IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 1, 2021

IN RE SEBASHTIAN K. ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County

No. 293069, 293070, 293071 Robert D. Philyaw, Judge

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No. E2020-01439-COA-R3-PT

___________________________________

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to three children. The 

juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of multiple statutory 

grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest. 

After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KENNY W.

ARMSTRONG and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Greta Locklear, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Louana M. 

David C. Veazey, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert K.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Kristen Kyle-Castelli, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

I.

A.

On May 22, 2018, sheriff’s deputies executed a narcotics search warrant at the home 

occupied by Louana M. (“Mother”), Robert K. (“Father”), and their three children, 

Sebashtian, Starla, and Skylar. The search uncovered a stash of ecstasy pills. The poor 

11/02/2021
2

condition of the home prompted the sheriff’s office to contact the Tennessee Department 

of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and Chattanooga Codes and Community Services 

Division. After inspecting the home, codes officials decided it should be condemned. 

Upon arrival, the DCS investigator noted the smell of marijuana and something 

putrid throughout the home. Piles of trash impeded access to several rooms. There was 

no food in the refrigerator—only condiments and milk. The kitchen sink was full of dirty 

dishes. Food was smeared on the kitchen floor. The home was also infested with roaches 

and gnats. The children were covered in dirt and appeared underweight. Starla and Skylar, 

four-year-old twin girls, wore only pull-ups. One twin’s hair was extremely matted.1 

Neither twin was potty trained. Sebashtian, the five-year-old, had lice. All three children 

still drank from baby bottles.

The parents consented to urine drug screens. Father tested positive for THC2and 

opiates. Mother’s test revealed the presence of amphetamines, methamphetamine, opiates, 

oxycodone, and marijuana. Both parents admitted to smoking marijuana. Mother also 

admitted that she had taken an ecstasy pill the previous night.

Mother reported significant untreated mental health issues. She had been diagnosed 

with bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and dual personality disorder. Her mental 

illness qualified her for monthly disability payments. 

DCS took the children to a local hospital for evaluation. The twins were diagnosed 

with severe failure to thrive. Both girls were in kidney and liver failure. Their blood work 

evidenced starvation. All three children were found to have severe developmental delays 

due to chronic neglect. 

The next day, the juvenile court granted DCS’s petition for temporary legal 

custody.3 The children were placed in level two foster homes because of their medical 

needs. Although the siblings were initially separated, within a few months they were 

reunited in the same foster home. 

According to the children’s medical records, they had not received any medical care 

for almost three years. After catching up on their required vaccinations, all three children 

began an intensive therapy regimen. The twins had feeding therapy and speech therapy 

 

1 After spending five or six hours trying to untangle the knots in Starla’s hair, the foster mother was 

forced to cut it off. 

2 Tetrahydrocannabinol or THC “is a marijuana metabolite.” Interstate Mech. Contractors, Inc. v.

McIntosh, 229 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Tenn. 2007).

3 A few months later, DCS filed an amended petition including allegations of severe child abuse as 

to the twins. 
3

twice a week as well as weekly physical and occupational therapy. Feeding therapy was 

critical for the twins as they were unable to chew and swallow solids without choking. 

Sebashtian received some initial feeding therapy. But his most critical needs were speech 

and occupational therapies. 

DCS developed a permanency plan for the family. Among other things, the plan 

sought to address the barriers to reunification, including income, stable housing, mental 

health, substance abuse, possible domestic violence, and parenting. Father claimed a 

substantial income from his car detailing business. Yet the family lacked appropriate 

housing. Both parents had pending criminal charges based on the drugs found in their 

home. Father faced aggravated assault charges from a dispute with a customer in 2017. 

The parents also disclosed that they had previously surrendered their parental rights to three 

older children in Georgia. 

The permanency plan placed a number of responsibilities on the parents. The 

parents were required to complete mental health and substance abuse assessments as well 

as parenting and domestic violence classes. They were also required to follow any 

treatment recommendations from the assessments. DCS also asked the parents to provide 

proof of income and to maintain residential stability for a minimum of six months. While 

the children remained in foster care, the parents were also expected to pay child support

and to maintain contact with the children through scheduled visits and phone calls. 

The court ordered supervised visitation once a month for four hours. DCS provided 

transportation and contracted with another agency to supervise the visits. The visit 

supervisor reported that the parents routinely brought snacks that the twins could not eat. 

They rarely interacted with the children, seemingly content to watch the children play.

Father did not respond well to redirection. 

DCS connected the parents with an in-home service provider to assist them with 

completing their plan responsibilities. But the parents failed to appear at multiple 

appointments. The service provider ultimately terminated services, citing the parents’ lack 

of cooperation. Father did complete a mental health assessment, but he told the assessor 

that he had no problems and was not interested in treatment. DCS asked Father to obtain 

another assessment, deeming the first one invalid. 

At the adjudicatory hearing on January 25, 2019, the parents stipulated that the 

children were dependent and neglected. Although they denied any wrongdoing, they also 

agreed that the twins were the victims of severe child abuse. Based on the parents’ 

stipulation and the record as a whole, the court adjudicated all three children dependent 

and neglected. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that the twins were 

victims of severe child abuse at the hands of Mother and Father. 
4

About a month later, Mother told the family service worker that she was scared to 

go home with Father. According to Mother, he had broken her face, ribs, and arms in the 

past. The service worker drove Mother to a nearby domestic violence shelter. After a short 

stay, Mother moved to a long-term shelter in another county. 

The family service worker arranged for another service provider to work with 

Mother on her plan responsibilities while she was living in the shelter. Mother completed 

three weeks of in-patient substance abuse treatment. Upon discharge, she was transferred 

to another care facility for out-patient treatment. Unhappy with the facility’s rules, Mother 

left without notifying DCS. The family service worker lost contact with Mother for almost 

a month. She eventually surfaced at another domestic violence shelter. Mother blamed 

her disappearance on problems with her cell phone. 

Mother cycled in and out of domestic violence shelters for the rest of the year. 

Despite DCS’s efforts, Mother invariably resumed her relationship with Father. In July, 

Mother obtained an ex parte order of protection. But the temporary order was dismissed 

when Mother failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Mother’s mental health also 

remained a significant problem. She spent a week in a psychiatric hospital. And she 

continued to test positive for THC. 

Father still lacked stable housing and proof of his claimed income. More than once, 

he indicated that he was close to obtaining housing. But he never followed through. Nor 

did he obtain a new mental health assessment, as requested. A previous mental health 

assessment in 2012 indicated that Father had severe anger issues. And he became 

increasingly hostile with the staff at his supervised visits. After a particularly heated 

exchange, the supervising agency terminated services. Visits were moved to the local DCS 

office.

DCS referred Father to a new service provider who helped him complete anger 

management and domestic violence classes. But his behavior did not improve. The court 

suspended his visitation in August 2019. Blaming DCS, Father threatened the family 

service worker with bodily harm. And he bombarded her with hundreds of rude text 

messages at all hours. So DCS asked him to complete another round of anger management 

classes. 

Mother and Father resolved their pending criminal charges in early 2020. Mother 

pled guilty to three counts of drug possession stemming from her 2018 drug arrest. Father 

pled guilty to simple assault. Both parents received probation. Father was also ordered to 

pay $5400 in restitution to the assault victim. 
5

With the parents showing so few signs of improvement, DCS petitioned to terminate 

their parental rights.4 The petition, filed May 1, 2020, sought to terminate the parental 

rights of both parents based on persistence of conditions and severe child abuse. DCS also 

alleged that Father’s parental rights should be terminated for failure to manifest an ability 

and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children. 

B.

The court heard evidence on the termination petition four months later. At the 

outset, the court denied both parents’ requests for a continuance.

After the termination petition was filed, Mother completed the outpatient 

component of her substance abuse treatment. She also sought treatment for her mental 

illness. But, as the family service worker related, significant issues remained unresolved. 

