### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 16 -C R

______________________________ J OHN SHEF FI EL D, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 124th J udicial District Court

Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 34805-B

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Carte r2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON J ohn Sheffield a

ppeals his conviction by

the trial cour

t of the off

ense of stalking. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 42 .0 72 (V e rn on 20 03 ). She ff ie ld wa s se nte nc e d by

the tr ia l c ourt

to e ig ht y e a rs ' imp ri so nme nt. On appe al, Sheffie ld claims that the evidenc e wa s leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient

to support his c on vic tio n, that he re c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, a

nd that th e tr ia l court a

bu se d it s d i s c r e t i o nb y n o ta l l o w i n g a d e f e n s e w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f

y. I. F acts Debr a B ayless testified that she a nd Sheffield ha d been ro m an t i cally involved for approximately a y ear and that Sheff ield beca me violent toward the end of that relationship, choking her, shovingher a g ainst a wa ll, and leavi n g b ruises on her . She testified that the esc alation of Sheffield' s violence towa

rd her cause d her to leave him. She stated that she had to " be in hiding f or the first month or two af

ter we split up," and that every time Sheffield called her , she fe are d for he r life. Ba

y less testified she wor

ked as a car eg iver at her c lient's r esidenc e. On Februar y 13 and Fe bruar y 21, 2006, Sheffield c alled B ayless' cell phone a nd called the residenc e whe re she worke d numerous ti mes, threatening to harm her. Ba y less turned on the a

nswering machine a

nd rec orded some of Sheff

ield' s calls, including one in which Shef field stated, " if [Bayless] wanted to play God, he' ll play death a nd he would find me a

nd b e where I ' m at." She later took this tape to the police.We r e vie w the le g a l suf fi c ie nc y of the e vid e nc e c on sid e ri nga ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t 1 favor able to the verdict, could a rational jury have found the essential e lements of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt. J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U .S. 30 7, 31 8– 19 (1 97 9) ; Ho op e r v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 3 I t was introduce d into evidence at trial. Sheffield further testified that Ba y less came to the residenc e, "ba ng ed" on the door a

nd, when she re fused to open the door, he thre atene d to break the windows
and c ome in a

nd kil l he r. She te sti fi e d th a t sh e c a lle d th e po lic e be c a us e sh e wa

nte d Sh effi eld to know t hat s he wa s s e r io u s a b o u t h im n o t c o mi n g to th e r e s id e n c e w h e r e s h e w o r k e d an d th a t s he
wa n t edn o fu rt h er

co n t ac twi t h h i m . S h e a l s o t es t i fi edt h at , d u ri n g t h e t i m e o f Fe b ru ary 1 3 t h ro u gh Fe bruar y 21, she took Sheffie ld's thre ats seriously and that she w as in fea

r for her life
. II. Legal Su ff

iciency Sheffield c laims in his first poi nt of err or that the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to support his conviction. Sheffield wa s convicted unde r Section 42.072 of the Texas Penal Code, which 1

re a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: § 4 2. 07 2. St alk ing (a) A per son commits an offe nse if the person, on more than one occa sion and pursua

nt to the same scheme or course of conduc t that is directed spe cifica lly at another person, knowingly eng ag es i n conduct, including following the other pe rson, that: (1 ) the a c tor kn ow s o r re a so na

bly be lie ve s the oth e r pe rs on wi ll re gar d as t h re at en i n g: (A) bodily

injury or death for the other

person;

. . . . (2 ) ca u s es t h e o t h er p er s o no r a m em b er

o f t h e o t h er

p er s o n 's family or household to be plac ed in fe ar of bodily injury or death . . .; and4 (3) would cause a re asonable person to fe ar: (A) bodily

injury or death for himself or he rself. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 42.072. Ba y less testified that S h ef

fi eld, on Februa

ry 13 and 21, 2006, made numerous thre atening telephone calls to he r, that he came by the residenc e wher e she wa s working and thre atene d to break in and kill her, and that she took his threats seriously and fea red for her life. The indictment alleg es th a t Sh e f f ie ld e n g a g e d in c o n d

u c t h e kn e w B ay le s s w o u ld r e g ar d a s thr e a te n in g b o d il y in ju r y or death including"r ingingthe doorbe ll of said residenc e and thr eate ning to kill Debr a B ayless." Sheffield f

urther c ontends the evide nce is leg ally insufficient be cause the State di d not prove he ra ng the do or

be ll on Fe br

ua ry 21 , 200 6, a s a lle g e d in

the ind ic tme nt. Th e argume nt i s e sse nti a lly that the State did not prove that whic h it had alleg ed. We measure t h e s ufficie ncy of the e vidence ag ainst the eleme nts of the offe nse as de fined by a h y p o t h et i cally

corr ect jury

char g e. Ma lik

v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 97 ); se e als o G oll iha r v . S tat e , 4 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 4 3 , 2 4 6 (T ex . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ). S u ch a c h ar ge inc lud e s o ne that " a c c ur a te ly se ts out the law, is au tho ri zed by the ind ic tme nt, do e s n ot u nn e c e ssa ri ly incre ase the State' s burden of proof or unnece ssarily

restric t th e State' s theories of liability , and adeq uat ely des cri bes th e part icu lar off ens e for whi ch th e defe nd ant was tr ied ." Ma lik, 953 S.W .2d
a t 24 0; Gollihar , 46 S.W .3d at 2 5 3
. T h e l aw as authorized by the indictment means the statutory elements of the char g ed off ense a s modif

i ed by the cha rg ing instrument. Se e Cur ry v . S tat e , 30See Sta ffo rd v . S tat e , 248 S.W .3d 400 (Tex. A pp.—Be aumont 2008, no pet. h.) (disc ussing 2 due proc ess, evidentiar

y sufficie ncy , and the r elationship of a va rianc e bet w e e n a ll e g a ti o n a n d p roof)
. 5 S.W. 3d 39 4, 40 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). Th is t e st i s a pp lic a ble in be nc h tr ia ls a s w e ll a s jury tr ia ls. Ma lik, 953 S.W. 2d

a t 24 0; Ha rv e

y v . S tat e , 135 S.W .3d 712, 716 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pe t.). 2 T h e c o n tr o ll in g s tatute is s e t o u t a b o v e . T h e p r e c is e me th o d u s e d b y Sh e f f ie ld tha t was
re g ard e d a s th re a te nin g is n ot a n e le men t of

the of fe ns e . T he thr e a t is an e le me nt— the pr e c ise
mann e r i n w hic h th e thr e a t is a c c omp lis he d is no t. T hu s, wh e the r t he State pr ov e d th a t Sh e ff ie ld hammere d on the door or rang a doorbell repe atedly is not an element of t he off ense, but a

manner
or mea ns of committing the of

fense , and we will not so restrict the theorie s of liability that might be proven by

the State. The State p ro v i d ed ev i dence of all that it was re quired to prove , and the varia nce, bei n g n o t hing mor e than a n alleg ation of how the of fense was c ommitt ed—and w ith no sug g estion that it failed to provide notice , or plac ed Sheff ield in risk of being prosec uted ag ain for the same c rime, is immaterial. See G ollihar , 46 S.W .3d at 257, n.23. There is leg ally

sufficie nt evidence on ea ch of the require d elements to support the conviction. We overr

ule this point of error
.When r eviewing the evidenc e for fac tual sufficie ncy , we revie w all the evide nce a dmitted 3 at trial in a ne utral lig ht. The evide nce supporting the verdic t may be fa ctually

insufficient if the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g that ve rd ic t is so we a k th a t th e jud g me nt o f t he tr ie r o f f

a c t a pp ears c le a rl y wrongor manife stly

unjust or if the evidenc e supporting the judgme nt of conviction is outweig hed by the g reat weig ht a

nd preponde ranc e of the e vidence
. Ro be rts v . S tat e , 2 2 0 S. W. 3 d

5 2 1 , 5 2 4 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Mc

Do we ll v. Sta te , 235 S.W .3d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). This f actua l suf ficienc y standard require s that we re ach " a hig h level of ske pticism" bef ore w e may reve rse a verdic t based on fa ctual insuffic iency
. Ro be rts , 220 S.W .3d at 524. 6 III. F actual Suf

fi ciency Sheffield ne x t contends the e vidence i s fa ctually insufficient to support his conviction. 3 We rec og nize that, in our review of the evidenc e, we must de fer to the trier of fa ct and may not substantially intrude on the fac t-finder ' s role as the sole judge of the we ight a nd cre dibilit y

of the witnesses. C

a i n v . Stat e , 958 S. W.2 d 4 04 , 4 08 –0 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Mo sle yv . S tat e , 141 S.W .3d 816 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref' d). We have previously discussed the e vidence introduced at trial. Weighing all the evidenc e in a neutra l lig ht, both in suppor t of and ag ainst the fi nd ing , w e c on c lud e the tr ie r o f f a c t w a s r a tio nal ly ju st ifie d in fi nd ingg uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt. The evide nce is fa ctually sufficie nt to support the verdic t. We overrule this point of er ror. IV. Ineff

ect ive Assistance of Counsel Sheffield ne x t complains he rece ived i neff ective assistance of counsel, statingthat counsel was de ficient in not subpoenaing reque sted witnesses, t hat t rial counsel did not properly explain the jury waiver to him, that counsel allowed a def ense w itness to violate the "r ule," that counsel did not object to t he int roduction of evidenc e of Sheffield' s prior bad acts, that counsel failed t o file a motion to s up pr e ss S he ff

ie ld' s arr e st, a

nd that c ouns e l f

a ile d to ob

je c t to the State ' s c los ingargume nt.7

I neff ective a ssistance of c ounsel claims are evaluated under the t wo-pa rt test formulated by the Unit ed S tates Supreme Court in Strickland v. W ashington , requiringa showing of both defic ient perf ormanc e and pr ejudice. 466 U .S. 668, 689 (1984). A Strickland claim must be " firmly

founded in t he re c or d" and

" the re c or d mu st a ff

ir ma tiv e ly de mon str a te " the me ri tor iou s n a tur e of the c la im. Go od sp e e d v . S

tat e , 1 8 7 S
. W
. 3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Di re c t a pp e a l is us ua lly

an in a de qu a te ve hic le fo r r a isi ngsu c h a c la im b e c a

us e the re c or d is g e ne ra lly un de ve lop e d f

or the ob je c t of lit ig a tin g or

pr e se rv ingthe c la im a

nd thu s o ft e n in c omp le te or inade quate f

or this purpose. See G oodspeed , 18 7 S.W. 3d a t 39 2; Fr e e ma n v . S

tat e , 125 S.W .3d 50 5, 50 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Fu lle r v . S tat e , 224 S.W .3d 823, 828–29 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2 0 0 7 , n o p et
. ). T h i s i s t ru e wi t h re gar d t o t h e qu es t i o n o f d ef i ci en t p er fo rm an ce
— i nwh i ch co u n s el 's conduct is re viewed w ith gr eat de fe re n ce, w ithout the dist orting eff ects of hindsig ht—where counsel' s rea sons for failing to do something do not appea r in the re cord. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. The Texas Court of Criminal Appe als has said that " trial counsel should ordinar ily be af forde d an opportunity

to expl ain his actions" befor e a c ourt finds that he or s h e rende red ine ffe ctive assistance
. See G oodspeed , 187 S.W .3d at 392 n.14 (quoting Ry lan de r v . S tat e , 101 S.W .3d 107, 11 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 )) ; Fo xv . S tat e , 1 75 S.W. 3d

47 5, 48 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 05 , p e t. ref ' d). We indulge a strongpresumption that counsel' s conduct fa lls withi n th e wi de ra ng e of
rea sonable, profe ssional a ssistance, and motivated by sound trial strateg y . See J ac k so n v . S tat e , 8778

S.W .2 d 7 6 8 , 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The def endant must rebut the pr esumption that the challeng ed conduct can be considered sound strateg y . Id. I f t h e r ec o rdi s s i l en tas t o an at t o rn ey 's particula r cour se of a ction , we a re c ompelled to find that the def endant did not re but the presumption. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 814. Her e, the trial attorney did not testify

