FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-0798

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MARIO COTO,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON 

OFFENDER REVIEW,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

John. C. Cooper, Judge.

May 1, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

Mario Coto challenges the circuit court’s denial of his petition 

for a writ of mandamus. Treating the instant petition for certiorari 

review as an appeal, see Green v. Moore, 777 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2000), we affirm. 

Coto is serving two life sentences for second-degree murder, 

which are to be followed by a sentence for aggravated assault. 

Following an initial parole interview in 1982, Coto’s presumptive 

parole release date (PPRD) was set at April 1, 2007. Over time, 

subsequent interviews resulted in revision of his PPRD to October 

2, 2062. 
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In 2016, Coto succeeded in having his sentence for aggravated 

assault reduced. He raised that fact at his parole interview in 

2021. But the Commission on Offender Review (the Commission) 

did not alter his PPRD. Coto then sought a writ of mandamus in 

the circuit court requesting that the Commission conduct another 

parole interview, consider the reduced sentence, and alter his 

PPRD accordingly. The circuit court, invoking its review capacity, 

denied the petition on the merits. It concluded that the 

Commission did not deprive Coto of a fair parole proceeding. The 

instant petition for certiorari followed. 

Coto’s mandamus petition did not trigger the circuit court’s 

review capacity, and thus we treat his petition for certiorari as an 

appeal, see Green, 777 So. 2d at 426, and affirm. But because the 

circuit court went further and addressed the merits of Coto’s 

petition, we take this opportunity to further explain Fla. Dep’t of 

Corr. v. Gould, 344 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), rev. granted, 

SC22-1207, 2022 WL 17347630 (Fla. Dec. 1, 2022).

I.

Traditionally, “for a court to issue a writ of mandamus, a 

plaintiff must establish ‘that he has a clear legal right to the 

performance of a clear legal duty by a public officer and that he 

has no other legal remedies available to him.’” James v. Crews, 132 

So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting RHS Corp. v. City of 

Boynton Beach, 736 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). When 

traditional mandamus is sought, the circuit court’s initial task is 

to “assess[] the legal sufficiency of the allegations.” Holcomb v. 

Dep’t of Corr., 609 So. 2d 751, 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). If the circuit 

court finds the allegations were insufficient, “it will deny the 

petition . . . or dismiss those claims that are factually insufficient.” 

Id. (citing Gibson v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 450 So. 2d 553 

(Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Adams v. Wainwright, 512 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 

1st DCA 1987)).

However, in limited circumstances, “[w]hen a trial court 

considers a mandamus complaint that challenges the 

constitutional sufficiency of a quasi-judicial prison or parole 

commission proceeding,” mandamus may be used as a tool of 

judicial review. Gould, 344 So. 3d at 504; see also Sheley v. Fla. 

Parole Comm’n, 720 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 1998) (“Mandamus is an
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accepted remedy for reviewing an order of the Florida Parole 

Commission.” (emphasis supplied)); Courtney v. Fla. Comm’n on 

Offender Rev., 371 So. 3d 418, 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) 

(Tanenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Not 

every final order of a trial court on a prisoner’s mandamus 

complaint is one rendered by the court in its ‘review capacity.’”) 

(citations omitted)). 

Here, Coto’s petition did not come in the form of review 

mandamus. Rather, Coto sought an order directing the 

Commission to conduct a new parole interview, where it should 

consider his reduced aggravated assault sentence and lower his 

PPRD. Thus, Coto sought traditional mandamus relief. See 

Holcomb, 609 So. 2d at 753. Accordingly, the circuit court should 

have determined only the legal sufficiency of the petition’s 

allegations. See Gould, 344 So. 3d at 505. But the circuit court did 

not stop there. It should have. 

II.

Coto’s petition was ripe for dismissal because he failed to 

establish that he had a “clear legal right” to the performance of a 

“legal duty” owed by the Commission. See Crews, 132 So. 3d at 899. 

Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, states that “[e]very person 

who has been convicted of a felony . . . shall, unless otherwise 

provided by law, be eligible for interview for parole consideration 

. . . .” (emphasis supplied). And section 947.174(1)(b), Florida 

Statutes, states that “[f]or any inmate convicted of murder . . . and 

whose [PPRD] is more than 7 years after the date of the initial 

interview, a hearing examiner shall schedule an interview for 

review of the PPRD.” (emphasis supplied). The subsequent 

interview “shall take place once within 7 years after the initial 

interview and once every 7 years thereafter . . . .” Id. (emphasis 

supplied). Coto does have a right to a subsequent parole interview, 

but only once every seven years. 

Coto, however, did not seek to have the Commission conduct 

the seven-year statutorily prescribed parole interview. Instead, 

Coto requested an additional interview—separate and distinct 

from the one granted to him in statute—for the Commission to 
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consider his reduced aggravated assault sentence and lower his 

PPRD. No right to such an additional interview exists in statute.

Section 947.174(2), Florida Statutes states that “[t]he 

[C]ommission, for good cause, may at any time request that a 

hearing examiner conduct a subsequent hearing according to the 

procedures outlined in this section.” (emphasis supplied). 

Similarly, section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, states, in pertinent 

part, that “[s]ubsequent to the establishment of the [PPRD], the 

[C]ommission may, at its discretion, review the official record or 

conduct additional interviews with the inmate.” (emphasis 

supplied). Thus, the plain language of the statutes shows that the 

Commission can decide when to hold a required parole interview

that is not required by statute at its discretion. 

Accordingly, given the Commission has discretion in deciding 

when to hold this type of parole interview, Coto cannot show that 

he had a right to enforce the performance of a legal duty. 

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS and LONG, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Mario Coto, pro se, Appellant.

Rana M. Wallace, General Counsel, and Mark J. Hiers, Assistant 

General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee.