UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4572

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIE T. WORSHAM,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief 

District Judge. (3:06-cr-00200-JRS-1)

Submitted: January 31, 2012 Decided: February 2, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Carolyn V. 

Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, 

Appellate Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen 

Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Jessica Aber 

Brumberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Willie T. Worsham was convicted of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon and received thirty-two months’ 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. After 

violating conditions of his supervised release, the court 

revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to two months’ 

imprisonment, with three years of supervised release to follow. 

Worsham once again violated the conditions of his release. He 

now appeals the resulting twenty-two-month sentence. Worsham’s 

attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal but questioning whether Worsham’s sentence is reasonable. 

Worsham has filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government 

has declined to file a response. We affirm.

This court will affirm a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly 

unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th 

Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a 

determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This 

initial inquiry takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture 

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than 

reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United 

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
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Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439) (applying “plainly unreasonable” 

standard of review for probation revocation). Only if the 

sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable does the 

inquiry proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine 

whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 438–39.

A supervised release revocation sentence is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the 

advisory policy statement range based upon Chapter Seven of the 

Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors 

applicable to supervised release revocation. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438–40. A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper 

basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence 

imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. 

“A court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a postconviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of 

reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 

(internal quotation marks omitted). After thoroughly reviewing 

the record, we conclude that Worsham’s sentence was both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case as well as the claims raised in Worsham’s pro se 
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supplemental brief and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Worsham, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Worsham requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Worsham. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED