Kr. S. Perry Brovn

Chairman

& Executive

Director Texas Employment

Commiesion Aus tin, Texas opinionlo. WW-7l.3
Re: Whether the Texas Employment Ccmmiesion

may legally

pay an attorney

for services

rendered in asaietlng

the AttorneyGeneral Dear Mr. Brown: in an eminent domainproceeding.
You have requested an opinion

a8 to whether the Texas EmploymentCommissionwas authorized to employand pay special counselto assist the AttorneyGeneral In preparing eminent

domainproceedings. You state that this attorney

was employed

pursuant

to a requestfrom the Attorney General

for aesistance

in preparing

a case to condemn land on which the Texas Xkployment Commission

was to erect buildings. Under Section '7,

Article

VI, General

Appropriations,

Acts 

### 55thAegislature, RegularSession,

### 1957, Chapter 

### 385,pages 1144 and 1145, set out in part here: Y

. . . Whe+e the Attorney General,

District

Attorney, CrimlnalDlstri& Attorney, CountyAttorney,

or other lawyer is required

by constitutional

or statutory

provision

to represent a StateAgency,State Official, State Board, or State Department,

no compensation

shall be paid from any appropriation made in this Act to any otherAttorneyfor repreeentlng the State of Texas in the trial of a civil lawsuit except in those caseswhere the Attorney General, District

Attorney, Criminal

District

Attorney,

CountyAttorneyor other lavyer, ae the caee may be, has requested that the attorney

or attorney8

employed

by the particular

State Agency,State Official,

State Department

or StateBoard, aselatwith the trial of the particular laveuit.

. 0 *"r L

hfr. S. Perry Brown, page 2 (w-713)

The Attorney

General 16 authorized to requestthe asalstance of counselemployedby the particular agency involved. In this instance the Texas E$lployment Commission,

88 requested,

employed

Robert L. Bums to assist the Attorney General in securinglend by eminent domainproceedings to be broughton behalf of the State of Texas for the Texas Employment Commission. This situation

is aualogoua

to a prerioua

Attorney

General's

Opinion ~~-633where the State Building Commission

hired an attorney

to assist the Attorney

General in preparing for the acqui6ltion of land. Here the Commiasion haa the authority to purohaeeland Just a8 the State Building Commission did and the power on the part of both Commissions to employattorneys comea from this power to acquire land for which the services of an attorney

are neededrather than from a statute directly

authorizing

the employment

of an attorney. The General

Appropriations

Act, Howe Bill 133,Acts of the 55th Legislature,

RegularSeseion,1957,Chapter 385, pages 979-980,appropriated funds for the development of buildings

to be wed by the Texas Employment Commission,

Attorney

General's

Opinion

~~-526made it clear that the Commission conld purchase the landwith the agreement of the land owners. This power to purchase

the land did not carry with it the power to condemn;80 it was necessary

for the Governor

to authorize

and requestthe Attorney General to bring a oondePnnatlon suit underArticle 5240, Vernon's

Civil Statutes, which providee

for the acquisition of land by purchase or by condemnation. Article 5240,

Vernon's

Civil Statutea,

state8 in part: *rJhen any land shall be required by the State for any character

of publicwe, the Governoris authorized to purchase said land, or the right to the use thereof, for such purpose;

or, fallingto agree with the owner on the price thereof,

such landmay be condemned for suoh publicwe in the name of this State. Upon the direction of the Governor, proceedings

ahallbe instituted againstthe owner of the land by the AttorneyGeneralor underhis direction by the district or county attorney.
. . .' The euit la brou@t to condelrm land in the name of the State of Texas by the Texas Employment Commission

and ie for the benefitof the Commission, which haa a direct intereat since appropriated

funds for the Commission will be wed to pay for the land and the buildings to be erected

on the land. Having the direct interest that it doee, and the acquirement of building sites being neceseary to furtherthe Act for which the Ccamnlasion was established,

the Ccminlssion

in furtherance

of the Act can employan attorney to assist in the preparation of the proceedings

under Article5221b-9, Vemon'e Civil Statutea,

which reads as follows:m. S. Perry Brown,page 3 (Ww-713)

"(a)~Duties

and Powers of Oommiaaiont It shall be the duty of the Conm.is~lon to administer

this Act; and It shall have power and authority to adopt,amend, or reaoindsuch rules and reguLationa, to employ such Wr'BonB, make such expenditures,

requiresuch reporta, make such lnveetlge.tions, and take such other actionae it deema neceseary or suitable to that end.
. . .“ (&nphaeis ours.) The legality

of the paymentof the Attorney has been questiomd on two grounds. The objection

to Article IV, Section 22 of the Texas Constitution by the Comptroller

on the groundsthat an attorney employed

by the Coimnieaion, not being the Attorney Gsneral,

could not represent the State in a legal proceeding

to 6eoum an officebuilding has no basic since thie objection wae answered

by the Suptie Court of Texas In Camp Y. Gulf ProductionCcmF 61 S.W.2d 773. It was alao answeredin Maude v. Terrell,109 Tex. 61, 2 5 S.W. 639 where this pdint was raised and overruled. These oaaee hold that an Act of the Legislature would not be held unoonatitutional unlese it clearly

deprived

the Attorney

Generalof his authority to represent

the State. The secondobjection raised ae to the legality of the employment

by the Colmaieaion

of an attorney

to aid the Attorney General is that Article 5221b-15,

Vernon's

Civil Statutee,

prohibits

anyone other than those attorneye who are regularly employed

by the Conunlsaion

to aid the Attorney General. This ass-es that since this attorney waa employed

solelyto help In one matter that he was not "regularly" employed

by the Commiseion. This cbjection

is without

merit since the attorney employed

by the Commission to aid the Attorney General in the mentioned litigation was "reg&rly" employed

by the Commi6alon. The word "regularly* is an adverband meana In regular

manner. The word "regular",hae been held to mean to be *agreeable to an eatabliahed

law" (Century

Dictionary

quoting Wise v. StateVeterinary Bs, I.38

Michigan428, 432, 101NW 562; Webeters Dictionary

quoting

$fers v. Resbeok,~upr~). The word has aleo been held to mean "dulyauthorized (Vebsters

Dictionary

quoting

Merchants

' Iiational

Bank v. Continental Elational B&, 98 California A 523, 277 Pac. 354). The word "regularly" has been held to be not eynoryrmoua with "continuously" (Ex. p. Cain, 39 Alabama 440). Since this attorney employed

by the Commission

was employed

under the authority of Article5221b-8

Vernon'sCivil Statutes, his employment

certainly

we,8 *regularly"

made, Thie opinionoverrules Attorney

General's

OpinionO-708 insofar

ae the two opinions conflict.Mr. S. Perry Brown, page 4 (WW-713)

It,18 our opinionthat the Texas Employment~Commfasion was authorized to employan attorney to assiat the Attorney General in preparing for Eminent Domain proceedinga authorized

by the Governor

for the benefitof the Texas Employment

Cozonissfon.

The Texas Employment Commission

may legally pay an attomeg for eervieea renderedin aasisting

the Attorney

Ceneral in an Eminent Domafn Proceeding.
Yours very' truly,
WILL WIISOH Attorney Generalof Texas

JCS:im:me APPROVFJh
OPIIVIOI

COMMITrEE Gee. P. Blackbum, Chairman GordonC. Caes WallaceFinfrock Riley EugeneFletcher Jay D, Howell REVIEWEDFORTREGlTORKEY GEXERAL BY: W. V. Geppert