at the hea

ring on the motion for new tr ial. A. F ailure to Obtain Witn esses She ff ie ld' s f ir st c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l ari se s fr om the fa c t that he c la ims de fe ns e c ouns e l di d n ot o bta in t wo wi tne sse s c ru c ia l to hi s defe ns e . B e fo re tr ia l be g an, de fe ns e counsel stated on the rec ord that Sheff ield had re quested him to subpoena two witnesse s: (1) a Mr. Roberts, who lived in a tra iler par k and who the G reg g C o u n t y S h er i ff' s Depa rtment had attempted to serve , but had found the trailer empty ; and (2) an Of fice r Easte rland, whose testimony would have be en about a

differ ent matter a

nd on a differ ent date than the incident for w hich trial wa s being held. Duringa pr et ri al d i s cussi on, counsel stated that he had instea d subpoenae d another office r and f

elt that office r' s testimony reg arding this sepa

rate incident was suff

icient. Counsel has stated hi s rea sons on the record for hi s strateg y in this reg ard. Sheffield has failed to over come the pr e su mpt ion

that su c h a c tio n w a s so un d tr ia l stra te g y . N o in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is shown.See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.42(d) ( Ver non Supp. 2007). 4 9 B. F ailure to Adequately Explai n the Jury Waiver During the hea

ring on the motion for new trial, Sheffield stated that counse l had told him that he wa s "f acing25 to life," but he had r ead in the ne wspape r th e p u n i s h m en t ra ng e wa s two to ten y ear s. This was explained when e vidence was pre sented that Sheff ield had pre viously

been
co n v i ct edfo r t wo fe l o n i es an d , i f th es e en h an ce m en tal l ega t i o n s we re i n v o k edb y t h e S t at e, t h e r an ge of punis hme nt w ou ld b e tw e nty -f ive y e ars to lif

e imp ri so nme nt. Th e re is no ev ide nc e that Sh e ff ie ld 4

was una war e of the proper

rang e of punishment at the time he waived the jury trial. Sheffie ld was qu e sti on e d b y

the tr ia l c ourt , a ft e r t

he c ourt ma de sure he wa s me nta lly c omp e te nt, a s f

oll ow s: THE CO UR T: Now, y ou have the rig ht to be tried by a jury
. You sig ned a paper saying y ou don' t want a jury , y ou want me a s the judg e of this cour t to hear the case and dec ide of [sic] y our g uilt or innocence
. . . .

. . . . THE CO UR T: Yo u d on ' t w ant t o h a ve a jur y do that? [SHEFFIELD] : No, sir. Th e c ourt we nt o n to a sk

She ff ie ld i f h e un de rs too d w hat he wa s d oin g by wa ivi nga

jur y tr ia l. S h ef fi el d answe red a ffirmatively . Fur ther, Sheff

ield does not claim that a diff ere nt trial strategy would have pr oduced a

differ ent re sult. No ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel is shown. Fur ther, we rec og nize that a strateg ic re ason for waiving a jury

trial was a

reque st for community

supervision punishment. Under the law, in view of Sheffield' s criminal hi story , a jury10

c ou ld n ot h a ve a sse sse d c omm un ity su pe rv isi on ; a

jur y c ann ot as se ss co mmunit

y su pe rv isi on un le ss the de fe nd ant f

ile s a sw or n mo tio n tha t he or

sh e ha s n e ve r b e fo re be e n c on vic te d o f a fe lony of fe ns e
an d t h e jury

finds that such information in the moti on is true. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 42.12, § 4(e) (Ve rnon S upp. 2007). Sheffield filed a motion for community supervision with the trial court, a

rg ued for su ch s en t en ce , an d it was consider ed and r ejec ted by the trial cour

t. No ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel has bee n shown. C. Allow ing Defense Witness to Violate the "Rule" Sheffield invoked the "r

ule," requiring that witnesses be e x cluded f rom the cour

troom except during their testimony
. See T EX . R. E V ID . 614. Sheffield' s sister, Ba rbar a L ondon (also known as B arb ara Sand e rs ), un

be kn ow ns t to c ouns e l, e nte re d th e c ourt ro om a t so me t im e duri ngthe tr ia l. Counsel stated that he ha d talked to L ondon on the telephone , but had neve r met her , and ther efor e he did not rec og nize her or r ealize she was in the courtroom dur ing the trial. The r ecor d also shows that Sheffield did not mention to his counsel that his sist er w as in th e courtroom. We adopt the
rea soning of the Austin Court of Appeals in Cas e yv . S tat e , No. 03-03-00030-CR, 2007 Tex . App. L EXI S 7940 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 5, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not desig nated f or publication), wher e the c ourt found no inef fec tive assistan ce of counse l when a w itness list ened to a portion of the trial and w as disqualified fr om testify ing. T he Austin court h el d t h at , since ther e wa s no11

evidenc e that trial c ounsel told the witness that she could listen to the trial or that counsel knew that she had e ntere d the cour

troom, ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel was not shown. Id. No ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel is shown. D. F ailure to Object to Evidence of Pr ior Bad Acts Sheffield ne x t complains that trial counsel was ineffe ctive for failing to object to "a lleg ations of prior phy sical abuse." This alleg ation does not specify the i nstance s of t his evidenc e in the re cord. We n ote tha

t B ay le ss t e sti fi e d th a t, b e fo re sh e and She ff ie ld e nd e d th e ir

re la tio ns hip , h e tr ie d to choke he r and shove d her, c ausing bruises. " And that' s why Ifea red for my life ever

y time he ca lled me." Sheffield ha s not adequately briefe d this iss ue; no authority was c ited, and the St ate ha s not responde d. Fr om this l imited recor d and ar g ument, this testimony appea rs t o be admissi ble to show an ele ment of the off

ense: that, due to Sheffield' s past behavior , Ba y less was in fac t in fea

r for her life and of

serious bodily

in jury . The State wa s require d to prove B ayless was plac ed in fe ar of bodily injury or death at t he time of Sheff ield' s conduct. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 42.072; Cle me nts v . S

tat e , 1 9 S. W.3 d 4 42 , 4 48 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; Allen v. Sta te , 218 S.W .3d 905 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2007, no pet.). Eve n if this evidence had bee n ob je c te d to and

e xclu de d, we do no t be lie ve thi s e xplanatio n o f t he ba c kg ro und of the p a rt ie s'
re la tio ns hip c a

us e d a dif fe re nt r e su lt.12

E. F ail ur e to F ile M ot ion to Suppr e ss She ff ie ld a lso c on te nd s h is tri a l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto f

ile a mot ion to suppress his arr est based on the fac t that he was a rre sted without a war

rant a nd had not committed any offe nse in the pre sence of the a rre sting off

icer . Sheffield was arr ested by Offic er Ma

rk F aulkner of the L ong view Police De partment. F aulkner testified he a

rre sted Sheffie ld on a " be-on- the-lookou t" c a ll f

or a c e rt a in v e hic le re g ard inga te rr or ist ic thr e a t ( wh ich char ge wa s late r c ha ng e d to stalking) . The c all went out at 10: 00 p.m., and Faulkner testified he located the ve hicle and a rre sted Sheffield at 10:18 p.m. I n o rd e r f or a wa rr antl e ss a

rr e st t o be jus tif

ie d, the State mus t sh ow the e xiste nc e of pr ob a ble
cause at t he time the ar

rest wa s made a

nd the exist ence of circ umstances whic h made the pr ocuring of the wa rra nt impractica

ble. Cra ne v . S

tat e , 786 S.W .2d 338, 346 (Tex. Cr i m . App. 1990). The test of proba

ble ca use for a w ar ra n t less arr est is whether the fa cts and c ircumstance s within the office r' s knowledg e and of which he or she had " rea sonably trustworthy

information wer e suff

icient to warr ant a pr

udent per son in believing that the ar rested pe rson had c ommitt ed or w as committing
an o ffen se. " Ga rri

so n v . S tat e , 7 2 6 S
. W
. 2 d

1 3 4 , 1 3 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 8 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Be c k v . O hio , 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).An offic er ma y rely on information relay ed to him or her by other officer s and the sum of 5 information known to those cooper ating with the office r. State v. Je nnings , 958 S.W .2d 930, 933 (T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 19 97 , n o p e t.) . E ve n when an o ff ic e r i s b ri e fe d o n th e c on te nts of a ra dio dis patc h, bu t did not pe rs on a lly he ar the dis patc h, that is a lso su ff ic ie nt t o p ro vid e pr ob a

ble c a us e to justi fy an ar rest. Bu sb

yv . S tat e , 990 S.W .2d 263, 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

13 I n th is c a se , Sh e ff

ie ld w a s arr e sted

e ig hte e n mi nu te s a ft e r t

he c a ll w e nt o ut. He ha d, jus t 5 shortly befor e, bee n threatening to harm B ay l es s , who had c alled police r eg ardinghis behavior. There was a dequate rea son for the of fice r t o b el i ev e that Sheffield ha d committed an offe nse. Couns e l w a s n ot i ne ff

e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ngto f ile a mot ion to s up pr e ss t

he arr e st. F . F ail ur e to Obj e c t t o St at e 's C los ing Ar gum e nt S h ef fi el d fu rt h er co mp l ai n s t h at h i s co u n s el wa s i n ef fe ct i v e fo r f

ai l i n g t o o b

j ec tt o t h e S t at e's
rema rk duringclosing argument that Ba y less' "undisputed testimony " was a comment on the fac t that Sheffield did not testify

at trial. To vio la te an a

pp e lla nt' s c on sti tut ion a l and st atu tor y ri g hts , th e ob

je c tio na ble c omm e nt, viewed f rom the per spective of

the fa ct-finde r, must be manife stly inte n d ed t o b e o r of such a ch ar ac t er t h at t h e f ac t -f i n d er wo u l d n ec es s ar i l y

an d n at u ra l l y t ak e i t as a c o m m en to nt h e a cc u s ed 's failure to testify
. Fu e nte

s v . S tat e , 991 S.W. 2d

26 7, 27 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Ba nk s v . S tat e , 643 S.W .2d 129, 134–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). An indirect or implied allusion to the acc used' s failure to te stify does not violate a def endant' s rig ht to remain silent. Fuentes , 991 S.W. 2d a t 27 5; Banks , 64 3 S. W.2 d 1 35 . Ca lli nga tte nti on to t he a bs e nce of evi dence wh ic h o nly the de fe nd ant c ou ld produce will result in reve rsal only if the remark can onl y be construe d to refe r to appe llant's f ailure14

to testify and not the def

ense' s failure to pr oduce e vidence
. Fuentes , 9 91 S.W. 2d a t 27 5; Banks , 643 S.W .2d at 134. This trial was nonjury . The re ason that a c omment on the defe ndant' s failure to te stify may prese nt error

is that it vi o l at es his or her c onstitut ional rig ht to remain silent as g uara nteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion. Gr iff in v . Ca lif or nia , 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965);

see U. S. C O N ST . ame nd . V . Wh e n th is o c c ur s, the us ua l pr oc e dure is fo r t he de fe ns e a tto rn e y

to ob je c t an d r e qu e s t th e tr ia l c o u rt to in s tr u c t th e ju r y to d is r e g ar d th e c o mm e n t a nd move for a mistrial. Most comments m ay be cur ed by

court instruction. Se e Mo or e v . S tat e , 999 S.W .2d 385, 40 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Th e c omp la int he re is that the a tto rn e y fa ile d to ob

je c t to the c omm e nt. But if he had objec ted, what would the obje ction be? There was no jury to instruct. The trial c ourt
wa s we ll aw are that no inf e re nc e c ou ld b e dr awn

fr om t he de fe nd ant' s f

a ilure to t e sti fy , a s it

ha d ju st instructed Sheff

ield that he had the rig ht "not to testify and I will not hold a g ainst y ou y our fa ilure to te sti fy
. . . . " I t is c e rt a inl y

un de rs tand a

ble that th e de fe ns e c ouns e l f e lt the re mark

by the State
wa s inno c uo us , p art ic ula

rl y sin c e thi s w a s a

be nc h tr ia l and

therefo re an o bje c tio n w a s n ot i n h is client' s best interest. We do not find the failure t o object in this contex t was def icient profe ssional perf ormanc e by

the trial attorne y . V. The Tr ialCo ur t D id N otAbu se It s D isc r e ti on i n Exc ludin g Te st im onyof Wi tn e ss Sheffield c ontends in his la st point of error that the trial cour

t abused its discretion by

failing to allow defe nse witness L ondon to te stify
. As stated ear lier in this opi nion, L ondon had ente red the15

courtroom, unbe knownst to trial counsel, after Rul e 614 of the Texas Rules of Evidence had bee n invoked. The tria l court denie d Sheffield' s reque st to allow L ondon to t es t i fy despite her

having he ard a t le a st p or

tio ns of the te sti mony

of oth e r w itn e sse s d

ur ingthe tr ia l. I t is the t ria l c o u rt' s d e c is io nw h e th e r to a ll o w a

w it n e s s to te s ti f

y a f te r th a t w it n e s s h as
v i o l at ed Rule 614, and that dec ision is reviewed unde r an a buse of discr etion standard. Ke ll e y v. Sta te , 8 17 S.W. 2d

16 8, 17 1– 72 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 91 , p e t. r e f' d) ; se e Ton e yv . S tat e , 3 S.W .3d 199, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. re f' d). A r e c o r d w a s m a d e o f

t h e c o n t e n to f

L o n d o n ' s t e s t i m o n y, h a d s h e b e e na l l o w e d

t o t e s t i f y. Counsel stated that L ondon was to have testified re g ardingthe f ac t t hat there was a

n ong oing
c on sp ir a c y

by B a y le ss to " g e t" She ff

ie ld, that sh e c on tin

ua lly ha ra sse d h im, and

that it wa s a g a me on her be half to g et control of the proper ty and the mobile home in which the y lived. Offi ce r M i k e Claxt on had testified f or the de fense and stated that he had investig ated a burg lary of Sheffield' s habitation Marc h 9, 2006. Sheffield ha d repor ted that his residenc e had be en burg lari zed

and tha t sp e c if ic ite ms ha d be e n sto le n. Duri ngCla xton' s in ve sti g a tio n r e g ard ingthi s burg lary , Clax ton had interview ed B ayless, who admitted g oing into the house and takingmost of the pr op e rt

y tha t ha d b e e n re po rt e d sto le n. B a se d on Cla xton' s in ve sti g a tio n, he te sti fi e d th a t B a y le ss had a r ight to ente r the prope rty and take the items she had take n, those items being h er persona l proper ty
.16

Ba s edo nt h e t es t i m o n y

t h e t ri al co u rt h adh ea rdan d b as edo nt h e c o n t en to f Lon d o n 's testimony had she be en allowe d to testify , Sheffield did not meet his burden of proof to show that L ondon' s testim o n y wa s "es s ential" to his defense reg ardingthe offe nse of stalking , and the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion by not allowing L ond o n t o t es t i fy
. See Toney , 3 S.W .3d at 208; Kelley , 81 7 S.W. 2d

a t 17 1– 72 ; se e als o W

e bb v . S tat e , 766 S.W .2d 236, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). VI . Judg m e nt We do note, howeve r, that the trial co u rt ' s judgme nt in this case indicates Sheff ield pled

" g u i l t y" t o t h e o f

f e n s e o f s t a l k i n g . O u r r e v i e w o f t h e r e c o r d

s h o w s t h a tS h e f

f i e l d p l e d " n o tg u i l t y" to the offense. We rec og nize that the t rial j udg e st ated at the hearing on motion for new t rial that the judgme nt was incorr ect a

nd that he wa s enteringa judg ment nunc pro tunc stating that Shef field pled not guilty . Howeve r, our r ecor d does not ref lect that this occur

red. This Court has t he authority to ref orm the judg ment to make the r ecor d speak the truth when the matter ha s b ee n ca l l ed t o our attention by any source . Fr e nc h v . S

tat e , 8 3 0 S. W. 2 d

6 0 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1992). I n As be rry v . S tat e , 813 S.W .2d 526 (Tex. App.—Dall as 1 9 9 1 , pet. re f' d), the court noted that the authority of the a ppellate c ourt to ref

orm incorr ect judg ments is not dependent
on re qu e st o f a

ny pa rt y ; th e a pp ell ate cou rt may

a c t su a sp on te . T he Te xas R

ule s o f A pp e llate Procedur e provide direc t authority for this Court to modify the judg ment of the trial c ourt. T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2.17

Th e re fo re , w e he re by

re fo rm the jud g me nt t o in dic a te a ple a of " no t g uil ty " to t

he of fe ns e of stalking
. As re fo rm e d, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: Fe bruar y 14, 2008 Date D ecide d: May 21, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh