### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 05 -C R

______________________________ EARNEST DWAI

N MORAL ES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 8th J udicial District Court

Delta County , Texas Trial Court No. 6954

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Op ini on by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr issMorales' second a nd third points of error

challeng e, re spectively , the fa ct u al an d leg al 1 su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

a fi nd ingtha

t he c a us e d b od ily

inj ur y to R ob e rt so n. Hi s f

ourt h point asserts a c laim for " fata l varianc e," howeve r, it merely res t at es h i s evidentiar

y sufficie ncy challeng e and f

ails to cite any

supporting la

w. We analy

ze Morales' fourth point of er ror a s a leg al sufficie ncy challeng e; and, to the e x tent he see ks to make a f atal var iance claim, we ove rrule it as inadequately

briefe d. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(i). 2 O P IN I O N The sister of Earne st D wain Morales had been arr ested ear lier in the day by Serg eant P aul David Robertson of the Delta County Sheriff' s Depa rtment. So, whe n Morales f ound Robertson and fellow off icer J osh Richardson at a

convenie nce store in Coope r, Texas, he approa ched them in the parkinglot to dis cuss the ar rest. A strug g le ensue d. As a result, Robertson had scr aped kne es and pe pp e r s pr ay

in h is e y e s and

up pe r r e sp ir a tor

y sy ste m. Mor a le s wa s convic te d of as sa ult on a pu bli c
serva nt and sentenc ed to three y ear s' confine ment and fine d $10,000.00. On a pp e a l, M or a le s c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly and fa c tual ly insuf

fi c ie nt t o
su pp or t th e ve rd ic t and

that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y a dmi tti nge vid e nc e of

his pr ior arr e sts
. We a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt bec ause ( 1) leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence supports the jury ' s finding that Morales re cklessly cause d Robertson bodily injury , and (2) the trial
c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

a dmi tti nge vid e nc e of

Mo ra le s' pr ior

vio le nt o ff

e ns e s. ( 1) Legally and Factually Sufficient Evidenc e Supports th e Jury's Findi ng that Morales Re c k le ssl yCau se d R ob e rts on Bo dil yIn jur y M o r a l e s c h a l l e n g e s t h e l e g a l an d f a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t h e i n t e n t i o n a l l y, knowing ly , or re cklessly

cause d bodily

injury to Robertson. 13

I n revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we v i ew al l o f t he evide nce in the lig ht most favora

ble to the verdic t a

nd deter mine whether

any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1 97 9) ; J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n a fa ctual suff iciency revie w,
we r eview a ll the evidenc e, but do so in a neutra l light and de termine whe ther the e vidence supporting the verdic t is so weak or is so outweig hed by the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the jury ' s verdic t is c lear ly wrong or manife stly unjust. Lan c on v . S

tat e , 253 S.W .3d 69 9, 70 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ro be rts v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We must aff ord "due defe renc e" to the fac t-finder ' s deter

minations. Ma rsh all

v . S tate , 210 S.W .3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);

see Y ou ng v . S tat e , 242 S.W .3d 192, 198 (Tex. A pp.—Tyler 2007, no pet.). And althoug h, when we
re vie w the fa c tua l suf

fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , w e have the a bil ity to s e c on d- g ue ss t

he fa c t- fi nd e r t o
a lim ite d d e g re e , w e sh ou ld non e the le ss be de fe re nti a l, w itha hig h le ve l of

sk e pti c ism

a bo ut t he fa c tfinder' s verdict r equire d befor e a r ever sal ca n occur . Ro be rts , 22 0 S.W. 3d at 5 24 ; Y oung , 242 S.W .3d at 198–99. The e lements of assa

ult on a public serva

nt a re that a per son (1) intentionally , knowing ly , or
re c kle ssl y , (2 ) c a

us e s bo dil y inj ur

y , (3 ) to a pe rs on , (4 ) w ho m th e a c tor kn ow s to be a

pu bli c se rv ant, and (5) that public serva

nt is discharg ing a

n officia l duty . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22
. 0 1 (a)(1),We f ind the tr ial cou rt' s c ha

rg e to t he jur y to h a ve be e n in

su bs tanti a l if

no t c omp le te 2 compliance with the applicable law, and thus, the e quivalent of a hy pothetically

corr ect c harg e. 4 (b)( 1) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). We use a hy pothetically corr ect jury

char g e to eva luate both the leg al and factual sufficiency

of the e vidence
. Gr ott i v . S tat e , 273 S.W .3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 2 Morales c halleng es the e videntiary sufficie ncy

only with respec t to the elements that he
c a us e d b od ily

inj ur y to R obertso n a

nd that he wa s at le a st r e c kle ss w he n h e did so . B e c a

us e
e vid e nti ary su ff

ic ie nc y is que sti on e d, we se t out, h e re , mo re of the sa lie nt f

a c ts b e fo re our a

na ly sis of the iss ue s. Robert s o n and Richar dson had their patrol car parke d at a c onvenienc e store. Robe rtson t e s t i f i e d t h a t , w h i l e h e w a s s t an d i n g n e x tt o t h e p a t r o l c ar , M o r a l e s , v e r y s w e a t y an d

