IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-00526-COA S&M TRUCKING, LLC APPELLANT

v. ROGERS OIL COMPANY OF COLUMBIA, INC. APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/20/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PRENTISS GREENE HARRELL COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL MYERS W AIDE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: BENJAMIN ALAN SNOW NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CONTRACT TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 06/07/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., FAIR AND WILSON, JJ. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Rogers Oil Com

pany of C olum

bia Inc. (Rogers O i l) f

iled suit against S&M Trucking LLC ( S&M) in circuit c ourt to c ollect an alleged debt. Af ter it was unable to s erve S&M’s agent or either of i ts m e m b ers, R ogers Oil attem

pted service through t he Secretary of State pursuant t o M i s sissippi Code Annotated s ection 79-35-13(b) (Rev. 2013). S &M did not

answer within thirty d a y s, and R o g e r s Oil then o btained a def ault j udgm ent. W hen S&M later learned of the def

a ult judgm ent, i t m oved to set i t aside, arguing that it w as void due to im p roper service of

process. The circuit court denied S&M’s m o tion, and S&M appealed.
W e agree with S&M that, on the f acts of this case, service pursuant to section 79-35-13(b)was im

proper a nd that the def

ault judgm ent was void and m ust be s et a side f

or that reason. Accordingly , we reverse and rem a nd f or f urther proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Rogers Oil sells f

uel. It is headquartered i n C olum bia (Marion C ounty ). S&M is a

sm all trucking c om

pany organize d a s a lim ited liability com pany . It has two m em

bers, Stephanie and Michael Lee, who are m arried. S&M was a custom er of Rogers Oil. ¶3. On May

21, 2013, Rogers Oil f

iled a com

plaint against S&M in the Marion County Circuit Court. Rogers O il alleged that it had f urnished S &M g oods and s e rvices on an open
account and that S&M had f ailed t o pay a balance due of $ 23,258.48. The com plaint sought
to recover that am ount and attorney ’s f ees of $5,645.26. The com plaint alleged that S&M’s principal place o f business was at 902 Longwood P lace i n Clinton and that it could be served through its registered agent, Chery l Green, at 824 McCluer Road in Jackson. ¶4. The circuit clerk issued a sum m ons t o counsel f or Rogers Oil that sam e day directed
to “S&M Truck i n g , L L C c/o Chery l Green, registered agent,” at 824 McCluer Road in
J ackson. The record includes a p roof of service f o rm that was e xecuted b y proce s s s e r v e r Gary W indham on June 5, 2013, and f iled with the court on February 28, 2014. W indham

was unable to serve Green, but he did not check the line f or “UNABLE TO S ERVE”; instead, he handwrote on the f orm , “Vanessa Buckley

lives here now.” ¶5. On June 10, 2013, the clerk issued an “alias s um m o ns” to counsel f o r R o g e r s Oil directed t o “S&M Trucking, LLC c/o Michael Lee, m em ber, or any other m em

ber or of f icer”

a t 902 Longwood Place in C linton. On July 22, 2013, Rogers Oil f iled a proof of servi c e

2executed by W indham on July 16, 2013, that indicated that he was u nable to serve Stephanie

Lee with the sum m ons. ¶6. On Septem

ber 18, 2013, the court entered an order extending the tim e t o serve S&M f or 180 additional day s . T h e record does not r ef lect that Rogers O il f

iled any m otion setting f orth its ef f orts to ef f e ct service or why the exten sion should be g ranted. On Decem ber 3, 2013, Rogers Oil f

iled another proof of

service indicating that W indham was again unable to serve S&M with the alias sum m ons. ¶7. Rogers Oil subsequently f iled an af f idavit f rom Chris W alker of the B arnett Group,

a private investigations f

irm

. According to W alker, he was hired “af t er se r v ice of process through a standard p rocess server [ (i.e., W indham )] was unsuccessf ul.” Regarding his own

e f f o r t s t o e f f ect service, W alker stated, in f ull, as f o llows: “That af

ter several m onths o f continued pursuit o f the registered agent or any o th e r o f f icer of S&M Trucking, LLC (Michael Lee and S tephanie Lee), the Barnett G roup has been unable to s erve process on any individual with requisite authority to accept process on behalf of S&M Trucking, LLC.” ¶8. Months later, Rogers Oil f i l e d a n i n v oice f

rom t he B arnett Group that purportedly ref lects W alker’s ef

f orts to serve S&M. However, the invoice was n ot explained o r verif ied by any af f idavit. Rather, it was sim ply attached as an exhibit to a response to a m otion. In

a n y e v e n t , the invoice indicates that in Decem ber 2013 a nd January 2014, W alker went to
t h e Lees’ L ongwood Place address f our tim es; went t o other unspecif ied a ddresses associ a t e d with the Lees o n two occasions; went to Michael Lee’s parents’ hom e and “ [ c ]anvass[ ed] the

area and talk[ ed] with neighbors”; and perf orm ed unspecif

ied “online research” and research

3into m arriage and divorce records. The invoice a lso ref lects “[ p]hone c a lls m ade to Michael Lee” in February

2014, but it does not indicate the result of the calls. ¶9. On February 28, 2014, the clerk issued an alias sum m ons to counsel f or R ogers Oil directed to “S&M Trucking, LLC c/o Delbert Hosem ann, Secretary of State.” On March 6, 2014, the Secretary of State s ent the com plaint and sum m ons to S&M b y certif ied m ail at 824 McCluer R oad. The Secretary o f State’s cover letter incorrectly shows the address as being in Clinton with a Clinton zip code. On the return receipt, “Clinton” and the Clinton zip code

are scratched through a nd “Jackson” is handwritten i n u n d e r n e a th with no zip code. The

com plaint and sum m ons were returned to the Secretary o f State unclaim ed. T he r ecord does not ref lect who m a de the handwritten changes. ¶10. On April 7, 2 014, Rogers Oil f iled an application f

or entry of a def

ault a g ainst S&M. The c lerk entered the def

a ult the sam e day

. The sam e d ay , R ogers Oil also f iled a m otion f

or

a d ef ault judgm ent in the am ount o f $28,903.74, consisting of t he alleged debt of $ 23,258.48 and a ttorney ’s f

ees of $5,645.26. The sam e day , the court entered an order granting a def ault judgm ent in that am o unt 1 plus eight percent post-judgm ent interest. ¶11. On Augus t 5 , 2 014, R ogers Oil f iled a m o tion f

or a judgm ent debtor exam ination. The m otion alleged that S &M h a d not paid the def a ult j udgm ent and requested an order

com pelling a representative of S&M to appear f

or an exam ination and produce docum ents such as bank st a t e m e n t s and tax returns. Two day s later, the c ourt granted Rogers Oil’s

1 I n th e j u d g m en t, th e am o u n t o f atto rn ey ’s f ees req u ested is s tru c k th ro u g h , a n d $ 4 ,9 5 0 i s h an d w ritten in its p lace; h o w ev er, th e j u d g m e n t is f o r th e to tal am o u n t req u ested in R o g ers O il’s m o tio n . 4m otion and set October 21, 2 014, as the date f or the j udgm ent debtor exam . The order also directed the clerk to issue a citation “directing and c om m anding the representative of S&M”
to appear and produce d ocum e nts. Only eight day s later—on August 15, 2015—Rogers Oil personally

served Stephanie Lee with the citation to appear at the judgm ent debtor exam

. ¶12. The court subsequently entered an agreed order continuing the judgm ent debtor exam
to Novem ber 10, 2014. The order also r ef lected that S&M’s attorney w as thereby entering an appearance in the case. ¶13. On Novem

ber 25, 2014, S&M f

iled a m otion to set aside the def ault judgm ent under Mississippi Rule o f Civil Procedure 60(b). S&M argued t hat the judgm ent was void because it was never served with process. S&M also argued that the judgm e nt was void f or lack of jurisdiction because v enue w as not pro p e r i n M arion C ounty

. 2 S&M attached a proposed

answer to its m otion. In its answer, S&M alleged that it was adm i nistratively dissolved and that Green no longer resided in Mississippi. S&M adm itted that it h ad purchased f uel f rom Rogers Oil’s f

uel station in Covington County , but it denied that it owed any debt. ¶14. In r esponse, Rogers Oil argued that S &M’s m otion to set aside the def ault judgm ent

was untim ely under Rule 60(b); that S&M h a d waived any argum ent b ased on im proper

venue o r i n s u f

f icient service; that the judgm ent was not void; t hat service through the Secretary of State was proper pursuant to sectio n 7 9-35-13(b); that venue was p roper; and

2 S &M arg u ed th at M ario n C o u n ty (R o g ers O il’s h o m e co u n ty ) w a s n o t a p ro p er v en u e— an d t h at th e circu it c o u r t l ack e d j u risd ictio n

— b ecau se S & M resid ed in H in d s C o u n ty an d o n ly p u rch ased f u el f ro m R o g ers O il a t its serv ice statio n i n C o v in g to n C o u n ty

. S ee g en era lly G illa rd v. G r ea t S

. M o rtg

. & L o a n C o rp
. , 3 5 4 S o . 2 d 7 9 4 (M iss. 1 9 7 8 ); B rya n t v. L o vitt , 2 3 1 M iss. 7 3 6 , 9 7 S o . 2 d 7 3 0 (1 9 5 7 ). 5that the court h a d j u r i s d i c tion over the case. Rogers Oil also f i led a m otion f

or a writ of execution against S&M’s property , including its two trucks. ¶15. On February 25, 2012, the circuit court d enied S&M’s m otion to set a side the def ault judgm ent. The court f

ound that S&M “was adequately and pro p e r l y served with process according to law”; that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject m atter; and that S&M’s Rule 60(b) m otion was untim ely

. In the sam e order, the court denied Rogers Oil’s

m otion f or a writ of

execution. S&M then f

iled a tim ely

notice of appeal. DISCUSSION ¶16. “ [ T ] h e g r a n t o r d e n i a l o f a 60(b) m otion i s generally within the lower court’ s discretion, unless the j udgm ent in question is d eem ed to b e void.” Evans v. Oberon Holding Corp. , 729 So. 2d 825, 827 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Sartain v. W hite , 588 So. 2d 204, 211 (Miss. 1991)). “If a def a ult judgm ent is void, t he trial court has no discretion and

m ust set the judgm e nt aside

. ” McCain v. Dauzat , 791 So. 2d 8 39, 842 (¶7) (Miss. 2001).
I n t he a bsence of “proper service of process,” the c ourt lacks jurisdiction, so a ny d e f a u l t judgm ent that it enters is void. Id. ; accord E vans , 7 2 9 S o. 2d a t 827-28 (¶¶5-9). “Suf f iciency of service of process is a jurisdictional issue, which is reviewed de novo.” BB Buggies Inc. v. Leon , 150 So. 3d 90, 95 (¶6) (Miss. 2014). ¶17. A m otion to set aside a def ault judgm ent as void due to im proper service of

process is g overned by Mississippi Rule o f Civil Procedure 6 0(b)(4). 3 See Evans , 729 So. 2d at 827

3 A d ef a u lt j u d g m en t m ay also b e set asid e u n d er R u le 6 0 (b )(2 ), b u t su c h a mo t i o n m u st b e f iled w ith in s ix m o n th s o f th e j u d g m en t

. M .R .C .P

. 6 0 (b ) & ad v iso r y c o m m ittee’s n o te. S &M ’s m o tio n w as f i led m o re th an sev en m o n th s af ter th e j u d g m en t. 6(¶5). The f irst three subsections of Rule 60(b) require that a m otion to set aside a j udgm ent be f iled not later than six m onths af ter the judgm ent is entered, but subsection (4) h as no such tim e lim it. O verbey v. Murray , 569 So. 2d 3 03, 306 (Miss. 1990)

. Moreover, although Rule 60(b) indicates that s uch a m otion should be f iled “within a reasonable t im e,” our “[ Suprem e] Co u r t p r e v iously has recognized that, essentially , there c an be no tim e lim itation f or relief f rom a void judgm ent as ‘no am ount of tim e or delay

m a y c u re a void judgm ent.’” O'Neal

v. O'Neal , 17 S o. 3d 572, 575 (¶14) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Kirk v. Pope , 973 So. 2d 981, 988 (¶19) (Miss. 2007); Overbey , 5 69 So. 2d at 306); accord , e.g. , Ravenstein v. Ravenstein , 167 So. 3d 2 10, 216-17 ( ¶12) (Miss. 2014) (“[ T]here is n o ef f ective tim e lim it f

o r seeking relief f rom a void judgm ent under Rule 60(b)(4)[ .]”). ¶18. A s discussed above, Rogers Oil contends that it properly served S&M thr o u g h t h e Secretary of State pursuant to section 79-35-13(b), which provides in relevant part: If an entity t hat p reviously f iled a registered agent f

iling with the S ecretary of State no longer has a r egistered agent, o r if i t s r egistered agent cannot with reasonable d ilige n c e b e s e r ved, the governors of the entity will be treated as the entity ’s agent f

or service o f p r o c e s s w ho m ay be served pursuant to the provisions of the M ississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

. . . If the governors of the entity c annot with reasonable diligence be s erved, serv i c e of process against the entity s h all be upon the Secretary of S tate in accordance with the Mississippi Rules of

Civil Procedure.
In response, S&M argues, am ong other things, t hat Rogers Oil f ailed to e s t a b l i s h that it exercised “reasonable diligence” in its ef f o rts to serve S&M’s “governors,” i.e., Stephanie and Michael Lee. ¶19. As noted above, the record contains two p roof s o f s ervice indicating that the original
process server, W indham , attem pted to serve t he Lees but was unable to do so. T here is no

7f

urther af f idavit f rom W indham describing h is ef f orts. W alker avers that he was unable to

serve t he Lees despite “several m onths of continued pursuit.” H owever, W alker’s af f idavit is conclusory

and devoid of

f actual support. The Barnett Group’s invoice—if we credit it, even though it is not verif i ed or otherwise supported—adds little. As described above, f or the period of Decem

ber 2013 to J anuary 2014, it appears t o ref lect f o ur trips t o t he Lees’ hom e, three trips to other unspecif ied addresses possibly associated with them , and internet and public records r esearch. It also indicates that phone calls t o M ichael Lee were attem pted in February 201 4

. W hile the invoice suggests som e ef f orts a t service, without com petent evidence to explain it, it is entitled to little, if any , weight. Michael and Stephanie Lee are the sole m em

bers of a trucking business, and the Longwood Place address is b oth their hom e and their business address. All we know is that W i ndham and W alker went by

their house several tim es and f

ound no one hom e. W ithout knowing m ore, that is hardly surprising. Nor, in and of itself , does it establish reasonable diligence. ¶20. S&M also points out that Rogers Oil n ever attem pted s ervice via the sim

ple m ethod of f irst-class m a il. U nder Mississippi Rule of C ivil Procedure 4(c)(3), a com plaint and

sum m ons m ay be served on certain ty pes of def endants, including dom estic LLCs, 4 by firstclass m ail together with a request that the def endant a ckno w l e d g e s e r

vice. The def

endant is n ot requir e d t o a c k nowledge and accept service b y m ail, but if he f a ils to do so without

4 R u le 4 (c)(3 ) ap p lies to d ef en d a n t s c o v e red b y R u l e 4 (d )(4 ), w h ich in clu d es, in ter alia, “a d o m estic o r f

o r eig n . . . u n in co rp o rated asso ciatio n w h i ch is su b j ect to su it u n d er a co m m o n n am e .” M .R .C .P

. 4 (d ) ( 4 ). “T h e L eg islatu re h as sp e cif ically d ef in ed a lim i ted liab ility co m

p an y as an u n i n co rp o ra ted asso ciatio n .” C h a m p lu vier v
. S ta te , 9 4 2 S o . 2 d 1 4 5 , 1 5 3 n .9 (M iss. 2 0 0 6 ) (citin g M iss. C o d e A n n . § 7 9 -2 3 -1 0 3 (j ) (R ev . 2 0 0 1 ), n o w co d if ied as am en d ed at M iss. C o d e A n n . § 7 9 -2 9 -1 0 5 ( o ) (R e v . 2 0 1 3 )). 8“good cause,” he w ill be required to pay the cost of p ersonal s ervice. M.R.C. P. 4(c)(3)(C).

