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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,

)

) I.D.: 91009844DI

v. )

)

CHRISTOPHER DESMOND, )

)

Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

Submitted: June 30, 2022

Decided: July 11, 2022 

Defendant, Christopher Desmond (“Desmond”) or (“Defendant”), has filed with 

the Court the following: (1) his June 22, 2022 filing, the title of which is “The 

Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (1955) Make Delaware Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61 Proceedings Civil Proceeding...;” (2) his letter dated June 29, 

2022, the subject of which is “Application of Concepcion v. United States...”; and 

(3) his letter dated June 30, 2022, the subject of which is ‘Application of “Formerly 

Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transition Every Person Act ....” 

Having considered these filings and letters, it appears to the Court that: 

1. Defendant was convicted in November of 1992, following a jury trial, 

of several dozen criminal offenses in connection with a series of armed 

robberies of different businesses located in New Castle County, Delaware, 

which took place between 1990 and 1991. Defendant’s convictions include 
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ten (10) counts of Robbery in the First Degree and three (3) counts of Theft. 

In January of 1993, Defendant was sentenced to seventy-eight (78) years of 

Level V incarceration. 

2. Defendant has filed numerous unsuccessful petitions, motions, and 

appeals in this Court, the Supreme Court of Delaware, the United States 

District Court for the District of Delaware, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 

and the Supreme Court of the United States since his 1992 conviction.

3. Most recently, this Court denied Defendant’s sixteenth attempt to 

receive relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In this most recent 

application, Defendant argued that the recent United States Supreme Court 

decision, Wooden v. United,

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articulated a new rule of constitutional law that 

justified relief under Rule 61. Applying Rule 61, this Court wrote:

Second or subsequent motions for post-conviction relief under 

Rule 61 must be summarily dismissed unless Defendant 

pleads with particularity (i) that new evidence exists that 

creates a strong inference of actual innocence on the part of 

the Defendant or (ii) pleads that a new and retroactively 

applicable rule of constitutional law has been established by 

the Supreme Court of Delaware or the United States Supreme 

Court which would render Defendant’s sentence invalid.

As previously mentioned, this is Defendant’s sixteenth Rule 

61 motion. As such, Defendant’s Motion must demonstrate 

that one of the two exceptions to summary dismissal of 

secondary or subsequent Rule 61 motions applies in order to 

prevail. Defendant’s Motion does not assert that any new 

evidence in this case exists. 

1 142 S.Ct. 1063 (March 7, 2022).
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Defendant claims that the second exception to summary 

dismissal applies. Defendant argues that Wooden prohibits 

this Court from imposing multiple sentences for one single 

offense as this Court did in Defendant’s case. However, the 

Wooden decision addresses not a constitutional requirement, 

but a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) –

the occasion requirement. Thus, Wooden establishes no new 

and retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law. As to 

the second requirement, while Wooden does resolve a split of 

authority, the decision is inapplicable to Defendant’s 

sentence as it is based on a federal statute, not a Delaware 

criminal law. 

4. Desmond takes issue with this Court’s use of existing Rule 61 to 

analyze his claim. According to Desmond, the standards of Rule 61 that were 

in effect at the time of his conviction should apply. Desmond is incorrect as 

Delaware law is clear that, in analyzing Rule 61 motions, the Rule in effect at 

the time the motion was filed controls.2 Even assuming that Desmond is 

correct, he is not entitled to relief under the pre-2014 Amendment to Rule 61 

which allowed a Court to grant relief where, in the Court’s view, there was a 

manifest injustice. No manifest injustice has occurred in this case. The record 

reflects that Desmond was charged for a series of robberies which took place 

at multiple supermarkets and pharmacies in the Wilmington area between 

1990 and October 1991. There is simply no manifest injustice in not applying 

Wooden to Defendant’s case.3

2 Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768 (Del. 2016) and Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 757 n.24 (Del. 2016).

3 The Court notes that, prior to 2014, numerous courts have considered Desmond’s Claim for Relief in this case, and 

every single court that applied the pre-2014 version of Rule 61 denied Desmond’s Claim for Relief.
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5. Desmond also maintains that this Court is required to review his 

convictions and sentences under the First Step Act,4a law passed by Congress, 

because Delaware received funds under the Act. The review of Desmond’s 

sentence and convictions is not controlled by the First Step Act. The First Step 

Act is a federal law applying to federal crimes only.

5 The review is controlled 

by Delaware law and the United States Constitution. This Court joins the 

multitude of other Courts and Judges that have reviewed Defendant’s case and 

have determined that Defendant’s convictions and sentences were proper.

6. Desmond further maintains that Concepcion v. United States,

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a 

recently decided case by the United States Supreme Court, supports his claim 

that he is entitled to application of State v. Owens7and State v. Bridgers.

8

 In 

Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that under the First Step Act, district 

courts are permitted to consider intervening changes of law or fact in 

exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the Act. This Court 

reiterates that Concepcion and the First Step Act are inapplicable to 

Defendant’s case because his convictions are pursuant to state law not federal 

law. Additionally, this Court has already addressed Defendant’s claim which 

relies on Owens and Bridges. The Court reiterates that Owens and Bridges did 

4 FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018, PL 115-301, December 21, 2018, 132 Stat 5194.

5 Id. at § 404(a)(“[T]he term ‘covered offense’ means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory 

penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2018 (Public Law 111-220; 

124 Stat. 2372, that was committed before August 3, 2010.”).

6 2022 WL 2295029, at *12(Jun. 27, 2022).

7 2010 WL 2892701 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 16, 2010).

8 988 2.d 939 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 2009 WL 824536 (Del. Mar. 30, 2009).
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not re-fine or re-interpret the elements of first degree robbery, neither did it 

make such reinterpretation retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review.9

Therefore, Desmond’s Application for Relief is DENIED.

This Court reaffirms its instructions contained in its May 22, 2022 Order 

which provided:

This Motion constitutes Defendant’s seventeenth Motion 

for postconviction relief. Defendant’s requests are repetitive 

and/or frivolous and it is not in the interest of justice to 

review the same issues ad infinitum. Continuing concerns 

for allocation of scarce judicial resources demand that the 

Court exercise its discretion to refuse consideration of 

additional motions unless new issues are raised for the 

Court’s consideration. Therefore, in the future, the Court 

will not take any action on Defendant’s filings unless there 

is an initial determination that such filings are not repetitive 

or frivolous. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.

Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

cc: Original to the Prothonotary

Maria Knoll, Deputy Attorney General

Anthony Figliola, Esquire

Mr. Christopher Desmond, Defendant

9 See Desmond v. Phelps, 2012 WL 3518531, at *2 (Del. Aug. 15, 2012).