COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DEBORAH C. SPROLES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0134-98-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 JANUARY 12, 1999 

ROBERT K. LOWRY, IV 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 

Charles B. Flannagan, II, Judge 

 Charles F. Lincoln for appellant. 

 B.L. Conway, II (Conway & Conway, L.L.C. on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Deborah C. Sproles appeals an order from the circuit court 

requiring Robert K. Lowry, IV, to pay $219.21 per month in child 

support for his son, Isaac Lowry. The parties stipulated that 

Lowry was entitled to a $157 "credit" for support of a child from 

a previous marriage. Sproles contends that the circuit court 

erred by deducting the $157 after calculating Lowry's presumptive 

amount from the statutory guidelines. Sproles argues that the 

court should have "credited" the $157 against Lowry's monthly 

income before calculating the presumptive child support 

obligation. Based on the procedural posture of the case, and the 

manner in which the issues were presented to the trial judge, we 

affirm the support award. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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BACKGROUND

 On November 20, 1991, the circuit court ordered Lowry to pay 

$260 per month in child support. The court arrived at the amount 

by calculating the presumptive amount of child support, according 

to the statutory guidelines, and then deducting $159 per month to 

adjust for Lowry's support of a child from a previous marriage. 

Neither party objected to this calculation and the record 

suggests, although it is not entirely clear, that they agreed to 

a $159 "credit" then, as they later did in the proceeding before 

us on appeal. 

 On June 30, 1997, Sproles moved the juvenile and domestic 

relations court to modify the prior support order based on 

changed circumstances. At the modification hearing, the parties 

stipulated to their gross monthly incomes, work-related child 

care expenses and the $157 credit to Lowry for support of the 

other child.1 The juvenile and domestic relations court found 

that circumstances had changed and, in calculating the support 

award, deducted the $157 credit from Lowry's monthly gross income 

before calculating the presumptive amount of child support from 

the guidelines. Lowry appealed to the circuit court. In the 

circuit court, the parties stipulated to the figures and 

submitted the case to the court on the sole issue of whether 

under Code § 20-107.2 the stipulated amount for a "credit" for 

 

 1The record does not explain why the parties agreed upon a 

$157 credit in 1997, when the credit in 1991 was $159. 
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child support to the other child should be deducted from gross 

income or from the presumptive child support amount. The trial 

court held that under the statute any deviation should be from 

the guidelines amount, not from the gross income. The appellant 

argues that the trial court erred and asserted at oral argument 

that the Washington County Juvenile and Domestic Relations 

District Court routinely uses the approach of adjusting gross 

income. 

ANALYSIS

 "`Code § 20-107.2(2) vests discretion in the trial court in 

awarding child support and such awards will not be reversed on 

appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.'" 

Auman v. Auman, 21 Va. App. 275, 277, 464 S.E.2d 154, 155 (1995) 

(quoting Young v. Young, 3 Va. App. 80, 81, 348 S.E.2d 46, 47 

(1986)). 

 The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that adherence 

to the guidelines produces a just and appropriate child support 

award. Code § 20-108.2(A). Here the parties stipulated that the 

amount for which Lowry would be granted a "credit" to adjust for 

the support of the other child would be $157. The parties 

disagree as to how the court should have applied that "credit." 

 We disagree with Sproles that pursuant to the statute or the 

stipulation the court should have deducted the credit from 

Lowry's gross income. 

 The starting point for a trial court in 

determining the monthly child support 

obligation of a party is the amount as 
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computed by the schedule found in Code 

§ 20-108.2(B). . . . No additions or 

subtractions from the gross income, as 

defined in Code § 20-108.2(C), even if 

otherwise valid considerations, may be made 

before this figure is determined. 

Richardson v. Richardson, 12 Va. App. 18, 21, 401 S.E.2d 894, 896 

(1991). Thus, under the statute it would have been an abuse of 

discretion for the juvenile and domestic relations court to 

subtract the stipulated "credit" from the gross income prior to 

calculating the presumptive amount. 

 On the other hand, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion under the statute by subtracting the $157 stipulated 

"credit" from the presumptive guideline support amount. As 

Richardson makes clear, the court may deviate from the guidelines 

as long as the court bases the deviation on the factors in Code 

§§ 20-107.2 and 20-108.1. See id. "Actual monetary support for 

other children, other family members or former family members" is 

one of the factors that a trial court may consider in deciding 

whether to deviate from the guidelines. Code § 20-108.1(B)(1). 

See Farley v. Liskey, 12 Va. App. 1, 3-4, 401 S.E.2d 897, 898-99 

(1991). 

 Although the circuit court would normally consider the full 

amount of support paid for another child in determining how much 

to deviate, the trial court did not err in accepting the 

stipulated amount of $157, which had similarly been applied 

between 1991 and 1997, as the amount by which the presumptive 

award would be modified. The trial judge did not abuse his 
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discretion by accepting the parties' stipulation, although he was 

not bound by it. When a trial judge determines that the best 

interest of the child would be served by rejecting the 

stipulation, a trial judge has the discretion to adjust or 

disregard a "credit" to which the parties stipulated. See Kaplan 

v. Kaplan, 21 Va. App. 542, 548, 466 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1996). 

Here, neither party requested the circuit court judge to take 

such action, and he did not do so sua sponte. Likewise, on 

appeal, neither party argues that the circuit court abused its 

discretion by accepting $157 as the amount of the "credit." The 

only issue before us, therefore, is whether the trial court erred 

in deducting the stipulated "credit" after, instead of before, 

calculating the presumptive amount of support. Because the 

circuit court was correct under Code § 20-107.2 in deducting the 

credit from the presumptive amount of child support, we affirm 

its support award. 

Affirmed.