[Cite as Cleveland v. S.W. Invests., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-1271.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 112485, 112486, 

and 112683

v. :

SOUTHWEST INVESTMENTS LLC, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 4, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court

Case No. 2021-CRB-004651

Appearances:

Mark Griffin, Director of Law, and William H. Armstrong, 

Jr., Assistant Director of Law, for appellee. 

Cavitch, Familo & Durkin Co. LPA and Bradley Hull IV, 

for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

Defendant-appellant, Southwest Investments LLC (“Southwest”), 

appeals from several judgments of the Cleveland Municipal Court following the 

court’s finding that Southwest violated its community-control sanctions. After a 

thorough review of the record and law, this court affirms.
I. Factual and Procedural History

On May 10, 2021, the city of Cleveland (“Cleveland”) filed a complaint 

against Southwest alleging violations of Cleveland Codified Ordinances

(“C.C.O.”) 3103.25(e), failure to comply with an order of the city’s department of 

building & housing (“DBH”). Southwest’s statutory agent and sole member,

Anthony Dattilo (“Dattilo”), appeared as the representative for Southwest 

throughout the pendency of this matter. 

The failure-to-comply complaint stems from a notice generated on 

August 7, 2019, by DBH, providing that the property owned by Southwest located at 

6215 Gertrude Avenue in Cleveland was in violation of C.C.O. 3105.01(a) and 

3105.25 for installing a porch roof without a permit. C.C.O. 3103.99(a) provides that 

each separate day out of compliance is a separate first-degree misdemeanor. 

Southwest did not appeal an earlier building code case filed against 

Southwest, 2019-CRB-010919, but it is discussed briefly to the extent it is discussed 

in the record of the instant matter. It appears that due to a clerical error by 

Cleveland, Southwest was named as the defendant in a building code violation 

complaint associated with a property that Southwest and Dattilo did not own, and 

indeed had never owned. Southwest allegedly never received notice of this action 

and never appeared. As a result, Southwest was fined a significant sum that was 

eventually reduced to a judgment lien. Only after this judgment lien was filed did 

Southwest and Dattilo discover the pending case. Southwest and Dattilo underwent 
a lengthy process attempting to get the 2019 case dismissed and the associated lien 

released and removed. 

Turning back to the case from which this appeal was taken, the trial 

court held a plea hearing on July 13, 2022, at which Southwest entered a no-contest 

plea to ten counts of violating C.C.O. 3103.25(e). The court found it guilty and nolled 

the remaining 156 counts. Sentencing was continued pending the preparation of a 

presentence-investigation report and the order pertinently noted that “[Southwest] 

is ordered to not sale [sic], order [sic] or gift property while [the] case is pending.” 

The trial court sentenced Southwest on October 12, 2022. It was noted 

during this hearing that the work was complete, and the permits had been requested, 

meaning Southwest had remedied all violations that led to the complaint. The court 

advised defendant that his total penalty could have been a fine of $50,000, five years 

of community-control sanctions, and court costs. Relevant to this appeal, the court 

suspended the $50,000 fine pending successful completion of two-years of 

community-control sanctions and specifically ordered that Southwest was not to 

“sale, gift or transfer the properties it owns within the City of Cleveland while on 

community control without approval of the Court.” The court advised numerous 

times that “all of your properties owned in the City of Cleveland [are] under the 

jurisdiction of this court. That is so that you don’t get any more violations.” 

(Tr. 10/12/2022, 34.) The accompanying journal entry provided that “No 

Prohibition Order will be filed at this time provided Defendant remains in 

compliance with the orders of the Court.” The journal entry also referenced 
Exhibit A, which designated the six properties that Southwest owned in Cleveland. 

The entry also noted that if Southwest was found in violation of community control, 

the court may (1) impose further community-control sanctions up to five years and;

(2) impose more restrictive community-control sanctions, including increased 

financial sanctions up to $50,000. 

On November 15, 2022, the court held a community control status 

hearing and reviewed Southwest’s compliance with community control. At the end 

of the hearing, Southwest’s counsel asked if the order not to sell, gift, or transfer any 

of the properties could be lifted for the five properties that were not the subject of 

the initial violation, which the court declined. The accompanying journal entry 

again provided that “[Southwest and counsel] were again informed on 

November 15, 2022, not to sale, gift or transfer the properties it owns within the 

City of Cleveland while on community control without approval of the Court. No 

Prohibition Order will be filed at this time provided Defendant remains in 

compliance with the orders of this Court.” The entry again referenced Exhibit A, 

enumerating the six properties that Southwest owned in Cleveland. 

On December 8, 2022, Southwest sold one of the properties referenced 

in Exhibit A, located at 3636 East 65th Street. The housing court specialist assigned 

to this matter, Antonio McMullen (“McMullen”), wrote in his report that this 

property had been sold “without notifying Deputy Chief housing court Specialist 

McMullen, and/or approval from the Cleveland Housing Court.” The report further 
noted that another one of Southwest’s properties located at 3691 East 63rd Street

was transferred to another LLC that was allegedly associated with Dattilo. 

On January 31, 2023, the court held an in-person status hearing at the 

request of Southwest’s counsel. During this hearing, McMullen testified regarding 

the sold and transferred properties. Dattilo was sworn in to testify on Southwest’s 

behalf and indicated that he was the sole member of Southwest. Dattilo admitted 

that he sold and transferred the two properties at issue. Dattilo indicated that he

understood that Southwest was not to sell, gift, or transfer any of the properties and 

admitted that he had received all prior orders forbidding Southwest from doing so. 

The court found Southwest in violation of community control based on the two 

properties that were sold and transferred in violation of the court’s order. The court 

ordered that Southwest pay $25,000 with the remaining $25,000 stayed so long as 

Southwest remained in compliance with all community-control sanctions and did 

not sell, gift, or transfer any of the other properties unless approved by the court. 

The court ordered that Southwest pay $2,000 monthly beginning on February 20, 

2023, until the $25,000 fine was paid, and noted that failure to make these 

payments would potentially subject Southwest to additional community-control 

sanctions violations. The court also advised that a prohibition order would be filed 

with the Cuyahoga County Office of Fiscal Officer and that Southwest was 

responsible for all filing costs of the order. A copy of the prohibition order was filed 

in the trial court on February 8, 2023. 
Southwest filed two notices of appeal on March 8, 2023, attaching 

both the order finding Southwest in violation of community control and the 

prohibition order dated February 8, 2023. 

While the first two appeals were pending, yet another communitycontrol sanctions violation hearing was held on April 5, 2023, because Southwest 

had not made any payments towards the $25,000 fine imposed at the prior hearing. 

Counsel for Southwest explained that Southwest had not made any payments 

because Southwest was exercising its right to appeal the fine and noted that paying 

the fine in full would render the instant appeal moot. Southwest made an oral 

motion to stay the fine, which the trial court denied. The court did not find 

Southwest in violation of community control, but warned that it would generate a 

new payment schedule for the $25,000 fine. The journal entry following this 

hearing provided that “[a]ll prior orders to remain in full force and effect. 

[Southwest’s] motion to stay fine denied. Defendant ordered to pay $6,000 by 

April 20, 2023, and to resume $2,000 per mo[nth] p[a]ym[en]t May 20, 2023.” 

Southwest filed its third notice of appeal from this journal entry. 

This court consolidated all three of Southwest’s appeals into the 

instant matter for briefing, and Southwest assigned the following three errors for 

our review: 

I. The trial court committed an abuse of discretion in imposing 

community control sanctions upon defendant-appellant including 

prohibiting defendant-appellant from selling, conveying, gifting and 

transferring any properties it owned in the City of Cleveland, Ohio, and 

then imposing a prohibition order. 
II. The trial court imposed an unlawful fine on defendant-appellant 

when it found that defendant-appellant had violated its order. 

III. The trial court wrongfully refused to impose a suspension of 

execution of sentence after a judgment of conviction upon defendantappellant. 

II. Law and Analysis

A. Imposition of Community-Control Sanctions

In its first assignment of error, Southwest argues that the trial court 

erred in imposing a community-control sanction forbidding Southwest from selling, 

conveying, gifting, or transferring any properties that it owned and then imposing a 

prohibition order. Southwest advances two arguments: 1) that the court abused its

discretion in fashioning a community-control sanction that was overly broad and 

impinged upon Southwest’s liberty and 2) that Southwest’s due process rights under 

the United States and Ohio Constitutions were violated by the trial court’s 

community-control sanctions including the directive to not sell, gift, or transfer the 

property and that the property be kept in a neat and clean condition. 

Res judicata bars a defendant from appealing a final judgment of 

conviction when the defendant, who was represented by counsel, failed to raise or 

litigate “any defense or claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have 

been raised by the defendant at the trial, * * * or on appeal from that judgment.” 

State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), citing State v. Perry, 

10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. The Ohio 

Supreme Court recently clarified its position on res judicata as it applies to any 
party’s failure to directly appeal a sentence in State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 

285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776. “[S]entences based on an error are voidable, 

if the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction over the case and the defendant[.] 

A sentence is void only if the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject 

matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” Id. at ¶ 27. “[U]nless 

it is vacated on appeal, a voidable judgment has the force of a valid legal judgment,

regardless of whether it is right or wrong.” Id. at ¶ 17. “The failure to timely — at 

the earliest available opportunity — assert an error in a voidable judgment, even if 

that error is constitutional in nature, amounts to the forfeiture of any objection.” Id. 

The journal entry setting forth the terms of Southwest’s communitycontrol sanctions was a final, appealable order from which Southwest could have, 

and did not, directly appeal. A judgment of conviction is final when the order sets 

forth (1) the fact of the conviction; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; 

and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court. State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 

893 N.E.2d 163, syllabus, as modified by State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-

Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, syllabus. Southwest did not file a direct appeal from 

the trial court’s final, appealable order setting forth the conditions of community 

control, including the sanction barring Southwest from selling, gifting, or 

transferring its properties and the warning that a prohibition order would not be 

filed unless and until a violation of this order occurred. See, e.g., Cleveland v. 

Durham Properties Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100754, 2014-Ohio-4378, ¶ 10, 

citing Cleveland Mun. Court Criminal Div. v. Anthony, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
97786, 2012-Ohio-4055, ¶ 21. Southwest did not raise any arguments or objections

to the community-control sanctions in the trial court. Even now, Southwest does 

not advance any arguments indicating that the trial court’s judgment was void rather 

than voidable, which would allow this court to review the trial court’s judgment 

despite Southwest’s failure to directly appeal the sentence. Nonetheless, upon 

review, the sentencing court did not lack subject matter or personal jurisdiction over 

Southwest at the time that the sentence was issued; the judgment is not void.

Southwest’s first assignment of error is barred by res judicata; it is 

overruled. 

B. The $25,000 Fine

Southwest’s second assignment of error contends that the $25,000 

fine imposed because of Southwest’s community-control violation was excessive 

under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against

excessive fines. Southwest argues that “at worst, one conveyance did not put 

[Southwest’s] half-interest beyond the control of [Southwest], and the other 

conveyance was to a legitimate homeowner, not an absentee [l]andlord as the 

[c]ourt assumed[.]” Southwest further argues that the $25,000 fine “exceeded the 

value of a number of [Southwest’s] rental houses in Cleveland, Ohio, [and] started 

off at 50% of the maximum fine for the underlying conviction on all counts (despite 

this being, at worst, a single violation of one — thus, fewer than 10%, of all 

community control conditions.)” Southwest argues that because of all of the above, 

the $25,000 fine was punitive in nature. 
In a community-control violation proceeding, the prosecution is only 

required to present “substantial proof” that the defendant has violated the terms of 

community control. Cleveland v. ProTerra, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109696, 

2021-Ohio-1086, ¶ 50. Once a violation of community control is proven, the 

decision to impose a portion of the suspended sentence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Id., citing State v. Walton, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009588, 2009-

Ohio-6703, ¶ 13. A court has wide latitude in sentencing defendants for communitycontrol violations. State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 

N.E.2d 837, ¶ 20. Southwest does not dispute the trial court’s finding that it violated 

community control. Instead, Southwest disputes the portion of the suspended 

sentence that the trial court imposed as excessive and punitive. 

