Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Majority and 

Dissenting Opinions filed January 2, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00681-CV

IN RE PLATINUM ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2012-30972

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

In this mandamus proceeding, relator Platinum Energy Solutions, Inc. 

asserts the trial court clearly abused its discretion by issuing two orders denying 

Platinum’s motion for protective order, overruling Platinum’s discovery 

objections, and compelling Platinum to produce documents requested by the real 

parties in interest. Platinum seeks mandamus relief commanding the trial court to 

vacate these two orders and to issue an order granting the requested protection. 

Platinum does not complain that the trial court failed to address expressly whether 
2

the requested documents at issue are within the scope of the discovery allowed by 

section 21.556(a) of the Texas Business Organizations Code; rather, Platinum 

complains that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the 

requested documents are within the scope of that provision and are discoverable. It 

is unclear what mandamus relief this court is granting. And, contrary to binding 

precedent, this court grants mandamus relief without identifying any abuse of 

discretion by the trial court. 

To the extent the majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion 

by failing to state expressly in its orders whether the requested documents are 

within the scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a),1the trial court was 

not required to make such a statement, and Platinum does not assert that the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to do so. To the extent the majority concludes 

that the trial court abused its discretion by applying Nevada law under section 

21.562(a) rather than Texas law under section 21.556(a), the majority contravenes 

the legal principle that the trial court is presumed to have correctly applied the law. 

Because the record does not reflect whether the trial court applied Nevada law 

under section 21.562(a) or Texas law under section 21.556(a) in making the 

challenged rulings, this court must presume that the trial court correctly applied 

Texas law under section 21.556(a). Thus, the trial court did not apply Nevada law 

under section 21.562(a), and there is no basis for a conclusion that the trial court 

abused its discretion in this regard.

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references in this opinion are to the Texas Business 

Organizations Code.
3

This court should ascertain the extent to which the documents requested are 

outside the scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a) and grant 

mandamus relief to the extent, if any, the trial court compelled production of these 

documents. 

What relief is this court granting?

Today, the court issues a final ruling in this mandamus proceeding. In doing 

so, the court adjudicates all issues and lifts the stay. But, the court’s opinion raises 

as many questions as it answers. Platinum asks this court to grant mandamus relief 

ordering the trial court to vacate the two challenged orders and to issue an order 

granting Platinum’s motion for protection. The majority twice states that this court 

is conditionally granting Platinum’s petition for writ of mandamus, which means 

that this court is ordering the trial court to vacate the two challenged orders and to 

issue an order granting Platinum’s motion for protection; yet, the majority does not 

state specifically that this court is granting this relief. The majority does

specifically direct the trial court to ―make an express determination as to the 43 

categories of documents at issue, and to determine whether these categories pertain 

to one or more of the areas of inquiry allowed by section 21.556(a),‖ but Platinum 

has not requested this relief. Moreover, this language suggests that this court may 

be dismissing Platinum’s mandamus petition for lack of ripeness under the theory 

that Platinum’s petition is not ready for review unless and until the trial court 

makes such an express determination. The parties and the trial court are entitled to 

an unambiguous ruling on the petition and to a clear statement of the relief this 

court is granting.
4

What was the trial court’s abuse of discretion?

Before this court may conditionally grant mandamus relief, it first must 

determine that the trial court abused its discretion.2 Yet, the majority conditionally 

grants mandamus relief without making any such determination. The closest the 

majority comes is when it states: ―Therefore, the trial court acted beyond its 

discretion insofar as it required production of the 43 categories of documents at 

issue to occur based on a determination that section 21.562(a) governs this 

inquiry‖3 But, the majority never states whether the trial court required this 

production based on such a determination.4 Thus, contrary to binding precedent, 

the majority conditionally grants mandamus relief without determining that the 

trial court abused its discretion.5 

 

2

See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2003) (holding appellate court cannot grant 

mandamus relief absent determination that trial court abused its discretion); In re Labidi, 287 

S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding) (holding appellate 

court cannot grant mandamus relief absent showing by relator that trial court abused its 

discretion).

3

Ante at p.13 (emphasis added).

4 As discussed below, under binding precedent, the trial court did not require production of any 

documents based on a determination that section 21.562(a) governs this inquiry. This court must 

presume that the trial court correctly applied Texas law and section 21.556(a), and nothing in the 

record rebuts this presumption. See Nexen, Inc. v.Gulf Interstate Engineering Co., 224 S.W.3d 

412, 416–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Vickery v. Comm’n for Lawyer 

Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Ex parte 

Jackson, 911 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding [hab. 

denied]); State Nat’l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 290 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

1990, writ denied).

5

See In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 738; In re Labidi, 287 S.W.3d at 926.
5

Is it right to grant mandamus relief based on the trial court’s failure to make 

an express statement in its orders as to whether the requested documents are 

within the statutory scope of discovery?

The majority correctly concludes that section 21.556, entitled ―Discovery,‖ 

governs today’s discovery dispute and that the minority shareholders are limited to 

discovery addressing (1) whether the Special Litigation Committee is independent 

and disinterested; (2) whether the committee’s inquiry and review was undertaken 

in good faith; and (3) the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the 

committee in conducting the review.6The majority then proceeds to grant 

mandamus relief without specifying how the trial court abused its discretion. The 

majority notes that, in the challenged orders, the trial court did not ―expressly 

address whether the minority shareholders are entitled to production of the 43 

categories at issue in light of section 21.556’s specific discovery limits.‖7The 

majority then directs the trial court to issue an order expressly stating whether the 

trial court has concluded that these 43 categories of documents are within the scope 

of discovery permitted by section 21.556(a).8 Thus, the majority appears to base 

this court’s decision to grant mandamus relief on a conclusion that the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to state expressly in its orders whether the requested 

documents are within the scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a). If 

this is the basis for today’s mandamus relief, it is not supported by the law or the 

record.

 

6

See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.556(a). 

7

Ante at p. 13.

8

See ante at p. 14.
6

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to state expressly in 

its orders whether the requested documents are within the scope of the 

discovery allowed by section 21.556(a).

In its motion for protective order, Platinum asserted that (1) the trial court 

should issue an order protecting Platinum from producing any documents beyond 

the documents Platinum produced before filing the motion; (2) the trial court 

should limit the required production to five categories of documents; (3) section 

21.556(a) applies to the discovery process in the underlying suit, and the 45 

document requests are overbroad and encompass documents outside the scope of 

the discovery allowed by this statute; and (4) the trial court should issue an order 

disallowing the requested discovery. In their response, real parties in interest 

Starstream Capital, LLC, Robert E. Chamberlain, Jr., Martha Derrick, Marvel K. 

Mann, and John Dinn Mann (hereinafter the ―Shareholders‖) asserted that under 

section 21.562(a), Nevada law, rather than Texas law, applies to the discoverability 

of the requested documents.9 Though Platinum’s primary argument always has 

been that Texas law and section 21.556(a) apply to this discovery dispute, 

Platinum also has argued in the alternative that it would be entitled to a protective 

order even if Nevada law applies. 

As Platinum points out in its mandamus petition, at a hearing on its motion 

for protective order, (1) Platinum argued that section 21.556(a) applies to the 

 

9

The Shareholders asserted that, to the extent Nevada law applies, Nevada courts would follow 

Delaware law on such issues, and the Shareholders briefed these issues under Delaware law. 

Nonetheless, even presuming that Nevada courts would follow Delaware precedent on these 

issues, under the Shareholders’ argument, this court still would be applying Nevada law rather 

than Delaware law. Therefore, in this opinion, this alternative is described as applying Nevada 

law rather than as applying Delaware law. 
7

underlying case; (2) the trial court and counsel discussed section 21.556(a)’s limits 

on discovery, and (3) without ruling on the motion at that time, the trial court 

indicated it was inclined to conclude that all 45 document requests are within the 

scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a). After taking the motion 

under advisement, the trial judge acted on his stated inclination and signed an order 

denying Platinum’s motion for protective order ―in its entirety.‖ Using this 

language is the same as saying the motion is ―in all things‖ denied, and in the 

context of the denial of a motion, it means every individual part of the motion is 

refused. Under the unambiguous language of the trial court’s order, the trial court 

denied every single request in Platinum’s motion.10 Thus, in its July 15, 2013 

order, the trial court ruled that (1) Platinum is not entitled to protection from 

producing any documents beyond the documents Platinum already produced; (2) 

the required production of documents should not be limited to five categories of 

documents; and (3) the Shareholders’ 45 document requests are not overbroad and 

do not encompass documents outside the scope of the discovery allowed by section 

21.556(a).11 

In its October 21, 2013 order, the trial court addressed a second time the 

issue of whether the requested documents are within the scope of the discovery 

allowed by section 21.556(a). The Shareholders moved to compel production of 

 

10 See Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Int’l Exploration & Production, Inc., 234 S.W.3d 

679, 693 & n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (concluding that, although 

trial court expressly referred to only one ground for granting the motion to dismiss in its 

dismissal order, the trial court dismissed on both grounds asserted because the trial court stated 

that it granted the motion ―in all things,‖ which means that the court dismissed based on all the 

grounds in the motion). 

11 See id.
8

the 45 categories of requested documents. In response, Platinum asserted that (1) 

Texas law and section 21.556(a) apply to this discovery dispute; (2) the requested 

discovery is overbroad and exceeds the scope of permissible discovery under 

section 21.556(a); and (3) Platinum has produced all documents within the scope 

of discovery permitted under section 21.556(a) and therefore no further production 

should be ordered. Though, from the beginning, Platinum’s chief argument has 

been that Texas law and section 21.556(a) apply to this discovery dispute, 

Platinum also has asserted the alternative argument that the motion to compel 

should be denied even if Nevada law applies. The trial court granted the 

Shareholders’ motion to compel production of the requested documents, despite 

Platinum’s argument that section 21.556(a) barred this discovery, and the trial 

court expressly overruled Platinum’s objections to 43 discovery requests,12

including objections that the requests are overbroad and exceed the scope of 

permissible discovery under applicable law. 

The majority is simply incorrect to the extent it concludes the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to state expressly in its orders whether the requested 

documents are within the scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a).13 

The majority cites no authority requiring the trial court to make such an express 

statement, and such a requirement is contrary to precedent from the Supreme Court 

 

12 The trial court did not rule on the objections to requests 5 and 6 because the Shareholders 

withdrew these two requests at the hearing on their motion to compel. Therefore, only 43 of the 

original 45 requests are currently at issue.

13 See ante at p. 12–14. 
9

of Texas, this court, and sister courts of appeals.14 There is no requirement that the 

trial court recite its rationale or detail its reasoning. All that is required is a ruling. 

And, usually that is all that is given.

For example, in In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., this court granted mandamus 

relief as to two orders compelling discovery because the discovery requests were 

overbroad.15 This court concluded that the trial court sufficiently addressed the 

overbreadth issues and that the two orders were ready for mandamus review even 

though in the orders the trial court did not expressly provide an overbreadth 

 

14 See Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 555–56 (Tex. 1990) (stating that, before a 

discovery issue may be reviewed in an original mandamus proceeding, the trial court must have 

denied a motion raising that issue, without imposing any requirement that the trial court 

explicitly detail its reasoning or explicitly state the various issues it determined in ruling on the 

motion); Douglas v. Redmond, No. 14-12-00259-CV, 2012 WL 5921200, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 27, 2012, pet. denied) (holding that, when trial court does not specify 

the basis for its ruling in its order, appellate courts must uphold the order on any legal theory 

supported by the record) (mem. op.); In re Kenefick, No. 14-08-00203-CV, 2008 WL 3833842, 

at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 19, 2008, orig. proceeding) (holding that by 

granting a motion to compel discovery, the trial court implicitly overruled all of the resisting 

party’s discovery objections, even though the trial court did not explicitly state in its order that it 

was overruling these objections); Nexen, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Engineering Co., 224 S.W.3d 

412, 416–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (finding no error and proceeding to 

adjudicate merits of case in which trial court did not specify whether its ruling was based upon 

Texas law or Alberta law, in case in which there was a conflict-of-laws issue); In re Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d 573, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) 

(holding that trial court necessarily overruled defendant’s objections to plaintiffs’ 142 discovery 

requests by granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery, even though, in its order, the trial

court expressly stated that it was not ruling on the defendant’s discovery objections); In re Texas 

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 989 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, orig. 

proceeding) (holding, in a mandamus proceeding, that trial court’s order must be upheld on any 

theory supported by the record, even though the trial court did not state any basis for its ruling in 

the order); State Nat’l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 290 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

1990, writ denied) (finding no error in trial court’s failure to specify whether its ruling was based 

upon Texas law or Illinois law, in case in which there was a conflict-of-laws issue, and 

proceeding to adjudicate merits of the case).

15 See 123 S.W.3d at 575–80. 
10

analysis, or address the issue at all.16 The trial court simply compelled discovery 

without explaining its reasoning.17 Not only did the trial court fail to make an 

explicit statement of the basis for its ruling on the defendant’s objections to the 142 

discovery requests, the trial court expressly stated it was not ruling on these 

objections.

18

 This court held that, by granting the plaintiffs’ motion to compel 

discovery, the trial court necessarily overruled the defendant’s objections.19 While 

explanations are often helpful, usually appreciated, and sometimes included, they 

are not required in an order compelling discovery or granting protection from it. A 

trial court need not expressly state the reasoning behind its rulings nor identify 

which of the losing party’s arguments the trial court is rejecting.20 By making its 

discovery ruling, a trial court impliedly considers and rejects all of the losing 

party’s arguments.21 That is precisely what happened in today’s case. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to make an express statement in its 

orders that the requested documents are within the scope of the discovery allowed 

by section 21.556(a).22 

 

16 See id. at 575–76. 

17 See id. 

18 See id. at 575. 

19 See id. 

20 See Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 555–56; In re Kenefick, 2008 WL 3833842, at *5–6; Nexen, 

Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 416–17; In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d at 575; In re Texas Prop. 

& Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 989 S.W.2d at 882; State Nat’l Bank, 802 S.W.2d at 290.

21 See In re Kenefick, 2008 WL 3833842, at *5–6; In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d at 

575.

22 See Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 555–56; In re Kenefick, 2008 WL 3833842, at *5–6; Nexen, 

Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 416–17; In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 S.W.3d at 575; In re Texas Prop. 

& Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 989 S.W.2d at 882; State Nat’l Bank, 802 S.W.2d at 290.
11

Even if it were an abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail to state 

expressly in its orders whether the requested documents are within the 

scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a), mandamus relief still 

would not be appropriate because the trial court has not refused a request 

that it make such an express statement.

Mandamus relief generally requires a predicate request for an action and a 

refusal of that request.23 But, the requirement that there be a predicate request and 

an adverse ruling is excused when such a request would have been futile and the 

trial court’s refusal is little more than a formality.24 To determine whether a request 

would have been futile, the reviewing court examines whether the request would 

have added anything for the trial court’s consideration.25 Platinum moved for a 

protective order, and the trial court ruled on that motion. The Shareholders moved 

to compel production of the requested documents, and the trial court ruled on that 

motion and overruled Platinum’s discovery objections. Even if, contrary to the 

above analysis, there were a requirement that the trial court expressly state in its 

order that all of the requested documents are within the scope of the discovery 

allowed by section 21.556(a), a failure to satisfy that requirement would not be a 

basis for granting mandamus relief in this proceeding because no party requested 

that the trial court make such a statement in its orders, and thus the trial court did 

not refuse any such request. And, because such a request would have added 

something for the trial court’s consideration and would not have been futile, even 

 

23 Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 556.

24 See In re Le, 335 S.W.3d 808, 814–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. 

proceeding).

25 See id. 
12

if an express-statement requirement existed, the failure to meet it would not 

provide a basis for granting today’s mandamus relief.26 

Is mandamus relief appropriate based upon the trial court’s purported 

application of Nevada law?

The majority conditionally grants mandamus relief and states that the trial 

court abused its discretion to the extent it required production of the 43 categories 

of documents at issue based upon Nevada law under section 21.562(a). Though 

the majority does not state whether the trial court required this production based 

upon Nevada law under section 21.562(a),27 the majority appears to base its 

decision to grant mandamus relief on a conclusion that the trial court abused its 

discretion by applying Nevada law under this provision. This possible basis for 

mandamus relief is not supported by the law or the record.

Under binding precedent, this court must presume that the trial court 

based its discovery rulings upon section 21.556(a) and Texas law rather 

than Nevada law under section 21.562(a).

Under Texas law, in both original proceedings and appeals, the trial judge is 

entitled to a presumption that he correctly applied the law.28 If nothing in the 

record rebuts this presumption, then the trial court is deemed to have applied the 

law correctly in making its ruling.29 Specifically in the context of conflict-of-laws 

issues, appellate courts have held that, if the parties dispute which jurisdiction’s 

 

26 See Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 556; In re Le, 335 S.W.3d at 814–15.

27 See ante at p.12–14.

28 Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 251; Ex parte Jackson, 911 S.W.2d at 234.

29 Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 251; Ex parte Jackson, 911 S.W.2d at 234; Nexen, Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 

416–17; State Nat’l Bank, 802 S.W.2d at 290.
13

law should be applied and the record does not reflect which jurisdiction’s law the 

trial court applied, appellate courts should presume that the trial court applied the 

law of the jurisdiction that should have been applied under a correct legal 

analysis.30 

Platinum and the Shareholders dispute whether Texas law and section 

21.556(a) apply or whether under section 21.562(a), Nevada law applies. Under a 

correct legal analysis, the trial court should have applied Texas law and section 

21.556(a) rather than Nevada law under section 21.562(a). Nothing in the record 

shows that the trial court did the latter. Therefore, under binding precedent, the 

trial court is deemed to have done the former and to have held that all requested 

documents fall within the scope of the discovery allowed under section 

21.556(a).31 By not basing this court’s analysis on the presumption that the trial 

court applied Texas law and section 21.556(a), today’s decision conflicts with 

precedents from this court and from the other Houston-based court of appeals.32 

 

30 See Nexen, Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 416–17 (holding that court of appeals would presume that the 

trial court correctly applied Alberta law rather than Texas law because appellate courts presume 

the trial court correctly analyzed the conflict-of-laws issues and applied the correct law and 

because the record was silent as to which jurisdiction’s law the trial court applied in making the 

challenged ruling); State Nat’l Bank, 802 S.W.2d at 290–91 (holding that court of appeals would 

presume that the trial court correctly applied Illinois law rather than Texas law because appellate 

courts presume the trial court correctly analyzed the conflict-of-laws issues and applied the 

correct law and because the record was silent as to which jurisdiction’s law the trial court applied 

in making the challenged ruling).

31 Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 251; Ex parte Jackson, 911 S.W.2d at 234; Nexen, Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 

416–17; State Nat’l Bank, 802 S.W.2d at 290.

32 See Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 251; Ex parte Jackson, 911 S.W.2d at 234; Nexen, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 

at 416–17. The First Court of Appeals District and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals District both 

are composed of the counties of Austin, Brazoria, Chambers, Colorado, Fort Bend, Galveston, 

Grimes, Harris, Waller, and Washington. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. 22.201 (West 2013).
14

Instead of creating confusion in the law and uncertainty in the region’s 

jurisprudence, this court should presume that the trial court applied Texas law and 

determined that all requested documents fall within the scope of the discovery 

allowed under section 21.556(a).

This court must uphold the trial court’s orders under any legal theory 

supported by the record.

In both appeals and original proceedings, if the trial court does not specify 

the basis of its order, this court must uphold the trial court’s order under any legal 

theory supported by the record.33 The majority determines that Texas law and 

section 21.556(a) apply rather than Nevada law. Thus, to the extent the record 

reflects that the requested documents fall within the scope of the discovery allowed 

under section 21.556(a), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling 

their production. But, rather than deciding whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by impliedly determining that all requested documents fall within the 

scope of section 21.556(a), the majority conditionally grants mandamus relief and 

orders the trial court to make an express determination regarding the extent to 

which the discovery of the documents requested is permitted by section 

 

33 See Douglas, 2012 WL 5921200, at *7 (holding that, when trial court does not specify the 

basis for its ruling in its order, appellate courts must uphold the order on any legal theory 

supported by the record); In re Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 989 S.W.2d at 882 

(holding, in a mandamus proceeding, that trial court’s order must be upheld on any theory 

supported by the record, even though the trial court did not state any basis for its ruling in the 

order).
15

21.556(a).34 This decision conflicts with precedents requiring that this court 

uphold the trial court’s order under any legal theory supported by the record.35

Is today’s new rule a good idea?

Texas trial courts have limited time and limited resources. This combination 

makes it challenging for them to issue written orders that detail their legal 

reasoning and conclusions, especially when the ruling resolves a discovery dispute 

that involves dozens of document requests and multiple objections to these 

requests. Though in some areas of the law, trial courts are required to express their 

reasoning and legal conclusions, there is no such requirement for rulings on 

quotidian discovery disputes.36 The majority’s new rule, if followed in the future, 

will impose an unwarranted burden on trial courts, unnecessarily increase the cost 

of litigation, and delay the resolution of disputes, all without any apparent benefit. 

Worse yet, the new rule will inflict collateral damage in the form of a split of 

authority in the ten-county jurisdiction this court shares with the First Court of 

Appeals. Discovery disputes should be resolved quickly and efficiently. Today’s 

ruling obliges a trial judge to express reasoning and conclusions as to each possible 

ground underlying every discovery ruling or risk being ordered to do so by writ of 

mandamus. Trial judges that undertake the task will have a substantial new burden 

on their time and resources and those that do not will be forced into an unwelcome 

 

34 See ante at pp. 12–14.

35 See Douglas, 2012 WL 5921200, at *7; In re Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 989 

S.W.2d at 882.

36 See Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 555–56; Douglas, 2012 WL 5921200, at *7; In re Kenefick, 

2008 WL 3833842, at *5–6; Nexen, Inc., 224 S.W.3d at 416–17; In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

123 S.W.3d at 575; In re Texas Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 989 S.W.2d at 882; State Nat’l 

Bank, 802 S.W.2d at 290.
16

ping-pong match, in which they serve the ruling and the appellate court returns it 

for an express statement of the trial court’s reasons. Because trial courts often do 

not express their reasoning and legal conclusions in discovery orders, the 

majority’s new rule will result in this court granting ―extraordinary‖ relief in very 

ordinary circumstances. If mandamus relief is granted on this purely procedural 

basis, what could have been resolved in a single mandamus proceeding will require 

repeat visits to the appellate court. 

If the trial judge in this proceeding does not change his mind, then he will 

sign an order expressly stating that each category of requested documents falls 

within the scope of the discovery allowed under section 21.556(a) and the disputed 

documents are discoverable. If the trial judge does change his mind, then he will 

issue a different order specifying the extent to which he concludes that the 

requested discovery falls within the scope of the discovery allowed under section 

21.556(a) and is discoverable. In either event, unless Platinum and the 

Shareholders both are satisfied with the trial court’s order, this court is likely to see 

yet another mandamus petition, and the next time this court will have to answer the 

same question presented today—To what extent, if any, do the requested 

documents fall within the scope of the discovery allowed by section 21.556(a)? It 

would be more efficient—and in keeping with binding precedent—to apply the 

existing rule.

For all of these reasons, this court should determine today the extent, if any, 

the documents requested fall outside the scope of the discovery permitted by 

section 21.556(a) and grant mandamus relief to the extent the trial court compelled 
17

discovery or denied protection as to these documents. Because this court chooses 

not to do so, I respectfully dissent.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Jamison. (Boyce, J., 

majority).