Mother’s most recent drug screen was positive for THC. She lacked stable housing. And 

she refused to end her relationship with Father. 

Father had yet to address his anger issues either by completing another round of 

anger management classes or seeking a new mental health assessment. Despite his claimed 

income, Father had never paid any child support. Nor had he taken steps to reinstate his 

visitation rights. 

Mother defended her decision to stay with Father. She claimed he had not hit her 

since February 2019. Admittedly, she had frequented domestic violence shelters after that 

date, but it was only to appease DCS. 

She acknowledged that the hotel room she shared with Father was not appropriate 

for the children. But she was actively seeking better housing. According to Mother, the 

pandemic limited the available housing options. 

Mother conceded that she had failed her children. Her relationship with the children 

was “not what [she] want[ed] it to be.” But she was “a totally different person” now. 

Shortly before trial, she finished her substance abuse treatment. She last smoked marijuana 

in August 2019. She blamed her recent positive drug screen on the CBD oil she used as a 

substitute. And her mental illness was under control with medication management and 

 

4 DCS discovered that Mother had never obtained a divorce from her husband, Charles P. When 

DCS contacted Charles P., the children’s legal father, he was completely unaware of their existence. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(29)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2020) (defining legal parent as “[a] man who is or has been 

married to the biological mother of the child if the child was born during the marriage”). And he had no 

interest in asserting his parental rights. So, in its petition to terminate, DCS also sought to terminate the 

legal father’s parental rights to the children. Charles P. did not appeal the court’s judgment terminating his 

parental rights.
6

therapy. Still, she planned to stop medication management, believing she could achieve 

the same result with CBD oil. 

Father maintained that he had completed most of his plan responsibilities with little 

or no help from DCS. He never paid any child support “because [his] kids should not be 

in DCS custody.” He blamed any problems with his mental health assessment on the test, 

not his answers. While he may have been in a few “domestic fights,” the last one was in 

2018. Mother was delusional when she said otherwise. And he finished his required 

classes. He categorically denied having an anger management problem. He claimed that 

he was just loud. 

He acknowledged that he no longer had a relationship with the children. He had not 

seen them in over a year. And he conceded that he was not ready to take custody. He 

needed another “month, month and a half” to find better housing. He was willing to retake 

his assessments and classes, if necessary. He just wanted a fresh start with a new family 

service worker because the last three had been biased against him.

Neither parent seemed to appreciate the seriousness of the children’s condition when 

removed from their home. Father thought that the children were in “fair condition” when 

they were removed because they had food and shelter. And both parents blamed the 

medical needs and developmental delay of the twins on their premature birth. 

The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents. The court found clear 

and convincing evidence supported the three alleged grounds for termination. The court 

also determined, by the same measure of proof, that termination of parental rights was in 

each child’s best interest. 

II.

Mother argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance on 

the first day of trial. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is 

discretionary. Nagarajan v. Terry, 151 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). We will 

not disturb the court’s decision absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion and unfair 

prejudice. Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tenn. 1997); see also Comm’r

of Dep’t of Transp. v. Hall, 635 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tenn. 1982) (“[I]n order to show an 

abuse of discretion, the plaintiff must show some prejudice or surprise which arises from 

the trial court’s failure to grant the continuance.”). 

A trial court may grant a continuance at any time upon a showing of good cause. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-7-101 (2009). “[T]he moving party must supply some ‘strong 

excuse’ for postponing the trial date.” Howell v. Ryerkerk, 372 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). In making its decision, the court should consider “(1) 

the length of time the proceeding has been pending, (2) the reason for the continuance, (3) 
7

the diligence of the party seeking the continuance, and (4) the prejudice to the requesting 

party if the continuance is not granted.” Id. at 580-81 (quoting Nagarajan, 151 S.W.3d at 

172).

