Filed 1/29/15 P. v. Littleton CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
STEVE DONNELL LITTLETON,
Defendant and Appellant. B254510
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TA124049)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los An geles County, John Joseph Cheroske an d Laura R. Walton, Judges. Affirmed. Linn Davis, under a ppointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assist ant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Na than Guttman, Deputy At torney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————2 Following the denial of his motion to su ppress, appellant Steve Littleton pleaded no contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted three prior convictions w ithin the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to two ye ars in state prison. Littleton contends the trial court erred in denying his section 15 38.5 motion to suppress evidence which he contends was seized pursuant to an illegal detention. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts are shown by tes timony at the suppression hearing. On July 12, 2012, Det ective Matthew Landreth was assigned to the gang enforcement team within the op eration safe streets task force of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). Detective Landreth asked a proba tion officer who was also assigned to the gang enforcement team to research the residence at 11635 Pope Avenue in Lynwood (Pop e house) and find out if anyone residing there was on probation. Detective Landreth had previously been to the Pope house, and knew from LASD resources and from speaking with other office rs who had investigated the residence that the Pope house was owned and operated by me mbers of the Pope Avenue “Crips” street gang. The probation officer reported that a woman named Rayshaniece Richards had identified the Pope house as her residence. Richards was on probation and subject to search-and-seizure conditions, and had an ou tstanding “no-bail” arrest warrant for robbery issued on October 30, 2008. On July 13, 2012, at 7: 15 p.m., after confirming that Richards’s probation and warrant status remained unchanged, Detectiv e Landreth and other deputies proceeded to the Pope house. As he and hi s partner approached in their patrol car, Detective Landreth
saw Littleton and a nother man standing in front of th e open door of the Pope house’s attached garage. Other people were also standing outside the home. The garage was
about 30 feet fro m the sidewalk.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 The patrol car accelerated as the deputies approached, and Littleton and the other men on the property “started scattering.” Detective Landreth saw Littleton “[throw] a long object into the garage area” and walk away. Detect ive Landreth detained Littleton
and ascertained his name. Three other men who had been outside the Pope house on the
sidewalk or street were also detained. After detaining Littleton, Detective Landreth entered the open garage where he saw a sawed-off shotgun lying on a couch. Upon further in spection, Detective Landreth’s partner saw that the weapon’s se rial number had been ob literated. Detective
Landreth believed that the s hotgun was the object he had seen Littleton discard as he approached. Both were the same length and color, and the shotgun was found in the area
into which Littleton had tossed th e long object. No one else was or had been inside the

garage. Detective Landreth left the garage and headed to the front door where he asked Rosevelt Carter, the owner of the Pope house, whether Richards resided there. Carter denied knowing who Richards was. A few seconds later Detectiv e Landreth noticed a woman (Imane Wallace) walking back and forth in the rear of the house. Detective Landreth spoke with Wallace w ho said she knew Richards, a nd told the detective that Richards “stayed” at the Pope house “often.”
Detective Landreth then searched the ho use. He entered one bedroom which
Carter identified as the room Littleton “had b een staying” in. The door to the room was open and contained no locking mechanism. Be cause Richards had an outstanding arrest warrant, Detective Landreth searched under th e bed in that room to ensure that no one was hiding there. After shoving some bags , shoes and other items aside, he saw a revolver which, upon inspection also had had the serial numbe r removed. In the bedroom
Detective Landreth found mail addressed to Little ton at the Pope house address. He also found mail dated July 12, 2012 , addressed to Richards at the Pope house, lying on a
coffee table elsewhere in the house.4 DISCUSSION
Littleton contends his detention was unl awful and unsupported by any objective manifestation that he was involved in any criminal activity and that, therefore, all evidence derived as a result of the illegal dete ntion should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484–488 [83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441].) We disagree. 1. Standard of review “In ruling on a motion to su ppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and a pply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.]” ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 891.) In a hearing on a section 1538.5 motion to su ppress evidence, “the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the tr ial court. On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, and the trial c ourt’s findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they ar e supported by substantial evidence.” ( People v.
Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.) 2. The investigative detention was justified.
“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific, articulable facts th at, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manife station that the person detained may be
involved in crimin al activity.” ( People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231 ( Souza ).) Although a person’s presence in a high-crime area is not by itself enough to create a reasonable suspicion the person is involved in criminal activ ity, the “setting is a factor that can lend meaning to the person’s behavior. [Citations.]” ( People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 532.) “The time of night is another pertinent factor in assessing the validity of a detention.” ( Souza , at p. 241.) A person’s “e vasive conduct” or “sudden flight” from police also tends to establish the existence of reasonable suspicion. ( Id . at p. 242.) Furtive movements or gestures al one are insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. ( People v. Superior Court ( Kiefer ) (1970) 35 Cal.3d 807, 827–828, fn. 13.) However, furtiv e gestures coupled with other factors may provide reasonable suspicion that activity out of the or dinary has taken place. ( People v.
Flores (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 23, 27–28.) The concept of reas onable suspicion cannot be
reduced to “‘a neat set of le gal rules.’ [Citation.]” ( United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1].) It “can ar ise from less reliable information than required for probab le cause . . . .” ( People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) “The officer, of course, must be able to ar ticulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.”’ [Citation.]” ( Sokolow , at p. 7.) The detention at issue was predicated on Detective Landreth’s reasonable, articulated suspicion. The specific facts ar ticulated by Detective Landreth were: On the evening of July 13, after verify ing Richards’s probation status and the fact that a warrant for her arrest remained outstanding, Detectiv e Landreth and other o fficers headed to the Pope house—a residence he knew from pers onal experience and LASD resources was owned and operated by members of the Pope Avenue Crips, a criminal street gang—to search for Richards. As the patrol cars co nverged on the property, Detective Landreth saw Littleton immediately toss the “long object ” he was holding through the open garage door just before he and others quic kly scattered to avoid the deputies. The experienced detective’ s decision to detain Little ton was based on specific, articulable facts about the object he observed and the timing of Littleton’s rapid, furtive action immediately disposing of that object and dispersing just as officers converged on the scene, and was reasonable un der the circumstances. (See People v. Superior Court (Vega) (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 383 , 387–388 [driver’s suspicious act of driving at night without headlights coupled with furtive movements made just as red lights on patrol car pulling in behind his car were activated genera ted probable cause to justify detention and arrest]; Souza , supra , 9 Cal.4th at pp. 235, 240–241 [finding reasonable suspicion to detain where suspect in unlit, high-crime area late at night fled when officer shined spotlight on him, and his companions also ducked to avoid spotlight].) We reject Littleton’s assertion that De tective Landreth lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in any criminal activity because there could be an6 innocent explanation for his ac ts; the long object thrown into the garage might, for example, have been a wrench. First, Detec tive Landreth testified that he recognized the sawed-off shotgun lying on to p of the couch in the garage precisely because it was the same size and color as the object Littleton di scarded, and because it was found in the
same area into which Littleton had tossed the object after seeing the officers converge. The visual information gleaned by the detective of Littlet on’s furtive movements and his effort to distance himself as quickly as possi ble from the garage into which he had just tossed the object were sufficiently reliable to justify the detective’ s reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. This is par ticularly so in light of Detective Landreth’s specialized knowledge as a seasoned member of the gang enforcement team and his knowledge that the Pope house was owned and operated by members of a criminal street gang, the routine activities of which includ e commission of gun-related or violent
felonies. Although Littleton posits ther e may have been an inno cent explanation for his behavior, “[a] determination that reasonable su spicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” ( United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 277 [122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740]; see Souza , supra , 9 Cal.4th at pp. 233–235; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894 ( Tony C. ) [“The possibility of an in nocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct”].) Even if circumstances observe d by the officer might have an innocent explanation, they may still give rise to a re asonable suspicion which entitles the officer to perform an investigative detention. ( People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 146; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 373; Souza , at p. 242.) The California Supreme Court has long recogn ized: “[E]xperienced police o fficers develop an ability to perceive the unusual and suspic ious, and we recognize the right and duty of officers to make reasonable investigation of such activities.” ( People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477.) Activities which in isolation may seem innocuous, in proper context, can indicate criminal activity to a specia lly trained, experienced officer. ( People v. Carvajal (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 487, 495–496.)7 It is true that the factors cited by Detective Landreth might not by themselves suggest criminality. However, those factors mu st be examined in th eir entirety, not in
isolation. A factor such as “evasive behavi or is . . . pertinent . . . in determining reasonable suspicion.” ( Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124 [120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570].) So is the fact that the defendant makes gestures or hand movements, which, to an experienced officer, suggest furtive and illegal motives. (See, e.g., Souza , supra , 9 Cal.4th at pp. 241–242.) Based on th e totality of circumstances, Detective Landreth was justified in condu cting an investigative deten tion: he had specific and
articulable facts that would cause a reasonabl e officer to suspect that Littleton could be involved in criminal activity . The detective’s testimony sh owed: Littleton was standing with several other individuals on the propert y of a residence owned and operated by a criminal street gang and at which a violent fe lon with an outstanding arrest warrant was believed to reside; the entire gr oup immediately dispersed as the officers converged; and Littleton made a furtive movement to dispose of the long object he held as soon as he saw the officers approach. “The po ssibility of an innocent expl anation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasona ble suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the principal function of his [or her] investiga tion is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal . . . .” ( Tony C. , supra , 21 Cal.3d at p. 894.) The trial court was correct in finding th e existence of reasonable suspicion to justify the detention and in de nying Littleton’s motion to suppre ss. As a result of this conclusion, we need not and do not address respondent’s supplemental arguments as to why the motion to suppre ss was properly denied.8 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

BENDIX, J. *

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.