AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed August 19, 2013.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-12-00491-CR

CLOVIS BRAXTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F11-00729-H

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans 

Opinion by Justice Evans

A jury convicted Clovis Braxton of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ 

confinement. Appellant complains in a single issue that the evidence against him is legally 

insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. The background of 

the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit 

recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Two witnesses claimed they saw appellant participate in the murder of Walter McGee. 

Elaine Turner, McGee’s neighbor and acquaintance for approximately twenty years, stated that 

she saw appellant fire a pistol at the ground near McGee and then saw appellant and David 
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Craddock beat McGee with two-by-fours. According to Turner, appellant and Craddock were 

arguing with McGee about money before they began to assault him. She stated that McGee gave 

the men the money he had in his pocket, but “it didn’t stop the argument.” She stated that she 

picked up the gun that appellant had set down and fired it into the air in an attempt to stop the 

beating, then she fled to her backyard. She claimed she saw appellant get into a car to leave the 

scene. 

Turner admitted that she had been employed by Craddock to sell drugs out of her house. 

She also admitted that when she gave a statement to police she never referred to Craddock by his 

name but instead referred to him as the “stocky guy.” She was afraid of what Craddock might do 

to her. Turner claimed she did not tell police she shot the gun in the air because she was on 

probation at the time and did not want any trouble for shooting a loaded weapon. 

In addition, Turner testified that she used both crack cocaine and heroin at the time of the 

offense, although she claimed she was sober at trial. She also admitted that she was “paranoid 

schizophrenic, manic depressant, and bipolar.” She stated that she takes medication for her 

mental illnesses. A video admitted into evidence of her reviewing a photographic lineup shows 

Turner talking to herself. Turner acknowledged that she sometimes hears hallucinated voices. 

She stated that, despite the fact that police came to the scene of the attack, she did not reveal 

what she had witnessed until hours later when she flagged down police officers on horseback 

patrolling her street. She claimed she was in too much shock after the offense to speak to police. 

Turner testified that she had known appellant for about four to five months before 

McGee’s death. She had witnessed Craddock beating McGee with a two-by-four earlier the 

same week because McGee owed Craddock money. Turner stated that appellant was not present 

during that assault. 
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Alonzo Ruben, appellant’s cousin, also testified that he witnessed the murder. According 

to Ruben, McGee1had given appellant a “fake” hundred dollar bill and the two were arguing 

about it when “an old lady and another dude showed up.” According to Ruben, the argument 

escalated and appellant fired a gun at the ground. Ruben recalled the gun being shot just one 

time. At that point, he tried to break up the argument. Afterward, Ruben claimed, appellant and 

the other man beat McGee with sticks that looked like lumber. Ruben witnessed the woman go 

into her house after appellant and the other man beat McGee. Ruben testified that he and 

appellant left from the scene separately. According to Ruben, when he and appellant talked the 

next day, both were unaware that McGee had died. 

Ruben admitted that he was awaiting trial in an unrelated murder case and was hopeful 

that his testimony would be viewed favorably by the State. He admitted he had lied to police 

when he stated that he had not seen a gun during the attack; he claimed he did not “want to bring 

up a gun” to police but did not know why he lied about the gun. He stated that he had been 

smoking PCP at the scene. He also admitted that he had been diagnosed as paranoid 

schizophrenic. He had taken medication for his mental condition on the day of the offense. He 

admitted that he sometimes experiences aural and visual hallucinations but stated that the 

medications stop the hallucinations.

When McGee’s body was discovered by police, he was still conscious and lying on top of 

a two-by four. He told officers at the scene “that he had been shooting dice, he had won some 

money, that he had left the location, he had been followed to [the scene], and two guys had 

beaten him up and taken his money.” He stated only that “two black guys” had attacked him. 

When an autopsy was performed on McGee’s body, it was determined his death was caused by 

 

1

Ruben did not identify McGee specifically, but rather referred to him only as the “old dude.” His testimony, however, related to 

appellant’s actions against McGee at the date and time of McGee’s murder, so for simplicity we will refer to McGee by his name.
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blunt force injuries. The forensic pathologist who testified stated that the injuries could have 

been caused by a two-by-four or by hands and/or feet. 

After appellant was developed as a suspect in the case, police conducted surveillance on 

his girlfriend in order to arrest him. When officers in marked police vests approached him in the 

parking lot of an apartment complex, he fled on foot and led police on a chase that lasted close to 

one hour. When appellant could not be found, they obtained his cell phone information and 

began to track him through the GPS on his phone. Hours later, they found him hiding under a 

tractor-trailer in the docking area behind a grocery store. After a small struggle, the officers 

apprehended appellant. Appellant gave a statement to police in which he admitted that McGee 

had given him a fake hundred dollar bill. Appellant claimed he had accepted forty dollars from 

McGee and left McGee without hurting him. Appellant claimed he did not know who had 

assaulted McGee and he did not know if Craddock had a “beef” with McGee.

A recorded phone call by Craddock to his girlfriend was admitted into evidence. In it, 

Craddock admitted that he had beaten McGee but also implied that he had done so with another 

man. He never mentioned appellant’s name, but he did state that McGee had given someone a 

fake hundred dollar bill.

ANALYSIS

Appellant’s sole issue alleges that the evidence against him is insufficient to support his 

conviction for murder. He specifically complains that the evidence shows only Craddock’s guilt 

for the offense and that the testimony of Turner and Ruben is too unreliable to constitute legally 

sufficient proof of his guilt. The Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only 

standard we apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a 

criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (discussing Jackson v. 
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Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)). This standard requires the reviewing court to determine whether, 

considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally 

justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 899. We defer to the jury's 

determinations of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because 

the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Id.; Bell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2010, pet. ref’d, untimely filed). Under the law of parties, a person is criminally 

responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with the intent to 

promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts 

to aid the other person to commit the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 

2011). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence in this case showed

McGee had given appellant a counterfeit one-hundred-dollar bill, and appellant was not happy 

about it. Appellant first shot a gun near McGee, then he and Craddock beat McGee with two-byfours before he fled the scene. He then hid from police until he was discovered. The credibility 

of Turner and Ruben was for the jury to decide, and we must defer to their determination. The 

evidence is legally sufficient. We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him. We affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

120491F.U05

/David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

CLOVIS BRAXTON, Appellant

No. 05-12-00491-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

No. 1, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F11-00729-H.

Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. 

Justices Lang and Myers participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 19th day of August, 2013.

/David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE