### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A s s i gne d on B r i e f s J ul y 13, 2004

J A C Q U ELI N E H U R T v

. STA TE O F TEN N ESSEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -25587 Ar thur T. Benn ett , Judge

No. W2004-00151-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Novem ber 4, 2004

Th e pe ti ti on e r, Jac qu e lin e Hu rt , a pp e a ls the de nia l of

he r p e tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f i n which she a sserted that her plea wa s not knowing and voluntary and that she w as denie d eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. Following our re view, we aff irm the denial of the petition; howeve r, we rema nd the matter f or the limited purpose of e ntry of a c orre cted judg ment. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed and R e m ande d forEnt r y o f Co r r e c te d Judg m e nt

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in whic h N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

J acque line Hurt, Memphis, Tenne ssee, Pro Se

. Paul G

. Su mm e r s , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l an d Re p o r te r ; H e le n a Wa lt o n Y ar

b r o u g h , A s s is tant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Julie Mosley , Assistant District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F acts and P roce dural Hi story

On Ma y 8, 20 00 , th e pe tit ion e r e nte re d p le a s o f g uil ty to t wo c ou nts of

a tte mpt e d f

ir st de g re e mur de r, on e c ou nt o f e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , a ndon e c ou nt o f e sp e c ia lly ag g ravat ed k i dnapping . The pe titioner was sente nced to twe nty -five y ear s on eac h of the four counts, with the two attempted murde r se n t en ce s running consec utively to one another . The
rema ining c ounts were run conc urre ntly , but consec ut i v el y to the attempted murde r counts, for an ef fec tive sentenc e of se venty -five y ea rs

. T h is Court affirmed the convictions and sente nces on direc t appea l. See State of Tenne ssee v. Jacqueline H urt, No. W2000-02 1 9 3 -C C A- R 3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 642 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, A ug . 16, 2 0 0 1), perm. to appeal denied ( Tenn. 2001).-2-

On A u g u s t 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 , th e p e ti ti o n e r f il e d a n u n s ig n e d p e ti ti o n f o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n relief

. On September

3, 2001, counsel wa s appointed a n d an amende d petition was subsequently filed. That petition was summarily denied ba sed on a violation of the statu t e o f limitations. The petitioner filed a s ec o n d p et i tion for post-conviction re lief in Novembe r 2002. The c ourt appointed counsel on that petition on November 21, 2002, and an amende d petition wa s fi l ed on Ap r il 2 4 , 2 0 0 3

. I n h e r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n p e ti ti o n , th e p e ti ti o n e r ma d e s e v e r a l c laim s o f ineff ective
a s s i s t a n c e o f

c o u n s e l a n d a s s e r t e d t h a th e r g u i l t y p l e a w a s n o tm a d e k n o w i n g l y a n d v o l u n t a r i l y. The post-c o n v i ction court he ld an evidentiary hearing on O ctober

8, 2003, and ther eaf

ter de nied th e p e ti ti o n

. We h a v e r e v ie w e dth e r e c o r d , th e b rie f s o f the p ar ti e s , a n d th e ap p li c ab le la w

. We aff irm the trial court’s dismiss al of the pe tition.

The fa cts supporting the petitioner’s c onviction were summarized in this Co u rt ’s direc t appea l opinion. S ee id. On Thursda y , Ap ri l 1 5, 1999, at appr ox imately four o’ clock in the morning , the petitioner we nt t o the apa rtment of the victim, Carnomas Ma nning, a sking f or money that the petitioner m ai ntained the victim owed to he r. I d. at *2. Afte r the victim stated that she did not have the money , the petiti o n er p ro ceeded to ask if she could come inside the
v i ct i m ’s ap ar t m en tfo r agl as s o f w at er , wh i ch t h e v i ct i mal l o we d

. I d

. I n t h e h o u rs fo l l o wi n g, the petitioner inflicted a series of attacks on t h e v i ct i m , including intermittentlystabbing her wi t h b o t h a b ro k e n b e erb o t t l e a n d a b u t ch erk n i fe , “h o g-t y i n g” h erh an d s an d fe et , p u t t i n g a c ig are tte ou t onhe r f

a c e , a ndc ho pp ing int o h e r fo rearm wi th a me a t c le a ve r. I d. a t *2 -4 . T he se attacks took plac e while the vi ctim’s two children, a g es two and thre e, we re in the a partment. I d. at *4. Moreove r, the victim was se ven mont h s p re gn an t wi t h her third c hild at the time of the assault. I d. at *2.

At ap p r o xim a te ly

1 0 :5 0 a

. m. , w h il e th e p e ti ti o n e r s le p t, th e v ic ti m e s c ap e d th e apartment and fled to th e ap ar tm e n t m a n a g e r ’ s o f f ic e

. I d

. a t * 5

. T h e p r o p e r ty man a g e r th e n c a ll e d s e v e ral maintenanc e m en who went to the apartment a nd detained the petitioner until the police ar rived. I d. a t *6 . O n A pril 1 6, 19 99, th e pet ition e r g a ve a ty pe d a ndsig ne d s ta te me nt o f a dmi ssi on to the incident. I d.

At the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng, the pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th a t tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to adequately

meet with her

and communicate the issues pertaining to h er ca s e. Specifica lly , the pe tit ion e r s ta te d th a t tria l c ou ns e l on ly me t w ithhe r o nc e in j a il a nd , there a ft e r, on ly sp ok e wi th her brie f ly inc o u r t. Sh e f

u r th e r s tate d th a t c o u n s e l f

a il e d to e xp lainth e s e n te n c in g p r ocedur es and terminology

and did not make a

rec ommendation to h er as t o whether she should ac cept the prosec utor’s off

er, ple a to the court, or have a jury trial.

Th e pe tit ion e r a lso te sti fi e d th a t tria l co un sel fa ile d to inv e sti g a te he r m e nta l he a lth backg round and the way such issues might ha ve af fec ted her

case . The pe titioner had bee n hospitaliz ed as a

t ee n age r at S t. J oseph’s a nd Oakview for suicide attempts. She testified that sh e di d no t recall tr ia l c ou ns e l e ve r i nq uiring int o h e r m e nta l hi sto ry , a lth ou g h s he fe lt this information could have impacted he r def ense.

F ina lly , th e pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t he r g ui lt y pl ea wa s n ot kno wi ng a ndvo lun tary be c aus e she did not understand the conseque nces of the proc eeding an d beca use she wa s coer ced by

trial-3-

counsel to make the plea. She a vers that c ounsel did not inform her of the ra mifications of her actions and how those ac tions would im pact he r sente n ce. Mor eover , the petitioner testified that she base d her de cision to plea, in large part, on c ounsel’s statement that he would “try to ge t her fi ft e e n y e ars ,” a ndthat sh e re lie d o n th is s ta te me nt t o h e r d e tr ime nt.

Trial counse l testified at the post-convic tion hearing t h at , p ri or to trial, he met with the petitioner seve ral times, ea ch time re viewing the fa cts of the c ase, the petitioner’s statement, and the prosec ution’s plea off er. H e stated that the petitioner wa s resistant to t h e p ro s ec u t i on’s offe r of forty -four y ea rs and repeatedly asked him to neg otiate a be tter off er. Counsel further testified that, despite seve ral attempts, he was unable to ge t an offe r the pe titio n er fo und acc eptable;
mor e ov e r, sh e re fu sed to go to tria l. H e state d th a t he e xpla ine d to the pe tit ion e r that, i f s he did not want to g o to trial or take the prosec ution’s offer , the only other option was to plea d to the
c ou rt , w hic h s he e ve ntu a lly did . A c c or din g to t

ri a l c ou ns e l’ s tes ti mon y , th e ple a a ndits conseque nces w e r e f

u ll y e xp lain e d to th e p e ti ti o n e r inmu lt ip le me e ti n g s

. H e s tate d th a t s he
came to the conclusion that she would plead g uilty on her own, by virtue of eliminating all o t h er op tio ns

. Counsel a lso te stified conce rning the issue of the petitioner’s mental health backg round. He stated that he spoke with he r about her mental condition and that she u n d er s t o o d every thing that ha d h app e ne d to that po int a ndc ou ld r e c a ll h er prio r r e c or d. Cou ns e l st a te d th a t it wa s h is underst an d i n g t h at a competency hearing ha d alre ady

been c onducted on a

prior convic tion and that she wa s decla

red c ompetent at that time. Moreove r, he st at ed t h at s h e t old him she had not been hospitalized since she was “ very y oung .” The ref

ore, he found no g ood faith basis for
a sking fo r a

me nta l e xami natio n a ndthu s d id n ot p ur su e the a ve nu e of me ntal in com pete nc e in her de fense

. The post-c onviction court d i s m issed the petition at the conc lusion of the hearing. T he
c ou rt g a ve c re de nc e to t

ri a l co un sel ’s test imo ny , f ind ing that he ha d b e e n d ili g e nt b othin h is eff orts to prepa

re the case and in g etting the best plea of fer available for the pe titioner. Mo re ov e r, the c ou rt

fo un d th a t tria l c ou ns e l me t w iththe pe tit ion e r and ex plai ne d to he r a ll available opti o n s , as we l l as the conse quence s of ea ch. As to the inquiry into mental incompetenc e, the c ourt fo u n d t h at her me ntal health history might have impacted a

defe nse of diminis hed ca

pacity but, because she made it clear she did not want to g o to trial, the issue would have ne ver be en hea rd and w as thus irrele vant. Fina lly , as to the plea , the court found that the evidenc e indicate d that trial counsel e x plained fully t h e n ature and ra mifications of the plea , thu s it w a s v o l u n t ar y

a n d k n o w i n g

. M o r e o v e r , h e r e xp e r i e n c e w i t h t h e j u s t i c e s y s t e mw e i g h e d in favor of a know ing and voluntary plea; with seve nteen prior arr ests and eig h t convictions, the
c ou rt fo un d th a t sh e wa s “ no t a no vic e to the jus tic e sy ste m,” a ndthat sh e un de rs too d h e r rig hts fro m prior

e xpe ri e nc e . T hu s, the c ou rt dis mis se d th e pe tit ion , a ndthe pe tit ion e r f ile d a tim e ly
app e a l to thi s Co urt.-4- Ana lys is

I nitially , we note that the judgme nt of the p o s t -c o n v i cti on court is in conflict with the transcript of the proce ed i n gs

. Al t houg h the judg ment states that the petition was de nied base d on the expiration of the post-conviction statute of limitations, this w as n o t ev en discussed in the transcri p t and amounts to a misapplication of law . The State c oncede s that the petitioner wa s not time-barr ed but asks this Court to rely on the spec ific finding s of fa ct and c onclus i o n s of law made immediately

afte r the post-c onviction hearing an d noted in the transc ript. As a g ener al rule, “when ther e is a c onflict betwe en the judg ment of convic tion and the transc ript of the proce eding s, the transc ript controls.” Ronald W. Rice v

. Da v i d Mills, No. E2003-00328-CCAR3-PC, 2 0 0 3 T en n

. Crim. App. LEXI S 709, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvill e, Aug . 19, 2003)(c iting State v. Da vis, 706 S.W .2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) ). As a r esult, we ha ve indeed r elied on the r easoning found in the transc ript, and our opinion refl ec t s t h at re liance. T he
err ant judg ment is a mere clerical er ror whic h may

be re medi ed b y t h e post -convic tion court pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 36.
The pe titioner first contends that she rec eived inef fec tive assistance of counse l. When a claim of inef

fec tive assistan ce o f counsel is made under the Six th Amendment, the petitioner bears t h e burde n of proving (1) that c ounsel = s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt, and (2) the defic iency was pre judicial in terms of re ndering a re asonable probabili t ythat the re sult of the trial was
un re liable or the pr oc e e din g s w e re fu nd a me nta lly un fair . Stri c klandv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 66 8, 68 7, 10 4 S. Ct. 20 52 , 2 06 4, 80 L

. Ed . 2 d 6 74 (1 98 4) . T his stand ardha s a lso be e n a pp lie d to the rig ht to counsel under Article I , Section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution. S t at e v

. M el son, 772 S.W .2d 417, 419 n.2 (T en n

. 1 9 8 9 ). W hen a pe titioner claims ineffe ctive assistanc e of
c ou ns e l in re la tio n to a

g uil ty ple a , th e pe tit ion e r mus t pr ov e that c ou ns e l pe rf orme d d e fi c ie ntl y an d , b u t for counsel =

s e rr o r s , th e p e ti ti o n e r

w o u ldn o t h a v e p le d g u il ty b u t w o u ldh a v e , in s te a d, insisted upon going to trial. Hill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. C t. 366, 370, 88 L . Ed. 2d 203 (1985).

I n Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our su p re m e court required that the servic es be r ender ed withi n t h e rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal
case s. I n revie wing counsel = s conduct, a A

fair a ssessment of at t orney perf ormanc e re quires that
every eff ort be made to eliminate the distorting e ffe cts of hindsig ht, to reconstru ct the circ umstances of

counsel = s challeng ed conduc t, and to evaluate the conduc t from counse l’s perspe ctive at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S

. C t

. at 2 0 6 5 ; s ee Nichols v. State, 90 S.W .3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002)

. The pe titioner bear s the b u rd en of proving by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e the f actua l allegations t hat would entitle the petitioner to re lief. Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). This Court is bound by the post-conviction c o urt = s findings of

fac t unless the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001).
The pet i tioner conte nds that counsel wa s ineffe ctive bec ause of his failure to visit the petitioner, fa ilure to communicate issues to the petitioner, and f ailure to investig ate the f acts of the ca se, particularly

the mental hea lth of the petitioner. T h e p o s t -conviction court acc redited the-5-

trial co u n s el ’s t est imony that he visited with her “ sever al times,” ea ch time g oing ove r the various issues of the c ase and informing the petitioner of pe rtinent information. I n so doing, the
court f o u n d th a t tria l c o u n s e l w a s n o t in e f f e c ti v e “ in h is a s s is tan c e to h e r , in n e g o ti a ti n g th e ca se, or talking to her a

bout the case . . . .”

Mo re ov e r, as to the inq uiry int o th e me nta l he a lthba c kg ro un d o f the pe tit ion e r, the po stconviction court found that trial counse l’s failure to look into t he mental he alth o f t he petitioner
was not ine ffe ctive assistance

. I n support of this finding , the court noted t h e r at i o nal
conver sations that trial counsel had w ith the petitioner, as we ll as the fac t th at the petitioner ref used a jury

trial, thu s m ak i n g the issue of menta l incompetence moot. The evidenc e pre sented does not preponde rate ag ainst the finding s o f fa ct by the post-conviction court. The petitioner has fa iled to show by

clea r and c onvinci n g evidence that she w as pre judiced by

any alleg ed ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.

I n addition to ineffec tive assistance of counse l, the petitioner cla ims that h er guiltyplea was unknowing and involuntary . A post-conviction petitioner may succe ssfully

attack he r conviction when he r g uiltyplea wa s unkn o wi n g or involuntary . See Te nn. Code Ann. ' 40-30- 103 (2003); Boy

kin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L

. Ed. 2 d 274 (1 96 9) ; State v. Wils on , 3 1 S. W.3d 189, 19 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . A ple a is n ot “ vo lun tary ” if

it r e su lts from ig noranc e, misunderstanding , coer cion, induceme nts, or t h reats. Blanke nship v. St ate, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c o u rt m u s t d et er m ine if the g uiltyplea is “know ing” by qu e sti on ing the de fe nd a nt t o ma ke su re he or

sh e fu lly

un ders tan ds the ple a

a ndits conseque nces. State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 ( Tenn. 1999); B lankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904. Be cause the plea must re p re s en t a voluntary and intellige nt choice among a lternatives
a va ila ble to the de fe nd a nt, the tr ia l c ou rt ma y loo k at a nu mb er o f c ir c ums ta nti a l f a c tor s in making this determination. Bla nkenship, 858 S.W .2d at 904. These fac tors i n cl u d e: (1) the defe ndant =

s relati v e intelligenc e; (2) the defe ndant’s familiaritywith criminal proce eding s; (3) whether the defe ndant was repr esente d by competent counsel and had the opport u n i t yt o confe r wi th c ouns e l a

bo ut a lte rn a tiv e s; ( 4) the a dv ic e of c ou ns e l a ndthe c ou rt

abo ut the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t the def endant a nd the pena lty

to be imposed; and (5) the def endant = s r e a s o n s f

o r p l e a d i n g g u i l t y, including the desire to a void a g reater pe nalty in a jury trial. I d. at 904-05.
The pe titioner alleg es that, bec ause c ounsel did not ex plain the conse q u en ce s of her g uil ty ple a or the s e nte nc ing te rm ino log y , h e r p le a wa s u nkno wi ng . H ow e ve r, the po stconviction court cre dited the testimony of trial counse l and found that the co n s eq u en ce s of the plea we re e x plained to the petitioner on multiple occ asions. Moreove r, the post-c on v i cti on court found that she did, in fac t, understand the me aning of the pe rtinent terminolog y , as evide nced by her te stimonyas the post-c onviction hearing. Further, the rec ord re flec ts that the petitioner was tho ro u gh l y q u estioned during the entry of her g uiltyplea a nd answe red in a fashion that lef

t no question as to her know ing a ct. Ther efor e, the a nswers g iven by the petitioner in the e ntry of her g uiltyplea a

re inc ompat i ble with her post-c onviction claim. Finally , the court noted the petitioner’s prior

history with the court sy stem in m ak i n g i t s fi nding, stating spe cifica lly , “So the Court d o es n ’t fi n d that she wa s so much out of the under standing of what happens down he re and the sy s t em and people explaining her rig hts. She’s been e x plained her rig hts a number of times in the past.” After revie wing the transcript of the plea submissi on hearing and ev idence-6-

prese nted at the post-c onviction relief he aring , we c onclude that the e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the post-conviction court = s finding that the p et i t i o n er w as informe d of the conseque nces of

her g uiltyplea. The petitioner has f ai l ed t o prove by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that her

g uiltypleas we re not knowing

. There is likewise no proof c ontained in the re cord that counsel coe rce d the petitioner. As stated above , the post-conviction court found that trial counsel f ully explained the conseque nces of p le a d in g g u il ty a n d th e r ig h ts th a t w e r e b e in g w a iv e d b y th e p e ti ti o n e r

. M o r e o v er, the court adopted tria l counsel’s ve rsion of the fa cts, maintaining that trial counsel pr esente d the peti t ioner with the options, but t he final decision reste d wi t h t h e p et i tioner. The post-c onviction court state d inits fi nd ing that, “Sh e de c ide d to g o w iththe c ou rt .” Th e pe tit ion e r h a s f a ile d to demonstrate that she did not knowingly and voluntarily

enter her ple a of g uilty

. Conclusion

We conclude that the petitioner has f ailed to s h o w t hat she wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistance of counse l. We also conclude that the petitioner = s g uiltyplea w as k n o wi ng and voluntary . Ba sed on the for eg oing r easons, we aff irm the denial of p o s t -c onviction relief; howeve r, w e r e man d th is matt e r , p u r s u a n t t o T e n n e s s e e Ru le o f Crim in a l P r o c e d u r e 3 6 , to the She lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt f

or the lim it ed pu rpo se of e ntry of a c or re c te d ju dg me nt, ref lecting the re asoning found in the transc ript of the proc eeding s.

__________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE