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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48823

QUENTIN NAVA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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Filed: September 15, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon

County. Hon. George A. Southworth, District Judge. 

Judgment summarily dismissing amended petition for post-conviction relief, 

affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Andrew V. Wake, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Quentin Nava appeals from the judgment summarily dismissing his amended petition for 

post-conviction relief. Nava alleges the district court erred because his ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claim was timely, not otherwise barred, and raised a genuine issue of material fact. 

A post-conviction claim may be summarily dismissed if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits 

submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Nava’s claim was bare, conclusory, and unsupported by admissible 

evidence. As a result, Nava failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claim

and, accordingly, the district court did not err. The judgment summarily dismissing Nava’s 

amended petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed. 
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury found Nava guilty of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-

1508, and sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506. Nava admitted to two sentencing 

enhancements, and the district court sentenced him to forty years, with eighteen years determinate, 

for the lewd conduct conviction and twenty-five years, with eighteen years determinate, for the 

sexual abuse conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. Nava appealed.

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 The Idaho 

Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on June 11, 2020, and issued a remittitur on 

July 2, 2020. State v. Nava, 166 Idaho 884, 465 P.3d 1123 (2020). 

On July 13, 2020, Nava filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Nava’s petition raised 

multiple claims, including the “State[’]s Prosecutor Assistant coaching of witness, when to cry, 

what Hand motions to use, my nephew was thrown out of court when [he] tried to point it out. 

Have Affidavits this occurred and my coun[s]el didn[’]t object to this Happening But was made 

aware of this.” Despite stating that he had affidavits to support this claim, no affidavits 

accompanied the petition. The district court appointed Nava post-conviction counsel. 

The State subsequently filed an answer asserting multiple defenses, including that Nava’s

petition failed to allege sufficient facts to find that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and 

that Nava was prejudiced by the deficiency. Nava filed a motion for limited discovery, which the 

district court granted. The district court then issued a notice of its intent to dismiss Nava’s petition 

for post-conviction relief. Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim of alleged witness 

coaching, the district court stated that Nava’s claim was bare, unsupported, and conclusory because 

it was unsupported by any admissible evidence.

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 Nava then filed a notarized affidavit verifying 

his petition for post-conviction relief, attesting that “the facts set forth in the foregoing Petition 

filed with this Court file stamped July 13, 2020 are true, accurate, and complete to the best of 

Petitioner’s knowledge and belief.” 

 

1 Nava’s appeal did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See generally State 

v. Nava, 166 Idaho 884, 465 P.3d 1123 (2020).

2 Although the district court initially characterized Nava’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim as trial court error, the court also analyzed the claim as a claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel.
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The district court subsequently dismissed Nava’s petition for post-conviction relief finding, 

in part, that Nava did not support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding alleged 

witness coaching with admissible evidence and did not show he was prejudiced by the alleged 

deficiency. However, because of circumstances relating to the State’s compliance with the 

discovery order, the parties stipulated to setting aside the order dismissing Nava’s petition for postconviction relief.

The district court set aside the order, and Nava filed an amended petition for postconviction relief. In the amended petition, Nava alleged, in part, a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel for failing to object to the coaching of witnesses during trial (IAC claim). Specifically, 

Nava alleged: “Ineffective assistance of Counsel. The alleged victims were coached on when to 

cry with use of hand motions and the Petitioner[’]s nephew was removed from the courtroom when 

attempting to point it out. Trial Counsel failed to object when this was occurring. (see attachments 

filed herewith and incorporated herein).” Nava attached five signed letters, four of which had the 

signatures notarized, from various family members and friends; each letter described acts of 

witness coaching. 

The State moved for summary dismissal. In relation to Nava’s IAC claim, the State argued 

that Nava did not show that trial counsel knew about the alleged coaching or that the alleged 

coaching affected the trial’s outcome. The district court agreed. In relevant part, the district court 

found that Nava’s IAC claim was untimely, should have been raised on direct appeal, and was 

bare, conclusory, and not supported by evidence. Nava filed a premature notice of appeal, which 

became timely upon the filing of the district court’s judgment summarily dismissing his amended 

petition for post-conviction relief.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. I.C. § 19-

4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v. Bearshield, 104 

Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 

1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a 

preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is 

based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for 

post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141 
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Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more than a short and plain 

statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(1). Rather, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting 

its allegations or the petition will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 

1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011). 

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction 

relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if it appears from 

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,

together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal, 

the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required 

to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, 

or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. 

App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). 

Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of 

the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at 

the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 

353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if 

the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id. 

Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by 

the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima 

facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify 

relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé 

v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). If a genuine issue of material fact is 

presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues. Goodwin, 138 

Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. 

On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by 

the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if 

true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 

(2010); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. Over questions of law, we exercise free 
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review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 

P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Nava alleges the district court erred by summarily dismissing his amended petition for 

post-conviction relief because his IAC claim was timely, not otherwise barred, and raised a

genuine issue of material fact under both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

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 In response, the State concedes that Nava’s IAC claim was timely and not 

otherwise barred, but argues the district court did not err because Nava presented insufficient 

evidence for an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 

We agree that Nava’s IAC claim was timely and not otherwise barred. Nava commenced 

a post-conviction action within a year of the Idaho Supreme Court affirming the judgment of 

conviction in his underlying criminal case, which complies with I.C. § 19-4902(a). Accordingly, 

Nava’s IAC claim was timely. Similarly, while a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, 

Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806, 839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992) (holding defendant may raise 

issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial either on direct appeal or in petition for postconviction relief, but not both), often such claims are more appropriately presented through postconviction relief proceedings where an evidentiary record can better be developed. Sparks v. State, 

140 Idaho 292, 296, 92 P.3d 542, 546 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims should not be raised on direct appeal because trial record is rarely adequate for 

review of such claims). Nava’s IAC claim was not a claim that could have or should have been 

raised on direct appeal and, consequently, Nava was not barred from raising the claim for the first 

time in this post-conviction proceeding. 

We turn to the question of whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Nava’s 

IAC claim because it failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. A claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 

 

3 Nava’s amended petition for post-conviction relief raised multiple claims but Nava only 

pursues the above referenced ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. Accordingly, Nava 

waives any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of the other claims contained in his amended 

petition for post-conviction relief. 
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Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 477, 224 P.3d 536, 544 (Ct. App. 2009). To prevail on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s performance 

was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-

88; Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, 

the petitioner has the burden of showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); 

Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 442, 163 P.3d 222, 231 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish prejudice, 

the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, 

the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; 

Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 442, 163 P.3d at 231. 

As an initial matter, we must address what documents in the record the district court and 

this Court may properly review to determine if Nava’s IAC claim raised a genuine issue of material 

fact and was supported by admissible evidence. On appeal, Nava alleges we should look to both 

his original petition and his amended petition to make this determination. In his original petition, 

Nava alleged trial counsel was aware of the alleged witness coaching and failed to object. In his

amended petition, Nava alleged that trial counsel failed to object to the coaching, but did not allege 

trial counsel was aware of the alleged coaching. Nava argues that we may consider the factual 

assertion in his original petition to support his IAC claim in his amended petition. Nava also 

contends that we should consider the letters from various family and friends that he submitted with 

his amended petition in determining whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 

IAC claim. We disagree with both contentions. 

First, any argument that the district court should have looked to Nava’s original petition 

either for claims or factual support rather than his amended petition is not preserved. After the 

State filed a motion for summary dismissal of Nava’s amended petition arguing that Nava’s IAC 

claim was not adequately supported, Nava did not argue that evidence from the original petition 

supported his IAC claim, attempt to incorporate any part of his original petition into his amended 

petition, or point to factual allegations in his original petition as support for his claim. 

Accordingly, because Nava did not raise this issue below, he may not raise it on appeal. Sanchez 

v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (holding generally issues not raised 

below may not be considered for first time on appeal). 
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Further, even if Nava’s argument was preserved, it would be unavailing because, as Nava 

acknowledges on appeal, unless an amended petition adopts or incorporates a prior petition, the 

factual allegations in the prior petitions have no legal effect. Once an individual files a petition 

for post-conviction relief, he may, under certain conditions, file an amended petition, I.R.C.P. 15, 

but the amended petition takes the place of all prior petitions. See Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. 

of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 411, 258 P.3d 340, 346 (2011); see also Freiberger v. Am. Triticale, 

Inc., 120 Idaho 239, 243, 815 P.2d 437, 441 (1991) (noting that when pleading is amended, it takes

place of original pleading). As such, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaints and 

represents the substance of plaintiff’s claims “entirely and exclusively,” such that all subsequent 

pleadings must be based upon contents of amended complaint. Allied, 151 Idaho at 411, 258 P.3d 

at 346. 

Nava filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, which did not refer to or 

incorporate his original petition, and Nava never moved to admit the original petition into 

evidence. As such, Nava’s amended petition superseded the factual allegations and legal claims 

of his original petition and represented the entire and exclusive substance of his post-conviction

claims. Id. Accordingly, we will not look to claims or factual allegations made in Nava’s original 

petition as support for claims in his amended petition. 

Second, petitions for post-conviction relief must present or be accompanied by admissible 

evidence, i.e., affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the allegations in the petition, I.C. 

§ 19-4903, or the petition will be subject to dismissal. See also Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 

861-62, 243 P.3d 675, 677-78 (Ct. App. 2010). The letters Nava submitted to support his IAC 

claim did not create a genuine issue of material fact for two reasons: (1) none of the letters 

indicated that trial counsel had any knowledge of the alleged witness coaching; and (2) the letters 

were not affidavits and, thus, were not admissible evidence. 

First, none of the letters indicate that trial counsel had any knowledge of the alleged witness 

coaching at the time it occurred. As discussed below, trial counsel does not render deficient 

performance for failing to object to something of which counsel is not aware. As there are no facts 

to support a claim that trial counsel knew about the alleged coaching, there is no genuine issue of 

fact to support the first prong of Strickland. 

Second, even if the letters included such a statement, the letters are not admissible 

evidence. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.7 provides: “Whenever these rules require or permit a 
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written statement to be made under oath or affirmation, the statement may be made as provided in 

Idaho Code Section 9-1406. An affidavit includes a written certification or declaration made as 

provided in Idaho Code section 9-1406.” Idaho Code § 9-1406 provides:

(1) Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order 

or requirement made pursuant to a law of this state, any matter is required or 

permitted to be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the sworn statement, 

declaration, verification, certificate, oath, affirmation or affidavit, in writing, of the 

person making the same, other than a deposition, an oath of office or an oath 

required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public, such 

matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established or 

proven by the unsworn certification or declaration, in writing, which is subscribed 

by such person and is in substantially the following form:

“I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of 

Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.”

Affidavits must be verified on oath or affirmation by a notary. I.C. § 51-105(2). 

“‘Verification on oath or affirmation’ means a declaration, made by an individual on oath or 

affirmation before a notarial officer, that a statement in a record is true.” I.C. § 51-102(16).

Nava submitted five letters in support of his amended petition. While all of the letters were 

signed, only four had notary stamps, and the stamps only attest to the identity of the person signing 

the document. See I.C. § 51-105(3). While two of the letters contained an assertion that the 

statements in the letter were true, none of the documents are subscribed and sworn to as an oath or 

affirmation, as required of an affidavit. See I.C. § 9-1406; I.C. § 51-102; I.R.C.P. 2.7; See Evans 

v. Twin Falls Cnty, 118 Idaho 210, 218 n.9, 796 P.2d 87, 95 n.9 (1990) (noting document filed not 

subscribed and sworn to as oath or affirmation, as required of an affidavit; rather, signature merely 

acknowledged by notary public in manner required for acknowledgment of signatures). Because 

none of the documents were subscribed or sworn to, they were not affidavits and not admissible 

evidence to support Nava’s IAC claim. Accordingly, Nava has only provided his amended petition 

and affidavit to support his claims and, thus, we will look only to those documents to determine if 

Nava’s IAC claim was sufficiently supported to survive summary dismissal. 

Nava’s IAC claim in his amended petition reads: “The alleged victims were coached on 

when to cry with use of hand motions and the Petitioner[’]s nephew was removed from the 

courtroom when attempting to point it out. Trial Counsel failed to object when this was occurring. 

(see attachments filed herewith and incorporated herein).” As admissible evidence of the IAC 

claim, Nava included his own affidavit that stated the facts in his amended petition were “true, 
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accurate, and complete”; the affidavit contained no additional factual assertions. Even with Nava’s 

affidavit, the district court correctly concluded Nava’s amended petition and affidavit failed to 

establish either prong of the Strickland standard. 

Nava’s assertion that his trial counsel provided deficient performance under the first prong 

of Strickland is bare and conclusory because Nava did not allege, either in his amended petition or

accompanying affidavit, that his trial counsel was aware of the alleged witness coaching; trial 

counsel could not have provided deficient performance by failing to object to something of which 

counsel was unaware. Nonetheless, Nava argues that “the only reasonable inference” from Nava’s 

IAC claim is that Nava’s trial counsel knew about the alleged witness coaching. As support for 

this assertion, Nava cites to Stanfield v. State, 165 Idaho 889, 894, 454 P.3d 531, 536 (2019) for 

the proposition that all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the petitioner and, as 

such, we should infer that Nava’s trial counsel knew of the alleged witness coaching from the 

nature of Nava’s IAC claim. We decline to do so. 

The standard articulated in Stanfield was not a new standard, nor did it supersede the 

requirement that a petitioner is required to allege facts, supported by admissible evidence, in 

support of his claim. As noted by the Stanfield Court, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists 

when ‘the appellant has alleged facts in his petition that if true, would entitle him to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)). Thus, even after 

Stanfield, it is still the petitioner’s burden to show that trial counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. Dunlap v. State, ___ Idaho ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___, ___ 

(Aug 30, 2022) (noting to establish deficient performance, this Court requires defendant to show 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness); Pomrenke v. State, 

169 Idaho 474, 478, 497 P.3d 548, 552 (Ct. App. 2021) (same).

Nava’s amended petition did not allege or include admissible evidence from which it would 

be reasonable to infer that his trial counsel was aware of the alleged witness coaching. Nava’s 

amended petition, filed with the assistance of post-conviction counsel, omitted this relevant fact. 

This Court declines to insert a fact that is crucial to the IAC claim into the amended petition. 

Without a factual basis, inferring that Nava’s trial counsel knew of the alleged witness coaching 

would not be reasonable. Without being aware of the alleged witness coaching, trial counsel could 

not have provided deficient performance by failing to object. Nava did not meet his burden to 

show that trial counsel provided deficient performance. 
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Similarly, Nava does not provide any admissible evidence to support that he was prejudiced 

by his trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance, as required under the second prong of 

Strickland. Nava argues this Court should infer prejudice on Nava’s IAC claim because of 

statements the district court made when analyzing the claim as one of a trial court error. While 

Nava argues the district court erroneously analyzed the claim as a claim of direct trial error, he 

asserts we should nonetheless adopt some of the district court’s legal conclusions contained in the

direct trial error analysis. We decline to do so for several reasons. 

First, the district court’s analysis of the witness coaching claim as a direct trial error claim

is superfluous as both parties acknowledge Nava’s amended petition for post-conviction relief did 

not assert a claim of direct trial error. Second, while the district court found that if Nava’s witness 

coaching claim were true, it could raise a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of 

guilt, the district court’s conclusion rests upon the inadmissible information contained in the five 

letters. Those letters contain no information relative to counsel’s knowledge of the alleged 

coaching or any prejudice stemming therefrom. The district court’s statement is largely a 

generalized conclusion that witness coaching, if true, affects the fairness of a trial. As noted, no 

direct trial error claim was or is at issue in this case. Thus, we disregard any analysis related to 

the non-plead claim. 

Third, while the district court need not have considered Nava’s IAC claim under a direct

trial error analysis, it also correctly considered the claim under the Strickland standard for 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. When the district court considered Nava’s IAC claim

under Strickland, the court found that Nava’s “prejudice argument consists of nothing more than 

unsupported and conclusory statements.” Thus, the district court found that Nava did not provide 

sufficient evidence of prejudice under the correctly applied Strickland standard. We decline to 

infer that the district court intended the legal conclusion in its direct trial error analysis to apply to 

its ineffective assistance of counsel analysis because the court explicitly identified the correct legal 

standard for assessing Nava’s IAC claim, used that standard when analyzing the claim, and 

thereafter dismissed Nava’s IAC claim. 

Moreover, on appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards 

utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts 

which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929; 

Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. As such, this Court conducts an independent analysis 
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to determine if a petitioner provided admissible evidence to assert that he was prejudiced by trial 

counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Nowhere in Nava’s amended petition does Nava assert 

that a timely objection by his trial counsel to the alleged witness coaching would have likely

changed the trial’s outcome. Accordingly, because Nava did not allege or show evidence that the 

outcome of his trial would have been different if Nava’s trial counsel had objected to the alleged 

witness coaching, Nava did not meet his burden to show that he was prejudiced by his trial 

counsel’s alleged deficient performance. 

With no admissible evidence to support either of the Strickland prongs, Nava’s IAC claim 

was bare and conclusory and the district court did not err by summarily dismissing the petition. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Nava’s IAC claim in the amended petition was bare, conclusory, and unsupported by 

admissible evidence. As a result, Nava failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding 

his claim and the district court did not err in summarily dismissing the amended petition. The 

judgment summarily dismissing Nava’s amended petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed. 

Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.