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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

LISA ANN WEAVER, formerly known as LISA 

ANN WEAVER-GIFFELS, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

November 10, 2016 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 327844 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

JAMES MICHAEL GIFFELS, LC No. 2010-007630-DM 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ. 

MURRAY, P.J. 

 Typically a divorced parent’s child support obligation ends when the child turns 18 years 

old, i.e., is no longer a minor. An exception to that rule exists, however, when the child turns 18 

but is still attending high school and is residing on a “full-time basis” with the child support 

recipient. MCL 552.605b(2). This case presents the question of what is meant by residing on a 

“full-time” basis with the child support recipient. The circuit court, focusing on the parties’ 

argument over the meaning of “full-time basis,” concluded that residing on a “full-time” basis 

meant that the child must still be residing with the support recipient in full compliance with the 

child custody or parenting time order. We hold that the support order is irrelevant to the 

analysis, and that an 18-year-old child is residing on a “full-time” basis with the support recipient 

when the child is residing only with that parent. As a result, we reverse the circuit court order to 

the extent it ruled that compliance with the parenting time order constituted “full-time,” and 

remand for the trial court to determine whether the 18-year-old resided with her mother on a fulltime basis. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiff and defendant were married on August 3, 1991, and had two children, KG and 

MG, during the marriage. Plaintiff filed for divorce, and the judgment of divorce eventually 

entered provided, among other things, that the parties would share joint legal and physical 

custody of the children. Specifically, the judgment provided that the children would reside 

primarily with plaintiff while defendant would have parenting time in an amount agreed to by the 
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parties or, if no agreement could be reached, according to the schedule set forth in the judgment. 

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Order, incorporated by reference into the judgment of 

divorce, defendant was ordered to pay a total of $2,000 per month in child support.1

 The 

Uniform Child Support Order provided that defendant’s support obligation for each child would 

continue as follows: 

through the end of the month of the later: 1) the child’s 18th birthday, or 2) the 

last day of regularly attending high school full-time with the reasonable 

expectation of graduating, as long as the child is residing full-time with the 

recipient of support or at an institution, but under no circumstances shall the 

support obligation continue after the month that the child reaches age 191⁄2.2

According to defendant, following entry of the judgment, the parties informally agreed to a 

parenting time arrangement that allowed the children to reside with plaintiff four days per week 

and with defendant three days per week. That arrangement continued for all times relevant to 

these proceedings. 

 KG turned 18 years old on November 26, 2014. At that time, she was still enrolled in 

high school, with an expected graduation date in the spring of 2015. After she turned 18, 

defendant filed a motion in the Family Division of the Kalamazoo Circuit Court praying for an 

order terminating his support obligation as to KG, retroactive to November 26, 2014. In support, 

defendant recited the pertinent portion of the Uniform Child Support Order providing that 

defendant’s support obligation ended either (1) at the end of the month of KG’s 18th birthday or 

(2) at the end of the month in which KG no longer attended high school full-time while residing 

on a “full-time basis” with plaintiff. Defendant argued that the latter provision was 

inapplicable—and thus his support obligation ended upon KG’s 18th birthday—because while 

KG was still enrolled full-time in high school, she did not, nor had she ever, live with plaintiff 

“on a full-time basis;” instead, the parents shared physical custody, with KG spending three days 

per week with defendant. 

 A hearing on defendant’s motion was held before a family division referee, who agreed 

with defendant, concluding that “[t]he statute [MCL 552.605b] is really quite clear:” it allowed 

for postmajority child support only where the child is “regularly attending high school on a fulltime basis, with a reasonable expectation of completing sufficient credits to graduate,” and is 

living with the recipient of support on a full-time basis. With regard to the term “full-time 

basis,” the referee opined that the term “means what it says;” i.e., that the child must be living 

full-time with the recipient of support, not simply the full amount of time allotted to the recipient 

under the custody agreement. On the basis of these conclusions, a recommended order was 

submitted granting defendant’s motion to terminate his support obligation to KG effective 

November 26, 2014. 

 

1

 Specifically, defendant was ordered to pay $1,350 for one child and an additional $650 for the 

second child, for a total of $2,000. 

2

 The Uniform Child Support Order comports with MCL 552.605b. 
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 Plaintiff filed a written objection to the referee’s recommended order, asserting that the 

referee’s definition of “full-time basis,” effectively requiring KG to reside with plaintiff at all 

times rather than merely the time allotted to her under the parenting time arrangement, was 

erroneous. Plaintiff asserted that “it would be unlikely that any child for whom child support is 

presently being ordered in the State of Michigan resides ‘full-time’ with either parent given the 

progression of shared parenting time, joint custody, etc.” Thus, she argued, to define the term 

“full-time basis” in such a way as to require the child to live with the recipient of child support at 

all times, irrespective of a parenting time arrangement, would lead to an “inequitable” result, i.e., 

almost no parent supporting a postmajority child in high school would receive support. 

 After a hearing on plaintiff’s objection, the circuit court entered an order denying 

defendant’s motion to terminate his support obligation to KG as of her 18th birthday, holding 

that defendant’s support obligation extended beyond KG’s 18th birthday because she resided 

with plaintiff in full compliance with the custody order: 

 The general rule is and has been that child support terminates after the 

child reaches 18 years of age. MCL 552.605B [sic] states an exception to the 

general rule; that is, if a child is regularly attending high school on a full-time 

basis with the reasonable expectation of completing sufficient credits to graduate 

from high school while residing on a full-time basis with the recipient of support 

or an institution, no case after the child reaches 19 years and sixth months of age, 

child support may be ordered. This Court has dealt with many cases where the 

issue of whether the child is regularly attending high school on a full-time basis 

with a reasonable expectation of completing sufficient credits to graduate from 

high school [was in dispute]; however, this is the first case that this Court has 

considered where the issue of “residing on a full-time basis with the recipient of 

support” was at issue. No case law has been found that defines the term “residing 

full-time”. If full-time means all the time as is suggested by the Defendant and a 

child resided part-time with the payor of support pursuant to parenting time which 

happens in most every case, child support for a child over 18 would hardly ever 

be ordered. If it is analogous to full-time employment, an individual does not 

work all of the time, but only involving a standard number of hours of working 

time, or for the entire time appropriate to an activity. It makes more sense that 

“full-time with the recipient of support” means spending all of the time with the 

recipient of support that she is ordered to be with, and not somewhere else like a 

girlfriend’s, a boyfriend’s, or someone else’s place, and not either parent. For 

example, in the present case, [where] the child spends four days with the mother 

and three days with the father, residing full-time with the recipient means that the 

child is residing the full four days with her mother. 

 Clearly, MCL 552.605(2) [sic] requires courts to use the Michigan Child 

Support Formula which accounts for the parenting time split between the parties. 

2013 MCSF 3.03(B) says, “An offset for parenting time generally applies to every 

support determination whether in an initial determination or subsequent 

modification, whether or not previously given.” This Court does not read MCL 

552.605b(2) as conflicting with [the MCSF], otherwise we would have to 

consider whether any overnights with the payor renders the recipient’s residence a 
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“part-time” residence, and thereby undermine the intent of the statute and the 

policies embodied in the Michigan Child Support Formula. 

 . . . . Therefore, the Defendant would be required to continue to pay child 

support at the ordered rate until the child graduates from high school as long as 

the child is residing with the mother the four days per week which the child 

support was based upon. 

 Following entry of the trial court’s order, we ultimately granted defendant’s delayed 

application for leave to appeal, Weaver v Giffels, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, 

entered October 15, 2015 (Docket No. 327844). We now reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.3

 II. ANALYSIS 

 This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to modify child support for an abuse of 

discretion. Burba v Burba (After Remand), 461 Mich 637, 647; 610 NW2d 873 (2000). 

However, we review de novo any attendant questions of law, which of course include the trial 

court’s interpretation of court rules and statutes. Id.; Neville v Neville (On Remand), 295 Mich 

App 460, 466; 812 NW2d 816 (2012). As we observed in Lee v Smith, 310 Mich App 507, 509; 

871 NW2d 873 (2015), in determining the meaning of a statute, 

[a] court’s primary goal when interpreting a statute is to discern legislative intent 

first by examining the plain language of the statute. Courts construe the words in 

a statute in light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the statute as a 

whole. A court must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause, and avoid an 

interpretation that renders any part of a statute nugatory or surplusage. Statutory 

provisions must also be read in the context of the entire act. It is presumed that 

the Legislature was aware of judicial interpretations of the existing law when 

passing legislation. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts 

enforce the language as written. A statutory provision is ambiguous only when it 

irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or is equally susceptible to more 

than one meaning. [Internal citations omitted.] 

If a word or phrase is defined in the statute itself, then it must be applied as expressly defined. 

Sanchez v Eagle Alloy, Inc, 254 Mich App 651, 662; 658 NW2d 510 (2003). “However, where a 

statute does not define a term, resort to a dictionary for a definition is appropriate.” Id. 

 It is well-settled that “[t]he parents of a minor child have a duty to support that child.” 

Paulson v Paulson, 254 Mich App 568, 571; 657 NW2d 559 (2002), citing Macomb Dep’t of 

 

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 At oral argument before this Court, defendant argued that because plaintiff had paid the child 

support as required by the contested order, this appeal was moot. We have specifically held to 

the contrary, Dean v Dean, 175 Mich App 714, 722; 438 NW2d 355 (1989), so we must resolve 

the merits of this appeal. 
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Social Servs v Westerman, 250 Mich App 372, 377; 645 NW2d 710 (2002). Historically 

speaking, absent an agreement by the parties, a parent’s obligation to pay child support ended 

when the child reached 18 years of age; i.e., the age of majority. MCL 722.21(1)(a); Lee, 310 

Mich App at 509-510. In fact, before 1990, courts were without authority to independently order 

a parent to pay postmajority child support. Smith v Smith, 433 Mich 606, 632-633; 447 NW2d 

715 (1989), superseded by statute as explained in Lee, 310 Mich App at 509-510. In 1990, 

however, the Legislature enacted MCL 552.16a, which provided a narrow exception to the 

general rule that support obligations end at the age of majority. See 1990 PA 243; Rowley v 

Garvin, 221 Mich App 699, 706; 562 NW2d 262 (1997); Lee, 310 Mich App at 510. 

Specifically, MCL 552.16a provided, in pertinent part: 

(2) Beginning on the effective date of this section, the court may order support for 

the time a child is regularly attending high school on a full-time basis with a 

reasonable expectation of completing sufficient credits to graduate from high 

school while residing on a full-time basis with the payee of support or at an 

institution, but in no case after the child reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. . . . 

See Lee, 310 Mich App at 510; Rowley, 221 Mich App at 705-706. 

 In 2001, the Legislature repealed MCL 552.16a and replaced it with the current statute, 

MCL 552.605b, which essentially mirrors the old version. See 2001 PA 106; 2001 PA 107; Lee, 

310 Mich App at 511. Specifically, in its current form, MCL 552.605b provides, in pertinent 

part: 

(1) A court that orders child support may order support for a child after the child 

reaches 18 years of age as provided in this section. 

(2) The court may order child support for the time a child is regularly attending 

high school on a full-time basis with a reasonable expectation of completing 

sufficient credits to graduate from high school while residing on a full-time basis 

with the recipient of support or at an institution, but in no case after the child 

reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. A complaint or motion requesting support 

as provided in this section may be filed at any time before the child reaches 19 

years and 6 months of age. 

(3) A support order entered under this section shall include a provision that the 

support terminates on the last day of a specified month, regardless of the actual 

graduation date. 

* * * 

(5) A provision contained in a judgment or an order entered under this act before, 

on, or after September 30, 2001 [the date the statute took effect] that provides for 

the support of a child after the child reaches 18 years of age is valid and 

enforceable if 1 or more of the following apply: 

(a) The provision is contained in the judgment or order by agreement of the 

parties as stated in the judgment or order. 
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(b) The provision is contained in the judgment or order by agreement of the 

parties as evidenced by the approval of the substance of the judgment or order by 

the parties or their attorneys. 

(c) The provision is contained in the judgment or order by written agreement 

signed by the parties. 

(d) The provision is contained in the judgment or order by oral agreement of the 

parties as stated on the record by the parties or their attorneys. 

MCL 552.605b thus contains two mechanisms for continuing a parent’s obligation to pay postmajority support for a child over the age of 18. First, under subsection (5), the parties may—as 

they always could—expressly agree that the parent will continue paying support for the child 

past the age of 18, regardless of whether the child satisfies the requirements for support in 

subsection (2). See Lee, 310 Mich App at 513. Second, under subsection (2), the trial court has 

“limited authority” to order postmajority support for children between the ages of 18 and 191⁄2 

who meet the requirements set forth in that subsection. Id. 

 The term “full-time basis” is not defined in MCL 552.605b or anywhere else in the 

relevant statutes, and neither this Court nor our Supreme Court have previously construed the 

term as it pertains to the residency requirement. Because the term is undefined, we resort to the 

dictionary. Sanchez, 254 Mich App at 662. The most closely related definition from MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) is that “full-time” means, “devoting one’s full 

attention and energies to something.” “Full,” however, is defined in relevant part as “complete, 

esp in detail, number or duration.” Id. Together, these definitions reveal that in this context 

residing on a “full-time” basis means a child must completely reside with the child support 

recipient for the duration of high school. In other words, for support to continue, the child must 

reside4 only with the support recipient while completing high school. 

 Aside from the dictionary definitions, the provisions of several related statutes support—

if not compel—the conclusion that compliance with the parenting time order is not a factor in 

deciding what “full-time” means. Initially, MCL 552.17a(1) provides that a circuit court has 

jurisdiction over the custody of a child only until that child reaches the age of 18, while child 

support generally ends at 18 but with two exceptions: 

The court has jurisdiction to make an order or judgment relative to the 

minor children of the parties as authorized in this chapter to award custody of 

each child to 1 of the parties or a third person until each child has attained the 

age of 18 years and may require either parent to pay for the support of each child 

until each child attains that age. Subject to section 5b of the support and 

parenting time and enforcement act,1982 PA 295, MCL552.605b, the court may 

 

4

 We emphasize “reside” because, as discussed later in this opinion, that word is of equal 

importance in resolving this matter. 
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also order support as authorized in this chapter for a child of the parties to provide 

support for the child after the child reaches 18 years of age. [Emphasis supplied.] 

Likewise, MCL 722.27(1)(a) provides that custody can only be awarded until the child reaches 

the age of 18: 

If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original 

action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit 

court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the child 

the court may do 1 or more of the following: 

(a) Award the custody of the child to 1 or more of the parties involved or to others 

and provide for payment of support for the child, until the child reaches 18 years 

of age. [Emphasis supplied] 

Hence, these statutes allow a circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over the custody of a child until 

she reaches the age of 18, the age of majority, Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 53; 490 NW2d 568 

(1992); Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 30; 638 NW2d 123 (2001), but in limited 

circumstances a court can order child support beyond the child turning 18. 

 Our Court has recognized these important but differing implications under the child 

custody and support laws from a child turning 18. In Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324, 

327; 760 NW2d 503 (2008), we pointed out that an 18 year old is no longer subject to custody 

orders, but could be subject to child support orders: 

Because petitioner reached majority age before seeking the PPO, the Child 

Custody Act was inapplicable with respect to custody issues, although it was still 

applicable regarding child support. The Child Custody Act defines “child” as 

‘minor child and children. Subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time 

enforcement act, 1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605b, for purposes of providing 

support, child includes a child and children who have reached 18 years of age.’ 

MCL 722.22(d). MCL 552.605b permits the entry of a child-support order in 

certain circumstances for a child who has reached 18 years of age. If the child is 

still in high school, MCL 552.605b provides that support may be ordered until he 

or she reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. Otherwise, as used in the Child 

Custody Act, “child” means a minor. [Emphasis supplied.] 

 Reaching the age of majority is significant because, as we said some time ago, “the Age 

of Majority Act provides that a person who attains eighteen years of age ‘is deemed to be an 

adult of legal age for all purposes whatsoever and shall have the same duties, liabilities, 

responsibilities, rights and legal capacity as persons heretofore acquired at 21 years of age.’ ” 

Adkins v Adkins, 181 Mich App 81, 83; 448 NW2d 741 (1989), quoting MCL 722.52. See also 

Smith, 433 Mich at 614. Once KG turned 18, she was no longer subject to the custody order and 

was free to live with defendant, plaintiff, both (as she did when she was subject to the custody 

order), or somewhere else. But because of MCL 552.605b, she was still a “child” for purposes 

of the child support order, so long as the requirements of that statute were met. 
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 Turning to the facts, there was no agreement in the parties’ judgment of divorce 

obligating defendant, without qualification, to pay child support for KG until she obtained the 

age of 191⁄2. Therefore, defendant’s continuing obligation to pay child support for KG rested 

upon whether KG satisfied the requirements of MCL 552.605b(2) and the uniform support order 

incorporated into the divorce judgment; i.e., whether she was regularly attending high school on 

a full-time basis with the reasonable expectation of graduating while residing with plaintiff on a 

full-time basis. As to the first requirement, the record reflects—and defendant does not 

dispute—that KG was still attending high school on a full-time basis when she turned 18 on 

November 26, 2014,5

 and that she expected to graduate the following spring. Thus, the only 

dispute was whether KG was residing on a “full-time basis” with plaintiff. Based upon the law 

set forth above, the trial court erred in concluding that KG resided with plaintiff on a “full-time 

basis” on the exclusive basis that, after she turned 18, she continued living by the arrangements 

in the now inapplicable parenting time order. 

