United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 19-2323

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Twyla McElree; Mikaela Gossman, Surviving Spouse of Jonathan Tyler Gossman, 

on her own behalf, next friend of L.R.G., next friend of Z.A.G.

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

City of Cedar Rapids

 Defendant - Appellee

Wayne Jerman, in his official capacity; Brent Long, in his official capacity; Jeff 

Hembera, in his official capacity

 Defendants 

Nathan Juilfs, in his individual capacity

 Defendant - Appellee

Christopher Bieber, in his official capacity

 Defendant

Lucas Jones, in his official capacity; Brandon Boesenberg, in his official capacity; 

Bryson Garringer, in his official capacity

 Defendants - Appellees

John Does, 1-5 

 Defendants
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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

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Submitted: September 23, 2020

 Filed: December 23, 2020 

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Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

Officers from the Cedar Rapids Police Department shot and killed Jonathan 

Gossman during an altercation after stopping his vehicle to investigate possible drug 

crimes. Several of Gossman’s relatives sued the officers and the city asserting 

various federal and state law claims under the United States Constitution, the Iowa 

Constitution, and Iowa tort law. The district court1 granted summary judgment to 

the officers and the city on all claims. We affirm.

I. Background

In October 2015, Investigators Brandon Boesenberg and Bryson Garringer 

were conducting surveillance in a Walgreens parking lot. The officers sat in an 

unmarked vehicle to avoid detection. Part of their stakeout included electronically 

tracking purchases of pseudoephedrine2 in the area. 

1

The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa.

2

Pseudoephedrine is a non-prescription drug used to treat congestion caused 

by colds and allergies. It is also used illicitly as a methamphetamine precursor. The 

officers used the National Precursor Log Exchange (“NPLEx”), which allowed them 
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The officers noticed a pickup truck in the back of the parking lot. Two people

who the officers believed had connections to methamphetamine manufacturing were 

in and about the truck. Annabelle Santos (one of the truck’s occupants) exited the 

truck, entered the Walgreens, and purchased pseudoephedrine at 9:55 p.m. The 

officers identified her using the NPLEx as she left the store and headed back to the 

truck. At 9:59 p.m., the officers were alerted to another pseudoephedrine purchase 

across the street at a different pharmacy. The officers saw a person who they 

recognized as involved with methamphetamine walk up to the truck from the 

direction of the other pharmacy.

3

 Soon after, the officers saw Gossman exit the 

truck, purchase pseudoephedrine in the Walgreens, and return to the truck. While 

the truck was parked, the officers observed a flurry of movement inside and near the 

truck and a flashlight shining from inside. 

The officers began to suspect the individuals observed in and about the truck 

were purchasing pseudoephedrine to make methamphetamine. The truck soon left 

the parking lot, dropped off a passenger at a gas station across the street, and drove 

through the city. Boesenberg and Garringer followed the truck, as did Sergeant 

Nathan Juilfs who responded to a request for assistance from the other officers. The 

officers decided to stop the truck because they suspected it contained evidence of 

methamphetamine manufacturing. After receiving a call for a K9 unit, Officer Lucas 

Jones arrived at the scene with his police dog, Bane.

to monitor all pseudoephedrine purchases at their location in real time. When an 

attempted purchase was made nearby, the officers received the time, location, 

purchaser’s driver’s license information, and purchasing history.

3

The officers believed the actual purchaser may have given the 

pseudoephedrine to this person who then walked it to the truck.
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When the officers approached the truck, they asked Dillon Graf and Santos to 

exit and began interviewing them. After being prompted, Graf produced a knife, a 

methamphetamine pipe, and some prescription pills. 

While the other officers questioned Graf and Santos, Sergeant Juilfs 

questioned Gossman through the truck’s open back window. After hearing about 

Graf’s pipe,Juilfs told Gossman he would be searched. Gossman repeatedly reached

toward his own waist. Juilfs ordered Gossman to put his hands up, and Juilfs 

removed a knife on a lanyard from around Gossman’s neck. Graf then informed 

Garringer that there was a shotgun in the back seat. Several of the officers drew 

their firearms and told Gossman to exit or he would be removed from the truck. 

Gossman refused.

Gossman then got out of the truck, but when his feet hit the ground, he started 

moving. With his weapon still drawn, Boesenberg used his other arm to attempt to 

restrain Gossman. However, to avoid firing accidently, Boesenberg quickly released 

him. Gossman took off running. Bane, the service dog, and Officers Jones and 

Garringer chased him. 

Jones and Garringer both noticed that the entire time Gossman ran, he held 

the front of his waistband. After a short chase, Bane caught up with Gossman and 

bit his arm. After running a few more steps, Gossman fell, twisted, and drew a 

handgun from his waistband. Garringer yelled “gun.” He testified that he believed 

Gossman fired at him and that he heard a clap and saw a flash of light. Garringer 

stopped abruptly, slipped, and fell to the ground. Jones heard the shout and saw 

Garringer fall before popping back up. Jones and Garringer then fired repeatedly at 

Gossman, until they determined he was no longer a threat. Gossman was 

pronounced dead at the scene. The medical examiner’s report and further 

investigation revealed that Gossman was shot 24 times. An investigation also

revealed Gossman had methamphetamine in his system, and his 9mm handgun was 

loaded but had not been fired.
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Gossman’s surviving family members sued the City of Cedar Rapids and the 

officers involved in Iowa District Court asserting nine separate counts including 

violations of the United States Constitution, the Iowa Constitution, and Iowa tort 

law. The city removed the case to federal court and ultimately moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted the city summary judgment on all claims.

II. Analysis

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, taking 

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” See Oglesby v. Lesan, 

929 F.3d 526, 531–32 (8th Cir. 2019). We draw all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the family as the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is proper if there is 

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The nonmoving party must cite to specific 

facts in the record demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial and may not rely 

solely on allegations.” Lucke v. Solsvig, 912 F.3d 1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2019).

The family argues that the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion required 

to stop the truck and detain Gossman. The Fourth Amendment protects against 

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although officers 

need probable cause to affect an arrest, for an investigatory stop, “the Fourth 

Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion 

to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 

266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “An 

investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person 

stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 

449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).4

4

The Iowa Supreme Court usually views the “Iowa Constitution’s search and 

seizure provisions to track with federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.” 

State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Christopher, 

757 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 2008)). An excessive force claim under the Iowa 
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As a standard for initiating an investigative stop, reasonable suspicion hovers 

well below preponderance of the evidence and need not rise to the level of probable 

cause. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. It is a “commonsense, nontechnical concept[]” that 

requires more than a hunch. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). 

Officers must have “‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person 

stopped of criminal activity.” Id. at 696 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18). We 

look “to the totality of the circumstances, ‘allow[ing] officers to draw on their own 

experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about 

the cumulative information available to them.’” United States v. Dortch, 868 F.3d 

674, 680 (8th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273).

 

We turn first to the stop of the truck that was carrying Gossman. The district 

court found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on (1) two to three

separate pseudoephedrine purchases in a twenty-minute span, (2) known 

methamphetamine manufacturers associated with the truck, and (3) suspicious levels 

of activity in and around the truck. We agree that these facts, taken together, support 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have been afoot.

This case is similar to United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2003). 

There, we upheld the investigatory stop of two people who purchased 

pseudoephedrine separately from the same store before meeting up at a shared car, 

and who had also purchased a lithium battery (another methamphetamine precursor) 

at a different store. Id. at 445. The individuals’ movements in the stores and parking 

lots—splitting up and rejoining one another periodically—and their separate 

purchases of methamphetamine precursors supported a finding of reasonable 

suspicion. Id. at 448. Although this case lacks a lithium battery purchase, the facts 

are otherwise quite similar. In both cases, multiple people purchased 

Constitution is also substantially similar to a claim under the United States 

Constitution. State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 2012). Because the 

parties have not articulated any reason to treat their state law claims differently in 

this case, we assess the state constitutional claims under the same general standards 

as their federal constitutional claims.
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pseudoephedrine separately within a short time and rejoined one another at the same 

vehicle. And here, there are additional facts supporting reasonable suspicion, such 

as (1) suspicious movement in and around the truck and (2) known 

methamphetamine manufacturers standing around the truck. Ameling’s reasonable 

suspicion holding supports the same here.

The family raises several arguments to the contrary. First, they argue that the 

officers could not be sure they had definitively identified Gossman, Santos, or 

anyone else before the stop. But reasonable suspicion does not require certainty, 

including in the identification context. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (noting how 

reasonable suspicion is a considerably lower standard than the preponderance of 

evidence standard); United States v. Lopez-Tubac, 943 F.3d 1156, 1158–59 (8th Cir. 

2019) (finding an officer’s identification mistake did not negate reasonable 

suspicion). Further, the officers’ suspicions as to the participants’ identities were 

not developed in isolation. Combined with the other suspicious behavior observed, 

their suspicions about the participants’ identities contributed to the reasonable 

suspicion of the officers.

Second, the family argues that legally purchasing packages of cold medicine 

is not against the law and the officers observed no traffic violations. In support, they 

cite two state court cases holding the legal purchase of cold medicine did not support 

reasonable suspicion. See State v. Schneider, 80 P.3d 1184, 1189–90 (Kan. Ct. App.

2003); People v. Lomas, 812 N.E.2d 39, 47–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Their argument

fails for two reasons.

First, under our precedent, lawful activity can—and often does—help form 

the basis for reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Ameling, 328 F.3d at 448 (concluding

legal purchases, in addition to other factors, supported a finding of reasonable 

suspicion); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting “nervous, 

evasive behavior,” though not illegal, “is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 

suspicion”). Activity that does not directly indicate wrongdoing but suggests 

criminality is highly relevant to a reasonable-suspicion determination. See Sokolow, 
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490 U.S. at 10 (“‘[I]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing 

of’ . . . reasonable suspicion.” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.13 

(1983))). 

Second, the purchases of pseudoephedrine cold medicine (by separate people 

tied to the same car) was not the only consideration that led to an investigative stop

here. The officers also observed individuals known to be methamphetamine users 

and manufacturers hanging around the truck and suspicious activity inside the truck. 

Collectively, the officers’ observations were enough to support the belief that

criminal activity might have been afoot.

 Next, we hold the officers’ first attempt to detain Gossman was also supported 

by reasonable suspicion. During a lawful Terry stop, officers can “take any measures 

that are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the 

status quo during the course of the stop.” Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 737 (8th 

Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Sanford, 813 F.3d 708, 713 (8th

Cir. 2016)). Depending on the circumstances, officers may instruct the driver and 

passengers to step out of the car, prevent passengers from leaving the scene, and 

increase restraint proportionate to uncooperative behavior during an investigative 

detention. See id. at 738; United States v. Smith, 645 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Here, the officers had reason to believe Gossman was armed because the 

driver of the truck had told them there was a shotgun in the back seat near Gossman, 

and Juilfs had already removed a knife from around Gossman’s neck. In addition to 

the officers’ suspicions that Gossman was armed, Gossman’s lack of cooperation 

and his sudden movements in the back seat supported restraining him. See Waters, 

921 F.3d at 738 (finding the use of handcuffs and placing the suspect in a squad car

were justified where the suspect displayed argumentative behavior and refused to 

obey orders). As soon as Gossman exited the truck, the record indicates he 

physically struggled with Boesenberg and ran off. Jones’s decision to release Bane 

to subdue the struggling Gossman and keep him from leaving was not unreasonable. 

See Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding the use of a 
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police dog to control a non-compliant suspect was reasonable where the suspect was 

merely twisting on the ground). 

The family next argues the officers’ use of deadly force was excessive. Our 

precedent says otherwise. Succeeding on an excessive force claim requires a 

showing that the officers used unreasonable force “judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Swearingen v. Judd, 930 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). When analyzing reasonableness, a court must consider

“that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of 

force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 988. The use of deadly force 

is constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “if an officer has 

probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, 

either to the officer or others.” Thompson v. Dill, 930 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 

2019) (quoting Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2012)). That rule covers 

an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake. Id. Before using deadly force, officers 

should give “some warning” if it is “feasible.” Dooley v. Tharp, 856 F.3d 1177, 

1181 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Loch v. City of Lichfield, 689 F.3d 961, 967 (8th Cir. 

2012)). 

Here, Garringer and Jones reasonably believed Gossman posed a serious 

threat to their safety and that deadly force was justified. When Bane caught him, 

Gossman drew a handgun. That drawn handgun “pose[d] a threat of serious physical 

harm” to the officers and justified their use of deadly force against Gossman. 

Thompson, 930 F.3d at 1013.

The family advances two primary arguments as to why it was unreasonable 

for the officers to shoot Gossman. They first emphasize that Garringer mistakenly 

believed Gossman fired his gun. They also argue the officers should have warned 

Gossman before firing. Neither argument has merit considering the totality of the 

circumstances. First, we need not resolve whether Garringer’s mistaken belief was 
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reasonable here since deadly force was authorized because Gossman pulled a gun 

and thus the officers were “faced with an apparently loaded weapon.” Smith v. City 

of Brooklyn Park, 757 F.3d 765, 772 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[N]o constitutional or 

statutory right exists that would prohibit a police officer from using deadly force 

when faced with an apparently loaded weapon.” (quoting Sinclair v. City of Des 

Moines, 268 F.3d 594, 596 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam))). Second, Gossman’s 

family is correct that a warning should be given if it is feasible. See Dooley, 856 

F.3d at 1181. But where the decision to shoot must be made in a “split-second,” as 

here, it is reasonable to forgo a warning. See Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 987. In light 

of the above, we hold the use of deadly force did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The family’s state law assault and false arrest claims also fail because the 

officers did not act unreasonably in using deadly force and did not act unlawfully in 

detaining Gossman. Under Iowa law, “an assault only occurs if the peace officer 

does not reasonably believe the particular force was necessary in the circumstances.” 

Johnson v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 352 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa 1984); Iowa Code 

§ 804.8. And a false arrest occurs only if there is an unlawful detention or restraint. 

Thomas v. Marion Cnty., 652 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 2002). Because the officers’ 

use of deadly force was reasonable and the detention of Gossman was lawful, the 

district court properly disposed of the assault and false arrest claims.5

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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5

The family also argues the district court erred in deciding to strike certain 

portions of the record and their statement of facts offered in support of summary 

judgment. However, they admit these issues only need to be resolved if we reverse 

the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Appellant’s Br.

at 17, 48, 55. Having affirmed the grant of summary judgment, we need not reach 

these issues.