W.F. Gebhardt & Co., Inc. v. American European Insurance Co., No. 93, September Term, 

2020. Opinion by Fader, C.J.

INSURANCE POLICES — RULES OF CONSTRUCTION — CONTRACT 

PRINCIPLES

Insurance policies are construed according to contract principles, construing the policy as 

a whole according to the objective theory of contract interpretation.

INSURANCE POLICES — RULES OF CONSTRUCTION — AMBIGUITY —

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 

A court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent if it determines contractual 

language to be ambiguous. A term in an insurance policy is ambiguous only if a reasonably 

prudent person would find it susceptible to more than one meaning when viewed in context 

of the text of the entire policy, the policy’s character and purpose, and the facts and 

circumstances of the parties at the time of execution. 

INSURANCE POLICES — RULES OF CONSTRUCTION — USE OF 

DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS

Courts traditionally look to dictionary definitions to supply the ordinary and accepted 

meanings of terms in an insurance policy. Dictionaries are thus useful in determining 

whether terms in an insurance policy are ambiguous. Dictionaries are not extrinsic 

evidence.

INSURANCE POLICES — RULES OF CONSTRUCTION — USE OF 

DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS — SPECIFIC TERMS

If the definition of a word incorporates multiple concepts, that can be a feature of its 

meaning rather than an inherent ambiguity. 

INSURANCE POLICES — PARTICULAR WORDS OR TERMS

A fire escape that is physically attached to a building, including its attached ladder that 

descends onto a neighboring property a few feet away from the premises boundary, was 

“at the premises” for purposes of a commercial property insurance policy.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-19-000218

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 93

September Term, 2020

______________________________________

W. F. GEBHARDT & CO., INC.

v.

AMERICAN EUROPEAN INSURANCE CO.

______________________________________

Fader, C.J.,

Kehoe,

Friedman,

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Fader, C.J.

______________________________________

Filed: May 26, 2021
Is a ladder that is part of a fire escape that is physically attached to a multi-family 

apartment building “at the premises” if the ladder descends to the ground at a spot in a 

neighbor’s backyard within a few feet of the covered premises? In this insurance coverage 

case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that the answer is no, and, therefore, 

that American European Insurance Company (“AEI”), the appellee, was not required to 

provide coverage to W.F. Gebhardt & Co., Inc. (“Gebhardt”), the appellant, for damages 

arising from the destruction of the ladder. Based on the plain language of the insurance 

contract, we disagree. Accordingly, we will reverse the circuit court’s award of summary 

judgment in favor of AEI and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Destruction of the Fire Escape and the Claims Against the Neighbors

Gebhardt is the owner of a four-unit apartment building located at 2709 N. Calvert 

Street in Baltimore (the “Premises”).1 Upon acquiring the Premises in 1966, Gebhardt 

converted it from a single- to a multi-family dwelling and paid to construct a fire escape at 

the building’s rear. The fire escape, then and now, ran from the Premises’s roof down to a 

shared metal landing connecting its second-floor balcony with the second-floor balcony of 

the neighboring property at 2707 N. Calvert Street. The fire escape, which Gebhardt 

constructed with the agreement of the then-owner of 2707 N. Calvert Street, is physically 

attached to both buildings. As originally constructed, the fire escape included a narrow 

1 William Gebhardt owned W.F. Gebhardt & Co., Inc. until his death in 2017. 

Lawrence Gebhardt and Nancy Dowling, William Gebhardt’s children, now serve as the 

co-personal representatives of Mr. Gebhardt’s estate and operate the company in that 

capacity. 
2

ladder that descended from the second-floor landing directly into the backyard of 2707 N. 

Calvert Street, “within a foot or two” of the Premises. 

Sometime in the late-summer or fall of 2017, Gebhardt discovered that the ladder 

was missing.2 Gebhardt did not initially know who had removed the ladder or when it had 

been removed. In April 2018, Gebhardt sued both the current owner of 2707 N. Calvert

Street—an LLC controlled by Emery Ayers Greenidge, who lived there along with her 

husband (collectively, the “Greenidges”)—and the previous owners (until April 2016)—

Damon Burton and Jessica Jones-Smith (“Burton/Jones-Smith”). Gebhardt sought to 

establish easement rights from the Greenidges to rebuild the ladder and to recover the cost 

of rebuilding the ladder from the culpable party. In late 2018, Gebhardt learned through

discovery that Burton/Jones-Smith had removed the ladder in February 2016, before 

transferring the property to the Greenidges. Because the Greenidges neither recognized 

Gebhardt’s easement claim nor permitted Gebhardt to rebuild the ladder into their yard, 

Gebhardt continued the suit against both parties. 

The Building Code Violation

On December 10, 2018, the City issued a violation notice and suspended Gebhardt’s 

multi-family occupancy permit for the Premises due to “[i]nadequate means of egress” as 

a result of the lack of a fully operational fire escape. The notice informed Gebhardt that it 

would be liable for fines of up to $500 daily unless it corrected the infraction within 30 

2 Until relatively recently, both properties were operated as multi-family dwellings 

that were required to have a fire escape by the City of Baltimore (“City”) building code. 

At some point before the ladder was destroyed, the owners of 2707 N. Calvert Street 

apparently decided to revert use of that property to a single-family dwelling.
3

days. Gebhardt sought administrative review and asked the City to rescind the violation 

notice because Gebhardt was engaged in litigation for the purpose of obtaining an easement 

to resolve the matter. Gebhardt also informed the City that the Premises did not at the time 

have tenants and would not be re-occupied until Gebhardt remedied the violation.

In its letter requesting administrative review, Gebhardt explained its quandary:

To install the fire escape so it is solely on [the Premises] would cost 

in the area of $70,000, according to one estimate. Installing the lower 

portion of the fire escape on 2707 N. Calvert Street will cost 

approximately $16,000 according to the same estimate. The current 

owners of 2707 N. Calvert Street will not permit the fire escape to be 

reconstructed and discharge into the yard of 2707 N. Calvert Street 

without a court order. 

The problem was that the original fire escape was built with 24-inch wide ladders from 

both the roof to the second-floor landing and from the second-floor landing to the ground. 

Although those ladders were compliant with the 1966 City building code, the current code 

required 36-inch wide ladders. Gebhardt believed that grandfather provisions of the 

building code would permit it to rebuild a 24-inch ladder descending into the yard of 2707 

N. Calvert Street, without any further changes, but that those provisions might not have 

permitted it to install a ladder descending onto the Premises without also widening and 

reconfiguring the rest of the fire escape at significantly greater cost. 

At some point during the administrative review, the City agreed to permit Gebhardt 

to install a new, 36-inch wide set of steps descending from the second-floor landing onto 

the Premises without reconfiguring the remainder of the fire escape. Gebhardt did so, at a 

cost of $23,570, and the City eventually abated the violation notice and reissued the multifamily dwelling license. The City never charged Gebhardt any of the threatened fines. 
4

Resolution of Litigation with the Neighbors

On September 5, 2019, after regaining its occupancy permit, Gebhardt reached a 

settlement with Burton/Jones-Smith, whose insurance carrier paid $30,000 to resolve the 

claim. Of that amount, Gebhardt allocated $23,570 to cover the cost of adding the new 

steps, $1,563.11 to cover its attorneys’ fees in defending the City’s violation notice, and 

$4,866.89 toward the cost of its suit against Burton/Jones-Smith and the Greenidges. 

Gebhardt then dismissed its easement claim against the Greenidges. 

Gebhardt asserts that it incurred attorneys’ fees in connection with its lawsuit 

against the Greenidges and Burton/Jones-Smith, over and above the $4,866.89 it allocated 

from the settlement, of $114,628.83. 

The Policy

AEI insured Gebhardt for the policy period March 5, 2015 through March 5, 2016 

pursuant to Commercial Package Policy CPP 1900299 10 (the “Policy”).3 The Policy 

provided commercial property insurance for the Premises with limits of $294,000 for 

building coverage, $30,000 for business income coverage, and $324,000 for equipment 

breakdown coverage. 

This dispute centers on the Policy’s Building and Personal Property Coverage, 

pursuant to which AEI undertook an obligation to “pay for direct physical loss of or damage 

to Covered Property at the [Premises] caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of 

3

In addition to the commercial property coverage, the Policy also included general 

liability insurance. That coverage is not at issue in this appeal, so we will not consider it.
5

Loss.”4 The coverage form defines Covered Property by reference to three different 

“type[s] of property”: (1) Building; (2) Your Business Personal Property; and (3) Personal 

Property Of Others. Only the first two are at issue in this appeal.5

The Policy defines the Building type of coverage as follows: 

a. Building, meaning the building or structure described in the 

Declarations, including: 

(1) Completed additions; 

(2) Fixtures, including outdoor fixtures; 

(3) Permanently installed: 

(a) Machinery and 

(b) Equipment;

(4) Personal property owned by you that is used to maintain or service the 

building or structure or its premises, including:

(a) Fire-extinguishing equipment;

(b) Outdoor furniture; 

(c) Floor coverings; and

(d) Appliances used for refrigerating, ventilating, cooking, 

dishwashing or laundering;

4 The version of the Policy included in the record extract omits the page that 

identifies the premises that are covered. A version of the Policy included in the record 

includes that page, which identifies the Premises as one of two covered premises. 

5 The Policy states that it applies to each “type of property . . . if a Limit of Insurance 

is shown in the Declarations for that type of property.” The declarations page lists a limit 

of liability for Building coverage but not for Your Business Personal Property coverage. 

Nonetheless, the parties appear to agree that the Policy provides Your Business Personal 

Property coverage and neither raised or addressed the absence of a limit of liability for that 

coverage in the circuit court or on appeal. As a result, we will not consider that issue 

further. 
6

(5) If not covered by other insurance:

(a) Additions under construction, alterations and repairs to the 

building or structure;

(b) Materials, equipment, supplies and temporary structures, on or 

within 100 feet of the described premises, used for making additions, 

alterations or repairs to the building or structure.

The Policy defines the Business Personal Property type of coverage as follows: 

b. Your Business Personal Property located in or on the building 

described in the Declarations or in the open (or in a vehicle) within 100 

feet of the described premises, consisting of the following . . . :

(1) Furniture and fixtures; 

(2) Machinery and equipment; 

(3) “Stock”; 

(4) All other personal property owned by you and used in your business;

(5) Labor, materials or services furnished or arranged by you on personal 

property of others;

(6) Your use interest as tenant in improvements and betterments. 

Improvements and betterments are fixtures, alterations, installations or 

additions:

(a) Made a part of the building or structure you occupy but do not 

own; and

(b) You acquired or made at your expense but cannot legally remove;

(7) Leased personal property for which you have a contractual 

responsibility to insure, unless otherwise provided for under Personal 

Property Of Others.

Gebhardt’s Insurance Claim

Gebhardt submitted an insurance claim to AEI for the destruction of the ladder on 

November 5, 2018, which was shortly after Gebhardt learned when the ladder had been 

destroyed, but more than a year after Gebhardt had discovered that the ladder was missing,
7

and approximately seven months after it brought suit against the Greenidges and 

Burton/Jones-Smith.6 In its claim, Gebhardt described the fire escape and its shared, 

second-floor landing; informed AEI of the fire escape’s history and damage; and provided 

information about its litigation against Burton/Jones-Smith and the Greenidges. Gebhardt 

asked AEI to provide coverage for

(a) the costs of reconstructing the lower portion of the fire escape in the 

yard of 2707 Calvert N. [sic] Street and obtaining a declaratory judgment 

and injunction permitting the construction, including attorney’s fees and 

litigation expenses, or (b) the cost of constructing a new fire escape solely 

on 2709 N. Calvert Street if possible, or (c) the diminution in the fair 

market value of 2707 Calvert N. [sic] Street if it must revert to single 

family use due to a lack of a serviceable fire escape and must be sold as 

a single family residence configured as a multi-family four unit apartment 

building. 

On November 26, 2018, AEI denied coverage. AEI based its coverage decision on 

two Policy exclusions. First, AEI cited an exclusion “for loss or damage caused by or 

resulting from . . . loss of use or loss of market,” which it contended precluded Gebhardt’s 

alternative request for diminution in the Premises’s market value if Gebhardt were not able 

to repair the fire escape. Second, AEI cited an exclusion for “[a]cts or decisions, including 

the failure to act or decide, of any person, group, organization or governmental body.” AEI 

asserted that this exclusion precluded any coverage for Gebhardt’s loss, which it concluded 

was due to the acts and decisions of Burton/Jones-Smith. On that basis, subject to a general 

6 On appeal, Gebhardt explains that it did not submit a coverage claim earlier 

because it was unsure when the ladder was destroyed and, therefore, which of three 

different insurers’ policies was implicated. 
8

reservation of rights, AEI disclaimed any “duty to defend or indemnify; or to take action; 

or perform acts or services,” and it declined coverage.7 

Procedural History

In January 2019, Gebhardt sued AEI in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for 

breach of contract. Gebhardt alleged that AEI had breached its obligations under the Policy 

by declining coverage for the destruction of the ladder. By the time of trial in October 

2019, Gebhardt had settled its claim with Burton/Jones-Smith, dismissed its claim against 

the Greenidges, built a new ladder descending exclusively onto the Premises, and obtained 

a new permit from the City. As a result, the focus of Gebhardt’s damages claim was its 

$114,628.83 in unreimbursed attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the litigation against the 

neighbors, which Gebhardt contended it had incurred due to AEI’s wrongful denial of 

coverage. Of that amount, $59,050.50 had been incurred before Gebhardt had placed AEI 

on notice of its claim and $55,578.33 was incurred after that date.

A primary focus at trial was on whether the destroyed ladder was “at” the Premises. 

The Policy obligated AEI to provide coverage “for direct physical loss of or damage to 

Covered Property at the premises[.]” Gebhardt argued that “at” could mean both “on” and 

“near,” and because the ladder was part of a shared fire escape attached to the Premises 

and descending just feet away from the Premises, it was “at” the Premises for purposes of 

the Policy’s Building coverage. In the alternative, Gebhardt contended that even if “at” 

were interpreted to be synonymous with “on,” the ladder was “on” the Premises because 

7 AEI did not identify late notice as a basis for its denial of coverage. 
9

Gebhardt had a prescriptive easement to use the premises of 2707 N. Calvert Street for 

purposes of the fire escape. Finally, Gebhardt argued that even if not covered under the 

Building coverage, the ladder was nonetheless covered as Your Business Personal Property 

because it was owned by Gebhardt and “within 100 feet of the described premises[.]” 

AEI responded that the Policy did not cover the ladder at all. With respect to the 

Building coverage, AEI argued that “at” was ambiguous and should be interpreted to mean 

“on” because it would be unreasonable to interpret it to mean “near” in the context of the 

Policy. In response to Gebhardt’s alternative argument that it held a prescriptive easement, 

AEI argued that Gebhardt’s use of the neighboring property had always been by consent 

and it had never recorded an easement. With respect to the Your Business Personal 

Property coverage, AEI argued that the fire escape was a fixture that was attached to 2707 

N. Calvert Street, rather than the Premises, and it was therefore not Gebhardt’s personal 

property. AEI also asserted that coverage was barred by the “acts or decisions” of others 

exclusion, on which it had relied in its initial coverage denial, although that exclusion was

mentioned only briefly at trial. 

