IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-2188

Filed March 4, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DEVEN DESCHEPPER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark D. Cleve (plea 

hearing) and Henry W. Latham II (sentencing), Judges.

A defendant challenges his consecutive sentences for two drug offenses. 

AFFIRMED.

Eric D. Tindal of Keegan Tindal & Mason, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.

Deven Deschepper pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver 

marijuana, a class “D” felony, and possession of amphetamine, a serious 

misdemeanor. The district court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of five 

years on the felony and a determinate term of 365 days on the misdemeanor—to

run consecutively. The court suspended incarceration and placed Deschepper on 

supervised probation for three years. He appeals, arguing the court abused its 

discretion in declining to defer judgment and in not stating a reason for the 

consecutive terms. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentence. 

We review a sentence to see if the district court properly exercised its 

discretion. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016). An abuse of discretion

occurs if the grounds for the sentence are not supported by substantial evidence 

or are based on an erroneous application of the law. Id. Our task on appeal is not 

to second guess the sentencing court’s decision but to assess “if it was 

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 

720, 725 (Iowa 2002).

To help us evaluate its exercise of discretion, a sentencing court must state 

on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence. See Iowa R. Crim. 

P. 2.23(3)(d). Beyond that requirement, the court must explicitly state the reason 

for imposing consecutive sentences, though the court may rely on the same reason

as it did in arriving at the underlying sentence. See Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 275.
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In his first issue on appeal, Deschepper claims he was entitled to a deferred 

judgment1rather than probation. Deschepper believes the sentencing court

abused its discretion by paying too much attention to his history of offending as a 

juvenile. He notes “at the time of sentencing [he] was only 20 years old and had 

a year of sobriety under his belt.” Deschepper contends the court should have 

elevated his recent rehabilitation efforts and deferred judgment.

A sentencing court’s mission is to consider all pertinent information before 

deciding which option “will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of 

the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the 

defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5 . When exercising its sentencing

discretion, the court must weigh relevant factors such as the nature of the offense 

and attending circumstances; the defendant’s age; and the defendant’s character, 

propensities, and chances of reform. Iowa Code § 907.5; State v. Leckington, 713 

N.W.2d 208, 216 (Iowa 2006). 

Here, the sentencing court carried out that mission. The court told 

Deschepper that it appreciated his allocution. Deschepper had expressed his 

gratitude for the addiction treatment he was receiving at the One Eighty Zone, a 

community outreach organization. The court told Deschepper, “I have seen a lot 

 

1 The presentence investigation (PSI) report stated Deschepper did “not appear to 

be eligible” for a deferred judgment. See Iowa Code § 907.3(1)(a) (2019) (listing 

conditions disqualifying a defendant from receiving a deferred judgment). The PSI 

preparer did not say why. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked for 

supervised probation. Counsel noted his client had never been granted a deferred 

judgment but counsel admitted he couldn’t “actually tell if he is eligible or not based 

on the juvenile adjudications.” Like the district court, we may assume without 

deciding Deschepper was eligible for a deferred judgment.
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of people that have had a lot of success through that program. It’s not easy, as 

you know. But if you keep at it, you will have some success in your life.” 

After acknowledging Deschepper’s efforts at rehabilitation and his chances 

of reform, the court returned to his propensity to reoffend. The court reasoned: 

“[T]he basis of my decision not to grant a deferred judgment in this case is the 

criminal history and the violence that has been in the past. I don’t find that it’s 

appropriate for a deferred judgment given your extensive criminal history.” The 

court then offered Deschepper what could be described as a pep talk:

I understand you’re a young man. I don’t want you to be 

disappointed with that decision, sir. All right. You can come out of 

this. You can still come out of this and have a productive life within 

the community. It’s going to take some work on your part. And I 

think you recognize that right now. And I commend you on your one 

year sobriety. I know that’s not easy. Every day is not easy. 

Particularly with an addiction that you have had for so long. But I 

believe that you will be able to make it on the terms of probation with 

help of your probation officer and the folks at the One Eighty Zone.

On this record, Deschepper cannot overcome the strong presumption of validity 

accorded the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion. See State v. Cheatheam, 

569 N.W.2d 820, 821 (Iowa 1997).

In his second claim on appeal, Deschepper asserts the court’s reasons for 

issuing consecutive sentences was “essentially non-existent in this record.” We 

disagree. The court expressly stated: “The sentences will be consecutive due to 

the extensive criminal history.” That statement complied with the mandate in Hill. 

See 878 N.W.2d at 275. We find no basis for resentencing.

AFFIRMED.