J-E01013-20

2020 PA Super 200

IN THE INT. OF: K.M.W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.W.R., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1537 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 13-AD-2019, 

CP-22-DP-98-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., 

NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and 

McCAFFERY, J.

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2020

I agree with the Majority that this case should not be quashed based on 

Walker1 and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating 

Mother’s parental rights and changing the goal from reunification to adoption. 

However, I disagree with the Majority’s reliance on this Court’s decision in 

Larkin and Stansbury as its basis for an exception to the bright-line rule set 

forth by our Supreme Court in Walker. 

In Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), 

this Court declined to quash under Walker due to a “breakdown in court 

operations” – the breakdown being the PCRA court’s statement to the 

appellant that he could file a singular notice of appeal, rather than plural 

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1 See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018).
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notices of appeal because the order contained multiple docket numbers.

Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 159-60 (“we may overlook the defective nature of 

Appellant’s timely notice of appeal rather than quash pursuant to Walker”); 

see also Commonwealth v. Larkin, __ A.3d __, 2020 WL 3869710, at *6

(Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (same). This Court has frequently cited and 

relied upon Stansbury because it affords appellants a reprieve from the 

“bright-line” rule of Walker, and a popular means for this Court to circumvent 

Walker when the trial judge advises a defendant of the right to file a notice 

of appeal rather than notices, when the order or judgment contains more than 

one docket number — resulting in a “breakdown in court operations.”

Instead, I would base my decision not to quash Mother’s appeal on the 

reasoning recited in In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009), which I 

find much more persuasive than Stansbury. As the Majority points out, in 

K.T.E.L., the appellant failed to file a concise statement of matters complained

of on appeal contemporaneously with her notice of appeal as required by 

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2), and thus rendered the appellant’s notice 

of appeal procedurally defective. See K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d at 747 (holding that 

an appellant’s failure to file a simultaneous concise statement and notice of 

appeal violated Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2) and, as such, is 

defective). K.T.E.L., however, declined to adopt a per se rule requiring 

automatic quashal or dismissal of children’s fast track cases for such a failure. 

Id. Rather, we held that a disposition must be “decided on a case-by-case 
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basis” because Rules 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2) are “procedural, not 

jurisdictional.” Id. 

Likewise, I view an appellant’s non-compliance with Rule 341 to be a

procedural, not jurisdictional, defect. See also Walker, 185 A.3d at 976 

(describing Rule 341 as a “[p]rocedural rule,” which “should be construed to 

give effect to all their provisions. . . .”). We are not divested of jurisdiction 

by non-compliance; failure to comply with Rule 341 results in a defective 

notice of appeal. Further, because this is a children’s fast track case, “[t]he 

extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly, 

and clearly would be inappropriate when there has been substantial 

compliance with the rules. . . .” K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d at 747. Accordingly, I 

respectfully concur.