### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Fe br ua ry 9, 200 6 S es sio n

JO HN L. MEDEARI S v . BONNI E BAUMGARDNER (ST OLO FF)

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 66485 Hon. W. Fr ank B rown, I II., Chancellor

No. E2005-01785-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MARCH 27, 2006

The mother sue d to enforc e Ag ree ment with the fathe r to pay colleg e ex penses f

or adult child of the parties. The Trial Court re fused to enfor ce the terms of the Ag ree ment on the equitable g rounds of

un c le a n h a nd s a ndthe la c k o f c oo pe ratio n a ndfa ir de a lin g s b y

the mothe r. We a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J
., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , joined.

Pa me la R. O ’D wy e r, a ndRa nd a ll D . L ara mor e , Ch a tta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt.

Donna L . Pierce , Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for a ppellee.

OP IN ION

The pa rties, fa ther John an d m o t h er Bonnie, we re divorc ed on Mar ch 7, 1988, and the Fina l J udg ment adopted a nd incorporated their Marital Dissolution Agre ement by ref ere nce. T he MD A s ta te d th a t th e mothe r w a s to ha ve c us tod y of the pa rt ie s’ min or

c hil d, Jame s H e nry

Me de ari s (Jimm y ), d. o. b. 3/2 4/8 6, a ndthe fathe r w a s r e qu ir e d t o pay se mi- mon thl y c hil d s up po rt

pa y me nts of $2 60 .0 0. Th e MD A a lso pr ov ide s:

Husband’s liability for such child support pay ment shall cea se upon t he happe ning of wh ic he ve r o f the fo llo wi ng e ve nts sh a ll f ir st o c c ur :

a. Dea th of Husband;-2- b. Dea th or marr iag e of c hild; or

c

. Chi ld o bta ins t he a g e of 18 y e ars ; pr ov ide d h ow e ve r, Hu sb a nda g re e s to continue child support payments to Wi fe until the child obtains 22 y ear s of

a g e so lon g a s th e c hil d c on tin ue s to live wi th Wi fe on a da ily ba sis a ndis enrolled a s a full-time student in pursuit of a re cog nized license, diploma or deg ree . S o l o n g as Hu sband is pay ing at least fifty perc ent of the c hild’s

a nn ua l tu iti on , b oo ks , r oo m a ndbo ard , H us ba ndwi ll h a ve n o ob lig a tio n to dir e c tly pa y Wif e a ny c hil d s up po rt

.

I n 2000, the fa ther filed a Petition for Contempt a nd to Modify the Fina l Decr ee. T he Pe tit ion a lle g e d th a t th e mothe r h a d in te rf e re d w ith the fathe r’ s visi ta tio n r ig hts , a nda llo we d Jimmy to disre g ard the visitation sche dule. The fathe r soug ht injunctive relief and mediation, aski n g the Court to order the mother to cooper ate with the visitation schedule. The mother responde d with a
counter -cla im for incre ased c hild support.

Th e Cou rt c on du c te d a hea

ri ng on June 26 , 200 0, inc lud ing a n inte rv ie w with Jimmy in chamber s, in the prese nce of the attorne y s. I n that interview, Jimm y opined h e d i d n o t have a g ood rela tionship wit h his father , th at h e an d h is father did not communicate bec ause the fathe r would not liste n , a n d th a t h e w o u ldb e o k w it h th e Co u r t t e ll in g th e f

a th e r to le a v e h im

a lo n e. F urthe r, that his fathe r ha d “ take n him to c ou rt ” wh ic h ma de him a ng ry , a nd ba sic a lly e xpre sse d h is desire to ha ve nothing to do with his father.

The Court ente red a n Orde r on Jul y 24, 2000, and found tha t to enforc e the visitation at that point would be “disastrous” and would further impair the fathe r/son rela tionship. The Court found that counse ling wa s nece ssary , and orde red tha t all parties shoul d attend counse ling, a nd that the visitation schedule would be suspe nded pending further order s of t he court. Both parties wer e order ed to attend pa

renting classes, a nd the fa ther’s Motion for Injunctive Relief wa s denied.

On J anua ry 2
, 2002, the Court enter ed an O rder stating tha t both parties had f iled

certificates s h o wi n g t h eir attendance at a pa renting class, and a lso stating that the f ather had voluntarily

incre ased his child support payments. The Court sta ted “It appea rs that this case, in pa

rt due to the child’s a g e and f eeling s, must be resolved b y t h e p ar ties and not by judicial fiat.” The Court the n dismiss ed both parties’ petitions without prejudice, and or dere d the parties to continue to work with ea ch other

and their son to improve the fathe r-son re lationship.

On Aug ust 18, 2004, the m o t h er filed a Motion see king to e nforc e the MDA provisions as related to child support and colleg e expenses. I n the fa ther’s Response , he stated tha t h e had cea sed pay ing child support pay ments in Ma y 2004 when the child g raduated fr o m h i gh

sc ho ol, ha vin g turne d 1 8 inMa rc h o f 2 00 4. He a sse rt e d t hat he ha d n o in fo rm a tio n th a t th e c hil d

was a ttending c olleg e, and the mother continued to interf ere with his relationship with J immy , and
t h at h e h ad not s een Jimm y since the la st court hea

ring . Further, that the mother ’s interfe renc e justified relieving his future duty of support under

the MDA. The Court conduc ted a tria l on J une 6, 2005, wher ein the parties a nd J immytestified.-3-

Following trial, the court issued a Memora ndum O pinion a nd Orde r, whe rein the Court stated tha t “the law is clear

that parties’ ag ree ments applicable t o ch i l d re n ’s post-emanc ipation support and education are tre ated a nd handled pur suant to contra ct l aw and not divorce la w.” The Court denied the mothe r’ s r e qu e st f

or c on te mpt a nd state d tha t the c a se wa s “on e of the sa dd e st an d most tr a g ic

case s fac ed by

this court”. The Court cre dited the fa ther’s te stimony that the m other tol d him during the divorce that he would not have to pay support if he would ag ree not to see the c hild. The Court
state d th e fathe r t e sti fi e d h is r e la tio ns hip w i thJi m m y be g a n to de te ri or a te so on the re a ft e r, a ndJimmy would not visit . The mother sta ted that she let Jim my decide whether

to visit

. The Court found that th e f a th e r w e n t to a c o u n s e lo r , b u t th e mo th e r d id n o t a n d th e f a th e r s e n t g if

ts , car ds, money and letters to J immyto try to ke ep the rela tionship alive, but J immywould then leave messag es telling the fathe r he wa nte d no c on ta c t. T he Cou rt fo un d th a t th e fathe r h a d n ot s e e n Jimmy sin c e the ir

la st h e ar i n g i n 2 0 0 0
, a n d J i m m y b l a m e d e v e r yt h i n g o n t h e f a t h e r a n d a c c e p t e d n o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y.

The Court f

ound that with reg ard to c hild support that J immywanted nothing to do with his father, but still wanted his mone y

. The Court discussed the ca se law in Te nnessee wher e a pare nt’ s in f

lu e n c e o v e r th e c h il d ’ s r e lati o n s h ip w ith th e o th e r p ar e n t w a s a f a c to r in c hang e of custody , and re cog nized the policy that a child’s r elationship with a non-custodial pa rent wa s very important. The Court found that it was c lear that the mother ha d n o u s e fo r t h e fa t her a nd didn’t want him around or

involved, and wa nted to be fr ee of him. The Court found t hat J immyg rew up in this environment and it affe cted how he felt about his fa ther.

The Court then noted tha t in Tennessee , every contra ct had a n implied standard of g ood faith and fair de aling , and that the MDA in this case provide d for visitation, and the 2000 Or der provided that the pa

rties would a t t en d counseling , but the mother had f ailed to comply

with both. The Court found that a

person who materially violates a contract could not then claim bre ach by the

o t h erp ar t y

. T h e C o u rt h el d t h e m o t h er h ad b re ac h ed t h e i m p l i ed d u t y o f go o d fa i t h an d fa i r d ea l i n g, and had a lso violated her duty to foster the other parent’s r elationship with the child, and the father was thus re lieved of a ny

further duty of support under

the MDA. The Court also held that the mother

wa s g uil ty

of un c le a n h a nd s f

or fa ili ng to a

bid e by the Cou rt ’s or de rs

.

Th e mothe r h a s a

pp e a le d a ndra ise d th e se iss ue s:

1. Did the Trial Court er r in holding tha t there w as a f ailure of consideration in the Ma ri ta l D iss olu tio n A g re e me nt?

2. Did the Trial Court er r in holding tha t the mother violated the duty of g ood faith and f

air de aling when she took no action to impede visitation or impair the son’s re lationship with father?

3. Did the fa ther wa ive his rig ht to visi tation and a r elationship with the son when he took no action to secur e visitation and failed to void the ag ree ment afte r the c ourt suspended visitation.-4- Ou r r e vie w o f the Tr ia l Co urt’ s d e c isi on a s to fa c tua l de te rm inatio n is de novo wi th a pre sumption of corre ctness of the finding s of fac t by the Trial Court unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. B ut our re v i ew o f t he Judge’ s conclusions of law e njoy no such presumption. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

The mother a

rgu es t h e Tria l Court incorrec tly held that there was a

failure of considerat ion to support the father ’s post-emanc ipation support obligations under the MDA. The Trial Court did mention a “failure of consideration”, but went on to explain that the main basis for its holdi ng was the mother ’s violations of her duties unde r the c ontrac t, and t hat her brea ch re lieved the fa ther of his further oblig ations.

B o t h p ar t i e s a g r e e t h a t a p ar e n t ’ s o b l i g a t i o n t o p a y s u p p o r tp o s t

- m a j o r i t y i s p u r e l y a

m a t t e r o f c o n t r a c ti n T e n n e s s e e , a n d i s o u t s i d e t h e p ar e n t ’ s d u t y o f l e g a l s u p p o r td u r i n g m i n o r i t y. See P enland v. Pe nland , 5 21 S.W. 2d 22 2 (T e nn . 197 5) . A n a g re e me nt t o p a y su pp ort po st- ma

jority will be enforce d as any

other written contrac t. See Hathaway v. Hathaway , 98 S.W .3d 675 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th e pa

rt ie s a lso a g re e that th e Cha nc e llo r w a s c or re c t in ho ldi ng that a ll c on tr a c ts

car ry with them a duty

of g ood faith and f

air de aling

. El lio tt v . E lli ott , 1 49 S.W. 3d 77 (Ten n. Ct. App. 2004).

I n a sc e rt a ini ng a ndg ivi ng e ff e c t to the pa

rt ie s’ int e nti on s r e g ard ing the MD A, it i s

c le ar tha t th e Con tr a c t pr ov ide d th a t th e fathe r w ou ld h a ve lib e ra l vi sit a tio n w ith Jimmy , a s se t f orth in the visitation schedule, and that there would be a c ontinuing and via ble fa ther/son re lationship, as the Tr ial Court found. The Trial Court, however , conclude d that this relationship had deterior ated,

a ndthat b oth so n a ndmothe r w e re re sp on sib le . T he e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th is fac tual deter mination. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The evidenc e esta blishes the mother did not pressure the c hil d to g o to vis it the fathe r, bu t inste a d, le t a min or make tho se de c isi on s. I n th e e ns uin g y e ars , the mother did not tell, ask, or encoura g e the child to visit or contact the father at all, and she did not

a tte ndthe c ou ns e lin g ma nd a te d b y the Cou rt a ft e r the 20 00 he ari ng , a nd didno t, a s c us tod ia l pa re nt,

ensure that J immywent to such c ounseling . The result was a complete bre akdown in the f ather /son rela tionship, and the Court pr operly conclude d the fathe r had not rec eived a ll the benef its that he was entitled to under the MDA , and further the mother had violated the implied duty of g ood faith and fa ir de a lin g be c a us e sh e ha d impa ir e d th e fathe r’ s r ig hts un de r the Con tr a c t.

The mother ar g ues this finding is improper beca use visitation remained w ithin the Court’s control during the child’s minority
, and the Court c ould ha ve order ed that it take place . The Court’s deter mination was not depende nt simply on the fa ilure of visitation, howeve r, but was ba sed

u p o n t h e m o t h e r ’ s c o m p l e t e d i s r e g ar d f o r t h e f a t h e r / s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d t h e C o u r t ’ s o r d e r s

. C l e ar l y,

a f a i l u r e t o v i s i tc a n n o tr e l i e v e a p ar t y o f h i s /h e r l e g a l d u t y t o s u p p o r ta

c h i l d d u r i n g h i s m i n o r i t y. See Hi ll v . H

ill , 152 S.W .3d 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). T he posture of this case , howeve r, does not de a l w ith the le g a l du ty

of su pp ort du ri ng the c hil d’ s mi no ri ty , r a the r w ith a c on tr a c tua l du ty

to support an adult child who is in colleg e.The mother ar gu es in her brie f that counse ling wa s not mandated by the Trial Court af

ter 1 the 20 00 he ari ng , b ut the Or de r d e mon str a te s th a t it wa s.

-5- As stated, the Contract must be interpre ted and enf orce d as any

other c ontrac t, and is subject to the same de fense s as any other c ontrac t.

The Court found the mother failed to c omply with the Court’s prior orde r re g arding counseling and working toge ther to r epair the rela tionship, which further evidenc ed her lack of g ood fa ith a ndfa ir

de a lin g , a s w e ll a s su bje c tin g he r c la im t o th e a dd iti on a l de fe ns e of unc le a n h a nd s. Th is l a tte r d oc tr ine ha s b e e n u til ize d to “ de ny re lie f i f the g ra nti ng of

the re lie f a sk e d w ill , b e c a us e of the c omplained of a ctivities of the litigant, pr oduce a n il l egal or unjust result.” C.J

.S . E qu ity
, §111. I n this case
, t h e C o u rt i nvoked the doc trine of unc lean ha nds due to the mother’ s conduct reg arding the child’s re lationship with the fa ther, a nd her disre g ard of the Court’s prior or der

re gar d i n g co u n s el i n g. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t this fi nd ing

. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 13(d). It would be unjust to allow the m other to g ain her reque sted relief from the Court whe n she disreg arde d the Court’s prior or der.

Whil e Ji mmy is not a party to this action nor to the contra ct, he did nothing to mend the re la t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s f a t h e r , s t a t i n g t h a t h e w a n t e d n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h h i m

. H i s c o n d u c t a s a third-party

benef iciary of this Contract ca n be take n into account in dete rmining w hether the fa ther’s obliga tion to continue to support him post-majorityshould be enfor ced. See Lopez v. Taylor , 2005 WL 35 55 70 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . Jan . 4 , 2 00 5) (“ A b e ne fi c iary ’s ri g ht a g a ins t th e pr omi so r is sub je c t to any claim or de fense arising from his o wn co nduct or a g ree ment”). F urther, a s the Trial Court

e xpla ine d, oth e r j ur isd ic tio ns that r e c og nize a le g a l du ty of a pare nt to su pp ort a n a du lt c hil d in colleg e have held that the par ent i s excused from that duty when the child has re pudiated his or her rela tionship wit h that pare nt. See McKay v . McKay
, 64 4 N. E. 2d 16 4 ( I nd . Ct . A pp . 1 99 4) ; Hambrick v. Prestwood , 382 So. 2d 474 (Miss. 1980); and Milne v. Milne , 383 Pa.Super, 177, 556 A.2d 854 (1989). .

Next, the m o t h er a rg ues the e vidence did not support the Trial Court’s fa ctual de te rm inatio n th a t th e mothe r i mpe de d th e fathe r’ s r e la tio ns hip wi th Jimm y

. As we no te d, the se finding s are revie wed de novo with a pre sumption of corre ctness. The Trial Court’s finding s of fa ct hinge d on witness cre dibilit y issues, and the e vidence does not prepon d erate ag ainst the Trial Court’s fi nd ing s.

Finally
, t h e m o t her a rg ues that the father is estopped or has wa ived his rig ht to a rela tionship with the son, by failing to exercise his option to void t he parties’ ag ree ment as provided by a provision i n t h e M DA
, an d by failing to return to court to enforc e visitation. The mother’s arg ument reg arding voiding the a g ree ment was not ra ised b efore the Trial Court, and will not be addr e s s e d f

o r th e f ir s t t im e o n ap p e a l. A s to th e f a th e r ’ s f a il u r e to r e tu r n to c o u r t, th e fathe r-6-

ex p l ai n ed t h at h e f

el tt h i s wo u l d b e ad an ger o u s m o v e, gi v en J i m m y ’s an ger o v er t h e 2 0 0 0 h ea ri n g. He e x plained that he was simply following the counse lor’s advic e, and se nt letters, ca rds, g ifts, and called in a n eff

ort to continue the re lationship, all to no ava il. Both the c ounselor and the Trial Court had opined that fo rc i n g J i m m y to go on visitation would be the w rong thing to do, and the fathe r thought he was in a c lassic Catch 22 situation.

“Waiver is def

ined as a voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a rig ht.” American H o m e A s s u r

a n c e Co

. v

. O z b u r

n

- H e s s e y S to r

a g e Co.
, 81 7 S .W .2 d 6 72 , 6 78 (T e nn .1 99 1) . I n th is situatio n, the fathe r d id n ot v olu nta ri ly or int e nti on a lly re lin qu ish his ri g ht to a re la tio ns hip wi th h is son. L ikewise, e stoppel require s a “promise which the promissor should r easona bly expect to induce action or f

orbea ranc e of a definite a nd substantial char acte r on the pa rt of the pr omisee and w hich does induce such ac tion or forbe ara nce is binding if injusti ce can be avoided only by enfor ceme nt of the promise.” Alden v. Pre sley , 6 37 S.W. 2d86 2, 86 4 (T e nn .1 98 2)

. F urthe r, the pr omi se e mus t have r easona

bly relied on the promise. Id. There was no such pr omise nor re liance show n here

.

Since we a

re a ffirming the Trial C o urt’s Judgment it is unnecessa ry to addre ss the issue raised by

the fa ther.

We affir m the J udg ment of the Tr ial Court and remand, wit h the cost of the appea l assessed to B onnie B aumg ardne r (Stoloff).

_____________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.-7-