United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 16, 2022*

Decided February 24, 2022 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2364 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MATTHEW R. JONES, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 18-CR-20036 

Harold A. Baker, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Matthew Jones appeals his sentence of 10 years in prison, the statutory maximum

for his offense. He argues that the district court committed procedural errors when 

resentencing him after a remand from this court. Because the judge did not adequately 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, the parties have waived oral 

argument, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-2364 Page 2 

explain Jones’s sentence or address his arguments in mitigation, we vacate the sentence 

and remand for resentencing. 

A jury found Jones guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). At Jones’s original sentencing hearing, the judge calculated his range of 

imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines to be 188 to 235 months, reduced under 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.l(a) to an effective “range” of 120 months by operation of the statutory 

maximum. Jones was sentenced to 120 months in prison and 3 years of supervised 

release. We vacated and remanded for resentencing, United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949, 

953 (7th Cir. 2020), because the judge erred by imposing a longer sentence in part to 

promote Jones’s rehabilitation, see Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 334–35 (2011). 

On remand the judge held another sentencing hearing. The probation office filed 

a short, updated sentencing memorandum noting that while in custody Jones had 

completed a drug-education program, had incurred no disciplinary infractions, and was 

waiting for a spot in an anger-management therapy program. (At the hearing the 

government relayed that after the probation office filed its memorandum, Jones 

incurred a low-level violation for using another inmate’s phone access code.) After 

listening to statements from Jones, his attorney, and the government, the judge imposed

the same sentence of 120 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release but did not 

give any explanation. As the judge prepared to the end the hearing, the courtroom 

deputy prompted him to state what the judgment should reflect about conditions of 

supervised release and the special assessment. After doing so, the judge stated: “[A]ll 

right, I’m not going to say anything more” lest he commit “reversible error.” The 

government reminded the judge that he was required to advise Jones of his reasons for

imposing the sentence. The judge responded: “I adopt the reasons that were advanced 

by the government.” 

After a brief pause, the government reminded the judge to ask the defendant 

whether his principal arguments in mitigation had been sufficiently addressed. Jones’s 

attorney reiterated the arguments related to his good conduct and efforts at selfimprovement while in custody. The judge replied: 

I’m sure he has done those, some of those things, but that doesn’t ... overcome 

the seriousness of the other occurrences in his life. And I believe that the sentence 

imposed represents those concerns, mainly the safety of the public and the fact 

that—well, I’ve said enough. ... I’m not sure what ... a Tapia error means, and I 

don’t know that a lot of people think, know what it means. That’s the sentence. 
No. 21-2364 Page 3 

The government then reminded the judge to read Jones’s conditions of supervised 

release or obtain Jones’s waiver, and Jones waived the reading. After another pause and 

prompting by the courtroom deputy, the judge instructed Jones of his right to appeal

but commented that “I’m betting that you know that thoroughly.” 

On appeal Jones argues that the judge committed procedural error by failing to 

consider the § 3553(a) factors and inadequately explaining the chosen sentence. See Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We agree. We do not require any formulaic 

approach to addressing the § 3553(a) factors or require judges to explain the obvious at 

length. United States v. Washington, 739 F.3d 1080, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014). But the judge did 

not explain his thinking at all before imposing Jones’s sentence and did so only vaguely 

afterward, which makes meaningful appellate review impossible. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 

The government’s prodding did not rectify the ambiguity. When asked, the 

judge said that he “adopt[ed] the reasons that were advanced by the government” and

later added that the sentence reflected his concern about “the safety of the public.” This 

terse explanation does not reflect “an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented.” Id. Nor does the judge’s rote invocation of a § 3553(a) factor explain why the 

maximum sentence was warranted here, especially when there was new evidence and 

mitigating arguments. See Washington, 739 F.3d at 1081. 

The government points out that when a judge chooses a sentence within the 

guidelines range, we do not require as much explanation for the sentence. United States 

v. Lyons, 733 F.3d 777, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2013). But the judge must provide some 

justification for the sentence based on the § 3553(a) factors, Washington, 739 F.3d at 1082, 

because absent an explanation, “‘meaningful appellate review’ of the sentence’s 

reasonableness is impossible.” Lyons, 733 F.3d at 785 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Here, 

the judge did not sufficiently explain his decision or how he weighed the § 3553(a) 

factors, and his comment about Tapia leaves open the possibility of improper 

considerations, so Jones must be resentenced. See United States v. Shoffner, 942 F.3d 818, 

824 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Jones is also correct that the judge did not adequately address his principal 

arguments in mitigation. United States v. Vidal, 705 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2013). Jones 

primarily argued that his postconviction conduct and his efforts at self-improvement

warranted a lower sentence. Jones demonstrated that since the original sentencing, he 

had successfully completed one stage of the drug-abuse program and enrolled in six 

other courses. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490–91 (2011). His arguments 
No. 21-2364 Page 4 

were appropriate, see id., and should have been evaluated on the record, especially 

because they responded to concerns the judge had articulated at the first sentencing 

hearing, Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 823. The judge did not need to analyze exhaustively (let 

alone accept) every mitigating argument, but he had to address why Jones’s principal 

arguments were unpersuasive. Vidal, 705 F.3d at 744. 

The government responds that if a judge considers mitigating arguments, even if

implicitly and imprecisely, the sentence may be reasonable. United States v. Diekemper, 

604 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2010). But here the judge said only that Jones’s arguments did 

not “overcome the seriousness of the other occurrences in his life.” That oblique 

reference to “occurrences” is too vague to allow us to evaluate the judge’s reasons for 

rejecting the evidence that Jones had heeded the judge’s concerns and pursued drug 

treatment and other rehabilitative programming. See Shoffner, 942 F.3d at 824. And the 

written statement of reasons is also devoid of explanation, so it does not aid our 

interpretation of the judge’s oral statements. See United States v. Reed, 859 F.3d 468, 474 

(7th Cir. 2017).

We VACATE Jones’s sentence and REMAND for plenary resentencing.