No.  2--01--1292				 					    		 

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

RAINTREE HOMES, INC., and	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

RAINTREE BUILDERS, INC.,		  )  of Lake County.

						  )	

	Plaintiffs-Appellants,	)	

		)			)	

v.	)	No. 98--MR–--148

						  )

THE VILLAGE OF LONG GROVE, 	  )	Honorable

	)	John R. Goshgarian,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)	Judge, Presiding.

	JUSTICE GEIGER	delivered the opinion of the court:

	The plaintiffs, Raintree Homes, Inc., and Raintree Builders,

Inc., filed a complaint against the defendant, the Village of Long

Grove, challenging the constitutionality of the impact fees the

defendant had charged them for the issuance of building permits. 

The plaintiffs appeal from the August 22, 2000, October 11, 2001,

and November 8, 2001, orders of the circuit court of Lake County

striking certain portions of their complaint, dismissing their

complaint, and denying their motion to reconsider, respectively. 

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

	The present controversy concerns section 4--1--4 of the

defendant's village code (Long Grove Village Code §4--1--4(b)

(1998)).  That section provided that, as a condition of the

issuance of a building permit, an applicant must pay to the

defendant $2,500 for the benefit of the elementary school district

in which the property for which the permit sought is located, $1,500 for the benefit of the high school district in which the

property for which the permit sought is located, and $3,300 to be

applied to the defendant's general fund.  See Long Grove Village

Code §4--1--4(b) (1998).

	Between September 8, 1994, and March 24, 1997, the plaintiffs

applied for and obtained 11 building permits by paying the required

impact fees.  On February 20, 1998, the plaintiffs applied for and

obtained another building permit.  On March 26, 1998, the

plaintiffs initiated their complaint.  The plaintiffs' original

complaint contained four counts.  On July 14, 2000, the plaintiffs

filed an amended single-count complaint seeking (1) a declaration

that the defendant did not have the statutory or constitutional

authority to charge an applicant $7,300 in impact fees for a

building permit and that, therefore, the defendant's practice of

doing so was ultra vires and (2) a refund of the fees they had paid.  

	On August 3, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the

Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2000)).  In its motion, the

defendant asserted that the plaintiffs' complaint was inundatedreplete with

conclusory statements rather than allegations of fact.  The trial

court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss but struck

paragraphs 21 through 27, 31, 32, and 36 through 39 of the

complaint.  

	On August 16, 2001, the defendant filed another section 2--615

motion to dismiss.  In this motion, the defendant asserted that the

plaintiffs' claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Local Governmental and Governmental 

Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-

-101 (West 2000)).  On October 11, 2001, the trial court dismissed

the plaintiffs' complaint as being timed barred by the Tort

Immunity Act.  Following the denial of its November 8, 2001, motion

to reconsider, the plaintiffs filed a timely appeal.

	The plaintiffs' first argument on appeal is that the trial

court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint as being time

barred by the one-year statute of limitation contained in section

8--101 of the Tort Immunity Act.  The plaintiffs argue that the

Tort Immunity Act and its one-year statute of limitations period is

inapplicable to the instant case.  

	At the outset, we note that the question presented by a section 2--615 motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the

complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which

relief can be granted.  Hough v. Kalousek, 279 Ill. App. 3d 855, 862 (1996).  Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction that requires

a plaintiff to present a legally and factually sufficient

complaint.  Hough, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 863.  The plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case, but must allege sufficient facts

to state all the elements of the asserted cause of action.  Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Tower Construction Co., 174 Ill. App. 3d 421, 433 (1988). 	When ruling on a section 2--615 motion to dismiss, the trial court should admit all well-pleaded facts as true and

disregard legal and factual conclusions that are unsupported by

allegations of fact.  Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 452, 456- 57 (1995).  If, after disregarding any legal and factual conclusions, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to

state a cause of action, the trial court must grant the motion to

dismiss.  Lake County Grading Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d at 457.  The standard of review on a section 2--615 dismissal is de novo.  T&S Signs, Inc. v. Village of Wadsworth, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083-84 (1994).

	We turn now to an analysis of the Tort Immunity Act itself. 

Traditionally, before the Tort Immunity Act, governmental entities

were immune from liability pursuant to the common-law doctrine of

sovereign immunity.  See 2 M. Pollelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort

Law §22.22 (2d ed. 1997).  However, in 1959, the Illinois Supreme

Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity with Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School District No. 302.  18 Ill. 2d 11, 25 (1959).  Then in 1969, in response to Molitor, our legislature enacted the Tort Immunity Act, which limited local governmental

entities' liability for tortious actions.  See 745 ILCS 10/1--101 et seq. (West 2000).  Finally, in 1970, our legislature adopted a new state constitution, which provided that "[e]xcept as the

General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity *** is

abolished."  See Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4.  Now, the tort

liability of a public entity is expressly controlled by both our

constitution and the Tort Immunity Act.  See Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 506 (1990).  

	Focusing on the Tort Immunity Act, we note that nowhere in the

Tort Immunity Act does it state that the Tort Immunity Act applies only to actions in tort.  745 ILCS 10/1--101 et seq. (West 2000).  In fact, its expressed purpose is to protect local public entities

and public employees from liability arising from the operation of

government.  745 ILCS 10/1--101.1(a) (West 2000).  Furthermore,

section 8--101 of the Act, its statute of limitations provision,

ambiguously provides:

		"No civil action may be commenced in any court against a

local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it

is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was

received or the cause of action accrued.  For purposes of this

Article, the term 'civil action' includes any action, whether

based upon the common law or statutes or Constitution of this

State."  745 ILCS 10/8--101 (West 2000).                

	Nonetheless, having previously visited this issue on several

occasions, we believe that the Tort Immunity Act, including its

limitations provision, applies only to actions in tort.  See

Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Kildeer, 302 Ill. App. 3d 304, 307 (1999)(the Tort Immunity Act's one-year statute of limitations

does not apply to nontortious civil actions); see also Dewitt v. McHenry County, 294 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1998) (same).  Looking at the full name of the Tort Immunity Act, the Local Governmental

and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, the legislative

intent to limit the Tort Immunity Act to matters of tort liability

seems quite apparent.  See Dewitt, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 716 (the official heading or title of a statute can provide guidance in

interpreting an ambiguous provision within the statute). 

Furthermore, putting the Tort Immunity Act in historical context, it is clear that the Tort Immunity Act was enacted to circumscribe

our local governmental entities' liability in tort.  However, there

is nothing in the legislative history of the Tort Immunity Act to

suggest that the Tort Immunity Act was enacted to limit our local

governmental entities' liability arising from contractual or

constitutional violations.  See Dewitt, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 716-17. In the case herein, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had

committed an ultra vires act and, thus, their cause of action was constitutional in nature rather than tortious.  Therefore, the

trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint as time-

barred by section 8--101 of the Tort Immunity Act.

	The plaintiffs' next argument on appeal is that the trial

court erred in striking certain portions of their complaint.  The

plaintiffs argue that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, the

stricken paragraphs consisted of factual allegations and not

conclusions.  

	Our careful review of the record reveals that the paragraphs

stricken from the plaintiffs' complaint were indeed comprised of

conclusory statements.  For example, the first paragraph stricken,

paragraph 21, alleged that "[t]he defendant would not have issued

the above referenced building permits to the plaintiffs without the

required donation."  Paragraph 21 was nothing more than a factual

conclusion.  As an additional example, the second paragraph

stricken, paragraph 22, alleged that the "[f]ailure of the

plaintiffs to obtain the above referenced building permits would

have been a breach of their contractual obligation to obtain the

building permits."  Paragraph 22 was nothing more than a legal conclusion.  As none of the stricken paragraphs contained well-

pleaded allegations of fact, the trial court did not err in

striking them.                     

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court

of Lake County is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for assignment to a different judge for further

proceedings consistent with this decision.

	Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

	CALLUM and KAPALA, JJ., concur.