Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A05-1602-DR-362 | December 20, 2016 Page 1 of 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael H. Michmerhuizen

Barrett McNagny, LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

James C. Yankosky

Angelica N. Fuelling

Tourkow Crell Rosenblatt & 

Johnston, LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas H. Torson,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Vicky L. Torson,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 20, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

90A05-1602-DR-362

Appeal from the Wells Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kenton W. 

Kiracofe, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

90D01-1002-DR-16

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A05-1602-DR-362 | December 20, 2016 Page 2 of 20

Summary

[1] Thomas Torson appeals the trial court’s order modifying the parties’ parenting 

time and the child support order in favor of Vicky Torson. We affirm in part 

and remand consistent with this decision.

Issues

Thomas raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

included the acquisition of certain stock in his income for 

purposes of calculating child support and modifying

Thomas’s child support payments; and

II. whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

modified the parties’ parenting time.

Facts

[2] Thomas and Vicky were married in 1992, and they had three sons. In February 

2010, Vicky filed her petition for dissolution of marriage. In April 2010, the 

parties filed their marital settlement agreement, and the trial court approved it. 

The parties’ sons were thirteen, eleven, and eight years old at the time the 

settlement agreement was approved. The parties agreed to share joint legal and 

physical custody of their three children, one of whom has since turned eighteen. 

Since then, this matter has remained contentious, and the parties have been 

litigious. They have filed numerous contempt citations, petitions for rule to 

show cause, and requests for modifications. Between April 2010 and October 

2010, the parties filed four mediated settlement agreements. In May 2012, the 

parties filed a fifth mediated agreement in which they agreed Thomas would 
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have sole legal custody of the children; they continued to share physical 

custody. Thereafter, the parties continued to litigate issues related to custody, 

child support, and parenting time.

[3] On June 11, 2015, Thomas filed a petition for modification of parenting time 

schedule and related orders. At the time Thomas filed his petition, Thomas

exercised parenting time eight out of fourteen overnights, and Vicky exercised 

parenting time six out of fourteen overnights. On July 22, 2015, Vicky filed a 

verified petition to modify child support and post-secondary educational 

expenses. At the time Vicky filed her petition, the parties’ eldest child was 

responsible for one-third of his college expenses. Of the remaining two-thirds of 

the college expenses, Thomas was responsible for paying sixty percent, and 

Vicky was responsible for paying forty percent. In August 2015, at Thomas’s 

request, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem.

[4] After hearings on the parties’ motions, the trial court sua sponte entered 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon on January 25, 2016. The trial court 

modified the parties’ parenting time by ordering Thomas and Vicky to have 

seven out of fourteen overnights with the minor children. The trial court 

modified Thomas’s weekly child support obligation and ordered him to pay 

71% of the portion of college expenses for which the parties are responsible and 

ordered Vicky to pay 29% of those college expenses. Thomas now appeals.
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Analysis

I. Child Support

[5] “‘A trial court’s calculation of child support is presumptively valid.’” Martinez 

v. Deeter, 968 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Young v. Young, 

891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008)). “A trial court’s decision regarding child 

support will be upheld unless the trial court has abused its discretion.” 

Martinez, 968 N.E.2d at 805. “A trial court abuses its discretion when its 

decision is clearly against the logic and the effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. Where, as here, 

the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon sua sponte, the 

specific findings control only with regard to the issues they cover. Id. The trial 

court’s findings or judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. 

In re Marriage of Sutton, 16 N.E.3d 481, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A finding is 

clearly erroneous only if there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to 

support it. Id. “A general judgment standard applies to any issue upon which 

the trial court has not found, and we may affirm a general judgment on any 

theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial.” Martinez, 968 N.E.2d at 

805.

[6] Indiana trial judges are granted latitude and deference in family law matters. 

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). “On appeal it is not enough 

that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively 

require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for 

reversal.” Id. (citation omitted). “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the 
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evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed 

most favorably to the judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

(a) Provisions of an order with respect to child support or an 

order for maintenance . . . may be modified or revoked . . . .

