In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-3473

Michael Downey,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 98-1118--Michael M. Mihm, Judge.

On Petition for Rehearing and 

Rehearing En Banc

 Before Easterbrook, Rovner, and Diane P.

Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Per Curiam. State Farm has filed a

petition for rehearing, with the support

of the Federal Emergency Management

Agency as amicus curiae. The fema contends

that our conclusion with respect to the

jurisdictional issue--that suits seeking

indemnity on flood insurance policies may

be filed under 28 U.S.C. sec.1331 because

the interests of the United States are at

stake, but not under 42 U.S.C. sec.4072

unless the Director of fema is named as a

defendant--"does great harm to the

National Flood Insurance Program." With

all due respect to the fema’s position, we

think that this considerably overstates

matters.

 According to the fema, our decision has

three adverse consequences: first, it

will induce insureds to sue the Director,

which will strain available federal

resources; second, it will allow insureds

to sue in state court despite the

exclusive-jurisdiction language in

sec.4072; third, it will allow insureds

to delay suit past the one-year period of

limitations in sec.4072. Our decision has

none of these consequences, however.

 First, the possibility of suit directly

against the Director is created not by

our decision but by the language of
sec.4072 itself. It is an option,

however, only when the Director has

disallowed a claim. According to the

fema’s amicus brief, the Director deals

directly with claims in only some 5% of

all cases; in the remainder, therefore,

sec.4072 does not permit suit against the

Director. Our opinion does not increase

the Director’s exposure beyond what the

statute itself provides. What we held is

instead that sec.4072 does not allow

suits directly against insurers, which

cannot be called "the Director" even when

they administer the program on behalf of

the fema. Nothing in the amicus brief

persuades us that we should disregard the

express language of sec.4072 and treat it

as creating federal jurisdiction over

suits against private insurers. Private

entities often carry out governmental

programs, but statutes authorizing suit

against the Secretary of Defense do not

create jurisdiction over litigation

against defense contractors, and laws

permitting suit against the Administrator

of Social Security do not create

jurisdiction of litigation against the

private fiscal intermediaries in the

Medicare program. We see no good reason

why sec.4072 should be read to mean

something that it does not say.

 Second, the possibility of suit in state

court is hardly a major concern, given

the option of removal under 28 U.S.C.

sec.1441(b). All claims seeking indemnity

under flood insurance policies arise

under federal law, we held, and therefore

all may be removed. That is not all: The

fema can, and did, preclude filing in

state court in the first place. Insureds

and insurers alike must live by the

language in the policies--language that

has been established by federal

regulation. Like every other residential

flood insurance policy, Downey’s

provided: "you must file [any] suit in

the United States District Court of the

district in which the insured property

was located at the time of loss." 44

C.F.R. Part 61, App. A(1), Article 9,

Clause R. This forum-selection clause is

enforceable, see Carnival Cruise Lines,

Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), and

prevents litigation in state court just

as sec.4072 would do.

 Third, the amicus brief’s concern about

delay in filing suit is addressed by the

same clause of the policy. It provides:
"[i]f you do sue, you must start the suit

within 12 months from the date we mailed

you notice that we have denied your

claim". The fema’s brief, though full of

dire predictions, pays no attention to

language in the policy that prevents the

outcomes about which the fema expresses

such concern. Has the fema forgotten the

terms of its own regulations? At all

events, it is unnecessary for us to grant

rehearing and warp the language of

sec.4072 in order to bring about a state

of affairs that the fema has achieved

byregulation without inflicting any

distress on the United States Code.

 All three members of the panel have

voted to deny rehearing, and no judge in

active service has called for a vote on

the petition for rehearing en banc.

Rehearing and rehearing en banc are

accordingly denied.