[Cite as Williams v. Canton School Employees Fed. Credit Union, 2018-Ohio-2474.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARK A. WILLIAMS 

 Plaintiff-Appellant 

-vsCANTON SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 

FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 

 Defendant-Appellee 

JUDGES: 

Hon. John W. Wise, P. J. 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. 

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

Case No. 2017 CA 00213 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2017 CV 01645 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 25, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

MARK A. WILLIAMS M. CHARLES COLLINS 

PRO SE EASTMAN & SMITH LTD 

6054 Quarry Lake Drive, NE One SeaGate, 24th Floor 

East Canton, Ohio 44730 P.O. Box 10032 

 Toledo, Ohio 43699-0032
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 2

Wise, John, P. J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Mark A. Williams appeals the October 23, 2017, 

Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, granting the motion 

for summary judgment filed by Defendant-Appellee Canton School Employees Federal 

Credit Union. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 

{¶2} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: 

{¶3} On June 15, 2011, Appellant Mark A. Williams obtained a loan from Appellee 

Canton School Employees Federal Credit Union (CSE). The amount financed as shown 

on the Note, signed by Appellant, was $13,104.55. The total amount financed was 

comprised of three parts: (1). $3,405.55 to pay off a prior loan by Appellant with CSE 

(account number XXX220-53); (2). $9,400.00 to finance an automobile being purchased 

by Appellant at the time of the loan, i.e. a 2005 Chrysler 300 sedan (the "Vehicle") in 

which CSE took a security interest as part of the loan transaction; and (3). $299.00 for 

"gap insurance," which will pay the difference between the actual cash value of the Vehicle 

and the current outstanding balance on the Loan if something happens to the Vehicle 

during the course of the loan. 

{¶4} The terms of the Note required that the Loan be repaid in 42 monthly 

installments of $377.33 each, commencing on July 15, 2011. If any payment was late 

by 15 days or more, a late charge of $25.00 was assessed. 

{¶5} The Note also contained “Default and Repossession” and “Default 

Remedies” provisions that provided CSE with the right to require immediate payment 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 3

on the Loan’s outstanding balance and the right to take possession of the collateral 

upon failure of Appellant to make any payment on time. 

{¶6} During the course of the Loan, Appellant was chronically late with his 

payments. 

{¶7} On July 22, 2015, Appellee Canton School Employees Federal Credit Union 

filed its Complaint against Appellant Mark Williams seeking judgment on a $4,304.20 

balance owed to CSE, plus costs and interest, on the loan taken out by Mr. Williams. CSE 

also sought an order of replevin for possession of the Loan's collateral, an automobile. 

{¶8} On August 24 2015, Appellant filed his Answer, wherein he admitted that 

he entered into the Loan agreement, but denied any balance was owed on the Loan, 

contending the Loan had been repaid and therefore CSE had no interest in the collateral. 

{¶9} On September 22, 2015, Appellant filed a counterclaim (incorrectly 

designated as a cross-complaint). In his counterclaim, Appellant again admitted entering 

into the Loan agreement and granting a security interest in the Vehicle to CSE under the 

Note. Appellant also admitted that his Loan payments were "irregular" and that he had 

not relinquished title to the Vehicle, but alleged that he has more than paid off the Loan 

and the CSE has improperly applied his past payments. More specifically, Appellant 

alleged violations of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), stating that TILA "requires 

full and complete disclosure of all finance amount costs. The disclosure in this matter 

clearly was not complete, and or deceptive resulting in a violation of said Federal Law." 

Appellant also alleged that he and his family had been harassed by CSE as part of its 

collection efforts. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 4

{¶10} On October 13, 2015, CSE filed its Reply to Counterclaim, denying any 

liability to Appellant and asserting a number of affirmative defenses including that 

Appellant’s counterclaim was untimely filed and that certain parts were barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations. 

{¶11} That same day, CSE filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims, 

supported by the Affidavit of Stefanie McCrae. In its summary judgment motion, CSE first 

argued that, as to CSE's claim-in-chief against Appellant for the balance of his unpaid 

loan, Appellant had failed to make timely and sufficient payments on his loan and that 

CSE was therefore entitled to judgment in its favor on the unpaid balance and for replevin 

of the collateral. 

{¶12} As to Appellant’s counterclaim, CSE contended that the entire counterclaim 

was untimely under Civ.R. 13 and therefore subject to dismissal by the trial court. Further, 

CSE argued that Appellant failed to file his TILA claims within the one-year statute of 

limitations, and therefore such claims were barred. Lastly, CSE presented evidence that 

it did not violate the TILA. 

{¶13} On October 30, 2015, Appellant filed his Opposition to Summary Judgment, 

arguing that the loan agreement documents did not contain any security agreement 

provisions, and also that CSE was "overreaching" by seeking judgment in excess of the 

actual unpaid balance on his loan. 

{¶14} On Nov. 24, 2015, CSE filed its Reply Brief, noting to the trial court that the 

only evidence before it revealed that the Loan included security agreement provisions, 

and that the unpaid balance demanded by CSE was accurate given the Loan's terms and 

payments received to date from Appellant. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 5

{¶15} On December 4, 2015, Appellant filed his Opposition to Reply Brief, 

reiterating his prior arguments against summary judgment. 

{¶16} On December 30, 2015, the trial court entered its Judgment Entry granting 

summary judgment to CSE on the unpaid loan balance of $4,304.20, plus pre- and postjudgment interest at 11%. The trial court also dismissed with prejudice Appellant’s 

counterclaim. In ruling in CSE's favor, the trial court determined that Appellant’s 

counterclaim was untimely filed and filed without leave of court. The trial court also held 

that Appellant’s claims based upon TILA were time-barred by TILA's one-year statute of 

limitations. The trial court further noted that CSE had identified the lack of genuine issues 

of material fact on Appellant’s claims, and that he had failed to meet his reciprocal burden 

of setting forth specific facts under Civ.R. 56 to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. 

{¶17} Appellant appealed to this Court, raising four assignments of error, all of 

which challenged the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Canton School 

Employees Federal Credit Union. This Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. See

Canton School Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2016 AP 

01 0003, 2016-Ohio-2653. 

{¶18} On August 11, 2017, Appellant filed a Complaint in the Stark County Court 

of Common Pleas alleging Appellee Canton School Employees Federal Credit Union 

delivered to him a fraudulent promissory note and security agreement for his automobile 

loan, that CSE incorrectly applied his car payments and sought improper additional 

payment amounts in violation of TILA, and that CSE undertook repossession efforts and 

harassed him. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 6

{¶19} On August 30, 2017, Appellee Credit Union filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment. 

{¶20} On September 13, 2017, Appellant filed his brief in opposition. 

{¶21} By Judgment Entry filed October 23, 2017, the trial court granted Appellee’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, finding Appellant’s claims in his Complaint were barred 

by the doctrine of res judicata. 

{¶22} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following assignments of error (as 

taken from the body of Appellant’s brief1: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶23} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY 

APPLYING THE RULES OF JUDICATA BASED ON AN OUTCOME FROM 

TUSCARAWAS COUNTY. 

{¶24} “II. THE PREVIOUS TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN RULING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM WAS 

UNTIMELY FILED AND AS SUCH THAT CASE WAS CUT WELL SHORT OF A JUST 

CONCLUSION. 

{¶25} “III. THE PREVIOUS TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT WHILE LEAVING AMBIGUOUS AND OPPOSING ORDERS IN ITS 

CONCLUSION. 

 

1 Appellant’s assignments of error as listed on pages 2 and 3 of his brief are identical to 

those in his prior appeal Canton School Emps. Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 5th Dist. 

Tuscarawas No. 2016 AP 01 0003, 2016-Ohio-2653, and do not match the assignments 

or error as set forth in the body of Appellant’s brief. 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 7

{¶26} “IV. THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIM WITH PREJUDICE.” 

I., II., III., and IV. 

{¶27} In his first Assignment of Error, Appellant contends the Stark County trial 

court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. In his Second, Third and 

Fourth Assignments of Error, Appellant argues that the Tuscarawas County trial court in 

the prior appeal erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee and in 

dismissing his counterclaim. We disagree. 

“Summary Judgment Standard” 

{¶28} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique 

opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. 

The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36. Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in pertinent 

part: 

 Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, 

if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it 

appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that 

reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is 

adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 8

made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation 

construed most strongly in his favor. 

{¶29} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter a summary judgment 

if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment 

bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion that the non-moving party 

has no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some 

evidence which demonstrates the non-moving party cannot support its claim. If the 

moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set 

forth specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila 

v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997-Ohio-259, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 

1996-Ohio-107. 

{¶30} It is based upon this standard that we review Appellant’s Assignments of 

Error. 

{¶31} Appellant herein challenges the trial court’s finding that the claims in his 

Complaint are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

{¶32} Upon review, we also find Appellant's arguments are barred by the doctrine 

of res judicata. In Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, syllabus, the 

Supreme Court of Ohio explained res judicata as “[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon 

the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction 

or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” 
Stark County, Case No. 2017 CA 00213 9

{¶33} Here, Appellant is attempting to re-litigate the issues with regard to the 

promissory note and security agreement with CSE attached to his automobile loan, as 

well as alleged TILA violations. These claims were previously raised and decided in the 

Tuscarawas County case and affirmed on appeal to this Court. 

{¶34} Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellee was entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law. 

{¶35} Appellant’s Assignments of Error are overruled.

{¶36} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

By: Wise, John, P. J. 

Gwin, J., and 

Wise, Earle, J. concur. 

. 

JWW/d 0614