 However, this does not end the inquiry. Although the parties argue exclusively over the 

meaning of “full-time” basis, equally important—if not more so—is whether KG had the intent 

to “reside” full-time with the payee. In Kubiak v Steen, 51 Mich App 408, 413-414; 215 NW2d 

195 (1974), we set forth both the legal and popular definitions of “reside.” 

The Legislature did not use the word ‘residence’ or ‘domicile’ but ‘resides.’ That 

the term ‘resides’ may have a different connotation than the term ‘residence’ is 

without doubt. 

‘It has been said that the word ‘reside’ has two distinct meanings, and that it may 

be employed in two senses, and, in what is sometimes referred to as the strict, 

legal, or technical sense, it means legal domicile as distinguished from mere 

residence or place of actual abode. In this sense the word ‘reside’ means legal 

residence; legal domicile, or the home of a person in contemplation of law; the 

place where a person is deemed in law to live, which may not always be the place 

of his actual dwelling, and thus the term may mean something different from 

being bodily present, and does not necessarily refer to the place of actual abode. 

When employed in this sense, the word ‘reside’ includes not only physical 

presence in a place, but also the accompanying intent of choosing that place as a 

permanent residence. 

‘In what is sometimes referred to as its popular sense, the word ‘reside’ means the 

personal, actual, or physical habitation of a person; actual residence or place of 

abode; and it signifies being physically present in a place and actually staying 

there. In this sense the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, 

 

5

 With regard to the “regularly attending high school on a full-time basis” provision, this Court 

previously construed the term “full-time” consistent with the State School Aid Act, MCL 

388.1601 et seq., which provides that “students who take nine hundred hours of instruction over 

the course of a school year are considered ‘full-time’ equivalent pupils.” Rowley, 221 Mich App 

at 708-709, citing MCL 388.1606(4)(t). 
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and it does not mean legal residence or domicile.’ (Emphasis supplied.) 77 C.J.S. 

Reside, pp 285-286. 

Utilizing the legal definition of “reside,”6

 which contains both a physical presence and an intent 

element, it is quite possible that KG could reside full-time with the payee based on her intent to 

make her mother’s home her permanent residence, while still spending some overnights with her 

father, so long as her intent was to reside full-time with her mother. Because this issue was not 

raised before this Court or the trial court, there are no factual findings or decision to review. 

However, that issue must be decided by the trier of fact to properly resolve defendant’s motion. 

In doing so, the trial court should consider, where relevant, the factors historically considered in 

determining where an individual resides or has their domicile: 

(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either 

permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he 

contends is his “domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the 

relationship between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether 

the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or 

upon the same premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the 

person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. [Workman v DAIIE,

404 Mich 477, 496-497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979) (citations omitted).] 

“ ‘In considering these factors, no one factor is, in itself, determinative; instead, each factor must 

be balanced and weighed with the others.’ ” Tienda v Integon National Ins Co, 300 Mich App 

605, 615; 834 NW2d 908 (2013), quoting Workman, 404 Mich at 496.7

 The trial court must 

make this fact-intensive determination, and only after doing so can it decide whether KG resided 

on a full-time basis with her mother. Consequently, we remand to the trial court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 

6

 The Child Custody Act refers to the legal connotation of reside when referring to a child’s legal 

residence under a custody order. MCL 722.31. See also McGrath v Allstate Ins Co, 290 Mich 

App 434, 443; 802 NW2d 619 (2010) (stating that “reside” may have a legal or technical 

meaning under the Child Custody Act as recognized in Heniser v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 449 

Mich 155, 163; 534 NW2d 502 (1995)). Although the custody order is no longer applicable to 

KG, the fact that the Legislature utilized that connotation is relevant to how we construe that 

term in a related statute. 

7

 The Workman factors are relevant to the determination of where KG resides, even though 

Workman dealt with deciding one’s domicile, a term not specifically referenced in the statute. 

This is so because (1) the legal definition of “reside” relates that term to domicile, Kubiak, 51 

Mich App at 413; (2) domicile and residence are sometimes treated as having the equivalent 

meaning under Michigan law, Grange Ins Co v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 498-499; 835 NW2d 

363 (2013), which is the case with MCL 552.605b(2), as it denotes a more permanent, singular 

residence by associating “reside” with “full-time basis.” See Tienda, 300 Mich App at 615 

(Noting that “the Workman Court set forth the following nonexhaustive list of factors to

determine whether a person resides or is domiciled in an insured’s household.”). 
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 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs, 

an issue of first impression being involved. MCR 7.219(A). 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra