In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-1113 

JAMES SNOW,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

RANDY PFISTER,*

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13-cv-3947 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 25, 2017 — DECIDED JANUARY 25, 2018 

____________________ 

Before KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and DARROW, District Judge.**

 

* Michael Lemke was replaced by Randy Pfister, the current warden of 

Stateville Correctional Center. See Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. 

** Of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, 

sitting by designation. 
2 No. 17-1113 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. James Snow was convicted of murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. In a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus, he alleges that his constitutional rights 

were violated when his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance and when the prosecutor failed to disclose material evidence helpful to the defense. The district court denied the petition. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

William Little was shot to death while working at the 

Clark Street gas station in Bloomington, Illinois on March 31, 

1991. Officer Pelo of the Bloomington Police Department was 

the first law enforcement officer to respond. No one other 

than Little was found in the station. Danny Martinez told investigators that he was walking towards the station after filling his tires when he heard two loud “pops.” He turned to 

check on his car. When he turned back towards the station, 

he saw a man walking backwards out of the door. He said he 

came within a few feet of the man. Carlos Luna told investigators that he was looking out of his window across the street 

from the station at the time of the incident and that he saw a 

white male who appeared to be carrying something under a 

long trench coat walking out of the gas station. A third witness, Gerado Gutierrez, told the investigators that he purchased fuel at the station around the time of the incident and 

that when he entered the station to pay, he saw another man 

with the attendant who appeared to be trying to avoid being 

seen. No suspect was immediately apprehended. 

In April 1991, James Snow was arrested for robbing a different gas station in Bloomington, Illinois. It took the police 

several hours to find Snow hiding in the attic of his sister’s 

house in Missouri to complete the arrest. He was transported 
No. 17-1113 3

back to Bloomington, where he was interviewed by police. 

According to the officers who transported and questioned 

Snow, he repeatedly asked about the Little homicide investigation and asked “what would happen to him if he knew 

something about the murder.” (R. 47-6 at 121.) 

Snow was then called to participate in a lineup. He initially refused to participate. Carlos Luna viewed the lineup 

and stated that Snow looked like the man he saw leaving the 

gas station on March 31. Danny Martinez also viewed the 

lineup and indicated that he thought two of the individuals, 

neither of whom was Snow, looked like the man he saw at 

the station that night, but he made no identification. 

After the lineup, Snow moved to Florida. He returned to 

Bloomington in July 1993, and in October 1994, he pleaded 

guilty to obstruction of justice for attempting to persuade a 

girlfriend to lie about his involvement in another crime. 

Snow was incarcerated until February 1996. Upon his release, he moved back to Florida. 

In September 1999, Snow was indicted in Illinois state 

court for the murder of William Little. Snow was apprehended later that month in Ohio. When first approached by 

the police, Snow provided a false name and identification. 

He then fled after the officer attempted to view a tattoo on 

his calf. He was arrested a short time later hiding under the 

porch of a nearby home. 

Susan Claycomb was also charged for the crime. Her case 

went to trial before Snow’s, and she was acquitted. According to the state’s theory at Snow’s trial, Claycomb was 

Snow’s getaway driver. 
4 No. 17-1113 

In 2000, G. Patrick Riley and Frank Picl were appointed 

to represent Snow. At the end of that year, Snow sent the trial 

judge a letter stating he believed his attorneys were unprepared for trial. He subsequently sought a continuance. The 

judge questioned the attorneys, determined they were adequately prepared for trial, and denied the request. 

Snow’s trial began in January 2001 and lasted nine days. 

In all, the state called forty-three witnesses, and Snow called 

fifteen. The state called Martinez and Luna as eyewitnesses. 

Martinez identified Snow and testified about seeing someone exit the gas station as he approached it on the night of 

March 31, 1991. He admitted he had not identified Snow in 

photographs or in the lineup, but had later identified him 

from a picture in the newspaper after Snow was arrested 

years after the murder. Luna made no in-court identification 

of Snow, but testified regarding his statements given to the 

investigators on the night of the murder. 

Officer Pelo testified about receiving the dispatch call on 

March 31, 1991. He stated that he saw Martinez filling his 

tires and approaching the station. He did not see anyone 

leave the station. 

Twelve other witnesses testified that, at various times, 

Snow admitted responsibility for the murder or otherwise indicated that he was involved in the crime.1 

 

1 For details regarding these witnesses’ testimonies, see the district court’s 

memorandum opinion and order. Snow v. Pfister, 240 F.Supp. 3d 854 (N.D. 

Ill. 2016). 
No. 17-1113 5

Snow testified in his own defense, claiming to have been 

at home with his wife on the night in question. His wife also 

testified that Snow was home with her on March 31, 1991. 

In his closing argument, Snow’s counsel highlighted inconsistencies between the testimonies of the state’s witnesses, particularly between the different accounts of Martinez and Pelo. He also pointed out that none of the witnesses 

contacted authorities after Snow allegedly confessed to the 

crime and that many of the state’s witnesses had lengthy 

criminal histories. 

The state focused on the testimony of the eyewitnesses 

and of the witnesses who said Snow implicated himself in 

the crime. The state also highlighted as evidence of guilt 

Snow’s refusal to participate in the lineup, his flight to Ohio 

following his indictment, his attempt to use a false identification when apprehended in Ohio, and the fact that Snow 

never provided an alibi before trial, despite knowing he was 

a suspect for years. 

The jury found Snow guilty of first degree murder. After 

the trial, Snow sent two letters to the trial court asserting his 

attorneys had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

trial judge held a hearing, reviewed Snow’s complaints, and 

denied the motion. The trial judge also denied Snow’s motion to reconsider. The Illinois appellate court denied Snow’s 

direct appeal, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. 

In 2004, Snow filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. In 2008, the Exoneration Project began representing 

Snow. It filed an amended petition citing new evidence in 
6 No. 17-1113 

support of Snow’s ineffective assistance claim, including evidence that one of Snow’s trial attorneys had since been disbarred. The Illinois circuit court denied the postconviction 

petition, the Illinois appellate court affirmed the denial, and 

the Illinois Supreme Court again denied Snow’s petition for 

leave to appeal. 

Snow filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief in 

federal court in May 2013. Shortly thereafter, Snow discovered additional evidence and filed a motion for leave to file 

a successive postconviction petition in state court. The proceedings in federal court were stayed pending the proceedings in state court. The Illinois circuit court denied the motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, the 

Illinois appellate court affirmed, and again the Illinois Supreme Court denied Snow’s petition for leave to appeal. The 

federal district court then lifted the stay and addressed the 

merits of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district 

court denied the petition, and this court certified the claims 

for appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

II. ANALYSIS

This court reviews the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de novo. Campbell v. Reardon, 780 F.3d 752, 761 (7th 

Cir. 2015). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the federal court may grant a federal petition for habeas corpus only if the state court’s ruling on the 

federal constitutional question “‘was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’ or ‘was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Id. (quoting 
No. 17-1113 7

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). This standard is “‘difficult to meet’ and 

‘highly deferential.’” Id. (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 

170, 181 (2011)). A petitioner “must show that the state court’s 

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. at 761–62 (quoting 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). 

This “deferential standard of review applies only to claims 

that were actually ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings.’” Id. at 762 (quoting § 2254(d)). For each claim, 

we review the decision of the last state court to address its 

merits. Id. 

In addition to the merits of Snow’s claims, we must consider which claims have been procedurally defaulted. “There 

are two distinct ways in which a state prisoner can procedurally default a federal claim.” Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 

384 (7th Cir. 2016). In cases where the state court declines to 

address a petitioner’s federal claims because the petitioner 

did not meet state procedural requirements, “principles of 

comity and federalism dictate against upending the 

state-court conviction, and instead, finding that the petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted.” Id. 

The second type of procedural default stems from the requirement that a state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in 

state court before seeking relief in federal court. Id.; 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A)). “State prisoners must give the state courts 

one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by 

invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 

(1999). To exhaust state remedies in the Illinois courts, the 
8 No. 17-1113 

prisoner must include his claims in a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at 845–46. 

“Procedural default may be excused ... where the petitioner demonstrates either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual 

prejudice’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will result 

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Thomas, 822 F.3d at 

386 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). 

Snow’s claims fall into two substantive categories: claims 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and claims that the 

state failed to disclose material evidence helpful to the defense. We address each category in turn, including analyses 

of which claims have been procedurally defaulted. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a plaintiff must show that counsel “made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and that the errors 

deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The plaintiff must show that there is 

a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694. When asserting an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim in the context of an AEDPA petition for habeas corpus relief, the prisoner must show that the state 

court’s decision is contrary to or involved an unreasonable 

application of this standard. Campbell, 780 F.3d at 761–62. 

The Illinois appellate court dismissed Snow’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims under the doctrine of res judicata, 

therefore, the circuit court was the last court to review the 

merits of the claims. Res judicata is “not a bar to consideration 
No. 17-1113 9

of claims in a federal habeas action.” Davis v. Lambert, 388 F.3d 

1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Moore v. Bryant, 295 F.3d 

771, 776 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2002)). So we review the opinion of the 

Illinois circuit court, which granted the state’s motion to dismiss these claims. 

Snow alleges his appointed attorneys provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and that the Illinois court’s contrary 

conclusion is unreasonable. First, he argues that counsel 

failed to use available evidence, or failed to perform the necessary investigation to discover evidence, to impeach Martinez and Luna. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[C]ounsel has 

a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”). Second, he alleges his attorney was suffering from alcoholism during the trial. 

1. Procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims 

Snow did not specifically allege in the petition for leave to 

appeal that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed 

to call Officer Sanders to testify regarding Carlos Luna’s ability to describe Snow after the incident. Nor did the petition 

address whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call Officer Williams to testify regarding what he saw at the gas station on the night of the murder. 

There was no reason Snow could not have included both 

of these claims in his initial petition for leave to appeal. Issues 

not raised in the petition are not properly before the court and 

are considered forfeited. People v. Fitzpatrick, 986 N.E.2d 1163, 

1170 (Ill. 2013). The fact that an Illinois Supreme Court rule 

limits the number of pages in a petition for leave to appeal 
10 No. 17-1113 

does not excuse a petitioner from the requirement. Therefore, 

Snow cannot establish cause, and he does not allege that this 

court’s refusal to review these allegations will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. These claims, therefore, are 

defaulted, and we will not review their merits. 

Snow’s remaining ineffective assistance claims were 

properly raised in his first postconviction petition and first 

petition for leave to appeal, and the Illinois circuit court addressed the claims on their merit. These claims, discussed below, are not defaulted. 

2. Statements tending to impeach Martinez 

Snow argues that, had counsel properly investigated and 

questioned the state’s witnesses, Martinez’s testimony would 

have been impeached at trial. In his initial postconviction petition and subsequent petition for leave to appeal, Snow alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

statements made by Officer Pelo, by Dennis and William Hendricks, by Detective Crowe, and by Martinez himself. The Illinois appellate court rejected each of these claims. Therefore, 

these claims were not procedurally defaulted. The district 

court found that the Illinois court’s conclusion was based on 

the reasonable application of federal law. We agree. 

At trial, Officer Pelo testified that he did not see anyone 

leave the gas station, which contradicted Martinez’s account. 

On the night of the murder, however, Pelo told investigators 

specifically that he was looking back and forth between Martinez and the front of the station and that he did not see anyone else. Thus, Snow urges, if Pelo’s testimony is true, Martinez must be lying. Snow argues that this direct contradiction 
No. 17-1113 11

was not presented at trial and that it could have been if counsel had interviewed Pelo. It is undisputed that counsel did not 

interview Pelo. 

