IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1797

Filed November 26, 2014

WILLIAM JOHN FLINN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

IOWA DISTRICT COURT

FOR POLK COUNTY,

Defendant.

________________________________________________________________

Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rebecca Goodgame 

Ebinger, Judge.

William Flinn challenges the district court’s finding he was in contempt of 

the dissolution decree. WRIT SUSTAINED IN PART, ANNULLED IN PART.

Catherine C. Dietz-Kilen of Harrison & Dietz-Kilen, P.L.C., Des Moines, for 

plaintiff.

Elizabeth Kellner-Nelson of Kellner-Nelson Law Firm, P.C., for defendant.

Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
2

DANILSON, C.J.

The district court found William Flinn in contempt for refusing to provide 

his former spouse with the names of individuals providing care to their child while 

he was at work, and for failing to “foster feelings of affection and respect between 

the child[] and the other party.” Flinn contends the court’s findings are not 

supported by the evidence. We uphold the contempt finding in the first respect 

because it is clear that William’s former spouse, Michaelle Flinn, was entitled to 

know the specific identity of the person providing care for the child. And while we 

agree that former spouses should encourage respect between the other parent 

and child, that laudatory goal cannot support a finding of contempt in the 

circumstances presented here.1

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The marriage of William Flinn and Michaelle Flinn was dissolved by 

decree on April 25, 2013. In the dissolution decree, the district court “observed 

during the trial that [William] is still very angry with [Michaelle] over how their 

marriage and relationship broke up and appears to be very rigid in regard to 

certain matters including following only Court orders regarding visitation with [the 

child] with little or no variation or communication.” The decree ordered joint legal 

custody of their five-year-old daughter, A.F., with Michaelle having physical care. 

William was to have weekly visitation with the child Tuesday at 4:15 p.m. to 

Thursday at 7:45 p.m., alternating weekends beginning at 4:15 on Friday until 

7 p.m. on Sunday, and holidays as set forth in the decree.

 

1 Although the district court found William guilty of contempt for failing to foster feelings 

of affection, the court imposed no sanction because the court determined that Michaelle 

had similarly failed to comply with these terms of the decree.
3

William was to have visitation with A.F. over the 2013 Memorial Day 

weekend beginning at 4:15 p.m., Friday, May 24, and ending Monday, May 27, at 

7 p.m. Michaelle was aware that William worked as a detention officer at the 

Polk County Jail each week Friday through Tuesday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 

Michaelle thus understood William would be working each day of the Memorial 

Day weekend from 7:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. She asked that William provide her with 

the names and contact information of the person or persons who would be caring 

for their child while he worked. Despite numerous requests, William’s only 

eventual response was “my family.” William arrived to pick the child up at 4:15 

on Friday, but Michaelle and the child were not there. Text messages were 

exchanged, but William did not inform Michaelle who would be caring for their 

child. William was not able to visit with his child until Monday at 4:15 p.m. He 

returned the child at 7 p.m. that day.

On May 29, William filed an application to show cause, complaining he 

had been denied visitation. He asserted Michaelle refused to follow the visitation 

schedule. He asserted:

12. [William’s] three (3) sisters, brother, mother, father and 

grandmother all live in close proximity to [William].

13. [William] made plans with his family members to provide 

care for A.K.F. during the holiday weekend at the times when he 

was required to work.

14. [William] arrived at [Michaelle’s] home on Friday, 

May 24, 2013, [William’s] birthday, at 4:15 p.m. to pick the minor 

child up. [Michaelle] and minor child were not home, and 

[Michaelle] refused to provide the minor child to [William].

15. After letting [Michaelle] know [William] would be again 

attempting to pick the minor child up on Saturday, May 25, 2013 at 

4:15 p.m., [Michaelle] and minor child were again not home when 

[William] went to exercise his awarded visitation.

16. [Michaelle] continued to deny [William] his awarded 

visitation with the minor child on Sunday, May 26, 2013 when 
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[William] again attempted to pick the minor child up at [Michaelle’s]

residence at 4:15 p.m.

17. [William] was finally allowed to exercise his parenting 

time with the minor child on Monday, May 27, 2013 when he picked 

the minor child up from [Michaelle’s] residence at 4:15 p.m. 

Because his scheduled visitation ended at 7:00 p.m. on the same 

day, the 3-day weekend visitation [William] was awarded was 

reduced to less than 3-hours in length due to [Michaelle’s] actions.

18. [Michaelle’s] behavior is willful and wanton and in 

disregard of the Order of the Court, the rights of [William] and the 

best interest of the minor child.

On June 18, William arrived at Michaelle’s home to pick up the child for a 

ten-day visit.

2

 A.F. was holding on to Michaelle’s leg and crying when William 

arrived. Michaelle asked, “Will she be able to call if she wants to?” William did 

not respond to Michaelle. Michaelle asked two more times if she would be able 

to call or talk to the child during the visit. William stated, “It’s supposed to be 

uninterrupted, Michaelle.” Michaelle stated, “Okay. I tried baby, I really tried.”

He and A.F. got in William’s car. Michaelle then said, “That’s really nice that you 

do that to her.” 

On June 25, Michaelle filed an application for rule to show cause against 

William. In the first count, Michaelle contended William “has repeatedly and 

consistently refused to provide [her] with any information regarding who is caring 

for the minor child during his visitation despite repeated request.” In a second 

count, Michaelle alleged that William’s behaviors on June 18 “were disrespectful, 

demeaning, and did not foster feelings of affection between the child” and her. 

Michaelle also contended that William did not foster feelings of affection by

preventing her from being able to telephone the child during visits. 

 

2 As he did with most transfers of the child, William made an audio recording of this 

transaction with his cell phone. He submitted a transcript of the transaction with his 

response to Michaelle’s application to show cause.
5

A hearing was held on the dueling applications. Michaelle acknowledged 

she refused to allow the Memorial Day visitation, but argued she was not given 

information on who would care for the child. William testified he had refused to 

provide Michaelle the information she requested. He stated, “I told her my family 

would be watching her.” He acknowledged the June 18 exchange, but provided

records from his phone indicating the child and mother did speak on at least two 

occasions during that extended visitation time.

The district court found both parties in contempt. With respect to

Michaelle’s application, the court ruled:

9. As to Count one of [Michaelle’s] application for rule to 

show cause, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[William] violated the court’s order by knowingly and willfully 

refusing to provide [Michaelle] with the names of individuals 

providing childcare for the parties’ minor child during [William’s] 

visitation.

10. As Count two of [Michaelle’s] application for rule to show 

cause, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [William]

violated the court’s order by knowingly and willfully failing to foster 

feelings of affection between the minor child and [Michaelle]. 

However, it is clear from the evidence presented that [Michaelle] 

has also acted in ways which are inconsistent with fostering feeling 

of affection between the minor child and [William] and therefore, no 

sanction will be imposed upon [William].

The district court sentenced each party to thirty days in jail but withheld

mittimus, allowing each to purge the contempt if there were no further violations 

for a period of six months. Each party filed a motion to reconsider. Those 

motions were denied.

William challenges the court’s findings that he was in contempt.3

 

3 Michaelle has not challenged the court’s ruling as it relates to her, and we therefore do 

not address the findings of contempt against Michaelle.
6

II. Scope and Standards of Review. 

We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law. Taft v. Iowa 

Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 2013). We “examine only the jurisdiction of 

the district court and the legality of its actions.” Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 

N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998). An illegality exists “[w]hen the court’s findings of 

fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or when the court has not applied 

the law properly.” Ary v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 735 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2007).

A person who willfully disobeys a court order may be cited and punished 

for contempt. Iowa Code § 598.23(1) (2013). A contempt proceeding is 

essentially criminal in nature, and each element must have been established 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Marriage of Ruden, 509 N.W.2d 494, 496 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1993).

III. Merits.

Only willful disobedience of a court order will justify a conviction for 

contempt. Id. To find willful disobedience “‘requires evidence of conduct that is

intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard

of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with 

an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.’” Ary, 735 N.W.2d at 

624 (quoting Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 1980), overruled on 

other grounds by Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 707, 709 (Iowa 

1986)). “A failure to follow a court order is not willful if a contemner shows the 

order was indefinite or that the contemner was unable to comply with the order.” 

Id. at 625; see Christensen, 578 N.W.2d at 678. 
7

The district court found William willfully disobeyed two provisions of the 

decree concerning joint legal custody, specifically:

For the purposes of this decree, joint legal custody shall be

defined as follows:

(a) Both parents shall have legal access to information 

concerning the child, including but not limited to medical, 

educational, childcare and law enforcement records.

. . . . 

(h) Each of the parties shall act to foster feelings of affection 

and respect between the child[] and the other party, and neither 

party will do anything which may estrange the child from the other 

party or impair the child’s high regard for the other party.

A. Access to information. The court found William’s refusal to provide 

the names of those who would be caring for the child violated the decree’s 

command that each parent “shall have legal access to information concerning . . .

childcare.” William argues that in eventually stating “his family” would be caring 

for the child, “he provided the identify of persons historically responsible for child 

care, whose identities would be well-known to Michaelle.” He argues he was not 

“concealing an unknown childcare provider” or “attempting deception.” He finds it 

significant that he at first “remained silent,” which he claims shows he was not 

evincing belligerence or evil intent.

Having reviewed the testimony presented at the hearing, we conclude the 

district court did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that William willfully 

refused to provide information concerning who would be providing care to the 

parties’ daughter while he was working. William admitted he had not provided 

the names and phone numbers of persons taking care of the child when 

Michaelle asked for that information. William testified he believed babysitting is 
8

different than childcare, and he was not required to provide a babysitter’s name. 

William testified: 

Q. You—is it your testimony that you do not believe that 

Michaelle has a right to know who is caring for [A.F.] while you are 

at work? A. I would say that I leave her alone to do—because 

she’s the responsible adult in charge. She is—she is the mother of 

[A.F.]. I am the father of [A.F.]. And I believe that we are both 

capable of doing what’s in [A.F.]’s best interest while—you know, if 

someone is at work or someone has—you know, she was in an 

internship. I’m sure she had a babysitter in there somewhere that I 

don’t know about, but that’s okay.

Q. Do you believe when Michaelle asks you, specifically 

asks you who is providing childcare, that you have a responsibility 

or a duty to tell her who that person is? A. I would say only if it’s 

reciprocated.

Q. Have—you agree there have been numerous times 

where she has specifically asked you who is providing childcare for 

[A.F.]? A. Yes.

Q. And you agree that you, each time, have failed to provide 

her the name of that person? A. I provided her that it was my 

family.

Q. You’ve had a number of individuals living in your home.

Would you agree that Michaelle has asked you who’s living in the 

home? A. Yes, she has.

Q. And you’ve refused to provide that information? 

A. Correct.

Q. Again, do you believe that Michaelle is entitled to know if 

there is another individual living in a home where her child is also 

living? A. I don’t. I don’t agree with that. It’s my home and I can—I 

think I’m capable of, you know, picking—knowing these people and 

who I’m having around my child, and I can be responsible for all of 

it.

Q. You have had individuals who have been residing in your 

home also caring for [A.F.]; correct? A. Yes, I had Laurie babysit 

[A.F.] when I was at work. Kerry has babysat. Sharon has 

babysat. My dad has babysat. My grandmother has babysat. My

brother even babysat.

Q. You also left [A.F.] in the care of an individual named 

Shelly? A. No, she has not babysat.

William’s stance is unreasonable. A parent with joint legal custody is 

entitled to know who is caring for their child and should not be required to guess 

who that person might be or how to contact that person in the event the need 
9

arises. The child is of young age and that circumstance is different than an older 

child with whom the other parent may be able to communicate with by cell phone. 

William’s failure to provide the names of the caregivers was “in disregard of the 

rights of others [Michaelle], or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled 

with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.” Lutz, 297 

N.W.2d at 353. The record provides substantial evidence for a rational trier of 

fact to find William willfully refused to provide Michaelle with the name of the 

person who would provide care for the child while William was working. We 

agree the better practice would be to specifically address in the decree each 

parent’s right to the name and contact information while the child was in 

another’s person’s care. Nevertheless, we conclude the decree’s language that 

each parent “is entitled to legal access to information” concerning “childcare” is 

not ambiguous and sufficiently conveys the requirement to provide the 

information sought. 

B. Fostering feelings of affections. As to the contempt finding based on 

the June 18 exchange, William was asked and responded to the following 

questions: 

Q. On June 18th when you came to pick up [A.F.], we’ve all 

heard the recording, we’ve seen the transcript. You agree that 

when Michaelle’s trying to speak with you about [A.F.] calling, 

initially you ignore any—you ignore Michaelle completely? Is that

accurate? A. Yes. I had no intention of trying to speak with her 

about what had went on with not being able to get [A.F.] and all of 

that, so I did not want to engage her in front of [A.F.].

Q. And isn’t it true that that’s typically how you treat 

Michaelle during visitation exchanges? You refuse to respond to 

questions, refuse to speak to her? A. Well, most of the time she 

doesn’t ever ask me any questions.

Q. Do you agree that’s upsetting for [A.F.]? A. What 

happened on the 18th, I believe, would probably upset her, yes.
10

Q. Do you believe that not responding when [A.F.]’s mother 

is asking you a question is disrespectful? A. I don’t know that I’d 

call it disrespectful. I was just trying not to make it worse than it 

already was.

. . . .

Q. Do you feel you are modeling good behavior? A. I think 

in the—in—I mean, what had happened, I just felt like it was not the 

time and place to try to figure this out in front of [A.F.], being as,

you know, she’s upset anyway. Obviously, Michaelle is not happy.

I’m not happy. It was just the wrong time and place for all of that to 

happen. 

Q. When [A.F.] was picked up for this June visit, she was 

going to be gone for a week to ten days; is that—actually, ten days; 

is that right? A. Yes.

Q. Generally, when she has visits, those are for two days, 

maybe three? Would that be accurate? A. Well, I mean, they—the 

Court knows my visitation schedule, so she’d get—if you’re just

counting nights, most of the time I get two nights at a time, you 

know, and every other weekend for two nights. 

Q. So prior to this summer, [A.F.] had not been away from 

her mother for more than two to three days at a time. Would you 

agree with that? A. Yes.

Q. That is a pretty big thing for a five-year-old, don’t you 

think? A. Yes, I would agree.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. DIETZ-KILEN:

Q. On June 18th when you came to pick up [A.F.], was she 

upset by the conversation, or was she upset before you even got 

there? A. She was upset before when she came out of the door. 

She was in Michaelle’s arms and she was already upset. I don’t 

know. I can’t make speculation, I guess.

Q. And if you had engaged in conversation with Michaelle, 

would that have improved the situation? A. I don’t believe so.

William challenges the court’s finding of contempt, arguing the record 

shows a father who is doing his best to prevent his child from being caught in the 

middle of an argument, not willful and knowing behavior designed to affect the 

feelings of affection of the parties’ child.

As already noted, willful disobedience means “conduct that is intentional 

and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights 

of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an 
11

unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.” Christensen, 578 

N.W.2d at 678. An alleged contemner may show his or her failure to comply was 

not willful by showing the order was indefinite. Id.

The court’s finding of contempt was based upon the decree language that 

each parent was to “foster feelings of affection and respect between the child[] 

and the other party.” The court’s ruling relied upon the failure to provide access 

by telephone. At the end of the contempt hearing, the court stated on the record:

The Court does find that it has been proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt that this also was a violation of the order and is 

contemptuous. The plain reading of [the transcript of the exchange]

in and of itself demonstrates that this was a violation. But the audio 

recording is particularly troubling, the context of the conversation 

and the context of this being an initial visit. The reference to 

“uninterrupted time” by [William], that is not what visitation is on 

either side. Both of you have the obligation to allow reasonable 

access via telephone calls to the other party while they are visiting,

particularly over a stretch of time that is seven to ten days.

The decree in this instance did not put that in, that particular 

requirement. Most of my orders I say, you know, Must provide 

reasonable access to the other person via telephone or Skype or 

other means during visitations. That doesn’t mean that the violation 

didn’t occur in this instance because it did infringe upon that 

general requirement to foster feelings of affection.

So the Court finds there was a contempt here. But the Court 

finds that no action is required for that finding of contempt, 

particularly in light of the fact that the Court believes that the—while 

it wasn’t charged as a contempt against [Michaelle], [Michaelle] has 

also acted in ways that are inconsistent with fostering affection.

(Emphasis added.)

The district court gave sage advice to assist Michaelle and William in their 

efforts to jointly parent their child. We agree the term “uninterrupted time” does 

not denote the caretaker may deny the child’s communication with the other 

parent. Rather it simply means that the same parent shall provide the child’s 
12

care throughout the designated time period so the caretaker can plan a vacation 

or other activities.

The district court also recognized that the decree did not explicitly state 

that the parties were to provide the other parent reasonable access to call the 

child during visitation. We agree. We conclude the decree “was indefinite,” see

Christensen, 578 N.W.2d at 678, in respect to allowing telephone access and 

cannot be the basis for the finding of a contempt as alleged, that is, that William 

failed to foster feelings of affection and respect between the mother and child. 

The concern intended to be addressed by the phrase “foster feelings of affection 

and respect” is the child’s feelings of affection and respect for the other parent. 

Notwithstanding, both parties are strongly encouraged to co-parent their child by 

allowing reasonable telephone contact.

Here, Michaelle was able to communicate in a limited fashion with the 

child in two brief phone calls during the ten-day period. Reasonable telephone 

contact with the child is in the best interests of the child, and failure to allow 

reasonable contact unless prohibited by the decree may be a factor in any 

modification action related to custody or visitation terms. 

Michaelle also argued that during the exchange of the child prior to 

William’s ten-day uninterrupted visitation, William’s behavior was disrespectful 

and demeaning. Because the child was present, Michaelle argues his conduct 

was contrary to the “foster feelings of affection and respect” provision. We have 

listened to the audio recording of the exchange, and although the child was 

crying during the exchange, William did not raise his voice. He explained his 

understanding of “uninterrupted time,” and was unwilling to carry on a long 
13

conversation with Michaelle. We conclude William’s comments were not 

contemptuous.

IV. Conclusion.

The dissolution decree’s language that each parent “is entitled to legal 

access to information” concerning “childcare” is not ambiguous. The district court 

did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that William willfully refused to 

provide information to Michaelle concerning who would be providing care to the 

parties’ daughter while he was working. We annul the writ with respect to the 

finding of contempt on count one.

However, with respect to the contempt finding related to William’s failure 

to “foster feelings of affection and respect” provision, we conclude William’s 

comments were not contemptuous. We thus sustain the writ and vacate the 

finding of contempt on count two.

WRIT SUSTAINED IN PART, ANNULLED IN PART.