[Cite as State v. Papotto, 2019-Ohio-5405.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ROBERT M. PAPOTTO 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 29188 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

STOW MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. 18 CRB 0426 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: December 31, 2019 

 

SCHAFER, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Robert Papotto, appeals from his conviction in the Stow 

Municipal Court. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} One afternoon, the police responded to a report of a fistfight between two men at a 

casino in Northfield. Papotto was one of the men involved in the fight and the other was W.K. 

When officers spoke with the men, they each identified the other as the initial aggressor. The 

officers, therefore, reviewed the casino’s security footage at the scene. Based on their review of 

the footage, the officers determined that Papotto was the aggressor. 

{¶3} Papotto was charged with one count of assault in violation of Northfield Village 

Codified Ordinance 636.02. He was appointed counsel and demanded a jury trial. On the day of 

trial, however, the State amended his charge to disorderly conduct in violation of R.C. 

2917.11(A)(1). Because the amended charge was a minor misdemeanor, the trial court dismissed 
2 

 

the jury and held a bench trial. At the conclusion of trial, the court found Papotto guilty and 

sentenced him to a fine. The court later granted his motion to stay the execution of his sentence 

for purposes of his appeal. 

{¶4} Papotto now appeals from his conviction and raises two assignments of error for 

our review. 

II. 

Assignment of Error I 

The trial court erred by being extremely prejudicial when she convicted 

Appellant of disorderly conduct. This conviction was unjust and decided by a 

judge who was hostile, aggressive and “in a hurry” in direct violation of his 

constitutional rights and the Ohio Codes of Judicial Conduct. 

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Papotto argues that he was prejudiced as a result of 

“unwarranted and egregious conduct” on the part of the trial judge. He asserts that he was denied 

a fair trial because the trial judge acted in a hostile and biased manner. For the following reasons, 

we reject his argument. 

{¶6} The issue of whether a conviction must be vacated due to bias or prejudice on the 

part of a trial judge is one that lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice of the 

Ohio Supreme Court. See State v. Polke, 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0061-M, 2019-Ohio-904, ¶ 

7; R.C. 2701.031. This Court lacks authority “to void a trial court’s judgment on the basis of 

personal bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge * * *.” State v. Hunter, 151 Ohio App.3d 

276, 2002-Ohio-7326, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), citing Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442 (1978). 

Nevertheless, we may determine whether conduct on the part of a trial judge denied a criminal 

defendant due process of law. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010284, 2017-

Ohio-4030, ¶ 8-13. “A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the 
3 

 

appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.” In re 

Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, ¶ 5. 

{¶7} Papotto argues that he was “severely prejudiced” at trial because the trial judge 

violated several canons of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct. According to Papotto, the judge 

acted in a hostile manner, chided him for wasting time, and rushed the proceedings to attend to a 

personal commitment. In support of his claim, he points to two affidavits that claim to recount 

statements made or exchanges had off the record. 

{¶8} Upon review, Papotto’s arguments must fail for three reasons. First, the statements 

and exchanges he cites that do not appear in the trial court record “are inappropriate for 

consideration on direct appeal.” State v. Zeber, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28481, 2017-Ohio-8987, ¶ 

8. That is because “[t]his Court’s review is limited to the record before us.” Easley v. Akron, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 28809, 2018-Ohio-2550, ¶ 5. Second, Papotto failed to object to any alleged 

misconduct on the part of the trial court judge and has not argued plain error on appeal. See Powell

at ¶ 12. He, therefore, forfeited those arguments, and this Court will not construct a claim of plain 

error on his behalf. See id,; State v. Butler, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23786, 2008-Ohio-781, ¶ 31. 

Finally, to the extent Papotto asks us to void his conviction because the trial judge violated certain 

ethical canons or was biased or prejudiced against him, we lack the authority to do so. See Hunter

at ¶ 18, citing Beer at 441-442. Relief was available to him, if at all, through a properly filed 

affidavit of disqualification. See R.C. 2701.031. Accordingly, his first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

Assignment of Error II 

The trial court erred by not granting the motion to withdraw filed by the 

Public Defender’s Office and appointing new counsel on the charge of [a]ssault 

and not continuing the proceedings to another day rendering Appellant left 

with ineffective assistance of counsel. 
4 

 

{¶9} In his second assignment of error, Papotto argues that the trial court erred when it 

failed to grant the motion to withdraw that defense counsel filed two days before trial. He argues 

that the court’s error caused him to receive ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney 

was unprepared, did not represent him to the best of his abilities, and failed to object when the 

court denied his request for a recess. According to Papotto, the trial court should have granted the 

motion to withdraw, continued the proceedings, and appointed him new counsel. Upon review, 

this Court rejects his argument. 

{¶10} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal 

defendant the right to counsel for his defense. Accord Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 

Yet, a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel if his sole charge is a minor misdemeanor 

for which no sentence of confinement is available. See State v. Roth, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 

17CA011083, 2018-Ohio-2564, ¶ 39. Because the State reduced Papotto’s original charge to a 

minor misdemeanor at the start of trial, he had no constitutional right to counsel. See id. Defense 

counsel continued to represent Papotto, but had no obligation to do so. Further, we would note 

that Papotto never objected to defense counsel’s continued representation or sought to represent 

himself. Because Papotto had no constitutional right to counsel and, in any event, failed to raise 

this issue with the trial court, we conclude that his argument lacks merit. As such, his second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶11} Papotto’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Stow Municipal 

Court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 
5 

 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Stow Municipal Court, 

County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this 

journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

ROBERT M. PAPOTTO, pro se, Appellant. 

BRADRIC T. BRYAN, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.