[Cite as Coleman v. Warren, 2022-Ohio-1020.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

LA’SHEARA COLEMAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 vs.

DALE WARREN,

 Defendant-Appellee.

:

:

:

:

:

APPEAL NO. C-210362

TRIAL NO. A-2100373

 

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 30, 2022

Stepleton Law, LLC, and Richard P. Gabelman, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Joseph P. Hoerig, for Defendant-Appellee. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

ZAYAS, Judge.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant La’Sheara Coleman appeals the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Dale Warren. For the following 

reasons, we sustain the sole assignment of error, reverse the judgment of the trial 

court, and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and 

the law. 

Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} Warren was charged with a traffic-light violation in the case numbered 

18TRD-15989, resulting from a traffic accident which occurred on April 25, 2018. He 

pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial on May 15, 2018. Three witnesses 

testified at trial: Warren, Mariah Miller, and Kolyon Allen, who was the driver of the 

other vehicle. The accident occurred when Allen was turning left off of North Bend 

Road onto Simpson Avenue. The intersection is controlled by a traffic light. Allen

testified that the light was yellow when he was turning left, but also testified that the 

light was red when the accident occurred. Miller was a pedestrian attempting to cross 

when the accident occurred. Miller testified that the light was yellow as she was 

crossing the street, but red when the accident occurred. The accident occurred as she 

was approaching the sidewalk. Warren testified that the light was green when the 

other car turned in front of him. The trial court found Warren not guilty of the trafficlight violation. At the hearing, the trial court stated:

Mr. Allen testified that he was making a left-hand turn. His light 

was yellow. So he has a duty to yield when he’s turning left. If his light 

was yellow when he is making this left-hand turn, that means your light 

was also yellow. So you can proceed through. He had a duty to yield

when turning left, not you. And nobody can testify as to what color your 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3

light was, he only testified the color of the light going this way, which 

was yellow, which would mean your light was yellow as well. So the 

finding is not guilty. 

{¶3} On January 29, 2021, Coleman filed the complaint in the instant case 

against Warren, alleging that Warren negligently ran a red light and struck Coleman’s 

vehicle, which was making a left-hand turn while she was a passenger, causing 

damages. Warren answered the complaint on March 4, 2021. The answer admitted 

that a collision occurred between a vehicle driven by him and a vehicle occupied by 

Coleman but driven by Allen; however, the answer denied any liability for the same. 

Warren subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on March 11, 2021, 

arguing that issue preclusion applied as to the color of the light and who violated the 

right-of-way since these issues were already decided in his favor in the previous traffic 

court case. Accordingly, he argued that, since it was already determined that the light 

was yellow and he had the right of way, it cannot be shown that he violated a duty of 

care in the instant case and thus summary judgment was appropriate. After 

responsive pleadings were filed by Coleman and Warren, the trial court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Warren on June 9, 2021. Coleman timely filed a notice 

of appeal on June 30, 2021. 

Law and Analysis

{¶4} In a sole assignment of error, Coleman argues that the trial court erred 

in granting Warren’s motion for summary judgment. We review a trial court’s grant 

of summary judgment de novo. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Stites, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. 

C-200421, 2021-Ohio-3839, ¶ 10. “ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there 

is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, and (3) the evidence, when viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

permits only one reasonable conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the 

nonmoving party.’ ” Id., quoting Heiert v. Crossroads Community Church, Inc., 1st 

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200244 and C-200391, 2021-Ohio-1649, ¶ 37. 

{¶5} “ ‘The main legal thread which runs throughout the determination of the 

applicability of * * * collateral estoppel, is the necessity of a fair opportunity to fully 

litigate and be “heard” in the due process sense.’ ” (Ellipses sic.) Caliman v. Am. Gen. 

Fire & Cas. Co., 94 Ohio App.3d 572, 578, 641 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist.1994), quoting 

Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 200-201, 443 N.E.2d 

978 (1983). “Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, provides that an issue 

that has been fully and fairly litigated and determined in a prior action ‘may not be 

drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties and their privies, 

regardless of whether the claims in the two actions are identical or different.’ ” 

Brunner v. RJ Lipps, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150601, 2016-Ohio-3231, ¶ 8, 

quoting Mitchell v.Internatl. Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 179 Ohio App.3d 365, 2008-

Ohio-3697, 902 N.E.2d 37, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when (1) the 

party against whom estoppel is sought was either a party or in privity 

with a party to the prior action; (2) a final judgment was rendered on 

the merits in the previous action following a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate the issue; (3) the issue on which estoppel is sought was either 

admitted or actually tried and decided in the prior action, and was 

necessary to the final judgment; and (4) the issue in the current case is 

identical to the issue involved in the prior suit. 

Id., citing Monahan v. Eagle Picher Industries, Inc., 21 Ohio App.3d 179, 180-181, 486 

N.E.2d 1165 (1st Dist.1984). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5

{¶6} Coleman argues that issue preclusion was inapplicable in this case 

because no privity existed between her and the state of Ohio. She does not contest the 

other elements of collateral estoppel. Warren argues that issue preclusion was

applicable because privity exists when a mutuality of interest is established among the 

parties, and Coleman and the state of Ohio “shared a common desired result with all 

other motorists on the roadway that day,”—“safely arriving at her ultimate 

destination.” 

{¶7} “As a general matter, privity ‘is merely a word used to say that the 

relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close enough 

to include that other within the res judicata.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Thompson v. Wing, 

70 Ohio St.3d 176, 184, 637 N.E.2d 917 (1994). “Neither a contractual nor a beneficiary 

relationship is necessary for an Ohio court to apply the concept of privity for purposes 

of res judicata.” (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emp. 

Retirement Bd., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-444, 2008-Ohio-3624, ¶ 19. A party is 

in privity with another if he succeeds “an estate or an interest formerly held by the 

other” or “where a party is so identified in interest with another that the party 

represents the same legal right.” (Citations omitted.) Wright v. Heller, 2018-Ohio149, 102 N.E.3d 1285, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). 

{¶8} “Privity was formerly found to exist only when a person succeeded to 

the interest of a party or had the right to control the proceedings or make a defense in 

the original proceeding.” (Citation omitted.) O’Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 

Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 9. “An interest in the result of and 

active participation in the original lawsuit may also establish privity.” Id. Further, 

“[i]ndividuals who raise identical claims and seek identical rather than individually 

tailored results may be in privity.” (Citation omitted.) Id. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

6

{¶9} The Ohio Supreme Court has more recently stated that “privity is a 

somewhat amorphous concept in the context of claim preclusion.” (Citation omitted.) 

Id. “A ‘mutuality of interest, including an identity in the desired result,’ might also 

support a finding of privity.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. “Mutuality, however, exists only 

if ‘the person taking advantage of the judgment would have been bound by it had the 

result been the opposite. Conversely, a stranger to the prior judgment, being not 

bound thereby, is not entitled to reply upon its effect under the claim of res judicata

or collateral estoppel.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. 

{¶10} “The crux of the issue of privity is whether the new party had adequate 

representation in the prior action.” Monfort Supply Co. v. City of Cheviot, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-940898, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4172, *16-17 (Sept. 27, 1995); see 

Seibel v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-850758, 1986 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 7168, *9-10 (June 18, 1986) (“The gravamen of the party-or-privity 

requirement is the party against whom estoppel is sought had previously been 

afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the disputed issue.”). “If so, then that 

new party is in privity with the party to the prior case for collateral-estoppel purposes.” 

Monfort Supply at 17. 

{¶11} In Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 547 N.E.2d 962 (1989), the 

Ohio Supreme Court recognized that “a verdict or judgment of acquittal in a criminal 

trial is a determination that the state has not met its burden of proof on the essential 

elements of the crime. It is not necessarily a finding that the accused is innocent.” It 

also recognized that the “qualitative differences” between a civil proceeding and a 

criminal proceeding, such as burdens of proof, rules, and constitutional safeguards, 

“militate against giving criminal judgments preclusive effect in civil or quasi-civil 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

7

litigation.” See id. at 52; accord State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims, 98 Ohio 

St.3d 399, 2003-Ohio-1631, 786 N.E.2d 43, ¶ 24. 

{¶12} Relying on Walden, the Third District Court of Appeals found an 

absence of privity between the state of Ohio and a plaintiff in a subsequent civil action, 

who was the victim of a crime and appeared as a witness at the defendant’s criminal 

trial, where the plaintiff was “a mere witness at the criminal trial who could not choose 

whether to empanel a jury or decide which witnesses to call or cross-examine,” and 

“had no ability to appeal the trial court’s ruling of acquittal.” Manley v. Rufus Club 

Mozambique, Inc., 111 Ohio App.3d 260, 263, 675 N.E.2d 1342 (3d Dist.1996). 

{¶13} Here, the prior proceeding was a traffic proceeding. Traffic proceedings 

are governed by the Ohio Traffic Rules. See Traf.R. 1(A); Crim.R. 1(C). However, when 

no procedure is specifically prescribed by the Ohio Traffic Rules, “the Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and the applicable law apply.” Traf.R. 20. Additionally, “[i]n the 

case of traffic offenses, as with criminal offenses, the prosecution is required to prove 

each material or essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted.) 

City of Sidney v. Alter, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-13-22, 2014-Ohio-3374, ¶ 15. Thus, 

while not identical to a criminal proceeding, the burden of proof and rules governing 

traffic proceedings still differ from that of a civil proceeding and the same rationale 

would apply to militate against giving the judgment a preclusive effect. Additionally, 

Coleman did not have any right to control the traffic court proceedings, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate that Coleman participated in the prior proceedings 

in any way, and Coleman had no ability to appeal the traffic court judgment. See 

Manley at 263; accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 2d Dist. Green No. 2006 

CA 24, 2007-Ohio-581, ¶ 9. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

8

{¶14} Warren argues that privity existed between Coleman and the state of 

Ohio based on a mutuality of interest; however, mutuality of interest can only exist if 

Warren, the person taking advantage of the judgment, would also be bound thereby 

had the traffic court ruled differently. See O’Nesti, 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 

862 N.E.2d 803, at ¶ 9. This court has previously determined that a traffic court 

judgment, concerning who had the right of way and who was liable, cannot be used to 

bind the defendant in a subsequent civil action because (1) “[a] defendant does not 

have the same incentive to defend a traffic citation for making an improper left turn 

as he or she would have to defend a civil action for negligence,” (2) the damages at 

stake in a civil action are “simply not present in an action involving a traffic citation,” 

(3) “defenses that would be available to a defendant in a civil action for negligence 

have no relevance to and are unavailable in a traffic case,” and (4) the rules which 

govern a negligence action, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, are separate from the 

rules that the legislature promulgated to govern actions involving traffic citations, the 

Ohio Traffic Rules. Brunner, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150601, 2016-Ohio-3231, at ¶ 

11-13. Thus, Warren is trying to take advantage of a judgment that would not be 

binding on him had the traffic court found differently and held him liable for the 

traffic-light violation. Therefore, a mutuality of interest cannot exist in this case. 

{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that privity does not exist between 

Coleman and the state of Ohio. Because no privity exists, collateral estoppel is not 

applicable to bar Coleman from relitigating the issues previously determined by the 

traffic court. Because collateral estoppel is not applicable, material issues of fact 

remain to be determined and Warren failed to show that he is entitled to summary 

judgment as a matter of law on Coleman’s negligence claim. Accordingly, the

assignment of error is sustained. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

9

Conclusion

{¶16} Having sustained the sole assignment of error, we reverse the judgment 

of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion and the law. 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

MYERS, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

Please note: 

The court has recorded its own entry this date.