NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0586n.06

Case Nos. 13-3855/3857

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MARK LANGFORD,

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

WARDEN, ROSS CORRECTIONAL 

INSTITUTION,

Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

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ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED 

STATES SUPREME COURT 

OPINION

BEFORE: BOGGS and DONALD, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Mark Langford, an Ohio state 

prisoner, filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming several grounds 

for relief from his state trial court conviction for murder. The district court conditionally granted 

and denied the petition in part, and both sides appealed. We affirmed the district court’s decision 

in all respects. This decision was remanded from the Supreme Court in light of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015). Because the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Ayala is procedurally different than this case, we continue to AFFIRM the 

district court’s decision.

 

*The Honorable Denise Page Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, 

sitting by designation.
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Langford petitioned in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief on 

several grounds: (1) pre-indictment delay violated his rights to due process and a fair trial; (2) the 

trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the mens rea for complicity; and (3) his appellate counsel 

was ineffective for failing to raise several issues to the state court of appeals. See Langford v. 

Warden, Ross Corr. Inst., No. 2:12-CV-0096, 2013 WL 459196 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2013). 

The district court granted Langford relief on the jury instruction issue and dismissed Langford’s 

other claims. See Langford v. Warden, Ross Corr. Inst., No. 2:12-CV-96, 2013 WL 3223379 

(S.D. Ohio June 25, 2013). This Court affirmed the district court’s decision in Langford v. 

Warden. Langford v. Warden, Ross Correctional Inst., 593 Fed.Appx. 422, 427-33 (6th Cir. 

Nov. 12, 2014), finding that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the mens rea for 

complicity and the state court’s decision to the contrary was unreasonable in light of the 

language of the jury instructions and the record as a whole.

The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ayala is that courts on collateral review 

have to give a heightened degree of deference to the state court’s review of a harmless error 

decision. Ayala, at 2197. Thus, habeas petitioners, under Ayala, are not entitled to habeas relief 

based on trial court error unless they can establish that it resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id.

Since there was no state court review of harmless error in this case, Ayala does not apply to the 

facts of this case because this Court could not give deference to the state court’s determination of 

harmless error. Therefore, we uphold our decision granting Langford habeas relief and affirming 

the district court’s decision.
Nos. 13-3855/3557, Langford v. Warden

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BOGGS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While the majority 

correctly reads the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2187 

(2015), it incorrectly concludes that it has no application to this case. Ayala stands for the 

proposition that federal courts must give heightened deference to a state court’s harmless-error 

determination when evaluating that decision on habeas review. Id. at 2197. Where a state court 

has “adjudicated on the merits” a prisoner’s alleged constitutional error and found it harmless, a 

federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s holding in Chapman v. 

California, 366 U.S. 18 (1967). Id. at 2198 (quoting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). This is a substantially more deferential standard than 

the one we employed when we initially affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief in 

Langford v. Warden, 593 F. Appx. 422, 427–33 (6th Cir. 2014).

Recognizing that its announcement in Ayala would have potential ramifications for this 

case, the Supreme Court vacated our decision in Langford and remanded the case to us for 

further consideration. See Hooks v. Langford, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (mem.). The Supreme 

Court frequently engages in this practice in order to “call[] the panel’s attention to [Supreme 

Court] opinions highlighting the necessity of deference to state courts in § 2254(d) habeas 

cases.” Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7 (2011). The majority ignores this directive, instead 

concluding that Ayala does not apply because there was no state review of harmless error. 

As the Ohio Court of Appeals makes clear, however, it did adjudicate the harmless-error issue. 

The court’s opinion plainly states that “[t]he jury could not have been misled by the charge 

given, nor could it have found Langford guilty based upon an error in the jury charge.” State v. 

Langford, 2010 WL 3042185, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
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Ohio court concluded, “[n]o reversible error is present with respect to the jury charge or 

complicity.” Ibid. That the state court’s treatment of the issue is brief has no bearing on whether 

or not it reached the merits—we are required to “presume[] that the state court adjudicated the 

claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the 

contrary.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011)). That presumption can only be overcome “when there is reason to think 

some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99–

100. As the Ohio court’s language demonstrates, Langford cannot make this showing.

Thus, so long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision, we are required to give it deference, even if we might decide the case differently on de 

novo review. Id. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). As my 

dissent in our initial decision in Langford demonstrates, see 593 F. App’x at 438–41, Langford 

cannot overcome this deferential standard on appeal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.