IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE 

AT JACKSON

JAMES GLENN COLLINS, JR. v. TOMMY MILLS, WARDEN 

 (STATE OF TENNESSEE)

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 08-CR-9149 Lee Moore, Judge

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W2008-00798-CCA-R3-HC - Filed December 3, 2008

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The petitioner, James Glenn Collins, Jr., appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal

of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm

the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals because

the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon our review of the petition and the

applicable authorities, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed Pursuant to

Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS

and ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined. 

James Glenn Collins, Jr., Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and Rachel E. Willis, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

In July 1986, the petitioner, James Glenn Collins, Jr., pled guilty in Knox County Criminal

Court to four counts of armed robbery, two counts of grand larceny, one count of petit larceny, one

count of concealing stolen property, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of escape as

charged in nine separate indictments. He agreed upon an effective sentence of forty-five years in the

Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. He did not file a direct appeal

or seek post-conviction relief. 

On March 28, 2008, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief in Lake

County Circuit Court. His central claim was that his 1986 plea agreement was “illegal and void 

. . . due to the cumulative affect [sic] of the Constitutional errors affecting the substantial rights of

the defendant in that he has clearly been denied fundamental due process of law.” The petitioner

challenged each of his convictions for a combined total of over one-hundred forty grounds for relief,
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with varying sub-parts, which can be categorized as follows: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel;

(2) deficiencies in the affidavits of complaint and arrest warrants; (3) sufficiency of the evidence;

(4) validity of guilty plea; (5) the statutes under which petitioner was charged were inapplicable to

the offense he actually committed; (6) allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and (7) challenges

to the sentence imposed. After carefully reviewing the allegations within the petition, the trial court

denied habeas corpus relief with an extensive eight-page written order analyzing the petition, the

exhibits, and the applicable law. The petitioner then filed this timely appeal. 

In this appeal, the petitioner filed a one-hundred-twenty-two page handwritten brief arguing

largely the same aforementioned grounds. He additionally claims that the habeas court erred by

denying him relief on his habeas corpus petition without the appointment of counsel. The State

argues the habeas court properly dismissed the petition because none of the petitioner’s claims, even

if true, would render the petitioner’s convictions void. We agree.

A prisoner is guaranteed the right to habeas corpus relief under Article I, section 15 of the

Tennessee Constitution. See also T. C. A. § 29-21-101, et seq. However, the grounds upon which

a writ of habeas corpus may be issued are very narrow. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn.

1999). “Habeas corpus relief is available in Tennessee only when ‘it appears upon the face of the

judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting

court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence

of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993).

“[T]he purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to contest void, not merely voidable, judgments.” Id.

at 163. A void judgment “is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked

jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant’s sentence has expired.”

Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. “In contrast, a voidable judgment is facially valid and requires the

introduction of proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to establish its invalidity. Thus, in

all cases where a petitioner must introduce proof beyond the record to establish the invalidity of his

conviction, then that conviction by definition is merely voidable, and a Tennessee court cannot issue

the writ of habeas corpus under such circumstances.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Tenn.

2004)(internal citation and quotation omitted); see also Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256

(Tenn. 2007) (citation omitted). Moreover, it is the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the judgment is void or that the confinement illegal. Wyatt v.

State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). 

 If the habeas corpus court determines from the petitioner’s filings that no cognizable claim

has been stated and that he is not entitled to relief, the petition for writ of habeas corpus may be

summarily dismissed. See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004). Further, the habeas

corpus court may summarily dismiss the petition without the appointment of a lawyer and without

an evidentiary hearing if there is nothing on the face of the judgment to indicate that the convictions

are void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), superceded by statute

as stated in State v. Steven S. Newman, No. 02C01-9707-CC-00266, 1998 WL 104492, at *2 n.2

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 11, 1998).
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Upon review of the record and applicable law, this court concludes that the petitioner is not

entitled to habeas corpus relief and that the habeas court’s summary dismissal of the petition was

proper. The petitioner’s numerous claims are merely voidable, not void. Nothing in the record

demonstrates that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept the petitioner’s guilty pleas, impose the

sentences, or that the petitioner’s sentences have expired. Accordingly, the petitioner has not

asserted a facially cognizable claim that is appropriate for habeas corpus relief. Because there was

no facially cognizable claim, the petitioner was also not entitled to appointment of counsel for his

hearing in the habeas court. Billy James Matthews v. Turner, No. W2004-01547-CCA-R3-HC, 2005

WL 957112, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 26, 2005) (citations omitted). 

On November 6, 2008, the petitioner filed a motion with this court to amend his petition for

habeas corpus relief. The petitioner now attempts to amend his petition based on his “illegal range

sentencing.” In this motion, the petitioner apparently complains because he was sentenced as a

Range I, standard offender, rather than being sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, his true

status at the time of the guilty plea. “[A] plea-bargained sentence is legal as long as it does not

exceed the maximum punishment authorized for the plea offense.” See Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d

776, 780 (Tenn. 2007). Moreover, “offender classification and release eligibility are nonjurisdictional and may be used as bargaining tools by the State and the defense in plea negotiations.”

Id. Nothing in this record indicates the petitioner’s sentence exceeded the maximum punishment

authorized by statute. Accordingly, the petitioner’s motion is denied. 

When an opinion would have no precedential value, the Court of Criminal Appeals may

affirm the judgment or action of the trial court by memorandum opinion when the judgment is

rendered or the action taken in a proceeding without a jury and such judgment or action is not a

determination of guilt, and the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial judge.

See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. We conclude that this case satisfies the criteria of Rule 20.

Accordingly, it is ordered that the State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is

affirmed in accordance with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

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CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE