COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Humphreys 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

ANTONIO LAMONT MOZELLE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1734-00-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 SEPTEMBER 25, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

James A. Cales, Jr., Judge 

 Andrew Kolp, Assistant Public Defender, for 

appellant. 

 Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Antonio Lamont Mozelle (defendant) was convicted in a bench 

trial for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and 

possession of heroin with intent to distribute, violations of Code 

§§ 18.2-308.2 and -248, respectively. On appeal, he contends the 

trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained by police incident to an unconstitutional seizure of his 

person. We agree and reverse the convictions. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 
I. 

 "In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, 

'the burden is upon the defendant to show that the ruling, when 

the evidence is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth, 

constituted reversible error.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 

Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citation 

omitted). "Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and 

probable cause to make a warrantless search" involve issues of 

both law and fact, reviewable de novo on appeal. Ornelas v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). However, "[i]n 

performing such analysis, we are bound by the trial court's 

findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without 

evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences 

drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers." McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 S.E.2d at 

261 (citation omitted). 

 On March 6, 2000, several Portsmouth police officers "were 

conducting a surveillance on [defendant's] house," "looking for an 

individual who was an associate of defendant" and "allegedly 

involved in a shooting." Although police were unable to recognize 

the suspect, "information" indicated that he "[h]ad been seen 

riding in [a] vehicle with [defendant]." During the "stake-out," 

police observed defendant exit the home, accompanied by three 

unidentified males, enter an automobile and leave the area. 

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 The surveillance team immediately notified Officer K.M. 

Armstrong who, together with "six to eight" other officers, 

"effected a stop on the vehicle" seeking "to identify an associate 

of defendant" that "hung around with" him. When Armstrong 

approached the passenger side of the car, he "detected an odor of 

marijuana," "had the occupants step out of the vehicle" and 

conducted a pat-down search of defendant, discovering a baggie 

containing heroin in his pocket. Defendant was then arrested for 

the offense and, as a result, Armstrong obtained a search warrant 

for his home. Upon execution of the warrant, police discovered "a 

.45 caliber, semiautomatic handgun," "a magazine with bullets," 

"two clear bags . . . contain[ing] fifty capsules each of 

suspected heroin," and "personal papers" of defendant. 

 At trial, defendant moved the trial court to suppress the 

evidence as "fruit of the poison tree," arguing he was illegally 

seized at the time of the initial stop. Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). The court overruled defendant's 

motion and proceeded with trial, resulting in the subject 

conviction and appeal. 

II. 

 "When the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an occupant, 

this constitutes a 'seizure' of the person for Fourth Amendment 

purposes, even though the function of the stop is limited and the 

detention brief." Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 

363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988) (citations omitted). 

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Accordingly, the stop of an automobile and 

the resulting detention . . . is 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 

absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that the driver is unlicensed or that the 

automobile is not registered, or that either 

the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise 

subject to seizure for violation of the law. 

Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 923-24 

(2000). 

 "Reasonable suspicion, while not as stringent a test as 

probable cause, requires at least an objective justification for 

making the stop." Ramey v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 624, 629, 

547 S.E.2d 519, 522 (2001) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 

U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Thus, "'[a]t the time of the stop, the 

officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, 

which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

objectively warrant a reasonable person with the knowledge and 

experience of the officer to believe that criminal activity is 

afoot.'" Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).1 

"To determine whether an officer has articulated a reasonable 

basis to suspect criminal activity, a court must consider the 

totality of the circumstances, including the officer's 

knowledge, training, and experience." Freeman v. Commonwealth, 

 1

 "[I]n Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the 

Supreme Court held that the principles of Terry apply equally to 

the stop of a suspect who is traveling in an automobile." 

Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 64, 354 S.E.2d 79, 85 

(1987). Accordingly, the Commonwealth expressly did "not rely 

upon the trial court's holding that the defendant lacked 

standing to challenge the stop of the car." 

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20 Va. App. 658, 661, 460 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1995) (citation 

omitted). 

 Here, the circumstances failed to provide the requisite 

reasonable basis in justification of the disputed stop and 

attendant seizure. The officers observed no traffic violation or 

other criminal activity and were admittedly unable to recognize 

the "associate" of defendant among the men accompanying him in the 

vehicle. Nevertheless, the car was stopped and its occupants 

seized. To countenance such conduct would permit police to stop 

defendant whenever found in the company of an unidentified person, 

a result clearly offensive to the Fourth Amendment. 

 Accordingly, the court erroneously admitted the evidence 

resulting from the unlawful stop and seizure, and we reverse the 

convictions and remand the cause for such further proceedings as 

the Commonwealth deems appropriate. 

 Reversed and remanded.

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