UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4757

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RONNIE L. ROBBINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, 

District Judge. (2:10-cr-00006-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: September 11, 2012 Decided: September 13, 2012

Before MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

Robert W. Austin, Johnny L. Rosenbaum, SCYPHERS & AUSTIN, P.C., 

Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United 

States Attorney, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States

Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Ronnie L. Robbins appeals his convictions following a 

jury trial on two counts of possession of a falsely altered 

military discharge certificate (Counts 1s and 2s), in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 498 (2006); one count of falsely claiming receipt 

of a military decoration or medal (Count 3s), in violation of 18 

U.S.C.A. § 704(b) (West Supp. 2012); one count of making false 

statements to the Department of Veterans Affairs in his 

application for disability benefits (Count 5s), in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), (3) (2006); and one count of mail fraud 

in conjunction with his application for disability benefits 

(Count 6s), in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2000 & 

Supp. 2012). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Robbins first challenges the district court’s denial 

of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment 

of acquittal on Counts 1s, 2s, 5s, and 6s for insufficient 

evidence. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

Rule 29 motion. United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 160 

(4th Cir. 2006). A jury verdict must be upheld “if there is 

substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Government, to support it.” Id. “[S]ubstantial evidence is 

evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as 

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s 
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “We consider both circumstantial and direct 

evidence,” drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence 

in the government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 

326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). However, “[w]e may not weigh the 

evidence or review the credibility of the witnesses [because] 

[t]hose functions are reserved for the jury.” United States v. 

Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation 

omitted).

Section 498, under which Counts 1s and 2s arose,

criminalizes the use, possession, or exhibition of a military 

discharge certificate “knowing the same to be forged, 

counterfeited, or falsely altered.” 18 U.S.C. § 498. Viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we 

conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find 

that Robbins knowingly used a forged or falsely altered military 

discharge certificate as charged in Counts 1s and 2s.*

 Thus, the 

district court did not err in denying Robbins’ Rule 29 motion on 

those counts. 

 * We decline Robbins’ invitation to apply the rule of lenity 

to his case, as § 498 is not ambiguous. See United States v. 

Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (“The rule of lenity requires 

ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the 

defendants subjected to them.”).
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Section 1001(a), under which Count 5s arose,

criminalizes the making of “any materially false, fictitious, or 

fraudulent statement or representation” and the use of “any 

false writing or document knowing the same to contain any 

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), (3). “The test of materiality is 

whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence 

agency action or is capable of influencing agency action.” 

United States v. Garcia-Ochoa, 607 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Government, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient for the jury to find that Robbins made a materially 

false statement to the Department of Veterans Affairs in order 

to obtain disability benefits for post-traumatic stress 

disorder. See id. at 376 (“Materiality, as an element of a 

criminal offense, is a question of fact (or at the very least, a 

mixed question of law and fact) to be resolved by the fact 

finder . . . .”). Likewise, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Government, we conclude that the Government presented 

sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Robbins

committed mail fraud in conjunction with his attempt to obtain 

disability benefits. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341; United States v. 

Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001) (providing elements of 

mail fraud); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 
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(1999) (stating that scheme to defraud must involve material 

misrepresentation). 

Finally, Robbins contends that Count 3s should be 

dismissed because the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b), is 

unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-51 

(2012), in which the Court concluded that the Stolen Valor Act 

violates the First Amendment, Robbins’ point is well-taken. We 

therefore vacate Robbins’ conviction on Count 3s. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment 

on Counts 1s, 2s, 5s, and 6s, vacate the court’s judgment on 

Count 3s, and remand for entry of a corrected judgment

consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

VACATED IN PART;

AND REMANDED