T EX . P EN . C ODE §1 9. 03 (a ); T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art . 3 7. 07 1. Un le ss o the rw ise ind ic a te d, a ll 1 future r efe renc es to article s ref er to the Code of

Criminal Procedure

. Art. 37.071, §2(h)

. 2 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . A P - 75, 635

JO SEP H G A M BO A A ppe l l ant

v. THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON DI RE CT AP P EA L F ROM CAUS E N O. 2 0 0 5 - CR 7 1 6 8 A I N T HE 3 7 9 DI S TR I CT COURT th BEX AR CO UNTY

K ELL ER , P .J ., de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on of t he C our t i n w hi c h M E YERS , P RI CE , K EASLER , H ERV EY , and H O L C O MB , JJ., joined. C OCH RAN , J., concurre d in point of errorseven and o th e r wise jo ine d. W OM ACK and J OHN S ON , JJ., concurre d.
I n Marc h 2007 , appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenc ed to de ath. Direc t 1

a pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t is a uto ma tic

. Ap pe lla

nt ra ise s e ig hte e n po int s o f e rr or . F ind ingno re ve rs ibl e 2

err or, we aff

irm the conviction and se ntence
.GA MBOA - 2 I. BACKG ROUND A. T h e C ri me On the nig ht of J une 23, 2005, Ramiro “Ram” Ay ala, the owner of a San A ntonio bar name d Tac o L and, wa s working along side employ ees Denise Koge r and Doug las Morg an. Shortly afte r the bar ope ned, be t we en 10:00 and 11:00 in the evening , appellant a nd J ose Na

jera enter ed the ba

r. Neither man was know n to the employ er or his staf f. Patrons Paul Mata and A shley Casas ar rived

a t a ro un d 1 1 : 3 0 p . m . T h e y p u r c h a s e d a c o u p l e o f b e e r s an d b e g an a g a m e o f p o o l

. Sho rt ly afte rwa rds, appellant approa ched Paul, introduc ed himself as “Rick,” and asked to play pool. After Paul and Ashley

finished their g ame, a

ppellant and Paul beg an to play . Another patron, Anita Exon, left ar ound midnight and r em em b ered seeingtwo Hispanic male s who rema ined at the ba r. At some point during the pool ga m e, ap pellant appr oache d Ram and beg an to ar g ue. Ap pe lla nt t he n p ut a g un to Ram’ s sto ma c h and sh ot h im. Pa

ul a nd As hle y hid in a ne arb y c los e t. Do ug la s and

De nis e hid

behin d th e bar, on ly

to b e c on fr on te d late r b y a pp e lla nt. Ap pe lla

nt t old Doug las to open the cas h re gi s t er, but he was una ble to do so. Appellant then shot him and had Denise ope n the cash r eg ister. Afte r she r etrieve d the money , appellant de manded a ny money that was not kept in the re g ister. W h i l e De nise was c omply ing, a ppellant shot her in the ba ck and
commence d kicking her in the he ad. He then picked up D oug las and shot him ag ain. Shortly afte rwa rds, appe llant and Naje ra left the bar. Denise was able to te lephone 911 f or help while Paul attempted to r ender aid to Ram a nd assist D enise with the phone ca ll. Ram died that same nig ht; Dougla s lived for thre e more wee ks befor e succ umbing to his injuries. B. Investigation and Evid ence Offic er Micha el Wesner a rrived f irst on the scene at appr ox imately 1:15 a.m. I nvestig atorsGA MBOA - 3

took statements from the thre e witnesses a nd collecte d various it ems such as pool cues and a bee r can thoug ht to have been handled by appellant, as well as spent bullets a nd samples of blood. L ater , he attended a memorial service for Ram where he intervie wed se vera l people. The leads he rec eived at the ser vice did not pan out under further investigation. At so me po int , A nit a

Exon tol d De te c tiv e John Sla

ughte r that, ba se d on h e r b e lie f t hat D e nis e had owe d a per son called “Tiny ” money for drug s, “Tiny ” might have be en involved in this offense

. Other le ads included a

J une 25 Crime Stoppers tip reg ardinga per son named Sea n Wagg oner. th De te c tiv e Sla

ug hte r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d n o r e a so n to thi nk of or dis c ount “ Ti ny” a s a

su sp e c t. The only rea son he wa s considere d by Detec tive Slaughte r wa s that Anita mentioned him. Nothing in Denise’s a ccount of

what happe ned re fer

red to “ Tiny ,” nor did a

ny thing e lse that came up in the investigation. Sean Wagg oner matched the de scription of one of the assailants, a

nd once he hear d that the police whe re looking for him, he contacted D etec tive Slaughte r. De tective Slaug hter then
me t w ithSe an, wh o w a s c oo pe rativ e . Sea n g a ve a DN A sa mpl e and an ali bi f or his wh e re a

bo uts
on the night in que stion. His DNA did not match the D NA take n from the be er c an believe d to have been use d by

appellant a

nd his acc omplice, and f

urther inve stigation substantiated his alibi. On J uly 2, 2005, Detec tive Slaughte r re ce i v ed a tip from Crime Stoppers reg ardingthe identities of the two assailants, Najer a and appellant. Detec tive Slaughte r re turned to the hospital that da y to s ho w D e nis e a ph oto lin e -u p wi th a pic tur e of

a pp e lla nt. She wa s n ot a

ble to i de nti fy

him as her assailant, but she did point to hi s picture a nd that of anothe r per son and said that they looked familiar to her

. Detec tive Slaughte r showed her another photo arr ay that included Na jera , and she
wa s a ble to i de nti fy

him a s o ne of the a ssa ila

nts . De te c tiv e Sla

ug hte r w a s n e ve r a

ble to c omm

un ic a te in any signific ant way

with the other victim, Doug las, befor e his death.GA MBOA - 4

On the same day , Detec tive Roy Rodrigu ez s h o wed Paul a black and w hite photo arra y consisting of

pictures of appellant and five other men. Paul w as able to identify appellant a s one of the two men involved in the cr ime. Three day s later, due to a miscommunication betwee n Detec tives Slaughte r and Rodriguez, the same pho t o ar ra y , but this t ime in color, wa s shown to Paul. Once ag ain he identified appellant. Paul w as also shown a nother a rra y , which included N ajer a’s photo, but he was una

ble to identify

him as one of the two of

fende rs. On J uly 6, 2005, Detec tive Slaughte r re ceive d fing erpr int results from the pool cue s and bee r cans. Afing erpr int ex aminer f or the San Antonio Police De partment found that the prints from one of the pool cue s matched those of appellant. On June 7, 20 06 , D e te c tiv e Sla ug hte r e xec ute d a

se arc h w arr ant t o obt ain a DNA sampl e from appe llant. The nex t day , appellant’ s and Najera ’s DNA wer e compared to samples f rom the be e r c an f ound a t th e Ta c o L and

B ar. Th e re su lts e xclu de d N a je ra , b ut d id n ot e xclu de a pp e lla nt. II. G UI LT A. F actual Suf

fi ciency of the Evidence I n point of err or nine, a ppellant contends that the eviden ce at t rial, including DNA,
e y e wi tne ss i de nti fi c a tio n, a nd fi ng e rp ri nts , w a s f

a c tually ins uf fi c ie nt t o ju sti fy

the jur y ’s ve rd ic t. Appellant ar g ues that the thre e witnesses w ho testified to seeingappellant shoot Ram neve r positively identified appe llant before trial and ther efor e their in -c o u rt identifications ar e suspec t. Appellant also a

rg ues that Anit a testi fied that appellant and Najer a left the bar befor e she did, so the DN A a nd fi ng e rp ri nt evi den c e c oll e c te d w e re no t di sp os iti ve of g uil t. F ina lly , a

pp e lla nt s ug g e sts that Detec tive Slaughte r purpose fully ignor ed other

suspects, such a s “Tiny ” and Sea n Wagg oner. DN A e vid e nc e fr om b e e r c ans wa s c on sis te nt w i t h a p p e l l a nt ’ s D N A
. B e xa

r C o u nty ’s fo re ns icGA MBOA - 5

W atson v. State, 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). 3 scientist testified that the cha nce of finding another

person with the same DNA profile a s appellant’s is 1 in 5.95 quadrillion. Also, appellant’s fing erpr ints were r ecove red f rom the cr i m e s ce n e, and multipl e ey ewitnesses identified him as t he perpetrator of t he crime. During Paul’s testimony , there
was some confusion a s to when he be came positive of his identification. Neve rtheless, the r ecor d ind ic a te s th a t Pa

ul p os iti ve ly

ide nti fi e d a

pp e lla nt a t th e tim e he re vie we d th e ph oto arr ay . T he ph oto
arr ay , w ithhis sig natur e be hin d a pp e lla nt’ s p ho tog ra

ph , w a s a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e a s w e ll. De nis e testified that once she wa s out of the hospital a nd no longe r under the influenc e of me dication, she
was a lso able to positively identify appellant. Appellant also contends that Anita s tated that appellant a nd Najer a lef

t before she did. But

a pp e lla nt s e e ms to be re fe rr ing to wh a t De te c tiv e Sla ug hte r te sti fi e d re g ard ingwh a t A nit a ha d to ld him, as opposed to he r own testimony . Anita testified that she ne ver told him any thing of the sort and the two men sh e s aw we re s t ill at the bar whe n she left. The rec ord shows that De tective Slaughte r investig ated both Sean a nd Tiny and wa s able to eliminate them a s suspects. I n revie wing a fa ctual suff iciency challeng e, we consider all of the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht

and a sk wh e the r t

he e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d to su

pp or t th e ve rd ic t, t

ho ug h le gall y su ffi c ie nt, is
ne ve rt he le ss s o w e a k o r s o a g a ins t th e g re a t w e ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of c on fl ic tin g e vid e nc e a s to rende r th e ju

r y ’ s v e r d ic t c le ar ly

w r o n g an d

ma n if e s tl y u n ju s t. V ie w in g th e e v id e n c e in a n e u tral 3 light, we find the evidence factua lly sufficie nt to sustain the verdict. Point of error nine is overrule d. B. Jury Selection I n point of err or one, a

ppellant complains that the trial judge err ed in di smissi ng a juror sua
s p o n t e w h en h e w as n o td i s qu a l i f i edas a m at t er

o f l aw . Ap p el l an tar gu es t h at t h e t ri al j u d geGA MBOA - 6

Brooks v. D retke , 444 F.3d 328 ( 5 Circuit 2006) . 4 t h Gray v . Mississippi , 481 U.S. 648 (1987). 5 Gray , 4 8 1 U. S
. at 6 6 5 , 6 6 8 (c i t i n g W itherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521). 6 Ross v. Mississippi , 487 U.S. 81, 87 (1988). 7 err oneously relied upon Brooks v. D retke in dismiss ing the juror. I n addition, appellant ar g ues that 4 the harmless err or doctrine does not apply due to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gray v . Mississippi
. 5 During voir dire, Juror Aulds was a rre sted for driving while intox icated. T he ar rest occ urre d

a ft e r t he jur y wa s se le c te d, bu t be fo re it w a s sw or n, and a c ou ple of day s befo re the tr ia l w a s to
commence . Neither

the State nor a

ppellant objecte d to Juror Aulds serving on the jury . But the tria l judge believed that beca

use of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Brooks v. D retke , J uror Aulds should be disqualified or e lse his inclusion would lead to an eve ntual overturningof a ve rdict on appe al. The tr ia l ju dg e be lie ve d th a t th e po we r t he Di str ic t A tto rn e y ’s of

fi c e wo uld

have ov e r Jur or Au lds wo uld inf lue nc e his a

bil ity to b e imp art ia l. A

pp e lla nt o bje c te d to the su a

sp on te dis mis sa l of

Juro r Auld s. Af te r t he dis mis sa l, t

he tr ia l ju dg e deci ded to pla c e the a lr e a dy -s e le c te d a lte rn a te in Jur or Au lds ’ position and continue voir dire w ith the remaining potential jurors to fill the alternate’s spot. Appellant re lies on Gray v . Mississippi to support his position. But the Supreme Court has 6 explained that the broad la ng uag e in Graywas too swee ping to be applied litera lly and should not be e xten de d b e y on d th e c on te xt of the “ e rr on e ou s W

itherspoon exclusion” of a qualifie d juror in a capital c ase.” This Court has also held that, whe n W itherspoon err or is not at issue, the er roneous 7 excusal of a veniremembe r will call for reve rsal “only

if the re cord shows that the err or depr ived theGA MBOA - 7

J on es v . S tat e , 982 S.W .2d 386, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 8 Id. at 391. 9 Lad d v . S tat e , 3 S.W .3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 10 defe ndant of a

lawfully const i t u t ed jury .” Under Jones , the question is whether or not the jurors 8 wh o a c tua lly

sat w e re imp art ia l. 9 I n th e ins tant c a se the re is n othin g to i nd ic a te that th e jur or s w e re any thi ngbu t im

pa rt ia l. Ap pe lla nt’ s o nly c omp la int

re g ard ingthe jur

y is that, b e c a

us e of the e rr on e ou s e xcu sa l, h is a bil ity to have a comp at i ble jury

was ne g ated. This is insufficient to show that he was de prived of a lawf ull y c on sti tut e d ju

ry . F or the se re a so ns , we ne e d n ot d e c ide wh e the r t he tr ia l ju dg e e rr e d in dismiss ing Juror Aulds. Appellant’ s first point of err or is overr uled. C. Outbu rst during trial I n point of err or fo u r, appellant a lleg es that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied his motion for mistrial af

ter a n outburst by

one of the victim’s relatives. During the testimony

of a w itness for the State, a family member of

the victim shouted, “You did th is f o r 2 0 0 d o ll ar s ?” A p p e ll an t mo v e d f o r a mi s tr ia l, an d th e tr ia l c o u rt d e n ie d h is motion. I ns te a d, the c ourt

dir e c te d th e jur

y tha t the ou tbu

rs t wa s ma de by

so me on e wh o w a s n ot a

wi tne ss and not under

oath. The tria l judge further instructed the jury to c ompletely disreg ard what wa s said. The denial of a motion for mistrial is revie wed under an abuse of discre tion standard. 10 Th is Court ha s lo nghe ld t

hat c onduct by

a by stander “ which interfe res with the normal proc eeding s of a trial will not result in reve rsible er ror unless the defe ndant shows a re asonable probability that theGA MBOA - 8

Lan dr yv . S tat e , 706 S.W. 2d 10 5, 11 2 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ); As hle yv . S tat e , 362 S.W .2d 847 11 (T e x.Cr .App . 1 96 3) ; Gu se v . S tat e , 97 Tex.Cr.R. 212, 260 S .W. 852 (1924). Colbu rn v . S

tat e , 966 S
. W
. 2 d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (jury presumed to disre g ard 12 pa ro le duri ngde lib e ratio n w he n s o in str uc te d) ; W ald o v . S tate , 746 S.W .2d 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 88 ) ( jur y pr e su me d to fo llo w i ns tr uc tio n to dis re g ard

te sti mony

re g ard ingdefend ant’s po stMir and a sil e nc e ); Ga rd

ne r v . S tat e , 730 S.W .2d 675, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (jury presumed to follow instruction after acc omplice witness alluded to def endant’ s previous inca

rce ration). Colbu rn , 966 S.W .2d at 520. 13 conduct inter fer ed with the jury ’s ver dict.” I nstructio n s t o the jury are g ener ally

considere d 11

su ff ic ie nt t o c ur e imp ro pr ie tie s th a t oc c ur duri ngtr ia l. An d we g e ne ra lly pr e su me that a jur y wi ll 12 fo llo w the jud g e ’s ins tr

uc tio ns . 13 Nothing in the r ecor d sug g ests that the outburst was of suc h a nature that the jury could not ignor e it and fa irly

examine the evidenc e in ar riving at a ve rdict. Point of error four is over

ruled. D . Ext r ane ous Offen se I n point of error three, appellant argues t hat the trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied his motion for mistrial af

ter e x trane ous offe nse evide nce w as elicited du ri n g t h e g uilt phase of trial. The compl a in e d

- o f e v id e n c e w a s e li c it e d in th e f o ll o w in g c o ll o qu y b e tw e e n th e p r o s e c u to r an d the

w it n e s s , D e te c ti v e Ro dr igu e z:

Q: And in fac t, on J uly

2 afte r Paul positively

id en t i fi ed J oseph nd Ga mbo a , th is d e fe nd ant, a s th e a c tor or on e of the a c tor s, he be c a me emotional, didn’t he? A: Yes, he did. Q: And he be g an to cr

y didn’t he? A: Yes he did. Q: What did he tell y ou?GA MBOA - 9 A: He sa id he h ad s ee n this person in a Crime Stoppers on an unrelated shooting that occur red like the following wee kend. Appellant objec ted to the testimony and argued that an instruction to disreg ard w ould be ineff ective. The trial c ourt sustained appe llant’s objection and g ave the jury the following instruction: “As for the last question and answe r, if you rec all what it was, I ’m instructing y ou to completely disreg ard it. I t has nothing to do with this case or any of y our deliberations whatsoeve r. So just dis reg ard it.” Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t e vid e nc e vio la te d Texa s Ru le of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) , w hic h s ta te s:

“ Ev ide nc e of

oth e r c ri me s, wr on g s o r a c ts is no t adm issib le to p ro ve the c ha ra c te r o f a

pe rs on in order to show action i n confor

mity there with.” Assuming that the t estimony was improper , the trial judge quickly

instructed the jury

to disreg ard the statement and the questi on. Nothing in the rec ord sug g ests that the jury

was una ble to follow the instruction. Point of error three is overrule d. E. I n- Co ur t I de nt ific at ion I n p oin t of

e rr or se ve n, a pp e lla nt c on te nds th at th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto s up pr e ss Paul’s in-court identific ation of appe llant. Appellant arg ues t hat P aul’s in-court identification wa s influence d by

a hig hly suspect photo ar

ray shown to him by

police off icer s during their investig ation. Appellant ar g ues that Paul neve r positively identified appe llant as the shooter until a pre -trial hea ring wher e appe llant was pre sent in an ora ng e jumpsuit. Paul was shown thre e photo ar ray s during the police investig ation. The fir st, shown on J une 28 , 2 00 5, c on sis te d of ph oto g ra ph s o f S e an Wa g g on e r a

nd fi ve ra nd om i nd ivi du a ls. Pa

ul w a s una

ble to identify

any one fr om that arra

y . The second, shown on J uly 2, 2005, was a black a nd white ar

ray that in c lud e d a

ph oto of a pp e lla nt. Af te r Pau l wa s abl e to narr owthe arr ay do wn to t wo ind ivi du a ls, De te c tiv e Rod

ri g ue z as ke d Pa

ul t o c ho os e the on e wh o mo st r e se mbl e d th e sh oo te r. Pa ul w a s a bleGA MBOA - 10

Los e rth v . S

tat e , 963 S.W .2d 770, 771-772 (Te x . Crim. App. 1998). 14 Id. at 772. 15 Id. qu o t i n g Simmons v. United States , 390 U.S. 377, 384, 19 L . Ed. 2d 1 2 4 7 , 8 8 S
. C t. 967 16 (1968). Se e als o M

ad de n v . S tat e , 799 S.W .2d 683, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Ne il v . B igge rs , 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). 17 to single out a

nd identify

the appe llant, and he sig ned his name be hind that picture. Due to a miscommunication, three da y s later, a nother de tective we nt to Paul with a third photo arra y , which was identica l to the second ex cept that it was in color. A g ain, Paul identified appe llant. I n a pre -trial hear ing Paul identifie d appellant a s the man who shot and killed Ram. Finally , Paul ag ain identified

a p p e l l an ta tt r i a l

. T h e t r i a l c o u rts u p p r e s s e d o n l y t h e th i r d

p h o t o ar r ay. We review de novo a trial court’ s ruling on how the sug g estiveness of a

pre- trial photo arr ay may have influence d an in-c ourt identification “An in-c ourt identification is inadmissible when 14 it h a s b e e nta in te d

b y anim p ermissibly s u g g e s ti v e p r e tr ia l p h o to g r a p h ic id e n ti f

ic a ti o n . ” We

15

c on sid e r the tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s in or de r to de te rm ine wh e ther “the ph otog ra ph ic identification proc edure was so impermissibly sug g estive as to g i v e rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepa

rable misidentification.” Fa ctors to be c onsidered w hen makinga de novo 16 revie w ar e: 1) the w itness’s opportunity to view appe llant at the t ime of the c rime; 2) the witness’ s deg ree of attention; 3) t he accur acy of t he witness’s prior descr iption of the criminal; 4) the witness’s level of c erta inty at t he ti me of confr ontation; and 5) the leng th of time betwee n the offe nse and the confr ontation. 17 Even thoug h Paul testified that he hes i t at ed when identify ing a ppellant, there was other testimony to support the contention that Paul g ave multi ple pos itive identifications. Police offic ersGA MBOA - 11

who conduc ted the ar

ray testified to Paul’s positive identification of appellant. A fe w day s after the shooting, Paul wa s watchingtelevision and re cog nized appellant from an unrelated Crime Stoppers
commerc ial reg ardinganother robb er y . P aul ca lled the Crime Stoppers hotline when he saw the number c ome up on the commer cial. A l s o , P aul t estified that he pla y ed pool with appellant f or
a pp ro xima te ly

te n mi nu te s. Pa

ul t e sti fi e d th a t he ba se d his in- c ourt ide nti fi c a tio n o f a pp e lla nt o n h is memory of the events that transpire d at Tac o L and and of Ram’s murder . This evidence is sufficient to r e mov e any

po ssibl e tai nt fro m the e xclu de d th ir d p ho to a rr ay . T he tr ia l c ourt

did no t e rr in admitting evidenc e of Paul’s in-court identific ation of appe llant. Point of er ror se ven is overr

uled. F . Jury Unanimity I n point of err or two, appe llant cont en d s that he wa s denied his rig ht to a unanimous jury
ve r d i c t
. H e c l a i m s t h a tt h e j u r y w a s a l l o w e d

t o c o n v i c th i m b a s e d

u p o nt w o d i s t i n c tan d

se pa ra te theories within the ca

pital murder statute w ithout having to u n an i m o u s ly ag ree which one w as applicable . He acknow ledg es prior ca ses that per mit the disj unctive cha

rg ing of alternate methods of committing c apital murder, but he argues that those ca ses ar e distinguishable beca use the diff

ere nt means of committing capital murder in those case s wer e contained within the same subsection of the statute, while the diff

ere nt leg al theorie s of ca pital murder i n h i s case are found in diffe rent
su bs e c tio ns . Appellant wa s char g ed in a two- para g raph indictment. The first para g raph a lleg ed that

a pp e lla nt c a us e d the de a th Ram by sh oo tin g him wi th a fi re arm wh ile c omm itt ingor

a tte mpt ingto commit the offense of robbe ry of Ram, Doug las, and De nise. The se cond par ag raph a lleg ed that appellant c aused the death of Ram and murder ed Doug las during the same c riminal transac tion.. I n Kitc he ns v . S

tat e , we he ld that the disjunctive submissi on of two theorie s of ca pital murderGA MBOA - 12

82 3 S. W.2 d 2 56 , 25 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); se e als o M ar tin e z v . S tat e , 129 S.W .3d 101, 103 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). See T EX . P EN A L C ODE §19.03(a) (2)( “A pe rson commits an offe nse if the pe rson commits murder 19 as define d under Section 19.02(b)( 1) and

. . . the person intentionally commits the murder i n the course of committing or attempting to commit k i d napping , burg lary , robber y , ag g ravated sexual assault, arson, obstruction or reta liation, or terror istic thre at under Section 22.07(a) (1), (3), ( 4), (5) , or (6) .”). 82 3 S. W.2 d at 25 8; see also Martinez , 1 2 9 S .W.3d at 103 (question is whether the disjunctive 20 submissi on involves “alter native theories of committing the same offe nse, in contra st to inst ructing the jury on two separ ate of

fense s involving sepa

rate incidents”). See T EX . P EN A L C ODE §19.03(a) (2)( robber y and burg lary

), (3) (“the person commits the murde r 21 for re mu n e r a ti o no r

th e p r o mi s e o f

r e mu n e r a ti o no r

e mp lo y s an o th e r

to c o mm it

th e mu r d e r f or remune ration or the pr omise of re muneration”). 848 S.W .2d 101, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 22 with two differ ent ag g ravating elements (the underly ing offe nses of robber

y and ag g ravated sexual

a ssa ult ) d id n ot v iol a te the ri g ht t o a un anim ou s v e rd ic t be c a

us e the dif

fe re nt t he or ie s w e re sim

ply alternate m ethods of commi tting the same offense. I t is true that the alter nate theor ies of ca

pital 18 murder in Kitchens involved ag g ravating elements that wer e li sted within a single subsection of the capital murder statute. Neve rtheless, in Kitchens , we ex plained gene rally that alternate t heorie s of 19 committing t he same offe nse m ay be submitted disjunctively in the jury

char g e without violating the rig ht to jury unanimity

. I n answe ring a cla im that the State should have ele cted be tween dif fer ent 20 the or ie s o f c a

pit a l murd e r t

hat did involve ag g ravating e lemen t s that wer e conta ined in differ ent subsections (murder in the course of robber y and burgla

ry and murde r for

hire), we he ld in Ha tho rn 21 v. State that no e le c tio n w a s r e qu ir e d b e c a us e the ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d o nly on e of

fe ns e . F or

thi s 22

rea son, we re

jected the defe ndant’s re liance upon the sever ance statute bec ause that statute appliedGA MBOA - 13

Id. 23 19 S.W .3d at 851, 852 (Te x . Crim. App. 2000). 24 Id. at 854. 25 Id. 26 267 S.W .3d 902, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 27 only when two or

more off enses ha ve bee n consolidated or joined f or prose cution. 23 I n Grah am v . S

tat e , we addre ssed a complaint that the trial court err ed in de ny ing a motion to sever w here the def

endant’ s cl aim was that diff ere nt theories of c apital murder (whe re the ag g ravating e lements wer e in fac t codified in differ ent s ubsections) were differ ent offe nses. Three 24 differ ent theorie s were at issue: (1 ) t h e m u rder of Hurta do in the course of robbinghim, (2) the murder of Hurtado dur ing the same tra nsaction in which the de fenda nt also murdere d Giraldo, a nd (3) th e mu

r d e r o f G ar c ia

- Ca s tr o in th e c o u r s e o f r o b b in g h im

. T h e Co u rt h e ld th a t the first two 25 theories, whic h involved Hurtado as the vi ctim of t he predicate murder, were the s ame offense , but the third theory , involving a dif fer ent victim f

or the predic ate murder, w as a diff ere nt offense that
s h o u l d h a v e b e e ns e v e r e d

. H e r e , w e f a c e t h e s a m e f

a c tu a l s i tu a t i o n p r e s e n t e d b y Graham ’s fi rs t 26 two theories of

capital murde r: the victim of the pre dicate murder is the same (Ram), a nd the predic ate murde r is ag g ravated by the eleme nts of robber

y and an a dditional murder. We expl ained in Hu

ffm an v . S

tat e that two “close ly

intertwined stra

nds of our jurisprude nce” – jury unanimity and double jeopar dy – “addr ess the same basic que stion”: whether “ differ ent leg al theories of

criminal liability

comprise differ ent offe nses” or “alter nate methods of c ommitt ing the
same offe nse.” Comparing the jury unanimity

case of Kitchens to the doubl e jeopa rdy case of Ex 27GA MBOA - 14

991 S.W .2d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 28 I d. at 807. 29 Id. ; see also id. at 807-11 (c iting and disc ussing c ases)

. 30 pa rteErv in , we obse rved th at t h e rule for homicide of fense s appea

red to be that “diffe rent leg al 28 theories involving the s ame victim are simply alternate methods of committing the sa me offe nse.” 29 I n Erv in , we include d in our discussion of “murde r var iations” th e o cc urre nce of differ ent leg al theories in the c apital murder context, and we obser

ved that the p reva iling view w as “that a trial court c annot impose multipl e convic tions and sentence s for va riations of murder

when only

one person wa s killed.” 30 We conclude that our holding in Kitchens applies equally to a ll a lternate theories of ca pital murder c ontained within §19.03, whether they are found in the same or

differ ent subsections, so l ong
as th e sam e vic timis a lle g e d f or the pr e dic a te mur de r, a s w a s th e c a se he re . Po int of e rr or tw o is
overr uled. III. PU NISHMENT

A. Outside In fl uence Upon Jurors 1. Juror Harce k I n point of err or five, a

ppellant claims that J uror Har cek was exposed to im proper influence when he overhe ard a

conver sation betwee n Police Offi ce r Br een a nd a prose cutor who w as not involved in the case

. J uror Ha rce k was in the c ourthouse ele vator whe n Offic er B ree n enter ed and the prosec utor
as k ed whe re he was he aded. O ffice r B ree n responde d, and aske d if the jury took all of forty -five minutes to come bac k with a verdic t. The prosec utor then told him it took four hours, a fter w hichGA MBOA - 15

Ladd, 3 S.W .3d at 567. 31 Qu inn v . S

tat e , 958 S.W .2d 395, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 32 Id . at 402. 33 J uror Ha rce k asked the m to be quiet. Offic er Br een saw J uror Ha rce k’s juror ba dg e and a

pologized, riding the re st of the way up the eleva tor with no further discussion r eg arding the case . J uror Ha rce k testified that all he he ard w as someone me ntion the Tac o L and case, at which point he asked the m to b e qu ie t and

the y did . H e did

no t he ar a

ny thi ng re la tin g to ev ide nc e in the c a se or de lib e ratio ns . He f urther te stified that he would still be able to be an impartial juror. The judge then admonished J uror Ha rce k not to discuss what happened with any of t he other jurors, to disreg ard the comment when de liberatin g, and he a sked, multiple tim es, if the c omment would affe ct his ability to be impartial, to which Juror Harc ek said it would not. A trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is revie wed for an abuse of discre tion. When 31 a juror ha s a conve rsation with an unauthor ized person about the c ase on which he is serving , there is a re bu tta ble pr e su mpt ion

that in jur y ha s o c c ur re d a nd a ne w tri a l may be ne c e ssa ry . An a pp e llate 32 court should def

er to the tria l court’s finding s of fa cts reg ardingthe cr edibility and deme anor of

the wi tne sse s, vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he tr ia l ju dg e ’s ru lin g s. I n th is c a se 33 the juror wa s not even involved in the c onversation; he merely overhe ard it. Given Juror Har cek’ s testimony , we hold that the tria l court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing the reque st for a mistrial. Poi nt of err or five is ove rruled. 2. J ur or Lin c oln I n point of err or si x , appellant claims that the t rial court err ed when it denied his motion for mistrial afte r it was discove red that J uror L incoln’s seve nteen- y ear -old son was a rre sted while sheGA MBOA - 16

See Stahl v. State, 749 S.W .2d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 34 wa s se rv ingon

the jur y . B e c a us e Juro r L inc oln ’s so n w a s a rr e ste d in B e xar County and the same District Attorney ’s office that was prosecuting the case at hand would also be prose cuting her son’ s
c a se , a pp e lla nt c la ims that he r s on ’s arr e st w ou ld u nd uly inf lue nc e he r a

bil ity to b e fa ir and imp a rt ia l. After the g uilt phase of the trial but bef ore the punishment phase, Juror L incoln informed the
c ourt that ov e r t

he we e ke nd

he r s on ha d b e e n a

rr e ste d f or int e rf e ri ngwi th t

he du tie s o f a

pu bli c
serva nt, evadingarr est, and fa ilure to identify . The trial judg e aske d J uror L incoln whether or not her son’ s arr est would aff ect he r ability

to pay attention to the evidenc e and if she could set a side what happe ned to her

son. She responde d that it would not affec t her a bility to pay attention, nor would it prevent he r fr om being impartial

. T h e j u dg e also a sked her if she could se t aside what happene d, to which she re sponded that she c ould. J uror L incoln also informed the judge that her son was be ing “ stupid” and she ha d let him stay in jail b ec au s e he neede d to “lear n a lesson.” Juror L inc oln re pe a te dly

te sti fi e d th a t sh e wo uld

have no tr ou

ble be ing fa ir and that he r s on ’s arr e st w ou ld not affe ct her

in any way for the r emainder

of the trial. She testified that she knew that her son wa s running with a bad c rowd a nd it was her c hoice to leave her son in jail to t eac h him a lesson. Viewe d in t h e l i ght most favorable to the trial court’ s ruling, w e find that the e vidence supports the trial cour

t’s denial of a

ppellant’s motion for mistrial. Point of error six is overruled. B. Cumulative im pact of f irst seve n error s I n appellant’ s eig hth point of error he contends that, cumulatively , err ors one throug h seven
we re so g re a t th a t th e y

de mand a reve rs a l. T ho ug h it is p os sib le fo r a

numbe r o f e rr or s to cumulatively

rise to the point wher e they become harmful, we have never found that “non-e rror s 34GA MBOA - 17

Cha mb e rla in v . S

tat e , 998 S.W .2d, 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 35 may in their cumulative e ffe ct ca use er ror.” Point of error e ight is over ruled. 35 C. Mu l ti p l e C h a l l en g es to th e D ea th Pen a l ty S ch eme I n p oin ts o f e rr or

te n th ro ug h s e ve nte e n, a pp e llant rai ses cha lle ng e s to the Te xas d e a th penalty scheme that we have alr eady reje cted. I n point of er ror ten, a ppellant contends that the trial court violated the Six th, Eig hth, and Fourtee nth Amendments t o the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion by failing to instruct the jury

that a vote by one juror would result i n a life se ntence despite the statuory
re qu ir e me nt o f t e n v ote s f or a “ No ” ans we r to the qu e sti on of futur e da ng e ro us ne ss, or

fo r a “ Ye s” vote to a finding of mitigating circ umstances. In point of err or ele ven, appe llant argues that the c ourt violated the Eig hth Amendment by failing to instruct the jury that there is no presumption in favor of death, even if the y

wer e to find appe llant t o b e a “f uture da ng er” in answer

to special issue number one , and that spec ial issue number thre e, re g arding mitigating circ umstances, is to be taken up and conside red inde pendently , without reg ard to the jury ’s finding on issue one. In points of error twelve throug h fiftee n, appellant arg ues that the jury should have be en instructed on the definitions of par ticular wor ds and phra ses in t h e j u ry charg e and, in not doing so, the trial cour t violated the United States Constit ution. I n point of err or six teen, a ppellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied h i s m o t i o n to prec lude the dea th penalty as a se ntencingoption due to equal prote ction vio la tio ns . I n po int

of e rr or se ve nte e n, a

pp e lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it

re fu se d to hold Article 37. 071 unconstitutional because a g rand jury had not consider ed, and a lleg ed in an indictment, the fac ts leg ally essential to appe llant’s conviction and de ath sentenc e.GA MBOA - 18

Sa lda no v . S

tat e , 232 S.W .3d 77, 104-09 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007), cert. de nied , 1 28 S. Ct
. 36 14 46 (2 00 8) ; Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W .3d 654, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Bl ue v . S tat e , 12 5 S. W.3 d 4 91 , 5 04 -0 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 9 2 4 S. W. 2 d

6 9 3 , 6 9 8 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); see also Gallo v. State, 239 S.W .3d 757, 779-780 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007); Perry v . State, 15 8 S. W.3 d 4 38 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); W oo ds v . S tat e , 152 S.W .3d 105, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Saldano , 232 S.W .3d at 107. 37 Se gu nd o v . S tat e , 270 S.W .3d 79, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 38 Al l of

the se c la ims have be e n r e je c te d in the pa st. I t is s uf

fi c ie nt t o d isp os e of

su c h c la ims 36 “by rec og nizi ng that the trial cour t submit ted a c harg e consistent with applica ble st a te statutes, which have w ithstood num erous c onstitut ional challeng es.” Points of e rr o r t en throug h sevente en ar e 37

overr uled. D. Lethal injection cruel and un usu al I n p oin t of

e rr or e ig hte e n a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e pr oc e dure us e d by the State of

Te xas i n which lethal injec tions are e mploy ed in administering the death penalty violates the rig ht to be fre e from cr uel and unusu al p u n i s h m ent under the Eig hth and Four

teenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tution. S i n ce appellant’ s execution is not i mminent his arg ument is not ripe for revie w. Point of error e ighte en is overr uled. 38 We a ff ir m th e jud g e me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. DEL I VERED: April 8, 2009 PUB L I SH