Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A05-1712-CR-2977 | June 26, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jane Ann Noblitt

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lee M. Stoy, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevin E. Bell,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 26, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

40A05-1712-CR-2977

Appeal from the Jennings Circuit

Court

The Honorable Jon W. Webster,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

40C01-1609-F5-65

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] On September 17, 2016, Kevin Bell was driving a vehicle without a valid 

driver’s license. At some point, the vehicle he was driving went down a ravine 

and crashed. His girlfriend, who was a passenger in the vehicle, died as a result 

of the crash. Approximately three days later, the police became aware of the 

accident. The State subsequently charged Bell with a number of crimes, 

including Level 5 felony driving while suspended. Bell pled guilty to Level 5 

felony driving while suspended. In exchange for Bell’s guilty plea, the State 

agreed to drop all of the remaining charges. Although the length of Bell’s 

sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court, the terms of the plea 

agreement indicated that none of the sentence would be suspended. The trial 

court accepted Bell’s guilty plea and sentenced him to an executed four-year 

term. Bell contends both that his sentence is inappropriate and that the trial 

court abused its discretion in failing to find certain mitigating factors. 

Concluding otherwise, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 17, 2016, Bell and his girlfriend Nikki Reed were driving 

together from Pennsylvania to Indiana to attend Reed’s son’s birthday party. 

Despite knowing that his driver’s license was suspended, Bell drove Reed’s 

vehicle. While driving on U.S. 50 in Jennings County, Bell veered off the road 

into a ravine and struck a tree. Reed died as a result of the impact. 
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[3] Bell remained in the vehicle for the next three days. On September 20, 2016, he 

crawled out a broken window and attempted to climb out of the ravine. As he

did this, he found his cellular phone, which had two percent of the battery

power remaining. Instead of immediately calling 911, Bell informed his 

employer that he had been in an accident. Bell did not notify 911 of the 

accident before the phone’s battery died. 

[4] Bell eventually climbed out of the ravine and flagged down a passing motorist, 

who called 911. Indiana State Trooper Rick Hewitt responded to the 911 call. 

When Trooper Hewitt arrived, Bell informed Trooper Hewitt that he had fallen 

down into the ravine. Upon receiving Bell’s name, Trooper Hewitt learned that 

Bell was associated with Reed who had been reported missing by her exhusband. When Trooper Hewitt inquired about Reed, Bell had a “surprised 

look” on his face and told Trooper Hewitt that “she was probably still in the 

truck.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 26. After Trooper Hewitt asked “what 

truck,” Bell admitted that there was a vehicle at the bottom of the ravine. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 26. Trooper Hewitt observed that the location of 

the crashed vehicle was “at the bottom of a heavily wooded ravine and was not 

visible from the roadway due to thick vegetation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 

26. Bell initially told Trooper Hewitt that Reed had been driving at the time of 

the accident but later admitted that he was driving when the accident occurred. 

[5] On September 27, 2016, the State charged Bell with Level 5 felony driving 

while suspended, Level 5 felony leaving the scene of an accident resulting in 

death, Class A misdemeanor failure to report a dead body, Class A 
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misdemeanor driving while suspended, and Class B misdemeanor false 

informing. Bell subsequently pled guilty to Level 5 felony driving while 

suspended. In exchange for Bell’s guilty plea, the State agreed to drop all of the 

remaining charges. The plea agreement left the length of Bell’s sentence to the 

trial court but provided that none of the sentence would be suspended. The trial 

court accepted Bell’s guilty plea and sentenced him to an executed four-year 

term.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Bell challenges his sentence on appeal. First, he contends that his four-year 

sentence is inappropriate. Next, he contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to consider certain mitigating factors. We disagree with 

both contentions.

I. Appropriateness of Sentence

[7] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “‘concentrate 

less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or 

hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the 

offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about 

the defendant’s character.’” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. 
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denied). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is 

inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[8] In this case, Bell was involved in a traffic accident while driving without a valid 

driver’s license. His girlfriend, who was a passenger in the vehicle, died as a 

result of the accident. When Bell finally exited the vehicle, he did not 

immediately notify the police of the accident, despite having the brief 

opportunity to do so. In addition, when he finally did speak to police, he 

initially lied and said that he had fallen down the ravine. He only admitted that 

he had been driving in a vehicle in which Reed was a passenger when 

specifically asked about her whereabouts. 

[9] As for Bell’s character, Bell admits that despite having limited mental function, 

he understands right from wrong and knows what he should and should not do. 

At the time of his arrest, there was an active bench warrant for his arrest 

stemming from a harassment case in Pennsylvania. Moreover, although Bell’s 

criminal history involved only one other criminal conviction, this prior 

conviction also involved a traffic accident that resulted in the death of another 

person. Similar to this case, following the first accident, Bell did not 

immediately report the accident but rather waited a number of days before 

coming forward to report his involvement. Further, it does not reflect well on 

his character that when speaking to police, Bell was not immediately forthright 

about the circumstances surrounding the most recent accident. Bell has failed 

to persuade us that his four-year sentence is inappropriate.
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II. Abuse of Discretion

[10] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are 

reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 

(Ind. 2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the 

reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. 

(quotation omitted). 

One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing 

to enter a sentencing statement at all. Other examples include 

entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for 

imposing a sentence-including a finding of aggravating and 

mitigating factors if any-but the record does not support the 

reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are 

clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Under 

those circumstances, remand for resentencing may be the 

appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the 

trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly 

considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.

Id. at 490–91. A single aggravating factor may support an enhanced sentence. 

Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993).

[11] In sentencing Bell, the trial court found Bell’s criminal history including his 

prior felony conviction and the outstanding active warrant for his arrest and the 

fact that he “delayed 3–4 days in calling anyone or looking for help while lying 

in a ravine” to be aggravating factors. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 62. The trial 
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court also found the fact that Bell (1) admitted his crime without the necessity 

of a trial, (2) is a high school graduate, (3) is a low risk to reoffend, and (4) “has 

some functional disabilities arising from complications with his birth” to be 

mitigating factors. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 62. Bell does not argue on 

appeal that these factors are not supported by the record. Rather, he claims that 

the trial court abused its discretion by failing to also find his “extreme remorse” 

and the “likelihood he would respond affirmatively to probation or short-term 

incarceration” to be mitigating factors. Appellant’s Br. p. 14.

[12] Although a sentencing court must consider all evidence of mitigating factors 

offered by a defendant, the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court’s 

discretion. Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002). A trial court is 

neither required to find the presence of mitigating factors, Fugate, 608 N.E.2d at

1374 (citing Graham v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ind. 1989)), nor obligated 

to explain why it did not find a factor to be significantly mitigating. Sherwood v. 

State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. 2001) (citing Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 47 

(Ind. 1997)). “A court does not err in failing to find mitigation when a 

mitigation claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance.” 

Henderson, 769 N.E.2d at 179 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, while 

Indiana law mandates that the trial judge not ignore facts in the record that 

would mitigate an offense, and a failure to find mitigating factors that are 

clearly supported by the record may imply that the trial court failed to properly 

consider them, id., an allegation that the trial court failed to find a mitigating 

factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both 
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significant and clearly supported by the record. Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 

838 (Ind. 1999).

[13] With respect to Bell’s claimed remorse, we have previously concluded that 

“substantial deference must be given to a trial court’s evaluation of remorse 

[because t]he trial court, which has the ability to directly observe the defendant 

and listen to the tenor of his or her voice, is in the best position to determine 

whether the remorse is genuine.” Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004). Like in Corralez, we conclude that Bell’s reference to statements 

articulating his remorse is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion. See id.

[14] As for Bell’s claim that he would have responded well to probation or a short 

term of imprisonment, the record reveals that pursuant to the terms of Bell’s 

plea agreement, “none” of his sentence was to be suspended. Appellee’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 5. In addition, despite having previously received a short term of 

incarceration in connection to his first conviction, Bell did not reform his 

behavior. Further, when Bell first spoke to police, he was not initially forthright 

about the circumstances surrounding the accident. We cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to find Bell’s claim that he might have 

responded affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment to be a 

significant mitigating factor. 

[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.