If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

September 19, 2024

In re G. VANDERARK, Minor.

No. 369645

Muskegon Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 22-003142-NA

Before: N. P. HOOD, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this case arising from a child protective proceeding, respondent-mother appeals by right 

the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, GV. The trial court 

terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (h), 

(j), (k), and (m). On appeal, respondent claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

admitted gruesome images and videos depicting the condition of, as well as respondent’s treatment 

of, her 15-year-old son, TF, whom she was convicted of abusing and murdering. She further claims 

that the evidence did not support the trial court’s findings that the Department of Health and 

Human Services (the Department) established grounds for termination by clear and convincing 

evidence or that termination was in GV’s best interests. We conclude that respondent has not 

identified any errors and accordingly affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

Respondent had four children from a previous relationship. TF was one of those children. 

Respondent and her first husband divorced, and respondent subsequently married a man named 

Adam. Respondent and Adam had GV in 2014. Respondent’s adult son, Paul, came to live with 

respondent, Adam, and GV in May 2020 after Paul’s father (respondent’s ex-husband) kicked Paul

out. Respondent’s ex-husband sent TF to live with respondent in May 2021. TF had autism 

spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and bipolar disorder. According to 

respondent, her ex-husband sent TF to live with her because her ex-husband could no longer handle 

TF’s behaviors.
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Adam suffered a stroke in January 2022. Because he could no longer care for himself, 

Adam went to live with his parents. He had hoped to return to his home with respondent after 

rehabilitation. Adam died during the pendency of these proceedings.

On July 6, 2022, respondent called 911 and reported that TF was not breathing. Emergency 

responders pronounced TF dead upon their arrival. They discovered that TF was emaciated and 

saw bruising on his torso. Respondent told emergency responders that TF had been on a hunger 

strike.

The Department investigated the circumstances surrounding TF’s death and removed GV 

from respondent’s care. The Department petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights in 

July 2022. Respondent pleaded no contest to allegations that established jurisdiction in May 2023. 

The parties agreed to postpone the termination hearing until after respondent’s criminal trial related 

to TF’s death.

A jury convicted respondent of felony murder in relation to TF’s death in December 2023. 

The trial court held a termination hearing over two days in January 2024. The trial court heard 

testimony and considered evidence detailing horrific abuse that respondent inflicted on TF and 

heard testimony about how that abuse affected GV. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

found that the Department had proved the identified grounds for terminating respondent’s parental 

rights and found that termination was in GV’s best interests. The trial court then entered an order 

terminating respondent’s parental rights.

Respondent now appeals by right.

II. GRUESOME IMAGES AND VIDEOS

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion in limine to 

preclude the Department from admitting images of TF when he was found dead and admitting 

video clips that depicted TF’s last hours.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s evidentiary decisions. People 

v McFarlane, 325 Mich App 507, 517; 926 NW2d 339 (2018). A trial court abuses its discretion 

when it selects an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes. See In re Utrera, 

281 Mich App 1, 15; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). This Court reviews de novo whether the trial court 

properly applied the rules of evidence. McFarlane, 325 Mich App at 517. A trial court necessarily 

abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. Id.

B. ANALYSIS

Because the Department requested termination at the initial disposition on the basis of 

aggravated circumstances, see MCL 722.638(2), the trial court had to order termination of 

respondent’s parental rights if it found, among other things, that the Department proved by clear 

and convincing legally admissible evidence one or more specified grounds for termination, see 

MCR 3.977(E)(3). The rules of evidence provide that relevant evidence is admissible unless 
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excluded by the Constitutions of the United States or Michigan, by the rules of evidence, or by 

other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. See MRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any 

tendency to make a fact that is of consequence to the action more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. MRE 401.

On appeal, respondent does not argue that the images or videos were irrelevant; she argues 

instead that—even though relevant—the trial court should have excluded the images under MRE 

403 because they were too gruesome to be fairly considered. MRE 403 provides that a trial court 

has discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” A 

trial court may not exclude evidence under MRE 403 simply because it is prejudicial; the rule only 

provides for the exclusion of evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. People v McGhee, 268 Mich 

App 600, 607; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger 

that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People 

v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).

In this case, the Department sought to prove several grounds for terminating respondent’s 

parental rights that involved proof of how she treated GV’s sibling, TF. Under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b), the Department had to prove, in relevant part, that respondent either 

physically injured TF or that she had the opportunity to prevent TF from suffering an injury and 

failed to prevent the injury. The Department also sought to prove that respondent abused TF and, 

in relevant part, that the abuse amounted to torture, severe physical abuse, murder, or aiding and 

abetting murder, as provided under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k). Similarly, the Department sought to 

prove that respondent was convicted of murdering TF, and that—under the circumstances—

termination would be in GV’s best interests as provided under MCL 712A.19b(3)(m). Because 

the nature and extent of respondent’s mistreatment of TF was an element of each of these grounds 

for termination, the Department had the right to offer all relevant evidence to prove that element, 

even if respondent did not dispute the element. See People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 70-71; 537 

NW2d 909 (1995). The Department could also present evidence concerning how respondent 

treated TF to prove how she might treat GV under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect. See In re 

Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 258-259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020).

The Department presented extensive evidence that respondent orchestrated and actively 

participated in a weeks-long campaign of torturing and starving TF. The evidence showed that 

she put in place steps to prevent TF from eating and drinking anything other than bread and small 

amounts of water. There was evidence that she locked the refrigerator, freezers, and pantry to 

prevent TF from getting food on his own. She instructed Paul to prevent TF from eating when she 

was not there, and she put cameras in place to monitor TF’s activities remotely so that she could 

intervene and ensure that he was unable to eat or drink. In one text exchange, for example, 

respondent learned that TF tried to eat a butterscotch candy, and respondent instructed Paul to use 

a toothbrush to force TF to vomit. Paul responded that that was not necessary because he got to 

TF before he was able to eat the candy.

The text exchanges also established that respondent forced TF to endure repeated 

punishments for trying to eat or drink, or otherwise failing to comply with her extreme behavioral 

requirements. She forced TF to run up and down the stairs, forced him to endure hours-long ice 
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baths, forced him to stand with his nose to a wall and his hands above his head, forced him to eat 

bread soaked in hot sauce, and doused his mouth with hot sauce. Respondent also prevented TF 

from using the bathroom, forced him to wear adult diapers, restrained him with shackles and zip 

ties, and locked him in a darkened closet at night.

The Department also presented the medical examiner’s findings to establish that TF had 

“profound emaciation due to starvation with a weight and body mass index at the 0 percentile.” 

TF also had “severe dehydration.” The medical examiner opined that TF died from dehydration 

and emaciation because of malnutrition and starvation, with exogenous hypothermia as a 

contributing factor.

Examined together, the text messages and medical report established beyond a reasonable 

doubt that respondent participated in, and aided and abetted, the torture and murder of TF through 

abusive punishments and starvation. Nevertheless, the texts and reports did not adequately convey 

the full import of respondent’s acts, and the Department was not required to limit the evidence to 

testimony about TF’s appearance or descriptions of the images and videos. See People v Boshell, 

337 Mich App 322, 332; 975 NW2d 72 (2021).

Witness testimony and the medical examiner’s report indicated that TF was emaciated, but 

the images and videos depicted what it meant for a 15-year-old child to be emaciated. The images 

showed TF with sunken eyes and skin stretched so tightly over his skull that one could see every 

boney prominence on his face. The images also showed that he had an impossibly tiny waistline, 

that he had bruising over his torso, and that he had so little flesh on him that one could see his rib 

bones and spinal vertebrae. In sum, the images showed that TF looked like a skeleton by the time 

of his death.

The video evidence corroborated the inferences from the images and provided further 

context. In the first video, the finder of fact could see respondent dragging TF by his skeletal arm 

into the darkened closet where she locked him away on the night of his death. The video plainly 

showed that TF had no strength to walk, let alone resist. It showed too that respondent placed a 

tarp in the closet for TF’s bedding and then arranged his emaciated body on the tarp. While 

arranging him, one can see that TF’s hips had no flesh on them—the bones stuck out sharply. 

There was also no muscle on his thighs, and one could see that respondent had him in an adult 

diaper. Throughout the ordeal, the video showed that TF’s head moved without volition until 

respondent repositioned it to face the camera. Thereafter, TF made only slight movements in the 

night. The second video showed respondent discovering that TF had died when she checked on 

him in the morning. The video established that respondent moved TF’s body from the closet before 

calling 911 in an apparent effort to conceal the circumstances under which he died.

The images and videos were not marginally probative; they strongly corroborated 

Lieutenant Joel Hoeksema’s testimony and the medical examiner’s report that TF was emaciated, 

dehydrated, and starving at the time of his death. The finder of fact was “entitled to view the 

nature and extent of the injuries for itself, and not to depend solely” on testimony and other 

evidence. Mills, 450 Mich at 72-73.

Additionally, the images and videos were highly probative of several other matters at issue 

that could not be proved through testimony and documentary evidence. The images and videos 
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showed what respondent, Paul, and GV would have seen on a daily basis over the last days of TF’s 

life. Any finder of fact viewing the images and videos would immediately infer that respondent 

had to have known that TF was starving and close to death when she dragged him by his arm into 

the closet after subjecting him to hours of torture in an ice bath. Only with that video could the 

finder of fact see how cruel respondent’s actions truly were. The level of respondent’s cruelty 

implicated both the doctrine of anticipatory neglect and whether termination was in GV’s best 

interests.

The images and videos also permitted an inference that TF’s horrific appearance must have 

developed over a significant period. In that way, the video evidence corroborated the evidence 

from the text messages that respondent knowingly starved TF over several weeks. It also provided 

context for the evidence about TF’s punishments. Forcing a child to stand against a wall or run up 

and down stairs might not seem particularly depraved when described by a witness in isolation, 

but when that evidence was considered with the images and videos depicting how frail and 

emaciated TF was by the time of his death, the evidence about the punishments was brought into 

an entirely different light. Indeed, when the evidence from the texts are considered with the images 

and videos, a finder of fact could infer that respondent tortured an emaciated and helpless child 

with the intent to maximize his suffering.

The images and videos also showed what GV would have seen when he looked at TF in 

the days leading up to TF’s death. The images and videos were strong evidence that GV had to 

have known that respondent and Paul were deliberately starving and torturing TF. The images and 

videos helped the finder of fact better understand GV’s statements at his forensic interview as well. 

GV repeatedly emphasized that he was a good boy—unlike TF—and so he did not get punishments 

like TF; GV seemed worried about being labeled a “bad boy.” GV also noted that TF was not 

allowed to talk to him during this time. He explained that TF kept asking him to do things for him. 

The sad inference was that TF was asking his then seven-year-old brother to help alleviate his 

suffering. When considered with the forensic interview, the images and videos permitted an 

inference that respondent’s decision to abuse and starve TF while GV resided in the house, and 

with GV’s almost certain knowledge of TF’s condition and distress, also amounted to abuse or 

neglect of GV.

The images and videos were highly probative and were not merely cumulative to other less 

prejudicial evidence. See id. at 75-76. The images and videos were the most compelling evidence 

of TF’s condition and appearance in the days before his death. They also corroborated testimony 

and evidence, and permitted further inferences beyond that which the other evidence provided 

when considered in isolation. Ultimately, the probative value of the evidence was so high that it 

was unlikely that the finder of fact would give the evidence such undue weight that the admission 

threatened the fairness and accuracy of the proceeding. See People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 501-

502; 537 NW2d 168 (1995). Moreover, as was the case in Mills, the trial court only admitted a 

limited number of images and videos. Accordingly, it appears that the trial court admitted the 

images and videos necessary to furthering the probative force without being too repetitive or 

gruesome. See Mills, 450 Mich at 78. On this record, the trial court’s decision to admit the three 

images and the two videos did not fall outside the range of principled outcomes. See In re Utrera, 

281 Mich App at 15.
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III. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

We next address respondent’s claim that the trial court erred when it found that the 

Department established grounds to terminate her parental rights.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that the Department established by 

clear and convincing evidence a ground for termination. See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 

782 NW2d 747 (2010). A trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous when, on the entire evidence, 

this Court has the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. Id. at 430-431.

B. ANALYSIS

A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it finds that the Department has 

established at least one ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See 

MCL 712A.19b(3); In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431. The trial court in this case 

found that the Department established grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), 

(b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (h), (j), (k), and (m).

In the portion of her brief on appeal supposedly disputing these statutory grounds for 

termination, respondent does not discuss any one of the eight grounds. Instead, she argues in 

essence that the trial court should not have relied on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect to establish 

each of these grounds for termination because—in her view—the differences between TF and GV 

made it unlikely that GV was in any danger in her care. In the four pages of her brief that she 

devoted to discussing this claim of error, respondent does not discuss the elements that the 

Department had to prove to establish any of these grounds for termination. She likewise does not 

discuss the specific findings made by the trial court in support of any of these grounds for 

termination. By failing to offer any meaningful analysis of the law or facts applicable to this claim 

of error, respondent has abandoned it on appeal. See In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350, 362 n 5; 948 

NW2d 131 (2019).

Respondent’s cursory treatment of the grounds for termination also affects this Court’s 

ability to grant her relief. Whether respondent would neglect or abuse GV was arguably an element 

of several of the grounds for termination found by the trial court, see MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), 

(b)(ii), (j), (k), and (m), but abuse and neglect were not necessary elements of every ground for 

termination, see MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (h). A trial court may terminate a parent’s 

parental rights on the basis of any one ground for termination. See MCL 712A.19b(3); In re 

Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431. Because respondent’s argument does not identify an 

error for each of the grounds for termination found by the trial court, we would have to affirm even 

if we were to agree with portions of respondent’s claim of error. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich 

App 252, 273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (“If the trial court did not clearly err by finding one statutory 

ground existed, then that one ground is sufficient to affirm the termination of respondent’s parental 

rights.”).

Even setting aside these deficiencies, respondent’s statutory-grounds argument on appeal 

is entirely unsupported by the record. Her argument depends on ignoring the trial court’s findings, 
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ignoring significant evidence presented at trial, and viewing the remaining evidence in an 

unreasonable light.

Respondent first maintains that the trial court should not have relied on the doctrine of 

anticipatory neglect to find that she posed a danger to GV. She argues in relevant part that the 

evidence showed that she had a bond with GV and that she tried to protect him from the things 

that were happening in the house. Because of these facts and the differences between GV and TF 

in terms of their age and diagnoses, she contends that GV would not be in danger of neglect or 

abuse in her care. Stated more bluntly, respondent argues that she would never torture and starve 

GV because GV did not have TF’s challenging behaviors, and because she had a caring bond with 

GV. The evidence does not support respondent’s position that the trial court misapplied the 

doctrine of anticipatory neglect.

The doctrine of anticipatory neglect recognizes that how a parent has treated one child is 

probative of how that parent will treat another child. In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 259; 952 

NW2d 544 (2020). Although the doctrine provides that evidence of harm to one child may permit 

inferences about how a parent will treat another child, factual differences between the children and 

their situations may lessen the probative value of the inferences to be drawn from the evidence that 

a parent abused or neglected a different child. See id. at 259-261.

The evidence that respondent used extreme punishments against TF for even trivial 

infractions of her rules, and that she was willing to see her punishments through even when they 

clearly amounted to physical, mental, and emotional abuse, was highly relevant to how she might 

treat another child with behavioral issues. Respondent makes much of the fact that GV did not 

have the same diagnoses as TF and notes that they had a good bond, but she overstates the import 

of these differences. Although GV was not diagnosed with autism, it was evident from the forensic 

interview that he had concerning behaviors. The caseworker assigned to GV was for a time 

concerned that GV might be on the autism spectrum given his poor eye contact, gestures, and other 

social markers. GV was also diagnosed with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, as TF had 

been diagnosed. GV was much younger than TF and his behaviors were likely more manageable 

as a result, but there was no guarantee that GV’s behavioral concerns would not increase as he 

matured into his teenaged years. A reasonable finder of fact could infer that respondent would use 

the same punishment regimen to try and control GV if he too started to behave in a way that 

angered her. When asked on cross-examination, respondent herself could not guarantee that she 

would not punish GV in the same way if—to use her own words involving TF—GV tried to “out 

stubborn” her, like TF supposedly did. Therefore, the trial court did not misapply the law when it 

used the evidence of how respondent treated TF to infer that she might impose similar abuse on 

GV. See id.

Additionally, contrary to respondent’s strained interpretation of the record, there was 

strong evidence that respondent’s actions involving TF directly harmed GV. The trial court found 

that any “reasonable person” would have seen that TF was dying from starvation, and the video 

evidence clearly supported that finding. The court further noted that respondent can be heard on 

the video yelling at TF while he was in that condition, which evinces an unfathomable depth of 

callousness and cruelty.
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The trial court cited evidence that the living space within the home was quite small and 

that GV’s bedroom was next to the living space and bathroom where TF was repeatedly punished 

and where he dwelled while slowly starving to death. GV spent the majority of his waking 

moments in the same space as TF, and it was reasonable to infer on this record that he must have 

seen and heard the abuse perpetrated against TF. Indeed, GV’s statements at the forensic interview 

give the overwhelming impression that GV knew what was happening to his half-brother.

GV described the punishments that TF underwent—including being forced to consume hot 

sauce and being forced to stand against the wall. GV also discussed how, if Paul ever got angry 

with him, he would use tears to get Paul to feel sorry for him, but when TF tried that, everyone 

knew that TF was faking because he was older. GV’s statement permitted an inference that he had 

seen TF in distress and observed that Paul and respondent did not feel sorry for TF in the same 

way that they would have felt sorry for him. GV also knew that respondent would use leg and arm 

cuffs on TF whenever she wanted. He also knew that TF was prohibited from eating and drinking 

and that he would be “breaking punishment” if he ate or drank more than permitted. GV also knew 

that respondent monitored TF remotely through cameras and explained that the cameras would 

distort one’s voice when you spoke through them. He also knew that respondent decided that TF 

had to stay in the little room because he was a bad boy.

GV also stated that Paul got “maximum mad” with TF, and the text messages show that 

respondent guided and instructed Paul on how to punish and control TF. A reasonable finder of 

fact could infer that GV understood that respondent played a role in Paul’s angry outbursts and 

that she used him to punish TF. GV specifically discussed the yelling in the household and told 

the interviewer that, when he went to stay at “grammy’s house,” there was no “chaos.” GV also 

discussed “throwing” TF away in the graveyard and spoke of TF in terms that suggested that GV 

had been taught to devalue TF or, at the very least, learned to devalue him by way of example. As 

the trial court aptly stated, it was “not sure [TF] was a human being to [GV]” by the time GV was

interviewed.

The testimony and evidence also supported an inference that GV had been traumatized by 

these events. In the forensic interview, GV repeatedly noted that TF was a “bad boy,” whereas he 

was a “good boy.” The context suggested that he needed assurances that he would never be treated 

like TF because, unlike TF, he was a good boy. Additionally, GV’s grandfather testified that GV 

had triggers—such as when seeing an ad for hot sauce or adults arguing on television—that made 

him quiet and caused him to leave the room for time alone. GV used to cry when he saw such 

things, his grandfather said. GV’s grandfather also stated that GV took being called a bad boy 

very personally.

Contrary to respondent’s contention on appeal, it was not pure speculation for the trial court 

to find that GV witnessed enough of the extreme cruelty that was occurring in his home to have 

been traumatized by it. Rather, there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence that GV not only 

witnessed the horrors that occurred in his home but was profoundly affected by the cruelty. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s finding that respondent directly neglected and abused GV was 

supported by the record evidence.

Respondent faults the trial court for purportedly trying to shift the burden of proof. The 

trial court did not at any point shift the burden. The trial court merely noted the troubling testimony 
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by respondent that strongly suggested that respondent still posed a danger to any child left in her 

care. The trial court cited, in particular, respondent’s response to her lawyer’s question: “What 

would you do differently?” The trial court stated that respondent’s answer was so shocking that it 

“sealed” the court’s understanding of the evidence. The court explained:

And I was waiting for you to say . . . I would have done anything. I would have 

taken him to the hospital. I would have fed him. Anything. But that’s not what 

you said. You said: “I wish I would have sent him back.” He was your child. “I 

wish I would have sent him back.” And so now, my horrific—my horrific like 

upset—crying, my tears, turns to anger. How dare you. How dare you.

The trial court’s statements do not show that it shifted the burden. The court merely 

explained that it was horrified by that answer—and rightly so. Respondent’s response was, in 

essence, that the only thing that she could have done differently was to have sent TF back to live 

with his father. Her answer suggested that she felt it was necessary to treat TF as she did, which 

was extremely disturbing and highly relevant to how she might treat another child. There was 

nothing improper about the trial court’s observations.

The trial court also plainly rejected respondent’s testimony that she did not recall torturing 

and starving TF because she had memory issues brought on by the stress of Adam’s stroke. The 

trial court found that respondent knew exactly what she was doing:

She is able to pick out the details, well, the dog food wasn’t on the floor, 

but I don’t remember what I did. Well, he’s allergic to immunizations, this is 

whatever, but I don’t remember what I did. [GV] was upstairs, not downstairs, but 

I don’t remember what I did. I tested the alarm to see if [it] didn’t bother him. 

These are details. These are specific details that you gave over and over. You were 

on that stand a long time. You gave details over and over and over and over, but 

you don’t remember anything that happened. That’s completely not credible to me. 

I think you knew exactly what you were doing. You were torturing.

This Court will defer to the trial court’s superior ability to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses that appeared before it. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431. The trial 

court also cited respondent’s incredible story that she did not recall abusing TF as evidence that 

she was likely to repeat her abuse if GV were returned to her care. The trial court’s finding in this 

regard was supported by the record.

