Kr. S. Perry Brovn 

Chairman & Executive Director 

Texas Employment Commiesion 

Aus tin, Texas 

opinion lo. WW-7l.3 

Re: Whether the Texas Employment 

Ccmmiesion may legally pay an 

attorney for services rendered 

in asaietlng the Attorney General 

Dear Mr. Brown: in an eminent domain proceeding. 

You have requested an opinion a8 to whether the Texas Employment Commission was authorized to employ and pay special counsel to assist the Attorney General In preparing eminent domain proceedings. You state that this 

attorney was employed pursuant to a request from the Attorney General for 

aesistance in preparing a case to condemn land on which the Texas Xkployment 

Commission was to erect buildings. 

Under Section '7, Article VI, General Appropriations, Acts 55th Aegislature, Regular Session, 1957, Chapter 385, pages 1144 and 1145, set out in 

part here: 

Y . . . Whe+e the Attorney General, District Attorney, 

CrimlnalDlstri& Attorney, County Attorney, or other lawyer 

is required by constitutional or statutory provision to represent a State Agency, State Official, State Board, or State 

Department, no compensation shall be paid from any appropriation made in this Act to any other Attorney for repreeentlng 

the State of Texas in the trial of a civil lawsuit except in 

those cases where the Attorney General, District Attorney, 

Criminal District Attorney, County Attorney or other lavyer, 

ae the caee may be, has requested that the attorney or 

attorney8 employed by the particular State Agency, State 

Official, State Department or State Board, aselat with the 

trial of the particular laveuit. . 0 *" 
r L 

hfr. S. Perry Brown, page 2 (w-713) 

The Attorney General 16 authorized to request the asalstance of counsel employed by the particular agency involved. In this instance the Texas E$lployment Commission, 88 requested, employed Robert L. Bums to assist the Attorney 

General in securing lend by eminent domain proceedings to be brought on behalf of the State of Texas for the Texas Employment Commission. 

This situation is aualogoua to a prerioua Attorney General's Opinion 

~~-633 where the State Building Commission hired an attorney to assist the 

Attorney General in preparing for the acqui6ltion of land. Here the Commiasion haa the authority to purohaee land Just a8 the State Building Commission 

did and the power on the part of both Commissions to employ attorneys comea 

from this power to acquire land for which the services of an attorney are 

needed rather than from a statute directly authorizing the employment of an 

attorney. 

The General Appropriations Act, Howe Bill 133, Acts of the 55th 

Legislature, Regular Seseion, 1957, Chapter 385, pages 979-980, appropriated 

funds for the development of buildings to be wed by the Texas Employment 

Commission, Attorney General's Opinion ~~-526 made it clear that the Commission conld purchase the land with the agreement of the land owners. This 

power to purchase the land did not carry with it the power to condemn; 80 it 

was necessary for the Governor to authorize and request the Attorney General 

to bring a oondePnnatlon suit under Article 5240, Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

which providee for the acquisition of land by purchase or by condemnation. 

Article 5240, Vernon's Civil Statutea, state8 in part: 

*rJhen any land shall be required by the State for any 

character of public we, the Governor is authorized to purchase said land, or the right to the use thereof, for such 

purpose; or, falling to agree with the owner on the price 

thereof, such land may be condemned for suoh public we in the 

name of this State. Upon the direction of the Governor, 

proceedings ahallbe instituted against the owner of the land 

by the Attorney General or under his direction by the district 

or county attorney. . . .' 

The euit la brou@t to condelrm land in the name of the State of Texas 

by the Texas Employment Commission and ie for the benefit of the Commission, 

which haa a direct intereat since appropriated funds for the Commission will 

be wed to pay for the land and the buildings to be erected on the land. 

Having the direct interest that it doee, and the acquirement of building 

sites being neceseary to further the Act for which the Ccamnlasion was established, the Ccminlssion in furtherance of the Act can employ an attorney to 

assist in the preparation of the proceedings under Article 5221b-9, Vemon'e 

Civil Statutea, which reads as follows: 
m. S. Perry Brown, page 3 (Ww-713) 

"(a) ~Duties and Powers of Oommiaaiont It shall be the 

duty of the Conm.is~lon to administer this Act; and It shall 

have power and authority to adopt, amend, or reaoind such 

rules and reguLationa, to employ such Wr'BonB, make such 

expenditures, require such reporta, make such lnveetlge.tions, 

and take such other action ae it deema neceseary or suitable 

to that end. . . .“ (&nphaeis ours.) 

The legality of the payment of the Attorney has been questiomd on 

two grounds. 

The objection to Article IV, Section 22 of the Texas Constitution by 

the Comptroller on the grounds that an attorney employed by the Coimnieaion, 

not being the Attorney Gsneral, could not represent the State in a legal 

proceeding to 6eoum an office building has no basic since thie objection 

wae answered by the Suptie Court of Texas In Camp Y. Gulf Production CcmF 

61 S.W.2d 773. It was alao answered in Maude v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 61, 

2 5 S.W. 639 where this pdint was raised and overruled. These oaaee hold 

that an Act of the Legislature would not be held unoonatitutional unlese 

it clearly deprived the Attorney General of his authority to represent the 

State. 

The second objection raised ae to the legality of the employment by 

the Colmaieaion of an attorney to aid the Attorney General is that Article 

5221b-15, Vernon's Civil Statutee, prohibits anyone other than those attorneye who are regularly employed by the Conunlsaion to aid the Attorney 

General. This ass-es that since this attorney waa employed solely to help 

In one matter that he was not "regularly" employed by the Commiseion. 

This cbjection is without merit since the attorney employed by the Commission to aid the Attorney General in the mentioned litigation was "reg&rly" 

employed by the Commi6alon. The word "regularly* is an adverb and meana 

In regular manner. The word "regular",hae been held to mean to be *agreeable 

to an eatabliahed law" (Century Dictionary quoting Wise v. State Veterinary 

Bs, I.38 Michigan 428, 432, 101NW 562; Webeters Dictionary quoting $fers v. 

Resbeok, ~upr~). The word has aleo been held to mean "duly authorized 

(Vebsters Dictionary quoting Merchants ' Iiational Bank v. Continental Elational 

B&, 98 California A 523, 277 Pac. 354). The word "regularly" has been held 

to be not eynoryrmoua with "continuously" (Ex. p. Cain, 39 Alabama 440). 

Since this attorney employed by the Commission was employed under the authority 

of Article 5221b-8 Vernon's Civil Statutes, his employment certainly we,8 

*regularly" made, Thie opinion overrules Attorney General's Opinion O-708 

insofar ae the two opinions conflict. 
Mr. S. Perry Brown, page 4 (WW-713) 

It,18 our opinion that the Texas Employment~Commfasion was authorized 

to employ an attorney to assiat the Attorney General in preparing for Eminent 

Domain proceedinga authorized by the Governor for the benefit of the Texas 

Employment Cozonissfon. 

The Texas Employment Commission may legally 

pay an attomeg for eervieea rendered in 

aasisting the Attorney Ceneral in an Eminent 

Domafn Proceeding. 

Yours very' truly, 

WILL WIISOH 

Attorney General of Texas 

JCS:im:me 

APPROVFJh 

OPIIVIOI COMMITrEE 

Gee. P. Blackbum, Chairman 

Gordon C. Caes 

Wallace Finfrock 

Riley Eugene Fletcher 

Jay D, Howell 

REVIEWEDFORTREGlTORKEY GEXERAL 

BY: W. V. Geppert