Snow also argues counsel should have presented the jury 

with testimony from Dennis and Williams Hendricks. In affidavits, the Hendrickses stated that Martinez said he knew 

Snow and that he did not see Snow at the crime scene. Both 

testified for Snow at trial, but counsel focused on eliciting testimony about another witness. Counsel acknowledged that 

they failed to lay the necessary foundation to use William to 

impeach Martinez. 

Moreover, Snow contends that counsel should have interviewed and called Detective Crowe to impeach Martinez’s 

credibility by explaining that Martinez actually identified 

other people, not Snow, in the initial lineup. 

Finally, Snow claims counsel should have discovered police reports that contain an interview with Martinez. The reports reveal that Martinez told detectives that the victim’s 

mother had been contacting him and that the police acknowledged that they gave Martinez’s phone number to the victim’s 

mother. This evidence could have been used to show how 

Martinez’s testimony had been influenced. 

Certainly, all of this evidence would have further impeached the credibility of one of only two eyewitnesses. Snow 

points out that much of this evidence was presented in his 

co-defendant’s trial and that his co-defendant was acquitted, 

but the role of Martinez’s testimony in that trial is unclear. 

Regardless, Snow cannot demonstrate that counsel’s failure to 

solicit any of this testimony was prejudicial. At trial, Martinez’s credibility was undermined. Snow’s counsel pointed 
12 No. 17-1113 

out the difference in Pelo’s testimony and Martinez’s account 

of what occurred at the gas station. And Martinez himself told 

the jury how he was not able to identify Snow immediately 

after the incident. One of the attorneys explained that it was 

his experience that continuing to introduce cumulative impeachment evidence could do more harm than good and that 

he believed Martinez’s credibility was sufficiently challenged. 

In light of the other evidence, it was reasonable for the state 

court to conclude that counsel’s failure to introduce this evidence did not affect the outcome of the case. Therefore, Snow 

is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

3. Counsel’s personal and professional problems 

Snow’s assertion that he was denied effective assistance of 

counsel based on Picl’s personal problems is easily dismissed. 

Frank Picl was disbarred in 2006 after he pleaded guilty to financial exploitation of an elderly person. According to testimony from Picl’s sentencing hearing, he suffered from alcoholism, mental illness, and a gambling addiction dating back 

at least as far as the time of Snow’s trial. However, Snow fails 

to allege any specific incident that occurred during the course 

of Picl’s representation of Snow. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 

(“It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors 

had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”); see also United States v. Jackson, 930 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 

(N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Alcoholism, or even alcohol or drug use during trial, does not necessarily constitute a per se violation of 

the Sixth Amendment absent some identifiable deficient performance resulting from the intoxication.”). The Illinois 

court’s determination that Picl’s personal problems, without 

more, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel is 
No. 17-1113 13

consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Snow is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

B. Brady v. Maryland Claims 

Snow’s habeas corpus petition also alleges that the state 

failed to disclose material evidence helpful to the defense. The 

failure to disclose such evidence is a violation of the accused’s 

due process rights. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) 

(“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable 

to an accused upon request violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). There 

is no difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for these purposes. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 

676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The 

state’s obligation under Brady turns on the cumulative effect 

of all evidence wrongly suppressed by the government. Kyles 

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421, 437–38 (1995). To be entitled to 

habeas corpus relief on this basis, Snow must demonstrate 

that the Illinois court’s decision is contrary to or involves an 

unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny. He has 

not. 

1. Brady claims raised in Snow’s first postconviction petition 

Snow claims the state should have disclosed deals made 

with several witnesses who, he claims, received leniency in 

their own criminal trials in exchange for their testimony. 

Snow’s initial postconviction petition and first petition for 

leave to appeal addressed whether the state has a duty to disclose deals made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony 

regardless of whether such information is publicly available. 
14 No. 17-1113 

The Illinois appellate concluded that no Brady violation occurred. Thus, these claims are not defaulted. 

For those witnesses who actually received a downward 

sentencing departure, all court documents regarding the witnesses’ sentences were publically available. It was reasonable 

for the state court to determine that no Brady violation occurred. See United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 747 (7th Cir. 

2015) (noting that documents were publicly available and 

concluding that the documents were not suppressed under 

Brady); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1170 (7th Cir. 

1996) (“[T]he government will not be found to have suppressed material information if that information also was 

available to a defendant through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence.”). 

Snow also claims the state should have disclosed evidence 

that it coached or coerced the testimony of Steven Scheel. This 

claim was also included in the initial petitions and not defaulted. At trial, Scheel testified that he had known Snow 

since childhood and that Snow told him that he had robbed 

the gas station and killed the attendant. An affidavit submitted by an investigator for Snow’s defense states that Scheel 

told investigators that he was threatened or coerced into testifying against Snow and that detectives tried to coach him on 

what to say. But, Scheel himself refused to sign an affidavit 

stating that the state had coerced his testimony, and many 

other witnesses testified that Snow made similar inculpatory 

statements. The Illinois appellate court reasonably applied 

Brady and other federal precedent and concluded that the evidence was not material. 
No. 17-1113 15

2. Brady claims raised in Snow’s successive postconviction petition 

Snow’s remaining Brady claims were raised for the first 

time in his successive postconviction petition. The Illinois 

court denied Snow leave to file this petition. The appellate 

court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal. Therefore, Snow subjected these 

claims to a full round of review in state court before seeking 

federal review. The state court’s decision, however, was based 

on Illinois state law. Generally, this court will not review a 

claim resolved by the state court on independent and adequate state law grounds. Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 373 

(7th Cir. 2009). Because Snow was denied leave to file his successive petition based on the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing 

Act, both parties assert that the claims were procedurally defaulted. 

The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act limits a petitioner to one petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f). Leave to file a successive petition is required and “may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the 

claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and 

prejudice results from that failure.” Id. The Illinois court 

found that Snow had demonstrated cause, but not prejudice. 

It is difficult to conclude that the state court’s decision was 

based entirely on independent and adequate state grounds. 

“[W]hen resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong 

of the court’s holding is not independent of federal law and 

[the federal court’s] jurisdiction is not precluded.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The Illinois court had to con-
16 No. 17-1113 

sider the merits of Snow’s Brady claims raised in the successive petition when determining whether Snow demonstrated 

prejudice. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) 

(“‘[C]ause and prejudice ... parallel two of the three components of the alleged Brady violation itself.’” (quoting Strickler 

v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999)). In concluding that Snow 

failed to demonstrate prejudice, the court noted that the 

claims failed the Brady materiality standard. 

Regardless of whether the claims are considered defaulted 

or are reviewed on their merits, Snow is not entitled to relief. 

Though he can show cause, he cannot demonstrate prejudice 

to avoid default, or materiality to succeed on the merits. See 

Banks, 540 U.S. at 691 (“[P]rejudice within the compass of the 

“cause and prejudice” requirement exists when the suppressed evidence is “material” for Brady purposes.”); see also 

People v. Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d 609, 621 (Ill. 2002) (explaining that the cause-and-prejudice test for filing successive postconviction petitions in Illinois mirrors the cause-and-prejudice test used by federal courts reviewing procedurally defaulted claims in habeas corpus proceedings). 

Snow’s successive petition included an affidavit from Ed 

Palumbo, one of the witnesses who testified that Snow made 

a statement indicating he committed the murder. In the affidavit, Palumbo claimed that he thought Snow was “bullshitting” when he made the inculpatory statement, that the prosecutor indicated that he did not think that Snow was guilty, 

and that he had been trying to get a “deal” in his own criminal 

proceedings. Because Palumbo failed to provide this testimony earlier, Snow had cause to include the evidence for the 

first time in his successive petition. The Illinois court specifically found Palumbo’s assertion regarding the prosecutor’s 
No. 17-1113 17

statement not credible. The only other information in the affidavit potentially in the custody of the state at the time of trial, 

and thus the only evidence that could have been suppressed 

by the state, was the fact that Palumbo was seeking a deal. 

And the impeachment value of this evidence was limited. Palumbo stated only that he sought a deal, not that he had received one. This evidence on its own would not have likely 

changed the outcome of the proceeding. 

The wife of another witness, Bruce Roland, also provided 

an affidavit stating that Roland was pressured by law enforcement to testify and that his testimony was false. Again, Snow 

did not have access to this testimony earlier and thus had 

cause to raise it for the first time in his successive petition. Roland’s incentive to testify, however, was explored at trial. He 

conceded that he did not report Snow’s inculpatory statement 

until he was charged with a DUI. So it is unlikely this evidence would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. 

Finally, Snow argues that prosecutors should have disclosed unredacted reports from polygraph tests of Martinez 

and Scheel. Polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible under Illinois law. People v. Jefferson, 705 N.E.2d 56, 62 (Ill. 1998). 

The federal circuits are split on whether a Brady claim can be 

based on inadmissible evidence. See United States v. Morales, 

746 F.3d 310, 314 (2014) (noting that the Seventh and Fourth 

Circuits have held that suppressed evidence must be admissible to trigger a Brady analysis, whereas the First, Second, 

Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held the opposite). 

Under either standard, however, Snow’s claim fails. The 

newly discovered notes from Martinez’s test were vague and, 

if anything, repetitive of the fact that Martinez did not initially 

identify Snow. The notes from Scheel’s test indicate that he 
18 No. 17-1113 

was not being truthful when he said Snow confessed to the 

murder. Even if Scheel could have been impeached with this 

evidence, it is unlikely that this evidence on its own would 

have changed the outcome of the case. 

But our analysis does not end with the conclusion that no 

singular piece of suppressed evidence is material on its own. 

The evidence must be considered cumulatively. Kyles, 514 

U.S. at 436–37. When all of the evidence is considered cumulatively, Snow has not proven a Brady violation. 

The jury heard testimony from many witnesses in this 

case. Two of those witnesses testified regarding the person 

they saw exit the Clark gas station around the time the silent 

alarm was triggered. The jury also heard from Officer Pelo, 

who arrived first at the scene. Defense counsel highlighted the 

discrepancies in the testimony of Pelo and the witnesses, and 

the state explained how it thought the accounts corroborated 

each other. 

Twelve witnesses testified that Snow at some time made 

an inculpatory statement to them or in their presence. Snow 

denied making any of these statements, and his counsel presented evidence that many of these witnesses had criminal 

histories and selfish reasons for testifying. It was for the jury 

to determine which of these witnesses were credible. 

The only alibi witnesses presented by the defense were 

Snow and his wife, Tammy. Both testified that they were 

home together the entire night of the murder. Tammy testified to the grand jury, however, that it was possible Snow left 

at some point that evening. The trial jury was informed of her 

grand jury testimony. 
No. 17-1113 19

Furthermore, the state introduced the testimony of law enforcement officers who recounted how Snow hid in the insulation in his sister’s attic for five hours when police came to 

arrest him. Officers also testified that Snow repeatedly asked 

about the Little homicide investigation and inquired whether 

he could receive any leniency in exchange for information he 

had about the murder. Other officers testified that Snow presented false identification and then fled when they tried to arrest him in Ohio in 1999. 

Taking all of this together, there is no reasonable likelihood that the disclosure of the contested evidence would 

have changed the outcome of the case. 

III. CONCLUSION

The Illinois appellate court reasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington and Brady v. Maryland

when reviewing Snow’s non-defaulted claims. Even if those 

claims raised for the first time in Snow’s successive petition 

were not procedurally defaulted and even when considering 

all of the evidence cumulatively, Snow has failed to sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional violation. Therefore, we 

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Snow’s petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.