Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Fricks, 2017 IL App (2d) 160493

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

LEONARD R. FRICKS, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-16-0493

Filed July 6, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 

11-CF-1688; the Hon. Rosemary Collins, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Vacated and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Vicki P. Kouros, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Joseph P. Bruscato, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick Delfino, 

Lawrence M. Bauer, and Steven A. Rodgers, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Spence concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Leonard R. Fricks, entered a nonnegotiated plea of guilty to a single count of 

first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2010)) and was sentenced to a 60-year 

prison term (which included a 20-year sentencing enhancement for personally discharging a 

firearm during the commission of the offense (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2010))). 

Prior to sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his guilty plea, contending, 

inter alia, that his attorney, Wendell Coates, had made false assurances about the length of 

the sentence defendant would receive. Another attorney, Michael J. Phillips, represented 

defendant in connection with the motion. After the trial court imposed sentence, Phillips filed 

a motion to reduce defendant’s sentence. The trial court denied the motion and defendant 

appealed. Because Phillips did not properly certify compliance with Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), we vacated the denial of the motion and remanded the matter 

for proceedings in compliance with that rule. People v. Fricks, No. 2-14-0054 (Aug. 11, 

2014) (minute order). On remand, defendant was represented by attorney Gary V. Pumilia, 

who filed a second amended motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea, along with a proper 

certificate under the amended Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). The 

trial court denied that motion. Pumilia also advised the trial court that defendant was 

“standing on and adopting” his prior motion to reduce his sentence. When Pumilia informed 

the trial court that it had previously ruled on the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence, the 

trial court stated, “So that ruling will stand.” Pumilia did not ask to be heard on, and there 

were no further proceedings relative to, the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence. This 

appeal followed. Because there was no hearing on remand on the motion to reduce 

defendant’s sentence, yet another remand is necessary.

¶ 2 Rule 604(d) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

“No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the 

defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial 

court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, 

if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the 

judgment. *** The trial court shall *** determine whether the defendant is 

represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial 

court shall appoint counsel. *** The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court 

a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant *** to ascertain 

defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has 

examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty 

and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any 

amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those 

proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

¶ 3 It is well established that the attorney’s certificate must strictly comply with the 

requirements of Rule 604(d). See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35 (1994). If the certificate 

does not satisfy this standard, a reviewing court must remand the case to the trial court for 

proceedings that strictly comply with Rule 604(d), including “a new hearing on the motion.” 

Id. at 33. Defendant argues that the proceedings on remand were deficient because there was 

no hearing on the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence. The State argues that, although 
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defendant had the right to a hearing, he chose, through counsel, not to exercise that right. We 

conclude, however, that a defendant is not permitted to make that choice. 

¶ 4 In Janes, our supreme court observed that the courts in People v. Denson, 243 Ill. App. 

3d 55 (1993), People v. Dickerson, 212 Ill. App. 3d 168 (1991), People v. Vickery, 207 Ill. 

App. 3d 574 (1991), People v. Johnson, 207 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1990), and People v. Hayes, 

195 Ill. App. 3d 957 (1990), granted the defendants therein “the right to file a new motion to 

withdraw guilty plea and the right to have a hearing on the new motion” (emphases added) 

(Janes, 158 Ill. 2d at 33) as a remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with the certificate 

requirement. Immediately after that observation, the Janes court stated, “With this opinion, 

we affirm the holdings of these cases and unequivocally state that, [with the exception of the 

requirement that the defendant file a motion to withdraw his or her plea or to reconsider his 

or her sentence], the remedy for failure to strictly comply with each of the provisions of Rule 

604(d) is a remand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to withdraw guilty plea 

or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.” Id. In People v. Oliver, 276 Ill. 

App. 3d 929 (1995), we read this to mean that a new motion and a new hearing were 

required on remand. 

¶ 5 In People v. Lindsay, 239 Ill. 2d 522 (2011), our supreme court concluded, contrary to 

Oliver, that filing a new motion on remand is optional. The Lindsay court reasoned as 

follows: 

“There is no question that this court used language in Janes that, in isolation, appears 

to mandate the filing of a new motion on remand: 

‘[T]he remedy for failure to strictly comply with each of the provisions of Rule 

604(d) is a remand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to withdraw 

guilty plea or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.’ [Citation.]

