JOSEPH MATURO, JR. v. STATE EMPLOYEES

RETIREMENT COMMISSION

(SC 19831)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.*

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 7-438 [b]), if a member of the municipal employees’

retirement system who is retired and has begun to collect a pension,

again accepts employment from the same municipality from which he

was retired, he shall be eligible to participate, and shall be entitled to

credit, in the municipal employees retirement system for the period of

such municipal employment, provided such member shall not receive

his retirement allowance while so employed, except under certain specified circumstances.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court upholding the

declaratory ruling of the defendant retirement commission and dismissing his administrative appeal. The plaintiff retired from his position as

a firefighter with the town of East Haven in 1991 and was awarded a

disability pension through his membership in the municipal employees

retirement system, which is governed by the Municipal Employees’

Retirement Act (§ 7-425 et seq.). From 1997 to 2007, the plaintiff served

as the elected mayor of East Haven, a full-time, salaried position that

the town had not designated for participation in the retirement system.

During his tenure as mayor, the plaintiff continued to receive his disability pension, as it was the policy of the commission at that time that a

member could continue to collect a pension while reemployed by a

participating municipality, provided the member was reemployed in a

nonparticipating position. In 2010, the retirement services division of the

Office of the State Comptroller, which jointly administers the retirement

system with the commission, informed the plaintiff that the commission’s prior interpretation of the act was erroneous, and that, pursuant

to § 7-438 (b), he no longer would be eligible to collect a disability

retirement benefit if he were to be employed in any paid position with

the town. When the plaintiff was again elected to the position of mayor

of East Haven in 2011, the retirement services division suspended the

plaintiff’s pension. The plaintiff then appealed to the commission, which

issued a declaratory ruling denying reinstatement of the plaintiff’s pension. On appeal to the trial court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that

the decision of the commission was inconsistent with the statute (§ 7-

432) that authorizes disability pensions because there had been no determination by a medical examining board that he was no longer disabled

before his pension was suspended, and further claimed that he had

relied to his detriment on the agencies’ priorinterpretation of the act. The

trial court affirmed the commission’s decision and rendered judgment

dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed. Held:

1. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal from the decision

of the commission, the plain language of § 7-438 (b) having barred the

plaintiff from continuing to collect a disability pension while serving as

the mayor of East Haven: the plaintiff’s claim that the act could be

interpreted to exclude elective officers as employees, and that, as mayor,

he was not an employee of the town as that term is used in § 7-438 (b),

was unavailing, as that interpretation would deprive elective officers

who are members of the retirement system from many of the rights and

benefits that other members enjoy, and, in the absence of any apparent

rationale for such a scheme or a clear statement of legislative intent,

this court declined to adopt the interpretation urged by the plaintiff,

which would achieve a bizarre outcome.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that § 7-438 (b), when read

as a whole and in light of the underlying policy rationales, evidenced a

legislative intent to preclude a member of the retirement system from

receiving a retirement pension only while reemployed in a participating

position, and that, because he returned to work in a nonparticipating

position, he was entitled to continue collecting his disability pension;

notwithstanding the provision in § 7-438 (b) that a member ‘‘shall be
eligible to participate, and shall be entitled to credit,’’ in the retirement

system, a member of the retirement system, such as the plaintiff, who

is reemployed in a nonparticipating position is not eligible to participate

in the retirement system while so employed, and § 7-438 (b) reasonably

may be understood to embody a legislative judgment that a participating

municipality should not have to contribute additional funds to a member’s retirement pension while at the same time paying the member’s

salary.

3. There was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that the commission and the

trial court improperly interpreted § 7-438 (b) in isolation and did not

consider its relationship to § 7-432 (g), which precludes the medical

examining board from reconsidering eligibility for a disability pension

unless additional facts concerning the member’s condition are disclosed:

subsection (g) was not added to § 7-432 until 2013, approximately two

years after the retirement services division suspended the plaintiff’s

pension, and § 7-432 previously did not reference the medical examining

board but, instead, delegated broad authority to the commission to

determine a member’s ongoing eligibility for a disability pension.

4. This court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s claim that the commission

was bound by, or should have adhered to, its prior interpretation of § 7-

438 (b) that permitted elective officials to retain their pensions while

reemployed by participating municipalities in light of the fact that the

legislature effectively acquiesced in that prior interpretation when it

failed to amend the act, and the fact that the attorney general issued a

nonbinding opinion letter counseling the commission not to deviate from

its prior interpretation in the absence of further legislative direction: the

evidence for legislative acquiescence in the commission’s prior interpretation of the act was inconclusive and did not compel this court to

depart from the plain meaning of the statutory text, and the legislature’s

failure to address the commission’s revised interpretation when the

legislature amended § 7-438 in 2011 tended to demonstrate acquiescence

in the revised interpretation; moreover, the plaintiff’s claim that the

attorney general’s opinion that the legislature had acquiesced in the

commission’s prior interpretation and that the revised interpretation

might upset retirees’ settled expectations was unconvincing, as an

administrative agency, such as the commission, that discovers that it

has been applying an erroneous interpretation of a statute is obliged,

after giving fair notice to affected persons, to conform its policy to the

correct interpretation, particularly in light of the provision (§ 7-439h)

in the act thatrequires the commission to correct any erroneous overpayment of benefits.

Argued March 30—officially released July 11, 2017

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant determining that the plaintiff was ineligible to receive certain

pension benefits, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court,

Schuman, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from

which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Lawrence C. Sgrignari, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael J. Rose, with whom was Cindy M. Cieslak,

for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ESPINOSA, J. The plaintiff, Joseph Maturo, Jr.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court upholding

the declaratory ruling of the defendant, the State

Employees Retirement Commission, and dismissing his

administrative appeal. The plaintiff retired in 1991 from

his position as a firefighter with the town of East Haven

and was awarded a disability pension through his membership in the municipal employees retirement system

(retirement system). He subsequently was elected to

the position of mayor of East Haven in 1997, and served

in that capacity until 2007, when he lost his reelection

bid. During that time, the commission and the retirement services division of the Office of the State Comptroller (collectively, the agencies), which jointly

administer the retirement system,1

interpreted the

Municipal Employees’ Retirement Act (act), General

Statutes § 7-425 et seq., to provide that a retired member, who is reemployed by a municipality that participates in the retirement system, may continue to receive

a retirement pension if he or she is reemployed in a

position, such as the mayor of East Haven, that the

municipality has not designated for participation in the

system (nonparticipating position). In 2009, however,

the agencies concluded that they had misconstrued the

act in this regard and that a retiree cannot continue to

collect a pension while reemployed in any full-time

position with a participating municipality. Accordingly,

when the plaintiff was again elected mayor in 2011, the

retirement services division suspended2 his pension, a

decision that both the commission and the trial court,

Schuman, J., subsequently affirmed. On appeal, the

plaintiff’s primary contention is that the agencies

improperly construed the reemployment and disability

pension provisions of the act,3 and that he is not barred

from receiving a disability pension while serving as the

mayor of East Haven. The plaintiff also challenges the

trial court’s conclusions that he did not rely to his detriment on the agencies’ previous interpretation of the act

and that the commission did not violate his rights to

equal protection and due process of law. Finding no

error, we affirm.

I

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts and procedural history, as found

by the commission and supplemented by the undisputed

evidence of record, are relevant to our disposition of

the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff served as a firefighter

for the town of East Haven from 1973 to 1991, during

which time he participated as a member of the retirement system. In September, 1991, the town separated

the plaintiff from service on the basis of a ‘‘serviceconnected’’ disability. In a January, 1992 letter, the commission approved his application for early retirement,
but informed him that his retirement payments would

be suspended if he again accepted employment with

the town. In 1993, after the medical examining board

confirmed the plaintiff’s disability, the commission

approved his ‘‘service-connected disability retirement,’’

retroactive to October, 1991. A March, 1993 letter from

the commission again advised the plaintiff as to the

retirement system’s reemployment rules, stating that

‘‘[his] eligibility for a disability retirement [pension] is

contingent on [his] being permanently and totally disabled from performing any gainful employment in the

service of [his] former employer [and that he] may not

accept reemployment with that municipality.’’

In 1997,the plaintiff was elected to the office of mayor

of the town of East Haven. At all times relevant to this

case, although the town participated in the retirement

system, it did not designate the office of mayor as a

participating position. The plaintiff served as mayor

from 1997 until 2007, when he lost a reelection bid.

During that time, in spite of the warnings contained in

the January, 1992 and March, 1993 letters, it was the

policy of the agencies that a member could continue

to collect a pension while reemployed by a participating

municipality, so long as the member was reemployed

in a nonparticipating position. Accordingly, during his

initial ten years as mayor, the plaintiff received a salary

from the town and also continued to collect his disability retirement pension.

In June, 2010, in response to information that the

plaintiff was again considering running for elective

office, Helen M. Kemp, the assistant director and counsel of the retirement services division, wrote to advise

him that the commission’s prior interpretation of the

act was erroneous and that in the future he would not

be eligible to collect a disability retirement benefit while

employed in any paid position for the town. In a followup letter, Mark E. Ojakian, the deputy state comptroller

and acting director of the retirement services division,

explained that, in 2009, the retirement services division

had adopted and begun informing members of this

revised interpretation of the act. Despite these warnings, in November, 2011, the plaintiff again campaigned

and won the election for the position of mayor of

East Haven.

Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff received a letter from

Kimberly McAdam, a retirement system supervisor,

informing him that he was no longer considered to be

disabled under the act because ‘‘[t]he fact that [he is]

performing the duties of [mayor] indicates that [he is]

neither permanently nor totally disabled from engaging

in gainful employment in the service of the municipality.’’ The letter notified the plaintiff that his pension

would be ‘‘stopped’’ as of November 19, 2011. In that

same time period, the commission sent letters to all

disability retirees informing them that they could not
collect a disability retirement pension while working

for the same municipality from which they had retired,

even in a nonparticipating position.

The retirement services division subsequently

declined the plaintiff’s request to reconsider its decision. The plaintiff then appealed to the commission,

which, following what the trial court characterized as ‘‘a

long and somewhat complicated administrative review

process,’’ ultimately issued a declaratory ruling denying

reinstatement of the plaintiff’s retirement pension.

The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court.

While proceedings in that court were pending, the General Assembly considered—for the second time in three

years—legislation that would have expressly allowed

the plaintiff and similarly situated members of the

retirement system to continue to collectretirement pensions while reemployed by a participating municipality

in a nonparticipating position. See Public Acts 2015,

No. 15-188 (P.A. 15-188); Public Acts 2013, No. 13-219

(P.A. 13-219). The legislature unanimously passed each

bill but Governor Dannel P. Malloy vetoed each one,

and the legislature did not attempt to override the

vetoes. See 2 Conn. Public and Special Acts 1478 (2015);

2a Conn. Public and Special Acts 2230 (2013).

The plaintiff made four primary claims before the

trial court. First, he argued that the decision of the

commission upholding the suspension of his disability

pension while he is employed as the mayor of East

Haven was inconsistent with various provisions of the

act. Specifically, he argued that (1) General Statutes

§ 7-432, which authorizes disability pensions, does not

allow the retirement services division to suspend a

member’s pension unless the commission’s medical

examining board first finds that the memberis no longer

disabled pursuant to § 7-432 (g), and (2) the provision

on which the retirement services division relied in suspending his pension, General Statutes § 7-438 (b), which

prohibits members of the retirement system from

receiving a retirement pension while reemployed by a

participating municipality, does not apply to former

members who return to work in nonparticipating

positions.

In its memorandum of decision, the trial court found

the first argument to be without merit because, although

the retirement services division initially had informed

the plaintiff that his disability pension was being terminated because his reemployment with East Haven was

prima facie proof that he no longer was disabled, the

commission itself did not rely on the premise that the

plaintiff no longer was disabled.Rather, the commission

determined that § 7-438 (b) applies to both disability

and ordinary retirements and bars members from collecting either type of pension while reemployed by a

participating municipality. The trial court found the

plaintiff’s second statutory argument to be so incompre-
hensible as to be effectively abandoned. Nevertheless,

the court did attempt to parse and evaluate the argument, which, it concluded, lacked any support in the

text of the relevant statutes.4

Second, the plaintiff claimed that it was improper for

the agencies, after years of construing the act to allow

the plaintiff and others similarly situated to retain their

retirement pension when returning to work in a nonparticipating position, to adopt a new, contrary interpretation of the law. He specifically argued that (1) he had

reasonably relied to his detriment on the agencies’ pre2009 interpretation of the act and on a September 30,

2011 letter in which the retirement services division

director, Brenda Halpin, advised him to take no action

with respect to his current employment status until the

retirement services division completed an administrative review of the issue, and (2) the commission should

have abided by the advice of Attorney General George

C. Jepsen, who counseled in a November 2, 2012 opinion

letter (Jepsen opinion) that the commission not deviate

from its pre-2009 interpretation of the act in the absence

of further legislative direction.

In rejecting the plaintiff’s detrimental reliance claim,

the trial court noted that the law disfavors claims of

estoppel against government entities, which ‘‘may be

invoked: (1) only with great caution; (2) only when the

action in question has been induced by an agent having

authority in such matters; and (3) only when special

circumstances make it highly inequitable or oppressive

not to estop the agency.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 268–69,

690 A.2d 368 (1997). In the present case, the court determined that that standard was not satisfied because the

retirement services division had notified the plaintiff

that its prior interpretation of the act was erroneous

and that, henceforth, he would not be permitted to

receive a disability benefit while employed in any paid

position with the town. In addition to concluding that

the plaintiff’s ongoing reliance on the retirement services division’s past interpretation of the act was unreasonable, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed

to demonstrate that his reliance thereon had caused

him any detriment. Rather, the court found that the

plaintiff’s erroneous receipt of a retirement pension

during his previous ten year tenure as mayor had been

a ‘‘windfall.’’ The court further noted that the Jepsen

opinion constituted nonbinding authority and that the

opinion was unpersuasive insofar as it did not purport

to analyze the statutes at issue or identify any defects

in the commission’s revised interpretation of the act.

As a general matter, the court rejected as untenable

the principle that a government agency must continue

to adhere to an erroneous interpretation of a statute

even when, having discovered its error, it provides fair

notice to affected persons that it will change its policy

in light of the revised interpretation.
Third, the plaintiff claimed that the commission

treated him differently from other, similarly situated

persons and thereby denied him equal protection of the

law, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. At trial, the plaintiff was unable to identify any

other members who had been permitted to retain their

retirement pensions after returning to work for participating municipalities.5 Still, the plaintiff, a Republican,

alleged that he had been singled out on the basis of his

political affiliation insofar as the agencies (1) sent him

an unsolicited letter in 2010, warning him that if he

were again elected mayor, his pension would be suspended, (2) closely monitored the results of the East

Haven mayoral election, (3) gave a Democrat, the registrar of voters for the town of East Haven, the express

choice either to resign from his employment or to have

his pension suspended, whereas the plaintiff’s pension

was simply suspended a few days after he was sworn

into office, and (4) initially permitted another Democratic municipal retiree to retain her pension while

reemployed, before ultimately reversing that decision.

The plaintiff also introduced testimony by a Republican

state senator suggesting thatlegislative efforts to amend

§ 7-438 (b) in 2013, to allow persons in the plaintiff’s

position to retain their pensions while reemployed had

been delayed by certain legislators, presumably Democrats, who did not want to help the plaintiff.

The trial court found that the plaintiff also had abandoned this claim by inadequate briefing, insofar as he

had failed to allege that any selective treatment was

based on impermissible considerations or membership

in a protected class. In the alternative, the courtrejected

the equal protection claim on the merits, finding that

the commission had informed all disability pension

recipients that they could not collect their pensions

while working for the same municipality for which they

had previously worked, even in a nonparticipating position. The court further concluded that the aforementioned factual allegations did not constitute selective

treatment vis-a-vis other, similarly situated persons.

Fourth, the plaintiff claimed that the commission’s

decision to provide him with an informal rather than a

formal hearing violated both the governing statutes and

his right to procedural due process. The trial court,

in rejecting this claim, determined that the relevant

procedural statutes did not require the commission to

hold a formal hearing and that the requirements of due

process had been satisfied.

Consistent with these determinations, the trial court

affirmed the commission’s decision and dismissed the

plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, raising

claims substantially similar to those he raised before

the trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this

court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and
Practice Book § 65-1. Additional facts will be set forth

as necessary.

II

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff’s primary argument on appeal is that the

trial court misinterpreted the reemployment provisions

of the act and that § 7-438 (b), when construed in the

context of the overall statutory scheme, permits him

to continue collecting a disability pension while

employed by a participating municipality in a nonparticipating position. The commission disagrees, arguing

that the plain language of § 7-438 (b) bars this sort of

double recovery. We agree with the commission.

A

We begin our analysis of the plaintiff’s claim by setting forth the well established standards that govern

judicialreview of an agency decision under the Uniform

Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. ‘‘Under the UAPA, it is [not] the

function . . . of this court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.

. . . Even for conclusions of law, [t]he court’s ultimate

duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence,

the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must

stand if the court determines that they resulted from a

correct application of the law to the facts found and

could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.

. . . [Although] this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative

agency empowered by law to carry out the statute’s

purposes . . . [c]ases that present pure questions of

law . . . invoke a broader standard of review . . . .

[W]hen a state agency’s determination of a question of

law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny

. . . the agency is not entitled to special deference.

. . . Even if [an agency’s interpretation of a statute

has been] time-tested, we will defer to [it] only if it is

reasonable . . . [as] determined by [application of] our

established rules of statutory construction.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Lieberman v. Aronow, 319

Conn. 748, 755–56, 127 A.3d 970 (2015). No deference

is warranted when an agency’s construction of a statute

has been inconsistent or is only of ‘‘recent vintage.’’

Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 194 Conn.

165, 174, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984).

B

In order to evaluate the plaintiff’s claims, we first

must describe in some detail the statutory framework

that establishes and governs the retirement system.

That framework is codified at § 7-425 et seq., which, as

previously noted, we have referred to as the Municipal

Employees’ Retirement Act. See Lambert v. Bridgeport,
204 Conn. 563, 566, 529 A.2d 184 (1987).

Section 7-425 defines key words and phrases used in

the act. That section defines a ‘‘ ‘[m]ember’ ’’ of the

retirement system as, among other things, ‘‘any regular

employee or elective officer receiving pay from a participating municipality . . . who has been included by

such municipality in the pension plan as provided in

[§] 7-427 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-425 (5). ‘‘ ‘Pay’ ’’

is defined in relevant part as ‘‘the salary, wages or earnings of an employee . . . .’’ General Statutes § 7-425

(6). The terms ‘‘employee,’’ ‘‘employed,’’ and ‘‘employment’’ are not defined in the act.

General Statutes § 7-427 (a) authorizes each municipality to opt into the retirement system with respect

to any department or departments that it chooses to

designate for participation. Section 7-427 (a) also permits municipalities to decide whether to allow their

elective officers to participate in the system.

General Statutes § 7-428 provides that any member

shall be eligible for retirement and to receive a retirement pension upon either completing twenty-five years

of aggregate service in a participating municipality or

upon reaching the age of fifty-five and having completed

five years of continuous service orfifteen years of aggregate service in a participating municipality. General

Statutes § 7-429 further provides that an elective officer

participating in the retirement system who is separated

from service, except for cause or by resignation, after

attaining the age of sixty and after completing at least

twenty years of continuous service, shall be entitled

to a retirement pension ‘‘upon reaching the voluntary

retirement age . . . .’’6

Section 7-432 authorizes and establishes the standards governing disability retirements. At the time the

plaintiff’s retirement pension was suspended in November, 2011, that section provided in relevant part: ‘‘Any

member shall be eligible for retirement and for a retirement allowance who has completed at least ten years

of continuous service if he becomes permanently and

totally disabled from engaging in any gainful employment in the service of the municipality. For purposes

of this section, ‘gainful employment’ shall not include

a position in which a member customarily works less

than twenty hours per week. If such disability is shown

to the satisfaction of the Retirement Commission to

have arisen out of and in the course of his employment

by the municipality, as defined by the Workers’ Compensation Act, [General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.] he

shall be eligible for retirement irrespective of the duration of his employment. Such retirement allowance

shall continue during the period of such disability. The

existence and continuance of disability shall be determined by the Retirement Commission upon such medical evidence and other investigation as it requires. . . .’’

General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 7-432, as amended by
Public Acts 2011, No. 11-251, § 2.

General Statutes § 7-434a addresses the situation in

which a member is elected to serve as an official of the

state or any political subdivision thereof. Section 7-434a

provides that such member may continue his or her

membership in the system for up to ten years while

serving in elective office, during which time the member

must continue to make contributions to the system.

Finally, § 7-438 establishes the rules that govern a

member who, having retired and begun to collect a

retirement pension, again accepts public employment

in the state. That statute provides as follows: ‘‘(a) Any

member retired under this part who again accepts

employment from this state or from any municipality

of this state other than a participating municipality,

shall continue to receive his retirement allowance while

so employed, and shall be eligible to participate, and

shall be entitled to credit, in the state retirement system

for the period of such state employment, but any such

member shall not be eligible to participate or be entitled

to credit in any municipal retirement system for the

period of such municipal employment.

‘‘(b) If a member is retired under this part and again

accepts employment from the same municipality from

which he was retired or any other participating municipality, he shall be eligible to participate, and shall be

entitled to credit, in the municipal employees’ retirement system for the period of such municipal employment. Such member shall receive no retirement

allowance while so employed except if (1) such

employment is for less than twenty hours per week,

or (2) his services are rendered for not more than ninety

working days in any one calendar year, provided that

any member reemployed for a period of more than

ninety working days in one calendar year shall reimburse the Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund for

retirement income payments received during such

ninety working days.’’7

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 7-438.

C

It was the conclusion of both the agencies and the

trial court that the plaintiff’s case represents a straightforward application of § 7-438 (b). The plaintiff was a

member of the retirement system who, having retired

pursuant to § 7-432, again accepted employment from

East Haven, a participating municipality. Because § 7-

438 (b) provides that ‘‘[s]uch member shall receive no

retirement allowance while so employed,’’ the commission determined, and the court agreed, that the retirement services division did not act improperly in

suspending his retirement pension during his tenure

in office.

On appeal, the plaintiff identifies what he considers

to be four flaws in the commission’s statutory analysis.
First, the plaintiff contends that his position as the

mayor of East Haven does not constitute ‘‘employment’’

and that he is not an ‘‘employee’’ of that town for purposes of the act and, therefore, that § 7-438 (b) does

not apply to his case. Second, he contends that § 7-438,

when read as a whole, reveals a legislative intent to

preclude a member from continuing to receive a retirement pension only while reemployed in a participating

position. Third, the plaintiff contends that his case is

governed by the disability provisions of the act as well

as by its reemployment provisions and that, pursuant to

§ 7-432, his disability retirement could be discontinued

only if the commission’s medical examining board

determined on the basis of additional medical evidence

that he was no longer entitled to receive a disability

benefit. Fourth, he contends that the commission is

bound by, or should adhere to, its pre-2009 interpretation of the statute, in which the legislature allegedly

acquiesced. We consider each argument in turn.

1

The plaintiff’s first contention is that § 7-438 (b) does

not govern his case because that subsection applies

only to retired members who again accept employment

from a participating municipality, and that the statute

precludes members from receiving a retirement pension

only while so employed. He avers that he is not

employed by East Haven, as that term is used in the

statute, notwithstanding that he receives a salary to

serve as the town’s full-time mayor.

When a term is not defined in a statute, we begin

with the assumption that the legislature intended the

word to carry its ordinary meaning, as evidenced in

dictionaries in print at the time the statute was enacted.

State v. Wright, 320 Conn. 781, 802, 135 A.3d 1 (2016);

State v. Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 866, 110 A.3d 410

(2015). Although the earliest version of the predecessor

statute to § 7-438 used the term ‘‘appointment’’ rather

than ‘‘employment,’’ that statute did provide that a

retired member who is reemployed by a municipality

‘‘shall receive no retirement allowance while so

employed.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Supp.

1945) § 128h.8 At the time § 128h was drafted, the word

‘‘employed’’ meant ‘‘[e]ngaged by an employer,’’ and an

‘‘employee’’ was defined as ‘‘[o]ne employed by another;

one who works for wages or salary in the service of

an employer . . . .’’ Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed. 1941). The plaintiff cannot and does not

seriously contend that his full-time, salaried work as the

mayor of East Haven does not qualify as employment, as

that term ordinarily has been used.

Instead, the plaintiff argues that the words

‘‘employee,’’ ‘‘employed,’’ and ‘‘employment’’ are statutory terms of art that have a particular meaning in the

context of the act. He notes, for example, that § 7-425

(5) defines a ‘‘ ‘[m]ember’ ’’ of the retirement system as
‘‘any regular employee or elective officer,’’ which, he

contends, evinces a legislative intent to distinguish officers such as himself from employees. He further notes

that § 7-425 (6) defines ‘‘ ‘[p]ay’ ’’ as ‘‘the salary, wages

or earnings of an employee,’’ and finds meaningful the

fact that that provision makes no mention of elective

officers.9

The plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish between municipal employees and elective officers, while valiant, are

unavailing. We begin by observing that § 7-425 (5)

defines a member of the retirement system as ‘‘any

regular employee or elective officer . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) If the statute had been written solely in terms of

‘‘employee or elective officer,’’ the plaintiff’s argument

might be more convincing. But the legislature’s use of

the adjective ‘‘regular’’ to modify ‘‘employee’’ strongly

suggests that, for purposes of the retirement system

scheme, there are two classes of employees, namely,

elective officers and other, regular employees. See

Dautel v. United Pacific Ins. Cos., 48 Wn. App. 759,

766–67, 740 P.2d 894 (1987) (discussing comparable use

of term ‘‘regular’’). Thus, we do not read § 7-425 to

foreclose the possibility that elective officers are merely

a subset of all employees for purposes of the act.

This interpretation is consistent with the fact that

many provisions of the act refer only to ‘‘employees’’

or related cognate terms; specific mention of elective

officers is made only in particular instances when distinct treatment is warranted. Compare, e.g., General

Statutes § 7-425 (6) (‘‘‘[p]ay’ means the salary, wages

or earnings of an employee’’), General Statutes § 7-428

(establishing voluntary retirement standards for

employees), General Statutes § 7-437 (setting forth conditions under which employees’ retirement pensions

must be increased in conjunction with Social Security

benefits), and General Statutes § 7-442a (using terms

‘‘member’’ and ‘‘employee’’ interchangeably), with General Statutes § 7-427 (a) (giving municipalities option

whether to designate elective officers for participation

in retirement system), and General Statutes § 7-430

(exempting elective officers from mandatory retirement rules).

It bears emphasizing in this regard that many provisions of the act that afford rights or benefits to members

of the retirement system use only the terms ‘‘employees’’ or persons ‘‘employed’’ by a municipality, and do

not mention elective officers. See, e.g., General Statutes

§ 7-431 (establishing retirement eligibility for members

separated from service by employing municipality

before voluntary retirement age); General Statutes § 7-

434 (providing continuity of service benefit for full-time

employees); General Statutes § 7-436 (b)(providing that

employees and their surviving spouses are entitled to

additional cost of living allowance); General Statutes

§ 7-436b (crediting military service prior to member’s
date of employment); General Statutes § 7-442b

(allowing employees to transfer retirement funds from

state or other municipal retirement systems); General

Statutes § 7-449 (providing that retirement pensions

granted to members formerly employed by municipality

shall not be affected by repeal of act); General Statutes

§ 7-459b (allowing members to participate in deferred

retirement option plan adopted by municipality that

employs them). If we were to accept the plaintiff’s interpretation of the act and conclude that the term

‘‘employee’’ excludes elective officers, then elective

officers who are members of the retirement system

would be deprived of many of the rights and benefits

that other members enjoy. In the absence of any apparent rationale for such a scheme or a clear statement of

legislative intent, we decline to adopt an interpretation

of the law that would achieve such a bizarre outcome.

See Levey Miller Maretz v. 595 Corporate Circle, 258

Conn. 121, 133, 780 A.2d 43 (2001).

Particularly fatal to the plaintiff’s theory are those

sections of the act that appearto equate elective officers

with municipal employees or imply that the former as

well as the latter can be ‘‘employed’’ for purposes of

the retirement system. Section 7-429, for example, provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]f any member of a participating municipality who is an elective officer is

separated from the service of the municipality by which

he is employed . . . he shall be entitled to a retirement

allowance . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

Finally, we note that the original version of the reemployment statute barred retired members from collecting a pension while reemployed in any state or

municipal position, but expressly exempted elective

officers from that prohibition. See General Statutes

(1949 Rev.) § 892. The 1973 amendments to the statute

eliminated the carve-outfor elective officers, suggesting

that the legislature intended that they would be treated

the same as other public employees with respect to

reemployment. See Public Acts 1973, No. 73-519. For

all of these reasons, we reject the plaintiff’s argument

that, by accepting the position of mayor of East Haven,

he did not accept employment for purposes of § 7-

438 (b).10

2

The plaintiff’s second statutory argument is that § 7-

438, when read as a whole and in light of the underlying

policy rationales, evidences a legislative intent to preclude a member from receiving a retirement pension

only while reemployed in a participating position. The

argument, which is the plaintiff’s strongest, is as follows. Section 7-438 envisions two paths by which a

retired member may return to full-time public employment.11 First, a member may be employed by the state

or by a municipality that does not participate in the

retirement system. Under those circumstances, § 7-438
(a) provides that the member can continue to collect

his or her retirement pension, but will not be eligible to

earn credit in any other municipality’s own retirement

system.12 Second, the member can return to service in

the same municipality from which he or she retired,

or in another participating municipality. Under those

circumstances, § 7-438 (b) provides that the member

shall receive no retirement pension while so employed,

but shall be eligible to participate and be entitled to

additional credit in the retirement system. This scheme,

the plaintiff contends, is predicated on the assumption

that, at any particular time, a retired member will be

entitled either to earn additional retirement credit,

while reemployed by a participating municipality, or to

collect a retirement pension, while not so employed.

The member cannot simultaneously earn and collect,

but the statute does not envision a scenario in which

a retired member can neither collect a pension nor earn

new credits. But that is precisely the plaintiff’s situation,

because, although he returned to work in a participating

municipality, he did so in a nonparticipating position.

The nub of his argument, then, is that the legislature did

not intend that retired members who return to public

service would have the worst of both worlds in this

regard.

The key to the plaintiff’s argument is the provision

in § 7-438 (b) that a member who is reemployed by a

participating municipality ‘‘shall be eligible to participate, and shall be entitled to credit, in the municipal

employees’ retirement system’’ (eligibility clause).

Despite this provision, the parties agree that a member,

such as the plaintiff, who accepts a nonparticipating

position in a participating municipality is not in fact

eligible to participate in the retirement system while

so employed. But see footnote 15 of this opinion. In

the face of this apparent contradiction, the commission

essentially concedes that the eligibility clause either

was inartfully drafted or suggests that the legislature

failed to anticipate the type of scenario at issue in

this case.

The conundrum we face, then, is that, under the circumstances of the present case, it seems that we must

disregard either the eligibility clause, which allows

members such as the plaintiff to participate in the retirement system, or the second sentence of § 7-438 (b),

which bars such members from collecting a pension

while so employed. The commission invites us to

choose the former path, the plaintiff the latter. For

several reasons, we find the commission’s approach to

be more sensible.

First, the commission offers a more plausible account

of how all the different provisions of § 7-438 (b) can

be given effect. See Southern New England Telephone

Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 274 Conn. 119,

129–30, 874 A.2d 776 (2005) (statute should be con-
strued so as to give effect to every provision). As we

already have discussed, the plaintiff’s solution to this

conundrum—the theory that § 7-438 (b) simply does

not apply to elective officers—is unconvincing. See part

II C 1 of this opinion. The plaintiff also does not address

the problem of nonofficer retirees who return to work

in nonparticipating departments of participating municipalities. Various provisions of the act recognize that

a participating municipality may choose to designate

certain of its departments as nonparticipating; see, e.g.,

General Statutes §§ 7-427 (a), 7-436a (b), 7-437 and 7-

442a; and we are not free to assume that the legislature

simply overlooked this possibility when drafting § 7-

438 (b). See Southern New England Telephone Co. v.

Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 129 (‘‘[w]e presume that the legislature is aware of existing statutes

when enacting new ones’’).13

The commission, by contrast, offers a plausible

account of how all the various provisions of the statute

can be given effect. Specifically, the commission submits that the eligibility clause reasonably may be understood to mean that a retired member is entitled to earn

additional retirement credits so long as he or she is

reemployed in a position for which such credits are

available.

14

Alternatively, it may well be that the legislature meant

exactly what it said, and that retired members such as

the plaintiff are eligible to earn additional credits in the

retirement system even while reemployed in nonparticipating positions. Although a municipality may opt not to

designate its elective officers as participating positions;

see General Statutes § 7-427 (a); other provisions of the

act nevertheless allow for continued participation by

members who leave their positions to work in nonparticipating governmental positions. Most notably, § 7-

434a provides that any member who is elected to serve

as an officer of the state or a subdivision thereof may

elect to remain in the system and continue to make

contributions for up to ten years.15 See also General

Statutes § 7-434 (granting credit for intervening military service).

Second, we are not persuaded that the plaintiff is

correct in his assessment of the policy rationales that

underlie § 7-438 and, specifically, that the statute

embodies a legislative intent that all retired members

should be able either to collect a pension or to earn

additional retirement credits. On the one hand, the statute allows for certain instances of what the trial court

referred to as ‘‘double dipping.’’ For example, § 7-438

(a) permits a retired member to continue to collect a

municipal retirement pension while also participating

in the state employees’ retirement system. On the other

hand, it is not clear that a retired member should be

allowed to receive a retirement pension while also earning a salary from a participating municipality. In 2013
and 2015, Governor Malloy vetoed amendments to the

act that would have expressly permitted members who

are reemployed in nonparticipating municipal positions

to continue to collect a retirement pension. See P.A. 15-

188; P.A. 13-219. In his 2015 veto message, the governor

articulated a countervailing policy rationale: ‘‘I believe

this bill would impose an undue burden on municipalities and is inconsistent with the purpose of the municipal retirement system, which is intended to provide

assistance to our retirees and not current employees.’’

2 Conn. Public and Special Acts 1478 (2015). In other

words, although it may seem unfair from the member’s

standpoint that he can neither receive a pension nor

earn additional credits while reemployed in a nonparticipating position, § 7-438 (b) reasonably may be understood to embody a judgment that a participating

municipality should not have to contribute additional

funds to a member’s retirement pension while at the

same time paying his salary. See General Statutes § 7-

441 (d)(providing that participating municipalities must

make contributions to cost of administration of retirement fund on behalf of retired members receiving benefits, as well as currently employed members).

The plaintiff argues that, prior to 1987, § 7-438 clearly

permitted retired members to collect a pension while

reemployed with a different department or agency, and

that we should hesitate before concluding that, in

amending the statute, the legislature intended to curtail

the ability of a member such as the plaintiff to return

to work in a nonparticipating position. It is undeniable,

however, that the legislature chose to substantially

broaden the restrictions on reemployment at that time.

Prior to 1987, a member could retain his or her pension

while reemployed in any position outside the department or agency from which he or she retired. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 7-438 (a). After 1987, this

exception was narrowed to reemployment by the state

or a nonparticipating municipality. See Public Acts

1987, No. 87-83, § 2. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s second

statutory argument is unpersuasive.

3

The plaintiff’s third statutory argument takes as its

starting point the well established rule that we must

‘‘construe a statute as a whole and . . . harmonize its

disparate sections within the bounds of reason.’’ State

v. Gonzalez, 210 Conn. 446, 451, 556 A.2d 137 (1989).

He faults the agencies and the trial court for having

considered § 7-438 (b) in isolation and, in his view,

not having paid adequate attention to the relationship

between that provision and the disability retirement

provisions of § 7-432.

The plaintiff primarily relies on § 7-432 (g), which

provides that ‘‘[n]o reconsideration of a decision concerning eligibility for a disability retirement allowance

or the discontinuance of such allowance shall be made
by the medical examining board unless a member, upon

application to the medical examining board for a redetermination, discloses additional facts concerning the

member’s condition.’’ The plaintiff reads this to mean

that the only way that his disability pension could be

terminated was if the medical examining board, having

considered new evidence, determined that he was no

longer disabled.

If we were compelled to parse § 7-432 (g) and its

relationship to § 7-438 (b), we likely would encounter

any number of impediments to the plaintiff’s argument.16 Fortunately, we need not enter those waters.

Subsection (g) was not added to the statute until July,

2013, nearly two years after the retirement services

division suspended the plaintiff’s pension. See Public

Acts 2013, No. 13-247, § 385. Prior to that time, § 7-

432 made no mention of the medical examining board.

Instead, the statute delegated broad authority to the

commission to determine a member’s ongoing eligibility

for a disability pension: ‘‘The existence and continuance

of disability shall be determined by the . . . [c]ommission upon such medical evidence and other investigation as it requires.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 7-

432. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.17

4

The plaintiff’s fourth statutory argument is that the

commission is bound by, or should adhere to, its prior

interpretation of § 7-438. The plaintiff contends that this

is especially true in light of the fact that (1) the Jepsen

opinion counseled a stay-the-course approach, and (2)

during the period from 1987 until 2009, during which

the agencies were interpreting the act to permit elective

officials such as the plaintiff to retain their retirement

pensions, the legislature did not override the agencies

by amending the act and, therefore, effectively acquiesced in the prior interpretation. We are not persuaded.

With respect to the plaintiff’s legislative acquiescence

argument, we frequently have explained that ‘‘the legislative acquiescence doctrine requires actual acquiescence on the part of the legislature. [Thus, in] most of

our prior cases, we have employed the doctrine not

simply because of legislative inaction, but because the

legislature affirmatively amended the statute subsequent to a judicial or administrative interpretation, but

chose not to amend the specific provision of the statute

at issue. . . . In other words, [l]egislative concurrence

is particularly strong [when] the legislature makes unrelated amendments in the same statute.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26, 47, 996 A.2d

259 (2010).

In the present case, the legislature made no changes

to § 7-438 between 1987, when the statute was amended

to prohibit members from collecting a retirement pen-
sion while reemployed by any participating municipality, and 2009, when the retirement services division

announced its revised interpretation of the statute. By

the time the legislature did make minor changes to the

statute in 2011; see Public Act 11-251, § 3; this revised

interpretation had been in effect for several years.

Accordingly, the legislature’s failure to address the

issue in the 2011 amendment demonstrates, if anything,

acquiescence in the agencies’ revised interpretation.

Moreover, although we recognize that the legislature

voted overwhelmingly in 2013, and again in 2015, to

amend § 7-438 to reinstate the pre-2009 interpretation,

Governor Malloy vetoed both amendments and the legislature did not attempt an override. Accordingly, we

conclude that the evidence for legislative acquiescence

in the agencies’ pre-2009 interpretation of the act is at

best inconclusive and does not compel us to depart

from the plain meaning of the statutory text. See Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Board of

Education, 270 Conn. 665, 724–25, 855 A.2d 212 (2004).

Lastly, we consider the plaintiff’s argument that the

Jepsen opinion, while not binding on this court; see

Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 825, 850 A.2d

114 (2004); nevertheless represents highly persuasive

authority to which the trial court should have deferred.

As that court recognized, however, the Jepsen opinion

neither purported to interpret the statutory language at

issue nor concluded that the agencies’ pre-2009 interpretation of § 7-438 was in any way superior to their

revised interpretation. Rather, the Jepsen opinion concluded that neither interpretation was ‘‘clearly wrong.’’

Ultimately, the only reasons the Jepsen opinion offered

in support of its recommendation that the agencies hew

to their pre-2009 interpretation were that (1) it believed

that the legislature had acquiesced in that interpretation, and (2) adopting a new interpretation might upset

retirees’ settled expectations.18 We already have

explained why the legislative acquiescence argument

is unconvincing. With respect to the reliance argument,

we agree with the trial court that, in most instances,

an administrative agency that discovers that it has been

applying an erroneous interpretation of a statute is

obliged, after providing fair notice to affected persons,

to conform its policy to the correct interpretation. Cf.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita

Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808, 93 S. Ct. 2367, 37 L.

Ed. 2d 350 (1973). This is particularly true in the present

case, insofar as the act expressly requires that the commission correct any erroneous overpayment of benefits.

See General Statutes § 7-439h.

For all of these reasons, the plaintiff’s statutory arguments are unpersuasive.19 In addition, we have reviewed

the plaintiff’s other claims of error and find them to be

without merit.20

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this

court consisting of Chief Justice Rogers and Justices Palmer, Eveleigh,

McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson. Although Justice Robinson was not

present when the case was argued before the court, he has read the briefs

and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to

participating in this decision.

1 See General Statutes § 5-155a (c); Regs., Conn. State Agencies §§ 5-155-

2 and 5-155-7.

2 Although the plaintiff refers at times to the ‘‘termination’’ of his pension,

as do certain of the agencies’ decisions, neither party disputes the trial

court’s conclusion that, under the commission’s interpretation of the act,

he will be entitled to a resumption of his retirement pension upon completion

of his tenure as mayor. Accordingly, we use the term ‘‘suspension’’ rather

than ‘‘termination.’’

3 The text of the relevant statutory provisions is set forth in part II B of

this opinion.

4 Because (1) the issue is one of statutory interpretation, (2) the relevant

arguments have been fully briefed before this court, and (3) the commission

has indicated that it is in need of judicial guidance as to how to apply § 7-

438 (b), we will evaluate the plaintiff’s statutory claims on the merits despite

the trial court’s finding that they were abandoned at trial. See Notopoulos

v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 233 n.12, 890 A.2d 509,

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006).

5 The commission represented at trial that it was in the process of identifying any such members and they were being informed that, in the event

the commission’s interpretation of the act was upheld in this litigation, they

could not continue to receive their pensions while reemployed.

6 Although the term ‘‘voluntary retirement age’’ is not defined in the act,

the commission has construed the phrase to refer to the eligibility standards

set forth in § 7-428. See Connecticut Municipal Employees’ Retirement Fund

B Summary Plan Description (January 1, 1990) p. 5.

7 Section 7-438 was amended in 2011 to add the highlighted language,

which is not material to the present appeal. See Public Act 11-251, § 3.

Although the amendment became effective July 13, 2011, it was made applicable only to members who retired on or after January 1, 2000. Public Act

11-251.

8 General Statutes (Supp. 1945) § 128h provides: ‘‘If a member shall be

retired under this chapter, and again accepts appointment, except to an

elective office, from this state or from a municipality of this state, under

which appointment services are to be rendered for more than three months

in any year, he shall receive no retirement allowance while so employed.’’

9 The other authorities on which the plaintiff relies relate to different

statutory schemes and, therefore, do not support his argument that the term

‘‘employee’’ is used as a term of art in the act. See, e.g., General Statutes

§ 7-467 (2) (distinguishing municipal employees from elective officers solely

for purposes of collective bargaining statutes, General Statutes § 7-467 et

seq.); Prudential Mortgage & Investment Co. v. New Britain, 123 Conn.

390, 392, 195 A. 609 (1937)(distinguishing,for purposes of wage garnishment,

between elective public officers and contract employees such as teachers).

10 In his reply brief, the plaintiff argues that, if East Haven intended to

make the position of mayor that of an employee, the town would have

spelled out the benefits attached to that position in the town charter or

elsewhere. This argument is purely speculative and, in any event, nothing

in the act permits a town to designate its officers or personnel as nonemployees for purposes of the retirement system.

11 Special exceptions, not relevant to the present case, are made for members reemployed for less than twenty hours per week or not more than

ninety days per calendar year. See General Statutes § 7-438 (b).

12 The statute does permit a retiree who returns to work for the state to

simultaneously collect a municipal retirement pension and earn credits in

the state retirement system, which the commission also administers. General

Statutes § 7-438 (a).

13 We note that, at approximately the same time that the legislature

amended § 7-438 to add the present language regarding participating municipalities; see Public Acts 1987, No. 87-83, § 2; it also amended General Statutes

§ 7-444, which expressly addresses the possibility that a participating municipality may withdraw one or more departments from the retirement system.

See Public Acts 1987, No. 87-85. Both amendments were drafted in the

Labor and Public Employees Committee. Under those circumstances, it is
unrealistic to assume that legislators drafted the relevant amendments to

§ 7-438 unaware that a participating municipality might have employees who

do not participate in the retirement system.

14 This is consistent with the fact that subsection (a) of § 7-438 provides

that any member who is reemployed with the state will be eligible to participate in the state employees retirement system. It seems unlikely that the

legislature, in crafting the reemployment rules for municipal employees,

intended to confer eligibility for state retirement on employees who would

not otherwise be eligible for that program. See General Statutes § 5-158 (a)

(listing classes of state employees in positions not covered by state retirement system or covered by state retirement system but ineligible to be

members).

15 We emphasize that, because the plaintiff has not claimed that either

§ 7-434a or § 7-438 (b) entitles him to eligibility or credit during his service

as mayor, we express no opinion as to the potential merits of such a claim.

16 The trial court, for example, was of the opinion that the relevant provisions of § 7-438 (b) are more specific than, and thus prevail over, the provisions of § 7-432 on which the plaintiff relies, and also that the plaintiff’s

argument leads to irrational and absurd consequences, in that his interpretation of the act would mean that any member retired pursuant to § 7-432

would in effect be exempted from § 7-438 (b).

17 The plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to retain his disability pension

under the 2011 revision of the statute, which provides in relevant part that

‘‘[a]ny member shall be eligible for retirement and for a retirement allowance

who has completed at least ten years of continuous service if he becomes

permanently and totally disabled from engaging in any gainful employment

in the service of the municipality. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes

(Rev. to 2011) § 7-432. His argument appears to be that his pension cannot

be suspended so long as he is not again gainfully employed in the service

of a participating municipality and that, for reasons that are not entirely

clear, his position as the full-time, salaried mayor of East Haven does not

constitute gainful employment in the service of that town. The trial court

found this argument to be abandoned as inadequately briefed. In any event,

the plain language of the act will not sustain the tortuous reading to which

the plaintiff would affix it.

For similar reasons, we are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s apparent

argument that he is no longer a member of the retirement system and,

therefore, not bound by § 7-438. Among other things, that interpretation is

inconsistent with various provisions of the act that make clear that members

remain members after retirement. See, e.g., General Statutes § 7-436 (setting

forth benefits that ‘‘each member’’ shall receive after retirement); General

Statutes § 7-439h (discussing receipt of retirement benefits by members).

18 Although the Jepsen opinion also alluded to concerns regarding disparate treatment of members who apply for retirement on different dates,

those concerns appear to be directed toward an unrelated issue addressed

by that opinion, namely, a change in how the agencies evaluated disability

retirement claims. Our understanding is that the agencies’ revised reemployment policies will be applied without distinction to both current and

future retirees.

19 Because we conclude that the plain language of § 7-438 (b) bars the

plaintiff’s claim, we need not delve into the legislative history. See General

Statutes § 1-2z. To the extent that any ambiguity remains, however, we

note that the limited legislative history material to the questions before us

generally favors the commission’s interpretation of § 7-438 (b).

20 With respect to the plaintiff’s detrimental reliance claim, we agree with

the trial court that (1) the plaintiff failed to establish that he relied to his

detriment on the agencies’ previous, contrary interpretation of § 7-438 (b),

(2) once the commission came to understand that the prior interpretation

of § 7-438 (b) was incorrect, it was permitted, if not required, to correct the

error, at least on a prospective basis, and (3) in light of the fact that the

retirement services division repeatedly warned the plaintiff that he would

no longer be allowed to collect a pension if reelected as mayor, the fact that

he might have received other, more equivocal guidance from the retirement

services division fails to meet the exacting requirements for establishing a

claim of detrimental reliance involving public funds. See Chotkowski v.

State, supra, 240 Conn. 268; Fennell v. Hartford, 238 Conn. 809, 816, 681

A.2d 934 (1996).

With respect to the plaintiff’s equal protection claim, we note that the

allegedly political motivations of certain legislators in delaying the amendment of § 7-438 do not offend the equal protection clause. See Hearne v.
Board of Education, 185 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1999). Moreover, setting aside

the innuendo, the plaintiff’s equal protection claims against the commission

ultimately concern his complaints that (1) whereas the commission

expressly gave one Democratic official the option either to resign or to lose

his retirement pension, the plaintiff was presented with this same choice

only implicitly, and (2) whereas the commission initially allowed another

Democratic official to retain her pension before soon changing course and

suspending it, the plaintiff’s pension was suspended mere days after he

assumed office. Even in the constitutional sphere, however, ‘‘the law [does

not] concern itself with trifles . . . .’’ Brandt v. Board of Education, 480

F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2007).

Lastly, in his principal appellate brief, the plaintiffrefers to his due process

claims only in passing and fails to list those claims in his statement of issues.

Accordingly, we decline to address those claims as inadequately briefed.

See Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323 Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d

420 (2016).