If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re C. L. BYNUM, Minor. May 12, 2022

No. 357884

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2018-001603-NA

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the 

minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), 

(c)(ii) (other conditions exist that have not been rectified), (g) (failure to provide proper care or 

custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent).

1

 On appeal, respondent 

argues that (1) petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services, failed to make reasonable 

reunification efforts, (2) there was insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights to the child 

because she was working toward compliance with her treatment plan, and (3) termination of her 

parental rights was not in the child’s best interests. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The minor child and her two older siblings were removed from respondent’s care in 

September 2018, because of respondent’s substance abuse. The trial court exercised temporary 

jurisdiction after a bench trial and a treatment plan was adopted. The treatment plan required 

respondent to submit random drug screens, engage in family therapy and individual therapy, 

undergo a psychological examination, obtain suitable housing, obtain a legal source of income, 

visit the children, and maintain contact with the caseworker. Respondent was in compliance with 

her treatment plan early on, and voluntarily engaged in an inpatient substance abuse treatment 

 

1 The child’s father was not identified and the trial court terminated the unknown father’s parental 

rights to the child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion). Respondent’s parental rights to two 

older children were not terminated because those children were placed in the custody of their 

father.
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program. However, she relapsed and had several positive screens, and then stopped screening 

altogether. Although she completed another inpatient program, she did not benefit from it, and 

never completed substance abuse counseling. She never completed family therapy despite several 

referrals. While she completed a psychological examination and obtained employment, she never 

secured suitable housing, and her visits with the child were inconsistent. She claimed that she was 

seeing a new therapist, but the caseworker was never able to reach the therapist. Following a 

termination hearing in April 2021, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the 

child because of her continued substance abuse, lack of housing, and failure to complete services.

II. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

Respondent first argues that petitioner failed to make reasonable reunification efforts. We 

disagree.

“In order to preserve the issue of whether reasonable efforts for reunification were made, 

a respondent must raise the issue at the time the services are offered.” In re Smith-Taylor, ___ 

Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2021) (Docket No. 356585); slip op at 5. Respondent did 

not argue below that petitioner failed to make reasonable reunification efforts. Therefore, this 

issue is unpreserved. This Court reviews unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial 

rights. In re Beers, 325 Mich App 653, 677; 926 NW2d 832 (2018). “To avoid forfeiture under 

the plain-error rule, the proponent must establish that a clear or obvious error occurred and that 

the error affected substantial rights. An error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., 

it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

“Under Michigan’s Probate Code, the Department has an affirmative duty to make 

reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re 

Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). “As part of these reasonable efforts, the 

Department must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to 

rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” Id. at 85-86. Whether 

reasonable services were offered relates to the sufficiency of the evidence for termination of 

parental rights. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). “While the 

[Department] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure 

reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate 

in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). To 

prove a claim of lack of reasonable efforts, respondent must show that she would have fared better 

had petitioner offered other services. In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 543.

Although respondent argues that she was provided minimal assistance with housing, 

Dominique Dalton, the foster care specialist for the older two children, testified that respondent 

was provided numerous housing resources, including Section 8 information, Housing Commission 

information, and applications, but she never followed up with any of them. At the time of the 

termination hearing, respondent was living with a friend, had not allowed the home to be assessed, 

and had not requested any additional assistance. At one point, respondent said she was focusing 

on other services. The evidence established that petitioner made reasonable efforts to provide 

services to assist respondent in securing suitable housing, but respondent failed to participate in 

those services and essentially gave up on finding suitable housing. Respondent argues that Dalton 

never even asked to do a home assessment, but respondent informed the prior worker that the 
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house in which she was staying was not suitable. While Dalton did not provide any additional 

housing resources, the prior worker had given respondent numerous resources, respondent was not 

in consistent communication with Dalton, and respondent had not asked for more assistance. On 

appeal, respondent asserts that Dalton never assisted her with the applications, but Dalton asked 

respondent if she had completed them, and respondent never asked for assistance. Petitioner’s 

efforts with regard to housing were reasonable.

Respondent next argues that petitioner failed to adequately address her substance abuse 

issue by providing referrals and specific assistance. Respondent was referred for substance abuse 

counseling at Assured Family Services, but she failed to complete it. Respondent also voluntarily 

entered and completed two inpatient programs during the case. However, she failed to benefit 

from those programs as shown by her continued positive tests and missed screens. After the 

COVID-19 shutdown, when testing resumed, respondent continued to miss screens, despite being 

informed that she needed to test and that missed screens would be considered positive results. 

Respondent never expressed concern with the location of the screening or transportation. Thus, 

respondent was provided with services to address her substance abuse issue, but she failed to either 

complete or benefit from those services. Further, while respondent argues that petitioner should 

have provided specialized substance abuse services, she fails to specifically identify what other 

services could have been offered to her or that they would have made a difference.

Respondent also argues that Dalton never helped her with her feelings of being 

overwhelmed. As respondent acknowledges, Dalton testified that she told respondent to focus on 

screening and her substance abuse issue, which were the priority. In addition, respondent had been 

referred to and was participating in individual therapy, but there was no evidence that she ever 

completed it. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent claimed to be seeing a new 

therapist who would address all of her issues, but Dalton was unable to reach the therapist. 

Respondent argues that Dalton never followed up with the therapist, but Dalton testified that she 

tried to reach the therapist for three months with no success. To the extent that family therapy 

could also have assisted respondent, she had to be referred four times, was early-terminated twice, 

and never completed the service. Again, respondent fails to argue what more petitioner could or 

should have done to address her feelings of being overwhelmed, or that she would have fared better 

had other services been offered.

Finally, respondent argues that she should have been given more flexible scheduling for 

visits and more bus tickets. However, during the period just before the termination hearing, 

respondent was given bus tickets and still did not attend visits. The child’s foster care worker, 

Jalen Robinson, informed respondent’s employer that she needed to take Thursdays off for visits, 

but respondent chose to work instead for the extra money. There is no evidence that more flexible 

scheduling or more bus tickets would have made a difference.

In sum, the reunification efforts made by petitioner were reasonable. Respondent was 

given a meaningful and adequate opportunity to participate in and benefit from services, but she 

failed to do so. Given her failure to fully take advantage of the services that were offered, 

respondent cannot show that she would have fared better had other services been provided. 

Respondent fails to establish plain error affecting her substantial rights.
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III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Next, respondent argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a statutory ground 

for termination of her parental rights to the child. We disagree.

“To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 

In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad, 305 Mich App 623, 635; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and 

ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination. The trial court’s factual findings 

are clearly erroneous if the evidence supports them, but we are definitely and firmly convinced 

that it made a mistake.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709-710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (footnotes

omitted). “A reviewing court must defer to the special ability of the trial court to judge the 

credibility of witnesses.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014).

The trial court found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was proper under

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), which provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court 

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s 

jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, 

the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received 

notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the 

conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified 

within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, 

fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent.

The trial court did not clearly err by finding that several statutory grounds for termination 

were established by clear and convincing evidence. Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the conditions 

that brought the child into care were respondent’s substance abuse, lack of employment, and lack 

of housing. While respondent did obtain employment, she never secured stable housing or 

rectified her substance abuse problem, despite reasonable efforts by petitioner. Respondent 

continued to miss screens, never completed substance abuse counseling, and had stopped trying to 

find suitable housing. Given the length of time that the child had been in care and respondent’s 

minimal progress, there was also no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified 

within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.2

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), respondent’s failure to participate in and benefit from her 

treatment plan established that she could not provide proper care or custody for the child. See In 

re White, 303 Mich App at 710. Respondent did not consistently visit the child, did not have 

suitable housing, missed 93 out of 94 drug screens, did not benefit from her inpatient drug 

treatment programs, and did not complete family counseling. Respondent claims she was making 

great progress and getting close to compliance, but at the time of the termination hearing she had 

not been screening or visiting the child, and had stopped trying to find housing. She failed to even 

appear at the termination hearing. While the trial court did state that it was “possible” that 

respondent would get herself together and acknowledged that she had obtained employment, the 

court did not find that there was a reasonable expectation that she would do so within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age. Given the length of time the child had been in care and 

respondent’s minimal progress on her treatment plan, there was no more than a mere possibility 

that respondent might provide proper care or custody within a reasonable time.

Finally, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), respondent’s failure to comply with and benefit from 

her treatment plan was also evidence that the child would be harmed if returned to her care. See 

In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. Respondent claims “[t]his simply was not the situation in this 

case.” However, she fails to explain why this principle should not apply. Although respondent 

claims that her marijuana use did not affect her ability to parent, her “drug of choice” was cocaine, 

and her 93 out of 94 missed screens were considered positive results. While there was no evidence 

that the child had ever been harmed in the past, respondent’s failure to rectify her substance abuse 

 

2 We agree with the child’s lawyer-guardian ad litem that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) was not 

established. The trial court did not identify any other conditions that would cause the child to 

come within the court’s jurisdiction. Nonetheless, any error in relying on this ground is harmless 

because only one statutory ground for termination must be established, and the trial court did not 

clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was supported by other 

statutory grounds. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011); In re Powers, 244 

Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
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issue, her lack of housing, and her overall failure to participate in and benefit from services showed 

a reasonable likelihood of harm in the future. 

In sum, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that several statutory grounds for 

termination of respondent’s parental rights to the child were established by clear and convincing 

evidence.

IV. BEST INTERESTS

Lastly, respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the child’s best 

interests. We disagree.

“The trial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if the Department has established 

a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a 

preponderance of the evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713, citing MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews “for 

clear error the trial court’s determination regarding the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 

Mich App at 713.

“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best 

interests.” Id. The trial court “should consider a wide variety of factors,” including: “the child’s 

bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and 

finality,” “the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home[,]” “a parent’s history of 

domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation 

history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. 

at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Respondent first argues that the trial court gave inadequate weight to the bond between her 

and the child. The trial court did not specifically address the bond between respondent and the 

child. Robinson opined that there was a bond between respondent and the child, but he could not 

say how strong it was.3 The trial court had previously commented that the bond was as strong as 

it could be with three or four visits a month for an hour and a half. Even if the trial court did not 

give sufficient weight to the bond between respondent and the child, that one factor does not 

outweigh the other factors that supported termination, including the child’s need for permanency, 

the foster parents’ ability to provide permanency, respondent’s lack of compliance with her service 

plan, respondent’s inconsistent visitation, the fact that the child was comfortable and safe in her 

foster home, and the possibility for adoption. While the trial court did not explicitly address all of 

these factors, it properly focused on the child’s need for permanency and the fact that respondent 

had not progressed beyond supervised visits.

 

3 To the extent respondent argues that minimal evidence was presented regarding her bond with 

the child, we note that respondent’s attorney did not call any witnesses at the termination hearing.
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Respondent also argues that her visits with the child were appropriate and her marijuana 

use never affected her ability to parent. Again, however, respondent’s cocaine use was a concern 

and her numerous missed screens were considered positive results.

Respondent also argues that termination of her parental rights was improper in light of the 

trial court’s decision not to terminate her parental rights to the two older children. However, a trial 

court must consider the best interests of each child individually. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 

35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court properly considered the two older children 

separately because those children were not similarly situated with the child, given that they were 

able to be placed in the custody of their father, which weighed against termination. Id. at 43.

Respondent also argues that there was little evidence presented regarding the child’s foster 

home. It is true that there was not a great amount of detail about the child’s foster home, but there 

was evidence that the child was comfortable, she had a bond with the foster parents, and there was 

the potential for adoption, all of which weighed in favor of termination of respondent’s parental 

rights.

Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred because she would likely have come 

into compliance with her treatment plan within a reasonable time. For the reasons discussed 

earlier, this argument is without merit. Respondent made minimal progress on her treatment plan 

and had stopped participating in many aspects of her treatment plan at the time of the termination 

hearing, at which she failed to appear. In sum, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that a 

preponderance of the evidence showed that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the 

child’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Michael J. Riordan