1

Filed 8/27/24 Security Management Group Internat. v. Jenkins CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SECURITY MANAGEMENT 

GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SCOTT JENKINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164147, A164970

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG16809374)

A jury awarded approximately one million dollars in damages, 

including $100,000 in punitive damages, to private security company, 

respondent Security Management Group International, Inc. (SMGI or the 

company), for multiple business torts committed by its former chief executive 

officer, appellant Scott Jenkins. 

Jenkins now appeals the resulting judgment and the denial of his 

motion for a new trial, raising numerous issues. 

We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

SMGI brought suit against Jenkins, asserting causes of action for 

breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, intentional interference with 

contractual relations, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. and Prof. 
2

Code, § 17200), and declaratory relief. It alleged that during Jenkins’ threeyear tenure as C.E.O., Jenkins misappropriated more than $400,000 from the 

company through a combination of writing unauthorized checks and making 

unauthorized withdrawals and wire transfers (including $21,500 in 

unauthorized wire transfers for personal expenses relating to his divorce); 

ran up $60,000 in unauthorized credit card charges; and unilaterally gave 

himself $35,000 in unauthorized pay raises. 

SMGI also alleged that Jenkins, while still employed, had been 

engaged in a secret plot with a competitor, Resolute Security Group, Inc.

(RSG), to destroy the company by stealing its customers and hiring away its 

employees. SMGI alleged that, as part of the plot, Jenkins tried to acquire a 

controlling stake in SMGI but failed to disclose to members of SMGI’s board 

of directors during negotiations for the purchase of controlling shares that 

the attempted acquisition was just a ruse to destroy the company, carried out 

with the secret financial backing of a business rival, Scott Gimple, RSG’s 

founder who had been ousted from the SMGI board but remained an SMGI

shareholder. 

It further alleged that when Jenkins abruptly resigned, he took his 

entire management team with him, abandoned the company’s headquarters 

leaving no employees behind, and with the former SMGI management team

immediately began working for the competitor. The company’s computers 

and cloud storage were allegedly discovered to have been wiped clean, the 

telephones had been “sabotaged,” and the company’s customer files were 

missing. After that, many customers transferred their business to the 

competitor and/or cancelled their contracts with SMGI.

The case proceeded to a 10-day trial. The first day of trial was not 

reported, and thus we have no record of opening statements and a portion of 
3

testimony by SMGI’s first witness, Robert Shiells, who testified for 

approximately two hours. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Jenkins 

liable for breaching his duty of loyalty to SMGI, for which it assessed 

$350,000 in damages; conversion, for which it awarded $251,268.75; 

interference with contract, for which it awarded $150,000; and interference 

with prospective economic relations, for which it likewise awarded $150,000.1

The trial court then held a one-day bifurcated trial on punitive damages at 

which Jenkins testified. The punitive damages phase of trial was unreported 

and no other record of the evidence was made. The jury awarded $100,000 in 

punitive damages. 

DISCUSSION

In considering Jenkins’ many arguments, we will consider only those 

issues that are identified in an argument heading of his opening brief, 

because the headings define the issues on appeal. Their purpose is to ensure 

that we are “ ‘ “advised, as [we] read, of the exact question under 

consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.” ’ ” 

(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142,

153 (United Grand Corp.).) “ ‘Failure to provide proper headings forfeits 

issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by a 

heading.’ ” (Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023) 

95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310.)

In considering this appeal, we also presume that all the trial court’s 

rulings are correct. It is Jenkins’ burden as the appellant to persuade us 

both of an error and that he was prejudiced as a result. (See Grappo v. 

1 The jury also found Jenkins breached a Mutual Non-Disclosure and 

Confidentiality Agreement, but the breach caused no damages. 
4

McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [calling such framework “[t]he most 

fundamental principle of appellate review”].)

This burden requires an appellant to do more than just criticize a 

ruling in a conclusory, truncated fashion: an appellant must develop a legal 

argument in a sufficiently clear manner to enable us to evaluate its 

soundness, without undertaking laborious steps on our own to figure out the 

applicable law, the pertinent facts or the logic behind appellant’s assertion of 

legal error. “ ‘[A]n appellant must supply the reviewing court with some 

cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” 

(United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 146.) “Mere suggestions of 

error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract 

principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.”

(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control 

Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) So, for example, it is not 

sufficient simply to cite legal authority without explaining how it applies. 

(Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 654; Allen v. City of 

Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) Nor is it proper to make factual 

statements without citing to the record; any arguments not supported by 

necessary record citations are forfeited. (United Grand Corp., at p. 156.) 

Simply put, appellate courts are not required to “guess” how an appellant 

thinks the trial court erred. (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle 

Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 869.) An appellant must “convince 

us, by developing his arguments, stating the law, and calling out relevant 

portions of the record, that the trial court committed reversible error,” and 

when an appellant fails to do so we may reject the appellant’s argument on

its face as insufficient to demonstrate error. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School

(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910; accord, Lafayette Morehouse, at p. 869.)
5

Jenkins’ opening brief asserts dozens of errors, many are briefed in a 

disorganized fashion without appropriately informative argument headings, 

and many in a conclusory fashion with little or no legal authority or analysis. 

He also fails to provide record citations for many of the factual assertions 

supporting his claims of error. Issues not discussed in this opinion are 

deemed forfeited for violating one or more of these principles of appellate 

review. 

1. The Jury Instructions

Jenkins argues, first, that there were numerous errors in the jury 

instructions. 

It is unnecessary to address the substance of the jury instructions 

because Jenkins has not demonstrated that any of the claimed errors 

prejudiced him. “[T]here is no rule of automatic reversal or ‘inherent’

prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of 

commission or omission.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th

548, 580.) Rather, “[i]nstructional error in a civil case is prejudicial ‘where it 

seems probable’ that the error ‘prejudicially affected the verdict.’ ” (Ibid.) 

“[T]hat determination depends heavily on the particular nature of the error, 

including its natural and probable effect on a party’s ability to place his full 

case before the jury,” and “[a]ctual prejudice must be assessed in the context of 

the individual trial record.” (Ibid., italics added.) This requires 

consideration of factors including “(1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect 

of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any 

indications by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Id. at pp. 580-581.)

Our duty to examine the record to evaluate whether an instructional 

error is prejudicial under the Soule factors “is triggered ‘when and only when 

the appellant has fulfilled his duty to tender a proper prejudice argument. 
6

Because of the need to consider the particulars of the given case, rather than 

the type of error, the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief 

exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] These 

principles are derived from the axiom that prejudice is not presumed and the 

burden is on the appealing party to demonstrate that prejudice has occurred.” 

(Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 614.) 

“ ‘Where any error is relied on for a reversal it is not sufficient for appellant 

to point to the error and rest there.’ ” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 

74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106; accord, DiRaffael v. California Army National 

Guard (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 692, 718.)

Here, Jenkins fails to analyze the Soule factors at all and instead 

makes only conclusory assertions of prejudice for the many errors he asserts. 

He goes so far as to call many of the claimed instructional errors “facially 

prejudicial” and asserts as to another that “prejudice is self-evident.” This 

was a 10-day trial, with a (partial) reporter’s transcript running to nearly 

3,000 pages and a 1,000-plus-page appendix. Prejudice is not “self-evident.” 

Jenkins has failed to carry his burden of affirmatively demonstrating the 

existence of any prejudicial instructional error. (Adams v. MHC Colony Park, 

L.P., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)

In addition, an appellant “carries the burden of presenting a sufficient 

record to establish that . . . claimed instructional errors were not invited or 

waived . . . .” (Green v. Healthcare Services, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 407,

420), and yet here the record shows that Jenkins also forfeited several of 

them: (1) his contention that the court erred by failing to give a clarifying 

instruction that he had a legal right to announce his resignation to SMGI 

customers, and (2) his contention the court erred by failing to give an 

instruction on breach of fiduciary duty damages. That is because the record 
7

does not show that he requested any such instructions.2 (See Suman v. BMW 

of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“When a trial court gives a 

jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is too general or is 

incomplete . . . , a failure to request an additional or a qualifying instruction 

will waive a party’s right to later complain on appeal about the instruction 

which was given”].)

Even if we considered the merits of Jenkins’ claims of instructional 

error, we still would reject them all because Jenkins has failed to develop a 

coherent argument that any of the instructions were legally erroneous. He 

asserts at least 20 distinct claims of instructional error (and maybe more, it’s 

hard to tell) in just 10 pages, unfurled rapid-fire at a breakneck pace. The 

discussion of each claimed error is long on generality, short on citation to 

legal authority and practically devoid of legal analysis. In the few instances 

2 Jenkins has filed an opposed request for judicial notice that we 

previously took under submission, a portion of which requests judicial notice 

of several proposed jury instructions. He requests judicial notice of the set of 

jury instructions proposed by SMGI, which are already in the record; two

proposed instructions submitted by his co-defendants, John Gimple and Scott 

Gimple and his own Proposed Special Instruction No. 1 (“Absolute Right of 

At-Will Employee to Terminate Employee [sic]”).

We deny his request for judicial notice of the proposed instructions, but 

on our own motion we deem the record augmented to include those that are 

not already in the appendix, specifically: Defendants’ Special Instruction 

No.1 (“Employee’s Announcement He Is Leaving His Employment”) and 

Defendants’ Special Instruction No. 2 (“Hiring Another Company’s 

Employees”), both proposed by defendants Scott Gimple and John Gimple,

and Defendant Scott Jenkins’ Proposed Special Instruction No. 1 (“Absolute 

Right of Employee to Terminate Employee [sic]”). (See Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

We address the remainder of Jenkins’ opposed request for judicial 

notice in footnote 10, infra, p. 16. 
8

where a claim of instructional error is supported by citation to case law,

Jenkins fails to explain how the authority applies. And with few exceptions, 

he does not even lay out the language of the instructions he challenges. His

challenge to the jury instructions sweeps far and wide but in highly 

conclusory fashion. No claim of instructional error is sufficiently explained or

developed to constitute a proper appellate argument, and thus none meets his 

burden to demonstrate error. 

Indeed, many problems are apparent from the face of Jenkins’ appellate 

briefing or a cursory review of his cited authorities and/or portions of the 

record. Illustrative are his arguments about errors in the instructions

concerning the conversion claim, where we will end our discussion. 

Jenkins argues that the conversion instructions were legally incorrect, 

first, because they omitted the element of demand for the return of property

allegedly converted. He cites authority that where property is acquired by 

consent, a claim for conversion requires proof of demand for the return of 

property and a refusal by the defendant. (Atwood v. Southern California Ice 

Co. (1923) 63 Cal.App. 343, 345.) But the plaintiff’s theory was that none of 

Jenkins’ actions were consensual, and both the jury instructions and special 

verdict form reflected that theory. On the conversion claim, the jury was 

instructed that SMGI had to prove (among other elements) that Jenkins 

withdrew funds from bank accounts “which [he] was not supposed to access 

without SMGI’s authorization and knowledge” yet did so, and that “SMGI did 

not consent.” And the special verdict form asked merely whether Jenkins 

“intentionally t[ook], spen[t], use[d], or interfere[d] with money, that 

belonged to SMGI,” whether SMGI “consent[e]d” to such actions, and what 

dollar amount of money Jenkins “took” from SMGI. The instructions and 

verdict form thus left no room for a finding Jenkins converted money that he 
9

acquired with SMGI’s consent. So the demand requirement of Atwood is 

irrelevant. (See Flennaugh v. Heinrich (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 214, 222 [“when 

property comes into the possession of a . . . person tortiously or unlawfully, . . 

. a demand, as a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of a suit for 

conversion, is not necessary”].) 

Jenkins also asserts the conversion instructions were faulty because 

“the jury was not instructed that it must find specific identifiable sums [of 

money] were taken and not returned.” But he cites no legal authority 

suggesting that specific identifiable sums of money are not involved where, as 

here, money is taken by means of provable, unauthorized bank withdrawals. 

The case he cites rejecting a conversion claim involved the theft of an 

indeterminate number of duffel bags stuffed with an indeterminate amount 

of cash. (See PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & 

Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 397.) By contrast, SMGI cites 

authority that expressly discusses caselaw involving conversion of money by 

the same means involved here: cashing checks belonging to the plaintiff by 

endorsing them with an unauthorized signature. (See Welco Electronics, Inc. 

v. Mora (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 212, discussing Acme Paper Co. v. 

Goffstein (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 175, 179.) In short, Jenkins has cited no 

pertinent caselaw in support of this claim of error. He does not even discuss 

the one case he does cite. 

Jenkins also challenges the instructions on awarding treble damages 

for conversion but the argument is confusing, poorly developed and hard to 

follow.3 It also borders on frivolous because the jury did not award treble 

3 He asserts that it failed to correctly instruct the jury on the 

heightened showing of “ ‘criminal intent’ to engage in theft” under Penal Code 

section 496, while at the same time erroneously telling the jury that treble 
10

damages for conversion, and so any error obviously was harmless. Although 

the jury was instructed that it could treble damages for conversion, the 

portion of the special verdict form addressing the conversion cause of action 

had no question asking the jury to do so. The verdict form merely asked it to 

determine “the dollar amount of money that Scott Jenkins took from SMGI” 

(answer: $251,268.75). Jenkins’ response to this problem is unpersuasive.

We will comment no further. For the reasons stated, Jenkins has failed 

to demonstrate any prejudicial instructional error.

2. Compensatory Damages

Next, Jenkins argues that the compensatory damages were “incorrectly 

calculated” because, he claims, the jury awarded damages “for the same 

alleged wrongs.” 

This argument fails at the threshold because Jenkins did not request a 

special verdict form segregating the various elements of damages.4 (See 

Moore v. Teed (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 280, 294-295 [duplicative damages claim 

held forfeited].) Without a special verdict segregating the various 

components of damages, “ ‘ “we have no way of determining what portion—if 

any” of an award was attributable to a particular category of damages 

challenged on appeal.’ ” (Id. at p. 295.)

damages could be awarded “even if no form of ‘fraud’ was found.” But he does 

not explain what “criminal intent” entails much less what a proper 

instruction should have said. 

4 Although SMGI does not argue forfeiture but simply addresses the 

argument on the merits, that does not preclude our consideration of the 

problem. (See S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 

184 Cal.App.4th 712, 722 [deeming issue forfeited even though respondent 

did not argue forfeiture].)
11

Furthermore, Jenkins’ claim of error is not sufficiently developed for us 

to consider it.

Both parties cite and acknowledge the applicable legal standard. As 

explained by our Supreme Court in caselaw both parties cite, “Regardless of 

the nature or number of legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, he is not 

entitled to more than a single recovery for each distinct item of compensable 

damage supported by the evidence. [Citation.] Double or duplicative 

recovery for the same items of damage amounts to overcompensation and is 

therefore prohibited.” (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158-

1159.) 

Jenkins recites this general legal principle but does not explain how it 

applies here. He argues that multiple claims were based on the same 

underlying conduct. And that may be true. But he has not explained the 

various “items of damages” sought for each claim, much less demonstrated 

that the jury awarded the same “items of damage” on more than one claim.

Such a showing would require at least some minimal comparison between 

plaintiff’s damages theories for each cause of action, the evidence supporting 

them and the amounts the jury awarded for each cause of action. Jenkins 

has not done that, and it is not our job to pour over the trial transcripts to 

figure out plaintiff’s damages claims, scrutinize the special verdict form, and 

attempt to reconcile the two with no assistance. (See Billauer v. Escobar-Eck

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 969 [“It is not our function to scour the record and 

make [appellant’s] arguments for him”].) “Appellants may not enlist the 

court as their legal assistant to develop arguments they merely suggest. The 

duty to present legal analysis belongs to the parties. It would be unfair for 

one side to loft an undeveloped legal idea, to rely on the court to work it out, 

and to leave the opposing party with nothing concrete to tackle in the 
12

briefing.” (Paglia & Associates Construction, Inc. v. Hamilton (2023) 

98 Cal.App.5th 318, 327; accord, KCSFV I, LLC v. Florin County Water Dist.

(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1031 [appellate courts disregard “conclusory 

arguments”].) 

Furthermore, as SMGI points out, the jury was instructed that it was 

not permitted to award duplicative damages under multiple legal theories—

an instruction we must presume the jury followed (see People v. Boyette

(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436)5—and it also awarded significantly lower 

compensatory damages than plaintiff sought.6 Jenkins does not respond to 

those points. In addition, plaintiff’s counsel told jury in closing argument 

that even though some of its damages claims overlapped, “[t]his does not 

mean that we want—are entitled to or are asking [for] this money [to be] 

awarded” more than once.7 

5 No such instruction was given in any of the cases Jenkins cites 

(Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1612; DuBarry Internat., 

Inc. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 552, 564-565

& fn. 16) and, indeed, in one the jury was expressly told (in response to a jury 

question) that it could award duplicative damages. (See DuBarry, at pp. 564-

565 & fn. 16.) 

6 Plaintiff’s counsel asked the jury to award approximately $2.1 million 

in compensatory damages: $512,916 for stolen money (which included 

$416,000 in unauthorized wire transfers and $96,000 of personal expenses) 

and $1.6 million in damages for the company’s diminution in value. The jury 

awarded less than half that amount, i.e., $901,268: $350,000 in breach of 

fiduciary duty damages, $251,268 in conversion damages, $150,000 for 

interference with contract, and $150,000 for interference with prospective 

economic relations. 

7 Jenkins misrepresents the record by omission on this point. He 

misleadingly asserts that plaintiff’s counsel “admitted its own duplicative 

theory at trial” by telling the jury that the breach of fiduciary duty and 

conversion claims were “two ‘avenue[s] to get to the same damages claims.’ ” 
13

In sum, we are left with far more questions than answers regarding 

Jenkins’ assertion the jury awarded duplicative damages. Accordingly, he 

has failed to meet his burden as the appellant to demonstrate that it did.

3. Punitive Damages

Jenkins argues the $100,000 punitive damages award must be vacated, 

first, because SMGI delayed until the middle of closing arguments on the 

merits to seek discovery of his financial condition and bifurcation of the 

punitive damages phase. He argues this was legally erroneous on the face of 

Civil Code section 3295, the statute precluding pre-trial discovery of a 

defendant’s financial condition, allowing bifurcation and precluding 

introduction of evidence of a defendant’s wealth during the liability phase of 

trial. The contention is not supported by the statute’s plain language, which 

for brevity we refrain from discussing. (See Civ. Code, § 3295, subds. (c), (d).) 

The contention has also been consistently rejected by the courts. “[A]

court may order a defendant to produce evidence of his or her financial 

condition following a determination of liability for punitive damages even if 

the plaintiff has not attempted to obtain that information prior to trial.”

(StreetScenes v. ITC Entertainment Group, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 233, 

243; accord, Soto v. BorgWarner Morse TEC Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 165,

193 [“the court may issue its order at any time, including after a finding of 

liability has been made”]; Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 

597, 609.) SMGI cites some of these cases, yet Jenkins persists in his reply 

brief to ignore them.8

He fails to disclose that plaintiff’s counsel told the jury that nonetheless, it 

could not award duplicative damages.

8 The fact that a trial court has discretion to permit discovery into a 

defendant’s financial condition after a trial on liability has been conducted 
14

Next, Jenkins argues the jury instructions on punitive damages were 

legally erroneous because they permitted a finding of oppression, fraud or 

malice in a vacuum rather than with respect to a specific cause of action (see 

Civ. Code, § 3294). We reject this claim for two reasons. First, he has not 

demonstrated any error: the authority he cites does not address this issue

(see Medo v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 64 [separate juries for 

liability and punitive damages not permitted]), and the court gave the 

standard pattern instruction on this issue (see CACI No. 3941).

9 In addition, 

as noted above, Jenkins has made no attempt to demonstrate that any such 

error was prejudicial.

Next, Jenkins argues the award must be vacated because “[t]his record 

has no evidence to justify the award.” There is “no evidence” because there is 

no reporter’s transcript of the punitive damages phase. 

The lack of a record compels us to affirm the jury’s punitive damages 

award. An appellant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence if it 

fails to provide a reporter’s transcript of trial. (See, e.g., Foust v. San Jose 

“does not preclude a trial court from determining, in its discretion, that such 

an order is inappropriate” on the ground the plaintiff delayed too long in 

seeking such information. (I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc.

(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 284.) But Jenkins does not contend that the 

particular facts here rendered the ruling an abuse of discretion. He asserts 

only categorically that the court has no power to permit this after a trial on 

liability has been conducted, ever.

9 In relevant part, the jury was instructed: “If you decide that Scott P. 

Jenkins and John Gimple’s conduct caused SMGI harm, you must decide 

whether that conduct justifies an award of punitive damages. [¶] At this time 

you must decide whether SMGI has proved by clear and convincing evidence 

that Scott P. Jenkins and John Gimple engaged in that conduct with malice, 

oppression or fraud. The amount of punitive damages, if any, will be decided 

later.” 
15

Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 184-188; Aguilar v. Avis 

Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) That is because “a party 

challenging a judgment has the burden of showing reversible error by an 

adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) And “ ‘[i]t is 

well established that a reviewing court starts with the presumption that the 

record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.’ ” (Foreman & Clark 

Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman & Clark Corp).) Where the 

record is silent on a particular matter, we presume the judgment is correct. 

(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) 

Jenkins implies that punitive damages awards are exempt from these 

bedrock principles of appellate review, but he cites no authority that they are,

and we are aware of none. On the contrary, his position is directly refuted by 

caselaw. (See California Novelties, Inc. v. Sokoloff (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 936,

945 [rejecting sufficiency of evidence challenge to punitive damages award 

because appellant “has provided us with no record of the testimony presented 

by plaintiffs at the four-day hearing on damages”].) Indeed, his own cited 

authority acknowledges that when a punitive damages award is challenged 

on the ground of insufficient evidence, appellate courts draw all favorable 

presumptions in support of upholding the award. (See Kelly v. Haag (2006) 

145 Cal.App.4th 910, 916.) 

Jenkins also argues the $100,000 award cannot stand because it equals 

his entire net worth, which he says is $100,000. And he cites caselaw holding 

that a punitive damages award is excessive as a matter of law in such 

circumstances. (See Storage Services v. C.R. Oosterbaan (1989) 

214 Cal.App.3d 498, 514-516; but see People v. Ashford University, LLC

(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 536-537 [questioning Storage Services]; Zaxis 

Wireless Communications, Inc. v. Motor Sound Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 
16

577, 582 [same].) We express no opinion on the merits because this 

contention fails for the same reason: the lack of an adequate record.

10

4. SMGI’s Damages Expert

Jenkins contends the court erred in permitting testimony from SMGI’s 

damages expert, Mark Newton. Jenkins concedes, however, that he did not 

object to the admission of Newton’s testimony. Accordingly, he has forfeited 

any challenge to its admission. (See Orozco v. WPV San Jose, LLC (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 375, 396-397 [arguments that damages expert was 

incompetent and used flawed methodology held forfeited].) “ ‘It is hornbook 

law that a timely and specific objection is required to prevent the 

consideration of certain evidence; the failure to object at all waives any claim 

of error.’ ” (Id. at p. 397.)

5. Guilty Plea Evidence

Jenkins challenges on several grounds the admission of Exhibit 151, a

copy of his February 2018 guilty plea to one misdemeanor count of 

embezzlement (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) reflecting he was sentenced to 

three years of probation and required to attend a driving under the influence 

program. 

10 The remainder of Jenkins’ opposed motion for judicial notice that we 

previously took under submission (see footnote 2, ante, p. 7) asks us to take 

judicial notice of the transcript of his deposition in which he testified about 

his net worth. 

We deny that request. “[D]ocuments not before the trial court cannot 

be included as part of the record on appeal and thus must be disregarded as

beyond the scope of appellate review.” (Pulver v. Avco Financial Services

(1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622, 632.) Moreover, deposition testimony is not 

judicially noticeable. (See Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 22

[“Although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript 

filed as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not 

subject to judicial notice”].)
17

SMGI argues without contradiction by Jenkins that: (1) he forfeited 

any challenge to the admissibility of this exhibit because, although the record 

reflects he objected to its introduction, the record does not specify any 

ground(s) for his objection (see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [record must show 

a timely objection to evidence “and so stated as to make clear the specific 

ground of the objection”]); (2) any error in the introduction of the exhibit was 

harmless, because there also was oral testimony about Jenkins’ criminal plea; 

and (3) Jenkins’ contention the document was not certified is wrong. 

Jenkins’ reply brief does not address those points (indeed, it does not 

address this issue at all). We interpret Jenkins’ failure to respond to SMGI’s 

arguments as an implicit concession of their merits. (See Rudick v. State Bd. 

of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89-90 [appellants implicitly conceded

point by “failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument

on this point”].) 

We also reject Jenkins’ arguments for the additional reason that he has 

not made any attempt to show that the admission of this evidence was 

prejudicial. When challenging an evidentiary ruling, an appellant must do 

more than show the trial court erred. “A court’s error in excluding evidence 

is grounds for reversal only if the appellant demonstrates a miscarriage of 

justice, that is, that a different result would have been probable had the error 

not occurred.” (Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 

1179, 1202; see also Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 

157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1480; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid. Code, § 354; Code 

Civ. Proc., § 475.) Jenkins has made no attempt to do that. 
18

6. Conversion Verdict

Jenkins argues that the conversion verdict “fails both as a matter of 

law, and also even under the substantial evidence standard of review as to 

the facts” for several reasons. 

First, reprising his argument concerning the jury instructions, he 

argues that conversion requires proof of a “specific, identifiable” sum and yet 

in this case, there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s $251,000 

conversion verdict which he says “is not in the record, and is made up.” But, 

as we have explained, Jenkins has failed to show that the court erred by not 

instructing the jury that conversion requires proof of “specific identifiable 

sums of money.” 

And because Jenkins has failed to demonstrate any error in the jury 

instructions in this respect, he cannot challenge the verdict through the 

backdoor by recasting the same point as a sufficiency of the evidence 

problem. It is well-settled that an appellate court “review[s] the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a verdict under the law stated in the instructions 

given, rather than under some other law on which the jury was not 

instructed.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655,

674-675 (Bullock).) “Absent instructional error, . . . for an appellate court to 

review a verdict under a rule of law on which the jury was not instructed 

would allow reversal of a judgment on a jury verdict, requiring a retrial, even 

though neither the jury nor the court committed error.” (Id. at p. 675.)

The argument also fails on its face: Jenkins’ complaint is that “no one 

can even figure out where the number comes from” yet concedes that “the 

jury was told to calculate specific sums plus further compensation.” He has 

not shown that there is no possible way the jury could have sifted through the 
19

evidence and arrived at a figure of $251,268.75. He has not even summarized 

(much less analyzed) SMGI’s damages evidence.

Second, he contends that the conversion verdict is “invalid” or “void” 

because in order to treble damages for conversion, “the evidentiary rules of 

punitive damages attach” and yet there was no evidence introduced during 

phase one of his financial condition, nor was there clear and convincing 

evidence of oppression, fraud or malice. We do not address these points. As 

explained above, the jury did not award treble damages for conversion. Any 

error was harmless.

Next, he argues there was insufficient evidence of conversion because 

“one signature is not conversion,” a contention supported by argument that 

$1.1 million of business checks and wires allegedly converted “were paid to 

third parties and not taken by [him].” He asserts the money was used to pay 

legitimate business expenses, including bills and employee payroll. At a very 

high level of generality, the argument has some superficial appeal. But 

Jenkins has failed to develop the argument in a way that we can 

meaningfully assess it. He has not discussed any of the evidence bearing on 

this issue; rather, the entire argument is supported by a citation to a single, 

isolated sentence in SMGI’s closing argument.11 Nor has he shown either 

that the jury instructions were erroneous in connection with this issue or, 

alternatively, that the evidence was insufficient judged by the law stated in 

the instructions. (See Bullock, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 674-675.) So the 

point is wholly disconnected from any specific claim of error. Further, his

11 He cites counsel’s statement to the jury that “Jenkins wrote checks 

over $5,000 on a single signature for more than a total of $977,000. He also 

made wire transfers in excess of $5,000, each on his single signature, for over 

$137,000.” 
20

argument is not supported by a discussion of any pertinent legal authority. 

He cites just one case but does not analyze it, and it is of no apparent 

relevance. (See Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141 [holding that 

conversion does not lie to recover unpaid wages].) 

We also have trouble following the logic. Even if we assume that some 

portion of the funds allegedly converted were put to some legitimate use that 

legally cannot constitute conversion, Jenkins has failed to demonstrate that 

the jury necessarily found him liable for converting those funds or otherwise 

explain why the entire verdict fails for insufficient evidence. As noted, the 

jury returned a conversion verdict of $251,268.75, a figure substantially 

lower than the $1.1 million in allegedly unauthorized wires and checks.

For all these reasons, Jenkins has not met his burden to demonstrate 

an error. 

Next, Jenkins argues that the jury’s conversion verdict was 

unsupported by the evidence because, as we understand his argument, the 

$46,022 he concededly paid himself in unused paid time off was not improper.

He maintains that this aspect of the conversion claim was based only on an 

employment policy stated in an employee handbook yet “there was no 

evidence” the handbook even applied to him. But the very testimony he cites 

is from a board member who testified that he believed “it was the policy for 

everyone.” 

And even without such testimony we would reject Jenkins’ argument. 

He makes no argument, much less cites authority, that it was beyond the 

fact-finding province of a jury to reasonably infer that the policy stated in the 

employee handbook did apply to him. (See Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 291, 308 [in reviewing judgment based on jury verdict, “a 

reviewing court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the 
21

prevailing party and must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the 

trial court’s judgment”].)

7. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Verdict

Next, Jenkins challenges the jury’s $350,000 breach of fiduciary duty 

verdict on multiple grounds.

First, he argues that he is protected by the business judgment rule for 

the way he ran the company and contends that “the root problem with the 

jury’s verdict is that the jury granted SMGI fiduciary duty damages for [his] 

alleged poor management (that the Board even approved no less).” But the 

legal standard he recites was not reflected in the jury instructions, and 

Jenkins has not argued that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on 

the business judgment rule.12 As noted, absent error in the jury instructions, 

we judge the sufficiency of the evidence based on the law stated in the 

instructions. (See Bullock, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 674-675.) Jenkins’ 

arguments about points of law not addressed in the instructions given are 

thus irrelevant in determining the sufficiency of the evidence.

Next, he argues that his expenditures for overseas travel were 

legitimate. This conclusory argument is presented in a vacuum, with no 

discussion of the jury’s actual verdict and no discussion of any law. It fails to 

demonstrate error.

Next, he argues he did not breach his duty of loyalty “by using one 

signature” on checks “as a matter of law” because the SMGI board never 

questioned his check-writing practices and/or ratified his decisions to pay 

SMGI bills in this fashion. This conclusory argument is presented in a 

12 Such an argument would fail, because the record does not show he 

requested an instruction on the business judgment rule.
22

vacuum, with no discussion of the jury’s actual verdict, no discussion of the 

evidence of the bills supposedly paid and the testimony about them, and no 

discussion of any law. It fails to demonstrate error.

Next, he argues that “trying to acquire a company is not a breach of 

duty of loyalty.” Citing—but not discussing—Jaynes v. Jaynes (1950) 

98 Cal.App.2d 447, he asserts that the only information SMGI claims he 

should have disclosed was that Gimple, SMGI’s business rival, was his source 

of funding in the attempted acquisition of SMGI, but that he did not owe 

SMGI a duty to disclose that information. Jaynes does not address the 

existence or non-existence of a duty by corporate officers to disclose such 

information, nor in any way support that contention.

13 Accordingly, Jenkins 

has shown no error. 

Next, he argues he did not breach his duty of loyalty by transferring 

SMGI business and employees to RSG when he resigned. This contention is 

forfeited. It is evident from even a cursory reading of the appellant’s brief 

that Jenkins has failed to summarize all the relevant evidence, and to the 

extent he discusses the evidence at all it is unfairly one-sided. 

For example (and without being exhaustive), he asserts that the Board 

instructed him to cut most of the employees, citing his own testimony to that 

effect and that of an SMGI employee who testified Jenkins told him this, and 

13 Jaynes reversed a judgment for instructional error where a nonmanaging shareholder was allegedly duped into selling her shares to the 

company’s general managers based on false representations about the value 

of her shares and false representations that the managers had a controlling 

stake in the company. (See Jaynes v. Jaynes, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d at p. 449.) 

The appellate court held that the breach of fiduciary duty instruction 

erroneously imposed a duty on the selling shareholder to investigate the true 

facts for herself. (See id. at pp. 451-453.)
23

thus claims he could not be held liable for merely “informing the [SMGI] 

employees of the state of the company.” But nowhere does his appellate brief 

discuss conflicting testimony by an SMGI board member denying that 

Jenkins was told to fire employees or that the board planned to shut down 

the company. 

He does not discuss his own admission at trial that while he was still 

employed with SMGI he was simultaneously working with Gimple to make a 

business proposal to one of SMGI’s prospective clients (Edison Electric 

Institute).

He does not discuss testimony that at the very first meeting with new 

SMGI employees who had been hired by RSG (including Jenkins), RSG 

discussed that “the plan was to reach out to the SMGI clients, let them know 

what was going on, and RSG was going to start taking over these accounts.” 

He does not discuss the evidence that he directed departing 

management employees to engage in wholesale destruction of all SMGI paper 

files and to wipe all data from SMGI computers coincident with their mass, 

unannounced resignation.

He does not discuss the content of the email he sent to SMGI clients 

soliciting their future business when he resigned from SMGI. The email 

went well beyond merely announcing his departure and was similar in tone 

and content to communications courts in other cases have held to be unlawful 

solicitation.14 (See, e.g., American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks (1989) 

14 The email touted his own personal accomplishment as CEO for 

“bringing this company back from the brink of extinction to the flourishing 

company it is today,” announced his resignation and that of his executive 

team due to “the differences in the long-term vision and commitment for 

continued growth with the company’s Board of Directors” and concluded by 
24

213 Cal.App.3d 622, 626, 636-637 [holding that similar letter went beyond 

merely announcing new employment and constituted unlawful solicitation of 

employer’s customers]; Blue Mountain Enterprises, LLC. v. Owen (2022) 

74 Cal.App.5th 537, 544, 554-556.) Yet he makes no attempt to analyze its 

contents to show that it was lawful. Further, even some of the evidence that 

Jenkins does cite in his own defense (but does not actually discuss) supports 

a reasonable inference that RSG actively solicited SMGI clients.

15 

In light of Jenkins’ incomplete, one-sided discussion of the evidence, we 

will not consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the jury’s finding he breached his fiduciary duty. “A party who challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding must set forth, discuss, 

and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.” 

(Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 

209, 218.) When the appellant fails to do that, we deem the sufficiency of the 

evidence issue waived. (Id. at p. 218; Foreman & Clark Corp., supra,

3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) An appellant who discusses “ ‘merely their own 

evidence’ ” falls short of tendering an issue for the appellate court’s 

consideration. (Foreman & Clark. Corp., at p. 881, italics omitted.) In short, 

stating “I truly look forward to our paths crossing again in the not too distant 

future and being of service to you once again.” 

15 Specifically, he cites email correspondence with an SMGI customer 

“recommend[ing]” that they “stay with SMGI for thirty days” before making a 

decision about whether to transfer their business while RSG in the meantime 

promised to “be looking to find you the best possible officers in case at the end 

of those days you want the current officer replaced or they come to Resolute 

with the account,” in order to “separate[] you from the whole mess, provid[e] 

you with an industry-standard transition and cannot be questioned.” The 

jury could reasonably infer from the face of that communication that the 

effort to lure customers away from SMGI was structured to reach fruition 

under cover of a 30-day waiting period designed to minimize legal exposure. 
25

Jenkins has waived his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the jury verdict finding that he breached his fiduciary duty to SMGI.

8. Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Verdict

Jenkins argues that the $150,000 jury verdict for interference with 

prospective economic advantage must be reversed because the claim was not 

pled. 

He forfeited this issue because he allowed the cause of action to go to 

verdict without objection. He did not object to the jury instruction on this 

cause of action, nor to the inclusion of this claim on the verdict form.

“ ‘ “Where the parties try the case on the assumption that . . . [an] issue . . . 

[is] raised by the pleadings, . . . neither party can change this theory for the 

purpose of review on appeal.” ’ ” (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1996) 14 Cal.4th 39,

48-49; accord, Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 392; see 

also, e.g., Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 

257, 277 [failure to object at trial to error in special verdict form waives issue 

on appeal]; Olson v. La Jolla Neurological Associates (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 

723, 737 [contention that liability theory is beyond the scope of the pleadings

held forfeited by failing to object].) 

In his reply brief, Jenkins tacitly concedes he forfeited this issue, 

urging us not to “bless[]” this claimed error “by waiver.” We decline the 

invitation. Had the issue been called to the trial court’s attention, SMGI 

might have sought to amend the pleadings to conform to proof, and we will 

not unfairly deprive it of the right to request and likely obtain such relief by 

addressing this claimed pleading defect for the first time on appeal.

9. Interference with Contract Verdict

Citing authority that agents cannot be liable for interfering with 

contracts entered into by their principal (see Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 
26

52 Cal.3d 1, 24; Mintz v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 

1594, 1603-1604; PM Group, Inc. v. Stewart (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 55, 65), 

Jenkins argues he cannot be liable for interfering with SMGI’s contracts 

because while he was employed there he was functionally a party to those 

contracts (having procured them for SMGI in his capacity as CEO). This 

argument is forfeited because it contains no discussion of the evidence or 

citation to any portion of the record. It also is unpersuasive: Jenkins fails to 

discuss any of his conduct after he resigned from SMGI, when he was no 

longer acting as an agent for SMGI, much less explain why that conduct 

would not be sufficient to support the claim. 

Jenkins also argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law 

to support the jury’s verdict that he intentionally interfered with SMGI’s 

clients, because it is undisputed that SMGI itself terminated those contracts.

We reject this argument. The jury found that SMGI had existing 

contracts with five entities (the California Lottery, the Port of Seattle, the 

East Bay Municipal Utility District, the East Bay Asian Local Development 

Corporation, and Jones Lang LaSalle, Inc.) and that Jenkins intentionally 

interfered with “one or more” of them, for which it awarded $150,000 in 

damages. Accordingly, to overturn the jury’s verdict Jenkins must show 

there is no substantial evidence he interfered with any of them.16

But Jenkins has failed to discuss all the relevant evidence concerning 

at least one of the clients, the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD),

resulting in a one-sided recitation of the facts that works a forfeiture. 

Jenkins asserts that EBMUD contacted SMGI to discuss the contract and 

16 We note that SMGI concedes that its contract with the Port of 

Seattle was “extremely unfavorable,” it was “suffering huge losses” under the 

contract and it “chose to terminate” the contract. 
27

SMGI told the client it could no longer service the contract, thereby ending 

the relationship. He asserts that “Jenkins had nothing to do with SMGI’s 

loss” of this relationship. But Jenkins does not mention testimony by SMGI 

co-founder and board member Robert Shiells, cited by SMGI in its statement 

of facts, that this entire episode was precipitated by Jenkins’ solicitation 

letter:

“Q: [W]as SMGI able to keep that work after Mr. Jenkins left?

A: No.

Q: What happened with that contract?

A. They contacted us and said that we were not going to be their—no 

longer be their provider. Principally with the poison-pill letter from Mr. 

Jenkins, it did not appear that we could continue services.”17 (Italics added.) 

Jenkins’ incomplete discussion of the evidence forfeits his contention the 

evidence is insufficient to prove he interfered with the EBMUD contract. 

(See Foreman & Clark Corp., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Further, a jury could 

reasonably infer that but for Jenkins’ letter, EBMUD would not have reached 

out to SMGI to question SMGI’s ability to continue providing it with services. 

Accordingly, he has not demonstrated that the jury’s finding he interfered 

with “one or more” existing client is unsupported by substantial evidence.

10. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic 

Advantage Verdict

The jury found that SMGI had no existing contract with Levi’s but that 

there was an economic relationship that probably would have resulted in an 

economic benefit to SMGI that Jenkins disrupted. SMGI board member 

17 Jenkins does cite to this testimony elsewhere in his brief (on the 

issue of causation) and says it is not substantial evidence. No legal authority 

is cited for that proposition, and we therefore disregard it. 
28

Shiells testified Levi’s was an “event-driven customer” for whom SMGI would 

work from time to time but that there was nothing ongoing. Jenkins asserts 

that there is no substantial evidence to support tort liability for the loss of 

this relationship solely because “[w]hen asked why . . . Levi’s did not call 

SMGI in 2016, Shiells responded by saying ‘I don’t know why.’ ” That 

conclusory argument, unsupported by any legal authority or analysis, does 

not meet Jenkins’ burden to show error. 

It also fails to accurately summarize Shiells’ testimony. Shiells 

testified, “I don’t know why. Well, I assume it was because of the letter they 

received that we no longer had a CEO or any management on the staff.”

(Italics added.) Jenkins makes no argument that the jury could not 

reasonably infer the same thing. Thus, he has failed to show the verdict is 

unsupported by substantial evidence.

Moreover, as noted, the first day of Shiells’ testimony is unreported. 

When no reporter’s transcript is provided, “it is presumed that the

unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (In re 

Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992; accord, Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. 

of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1125, fn. 4 [“[i]n the absence of 

any record of [witness’s] testimony at the evidentiary hearing, we must 

presume that testimony supports the court’s findings”]; see also Foreman & 

Clark Corp., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881 [appellate court must presume “ ‘the 

record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact’ ”].) So we must 

conclusively presume that his testimony would support a finding in SMGI’s 

favor.

11. Causation and Harm

Jenkins asserts that SMGI failed to prove that his actions caused 

damage to SMGI. We reject this argument because it cites legal authority 
29

without explaining how it applies, relies on conclusory factual statements 

unsupported by citations to the record, and is presented in a vacuum with no 

analysis of the jury’s verdict. For example, as just discussed, a jury could 

reasonably conclude Jenkins caused the disruption of actual or prospective 

relationships with both Levi’s and EBMUD. Jenkins’ argument is 

insufficient to demonstrate error.

12. Remaining Issues

Jenkins argues that his mere “act of quitting was wrongly used as a 

basis for interference” of liability, citing (but not discussing) portions of 

testimony by SMGI’s damages expert to which no objection was interposed, 

portions of SMGI’s closing argument to which no objection was interposed, 

and the jury instructions on intentional interference with prospective 

economic relations which imposed liability for communications with clients,

not the act of quitting.

18 Jenkins asserts that the tort verdict violates “the 

most basic [canons] of freedom of mobility for employees,” because “Jenkins

was an at-will employee and had every right to leave SMGI at any time.” 

That is exactly what the jury was told. It was instructed that Jenkins 

had the legal right to quit his employment “at any time, with or without 

cause” and SMGI had “no authority to compel [any] employee to remain as 

employed.” So the premise of Jenkins’ argument is flawed. The verdict did 

18 In relevant part, they required proof “that in connection with leaving 

his job at SMGI for his new job at RSP, Mr. Jenkins communicated with

SMGI’s customers or prospective new customers in a manner that he 

intended to persuade those customers to transfer their business from SMGI 

to RSG or in a manner that he knew or should have known would cause or 

was likely to cause those customers to terminate their existing business

relationships with SMGI, even if they decided not to transfer their business 

to RSG.” 
30

not rest on legal principles that sanction “forced servitude” or “some sort of 

unenforceable noncompete in violation of California law.”

Jenkins raises no independent claim of error concerning the denial of 

his motion for new trial apart from the damages issues already discussed, 

and so we conclude there was no error in the new trial ruling. 

Finally, scattered throughout Jenkins’ briefing are bids for leniency 

toward him given the fact that he represented himself below. He cites no 

authority excusing pro per litigants from the necessity of preserving issues 

for appellate review or interposing objections at trial.19 On the contrary, his 

own cited authority acknowledges that “pro per litigants are not entitled to 

special exemptions from the California Rules of Court or Code of Civil 

Procedure” but “are . . . entitled to treatment equal to that of a represented 

party.” (Gamet v. Blanchard, supra, at p. 1284.) We agree. (See Rappleyea 

v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) “A doctrine generally requiring 

or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves 

would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other 

parties to litigation.” (Id. at p. 985.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment and the order denying the motion for new trial are 

affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs.

19 In support of his bid for leniency, he cites (but does not discuss) 

authority of no apparent relevance. (See Frazee v. Seely (2002) 

95 Cal.App.4th 627, 631, 633-635 [abuse of discretion to deny request by 

party who was represented by counsel for continuance to oppose summary 

judgment motion]; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284-

1285 [abuse of discretion to deny pro per plaintiff’s motion to vacate 

judgment where trial court gave her “confusing, indeed misleading” orders 

and communications].) 
31

STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

Security Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Jenkins (A164147, A164970)