IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-12-00051-CR

LAWRENCE EDWARD BLUE,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 272nd District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 11-02471-CRF-272

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The jury convicted Lawrence Blue of the offense of possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance, cocaine, in a drug free zone. The jury assessed 

punishment at forty-five years confinement. We affirm.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue on appeal, Blue argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of 

review of a sufficiency issue as follows:
Blue v. State Page 2

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 

13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This "familiar standard gives full play to the 

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, 

to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 

to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. "Each fact need not point 

directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the 

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to 

support the conviction." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert den’d , 132 S.Ct. 2712, 183 

L.Ed.2d 71 (2012).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has also explained that our review of "all of the 

evidence" includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Conner v. 

State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). And if the record supports conflicting 

inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the 

prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Further, direct and circumstantial evidence 

are treated equally: "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in 

establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to 

establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Finally, it is 

well established that the factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and 

can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. 

Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Blue v. State Page 3

Facts

On February 23, 2011, the Bryan Police Department executed a narcotics search 

warrant. There were three houses that were the subject of the search, and Lawrence 

Blue was a subject named in the warrant. Officer Jon Agnew, along with two other 

officers, conducted surveillance for the search warrant, and Officer Agnew provided 

information to the officers executing the warrant. Officer Agnew testified that he set up 

around 6:30 a.m. and that he observed Blue drive up to one of the houses in a white 

pickup. Blue got out of the pickup and went in the house, but left in the pickup a short 

time later. Blue returned in the pickup and went back into the house carrying a plastic 

bag. Blue went back and forth between the three houses that were the subject of the 

search warrant and then sat outside in a chair between the properties.

Officer Agnew testified that Blue sat in the chair for approximately ten minutes 

and then a car drove up to the property. Blue got up from the chair, went and got 

something out of a tree, and then approached the car. Blue walked to the driver’s side 

window of the car and an exchange took place. The car left, and Blue walked back to 

the tree and placed something back into the tree. Officer Agnew testified that he was 

certain he observed a drug deal. Officer Agnew notified Sergeant Gabriel Alvarez by 

radio of his observations. Sergeant Alvarez then brought in the team to execute the 

search warrant. Officer Agnew kept surveillance on the area, particularly the tree, until 

the team arrived to execute the warrant. Officer Agnew stated that no one else 

approached the tree prior to the officers arriving.
Blue v. State Page 4

Sergeant Alvarez testified that he was the first person who went to the tree after 

Officer Agnew’s observations. Sergeant Alvarez stated that there was a razor blade 

stuck in the tree. There was also a divot in the tree and inside of the divot was a plastic 

bag. There were forty-five rocks in the plastic bag that were determined to be crack 

cocaine. Sergeant Alvarez testified that the amount of cocaine was consistent with that 

of a drug dealer.

Possession

Blue specifically argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he 

knowingly or intentionally possessed the cocaine. To prove unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance, the State was required to prove that: 1) Blue exercised control, 

management, or care over the substance; and 2) Blue knew that the matter possessed 

was contraband. Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); 

Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Whether this evidence is 

direct or circumstantial, "it must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the 

accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous. This is the whole of 

the so-called 'affirmative links' rule." Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d at 405-6. The 

affirmative links rule is designed to protect the innocent bystander from conviction 

based solely upon his fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs. Poindexter v. State, 

153 S.W.3d at 406. When the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where 

the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and 

control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and 

circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband. Id. The 
Blue v. State Page 5

affirmative link may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, but in either case it 

must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused's connection with 

the drug was more than just fortuitous. Id.

The evidence shows that Blue was alone outside the houses subject to the search 

warrant. After a car pulled up, Blue went to a tree, took something from the tree, went 

to the driver’s side of the car, and exchanged something with the driver. The car left, 

and Blue returned something to the tree. Officers maintained surveillance and no one 

else approached the tree after Officer Agnew observed the transaction between Blue 

and the driver of the car. Officer Agnew testified that he was certain he observed a 

drug transaction. A jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Blue’s 

connection to the cocaine was much more than just a fortuitous accident. See Blackman 

v. State, 350 S.W.3d at 596. We find that the evidence is sufficient to show that Blue 

possessed the cocaine. We overrule the first issue.

Admission of Evidence

In his second issue, Blue argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 

items found at the location where he was arrested. In the third issue, he complains that 

the trial court erred in admitting extraneous offense evidence.

Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence." TEX. R. EVID. 401. Relevant evidence is 

generally admissible. TEX. R. EVID. 402. Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
Blue v. State Page 6

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or 

needless presentation of cumulative evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403. Absent an abuse of 

discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude 

evidence. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Under the abuse 

of discretion standard of review, we will uphold a trial court's evidentiary ruling so 

long as that ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.

Evidence Admitted at Trial

Blue contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of items found at 

the location where he was arrested during the execution of the search warrant. Officer 

Randall Hall testified that he searched the outside of one of the houses where Blue was 

located. Officer Hall stated that he was at the back of the residence and that he saw a 

metal toolbox that goes on the back of a pickup. He cut the locks on the toolbox and 

inside he found firearms and a bag containing $14,385.

Officer Paul Mahoney testified that drug dealers keep their money and drugs in 

separate locations. Officer Mahoney further testified that it is common for drug dealers 

to have a weapon to protect their drugs and money.

The State was required to prove that Blue possessed the cocaine with the intent 

to deliver. Evidence that weapons were found in close proximity to Blue was relevant 

to show that the weapons were used for protection of the drugs. See Levario v. State, 964 

S.W.2d 290, 297 (Tex. App.─El Paso 1997, no pet.); Hawkins v. State, 871 S.W.2d 539, 541-

2 (Tex. App.─Fort Worth 1994, no pet.). The evidence makes it more probable that Blue 
Blue v. State Page 7

possessed the drugs with the intent to deliver. The trial court found that the probative 

value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect and admitted the evidence with 

a limiting instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence. We overrule Blue’s second issue.

Extraneous Offenses

Officer Mahoney testified that he conducted three undercover drug transactions 

involving Blue prior to Blue’s arrest. Officer Mahoney stated that he purchased crack 

cocaine from Blue in a constructive delivery. Officer Mahoney indicated to Blue that he 

wanted to purchase forty dollars worth of crack cocaine, and another individual 

delivered the crack cocaine to Officer Mahoney. Officer Mahoney testified that he 

purchased the crack cocaine with impressed funds and that those funds were recovered 

in the tool box at the residence.

Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of extraneous 

offenses is not admissible "to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith." TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). However, Rule 404(b) allows evidence of 

extraneous offenses if the evidence has relevance apart from character conformity. For 

example, extraneous offense evidence may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. TEX.

R. EVID. 404(b); Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Evidence that 

Blue had constructively delivered drugs to Officer Mahoney about two weeks before his 

arrest was relevant to show that, on the date of his arrest, he possessed the cocaine with 

the intent to deliver. Gately v. State, 321 S.W.3d 72, 81 (Tex. App.─Eastland 2010, no 
Blue v. State Page 8

pet.). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extraneous offense 

evidence. We overrule Blue’s third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 7, 2013

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