NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0797n.06 No. 08-6524 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. ON E M EN ’S RO LEX

P EA RL MA S TER

WA TC H, Serial No. K 573643, Defendan t, JOHN F ORD, Claim ant Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COUR T F O R THE WEST ERN DIS TR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , M c KEA G UE , a nd K ETHL ED G E, C ir c uitJudg e s.

McK eague, Circ uit Jud ge. I n this c ivil for feiture action, cla imant J ohn For d (“F ord”) seeks

re ve rs a l of

the dis tr ic t cour t’ s ord er de nyinghis Rul e 60 (b ) m oti on to s e t a sid e de fa

ult jud g me nt, which wa s entere d afte r F ord’s c laim was dismis sed for failing to comply

with the Supplemental R u l es fo r Admi ralty

or Mar itime Cl aims and Asset F orfe iture Ac tions. Bec ause w e find that the district court did not abuse its discre tion, we AF F IRM

. I.No. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

Acc ording to the g overnme nt’s pleading s, the Rolex watch at issue in the case is valued at 1 approximately

$70,000. - 2 - F or d d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e the fa c ts a s la id o ut b y the dis tr ic t c ourt in i ts o rd e r d e nyinghis motion to set aside dism issal and default judgme nt. We there fore adopt the following version of the fa c ts f ro m th e dis tr ic t c ourt : Claimant J ohn For d was indi cted by a federa l g rand jury on May 25, 2005 for a cts of corr uption, inti mation, and extortion as an elec ted offic ial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 66 6, 15 12 (b )( 3) , a

nd 19 51

. On Ma

y 26 , 20 05 , Cla ima

nt w a s a rr e ste d. At

the tim e of C la im a n t’ s a r

r e s t h e w a s w e a r in g a

Ro le x M a s te r

p ie c e Wa tc h ( th e D e f

e ndant [1] pro pert y in th e in st ant mo ti on ), w hi ch w as s eiz ed an d en ter ed i nt o ev id ence a t FBI Memphis. Acc ording to Plainti ff the U nited States of Amer ica’ s Amended V erifie d Complaint and the attached A mended Verified Affidavit, which was filed on Septembe r 4, 2007 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 98 1 (a )( 1 )( c), D efe ndant Rolex Masterpie ce Watch w as obtained by

Claimant in ex change for Claimant’s pe rfor mance of the same actions for which Claimant was indi cted and arr ested. An in rem war rant of a rre st issued for De fe nd ant Role x Mas te rp ie c e Wat c h o n O c tob e r 7 , 2 00 7. I n r e sp on se to t he se filings, Claimant f

iled (1) a Claim for

Seized Property

on November

20, 2007, (2) a

n Answer to the orig inal Complaint on November 21, 2007, and ( 3) an a nswer to the Amended Complaint on J anuar y 4 , 2008. These doc uments were all signe d by Claimant’s counsel but wer e not sig ned by Claimant under pena lty

of per jury

. On April 21, 2008 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Claimant’s Claim and Answer

. Following this filing, on May 12, 2008, Claimant’s counsel beg an trial in the ca se of Un ite d S tat es v . E dm on d F or d , w h i c h c o n c l u d e d

o n M a y 2 1 , 2 0 0 8

. S u

b s e qu e n t l y, on May 29, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Ex tend t he Discovery and Dispositive Mo tio ns De a dli ne , c iti ng c ouns e l’ s tr ia l inv olv e me nt a s on e re a so n wh y mor e tim e was ne eded. T he Court g rante d the extension on May 29, 2008. Then, on July

11, 2008, having receive d no response from Claimant, the Court g rante d the g overnme nt’s Motion to Dism iss for Claimant’s failure to sign his claim under pe na lty of pe rj ur y a s re qu ir e d by Rul e G( 5) of the Sup ple me nta l Rule s for Ad mir a lty or Mar itime Cl aims and Asset F orfe iture.No. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

- 3 - Plaintiff submit ted a Motion for Entr y of De fault, which the Clerk enter ed on J uly 14, 2008. Plaintiff the n filed a Motion for D efa ult J udg ment that same da y , which the Clerk also ente red July

14, 2008. Orde r De n. Claimant’s Mot. to Set A side Dismissal Or der and Def ault J ., at 1–3 (interna l citations and footnotes omitted). The distri ct co u rt then denied F ord’s motion to set aside dismissal and defa ult judgment, finding that For d failed to show e x cusable neg lect as r equire d by Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 60(b) (1). On appea l, For d claims that the di strict court e rre d in denying his motion to s e t a sid e dis mis sa l and de fa ult jud g me nt. II. We revie w a district court’s denial or gra nt of a Rule 60(b) moti on for an abuse of discretion, but we re view questions of law de novo. Ford Motor Co. v. Mustang Unlimited, Inc. , 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007). To find an a buse of discr etion, we must have “a definite and fir m conviction that the trial cour

t committed a clea

r er ror.” Id. (interna l quotations omi tted). “[O]nce the cour t has d et er m i n ed damag es and a judgme nt has bee n enter ed, the district cour t’s discretion to vac ate the judgme n t i s circumscribed by public policy

favor ing f

inality of judg ments and termination of litigation as ref

lected in Rule 60(b).” Fr on tie r I ns . Co . v . B lat

y , 454 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2007). Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a par

ty from a f inal judgme nt fo r a n y o f t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1 ) m ist a ke , in a dv e rt e nc e , s ur pr ise , o r e xcu sa

ble ne g le c t; (2) ne wly discovere d evidenc e . . . ; ( 3 ) f r a u d

. . . , m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , o r m i s c o n d u c tb y a n o p p o s i n g p a rt y; (4) the judg ment is void; (5) the judg ment has bee n satisfied, re lease d or dischar g ed; . . . or (6) a ny other re ason that justifies relief

.No. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

- 4 - Fe d. R. Civ. P roc. 60( b). For d seeks relief from judgme nt under Rule 60(b) (1) due to “excusable ne g lect.” I n deciding whether to gr ant re lief under

Rule 60(b)( 1), we look to whether the party seekingrelief

is culpable, wh e the r t he pa rt y op po sin g re lie f wil l be pr e jud ic e d, and

wh e the r t

he pa rt y se e kin g re lie f h a s a meritorious claim. W

illiams v. Meye r , 346 F .3 d 6 07 , 6 13 (6 th C ir . 2 00 3) . Re lie f u nd e r 6 0( b) (1 ) i s not available when the excusable negle ct i s premised on attorney err or. McCurry ex re l. Turner v. Adve ntist Health Sys./Sunbelt Inc. , 298 F.3d 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2002). For d claims two instances of excusable neg lect for

which he should be entitled to relief unde r 60(b) (1). Under his first arg ument, For d alleg es that the district cour t applied the wr ong version of p ro ce d u ra l ru l es t o h i s ca s e wh en i t gra n t ed t h e go v ern m en t ’s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s fo r f ai l u re t o s i gn the c la im und e r p e na lty of pe rj ur y . At the ou tse t, we no te that an “ a pp e a l f ro m th e de nia l of

a Rul e 60(b) motion does not enc ompass revie w of the unde rlying judg ment.” United States v. Re yes , 307 F.3d 451, 456 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Yet, eve n assuming that we ca n evaluate this claim, For d’s ar g ument has no support. Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for Admira l t y or Mar itime Cl aims and Asset F or fe iture Ac tio ns “ g ov e rn s a fo rf e iture a c tio n in

re m ari sin g fr om a

fe de ra l st a tut e .” 18 U. S.C. Suppl e me n ta l R. G ( 1 )

. U n d e r th is r u le , a p e r s o n w it

h a n in te r e s t in th e p r o p e rty subject to the forf eiture action must file a claim, “signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury ,” with t he cour t wher e the a ction is pending in order to p revent forfe iture. Id. Supplemental R. G(5)(a )(i)( C). Compli ance with this rule give s the claimant statutory s t an d i ng to contest the g overnme nt’s forf eiture a ction. United States v. $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency , 152 F.3d 491, 497 ( 6th Cir. 1998). The ve rification requireme nt of Supplemental Rule G i s p ar ticularly important beca

use it helpsNo. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

- 5 - “pre vent the danger o f fa lse claims in forf eiture pr ocee dings by

informing the cour

t on oath or aff irmation that the claimant is entitled to contest the for feiture action by virtue of his i ntere st in the defe ndant prope rty .” United States v. Currency $267,961.07 , 916 F.2d 1104, 1108 ( 6th Cir. 1990). We there fore require strict compliance with its requirements. Id. at 1108. This Circuit and others have previously upheld district c ourt order s striking claims in f orfe iture ac tions where the claimant failed to file a

verifie d claim. See, e. g . , T h i r t y-Fiv e Firearms , 123 F. App’ x 204, 206 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. $23,000 in U .S. C u r r ency , 3 56 F .3 d 1 57 , 1 60 –6 1 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 4) ; United Sta te s v . O ne Pa rc e l of

Pr op . Lo c ate d a t R R 2 , I nd e pe nd e nc e, B uch an an Cou nty , Io wa , 959 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1992). F or d c on te nd s th a t th e 20 05 Sup ple me nta l Ru le s f or Ad mir a lty or Ma ri tim e Cla ims a

pp ly to his case be caus e t h e p roper ty at issue was se ized in 2005. He further claims that under the 2005 version of the rules, a c laimant was not re quired to sig n the claim under penalty of per jury . The district court eva luated this claim but r ejec ted it a nd deter mined that “counse l’s mistaken application of the law i s n ot a

n a pp ro pr ia te g ro un d f

or r e lie f u nd e r R ule 60 (b ). ” Or de r D e n. Cla ima nt’ s Mo t. to S e t A sid e Di smi ssa l O rd e r a nd De fa ult J. a t 6. Whil e F or d c or

re c tly no te s that Su

pp le me nta l Ru le G bec ame e ffe ctive in 2006, he is wrongin arguing that t h i s rule does not a pply to his case. Acc ording to the scope of Supplemental Rule G, it “g overns a forf eiture action arising from a f eder al

s t a tu t e . ” 1 8 U

. S

. C

. S u

p p l e m e n t a l A d m i r a l t y a n d M a r i t i m e C l a i m s R u l e G ( 1 ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. In deter mining whe ther this rule a pplies to Ford’ s case , we must interpre t the statute itself to determine wh e n it s r e qu ir e me nts a re tr ig g e re d. A fund a me nta l cano n of s ta tut or y int e rp re ta tio n is to b e g in w ith the words of the statute and interpre t them acc ording to their ordinar y and common mea

ning. UnitedNo. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

Prior t o S u p p l emental Rule G’ s adoption, civil forfe iture ac tions were g overne d by 2 Supplemental Rules A, C, and E of the Supplementa l Rules f or Admiralty

or Mar itime Cl aims. See Supplemental Rule G, Advisory Commi ttee Notes. Rule G was “ added to br ing tog ether the ce ntral proce dures that g overn civil forf eiture a ctions.” Id. Our pre- 2006 case law ref ers to the proce dural re qu ir e me nts ou tli ne d in Sup ple me nta l Ru le C( 6) , w hi ch g ov e rn e d c la im p ro c e dure pr ior to Supplemental G’s adoption. See e .g. , Thirt y-Fiv e Firearms , 1 23 F . App ’x a t 20 6; United States v. $5,730.00 , 109 F . App ’x 712, 71 3 (6t h Ci r. 20 04 ); $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency , 152 F.3d at 497. - 6 - States v. Plavc ak , 411 F.3d 655, 660 ( 6th Cir. 2005). The plain lang uag e of Supplemental Rule G ind ic a te s th a t it

is tri g g e re d w he n th e fo rf e iture a c tio n is file d, no t whe n the pr op e rt y in q ue sti on is seized. The g overnme nt initi ated this civil forfe iture ac tion in 2007, making Supplemental Rule G and its require ment to sign unde r pena lty of per jury applicable to this case. F ur the r, e ve n und e r t

he pr e -2 00 6 r

ule c ha ng e s, a c la im h a d to be ve ri fi e d in ord e r t o e sta bli sh

s t at u t o ry s t an d i n g. See, e .g. , Thirt y-Fiv e Firearms , 123 F. App’ x at 206; $23,000 in U.S. Currency , 2 35 6 F .3 d at 16 0– 61 ; On e Pa rc e l of Pr op . Lo c ated

at RR 2 , I

nd e pe nd e nc e, B uc ha na n Co un ty , 959 F.2d at 104. Ford a

rg ues that his attorney ’s sig nature satisfied this require ment u n d er t he 2005 Rul e s. F or d, ho we ve r, ha s n ot c ite d a ny c a se law, no r h a ve we fo un d a ny , th a t su g g e sts that a claimant’s attorney ’s sig nature suffice s. To the contra ry , the case law has spe cifica lly noted whethe r the claimant

signe d a sworn statement. See, e .g., United St ates v. T hree Parc els of Real Prop. , 43 F.3d 388, 39 2 ( 8th

Cir . 1 99 4) (“ Th e Do wd

y s the mse lve s did no t ve ri fy the ir c la ims

. . . . ” ); United States v. One Urban Lot L ocated at 1 St. A-1, Valparaiso, Bay amon, Puerto Rico , 885 F.2d 994, 999 (1 st C ir . 1 98 9) (“ B ru

no a nd he r h us ba nd , Samm y , si g ne d a

nd sw or e to t

he tr uth of the state me nts

ma de in t he a ns we r. ” ); United States v. Be echc raft Queen Airplane Se rial No. L D-24 , 789 F.2d 627, 629 (8th Cir. 1986) (“ [T] here was no sworn s t at ement by Br own . . . . The only

signature on theNo. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

- 7 - answe r wa s that of B rown’s attorney .”). Thus, F ord’s a rg ument l ac k s m erit. Finally , the district court did not abuse its di scre tion in finding no excusable ne g lect whe re c ounsel mistakenly believed that For d was not re quired to sig n the claim under penalty of per jury

. Se e Mc Cur

ry , 298 F.3d at 594. Under his second a rgument, F ord cla ims that the district court improperly ruled on the g overnme nt’s motion to di smiss hi s claim bec ause the deadline f or ruling on the m otion had not y et

arr ived. For d failed to ra ise this arg ument in the district c ourt; thus, he has waived it. See Sm oot v. United T ransp. Union , 246 F.3d 633, 648 n.7 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining our r equire ment that parties raise a rg uments in the district court). L e a vin g a sid e F or d’ s w a ive r p ro ble m, t his a rgume nt a lso fa ils on the merits. On May 29, 2008, the district c ourt g rante d the g overnme nt’s motion to extend the time to complete d i s co very and file dispositive motions unti l Aug ust 22 and September 22,

re sp e c tiv e ly

(“ May 29 Or de r” ). Pr ior

to t his or de r, on

Ap ri l 21 , th e govern ment fi le d a mot ion to dismiss For d’s cl ai m and answer due to Ford’ s failure to sign the f ilings under

penalty of per jury (“A pril 21 Motion”). After

rec eiving no respons e from Ford on the April 21 Motion, the district

c ourt e va luate d th e me ri ts o f t

he mot ion a nd g ra

nte d it on July 11 , 2 00 8. I n h is b ri e f, F or d c la ims that th e dis tr ic t court ’s May 29 Or de r e xten de d th e tim e fo r h im t o r e sp on d to the g ov e rn me nt’ s Apr il 21 Motion. For d, howeve r, does not make any serious argument to this court that could possibly support h i s cl ai m t h at an order e x tending time to file dispositi ve motions somehow excused him from

answe ring , and prevented the district court from ruling , on the gover nment’s April 21 Motion, which was filed ove r one month befor e the May 29 Orde r. Under the local r ules for the Western District of Tenne ssee, a

party must respond to a motion t o d ismiss within thirty day s after

service of theNo. 08-6524

United States v. OneMen’ s Rolex Pe arl Master W

atch, Serial #

K573643

- 8 - motion. W .D. Ten. L ocal R. 7.2(a )(2)

. A party can seek an extension of t ime to respond for g ood

cause by a motion pursuant to L ocal Rul e 7.2. W.D. Ten. L ocal R. 7.1. I n this case , far more than thir ty d a y s h a d p a s s e d b e tw e e n th e g o v e r n me n t’ s A p r il 2 1 M o ti o n a n d th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s J uly 11

or de r g ra nti ngthe mot ion , a nd the re c or d d oe s n ot i nd ic a te that F or d r e qu e ste d a n e xten sio n. Thus , the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in ru lin g on the me ri ts o f t he g ov e rn me nt’ s mo tio n to dismiss

. Se e Cac e v ic v . Ci ty of H az e l P ar k , 226 F.3d 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding the district court’s de nial of a Rule 60( b) motion after plaintiffs failed to r espond t o a m o t i on for summary jud g me nt) . N or

do e s Fo rd ’s a tto rn e y ’s mis int e rp re ta tio n o f t he May 29 Or de r a

mou nt t o “ e xcu sa

ble neg lect” unde r Rule 60(b)( 1). Mc Cur ry , 298 F.3d at 594. Finally , For d urg es us to set aside the de fault judg ment beca use he dilig ently

pursued the matter a fter judg ment was e ntere d. Whil e For d might have been dilig ent in pursuing his claim after default judg me n t w a s e n te r e d , h e h a s n o t p r e s e n te d a n y th in g o n w h ic h w e c a n f

in d a n a b use of discretion by

district court. See M

ustang Unlimited, Inc. , 487 F.3d at 468.

III . For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the orde r of the district c ourt denying F ord’s motion to set aside def

ault judgme nt.