 And we can hardly fault the Oliver court for giving authoritative weight to this 

portion of our decision. That said, *** the preceding language does not appear in 

isolation but rather immediately follows the court’s explicit endorsement of a series 

of appellate court decisions holding that the appropriate remedy for the failure to file 

a Rule 604(d) certificate is to ‘grant[ ] the defendants therein the right to file a new 

motion to withdraw guilty plea and the right to have a hearing on the new motion.’

(Emphases added.) [Citation.] Unlike the language relied upon in Oliver, this 

language is permissive, allowing individual defendants to decide on a case-by-case 

basis whether the filling of a new motion on remand is warranted. And significantly, 

it was this permissive language that the court employed in the concluding paragraph 

of the decision, where the court sets forth its instructions for the remand: 

‘Therefore, pursuant to this court’s supervisory authority, we retain 

jurisdiction and remand this cause to the circuit court *** to allow defendant to 

file a new motion to withdraw his guilty plea and for a hearing on that motion in 

full compliance with Rule 604(d).’ (Emphasis added.) [Citation.]

 Clearly, nothing in this language mandates or requires the filing of a new motion 

on remand. On the contrary, the court was simply allowing defendant—that is, giving 

him the opportunity—to file a new motion on remand. Whether he exercised that 

option was entirely up to him.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at 528-29. 
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¶ 6 In the case now before us, the State seeks to extend Lindsay’s reasoning to the 

requirement that a new hearing be held on remand. According to the State, although 

defendant had a right to a new hearing, he was not required to exercise that right.1 However, 

that argument is contrary to Lindsay’s express holding:

“[W]e hold that, when defense counsel neglects to file a Rule 604(d) certificate, the 

appropriate remedy is a remand for (1) the filing of a Rule 604(d) certificate; (2) the 

opportunity to file a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea and/or reconsider the 

sentence, if counsel concludes that a new motion is necessary; and (3) a new motion 

hearing.” Id. at 531. 

The Lindsay court used permissive language with reference to filing a new motion: the 

defendant is to be afforded the “opportunity” to do so “if counsel concludes that a new 

motion is necessary.” Id. The Lindsay court did not use such language with reference to 

holding a new hearing. Presumably, the Lindsay court crafted its holding with care, so as to 

avoid the kind of misinterpretation that occurred in Oliver. Thus, if the Lindsay court had 

intended the new motion hearing to be optional, we cannot fathom why the court would not 

have said so explicitly. 

¶ 7 In the present case, there was no hearing on remand on the motion to reduce defendant’s 

sentence. Indeed, the motion was not considered anew. Pumilia merely acceded to the trial 

court’s previous ruling, which the trial court merely reiterated. The trial court did not review 

the original hearing on the motion. Pumilia did not summarize what transpired at that hearing 

for the trial court’s benefit. Thus, what occurred on remand was a “mere charade performed 

for the purpose of reinstating an appeal.” People v. Tejada-Soto, 2012 IL App (2d) 110188, 

¶ 14. 

¶ 8 The State relies on People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998), which found “limited 

value” in an additional remand where, on the first remand, the defendant “was afforded a full 

and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing.” The context for that 

statement is the Shirley court’s rejection of “defendant’s implicit premise that the strict 

compliance standard of [Janes] must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois courts 

to grant multiple remands and new hearings following the initial remand hearing.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, Shirley presupposes that an “initial remand hearing” actually 

took place. The failure here to hold any hearing on remand on defendant’s motion to reduce 

his sentence clearly distinguishes this case from Shirley. We thus conclude that this case 

must again be remanded for a hearing on defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence.

¶ 9 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the circuit court of Winnebago County 

denying defendant’s motion to reduce his sentence. We remand for a new hearing on the 

motion. 

¶ 10 Vacated and remanded. 

 

1The State contends that defendant “was in full agreement with defense counsel’s decision to 

forego [sic] presentation of the motion to reconsider sentence.” The record does not support the 

contention. Although the State cites portions of the record indicating that defendant and counsel 

discussed sentencing issues, the State cites nothing showing that defendant specifically agreed that a 

hearing was unnecessary. In any event, the State also cites nothing establishing that defendant was 

entitled to personally decide whether there would be a hearing.