J-S30018-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MUHAMMAD A. JOHNSON, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 861 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, November 17, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009984-2016.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2019

Muhammad Johnson appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and related charges.1 We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows:

On August 31, 2006, in the Mantua section of Philadelphia, 

at approximately 8:00 P.M., a sleeping Jymir Burbage was 

awoken by a shouting quarrel between his father, decedent 

Pierre Russell Buddy Burbage, and [Johnson’s] girlfriend. 

The two men, [Johnson and Burbage], were roommates. 

Burbage accused [Johnson’s] girlfriend, Amira Harris, of 

playing her music too loud and yelled at her to lower the 

volume. Immediately following the argument, Harris 

contacted Johnson, informed him of the confrontation and 

told him to come home. Afterwords, Burbage entered the 

room where his minor son, Jymir, was sleeping and told him 

to “grab the keys and turn off the light,” and they proceeded 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A § 2502(a).
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to leave the apartment. As they exited the apartment, and 

walked down the stairs, Harris trailed behind them. 

Burbage and his son proceeded to the nearby Mantua 

Recreation Center.

While Burbage and his son were standing on the porch of 

the Mantua Recreation Center, Johnson arrived, 

approximately thirty minutes later, walked up to [Burbage] 

and said “[a]re we really going to do this P?” (referring to 

[Burbage]). Burbage responded, “[y]ou already pulled out 

the ratchet.” (referring to a gun). The two men started 

arguing and Johnson shot [Burbage] three times from a 

distance of approximately six feet, and then ran away from 

the crime scene. Amira Harris, a witness to the shooting 

who testified that Johnson was the shooter, also ran away. 

At trial, after taking the oath, Jymir positively identified 

Johnson, by point of finger, as the person who shot his 

father. 

Additionally, the Mantua Recreation Center had 

surveillance cameras pointed in the direction of the crime 

scene, so large portions of the incident were captured on 

video. At trial, Detective Thorsten Lucke presented a 

compilation video of various camera angles taken from 

surveillance footage that depicted the homicide. The video 

was also shown during the examination of Amira Harris who 

identified [Johnson] on the surveillance footage.

Crime Scene Officer Gregory Yatcilla testified that three 

fired cartridge casings and a copper fragment were 

recovered from the scene. Dr. Lindsay Simon, the assistant 

medical examiner who conducted the autopsy, testified that 

the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. The first 

bullet struck [Brubage’s] right chest, piercing his liver, 

aorta, and lungs and would have independently been nearly 

instantly fatal. In addition, Dr. Simon also testified that the 

manner of death was homicide.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/18, at 2-3 (citations omitted).

After hearing the above evidence, the jury convicted Johnson of firstdegree murder and related charges. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an 

aggregate sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial 
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court denied Johnson’s timely filed post-sentence motion. This appeal 

followed. Both Johnson and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Johnson raises three issues on appeal:

I. Should [Johnson] be awarded an arrest of judgment 

on murder in the first degree and all related charges 

where, as here, the evidence is insufficient to sustain 

the verdict?

II. Should [Johnson] be awarded a new trial on the 

charge of murder in the first degree where, as here, 

the greater weight of the evidence does not make out 

the crimes charged?

III. Should [Johnson] be awarded a new trial where, as 

here, the prosecutor engaged in gross misconduct 

when vouching for the evidence.

Johnson’s Brief at 3 (excess capitalization omitted). We will address the issues 

in the order presented.

In his first issue, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions. Our standard of review is well settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable a fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, 

we note that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may 

be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means 

of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 
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above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free 

to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). “Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard 

or review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013).

Although Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

all of his convictions, his supporting argument is limited to the first-degree 

murder conviction. Thus, we will limit our consideration of this issue 

accordingly.

“A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is 

committed by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). An “intentional 

killing” is defined as a “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by 

any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2502(d). Our case law has held in order for an individual to be convicted of 

first-degree murder, “the Commonwealth must prove: 1) that a human being 

was unlawfully killed; 2) that the defendant perpetrated the killing; and 3) 

that the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.” 

Commonweath v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). This Court has also stated the third element to include proof that 

“the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” Commonwealth v. 

Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 573 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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The trial court found no merit to Johnson’s sufficiency challenge:

Here, the evidence shows that [Johnson] committed 

first-degree murder. Certainly, [his] conduct was the 

product of premeditation and deliberation. See 

[Commonwealth v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116, 1124 (Pa. 

2001). (holding that “[t]he period of reflection necessary to 

constitute premeditation may be very brief; in fact, the 

design to kill can be formulated in a fraction of a second”). 

[Johnson’s] conduct alone, shooting the unarmed victim in 

a vital part of his body from six feet away, is sufficient 

evidence of malice and intent to kill to sustain a verdict of 

murder in the first degree. See Commonwealth v. 

Holley, 945 A.2d 241 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that a 

defendant’s intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial 

evidence). Indeed, “[s]pecific intent to kill as well as malice 

can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital 

part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 

A.3d 1238, 1244 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2725 

(2014). See Commonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d 308, 311 

(Pa. 1995) (noting that a gun is “clearly a deadly weapon”); 

Commonwealth v. Solano, 906 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Pa. 

2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 938 (2007) (noting that one 

of the factors that “weighs in on the element of intent” is 

“the precise distance from which the bullets were fired”); 

Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 456 A.2d 1352, 1354 ([Pa.] 

1983) (ruling that a shotgun fired within a short range of 

the victim “establishes specific intent to take life”); 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179 (Pa. 1980) 

(holding the Commonwealth established specific intent to 

kill through the evidence that the defendant shot unarmed 

victim); Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239, 1242 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that evidence of a defendant 

shooting an “unsuspecting, unarmed” victim clearly 

indicated specific intent to kill and malice).

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/18, at 6-7. Our review of the record amply supports 

the trial court’s conclusions.

Johnson’s claims to the contrary are unavailing. As noted above, he 

claims that the evidence failed to identify him as the perpetrator and failed to 
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establish the specific intent to kill. In his brief, Johnson provides no supporting 

argument regarding his identity as the perpetrator.2 Thus, he abandoned this 

argument. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super 

2007) (stating “[t]his court will not act as counsel and will not develop 

arguments on behalf of an appellant”).

With regard to the Commonwealth’s alleged failure to establish 

premeditation or a specific intent to kill, Johnson argues:

In simple terms, the evidence does not establish Murder 

in the First Degree. The facts are straight-forward. Miss 

Amira Harris said that she called her boyfriend, [Johnson] 

and explained to him how the victim had made a fuss over 

some loud noise. However, what she was really saying was 

that she agitated [Johnson] and his testosterone and 

maleness and implored him to come over to the house to 

adjust the wrong that was so unrighteously [sic] foisted 

upon her. [Johnson] shows up and perhaps not to the 

surprise of any reading the transcript, shoots and kills the 

victim. The undersigned is not claiming that the shooter 

was justified nor should have been undertaken [sic]. 

Rather, this counsel is merely saying that the facts do not 

make out malice nor premeditation. 

***

The defense here, takes the position that [Johnson] acted 

without malice because of the passion and provocation 

generated not only by [Burbage] who made a big deal over 

some loud noise but also by Miss Harris who injected her 

femininity into the ongoing matter and in essence, 

challenged her boyfriend to “do something about it.”

***

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2 This is understandable, since two eyewitnesses identified him as the 

perpetrator, and he could also be seen on surveillance video of the incident.
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The record does not establish that [Johnson] and 

[Burbage] were “beefing” on the day in question or any 

other day and the record really does establish that 

[Johnson] came over to the girlfriend’s house in an excited 

state and reacted to external stimuli which caused him to 

lose his temper and act. [Johnson], while acting most 

inappropriately did not lay in wait or hunt [Burbage] down. 

It was an explosion on the street. It was a tragic ending. 

But, it was not Murder in the First Degree. [Johnson] should 

be awarded an Arrest of Judgment.

Johnson’s Brief at 7-8. 

We disagree. Although Johnson’s counsel provides his interpretation of 

the “facts” presented, he does not develop the claim by citing or discussing 

any of Miss Harris’ actual testimony, or the testimony from any other 

Commonwealth witness.

3

 See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that undeveloped claims will not be considered on 

appeal).

Moreover, as noted by the trial court premeditation and/or a specific 

intent to kill can be in an instant. See Commonwealth v. Clemons, 2019 

WL 286565 (Pa. 2019) (explaining that the “law does not require a lengthy 

period of premeditation to support a first-degree murder conviction; indeed, 

the design to kill can be formulated in a fraction of a second”). 

Finally, it is well settled that a “[s]pecific intent to kill as well as malice 

can be inferred in a trial for first-degree murder from the use of a deadly 

weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 

____________________________________________

3 Johnson did not testify and provide no other witnesses in his defense.
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54 A.3d 332, 335-36 (Pa. 2012). As noted by the trial court, supra, the 

record establishes that the shots fired by Johnson struck vital organs within 

Burbage’s body and that death was almost instantaneous. Thus, for all these 

reasons, Johnson’s first issue on appeal fails.

In his second issue, Johnson contends, “the greater weight of the 

evidence only established that [he] was riled up by his girlfriend and the 

mouth of the victim. . . . [Johnson] lost his cool and opened fire. . . . From 

the record, one can only engage in speculation, conjecture and surmise as to 

whether [Johnson] had specific intent to kill or engaged in premeditation.” 

Johnson’s Brief at 9-11. 

In making his argument, Johnson conflates a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence with a claim challenging the weight of the evidence. As our 

Supreme Court has explained:

[I]t is necessary to delineate the distinctions between a 

claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim 

that challenges the weight of the evidence. The distinction 

between these two challenges is critical. A claim challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would preclude 

retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas a claim 

challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would 

permit a second trial.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a 

question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to 

support the verdict when it establishes each material element 

of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the 

accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence 

offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the 

physical facts, in contravention to human experience and the 
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laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter 

of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is 

required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is 

contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there 

is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (citations 

omitted). 

Nevertheless, we note that Johnson preserved a weight claim in his 

post-sentence motion, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, and the trial court addressed it 

as such in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Thus, despite Johnson’s phrasing of his 

second issue, we will address it as a challenge to the weight of the evidence.

“[A]ppellate review of a weight of the evidence claim normally involves 

examining the trial court’s exercise of discretion in its review of the factfinder’s determinations[.]” Commonwealth v. Ross, 856 A.2d 93, 99 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citing Widmer, supra). In Widmer, our Supreme Court 

further explained:

An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A 

new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in 

the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would 

have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do 

more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege 

that he would not have assented to the verdict if he [or she] 

were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the 

thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are 
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so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give 

them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations omitted). Stated 

differently, a court may award a new trial because the verdict is against the 

weight of the evidence only when the verdict rendered is so contrary to the 

evidence received as to shock one’s sense of justice such that right must be 

given another opportunity to prevail. Commonwealth v. Goodwine, 692 

A.2d 233, 236 (Pa. Super. 1997).

In this case, the trial court concluded that Johnson failed to specify how 

his guilty verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. The court 

explained:

[Johnson] claims that the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence as it was based on suspicion, conjecture and 

surmise. [He] does not make any specific allegations about 

what causes the verdict to be against the weight of the 

evidence. Indeed, despite his contentions, there were two 

eyewitnesses and video evidence, evidence that goes far 

beyond suspicion, conjecture and surmise. Thus, it cannot 

be said that the verdict herein was so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/2/18, at 10.

Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied Johnson’s weight claim. Ross, supra. As he did below, 

Johnson makes no specific weight claims in his brief. Indeed, in making his 

argument, he relies on a case involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. See Johnson’s Brief at 10 (quoting Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 

625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993)). Thus, because we discern no abuse of discretion 
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in the trial court’s rejection of his weight claim, we dismiss as meritless 

Johnson’s second issue on appeal.

Johnson’s third issue involves a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Our 

standard of review is well settled:

[P]rosecutorial misconduct does not take place unless the 

unavoidable effect of the comments at issue was to 

prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a fixed bias 

and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their 

ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true 

verdict. . . . In reviewing a claim of improper prosecutorial 

comments, our standard of review is whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. When considering such a claim, our 

attention is focused on whether the defendant was deprived 

of a fair trial, not a perfect one, because not every 

inappropriate remark . . . constitutes reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Noel, 53 A.3d 848, 858 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted). “Prosecutorial misconduct, however, will not be found where the 

comments were based on evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were 

only oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 927 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). In order to evaluate whether comments were 

improper, we must look to the context in which they were made. Id. Finally, 

the prosecutor’s comments may be reviewed as a fair response to defense 

counsel’s closing remarks. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 110, 1122 

(Pa. Super. 2018).

In his closing, defense counsel discussed the various items of evidence 

introduced by the Commonwealth, including the testimony of Burbage’s young 

son and Ms. Harris. Counsel stressed to the jury that “the most important 
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thing you’re going to have to decide is what we call credibility or believability.” 

N.T., Trial (Jury), 11/17/17, at 62. Pertinent to Johnson’s third issue, defense 

counsel argued:

Let’s take a look at Amira Harris, if we may.

17 years-old at the time. Although, if you recall when I 

asked her [a] question about her age, she had difficulty 

remembering, “Was I 17 or 18?” She wasn’t even sure.

Do you remember how I told you to watch in addition to 

listening? She was a perfect example of what I was 

referring to.

You will recall the way she was combative, antagonistic, 

confrontational. It seemed like almost every question that 

I asked she displayed one or more of these characteristics.

Why? Ask yourselves why. Did I ask her questions any 

differently that the [prosecutor] asked her? What was she 

trying to accomplish by this display of attitude and 

behavior?

***

You saw her body movements. She would stay back in 

the chair, look around, look down. All of these things, I 

submit, ladies and gentlemen, are telltale factors that can 

lead you to believe that this is a person who’s not being 

truthful.

What you have to decide is whether or not to believe 

what she had to say as well as the way she said them, the 

way she handled herself on the stand.

Id. at 72-73. Defense counsel then highlighted what he perceived to be 

inconsistencies in her testimony and later stated, “I submit [Ms. Harris] is 

about as worthy of belief as elephants flying.” Id. at 80.
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In her closing, the prosecutor addressed defense counsel’s above 

discussion about Ms. Harris’ testimony and her demeanor on the witness 

stand. She stated:

You also have Ms. Amira Harris, where defense wants you

to focus on her attitude during cross-examination instead of 

the substance of what she said what happened, but, yet, if

you paid close attention to his summation, the defense 

concedes that she was in the apartment that night, she got 

in an argument with [Burbage] and that she called 

Muhammad to come home. Muhammad is established to be 

[Johnson,] her boyfriend.

Everything she told us is the truth, but don’t believe her 

because she has an attitude with [defense] counsel.

N.T., Trial (Jury), 11/17/17, at 98. At this point, defense counsel objected, 

and the trial court overruled the objection.

The prosecutor then focused on Ms. Harris’ demeanor on the stand and 

offered reasons for her body movements, then continued: 

Members of the jury, I ask you to look at [Ms. Harris] as 

the real person she is and look at what she has gone through 

and had to experience in order to get to this point and yet 

when she gave her statement at the preliminary hearing and 

today, time and time again she has told what she saw 

happen that night.

Counsel calls her a liar. What could possibly be this girl’s 

motive? Common sense tells us we only lie when we have 

something to gain from it usually. What did she gain? The 

person she loved, the person she lived with it taken away 

from her, the person who was supposed to take care of her, 

gone.

***

Yet, despite that she came out strong. 

She told the truth about what happened - -
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N.T., Trial (Jury), 11/17/17, at 100-01. Defense counsel again objected, and 

this time the trial court sustained the objection. 

The prosecutor then went on to explain to the jury how other evidence 

presented by the Commonwealth corroborated Ms. Harris’ testimony. In her 

concluding remarks, the prosecutor stated:

As I stated and as I believe has been presented to you 

through witness after witness, after witness, after witness, 

the evidence in this case is overwhelming. We just don’t 

have two individuals with no motive to put [Johnson] in this 

situation other than the fact that it’s the truth - -

Id. at 106. At this point, defense counsel objected, and the trial court 

sustained the objection.

Following the prosecutor’s closing, and after the jury had left the 

courtroom, defense counsel moved for a mistrial “based upon each of the 

objections that [he] interposed to the commentary made by the 

Commonwealth during the course of the closing argument.” Id. at 109. When 

asked to be more specific, defense counsel referred to the prosecutor’s 

statements regarding the truth of Ms. Harris’ testimony, and stated that the 

“inappropriate commentary” was intended to “arouse or inflame the passions 

of the jury.” Id. at 110. The prosecutor informed the trial court that her 

argument regarding Ms. Harris’ truthfulness was said in the context that: 1) 

various aspects of her testimony were not challenged by the defense; and 2) 

her claim regarding no motive to fabricate was a fair response to defense 

counsel’s closing. Id. at 111.
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After hearing their positions, the trial court informed defense counsel 

that it would instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s “contention that 

the witnesses were truthful. That’s their decision.” N.T., Trial (Jury), 

11/17/17, at 112. The court further stated, “With regards to your objection 

to [the prosecutor’s] argument regarding motive to fabricate and twisting your 

words, I think that’s fair response.” Id. The trial court then denied Johnson’s 

motion for mistrial and recessed for lunch.

Once trial resumed, the trial court gave its charge to the jury. As part 

of its opening remarks the trial court addressed the basis for which Johnson 

had moved for a mistrial:

It is your responsibility as fact-finders to consider all the 

evidence that you believe material in deliberating upon your 

verdict.

To that end, you must disregard references to [Johnson] 

staring, at the witness, Amira Harris, as she testified.

Further, whether or not a witness is truthful is for you to 

decide.

Id. at 117.

In rejecting Johnson’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

when she vouched for Ms. Harris’ testimony, the trial court stated:

Here, the prosecutor simply argued that defense counsel did 

not challenge [Ms. Harris’] statements during her testimony, 

but rather [defense counsel] challenged her attitude on 

cross-examination. This does not constitute vouching for 

the witness’s credibility. Nevertheless, two of defense 

counsel’s objections were sustained. Indeed, this court 

gave a limiting instruction on this issue, stating “Further, 

whether or not a witness is truthful is for you to decide. In 
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light of these instructions, [Johnson] is unable to prove 

prejudice. This claim is meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/17, at 12 (citations omitted).

Our review supports the trial court’s conclusions. In his brief, Johnson, 

without citation, maintains, “It is Horn Book law that a prosecutor may not 

vouch for the alleged truth telling of his witness. Yet, the prosecutor in this 

case violated that holding.” Johnson’s Brief at 11. After discussing the 

prosecutor’s discussion of the truthfulness of Ms. Harris’ testimony despite his 

repeated objections, Johnson asserts:

In short, the prosecutor took a relatively weak case of 

Murder in the First Degree and attempted to make it much 

stronger by interjecting [her] personal opinion and beliefs 

for the jury’s consideration. That was grossly improper. 

There was prejudice as the jury now had to consider not 

only the evidence but the prosecutor’s person view of the 

evidence. For all those reasons, a new trial is required.

Id. at 13. We disagree.

In making the above argument, Johnson does not acknowledge the trial 

court’s limiting instruction. It is well settled, that juries are presumed to follow 

the instructions of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Faurelus, 147 

A.3d 905, 915 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Moreover, we agree with the trial court that, in making the challenged 

comments, the prosecutor did not vouch for Ms. Harris’ credibility. As this 

Court has recently summarized:

It is axiomatic that vouching is a form of prosecutorial 

misconduct, occurring when a prosecutor places the 

government’s prestige behind a witness through personal 
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assurances as to the witness’s truthfulness, and when it 

suggests that information not before the jury supports the 

wtiness’s testimony. Improper bolstering or vouching for a 

government witness occurs where the prosecutor assures 

the jury that the witness is credible, and such assurance is 

based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge or 

other information not contained in the record. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citations omitted). In Commonwealth v. Judy, this Court further stressed:

It is well settled that it is improper for a prosecutor to 

express a personal belief as to the credibility of the defendant or 

other witnesses. However, the prosecutor may comment on the 

credibility of witnesses. Further, a prosecutor is allowed to 

respond to defense arguments with logical force and vigor. If 

defense counsel has attacked the credibility of witnesses in 

closing, the prosecutor may present argument addressing the 

witnesses’ credibility. Thus, proper examination by the 

[prosecutor] in closing requires review of the arguments advanced 

by the defense in the defense summation.

Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

Here, the prosecutor’s comments about the “truthfulness” of Ms. Harris’ 

testimony, did not amount to the Commonwealth vouching for her credibility. 

In making these comments, “the prosecutor did not interject her personal 

belief” as to Ms. Harris’ veracity, but “simply commented thereon, as she was 

permitted to do.” Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1121. Moreover, the challenged 

comments were not based upon evidence dehors the record; the prosecutor 

repeatedly explained why Ms. Harris’ testimony was corroborated by other 

evidence presented by the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Burno, 

94 A.3d 956, 974 (Pa. 2014) (explaining while it is improper for prosecutor to 

offer a personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or credibility of a witness, 
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it is entirely proper for her to summarize the evidence presented, to offer 

reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, and to argue that the 

evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt). Finally, like the trial court, we 

view the prosecutor’s challenged comments as a proper response to defense 

counsel challenging Ms. Harris’ credibility. Since we discern no abuse of 

discretion by the trial court, Johnson’s third issue fails.

In sum, because all three issues raised by Johnson are meritless, we 

affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/19/19