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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : BARBARA L. NEWMAN, : : Appellant : No. 1766 MDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on Sept ember 5, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Criminal Division, No. CP- 41

- CR -0001976-2012 BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2014 Barbara L. Newman (“Newman”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following the revocation of her probat ion. Kathryn E. Bellfy, Esquire, (“Bellfy”), Newman’s counsel, has file d a Petition to Withdraw as Counsel and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.

California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant counsel’s Petiti on to Withdraw and affirm Newman’s judgment of sentence. The trial court has set forth the relevant history as follows: Under Information 1976-2012, [Newman] was charged with dr iving under the influence of alcohol [“DUI”] while incapable of safely driving and then refusing a chemical test of her blood, driving when her operating privilege was suspended as a result of a previous DUI, and several other summary offenses as a result of an incident on August 8, 2012, wh ere she drove past a “Road Closed” sign and got her truck stuck on a portion of Route 864 that was under construction. At the time [that Newman] committed these offenses, she was under probation supervision for simple assault, a misdemeanor of theJ-S51044- 14

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second degree, and trespass, a misdemeanor of the third degree [ 1 ] , in case 1261-2011. [Newman] failed to appear for a status conference and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. [Newman] fled to M issouri, but was arrested and extradited back to Pennsylvania. On August 8, 2013, [Newman] entered a no contest plea to DUIincapable (refusal) and [driving while operating priv ilege is suspended] [“DUS”] -DUI related. On September 5, 2013, the court sentenced [Newman] to pay a $1,500 fine and to s erve six months under the Intermediate Punishment Program wit h the first 90 days to be served at the pre-release center fo r DUI. In addition, the court sentenced [Newman] to 60 days of incarceration and a $500 fine for DUS-DUI related. The court [] held [Newman]’s probation violation hear ing on September 5, 2013. The court found that [Newman] vi olated her probation by absconding from supervision and committ ing a new criminal offense. The court revoked [Newman]’s pr obation and sentenced her to a term of 3 to 6 months of incarcer ation to be served consecutively to her sentence in case 1976-20 12. Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/13, at 1-2 (footnote added ). Newman filed a timely Notice of Appeal. On appeal, Newman’s counsel, Bellfy, has filed a brief pursuant to Anders that raises the following question for our review: “Whether the trial court abuse d its discretion by issuing a sentence that is manifestly excessive or in excess of the plea agreement[?]” Brief for Appellant at 4. Bellfy fi led a separate Petition to withdraw as counsel with this Court on April 28, 2014. Newman filed neither

a pro se brief, nor retained alternate counsel for this appea l. “[W]e note that when faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues with out first passing on

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a), 3503(b)(1)(i)J-S51044- 14

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the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Edwards , 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation, brackets, and quot ation marks omitted).

Pursuant to Anders , when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and wishes to withdraw representation, he must do the fol lowing: (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to any issues that might arguab lysupport the appeal, but which does not resemble a nomerit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advi se him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se , or raise any additional point s he deems worthy of this Court’s attention. Commonwealth v. Curry , 931 A.2d 700, 701 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978 A.3d 349 (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders , i.e. , the

contents of an Anders brief, and set forth the following requirements for

Anders briefs: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolou s; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant fact s of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point t hat have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolo us.J-S51044- 14

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Santiago , 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the [ Anders ] requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct it s own review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent jud g ment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards , 906 A.2d at 1228 (citation omitted). Here, we conclude that Bellfy has substantially complie d with each of the requirements of Anders

. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks , 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that counsel nee ds to substantially comply with the requirements of Anders ). Bellfy indicates that she has conscientiously examined the record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous. The record contains a copy of the letter that Bellfy sent to Newman, advising her of her rights to proceed pro se or retain alternate counsel and file additional claims and stating Bellfy’ s intention to seek permission to withdraw. Bellfy has complied with the p rocedural requirements for withdrawing from representation. T herefore, we shall proceed to an independent evaluation of the record to determine whether this appeal is wholly frivolous. Here, Newman challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence. “Challenges to the discret ionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury , 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue,J-S51044- 14

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[this Court conducts] a four part analysis to determine : (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal , see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was prop erly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s bri ef has a fatal defect, [ see ] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appeal ed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [ see ] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Moury , 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted).

“The determination of whether a particular issue raises a su bstantial question is to be evaluated on a case- by

- case basis.” Commonwealth v.

Titus , 816 A.2d 251, 256 (Pa. Super. 2003). “Generally, however, in order to establish a substantial question, the appellant must show actions by the sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.” Id. Here, Newman filed a timely Notice of Appeal, but di d not preserve the issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. Nevert heless, because we are required to undertake an independent review of the record, we will address Newman’s sentencing claim. Newman presents, in her Rule 2119(f) statement, only a bald allegation of excessiveness and does not raise any challe nge as to a violation of the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental n orm underlying the sentencing process. See Brief for Appelant at 7; see also Commonwealth

v. Provenzano , 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating we cann ot look beyond the statement of questions presented and 2 119(f) conciseJ-S51044- 14

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statement to determine whether a substantial question e xists). Therefore, we conclude that Newman’s claim does not present a substant ial question

for our review. See Titus , 816 A.2d at 255-56 (stating that bald claim of excessiveness does not raise a substantial question). More over, our independent examination of the record has convinced us that there are no other sentencing claims, not advanced by Bellfy, that w ould raise a

substan tial question to permit review of Newman’s sentence. See id. at

256. 2 Based on our independent review of the record, we concl ude that this appeal is frivolous. For these reasons, we grant Bel lfy’s request to withdraw. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel granted; judgment of sentence

affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 9/16/2014

2 We also note that at the sentencing hearing, the court noted that it believed that a three to six month sentence was lenient in light of the violations Newman had committed while on supervision. N.T., 9/5/13, at 12.