United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 11, 2016*

Decided February 19, 2016 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2267 

STEVEN WRIGHTSMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MARION THATCHER and 

RON NEAL, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

South Bend Division. 

No. 3:15-cv-00087 

Theresa L. Springman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Steven Wrightsman, an Indiana prisoner, challenges the dismissal of his 

complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wrightsman claims that he is being denied 

equal protection because other inmates in an “Honor Program” at his prison are 

rewarded with privileges not available to him and others in the general population. 

Because Wrightsman’s complaint does not state a claim, we affirm the dismissal. 

 

*

 The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not 

participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we 

have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 15-2267 Page 2 

Wrightsman named as defendants the superintendent and the administrator of 

the Honor Program at the prison where he is incarcerated. According to Wrightsman, 

the inmates accepted into the Honor Program are allowed special privileges, including 

more time outside their cells, up to twice as many visits, exclusive access to video games, 

and greater availability of exercise machines and microwaves. To be eligible, inmates 

must be at least 30 years old (previously the minimum age was 35) and cannot have 

committed an infraction of any type for 24 months or an infraction involving violence for 

48 months. Wrightsman attached to his complaint a grievance complaining that he was 

being excluded from the Honor Program because of his age, not because of misconduct. 

Wrightsman was 33 when he submitted that grievance in 2014, so apparently the 

minimum age had not yet been lowered to 30. In his complaint Wrightsman asserts that 

he is being treated “disparately without any relation to a legitimate penal interest,” but 

he also explains that he is not interested in admission to the Honor Program. 

At screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court interpreted Wrightsman’s 

complaint as raising a claim of age discrimination but reasoned that the program’s age 

classification is presumptively rational and thus the complaint fails to state a claim. 

Wrightsman moved for reconsideration, clarifying that he is not claiming age 

discrimination and repeating that he does not seek entrance into the Honor Program. 

Rather, he insisted, he meets the criteria for participation in the program and thus, even 

without applying, should receive the same benefits as prisoners who are accepted into 

the program. The district court denied this motion.

On appeal Wrightsman essentially argues that the Equal Protection Clause 

guarantees inmates in the general population the same privileges given to prisoners 

accepted into the Honor Program. He has “tried to get these rewards, but nothing 

worked,” Wrightsman says, even though he sees himself as a “role model inmate.” 

Wrightsman has never asserted, though, that he applied for entry into the Honor 

Program after becoming age eligible. Nor has he said that he was ever turned away for a 

reason other than his age. 

Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not affect a 

fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates differently if the unequal 

treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. See City of Cleburne, 

Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–41 (1985); Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 

585–86 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc); May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000); Stanley 

v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 2000). A presumption of rationality applies, and a 

classification will be set aside only if no ground can be conceived to justify it. See Ind. 
No. 15-2267 Page 3 

Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook, 808 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 2015); 

Johnson, 339 F.3d at 586. 

Wrightsman cannot overcome this presumption, as there are obvious 

justifications for extending preferential treatment to inmates in the Honor Program. Age 

can be used permissibly as a proxy for maturity, see Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 

83–84 (2000); Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 267–68 (8th Cir. 1990), and conditioning benefits 

on demonstrated good behavior encourages rehabilitation, institutional security, and the 

safety of inmates, staff and visitors, see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 271–73 (1973);

Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2010); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 576 

(6th Cir. 2005); Woodson v. Attorney Gen., 990 F.2d 1344, 1349–50 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In his 

appellate brief, Wrightsman even concedes that the purpose of the program is to 

“reward good behavior of inmates.” And though Wrightsman asserts that the Honor 

Program violates the Equal Protection Clause because prisoners meeting the admission 

criteria cannot be rewarded without applying to the program, there are many rational 

reasons for requiring an application to evaluate the prisoner before awarding benefits. 

See Mcginnis, 410 U.S. at 272–73.

Wrightsman incurred one “strike” for filing his complaint and a second for 

pursuing this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 843 

(7th Cir. 2011); Hains v. Washington, 131 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1997). 

AFFIRMED.