alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5347 

To suspend temporarily the duty on metsulfuron-methyl. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 12, 2008 

Mrs. BIGGERT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on metsulfuron-methyl. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. METSULFURON-METHYL. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Methyl 2-[[[[(4-methoxy-6- 

methyl-1,3,5-triazin-2-yl) 

amino]carbonyl]amino] 

sulfonyl]benzoate (CAS No. 

74223–64–6), in pure form 

or in forms or packings for 

retail sale, preparations or 

articles (provided for in subheadings 2935.00.75 or 

3808.30.15) ........................... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2011 ’’. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
2 

•HR 5347 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to articles entered, or withdrawn 

3 from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
#### Joseph Schachter, Respondent, v Royal Insurance Company of America, Doing Business as Royal & Sunalliance Insurance Company, Appellant.

[801 NYS2d 372]

*1025In an action to recover damages for breach of an insurance contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Harkayy, J.), dated June 30, 2004, which, in effect, granted the plaintiff leave to discontinue the action and directed the parties to proceed with an appraisal of the amount of the property damage allegedly sustained, and denied as academic the defendant’s motion to strike the note of issue, the plaintiffs cross motion to strike the first affirmative defense of a contractual limitations period, and the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the contractual period of limitations for commencing suit had expired.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, leave to discontinue the action is denied, the plaintiffs cross motion to strike the first affirmative defense is denied, the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, and the defendant’s motion to strike the note of issue is denied as academic.

The defendant established its entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the action was commenced after the two-year limitations period contained in the subject insurance policy had expired *(see Don’s Corp. v Commercial Union Ins. Cos.,*300 AD2d 535 [2002]; *Brown v Royal Ins. Co. of Am.,*210 AD2d 279 [1994]). In response, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant waived its right to assert, or should have been estopped from asserting, the limitations period as a defense *(see Neary v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*17 AD3d 331 [2005]; *Raniolo v Travelers Indem. Co.,*279 AD2d 514 [2001]).

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff leave to discontinue the action and directing the parties to proceed with the appraisal process contained in a separate section of the insurance policy, since it would allow the plaintiff to avoid the adverse consequences of having commenced an untimely action *(see Venture I, Inc. v Voutsinas, 8*AD3d 475 [2004]; *Casey v Custom Crushing & Materials,*309 AD2d 726 [2003]).

Since the complaint should have been dismissed as time-barred, the defendant’s motion to strike the note of issue should have been denied as academic. H. Miller, J.P., S. Miller, Goldstein, Mastro and Lifson, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 21, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51696

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MARIO DEWAYNE WILLIAMS

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:06-CR-128-ALL

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mario Dewayne Williams appeals the sentence imposed following his

guilty-plea conviction for felony possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922 & 924(a)(2). He argues that the district court erred in enhancing his

offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2005) after finding that his

possession of the firearm was in connection with another felony offense, namely

the distribution of crack cocaine. We review the district court’s application of the
No. 06-51696

2

Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United

States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005). 

The district court did not clearly err when it adopted the presentence

report’s (PSR) finding that Williams possessed the weapon in connection with

the distribution of a controlled substance. During the sentencing hearing,

Anthony Lourence, a police detective,testified that a confidential informanttold

him that Williams and Tyson Burris were selling drugs from a hotel. That

information was corroborated by the fact that the informant made a controlled

purchase of drugs from Burris at the hotel, that Burris and Williams then left

the hotel together, and that drugs and a scale with drug residue on it were found

in the vehicle driven by Williams. Williams did not present any rebuttal

evidence demonstrating thatthe information in the PSR was materially untrue,

inaccurate, or unreliable. See United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 329 (5th

Cir. 1998). Absent such rebuttal evidence, the district court’s reliance on the

PSR and Lourence’s testimony was proper, and the district court’s factual

finding thatthe firearm was related to the distribution of drugs by Williams and

Burris was not implausible in light of the record as a whole. See Parker, 133

F.3d at 329; United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1199 (5th Cir. 1994).

Williams’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
### NUMBER S 13 - 1 2 - 00 193 - CR ; 13 - 1 2 - 00 194 - CR ; 13 - 12 - 00195 - CR; AND 13 - 12 - 00196 - CR 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JOSEPH SYLVESTER TURNER , Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.

On appeal from the 2 4 th District Court of Jackson County, Texas

.


## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides , Vela, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant, Joseph Sylvester Turner , attempts to appeal conviction s for delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance

. The trial court has certified in these case s that this A is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right2

of appeal , @ and A the defendant has waived the right of appeal. @ See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 25.2(a)(2). On March 23, 2012 , this Court notified appellant = s counsel of the trial court = s certification s and ordered counsel to: (1) review the record; (2) determine whether appellant has a right to appeal; and (3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel = s findings as to whether appellant has a right to appeal, or, alternatively, advise this Court as to th e existence of any amended certification s

. On April 30, 2012 , counsel filed a letter brief with this Court. Counsel = s response does not establish that the certification s currently on file with this Court are incorrect or that appellant otherwise has a right to appeal. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appeal must be dismissed if the trial court = s certification does not show that the defendant has the right of appeal. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25 .2(d); see T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. Accordingly, th ese appeal s are DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).
D elivered and filed the 1 0 th day of May , 20 1 2

.
# Council Decision of 4 February 2013 appointing a Danish alternate member of the Committee of the Regions (2013/75/EU)

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U.K.

# Council Decision

# of 4 February 2013

# appointing a Danish alternate member of the Committee of the Regions

# (2013/75/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Danish Government,

Whereas:

(1)On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU(1) and 2010/29/EU(2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January                              2015.

(2)An alternate member’s seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr                              Martin MERRILD,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

# Article 1U.K.

The following is hereby appointed as alternate member to the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term                     of office, which runs until 25 January 2015:                  
          -  Mr Erik FLYVHOLM, *Borgmester i Lemvig Kommune*.                         

# Article 2U.K.

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 4 February 2013.

*For the Council*                            

*The President*                            

E. Gilmore                            

1

OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 22.                           

2

OJ L 12, 19.1.2010, p. 11.
# Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 124/2013Show full title

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 124/2013 of 12 February 2013 establishing the standard import values for determining            the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables         

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U.K.

# Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 124/2013                     

# of 12 February 2013

# establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural                           markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation)(1),                        

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application                           of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors(2), and in particular Article 136(1) thereof,                        

Whereas:

(1)Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations,                              the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products                              and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

(2)The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU)                              No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its                              publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

# Article 1U.K.

The standard import values referred to in Article 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 are fixed in the Annex to                     this Regulation.                  

# Article 2U.K.

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.                  

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 12 February 2013.

*For the Commission, On behalf of the President*,                           

José Manuel Silva Rodríguez                            

*Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development*                            

## ANNEXU.K.Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

1

OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.                           

2

OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.
#### CGU Insurance Company, Appellant, v John T. Nothnagle, Inc., Doing Business as Nothnagle Realtors, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 2.)

[801 NYS2d 225]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas A. Stander, J.), *1280entered December 2, 2004. The order denied plaintiffs motion for leave to renew.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs for the reasons stated in decision at Supreme Court. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
IN RE S.P.

No. COA06-1082

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Filed April 17, 2007

Certification Date May 7, 2007

Appeal from Pitt (03JT32).

Cases reported without published opinion. Affirmed.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SS.1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofOrphan Medical, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period endedSeptember 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, John H. Bullion, Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.                    TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                    Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
|   | /s/ John H. Bullion     |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   | John H. Bullion         |
|   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   | November 9, 2004        |

 

1

----
EXHIBIT 99.1








Contact:
Robert E. Wheaton

President, CEO

Star Buffet, Inc.

(480) 425-0397




FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  Monday, May 10, 2010








STAR BUFFET, INC. FILES FORM 10-K FOR FY 2010





SCOTTSDALE, AZ – May 10, 2010 – Star Buffet, Inc. (NASDAQ: STRZ) today filed a Form 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission for its fiscal year ending January 25, 2010.  Following are the highlights:





Star Buffet, Inc. had revenues of $78.0 million and net loss of ($2,035,000), or ($0.63) per share on a diluted basis, for the fifty-two weeks ended January 25, 2010.





About Star Buffet





Star Buffet is a multi-concept restaurant operator.  As of May 10, 2010, Star Buffet through eleven independently capitalized subsidiaries, operates 12 Barnhill’s Buffet restaurants, seven JB’s restaurants, five franchised HomeTown Buffets, five 4B’s restaurants, three K-BOB’S Steakhouses, three BuddyFreddys restaurants, two Casa Bonita Mexican theme restaurants, two Whistle Junction restaurants, one Western Sizzlin restaurant,  one Holiday House restaurant, one JJ North’s Grand Buffet, one Pecos Diamond Steakhouse and one Bar-H Steakhouse.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Gerald R. Tuskey, Chief Financial Officer of Eurasia Energy Limited, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Eurasia Energy Limited;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(d)) for the small business issuer and have:



(a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c)

disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.









May 14, 2007

/s/Gerald R. Tuskey

Date

Gerald R. Tuskey,

Chief Financial Officer and Director
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
REGISTRANT'S UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN ITS REPORT ON FORM 10-Q
FOR THE  QUARTERLY  PERIOD  ENDED  SEPTEMBER  30, 1996 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000929299
<NAME> ISOLYSER COMPANY, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                              22,038<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       26,383<F2>
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                         66,499
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   121,431
<PP&E>                                              75,513
<DEPRECIATION>                                      11,061
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     259,157
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               24,529
<BONDS>                                             39,051
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                39
<OTHER-SE>                                         191,398
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       259,166
<SALES>                                            123,598
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                               88,555
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       88,555
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    40,104
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   1,829
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (7,022)
<INCOME-TAX>                                          (490)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (6,532)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       (575)
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (7,107)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (0.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.18)
<FN>
<F1> INCLUDES CASH EQUIVALENTS.
<F2> ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ARE SHOWN NET OF ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
STATE v. LAKEY.

No. COA06-602.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed February 6, 2007.

Certification Date February 26, 2007.

Appeal from the Cumberland (04CRS62180).

Case Reported Without Published Opinion. No error.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN LAMONT BARKSDALE

No. 7P07.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 27, 2007.

J. Clark Fischer, Winston-Salem, for Barksdale.

*847Daniel P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Keith, District Attorney, for State of NC.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 8th day of January 2007 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 27th day of June 2007."

HUDSON, J., recused.