v i s i b l y an g r

y, qu ic kly a pp ro a c he d h im and be g an y e lli ng and sh a kin g his fi ng e r i n Ro be rt so n' s f a c e re g ard inghis
arr est of Mora les' sister ea rl i er i n t h e d ay . Morales " had a w ild look in hi s ey e" and cla imed
owner ship of an illeg al knife f ound durin g h i s sister' s arr est. I ntending to pat Morales dow n for
wea pons, Robertson repe atedly order ed Morales to place his hands on the ca r, but Morale s ref

used to c omp ly . Ro be rt so n tes ti fi ed to the a lte rc a tio n th a t f oll ow e d a

nd , a s an in te g ra l pa

rt of his testimony , ph y s i ca l ly

demonstrated the alterc ation for the jur y with another of

fice r. The de monst rat io n w a s n ot ( and c ou ld n ot b e ) t

ra ns c ri be d f ull y ; but th e jur

y vie we d it and ne c e ssa ri ly derive d information from the te stimony and demonstration bey ond what it would have de rived fr om the testimony

alone. The re w as no obj ection to the demonstration, and no e ffor t was made to assure that the re cord r efle cted the de tails placed be fore the jury by the demonstration.5

Rob e rt so n te sti fi e d th a t, w he n h e g ra bb e d f or Mo ra le s' arm , inte nd ingto r e str a in M or a le s in order to searc h him, Morales jerke d awa y , lowere d his head a

nd "c ame down into my

waist here (i nd ic a tin g ), " " du c ke d his he a d d ow n, " and " we nt t ow ard

[Rob e rt so n' s] r ig ht s ide ," " in t he mid dle of " Rob e rt so n, wi th h is a

rm s aro un d Ro be rt so n— a pp aren tly me anin g that Mo ra le s p hy sic a lly stepped into Robertson and c aused his ar ms to env elop R obertson. In response , as Mora les was doing that, Robertson then cause d the two strug g ling men to f all to the g round, ag ain movements that
wer e phy sically

demonstrated to the jur

y . Robe rt s o n repe atedly

order ed Mora les to put his hands behind his back. D uring this ti me, Morale s resisted the of fice rs, at one point locking his hands under his bo dy so the of fi c e rs c ou ld n ot c uf

f h im an d at ano the r p oin t r e a c hin g fo r R ob e rt so n' s g un (s til l ho lst e re d) . Wh e n Ri c ha

rd so n s pr ay e d M or a le s w ithpe pp e r s pr ay , at Ro be rt so n' s r e qu e st, it a lso aff ecte d Robertson, who wa s still on the g round holding Morales. L ater , appar ently as something of a summar

y of the phy sical demonstration to the jury , Robertson testified that Morales " attacke d" him and "c harg ed into" him. The off icer s cuff ed Morales and put him in the patrol ca r. Robertson testified that his " knees
wer e scr aped up f

rom having t o b e o n t he g round," his right e y e wa s temporar ily blinded by

the p e p p e r s p r ay, an d

h i s b r e a t h i n g w a s a f

f e c t e d b y t h e p e p p e r

s p r ay. On cr oss-examination, Robertson admitted that, in response to Morales' actions, he, r ather than Morale s, pulled or wre stled the two of them to the ground. He also ag ree d that Morales did not verba lly threaten him, that the natura l r esponse of a person put in a painful position wa s to tr y to ge t6

out of it as quickly as possible a nd that Morales was trying to free himself from Robertson' s hold and to ge t away
. R i ch ar dson testified that he wa s in the passeng er se at of the patrol car with the passeng er do or and wi nd ow shut w he n M or a le s a pp ro a c he d Ro be rt so n. Mo ra le s lo ok e d " a g g ra vate d, " ha d h is fists "ba ll ed u p , " "an d was y elling a t Robertson, asking if the off icer s had ar

rested Mor ales' sister
ear lier that nig ht. Richardson hea rd Robertson ask Mor ales to put his hands on the ca r " two or three times, and th en they

wer e on the g round." Richardson jumped out of the patrol car and ra n to the dr ive r' s si de wh e re Mo ra le s wa s on his k ne e s, wi th R ob e rt so n le ane d o ve r h im, g ra bb inga t Mo ra le s' upper body . Both off

icer s repe atedly

order ed Morales to put his ha nds behind his back, but Mora les resisted their e ffor

ts to cuff him by locking his ha nds toge ther under him. On or der f rom Robertson, Richardson spra

y ed Mora les with pepper

spray , which g ot on Morales, Rober tson, and Richardson, causingRichardson' s skin to burn. After spr aying Mor ales, they cuff ed him and put him in the squad
car , despite his continuing e ffor ts to resist. Ni ck i S z af

ra n , a f i rs t -gr ad e t ea ch er , wa s s i t t i n g i n t h e fr o n t p as s en ger s ea to f h er

d au gh t er 's
car , which wa s p ar k ed o n t h e ri g ht side of the patr ol car at the conve nience store, whe n she saw Morales w alk up to the patrol car . She saw Morales have a "heated .
. . discussion" with one of the deputies. She said Mora les l o o k ed ang ry , seeme d upset, and may have be en " pointing at [the de pu ty ]." Duri ngthe sc uf fl e be tw e e n Ro be rt so n a

nd Mo ra le s, sh e he ard the of fi c e rs re pe a te dly

te ll Morales to " [c] alm down" and "put [hi s] hands behind [hi s] back," but Morales "ke pt fig hting it" by7

"tr y ing to br eak a

way " a nd "g et loose" from Robertson. On direc t examination, S zafran c oncede d that she did not see Morales "r unning or hitting or a

ny thing," and on cr oss-examination, she admitted that she " couldn' t tell what was g oing on" once Robe rtson took Morales to the ground, be cause the police ca r blocke d her vie w. After the State re sted, Susan Childress, Mor ales' g irlfriend and mother of his child, testified
a s a de fe ns e wi tne ss. Chi ldr e ss saw Mo ra le s c a lml y a pp ro a c h Rob e rt so n and a sk to sp e a k wi th h im
a bo ut M or a le s' sis te r. Rob e rt so n to ld M or a le s to c ome c los e r so Rob e rt so n c ou ld s e arc h M or a le s. She said Morale s complied with Robert s o n 's commands, but when Mor ales a sked why the sea rch
wa s n e c e ssa

ry , Ch ild re ss saw Rob e rt so n s lam Mo ra le s' he a d a g a ins t th e patr ol c ar a nd se arc h h im. Then, she sa

w Robertson g rab Mor ales a round the throat and take him to the g round. Mora les tried to ge t Robertson' s arm off of his throat. She testified t hat s he had a clear, unobstructed vi ew of the
e ve nts and

that Mo ra le s n e ve r t

hr e a te ne d, swun g a t, or oth e rw ise a tte mpt e d to a ssa ult the of fi c e rs . On cr oss-examination, Chi ldress asse rted that Mora les wa s innocent and de nied that he char g ed into Robertson. She did not hear the office rs order M orale s to calm down or put his hands behind his back. She a dmitted that Morales provided f inancial support for her and their baby and
conce ded that, if Mora les wer e convic ted, it would cause her g reat financia l harm. Next, Morales' fathe r, Peter Mark Morales ( Peter), te stified that he wa s at the conve nience sto re pu tti ngg a s in

his tr uc k w he n h e sa

w M or a les app roac h Robe rt so n. Pe te r s aw M or a le s a sk Rober ts o n s o mething, a

nd Robertson started pushingMorales, shove d his head a g ainst the patrol ca r,8

quickly put him in a choke hold and p u l l ed him to the g round. B efor e the of fice rs re strained Morales, Pete r did not se e Morales take any violent a ction toward the office rs. He thoug ht Morales strug g led with the offic ers as a rea ction to the choke hold. Peter said Morale s offe red no r esistance of any kind until R obertson took Morale s to the g round. M o r a l e s t o o k

t h e s t an d

i nh i s o wn d ef

en s e a n d t es t i fi edt h at h e f

o l l o we d t h e o ff i ce r's ins tr uc tio ns and

de nie d d oin g any

thi ng to in

ju re Robe rt so n. Whe n a sk ingRob e rt so n a bo ut h is sister' s arr est, Morale s descr ibed his own demea nor as doc ile and re spectful. Mora les asser ts that Rob e rt so n p ut h im i n a

c ho ke ho ld a

nd pu lle d h im t o th e g ro un d. Af te r he and Rob e rt so n w e nt t o the g round, Mora les testified that, in order to avoid injur y , h e went int o defe nsive mode, a f etal po sit ion , b e nt o ve r on his kn e e s wi th his ha nd s c la sp e d to g e the r u

nd e r h im. Mo ra le s a dmi tte d th a t, in try ing to r elieve the pressure on his neck a nd stop Robertson's c hoke hold, he may have g rabbe d Robertson' s hands, tried to re move them from a round his neck, or rea ched a round Robertson' s body and tried to push him off. He denied makingany ag g ressive move s toward Rober tson. He re , M or a le s c on te nd s th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e that he kn ow ing ly , in te nti on a lly , o r r e c kle ssl y
cause d bodily

injury to Robertson beca

use t he officer wre stled Morales to the g round and or dere d t h e u s e o f p ep p er

s p ra y . Be ca u s e t h e p ai nfr o m b o t h ev en t s w a s t h e d i r e c tre s u l to f R o b er t s o n 's actions or or ders, Mora les argues, any pain from the pe pper spr ay or scr aped kne es wa s cause d by Robertson rathe r than Mora les. We disag ree . A p e rs on is c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le if

the re su lt w ou ld n ot h a ve oc c ur re d but f or his conduct, operating either a lone or c oncurr ently with another c ause, unle ss the9

concur rent c ause w as cle arly

sufficie nt to produce the result and the conduct of the a c tor c le a rl y ins uf fi c ie nt. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 6.04(a) (Ve rnon 2003). "B odily in j u ry " i s d ef

i n edas "p h y s i ca l p ai n , i l l n es s , o r a n y i mp ai rm en to f p h y s i ca l condition." T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1.07(a) (8) ( Ver non Supp. 2008). This "purpose fully broad" definition of "bodily injury " inc ludes phy sical pain from "e ven relatively minor phy sical contac ts so long as the y
c on sti tut e mor e tha

n me re of

fe ns ive tou c hing." W

awr y k ow v . S tat e , 8 6 6 S. W. 2 d

8 7 , 8 9 ( T e x. Ap p . — Be au m o n t1 9 9 3 , p et
. re f'd ) ( ci t i n g Lan e v . S tat e , 763 S.W
. 2 d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). The intent element, " rec kless," is de fined in Section 6.03(c ) of the T exas Penal Code: A pe rs on a c ts re c kle ssl y , or is r e c kle ss, wi th r e sp e c t to c ir c ums tanc e s su rr ound inghis conduct or

the re sult of his conduct whe n he is awa re of but consciously

disreg ards a su bs tanti a l and

un jus tif ia ble ri sk that th e c ir c ums tanc e s e xist o r t he re su lt w ill oc c ur . Th e ri sk mus t be of su c h a natur e and de g re e that it s d isr e g ard

c on sti tut e s a g ro ss d e viatio n f

ro m th e sta

nd ard o f care that an o rd ina ry pe rs on wo uld e xer c ise un de r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s a s v ie we d f ro m th e a c tor ' s st and

po int
. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 6
. 0 3 (c ) ( Ve rn o n 2 0 0 3 ). J u ro rs m ay al s o i n fe r i n t en t fr o m t h e d ef en d an t 's acts, wor ds, and conduc t. Gu e v ara v . S tat e , 152 S.W. 3d 45 , 49 & 5 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); see als o B e ltran v . S

tat e , 5 93 S.W. 2d

68 8, 68 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. [Pan e l O p. ] 198 0) ; Mo y e r v . S tat e , 948 S.W .2d 525, 530 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1997, pet. ref' d). M o ra l es focuses on Robertson' s action in taking the pair to the g round and in orde ring the use of pe pper spr ay , sug g esting that there is no pr o o f of any aff irmative ac tion by

Morales that
cause d any

pain or injury

to Robertson.10

Th e br oa d s ta tut or

y de fi nit ion

of ass aul t doe s n ot e xplic itl y re qu ir e an e xer

tio n o f f or c e in the dir e c tio n o f the vic tim , bu t, by its te rm s, a llo ws a c on vic tio n f

or e ve n r e c kle ssl y

" c a us ing " pa in to a no the r, wi tho ut s pe c if

y ingany ty pe of a c tio n r e qu ir e d. Gi ve n t hi s bro ad def ini tio n o f a ssa

ult , unless there is, within t he mea ning of the statute, some implicit ad d ed re quirement—such a s an
a c tio n ta ke n in the dir e c tio n of an a

rr e sti ngof

fi c e r— the re a pp e ars the re a l po ssi bil ity that, i n s ome
case s, it would be impossi ble to distinguish betwee n resisting arr est and a ssaulting a n office r who is atte mpt ingan a

rr e st. Pul lin g awa

y fr om a n o ff ic e r' s g ra sp , o r p a ssi ve ly

re fu sin g to c oo pe rate in
an ar rest, if pa in results to the arr esting o ff i cer, theore tically

could support an a ssault conviction. On the other

hand, we have found no published Texas case that has appr oved an a ssault conviction in the absenc e of some proof that the defe ndant struck the victim or used some for ce in the dir ection of the vic tim
. The Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls has held that a de fenda nt c harg ed with assaulting an
arr esting office r was not entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction on resisting a rre st when he
or she struck the arr esting office r, even though his or her motive w as to avoid beingarr ested. See Lofton v . S

tat e , 45 S.W .3d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). At least one court has e x presse d conce rn
o v er t h at h o l d i n g: [W ]e find the Lofton decisio n t ro u b l i ng : the Lofton holding c reates the ver y g reat ri sk that, i n a ny c a se in w hic h a

pe rs on re sis ts a rr e st b y any us e of f or c e , th e State wi ll o pp os e a re sis tin g arr e st ins tr uc tio n. Al tho ug h th e a

pp e lla nts in t he ins tant c a se and in Lofton clea

rly used a g reat de al of for ce in r esisting a rre st, the decision of the court of c riminal appea ls raises the ve ry rea l possibility that any

minor scuffle during11

an a rr e st w ill re su lt i n a

de fe nd ant b e ingc ha

rg e d s ole ly

wi th as sa

ult on a pu bli c se rv ant. Oi le r v . S tat e , 77 S.W .3d 849, 853–54 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref' d). A f e w y e ars a g o, we up he ld a n a ssa ult c on vic tio n w he re a de fe nd ant' s f la ili ngstr ug g le s to avoid arrest resulted in the defendant hit ting and kicking an officer
. Gu mp e rt v . S tat e , 48 S.W .3d 45 0, 45 4– 55 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , pe t. re f' d)
. Ev ide nc e that de fe nd ant s tr uc k th e vic timin the c he st c a

us ingpa in a

nd sc uf fl e d w iththe vic timre su lti ngin i nju re d f ing e rs , h a s b e e n h e ld sufficie nt to support an assa ult conviction. Br

y an t v. S tat e , 47 S.W .3d 80, 82–83 (Tex. App.—Waco 20 01 , p e t. r e f' d) ; see Lofton , 4 5 S. W.3 d at 65 2 ( e ve n if de fe nd ant int e nd e d on ly to p re ve nt h is a

rr e st, fo rc e us e d in stri kin g of

fi c e r in fa c e wa s at le a st r e c kle ss i n c a us ingbo dil y

inj ur y ); Br oo k s v . S tat e , 967 S.W .2d 946, 947–48 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (e vidence sufficie nt where defe ndant
acc idently

struck an of

fice r in ey e while " mere ly trying to f

ree herse lf" from off

icer ' s g rasp)
. I n eac h of the pre cedingcase s, the public serva nt testified to a blow of some sort f rom the defe ndant or a

forc ible strug g le wit h the defendant (not a si mple pulling away ), ca using pa in to the public serva

nt. Morales a

rg ues that t here is no proof that any action of his caused Robe rtson' s pain. Her e, we need not de cide whe ther a ssault require s proof of some forc e used on or in the dire ction of the vic tim
. Whil e there is no testimony of an actua l hit or kick that connec ted with a ny p ar t of Robert s o n ' s b o dy , th e r e is te s ti mo n y b y Ro b e rts o no f

a p h y s ic a l m o v e me n t b y

M o r a le s toward Rob e rt so n th a t c on ne c te d w itha t le a st s ome po rt ion of Robe rt so n's mid se c tio n a nd , im me diate ly12

following that contac t, an ensuing strug g le, during which Robertson was "injure d." A lso, there wa s later te stimony

that Morales, after ag g ressively approa ching Robertson, " attacke d" or "c harg ed into" Robertson. Those items of e vidence are sufficie nt, without more, to show that Morale s exerted forc e ag ainst or towar d Robertson and that for ce is c onnecte d causa lly to Robertson' s "injuries." Also during Robertson' s testimony , Robertson and a fellow office r g ave the jury a phy sical demonstration of the e ncounter , thus putti ng befor e the jury cer tain evidenc e that we cannot s ee or expli citly rea d in the rec ord. Phy sical demonstrations or ge stures have been cited as a dded re asons
a pp e llate c ourt s mu st d e fe r t o ju ry fi nd ing s. Centra l t o o n e c a s e w a s th e f a c t q u e s ti o no f

w h e r e th e d e f

e n d an t p u t h is h an d

d u r in g the char g ed robbe ry . Se e Ro ge rs v . S tat e , 756 S.W .2d 332, 336–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1988, pet. re f' d). The location of Roger s' hand wa s hinted at in the lang uag e used in testimony , but
was a ppare ntly specifie d b y t h e gestures of a witness and of

both attorney s in questioning that witness. Notwithstanding the lack of expli cit testimonial lang uag e specifying where Roge rs' hand was located, the cour

t in Ro ge rs defe rre d to the jury verdic t in light of t he demonstrations or ge stures
ma de a t tr ia l: I n addition to noting t hat appe llant failed to re quest that the re cord r efle ct the su bs tanc e of the g e sture s or de mon str a tio ns , we a lso no te that he fa ile d to ob je c t to them. Be cause this court must evaluate c halleng es to the suffic iency of the e vidence by revi ew i n g t h e record in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, we hold the testimony excerpted above, which indicates that not one but sever al demonstrations took place, suppor

ts the jury ' s verdict. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 50(d).13

Id. at 337. Simil arly , an ea rlier involuntary manslaug hter case turned on how the def endant he ld a g un; in defe renc e to the jury ' s findings, the appellate court found the evidenc e suff icient to support the conviction, bec ause the jury had see n the p h y s i cal g estures obviously acc ompanying indeterminat e ex pressions " like that" or "like this" used in the testimony
. Ga on a v . S tat e , 733 S.W. 2d 61 1, 61 3 & n. 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 87 , p e t. r e f' d) . We , to o, are c on str a ine d to de fe r t o the jur

y ' s f ind ing s, ba se d o n it s o bs e rv a tio n o f t he g e sture s and

de mon str a tio ns a t tr ia l, g estures a nd demonstrations which we re not tra nscribed a

nd which we cannot se e. Even without such a phy sical demonstration for the jury , we use "de fer ential standar ds of
r e v ie w " in r e v ie w in g ju

r y f in d in g s f o r e v id e n ti ar

y s u f f ic ie ncy . Ro be rts v . S

tat e , 221 S.W .3d 659, 66 4 n .7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Cle wis v . S tat e , 922 S.W .2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The jury is in the better position t o ev al u at e t h e witnesses. Ma rsh all , 2 10 S.W. 3d a t 62 5. Th a t is espec ially true whe n there wer e phy sical demonstrations or g estures give n in the jury ' s prese nce, but that are not expl icitly

transcr ibed or de tailed in the re cord. S e e R o ge rs , 7 5 6 S .W.2d at 336–37; Gaona , 733 S.W .2d at 613 & n.1. There is testimoni al evidenc e that Morales moved or c harg ed into Robertson' s body , making contac t with him and that pain to R obertson (skinned kne es and pe pper spr ay ) flowe d direc tly

from that contac t. There was also the phy sical demonstration to the jury . The e vidence , thus, allows for
a fi nd ingthat a c tio ns by

Mo ra le s, in wh ic h he dir e c te d for c e tow ard Rob e rt so n, re su lte d d ir e c tly in Robertson' s "take-dow n" of Morales, the strug g le on the ground, the skinned knee s, and the pe pperA jury may infer that a victim actually felt or suff

ere d phy si ca l p ain, because pe ople of 3 common intelligenc e under stand pain and some of the natura l cause s of it. Ra nd olp h v . S tat e , 152 S.W. 3d 76 4, 77 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 200 4, no pet .) . Wh e n c on sid e ri ngwh e the r e vid e nc e is sufficie nt to establish that a victim suffere d pain, j uries may use common sense and apply common knowledg e, obser

vation, and experienc e g ained in the or dinary aff airs of life , using infere nces that may rea sonably

be dra wn from the e vidence
. W awrykow , 866 S.W .2d at 88–89. Rob e rt so n te sti fi e d to su ff e ri ngon ly

tw o in jur ie s: Q [B y the State ] And wha t ki nd of pa in did [the pe pp e r sp ra y ] ca us e y ou? A
. . . yo u c an ' t b r e a t h e , o n a r e g u l ar . . . i t d o e s t a k e s yo u r b r e a t h aw ay. I t fee ls like y ou' re out of a ir. . . . Q
. . . yo uh a d

t h e i n a b i l i t y t o b r e a t h e p r o p e r l y? A Yea

h. And I was blinded for

a little bit, too. Q I nb o t h e y e s o r

j u s to n e e y e ? A J ust, mainly , one.

. . . . Q [By

Def ense Counsel] Did [ Morales] do any thing to har

m or injure y ou? A Yes, sir. Q What did [ Morales] do to harm or injure y ou? A Well, my knees wer e scra ped up from having to be on the g round, on the conc rete , and I

g ot spray ed [with pepper spra y ] as a result of him resisting
. 14 spray . Skinned knees a

nd the re sults of the pepper spray constitute "bodily

injury ." As the re cord

3At trial, Morale s prese rved an objection under Rules 404(b) and 609 of the Texas Rules of 4 Evidence ; however , Morales doe s not c ite, raise, or otherwise a

rg ue Rules 404(b) or

609 in his brief, so we do not a d d ress them he re a nd must assume, for purpose s of this review, that, under Rules 404(b) a nd 609, the evidenc e wa s fundamenta lly rele vant for a

n admissible purp o se other tha n confor mity . T EX . R. E V ID . 404(b), 609. 15 d o e s n o tc o n f

l i c tw i t h t h e j u r

y f i n d i n g s , w e f

i n d t h e e v i d e n c e t h a tM o r a l e s kn o w i n g l y, i n t e n t i o n a l l y,
or re c kle ssl y

c a us e d b od ily

inj ur y to R ob e rt so n le g a lly

and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt. ( 2) The Trial

Court Di d N

o t Abuse Its Discretion by A dmitting Evidenceof Morales' Prior Violent Offenses Mo ra le s argue s th a t the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ngqu e sti on s a

bo ut t he pr ior arr e sts be c a

us e the dang er of

unfair pr ejud i ce s u

b s t an t i al l y

o u t we i gh edt h e e v i d en ce 's p ro b at i v e v al u e. W e d i s agr ee. 4 On direc t examination, t he following exchang e too k place betwee n Morales' counsel a nd Chi ldr e ss, a

de fe ns e wi tne ss: Q D i d

M r . M o r a l e s t h r e a t e nt h e o f f i c e r i nan y w ay? A No. Q Did [Morales] use any abusive languag e towar ds the offic er? A No, he didn' t. He's not that t ype of pe rson . Q Did he make any

threatening g estures towa rd the off icer ? A No. (Emphasis adde d.) Outside the jury ' s prese nce, the State argued that by saying, " [h] e' s not that ty

pe of per son," Childress c hara cter ized M orale s "a s a pea cef ul person" and that her

testimony

opened the door to que stions about "a ny violent of

fense ." T he State soug ht to rebut Childress' testimony andThe trial c ourt g rante d Morales a running objection to all questions about Morales' prior 5 arr e sts
. 16 there by "c orre ct a f

alse impression that' s been put be fore the jury " by asking Childress if she knew about Morale s' p rior ar

rests for violent crimes, which ste m from 1993 throug h 2005. Morales ob je c te d, a sse rt ingthat th e pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e wa s su

bs tanti a lly outweig hed b y

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. T he trial c ourt overr uled Morale s' objection and 5 allowed the State to a sk Childress if she knew a bout Morales be ing a

rre sted for: Robbery in 1993; Battery of a police office r and r esisting a rre st in 1994; Obstructing a police of

fice r in 1994; Obstructing a police of

fice r and dome stic violence battery in 1998; First-de g ree kidnapping in 2002; Do me sti c vio le nc e in 2 00 3; Battery domestic violence in 2005; and Another battery

domestic violence in 2005. Stand ard of Review We r e vie w a

tr ia l c ourt ' s a dmi ssi on

or e xclu sio n o f e xtra

ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e fo r a

bu se of d i s cr etion. Mo se

s v . S tat e , 105 S.W .3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Moreove r, a tria l court' s decision re g ardingadmissibili ty of evidence will be sust ained if corr ect on any theory of law applicable to the case , even w hen the c ourt' s underly ing r eason f

or the de cision is wrong
. Ro me ro
v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). I f a tria l c ourt deter

mines that evidenc e of extraneous crimes or bad ac ts have re levanc e aside fr om c ha ra c te r c on fo rm ity , a

nd a ti mel y , pr op e r R

ule 40 3 o bje c tio n is ma de , th e tr ia l c ourt mus t17

make a balanc ing de termination under Rule 403. Mo ntgom e ry v . S tat e , 810 S. W
. 2 d 3 7 2 , 3 8 8–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh' g ). Rule 403 provides that, "[a]lthough rele vant, evidenc e may be excluded if its probative va lue is s u b s t an tially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice,
c on fu sio n o f t

he iss ue s, or

mis le a din g the jur

y , o r b y c on sid e ratio ns of

un du e delay , o r n e e dle ss pres ent ati on of cum ul ati ve evi den ce." T EX . R. E V ID . 4 03 . O nly " un fa ir " pr e

jud ic e pr ov ide s th e ba sis for e x clusion of re levant evide nce. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 389. Unfa ir prejudice arises f rom
e vid e nc e t h a th a s anu n d u e t e n d e n c y

t o s u g g e s tt h a ta

d e c i s i o nb e m a d e o nani mp r o p e r b a s i s, commonly

an emotional one. Id. We do not c on du c t a de nov o re vie w of the re c or d with a vie w t o making a wholly independe nt judgme nt as t o probative value ver sus prejudicial risk. Id. a t 3 9 2
. We
reve rse a trial court' s deter

mination unde r Rule 403 "r are ly and only afte r a c lear

abuse of discretion,"
rec og nizi ng that the trial cour t is in a superior position to ga ug e the impac t of the re levant evide nce. Mozo n v . S

tat e , 991 S.W .2d 841, 8 4 7 (T ex . C rim. App. 1999); J on es v . S tat e , 119 S.W .3d 412, 421–22 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2003, no pet.). Th e re le va

nt c ri te ri a

in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t he pr e jud ic e of an ex tr ane ou s o ff

e ns e substan ti a ll y

o u tw e ig h s it s p r o b a ti v e v a lu e in c lu d e , b u t i s n o t l im it e d to : ( 1 ) th e s tr e n g th

o f the extraneous offe nse to make a fac t of conseque nce mor e or le ss probable; (2) the potential the
e xtra ne ou s- of fe ns e e vid e nc e ha s to imp re ss the jur y in so me ir

ratio na l, bu t ne ve rt

he les s i nd elible way ; (3) the time n eeded to develop the e vidence , during which the jury will be distracted f

rom consideration of the indicted off ense; a nd (4) the proponent' s need for the evidenc e to prove a fac t18

o f c onsequenc e. State v. Me chler , 1 5 3 S
. W
. 3 d 4 3 5 , 4 4 0 (T ex . 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Mo ntg om e ry , 810 S.W. 2d a t 39 2) ; Mozon , 991 S.W .2d at 847. The fir st factor , probative va lue, weig hs in favor of admission. The State claimed that Chi ldr e ss p ut t

he fa lse imp re ssi on

be fo re the jur

y that Mor a le s wa s a

pe a c e fu l pe rs on , a

nd the State of fe re d e vid e nc e of

arr e sts fo r vio le nt c ri me s to re bu t that imp re ssi on . Th e re c or d s ho ws Chi ldr e ss testified, at best, that Mora les was not the ty pe of pe rson to make thre ats, use abusive lang uag e, or
make thr e a te nin g g e sture s to wa rd an o ff ic e r. Th e S tat e mis c ha

ra c te ri zed the dir e c t qu e sti on s to Childress and the answ ers she g ave. H oweve r, Mora les failed to objec t to the mischarac teriz at i on
or re qu e s t an e xami natio n o f t

he re c or d f

or the sp e c if ic qu e sti on s and

ans we rs . T he e xtra

ne ou s- arr e st evidenc e wa s probative of both how well Childress knew Mora les and the f oundation for he r
c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of Mo ra le s. Th e re fo re , th e pr ior arr e sts we re pr ob a ti ve to re bu t th e " fa lse impression." The sec ond fac tor, the pot ential t o g ive t he jury an irrational impression, inquires as to the
e vid e nc e ' s te nd e nc y

to te mpt the jur

y int o fi nd ing g uil t on g ro un ds a pa rt fr om p ro of

of the of fe ns e char g ed. Mec hler , 1 5 3 S
. W
. 3 d a t4 4 0
. T h e p r i o r

ar r e s t s a d m i t t e d

i n t o e v i d e n c e i n c l u d e d

r o b b e r y, battery of a police office r, re sisting ar rest, and dome stic violence. The ar rests for robber y and batter

y of a police office r occ urre d more than a deca de prior and are either identical or arguably worse tha

n the offe nse with which Mora les was c urre ntly char g ed. The potential prejudice of nea rly identical acts is ver y high be cause it is st ark pr oof of c riminal char acte r or pr opensity
. Pa rks v. Stat e , 746Th e fo llo wi ngins tr uc tio n w a s g ive n to the jur y and is n ot c ha lle ng e d o n a

pp e a l: 6 Yo u a

re ins tr uc te d th a t if

the re is a

ny te sti mony

be fo re y ou

in t his c a se reg ardingthe def

endant ha ving co m m itted offense s other than the of fense alleg ed ag ainst him in t he indictment i n this case, you cannot c onsider said testimony for a ny purpose unless you find and b eli eve be y ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant c omm itt e d s uc h othe r of

fe ns e s, if any we re c omm itt e d, and e ve n the n y ou may on ly consider the same in dete rmining the intent, knowledg e, desig n, and/or sche me of the de f e n d an t, if an y , in c o n n e c ti o n w it h th e o f f e n s e , if an y , a ll e g e d a g a in s t h im in the indictment in this case , and for no other purpose
. 19 S.W. 2d73 8 , 7 3 9 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 8 7 )
. H o w e v e r , g i v i n g l i m i t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e j u r

y is a fa c tor to c on sid e r i n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r t he jur y imp ro pe rl y

consid e re d th e e xtra

ne ou s- arr e st evidenc e. Ow e ns v . S

tat e , 827 S.W .2d 911, 916–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). I n this c ase, the trial
c ourt gave a limitin g ins tr uc tio n to the jur

y , a nd a lth ou g h n ot a s n arr ow ly ta ilo re d to the sp e c if

ic issues involved as it could have be en, the c harg e did s ee k to have the jur y limit its use of the extraneous-off

ense e vidence
. There fore , we f ind that this factor we ighs towa rd admission. 6 Th e thi rd fa c tor , th e tim e sp e nt d e ve lop inge vid e nc e of the e xtra ne ou s arr e sts , w a s n ot u

nd uly leng thy . Childress' te stimony reg ardingthe extraneous ar rests took up only

about four pa g es in the 564-pag e re cord. Thus, this fa ctor is ne utral and favor s neither e x clusion nor admission. Blac k we ll

v . S tat e , 193 S.W .3d 1, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, no pet.). The four th fac tor, the State' s need f or the e x trane ous-ar

rest evide nce to pr ove a f act of conseque nce, w eig hs in favor o f ad m i ssion. The State soug ht to rebut Childress' char acte rization of Mo ra le s th a t he wa s " no t tha t ty pe of pe rs on " by sh ow ing that she did no t kn owMo ra le s th a t w e ll or that long , i
. e., "the foundation of her be lief [was] . . . incomplete." The question of whethe r20

Morales w as threatening the offic ers is direc tly related to his intent, and the State did not have other
e vid e nc e wi th w hic h to re bu t Child re ss' c ha ra c te ri zat ion of Mo ra le s' c ha ra c te r. Th e re fo re , th e State had nee d for this evidenc e. Con sid e ri nga ll f

our fa c tor s tog e the r, we c on c lud e that the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e xtra ne ou sarr e st e vid e nc e wa s n ot s ub sta nti a lly ou tw e ig he d by its pr e jud ic ia l imp a c t. Con se qu e ntl y , w e ho ld that the trial cour

t properly overr uled Morale s' Rule 403 objection and ove rrule this poi nt of er ror. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

J o s h R
. M o r r i s s , III Chief J ustice Date Submitted: J uly 30, 2009 Date D ecide d: Aug ust 12, 2009 Pub lis h