We find no abuse of discretion here. Mother sought to postpone the trial so that she 

could complete her plan responsibilities. DCS did not allege that her parental rights should 

be terminated for substantial noncompliance with her responsibilities in the plan. And she 

had ample opportunity to complete her responsibilities prior to the filing of the petition to 

terminate. Mother did not make the necessary showing of good cause. Nor has she shown 

unfair prejudice.

III.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 sets forth both the grounds and procedures 

for terminating parental rights. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 546 (Tenn. 2015). 

Parties seeking termination of parental rights must first prove the existence of at least one 

of the statutory grounds for termination listed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g). 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1) (Supp. 2020). If one or more statutory grounds for 

termination are shown, they then must prove that terminating parental rights is in the child’s 

best interest. Id. § 36-1-113(c)(2).

Because of the constitutional dimension of the rights at stake in a termination 

proceeding, parties seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the grounds and 

the child’s best interest by clear and convincing evidence. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 

586, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 

215 S.W.3d 793, 808-09 (Tenn. 2007); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)). 

This heightened burden of proof serves “to minimize the possibility of erroneous decisions 

that result in an unwarranted termination of or interference with these rights.” Id. “Clear 

and convincing evidence” leaves “no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of 

the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 

901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992). It produces a firm belief or conviction in the fact-finder’s mind 

regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 

596.

We review the trial court’s findings of fact “de novo on the record, with a 

presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

otherwise.” In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 112 (Tenn. 2013); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). 

We then “make [our] own determination regarding whether the facts, either as found by 

the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, provide clear and 

convincing evidence that supports all the elements of the termination claim.” In re Bernard

T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
8

A.

1. Severe Child Abuse 

Neither parent challenges the ground of severe child abuse. Still, we “must review 

the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination . . . regardless of whether the 

parent challenges these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 525-26 

(Tenn. 2016).

Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4), a parent’s rights may be 

terminated if “[t]he parent . . . has been found to have committed severe child abuse as 

defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found by the court . . . to have 

committed severe child abuse against any child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). To 

prove this ground, DCS entered the juvenile court’s adjudicatory hearing order into 

evidence. In that order, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother 

and Father committed severe child abuse against the twins “because they were diagnosed 

with severe failure to thrive, including kidney and liver failure, at the time of their removal 

from the parents’ home.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(27)(B) (2014) (defining 

“severe child abuse” as “[s]pecific brutality, abuse or neglect towards a child that in the 

opinion of qualified experts has caused . . . severe developmental delay . . . or severe 

impairment of the child’s ability to function adequately in the child’s environment, and the 

knowing failure to protect a child from such conduct”). Neither parent appealed the court’s 

order. So it became a final judgment.

DCS met its burden of proving this ground for termination. The court’s previous 

severe abuse finding serves as conclusive proof that Mother and Father committed severe 

child abuse against the twins. See In re Heaven L.F., 311 S.W.3d 435, 439-40 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2010) (holding the issue of whether a mother committed severe child abuse was res 

judicata where the issue was fully litigated in a previous dependency and neglect action). 

The severe abuse finding also satisfies this ground for termination of both parents’ parental 

rights to Sebashtian. As the statute makes clear, a parent’s rights may be terminated when 

the parent “ha[s] committed severe child abuse against any child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-

1-113(g)(4); see also In re Trinity S., No. E2021-00098-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 3486188, 

at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2021); In re Kayden A., No. W2020-00650-COA-R3-PT, 

2021 WL 408860, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2021).

2. Persistence of Conditions 

The juvenile court also found termination of parental rights appropriate under 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3), a ground commonly referred to as 

“persistence of conditions.” See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2005). The ground of persistence of conditions focuses “on the results of the parent’s 

efforts at improvement rather than the mere fact that he or she had made them.” Id. at 874. 
9

So the question before the court is “the likelihood that the child can be safely returned to 

the custody of the [parent], not whether the child can safely remain in foster care.” In re

K.A.H., No. M1999-02079-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1006959, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 

21, 2000).

Only Mother appealed this ground for termination. Still, we will review the record 

to determine whether the evidence supports this statutory ground as to both parents. In re

Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26.

There are several elements to the ground of persistence of conditions. Persistence 

of conditions may be a basis to terminate parental rights when:

The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody 

of a parent . . . for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered at any 

stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court 

alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the 

child’s safe return to the care of the parent . . . , or other conditions exist that, 

in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further 

abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent 

. . . ;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early 

date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent . . . in the near future; 

and

(iii) The continuation of the parent . . . and child relationship greatly 

diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and 

permanent home[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). Each of the statutory elements must be established 

by clear and convincing evidence. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 550.

At the time of trial, the children had been removed from the parents’ custody for 

well more than six months. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(B) (“The six (6) months 

must accrue on or before the first date the termination of parental rights petition is set to be 

heard.”). And this record contains clear and convincing evidence that conditions 

preventing reunification of this family remain. Mother and Father lack stable housing. 

Father has yet to acknowledge, much less properly address, his anger issues. Despite the 

court’s warnings, Father repeatedly interrupted the trial with his angry commentary. 

Mother continues to associate with a man she has accused of domestic abuse. And she still 

tests positive for THC. While her mental health status is greatly improved with medication 
10

and therapy, she plans to stop participating in medication management in favor of “vaping 

with CBD oil.”

Clear and convincing evidence also shows that there is little likelihood that these 

conditions will be remedied in the near future. Mother and Father maintained at trial that 

they would be able to care for the children in a month or two. But DCS had been working 

with this family for over two years. And significant barriers to reunification remain. 

“Where . . . efforts to provide help to improve the parenting abilities, offered over a long 

period of time, have proved ineffective, the conclusion that there is little likelihood of such 

improvement as would allow the safe return of the child to the parent in the near future is 

justified.” In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Continuation of the parent-child relationship would also diminish the children’s 

opportunity for an early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. The children 

have been in the same foster home for over two years. They have developed a strong bond 

with their foster family. The foster family wants to adopt them. 

3. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody or Financial 

Responsibility of the Children

Finally, the court found termination of Father’s parental rights appropriate under 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14). Under this ground, a parent’s rights may 

be terminated if he or she

[1] has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to 

personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of 

the child, and [2] placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody 

would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare 

of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Both prongs must be established by clear and 

convincing evidence. In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020). As to the first 

prong, the petitioner may prove that a parent is either unable or unwilling to “assume legal 

and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child.” Id. at 677.

Clear and convincing evidence shows Father’s lack of ability and willingness to

assume custody and financial responsibility of the children. Father conceded his inability 

to provide appropriate housing. And he has never sufficiently addressed his severe anger 

issues. His failure to pay any child support for over two years, despite his purported 

income, evidences an unwillingness to assume financial responsibility for these children. 
11

The evidence is equally clear and convincing that placing the children in Father’s 

custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to their psychological welfare. Father’s 

volatility alone poses a risk of substantial harm to these children. And the children have 

not seen him in over a year. They have bonded with the foster family. Returning the 

children to the custody of a virtual stranger also carries a risk of substantial harm. See In 

re Braelyn S., No. E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 4200088, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

July 22, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 2020) (reasoning that returning the child to a 

“virtual stranger” in light of her strong bond with her current caregivers would constitute 

substantial harm).

B.

Lastly, Mother and Father argue that it was not in the children’s best interests to 

terminate their parental rights. Because “[n]ot all parental misconduct is irredeemable,” 

our parental termination “statutes recognize the possibility that terminating an unfit 

parent’s parental rights is not always in the child’s best interests.” In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 

490, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). So even if a statutory ground for termination is established 

by clear and convincing evidence, we must also determine whether termination of parental 

rights is in the child’s best interests. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) lists nine 

factors that courts must consider in making a best interest analysis. The “factors are 

illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the termination proceeding is free to offer proof 

of any other factor relevant to the best interests analysis.” In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 

662, 681 (Tenn. 2017). In reaching a decision, “the court must consider all of the statutory 

factors, as well as any other relevant proof any party offers.” Id. at 682. The best interest 

analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry, and each case is unique. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 

187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

The juvenile court found all factors favored termination. Mother contends that the 

evidence does not support the trial court’s findings on factors two, seven, and eight. And 

both parents complain that DCS’s efforts to reunify this family were inadequate. 

The first statutory factor focuses on whether the parent “has made such an 

adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best 

interest to be in the home of the parent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1). The second 

factor considers the parent’s potential for lasting change “after reasonable efforts by 

available social services agencies.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(2). The court found no such 

adjustment by either parent. The evidence is overwhelming that neither parent had made 

such an adjustment that the children could be safely returned to their care. 

Mother and Father blame DCS for their lack of improvement. But the evidence 

does not preponderate against the court’s finding that DCS’s efforts were reasonable. 

While Mother and Father claimed that DCS offered them no assistance, the family service 

workers testified differently. The court credited the testimony from DCS’s witnesses. We 
12

will not disturb the court’s credibility finding on this record. See Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of

Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). 

The third factor looks at whether the parent has maintained regular contact with the 

children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(3). The court found that this factor favored 

termination. With respect to Father, we agree. His visits were suspended in August 2019 

after repeated inappropriate behavior. And he never asked the court to restore his visitation 

rights. But for the most part, Mother’s visitation has been consistent. Factor three favors 

Mother.

The fourth factor asks whether the parent has maintained a meaningful relationship 

with the children. See id. § 36-1-113(i)(4). The evidence does not preponderate against 

the trial court’s finding that Mother and Father lack a meaningful relationship with any of 

the children. Father admitted as much at trial. Mother agreed that her relationship was not 

what she wanted it to be. 

The fifth factor considers the effect a change in caregivers would have on the child’s 

emotional, psychological, and medical condition. Id. § 36-1-113(i)(5). The evidence does 

not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that a change in caregivers would be

“catastrophic” for these children. As the court noted the foster family “made near 

herculean efforts to catch these children up developmentally and medically.” The children 

are thriving in their current environment. Neither parent is familiar with the children’s 

current medical and developmental needs. This factor favors termination. 

The sixth factor asks whether the parent “has shown brutality, physical, sexual, 

emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(i)(6). This factor favors termination. Mother and Father committed severe child abuse 

against the twins. And Sebashtian was found to have severe developmental delay caused 

by chronic neglect. 

The seventh factor looks at the parent’s home environment and whether the use of 

alcohol or other controlled substances would prevent the parent from properly caring for 

the child. Id. § 36-1-113(i)(7). Mother contends that there is no proof in this record that 

the parent’s current home at a local hotel is unsafe. But Mother and Father admitted that 

their current home environment would be inappropriate for the children. And Mother’s 

most recent drug screen was positive for THC. 

The eighth factor evaluates whether the parent’s mental or emotional status prevents 

proper parenting. Id. § 36-1-113(i)(8). The court found that Mother and Father still 

struggle with mental health and instability. The court noted the parents’ “volatile 

performances during trial” as further proof that they were unable to properly care for these 

children. Mother complains that the trial court ignored her recent success in managing her 
13

mental health. We commend Mother on her progress. But we cannot ignore her ill-advised 

plan to trade medication management for CBD oil.

Lastly, the ninth factor examines the parent’s child support history. Id. § 36-1-

113(i)(9). Neither parent paid any child support. We are not persuaded by Father’s unique 

argument that this factor is inapplicable when children are in foster care. He cites no legal 

authority for his position. And we know of none.

Although the evidence weighs against one of the court’s factual findings as to 

Mother, the evidence supports the court’s other findings. We conclude that the proven 

facts amounted to clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents’ parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests. 

IV.

We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights. The record contains clear 

and convincing evidence to support two statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s 

parental rights and three statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights. We 

also conclude that terminating parental rights was in each child’s best interest.

 s/ W. Neal McBrayer 

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE