alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Michael G. O’Connor et al., Respondents, v Russell J. Curtin, Appellant, et al., Respondents.

[800 NYS2d 226]

In a proceeding pursuant to Election Law § 16-102, inter alia, to invalidate a petition designating Russell J. Curtin as a candidate in a primary election to be held on September 13, 2005, for the nomination of the Republican Farty as its candidate for the public office of Superintendent of Highways of the Town of Ossining, the appeal is from a final order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Murphy, J.), entered *508August 9, 2005, which granted the petition and invalidated the designating petition.

Ordered that the final order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The number of valid signatures required by the Election Law for a designating petition such as the appellant’s is “not less than [5%], as determined by the preceding enrollment, *of the then enrolled voters of the party residing within the political unit*in which the office or position is to be voted for” (Election Law § 6-136 [2] [emphasis added]). The term “political unit” as used in the statute means “the state or any political subdivision thereof or therein” (Election Law § 1-104 [1]). The term “political subdivision” is not defined in the Election Law.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Town of Ossining is a “political subdivision.” We agree with the Supreme Court that the legislation establishing the office of Superintendent of Highways *(see*Town Law § 20) does not reveal an intent to create a separate political subdivision within the Town composed only of those election districts eligible to vote for the office of Superintendent of Highways. Since the appellant failed to obtain the requisite 247 signatures, his designating petition was properly invalidated. Schmidt, J.P., Cozier, Rivera and Fisher, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                             390
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           2,468
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                        493
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                           2,055
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                             2,064
<LOANS>                                         56,530
<ALLOWANCE>                                        142
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  62,853
<DEPOSITS>                                      47,472
<SHORT-TERM>                                     1,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                744
<LONG-TERM>                                        162
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                      13,465
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  62,853
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  3,292
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                   93
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    86
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 3,471
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               1,774
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,883
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,588
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       18
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                 137
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                    861
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    907
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         907
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       599
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .76
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .74
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                     3.4
<LOANS-NON>                                        113
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1



     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the
Quarter Ended September 3, 2002 (the "Report") by ClubCorp, Inc. ("Registrant"),
each of the undersigned hereby certifies that to the best of his knowledge or
belief:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
                  amended, and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of Registrant.



                                             /s/ Robert H. Dedman, Jr.
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Robert H. Dedman, Jr.
                                             Chairman of the Board and
                                             Chief Executive Officer


                                             /s/ Jeffrey P. Mayer
                                             -----------------------------------
                                             Jeffrey P. Mayer
                                             Chief Financial Officer
# Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 379/2013Show full title

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 379/2013 of 24 April 2013 establishing the standard import values for determining            the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables         

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U.K.

# Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 379/2013                     

# of 24 April 2013

# establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural                           markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation)(1),                        

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application                           of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors(2), and in particular Article 136(1) thereof,                        

Whereas:

(1)Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations,                              the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products                              and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU)                              No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its                              publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

# Article 1U.K.

The standard import values referred to in Article 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 are fixed in the Annex to                     this Regulation.                  

# Article 2U.K.

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.                  

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 24 April 2013.

*For the Commission, On behalf of the President*,                           

Jerzy Plewa                            

*Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development*                            

## ANNEXU.K.Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

1

OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.                           

2

OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.
EXHIBIT 24.1



                                POWER OF ATTORNEY


KNOW  ALL  MEN  BY  THESE PRESENTS, that each individual whose signature appears
below  constitutes  and  appoints James P. McCoy, Jr. and Charles A. Little, and
each  of  them, his true and lawful attorneys-in-fact and agents with full power
of substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in
any  and  all capacities, to sign the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of ClubCorp,
Inc.  for  the  period  ended  September  7,  1999, together with any amendments
thereto,  and  to  file the same with all exhibits thereto, and all documents in
connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto
said attorneys-in-fact and agents, and each of them, full power and authority to
do  and  perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done
in  and  about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or
could  do  in  person,  hereby  ratifying  and  confirming  all  that  said
attorneys-in-fact  and  agents  or either of them, or their or his substitute or
substitutes,  may  lawfully  do  or  cause  to  be  done  by  virtue  hereof.

Pursuant  to  the  requirements  of the Securities Act of 1934, as amended, this
Power of Attorney has been signed by the following persons in the capacities and
on  the  dates  indicated:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


Signature                                      Title                              Date
------------------------  ------------------------------------------------  ----------------
<S>                       <C>                                               <C>

/s/Robert H. Dedman, Sr.
------------------------
Robert H. Dedman, Sr.     Chairman of the Board                             October 20, 1999


/s/Robert H. Dedman, Jr.
------------------------
Robert H. Dedman, Jr.     Chief Executive Officer, President and Director
                          (Principal Executive Officer)                     October 20, 1999


/s/James M. Hinckley
------------------------
James M. Hinckley         Chief Operating Officer and Director              October 20, 1999


/s/Patricia Dedman Dietz
------------------------
Patricia Dedman Dietz     Director                                          October 20, 1999

</TABLE>
In the Matter of M.E. appealed by Mother-Respondent.

No. 68P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2007.

Duncan McCormick, Lillington, for Mother.

Natarlin Best, for Edgecombe County DSS.

Robert Dale Pitt, Pinetops, for Guardian ad Litem.

Wayne Boyette, Tarboro, for Father.

Prior report: ___ N.C.App. ___, 638 S.E.2d 513.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 6th day of February 2007 by Respondent (Mother) in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd day of May 2007."
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45604

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff

- Respondent

,

v.

MICHAEL LYNN RAY

,

Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: July 11, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin

Falls County. Hon. Jon J. Shindurling , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and sentence of seven years determinate, for possession
of a controlled substance, affirmed

.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Lara E. Anderson , Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lo ri A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;
and LORELLO, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Michael Lynn Ray pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance . Idaho Code § 37

-

2432(c)(1) . The district court sentenced Ray to a determinate term of seven years to be served

consecutively to a previous unrelated sentence

. Ray appeals asserting that the district court

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence

. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discr etion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.2 1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Ra y ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Order entered September 23, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-01081-CV

BARBARA LINDSEY, Appellant

V.

MAX F. ADLER, M.D., P.A. F/K/A PARK CITIES DERMATOLOGY 

CENTER A/K/A COPPELL DERMATOLOGY; MAX F. ADLER; LINDA L. 

WHITE; AND JOHN DOES, Appellees

On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-07358

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s September 21, 2021 unopposed motion to 

amend and supplement her opening brief to correct an error in the duplication of 

page 26 of the appendix to the brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER the 

amended brief be filed no later than October 5, 2021.

The deadline for filing appellees’ brief(s) is RESET to November 4, 2021.

/s/ CRAIG SMITH

JUSTICE
# Council Implementing Decision 2014/151/CFSPShow full title

Council Implementing Decision 2014/151/CFSP of 21 March 2014 implementing Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures            in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine         

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U.K.

# Council Implementing Decision 2014/151/CFSP                     

# of 21 March 2014

# implementing Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial                        integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine                     

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 31(2) thereof,

Having regard to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining                           or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine(1), and in particular Article 3(1) thereof,                        

Whereas:

(1)On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP.

(2)In view of the gravity of the situation, the Council considers that additional persons should be added to the list of persons,                              entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.

(3)The Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

# Article 1U.K.

The persons listed in the Annex to this Decision shall be added to the list set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP.

# Article 2U.K.

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.                  

## ANNEXU.K.

### **List of persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 1**

Editorial Information

X1Substituted by Corrigendum to Council Implementing Decision 2014/151/CFSP of 21 March 2014 implementing Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning                                 restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence                                 of Ukraine (Official Journal of the European Union L 86 of 21 March 2014).

1

OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16.
Akhtar MASOOD, Employee v. ERWIN OIL COMPANY, Employer, EMC Insurance Companies, Carrier.

No. 94A07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 12, 2007.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C.App. ___, 639 S.E.2d 118 (2007), reversing and remanding an opinion and award filed on 23 November 2005 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 September 2007.

Patterson Harkavy, L.L.P., by Leto Copeley, Chapel Hill, for plaintiff-appellee.

Patterson, Dilthey, Clay & Bryson, L.L.P., by Phillip J. Anthony and Christopher J. Derrenbacher, Raleigh, for defendant-appellants.

Hatch, Little & Bunn, L.L.P., by Elizabeth T. Martin and Harold W. Berry, Jr., Raleigh, for North Carolina Petroleum Marketers Association, Inc., amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

As to the appeal of right based on the dissenting opinion, the members of the Court are equally divided. Therefore, the Court of Appeals opinion is left undisturbed without precedential value. *See, e.g., Barham v. Hawk,*360 N.C. 358, 625 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

AFFIRMED.

Justice HUDSON did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 9, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-41125

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v. 

ROLANDO RAMOS

Defendant - Appellant

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:04-CR-2114-1

--------------------

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Rolando Ramos was convicted by a jury of two counts of

transporting undocumented aliens within the United States for

financial gain by means of a motor vehicle, in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1324, and was sentenced to 37 months in prison. Ramos

appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress,

arguing that the arresting agent did not have probable cause or a

warrant to arrest him.

We review the district court’s factual findings for clear

error and the district court’s ultimate conclusion as to the
No. 05-41125

-2-

constitutionality of the law enforcement action de novo. United

States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2001). We consider 

all of the the evidence taken at trial, not just that presented

before the ruling on the suppression motion, in the light most

favorable to the Government. See id.; United States v. Rideau,

969 F.2d 1572, 1576 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

“The Constitution does not require that a warrant issue

prior to an arrest based on probable cause, even if no exigent

circumstances prevented the obtainment of a warrant.” United

States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (5th Cir.

1980). The question is whether the United States Border Patrol

agents had probable cause at the time Ramos was arrested. See

id. at 1271. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, we look to

whether the ‘laminated total’ of the information known by the

agents who were in communication with one another amounted to

probable cause. See United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 962 F.2d 430,

435-36 (5th Cir. 1992).

The testimony at trial shows that the facts and

circumstances within the collective knowledge of the Border

Patrol agents at the time of the arrest were sufficient for a

reasonable person to conclude that Ramos had committed the

offense of illegally transporting aliens. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii); United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512

(5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the agents had probable cause for
No. 05-41125

-3-

the warrantless arrest, and the district court did not err in

denying the motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Ball, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 219]

Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, from an order of the Erie County Court (Joseph P McCarthy, J.), entered June 7, 1999. The order denied the motion of defendant pursuant to CPL 440.20 (1) to set aside his sentence.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: County Court properly denied the motion of defendant to set aside the sentence imposed upon his conviction of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [2]), robbery in the first degree (§ 160.15 [1]), and assault in the first degree (§ 120.10 [4]). The reversal of defendant’s conviction of rape in the first degree (§ 130.35 [1]) *(People v Ball,*162 AD2d 989 [1990], *lv denied*76 NY2d 937 [1990]) and subsequent dismissal of that charge does not render the sentence on the remaining counts “unauthorized, illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law” (CPL 440.20 [1]). The record does not support the contention of defendant that he was denied his right pursuant to CPL 380.50 (1) to make a statement on his own behalf at sentencing *(see People v Hayes,*43 AD2d 99, 103 [1973], *affd*35 NY2d 907 [1974]). Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the advice of defense counsel not to make such a statement does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel *(see generally People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Kehoe, Martoche and Lawton, JJ.