(a) ( 2 ) or California

4 Sp ecif ically
, sectio n 9 8 0(a)(2 ) g ran ts “ ex clu siv e ow n ersh ip ” as ag ain st all p erso n s ex cep t

o n e w h o in d ep en d en tly m ak es o r d u p licates an o th er

so u n d reco rd in g th at d o es n ot d ir ectly o r in d irectly

r e c a p tu re t

h e actu al so u

n d s f ix ed in su ch p rio r so u n d

reco rd in g , b u t co n sists en tirely o f an in d ep en d en t f ix atio n o f o th er s o u n d s , ev en th o u g h su ch so u n d s im itate o r s im

u late th e so u n d s co n tain ed in th e p rio r

so u n d reco rd in g

.

Cal. Civ

. Co d e § 9 8 0 (a)(2 ). In S i riu s , th e d istrict co u rt in terp reted th is lan g u ag e as an ex cep tio n f o r artists creatin g “ co v ers,” d ef i n ed as

“ reco rd in g th e so n g w ith n ew in s tru m en ts.” Flo & Ed d ie , 2 0 14 W L 4 7 2 5 3 8 2
, at * 5 (“ In o th er w o rd s, o w n ersh ip of a s o u n d reco rd in g d oes n o t in clu d e th e ex clu siv e rig h t to m ak e ‘ co v ers’ (i.e., reco rd in g th e so n g w i th

n ew in stru m en t s)

. . . so lo n g as th ey pro d u ce t h e so u n d s in d ep en d en tly rath er th an

recap tu re th e actu al so u n d s in th e co p y rig h ted reco rd i n g .”).F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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common law e x tend a

n ex clusive rig ht of public performance
to owners o f pre-1972 sound recording s is the subject of this lawsuit.

B.

After F lo & Eddie filed the present lawsuit, Pandora filed

a motion to strike under California’s statute ag ainst “strateg ic litig ation ag ainst public participation,” o r SL APP. 5 Pandora arg ued that section 980(a)(2) does not even apply to The Turtles’ recording s since, under section 9 83( a ), those recording s entered the public domain a t t he point o f publication b ack in the 1960s. Rely ing on th e leg islative

5 “ T h e an al y s i s o f an an ti- SL A P P m otio n

. . . i n v o lv es tw o step s. F i rst, th e co u rt d ecid es w h eth er th e d ef

en d an t h as m ad e a th re s h o l d sh o w in g t h at th e ch allen g ed cau se of actio n i s o n e ‘ arisin g f ro m ’ p ro tected activ ity

. If th e co u rt f

in d s s u c h a sh o w in g h as b een m ad e, i t th en m u st

co n sid er w

h eth er th e p lain tif

f h as d em o n strated a p ro b ab ility o f prev ailin g

o n th e claim .” Oa sis W

. Rea lty, LLC v. Go ld

ma n , 2 5 0 P .3 d 1 1 1 5
, 1 1 2 0 (2 0 1 1) (in tern al q u o tatio n m ark s an d citatio n o m itted ); see also Hilto n v. Ha llma rk Ca rd

s , 5 9 9 F .3 d 8 9 4
, 9 0 1

– 0 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ). “ T o satisf y th e

seco n d p ro n g , . . . . th e p lain tif f ‘ m u st dem o n s trate t

h at th e co m

p lain t is b o th leg ally su f

f icien t an d su

p p o rted b y

a su f f icien t p rim a f

acie sh o w in g

o f f acts to su stain a f

av o rab le j u d g m en t if th e ev id en ce su b m itted b y

th e p lai n t i ff is cred ited .’ ” Oa sis , 2 5 0 P .3 d at 1 1 20

. Here, t h e parties relied

so lely o n th e f

actu al alleg atio n s in th e c o m p l ain t. T h u s, th e issu es are p resen t ed as pu re q u estio n s of l aw , an d are th eref ore p articu larly s u ited f

or certif icatio n

.

Mo reo v er, an an sw er t o th e certif ied q u estio n s in th is case w ou ld

reso l v e th e m erits o f Flo & Ed d ie’ s claim s alleg i n g v io latio n s o f an

ex clu siv e r i g h t to p u

b lic p erf o rm an ce u n d er b o th sectio n 9 80 (a)(2 ) an d Calif o rn ia co m

m on law

. T h u s, alth ou g h t he issu e b ef o re o u r co u

rt is in th e co n tex t o f an ap p eal f

ro m t h e d en ial o f an an ti- SL A P P m o tio n , a ru lin g

o n th e certif

ied q u e s t i o n s w o u ld n o t o n ly d i sp o se o f t h e ap peal f

ro m th e

co llateral o rd er, b u t w o u ld also reso lv e th e u n d erly in g claim s

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history o f section 980, Pandora further arg ued that the California l eg islature in 1982 d id not intend to c reate protection for sound recording s t h at h ad previously entered
t h e public domain when it adopted section 980(a)(2). E v e n if i t d id, Pandora arg ued, the leg islature did not intend that protection to include a public performance rig ht.

F lo & Eddie opposed the m o t i o n , arg uing that the plain lang uag e of section 980 g ave it “ex clusive ownership” over The Turtles’ pre-1972 sound recording s, includin g a public performance rig ht. F lo & Eddie further arg ued that the repeal of section 9 83 made that provision irrelevant. Even if it h ad

never been repealed, F lo & Eddie arg u ed, sect i o n 9 83 never applied to its sound rec o r d ing s because (1) The Turtles’ records were not “published” f or the purposes o f Calif

o r n ia law, and (2) section 983 applied only to compositions.

The distri c t court r ejected Pandora’s arg uments a nd denied the motion to strike, r easoning that Pandora’s r eading of section 980(a)(2) would lead to absu r d r e s u l ts. Flo & Eddie, I n c

. v. Pandora Media, Inc
., No. CV 14-7648 PSG (RZ x ), 2015 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 70551, at *22–23. The court ruled that California law had histo rically protected sound recording s e ven after publication via the common law. Id

. at *24–28. Reading that protection into the te x t o f section 980(a)(2), the court concluded that the statu te protected published pre-1972 recordin gs a n d g ranted F lo & Eddie a property rig ht in the public p e rformance of its sound recording s. Id

. at *27–29. On the b asis o f that property rig ht, the district court further held that F lo & Eddie’s claims for misappropriation, conversion, and unfair c ompetiti on were leg ally sufficient for the purposes o f the anti-SL APP statute. Id

. at * 29. Pandora timely appealed. See DC Comics v

. Pac. Pictures Corp
., 706 F .3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013) (holdingF L O & E D D I E , I N C

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that an order deny ing a speci al motion to strike under California’s anti-SL APP law is immediately a ppealable in federal court pursuant to the collateral order doctrine).

IV. The Need f

or Certif ication

C ertification is warranted if there is no controllin g precedent and the California Supreme Court’s decision could determine the outcome of a matter pending in our court. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(a). This appeal not only meets both criteria, but also presents an issue of sig n ificant public importance.

I ndee d
, the “sig nificant and unresolved” nature of the issue prompted the U nited States C ourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit to certify a similar question to the New York Court o f Appeals in F lo & Eddie’s c a s e a g ainst Sirius X M. F l o & Eddie
, 821 F

. 3d at 267. The Court of Appe a l s accepted the certified question, Flo & E ddie, Inc. v

. Sirius XM Radio, I

nc ., 52 N .E.3d 240 (2016), a n d r esolved it in view o f the fact that its decision could h a v e “ e x tensive a nd far-reaching ” consequences g iven the “many c ompeting interests at stake,” Flo & Eddie
, 2016 W L 7349183. 6

F aced with “a complete judicial void” in F lorida case law, the United States Court o f A p peals for the Eleventh Circuit likewise c ertified si m i l a r questions to the F lorida Supreme Court in another F lo & Eddie case ag ainst Sirius XM. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM R a dio, I nc ., 827 F .3d 1016,

6 In th at case, th e co u rt h eld th at co p y rig h t h o ld ers d o n o t h av e a rig h t

o f p u b lic p erf o rm an ce u n d er New Yo rk co m m o n law

. Flo & Ed

die
, 2 0 1 6 W L 7 34 9 1 8 3

. A cco rd in g ly
, th e S eco n d C ircu it d irected th e district co u rt to g ran t su

m m ary j u d g m en t to Siriu s XM an d d i sm iss th e case w i t h
p rej u d ice. Flo & Ed

d i e , 2 0 1 7 W L 6 2 9 2 6 1 , at * 2

.F L O & E D D I E , I N C

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1 0 2 0 (11th Cir. 2016). The F lorida Supreme Court h a s

a c c e pted the certified questions and set oral arg u ment f o r later t h i s y e ar. See Scheduling Order, Flo & Eddie, Inc. v

. Sirius XM Radio, Inc ., No. SC16-1161 (F la. J an. 30, 2017).

W e ag ree with o ur sist e r c i r c uits that certification is the best way to proceed o n these issues, especially in California. As an i n c u b ator o f b oth musical talent and technolog ical innovatio n , California has a sig n ificant interest in the appropriate resolution of the certified q uestions. Resolution of these qu estions will likely a f fect the state and industries within the state in a variety of way s, and is therefore best left to the California Supreme Court.

A.

No c ontrolling precedent resolves the certified questions. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson
, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1969) a nd A & M Records, I

nc. v. Heilma n , 1 42 Cal. Rptr. 390 ( Ct. App. 1977) predate the adoption of section 980(a)(2), and therefore cannot aid us i n r e s o l ving the first certified question. Erickson and Heilman also address only

common law liability for piracy
, the unauthoriz ed duplication and distribution of sound recording s for profit. Publ ic performance was not a t issue in either case, thereby rendering them unhelpf

u l i n resolving the second certified q uestion a s well. A s s u ch, there is no precedent, much less controlling precedent, from either the California appellate cour t s o r the California Supreme Court to g u ide our court’s inquiry

.

F lo & Eddie’s central a

rg ument is that California’s plain meaning r

ule for interpreting statutes resolves the f i r st certified question. See, e.g.
, People v. Canty
, 90 P.3d 1168, 1172-73 (Cal. 2004). A p p l y ing the rule, F lo & E d dieF L O & E D D I E , I N C

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contend s t hat the “ex clusive ownership” term in section 980(a)(2) a llows copy rig ht owners to e x c l u d e all unauthoriz ed uses, inc luding p ublic performance. B u t the
statute does not define “e x c l u s i v e o w n e rship” o r “ownership.” And while und e fined terms a re g iven their ordinary meaning s, as appropriate to the co n t e x t, see Mar t i n e z v

. Vaziri
, 2 00 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 884, 891 (Ct. App. 2016) (refusing to c onstrue an undefined phrase in isolation “because a s a m atter of basic statutory interpretation, the words must b e c o n s trued in contex t”), it could well b e said that the “ordinary

meaning ” of “ex clusive ownership” in the
contex t of copy

rig h t is at the very

heart of the dispute in this

case.

That section 980(a) ( 2 ) includes an ex ception f or cover artists does not make the meaning of “ex clusive ownership” plain. The e x ception o nly establishes that the “ o w n e r ship” rig hts g r a n t e d by the statute do n ot include r ig hts to control

cover artists; it does not establish what “ownership” rig hts a re included in the first instance. The c anon s o f statutory interpretation are therefore insufficient to aid in the resolution of this case, and do not eliminate the need for clear g uidance from California’s hig hest court. 7

7 T h e o n ly Calif

o rn ia case th at h a s t o uc h ed o n th e issu e is Ca p i to l Reco rd s, LLC v. S iriu s XM Ra d io

, I n c

. , No

. B C 5 2 0 9 8 1
, 2 0 1 4 W L 7 1 5 0 0 1 4 (Cal. Su

p er. Ct. Dec. 5 , 2 0 14 ), a L o s A n g eles Co u n ty Su p erio r Co u rt case. Seem in g ly co n f irm i n g th e lack of s u f

f icien t g u id an ce f

ro m Calif o rn ia ap p ellate co u rts, t h e C a p i to l Reco rd

s co u rt issu ed a ten tativ e

ru lin g ref

u s in g to reco g n ize a p u b lic p erf o rm an ce r ig h t i n a j u ry in stru ctio n on ly to rev erse th e ru lin g af ter th e Cen tral District o f C alif o rn ia reach ed th e o p po site co n clu sio n in S iriu s

. T h e i ssu e w as n ev er reso lv ed
, h o w ev er, as th e case later settled

.F L O & E D D I E , I N C

. V

. P A

N D O R A M E D I A , I

N C

. 14

Pandora maintains that F lo & Eddie’s sound r e cording s lost state c opy

r ig ht protection upon publication in the 1960s, and that the 1982 amendment adopting section 980(a)(2) did
not resurrect copy

rig ht p rotection. B ut this arg ument depends

o n an interpretation of the 1947 versions of sections 980 ( a ) and 983(a), which h ave likewise never been considered by the California Supreme Court. According ly
, F lo & Eddie cites only off-point lower court cases and o u t

- o f -state authority 8 for its counter-arg

ument that the div e s t iture-by -publication rule o f th e 1 947 version of section 983(a) did not apply to sound recording s. 9

8 Flo & Ed d i e cites o n e case w ith in o u r circu it, Ca

p i ta l Reco rd

s, LLC

v. Blu eb ea t, In c. , 7 6 5 F. S u pp

. 2 d 1 1 98 (C.D. Cal. 2 0 10 ). Oth erw ise, F lo & E d d ie cites cases f

ro m N ew Yo rk
, Metro

. Op era Ass’n v. W a gn er

Nich o ls Reco rd

er Co rp

. , 1 0 1 N .Y.S.2 d 4 83 ( S u p

. Ct. 1 9 5 0 ); Ca p i to l Reco rd s, In c. v. Na

xo s o f Am., In c. , 4 N.Y.3 d 5 40 (2 0 0 5), f ro m Flo rid a, CBS

, In c. v. Ga rro d
, 6 2 2 F. Su p p

. 5 3 2 (M.D. Fla. 1 9 8 5 ), f ro m Mich ig an , A & M Reco rd

s, In c. v. M.V.C. D i s trib

. Co rp

. , 5 7 4 F.2 d 3 1 2 (6 t h Cir. 1 9 7 8 ), f ro m W isco n sin
, Mercu ry Reco rd P r o d s

. v. Eco n

. Co nsu lta n ts, In c

. , 2 1 8 N.W .2 d 7 0 5 (W is. 1 9 7 4), an d f ro m Pen n s y lv an i a, W

a rin g v. W DAS Bro ad ca stin g S ta tio n, In c., 1 9 4 A . 6 3 1 (P a. 1 9 3 7 ).

9 A t o ral arg u m en t, t

h e p arties f

o cu sed o n th e m ean in g an d im p act of th e o u t- o f

- state case RCA Mfg

. Co

. v. W h itema n , 1 1 4 F.2 d 8 6 (2 d C i r. 1 9 4 0 ), an d th e d u o o f

cases th at w ere p u rp o rted to “ o v erru l e” it: Ca p i to l Reco rd s, In c. v. M

ercu ry Reco rd

s, Co rp

. , 2 2 1 F.2 d 6 5 7 (2 d Cir. 1 9 5 5 ) an d Metro

. Op er a , 1 0 1 N

. Y .S.2 d 4 83

. In a recen t d ecisio n , th e New Yo rk Co u rt o f A

p p eals d ecisiv ely reso lv ed t h e disp u te. T h e co u rt h eld th at M e rcu ry Reco rd

s d id n o t o v erru le th e u n d erly in g p rem ise o f W hite m a n , an d h eld th at n o rig h t o f p u b l i c p e r fo rm an ce ex isted u n d er New Yo rk

co m m o n law co p y rig h t. See Flo & Ed

d ie , 2 0 1 6 W L 7 3 4 9 1 8 3

.F L O & E D D I E , I N C

. V

. P A

N D O R A M E D I A , I

N C

. 15

I n Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp.
, 740 F .2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984), 1 0 a s Pandora points out, we addressed a similar situation. There, we concl u d ed that broadcast tapes of the L one Rang e r radio show leased to radio stations and sold to the public in the 1950s and 1960s had lost

common law or state copy rig h t protection upon g eneral pub lication under section 983, despite its later repeal. Althoug h binding precedent for our court, Lone Ranger was

a case about p i r a c y

. I t therefore does not help us resolve whether the California leg islature intended to g rant a rig ht o f public performance to owners of pre-1972 sound recording s when it ex plicitly ex tended cop y r ig h t protection to sound recording s with the adoption of section 980(a ) ( 2 ) in 1982. Nor does it r e s o l v e whether California’s common law o f copy rig ht g uarantee s a rig h t of p ublic performance
, in addition to protecting ag a inst piracy

.

B.

Resolving these questions will dispose of this appeal a nd determine the merits of F lo & Eddie’s underly i n g claims. The district court concluded that section 980(a)(2) g ranted

owners of pre-1972 sound recording s a property rig h t in the public performance of their recording s. On the basis of that property rig ht, the district court further concluded that F lo & Eddie’s c laims of misappropriation, c onversion, and unfair competition were leg ally su f ficient. I f either section 980(a)(2) o r Californi a c o mmon law does provide an

ex c lusive r i g ht o f public performance, the district court’s ruling must be affirmed, and F lo & Eddie’s claims g ranted.

10 Ou r o p in io n ack

n o w l ed g ed th at t

h is case w as d ecid ed af

ter sectio n 9 8 0 (a)(2 ) h ad been en acted an d s ectio n 9 8 3 h ad b een rep ealed

. Lo n e Ra n g er , 7 4 0 F.2 d at 7 2 5

.F L O & E D D I E , I N C

. V

. P A

N D O R A M E D I A , I

N C

. 16

I f neither section 980(a)(2) n o r California common law
p r o v i d es such a rig h t, the district court’s ruling must b e reversed, and the underly ing claims must be dismissed.

W e therefore conclude that this case presents p rime questions for the Cali f

o r nia Supreme Court to address. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.548(a). The answers g iven by the Cal i f ornia Supreme Court will dispose of this a ppeal currently pending before the Ninth Circuit. W e a g r e e to accept the court’s

answers.

V. Accom panying Materials

The clerk of this court is hereby directed to file in the California Supreme Court, under official seal of the United St a t e s Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, copies of all relevant briefs and ex cerpts of r ecord, and an orig inal and ten copies o f the request with a certification of servic e on the parties, pursuant to California Rules of Court 8.548(c), (d).

The panel will o nly resume control and jurisdiction of this

case upon receiving a d ecision from the California Supreme Court or u

pon that court’s decision to decline to answer the certified questions. The p a r t i es shall file a joint report informing this court of whether the California Supreme Court has accepted the certified questions, after that determination is made. I f the California Supreme Court accepts the c ertified questions, the parties shall file a joint st a tus report to our court every six months after the date of acceptance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.