This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 35,271 4 ISAIAH H., 5 Child-Appellant. 6 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY 8 Marci E. Beyer, District Judge 9 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 13 Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 182 {1} Child appeals from the children’s court’ s consent decree, entered following his 1 conditional plea of no contest to two counts of burglary of a vehicle; one count of 2 resisting, evading, or obstructing an offi cer; and one count of unlawful carrying of a 3 deadly weapon. [CN 1-2] Child’s plea wa s conditioned upon his right to appeal the 4 children’s court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and statements allegedly 5 gathered in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 6 Constitution and Article II, S ection 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. [CN 2] This 7 Court issued a calendar notice proposing summary affirmance. Child filed a 8 memorandum in opposition to this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, which we 9 have duly considered. U npersuaded, we affirm. 10
{2} Child raised five issues in his docketi ng statement. In our calendar notice, we 11 suggested that the first four issues appeared to have all been directed at the same 12 general contention: that the officer di d not have—at the time Child was seized—a 13 reasonable suspicion that Child was breaking, or had broken, the law. [CN 3] See State 14 v. Garcia , 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 43, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (stating that “[a] 15 reasonable suspicion is a particularized su spicion, based on all the circumstances, that 16 a particular individual, the one detained , is breaking, or has broken, the law” 17 (alteration, internal quotati on marks, and citation omitte d)). In his memorandum in 18 opposition, Child agrees that his docketing st atement “raise[d] this singular question 193 by asserting multiple variations of it” [MIO3, FN 3], and clarifies that the “sole 1 question on appeal is whether [Officer] Do llar had sufficient reasonable suspicion to 2 effectuate the seizure” [MIO 3]. 3
{3} We note that Child appearedto argue in his docketing statement that the phrase 4 “reasonable suspicion” should be interpreted more stringently under the New Mexico 5 Constitution than under the federal constitution. [CN 7] In response to our observation 6 in our calendar notice that Child failed todevelop this argument by articulating any 7 rationale for doing so, or by explaining how an analysis should differ under the state 8 constitution as to afford him heightened protection [CN 7], see State v. Garcia , 2002- 9 NMCA-050, ¶ 9, 132 N.M. 180, 45 P.3d 900, Child has chosen not to pursue this 10 contention [ See MIO 3]. Accordingly, this issue is deemed abandoned. See State v. 11 Johnson , 1988-NMCA-029, ¶ 8, 107 N.M. 356, 758 P.2d 306 (stating that when a case 12 is decided on the summary calendar, an i ssue is deemed abandoned where a party fails 13 to respond to the proposed disposition of th e issue). Likewise, as to Child’s fifth 14 issue—whether there was probable cause to support Child’s arrest—we indicated in 15 our calendar notice that we were not c onvinced that this issue was adequately 16 preserved in the children’s court or reserv ed for appeal. [CN 8-9] In his memorandum 17 in opposition, Child has explicitly chosen not to make any argument on this point. 184 [ See MIO 3, FN 3] Thus, this issu e is deemed abandoned as well. Garcia , 2002- 1 NMCA-050, ¶ 9. 2
{4} We focus our attention, then, on Child ’s one contention on appeal; that is, 3 whether Child’s seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion. [MIO 3] “Questions 4 of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo by looking at the totality of the 5 circumstances to determine whether the detention was justified.” State v. Hubble , 6 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). “[A]n officer may stop and detain a citizen if the officer has a 8 reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person stopped is or has been involved 9 in criminal activity.” State v. Watley , 1989-NMCA-112, ¶ 17, 109 N.M. 619, 788 P.2d 10 375. 11
{5} As we outlined in our calendar notice, Officer Dollar of the Las Cruces Police 12 Department testified at the suppression hearing that he was patrolling in the area of 13 Young Park and the Woodcrest Apartments at 2:00 a.m. due to an increased number 14 of criminal incidents—prowlers, su spicious activity, car alarms, and 15 burglaries—taking place there in the recent pa st. [CN 2] Officer Dollar testified that 16 he observed Child running from the apartmen ts toward the park , wearing a backpack 17 and holding something in his hand. [CN 2] Child, upon seeing Officer Dollar, slowed 18 down, then increased his speed, changed directions, and ran directly toward a 195 dumpster. [CN 2] Child threw the item he wa s carrying into the dumpster and then hid 1 behind the dumpster. [CN 2] When Officer Dollar approached, the Child ran away. 2 [CN 3] 3
{6} Our Supreme Court has held that unprovoked flight, when combined with 4 presence in a high-crime area, provides th e individualized reasonable suspicion to 5 justify an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Harbison , 6 2007-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 15-24, 141 N.M. 392, 156 P. 3d 30 (discussing the analysis set 7 forth in Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 (2000)). We suggested in our calendar 8 notice that based upon the totality of the ci rcumstances in this case, including but not 9 limited to Child’s unprovoked flight, we were not convinced that the children’s court 10 erred in finding that Offi cer Dollar had a reasonable suspicion that Child was 11 involved, or had been involved, in criminal activity. [CN 5-6] 12
{7} In his memorandum in opposition, Child raises two broad challenges to our 13 proposed conclusion. First, Child argues that there was no unprovoked flight in this 14 case. [MIO 5, 7] Second, Child contends that at the time Officer Dollar decided to 15 seize him, he did not have a reasonable su spicion to do so. [MIO 5] We address each 16 challenge in turn. 17
{8} Relying on the dissent in Wardlow , Child asserts that Officer Dollar’s testimony 18 regarding unprovoked flight on the part of Child was insufficient to give rise to 196 reasonable suspicion. [MIO 6-7] Specifically, Child asserts that: he was already 1 running when Officer Dollar first saw him; there was no testimony that Officer Dollar 2 was wearing a police uniform or driving a marked police unit; wearing a backpack is 3 not a suspicious activity; and presence in a high-crime area alone is not sufficient to 4 provide reasonable suspicion. [MIO 5, 7] We note, however, that the testimony 5 established that at two o’clock in the morning, Child was seen running, wearing a 6 backpack and carrying something in his hands, from the parking lot of an apartment 7 complex where there had been an increasing number of criminal incidents. In fact, 8 Officer Dollar was patrolling that particulararea because of the increase in criminal 9 activity. When Child saw Officer Dollar—wh ether he recognizedhim as a police 10 officer or not—he slowed down, changed directions, and sped up again; he threw the 11 item he was holding into a dumpster; and then he hid behind the dumpster. It was in 12 this context that Officer Dollar decided to investigate Child. As Officer Dollar 13 approached the dumpster to do so, Child ran away. At that point, Officer Dollar 14 identified himself as a police officer and yelled-out multiple commands for Child to 15 stop. Consequently, even if we were to discount Child’s unprovoked flight given the 16 lack of testimony about whether Officer Do llar was clearly identifiable as a police 17 officer, and the fact that Child was already running when initially observed by Officer 187 Dollar, we conclude that the totality of th e circumstances in this case still supports a 1 finding of reasonable suspicion. 2
{9} In our calendar notice, we proposed to ag ree with Child that he was seized, for 3 purposes of Article II, Section 10, at the point when Officer Dollar identified himself 4 as a police officer and commanded Child to stop running. See State v. Jason L. , 2000- 5 NMSC-018, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (stating that we look at whether a show 6 of authority was employed such that a reasonable person would have believed he was 7 not free to leave). [CN 4-5] “The point at which the seizure occurs is pivotal because 8 it determines the point in time the police must have reasonable suspicion to conduct 9 an investigatory stop.” Harbison , 2007-NMSC-016, ¶ 10. Although Child argued 10 below and in his docketing statement that he was seized at the point when Officer 11 Dollar commanded him to stop running, heargues in his memorandum in opposition 12 that “suppression was appropriate because[Officer] Dollar admitted that he was 13 planning to conduct an investigatory detention” even prior to Child’s “flight” from the 14 dumpster, and that Officer Dollar did not have reasonable suspicion at the time he 15 intended to seize Child. [MIO 5] To the exte nt that Child is contending that reasonable 16 suspicion must exist at the time an officer decides to investigate, as opposed to the 17 point in time when the person is actually seized, we are not persuaded. See Jason L. , 18 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20 (“Reasonable suspicion must exist at the inception of the 198 seizure.”); see also State v. Baldonado , 1992-NMCA-140, ¶ 17, 115 N.M. 106, 847 1 P.2d 751 (stating that an officer’s subjective intent is relevant only to the extent that 2 it would bear on the beliefs of a reasonabl e person in the defendant’s shoes). Here, 3 Child does not argue that Officer Dollar’s subjective intent in any way caused him to 4 believe that he was not free to leave prio r to Officer Dollar’s verbal command to stop 5 running. 6
{10} Therefore, we conclude that Officer Dollar had a reasonable suspicion, based 7 on the totality of the circumst ances, that Child was, or had been, involved in criminal 8 activity at the point when he identified himself as a police officer and commanded 9 Child to stop running. 10
{11} Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, as well as those provided in our 11 notice of proposed disposition, we affirm. 12
{12} IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

_______________________________________ 14 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

17 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 189 1 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 2