alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE v. JACKSON

No. COA06 1199

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Filed May 1, 2007

Certification Date May 21, 2007

Appeal from Northampton (05CRS1434, 05CRS1435).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.02
 
                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
 
  We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (SEC File No. 333-39923) of U.S.A. Floral Products, Inc.
of our report dated March 8, 1996, relating to the financial statements of CFX,
Inc., appearing on page 144 of this Annual Report on Form 10-K.
 
/s/ Madsen, Sapp, Mena, Rodriguez & Co., P.A.
 
MADSEN, SAPP, MENA, RODRIGUEZ & CO., P.A.
 
Plantation, Florida
March 24, 1998
Suzanne HILL, Ford Goudey, Mary Susan Schmidt, C.H. Ballou, Dora Dean Ballou, A.C. Blankenship, Steve A. Brock, Jean Burrows, Carolyn B. Byrd, D.S. Byrd, Joseph Canosa, J.L. Castleberry, Margie R. Castleberry, Albert Chappell, Jean Chappell, Lewis Clarke, Brenda Davis, J. Chris Davis, Josephine Davis, Jim French, Anne B. Gilliam, James Gilliam, Ann J. Gold, W.A. Gold, Emily Graham, Luke Gruber, Price Taylor Harrison, L.B. Haskins, James M. Hayward, Virginia C. Hayward, L. Jarvis Herring, Sally Herring, Clara Inscoe, Ralph Johnson, Clinton Lewis, Barbara D. Martin, Jessica L. Martin, Joseph McClure, Janil Miller, John Miller, Gene W. Morrison, Herbert Parkin, Barbara Paerl, Michelle S. Pittman, Gilbert M. Potter, Pat I. Potter, Joan H. Pulley. W. Paul Pulley, Jr., Arthur Rittmaster, Keith Rittmaster, Carolyn Rogers, Robert F. Roser, Denise Roser, Lena Rudder, Hazel Simpson, Kerry Sinclair, C.W. Stamper, Dawn Stewart, Mack Styron, Vicy Thayer, Deborah Boyce Todd, Edwin Lee Todd, Gwendolyn Towles, Thelma P. Ward, James R. Wheatley, Mack Willis, Edith York, Lawerence B. Wilson, Jr., Elizabeth B. Wilson. v. Michael TAYLOR

No. 703P05.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 2, 2006.

Claud Wheatly, III, Beaufort, for Michael Taylor.

*853Neil Whitford, Morehead City, for Hill et al.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 20th day of December 2005 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 2nd day of March 2006."
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5
<CIK>                    0000929649
<NAME>                   DIAMOND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS LTD
<MULTIPLIER>             1,000
<CURRENCY>               POUNDS STERLING

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                  1.5163
<CASH>                                        67,132
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 20,415
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (4,897)
<INVENTORY>                                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              89,216
<PP&E>                                       690,895
<DEPRECIATION>                             (177,318)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               693,636
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         89,462
<BONDS>                                      965,133
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                       1,478
<OTHER-SE>                                 (362,437)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 693,636
<SALES>                                            0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              72,917
<CGS>                                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 24,598
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              29,221
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            53,373
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (117,404)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (117,404)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                               (117,404)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      0


</TABLE>
STATE v. CHERRY.

No. COA06-1384.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed October 16, 2007.

Certification Date November 5, 2007.

Appeal from Bertie (01CRS50603).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
#### Kim Jenkins, Respondent, v State Farm Insurance Company, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 42]

In an action to recover uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to a contract of insurance, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Gigante, J.), dated June 8, 2004, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

On February 26, 1993, a car driven by the plaintiff was involved in an accident with a car owned by Adel Abdelgaied (hereinafter the Abdelgaied car). By letter dated November 18, 1993, the plaintiffs attorney asked the defendant, State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm), the plaintiffs insurance carrier, to open an uninsured motorist claim. Thereaf*530ter, by letter dated December 7, 1993, the plaintiffs attorney again wrote to State Farm, stating that he was enclosing a copy of the denial of coverage as to the Abdelgaied car. On December 9, 1994, he again wrote to State Farm, stating that he was enclosing copies of a notice of termination and a cancellation certificate as to the Abdelgaied car. Thereafter, in February 2003, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages under the uninsured motorist endorsement of the State Farm insurance policy. In its answer, State Farm asserted, inter alia, that the action was time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations for actions to recover damages for breach of contract *(see*CPLR 213). The Supreme Court denied its motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. We reverse.

Claims made under the uninsured motorist endorsement of automobile insurance policies are governed by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions *(see Matter of De Luca [Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.],*17 NY2d 76, 78 [1966]). The claim accrues either when the accident occurred or when the allegedly offending vehicle thereafter becomes uninsured *(see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Giordano,*108 AD2d 910 [1985], *affd on op below*66 NY2d 810 [1985]; *Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Torrales,*186 AD2d 647 [1992]; *Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Morrison,*267 AD2d 381 [1999]). The more than 10-year time lapse between the date of the accident and the plaintiffs assertion of a claim in this action for uninsured motorist benefits is prima facie evidence that the action is untimely *(see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Torrales, supra; Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Avena,*133 AD2d 159, 161 [1987]). In such circumstances, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that a later accrual date than the date of the accident is applicable *(see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Morrison, supra).*Since the plaintiffs proof showed that her attorney was aware of the Abdelgaied’s car’s uninsured status at the latest by December 9, 1994, this action is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations and State Farm’s motion should have been granted. Prudenti, P.J., Florio, Cozier and Lifson, JJ., concur.
#### Mary Immaculate Hospital et al., Plaintiffs, and Lenox Hill Hospital, as Assignee of Stefan Selig, Respondent, v *1010Government Employees Insurance Company, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 410]

In an action to recover no-fault medical payments, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Joseph, J.), dated April 19, 2004, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for summary judgment on the third cause of action to recover no-fault medical payments for Lenox Hill Hospital, as assignee of Stefan Selig.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment on the third cause of action is denied.

As relevant to this appeal, the plaintiffs, which brought this action to recover certain no-fault payments as assignees of insureds of the defendant, Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO), failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the third cause of action asserted in the complaint *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment with respect to this cause of action, regardless of the sufficiency of GEICO’s opposing papers *(see McBride v DeMartine,*15 AD3d 362 [2005]). H. Miller, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Skelos, JJ., concur.
INCORPORATED UNDER THE
                          LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Number                                                                  Shares




                             AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY

                              Class A Common Stock

This Certifies that _________________________________ is the owner of
_______________________ Shares of the Common Capital Stock of American Skiing
Company transferable only on the Books of the Corporation by the holder hereof
in person or by duly authorized Attorney on Surrender of this Certificate
properly endorsed.

In Witness Whereof of the duly authorized officers of this corporation have
hereunto subscribed their names and caused the Corporate Seal to be hereto
affixed.

At ______________ this _______________ day of ___________________ A.D. _________

                           SHARES Par Value $.01 EACH



<PAGE>


                                   CERTIFICATE

                                       FOR



                                     SHARES

                                     OF THE

                                     CLASS A
                                  COMMON STOCK

                             AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY

                                    ISSUED TO

                     --------------------------------------

                                      DATED

                      -------------------------------------


SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (the "Act"), AND MAY NOT BE SOLD, ASSIGNED OR TRANSFERRED
IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE ACT OR UNLESS
THE ISSUER HAS RECEIVED AN OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY TO IT THAT SHARES MAY
BE SOLD PURSUANT TO RULE 144 OR ANOTHER AVAILABLE EXEMPTION UNDER THE ACT AND
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS THEREUNDER.
Ex-10.1 Indemnification Agreement



 





Exhibit 10.1




INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT




     Katun Corporation (“Katun”) and Nashua Corporation (“Nashua”) (collectively, “the Parties”)
hereby enter into this Indemnification Agreement (“Agreement”) to address the Parties’ rights and
responsibilities relative to any costs, expenses, fees and damages that may arise from all pending
claims made by Ricoh Corporation in the lawsuit entitled Ricoh Co Ltd. et al. v. Katun Corp., et
al, Case No. 03CV2612(WHW), currently pending in the District of New Jersey (“the Action”). In so
doing, this Agreement is intended to clarify the Parties’ obligations under the November 2000
Supply and Purchase Agreement (“Supply and Purchase Agreement”) and the April 10, 2001 Cartridge
Agreement (the “Cartridge Agreement”). This Agreement covers this Action specifically. All other
matters outside this Action shall be governed by the original language of said Agreements, and
handled separately from this Agreement.




	 	1.	 	Katun will, to the maximum extent permitted by law, indemnify and hold harmless
Nashua for any monies owed as a result of any judgment rendered against Nashua in
the Action, including for damages, costs, attorneys’ fees and interest. Katun and
Nashua will each be responsible for their own attorney’s fees and costs. Katun
will also indemnify and hold harmless Nashua for any monies to be paid to Ricoh or
any other party pursuant to any settlement of the Action, provided that Katun has
consented to such settlement in writing.






	 	2.	 	Litigation counsel for Katun and Nashua shall use best efforts to coordinate
defense of the Action (including pursuit of any counterclaims) such that counsel
for Katun shall have primary responsibility for defending against the Action on
behalf of both Katun and Nashua. Counsel for Nashua will provide support to
counsel for Katun, primarily in connection with litigation events requiring the
production of information from Nashua, such as document requests, interrogatories,
or deposition notices directed to Nashua or its employees.






	 	3.	 	Katun shall not pursue any rights it may have under the Supply and Purchase
Agreement or the Cartridge Agreement to indemnification from Nashua related to all
pending claims made by Ricoh Corporation in the Action.






	 	4.	 	Each party shall retain the ability to take any and all actions necessary to
protect its interests in the Action, subject to the provisions of Paragraph 1 of
this Agreement.





	 	 	 
	KATUN CORPORATION

	 	NASHUA CORPORATION
	 
	/s/ Signature Illegible

	 	/s/ Robert S. Amrein
	 

	 	 
	By:

	 	By: Robert S. Amrein
	 

	 	       Vice President and General Counsel
	 
	 

	 	Date: February 11, 2004
STATE v. SULLIVAN.

No. COA06-1688.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed November 6, 2007.

Certification Date November 26, 2007.

Appeal from Mecklenburg (04CRS253063, 04CRS253064, 04CRS253065).

Cases Reported Without Published Opinion. No error as to trial; Dismissed as to suppression issue.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-7444

DUPREE EVANS, a/k/a Dupree R. Evans, #149521,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN LIEBER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Respondent – Appellee,

and

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Florence. Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. (4:17-cv-02085-TLW)

Submitted: May 29, 2019 Decided: June 11, 2019

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dupree Evans, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Dupree Evans seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Evans has not made 

the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
# The Lands Tribunal (Salaries) Order (Northern Ireland) 2013 (revoked)

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N.I.

Statutory Rules of Northern Ireland

# 2013 No. 239

Lands Tribunal

# The Lands Tribunal (Salaries) Order (Northern Ireland) 2013 (revoked)F1

Made

3rd October 2013

Coming into operation

4th October 2013

F1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                        

F1Order revoked (16.10.2014) by The Lands Tribunal (Salaries) Order (Northern Ireland) 2014 (S.R. 2014/259), arts. 1, **3**
In the Matter of W.R.

No. 560PA06.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

November 14, 2007.

Michelle F. Lynch, for Juvenile.

Michelle FormyDuval Lync, for W.R.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 9th day of November 2007 by State for Extension of Time to File Brief:

"Motion Allowed. State shall have up to and including the 27th day of November 2007 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court. By order of the Court in conference this the 14th day of November 2007."
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Compton Petroleum Corporation (the "Company") on the Form 40-F for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








DATED this 25 day of February, 2010.








/s/ C.W. Leigh Cassidy


C.W. Leigh Cassidy


Vice President, Finance & Chief Financial Officer,


Compton Petroleum Corporation
Note Conversion Agreement


 




Exhibit 10.4

Aspen Group, Inc.

224 West 30th Street, Suite 604

New York, New York 10001







April 16, 2016







Ladies and Gentlemen:




I am writing to you and confirming that subject to the approval of two warrant holders exercising 4,855,487 warrants at $0.155 per share, I will convert a $300,000 convertible note (and approximately $2,300 of accrued interest) presently convertible at $1.00 per share into shares of common stock at $0.19 per share, which is above market.  This conversion must occur by April 29, 2016 and shall occur by my tendering the original note with the conversion notice duly executed. In connection with my conversion, I am acquiring the shares of common stock for investment and without a view to resale in connection with a distribution.




 




		
	 
	Sincerely yours,


	 
	 

	 
	 

	 
	/s/ Michael Mathews


	 
	Michael Mathews










I hereby accept the subscription on the terms set forth above. 










By: /s/ Janet Gill

      Janet Gill, Chief Financial Officer
In the Matter of E.P., M.P., minor children.

No. 298A07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 7, 2007.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.App. ___, 645 S.E.2d 772 (2007), affirming an order filed on 6 January 2006 by Judge Wayne L. Michael in District Court, Alexander County. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 November 2007.

Thomas R. Young, Taylorsville, for petitioner-appellant Alexander County Department of Social Services, and Melanie Cranford, Newton, for Guardian ad Litem.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton, LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson, Raleigh, for respondent-appellee mother, and Hartsell & Williams, P.A., by Christy E. Wilhelm, Concord, for respondent-appellee father.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
In the Matter of C.B., et al.

No. 586A06.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 13, 2006.

R. Kent Harrell, Burgaw, for Guardian Ad Litem.

Regina Floyd-Davis, for Pender County DSS.

Sofie Hosford, for Brinson.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 13th day of December 2006 by Respondent to Amend Notice of Appeal:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference this the 13th day of December 2006."
EXHIBIT 15.1 

 

ClubCorp, Inc. 

Dallas, Texas 

 

Ladies and Gentlemen: 

 

Re: Registration Statements Nos. 33-89818, 33-96568, 333-08041, 333-57107 and 333-52612 

 

With respect to the subject registration statements, we acknowledge our awareness of the use therein of our report dated October 23, 2003,related to our review of interim financial information. 

 

Pursuant to Rule436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Act), such report is not considered part of a registration statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 ofthe Act. 

 

KPMG LLP 

 

Dallas, Texas 

October 24, 2003
INTEC USA, LLC v. Raph ENGLE, and Systems Technology (NZ) Limited, and Raph Engle Consulting Limited.

No. 355P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 11, 2007.

William Wolf, Durham, for Intec USA, LLC.

Brian Johnston, K. Alan Parry, Raleigh, for Engle.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 23rd day of July 2007 by Plaintiff in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 11th day of October 2007."
# Commission Implementing Decision of 4 March 2014 establishing the list of Union inspectors pursuant to Article 79(1) of Council            Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 (notified under document C(2014) 1178) (2014/120/EU) (repealed)         

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U.K.

# Commission Implementing Decision

# of 4 March 2014

# establishing the list of Union inspectors pursuant to Article 79(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009

# (notified under document C(2014) 1178)

# (2014/120/EU) (repealed)

F1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                        

Textual Amendments

F1Repealed by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/645 of 20 April 2015 establishing the list of Union inspectors who may carry out                                 inspections pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 (notified under document C(2015) 2496).
ROHDE v. SCHIVAL

No. S07A1459.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

October 9, 2007.

Judgment affirmed without opinion.
In re C.D.A.W.

No. 110A06.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 24, 2006.

Gary C. Rhodes, Salisbury, for Angela Wright Eagle.

Joyce Torres, Attorney Advocate, for Guardian Ad Litem.,

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 24th day of May 2006 by Petitioner for Extension of Time to File Brief:

"Motion Allowed. Petitioner (Guilford County DSS) shall have up to and including the 10th day of July 2006 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court. By order of the Court in conference this the 24th day of May 2006."