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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 22-3658 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Allan D. Schubert brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”), see 5 U.S.C. § 552, against two components of the United States Department of 

Justice (“DOJ”): Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Federal Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”). This matter is before the Court on defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 

No. 23, and plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Relief Requested, ECF No. 27. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for defendants and DENIES plaintiff

leave to amend.

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1 The Court’s consideration focused on the following documents, including attachments: 

• Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23), Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 

(ECF No. 23-1, “SMF”), and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23-2, “Defs.’ Mem.”)

• Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with Authorities in 

Support and Objections Cited (ECF No. 28, “Pl.’s Opp’n”)

• Motion to Amend Relief Requested (ECF No. 27, “Mot. Am. Relief”)

• Combined Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and 

Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 29, “Reply”).

ALLAN D. SCHUBERT, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al., :

:

Defendants. :
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Request to the FBI

“On August 15, 2022, [p]laintiff submitted a request to the FBI,” SMF ¶ 2, for the 

following information:

Any and all names, phone numbers, or other electronic 

identifications of any users that engaged or searched any of the 

criminal information systems/networks in reference to my criminal 

history for the months of November 2021, to and through August 

2022.

Defs.’ Mem., Ex. (ECF No. 23-3, “Seidel Decl.”) ¶ 5; see Seidel Decl., Ex. A (ECF No. 23-4). 

The request “did not state that [plaintiff] was attempting to submit a Privacy Act request or 

request any information about himself.” SMF ¶ 3. “Plaintiff did not enclose a privacy waiver 

for any person other than himself, [or] proof of death of any person.” Id. ¶ 4.

FBI, which assigned the request tracking number FBI 1557552-000, id. ¶ 5, responded “it 

would neither confirm nor deny the existence of [responsive] records pursuant to FOIA 

exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C),” id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, “FBI 

voluntarily chose to . . . search . . . its primary case management system” using two variations of 

plaintiff’s name as search terms, id. ¶ 12, and found no responsive records about plaintiff, id. ¶ 

13. FBI notified plaintiff of its determination by letter dated August 25, 2022. Id. ¶ 14. 

Plaintiff appealed FBI’s determination administratively to DOJ’s Office of Information 

Policy (“OIP”). Id. ¶ 15. OIP closed the appeal “due to the pendency of [this] lawsuit,” id. ¶ 16, 

which plaintiff filed on November 2, 2022, see Compl. (ECF No. 1). 

B. Request to the BOP

Plaintiff submitted a similar FOIA request to BOP, SMF ¶ 17, seeking “identifying 

information of individuals who accessed his criminal history or other information between 
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November 2021 and August 2022,” Defs.’ Mem., Ex. 3 (ECF No. 23-5, “Villa Decl.”) ¶ 7; see

Villa Decl., Ex. 2 (ECF No. 23-6). The request “did not state that [plaintiff] was attempting to 

submit a Privacy Act request or request[ing] any information about himself.” SMF ¶ 18. BOP 

assigned the matter tracking number 2022-05550. SMF ¶ 25.

BOP deemed SENTRY, its “national database which tracks various data regarding an 

inmate’s confinement,” Villa Decl. ¶ 8; see SMF ¶ 19, “the only BOP record system that could 

reasonably be described as a ‘prisoner look up’ system.” SMF ¶ 20. Because SENTRY “does 

not have the ability to track and report what transactions are completed by users,” id. ¶ 22, BOP 

determined that no responsive records existed, SMF ¶ 25. BOP informed plaintiff of its 

determination by letter dated August 26, 2022. Id.

Plaintiff appealed BOP’s determination to OIP, id. ¶ 26, and OIP “affirmed BOP’s 

conclusion that the records [p]laintiff sought did not exist,” id. ¶ 27; see Villa Decl., Ex. 7 (ECF 

No. 23-10).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Amendment of the Complaint

Generally, leave to amend a complaint should be freely granted “when justice so 

requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]he grant or denial of leave to amend is committed to a 

district court’s discretion.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In 

determining whether “justice so requires” amendment, the Court considers factors including 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue 

of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment[.]” Atchinson v. District of 

Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425-26 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 
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(1962)). The Court “may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim 

would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 181–82). 

B. Summary Judgment in a FOIA Case

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

A FOIA case typically is resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See Petit-Frere v. 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, 800 F. Supp. 2d 276, 279 (D.D.C. 

2011), aff’d, No. 11-5285, 2012 WL 4774807, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 19, 2012) (per curiam). The 

Court grants summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[A] material fact is ‘genuine’ 

. . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” 

on an element of the claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Factual 

assertions in the moving party’s affidavits or declarations may be accepted as true unless the 

opposing party submits his own affidavits, declarations or documentary evidence to the contrary. 

See Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

In a FOIA case, the Court may grant summary judgment based solely on information 

provided in an agency’s affidavits or declarations, see Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 

F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999), as long as they “describe the documents and the justifications for 

nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld 

logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary 

evidence in the record [or] by evidence of agency bad faith,” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 
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656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). Agency affidavits or declarations are 

accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims 

about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & 

Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. 

Cent. Intelligence Agency, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 

2. Local Civil Rule 7(h)

Under the Local Civil Rules of this Court, a “motion for summary judgment shall be 

accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no 

genuine issue, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the 

statement.” LCvR 7(h)(1). In accordance with Local Civil Rule 7(h), defendants submit a 

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in 31 sequentially-numbered paragraphs with citations to 

the portions of the record on which they rely. See generally SMF. 

The opposition to a summary judgment “motion shall be accompanied by a separate 

concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended 

there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated, which shall include references to the parts 

of the record relied on to support the statement,” as well as a memorandum of points and 

authorities. LCvR 7(h)(1). “[The] Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party 

in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement 

of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” Id.

3. Defendants’ Proffered Facts are Admitted

The Court issued an Order (ECF No. 24) on August 7, 2023, advising this pro se plaintiff 

of his obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Civil Rules of this 

Court and warning him the Court would accept as true any factual assertions contained in 
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defendants’ affidavits or attachments in support of their motion for summary judgment unless 

plaintiff submitted affidavits or evidence showing that defendants’ assertions are untrue. 

Because plaintiff did not respond to defendants’ statement of material facts, submit a statement 

of his own, or otherwise controvert defendants’ proffered facts, the Court treats defendants’ 

proffered facts as admitted. See, e.g., Clemente v. FBI, No. 1:20-cv-1527 (TNM), 2022 WL 

17092585, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2022) (treating FBI’s Statement of Material Facts Not in 

Dispute as admitted because plaintiff failed to respond to FBI’s summary judgment motion). 

Still, the Court must determine for itself whether the agencies meet their obligations under FOIA 

and under Rule 56. See Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 506–07 (D.C. Cir. 

2016) (explaining that district courts cannot treat a motion for summary judgment as conceded 

for want of opposition because “[t]he burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why 

summary judgment is warranted”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 

“Plaintiff is not seeking to amend” his FOIA claims, and, instead, wants to expand the 

scope of his FOIA requests. Mot. Am. Relief at 1. According to plaintiff, his requests set a date 

range “from October or November 2021 to January or February 2022,” and now he “seek[s] to 

enlarge the window from 2 or 3 months to the last ten . . . years.” Id. Defendants oppose the 

motion, see generally Reply at 6-8, for good reason.

An agency “has a duty to construe a FOIA request liberally,” Nation Magazine, 

Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995), but it is “not 

obliged to look beyond the four corners of the request,” Kowalczyk v. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d

386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here, plaintiff’s FOIA requests are limited to a nine-month period,
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from November 2021 through August 2022, and he may not expand the scope of his request in 

the course of this litigation. See Day v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:17-cv-1418 (EGS), 2020 WL 

1078955, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2020) (concluding that State Department “does not run afoul of 

FOIA by failing to search for or produce records other than those related to [plaintiff’s] August 

9, 2013, request,” as a request “pertain[ing] to plaintiff and events occurring in Mexico between 

2008 and 2011, would [not] have called for a search of records about Belize in 2007”), aff’d sub 

nom. Day v. United States Dep’t of State, No. 20-5072, 2021 WL 2525677 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 

2021); Donoghue v. Office of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 157 F. Supp. 3d 21, 23 n.2 

(D.D.C. 2016) (denying plaintiff’s request to expand scope of civil action to include three 

additional agencies where complaint pertained to single FOIA request to a single agency); see 

also Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that agency is required to 

read FOIA request as drafted, “not as either [an] agency official or [requester] might wish it was 

drafted”).

It is the requester’s obligation to ask for what he wants. If plaintiff wanted records 

spanning a ten-year period, he should have requested them, and he still may do so by submitting 

new FOIA requests. See Kowalczyk, 73 F.3d at 389 (“[I]f the requester discovers leads in the 

documents he receives from the agency, he may pursue those leads through a second FOIA 

request.”). Plaintiff’s motion to amend is denied.

B. FBI’s Interpretation of Plaintiff’s Request

FBI construes plaintiff’s request as one under FOIA alone for information about third 

parties, not himself, see Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 15; SMF ¶ 28, and plaintiff objects, see Pl.’s Opp’n 

at 1 ¶ 1. According to plaintiff, his “REQUESTS only asked for the identities, numbers – some 

form of identification for those who searched HIS criminal histories,” and questions “how . . . 
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that [can] be misconstrued as a request for records” related to a third party. Id. at 4 ¶ 3 (emphasis 

in original). He also contends that FBI should have treated his request as one under the Privacy 

Act in addition to FOIA, see id. at 2 ¶ 8, for “his records and file,” id. at 3 ¶ 1 (emphasis in 

original). Plaintiff’s interpretation of his requests is just not reasonable. 

By requesting identifying information about individuals who may have searched FBI and 

BOP databases for the purpose of accessing plaintiff’s criminal history, plaintiff necessarily is 

requesting information about individuals other than himself, even if the records the third parties 

may have accessed pertained to plaintiff. This is not a situation where plaintiff made a “request . 

. . to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in [an 

agency’s] system [of records].” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). As defendants point out, plaintiff “is not 

asking for his own name, phone number, or electronic identification[.]” Reply at 1. Had 

plaintiff sought information about himself, or had plaintiff sought access to information about 

himself under the Privacy Act, the requests would have, and should have, yet did not, made his 

intention clear. Therefore, FBI did not err by construing the request as one for information about 

third parties and by processing plaintiff’s request under FOIA alone. 

C. FBI’s Glomar Response Under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)

Pursuant to “longstanding policy,” Seidel Decl. ¶ 16, the FBI asserts “an Exemption

(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C) Glomar response . . . , neither confirming nor denying the existence or nonexistence of law enforcement records, in those instances where an individual seeks access to 

information regarding a third party, unless the requester establishes a significant public interest 

in disclosure that outweighs the third party’s privacy interests,” id. (footnote omitted). 

Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 
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552(b)(6), and Exemption 7 protects “records or information compiled for law enforcement 

purposes,” but only to the extent that disclosure would cause an enumerated harm, 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(7). Although the two exemptions are similar, ‘“Exemption 7(C) is more protective of 

privacy than Exemption 6’ and thus establishes a lower bar for withholding material.” Am. Civil 

Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing U.S. Dep’t of 

Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 496 n.6 (1994)) (additional citation 

omitted). And where, as here, the agency relies on both Exemptions 6 and 7(C) for the same 

material, the Court need not “consider Exemption 6 separately[.]” Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 

F.3d 675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see, e.g., Clemente, 2022 WL 17092585, at *6.

1. Law Enforcement Records 

The FBI’s first task is to demonstrate that the information at issue was compiled for law 

enforcement purposes. When a law enforcement agency invokes Exemption 7, it “warrants 

greater deference than do like claims by other agencies.” Keys v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d

337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987). It “must simply show that the nexus between the agency’s activity . .

. and its law enforcement duties is based on information sufficient to support at least a colorable 

claim of its rationality.” Berard v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 209 F. Supp. 3d 167, 172 (D.D.C. 

2016) (quoting Keys, 830 F.3d at 340) (internal quotation marks omitted); Campbell v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that agency need only “establish a rational 

nexus between the investigation and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties and a 

connection between an individual or incident and a possible security risk or violation of federal 

law”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 

421 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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The declarant describes FBI as the federal government’s “primary investigative agency . . 

. with authority and responsibility to all violations of federal law not exclusively assigned to

another agency, to conduct investigations and activities to protect the United States and its

people from terrorism and threats to national security, and further the foreign intelligence

objectives of the United States.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 12. Thus, defendants demonstrate, and plaintiff 

does not dispute, that FBI is a law enforcement agency. SMF ¶ 6.

Insofar as plaintiff requests “records specifically related to his criminal history,” id. ¶ 13, 

from the FBI, the declarant states that responsive “records, should any exist, would have been 

collected and maintained by the FBI as part of its law enforcement mission,” id. Plaintiff 

“challenges the characterization” of his FOIA request as one “for records made for law 

enforcement purposes, exempted by § 552(b)(7)(C).” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2 ¶ 3 (emphasis in 

original). The basis for his objection is that the records do not relate to “investigations of any 

sort[.]” Id. at 4 ¶ 3. Rather, he seeks “the identities, numbers – some form of identification for 

those “who searched HIS criminal histories,” and questions “[h]ow . . . that can be misconstrued 

as a request for records related to a third party’s investigation by law enforcement[.]” Id. 

(emphasis in original). As discussed above, plaintiff’s FOIA request reasonably is construed as a 

request for information about third parties, namely those who may have accessed plaintiff’s 

criminal history via an FBI database. Plaintiff is mistaken if he believes Exemption 7 applies 

only if there were an actual or active investigation by the FBI or that third parties who may have 

accessed his criminal history are the subjects of an FBI investigation. 

“Law enforcement entails more than just investigating and prosecuting individuals after a 

violation of the law.” Public Employees Emps. for Envt’l Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l 

Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico, 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis in 
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original). For example, “civil investigations and proceedings” are law enforcement purposes 

also. Mittleman v. Office of Personnel Management, 76 F.3d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per 

curiam) (citing Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420 n.32); see Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 294 F.3d 

71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that “‘law enforcement purposes’ under Exemption 7 includes 

both civil and criminal matters within its scope”). And “[t]he ordinary understanding of ‘law 

enforcement’ includes . . . ‘proactive steps designed to prevent criminal activity and to maintain 

security.’” Public Employees for Envt’l Responsibility, 740 F.3d at 203 (quoting Milner v. Dep’t 

of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 582 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring)). 

It is reasonable to conclude from FBI’s submission that any records it maintains 

regarding an individual’s criminal history would have been compiled for a law enforcement 

purpose within the scope of FBI’s authority and responsibility. Thus, FBI meets its threshold 

showing that responsive records, if any exist, are law enforcement records for purposes of 

Exemption 7.

2. Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) applies if disclosure of law enforcement records “could reasonably be 

expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C). 

The Court must balance the interest in privacy of individuals mentioned in the records against 

the public interest in disclosure. See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007); Beck v. Dep’t of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The privacy interest 

at stake belongs to the individual, not the government agency, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. 

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-65 (1989)); Nat’l Ass’n of Retired 

Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and “individuals have a strong 

interest in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity,” Stern v. FBI, 737 
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F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Exemption “7(C)’s protective standard derives from the fact 

that ‘the very mention of an individual’s name’ in law enforcement records could ‘engender 

comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.’” Woodward v. U.S. Marshals 

Serv., No. 1:18-cv-1249 (RC), 2022 WL 296171, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2022) (quoting Roth, 642 

F.3d at 1174) (quoting Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

When balancing the private interest against the public interest in disclosure, “the only 

public interest relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses on ‘the citizens’ right 

to be informed about what their government is up to.’” Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 

1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). It is the FOIA 

requester’s obligation to “show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant 

one” and that “the information [he seeks] is likely to advance that interest.” Boyd v. Crim. Div. 

of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Nat’l Archives & Records 

Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004)). The D.C. Circuit has held “categorically that, 

unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the 

ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the 

agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure.” SafeCard 

Servs., 926 F.2d at 1206; see Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 666 (“Assuming that the ‘private’ 

individuals mentioned in the records are living, their names and identifying information are 

presumptively exempt from disclosure under the SafeCard rule.”).

According to the declarant, FBI “determined that merely acknowledging the existence or 

non-existence of records responsive to [p]laintiff’s request would trigger harm” that Exemption 

7(C) is designed to protect “in that his request sought personal and identifying information 

[about] third party individuals.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 15. Further, he stated, “[i]t is well-recognized 
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that individuals have substantial privacy interests in relation to being associated with law 

enforcement investigations because any such association can engender comment, speculation, or 

harassment; can be embarrassing and stigmatizing; and can, in some circumstances, result in 

physical harm or threats of harm or death.” Id. ¶ 16. Only if a requester put forth a public 

interest in disclosure of third party information would the FBI proceed to the second step, 

“balanc[ing] that public interest against the third party’s privacy interests,” id. ¶ 17, and would 

process the FOIA request “only if it determines that a significant public interest outweighs the 

individual’s privacy interest,” id. Because plaintiff failed to articulate a public interest in 

disclosure of the requested information, id. ¶ 18, specifically third parties’ “phone numbers and 

other electronic identifiers,” id. ¶ 20, FBI asserts its Glomar response without having conducted 

a search for responsive records, see id. ¶¶ 13, 20, on the ground that “the nature of the requested 

records alone prohibits acknowledgment and disclosure,” id. ¶ 20. 

Plaintiff maintains that the Glomar response “was totally inappropriate [and] an abuse of 

its usage[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 ¶ 4; see id. at 5 ¶ 4. In general terms, plaintiff denies that 

Exemption 7(C) “has any relevance to this case,” and asserts that “revealing the identities” of 

third parties “would not produce any harm to any third parties.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6. Plaintiff offers 

no support for his arguments, however, and cannot defeat defendants’ showing on summary 

judgment. 

D. “No Records” Responses

Curiously, although plaintiff claims to have requested information about himself, he does 

not mention defendants’ “no records” responses. 
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1. Central Records System

FBI’s declarant explains that “records concerning [plaintiff’s] criminal history” likely 

would be “indexed within the automated indices of the FBI’s Central Records System,” Seidel 

Decl. ¶ 21, “consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and 

general files compiled and maintained by the FBI while fulfilling its mission and integrated 

functions as a law enforcement and intelligence agency, and in the fulfillment its administrative 

and personnel functions,” id. ¶ 22. The declarant describes the FBI’s records system at length, 

see id. ¶¶ 22-27, and explains the method by which agency staff searched the system, see id. ¶¶ 

28-29, for information about plaintiff. 

Relevant to this discussion are the following facts:

• FBI searched its primary case management system using “Allan Schubert” and 

“Schubert, Allen” as search terms; and

• FBI located no responsive records.

See SMF ¶¶ 13-14. FBI’s proffered facts are deemed admitted, and the agency adequately 

demonstrates that its search for records about plaintiff was reasonable, even if the search yielded 

no responsive records. Its “no records” response is justified.

2. SENTRY and Inmate Locator

Given plaintiff’s failure to respond to defendants’ proffered facts, plaintiff admits the 

following:

• Plaintiff did not indicate that his request to BOP as one under the Privacy Act or a request 

for information about himself;

• Plaintiff sought information about unidentified third parties, and not about himself;

• SENTRY is the only BOP system of records that could be considered a “prisoner look 

up” system;

• SENTRY cannot track or report what transactions are completed by particular users;

• BOP’s Inmate Locator does not maintain information about a prisoner’s criminal history;

• BOP’s Inmate Locator cannot track or record users of the tool; and

• There exist no records responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request to BOP.
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See SMF ¶¶ 20-23, 29. Accepting BOP’s factual proffer as true, BOP establishes that SENTRY 

and Inmate Locator are not capable of and do not maintain the information plaintiff requested. 

Thus, its “no records” response is justified.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that (1) defendants reasonably construed plaintiff’s requests as 

requests for information about third parties under FOIA; (2) FBI properly asserted a Glomar 

response; (3) FBI’s and BOP’s “no records” responses were proper; and (4) plaintiff cannot, 

essentially, amend his FOIA request by amending his complaint in the course of this litigation. 

Accordingly, defendants’ summary judgment motion will be granted and plaintiff’s motion to 

amend will be denied. An Order is issued separately.

DATE: January 29, 2024 COLLEEN KOLLAR KOTELLY

United States District Judge