In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 17-2667

SHERARD MARTIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAVIS MARINEZ, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15-CV-04576 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2019

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Sherard Martin appeals the district

court’s grant of partial summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,

on his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Chicago

and several of its police officers for false arrest and unlawful

search. Martin’s suit proceeded to trial, where a jury awarded

him $1.00 in damages after finding that two of the defendants
2 No. 17-2667

lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain him.

The jury found against Martin and in favor of the officers on

the remainder of his claims. Martin appeals, challenging only

the district court’s pretrial grant of partial summary judgment

to the defendants, which limited the damages Martin could

seek at trial. We affirm. 

I.

Martin’s suit arises from a traffic stop in May 2013. We

recount the facts surrounding the stop and subsequent events

in the light most favorable to Martin, noting disputed facts

where relevant and viewing the facts on which the jury

reached a verdict in the light most favorable to the verdict. On

the evening of May 24, 2013, Martin was driving in Chicago

when Officers Davis Marinez and Sofia Gonzalez pulled him

over. According to Martin, he had not committed any traffic

violations when the officers stopped him, although the officers

claim they initiated the stop because Martin’s tail and brake

lights were not working. When Officer Gonzalez approached

the car and asked Martin for his license and insurance, Martin

explained that he did not have his driver’s license because it

had been “taken for a ticket.” At that point both officers asked

Martin to step out of the car as the other defendants, Officers

Armando Chagoya and Elvis Turcinovic, arrived on the scene. 

According to Martin, the officers forced him from the car,

conducted a pat-down search, handcuffed him, and put him

into a police car. At that point, they searched his car, where
No. 17-2667 3

they recovered a 9 mm semiautomatic handgun with a defaced

serial number, and a plastic baggie of crack cocaine.1

Officers then took Martin into custody. At the police

station, Officer Marinez learned that Martin had previously

been convicted of first-degree murder and unlawful use of a

weapon by a convicted felon. Ultimately Martin was transferred to Cook County Jail and charged with four Illinois

felonies: (i) being an armed habitual criminal in violation of 720

ILCS § 5/24-1.7; (ii) being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 720 ILCS § 5/24-1.1; (iii) possessing a firearm with

a defaced serial number in violation of 720 ILCS § 5/24-5(b);

and possessing cocaine in violation of 720 ILCS § 570/402. He

also received traffic citations under Chicago Municipal Code

Section 9-76-050 (taillight operation) and 625 ILCS § 5/6-112

(outlining requirement to carry a driver’s license). Id.

Martin spent sixty-fivedays—from May 24 through July 29,

2013—incarcerated in connection with the charges resulting

from the traffic stop. On July 29th, a different court revoked

Martin’s bond when he was convicted in an unrelated criminal

case. During the course of the criminal proceedings for the

felony charges arising from the traffic stop, Martin filed a

motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted

on November 7, 2013. The state then dismissed the charges

against Martin through a nolle prosequi motion.

1

In the officers’ version of events, they spotted a handgun between

Martin’s legs as he stepped out of his car and placed him immediately into

custody. Officer Chagoya claims to have found the plastic baggie of crack

cocaine as well as $400 when he searched the car prior to having it

impounded.
4 No. 17-2667

Martin filed this suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against all of the officers involved in the stop as well as the

City of Chicago (on a respondeat superior theory of liability),

seeking money damages for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Martin sought civil damages totaling $110,500: 

$1,000 per day of his 65-day incarceration and $45,500 in lost

business income—calculated at $700 per day—from his

automobile dealership. 

Before trial, the defendants moved for partial summary

judgment, arguing that even if the stop was unlawful, once the

officers saw the handgun and cocaine, they had probable cause

for Martin’s arrest, which limited Martin’s damages to the

short period between his stop and his arrest. The district court

agreed, granting the defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment and concluding that although Martin’s § 1983 case

could proceed as to the initial stop of his car and seizure of his

person—before the defendants discovered the illegal gun and

cocaine—he could not seek damages for conduct post-dating

the discovery of contraband, including his 65-day incarceration.

Martin’s case proceeded to a jury trial, limited as described

above by the grant of partial summary judgment. At trial, the

facts largely tracked those described above, with the same

basic areas of conflicting testimony: (1) Martin testified that his

tail and brake lights were both functioning when he was

stopped; (2) he also testified that he handed Officer Gonzalez

his traffic ticket when he was unable to produce his license;

and (3) Martin maintained that the handgun was under the

driver’s seat, as opposed to on it and visible when he stepped

out of the car as directed by Officers Gonzalez and Marinez.
No. 17-2667 5

The district court instructed the jury to decide the following

Fourth Amendment questions: (1) whether the officers

“unlawfully seized” Martin without reasonable suspicion to

support a traffic stop; (2) whether they falsely arrested him

without probable cause; or (3) whether they unlawfully

searched his person or car without probable cause. The court

also instructed the jury that if they found that Martin proved

his claims, they could not award him damages for any time

spent in custody after officers found the handgun, and should

limit their consideration to the period of detention beginning

with his traffic stop and ending when they found the gun. The

jury found in favor of Martin and against Officers Marinez and

Gonzalez on the unlawful seizure claim and awarded him

$1.00 in compensatory damages. On that same claim, they

found in favor of Officers Chagoya and Turcinovic, and on the

remaining claims for false arrest and unlawful search, they

found against Martin and in favor of all four officers. 

Martinnowappeals from the district court’s grant of partial

summary judgment before trial limiting the scope of damages

available. 

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, considering the record in the light most favorable to

Martin and construing all reasonable inferences from the

evidence in his favor. E.g. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Tolliver v. City of Chicago, 820 F.3d 237, 241

(7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate when there

are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As
6 No. 17-2667

for those issues presented to the jury, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to its verdict. Matthews v. Wis. Energy

Corp., Inc., 642 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Martin challenges only the district court’s grant of partial

summary judgment before trial. He does not dispute the jury’s

verdict in his favor as to the initial traffic stop and against him

on all of his remaining claims. His appeal thus raises the

narrow issue of what type of damages he can recover as a

result of his unlawful seizure by Officers Marinez and Gonzalez. In considering this issue, we are mindful of the jury’s

verdict rejecting Martin’s false arrest claim as well as his claim

for unlawful search based on the officers’ search of his vehicle.

We thus consider solely whether Martin’s initial unconstitutional seizure can support his claim for damages arising from

losses from his subsequent incarceration on the weapon and

drug charges. 

Martin argues that the district court erroneously based its

conclusion that he was barred from collecting damages from

his wrongful incarceration on the premise that a § 1983

claimaint may not recover damages as a result of the “fruit of

the poisonous tree” doctrine. According to Martin, when

assessing available damages under § 1983, we should begin by

asking whether the plaintiff’s alleged damages were proximately caused by the constitutional violation. From that

starting point, Martin maintains that he is, at the very least,

entitled to have a jury decide whether his incarceration and

any consequential damages arising from it were proximately

caused by the unconstitutional stop.
No. 17-2667 7

The “basic purpose” of damages under § 1983 is to “compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation

of constitutional rights.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254

(1978); see also Memphis v. Cmty. Sch. District v. Stachura, 477

U.S. 299, 306 (1986). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted

that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability.” Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Stachura, 477 U.S.

at 305)(internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the appropriate starting place for the damages inquiry under § 1983 is the

common law of torts. Carey, 435 U.S. at 253. 

Using the available common-law torts as a starting point,

Martin’s damages claim immediately runs into trouble. His

complaint asserts claims for “false arrest” as well as “unlawful

search” arising from the defendants’ violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable searches and

seizures,” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. But a claim for false arrest

cannot succeed because it is undisputed that officers discovered an illegal handgun and cocaine in Martin’s vehicle, which

gave them probable cause for his arrest, notwithstanding the

previous unlawful stop. See Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates,

511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A police officer has probable

cause to arrest an individual when the facts and circumstances

that are known to him reasonably support a belief that the

individual has committed, is committing, or is about to ...

commit a crime.”). Given this, Martin’s claim runs headlong

into the rule that if an “officer had probable cause to believe

that the person he arrested was involved in criminal activity,

then a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest is foreclosed.”

Id. at 679–80; Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 997

(7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases); see also Maniscalco v. Simon,
8 No. 17-2667

712 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Probable cause is an

absolute barto a claim of false arrest asserted underthe Fourth

Amendment and section 1983.”) (quoting Stokes v. Bd. of Educ.,

599 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, the fact that the

evidence was the fruit of an illegal detention does not make it

any less relevant to establishing probable cause for the arrest

because the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil suit

under § 1983 against police officers. See Vaughn v. Chapman,

No. 16-1065, 2016 WL 5944726, *3 (7th Cir. 2016) (unpublished

order); see also Lingo v. City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 958–59 (9th

Cir. 2016); Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267–68 (11th Cir.

2016); Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir.

1999); Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1997). And

although Martin’s complaint is limited to claims forfalse arrest

and unlawful search, it bears noting that the existence of

probable cause for the arrest would also bar recovery on a

theory of malicious prosecution. See Stewart v. Sonneborn,

98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878) (“The existence of a want of probable

cause is, as we have seen, essential to every suit for a malicious

prosecution.”); Thompson v. City of Chicago, 722 F.3d 963, 969

(7th Cir. 2013) (noting that malicious prosecution claim under

Illinois law requires proof that underlying criminal proceeding

concluded in manner indicating innocence).

Ignoring the insurmountable hurdles tohis claimpresented

by possible tort law analogs, Martin insists that he is entitled to

damages for his incarceration solely on a theory of proximate

cause—under the general rule of Carey that a damages award

under § 1983 should compensate for what Martin characterizes

as any injuries arising as a result of a constitutional deprivation. Although the district court considered Martin’s claim that
No. 17-2667 9

his entitlement to damages for post-arrest incarceration should

be resolved using a proximate cause analysis, after reviewing

the cases Martin cited, the court deemed such an approach

unnecessary in light of its conclusion that the existence of

probable cause afterthe initial detention foreclosed any further

damages. 

Citing Carey, Martin points out that he should not be barred

from recovering § 1983 damages simply because recovery

would not be permitted under a common-law tort such as false

arrest. As the Court explained in Carey, “the interests protected

by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected

by an analogous branch of the common law torts.” Carey, 435

U.S. at 258. Thus, the Court recognized that although the

common law elements of damages and the prerequisites for

their recovery are the appropriate “starting point for the

inquiry under § 1983,” those common-law tort theories may

not “provide a complete solution to the damages issues in

every § 1983 case.” Id. at 258. The Court accordingly set out an

approach to handling those situations where the common-law

tort theories would not allow recovery but there were constitutional interests implicated that might nonetheless warrant

redress when violated. Carey explained that “to further the

purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation for

injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights

should be tailored to the interest protected by the particular

right in question—just as the common-law rules of damages

themselves were defined by the interests protected in the

various branches of tort law.” Id. at 258–59. Under that

rationale, we must determine whetherthe post-arrest damages
10 No. 17-2667

for incarceration Martin seeks would effectively redress the

interests the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect.

We have not resolved the specific question whether a

plaintiff may recover damages for post-arrest incarceration

following a Fourth Amendment violation when probable cause

supported the ultimate arrest and initiation of criminal

proceedings, but the application of the exclusionary rule

spared the plaintiff from the criminal prosecution. As Martin

notes, there is a split of authority on the question of whether a

defendant whose Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights have been

violated can recover damages for incarceration, legal defense

fees, or emotional distress in a subsequent civil suit under

§ 1983. Compare Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148

(2d Cir. 1999) (no damages for costs associated with defending

against gun possession charges when evidence for charges

arose from unlawful search); Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154,

155–59 (3d Cir. 2000) (no damages for costs incurred in

criminal prosecution for drug possession charges arising from

unconstitutional search) with Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d

1384, 1389–90 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing admission of acquittal

of criminal charges in plaintiffs’ subsequent § 1983 suit to

recover money spent on attorneys’ fees defending criminal

charges); see also Train v. City of Albuquerque, 629 F. Supp.2d

1243, 1255 (D.N.M. 2009) (allowing jury to determine whether

unlawful search that led to gun possession charges proximately caused plaintiff’s criminal defense costs, loss of income,

and emotional distress damages). 

Martin, however, insists that in Kerr v. City of Chicago,

424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970), we held that such damages are

recoverable and that here the district court was obligated
No. 17-2667 11

under Kerr to allow his damages claim. The district court

rejectedKerr as controlling here given “factual differences” and

case law developments since it was “decided nearly 47 years

ago.” (Appellant’s App. at A-14.) 

Like the district court, we reject Martin’s claim that Kerr is

dispositive on the question of allowabledamages. Martinrelies

almost exclusively on a sentence from Kerr stating without

further explanation that “[a] plaintiff in a civil rights action

should be allowed to recover the attorneys’ fees in a state

criminal action where the expenditure is a foreseeable result of

the acts of the defendant.” Kerr, 424 F.2d at 1141. The minor

plaintiff in Kerr alleged that Chicago police had violated his

Fifth Amendment constitutional rights by using physical force

to obtain an involuntary confession, which was used to detain

him for 18 months awaiting and during trial, when a nolle

prosequi was entered after the jury was unable to reach a

verdict. Kerr, 424 F.2d at 1136–37. The precise issue in Kerr was

thus whetherthe plaintiff should have been allowed to present

evidence in his civil case of attorneys’ fees expended in his

underlying criminal case, which hinged entirely on his involuntary confession. Id. at 1141. 

So although in the abstract Kerr stands for the proposition

that foreseeable damages arising from a constitutional violation may be recovered, it sheds no light on the precise question

Martin’s appeal poses.2 Using the framework of Carey, it is easy

2

The same is true for a much more recent case from our circuit cited by

Martin in his reply brief, Johnson v. Winstead, 900 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 2018).

Martin characterizes Johnson as holding that damages could be recovered

(continued...)
12 No. 17-2667

to see that the interest protected by the Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination was directly implicated by the

coerced confession and resulting criminal trial. Kerr is thus

entirely in keeping with Carey in the sense that the damages

sought—expenses of defending the criminaltrialprosecuted on

the strength of the involuntary confession—arise directly from

the constitutional violation and redress the precise interest the

Fifth Amendment protects: the right not to be compelled in a

criminal case to be a witness against oneself. Simply put,

nothing in Kerr sheds any light on Martin’s claim that he is

entitled to pursue damages for his post-arrest incarceration.

That leaves us with the handful of appellate courts that

have considered the specific issue of the proper scope of civil

damages for damages following an illegal search or seizure. In

Townes, the Second Circuit considered whether to award

compensatory damages in a § 1983 civil suit after police

stopped a taxi without probable cause and discovered an

illegal firearm and cocaine. The plaintiff’s motion to suppress

2

 (...continued)

for incarceration subsequent to a failure to provide Miranda warnings,

despite the fact that a failure to provide such warnings is itself not a

violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. But

Martin misreads Johnson, which specifies that an actual Fifth Amendment

violation occurs only when the information acquired without Miranda

warnings is introduced at trial to secure a criminal conviction. Martin

claims Johnson would allow damages based on a violation of a prophylactic

rule–the failure to give Miranda warnings itself—but he misreads Johnson.

The damages Johnson contemplates would be those arising from incarceration for the actual Fifth Amendment violation of admitting the statements

at trial to secure a criminal conviction, not, as Martin suggests, for a

violation of a prophylactic rule. Id. at 434–35. 
No. 17-2667 13

the firearm was initially denied, and he was convicted of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Over two years

later, the state appellate division reversed the conviction on the

grounds that police had lacked probable cause to stop and

search the taxicab. In his subsequent civil suit, the Townes

plaintiff sought to recover compensatorydamages arising from

his conviction and incarceration. Id. at 149. 

Citing Carey, the panel in Townes rejected the plaintiff’s

damages claim. After ruling out recovery under any commonlaw tort theories, the Second Circuit also rejected proximate

cause as a possible basis for recovery. In doing so, the court

noted that “the chain on causation between a police officer’s

unlawful arrest and a subsequent conviction and incarceration

is broken by the intervening exercise of independent judgment”—specifically, the trial court’s failure to suppress the

incriminating evidence before trial. Id. at 147. In an attempt to

distinguish Townes, Martin seizes this causation analysis, but

ignores the rest of the holding in Townes, which would

squarely foreclose Martin’s claim. 

In addition to concluding that the trial court’s refusal to

suppress the evidence of the unlawful search was an intervening and superseding cause of the conviction, the Second Circuit

noted that the plaintiff was “foreclosed from recovery for a

second, independent reason: the injury he pleads (a violation

of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures) does not fit the damages he seeks

(compensation for his conviction and incarceration).” Id.

Bearing in mind the Supreme Court’s directive in Carey to

tailor § 1983 liability to match the affected constitutional rights,
14 No. 17-2667

see Carey, 435 U.S. at 258, Townes pointed out a “gross disconnect” between the constitutional violation (the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures)

and the injury for which recovery was sought (the subsequent

conviction and incarceration). Townes, 176 F.3d at 148. As the

panel in Townes observed, “[t]he evil of an unreasonable search

or seizure is that it invades privacy, not that it uncovers crime,

which is no evil at all.” Id. 

Townes thus reasoned that to award damages for a conviction and incarceration that followed an illegal search would be

tantamount to awarding a windfall benefit in that the plaintiff

“already reaped an enormous benefit by reason of the illegal

seizure and search to which he was subjected: his freedom,

achieved by the suppression of evidence obtained in violation

of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.; cf. United States v. Calandra, 414

U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is

not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim . .

. [i]nstead, the rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful

police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the

Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and

seizures[.]”). The district court found the rationale of Townes

persuasive and noted that it had been cited repeatedly by

district courts in our circuit assessing civil damages for Fourth

Amendment violations. See Cannon v. Christopher, No. 1:06-CV267, 2007 WL 2609893, at *4 (“Several federal courts in the

Seventh Circuit have adopted the Townes principle and applied

it to dismiss cases where probable cause existed despite an

allegation of an improper initial stop and search.”); see

also Williams v. Carroll, No. 08 C 4169, 2010 WL 5463362, at *4–5

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2010) (collecting cases and observing that
No. 17-2667 15

although “holding of Townes has not been expressly adopted

here in the Seventh Circuit, it has not been meaningfully

challenged in this (or any other) circuit. On the other hand, it

has been relied upon in numerous district court opinions.”). 

The following year, the Third Circuit reached a similar

conclusion in Hector v. Watt, supra. In Hector, the plaintiff

brought a § 1983 suit to recover compensation for expenses

incurred during his criminal prosecution based on 80 pounds

of hallucinogenic mushrooms seized from his airplane. Like

Martin, the plaintiff had successfully litigated a suppression

motion for the seized drugs and the prosecution against him

was dismissed. 

The Third Circuit first concluded, as we did above, that

existing common-law torts could not provide the basis for the

requested damages. Hector, 235 F.3d at 156 (“Given the

Supreme Court’smandate that we look to similar common-law

causes of action, Hector appears to be on the horns of a

dilemma. If his claim is categorized as being like false arrest,

then his claim fails because false arrest does not permit

damages incurred after an indictment, excluding all the

damages he seeks. But if his claim is treated as resembling

malicious prosecution, then he would face the problem that a

plaintiff claiming malicious prosecution must be innocent of

the crime charged in the underlying prosecution.”) 

In rejecting proximate cause as a theory for recovery, the

Third Circuit, like the Second Circuit in Townes, concluded that

the policy reasons behind the exclusionary rule would not be

served by allowing the plaintiff to “continue to benefit from the

exclusionary rule in his § 1983 suit and be relieved of defense
16 No. 17-2667

costs from a prosecution that was terminated only because of

the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 158. Specifically, the court in

Hector carefully considered the competing policy concerns that

might be served by allowing damages arising from defending

a criminal proceeding triggeredby thediscovery of contraband

via an unconstitutional search. Bearing in mind the goal of the

exclusionary rule to deter Fourth Amendment violations, the

court concluded that policy considerations militated against

any incremental contribution to such deterrence that might be

had by allowing for civil damages arising well after the initial

constitutional privacy violation that led to the discovery of

contraband. Id. at 159.

The court in Hector thus ultimately concludedthat although

there would admittedly be some deterrent value to imposing

liability for all consequences that unfold from a search or

seizure unsupported by probable cause, the downsides of such

an approach would outweigh its benefits. Specifically, the

magnitude of the potential liability would routinely be

unrelated to the seriousness of the underlying Fourth Amendment violation, in the sense that the damages award would

often turn not on the nature of the unconstitutional invasion of

privacy but on whatever contraband officers happened to

uncover. Id. Noting that it would be irresponsible to impose

potential liability so disproportionate to the underlying

constitutionalviolationandthat neitherthe scholarly authority

nor any common-law tort supported such a theory of recovery,

the Third Circuit concurred with Townes to hold that, “Victims

of unreasonable searches or seizures may recover damages

directly related to the invasion of their privacy–including

(where appropriate) damages for physical injury, property
No. 17-2667 17

damage, injury to reputation, etc.; but such victims cannot be

compensated for injuries that result from the discovery of

incriminating evidence and consequent criminal prosecution.”

Id. at 148 (quoting Townes, 176 F.3d at 148). 

As Martin notes, however, the Ninth Circuit has concluded

that damages for incarceration and legal fees arising from an

unlawful detention and search may be recoverable in a § 1983

suit. In Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988), the

court rejected police officers’ appeal from a civil damages

award in favor of the plaintiffs after a finding that the officers

arrested them without probable cause. The precise issue on

appeal was whether the district court erred by admitting

evidence that the plaintiffs had been acquitted of the underlying criminal charges as well as evidence of the plaintiffs’

attorneys’ fees incurred defending against the charges.

Borunda, 885 F.2d at 1386. The court concluded that a “plaintiff

who establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional

rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover

compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations.” Id. at 1389.

In Borunda, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were

entitled to recovery because the “jury was entitled to find,

amidst the striking omissions in the police report, as well as the

two officers’ conflicting accounts of the incident, that appellants procured the filing of the criminal complaint by making

misrepresentations to the prosecuting attorney.” Id. at 1390.

The attorneys’ fees incurred defending the criminal prosecutions were thus directly attributable to the defendant officers’
18 No. 17-2667

misconduct—i.e., falsifying information in order to obtain a

criminal complaint. Id.

Thus, while Borunda, like Kerr, may in the abstract stand for

the proposition that civil damages may be recoverable for

expenses related to a wrongful search or arrest, nothing about

Borunda’s rationale is particularly helpful to Martin. First, in

Borunda, the very basis for the damages award was the jury’s

finding that the defendant officers had arrested the plaintiffs

without probable cause and had likely fabricated facts to secure

a criminal complaint against the plaintiffs. Id. at 1386–88. On

the contrary, the jury here concluded that although Officers

Marinez and Gonzalez unlawfully seized Martin without

reasonable suspicion, it found against Martin on the claim that

officers either arrested him or searched him or his car without

probable cause. So unlike the plaintiffs in Borunda, whose claim

succeeded precisely because the jury concluded that the

defendant officers manufactured a tale to support probable

cause for both the arrest and subsequent prosecutions, the jury

here concluded that probable cause existed for both Martin’s

arrest and any search of his automobile that yielded contraband. The holding in Borunda is thus a far cry from supporting

the outcome Martin seeks here. Although Martin asserts that

Borunda supports his theory that he may recover damages

under a proximate cause analysis, Borunda adds little to the

question of foreseeability given the jury’s finding there that the

defendant officers “procured the filing of the criminal complaint by making misrepresentations to the prosecuting

attorney.” Id. at 1390. That finding leads fairly uncontroversially to the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ attorney fees

“incurred during the criminal prosecutions was a direct and
No. 17-2667 19

foreseeable consequence of the appellants’ unlawful conduct.”

Id. Not so for Martin. 

Martin’s scenario is far more like those in Townes and

Hector, where probable cause for an arrest existed despite an

encounterthat initially violated the Fourth Amendment. First,

the precise relevant questions in Borunda were evidentiary:

whether the district court had erred in admitting evidence of

the plaintiffs’ prior acquittal of the criminal charges and

evidence of attorneys’ fees spent during the criminal proceeding. Id. at 1389. And in Borunda, the court considered the jury’s

finding that the officers lacked probable cause and concluded

it was defensible in light of general tort principles of recovery;

the jury’s verdict here cuts in the opposite direction given that,

with the exception of the initial traffic stop, the jury concluded

that the defendants did have probable cause for everything that

followed.

Finally, Martin relies heavily on a case from the District of

New Mexico holding that a plaintiff raising a constitutional

claim based on an illegal search may be permitted to recover

damages for post-indictment proceedings if the constitutional

deprivation proximately caused the damages. See generally

Train v. City of Albuquerque, 629 F. Supp.2d 1243 (D.N.M. 2009).

The district court in Train concluded that in addition to

protecting privacy, as the courts in Townes and Hector recognized, the Fourth Amendment had been described in the Tenth

Circuit as protecting “‘liberty, property, and privacy interests—a person’s sense of security and individual dignity.’” Id.

at 1252 (quoting Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d

1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2001)). Believing that the Tenth Circuit did
20 No. 17-2667

not “take such a narrow view of the Fourth Amendment” as

the one advanced in Townes and Hector, the district court in

Train concluded as follows: 

According to the Tenth Circuit’s guidance on the

Fourth Amendment, any damage award available

for a Fourth-Amendment violation under 41 U.S.C.

§ 1983 should be tailored to compensating losses of

liberty, property, privacy, and a person’s sense of

security and individual dignity. While it may not be

an evil to uncover crime, the drafters obviously did

not think uncovering crime was a higher value than

protecting and securing a person’s home from

unreasonable searches. Federal criminal charges,

federal detention, and all of the negative consequences of those charges and attendant to federal

custody implicated Train’s interest in liberty and his

sense of security and individual dignity. That imprisonment occasioned economic losses. Such losses

should be compensable, given that they implicate

the interests that the Tenth Circuit has explained the

Fourth Amendment protects. 

Id.

Although Martin urges us to reject the logic of both Townes

and Hector in favor of that found in Train, he fails to identify

any Seventh Circuit law urging the broad view of interests

protected by the Fourth Amendment that drove the district

court’s conclusion in Train. Nor didTrain analyze the plaintiff’s

claim in light of common-law false arrest. Because Martin

explicitly framed his claim as one for false arrest,
No. 17-2667 21

(Pl. Compl. 1), we are bound by our own precedent limiting

damages regardless of what we might conclude under a

proximate cause analysis. See Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354,

362–63 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Wallace v.

City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)) (available damages forfalse

arrest cover only time of detention until issuance of process or

arraignment). And although Train ably sets forth the competing rationale for an expansive view of both the interests

protected by the Fourth Amendment as well as damages

available fortheir breach, the rationale in Townes and Hector, in

addition to being more widely accepted as discussed infra, is

also more applicable to the facts here. 

Given the jury’s verdict against Martin on his claims for

false arrest and unlawful search, the only Fourth Amendment

injury being redressed is the brief initial seizure before officers

asked Martin for his license. Allowing Martin to recover

damages for his subsequent imprisonment, set in motion by an

arrest supportedbyprobable cause, would amount to precisely

the sort of mismatch between the violation and the damages

that Townes and Hector sought to avoid. We do not go so far as

to hold that post-arrest damages may never be recovered, only

that here such damages would be inconsistent with the rule in

Carey that damages should be tailored to protect the right in

question, 435 U.S. at 258. Here, the right in question is Martin’s

Fourth Amendment right not to be stopped by officers without

reasonable suspicion. That right was vindicated by the nominal

damages the jury awarded Martin. 
22 No. 17-2667

It is thus ultimately unnecessary to delve into the thorny

question of proximate cause. See Hector, 235 F.3d at 161 (“Given

that the cases on intervening causes are legion and difficult to

reconcile ... and that we have other, sufficient grounds for

resolving this case, we will not reach the issue of intervening

causation.”). That said, it is worth noting that there is no reason

Martin’s claim would fare any better under that analysis.

Martin’s stop was certainly the but-for cause of his imprisonment in the sense that but for the stop officers would never

have discovered the handgun and cocaine and arrested him.

But that tells us little about whether the stop was the proximate

cause of his incarceration. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564

U.S. 685, 691 (2011) (“The term ‘proximate cause’ is shorthand

for a concept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all should

give rise to legal liability.”). Any number of superseding,

intervening events could have broken the chain of causation,

from the discovery of the contraband itself to the independent

decision to deny bail, which was undoubtedly predicated in

part on Martin’s criminal history and otherfactors unrelated to

the initial stop. 

Moreover, consideration of proximate cause takes us back

around to where we began: with the observation that probable

cause for Martin’s arrest, which the jury concluded existed

shortly after Martin was pulled over, forecloses Martin’s claim

for damages from all that followed. See Townes, 176 F.3d at 146

(recognizing that “ordinary principles of tort causation” apply

to initial stop and search but concluding that allowing the fruit

of the poisonous tree doctrine to “elongate the chain of

causation” would “distort basic tort concepts of proximate

causation”); accord Edwards, 2012 WL 983788 at *7–8 (noting the
No. 17-2667 23

same). In short, the damages arising from Martin’s incarceration are simply too attenuated from and unrelated to the

Fourth Amendment violation he has proven: a brief detention

unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. His

damages award was thus properly limited to the harm arising

from his unconstitutional detention before his lawful arrest.

The decision regarding those damages was left to the jury,

which determined one dollar was the proper amount.

III.

Forthe foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.