alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
CONSOLIDATED  BALANCE SHEET OF ISOLYSER  COMPANY,  INC. AS OF MARCH 31, 1997 AND
THE RELATED  CONSOLIDATED  STATEMENTS  OF EARNINGS  AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE THREE
MONTHS  ENDED MARCH 31,  1997,  AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          18147
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29426
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1755
<INVENTORY>                                     64750
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               113485
<PP&E>                                          89446
<DEPRECIATION>                                  14111
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 247687
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21798
<BONDS>                                         49726
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                           39
<OTHER-SE>                                     177742
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   247687
<SALES>                                         40003
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                40003
<CGS>                                           30846
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   30846
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                12258
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1020
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (3906)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        4
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (3910)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (3910)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.10)
        

</TABLE>
# Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2013Show full title

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2013 of 18 October 2013 establishing the standard import values for determining            the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables         

        - Previous
        - Next

U.K.

# Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1008/2013                     

# of 18 October 2013

# establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural                           markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation)(1),                        

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application                           of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors(2), and in particular Article 136(1) thereof,                        

Whereas:

(1)Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations,                              the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products                              and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU)                              No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its                              publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

# Article 1U.K.

The standard import values referred to in Article 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 are fixed in the Annex to                     this Regulation.                  

# Article 2U.K.

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.                  

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 October 2013.

*For the Commission, On behalf of the President*,                           

Jerzy Plewa                            

*Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development*                            

## ANNEXU.K.Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

1

OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.                           

2

OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.
STATE v. Daniel C. COVINGTON.

No. 103P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 8, 2007.

Kathleen U. Baldwin, Assistant Attorney General, Garland N. Yates, District Attorney, for State of NC.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 15th day of February 2007 by Defendant for "Petition for Review of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals' Action Signing Orders in Lieu of the Court of Appeals Judge Signing:"

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference this the 8th day of March 2007."
STATE of North Carolina v. Kenneth Joel CUPID.

No. 560PA05.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 19, 2006.

Michael D. Youth, Assistant Attorney General, R. Stuart Albright, District Attorney, for State of NC.

M. Alexander Charns, Durham, for Kenneth Joel Cupid.

*AMENDED ORDER*

Upon consideration of the conditional petition filed on the 18th day of October 2005 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

*388"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 19th day of December 2006."
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6598

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ADELSON MICHEL, a/k/a Cowboy, a/k/a Mike,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Abingdon. Glen E. Conrad, Chief

District Judge. (5:06-cr-00041-GEC-1; 5:10-cv-80281-GEC-BWC)

Submitted: September 17, 2012 Decided: October 3, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Adelson Michel, Appellant Pro Se. Grayson A. Hoffman, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Harrisonburg, Virginia; Joseph W. H. 

Mott, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, 

for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Adelson Michel seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Michel has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHNNY MASLI,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-74432

Agency No. A078-020-251

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 19, 2010** 

Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

Johnny Masli, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

FILED

JUL 30 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 07-74432

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, Nagoulko

v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003), and we deny the petition for review. 

The record does not compel the conclusion that changed circumstances

excused the untimely filing of Masli’s asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.4(a)(4); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 656-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam). Accordingly, Masli’s asylum claim fails. 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal

because Masli’s experiences of threats and a robbery did not rise to the level of

past persecution, see Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016-18, and Masli failed to

demonstrate it is more likely than not he will be persecuted as a moderate Muslim

or as an Americanized Indonesian, see Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1184-85

(9th Cir. 2003).

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Masli is not

entitled to CAT relief because he failed to establish it is more likely than not he

will be tortured if he returns to Indonesia. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049,

1068 (9th Cir. 2009).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
B. FLETCHER, concurring:

I specially concur to express my disapproval of the government’s unfair

treatment of aliens who are directed to register under the NSEERS registration

program. Although an alien may be completely law-abiding except for his illegal

presence, the government uses the information provided in the NSEERS registry to

order deportation. This is plain entrapment and unworthy of our government. The

result is that only the most worthy and law-abiding are caught - the least worthy go

free.

FILED

JUL 30 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
#### Cynthia Johnson, Respondent, v Tryax Realty Management et al., Respondents, and Epic Security Corp., Appellant.

[800 NYS2d 395]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan J. Saks, J.), entered December 13, 2004, which denied the motion by defendant Epic Security Corp. (Epic) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims as against it, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted and the remainder of the action severed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly in favor of Epic.

Plaintiff alleges that, on October 12, 2000, she was assaulted at 141-153 West 139th Street in Manhattan, a building managed by defendant Tryax Realty Management (Tryax). Under a contract between Tryax and Epic, Epic was required to provide security services at locations to be specified by Tryax during the relevant period. Although Tryax had submitted a work order, dated September 25, 2000, directing Epic to provide security at the subject building commencing on October 1, 2000, the record establishes that Tryax canceled this work order on September 29, 2000. Since Epic had no obligation to provide security at the subject building on the date of the assault on plaintiff, there is no basis for holding Epic liable for plaintiff’s injuries. The speculation of Tryax’s building manager that Epic, although not required to station a security guard at the building when the assault occurred, possibly had a “roving” presence at the building at or around that time, is insufficient to raise a triable issue. Accordingly, Epic is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims as against it. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3120 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3120

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the income 
 limitation for qualified performing artists eligible for an above-the-
                line deduction for performance expenses.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 12, 2008

 Mr. Schumer (for himself and Mrs. Feinstein) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the income 
 limitation for qualified performing artists eligible for an above-the-
                line deduction for performance expenses.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASED INCOME LIMITATION FOR QUALIFIED PERFORMING ARTISTS 
              ELIGIBLE FOR ABOVE-THE-LINE DEDUCTION FOR PERFORMANCE 
              EXPENSES.

    (a) In General.--Section 62(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(defining qualified performing artist) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``$16,000'' in paragraph (1)(C) and 
        inserting ``$30,000'',
            (2) by striking subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) and 
        inserting the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(B) Application of paragraph (1).--In the case of 
                a joint return--
                            ``(i) paragraph (1) shall be applied 
                        separately with respect to each spouse, and
                            ``(ii) paragraph (1)(C) shall be applied 
                        with respect to one-half of their combined 
                        adjusted gross income.'', and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(4) Inflation adjustment.--In the case of any taxable 
        year beginning in a calendar year after 2008, the dollar amount 
        contained in paragraph (1)(C) shall be increased by an amount 
        equal to--
                    ``(A) such dollar amount, multiplied by
                    ``(B) the cost-of-living adjustment determined 
                under section 1(f)(3) for the calendar year in which 
                the taxable year begins, determined by substituting 
                `calendar year 2007' for `calendar year 1992' in 
                subparagraph (B) thereof.
        Any increase determined under the preceding sentence shall be 
        rounded to the nearest multiple of $50.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2007.
                                 <all>
```
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 2107

AVERY M. RIGGSBEE , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. W. BAIN JONES, JR., Judge; GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF NON STOP PAY OUT , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. William L. Osteen, Jr. , District Judge. ( 1:16

- cv - 00444

- WO

- LPA )

Submitted : December 19, 2017 Decided: December 21, 2017

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Avery M. Riggsbee, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Avery M. Riggsbee appeals the district court’s order dismissing his action for failure t o timely and fully comply with the magistrate judge’s order to correct significant procedural errors in his complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order may warrant involuntary dismissal. Id. We review such a dismissal for abuse of discretion. Ballard v. Carlson , 882 F.2d 93, 95

- 96 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that dismissal is appropriate sanction where litigant disregarded court order despite warning that failure to comply with order would result in dismissal). Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to dismiss Riggsbee’s complaint. We therefore grant leave to proceed in forma paupe ris and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Riggsbee v. Jones , No. 1:16

- cv 00444

- WO

- LPA (M.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th e court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
A FFIRMED
IN RE A.J.Y.-E.

No. COA06-568.

North Carolina Court of Appeals.

Filed February 20, 2007.

Certification Date March 12, 2007.

Appeal from Mecklenburg (05J446).

Case reported without published opinion. Affirmed in part; remanded in part.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Boysie March, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 209]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Michael E. Daley, J.), rendered August 27, 2003. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the second degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]). Although the contention of defendant that he was denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of his first attorney’s failure to notify the People that he wished to testify before the grand jury depends on facts outside the record and therefore must be raised by way of a motion pursuant to CPL article 440 *(see People v Bryant,*1 AD3d 966 [2003]; *People v Nicholson,*269 AD2d 868, 869 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 907 [2000]; *People v Parker,*220 AD2d 815, 817 [1995], *lv denied*87 NY2d 1023 [1996]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s contention would not require reversal in any event. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s contention survives the guilty plea *(see Bryant,*1 AD3d at 966), we conclude that “defense counsel’s failure to notify the People that defendant wished to testify before the grand jury does not, by itself, amount to ineffective assistance of counsel” *(People v Dennis,*
      *1394295 AD2d 755, 756 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 534 [2002]; *see People v Wiggins,*89 NY2d 872, 873 [1996]). We further reject defendant’s contention concerning the alleged factual insufficiency of the plea allocution. “[W]here, as here, defendant pleads guilty to a crime less than that charged in the indictment, a factual colloquy is not required” *(People v Harris,*233 AD2d 959, 959 [1996], *lv denied*89 NY2d 1094 [1997]; *see People v Zimmerman,*219 AD2d 848 [1995], *lv denied*88 NY2d 856 [1996]; *see also People v Clairborne,*29 NY2d 950, 951 [1972]). Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Gorski, Smith and Lawton, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1





TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.





OFFICER’S CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18 U.S.C. 1350)





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (the “Company”) for the quarter ended February 28, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Robert M. McMurrey, Chief Executive Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, that, to the best of his knowledge:





1.           The Report is in full compliances with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





/s/Robert M. McMurreyRobert M. McMurreyChief Executive OfficerApril 14, 2011
II 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3104 

To require that all individuals convicted of a felony under State law provide 

a DNA sample. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 10, 2008 

Mr. VITTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To require that all individuals convicted of a felony under 

State law provide a DNA sample. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘DNA Felony Collection 

5 Act of 2008’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DNA COLLECTION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General of the 

8 United States shall enter into an agreement with each 

9 State under which the State shall— 


erowe on PRODPC61 with BILLS
2 

•S 3104 IS

1 (1) collect a DNA sample from each individual 

2 convicted of a felony under the laws of the State; 

3 and 

4 (2) include the results of a DNA analysis of 

5 each DNA sample collected under paragraph (1) in 

6 an index of DNA analysis records maintained by the 

7 State or by the Federal Government. 

8 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

9 (1) the terms ‘‘DNA analysis’’ and ‘‘DNA sam10 ple’’ have the meanings given those term in section 

11 3(c) of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act 

12 of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14135a(c)); and 

13 (2) the term ‘‘State’’ means any State of the 

14 United States, the District of Columbia, the Com15 monwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 

16 Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the 

17 Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the 

18 United States. 

Æ 


erowe on PRODPC61 with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended.





Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as added by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended, the undersigned officer of DXP Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certifies that the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)), and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:  March 23, 2010





/s/David R. Little


David R. Little


President and Chief Executive Officer








The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.