UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4792

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DARYL STEVEN CARR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (2:06-cr-00014-FL-1)

Submitted: April 29, 2015 Decided: May 1, 2015

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Daryl Steven Carr appeals from his conviction and 192-month 

sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to two counts of 

possessing a stolen firearm. On appeal, counsel has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that he has found no meritorious grounds for appeal but 

suggesting examination of Carr’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and 

the reasonableness of his sentence. Although advised of his 

right to do so, Carr has not filed a supplemental pro se brief. 

The government has also declined to file a brief. After 

thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must 

conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, 

and determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the 

charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various 

rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 

1991). The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s 

plea is voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, 

and did not result from force, threats, or promises not 

contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), 

(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20. 
3

Because Carr did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in 

the district court or otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 

11 error, the plea colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United 

States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002). Our 

review of the record reveals that the magistrate judge 

substantially complied with Rule 11 in accepting Carr’s guilty 

plea during a thorough hearing. Accordingly, we find that his 

plea was knowing and voluntary.

We next review Carr’s sentence for reasonableness, applying 

a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first ensure that the 

district court committed no “‘significant procedural error,’” 

including improper calculation of the Guidelines range, 

insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors, or inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed. 

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). During the district court’s 

explanation of a selected sentence, while it must consider the 

statutory factors and explain the sentence, it need not 

“robotically tick” through every § 3353(a) factor on the record, 

particularly when imposing a sentence within the properly 

calculated Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 

339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). At the same time, the district court 

“must make an individualized assessment based on the facts 
4

presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. “This individualized 

assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide 

a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate 

to permit meaningful appellate review.” United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, the parties agreed that the Guidelines were properly 

calculated. Further, the court provided an adequate explanation 

of its sentence, referencing the seriousness of Carr’s conduct, 

his past criminal history and characteristics, the kinds of 

sentences available and the need to protect the public. The 

court specifically found that a sentence in the middle of the 

advisory Guidelines range was appropriate. We therefore 

conclude that the sentence was procedurally reasonable. 

When we find a sentence procedurally reasonable, we then

must examine its substantive reasonableness, considering “the 

totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The 

sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable 

on appeal, and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the 

presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable 

when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
5

Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Here, Carr’s sentence was within his Guidelines range, and 

the record does not provide any basis to overcome the 

presumption of reasonableness. We thus find the sentence to be 

substantively reasonable. Our review pursuant to Anders has 

revealed no meritorious issues for review. We accordingly 

affirm Carr’s conviction and sentence. This Court requires that 

counsel inform Carr in writing of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Carr 

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move this 

Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Carr. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED