The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendre n, Chief Judge, United States District Court 1 for the Western Distri ct of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable B everly R. Stites, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-3356

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Arkansas. Roxanne Hill, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 5, 1999 Filed: February 17, 1999

___________ Before FAGG, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Roxanne Hill appeals her conviction for a drug offense following her conditional guilty plea. For reversal, she argues that th e district court erred in denying her motion 1 to suppress evidence. We affirm.-2-

Hill f irst argues that the stop of her vehicle was not supported by reasonabl e suspicion. In asse ssing the validity of an investigatory stop, we review for clear error the findin gs of historical fact, and review de novo the legal conclusions based upo n those facts. See United Sta tes v. Pena-Saiz , 161 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1998). At the suppression hearings, government witnesses testified as follows.

A confi dential informant (CI) provided narcotics detective Paul Smith with informationthat Francisco Ocampo was the head of a drug trafficking ring, and tha t Alberto Cortez, Rogelio Toled o, and a white male named “Jimbo” and a white female tha t “Jimbo” lived with in Flippin, Arkansas, worked for Ocampo. The CI ha d delivere d methamphetamine to the Flippin couple, and had collected drug proceed s fromthemto give to Ocampo. The CI informed officers that on January 9, 1998, a la rge load of methamphetamine was to be transported to a Super 8 motel, and on t o Boonevi lle, Arkansas; and that Ocampo and Cortez would be involved. Surveillance established that Ocampo and Cortez were at the motel on January 9, and that a Subu rban and a Honda traveling in tandem arrived at the motel, and then left

. Furthermore, a traffic stop of the Suburban revealed that Cortez was in the vehicle, and nearly 4.7 pounds of methamphetamine were recovered from the Honda when it was later stopped away f

rom the Suburban. The methamphetamine was to be delivered to Booneville, Arkansas. Cortez did not know that the drugs were seized. Surveillance of the Super 8 motel the next day reveal ed that Ocampo and Cortez were there, and were join ed by a man and a woman driving a black pickup truck from Fli ppin, Arkansas. The woman was later identified as Hill, and the man was late r identif iedas her co-defendant, James Norcross. Ocampo and Cortez left the mote l going to wards Fort Smith, Arkansas, and were followed by Norcross and Hill in th e truck. Detective Smith witnessed the vehicles drive in a manner which, in hi s experience, suggested they were engaging in counter-surveillance. The vehicles were followed to Ocampo’s apartment in Fort Smith. Norcross, accompanied by Hill , carrie d a stereo component from the truck into the apartment. In Detective Smith’ s-3-

experience, stereo equ ipment is often used by Hispanic gangs to hide drugs. Ocampo andCortez were already in the apartment, and they were later joined by Toledo

. Shortly after Toledo arrived, Norcross and Hill left the apartment with a stere o component; they were followed and stopped by a marked squad car.

We con clude that the corroborated information provided by the CI whic h correctly predicted future actions of these individuals, combined with the officers ’ observation of the counter-surveillance attempts and Norcross’s transporting the stereo component, established reasonab le suspicion to stop the vehicle. See United States v. Hill , 91 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnson , 64 F.3d 1120 , 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1139 (1996).
Hill ne xt argues that the consent she gave to search the vehicle was no t voluntary. The voluntariness of consent is a fact question to be determined from the totality of the circumstances, and is reviewed for clear error. See Pena-Saiz , 161 F.3d at 1177. Consent is not voluntary when it is the product of express or implied duress
or co ercion. See id ; United States v. Sanchez , 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998 ) (listing factors to consider in assessing whether consent was voluntarily given). The government presented evidence that Hill was questioned for only a couple of minut es and detained for only ten minutes before she gave consent; that after th e initial stop--which the officers considered to be a high-risk situation--the officers did not yell, scream, or even speak with raised voices; and that the officers did no t threaten, crowd around, or coerce Hill, or accuse her of being a liar. Instead, officers testifi ed that when they spoke with Hill, they used calm and rational voices. Hil l admitted she was informed she was not under arrest and she was not handcuffed before givi ng consent, and the encounter was in a public place. Officers testified that Hil l immediately gave consent for the search when she was aske d; Hill testified that she did not “have a problem” with the officers’ searching the pickup; and Hill qualified he r assertion tha t the officers screamed at her by stating that the volume of the officers ’-4-

conversations with her was “[p]robably a little louder” th an “it should have been.” We conclude the district court did not clearly err in determining that Hill voluntaril y consented to the search of the vehicle. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the district court. A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.