[Cite as State v. Holdren, 2021-Ohio-810.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PICKAWAY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : Case No. 20CA3 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : 

v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

: ENTRY 

JEREMIAH J. HOLDREN, : 

AKA: JEREMIAH J. HOLDEN : 

AKA: MATTHEW HOLDREN : RELEASED: 03/15/2021

 : 

Defendant-Appellant. :

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jayme Hartley 

Fountain, Assistant Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee. 

Jerry L. McHenry, Pickerington, Ohio, for Appellant. 

____________________________________________________________ 

Wilkin, J. 

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas Court 

judgment of conviction in which a jury found Appellant, Jeremiah J. Holdren, 

guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. The trial court sentenced Holdren to 36 

months in prison. Holdren challenges his conviction and presents three 

assignments of error: (1) the trial court committed plain error by allowing codefendant Thomas Green to testify as to Holdren’s statements, (2) the conviction 

is against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and (3) Holdren’s 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Green’s testimony. 

{¶2} We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction finding no error in 

admitting Holdren’s statements since he is a party-opponent. Second, we 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 2

determine the jury could reasonably have found all elements of the offense and it 

did not lose its way in finding Holdren guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. 

Finally, we conclude that counsel’s failure to object to properly admitted evidence 

does not render counsel ineffective. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶3} On the afternoon of August 26, 2019, Corporal Steven Harger was on 

patrol with his canine officer when they encountered Holdren. Holdren drove 

past Corporal Harger who noticed two passengers in the vehicle. Corporal 

Harger turned around and began following Holdren. As soon as he did, Holdren 

made a quick lane change without signaling. After the lane change, Corporal 

Harger drove past Holdren’s vehicle. Holdren then went around the corporal’s 

cruiser and crossed over the center line with both tires. At that point, Corporal 

Harger activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. 

{¶4} Holdren complied and stopped his vehicle. After stopping, Holdren 

quickly exited the vehicle. Corporal Harger instructed Holdren to get back in the 

vehicle. Corporal Harger approached Holdren as he was instructing him to return 

inside the vehicle and noticed that Holdren was “very nervous” and “visibly 

shaken.” He also observed Thomas Green in the front passenger seat and 

Ashley Taulbee in the rear passenger seat. Based on Holdren’s behavior, the 

corporal’s belief that the two passengers were under the influence, and for his 

and the canine officer’s safety, Corporal Harger requested back-up. Before 

back-up arrived, Corporal Harger placed Holdren in the back of his cruiser and 

left the two passengers in the vehicle. 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 3

{¶5} Deputy Joseph Hugus arrived within 10 minutes of the back-up 

request and within 20 minutes of the traffic stop. Corporal Harger and Deputy 

Hugus secured the two passengers by placing Holdren and Green in Deputy 

Hugus’ cruiser and Taulbee in Corporal Harger’s cruiser since it only seats one 

person. This is when the canine officer was deployed to conduct a free air sniff 

of the vehicle. The canine officer alerted to the presence of drugs from the driver 

and rear passenger areas. 

{¶6} Deputy Hugus searched the driver side while Corporal Harger 

searched the front passenger seat. As soon as Deputy Hugus opened the door, 

he saw something tucked between the driver and passenger seats. When 

Deputy Hugus leaned in, he realized it was a large clear plastic bag with a 

crystal-like substance. The bag was tucked behind the driver’s seatbelt buckle. 

Corporal Harger identified the substance as methamphetamine. 

{¶7} By the glove box, Corporal Harger and Deputy Hugus discovered a 

black bag containing syringes, tourniquets (used to block the blood supply to the 

arm/vein) and several individual baggies with residue inside of them. In the trunk 

of the vehicle they discovered a Ziploc baggie with a white substance also 

identified as methamphetamine. The total methamphetamine weight from both 

bags—the one located by the driver’s seatbelt and the one from the trunk—was 

11.74 grams. 

{¶8} Based on the contraband found in the vehicle, Holdren was indicted 

for committing aggravated possession of drugs and aggravated trafficking in 

drugs both as second-degree felonies. Holdren pled not guilty and the matter 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 4

proceeded to a one-day jury trial but with the offenses amended as third-degree 

felonies. Green was also charged but pled guilty to aggravated trafficking in 

drugs as a third-degree felony with the agreement that the state would 

recommend community control sanctions as his sentence. In exchange for the 

state’s community control sentence recommendation, Green testified for the state 

at Holdren’s trial. 

{¶9} Green and Holdren have known each other for approximately 30 

years. A couple of weeks prior to August 26, Green began staying with Holdren, 

and, on that day, Holdren agreed to drive Green and Taulbee to Columbus to get 

heroin. As planned, when they arrived to Columbus, Taulbee procured the 

heroin and both she and Green got high in the back seat of the vehicle while it 

was parked. After getting high, Green fell asleep but was awakened by Holdren 

asking him for money. Green did not have any money to give Holdren and after 

responding to Holdren’s request, he fell back asleep. Green was again 

awakened by Holdren asking him to drive but Green was in no condition to drive. 

Green then moved to the front passenger seat. Once again, Green fell asleep 

and was awakened this time by Corporal Harger’s emergency lights. 

{¶10} Green testified that right as Holdren was pulling over to stop, 

Holdren asked him “[h]ey, are you going to stuff this?” Green explained that the 

term stuffing means to insert drugs in your buttocks area. Green did not stuff any 

drugs. Holdren then parked the vehicle and jumped out. Green recalls Holdren 

interacting with Corporal Harger and then both he and Holdren being placed in 

the same cruiser. While inside the cruiser, Holdren told Green he “better take the 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 5

charge or me and him were going to have problems.” After Green’s testimony, 

the state rested and Holdren did not present any evidence. 

{¶11} The jury deliberated a little over an hour before returning guilty 

verdicts as to both offenses including the finding that the weight of 

methamphetamine was greater than a bulk amount but less than five times the 

bulk amount. At sentencing, the state agreed that the two offenses merge and 

requested a sentence for the aggravated trafficking in drugs conviction. The trial 

court then sentenced Holdren to 36 months in prison. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE 

INTRODUCTION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AGAINST 

APPELLANT. THIS CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF 

APPELLANT’S RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL, CONFRONTATION 

OF WITNESSES, REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL AND DUE 

PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED HIM BY THE FIFTH, 

SIXTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 

10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. THOMAS GREEN 

TESTIFIED AS TO THINGS APPELLANT PURPORTEDLY SAID 

TO HIM. THESE WORDS WERE INDICIA OF GUILT. 

II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. HE WAS DENIED 

HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AS GUARANTEED HIM BY 

THE FIFTH, EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDEMENTS OF 

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 

SECTION 10, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

III. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL TO APPELLANT BY FAILING TO RAISE 

OBJECTIONS TO THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN 

THOMAS GREEN’S TESTIMONY. THIS WAS A DENIAL OF 

APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL, A FAIR TRIAL, DUE 

PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 

AS GUARANTEED HIM BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 6

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

{¶12} Holdren presents several conclusionary one-sentence arguments 

within the first assignment of error. First, Holdren argues the trial court erred in 

allowing the state’s witness Thomas Green to testify as to Holdren’s statements 

at the traffic stop because they are hearsay. According to Holdren, this error 

violated his right to confront Green because he could not dispute the statements 

without compromising his right against self-incrimination. Additionally, Holdren 

claims he was denied a fair trial since the statements were highly prejudicial—

indicia of guilt. In response, the state cites Evid.R. 801(D)(2) that defines 

Holdren’s statements as not hearsay because he is a party-opponent. 

{¶13} We begin our analysis with determining the appropriate standard of 

review. Holdren concedes that he did not object to Green’s testimony at trial. 

Consequently, “we may review this forfeited issue only for plain error.” State v. 

Dailey, 4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA2059, 2018-Ohio-4315, ¶ 17; see also State v. 

Stapleton, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA7, 2020-Ohio-4479, ¶ 14 (“Appellate 

courts nevertheless have discretion to consider forfeited issues under a plain 

error analysis.”) 

{¶14} “[N]otice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the 

utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest 

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), 

paragraph three of the syllabus. To demonstrate plain error, Holdren “must show 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 7

that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his 

substantial rights.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 

N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 52, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 2002-Ohio-68, 

759 N.E.2d 1240. The term affected “substantial right” has been interpreted as 

affecting the outcome of the case. Barnes at 27. 

{¶15} Green testified at trial that during the traffic stop Holdren asked him 

if he would “stuff” the drugs and also warned Green he “better take the charge” or 

they were going to have problems. Holdren argues the admission of these 

statements was erroneous because they are hearsay. Ordinarily, hearsay “is not 

admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, 

by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by statute enacted by the General 

Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, 

or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.” Evid.R. 802. 

{¶16} “Hearsay” is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). But Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) provides 

that a “statement is not hearsay if * * * [t]he statement is offered against a party 

and is (a) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative 

capacity.” The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a “defendant’s own out-ofcourt statements, offered against him at trial, are not hearsay.” State v. Leonard, 

104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 112, citing Evid.R. 

801(D)(2)(a); see also State v. Tyler, 4th Dist. Ross No. 10CA3183, 2011-Ohio-
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 8

3937, ¶ 36 (“Tyler’s statements in the recording are admissions and are, by 

definition, not hearsay.”) 

{¶17} Based on the clear definition in Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) and established 

caselaw, Holdren’s statements are not hearsay. The statements are admissions 

by a party-opponent. Subsequently, Holdren’s Confrontation Clause argument 

fails. “If testimony qualifies as nonhearsay, it does not implicate the 

Confrontation Clause.” State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 

70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 186, citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 

1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), fn. 9, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 

414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985). 

{¶18} Therefore, we find the trial court did not commit plain error by 

allowing Green’s testimony as to Holdren’s statements. Having rejected 

Holdren’s arguments, we overrule his first assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Holdren challenges his 

aggravated trafficking in drugs conviction on the basis that the methamphetamine 

was not his. Holdren emphasizes he was not the owner of the vehicle and Green 

and Taulbee were passengers and were left alone in the vehicle when Corporal 

Harger placed Holdren in his cruiser. Finally, Holdren calls attention to Green’s 

testimony that he did not observe Holdren purchase any methamphetamine on 

August 26. 

{¶20} In response, the state underscores Holdren’s demeanor at the traffic 

stop and conduct of exiting the vehicle as soon as he stopped. The state also 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 9

highlights the location of one of the methamphetamine bags near the driver’s 

seatbelt buckle and Green’s testimony that the drugs were not his. 

{¶21} “When a court reviews a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio 

St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 146, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 

{¶22} In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record, weighs the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses 

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost 

its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 

(1997), citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st 

Dist.1983). “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going 

to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court 

as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley 

Const. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. 

{¶23} “Although a court of appeals may determine that a judgment is 

sustained by sufficient evidence, that court may nevertheless conclude that the 

judgment is against the weight of the evidence.” Thompkins at 387. But the 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 10

weight and credibility of evidence are to be determined by the trier of fact. State 

v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 132. The trier 

of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, and we 

defer to the trier of fact on evidentiary weight and credibility issues because it is 

in the best position to gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice 

inflections, and to use these observations to weigh their credibility. State v. 

Dillard, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 13CA9, 2014-Ohio-4974, ¶ 28, citing State v. West, 

4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3507, 2014-Ohio-1941, ¶ 23. 

{¶24} Holdren was convicted of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation 

of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) as a third-degree felony based on the amount of 

methamphetamine—equals or exceeds bulk amount but less than five times the 

bulk amount, R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(c). To be convicted of aggravated trafficking in 

drugs the state has the burden to prove per R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) that Holdren did 

knowingly 

prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for 

distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled 

substance analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable 

cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled 

substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or 

another person. 

The mens rea “knowingly” is defined in R.C. 2901.22(A) as: 

A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the 

person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a

certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has 

knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such 

circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of 

a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is 

established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high 

probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a 

conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact. 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 11

{¶25} “Possess” or “possession” is defined in R.C. 2925.01(K) as “having 

control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere 

access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the 

premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” Possession may be 

actual or constructive. State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d 174, 175, 538 N.E.2d 98 

(1989). “Actual possession exists when the circumstances indicate that an 

individual has or had an item within his immediate physical possession.” State v. 

Fry, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 03CA26, 2004-Ohio-5747, ¶ 39. “Constructive 

possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and control 

over an object, even though that object may not be within his immediate physical 

possession.” State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 434 N.E.2d 1362 (1982), 

syllabus. “Dominion and control may be established by circumstantial evidence 

alone.” Fry at ¶ 39, citing State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82 

(1997); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). 

{¶26} “A defendant’s mere presence in an area where drugs are located is 

insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant constructively possessed the 

drugs.” Fry at ¶ 40, citing State v. Cola, 77 Ohio App.3d 448, 450, 602 N.E.2d 

730 (11th Dist.1991). However, “when one is the driver of a car in which drugs 

are within easy access of the driver, constructive possession may be 

established.” Id. at ¶ 41. 

{¶27} We find based on Holdren’s behavior at the traffic stop and the 

location of the methamphetamine, syringes and individual baggies with residue, 

the state established his constructive possession of the drugs with the intent to 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 12

distribute. Holdren exited the vehicle as soon as he stopped and was nervous 

and shaken. Even though Holdren was not the owner of the vehicle, the vehicle 

belonged to his girlfriend and he was the driver on August 26. Thus, Holdren had 

access and control to all compartments in the vehicle. 

{¶28} One of the clear plastic bags containing methamphetamine was 

tucked behind the driver’s seatbelt buckle. The second bag containing 

methamphetamine was located in the trunk of the vehicle. In addition, Corporal 

Harger and Deputy Hugus located a black bag by the glove box that had several 

individual baggies with residue, syringes and tourniquets. Deputy Hugus testified 

that the little baggies indicate trafficking—intent to sell. Although Green testified 

that he did not see anyone buy methamphetamine on August 26, he knew 

Holdren was going to buy methamphetamine “at some time that day.” 

Additionally, prior to the traffic stop on August 26, Green saw a male in the car 

known to him as an individual Holdren purchased methamphetamine from in the 

past. 

{¶29} Finally, Corporal Harger and Green’s testimonies negate Holdren’s 

claim that the drugs belonged to Green and/or Taulbee. When Corporal Harger 

left Green and Taulbee alone in the vehicle, he kept an eye on them and neither 

Green nor Taulbee made any movement inside the vehicle. In addition, Green 

stated that his drug of choice is heroin and it puts him down—to sleep. Green 

rarely uses methamphetamine but when he does, it brings him up—keeps him 

awake for days. On August 26, Green kept falling asleep. 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 13

{¶30} Accordingly, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

state, the jury could reasonably have found all the elements of the offense and it 

did not lose its way finding Holdren guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. 

Therefore, we overrule Holdren’s second assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Holdren argues his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to Green’s testimony when Green was recounting 

his statements at the traffic stop. Holdren reiterates his argument in the first 

assignment of error that the statements are hearsay. In response, the state cites 

Evid.R. 801(D)(2) in support of its argument that Holdren’s statements were 

admissible and are by definition not hearsay. 

 {¶32} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Holdren “must 

show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an 

objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would 

have been different.” State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 

N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 113, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Failure to demonstrate either prong of 

this test “is fatal to the claim.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 06CA3116, 

2008-Ohio-968, ¶ 14, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 

674. 

{¶33} Holdren “has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly 

licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 14

2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62, citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 

279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999), citing Vaughn v. Maxwell, 2 Ohio St.2d 299, 

209 N.E.2d 164 (1965). “In order to overcome this presumption, the petitioner 

must submit sufficient operative facts or evidentiary documents that demonstrate 

that the petitioner was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance.” Id., citing State 

v. Davis, 133 Ohio App.3d 511, 728 N.E.2d 1111 (8th Dist.1999). To 

demonstrate prejudice, Holdren “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland at 694. 

{¶34} In overruling Holdren’s first assignment of error, we determined that 

his statements by definition are not hearsay and so the trial court did not commit 

plain error by admitting Green’s testimony. Accordingly, Holdren cannot 

demonstrate that had counsel objected to the testimony the trial court would have 

sustained the objection. 

{¶35} Therefore, we overrule Holdren’s third assignment of error. 

 CONCLUSION 

{¶36} Having overruled Holdren’s three assignments of error, we affirm 

the trial court’s judgment entry of conviction. 

 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED 
Pickaway App. No. 20CA3 15

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed 

to Appellant. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL 

HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS 

COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the 

bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to 

file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency 

of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at 

the earlier of the expiration of the sixty-day period, or the failure of the Appellant 

to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five-day 

appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal 

prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

For the Court, 

 BY: ____________________________ 

 Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.