United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-2158

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

David Lenorris Cooper

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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Submitted: December 10, 2021

Filed: December 21, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

David Lenorris Cooper appeals after he pled guilty to failing to register as a 

sex offender, and the district court1 imposed an above-Guidelines prison sentence to 

run consecutively to an undischarged state sentence, and various special conditions 

1

The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Arkansas.
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of supervised release. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms 

the prison sentence and the imposition of release conditions, but remands for the 

district court to amend the judgment as it relates to Special Conditions 18 and 19.

Counsel has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the sentence is unreasonable because 

the district court failed to adequately explain its reasoning for running the federal 

sentence consecutively to the state sentence, and failed to properly consider and 

weigh the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Counsel also argues that 

the district court erred in imposing special conditions of supervised release 

restricting Cooper’s access to adult pornography. 

 The district court considered the relevant sentencing factors in deciding to run 

the sentences consecutively, and committed no plain error. See United States v. 

Brown, 992 F.3d 665, 672 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review); see also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3584(a) (“[I]f a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already 

subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or 

consecutively.”); United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817, 820-22 (8th Cir. 2010) 

(affirming where district court stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors, Guidelines, 

presentence report, arguments of counsel, and defendant’s allocution, and imposed 

consecutive sentences); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d), & comment. (n.4(A)) (factors to 

consider in imposing consecutive sentences). The sentence was not substantively 

unreasonable because the court properly considered the section 3553(a) factors and 

did not err in weighing them. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 

(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (sentences are reviewed for substantive reasonableness 

under deferential abuse of discretion standard; abuse of discretion occurs when court 

fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant 

factor, or commits clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors; this court 

must give due deference to district court’s determination that § 3553(a) factors 

justify variance); see also United States v. Mangum, 625 F.3d 466, 469-70 (8th Cir. 
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2010) (upward variance was reasonable where court made individualized assessment 

based on facts presented).

The record supports restrictions on Cooper’s access to pornography. See 

United States v. Adams, 12 F.4th 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2021) (district court is afforded 

wide discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release, so long as they meet 

the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). 

Special Conditions 18 and 19 should be clarified on remand. See United 

States v. Robertson, 948 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 298 (2020) 

(standard of review). Special Condition 18 prohibits Cooper from entering “adult 

bookstores, strip clubs, or adult sex-themed entertainment businesses, or any 

establishments where such material or entertainment is available.” Although bans 

on entering adult-themed establishments are routinely upheld by this court as 

reasonably related to the nature of the offense, the inclusion of “any establishments 

where such material or entertainment is available” results in a condition that is overly 

broad. See Adams, 12 F.4th at 889. Cooper did not object to this language, but as 

in Adams, this court directs that it be amended to conform to the district court’s 

presumed intent that the condition extend only to “establishments whose primary 

business involves sex-themed material or entertainment.” See Id. 

Special Condition 19 includes a prohibition on “material that would 

compromise the defendant’s sex offense-specific treatment.” As written, the 

prohibition is impermissibly vague because it provides insufficient notice as to the 

proscribed conduct. The court directs that on remand, the judgment be amended to 

add to Special Condition 19 the clarifying phrase “if the defendant is so notified by 

the probation office.” See Robertson, 948 F.3d at 920 (upholding condition 

requiring defendant to inform a person of a risk the defendant posed if defendant’s 

probation officer determined defendant posed a risk; scope of condition could be 

ascertained with “sufficient ease”).
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 The judgment of the district court is affirmed as to the length and consecutive 

nature of the sentence. The judgment is remanded for the narrow purpose of 

amending the written judgment as it relates to Special Conditions 18 and 19 in a 

manner consistent with this opinion. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. 

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