J-S14001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JENNIFER L. LACER

v.

JAMES P. SELB

APPEAL OF: ROBERT SELB AND 

CHUDI M. SELB

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 48 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s): 

13299-2015

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: June 14, 2022

Robert Selb and Chudi M. Selb (“Grandparents”) appeal from the order 

granting the preliminary objections filed by Jennifer Lacer (“Mother”) to 

Grandparents’ petition to intervene in the custody action. Grandparents 

maintain the court erred in finding they lacked standing under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5325(2). We affirm. 

Mother filed a custody complaint against J.B. (“Father”) in 2015. In 

December 2020, the court ordered that Mother “shall be entitled to make 

health, schooling, and other major decisions on behalf of” O.L., born August 

2013, (“Child”). Custody Order, filed Dec. 4, 2020. It further ordered that 

Father “shall be entitled to information concerning the child’s well-being and 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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mother shall keep the father informed of the child’s health, progress in school, 

and general welfare” and “is entitled to receive directly from schools, health 

care providers, or other relevant sources, information concerning the child,” 

but he could not “communicat[e] with the child directly or indirectly through 

school online platforms or through school or healthcare personnel.” Id. Father 

was “granted access to online school platforms so long as [he did] not 

communicate directly with the child, and so long as the child remain[ed]

unaware of father’s online presence.” Id. The order further provided that 

“[w]hile the Final Protection from Abuse [(“PFA”)] Order remains in place, the 

child shall reside with the mother, and the mother shall have sole physical 

custody of the child.” Id. The PFA order is in place until May 2023.

In August 2021, Grandparents filed a petition to intervene pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2). Grandparents alleged they were the paternal 

grandparents of Child. They alleged that in 2017, Father had been granted 

additional custody time and exercised partial custody for a three-night block 

each week. Starting in 2017, Grandparents, who live approximately six hours 

from Child, had at least 17 visits with Child. However, since the grant of a 

temporary PFA in March 2020, Grandparents have not had contact with Child. 

Grandparents allege Father is not able to continue to facilitate their 

relationship with Child, but that Father desires that Grandparents speak to 

and see Child while Mother has sole custody.

Mother filed preliminary objections, including a preliminary objection 

alleging Grandparents lacked standing. She alleged that Father “is estopped 
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from asserting, advocating, and/or participating in any decision about the best 

interests of . . . [C]hild, including whether or not it would be in [C]hild’s best 

interest for the paternal grandparents to have custody.” Preliminary 

Objections to Petition to Intervene, filed Oct. 1, 2021, at ¶ 2a. She argues 

that under Section 5325(2)(ii), the parents’ disagreement must be in the 

present tense, and currently Father “can have no input as to the best interests 

of [C]hild.” Id.

The trial court held a hearing on the objections, and the parties filed 

briefs. In December 2021, the trial court sustained Mother’s objection to 

Grandparents’ standing, reasoning Father’s current custody rights did not 

allow for disagreement:

[Grandparents] move for intervention on the basis of 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §5325(2). An essential element to grandparent 

standing pursuant to Section 5325(2) is that the parents of 

the subject child “do not agree as to whether the 

grandparents or great-grandparents should have custody.”

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2)(ii). The Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania recently held that the Child Custody Law does 

not extend standing to grandparents under Section 5325(2)

when the predicate disagreement does not currently exist. 

See E.A. v. E.C., 259 A.3d 497, 504-505 (Pa.Super. 2021) 

(denying standing to grandparents when the at-issue child’s 

father died as the father’s death eliminated the father’s 

ability to either assent or oppose the mother’s decisions 

regarding grandparent custody). The record is clear that the 

present state of [Father’s] rights with regard to the Child 

will not allow a current disagreement between the Child’s 

parents regarding whether [Grandparents] should have 

custody. Specifically, [Grandparents] admit that Father has 

no custodial rights to the Child and, due to a PFA Order 

entered following a finding of abuse against Father and

prohibiting Father’s contact with the Child for three years, 

he lacks the ability to facilitate the Child’s relationship with 
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[Grandparents]. [Grandparents] further admit that [Mother]

retained sole physical and legal custody of the Child 

pursuant to a December 4, 2020 Custody Order made in 

relation to the PFA Order and a July 22, 2020 Founded 

Report of Abuse by Child Protective Services. While 

[Grandparents] are correct that the terms of the Custody 

Order govern the parents’ custodial rights, not the

grandparents’ rights, the impact of the Order eliminated 

Father’s decision-making authority regarding the Child. 

Accordingly, as in E.A. v. E.C., only the opinion of one 

parent is at issue, rendering it impossible for 

[Grandparents] to satisfy a necessary element for standing 

pursuant to the sole section under which they intend to

proceed. 

Order, filed Dec. 8, 2021. The court dismissed the petition to intervene. 

Grandparents filed an appeal.

Grandparents raise the following issue:

Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion in sustaining [Mother’s] second 

preliminary objection, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(5), 

and dismissing [Grandparent’s] Petition to Intervene, where 

it found that where []Mother maintains sole physical and 

legal custody of [C]hild, that the state of []Father’s rights 

will not allow a current disagreement between [C]hild’s 

parents regarding whether [Grandparents] should have 

custody pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(2).

Grandparents’ Br. at 5.

Grandparents argue that the trial court’s “interpretation of Section 

5325(2)(ii) was in error as it interjects a new meaning into a clear and 

unambiguous statute.” Grandparents’ Br. at 13. They claim that Section 

5325(2)(ii) requires the parents to currently disagree; it “does not require 

parents with shared legal custody to disagree.” Id. They argue that if the 

General Assembly had intended to add a requirement of shared legal custody, 
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it would have done so. Grandparents note that this Court has interpreted the 

term “parent” to include “biological and adoptive parents,” and Section 5325 

“does not restrict the term ‘parent’ any further.” Id. at 17. They claim the 

facts of the instant case, “where one parent lacks the custodial rights to be

able to facilitate a relationship between the child and the grandparents, would 

be an example of a situation Section 5325(2) is meant to address.” Id. 

The issue Grandparents raise “involves statutory interpretation, which 

is a question of law, and our review is plenary and non-deferential.” A.S. v. 

Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 903 (Pa. 2016). “[T]he Statutory 

Construction Act directs courts to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the 

General Assembly.” Id. “The statute’s plain language generally provides the 

best indication of legislative intent.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[w]hen 

interpreting a statute, courts should read the sections of a statute together 

and construe them to give effect to all of the statute’s provisions.” Roethlein 

v. Portnoff Law Assoc., Ltd., 81 A.3d 816, 822 (Pa. 2013) (citing 1 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a)). “In giving effect to the words of the legislature, we 

should not interpret statutory words in isolation, but must read them with 

reference to the context in which they appear.” Id.

The Child Custody Act1 defines “[l]egal custody” as “[t]he right to make 

major decisions on behalf of the child, including, but not limited to, medical, 

religious and educational decisions.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322. It defines “[s]ole 

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1 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5321, et al.
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legal custody” as “[t]he right of one individual to exclusive legal custody of 

the child.” Id.

The Act further provides paths for grandparents to have standing to seek

partial physical and supervised physical custody of a grandchild. One such 

path provides that grandparents have standing where they have a relationship 

with the child that began with the consent of a parent, the parents have 

commenced a custody proceeding, and the parents “do not agree as to 

whether the grandparents . . . should have custody under this section”:

In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating 

to standing for any form of physical custody or legal 

custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file an 

action under this chapter for partial physical custody or 

supervised physical custody in the following situations:

. . .

(2) where the relationship with the child began either with 

the consent of a parent of the child or under a court order 

and where the parents of the child:

(i) have commenced a proceeding for custody; and

(ii) do not agree as to whether the grandparents or 

great-grandparents should have custody under this 

section[.]

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2). 

In E.A. v. E.C., 259 A.3d 497, 504 (Pa.Super. 2021), this Court 

concluded that the requirement that the parents “do not agree” was in the 

present tense, requiring a current disagreement, noting the words “do not 

make an exception to consider past disagreements.” We concluded that 

“regardless of any prior disagreements between parents about a 
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grandparent’s ability to exercise partial custody, the Child Custody Law does 

not extend standing to grandparents to file for partial physical custody under 

this section when the predicate disagreement no longer exists.” Id.

Here, when construing the Act, and giving effect to all of its provisions, 

it is clear that where a parent has sole legal custody, such that they have the 

sole right to make “major decisions on behalf of the child,”

2

there can be no 

current disagreement between the parents about whether grandparents 

should have custody under the Act. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

finding Grandparents lacked standing under Section 5325(2). We note that, 

as we have stated in prior cases, the concept of standing in child custody cases 

is “fluid” and can be re-evaluated if factual changes in circumstances occur. 

E.A., 259 A.3d at 501; M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1071 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Order affirmed. 

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2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that “Section 5325 burdens 

the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and 

control of their children” and “that such right is a fundamental one[.]” See, 

e.g., D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 210 (Pa. 2016). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2022