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and 

continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support 

that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount 

that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; 

and 

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at 

least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting the 

modification was filed.

Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1.

A. Calculation of Thomas’s Income

[7] Thomas first challenges the trial court’s inclusion in its calculation of his 

income certain stock his employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), gives 

him. He contends he receives the stock “in lieu of a traditional pension.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 24.

[8] The trial court found that, based on their 2014 W-2s, Vicky earned $929.33 per 

week and Thomas earned $2,302.91 per week. The trial court then ordered 
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Thomas to pay $177.37 per week in child support. Thomas testified his annual 

salary is “about $100,000.00” and that he also receives, “MIP.” Tr. p. 37. 

Thomas explained:

What that is is UPS doesn’t have a pension and our pension is 

stock and they call them RSUs and RSU stands for ‘restricted 

stock units’ and what it is given, I’ll give a ball park, I’m given 

about [$]20-25,000 a year of stock and that’s my retirement and 

they are in RSU form and that means out of say $25,000.00 in 

stock, it’s spread out over 5 years so they only give me so much 

per year . . . .

Id. In an attempt to “get a better picture of what [Thomas’s] income actually 

is,” the trial court questioned him further regarding the UPS stock. Id. at 303. 

Thomas testified, “Yeah” when the trial court asked, “once you receive the 

stock, can you sell it, trade it, do anything with it?” Id. at 302. But Thomas

characterized the stock as his retirement; “It’s a pension.” Id. Thomas

acknowledged the stock payments are reflected on his W-2 and also stated, 

“since they did away with our pension they do a 3% match on 401(K) and we 

get stock and that’s what our retirement is going to be is our stock and that 

whatever.” Id. Thomas testified he believed his income is reflected on his pay 

stub, not what is reflected on his W-2.

[9] Thomas correctly argues there is evidence—Thomas’s testimony—that the UPS 

stock at issue is a retirement benefit, not income. But there is also evidence that 

the stock is, in fact, income. Most notably, Thomas’s 2014 W-2 includes the 

value of the stock in the box designated to reflect “Wages, tips, other comp.” 
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Ex. F. Because there clearly are facts that support the trial court’s finding 

regarding Thomas’s income, that finding is not clearly erroneous.1 Although 

Thomas presented evidence favorable to his position that the UPS stock was 

not income but a retirement benefit, our standard of review does not permit us 

to reweigh the evidence. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 875 N.E.2d 320, 322-23 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008), trans. denied. 

B. Post-Secondary Educational Expenses

[10] Thomas contends the trial court erred by modifying the portions of postsecondary educational expenses for which each party is responsible. The trial 

court found:

3.1 On March 31, 2014, the court entered an order regarding 

post-secondary educational expenses, including expenses related 

to dual credit classes while in high school.

3.2 In summary, the parties were to share equally the costs of the 

dual credit classes; the child was responsible for one-third of the 

college expenses and the parties were to divide the remaining 

two-thirds. Father would be responsible for the [sic] 60% [of] the 

parties’ two-third portion and Mother the remaining 40%.

 

1 Thomas directs us to Saalfrank v. Saalfrank to support his argument. 899 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 2008). In 

Saalfrank, this court concluded, “in determining whether to exclude retirement contributions, in whole or in 

part, for purposes of calculating a child support obligation, the trial court should consider: [seven factors].” 

Id. at 680. There is a key distinction between Saalfrank and this case: in Saalfrank, the parties did not dispute 

that the money in question was a retirement benefit. In this case, however, the very issue is whether the UPS 

stock should be characterized as income or a retirement benefit. Because in this case the trial court found 

Thomas’s UPS stock was income, not a retirement benefit, Saalfrank is inapplicable.
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* * * * *

3.5 Based upon the parties’ respective incomes, the Court finds 

that the child is responsible for one-third of the college expenses 

and the parties shall divided [sic] the remaining two-thirds, with 

Father being responsible for 71% and Mother being responsible 

for 29%.

App. p. 26.

[11] Thomas contends the trial court did not explain why it ordered the modified 

division of college expenses and that “[t]here was no evidence presented 

demonstrating a change in circumstances ‘so substantial and continuing as to 

make the terms unreasonable’ that would permit a modification under Indiana 

Code § 31-16-8-1(b)(1).” Appellant’s Br. p. 43 (no citation in original). We 

review a trial court’s decision to order the payment of post-secondary 

educational expenses for an abuse of discretion. Hirsch v. Oliver, 970 N.E.2d 

651, 662 (Ind. 2012). Because the trial court did not make a finding regarding 

its reason for modifying the parties’ division of post-secondary educational 

expenses, we may affirm the trial court’s order in this regard “on any theory 

supported by the evidence adduced at trial.” Martinez, 968 N.E.2d at 805. 

[12] We conclude the evidence of the parties’ incomes—Thomas’s 2013 and 2014 

W-2s and Vicky’s 2013 and 2014 federal tax returns—amply support the trial 

court’s order regarding the division of post-secondary educational expenses. 

Between 2013 and 2014, Thomas’s W-2s reflect his wages increased by 
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$14,233.2 See Ex. E. Vicky’s total income, however, increased by a more 

modest $3,222. See Ex. B and C. Further, Thomas’s 2014 wages equal 

approximately seventy-one percent of the parties’ combined incomes, the same 

percentage of the post-secondary educational expenses that the trial court 

ordered Thomas to pay. Thomas’s increased income is a “changed 

circumstance so substantial and continuing as to make the terms [of the child 

support order] unreasonable.” I.C. § 31-16-8-1; see Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding father’s increased income constituted a 

substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of child 

support). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying this portion 

of the child support order.

C. Parenting Time Credit

[13] Thomas next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by retroactively 

modifying the child support order to the date Vicky filed her petition. He does 

not expand on that assertion, however. Instead, the bulk of his argument 

focuses on the fact that the trial court’s order modifying child support gave him 

credit for only 180 overnights when, in fact, Thomas exercised eight out of 

fourteen consecutive nights of parenting time—“57.143% of the parenting 

time”—between the date Vicky filed her petition and the date the modification 

went into effect. Appellant’s Br. pp. 27-28. To the extent Thomas argues the 

 

2 Thomas again contends the trial court erred by including the UPS stock in its income calculation. We do 

not revisit that argument.
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trial court erroneously modified its child support order retroactively, we 

conclude he has waived it for failure to make a cogent argument as required by 

Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[14] With regard to the credit for overnight parenting time, Thomas correctly notes 

that during the six months that passed between the date the retroactive order 

took effect and the date the modified parenting time schedule took effect, he 

exercised parenting time for eight out of fourteen consecutive nights rather than 

seven out of fourteen nights. The difference between the child support 

calculation with Thomas’s scheduled parenting time and that with which the 

trial court credited him is minimal. Vicky calculates the difference is $68.85. 

[15] Thomas faults Vicky for not setting out the manner in which she calculated that 

figure and asks this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for a new 

calculation of his parenting time credit. However, Thomas does not expressly 

argue Vicky’s calculation is inaccurate, nor does he provide us with an alternate 

calculation. We thus conclude that Thomas has failed to make a cogent 

argument that Vicky’s calculation is incorrect or that he is owed a credit in a 

different amount, and we accept Vicky’s calculation. Even if Vicky’s 

calculation is incorrect, the credit is de minimus. 

[16] We see no wisdom in asking the parties and trial court to expend additional 

time and financial resources continuing to litigate this issue on remand for a 

mere $68.85. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to modify its order to reflect 

a $68.85 credit to Thomas. 
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II. Modification of Parenting Time

[17] Thomas next argues that the trial court erred by rejecting his proposed 

modification of parenting time and instead modifying the parties’ parenting 

time in favor of Vicky. 

[18] The trial court issued detailed findings of fact related to Thomas’s request for a 

modification of parenting time. It found:

1.8 In his Petition to Modify, Father states the chronic areas of 

dispute include the children’s school work, school projects, 

grades, sports activities, sports practices and conditioning 

schedules, as well as telephone and personal contact with the 

boys and lost sports equipment.

1.9 In its July 17, 2015 Order, the Court addressed the issues of 

telephone and personal contact as well as lost sports equipment. 

The Court now reiterates that the boys are really young men and 

are ultimately responsible for their own sports equipment. 

Further, each child has their own cell phone and can contact the 

other “off-duty” parent whenever they desire.

* * * * *

1.11 The Court finds that the current custody and parenting time 

schedule clearly is not working due in large part to what it 

observes as Father’s relentless controlling and competitive 

personality. Ordinarily, the Court would modify the parenting 

time schedule to a more traditional parenting time arrangement; 

however, the children’s extracurricular activities are numerous 

and lengthy. The Court has concerns that Father would use any 

change in the children’s performance at school to blame Mother, 

thus prompting further litigation.
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1.12 To say that Father is extremely active in his children’s 

curricular and extracurricular activities is an understatement. 

Evidence presented shows that Father is in regular 

communication, if not almost daily in some circumstances, with 

the children’s teachers, guidance counselors and coaches.

1.13 On some occasions, Father emails teachers moments after 

the grades for various assignments, quizzes and tests are reported 

on an online database.

1.14 Dr. Amanda Mayle testified that in her opinion Father 

would be a better physical custodian than Mother. The Court 

finds, however, that Dr. Mayle provides regular counseling for 

Father and the children. Other than the initial assessment of 

Mother, Dr. Mayle has not provided any counseling to Mother 

or consulted with Mother regarding any of the alleged failures of 

Mother as a parent.

1.15 Father claims the children’s grades suffer when in Mother’s 

care; however, the children are currently on the honor roll and 

maintain grades of A’s and B’s.

1.16 Father cites two instances where the current parenting time 

arrangement interfered with the children’s extracurricular 

activities.

* * * * *

1.16.3 These two incidents are so inconsequential and trivial it is 

unbelievable that two days were spent arguing over incidents like 

them.

1.17 Father further points to a situation when the child was an 

hour and half late for a practice. Mother testified that she 
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mistakenly thought the practice was in Marion, Indiana where it 

has been at times. Instead the practice was in Wabash, Indiana. 

The Court notes that Father helps coach this team and could 

have provided transportation to the practice. He does, however, 

provide transportation to other players on the team.

1.18 Since the parties[’] divorce was granted in 2010, the 

children have had regular, frequent, and continuing contact with 

each parent.

1.19 Father has maintained now, as he has previously, that 

Mother’s parenting time should be limited because the children’s 

school performance is worse when in her care. Father hasn’t 

presented any evidence of this. To the contrary, the children are 

honor roll students. Further, Father does not present any 

evidence that Mother fails to have the children do homework or 

study for tests.

1.20 Father maintains that the above facts warrant a 

modification of parenting time. He desires and believes it will be

in the children’s best interest that Mother’s parenting time be 

limited to a more traditional parenting time arrangement. For 

example, overnight parenting time every other weekend and one 

evening during the week.

* * * * *

1.23 As noted above, Mother and Father have joint physical 

custody, and share near equally parenting time. In a 14 day 

period, Father has the children 8 consecutive days and Mother 

has the children the remaining 6 consecutive days.

1.24 Father’s request would reduce Mother’s overnights in a 

two-week period to two consecutive days.
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1.25 The Court finds that Father’s request is merely an end run 

around the statutory requirement of showing of a substantial 

change of circumstance for a modification of physical custody. 

Essentially, Father’s request is a de facto modification of custody. 

Along that line, the Court does not find that there has been a 

substantial change in any of the statutory requirements required 

at I.C[.] 31-17-2-8 and DENIES Father’s requested change.

1.26 The Court does find, however, that a modification of the 

current parenting time arrangement would be in the best interest 

of the children. Currently, the parties have “joint physical 

custody” which is not defined by law. Based on the testimony 

and evidence presented, the Court finds that the current 

parenting time arrangement should be modified to an equal 

division. Therefore, Mother and Father shall each have 

parenting time for seven (7) consecutive days beginning Sunday 

at 6:00 p.m., unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

App. pp. 23-25.

[19] Before addressing the substance of Thomas’s argument, we note a repeated 

inconsistency therein. Although Thomas styled his June 11, 2015, motion as a 

“Petition for Modification of Parenting Time Schedule and Related Orders,” 

his prayer for relief in that motion requests “an order granting him primary 

physical custody of the children . . . .” App. p. 226. A request to modify 

parenting time and a request to modify a child custody order require very 

different determinations. “The court may modify an order granting or denying 

parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of 

the child.” Ind. Code § 31-17-4-2. In order to modify a child custody order,

however, the trial court must determine the modification is in the best interest 
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of the child and “there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors 

that the court may consider under [Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8] and, if 

applicable, section 8.5 of this chapter.” I.C. 31-17-2-21. 

[20] Thomas’s petition for modification did not allege a substantial change in 

circumstances, nor did he argue in his closing statement to the trial court that 

any such change had taken place. In both his petition for modification of 

parenting time and his closing statement he contended his request for increased 

parenting time was in the children’s best interest; however, his petition for 

modification stated he “believes it to be in the boys’ best interest that he be their 

primary physical custodian.” App. p. 226. 

[21] On appeal, Thomas frames this issue as one of modifying parenting time, and 

he seems to take issue with the trial court’s characterization of his petition for 

modification as an “end run” around the substantial change showing necessary 

to support a change of custody. Id. at 25. He seems to argue, primarily, that a 

modification of parenting time in his favor was in the children’s best interests. 

He also seems to advance an alternative argument that he presented sufficient 

evidence of substantially changed circumstances to support a modification of 

custody. He states: 

[E]ven if Thomas’s request was simply a request for a de facto

modification, the Trial Court still had the discretion to modify 

custody to a degree less than a de facto modification . . . if the 

modification would be in the children’s best interests. Moreover, 

the evidence demonstrates that there was a substantial change 
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justifying a modification of custody, as opposed to a modification 

of parenting time. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 32. This argument is, at best, confusing. 

[22] Thomas does not make a cogent argument detailing the substantial changes to 

the statutory factors required to obtain a custody modification, nor does he 

provide citations to authority to support his contention regarding a substantial 

change. Therefore, to the extent Thomas argues the evidence was sufficient to 

support a modification of physical custody, we conclude he has waived that 

argument because he has failed to make a cogent argument on appeal. See Ind. 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the 

appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning [and] must be 

supported by citations to the authorities . . . relied on”). We thus confine our 

review to the trial court’s decision to increase Vicky’s parenting time from six 

consecutive days to seven. 

[23] First, Thomas challenges a portion of finding 1.19, in which the trial court 

found Thomas has not presented any evidence that the children’s school 

performance is worse when they are in Vicky’s care. We note that the next 

sentence in that finding is: “To the contrary the children are honor roll 

students.” App. p. 24. The trial court also found that the children “maintain 

grades of A’s and B’s.” Id. We acknowledge there is evidence that the children 

sometimes earn C’s, D’s, and F’s on individual projects and homework 

assignments. Thomas testified the children earn these lower grades on 

schoolwork they complete at Vicky’s house. The guardian ad litem testified 
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that he carefully reviewed the children’s grades and noticed “an abnormally 

large number of grades day to day and week to week that are below what you 

would expect for an A student or a B student.” Tr. p. 110. He looked at the 

dates on which assignments were completed and stated the school records “do 

lend some support for [Thomas’s] proposition.” Id. at 111. However, the 

guardian ad litem also testified that, despite some outlying low grades, “we’re 

talking about close to straight A students and a little room for improvement I 

guess until you get to 4.0 but they certainly strike me as gifted.” Id. at 110. 

[24] We read the trial court’s findings more broadly than Thomas seems to. We 

acknowledge that there may be “some support” for Thomas’s theory that the 

children earn some lower grades on some assignments they complete while in 

Vicky’s care, but, overall, the children are excelling in school. Id. at 110. There 

is no evidence that spending time in Vicky’s care has negatively affected their 

overall academic performance. We thus conclude the evidence supports the

trial court’s finding in this regard.

[25] Thomas also contends “a review of the entire record should leave this Court 

with a firm conviction that the Trial Court was mistaken.” Appellant’s Br. p. 

32. We note that the trial court did not make specific findings stating why it 

believed the modification of parenting time it chose was in the children’s best 

interests. It did, however, find that it would “[o]rdinarily” modify the parenting 

time schedule to a more traditional arrangement but that it had “concerns that 

Father would use any change in the children’s performance at school or 

athletics to blame Mother, thus prompting further litigation.” App. p. 23. 
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[26] Thomas directs us to the evidence in the record that is most favorable to his 

position. In particular, Thomas argues that Dr. Mayle’s testimony supports his 

position. We note that the trial court acknowledged that Dr. Mayle testified it 

was her opinion that Thomas would be a better physical custodian than Vicky. 

But the trial court did not give that testimony as much weight as Thomas would 

have liked because Dr. Mayle regularly counsels Thomas and the children but 

“has not provided any counseling to Mother or consulted with Mother 

regarding any of the alleged failures of Mother as a parent.” App. p. 23. “[T]he 

weight to be given expert testimony is for the trier of fact to decide, and it is not 

bound by an expert’s opinion. Moreover, the trial court may even disregard 

such opinion if it so desires.” Indiana Family & Soc. Serv. Admin. V. Hospitality 

House of Bedford, 783 N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Our standard of 

review does not permit us to reweigh the evidence. Mitchell, 875 N.E.2d at 322-

23.

[27] Because the trial court did not make specific findings explaining its 

modification of parenting time, we review the trial court’s judgment under the

clearly erroneous standard and will reverse it only if there are no facts or 

inferences drawn from the evidence that support the judgment. Sutton, 16 

N.E.3d at 485. In response to the question, “what changes could be made to 

make things better if they’re doing so well for your kids?” Vicky testified:

You know right now the way we are doing it, it is breaking right 

in the middle of the week. I mean that’s right in the middle of 

their week, it[’]s mid-week. It’s kind of, you know, yes, we’ve 

been doing it for years but [one child] will still ask when are we 
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at dad’s, when are we at your house on dates. You know, if it 

could just be more consistent, you know, Sunday to Sunday or 

whatever, I think that would help a lot.

Tr. p. 228. Vicky also testified that she thinks it is important for the children’s 

well-being that they “spend a similar amount of time with [her] that they have 

right now” because she thinks it is “very important to spend as much time with 

both parents as they can. Kids need both of their parents.” Id. She explained 

she thinks the children need the “balance” that comes with a near 50/50 split 

between the parties’ parenting time and that she thinks the children “need us 

both the same and [that] taking large blocks of time away from one or the other, 

I don’t see how that helps.” Id. at 233-34. These facts support the trial court’s 

conclusion that the modification of parenting time is in the children’s best 

interests. We thus conclude that the trial court’s judgment was not clearly 

erroneous.

Conclusion

[28] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by including certain stock in its 

calculation of Thomas’s income, nor did it abuse its discretion when it modified 

the portions of post-secondary educational expenses for which the parties are 

responsible. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the parties 

parenting time. We remand this matter, however, so that the trial court may 

reconsider Thomas’s credit for parenting time exercised between July 22, 2015, 

and January 25, 2016. We affirm in part and remand for corrections consistent 

with this decision.
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Affirmed in part and remanded.

Bailey, J., and Riley, J., concur.