W e t end t o agree with S&M t ha t “ r e a s o n a b l e diligence” would h ave included a t least an
attem pt at this straightf

orward m ethod of

service. ¶21. In this c ase, Rogers Oil presented no evidence that the Lees ever attem pted to evade service—only that n o one was hom e on several occasions w hen, at unspecif ied tim es of day ,

a p rocess server went to the L ees’ house. Compare Siemens F in. S ervs. v
. Delta R adiology
A s socs. PLLC , No. 14-00225-KD-N, 2015 W L 2079246, at * 4 (S.D. Ala. May 4, 2 0 1 5 ) (f i nding that s e r v i c e through the Secretary of State pursuant to section 79-35-13(b) was
proper “ based o n [ the] def endants’ apparent avoidance of service”); Holmes v. All Am. Check Cashing Inc. , No. 2:11CV007, 2 015 W L 1166629, at *2 & n.1 (N.D. Miss. M ar. 13, 2015) (suggesting that service pursuant to section 79-35-13(b) would be proper because, “[ b]ased

on the f acts presented, it appears to the court that Def endant has been successf

u l in evading

. . . service of

process despite Plaintif

f ’s reasonable diligence”). W e a lso note t hat Rogers Oil apparently had n o d i f f i culty f inding and serving Stephanie Lee with process once it desired a judgm e nt d ebtor exam . Only eight day s af ter the court granted Rogers Oil’s m otion f or the ex a m, R o gers Oil f ound Stephanie Lee at her hom e in Clinton. Thus, in sum m ary , Rogers Oil never attem

pted to serve the Lees by m ail a n d presented only conclusory claim s of diligence u n s u p p o r t e d by specif ic f acts. On this record, we are unable to conclude that Rogers O il m et i ts burden of proving “reasonable diligence” to serve t he Lees. Accordingly , service through the Secretary of State pursuant to section 79-35-13(b) was not proper. ¶22. Rogers Oil also argues, i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t hat S&M w aived any objection to the

9suf

f i ciency of service. Specif ically , Rogers Oil contends: “S&M entered its appearance on N o v e mb e r 6, 2014, participated in a Judgm ent Debtor Exam on N ovem ber 10, 2014, and didn’t raise any o b

jection to

. . . service of process . . . until Novem ber 25, 2 014 when it f

iled its Motion to Set Aside Def ault J udgm ent.” S&M initially responds that Rogers O il waived its waiver argum e nt by f ailing to raise the issue in the circuit court. I n t he circuit court, Rog ers Oil a rgued t hat S&M’s m otion to set aside the def ault j udgm ent w as untim ely and
t h a t S & M w a i ved any def iciency in service when it f ailed to f ile an answer, but S&M is
correct that Rogers Oil did not rely specif ically on S&M’s attorney ’s entry of appearance or
p articipation in the judgm ent debtor exam . However, we need n ot decide whether Rog e r s Oil waived its waiver argum ent because the argum e nt itself lacks m erit. ¶23. To begin with, the law i s clear that S&M d id not waive i t s o b j e c t ion to im

proper service m erely by e ntering an appearance through c o unsel. “A voluntary entry o f a ppearance by a d ef endant no longer serves as a waiver of that def endant’s right to subsequently contest the court’s in personam jurisdiction aris i n g f r o m a n alleged def

ect in the m anner in which the def endant w a s s erved with process.” S chustz v. Buccaneer Inc. , 850 So. 2 d 209, 213 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 003) (citing Rains v. Gardner , 7 31 So. 2d 1192, 1 194-97 (¶¶9-17) (Miss. 1 999)). “Thus, earlier disputes over w hether an appearance was a g eneral a ppearance

or a special appearance f

or the lim ited purpose of

contesting the court’s jurisdiction (or, in Mississippi at least, whether there was even such a thing a s a lim ited appearance) have becom e m oot.” I

d

. ( internal citations om itted). Thus, stand i n g a l o n e , S&M’s entry of appearance on Novem

ber 6, 2014, is of

no legal signif

icance.

1 0¶24. The rem aining issue is whether S&M waived its right to contest the suf f i c i e n cy of service by participating in a j udgm ent debtor exam on Novem ber 10, 2014, prior to f

iling its

m otion to set a s i d e t h e d e f a ult judgm ent f

i f teen day s later. Although t he record does not disclose what occurred at the judgm ent debtor exam , S&M’s m e re participation i n that exam did not waive its right t o c o n t e s t service of process. W e have e xplained t hat “the right to
contest the court’s jurisdiction based on som e perceived problem with service m a y y et be lost af ter m aking a n app e a r a n c e in the case if the issues r elated to jurisdiction are not raised at the f irst opportunity .” Id. at (¶15) (citing Y oung v. Huron S

mith Oil Co. , 564 S o. 2d 36, 38- 39 (Miss. 1990)). “Thus, a de f e n d a n t a ppearing and f

iling an a nswer or o therwise proceeding to defend the case on the merits in some w ay —such as p articipating in hearings

or discovery

—m a y not s ubsequently atte mp t t o a ssert jurisdictional questions based on claim s of def

ects in serv i c e o f process.” I d. (em phasis added). That is, as o ur Suprem e Court has put it, the def

endant’s “ first defensive m ove ” m

ust p ut the plaintif

f “on notice” that the def endant will “pursue dism i ssal based on insuf f iciency o f service of process.” Burleson

v. Lathem , 968 S o. 2d 930, 935 (¶13) (Miss. 200 7 ) ( e mp h a s i s added) (citing Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 712 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983)). ¶25. Here, in its f

irst def ensive m ove, S&M m oved t o s e t aside the d ef ault judgm ent due
to insuf f icient service of process. Its participation in the judgm ent debtor exam —whatever that am o unted to—d i d n ot w aive i ts objection to i m proper s ervice because it was not “def end[ ing] the case on the m e rits” by appearing at the exam

. Schustz , 850 So. 2d at 213 (¶15). The exam did not involve t h e “ me r i ts” of the c ase but only Rogers Oil’s ef f orts to

1 1collect on the def ault judgm e nt. S&M then prom ptly raised the issue of i nsuf f icient service of process in its m otion t o set aside the def ault judgm ent o nly nineteen d ay s af ter ent e r i n g

an initial appearance. See id. at 2 13-15 (¶¶16-20) ( holding that the obligation to object to the suf f i ciency of service at the “f irst opportunity ” has a “tem poral comp o n e n t ” s o that “(a) a voluntary appearance f

ollowed by (b) a prolonged f ailure to af

f ir ma t i v e l y c hallenge the validity of the service m ay , in comb i n a tion, constitute a waiver”). Accordingly , we reject Rogers Oil’s argum ent that S&M waived its objection to im proper service. 5
CONCLUSION ¶26. The f

acts i n t he record d o not d e mo n s t r a t e t h a t R ogers Oil exercised reasonable diligence in attem

pting to serve S&M ’ s me mb e rs, Michael and Stephanie Lee, prior to
attem pting s ervice through the S ecretary of S tate pursuant to M ississippi Cod e A n n o t ated section 79-35-13(b). B ecause service was im proper, the subsequent de f a u l t j u d g m e n t is void. Accordingly , we reverse and rem a nd f or f urther proceedings. ¶27. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E MARION COUN T Y C I R C U I T C O U R T I S REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT W ITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, I SHEE, FAIR AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., C ONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

5 B ecau se w e co n clu d e th at th e j u d g m en t i s v o i d d u e to im p ro p er serv ice, w e n eed n o t ad d ress S &M ’s “v en u e j u risd ictio n ” arg u m en t. S ee su p ra n .2

. 1 2