IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 2, 2016 

IN RE LILLIAN D.

 Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Knox County

No. 143439 Timothy E. Irwin, Judge

No. E2016-00111-COA-R3-PT-FILED-AUGUST 26, 2016

This is a termination of parental rights case involving a two-year-old child, Lillian D. 

(“the Child”). On October 7, 2013, the Knox County Juvenile Court granted temporary 

legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). 

The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. 

DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s 

biological mother, Penelope D. (“Mother”), in the Knox County Juvenile Court on 

January 26, 2015.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was 

mentally incompetent to care for the Child and that the conditions that led to the removal 

of the Child from Mother’s custody still persisted. The trial court further found by clear 

and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest 

of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court 

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D.

BENNETT, J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Mary L. Ward, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Penelope D.2

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Kathryn A. Baker, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

 

1

Termination of the biological father’s parental rights was sought by separate action.

2 We note that in its final order, the trial court listed “Vaneta A.” as a prior name for Mother. Inasmuch 

as the Child’s birth certificate and the trial court’s judgment refer to Mother as Penelope D., we will refer 

to Mother as Penelope D. or Mother for purposes of this Opinion.
2

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Child was removed from the custody of Mother when she was only three days 

old due to Mother’s mental health condition, which compromised her ability to care for 

the Child. At the hospital following the Child’s birth, medical staff became concerned 

when Mother appeared to be suffering from delusions. Following a psychiatric 

consultation, hospital personnel concluded that Mother was suffering from delusions and, 

due to her condition, was not able to safely care for the Child. The Child was placed in 

foster care on October 7, 2013, by order of the Knox County Juvenile Court (“trial 

court”). The trial court adjudicated the Child as dependent and neglected on April 8, 

2014, “due to the mother’s mental health issues which create[d] an inability for the 

mother to provide appropriate care and supervision for the child.” 

Following the child’s removal, Mother told a DCS case manager, Kim Harvey, 

details of certain events in Mother’s past. Throughout her involvement with DCS, 

Mother had shared her story with other professionals, remaining fairly consistent but 

including some factual variations. Mother stated that she was born on a U.S. Navy ship 

in international waters to her parents, Katherine Gyorgyi and Alberto Delarosa. 

According to Mother, her mother was a naval surgeon and her father was an imperial in 

the Marines. After her father’s death, her mother was remarried to a man named Jack 

Gardner, who was a commander prince in the Navy. Mother further related that she had 

been hospitalized in Ireland as an infant due to Marfan Syndrome. She reported spending 

time in foster care as a child following the death of both parents. By Mother’s account,

she had been kidnapped in Tennessee and taken to Florida at the age of five where she 

was adopted by a family named “Collinswood.” 

Mother further reported suffering a heart attack in the fifth grade and remaining in 

a coma until she was sixteen years old. As Mother explained, she was taken from foster 

care at sixteen years of age by a man named Arthur Howe, whom she married in order to 

be emancipated. She further reported giving birth to twenty-two children in addition to 

the Child, including Ellison who died at eight weeks due to a heart condition and three 

separate sets of septuplets with Mr. Howe. Mother explained that the last set of 

septuplets was born after Mr. Howe’s death in 2002 when she inseminated herself with a 

turkey baster. Mother said that the three sets of septuplets currently lived with a relative

named Magdalena.3 

 

3 Mother testified at trial that Magdelena was her cousin, but Ms. Harvey testified that Mother previously 

told her that Magdelena was her aunt.
3

Ms. Harvey testified that she searched and contacted multiple resources in an 

attempt to locate Mother’s family, including the Thomson Reuters CLEAR investigation

database, local missing person programs, Tennessee Department of Vital Records, 

Knoxville Police Department, Knox County Sheriff’s Office, Tennessee Bureau of 

Investigation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of State, U.S. 

Department of Naval Services, and the U.S. Embassy in Ireland. According to Ms. 

Harvey, despite searching foster care records in Tennessee, Georgia, and Florida, she was 

unable to locate any records regarding Mother’s reported time in foster care. Ms. Harvey 

facilitated a voluntary national fingerprint search that produced one record pertaining to 

an arrest of Penelope D. occurring in Georgia, but no identifying information was 

available from that arrest record. 

Upon the Child’s placement into the custody of DCS, a permanency plan was 

developed for the Child on April 30, 2014, listing the alternate goals of “Return to 

Parent” or “Adoption.” The permanency plan required Mother to: (1) cooperate with 

DCS to obtain legal identifying documentation regarding Mother’s identity; (2) complete 

a full psychological evaluation and follow all treatment recommendations until released 

from treatment upon successful completion; (3) if prescribed, take medication as 

prescribed; (4) complete a parenting assessment; (5) demonstrate the ability to perform 

basic parenting skills during visits; (6) attend medication management appointments; (7) 

attend individual therapy to address her past trauma; (8) provide a safe, stable home for 

the Child; (9) maintain contact with DCS; and (10) notify DCS of any change in 

Mother’s circumstances. It is undisputed that Mother made efforts to comply with her 

permanency plan throughout her involvement with DCS. Specifically, Mother 

participated in individual therapy, medication management, a full psychological 

evaluation, and a parenting assessment.4

In March 2014, Mother underwent a psychological evaluation performed by a 

clinical psychologist, Dr. William A. McGillivray, Ph.D., ABPP. During this evaluation, 

Mother was diagnosed with Psychotic Disorder, not otherwise specified, with rule-out 

diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Although Dr. McGillivray attempted to 

obtain information from Mother concerning her background, he was unable to do so. His 

evaluation described his interview with Mother as follows in relevant part:

There is virtually no reliable information about [Mother] and the 

consistent parts of her story are implausible, including the circumstances of 

her birth, where she lived growing up, with whom she lived following the 

death of both parents one year after her birth, and on and on. Her 

 

4 DCS pled substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan as a ground in the petition to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights. At trial, however, DCS conceded that Mother had substantially complied with 

the permanency plan, and DCS has not raised any issue on appeal with regard to that statutory ground.
4

explanation for the many gaps in her life history and the absence of any 

record of her life is also implausibly explained as being due to brain injury 

that has affected her memory and the loss of all documentation of her life 

by theft. 

* * * 

As may be clear from the above, I do not believe I made any 

progress in gaining a better understanding of this woman’s life, life 

circumstances, or motivation for her bizarre recounting of her life.

* * * 

The tenacity of her delusions (unless she is lying) is remarkable as is 

her ability to mix seemingly factual information (albeit often inaccurate) 

with unbelievable claims. The fact that she has blocked every avenue[] to 

determine her identity does suggest that some conscious deceit is involved; 

but I believe any deceit coexists with genuine delusion.

According to Dr. McGillivray, psychological testing revealed “evidence of a 

serious impairment to [Mother’s] ability to think logically and coherently.” Testing also 

showed that situation-related stress was placing higher demands on Mother than she had 

been accustomed to confronting. As a result, Dr. McGillivray determined that “[Mother] 

is at risk for becoming acutely upset and for functioning ineffectively in the decisions she 

makes and the courses of action she pursues.” Dr. McGillivray concluded that Mother 

may be indifferent to people and inattentive to what they are saying or doing. He 

maintained that Mother’s overly emotional and insufficiently deliberative approach 

“often compromises the effectiveness of [her] problem solving and the adequacy of [her] 

adjustment.” Dr. McGillivray concluded as follows:

This is a difficult case. [Mother’s] delusions are certainly all 

encompassing, although there may also be an element of deception, given 

her presentation of self as sui generis, that is, without any connection to 

real past. At the same time, she appears able to function [o]n a daily basis 

and her reality testing is sufficient to manage her affairs in a limited 

manner. From the supervised visits, [Mother] appears able to attend to her 

child’s needs (again, for a limited period and limited possible needs she 

would need to meet under the circumstances).

[Mother] is completely indifferent, la belle indifference in the old 

psychiatric literature, marking a kind of hysterical refusal to take what she 
5

is saying seriously. . . . There is a kind of manic quality in her delusions as 

opposed to themes of world destruction and/or omnipotence in 

schizophrenic delusions. The possibility should be considered that she has 

Bipolar Disorder.

To add to the mystery, [Mother’s] claim of multiple insults to her 

brain, once from a long-lasting coma, once from a severe automobile 

accident does suggest that her mental status may be connected to brain 

injury. The only evidence besides her own assertions is her significant 

difficulty noted on the WAIS and W-J in working with dispatch.

What remains clear is that [Mother] clearly is mightily unstable in 

her living and financial circumstances and the mystery of her origins leads

me to conclude she would not be very reliable in caring for her child at this 

time. I would recommend that she would need to have a longer track record 

of even modest stability before visits with her child be extended. Whether 

there can or should be more pressure on her to divulge her past or to allow 

an investigation by authorities such as the FBI is something DCS might 

consider if permissible.

I will conclude that at this point [Mother] is almost totally 

unbelievable in her ideas, beliefs or intentions. Although seemingly able to 

function on a daily basis, albeit with significant help from social services, I 

have no sense that she would be able to form a relationship of trust, for 

example, with [Family Service Worker]. Perhaps in time “more shall be 

revealed” and the possibility of a more reliable relationship may develop.

Mother’s parenting assessment was performed by Leigh Ann Goldstein, a licensed 

professional counselor, and René Stegall, M.S., Omni Community Health case manager 

for Mother. As Ms. Goldstein began the parenting assessment, Mother became agitated 

by questions regarding her family history when Ms. Goldstein was completing the 

genogram portion of the assessment. Mother suggested that because Ms. Goldstein did 

not believe her, she refused to work further with Ms. Goldstein. Ms. Stegall testified that 

she finished the genogram and the remaining parts of the assessment with Mother. 

Calling upon her master’s degree and thirty years of social work experience, Ms. Stegall 

related that Mother frequently became agitated when she was “being put on the spot” and 

would become further agitated if someone did not believe her or pointed out the 

inconsistencies in her story. Ms. Stegall recommended that Mother not be questioned 

during visits to prevent upsetting her with the Child present. Having observed Mother’s 

supervised visitation with the Child, Ms. Stegall testified that Mother was appropriate 

with the Child during these visits. At one visit supervised by Ms. Stegall, however, 
6

Mother arrived in a “very agitated state.” According to Ms. Stegall, Mother indicated

that the Child’s father was spreading rumors about her, and that she was previously

“running from people in the downtown area of Knoxville” when “people were shouting, 

‘whore’ and other things.” The assessment revealed that Mother remained agitated 

during the entire visit. Mother offered that she “‘was going to have to leave the state, 

find another place to live and go into hiding.’” Ms. Stegall recommended that Mother 

continue to maintain mental health services and be mentally healthy on a long-term basis 

before the Child’s return to Mother. 

Ms. Goldstein’s testimony included the importance to a healthy child of having a 

“mentally functional, non-delusional parent.” Ms. Goldstein holds a master’s degree in 

counseling from the University of Tennessee and is licensed as a professional counselor 

through the State of Tennessee. According to Ms. Goldstein, her career had focused on 

interactions between parents and children. During trial, Ms. Goldstein opined in 

pertinent part:

[I]t’s extremely important to a child’s ability to have successful 

interchanges with [her] environment, that [she has] a parent who has the 

ability to be attuned to, anticipate, acknowledge and appropriately meet 

[her] emotional needs. When you have a parent that struggles with severe 

mental illness, those needs take precedence over the child, which places the 

child at risk. 

In Ms. Goldstein’s proffered opinion, it would be difficult for a child to establish a sense 

of reality if raised by a delusional parent because the child’s reality would shift according 

to the reality of the parent. Significantly, Ms. Goldstein differentiated between a child 

having a delusional caretaker and having occasional contact with a delusional relative. 

According to Ms. Goldstein, a child with a delusional caregiver would have to trust that 

caregiver to meet her needs. Conversely, a child having occasional contact with a 

delusional relative can obtain corrective information from a stable caregiver, which 

would not be harmful to the child. 

During trial, Mother again articulated a review of her life and background as 

Penelope D. Mother’s explanation was substantially consistent with the previous 

narratives she had provided throughout her involvement with DCS. During the first day 

of trial, DCS informed Mother that they had located her parents, Marsha S. and Brad S.

(collectively, “Maternal Grandparents”), in Florida. DNA testing during the pendency of 

the case established that Maternal Grandparents were the biological grandparents of the 

Child. Mother, however, denied that they were her parents, insisting that her parents 

were deceased. Instead, Mother maintained that Maternal Grandparents were distant 

relatives from her mother’s side of the family. According to Mother, “[Maternal 
7

Grandparents were] extremely abusive mentally and physically, and I don’t want them 

anywhere near my children because I think that it would be detrimental to their health.”

Mother related that Maternal Grandparents lied to her about who her parents were and 

still refused to tell her the truth. When questioned as to why she did not like Marsha S., 

Mother stated, “Because she made up false tales regarding what my childhood was . . . . 

She for a while pretended to be my mother and she’s not. She pretended to be my sister’s 

mother, and she’s not alive anymore. And she just generally makes things up.” 

Although insisting at trial that she was residing in an apartment located in a house, 

Mother did not present a lease. Notwithstanding Mother’s claim of employment, it was 

undisputed that Mother’s employment did not constitute a legal source of income due to 

her lack of proper identification and Social Security number. According to Mother, her 

lack of identification and birth records limited her options for employment. 

At trial, Brad S. identified himself as Mother’s biological father. Marsha S. also 

testified, acknowledging that she was Mother’s biological mother. Maternal 

Grandparents testified that Mother’s name was in fact Vaneta A. and not Penelope D.

They first discovered that Mother was using the name Penelope D. in 2007 or 2008. 

Regarding other family members, Maternal Grandparents explained that Mother had

three brothers but not a sister. Although lacking a birth certificate for Mother, they 

presented Mother’s Social Security number and Florida driver’s license.5 When 

questioned, Maternal Grandparents, speaking as the only caretakers responsible for 

Mother’s care as a child, denied any kind of abuse or trauma to Mother or that Mother 

was ever placed in foster care as a child.

DCS presented evidence demonstrating that Mother has two biological children

residing in Florida: S.A., fourteen years of age, and C.A., eight years of age. Records 

from the respective child welfare agency in Florida reveal that S.A. was removed from 

the custody of Mother in 2005, when Mother was determined to be delusional and 

paranoid and verified indicators for threatened harm were found. Mother was homeless 

at the time. According to the Florida agency’s records, Mother took S.A. to various 

medical providers, claiming that someone had bitten S.A. on the vagina, but no medical 

evidence was present to support the claim. S.A. was later released to the custody of her 

father, where she remained according to Maternal Grandparents. 

 

5 According to Maternal Grandparents, Mother had no birth certificate. They maintained that Mother was 

born at home and that the doctor did not submit the paperwork for a birth certificate. As explained by 

Brad S., they did not obtain birth certificates or social security numbers for Mother and her siblings in

order to “protect them from Uncle Sam.” According to Brad S., Mother was enrolled in school without a 

birth certificate. Although Maternal Grandparents purportedly arranged for Mother to obtain a birth 

certificate, Mother would not cooperate because she refused to have her photograph taken. Marsha S. 

testified that she assumed Mother would follow through and obtain a birth certificate when needed. 
8

Florida agency records also reflect that Mother and C.A. were found sleeping in a 

vehicle in front of an individual’s home. Mother appeared delusional at that time, and 

her statements were “inconsistent with reality.” The child welfare agency and law 

enforcement became involved, which resulted in C.A.’s release to her biological father. 

Although Maternal Grandparents assisted C.A.’s father in obtaining custody of C.A., they 

opined that this action resulted in their estrangement from Mother. Marsha S. testified 

that when Mother lost custody of C.A., “[Mother] broke.” At trial, when Mother was 

shown photographs of her children, she incorrectly identified them. When Mother was 

presented photographs of herself and her biological children, she claimed the pictures

were either of her and one of her fictitious children, Rhiann, or of Mother’s fictitious 

sister and niece. Despite DNA testing and testimony by Maternal Grandparents, Mother 

continued to deny her identity and her family, including her two oldest children. 

In a letter received by DCS approximately three weeks before the second day of 

trial, Mother’s current therapist, Kimberly Rickerson, observed that Mother had made 

progress by beginning to take medication for bipolar disorder that had “assisted in 

creating some stability in [Mother’s] emotional state.”6 Ms. Rickerson also wrote that 

Mother continued to insist that Marsha S. was not her mother and maintain that she was a 

“victim of the system.” Ms. Rickerson informed Mother that DCS would need to observe

signs of long-term stability from Mother prior to any reunification with the Child. Ms. 

Rickerson recommended a psychiatric evaluation to determine a “more appropriate 

medication combination” for Mother. Ms. Rickerson also stated that Mother was 

“emotionally fragile” and that a termination of her parental rights could cause Mother to 

suffer “severe depression.”

A DCS case manager, Stephanie Grissom, testified at trial that as she had 

supervised visits between Mother and the Child, they were “some of the best visits [she

has] supervised.” Although Ms. Grissom indicated that she was not concerned about the 

Child’s safety during those visits, she explained on cross-examination that she had safety

concerns stemming from Mother’s mental health that prevented her from recommending 

unsupervised visitation. Stating that the Child was bonded to Mother through the 

supervised visits, Ms. Grissom opined that both Mother and the Child would be 

devastated if that relationship ceased. According to Ms. Grissom, however, the best 

long-term option for the Child was to be adopted by the foster parents, who desired to 

adopt her. As described by Ms. Grissom, the Child maintained a strong bond with the 

foster parents and had thrived since being in their home. Furthermore, the Child’s foster 

parents were open to allowing Mother to continue a relationship with the Child after an

adoption. According to Ms. Grissom, Mother had complied with the permanency plan 

 

6

Testimony established that Mother did not begin taking medication for her mental illness until April 

2015. 
9

developed in the case but was still delusional, telling fantastic stories about her life that 

contradicted her actual identity. Ms. Grissom explained that she did not believe Mother 

would be able to parent the Child in the near future due to Mother’s significant mental 

illness. 

Following two days of trial conducted on July 20, 2015, and October 5, 2015, the 

trial court entered a final order on December 15, 2015, terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to the Child. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother 

was mentally incompetent and unable to care for the Child and (2) the conditions leading

to the Child’s removal from the home still persisted. The trial court further found by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best 

interest of the Child. Mother timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Mother presents three issues for our review, which we have restated as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights 

based upon the statutory ground of mental incompetence.

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights 

based upon the statutory ground of persistence of conditions.

3. Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing 

evidence that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 

best interest of the Child.

III. Standard of Review

In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine 

“whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 

(Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record, 

accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against 

those findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 524 

(Tenn. 2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however, are 

reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483 

S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s 

determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and 

shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. 

Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).
10

“Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their 

children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling, 

92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not 

absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence 

justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 

97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 

L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). As our Supreme Court has recently explained:

The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property 

right.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59. Termination of parental rights has 

the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a complete stranger and 

of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian 

of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1); see also Santosky, 455 

U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decison terminating parental rights is “final

and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and consequences at stake, 

parents are constitutionally entitled to “fundamentally fair procedures” in 

termination proceedings. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; see also Lassiter v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) 

(discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair 

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair 

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing 

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of 

unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental 

parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010). 

“Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief 

or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or 

substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re 

Bernard T. 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-andconvincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as 

highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re 

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 

S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

* * *

In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination 

proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own 

determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as 
11

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and 

convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. 

In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-524. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental] 

rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,” 

including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319 

S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

IV. Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (Supp. 2016) lists the statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part as follows:

(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction 

with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to 

a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption 

proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or 

guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, 

part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4.

* * *

(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that 

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights 

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the 

best interests of the child.

The trial court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported a 

finding of two statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights: (1) mental 

incompetence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(8) and (2)

persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3). Both 

termination grounds found by the trial court were based on Mother’s mental condition 

and how it inhibited her ability to care for the Child. 

In its final judgment, the trial court found the following facts relevant to the 

grounds established for termination of Mother’s parental rights:
12

I

[The Child] was born out of wedlock to Penelope [D.] . . . in Knox 

County, Tennessee. . . . The temporary custody of this child was 

awarded to the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s 

Services, on October 7, 2013, by order of the Juvenile Court of Knox 

County, Tennessee; she has been in foster care continuously since 

that date. An order finding the child dependent and neglected was 

issued by this Court following a hearing on April 8, 2014. The 

termination petition was filed against [Mother] on January 26, 2015.

II

1. [The Child] was removed from her mother’s custody due to 

[Mother’s] mental health issues which create an inability for the 

mother to provide appropriate care and supervision for the child. 

When [the Child] was born, medical staff at the hospital became 

concerned about the mother’s mental health and whether she was 

well enough, from a mental health standpoint, to care for her 

newborn. The attending physician called for a psychiatric consult as 

the mother appeared to be significantly delusional. That consult 

concluded that the mother was actively suffering from one or more 

significant delusional disorders and that she could not safely care for 

the infant.

* * *

8. [Mother’s] delusions about her identity and her history have been 

essentially the same throughout her involvement with the 

Department of Children’s Services. So has her apparent interest in 

discovering the truth. . . .

9. One of the requirements on [Mother’s] permanency plan was that 

she complete a full psychological evaluation. That evaluation was 

done by Dr. William McGillivray in March 2014. [Mother] was 

diagnosed with Psychotic Disorder, NOS; R/o Bipolar Disorder, 

Schizophrenia. During the evaluation she gave evidence of a serious 

impairment in her ability to think logically and coherently. The 

evaluator recommended that she receive intervention focused on 

helping her improve the clarity of her thinking. He concluded:
13

This is a difficult case. Her delusions are 

certainly all encompassing, although there may also be 

an element of deception, given her presentation of self 

as sui generis, that is, without any connection to real 

past. . . .

She is completely indifferent, la belle 

indifference in the old psychiatric literature, marking a 

kind of hysterical refusal to take what she is saying 

seriously. . . There is a kin[d] of manic quality in her 

delusions as opposed to themes of world destruction 

and/or omnipotence in schizophrenic delusions. The 

possibility should be considered that she has Bipolar 

Disorder.

To add to the mystery, her claim of multiple 

insults to her brain, once from a long-lasting coma, 

once from a severe automobile accident does suggest 

that her mental status may be connected to brain 

injury. . .

What remains clear is that she clearly is 

mightily unstable in her living and financial 

circumstances and the mystery of her origins leads me 

to conclude that she would not be very reliable in 

caring for her child at this time.[]

10. Other requirements of the permanency plan include that Respondent 

[p]articipate in individual therapy. [Mother] has received ongoing 

individual counseling at The Solution Source at the Department’s 

expense. She has been compliant with treatment to the extent that 

she has kept all her appointments but, as evidenced by her testimony 

during this trial, she has made no progress in addressing her 

delusions. She recognizes that she has issues to address, but she is 

unable or unwilling to address them. She has been compliant with 

medication management through Cherokee since April 2015. She 

was required to obtain appropriate housing. She was unable to 

qualify for public housing due to her lack of identification. She 

stayed with various individuals until she recently obtained an 

apartment in a house. She still has no lease and, thus, no stability 

though there is no reason to believe she cannot remain there 
14

indefinitely. . . . [Mother] was also asked to complete a parenting 

assessment and to demonstrate parenting skills during visitation. 

The evidence was uncontroverted that [Mother] is a very loving 

mother, attentive to her child and prepared for visits. . . .

11. During a break on the first day of trial, [Mother] was advised that the 

Department of Children’s Services had finally been successful in 

identifying and locating her biological parents, Brad and Marsha S[.] 

Rather than being excited by the ultimate success of the 

Department’s extensive efforts, [Mother] became very upset. She 

testified that this was not good news and that “they’re not my 

parents. . . . My biological parents are deceased. . . .” 

12. Brad S[.] testified by speakerphone from Florida on the first day of 

trial and then traveled to Knoxville to testify in person on the second 

day. Marsha S[.] did the same. They identified themselves as 

[Mother’s] biological parents. DNA testing conducted with [the 

Child] between the two days of trial confirmed this relationship. 

[Maternal Grandparents] stated that [Mother’s] actual name is 

Vaneta [A.], named after two of her great-grandmothers. She never 

had a sister. . . .

13. Vaneta (aka Penelope) was born . . . in South Bench, Indiana. The 

family moved to Florida in 1985 where they lived in several 

different cities based on [Brad S.’s] work, settling in Fort St. Lucie 

in 1995. Vaneta (aka Penelope) never lived with anybody else and 

was never in foster care. She was described as a happy little person 

until she became a teenager. A high school counselor suggested that 

she was a willful child and needed counseling but her parents did not 

agree. When she was 15 or 16, she ran away with a band that came 

to town and her parents retrieved her a couple months later from 

Paducah, Kentucky. They never knew what happened during that 

time but saw that their child had changed. . . . 

14. [Mother’s] first child, [S.A.], was born in Florida [i]n . . . 2002. 

[S.A.] and [Mother] lived with [Maternal Grandparents] until [S.A.]

was about 3. After an argument with [Marsha S.] over who was to 

care for [S.A.], [Mother] left with the toddler and went to a shelter. 

[S.A.] was removed from [Mother’s] custody a few weeks later by 

the Florida child welfare agency after [Mother] was found to be 

delusional and paranoid, including making various fictitious 
15

allegations of abuse to the child. [S.A.] was eventually released 

from foster care to the custody of her father. [Mother’s] second 

child, [C.A.], was born in Florida [i]n . . . 2007. She was removed 

from [Mother’s] custody in March 2008 after they were found 

sleeping in a car in someone’s yard with no residence address and no 

means of support. [Mother] again appeared delusional. [C.A.] was 

immediately placed in the custody of her father . . . where she 

remains. It was about this time that [Mother] began using the name 

Penelope. [Mother] has not had ongoing contact with her parents 

since she lost [C.A.] They searched for her, but could not find her as 

she is an adult who did not want to be found.

* * * 

17. Leigh Anne Goldst[ein], a licensed professional counselor, 

attempted to complete a parenting assessment with [Mother]. 

During Ms. Goldst[ein]’s attempt to obtain family history and a 

genogram, [Mother] became agitated and refused to cooperate 

further with Ms. Goldst[ein]. That assessment was completed by 

René Stegall, another employee of Omni Community Health. The 

details of [Mother’s] history as related during this assessment vary 

from other stories, but the general outline is consistent with what she 

has told others and with her testimony during this trial. Ms. 

Goldst[ein]’s career has focused on interactions between parents and 

children. She testified as an expert witness to the importance of 

having a mentally functional, non-delusional parent. She stated that 

“it is extremely important to a child’s ability to have successful 

interchanges with their environment, that . . . they have a parent 

who has the ability to be attuned to, anticipate, acknowledge and 

appropriately meet their emotional needs. When you have a parent 

that struggles with severe mental illness, those needs take 

precedence over the child, which places the child at risk.” She 

agreed that it is difficult for a child to establish a sense of reality if 

being raised by a parent who is not in touch with reality. The child’s 

reality shifts according to whatever the reality of the parent is. 

* * * 

19. Upon these facts, the Court finds that the child has been removed by 

order of this Court for a period of six (6) months; that the conditions 

which led to her removal still persist; other conditions persist which 
16

in all probability would cause the child to be subjected to further 

abuse and neglect and which, therefore, prevent the child’s return to 

the care of [Mother]; there is little likelihood that these conditions 

will be remedied at an early date so that this child can be returned to 

[Mother] in the near future; the continuation of the legal parent and 

child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early 

integration into a stable and permanent home.

20. The Court further finds that [Mother] is incompetent to adequately 

provide for the further care and supervision of the child because 

[Mother’s] mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely 

to remain impaired that it is unlikely that [Mother] will be able to 

assume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future.

21. This is not your everyday termination case. There is no villain here. 

[Mother] is certainly mentally ill. She is delusional. She has proven 

that through her own testimony. The Court cannot get past her 

testimony about her identity and history, her 22 fictitious children, 

and her two other real children. None of this is based in reality. Her 

refusal to accept her actual identity has cut her off from her family, 

including her two older children and her siblings, and has hampered 

her ability to provide for her own basic needs. According to all the 

witnesses, she is currently doing the best she’s done. But that best 

does not include any diminution of her mental illness. She recently 

found a place to live and she has supportive, sheltered employment. 

She provides excellent care for [the Child] under supervision. The 

Court, however, cannot trust her ability to meet even her own needs 

when given the added burden of a two-year-old. She lost two other 

children under similar circumstances in the past and she was not as 

sick then as she is now.

22. [The Child] needs stability. She needs to know what to expect every 

day, to know where she is going to lay her head at night. She must 

be able to develop a sense of her own identity in the context of 

loving adults who are in touch with reality and can provide that 

secure base for her.

Having carefully reviewed the evidence and record in this action, we shall address 

each statutory ground in turn.
17

A. Mental Incompetence

Mother contends that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights based 

upon the statutory ground of mental incompetence. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-

113(g)(8) provides as a ground for termination: 

(8)(A) The chancery and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in an 

adoption proceeding, and the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts shall 

have jurisdiction in a separate, independent proceeding conducted prior to 

an adoption proceeding to determine if the parent or guardian is mentally 

incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the child, and 

to terminate that parent’s or guardian’s rights to the child;

(B) The court may terminate the parental or guardianship rights of that 

person if it determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that:

(i) The parent or guardian of the child is incompetent to adequately 

provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the 

parent’s or guardian’s mental condition is presently so impaired and 

is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian 

will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for 

the child in the near future; and

(ii) That termination of parental or guardian rights is in the best 

interest of the child;

(C) In the circumstances described under subdivisions (8)(A) and (B), no 

willfulness in the failure of the parent or guardian to establish the parent’s 

or guardian’s ability to care for the child need be shown to establish that the 

parental or guardianship rights should be terminated.

The General Assembly’s elimination of the requirement of willfulness from the statute 

“serves to protect children from harm caused by a parent who is incapable of safely 

caring for them.” See In re D.A.P., No. E2007-02567-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 2687569,

at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App July 9, 2008). If willfulness were required in order to terminate

parental rights for mental incompetence, “an obvious result . . . is to condemn a child, 

whose parents are unfit to properly care for the child because of mental illness, to a life in 

serial foster homes without any possibility of a stable, permanent home.” See State, 

Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Smith, 785 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 1990). 
18

This Court has rejected the argument that the ground of mental incompetence is 

reserved only for parents who have “a condition for which ‘no amount of intervention can 

assist’” and instead has affirmed the termination of parental rights for mental disorders 

such as bipolar disorder, adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood, 

dependent personality disorder, and schizophrenia disorder. See id. at 337-39 (affirming 

the termination of parental rights of a parent diagnosed with schizophrenic disorder on 

the basis of mental incompetence, although the acts of the mentally disabled parent were 

not willful); In re S.M.R., No. M2008-01221-COA-R3-PT, 2008 WL 4949236, at *6

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2008) (affirming a termination of parental rights on the 

statutory ground of mental incompetence when the parent was diagnosed with bipolar 

disorder and personality disorder, not otherwise specified); Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. 

M.R.N., No. M2006-01705-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 120038, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 

17, 2007) (affirming a termination of parental rights on the statutory ground of mental 

incompetence based on a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed 

mood, as well as dependent personality disorder). The parent’s mental condition,

however, must impair the parent to an extent that he or she cannot adequately provide for 

the care and supervision of the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i). 

In the instant action, Mother has a long history of mental illness. In 2005 and 

2008, Mother lost custody of her two oldest children in Florida due to her mental 

condition and her inability to care for those children. Mother denied the existence of 

those two children at trial. In October 2013, the Child was removed from Mother’s 

custody due to Mother’s mental health issues, which interfered with her ability to care for 

the Child. Even upon the conclusion of trial, Mother continued to deny her real identity 

and parentage, despite a DNA test establishing that Maternal Grandparents were the 

biological grandparents of the Child. The evidence demonstrates that Mother’s delusions

continued into a visit with the Child on at least one occasion when Mother appeared 

agitated and made statements that she was going to run away and go into hiding. 

In determining that Mother’s mental condition rendered her unable to care for the 

Child, the trial court relied heavily on Mother’s testimony at trial and her continued 

delusions concerning her identity. The evidence preponderates in favor of this 

determination. Despite efforts by Mother, the evidence demonstrated that her condition 

was unlikely to be remedied at any point in the near future to allow Mother to resume 

care and responsibility for the Child. As to this issue, Ms. Goldstein testified regarding 

the effect Mother’s delusions would have on the Child, opining that having a delusional 

parent would put the Child at risk. The trial court found that Mother was “compliant with 

treatment to the extent that she has kept all her appointments but, as evidenced by her 

testimony during this trial, she has made no progress in addressing her delusions.” As the 

trial court found, “[Mother’s] refusal to accept her actual identity has . . . hampered her 
19

ability to provide for her own basic needs” and called into question Mother’s “ability to 

meet even her own needs when given the added burden of a two-year-old.” 

We acknowledge and commend Mother on her efforts in attempting to overcome 

her mental illness. Following a thorough review of the record, however, we conclude 

that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that Mother was incompetent to adequately provide for the care and 

supervision of the Child. Mother’s mental condition is presently and is likely to remain 

so impaired that it is unlikely Mother will be able to assume care of and responsibility for 

the Child in the near future. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights based on the statutory ground of mental incompetence. 

B. Persistence of Conditions

Mother contends that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence 

of the ground of persistence of conditions in this case. Specifically, Mother argues that 

DCS presented no evidence to the court that Mother was unable to meet the needs of the 

Child. Mother also argues that she has made “substantial progress” during the pendency 

of this case. While we recognize that Mother has made efforts to remedy her mental 

condition by attending therapy and, more recently, beginning medication for her 

condition, we agree with the trial court that the conditions leading to removal still 

persisted at the time of trial. 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) provides as an additional ground for 

termination of parental rights:

The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by 

order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child’s removal or other 

conditions that in all reasonable probability would cause the 

child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and that, 

therefore, prevent the child’s safe return to the care of the 

parent or parents or the guardian or guardians, still persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be 

remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely 

returned to the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians 

in the near future; and
20

(C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child 

relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early 

integration into a safe, stable and permanent home; . . .

As the record reflects and the trial court found, the Child was removed from the 

custody of Mother on October 7, 2013, due to Mother’s mental health, resulting in 

Mother’s inability to care for the Child. The Child was adjudicated to be dependent and 

neglected on April 8, 2014, by the trial court due to Mother’s mental health issues and 

Mother’s inability to care for the Child. We have determined in this Opinion that the 

evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that Mother’s delusions still 

persisted at the time of trial, rendering her mentally incompetent to care for the Child. 

This Court has previously determined that the ground of persistence of conditions 

can be based on a parent’s mental incapacity. See In re B.S.G., No. E2006-02314-COAR3-PT, 2007 WL 1514958, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2007) (“A parent’s mental 

incapacity can provide a sufficient factual predicate for a finding that persistent 

unremedied conditions exist which prevent the safe return of the child or children to that 

parent’s care.”). In this case, despite efforts by both DCS personnel and Mother, the 

reason for removal of the Child from Mother’s care (Mother’s mental incapacity) still 

persisted at the time of trial. Additionally, the trial court found that it was unlikely this 

condition would be remedied at any point in the near future so that the Child could return 

to Mother’s custody. The court further found that continuation of the parent/child 

relationship between the Child and Mother greatly diminished the Child’s chances of 

early integration into a stable and permanent home.

Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence supports

the trial court’s finding that DCS has proven the ground of persistence of conditions by 

clear and convincing evidence. While Mother had received medication and therapy at the 

behest of DCS case managers, her mental condition had not improved by the time of trial 

such that she was capable of safely caring for the Child. Furthermore, testimony 

demonstrated that Mother’s mental condition would be unlikely to improve in the near 

future so as to allow the Child to return to Mother’s custody. Continuation of the 

parent/child relationship would therefore greatly diminish the Child’s chances of 

integration into a safe and stable permanent home. The trial court properly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights based on clear and convincing evidence of this statutory ground. 

V. Best Interest of the Child

When a parent has been found to be unfit by establishment of at least one statutory 

ground for termination of parental rights, as here, the interests of parent and child 

diverge, and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182 
21

S.W.3d 838, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 507, 

523 (Tenn. 2016) (“‘The best interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the 

determination that there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.’”) 

(quoting In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 254 (Tenn. 2010)). Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2016) provides a list of factors the trial court is to 

consider when determining if termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest. 

This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find the existence 

of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest. See In re 

Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (“The relevancy 

and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of each case.”). 

Furthermore, the best interest of a child must be determined from the child’s perspective 

and not the parent’s. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) lists the following factors for 

consideration:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the 

child’s best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian; 

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting 

adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services 

agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not 

reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or 

other contact with the child; 

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established 

between the parent or guardian and the child; 

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely 

to have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical 

condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the 

parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional 

or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child 

or adult in the family or household; 
22

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s 

home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the 

home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances 

or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or 

guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable 

manner; 

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status 

would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian 

from effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for 

the child; or 

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent 

with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department 

pursuant to § 36-5-101. 

The trial court made the following findings of fact concerning the best interest 

analysis in relevant part:

[The Child] is now described as a very smart, very happy child. She 

is bonded to her prospective adoptive family and excited to see them at the 

end of visits with her mother. They are providing her with that trusting, 

secure place where her emotional needs are being met and where she can 

develop with a clear sense of reality.

* * * 

[The Child] needs stability. She needs to know what to expect every 

day, to know where she is going to lay her head at night. She must be able 

to develop a sense of her own identity in the context of loving adults who 

are in touch with reality and can provide that secure base for her.

[Mother] has not made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct, 

or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in her 

home despite reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for 

such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear 

possible. A change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to have 

a detrimental effect on the child’s emotional and psychological condition. 

Most significantly, [Mother’s] mental and/or emotional status would be 

detrimental to the child or prevent [Mother] from effectively providing safe 

and stable care and supervision for the child.
23

The Department of Children’s Services has made reasonable efforts 

toward achieving permanency for this child.

It is, therefore, in the best interest of [the Child] and the public that 

all of [Mother’s] parental rights to this child be terminated and the complete 

custody, control, and full guardianship of the child be awarded to the State 

of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services, with the right to place 

her for adoption and to consent to such adoption in loco parentis. 

(Emphasis and paragraph numbering omitted.)

This Court addressed a similar situation in State of Tennessee, Dep’t of Children's 

Servs. v. Oliver, No. M2007-00844-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 4553036 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Dec. 26, 2007). In Oliver, this Court acknowledged that the parents had not actively 

abused the children and that they made substantial efforts to complete the requested 

classes, visit the children regularly, and maintain a relationship with the children. Id. at 

*9. Despite those efforts, this Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the parents in 

that case were unable mentally to care for the children and were unlikely to improve to a 

point where they would be capable of caring for the children. Id. In affirming the trial 

court’s best interest finding, this Court reasoned as follows: 

At this stage in the analysis . . . we must focus on the best interests of [the 

children]. We have observed:

[T]he statutes on termination of parental rights are established 

not only to protect a child from a parent who actively abuses 

him, but also to avoid the harm visited upon a child by 

spending years in the uncertainty of foster care because his 

biological parents are unwilling or unable to care for him 

properly, and yet will not voluntarily relinquish their parental 

rights so that the child will be available for adoption and a 

permanent home. Such parents may recognize that they are 

unable to shoulder the responsibility of caring for the child, 

but wish for a relationship with the child that does not require 

caring for the child’s needs. The statutory scheme enacted 

evidences recognition by the Legislature that, unless the 

parental rights of such a parent can be terminated, a 

substantial number of children will spend their childhood in 

foster care, with no possibility of a permanent home.
24

In re Marr, No. M2001-02890-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 152640, at *10 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2003), judgment vacated for lack of standing, 127 

S.W.3d 737 (Tenn. 2004). We emphasized that the best interests of the 

child “must be evaluated in light of the statutory purpose of determining 

whether the child would be able to safely live with the parents.” The Marr

court quoted Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Services v. D.G.B., No. E2001-

02426-COA-R3-JV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 647, 2002 WL 31014838 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002), as follows:

In the instant case, the trial court found – and the evidence 

does not preponderate to the contrary – that “an early return 

to the care of their parents” was not possible. . . . This it 

seems to us is the key to this issue. The legislative intent is 

not simply to establish a “meaningful relationship” between a 

child and his or her parents; it is to return the child to the care

of his parents.

D.G.B., 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 647, at *26-27, 2002 WL 31014838 

quoted in Marr, 2003 WL 152640, at *11. We then discussed the impact 

[on] the child of continuing the parent/child relationship with a parent who, 

through no fault of the parent, cannot care for the child:

[T]he focus of the termination statute is on whether the child 

can safely live with the parent and have his, that is, the 

child’s, day-to-day needs met. Some of the grounds, such as 

abuse of the child, are reasons for which the parent can be 

faulted. Other reasons, such as a parent’s mental 

incompetence, are reasons for which the parent cannot be 

faulted, but the result nonetheless is that the child cannot 

safely live with the parent in such a way that the child’s needs 

will be met. . . . For a child who is in foster care, failing to 

terminate the . . . parent’s parental rights means that the child 

will spend his childhood in foster care, with no permanent 

home.

Marr, 2003 WL 152640, at *12 (internal citations omitted). Thus, we 

cannot ignore the legislative intent behind the termination statutes. Clearly, 

the legislature intended for the focus to be on achieving a permanent, safe 

home for children coming into the care of the State. In this case, 

continuation of the children’s relationship with Mother and Father would 

prevent their adoption and mean that they would spend their childhood in 
25

foster care, with no permanent home. That is substantial harm indeed. 

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of the 

parental rights of Mother and Father is in the best interests of [the children].

Oliver, 2007 WL 4553036, at *9-10.

In the case at bar, the trial court found that Mother was mentally incompetent such 

that she was unable to safely care for the Child. Mother suffered from delusions and was

still unwilling or unable to accept her identity or her family at the conclusion of trial, 

despite DNA evidence proving a biological relationship between the Child and Maternal 

Grandparents. Expert testimony and a psychological evaluation of Mother’s mental state 

indicated that Mother’s mental illness would have a detrimental effect on the Child. 

Mother had made efforts to improve her mental condition, but her delusions persisted at 

the time of trial and were clear from her testimony. The trial court relied significantly on 

Mother’s testimony, which evinced that her delusions still persisted. 

In making its decision, the trial court found that the Child was bonded to her foster 

parents, who wished to adopt her, and that she was in a “trusting, secure place where her 

emotional needs [were] being met and where she [could] develop with a clear sense of 

reality.” Following our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence 

does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating

Mother’s parental rights to the Child. This case is remanded to the trial court, pursuant to 

applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment and collection of costs 

assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Penelope D. 

_________________________________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE