Filed: May 30, 2014 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2279

AI HUA CHEN; JIN XIU LI,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed February 5, 2014, 

as follows:

On page 12, footnote 2, all language following the 

sentence, “The BIA did not address this holding, and neither 

party briefed the issue on appeal” is deleted.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2279

AI HUA CHEN; JIN XIU LI,

Petitioners,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Argued: September 19, 2013 Decided: February 5, 2014

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Petition for review granted in part and denied in part by 

published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in 

which Judge Motz and Judge Keenan concurred.

ARGUED: Alexa Taiz Torres, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD TARZIA, Belle 

Mead, New Jersey, for Petitioners. Walter Bocchini, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. 

ON BRIEF: Gregory Marotta, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD TARZIA, Belle 

Mead, New Jersey, for Petitioners. Stuart F. Delery, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Carl H. 

McIntyre, Jr., Assistant Director, Christina J. Martin, Office 

of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
2

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Petitioners Ai Hua Chen and Jin Xiu Li, both natives of 

China’s Fujian Province, met and married in the United States 

and are the parents of two children born to them here. Chen and 

Li admit they are subject to removal, but seek asylum and 

withholding of removal on the basis that one or both of them 

will be persecuted for having violated China’s one-child policy. 

The couple also seeks asylum and withholding of removal on the 

grounds that they will face persecution for their Christian 

faith upon returning to China. Despite finding both Chen and Li 

to be credible witnesses, the immigration judge (“IJ”) and the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), relying on an often-cited 

2007 State Department report, China: Profile of Asylum Claims 

and Country Conditions (“2007 China Report”), concluded that 

neither petitioner established a well-founded fear of 

persecution. 

For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition for 

review to the extent Chen and Li seek relief based on China’s 

one-child policy and remand that claim for further consideration 

by the agency. We deny the petition for review to the extent it 

is grounded on the religious faith of the petitioners.
3

I.

A.

Li arrived in the United States in June 2001 without valid 

entry documents and was placed in removal proceedings by the 

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Li sought political 

and religious asylum, but an immigration judge denied his 

application in 2003 and the Board affirmed in 2005. In 2010, 

however, the Board granted Li’s motion to reopen. 

Chen entered the United States in January 2003 on a 

nonimmigrant K-1 visa. A K–1 nonimmigrant visa, known 

colloquially as a “fiancé visa,” permits the foreign-citizen 

fiancé of an American citizen to travel to the United States to 

marry his or her citizen sponsor within ninety days of arrival. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i). Chen’s fiancé sponsor, as it 

turned out, decided not to marry her. Chen, however, remained 

in the United States after the expiration of the ninety-day 

period. Chen and Li eventually met in 2005 and married in 2007. 

Also in 2007, Chen gave birth to petitioners’ two children—

the first in January and the second in December. Chen did not 

have legal status in the United States, however, and she worried 

that if she were ever forced to return to China, she and Li 

would be considered violators of China’s infamous one-child 

policy. Thus, in August 2007, while pregnant with petitioners’ 

second child, Chen applied for political asylum, which led to 
4

the DHS initiating removal proceedings against her for 

overstaying her visa. In 2011, the proceedings against Chen 

were consolidated with Li’s reopened proceedings. 

Chen and Li seek asylum on two identical grounds. First, 

Chen and Li claim that even though their children were born 

abroad, Chinese family planning officials would still consider 

the pregnancies to have been “out-of-plan” pregnancies and in

violation of China’s family-planning regulations. Chen and Li 

believe that they would face fines, imprisonment and involuntary 

sterilization upon their return to China. On this basis, they 

seek political asylum, which is potentially available for any 

person who establishes “a well founded fear that he or she will 

be forced to undergo [involuntary sterilization]” or will be 

“subject to persecution” for “other resistance to a coercive 

population control program.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 

Li and Chen also seek religious asylum. As practicing 

Christians, Li and Chen claim that, if removed, they would be 

compelled by their beliefs to attend a “house church,” which is 

illegal in China. They fear that participation in such a church 

would result in their arrest and detention and that they would 

be coerced by the government to renounce association with the 

church.
5

B.

1.

Although the IJ found both Li and Chen to be credible 

witnesses, he concluded that they failed to prove that their 

genuine fear of future persecution under the family-planning 

policy was objectively reasonable. The IJ’s reasoning was twofold. First, he determined that Li and Chen failed to prove 

they are in violation of China’s family-planning policies. 

According to the 2007 China Report, upon which the IJ heavily 

relied, each married couple in the Fujian Province “is allowed 

to have one child without a birth permit.” J.A. 419. A second 

child, therefore, is not allowed unless the government grants 

permission ahead of time by issuing a birth permit. But the IJ 

found that children born abroad are not counted against the 

number of children allowed unless the returning parents choose 

to register them as part of the household registration. The 

2007 China Report states that 

U.S. officials in China are not aware of the alleged 

official policy, at the national or provincial levels, 

mandating the sterilization of one partner of couples 

that have given birth to two children, at least one of 

whom was born abroad. 

. . . 

. . . [T]he Population and Family Planning 

Commission of Fujian Province stated in an October 

2006 letter that children born abroad, if not 

registered as permanent residents of China (i.e., not 

entered into the parents’ household registration), are 
6

not considered as permanent residents of China, and 

therefore are not counted against the number of 

children allowed under China’s family planning law. . 

. .

J.A. 421-22. 

Second, the IJ found that even if petitioners’ children 

“counted” for purposes of China’s family-planning law, Li and 

Chen would merely face fines or other economic penalties that do 

not rise to the level of persecution. Again, the IJ rested his 

factual determination on the 2007 China Report, which states 

that “[a]ccording to the Fujian Provincial Birth Planning 

Committee (FPBPC), there have been no cases of forced . . . 

sterilization in Fujian in the last 10 years.” The Report, 

however, also acknowledges that “[i]t is impossible to confirm 

this claim” and cited reports of forced sterilizations in 2006. 

J.A. 418. The 2007 China Report notes that the FPBPC claims 

provincial officials impose only economic penalties—“social 

compensation fees”—upon violators, not physically coercive 

sanctions. J.A. 419. According to the 2007 China Report, 

however, for returning Chinese nationals who are the parents of 

U.S.-born children, even such economic penalties would be 

triggered only if the parents decided “to register their 

children as Chinese permanent residents in order to gain free . 

. . educational and other social benefits.” J.A. 422.
7

The IJ noted some of the contradictory evidence submitted 

by Li and Chen, but indicated without explanation that the 2007 

China Report was simply “more persuasive.” The contradictory 

evidence from Chen and Li included (1) an affidavit (and 

supporting documents) from Renzun Yuan stating that immediately 

after removal to the Fujian Province, he was sterilized for 

having violated China’s family-planning law even though his sons 

were born in the United States; (2) a 200-page scholarly 

critique of the 2007 China Report from Dr. Flora Sapio 

concluding that it was outdated, inaccurate or based on 

anecdotal or unverifiable evidence; (3) written certifications 

issued by the applicants’ respective local family planning 

officials in Mei Hua Town, Chang Le City, and Ma Wei District of 

Fuzhou City indicating that Li and Chen would be sterilized upon 

returning to China under the circumstances; and (4) written 

affirmations from Chen’s father and Li’s mother stating that the 

certified statements from the family-planning officials were 

issued at their request. The IJ also dismissed written 

affirmations from two of the petitioners’ cousins and two 

friends, all of whom attested to having undergone forcible 

sterilization after having unauthorized children in China. The 

IJ found such evidence lacking in probative value because the 

children were not born abroad. 
8

Finally, as described in greater detail below, Li and Chen 

submitted evidence that the IJ either failed to mention or 

ignored altogether. This evidence included the 2009 Annual 

Report from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

(“2009 CECC Report”). The CECC Report states that, as of 2009, 

forced abortions and sterilizations were still occurring. While 

acknowledging that Chinese law prohibits official abuses 

relating to population control, the 2009 CECC Report notes that 

the law also requires local officials to carry out regular 

pregnancy tests on married women and administer unspecified 

“follow-up services” to the extent needed to meet planning 

goals. More specifically, local family-planning officials in 

the Fujian Province are authorized to take “remedial measures” 

for out-of-plan pregnancies, which the 2009 CECC Report 

interprets as a euphemism for compulsory abortions. 

Additionally, this report states that local authorities 

continued to require sterilization as a means of enforcing birth 

quotas.

The IJ also ignored or failed to mention evidence of a 

webpage maintained by the Fuzhou City (Fujian) Family Planning 

Committee which apparently provides a forum for citizens to 

submit questions about the family-planning policy and receive 

responses from the government. Li and Chen submitted a copy of 

a screenshot from this website, dated June 16, 2010, showing an 
9

April 2008 inquiry from “Robert Lin” about the consequences 

faced by Chinese nationals who have out-of-plan children abroad 

and the Committee’s response that “sterilization is mandatory” 

for violators of the one-child policy in this situation. J.A. 

824.

2.

The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision that the 

petitioners did not meet their burden of proving that there is 

an “objectively reasonable possibility” that Li or Chen would be 

“forcibly sterilized, excessively fined, or otherwise persecuted 

for having two children without permission while in the United 

States.” J.A. 4. The BIA offered additional reasons for 

discounting the evidence offered by Li and Chen. For example, 

the BIA observed that the certifications issued by familyplanning officials in Mei Hua Town, Chang Le City, and the Ma 

Wei District of Fuzhou City, were entitled to little weight 

because they were unauthenticated, unsigned, did not identify 

the author, and were procured for litigation purposes.1

 

 1 The BIA also dismissed these certifications on the basis 

that the 2007 China Report indicates that village committees are 

“not authorized to make any decisions pertaining to family 

planning issues.” According to the BIA, such documents should 

therefore “be deemed ineffective.” JA 5. This conclusion badly 

misses the mark. The relevant question for asylum purposes is 

not what local authorities are authorized to do; the question, 

particularly given the pressure local authorities face to meet 

birth targets, is what they actually do. As discussed in 

(Continued)
10

Likewise, the BIA found the statements from the petitioners’ 

family and friends claiming to have suffered forcible 

sterilization to be unworthy of extended consideration because 

the statements contained unsworn assertions from typically 

biased witnesses and lacked sufficient detail to demonstrate 

that the witnesses were subject to persecution. And, like the 

IJ, the BIA was unpersuaded by the documents related to the case 

of Renzun Yuan because they were submitted to support an 

unrelated asylum applicant and the applicants offered no 

explanation as to how their attorney obtained the documents.

Relying exclusively on the 2007 China Report, the BIA 

concluded that there was no basis for believing that government 

officials in the Fujian Province use coercive measures rising to 

the level of persecution in circumstances such as these. The 

BIA acknowledged that “there undoubtedly have been instances of 

forced abortion and sterilization imposed on the parents of 

children conceived and born [out-of-plan] in China,” J.A. 6, but 

the BIA distinguished the petitioners’ claim on the basis that 

their children were born abroad in the United States. The BIA 

found that “[t]he evidence submitted in this case does not 

 

greater detail below, petitioners’ evidence highlights the 

importance of this distinction, demonstrating that local 

practice does not always correspond with national policy.
11

document any instance where enforcement measures rising to the 

level of persecution have been imposed on the parents of 

children who are United States citizens.” Id. Finally, the 

BIA, relying on the 2007 China Report, restated the IJ’s finding 

that the only scenario in which sanctions might be imposed for 

unauthorized overseas births would arise from the parents’ 

registration of their children as members of their households 

upon returning to China in order to secure free public benefits. 

Even then, the BIA found, the parents would face only economic 

penalties.

The BIA did not mention the 2009 CECC Report or the Fuzhou 

City (Fujian) Family Planning Committee’s response to Robert Lin 

on its webpage that sterilization is mandatory for violators of 

the one-child policy even when the out-of-plan children were 

born abroad. 

II.

Because the BIA “adopted and affirmed” the decision of the 

IJ but supplemented that decision with its own opinion, “the 

factual findings and reasoning contained in both decisions are 

subject to judicial review.” Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 

511 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007). And, because the denial of asylum was 

based on the conclusion that Li and Chen failed to satisfy their 

burden of proving a well-founded fear of future persecution, we 

review these decisions under the “substantial evidence” 
12

standard. Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 

2007).2 Under this deferential standard, “administrative 

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). In other words, we cannot disturb the 

agency’s “decision that an applicant is ineligible for asylum 

unless we determine that the applicant’s evidence ‘was such that 

a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the 

requisite fear of persecution existed.’” Djadjou v. Holder, 662 

F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 

502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). 

In order to establish eligibility for asylum under the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), an applicant must

demonstrate that he or she is entitled to refugee status. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Under the INA, a refugee is someone 

“who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his or her] 

country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Petitioners “may satisfy this burden 

 2 The IJ also held that petitioners’ asylum claim was timebarred because they filed their applications after the usual 

one-year deadline of arriving in the United States. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The BIA did not address this holding, 

and neither party briefed the issue on appeal. 
13

by showing either that they were subjected to past persecution 

or that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution on 

account of” one of the enumerated grounds. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 

272 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The INA 

specifically permits victims of China’s population control 

policy to seek political asylum:

[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or 

to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been 

persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a 

procedure or for other resistance to a coercive 

population control program, shall be deemed to have 

been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a 

person who has a well founded fear that he or she will 

be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to 

persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance 

shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of 

persecution on account of political opinion.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 

Li and Chen do not claim to have suffered past persecution, 

but seek asylum based on their fear of future persecution. The 

“well-founded fear of persecution” standard set forth in § 

1101(a)(42) has subjective and objective elements. The 

subjective component requires the alien to “present[] candid, 

credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of 

persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The objective 

element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that 

would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear 

persecution.” Id. at 187-88. Li and Chen’s asylum claim 
14

faltered on the objective component. Although the IJ found both 

Chen and Li to be credible witnesses, he concluded that they did 

not prove their fear of future persecution was an objectively 

reasonable possibility. 

III.

Chen and Li contend that the IJ’s decision, as supplemented 

by the BIA’s order, lacked substantial evidence. In their view, 

the denial of asylum was unsupported by substantial evidence 

because the IJ and BIA relied almost exclusively on cherrypicked statements from the 2007 China Report and failed to 

consider compelling contradictory evidence suggesting that

forced sterilizations are still a reality for Chinese nationals 

such as Chen and Li. 

Typically, we have approved of the BIA’s proclivity for 

finding State Department Country Reports to be the definitive 

word in asylum cases. After all, such reports are rightly 

considered to be “highly probative evidence in a well-founded 

fear case. Reliance upon these reports makes sense because this 

inquiry is directly within the expertise of the Department of 

State.” Gonahasa v. U.S. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 1999)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the 

context of substantial-evidence review, “[a]bsent powerful 

contradictory evidence, the existence of a State Department 
15

report supporting the BIA’s judgment will generally suffice to 

uphold the Board’s decision.” Id. 

On the other hand, the BIA should avoid treating these 

Country Reports “as Holy Writ” immune to contradiction. Galina 

v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.). 

Although “our job as a reviewing court is not to reweigh the 

evidence,” we must “ensure that unrebutted, legally significant 

evidence is not arbitrarily ignored by the factfinder” and that 

the agency does not “base [its] decision on only isolated 

snippets of [the] record while disregarding the rest.” Baharon 

v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009). The BIA may not 

“selectively consider evidence, ignoring that evidence that 

corroborates an alien’s claims and calls into question the 

conclusion the judge is attempting to reach.” Tang v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

In order for us to discharge “our responsibility to ensure 

that unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily 

ignored by the factfinder,” Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233, we require 

the IJ and the BIA to “offer a specific, cogent reason for 

rejecting evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, because 

it lacks credibility,” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 720 (4th 

Cir. 2011). We recognize that the BIA and IJ are not required 

to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, but they must 
16

“announce their decision[s] in terms sufficient to enable a 

reviewing court to perceive that they have heard and thought and 

not merely reacted.” Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 

948 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted); see Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 1356, 1368 (11th 

Cir. 2011). 

We believe Chen and Li offered “powerful contradictory 

evidence,” Gonahasa, 181 F.3d at 542, for which the BIA and the 

IJ failed to adequately account. As previously noted, Li and 

Chen submitted the 2009 CECC Report.3 The BIA’s failure to 

account for the reports of the CECC is not unprecedented. See, 

e.g., Qiu Yun Chen v. Holder, 715 F.3d 207, 209 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(“We note with disapproval that the Board without explanation 

systematically ignores the annual reports of the Congressional–

Executive Commission on China, several of which we have cited, 

even though they are pertinent official publications of the 

federal government.”); Ji Cheng Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 627 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“The Board’s ongoing refusal to respond 

meaningfully to [CECC reports] is difficult to understand.”); 

 3 Congress established the Congressional–Executive 

Commission on China in 2000 “as a bipartite body, consisting of 

federal legislators and executive-branch officials, whose 

purpose in part is to ‘monitor the development of the rule of 

law in the People’s Republic of China.’” Jiali Tang v. Synutra

Int’l, Inc., 656 F.3d 242, 247 n.4 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 22 

U.S.C. § 6912(c)).
17

see also Zhu Ying Dong v. U.S. Atty. Gen., No. 12-13673, 2013 WL 

6511992, at *1 (11th Cir. December 13, 2013). The 2009 CECC

Report states that “[t]he use of [coerced abortions and 

sterilizations] in the enforcement of population planning 

policies remains commonplace despite provisions for the 

punishment of official abuse outlined in the PRC Population and 

Family Planning Law.” J.A. 759. According to this report, 

population planning officials in the Fujian Province “are 

authorized to take ‘remedial measures’ to deal with ‘out-ofplan’ pregnancies”; “remedial measures” is “synonymous[] with 

compulsory abortion.” Id. In 2008 and 2009, moreover, “[l]ocal 

authorities continue[d] to mandate surgical sterilization and 

the use of contraception as a means to enforce birth quotas.” 

J.A. 215 (emphasis added). 

The 2009 CECC Report appears to contradict the 2007 China 

Report upon which the IJ and BIA rely so heavily in concluding 

that compulsory sterilization for violators of the one-child 

policy is rare. Yet, neither the IJ nor the BIA explains why 

the 2009 CECC Report, a more recent official government 

publication, is less persuasive than the 2007 China Report, nor 

was there any attempt to reconcile these reports. There may be 

a perfectly reasonable explanation for favoring one report over 

the other, or there may be a way to reconcile these seemingly 

contradictory documents. But the BIA has not revealed its 
18

reasoning, and we are not permitted to guess what the BIA or the 

IJ were thinking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 

(1947) (“[A] reviewing court . . . must judge the propriety of 

[agency] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”). 

Second, Li and Chen submitted a copy of a screenshot from a 

Fujian Province government webpage dated May 6, 2008, as 

evidence that Fujian family planning officials consider all

couples who have multiple unauthorized births to be in violation 

of the one-child policy, even if such births occurred overseas. 

See www.fjjsw.gov.cn:8080/html/5/383/9626_200856322.html. This 

evidence suggests that the Fujian Province “Population and

Procreation Planning Committee” provided a forum for citizens to 

submit questions and receive responses about the family planning 

policy. J.A. 824. In response to a query about the 

consequences a returning Fuzhou couple would face after having 

two children in the United States, the committee indicated that 

they were in violation of provincial family planning regulations 

and that “sterilization is mandatory.” J.A. 825. This evidence 

is significant in that it purports to come directly from the 

same Fujian “Population and Procreation Planning Committee” that 

is referenced in the 2007 China Report, but it upends the BIA’s 

conclusion that there is no danger of sterilization where the 

would-be violator’s children were born abroad. See Qiu Yun 

Chen, 715 F.3d at 212 (explaining that the same Fujian webpage 
19

“cuts the ground out from under what the Board called the ‘key 

aspect of this case’—that because [petitioner’s] children were 

born abroad, she is in no danger of being forced to undergo 

sterilization”). To be sure, this document may not expressly 

contradict the BIA’s finding that “the evidence submitted in 

this case does not document any instance where enforcement 

measures rising to the level of persecution have [already] been 

imposed on the parents of children who are United States 

citizens.” But it certainly portends forced sterilization of

the inquiring couple and suggests that other parents of U.S.-

born children have faced similar persecution.4

In our opinion, the foregoing contradictory evidence is 

strong enough that it requires the agency to account for it in a 

meaningful way. The boilerplate language used by the BIA in 

discounting Li and Chen’s evidence was insufficient to 

demonstrate that the agency gave it more than perfunctory 

consideration. Presented with a record containing virtually 

 4 Moreover, the affidavit of Renzun Yuan does flatly 

contradict the BIA’s characterization of the record evidence, as 

it documents an instance of forced sterilization of the father 

of U.S.-born children. We also note that the BIA has used this 

precise language before when relying on the 2007 China Report to 

reject an asylum application from a similarly situated applicant 

on the grounds that the record “does not document any instance 

where enforcement measures rising to the level of persecution 

have been imposed on the parents of children who are United 

States citizens.” Li Ying Zheng v. Holder, 722 F.3d 986, 989 

(7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20

identical contradictory documentary evidence, the Seventh 

Circuit has on more than one occasion rejected the BIA’s 

exclusive reliance on the 2007 China Report and remanded for the 

BIA to offer an explanation that accounts for such evidence. 

See Li Ying Zheng, 722 F.3d at 991; Qiu Yun Chen, 715 F.3d at 

214; Ji Cheng Ni, 715 F.3d at 630-31; see also Zhu Ying Dong v. 

U.S. Atty. Gen., 2013 WL 6511992, at *1. We agree with the 

thrust of these decisions that petitioners are “entitled to have 

the expert agency, the BIA, evaluate in a transparent way the

evidence that [they have] presented” and that “[s]imply stating 

that a 2007 document defeats a claim . . . will not do.” Ji 

Cheng Ni, 715 F.3d at 631.

IV.

Chen and Li also seek asylum and withholding of removal 

based on their Christian faith. Again, both Li and Chen were 

found to be credible witnesses. Their task, therefore, was to 

establish that their genuine subjective fear of persecution 

based on their religious faith is objectively reasonable, i.e., 

that “[t]here is a reasonable possibility of suffering such 

persecution,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(B), and that “a 

reasonable person in like circumstances” would fear religious 

persecution. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187-88. 

Chen testified that when she met Li in 2005, he indicated 

he was a practicing Christian and he invited her to attend 
21

church services with him. Chen did not convert to Christianity, 

however, until 2009 after talking to her neighbors in 

Greensboro, North Carolina. Chen was baptized in 2010 and began 

regularly attending a Chinese Christian Church in Greensboro 

with Li and their children. Chen testified that if she is 

removed to China, she would be compelled by her beliefs to 

attend an unsanctioned “underground” or “house” church rather 

than an “official registered church” that “preach[es] about the 

. . . government’s policies.” J.A. 139, 140. Chen fears that 

her participation in such a church would be discovered by the 

government, subjecting her to arrest, torture, and fines. She 

also fears that the government would force her to renounce her 

participation in any unsanctioned church. Chen’s fear is based 

to a great extent on the experience of her mother, who Chen 

testified was persecuted based on her church affiliation in 

2009. According to Chen, her mother was one of eight members of 

an underground church to be arrested. Chen testified that her 

mother was detained for six days, during which time she was 

slapped in the face and forced to sign a written guarantee that 

she would cease participating in her church. Chen indicated the 

government also imposed on her mother a significant fine of 

2,500 renminbi (RMB). 

Li testified that he was a practicing Christian before he 

left China and attended an unsanctioned house church in the 
22

Fujian Province. Li testified that in March 2001, officials 

from the Public Security Bureau came to his home to arrest him 

for participating in the church but that he was able to elude 

arrest. Li left China shortly thereafter and arrived in the 

United States in June 2001. He testified that he subsequently 

learned from his sister that authorities looked for him after 

the 2001 incident, but that he did not have any information 

suggesting that they have looked for him recently. Li was 

baptized in September 2001 after arriving in the United States, 

and he verified that he attends church with Chen and their 

children. 

Like Chen, Li indicated that his fear of being persecuted 

on account of his religion was made real because of what he and 

Chen were told happened to his mother-in-law in 2009 as a result 

of her affiliation with an unsanctioned church. And, like Chen, 

Li stated that if he returns to China, he will attend an 

unsanctioned house church, for which he believes he will suffer 

official retribution including arrest and torture. 

Li and Chen also called their pastor, Steven Chang, to 

testify at the hearing. Chang confirmed that he is the pastor 

of a non-denominational Chinese Christian church in Greensboro

and that, as of the date of the asylum hearing, Chen and Li had 

been attending the church for approximately one year. Chang

indicated that he was generally familiar with the plight of 
23

Christian house churches because Chang had visited in China with 

missionaries financially supported by his church. Based on his 

experience, Chang indicated that government interference and 

harassment of unsanctioned congregations tended to increase 

proportionally with the visibility of the congregation. Thus, a 

house church with fifty congregants or fewer might conduct its 

services relatively unimpeded by the government, especially if 

it operated in a large metropolitan area. In less populated 

areas, Chang observed, it is more difficult to congregate 

without attracting attention. Chang noted additionally that the 

zealousness with which government officials police unsanctioned 

religious activities varies by location. Chang indicated he had

never been to Chen and Li’s native Fujian Province, and he did 

not offer observations specifically regarding the treatment of 

Christians who attend unsanctioned churches there. 

The IJ found that the applicants failed to establish that 

their fear of future persecution on account of their Christian 

faith was objectively reasonable. Relying on background 

materials published by the State Department, the IJ found that 

“while participation in unsanctioned Christian churches, such as 

house churches, is not approved by the Chinese government, those 

that do participate are not generally persecuted.” J.A. 83. 

The IJ noted that according to the 2007 China Report, house 

churches, though not officially approved, are “quietly 
24

tolerated” as long as they remain “small and unobtrusive.” J.A. 

83. Citing estimates from the State Department’s 2010 

International Religious Freedom Report, the IJ observed there 

are as many as 50-70 million Christians in China who practice 

their faith in connection with unsanctioned house churches. 

Additionally, the IJ was unconvinced that the treatment suffered 

by Chen’s mother reflected widespread persecution of house 

church congregants in Chen’s home town because, according to the 

IJ, Chen’s mother continued to attend a house church after her 

arrest and experienced no further trouble. 

Relying on the same background materials reporting on 

religious freedoms in China, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s finding 

that Li and Chen failed to establish a reasonable possibility 

that they would be persecuted because of their Christian faith. 

The BIA noted that the record did not support the IJ’s statement 

that Chen’s mother had continued to attend a house church in 

China, but it concluded that this error “[did] not undercut the 

[IJ]’s reasoned conclusion that the respondents do not have an 

objectively reasonable fear of persecution in China based on 

their religion.” J.A. 7. 

Chen and Li argue that they established an objectively 

reasonable fear of religious persecution through both the 

general background materials published by the State Department 

and specific evidence that they will risk persecution by 
25

attending home churches in their respective home towns in the 

Fujian Province. Because the BIA denied asylum based on the 

conclusion that Chen and Li failed to carry their evidentiary 

burden, we must not only conclude that the evidence presented 

sufficed to prove an objectively reasonable fear of religious 

persecution, but also that the “evidence presented was so 

compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find”

that a reasonable possibility of such persecution existed. 

Dankam, 495 F.3d at 119 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

While Chen and Li presented some contrary evidence, that 

evidence is not so compelling that we cannot defer to the 

agency’s factual determinations. First, we disagree with Chen 

and Li that the State Department’s 2010 International Religious 

Freedom Report and 2007 China Report support their claim for 

religious asylum. Although these materials certainly reported 

isolated cases of official harassment, the general picture 

presented by both reports was simply that official treatment of 

Christians who attend unregistered house churches varies

substantially based on locale and that such Christians in many 

regions practice their religion without interference. As noted 

by both the IJ and the BIA, Steve Chang, the applicants’ pastor 

who testified on their behalf at the asylum hearing, agreed with 

the general assessment that house churches are able to operate 
26

undisturbed in many areas of China. Moreover, Chen and Li have 

not directed us to any portion of these reports suggesting 

widespread persecution of Christians attending house churches in 

the Fujian Province. 

There was scant evidence presented specifically showing the 

persecution of Christians attending house churches in the Fujian 

Province. Primarily, this included the testimony of the 

petitioners themselves regarding the arrest and abuse of Chen’s 

mother, as well as her mother’s written statement regarding the 

incident. Chen’s mother, however, attended a house church in 

Chen’s hometown of Mei Dong Village in the Mei Hua Town area of 

Chang Le City; Chen testified that if she and Li are removed, 

they will live in and attend a house church in Li’s hometown of 

Shangdao Village of the Mawei District of Fuzhou City. Li 

testified that officials unsuccessfully attempted to arrest him 

in 2001 for attending a house church while he still lived in 

China. Li provided no testimony indicating that house church 

congregants in the Mawei District were persecuted regularly or 

even intermittently, and he conceded that he had no reason to 

believe that government officials were still looking for him.

In sum, viewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that 

the evidence compels us to conclude that there is a reasonable 

possibility that either Chen or Li will suffer persecution on 

account of their religious faith if they return to China. Thus, 
27

we cannot disturb the BIA’s conclusion that Li and Chen failed 

to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. 

Consequently, Chen and Li are not entitled to relief on the 

BIA’s denial of religious asylum.

On a final note, having found substantial evidence supports 

the agency’s denial of religious asylum, we necessarily uphold 

the denial of Chen and Li’s application for withholding of 

removal on account of their religious faith. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1231(b)(3). “Because the burden of proof for withholding of 

removal is higher than for asylum—even though the facts that 

must be proved are the same—an applicant who is ineligible for 

asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal 

under § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th 

Cir. 2004). 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for review 

as it relates to the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of 

removal based on the petitioners’ fear of being subjected to 

involuntary sterilization under China’s one-child policy, and we 

remand that particular claim for the agency to reevaluate it in 

accordance with this opinion. In conducting its analysis on 

remand, the BIA should account for, at a minimum, (1) the 2009 

CECC Report, (2) the evidence relating to the “Robert Lin” 

inquiry on the website of the Fujian Province Population and 
28

Planning Committee, and (3) the affidavit of Renzun Yuan. We 

deny the petition for review, however, as it relates to the 

BIA’s denial of relief based on petitioners’ claim that they 

will be persecuted on account of their Christian faith if they 

return to China. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART