UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4242

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RANDY WESLEY JONES, a/k/a Shabba-J,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,

Chief District Judge. (5:12-cr-00004-D-1)

Submitted: November 19, 2013 Decided: November 21, 2013

Before WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, 

Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. MayParker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Randy Wesley Jones pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute powder cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 228 months in prison. 

Jones’ counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in counsel’s 

view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court committed reversible 

error when it accepted Jones’ guilty plea and during Jones’ 

sentencing hearing. Jones has not filed a pro se supplemental 

brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do so, and the 

Government has declined to file a responsive brief. We affirm.

The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy is to 

ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters the 

guilty plea. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002). 

Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform 

the defendant of, and determine that he understands the nature 

of, the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory 

minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the 

various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine whether there is 

a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco, 

949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
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There is a strong presumption that a defendant’s 

guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was 

adequate. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th 

Cir. 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for 

plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under 

Rule 11. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 

2002). “To establish plain error, [Jones] must show that an 

error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error 

affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 

478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Jones satisfies 

these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our 

discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error 

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Jones has not presented any evidence or argument to 

demonstrate plain error. Indeed, the record reveals that the 

district court fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements during 

the plea colloquy, ensuring that Jones’ plea was knowing and 

voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by 

pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed 

the offense to which he was pleading guilty. Jones also 

attested during the hearing that he fully understood the 
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ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises 

to him outside those made by the Government in his plea 

agreement. We conclude that Jones’ plea was knowing, voluntary, 

and supported by a sufficient factual basis. Accordingly, we 

affirm Jones’ conviction.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an 

abuse of discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 

330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). This review requires consideration of 

both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We first assess whether the 

district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines 

range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

49–51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir. 

2010). If the sentence is free of significant procedural error, 

we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether 

the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that 

the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 

§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 

(4th Cir. 2010).
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In this case, the district court properly calculated 

Jones’ Guidelines range, granted the Government’s substantial 

assistance motion, treated the Guidelines as advisory, and 

considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, the 

record establishes that the district court based Jones’ sentence 

on its “individualized assessment” of the facts of the case. 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, we conclude that Jones’ sentence is both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED