UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-5049

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DWIGHT ELLIS CARRINGTON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00143-WO-1)

Submitted: August 29, 2013 Decided: September 3, 2013

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael E. Archenbronn, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dwight Ellis Carrington appeals his conviction and 

sixty-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to giving 

false or fictitious statements to acquire a firearm, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2006). On appeal, 

Carrington’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court committed sentencing error. Carrington has filed 

a pro se supplemental brief, raising additional sentencing 

issues. The Government has declined to file a response brief. 

Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a

“deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 52 (2007). We first examine the 

sentence for “significant procedural error,” including improper 

calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient consideration 

of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, and inadequate 

explanation of the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In 

announcing its sentence, the court must conduct an 

“individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the 

case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). It need not 

provide a “comprehensive, detailed opinion,” so long as its 
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explanation is adequate “to satisfy the appellate court that 

[it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned 

basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” 

United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

If we find a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we 

also must consider the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence under the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51. A sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary” to satisfy the § 3553(a) factors. United 

States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007)). 

A within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal, 

and the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by 

demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Counsel first questions whether the district court 

procedurally erred in failing to adequately respond to his 

arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence or consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors. However, the court expressly rejected 

Carrington’s arguments for a downward departure, recognizing 

that prior lengthy sentences had not deterred him. In 
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announcing its sentence, the court specifically addressed the 

nature of the offense and Carrington’s personal history and 

characteristics as possible mitigating factors but ultimately 

concluded that a sentence of sixty months was necessary to deter 

future crimes, to promote respect for the law, and to protect 

the public. We conclude that this individualized assessment 

adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors and counsel’s 

arguments, and we discern no procedural error in the sentence. 

Moreover, while counsel questions whether the sentence unduly 

emphasized Carrington’s criminal history and was greater than 

necessary to meet the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that 

Carrington fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness 

accorded his within-Guidelines sentence. See Montes-Pineda, 445 

F.3d at 379.

We also have reviewed Carrington’s pro se supplemental 

brief but conclude that his arguments lack merit. Carrington 

asserts that the district court erred in basing Carrington’s

sentence on his need to participate in a specific substance 

abuse treatment program that he has been prohibited from 

attending. Carrington’s argument is belied by the record, 

however. Although the court recommended Carrington for this

treatment program, the sentencing transcript clearly indicates 

that the court did not base Carrington’s sentence on the need 

for substance abuse treatment. Nor does the record support 
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Carrington’s assertion that his sentence was based on any 

inaccurate information in the presentence report. While 

Carrington argues that the court impermissibly considered his 

alcohol use and related convictions in sentencing him, we 

conclude the court appropriately considered these factors in 

fashioning a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Finally, 

insofar as Carrington challenges the court’s refusal to depart 

downward from the Guidelines range, we lack authority to review 

this issue, as the record reveals that the court properly 

understood its authority to depart. See United States v. 

Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Carrington, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Carrington requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Carrington.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED