alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 3.3  STATE OF DELAWARE CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF CHINA GATEWAY HOLDINGS, INC.  First:  That at a meeting of the Board of Directors of China Gateway Holdings, Inc., resolutions were duly adopted setting forth a proposed amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation of said corporation, declaring said amendment to be advisable and calling a meeting of the stockholders of said corporation for consideration thereof. The resolution setting forth the proposed amendment is as follows: Resolved, that the Certificate of Incorporation of this corporation be amended by changing the Article thereof numbered "First" so that, as amended, said Article shall be read as follows: "The name of the Corporation is Chemical Consortium Holdings, Inc. Resolved, that the Certificate of Incorporation of this corporation be amended by changing the Article thereof numbered "Fourth" so that, as amended, said Article shall be read as follows: "The total number of shares of stock which the corporation is authorized to issue is 100,000,000 shares of common stock with a par value of $.0001 per share." Second:  That thereafter, pursuant to resolution of its Board of Directors, a special meeting of the stockholders of said corporation was duly called and held, upon notice in accordance with Section 222 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware at which meeting the necessary number of shares as required by statute were voted in favor of the amendment. Third:  That said amendment was duly adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. Fourth:  That the capital of said corporation shall not be reduced under or by reason of said amendment. I, the Undersigned, being the President of said corporation, for the purpose of amending the Certificate of Incorporation under the laws of the State of Delaware, do make, file and record this State of Delaware Certificate of Amendment of Certificate of Incorporation, and does certify that the facts herein stated are true, and I have accordingly hereunto set my hand and seal this 4th day of October, A.D. 2001.  By:/s/ J. Greig J. Greig, President  {A0041335.DOC}
LESLIE v. WOODIE.

No. COA06-1418.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed October 16, 2007.

Certification Date November 5, 2007.

Appeal from Alleghany (05CVS126).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6729

BILLY GENE LEDWELL,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

SANDRA F. THOMAS, Supt. of Lumberton Correctional Inst.,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr.,

District Judge. (1:06-cv-00165-WO-RAE)

Submitted: September 16, 2008 Decided: September 22, 2008

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Billy Gene Ledwell, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III,

Alvin William Keller, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, NORTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Billy Gene Ledwell seeks to appeal the district court’s

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ledwell has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
STATE v. HILL.

No. COA07-769.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed March 4, 2008.

Certification Date March 24, 2008.

Appeal from Onslow (06CRS51991).

Case reported without published opinion. No error.
McDOWELL v. FORSYTH MOTOSPORTS, LLC.

No. COA06-1360.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed July 3, 2007.

Certification Date July 23, 2007.

Appeal from the Forsyth (03CVD739).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
STATE v. DOUGLAS.

No. COA06-1396.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed July 17, 2007.

Certification Date August 6, 2007.

Appeal from Wake (04CRS89804).

Case reported without published opinion. Reversed.
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</TABLE>
STATE v. John Wayne HAMPTON.

No. 370P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 11, 2007.

Kathleen U. Baldwin, Assistant Attorney General, Belinda J. Foster, District Attorney, for State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 25th day of July 2007 by Defendant for "Petition for Discretionary Review":

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference this the 11th day of October 2007."
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Corrie Blair, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 166]

Crew III, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Warren County (Austin, J.), rendered June 9, 2003, convicting defendant upon her plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Defendant was indicted and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree in connection with her alleged possession and sale of crack cocaine on two dates in January 2003. Additionally, a violation of probation proceeding was commenced against defendant as a result of her arrest on the aforementioned charges. After conferring with counsel, defendant agreed to accept the plea bargain offered by the People prior to the commencement of a hearing on pretrial motions. Accordingly, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, waived her right to appeal and, as agreed, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 to 10 years upon her conviction of that crime and a concurrent prison term of 1 to 3 years for her admitted violation of probation.

*1217On appeal, defendant challenges the voluntariness of her guilty plea. Although the voluntariness of defendant’s plea is not encompassed in the waiver of her right to appeal, the issue is not preserved for our review inasmuch as she did not move to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment of conviction *(see People v Mondore,*18 AD3d 961, 961 [2005]; *People v Kemp,*288 AD2d 635, 635 [2001]), and the exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable as the record of defendant’s plea colloquy does not contain any statements tending to negate an element of the crime *(see People v Mondore, supra*at 961; *People v Kemp, supra*at 636). Nevertheless, were we to consider defendant’s argument, we would conclude that her plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent *(see People v Coffey,*18 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2005]; *People v Keebler,*15 AD3d 724, 725-726 [2005]). Finally, given defendant’s knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty and waiver of the right to appeal, we will not review her contention that her sentence should be reduced in the interest of justice *(see People v Clow,*10 AD3d 803, 804 [2004]).

Peters, Mugglin, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 21



                       LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

1.   Aegis Realty Operating Partnership, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership

2.   Barclay/Aegis Inc., a Delaware corporation



        LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES OF AEGIS REALTY OPERATING PARTNERSHIP, L.P.

1.   Summit Insured Equity L.P., a Delaware limited partnership

2.   Summit Insured Equity L.P. II, a Delaware limited partnership

3.   Barclay/Aegis Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership

4.   Aegis Waterford, L.L.C. , a Delaware limited liability company

5.   Aegis Oxford, L.L.C., a Mississippi limited liability company

6.   Southgate Partners Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership

7.   Southgate/Aegis L.L.C., , a Delaware limited liability company

8.   Crossroads East Shopping Center, Ltd., an Ohio limited liability company

9.   Aegis Realty Holding Partnership, L.P. , a Delaware limited partnership
#### The People of the State of New York, v Hector Hernandez, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 167]

Crew III, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), rendered November 8, 2002, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree.

In May 2000, defendant was charged in an indictment with criminal possession of a controlled substance in first degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. After defendant failed to appear at the arraignment, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. More than two years later, after defendant was located in Florida and brought to New York, he pleaded guilty to the first count of the indictment, which was reduced to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, in full satisfaction of all charges. Under the terms of the plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal and was to be sentenced to four years to life in prison. Defendant was sentenced as agreed and appealed. This Court rejected a previous *Anders*brief and assigned new counsel (12 AD3d 723 [2004]).

*1215Initially, inasmuch as defendant neither moved to withdraw the plea nor vacate the judgment of conviction, he is precluded from challenging the voluntariness of his plea and waiver of appeal (see *People v Daniels,*16 AD3d 780, 780 [2005]; *People v Brown,*309 AD2d 1084, 1084 [2003], *lv denied*1 NY3d 595 [2004]). In any event, our review of the record discloses that defendant was fully advised of the ramifications of pleading guilty and indicated that he understood. Accordingly, we find that both the plea and waiver were knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. Defendant’s voluntary waiver of appeal encompasses his claims that the search and seizure was illegal and that his statutory speedy trial right was violated *(see People v Newsome,*17 AD3d 785 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 766 [2005]; *People v Lopez,*8 AD3d 819, 820 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 708 [2004]). Although the waiver does not extend to his constitutional right to a speedy trial, this claim has not been preserved inasmuch as it is raised for the first time on this appeal *(see People v Robinson,*1 AD3d 1019, 1020 [2003], *lv denied*2 NY3d 745 [2004]; *People v Haas,*229 AD2d 733, 734 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 1021 [1996]).

Mercure, J.P., Peters, Carpinello and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
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</TABLE>
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **3 -**  **7969**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , P laintiff

- Appell ee ,

v. JIMMY LAMONT WRIGHT , Defendant

- Appell ant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Rebecca Beach Smith , Chief District Judge. ( 2 : 11

- c r - 0 0 0 72

- RBS

- FBS

- 1 ; 2 :1 3

- cv - 00 481

- RBS )

Submitted : April 17, 2014 Decided: April 21, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion

. Jimmy Lamont Wright , Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Bartlett Fitzwater, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Benjamin L. Hatch , Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia , for Appellee.
Unpublished opini ons are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Jimmy Lamont Wright seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debat able or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Wright has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a ce rtificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the accompanying Annual Report of Enviro Voraxial
Technology, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Alberto DiBella, Principal Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fully presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


By:  /s/Alberto DiBella
     ------------------
     Alberto DiBella
     Principal Executive Officer
     April 14, 2004
### In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06

- 0 9

- 00 161

- CR

______________________________

DEVIN ERIC MIMS , Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 38009

- B

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Mo rriss2 MEMORANDUM OPINION

D evin Eric Mims claims error in sentencing by the trial court on a charge of theft, a class C

misdemeanor, enhanced by two prior theft convictions. Sentence was imposed in accordance

with Section 31.03(e)(4)(D) of the Texas Penal Code for a state

- jail felony term of two years’

confinement. See T EX

. P ENA L C ODE A NN . § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

Mims complains that (1) the S tate impermissibly enhanced punishment with a prior theft

conviction, when the same prior conviction was used to enhance punishment on a different theft

charge, in violation o f the D ouble J eopardy C lause of the United States Constitution, the Texas

Constitution, and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to

consider the full range of punishment in a context that violates his due process r ights and

implicates the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

We addressed these issues in detail in our opinion of this date on Mims’ appeal in cause

number 06

- 09

- 00160

- CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclud e that error has not

been shown in this case.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: February 16, 2010

Date Decided: March 9 , 20103

Do Not Publish