Respondent also suggests that the trial court should have taken into consideration the 

evidence that she was actually protecting GV from the events at issue. The fact that respondent 

had perpetrated such horrific abuse that she needed to shield GV from it was evidence in support 

of terminating her parental rights, as the trial court correctly concluded. The trial court cited 

evidence that respondent sent texts messages to Paul in which she stated that she did not want GV 

to see TF without clothing. She worried that GV might see TF when Paul left for work and before 

she got home. She complained that she could not work under these conditions, and she blamed 

TF for doing this to her. The trial court correctly noted that respondent created the conditions and 

yet still managed to frame the issue as though TF had forced her to starve him. The trial court also 
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correctly understood that there was no possible way to shield GV from knowledge about what was 

happening. As GV stated in his interview, it must have been “scary” for TF on the day he died.

Respondent has not identified any errors in the trial court’s findings in support of its 

determination that the Department proved the identified grounds for terminating respondent’s 

parental rights to GV by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 430-431.

IV. BEST INTERESTS

We lastly address respondent’s claim that the trial court erred when it found that 

termination was in GV’s best interests.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s 

best interests. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 430. A trial court’s finding is clearly 

erroneous when, on the entire evidence, this Court has the definite and firm conviction that the 

trial court made a mistake. Id. at 430-431.

B. ANALYSIS

Once the trial court determined that the Department had established grounds for 

terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court had to determine whether termination was 

in GV’s best interests. See MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 

(2013).

As this Court has explained:

To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best 

interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the 

child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the 

parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic 

violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s 

visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the 

possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 

(2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

On appeal, respondent argues that the evidence did not demonstrate that termination was 

in GV’s best interests. She contends that she was in prison—and so could not directly harm him—

and was willing to arrange for his care and custody through a guardianship. She also suggests that 

terminating her parental rights would somehow harm GV by depriving him of the ability to seek 

closure and answers from respondent. Respondent’s arguments are not persuasive.

The evidence showed that whatever bond GV might have had with respondent was severely 

strained by the events leading to TF’s death. GV’s therapist testified that GV had a trauma bond 
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with respondent, which, she explained, was a bond that occurs with a parent who caused trauma 

to the child. GV’s own statements showed that he feared being labeled a “bad boy” because 

respondent did not mix well with bad boys. There was additional evidence suggesting that GV 

observed how cruel respondent could be, and his grandfather and therapist both noted that GV 

rarely discussed respondent. Given the evidence that GV suffered from triggers associated with 

the events at issue, the trial court could reasonably find that GV not only lacked a healthy bond 

with respondent but also that he would be triggered by any interactions with her.

The consensus of the expert testimony and GV’s caregivers was also that it would not be 

healthy for GV to interact with respondent. Indeed, respondent’s own expert testified that 

respondent was not healthy enough to interact with GV at the present time. He felt that, with six 

months to a year of intensive therapy, respondent might make enough progress to have interactions 

with GV. But he opined that, even then, whether to allow such contact would depend on GV’s 

progress with his own therapy.

Respondent’s claim that termination was not necessary because she was willing to allow a 

guardianship does not negate the evidence that further interaction with respondent could set GV’s 

progress back. Although it may be unlikely that respondent would immediately seek termination 

of the guardianship once the trial court made its decision, it remains true that she would have the 

ability to affect GV’s living situation, even if indirectly, had the trial court declined to terminate 

her parental rights. The potential for such disruptions posed a serious concern for GV’s mental 

and emotional health and stability when considered in light of the trauma that he suffered by 

witnessing respondent’s extreme cruelty.

Respondent’s belief that termination would prevent GV from getting closure or answers

from respondent was also not supported by the record. Although termination would ensure that 

GV’s caregivers could protect GV from any harmful interactions with respondent, termination 

would not prevent GV’s caregivers from allowing GV to have limited contact with her should 

GV’s therapist determine that the contact would be appropriate and beneficial. GV’s grandfather 

testified that he could not imagine things changing so that it would beneficial for GV to interact 

with respondent, but he stated that he would do whatever was in GV’s best interests and whatever 

the court ordered him to do. He also acknowledged that GV might someday want to interact with 

respondent. He simply wanted to ensure that he had control over the contact while GV was a 

minor.

Other evidence showed that GV had done very well in his placement with his grandparents 

and that he had a strong and healthy bond with them. Given the totality of the evidence, it cannot 

be said that the trial court clearly erred when it found that termination was in GV’s best interests. 

See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 430-431.

Affirmed.

/s/ Noah P. Hood

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ James Robert Redford