After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that AEI did not owe coverage because 

the ladder was not “at” the Premises. In its written opinion, the circuit court identified the 

dispositive issue as “the meaning of the preposition ‘at’ as it was employed in the [Policy.]” 

The court looked to dictionaries to assess whether “at” was ambiguous, stating: 

According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, “at” is used as a 

function word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near. 

(emphasis added). Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) describes “at” as “a 

term of considerable elasticity of meaning . . . at may often express 
10

simply nearness and proximity . . .” On that basis, this Court concludes 

that the meaning of “at” is indeed ambiguous.

To resolve that purported ambiguity, the court relied on “common sense.” Observing that 

an “insurer has to know the parameters of its duties under the policy,” the court concluded 

that interpreting “at” to include concepts of “nearness and proximity” would render 

application of the Policy 

problematic to the point that it is non-sensical. Where does the zone 

considered “near” [the Premises] end under this contract? A foot off the 

premises? A meter? The adjacent zip code? Simply put, the definition 

urged by Gebhardt is simply too amorphous and indefinite, and cannot 

possibly be what was contemplated by the parties when they entered into 

the instant insurance contract.

In a footnote, the court disposed of Gebhardt’s alternative argument that it had a 

prescriptive easement, stating that the absence of a recorded easement meant that AEI was 

never put “on notice of its potential liability for coverage on that ladder.” The court did 

not specifically address Gebhardt’s alternative claim to coverage under the Policy’s Your 

Business Personal Property coverage. After the court entered judgment in AEI’s favor, 

Gebhardt noted this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

The basic facts underlying Gebhardt’s coverage claim are not in dispute. AEI does 

not contest that Gebhardt built and paid for the entire fire escape, including the ladder. It 

is also undisputed that the fire escape, of which the ladder was an integral part, was 

physically attached to the outside of the Premises, as well as to 2707 N. Calvert Street, and 

that it was a fixture. The issue before this Court is whether the circuit court correctly 

interpreted the Policy in determining that the ladder was not “at the premises” when it was 
11

destroyed. We conclude that the circuit court erred in adopting an overly restrictive 

interpretation of “at” as synonymous with “on.” Based on the unambiguous terms of the 

Policy, we hold that the fire escape ladder was “at the premises” and, therefore, AEI owed 

coverage unless precluded by an applicable exclusion. We will therefore reverse the 

court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings in line with our decision, including 

adjudication of any remaining coverage issues and, if appropriate, damages. Whether the 

court reopens the factual record is within its discretion.

“We construe an insurance policy according to contract principles.” Maryland Cas. 

Co. v. Blackstone Int’l Ltd., 442 Md. 685, 694 (2015). “To determine the intention of the 

parties to the insurance contract, which is the point of the whole analysis, we construe the 

instrument as a whole.” Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388 

(1985). Generally, Maryland courts subscribe to the objective theory of contract 

interpretation. See Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 198 (2006). Under this approach, if 

the language of the contract is unambiguous, we interpret the contract “based on what a 

reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the language to 

mean and not ‘the subjective intent of the parties at the time of formation.’” Credible 

Behav. Health, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 Md. 380, 393 (2019) (quoting Ocean Petroleum, Co. 

v. Yanek, 416 Md. 74, 86 (2010)). “Thus, ‘the written language embodying the terms of 

an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties, irrespective of the intent 

of the parties at the time they entered into the contract.’” Maryland Cas. Co., 442 Md. at 

695 (quoting Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 84 (2002)). Only “[w]here a court determines 

contractual language to be ambiguous, [do] the narrow bounds of the objective approach 
12

give way, and the court is entitled to consider extrinsic or parol evidence to ascertain the 

parties’ intentions.” Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 394.

“[T]he interpretation of a contract, including the question of whether the language 

of a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Id. at 392

(quoting Myers, 391 Md. at 198); Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md. App. 269, 273 

(1986) (“Where the facts are proved without contradiction and there exists no dispute as to 

any material inference of fact, a reviewing court may decide the issue as one of law.”).

I. THE POLICY’S BUILDING COVERAGE APPLIED TO THE FIRE ESCAPE 

BECAUSE THE FIRE ESCAPE WAS “AT THE PREMISES” WHEN THE 

LADDER WAS DESTROYED.

The Policy requires AEI to “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered 

Property at the premises . . . caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.” AEI 

argues that the circuit court was correct in determining that the meaning of “at,” in the 

phrase “at the premises,” is ambiguous because it could mean “in,” “on,” or “near”; and 

that the court properly resolved that ambiguity in favor of excluding the meaning of “near” 

because such a meaning would provide insufficient guidance for AEI to determine its 

coverage obligations. Gebhardt contends that “at” is unambiguous and that it applies to a 

ladder that is part of a fire escape that is physically attached to the building, even if the 

ladder ultimately descends onto the neighboring property. Gebhardt further argues that 

even if the term is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence favors its interpretation. We conclude 

that the phrase “at the premises,” as used in the Policy and as applied to these facts, is not 

ambiguous, and that the fire escape ladder was “at the premises[.]”
13

“A policy term is considered ‘ambiguous if, to a reasonably prudent person, the 

term is susceptible to more than one meaning.’” Connors v. Gov’t Employees Ins., 442 

Md. 466, 481 (2015) (quoting Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 359 Md. 298, 305-06 (2000)). 

Merely because “a term cannot be precisely defined so as to make clear its application in 

all varying factual situations does not mean that it is ambiguous.” Allstate Ins. v. 

Humphrey, 246 Md. 492, 496 (1967). Furthermore, “simply because [a party] can point to 

several slightly different dictionary definitions of [a word] does not render that term 

ambiguous.” Rigby v. Allstate Indem., 225 Md. App. 98, 110 (2015). Instead, each of 

those meanings must be reasonable in context. “Ascertaining the parties’ intentions 

requires us to consider the plain language of the disputed contractual provisions ‘in context, 

which includes not only the text of the entire contract but also the contract’s character, 

purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution.’” Credible 

Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 394 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ocean 

Petroleum, 416 Md. at 88).

“When the clear language of a contract is unambiguous, the court will give effect to 

its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, taking into account the context in which it is used.”

Maryland Cas. Co., 442 Md. at 695 (quoting Sy-Lene of Wash., Inc. v. Starwood Urban 

Retail II, LLC, 376 Md. 157, 167 (2003)). “Traditionally, to supply contractual language 

with its ‘ordinary and accepted meanings[,]’ this Court consults the dictionary definition 

of such terms.” Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 394-95 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388). AEI characterizes dictionary definitions as “extrinsic 

evidence,” relying on Cole v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 359 Md. 298, 305-
14

06 (2000), and Information System & Network Corporation v. Federal Insurance, 145 Md. 

App. 457, 465 (2002). In doing so, AEI misapprehends the role dictionary definitions play 

in statutory interpretation. In applying the objective theory of contract interpretation, we 

look to dictionary definitions to identify the common and popular understanding of the 

words used in the contract as evidence of what a reasonable person in the position of the 

parties would have understood those terms to mean. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 

393-95. Such definitions are thus useful in determining whether the language of a contract 

is unambiguous. Extrinsic evidence, by contrast, is evidence that reflects on the parties’ 

subjective intent in entering the contract, which is appropriately considered only for the 

purpose of resolving an ambiguity in the contract. Id. at 394 (“Where a court determines 

contractual language to be ambiguous, the narrow bounds of the objective approach give 

way, and the court is entitled to consider extrinsic or parol evidence to ascertain the parties’

intentions.”). 

Neither Cole nor Information System & Network Corporation is to the contrary. In 

both cases, the courts referred to dictionaries as “extrinsic sources,” not as extrinsic 

evidence. See Cole, 359 Md. at 305; Info. Sys. & Network Corp., 145 Md. App. at 465. 

And the courts did not use dictionary definitions as extrinsic evidence to resolve 

ambiguities in contractual language in either case. See Cole, 359 Md. at 317-18 (finding 

ambiguity based on one party having varied its treatment of identical policy language in 

prior legal actions and deciding case without extrinsic evidence by resolving ambiguity 

against the insurer); Info. Sys. & Network Corp., 145 Md. App. at 467 (noting no ambiguity 

in the policy’s terms).
15

The Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary provides as its first definition of “at”: 

“used as a function word to indicate presence or occurrence in, on, or near[.]” At, MerriamWebster Collegiate Dictionary 77 (11th ed. 2014). The same dictionary defines “in,” when 

referring to location, as “used as a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position 

within limits,” id. at 627, and “on,” when used in the same context, as “used as a function 

word to indicate position in contact with and supported by the top surface of,” or “in close 

proximity with,” or “the location of something,” id. at 865. “[N]ear” is defined as “at, 

within, or to a short distance[.]” Id. at 828. The word “at” thus encompasses several 

concepts, including an object that is within certain, specified boundaries (“in”), located 

upon a particular surface (“on”), or located within a short distance of something (“near”). 

That definition supports Gebhardt’s interpretation of the Policy as applying not only to 

outdoor fixtures that are in or on a covered premises, but also to fixtures that are in close 

proximity to it. 

The other definition on which the circuit court relied is from the fourth edition of 

Black’s Law Dictionary, which defined “at” as “[a] term of considerable elasticity of 

meaning, and somewhat indefinite.” With respect to location, the definition provided that 

the word “means ‘near’ or ‘near to,’ and involves the idea of proximity.” At, Black’s Law 

Dictionary 159 (4th ed. 1968). That definition is entirely consistent with the definition we 

have cited from Merriam-Webster and supports our conclusion concerning the meaning of 

the word. However, the current, 11th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary does not include 

a definition of “at,” so we place greater reliance on the more up-to-date definition in the 

text. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
16

Texts, Appendix A, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, at 419, 423 (2012) (identifying the 

up-to-date version of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as one of the 

contemporaneous-usage dictionaries that are “the most useful and authoritative for the 

English language generally and for law”).8

After reviewing those two dictionary definitions, the circuit court apparently 

concluded that the definition of “at,” by including the concepts “in,” “on,” and “near,” was 

ambiguous because it was unclear which of those concepts might apply. We think that is 

a misreading of the definition, which incorporates all of those concepts. That the word is 

broad enough to encompass multiple concepts is a feature of its meaning, not an inherent 

ambiguity. See Fister ex rel. Estate of Fister v. Allstate Life Ins., 366 Md. 201, 217-18 

(2001) (“[A] court may not create ambiguity or uncertainty where none otherwise exists.”); 

see also Montgomery County v. Cochran, 471 Md. 186, 209 (2020) (stating that same 

principle applies to statutory interpretation).

We turn next to a consideration of the context provided by other provisions of the 

Policy. The Policy’s Building coverage expressly applies to “[f]ixtures, including outdoor 

fixtures[.]” It does not limit covered outdoor fixtures to ones that hang only over the 

property constituting the premises. With respect to fire escapes, in particular, we would 

8 Other dictionaries included on the list of those “most useful and authoritative for 

the English language generally” from 2001 through the present include up-to-date editions 

of The Oxford English Dictionary, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 

The New Oxford American Dictionary, The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 

Webster’s New World College Dictionary, The Cambridge Guide to English Usage, and 

Garner’s Modern American Usage. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 422-23.
17

expect that if there were an intent to exclude coverage of outdoor fixtures protruding over, 

for example, an adjoining alley or neighboring property, the Policy would specify that.

9

 

The general grant of coverage for “Covered Property at the premises” applies not 

just to the Policy’s Building coverage, but also to its Your Business Personal Property 

coverage. To that extent, it is notable that the latter coverage expressly extends to personal 

property “located in or on the building described in the Declarations or in the open (or in a 

vehicle) within 100 feet of the described premises[.]” Although not part of the Building 

Coverage, that provision suggests that the scope of property included under the umbrella 

of “at the premises” is not strictly limited to property that is on the premises. Moreover, 

that coverage provision makes use of the more restrictive terms “in,” “on,” and “within . . . 

of,” reflecting an understanding of the difference in meaning of the terms. We must 

presume that the contrasting use of the broader term “at” in the general coverage grant was 

intentional, which counsels against interpreting that term as synonymous with “on.”

AEI contends that the Policy’s express application to personal property located 

within 100 feet of the Premises in the Your Business Personal Property coverage section, 

with no similar provision applied to fixtures in the Building coverage section, favors its 

interpretation that the Building coverage is limited to fixtures that are “on” the Premises. 

That interpretation ignores the structure of the coverage grant. The general grant of 

9 The Building coverage also expressly applies to “[m]aterials, equipment, supplies 

and temporary structures, on or within 100 feet of the described premises, used for making 

additions, alterations or repairs to the building or structure.” The Policy does not limit its 

coverage to such property only if it is “on” the premises. 
18

coverage applies to “Covered Property at the [Premises].” The Policy then defines the 

three particular “type[s] of property” to which that general grant applies. That the Policy 

includes additional limitations or specificity in identifying the scope of one type of covered 

property and not another cannot reasonably be read to restrict the general grant of coverage 

that applies to all three. That is particularly so because AEI’s proposed interpretation 

would require us to narrow the general coverage grant by replacing the word “at” with the 

narrower word “on,” in spite of the Policy’s separate and presumably purposeful use of 

that distinct term in other places.

We also consider the broader context provided by the purpose of the Policy. In 

disputes over the meaning of a contract, context is essential. See Credible Behav. Health, 

466 Md. at 394. The question is not whether a word could be ambiguous in a different 

context, but whether there is ambiguity in the context in which it is being used. See Labor 

Ready, Inc. v. Abis, 137 Md. App. 116, 128 (2001) (“If only one reasonable meaning can 

be ascribed to the agreement when viewed in context, that meaning necessarily reflects the 

parties’ intent.” (quoting Martinez v. Miller Indus., 974 P.2d 1261, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 

1999))). As this Court has explained: 

Language can be regarded as ambiguous in two different respects: (1) it 

may be intrinsically unclear, in the sense that a person reading it without 

the benefit of some extrinsic knowledge simply cannot determine what it 

means; or (2) its intrinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application 

to a particular object or circumstance may be uncertain. That a term may 

be free from ambiguity when used in one context but of doubtful 

application in another context is well settled.

Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins., 102 Md. App. 45, 54-55 (1994) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Town & Country v. Comcast Cablevision, 70 Md. App. 
19

272, 280 (1987)); see also Atl. Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico Cas. Co., 380 Md. 285, 

311 (2004) (stating that a contract “must be read as a whole, each of its provisions being 

interpreted together with its other provisions” (quoting Westinghouse Air Brake Div. v. 

United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. Local 610, 440 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 

1982))). 

Here, the context is Building coverage that expressly applies to “outdoor fixtures” 

of a commercial property that is used for multi-family rental housing in an urban setting. 

In that context, we struggle to conceive of a reasonable interpretation of “at the premises” 

that would not apply to a fire escape that: (1) is owned by the insured; (2) is physically 

attached to the roof and second floor of the premises; (3) has a final ladder that descends 

to the ground within feet of the premises; and (4) is necessary to the operation of the 

premises as multi-family residential housing. To that end, the circuit court’s concern that 

interpreting “at” to include the concept of “near” would render its application uncertain in 

some circumstances is simply not relevant to the interpretation of the term here. Although 

it is perhaps true that “near,” in some other context, could include an “adjacent zip code,” 

this is not such a context. 

In sum, we conclude that, in context, the phrase “at the premises” unambiguously 

applies to the Premises’s fire escape, including its final ladder, which descended “within a 

foot or two” of the Premises. As a result, we need not refer to extrinsic evidence to 

determine its meaning. See Vito v. Grueff, 453 Md. 88, 121 (2017) (“[T]he clear and 

unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away to what the parties thought that 
20

the agreement meant or intended it to mean.” (quoting Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam, 440 

Md. 1, 8 (2014))). 

Even if we were to conclude that the phrase “at the premises” were ambiguous in 

this context and so consider extrinsic evidence, however, it would not alter our conclusion. 

Extrinsic evidence is “[e]vidence relating to a contract but not appearing on the face of the 

contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements between the parties or the 

circumstances surrounding the agreement.” Extrinsic Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary 

700 (11th ed. 2019). Neither party presented any evidence concerning the negotiation or 

drafting of the policy language, likely because the Policy’s language was supplied by AEI 

on a standard industry form (specifically, an ISO Properties, Inc. form with a 2007 

copyright date). The only extrinsic evidence that AEI contends was introduced consists of 

the dictionary definitions that were considered by the circuit court. As we discussed above, 

those definitions do not constitute extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Most of the 

extrinsic evidence that Gebhardt contends it introduced is in the nature of context. 

Gebhardt points to evidence “that the fire-escape ladder was visible and in use for over 50 

years,” that it was essential to the lawful use of the Premises as a multi-family apartment 

building, and that it was physically attached to the Premises. We agree that this evidence 

provides context that suggests that a reasonable person reading the Policy and being aware 

of those facts would conclude that the fire escape would be covered. It is less clear that 

those facts constitute evidence of the parties’ subjective intent at the time of contract 

formation. Gebhardt also contends that AEI’s denial letter constitutes extrinsic evidence 

of the parties’ intent because AEI did not initially decline coverage on the ground that the 
21

fire escape ladder was not “‘at’ the premises.” We fail to see how that post-claim 

communication reflects on the parties’ intent when entering the insurance agreement. 

Most importantly, in the absence of any extrinsic evidence weighing in favor of 

AEI’s interpretation of the Policy—and none has been identified—Gebhardt’s reasonable 

interpretation would prevail. Maryland does not follow the rule embraced by many other 

states that an insurance contract is always interpreted in favor of the insured. See 

Harleysville Preferred Ins. v. Rams Head Savage Mill, LLC, 237 Md. App. 705, 722 

(2018). However, when a contract contains an ambiguity that is not resolved by extrinsic 

or parol evidence, “Maryland courts [will] construe a policy against an insurer” as the 

drafter of the policy. Connors, 442 Md. at 481-83 (quoting Empire Fire & Marine Ins. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins., 117 Md. App. 72, 98 n.10 (1997)); see also O’Quinn v. Maryland Auto. 

Ins. Fund, 157 Md. App. 214, 219 (2004) (“Although Maryland law does not construe 

insurance policies as a matter of course against the insurer, when a term in an insurance 

policy is found to be ambiguous, the court will construe that term against the drafter of the 

contract which is usually the insurer.” (quoting Mamsi Life & Health Ins. v. Callaway, 375 

Md. 261, 279-80 (2003))). Thus, if we were to conclude that the phrase “at the premises” 

were ambiguous because it could reasonably be interpreted to include or exclude the fire 

escape ladder, we would interpret the Policy against AEI.

II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE FIRE ESCAPE WERE NOT COVERED BY THE 

POLICY’S BUILDING COVERAGE, THE POLICY’S YOUR BUSINESS 

PERSONAL PROPERTY COVERAGE WOULD COVER IT.

If AEI were correct that the fire escape was not covered by the Policy’s Building 

coverage because it was not a covered “outdoor fixture” of the building, it would have been 
22

covered under the Policy’s Your Business Personal Property coverage. That coverage 

expressly applies to personal property “located in or on the building described . . . or in the 

open . . . within 100 feet of the described premises,” and it expressly includes “fixtures.” 

It is undisputed that the entire fire escape was located within 100 feet of the Premises and 

was a fixture.

AEI contends that because the fire escape ladder was a fixture, it was real property

as a matter of law, and so cannot properly be considered personal property for purposes of 

the Your Business Personal Property coverage. That argument both ignores the express 

terms of the Policy, which identifies “fixtures” as part of the Your Business Personal 

Property coverage, and misreads the law. In interpreting the provisions of the Policy, our 

concern is “what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood 

the language to mean,” Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 393, not whether the parties’

use of terminology was technically correct. Even if the parties were incorrect in identifying 

fixtures as personal property, a reasonable person reading a policy provision that expressly 

provides coverage for fixtures as personal property would understand that they are covered 

under that provision.

In arguing to the contrary, AEI relies on this Court’s decision in Nationwide Mutual 

Insurance v. Regency Furniture Inc., 183 Md. App. 710 (2009). Specifically, AEI contends 

that Regency Furniture stands for the proposition that business personal property coverage 

can never apply to fixtures, which instead are covered as real property, if they are covered 

at all. To the contrary, although the Court in Regency Furniture determined that fixtures 

were ordinarily real property that would not be covered under a policy’s personal property
23

coverage, id. at 730, it observed that, in the policy at issue in that case, “some specifically 

identified items that might be categorized as real property [we]re listed, expressly, as being 

included in the ‘Business Personal Property’ section,” id. That included “fixtures,” which 

were identified as a type of “[t]enant’s improvements and betterments” included in the 

policy’s personal property coverage. Id. at 725-26. The Court assumed that fixtures would 

be covered under that policy provision. The problem for the insured in that case, however, 

was that it was seeking coverage under a different portion of the policy—that applicable to 

“[p]roperty of others . . . that is in [the insured’s] care, custody or control”—which did not 

specifically list fixtures as covered. Id. at 728. Here, the Policy specifically lists fixtures 

as included within the Your Business Personal Property coverage. Regency Furniture thus 

offers AEI no assistance.

Finally, to the extent that AEI argues that it is unreasonable to interpret the Policy

as covering fixtures under both the Building and Your Business Personal Property 

coverages, we disagree, because the plain, unambiguous language of the Policy does 

precisely that. One category of property listed under the Building coverage is “[f]ixtures, 

including outdoor fixtures,” and one category of property listed under the Your Business 

Personal Property type of property is “[f]urniture and fixtures[.]” The Policy does not 

caveat or restrict either reference. If AEI did not mean to cover fixtures under both types 

of coverage, it should not have identified them as covered in both provisions.

In sum, even if AEI were correct that the fire escape ladder was not covered under 

the Policy’s Building coverage because it was not “at the premises” for purposes of that 

type of property, it would nonetheless be covered under the Policy’s Your Business 
24

Personal Property coverage because it was a fixture owned by Gebhardt that was located 

within 100 feet of the Premises.

III. THE CIRCUIT COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF OTHER EXCLUSIONS AND 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON REMAND.

Because the circuit court erred in entering judgment in favor of AEI on the ground 

that the fire escape ladder was not “at the premises,” we must reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. The trial court will first need to address whether there is any 

remaining dispute concerning the application of exclusion B.3.b. of the Policy relating to 

acts or decisions of others. The Policy provides coverage for losses “caused by or resulting 

from any Covered Cause of Loss.” Although Covered Cause of Loss is not defined in the 

Building and Personal Property Coverage Form, the Policy contains a separate Causes of 

Loss – Special Form, which states that “[w]hen Special is shown in the Declarations”—

which it is in the Policy—“Covered Causes of Loss means Risks Of Direct Physical Loss,” 

subject to certain exclusions and limitations. The Causes of Loss – Special Form does not 

define Risks Of Direct Physical Loss, nor have we identified a definition of that term 

anywhere in the Policy. However, the form does provide a list of exclusions and limitations

that appear to shape what constitutes Covered Causes of Loss. 

The only exclusion or limitation on which AEI relied at trial is exclusion B.3.b. of 

the Causes of Loss – Special Form, which provides:

We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any of the 

following [occurrences] . . . . But if an excluded cause of loss that is listed 

. . . results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will pay for the loss or damage 

caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.

. . . .
25

b. Acts or decisions, including the failure to act or decide, of any person, 

group, organization or governmental body.

Because the circuit court resolved coverage in favor of AEI on other grounds, it did not 

address the applicability of that exclusion and neither party addressed the issue in its briefs. 

In the absence of briefing and argument from the parties, we are not in a position to resolve 

whether exclusion B.3.b. is enforceable generally or whether it would apply in this case. 

As a result, the circuit court will need to determine in the first instance whether AEI has 

abandoned that argument and, if not, whether that exclusion applies and is enforceable.10

If the court determines that AEI has abandoned its reliance on exclusion B.3.b. or 

that that exclusion does not apply, the court will need to determine whether Gebhardt’s 

attorneys’ fees incurred in its litigation with Burton/Jones-Smith and the Greenidges

qualify as damages available under the collateral litigation doctrine. As the parties 

acknowledged at oral argument, resolving that dispute will involve making certain factual 

determinations. We therefore leave those determinations for the circuit court to address on 

remand, if appropriate.

10 If the court determines that AEI has not abandoned its reliance on exclusion 

B.3.b., the court will presumably need to address, among any other arguments that may 

arise: (1) the exception to the exclusion providing that AEI is responsible for coverage “if 

an excluded cause of loss that is listed . . . results in a Covered Cause of Loss”; and (2) the 

provision included in the Commercial Property Conditions form stating, “[a]ny act or 

neglect of any person other than you beyond your direction or control will not affect this 

insurance.” 
26

CONCLUSION

We will reverse the circuit court’s judgment in favor of AEI and its determination 

that the fire escape ladder was not “at the premises[.]” We will remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY 

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 

CONSISTENT WITH THIS 

OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

APPELLEE.
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here: 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/0093s20cn.pdf