NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0228n.06 No. 09-1644 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
AL BERTA H UB BA RD, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. DE TRO I T PU B L I C SCH OO L S, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : G UY , CO L E a

nd SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit Judge
. Alberta Hubbar d sued the Detroit Public School District, alleg ing that it vio late d f

e de ra l and

state law whe n it

fa ile d to a c c omm od a te he r d isa bil ity
. A j ur

y fo un d in fa v o r of t h e sc h o o l d i s t ri ct , an d Hu b b ar d , re p re s en t ed at t ri al b u t n o w p ro ce ed i n g pr o s e , claims that (1) the evidenc e does not support the j ury ’s ver dict; (2) the tria l court should not have a llowed the jury to hear about her application for social secur ity benef its; (3) defe nse counsel inflamed the jury duri ngc los ingargume nts ; and (4 ) t he c ourt imp ro pe rl y

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y . We a ff ir m. I. I n 1 99 8, Hu

bb ard be g an w or

kin g a s a so c ia l w or

ke r i n th e De tr oit

Pub lic Sc ho ol D istri c t. She worke d primarily at C offe y Middle School, wher e she provided services to st udents, many of wh om h a d s pe c ia l ne e ds and be havio ra l is su e s. He r r ole a t Co ff e y inc lud e d me e tin g on e -o n- on e wi th students, observingstudents in t h e cl assroom, evaluating students for emotional impairments andNo. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 2 - a uti sm, de ve lop ing I nd ivi du a lize d E du c a tio n Pl ans , a nd pr ov idi ngint e rv e nti on

se rv ic e s to stu de nts
and the ir fa mil ie s. I n Marc h 2002, Hubbar d had a hy sterec to m y . She took medical leave to re cover from the surg ery and intended to r eturn to wo rk wi t h i n 6 t o 8 wee ks. Shortly afte r the surg ery , howeve r, Hubbar d beg an experiencing fec al incontinence
. Throug hout 2002 and 2003, she c onsulted with a number of doc tors and under went two surg erie s to try

to improve the c ondition. Neither surg ery was
s u c c e s s f u l
. A n d p h ys i c a l t h e r a

p y, m e d i c a t i o n , h e r

b a l s u p p l e m e n t s , e v e ne l e c t r i c s h o c k t h e r a p y, failed to solve the pr oblem. Be cause Hubbar d’s incontinence left her unable to wor

k, the school district g rante d her a n
e xten de d me dic a l le ave . In O c tob e r 2 00 2, sh e a pp lie d f or and re c e ived Soc ia l Se c ur ity

Di sa bil ity I nsuranc e benef

its, whic h she continues to r ece ive on a monthly basis. The school district continued
rene wing h e r

le av e u n ti l m id

- 2 0 0 5 , w h e nH u b b ar d r e a c h e d th e d is tr ic t’ s thr e e - y e ar

c a p o nle ave entitlement. The district denie d her r equest for an ex tension beyond the t hree y ear s, and Hubba rd did not return to work. I n Fe bruar

y 2006, Hubbar d filed a r equest to re turn to work with ADA accommodations. S he and her treating phy sician, Dr. J ohn Eg g enber g er, said that she would be able to pe rfor m he r job as
a school social wor

ker if the district ga

ve her “re ady acc ess to a bathr oom within 20 seconds” and “per mitted [her] to sit at wil l.” R.72-4, 72-5. Approximately a we ek af ter she ma de her

reque st, the district sent her a

letter de nying the acc ommodations and stating that, “due to the re strictions list ed by [her] phy sician,” it could not g rant he r re quest to return to wor k. R
. 7 2 -6
. When HubbardNo. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 3 - inq uir e d a bo ut h e r o pti on s, human r e so ur c e s in fo rm e d h e r t hat he r “on ly

op tio ns we re to retire /resig n.” R.26-8, 2. I n May 2007, Hubbar d filed this lawsuit, raising claims u n d e r th e A me r ic a

n s w ith Disa

biliti es Act and Mic higa

n’s People with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. I n November 2007, the school district fo rm a lly dis c ha rg e d h e r, stat ingtha

t sh e wa s n o lo ng e r e lig ibl e fo r l e ave and ha d n ot r e tur

ne d to work whe n her le ave e x pired. In April 2008, a jury heard Hu b b ar d ’s ca se, and it found that the
sc ho ol d istri c t di d n ot v iol a te fe de ra l or state dis a bil ity dis c ri min a tio n la

ws . II. Hubbar d claims that the evide nce doe s not support the jury ’s ver dict. That is mistaken. The fir st problem with this arg ument is that Hubbar d did not prese rve it for appeal. Af ter a n adver se j ury verdic t, a li tiga nt must move for a new trial or for judgme nt as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e in or der to pre serve a suff iciency challeng e for appea l . See P ennington v. W . Atlas, Inc. , 2 02 F .3 d 9 02 , 9 11 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) . Wh e the r a ve rd ic t is
su ff ic ie ntl y a g a ins t th e we ig ht o f t he e vid e nc e a s to re qu ir e a ne w tri a l or

to w arr ant j ud g me nt a s a matter of la

w “ca lls for the judgme nt in the first instance” by the district c ourt, “who saw and hea rd the witnesses and has the fee l of the case which no appellate transcr ipt c an i m p ar t.” Cone v. W .V. Pulp & Paper , 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947). F ailure to g ive the district cour t an opportunity

to pass on a suff iciency claim thus waives the a

rgument on appea l. See Pennington , 202 F.3d at 911. Concedingthat she wa ived her claim, Hubbar d asks us to review the ver dict for plain e rror . Hu bb ard Re ply 1. Yet we hav e pr e vio us ly de c lin e d to g ive e ve n th is m od e st f or m of re vie w t o unprese rved suf

ficienc y challeng es, save in the conte xt o f a p p e als from c riminal judgme nts, se e Cul pNo. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 4 - v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , No. 04-1478, 2005 WL 1993334, at *2–3 (6th Cir. Aug . 16, 2005), and have sug g ested that we may lack jurisdiction over

these ty pes of c laims, Al lis on v . Ci ty of E as t Lansing , 4 8 4 F. 3 d

8 7 4 , 8 7 6 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ). In ci v i l ca s es , t h e s t an d ar d fo r r ev i ew i n g preserv ed sufficie ncy

challeng es is alre ady

“striking ly

simil ar, if not identica l to plain-err o r re v i ew,” we
re as o n ed , s o ex t en d i n g p l ai n -e rr o r re v i ew t o u np re s erv edch al l en ges wo u l d “a l l o w a n y

p ar t y t o fo rgo moving f or re lief in the trial court” and obtain the same level of revie w they

would have obta ined had they prese rved the ir claim. Cul p , 2005 WL 1993334, at *2-3. We n e e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r p la in e rr or re vie w i s inva

ri a bly out o f th e qu esti on

in t his context, however, be cause , even if we c onsidered H ubbard’ s sufficienc y challeng e, she w ould not pre v a il
. Ci r c u it s w il li n g to r e v ie w u np r e s e r v e d s u f f ic ie n c y c la im s c o n s id e r o n ly w h e th e r “ any evidenc e . . . irre spective of its suff iciency” supports the jury ’s ver dict “or whether plain err or wa s committed which, if not noticed, would result i n a manifest miscarr iag e of justi ce.” Br istol S te e l & Iron W orks v. Be thlehem Stee l Corp. , 41 F.3d 1 8 2 , 1 8 6 (4 th Cir. 1994) (emphasis adde d); ac c or d De lan o-Py le v . V

ic tor ia C ou nty , 302 F.3d 567 , 5 7 3 (5 t h C i r. 2002). This jury verdic t clear s that modest hurdle. The school district prese nted evidenc e that Hubba rd’s fe cal incontinen ce left her unable to perf

orm the essential functions of a school social worker e ven with ac commodation. The position, for example, require d Hubbar d to “meet the [ students] wher e they are ,” and it could not be perf ormed “most of the time” in a n office , wher e the sc hool district might have pr ovided conve nient
acc ess to an unocc upied re stroom. R.60, 101. “Part of” the s ch o o l s o cial wor k position “is that [social workers] observe students in the classroom” and, “if the student is in a classroom that’s wa y
awa y from the r estroom,” the obse rvation has to occ ur nonethe less. R.60, 106. W hether a diffe rentNo. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 5 - jur y mig ht h ave re a c he d a

dif fe re nt c on c lus ion

ba se d o n this and oth e r ev ide nc e is be sid e the po int
. What matters is that the district put on some evidenc e showingthat Hu b b ar d could not have perf ormed he r job eve n with acc ommodation. That alone suf fi ces to show that the jury did not plainly err . III
. Hubbar d claims that t h e d i s t ri ct court erre d in permitting the de fenda nts to int roduce her application for

Social Security

Disability I nsuranc e int o evidenc e. Showing the application to the jur y , s he ma int a ins , w a s “ g ro ssl y pr e jud ic ia l,” a s it imp lie d that her dis a bil ity re nd e re d he r u

na ble to perfor m her job. Hubba

rd B r. 12. No re versible e rror occur red. Courts may

exclude evidenc e if “the dang er of unfair prejudice , confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury” outweig hs its probative value. F ed. R. Evid. 403. Yet the district c ourt did not
a bu se its dis c re tio n in

c on c lud ingthat the prob a tiv e va lue of the a pp lic a tio n o utw e ig he d it s potentially

prejudicia l effe cts. See Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc. , 573 F.3d 365, 378 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (r eviewingevidentiar y ruling for a

buse of discr etion). A c entra l issue in the case was whe ther Hubbar d could per form the e ssential functions of her job. She stated on he r bene fits application that sh e wa s “ un a

ble to w or

k, ” and the c ourt

pe rm iss ibl y

tr e a te d th a t sw or

n s tatem ent as a

pa rt y admission. Fe d. R. Evid. 801(d)( 2). That the evidenc e may have weakened her case does not make it impermissi bly

prejudicia l, much less require its ex clusion. Hubbar d adds that the c ourt should not have allowe d the s chool di strict to present e vidence that the district discharg ed her beca use she f ailed to re turn to work whe n her le ave e x pired, not beca use of he r disability . Admitting this e vidence was improper, she say s, beca use (1) the districtNo. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 6 - court, in deny

ing the school district’s motion for summary judgme nt, sugg ested that Hubba rd had not abandone d her job, a

nd (2) the school district fabric ated e vidence about her discharg e. Hubba

rd forf ei t ed t h es e objec tions, however, when she did not objec t to the releva nt evidence at trial. See Bowman v. Corr ec t i o ns Corp of Am. , 3 50 F .3 d 5 37 , 5 48 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . We the re fo re g ive on ly plain-er ror revie w to he r cla im. See id. I n this inst ance , the cour t’s admission of evidenc e re g arding the circ umstances of her discharg e did not aff ect Hubba

rd’s substantial rig hts. Hubbard’ s attorney had an a dequate opportunity to cross-e x amine the r eleva nt witness a

bout the vera city of the school district’s justification, and the members of the jury acc ording ly wer e in as g ood a position as anyone to see whic h party

was be ing stra ight with them. I V. Hu bb ard c la ims that th e sc ho ol d ist ri c t’ s c ouns e l in fl ame d th e jur y duri ngc los ingar g ume nts , fi rs t by sh ow inghe r a

pp lic a tio n f

or Soc ial S ecur ity

be ne fi ts o n th e ov e rh e a d p ro je c tor wh ile addre ssing the jur

y . Hubbar d say s that the exhibit , which conta ined her signature a

nd provided that “anyone makinga fa lse statement [on a social secur ity application] . . . c ommits a cr ime,” could have led the jury

to conclude that Hubbard w as lying ab o u t h er condition. Hubbard B r. 27. B ut the district court did n o t ab u s e its discretion in permitting def ense c ounsel to display

the exhibit over Hubbar d’s objection. As noted, the school district permissibly introduced the benef

its application int o ev ide nc e e arl ie r in the tr ia l, an d co un se l per mis sib ly dis pla

y e d it duri ngc los ingargume nts to remind the jury

that Hubbar d had succ essfully filed for disability benef its. The court’s ruling was not improper or unduly

prejudicia l, and above all it was not an abuse of discre tion.No. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 7 - Hubbar d also points to defense c ounsel’s comments about he r prior m al p ra ct ice suit, her social security application and her medical conditi on. Hubbar d waived the se ar g uments, howeve r, by not objecting to the comments at trial. See B owman , 350 F.3d at 548. We reviewthis arg ument only for plain e rror , id. , and find none . Def ense c ounsel’s statements re lated to evidenc e pre sented duri ngtr ia l, a

nd his argume nts a

bo ut t he c on c lus ion s to dr aw f

ro m th a t e vid e nce w e re re a so na ble inf e re nc e s, no t r e ve rs ibl e c he a p s ho ts. V. Hu b b ar d ra i s es a n u mb er

o f o b j ec t i o n s t o t h e j u ry

i n s t ru ct i o n s . T h i s t y

p e o f c h al l en ge require s us to consider “whethe r, take n as a whole, the instructions ade quately inform[ed] t he jury of the re levant considerations and provide[d] the j ury with a sound basis in law with which to reac h
a conclusion,” and we will r ever se only if the cour t’s instructions were “conf using, misleading , and prejudicia l.” Pivnik v . W hite, Getgey

& Mey er Co., LPA , 552 F.3d 479, 488 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Hubbar d first claims that t he dis trict court did not instruct the j ury that the s chool district had
a re s p onsibili ty

to eng ag e in an “ interac tive dialog ue” w ith Hubbard onc e she r equeste d
acc ommodations. Hubbard B r. 20. Not true. The court instructe d the jury that “[b] oth the employ er and the e mploy ee mu st c oo pe rate in thi s int e ra c tiv e pr oc e ss in g oo d fa ith .” R.6 8, 18 6 (em pha sis added) . That instruction ade quately con vey ed to the jury

the emphasis the AD A place s on cooper ation betwee n employ er a nd employ ee when the e mploy ee r equests an a ccommodation. Hubbar d next arg ues that the d i s t ri ct court failed to instruct the jury , despite Hubba rd’s
a pp are nt r e qu e st, that th e sc ho ol d istri c t’ s r e fu sa l to e ng a g e in the int e ra c tiv e pr oc e ss c ou ld e sta bli sh

“ ba d f a ith .” Hu bb ard B r. 21
. Whil e the c ourt ne ve r i ssu e d a

sp e c if ic ins tr uc tio n a lon g the se lin e s,No. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 8 - its failure to d o s o d i d n o t mislead or conf use the jury . The c ourt instead instructed the jury that pa rt ic ipatin g in t

he int e ra c tiv e pr oc e ss i s e vid e nc e of “ g oo d f a ith ,” R. 68 , 1 86 , a

nd the jur y a ssu re dly could re asonably

infer that not participating in the interac tive proce ss shows bad fa ith. Hubbar d next ar gu es that the cour t failed to mention the nec essity of conduc ting a

n

“ ind ivi du a lize d a sse ssm e nt” of her part ic ula r d isa bil iti e s. B ut e ve n th ou g h th e c ourt did no t us e these words, it

d id s ay th a t t h e “ inte r a c ti v e p r o c e s s ” r e qu ir e d th e p arti e s to c o n s id e r

H u b b ar d’s

“ pr e c ise lim it ations ” and the re a so na

ble ne ss o f a

n a c c omm od a tio n f

or the m, whic h s uf

fi c e d to prese nt this t heory

of liability

to the jury . R.68, 186. Hubbar d next arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in instructing the jury about the school district’s “dire ct threat” def

ense. R.68, 188. Unde r Michig an and f eder al law, e mplo y er s m ay defe nd a dis a bil ity -d isc ri min a tio n c la im on the g ro un d th a t th e dis a bil ity po se d a “ dir e c t thre a t to the he a lth or saf ety of other individuals in the workp l ac e” an d that rea sonable a ccommodations would not el i m i n at e t he thre at. See42 U. S.C. § 1 21 13 (b ); 29 C.F .R. § 1 63 0. 15 (b )( 2) ; Col lin s v . B lueCro ss Blue Shield of Michigan , 579 N.W.2d 435, 439–40 (Mich. Ct. Ap p . 1998). The sc hool district
asser ted a “ direc t threat” defe nse in its answer, a nd elicited testimony

at trial that (1) abruptly

leaving school children una

ttended to use the bathroom would violate school district policy and pose a thre at to s tud e nt s a fe ty , a

nd (2 ) i n th e e ve nt Hu

bb ard ha d a

n a c c ide nt i n th e pr e se nc e of stu de nts , th e y

c ou ld encounte r dang erous g erms conta ined in fec al matter. In view of this evidenc e and in vie w of the rele vance of the de fense to this case, the tria l judge did not exceed its discretion in instructing the jury about the ele ments of a dire ct threat defe nse.No. 09-1644

Hu bb ar d v . D e tro it P ub lic Sc ho ols

- 9 - Hubbar d responds that a

“dire ct threat” instruction was inappr opri ate be cause she neve r would have e x posed her

students to harmful bac teria. Ajury might we ll have believed her, but that does not mean the distri ct co u rt er red in letti ng the jury decide . Hubbar d persists that the cour t sh ou ld n ot h ave g ive n a dir e c t thre a t in str

uc tio n b e c a

us e de fe nse cou ns el a sk e d h e r “ highly of fe ns ive ” qu e sti on s dur ing c ro ss- e xami natio n ab out the po ssi bil ity that her stu de nts wo uld c ome in contact with fe cal matter
. Hubbar d Br
. 25. Even assuming that counsel e x cee ded the bounds of fair que stioning, the c ustomary reme dy for offe nsive questioning is striking the improper r emar ks from the r ecor d or administeringa limiting instru ction, not barringthe jury from conside ring the de fe ns e a t a ll. V I. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.