The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court 1

for the Western District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the

Honorable Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District

of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-3356

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Roxanne Hill, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: February 5, 1999

 Filed: February 17, 1999

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Before FAGG, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Roxanne Hill appeals her conviction for a drug offense following her conditional

guilty plea. For reversal, she argues that the district court erred in denying her motion 1

to suppress evidence. We affirm.
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Hill first argues that the stop of her vehicle was not supported by reasonable

suspicion. In assessing the validity of an investigatory stop, we review for clear error

the findings of historical fact, and review de novo the legal conclusions based upon

those facts. See United States v. Pena-Saiz, 161 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1998). At

the suppression hearings, government witnesses testified as follows.

A confidential informant (CI) provided narcotics detective Paul Smith with

information that Francisco Ocampo was the head of a drug trafficking ring, and that

Alberto Cortez, Rogelio Toledo, and a white male named “Jimbo” and a white female

that “Jimbo” lived with in Flippin, Arkansas, worked for Ocampo. The CI had

delivered methamphetamine to the Flippin couple, and had collected drug proceeds

from them to give to Ocampo. The CI informed officers that on January 9, 1998, a

large load of methamphetamine was to be transported to a Super 8 motel, and on to

Booneville, Arkansas; and that Ocampo and Cortez would be involved. Surveillance

established that Ocampo and Cortez were at the motel on January 9, and that a

Suburban and a Honda traveling in tandem arrived at the motel, and then left.

Furthermore, a traffic stop of the Suburban revealed that Cortez was in the vehicle, and

nearly 4.7 pounds of methamphetamine were recovered from the Honda when it was

later stopped away from the Suburban. The methamphetamine was to be delivered to

Booneville, Arkansas. Cortez did not know that the drugs were seized.

Surveillance of the Super 8 motel the next day revealed that Ocampo and Cortez

were there, and were joined by a man and a woman driving a black pickup truck from

Flippin, Arkansas. The woman was later identified as Hill, and the man was later

identified as her co-defendant, James Norcross. Ocampo and Cortez left the motel

going towards Fort Smith, Arkansas, and were followed by Norcross and Hill in the

truck. Detective Smith witnessed the vehicles drive in a manner which, in his

experience, suggested they were engaging in counter-surveillance. The vehicles were

followed to Ocampo’s apartment in Fort Smith. Norcross, accompanied by Hill,

carried a stereo component from the truck into the apartment. In Detective Smith’s
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experience, stereo equipment is often used by Hispanic gangs to hide drugs. Ocampo

and Cortez were already in the apartment, and they were later joined by Toledo.

Shortly after Toledo arrived, Norcross and Hill left the apartment with a stereo

component; they were followed and stopped by a marked squad car.

We conclude that the corroborated information provided by the CI which

correctly predicted future actions of these individuals, combined with the officers’

observation of the counter-surveillance attempts and Norcross’s transporting the stereo

component, established reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. See United States v.

Hill, 91 F.3d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120,

1124-25 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1139 (1996).

Hill next argues that the consent she gave to search the vehicle was not

voluntary. The voluntariness of consent is a fact question to be determined from the

totality of the circumstances, and is reviewed for clear error. See Pena-Saiz, 161 F.3d

at 1177. Consent is not voluntary when it is the product of express or implied duress

or coercion. See id; United States v. Sanchez, 156 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1998)

(listing factors to consider in assessing whether consent was voluntarily given).

The government presented evidence that Hill was questioned for only a couple

of minutes and detained for only ten minutes before she gave consent; that after the

initial stop--which the officers considered to be a high-risk situation--the officers did

not yell, scream, or even speak with raised voices; and that the officers did not

threaten, crowd around, or coerce Hill, or accuse her of being a liar. Instead, officers

testified that when they spoke with Hill, they used calm and rational voices. Hill

admitted she was informed she was not under arrest and she was not handcuffed before

giving consent, and the encounter was in a public place. Officers testified that Hill

immediately gave consent for the search when she was asked; Hill testified that she did

not “have a problem” with the officers’ searching the pickup; and Hill qualified her

assertion that the officers screamed at her by stating that the volume of the officers’
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conversations with her was “[p]robably a little louder” than “it should have been.” We

conclude the district court did not clearly err in determining that Hill voluntarily

consented to the search of the vehicle.

Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.