# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 17 , 2019 * Decided September 20 , 2019

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER , Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT , Circuit Judge

No. 19

- 1266

MAURICE BUFORD , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.

LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 269 and LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 4 , Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division.

No. 16 C 10218

Gary Feinerman , Judge

.

O R D E R

T wo weeks after Maurice Buford, a b lack construction worker, started working
at I

. W . & G

. , Inc., the company fired him. His union investigated his assertion that he was fired because of his race, but it decided not to file a grievance against the company.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 1266 Page 2

Buford then sued the union , alleging three legal theories: (1) t he union violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 2(c)(3) , by supporting a race

- based firing ; (2) it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by participating in employment discrimination ; and (3) the union breach ed its duty to represent him fairly , in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 18 5

. The district court entered summary judgment for the union. Because Buford offered no evidence that could support his discrimination claim s and because his claim under the L abor Management Relations Act is untimely, we affirm.

We first address Buford’s contention that the district court improperly limited the record at summary judgment. I n opposing summary judgment , Buford violated the district court’s local rules by fail ing to cite record evidence to support his respon ses to the defendants’ proposed findings of fact

. S ee N.D. I LL

. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)

. Even pro se litigants must comply with the court’s rules, see McNeil v. United States , 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) , so the district court reasonably rejected Buford’s asserted dispu tes , s ee Friend

v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U , 789 F.3d 707, 710

– 11 (7th Cir. 2015)

. Like the district court, w e limit o ur factual summary to the undisputed material facts that are properly supported with admissible evidence , and we view those facts in the light most favorable to Buford

. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 807 F.3d 215, 218

– 19 , 222 (7th Cir. 2015)

.
Buford worked for I

. W . & G

. , a construction company, for two weeks in July 2014

. He and several coworkers belonged to the Laborers ’ International Union Local 269 , which had a contract with I

. W . & G. Th e agreement guaranteed that “Employees will not be discriminated against because of race , ” but did not require just cause to fire a union member. I

. W

. & G

. f ired Buford after h e reportedly displayed

“ [ t ] hreatening behavior” in clashes with coworkers . During one quarrel , a cowor ker and fellow union member called Buford a racial slur.
Buford complained to the union about his firing, and Timothy Moore, the union’s business manager, investigated. I.W. & G. explained that it fired Buford because of his several “verbal” and “physical altercation [ s ] ” during his two weeks at the company. Moore also interviewed Buford’s supervisor and collected disciplinary reports and cow or ker statements . The se statements and reports confirmed the difficulties of working with Bufo rd

. Moore decided that the union would not file a grievance against the company for firing Buford.

Buford then sued his union for discriminating against him and for breaching its duty to represent him fairly

. He alleged that , based on his race, the union (throughNo. 19

- 1266 Page 3

Moore and union members at I

. W . & G

. ) conspired with the company to falsify reports

s o that the company could fire him pretextually

. Buford also twice asked the court to recruit counsel

. T he court denied Buford’s first motion (filed with his complaint) because Buford had not “sought representation from a sufficient number of attorneys

. ” I t denied the second (filed before the union had answered Buford’s complaint) without prejudice because the court could not yet determine whether the case was so complex that Buford required counsel. Buford did not later renew his request.
After a magistrate judge presided over discovery, t he district court entered summary judgment for the defendants . On the discrimination claims, it ruled t hat Buford had not furnished evidence that the union had show ed racial animus or had treated similar ly situated workers better

. The claim under the L abor Management Relations Act, which has a six

- month statute of limitations, was untimely because Buford fi led his suit nearly two years after the union declined to challenge his firing

. The court also denied Buford ’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, in which he argued without elaboration that the defendants’ counsel misadvised Buford about how to respond t o the ir summary

- judgment motion.
On appeal, Buford argues that the district court improperly entered summary judgment , but the court made no error. For both his Title VII and § 1981 claims , B ufo r d must supply evidence of discriminatory intent or disparate treatment based on race

. See Al exander v. Wis

. Dep ’ t of Health and Family Servs

. , 263 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2001). But Buford cited no evidence that the union fabricated reports or treat ed non

- black members who were accused of threatening coworkers better than it treated him. See McDonnel l Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802

– 06 (1973); McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cty. , 866 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2017). Instead, h e argues that his discharge was discriminatory b ecause the racial slur from his union

- member coworker shows t hat the union ’s decision to acquiesce in his firing was racially motivated

. But no evidence suggests that company supervisors or union leaders knew about , let alone condoned, the slur. S o , a factfinder c ould not reasonably attribute the slur to either the company or the union

. E.E.O.C. v. Pipefitters Ass’n Local Union 597 , 334 F.3d 656, 661 (7 th Cir. 2003) ( unions have no “affirmative duty to prevent racial harassment ... in the workplace” ) ; Durkin v. City of Chicago
, 341 F.3d 606, 612 ( 7th Cir. 2003) (employer “must have notice or knowledge of the harassment before it can be held liable”)

. Finally, Buford ’s duty

- to

- represent claim under the L abor Management Relations Act was untimely; he sued in October 2016, more than two years after he was fired

— well outside the Act’s six

- month statute of limitations. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd.

o f Teamsters , 462 U.S. 151, 1 71

– 7 2 (1983)

.No. 19

- 1266 Page 4

Next, Buford argues that the district court unreasonably den ied his two motions to recruit counsel

. But h is first motion showed that he had contacted only one attorney , which the court permissibl y considered inadequate

. S ee Pruitt v. Mote , 503 F.3d 647, 65 4 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). And t he court properly denied the second motion without prejudice because the union had not yet answered the complaint : only in an “unusual”

case , which this lawsuit is not, need a court recruit counsel so early. Mapes v. Indiana , 932 F.3d 968, 971

– 7 2 (7th C i r. 2019). Buford could have renewed his motion later, when the contested issues became apparent, b ut he did not.
Buford also generally argues that the magistrate judge who oversaw discovery

was biased because he deci ded discovery disputes in favor of the defendants and thwarted Buford’s attempts to compel discovery

. But adverse decisions are not, by themselves, evidence of bias. See Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555

– 56 (1994). And i n any event , th e judge committed no abuse of discretion and adequately justified the rationale for his rulings

. See Jones v. City of Elkhart , 737 F.3d 1107, 1115

– 16 (7 th Cir. 2013)

. One example will suffice: in den ying Buford’s motion to compel the defendants to seek responses to Buford’s interrogatories f or non

- defendant witnesses , the judge explained to Buford the proper process for serving his requests

. Finally, Buford unpersuasively challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b)

. Buford’s a ssertions about his conversation with the defendants ’ counsel are vague . Therefore , we cannot conclude from his assertions t hat those conversations improperly prevented him from overcoming summary judgment

. See Venson v. Altamirano , 749 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2014)

.
AFFIRMED