F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

L A W R E N C E M. B E C K

E R , as fiduciary of the Xerox Corporation Saving s Plan and Xerox Corporation Retirement I ncome Guarantee Plan, Plaintiff

,

C A R M E N S T E P H A

N I E M A Y S

W I L L I A M S , Defendant-Appellee

,

v

.

A S A W I L L I A M S , J R

. , as personal representative of the Estate of Asa W illie W illiams,

Defendant-Appellant

. N o. 13-35069

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05830- B HS

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the W e stern District of W ashing ton B e njamin H. Settle, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted May 15, 2014—Seattle, W ashing ton

F iled J anuary

28, 2015

B efore: Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain, Marsha S. B e rz o n,

a nd Richard C. Tallman, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by J udg e O’ScannlainM A Y S -W I L L I A

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SUMMARY *

Em ployee Retirem ent Incom e Security Act

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judg ment i n an ERI SA interpleader a ction seeking a determination as to the proper beneficiary o f proceeds u nder two employ ee benefit plans.

The plan participant f

o r mally desig nated his wife as his beneficiary

. After their divorce, he d esig nated his s o n a s beneficiary o ver the telephone but did not sig n and r e turn beneficiary

desig nation forms.

The panel held that the beneficiar y desig nation f

orms

w e r e n o t “ p l a n d o c u m e n t s ” g o v e r n i n g t h e p l a n administrator’s award o f benefits under 29 U

. S .C. § 1 104(a)(1)(D). The panel concluded that there w as a triable i s s u e as to whether, under state law, the p lan part i cipant strictly or substantially complied w ith the
g overning plan documents’ requirements for chang ing his beneficiary d esig nation. The panel remanded the case for further proceeding s.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M A Y S -W I L L I A

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COUNSEL

Steven P. Krafchick, Krafchick L aw F irm PL L C, Seattle, W ash., a rg ued the cause and filed the briefs for the D e f e n dant-Appellant. W ith him on the briefs was L isa V

. B enedetti, Krafchick L aw F irm PL L C, Seattle, W ash.

Marcia P. Ellsworth, Peterson Russell Kell y , P L L C
, B e llevue, W a sh., a rg ued the cause and f

iled a b r i e f for the D efendantAppellee. W ith her on the brief w as Merry n B

. DeB enedetti, Peterson Russell Kelly

, PL L C, B e llevue, W ash.

OP INION

O’SCANNL AI

N, Circuit J udg e:

W e must decide whether a dece d e n t succeeded in his attempt to ensure that his son—and not his ex -wife—received the benefits to which his employ er’s retirement plans entitled him.

I

A

W h en he retired in October 2004, Asa W illiams, Sr., (“Asa, Senior”) h a d worked f or the Xerox Corporation for

over thirty y ears. He participated in various benefit prog rams that Xerox maintained for its employ ees, including the Xerox Retirement I ncome Guarantee Plan ( the “RI G P”) and the Xerox Saving s Plan (the “Saving s P l a n ,” and, tog ether with the RI GP, c ollectively

, the “Xerox Plans”), both of which a reM A Y S -W I L L I A

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. W I L L I A M S 4

subject to the E mplo y ee Retirement I n come Security Act o f 1974 (“ERI SA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

As a , S e n i o r, married Carmen May s-W illiams (“Carmen”) in J anuary 1993. I n 2002, he formally desig nated Carmen a s his beneficiary under the Xerox Plans. F ollowing his divorce from Carmen in 2006, h e attempted to chang e his desig nated beneficiary u nder the Xe r o x P l ans from his n ow ex -wife Carmen to his son from an ea r l ier marriag e, Asa W illiams, J r., (“Asa, J unior”). Specifically

, in J uly 2007, Asa, Senior, “t e lephonically undesig n ated” Carmen as his b eneficiary under t h e R I G P
, and indicated that h e wanted h is son a s beneficiary instead. Asa, Senior, g ave simil a r t e lephonic instructions with respect to the RI GP in F eb r u a r y 2 008 a nd with respect to both X erox Plans in J anuary 2011. I n e ach instance, following the telephone conversa tion with Xerox
, Asa, Senior, received, but d id not sig n and return, b eneficiary desig nation f

orms requesting that he confirm his selection o f his son as beneficiary

. On May 16, 2011, Asa, Senior, died.

B

A month later, Carmen wrote to Xerox claiming to be her

ex

- husband’s beneficiary under the X erox Plans. Asa, J unior, likewis e a s serted a rig ht to the p lan proceeds. Rather than resolve th e c o mpeting claims, the fiduciary of the Xerox Plans interpleaded the two parties in federal district co u r t seeking its determination as to the proper b e n e ficiary

. Carmen moved for summary judg ment, asserting that because Asa, Senior, failed to f

i l l o u t and to return the b eneficiary desig nation forms, h e did not properly desig nate Asa, J unior, as beneficiary

in her place.M A Y S -W I L L I A

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The district court g ranted Carmen’s motion for summary judg ment, and declined, on the subsequent mo t i o n of Asa, J unior, to reconsider its judg ment. Asa, J unior, f iled a timely notice of appeal.

C

T h e X e r o x R etirement I ncome Guarantee Plan Ag r e e m e n t (the “RI G P A greement”) p rovides the terms a nd procedures under w hich Xerox ex tends retirement benefits to q u alified employ e es, including the pr o c e dure for desig nating a beneficiary

. B y its terms, unm a r ried participants “ shall desig nate” a b eneficiary , and “may chang e [ the] desig nation of beneficiary from time to t i me.” A married participant, in contrast, before “desig nat[ ing ] one other than his Spouse a s beneficiary ,” must first o b tain “the requisite spousal consent comply ing in every

respect with reg ulations promulg ated by the Secretary of the T reasury .” The Ag r eement also b estows upon the plan administrator the discretion t o “ construe a nd interpret the provisions of the Plan, determine all questions o f fact, and make rules and reg ulations u n d e r t he Plan to the

ex tent deemed advisable or h e lpful.”

The Xerox Retirement I ncome Guarantee Plan Summary Plan Description (the “RI GP SPD,” or “SPD”) similarly notes that, while unmarried p articipan t s “can name any one [they ]
want to be the beneficiary of any death b e nefit that may become pay able,” ERI SA restricts married participants from freely desig n ating beneficiar i e s

. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2). Specifically

, the SPD ex plains that if a married par t i c i p ant ag e 35 or older wishes to desig nate a beneficia r y other than his wife, he must “submit [ his] spouse’s written and notariz ed
consent to do so on forms available

. . . .” The SPD does not outline a

ny further requirements for desig nating aM A Y S -W I L L I A

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beneficiary

. Rather

, i t e x plains that a participant “may visit the Your B en e f

i ts Resources w eb site

. . . or call the Xerox B enefits Center

. . . to complete or chang e [ h i s ] b e neficiary desig nation at any

time.” Elsewhere, the SPD ex plains that,
upon the d eat h o f a n unmarried participant, “a valid beneficiar y d es i g nation must be o n file with the Xerox B enefits Center p r i o r to

. . . death,” or Xerox w ill disburse benefits to the participant’s estate.

The Xero x S a ving s Plan A g r eement (tog e ther with the RI G P Ag reement, collectively

, the “Plan Ag reements”) was not in the record before the district court at t h e t i m e o f C a rmen’s motion for summary judg ment. Rather, Carmen attached five pag es of “ex cerpts” from the A gr e e ment as an

ex h ibit to her r esponse to a subsequent motion for reconsideration. These ex ce r p t s

— which do not include a sig nature pag e, a date of adoption, o r a ny authentication besides the affidavit of Carmen’s a ttorney —outline a similar procedure for beneficiary desig nations to the one described in the RI GP Ag reement. They also delega t e t o the p lan administrator the authority “to pres cribe such schedules o r forms which he deems necessary or he l p f u l to carry out the purposes of the Plan . . . .”

The Xerox Saving s Plan Summary Plan Description (the “Saving s Plan SPD,” and, tog ether wi t h the RI GP SPD, collectively

, the “SPDs”) conta i n s similar lang uag e to the RI G P SPD r eg arding beneficiary desig nations, ex cept that the Saving s Plan SPD o m i t s any reference to any r equired “form,” e ven w hen describing t h e r estrictions on a married participant’s freedom to desig n ate beneficiaries.M A Y S -W I L L I A

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I I

An ERI SA f

iduciary must distribute be n e f i ts “in accordance with the do c uments and instruments g overning the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). I n g ranting summary judg ment in favor of Carmen, the district court dete rmined that the beneficiary desig nation forms themselves constituted “plan documents” which Asa, S e n i o r, needed to sig n and to return in order to chang e his b eneficiary desig nation. Asa, J unior, d isp u t e s this determination, a nd arg ues that the beneficiary

forms do not constitute “plan documents.”

A

I n Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan

, 555 U .S. 2 85 (2009), the Supreme Court declined to decide whether the c atego r y o f “documents a nd instruments g overning the plan” described in § 1104(a)(1)(D) included beneficiary desig nation forms such as those at issue in this case. Id. at 304. N or have we y et addressed the question. 1 T hus, w hether such beneficiary forms constitute

1 On ly o n e co u rt o f ap p eals h as co n f ro n ted th e issu e. T h e T h ird Circu it, in a p re- Ken n ed

y case, su g g ested th at p o ten tially a l l “ d o cu m en t s o n f i le

w ith t h e P lan ,” i n clu d in g b en ef iciary d esig n atio n f

o rm s, fi t w ith i n th e statu to ry d ef

in itio n

. S

ee McGo wa n v. N

JR S erv. Co rp

. , 4 2 3 F.3 d 2 4 1
, 2 4 5

– 4 6 (3 d Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) (Van A n tw erp en , J .), a b r o g a ted o n o th er g ro un d s b y Ken n ed y , 5 5 5 U .S. 2 8 5

. Bu t see id

. at 25 8 n .1 7 (Fu en tes, J
., d issen tin g ) (“ [A lth o u g h ] J u d g e Van A n tw erp en ’ s o p in io n read s th i s p ro v isio n as allo w in g all d o cu m en ts filed with th e Plan to g o v e r n i ts ad m in istratio n , in clu d in g f

o rm s f iled to d esig n ate ben ef

iciaries[,]

. . . I n ote in passin g th at th e g o v er ni n g d o cu m en ts co u ld reaso n ab ly b e lim ited to th o se th at set f o rth th e term s o f

th e p lan .”).

B u t McGo wa n p ro v id es little g u id an ce f o r th is case. In M

cG o w a n , th e claim an t so u g h t to req u i re th e plan ad m in istrato r to ab id e b y th e term sM A Y S -W I L L I A

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“plan documents” presents this court with a question of first impression.

W e draw g uidance from our previous interpretation of a similar ERI SA provision, 29 U .S.C. § 1024(b)(4). See Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Comm. v. Ad m ’ r o f the Hughes Non-Bargai n i ng R et. Plan

, 7 2 F .3d 686 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Under § 1024(b)(4), plan administrators a re required, upon the request of a p articipant or beneficiary

, to provide the r e q u e s ting p arty with a copy of various p lan documents, including SPDs, a n nual reports, terminal reports, barg a in i ng a g reements, trust a g reements, contracts, a nd “other instruments under which t h e p lan is established o r operated.” 29 U. S

. C

. § 1024(b)(4). I n Hughes Salaried Retirees Action Committee v

. A d ministrator of the Hughes Non-Bargaining R etirement Plan

, we i n t erpreted that categ ory to include only “those documents that provide individual participants with information abou t the plan a nd benefits.” Id. at 690. C i t i n g leg islative history

, the e n banc panel ex pl a i ned that § 1024(b)(4) includes only those documents that elucidate “ex actly where [ t he participant] stands with respect to the plan—what benefits he may be entitled to, what circumstances may p r e c l ude him from obtaining benefits, what p rocedures he must follow to obtain benefits

. . . .” Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 93–127, at 2 7 (1974))

o f a m arital s ettlem en t ag reem en t in s t ead o f t h e b en ef i ciary desig n atio n f o rm

. T h e l ead o p in io n d rew a co n t rast b etw een th o se in stru m en t s d u ly f iled w ith t

h e plan

, su ch as b en ef

iciary d esig n atio n f

o rm s , a n d ex trin sic d o cu m en ts, su ch as “ o u

tsid e p riv ate ag reem en ts betw een b en ef iciaries an d
p articip an ts.” Id

. at 2 4 6 (Van A n tw erp en , J .). A sa, J u n io r, in t h e p resen t
case, d oes n o t arg u e th at ex t rin sic d o cu

m en ts p rev ail o v er th o s e f iled w i th th e p lan

. Rath er, h e co n ten d s th at th e p ro v isio n s o f th e P lan A g reem en ts sh o u ld co n tro l o v er an y p u rp orted ly ad d itio n al req u irem en ts i m p o sed b y th e b en ef iciary d esig n atio n

f o rm s.M A Y S -W I L L I A

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(internal q

uotation marks omitted). Notably

, the en banc panel specifically rejected an interpretation of § 1024(b)(4) to include “all documents that are critical to the operation of the plan.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the en banc panel limited the “other instruments” categ ory to those “similar in nature” to the documents specifically listed in § 1024(b)(4). Id. at 691. 2

I n Kennedy

, the Supreme Court sug g ested that the “other instruments” categ o ry d e scribed in § 1024(b)(4) overlaps wi t h t he “documents a

n d instruments g overning the plan”
cate g ory in § 1 104(a)(1)(D). 555 U.S. at 304. I ndeed, the categ ory described in § 1104(a)(1)(D) may be even narrower than that described in § 1024(b)(4). 3 Thus, only those that provide information as to “where [ the participant] stands with respect to the plan,” such as an SPD or trust ag reement mig ht, could q ualify as g overning docume n t s with which a p lan administrator must comply in awarding b e nefits under § 1104(a)(1)(D). B ecause the beneficiary desig nation f orms

2 O th er circu its h av e sim i larly co n stru ed § 1 02 4 (b )(4 ) as en co m p assin g

o n ly f o rm al d o cu m en ts th at g o v ern th e o p eratio n o f th e p lan

. S ee, e. g

. , Mo n d r y v. A m

. F

a mily M u t. In s. Co

. , 5 5 7 F.3 d 7 8 1
, 79 7 –9 8 (7 t h Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) (co llectin g cases f

ro m acro ss th e circu its co n sisten t w it h t h e v iew th at “ in stru m en ts” in § 1 02 4 (b )(4 ) “ reach es o n ly f o rm al leg al d o cu m en ts g o v ern in g a p lan ” (in tern al q u otatio n m ark s o m itted )); Fa irclo th v. L u nd y Pa ckin g Co

. , 9 1 F.3 d 6 4 8
, 6 5 4 (4 th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ) (“ T h e clear an d

u n am big u o u s m ean in g o f t

h is s tatu to ry lan g u ag e en co m p asses o n ly f

o rm al

o r leg al d o cu m en ts u

n der w h ich a p lan

is set u p o r m an ag ed .”).

3 T h e S u prem e C o u rt h as sp ecif

i cally ex clu d ed th e statu to rily m an d ated

su m m ary plan d escrip tio n , listed in § 1 02 4 (b )(4 ), as a so u rce o f th e p lan ’ s g o v ern in g term s. S

ee CIGNA Co rp

. v. Ama ra , 1 3 1 S. Ct. 1 8 6 6
, 1 8 7 8 (2 0 1 1) (“ [T ]h e su

m m ary do cu m e nt s , im

p o rtan t as th ey are, p ro v id e

co m m u n icatio n w ith b en ef

iciaries a b o u t t

h e p lan

, b u t

. . . th eir statem en ts d o n o t th em selv es co n stitu

te th e terms .”).M A Y S -W I L L I A

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. W I L L I A M S 10

in this case provide no such information—rather, they simply confirm the participant’s attempt to chang e his desig nat e d beneficiary

—the forms a

re not “plan documents” g overning the administrator’s award of plan benefits.

B

Nor do any

of the actual plan d ocuments incorporate the beneficiary desig nation forms so as to bring them into the § 1104(a)(1)(D) categ ory o f go verning documents. The RI G P Ag reement d e fi n e s the “Plan” as the provisions “set forth [ t] herein or in any amendment [ t] hereto. ” W h ile the A greement ex pressly contemplates the incorporation of certain other documents, s u c h as trust ag reements, to be “deemed to form a p a r t o f the Plan,” nowhere does the Ag reement allude to beneficiary desig n ation forms, and none of the schedules annex ed to the Ag reement contain even the
vag uest reference to a beneficiary desig nation f orm. Moreover, while the RI GP SPD refers to the use of f orms for married p articipants to chang e their beneficiary desig nations, nowhere d oes the RI GP SPD refer to the use of any form for unmarried participants. F inally

, t h e Xerox representative, whose declaration Carmen attached to her motion for
summary judg ment, did not list among the “plan documents” those beneficiary desig nation forms that a ppear in the record. 4

I n sum, nothing in the record indicates that the b eneficiary desig nation forms themselves c onstituted, or were in a ny way

4 Ev en if th e p an e l w e r e t o rev iew th e ex cerp t s f ro m th e Sav i n g s Plan A g reem en t su

b m itted b y Carm en in resp on se to A sa, J u n io r’ s m o tio n to

r eco n sid er, th e ex cerp ts do n o t allu de to th e m an d ato ry u s e o f s p e c i fi c f o rm s, an d th eref

o re f ail to d em o n strate th e in c o r p o r a tio n o f th e b en ef iciary f orm s in to th e g o v ern in g p l an d ocu m en ts.M A Y S -W I L L I A

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incorporated into, g overning plan documents. Therefore, the district court erred i n d e termining that Asa, Senior, was required to a

bide by the lang uag e contained in the forms—but
not in the g overning plan documents—to chan ge h is beneficiary

desig nation from Carmen to Asa, J unior.

I I I

Carmen counters that e ven if the beneficiary forms were
not “plan d ocuments,” Asa, Senior, still needed to comply with them because Xerox ex ercised its authority t o require their use.

Under Fi r e s t one Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch

, 489 U.S. 101 (19 8 9 ), if a plan g rants the a dministrator discretion to interpret it or to determine benefit elig ibility

, a court will uphold such interpretation or determination if r easonable. Id. at 115. Here, the RI GP Ag reement bestows upon Xeroxthe discretion to “construe and interpret the provisions of the Plan, determine all questions o f fact, an d make rules a nd
reg ulations under the Plan to the ex tent deemed advisable o r he l pful.” Assuming without deciding that such lang uag e bestows discretion on the plan admini strator, we must determine whether the administrator actually ex ercised such discretion by sending the benefic i ary desig nation forms to Asa, Senior. 5

Carmen arg ues that the forms themselves are evidence o f Xerox ’s ex ercise of discretion to require Asa, S e nior, to complete a n d to return the beneficiary d esig nation forms in order to effect the chang e. The forms indicate that “to

5 W e also assu

m e th at th e Sav in g s P lan A g reem en t w o u ld req u i re sim i lar j u d icial d ef

eren ce to ad m in istrativ e d eterm in atio n s th ereu n der.M A Y S -W I L L I A

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. W I L L I A M S 12

finaliz e” and “to validate” the beneficiary desig nations, the participant m ust “[ s] ig n, date, and return” them. The f orms also state that they “confirm[ ] y our benefic i a ry desig nations that y ou made” and r efer to t h e d a t e of Asa, Senior’s phone call.

Asa
, J u n ior, on the other h and, contends that the record fails to establish that the plan administrators were vested with discretion to require their use. Notably

, while t h e f orms conspicuously display the Xerox log o and indicate the benefits plan to which they p ertain, they also i n c lude the insig nia and other i n f

ormation of Hewitt Associates L L C,

w hich the Xerox Plans hired as an ag ent, but apparently did
not nominate as a plan ad m i n i strator or other fiduciary

. F urthermore, nothing in the r ecord indicate s t h a t the p lan administrator required any other plan participants to sig n a nd
to return such b e n eficiary forms in order to chang e beneficiary

desig nations.

Moreover, r at h er than award b enefits to Carmen due to Asa, Senior’s alleg ed failure to return the sig ned beneficiary forms, the plan administrator dec l i n e d to award benefits to either party , and instead chose to file this present interpleader action. T hus, the plan adm i n istrator impliedly declined to

ex e r cise any discretion in determining whether Asa, Senior’s telephonic desig nation of Asa, J u nior, as b en eficiary was valid u nder the plan. See, e.g. , Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Kennedy

, 358 F .3d 1295
, 1299 (11th Cir. 2 004) (finding that a plan administrator d id not ex ercise discretion granted to it under the plan w hen the administrator f i l e d a n interpleader action to d e termine whether a b eneficiary desig nation form filed in accordance with plan documents o r a subsequently

ex ecuted will g overned benefit elig ibility ).M A Y S -W I L L I A

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. W I L L I A M S 13

Thus, a s there has been no ex ercise of discretion to which we could defer, we review de novo whether Carmen or Asa, J unior, is e ntitled to plan ben e f its—a question answered b y reference to the g overn i n g plan documents. See Thomas v

. Or. Fruit Prods. Co. , 228 F

. 3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Liberty Life

, 358 F .3d at 1299 ( apply ing de novo r eview when the plan administrator d ecline d to e x ercise its discretionary

authority to interpret benefit elig ibility ).

I V

The inquiry thus is whether Asa, Senio r , s t rictly o r substantially complied with the g overning plan documents. See BankA m e r i c a Pension P lan v. M cMath

, 2 06 F .3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2000). Such an inquiry is one of state law, see id.

, and one that implicates Asa, Senior’s intentions, see, e.g. , Sun Life A ssurance Co. of Canada v. S u tter , 95 P.2d 1014, 1016 (W ash. 1939) (“[ I ]n cases in which t h e i n s u r e r is not interested, the intent of the insured is entitled to g reat consideration.”); see also Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co.
, 7 F .3d 11, 16 (2d C i r

. 1993) (“Summary judg ment is notoriously inappropriate for determination o f c l ai ms in which i s s u e s of intent, g ood faith and other subjective f eeling s play dominant roles.” ( internal quotation mar k s omitted)).

Nothing in the g overning plan d o c u m ents prevents unmarried participants from desig nating beneficiaries b y telephone call. The RI GP A g reement p rovides that unmarried participants “may chang e [ the] d e s ig nation o f beneficiary from t i m e t o time.” I n clarify ing the requirements of the underly ing Plan Ag reements, both SPDs instruct unmarried partic i p ants to c all the Xerox B enefits Center o r t o visit the Xerox website in order to c hang e or toM A Y S -W I L L I A

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. W I L L I A M S 14

complet e a beneficiary desig nation. And while the p lan documents require w ritten desig nations for m arried participants, they decline to impose any sort o f w ri t ing requirement on unmarried participants. Thus, the g overning plan d ocuments permit unmarried participants to chang e their beneficiary

desig nations by

telephone.

I n lig ht of the e vidence before us, including Xerox ’s c all log from J anuary 10, 2011, reflecting that Asa, Senior, called Xerox to chang e his beneficiary desig n ation from Carmen to Asa, J unior, a reasonable t r i e r o f fact could determine that Asa, Se n i or, intended to chang e his beneficiary to Asa, J u n i o r, and that his phone c alls to Xerox constituted substantial compliance with the go v erning plan documents’ requirements for chang ing his beneficiary desig nation.

A ccording ly

, we cannot sustain the g rant o f summ a r y judg ment in favor of Carmen.

V

W e the re fore REVERSE the judg ment of the district
court and REMAND the case for further proceeding s consistent with this opinion.