R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a) allows a sentencing court to “directly impose a 

sentence that consists of one or more community control sanctions authorized by 

section * * * 2929.28 (financial sanctions) of the Revised Code.” Since Southwest is 

an organization, R.C. 2929.31(A)(8) provides for an increased financial penalty of 

$5,000 for each first-degree misdemeanor. The notice provision of 

R.C. 2929.25(A)(3) requires that notice of the possible consequences of a 

community-control-sanctions violation be given to the defendant at the sentencing 

where community control was imposed. State v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 80851, 2002-Ohio-5086, ¶ 38. After pleading no contest, Southwest was found 

guilty of ten first-degree misdemeanors and duly advised that it was subject to a fine 

of $50,000 that would be suspended so long as Southwest did not violate 
community control. Based on R.C. 2929.31(A)(8), this fine was within the statutory 

range and the trial court was empowered to impose this fine directly at sentencing, 

but instead chose to suspend it and reserve all or some of the fine in the event that 

Southwest violated community control. 

Southwest argues that the fine was inappropriate because “in cases 

involving building, housing, or health code violations, the primary goal is to bring 

the property into compliance, rather than punish the defendant for the misconduct.” 

Cleveland v. Schornstein Holdings, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-7479, 73 N.E.3d 889, ¶ 19 

(8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Go Invest Wisely, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 

95172, 95173, 95174, 95175, 95176, and 95177, 2011-Ohio-3047, citing Lakewood v. 

Krebs, 150 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 2008-Ohio-7083, 901 N.E.2d 885, ¶ 19 (M.C.). 

Nonetheless, Schornstein recognizes that

the housing court is vested with broad authority to fashion appropriate 

punishment to bring about compliance. Unlike an individual 

defendant, who could be confined as a punishment for a lack of 

compliance, an organization defendant, such as the landlord here, 

cannot be incarcerated. The housing court is empowered to tailor the 

amount of financial sanctions to compel compliance from an 

organizational entity. 

Schornstein at id.

In Schornstein, this court reversed the imposition of a $230,000 fine 

for a community-control violation in a housing code violation case where the entry 

of conviction placed the organizational defendant on community control and 

imposed a fine of $2,000 with $1,800 suspended. Id. at ¶ 5. The instant matter is 

distinguishable because the Schornstein Court found that while the trial court 
checked the box indicating that community-control warnings were given, “there was 

no enumeration of the terms of the community control, or the consequences of a 

violation of the terms. There was also no warning of a potential maximum fine of 

$5,000 per count for a business entity, which would total $230,000[.]” Id. at ¶ 17. 

Here, the transcript and entry of conviction both make the possible fine abundantly 

clear to Southwest, and Southwest acknowledged as much during the communitycontrol-violation hearing. 

“For a building code violation, other than for a minor misdemeanor, 

the penalties set forth by statute or ordinance may include fines, jail time, and 

community control sanctions for a maximum of five years.” Cleveland v. Pentagon 

Realty, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-3775, 133 N.E.3d 580, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing N. Olmsted 

v. Rock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105566, 2018-Ohio-1084, ¶ 32; R.C. 2929.25(A)(1). 

“The court may impose one or more sanctions, and it may suspend all or some of a 

sanction.” Id., citing Krebs at ¶ 14, 15; R.C. 2929.25. Further, if the court finds a 

defendant in violation of community-control sanctions, it may impose one or more 

of the following penalties: (1) a longer time under the same community-control 

sanction so long as the total time does not exceed five years; (2) a more restrictive 

community-control sanction and/or (3) a combination of community-control 

sanctions, including a jail term. R.C. 2929.25(D)(2). A financial sanction is clearly 

authorized as a community-control sanction pursuant to R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a), so 

the court was empowered to order the $25,000 fine. 
Southwest has not pointed to any statutes or case law indicating that 

the trial court abused its discretion in imposing half of the suspended fine after 

finding that Southwest violated community control by transferring two properties. 

Southwest is unable to point to any authority that would allow us to conclude that 

imposing half of a suspended fine that was within the statutory range, and indeed, 

below the maximum that could have been imposed, was an abuse of discretion. Also 

recognized is Southwest’s position that the nature of the violation and conviction 

itself did not warrant a fine of over $25,000, nor should the fine have exceeded the 

value of the sold house; but, again, Southwest does not point to any case law 

suggesting that the weight of the fine, even when it is within the statutory range, may 

be second-guessed by an appeals court.

At bottom, Southwest was properly informed as to the sanction 

several times and, indeed, at the hearing, Dattilo admitted that he had received the 

notice setting forth the sanction. Southwest violated the court’s order and is subject 

to the sanctions that the trial court imposed. Southwest’s arguments are 

acknowledged regarding the value of the home, Southwest and Dattilo’s historical 

lack of building code violations, Southwest’s efforts to quickly rectify all the trial 

court’s issues with the property, and the financial losses incurred as a result of the 

erroneous 2019 case. Unfortunately, none of these negate the fact that Southwest 

violated the court’s community-control order, selling and transferring two of the six 

properties that Southwest was specifically ordered not to sell or transfer. 
Based on the foregoing, Southwest’s second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

C. Motion to Stay Execution

In its final assignment of error, Southwest argues that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to stay payment of the $25,000 fine so that he could 

appeal the matter to this court. 

Even though the trial court denied Southwest’s motion requesting as 

much, this court granted the stay of execution on July 12, 2023, pending the 

resolution of these appeals. Accordingly, there is no further relief that can be offered

to Southwest as it relates to this assignment of error, and therefore it is rendered

moot. 

Southwest’s final assignment of error is overruled as moot. 

III. Conclusion

Southwest’s attempt to contest the specific sanctions of its community

control are barred by res judicata. Southwest did not demonstrate that the trial 

court abused its discretion in imposing half of the suspended financial sanction after 

finding that Southwest violated its community control, especially when the potential 

financial sanction was repeated to defendant on numerous occasions before the 

violation hearing occurred. Finally, Southwest’s final assignment of error is moot 

because no further relief can be afforded to Southwest relief as requested. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY (WITH 

SEPARATE OPINION)

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS WITH THE SEPARATE CONCURRING IN 

JUDGMENT ONLY OPINION

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY:

Respectfully, I concur in judgment only with the lead opinion’s

application of the doctrine of res judicata and its determination that Southwest is 

barred from challenging aspects of the community-control sanctions that were 

imposed in October 2022. 

As noted by the majority, “It is well settled that the doctrine of res 

judicata bars claims that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal.” 

State v. Brooks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108919, 2020-Ohio-3286, ¶ 10. 

Traditionally, however, Ohio courts have recognized that res judicata is not to be so 

rigidly applied “when fairness and justice would not support it.” State ex rel. Estate 

of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231, 2009-Ohio-786, 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30, citing 

Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491, 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (res 
judicata is not to be so rigidly applied as to defeat the ends of justice or to create an 

injustice), and Lucas v. Porter, 2008 ND 160, 755 N.W.2d 88, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 

160, ¶ 22; see also Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 386, 653 N.E.2d 226 

(1995) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting 46 American Jurisprudence 2d, 

Judgments, Section 522, at 786-787 (1994) (Res judicata “‘is not to be applied so 

rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice or so as to work an injustice.’”). “The doctrine 

should be qualified or rejected when its application would contravene an overriding 

public policy or result in a manifest injustice.” Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc., 39 Ohio 

St.3d 168, 171, 529 N.E.2d 1255 (1988), citing Tipler v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & 

Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1971).

The exceptions to res judicata are limited to exceptional 

circumstances, however. As recently explained by the Ohio Supreme Court in AJZ’s 

Hauling, L.L.C. v. Trunorth Warranty Programs of N. Am., Slip Opinion No. 2023-

Ohio-3097:

An exception to the res judicata doctrine will not apply when the parties 

had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on an issue, the trial court 

issued a final, appealable order determining that issue, the parties 

failed to pursue a direct appeal or other available remedies to challenge 

that court’s order, and the parties did not commit bad-faith acts during 

the course of that litigation. * * * As the United States Supreme Court 

has recognized, simply having a final, unappealed judgment that rests 

on a wrong or incorrect legal principle is not enough to overcome res 

judicata — such an exception would swallow the rule. * * * Therefore, 

we hold that res judicata bars parties from raising claims based on 

unreasonable or unjust results when the parties had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue in the first instance. 

Id. at ¶ 19.
In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court had personal and 

subject-matter jurisdiction over Southwest and the criminal case. In addition, there 

is no dispute that Southwest (1) had a full and fair opportunity to be heard at the 

original sentencing hearing, (2) the trial court issued a final, appealable sentencing 

order, (3) Southwest failed to pursue a direct appeal or other available remedies to 

challenge that court’s order, and (4) the parties did not commit bad-faith acts during 

the course of the criminal proceedings. Thus, I reluctantly agree with the lead 

opinion’s conclusion that Southwest is procedurally barred from challenging the 

underlying conditions of its community-control sanctions. 

With that stated, however, I write separately to express my significant 

concerns with the pattern employed in the housing court, including its use and 

implementation of overly punitive conditions of community-control sanctions in 

cases involving corporations or limited liability companies. But for the Ohio 

Supreme Court’s controlling discussion in AJZ’s Hauling, I would have concluded 

that this is the exceptional case where the application of res judicata is inconsistent 

with the principles of fundamental fairness and results in a manifest injustice. 

Under R.C. 2929.21, a trial court enjoys broad discretion in fashioning 

a sentence for misdemeanors. Cleveland v. Meehan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

100202, 2014-Ohio-2265, ¶ 7. In fashioning a misdemeanor sentence, a trial court 

must consider the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing “to protect the 

public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” 

R.C. 2929.21(A). To achieve these purposes, “‘the sentencing court shall consider 
the impact of the offense on the victim, the need to change the offender’s behavior, 

the need to rehabilitate the offender, and the desire to make restitution to the victim 

and/or the public.’” Cleveland v. Go Invest Wisely, L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 

95172, 95173, 95174, 95175, 95176, and 95177, 2011-Ohio-3047, ¶ 8, quoting State v. 

Downie, 183 Ohio App.3d 665, 2009-Ohio-4643, 918 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 45 (7th Dist.), 

citing In re Slusser, 140 Ohio App.3d 480, 487, 748 N.E.2d 105 (3d Dist.2000). 

R.C. 2929.25 governs misdemeanor community-control sanctions. 

The statute provides a trial court with two options when sentencing a misdemeanor 

offender: (1) directly impose a sentence that consists of one or more communitycontrol sanctions authorized by R.C. 2929.26, 2929.27, or 2929.28; or (2) impose a 

jail sentence, suspend some or all of that sentence, and place the offender under a 

community-control sanction or combination of community-control sanctions 

authorized under R.C. 2929.26, 2929.27, or 2929.28. R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a)-(b). 

Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s imposition of communitycontrol sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cleveland v. Pentagon Realty, L.L.C., 

2019-Ohio-3775, 133 N.E.3d 580 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cooper, 2016-Ohio8048, 75 N.E.3d 805, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-

Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion connotes a decision that 

is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 

157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).

Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2929.27(C) permits the court to “impose 

any other sanction that is intended to discourage the offender or other persons from 
committing a similar offense if the sanction is reasonably related to the overriding 

purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing.” However, in cases involving 

building or housing code violations, “the primary goal of the court is to correct the 

violation and bring the property into compliance with all building codes, rather than 

punish the defendant for misconduct.” Pentagon Realty at ¶ 9; Cleveland v. 

Schornstein Holdings, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-7479, 73 N.E.3d 889, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.). To 

achieve that goal, the housing court has broad discretion in “fashioning a sentence 

to determine the most effective way to bring about compliance.” Id. at ¶ 10; R.C. 

2929.22(A), 2929.25, and 2929.27. And yet, that discretion is not limitless. As 

stated, community-control conditions must not be overbroad and must be 

reasonably related to the goals of community control, e.g., rehabilitation of the 

defendant, administering justice, protection of the community, and ensuring good 

behavior. See, e.g., Pentagon Realty at ¶ 13; N. Olmsted v. Rock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 105566, 2018-Ohio-1084, ¶ 32, 34. 

To determine whether a condition of community control is reasonably 

related to these goals, “courts should consider whether the condition (1) is 

reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the 

crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is 

criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of 

[community control].” State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990). 

All three prongs of the Jones test must be satisfied for the reviewing court to find 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Solon v. Broderick, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 107043, 2018-Ohio-4900, ¶ 8.

Applying the foregoing to the circumstances presented in this case, I 

begin by emphasizing that at the time of sentencing, the violation underlying the 

failure-to-comply offenses had been corrected at 6215 Gertrude Avenue. (See tr. 5-6, 

July 13, 2022; tr. 23, Jan. 31, 2023.) Thus, the primary goal of misdemeanor 

sentencing in the housing court was satisfied in this matter. Turning to the 

conditions implemented in this case, I recognize that the court is afforded broad 

discretion under R.C. 2929.27(C). After careful consideration, however, I am 

unpersuaded by any suggestion that the order prohibiting Southwest from selling or 

transferring its other properties, which have not been cited by the city, is reasonably 

related to the goals of community control. 

First, Southwest’s sales practices in the city of Cleveland do not share 

a relationship with the underlying citation or the failure-to-comply offenses charged 

in this case. Southwest was charged and convicted for failing to remedy a 

remodeling project that was completed without obtaining a necessary permit in 

2019. While the court was permitted to restrict Southwest’s actions at 6215 Gertrude 

Avenue during the term of community control, there is no causal or correlative 

connection between the facts supporting Southwest’s convictions and the significant 

ban placed on the L.L.C.’s ability to operate its other properties in Cleveland. Nor 

has the prosecution or the court demonstrated how the lawful sale or transfer of 

Southwest’s other property is reasonably related to the risk of future criminality. In 
my view, an order prohibiting an entity from selling or transferring unrelated 

property that is lawfully owned and in compliance with all pertinent statutes and 

ordinances boarders on an unlawful taking and is unreasonable under the test 

implemented in Jones. 

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the sale and transfer 

prohibition on Southwest’s other properties serves no rehabilitative purpose. 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “rehabilitation” as “the 

process of restoring an individual (as a convict, mental patient, or disaster victim) 

to a useful and constructive place in society through some form of vocational, 

correctional, or therapeutic retraining or through relief, financial aid, or other 

reconstructive measure.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961). 

Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary, defines “rehabilitation” as “[t]he process of 

seeking to improve a criminal’s character and outlook so that he or she can function 

in society without committing other crimes.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 

2019). I find no articulable basis to conclude that a restriction on Southwest’s ability 

to lawfully sell and transfer property is reasonably related to restoring or otherwise 

improving Southwest’s functionality in the city of Cleveland. The prohibition is not 

remedial and only served to restrict Southwest’s common business practices for an 

extensive period.

Beyond the blanket restriction on selling or transferring properties, I 

am equally concerned with the scope of the court’s additional restrictions on the 

other properties owned by Southwest. In this case, the bulk of the conditions 
outlined in the sentencing order did not directly relate to the 6215 Gertrude Avenue 

property. Rather, they set forth broad restrictions of each of Southwest’s properties, 

including the following obligations:

e. Defendant is ordered to provide Housing Specialist McMullen with 

proof of all rental registrations for all rental properties owned within 

the city of Cleveland.

f. Defendant is ordered to provide Housing Specialist McMullen with 

proof of its lead safe certifications for all rental properties owned within 

the city of Cleveland. 

g. Defendant is ordered to make all necessary repairs on all properties 

it owns within the city of Cleveland.

h. Defendant is ordered to ensure that all properties it owns within the 

city of Cleveland are properly maintained, clean and free of all junk and 

debris.

i. Defendant is ordered to properly cut and maintain the grass and 

shrubbery on all of the properties it owns within the city of Cleveland.

j. Defendant is ordered to permit a Housing and Building Inspector 

access to the property located at 3609 Gertrude Avenue, Cleveland, 

Ohio 44105 for an exterior inspection of the property including the 

front porch.

k. Defendant is ordered to repair the window of the property located at 

6910 Lansing, Cleveland, Ohio 44105. 

I recognize that Housing Div. Loc.R. 2.18 requires offenders to keep 

all of its properties in good repair, which 

includes the obligation to regularly inspect and maintain the property 

and the obligation to keep each property clean of debris, secure from 

entry and free of graffiti. This requirement is in addition to compliance 

with city or state code requirements for real property.

Based on the express terms of this provision, I cannot say the trial court abused its 

discretion by subjecting Southwest’s other properties to the conditions of its 
community-control sanctions. These conditions are supported by the court’s local 

rules. Nevertheless, it is my belief that the local rule and the restrictions imposed 

against Southwest’s other properties are not rehabilitative and serve to preemptively 

circumvent the procedures and policies in place in the building and housing 

department for ensuring compliance with the applicable statutes and ordinances. If 

another property owned by Southwest was in violation of a local building or housing 

code, the city was entitled to issue a citation and, if necessary, initiate criminal 

proceedings after affording Southwest due process. Instead, the court held a 

$50,ooo sanction over Southwest’s head to monitor properties that were not 

formally cited or directly related to the failure-to-comply convictions. 

Based on the foregoing, I can only conclude that the conditions relied 

on at the violation hearing constitute overly broad sanctions that merely serve to 

punish Southwest by restricting its control and ownership of properties that are in 

good condition. While I understand the trial court’s efforts to protect the 

community, I do not believe the record suggests that Southwest’s statutory agent 

and sole member, Anthony Dattilo, is the type of landlord the trial court routinely 

raised concerns about during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. Dattilo is 

not an out-of-state representative, and there is no evidence to suggest that he had a 

history of regularly failing to monitor Southwest’s properties in Cleveland. To the 

contrary, the record demonstrates that Dattilo has direct ties to the local community 

and has one prior citation in the past 20 years. It is worth reiterating that this 

criminal case did not arise from Southwest’s failure to complete necessary repairs at 
its property, but from its failure to obtain a permit before it completed a necessary 

repair. This is a distinction with a significant difference. Under these 

circumstances, I believe the conditions imposed in this case are unreasonable and 

may result in unintended consequences in the future. 

Accordingly, had this panel not been precluded from reviewing the 

contents of the trial court’s sentencing order based on Southwest’s failure to pursue 

a direct appeal, I would have found an abuse of discretion and vacated the 

restrictions pertaining to Southwest’s other properties. While I believe a manifest 

injustice has occurred, I am constrained by the holding in AJZ’s Hauling.

Finally, although distinct from the relevant considerations under R.C. 

2929.25, I find it necessary to note that the only reason Southwest was previously 

unable to sell or transfer the properties that are now subject to the court’s sentencing 

order was because the city failed to serve Southwest in accordance with the Ohio 

Rules of Civil Procedure. The city’s clerical error resulted in a judicial lien that 

prevented Southwest from selling properties before the no contest pleas were 

entered and the sentencing order was rendered. The disputed lien hampered 

Southwest’s ability to engage in its business practices in the years preceding the 

failure-to-comply convictions. As defense counsel explained:

My client has attempted to sell all five properties he owns in Cleveland 

* * *. The only reason these properties are still in his name at all is 

because of the inappropriately filed and maintained lien. If that lien 

would not have been here, he would have been out of Cleveland 

entirely.

(Tr. 25, Oct. 12, 2022.)
These uncited properties, which would have been sold prior to 

October 2022, are now subject to community-control sanctions that once again 

restrict Southwest’s business practices in the city of Cleveland. Based on the current 

condition of the 6215 Gertrude Avenue property, there is no evidence in this record 

to suggest that a violation of Southwest’s community-control sanctions would have 

occurred but for the sales restriction on the unrelated properties. And yet, 

Southwest’s decision to exercise its otherwise lawful right to sell and/or transfer its 

property has been used against it to invoke a suspended sanction that derives from 

a violation that has long been corrected. The fine, while permissible under the Ohio 

Revised Code, is substantial and exceeds the value of the property sold in this matter. 

While I am prohibited from substituting my judgment under the abuse-of-discretion 

standard, I believe that, at the very most, an extension of Southwest’s communitycontrol sanctions would have been more appropriate based on the various factors 

acknowledged by the lead opinion at paragraph 24.