IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30434

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JEREMY JAMES WASHINGTON, also known as Worm,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:15-CR-83-28

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jeremy James Washington appeals the sentence imposed following his 

conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 

cocaine and unlawful use of a communications facility. He was sentenced 

above the guidelines range to concurrent sentences of 60 months of 

imprisonment on the drug charge and 48 months of imprisonment on the 

communications charge and a total of three years of supervised release. He 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 12, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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contends that the district court violated Rule 32(i)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules 

of Criminal Procedure and deprived him of due process when it imposed an 

upward variance without notifying him of its intent to do so. He also contends 

that the 60-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.

We assume for purposes of the analysis that Washington preserved these 

claims of error. See United States v. Hebert, 813 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2015). 

A preserved claim of error regarding lack of notice is reviewed de novo. United 

States v. Garcia, 797 F.3d 320, 322 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2015). Washington had no 

“expectation subject to due process protection” of a sentence within the 

guidelines range by virtue of the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines. 

Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713 (2008). He was therefore on notice 

that the district court might impose an upward variance under the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 480 F.3d 713, 722 (5th 

Cir. 2007). The presentence report’s description and his personal knowledge 

of his criminal history put him on notice of the factual basis for the upward 

variance. See United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 846-48 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 137 S. Ct. 453 (2016); Garcia, 797 F.3d at 323-25; Mejia-Huerta, 480 

F.3d at 722-23. Therefore, he had a reasonable opportunity to comment on 

these matters, and there was no violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(C) or deprivation of 

due process.

The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court 

gave a “thorough justification” for the variance in this case. United States v. 

McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 344 (5th Cir. 2011). The district court concluded that 

Washington’s prior arrests and pending charges and the conversation during 

which Washington offered to kill someone for his codefendant and recounted 

how he had shot someone were aggravating factors that warranted an upward 

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variance. The extent of the variance, 30 months above the guidelines 

maximum of 30 months, is within the range of variances we have upheld. See 

id. at 345. Given the significant deference that is due to a district court’s 

consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, and the district 

court’s reasons for its sentencing decision, Washington has not demonstrated 

that the sentence is substantively unreasonable, see McElwee, 646 F.3d at 344-

45.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 17-30434 Document: 00514344979 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/12/2018