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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 17-2667

S H E R AR D M AR T I N , Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D AVI S M ARI N E Z

, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s, Ea stern Di v i s i o n. No . 1 5 -CV-0 4 5 7 6 — A my J. St. Eve , Judg e.

A RGU E D N OV E MB E R 2, 2018

— D E C I D E D A UGUS T 12, 2019

Befor e R I P PL E, K AN N E, and R OVN E R , Circuit Judges

. R OVN E R , Cir cuit Judge. S her ar d Mar ti n appeals the di s tr i ct
cour t’s gr ant of par ti al summary j udgment, Fed. R. Ci v
. P

. 56,

on h i s sui t under 42 U.S .C. § 1983 a gai nst the Ci ty of Chi cago and sev er al o f it s poli ce offi cer s for false ar r est and unlawful

sear ch. Mar ti n’s sui t pr oceeded to tr i al, wher e a j ur y aw ar ded hi m $1.00 in damages after finding that tw o of the defendants2 No. 17-2667
lacked r easonable s uspi ci on or pr obable cause to detai n hi m. The j u r y found agai nst Mar ti n and in fav o r o f the offi cer s on the r emainder of hi s clai m s. Mar ti n appeals, challengin g only the d i str i c t cour t’s p r etr i al gr a nt of par ti a l s ummar y j udgment to the defendants, whi ch li mi ted the d amages Mar ti n c o uld seek at tr i al. W

e affi r m. I. Mar ti n’s sui t a r i ses fr om a tr af f ic stop in May 2013. W e
r ecount the f acts sur r ounding the stop and subsequent ev ents in the li ght most fav or able to Mar ti n, n oti ng di sputed fac t s wher e r elev ant and vi ewing the facts on wh ic h t he j ur y
r eached a v er di ct in the li ght most fav or able to the v er di ct. On the ev enin g o f M a y 24, 2013, Mar ti n w as dr i v ing in Chi cago when Offi cer s Dav i s Mar in ez and S ofi a Gonzalez p u lled hi m
ov er
. Accor ding to Mar ti n, h e h a d not commi tted any tr affi c
v i olati ons when the offi cer s stopped hi m, a lthough the offi cer s clai m they in i tia t ed the stop because Mar ti n ’s tai l and br ake li ghts w er e not w or ki ng. When Offi cer Gonzalez appr oached the car and asked Mar ti n for hi s li c ense a nd insur ance, Mar ti n explai ned that he di d not ha v e hi s d r i v er ’s li cense because i t had b een “taken for a ti cket.” At that poi nt b oth offi cer s a sked Mar ti n to s tep out of the car a s the other defendants, Offi cer s Ar mando Chagoy a and Elv i s T u r cinov i c, ar ri v ed on the scene. Ac c o r din g to Mar ti n, the offi c er s for ced h i m fr om the car , conducted a pat-down sear c h, h andcuffed hi m, and put hi m into a poli ce c a r
. At that p oi nt, they sear ched hi s car , wher eNo. 17-2667 3 they r ecov er ed a 9 mm semi automati c handgun wi th a d efaced

ser i a l number

, and a plasti cbaggi e of cr ack cocaine. 1 Offi cer s then took Mar ti n into custody

. At th e poli ce stati on, Offi cer Mar inez lear ned th at Mar tin had pr ev i ously been conv i cted of fi r st-degr ee mur d er a nd unlawful u s e o f a
w eapon by a conv i cted felon. Ulti mately Mar ti n w as tr ansfer r ed to Cook County Jai l a n d c h a r ged wi th four Illi noi s feloni es: (i ) b ei ng an ar med habi tual cr i minal in v i olati on of 720 ILC S § 5/24-1.7; (i i ) being a felon in possessi on of a fi r ear m in
v i olati on of 720 ILCS § 5/24-1.1; (i i i ) possessin g a fi r ear m wi th

a defaced ser i a l number in vi olati on of 720 ILCS § 5 /24-5(b); and possessing cocaine in v i olati on of 720 ILCS § 570/402. He also r ecei v ed tr affi c ci tati ons under Chi cago Mun i ci pal Code S ecti on 9-76-050 ( tai lli ght oper ati on) and 625 ILCS § 5/6-112 (outli ning r equi r ement to car r y a dr i v er ’s li cense). Id.
Mar ti n spent s i x ty - fiv e days—fr om May 24 thr ough July 29, 2013—incar cer a ted in connecti on wi th the char ges r esulting fr om the tr affi c stop. On July 29th, a di ffer ent cour t r ev oked Mar ti n’s bond when he w as c onv i cted in an u nr elated cr i minal

case. Dur ing the cour s e of the cr i minal pr oceedin g s for the felony char ges ar i sing fr om the t r affi c stop, Mar ti n fi led a moti on to suppr ess the ev i dence, whi ch the tr i a l c our t gr anted

o n N ov ember 7, 2013. The state then di smi ssed the char ges agai nst Mar ti n thr ough a nolle pr osequi moti on.

1 In the offi cers’ v ersi o n o f ev ents, th ey spo tted a ha ndgun b etwe e n M a rti n’s l egs a s h e stepped o ut o f hi s ca r a nd pl a ced hi m i mmedi a tel y i n t o custo dy. Offi cer Cha go yacl a i ms to ha v e fo u nd the pl a sti c b a ggi e o f cra ck

co ca i ne a s w el l a s $ 4 00 when he sea rched t he ca r pri o r to ha v i ng i t i mpo unded.4 No. 17-2667
Mar ti n fi l ed thi s sui t in feder al cour t under 42 U.S

. C. § 1983 agai nst all o f the offi cer s inv olv ed in the stop a s well as the Ci ty of Chi cago ( on a re s p o ndeat superior theor y of li abi li ty), seeki ng money damages for v i olati o ns of hi s Four th Amendmen t ri ghts. Mar ti n sought ci vi l damages totali ng $110,500: $1,000 per day of hi s 65-day incar c er a t io n a n d $45,500 in lost business income—calculated at $700 per day—fr om hi s automobi le dealer s hi p. Befor e tr i al, the defendants m ov ed f or par ti al summary j udgment, ar gui ng that ev en i f the stop w as unlawful, once the offi cer s saw the h andgun and cocain e, they h ad pr obable cause f o r Mar tin’s ar rest, whi ch li mi ted Mar ti n’s damages to the shor t per i od betw een hi s stop and h i s ar rest. The di str i ct cour t agr eed, gr anti ng the defendants’ moti on for par ti al summary j u dgment a nd concluding that although Mar ti n’s § 1983 c a s e could pr oceed as to the ini ti al stop of hi s car and sei z ur e of hi s per son—befor e the defendants d i s cov er ed the i llegal gun and cocain e—he could not s e ek damages for conduct p ost-dati ng the di scov er y o f c o n tr aband, including hi s 65-day in car cer a ti on. Mar ti n’s case p r oceeded to a j ur y tr i al, li mi ted as descr ibed abov e by the gr ant of par ti al summary j udgment. At tr i al, the facts lar gely tr a c ked those descr ibed abov e, wi th the same basi c ar eas of confli cting testi mony: (1) Mar ti n testi fi ed that hi s tai l and br a ke li ghts w er e bo th functi oni n g when he w as stopped; (2) he also testi fi ed that he handed Offi cer Gonzalez hi s tr affi c ti c k e t w he n h e w as unable to p r oduce hi s l i cense; and (3) Mar tin maintai ned that the h andgun w as under the dr i v er ’s seat, as opposed to on i t and v i si ble when h e stepped out of the car as di r ected by Offi cer s Gonzalez and Mar inez.No. 17-2667 5
The di str i c t cour t instr ucted the j ur y to deci de the following Four th Amendment questi ons: ( 1) whether the offi cer s “unlawfully sei zed” M a rti n wi thout r easonable suspi ci on to sup p o r t a tr affi c stop; (2) whether they falsely a r r ested hi m
w i thout pr obable cause; or (3) whether they unlawfully

sear ched hi s per son o r c a r wi thout pr obable c ause. The cour t also instr ucted the jur y that i f they found t ha t Mar ti n pr ov ed h i s clai ms, they could not aw ar d hi m damages f or any tim e spent in custody after offi cer s found the handgun, a n d should li m i t thei r co n s ider ati on to the per i od of detenti on b egi nning wi th hi s tr a ffi c stop and ending when they found the gun. The j ur y found in f av or of Mar ti n and agai nst Offi cer s Mar inez and Gonzalez on the unlawful sei z ur e clai m a nd a w a r d e d h i m $1.00 in compensator y damages. On that same claim, t h ey found in fav or of Offi cer s Chagoy a and T ur c in ov i c, and on the

r e ma ining clai ms for false ar r est and unlawful sear ch, they found against Mar tin and in fav or of all four offi cer s
. Mar tin n o w appeals fr om the di str i ct cour t’s gr ant of par ti al

summary j udgment befor e tr i al li mi ti ng the scope of damages

av ai lable.
II. W e r ev i ew the di str i ct cour t’s gr ant of summar y j udgment de novo , consi der ing the recor d in the li ght m ost f a v o r a ble to Mar ti n a n d constr uing all reasonable infer ences fr om the

ev i dence i n hi s fav or
. E.g. Anderson v
. Liberty Lobby , Inc. , 477 U.S

. 242, 255 (1986); T

olliver v
. City of Chicago , 820 F .3d 237, 241 (7th Ci r
. 2 016). Summar y j udgment i s appr opr i ate when ther e
ar e no genuin e di sputes of mater i al fact and the m o v a n t i s enti tled to j u dgment as a matter of l aw
. Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 56(a). As6 No. 17-2667
for those i ssues pr esented to the j ur y , w e v i ew the ev i dence in the li ght most fav or able to i ts v er di ct. Matthews v. W is. Ener gy Corp., Inc. , 642 F .3d 565, 567 (7th Ci r . 2011). Mar ti n challenges o n l y the d i s tr i ct cour t’s gr ant of par ti al

summary j u dgment befor e tr i al. He does not di spute the j ur y’s

v er di ct in h i s fav or as to the in i ti al tr affi c stop and agai nst hi m
on all of hi s r emaining clai ms. Hi s a p peal thus r ai ses the

nar r o w i ssue of what type of d a mages he can r ecov er as a
r esult of hi s unlawful sei zur e by Offi cer s Mar inez and G onzalez. In con si der ing thi s i ssue, w e ar e min dful of the j ur y’s

v er di ct r ej ecti ng Mar ti n’s false ar r est clai m a s w ell as hi s clai m for unlawful sear ch based on the offi cer s’ sear ch of h i s v ehi cle. W e thus consi der s olely whether Mar ti n’s ini ti al unconsti tuti onal s ei zur e can suppor t hi s clai m for damages ar i sing fr om l o s s e s fr om h i s subsequent incar cer ati on on the w eapon an d dr ug char ges. Mar ti n ar gues that the di str i ct c our t er r oneously based i ts conclusi on that he w as bar r ed fr om collecting d a m a ges fr om h i s wr ongful incar cer ati on on the pr emi se that a § 1 9 8 3 clai m aint may not r ecov er damages as a r esult of the “fr ui t of the poi sonous tr ee” doctr in e. Accor ding to Ma r t in, when assessin g a v ai lable damages u nder § 1983, we should begi n b y asking whether the plainti ff’s a lleged damages w er e pr oxi

mately caused b y the consti tuti onal vi olati on. Fr om that star tin g poi nt, Mar ti n main tai ns that he i s, at t h e v e r y least, enti tled to hav e a jur y deci de whether hi s in c a r c er ati on and any consequenti al damages ar i sing fr om i t w er e pr oxi mately caused by the unconsti tuti onal stop.No. 17-2667 7
The “basi c p ur pose” of damages under § 1983 i s to “ c ompensate p er s ons for inj ur i es that ar e caused by the depr i v ati on of c onsti tuti onal r i ghts.” Carey v
. Piphus , 4 3 5 U.S

. 2 4 7, 2 5 4 (1978); see also Memphis v
. Cmty. Sch. District v
. S ta c h u ra , 477 U.S

. 299, 3 06 (1986). The S upr eme Cour t has “ repeatedly noted that 42 U.S .C. § 1983 cr eates a s p eci es of tor t li abi l i ty .” Heck v
. Humphrey, 512 U.S

. 477, 483 ( 1994) (quoting Stachura , 477 U.S

. at 305)(inter n al quotati on mar ks omi tted)). Thus, the appr opr i

ate star ti ng place for the damages inqui r y under § 1983 i s the common law of tor ts. Carey, 435 U.S . at 253. Using the av ai lable common-law tor ts as a s t ar ting poi nt, Mar ti n’s damages clai m im m e di a tely runs into tr ouble. Hi s complaint asser ts clai ms for “false ar r est” as w ell as “unlawful

sear ch” ar i sing fr om the defendants’ v i olati on of hi s Four th Amendment r i ght to be fr ee fr om “unr easonable sear ches and sei zur es,” U.S

. Const. Amend. IV

. But a c lai m for false ar r est cannot succeed because i t i s undi spu ted that offi cer s di scov er ed an i llegal handgun and cocaine in Mar ti n’s v ehi cle, whi ch gav e them p r obable caus e f o r hi s ar r est, notwi thstanding the pr ev i ous unlawful stop. See Holmes v
. V illage of Hoffman Estates , 511 F .3d 673, 679 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (“A poli ce offi cer has pr obable

cause to ar rest a n indi v i dual when the facts a nd ci r cumstances that ar e known to hi m r easonably su p p o r t a beli ef that the indi v i dual has commi tted, i s commi tti n g , o r i s about to

... commi t a cr i me.”). Gi v en thi s , M a r ti n’s clai m runs headlong into the r ule t h at i f an “offi cer had pr obable cause to beli ev e that the p er s on he ar r ested w as inv olv ed in cr i min al acti v i ty , then a Four th Amendment clai m f or false ar r est i s for eclosed.” Id. a t 6 79–80; Morfin v
. City of East Chicago , 349 F .3d 989, 997 (7th Ci r
. 2003) (collecting cases); se e a lso Maniscalco v
. Simon ,8 No. 17-2667
712 F .3d 1139, 1143 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (“Pr o b a b l e c a use i s an absolute b ar to a clai m of false a r r est asser ted u nder the Four th Amendment and secti on 1983.”) (quoti ng Stokes v
. Bd. of Educ. , 599 F .3d 617, 6 22 (7th Ci r
. 201 0 ))

. M or eov er , the fact that the

ev i dence w as the fr ui t of an i llegal d etenti on does n ot make i t any less r elev ant to establi shing pr obable caus e for the ar r est because the exclusi onar y r u le does no t apply in a c i v i l sui t under § 1983 agai n st poli ce offi c er s. See V aughn v
. C hapman , No. 16-1065, 2016 WL 5944726, *3 (7th Ci r
. 2 016) (unpubli s hed

or der ); see also Lingo v
. City of S al e m , 832 F .3d 953, 958–59 (9th Ci r
. 2016); Black v
. W

igington , 811 F .3d 1259, 1267–68 (11th Ci r
. 2016); T ownes v
. City of New Y ork , 176 F

. 3d 1 38, 1 4 5 ( 2d Ci r
. 1 9 9 9 ) ; W ren v
. T owe, 130 F

. 3d 1154, 1 158 (5th Ci r
. 1997). And although Mar ti n’s complaint i s li mi ted to c lai ms for false ar r est and unlawful se a r c h, i t bear s noti ng that the exi stence of pr obable cause for the a r r est w ou ld a l so bar r ecov er y on a t heor y of mali c i ous pr osecuti on. See Stewart v
. Sonne b o r n , 98 U

. S

. 1 87, 194 ( 1878) (“The exi stence of a w ant of pr obable

cause i s, as w e hav e seen, essenti al to ev er y sui t for a mali ci ous pr ose c u t io n.”); Thompson v
. City of Chicago , 722 F .3d 963, 969 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (noti ng that mali ci ous pr osecuti on clai m under I l l in oi s law requi r es pr oof that u nder l yi ng cr i minal pr oceeding concluded in mannerindi cating i nnocence). Ignor ing the in s ur mountable hur d l e s t o hi s c l a i m p r esented by possi ble tor t law analogs, Mar tin insi sts that he i s enti tled to damages for hi s in c ar c er ati on solely on a theor y of pr oxi m ate cause—underthe gener al r ule of Carey that a damages aw ar d under § 1983 should compensate for what Mar ti n char a cter i zes
as any inj ur i es a r i sing as a r esult of a consti tuti onal depr i v a ti on. Although the di str i c t cour t consi der ed Mar tin ’s clai m thatNo. 17-2667 9
hi s e nt i t lement to damages for post-ar r est incar cer ati on should be resolv ed usin g a pr oxi mate cause analysi s, after r ev i ewing the cases Ma r t in ci ted, the cour t d eemed such an appr oach

unnecessary in li ght of i ts conclusi on that the exi s t e nce of pr ob a b l e cause after the ini ti al detenti on for eclosed any f ur ther damages. Ci ti ng Carey, Mar ti n poi nts out that he s hould not be b ar r ed fr om r ecov er ing § 1983 d amages si mply because r ecov er y
w ould n ot be per m i tted under a common-law tor t such as false

ar rest. As the Cour t explai ned in Carey, “the inter ests pr otected by a par ti cular c onsti tuti onal r i ght may not also be pr otected by an analogous br anch of the common law tor ts.” Carey, 435 U.S

. at 258. Thus, the Cour t r ecogni zed t hat a lthough the

common law elements of damages and the p r er equi si tes for t h e ir r ecov er y ar e the a ppr opr i ate “ star ti ng poi nt for the inqui r y under § 1 983,” those c ommon-law tor t theor i es may not “p r ov i de a complete soluti on to the damages i ssues in
ev er y § 1983 case.” I

d. at 258. The Cour t accor dingly s et out an appr oach to handling those si tuati ons wher e the common-law tor t theor i es w ould not allow r ecov er y but ther e w er e consti tuti onal inter ests i m pli cated that m i ght nonetheless w a r r a n t

r edr ess when v i olated. Carey explai n ed that “to fur ther the pur pose of § 1983, the r ules gov er ning compensatio n f or inj ur i es c a used b y the depr i v ati on of consti tuti onal ri ghts should be tai lor ed to the inter est pr o t e c t ed by the p ar ti cular

r i ght in questi on—j u s t as the common-law rules of damages themselv es w er e defined by the in ter est s pr otected in the

v ar ious br anches of tor t law .” Id. at 258–59. Under that

r a ti onale, w e must deter m ine whether the post

- a r r est damages10 No. 17-2667
for incar ce r a ti on Mar ti n seeks w ould effectiv ely redr ess the inter ests the Four th Amendment i s intended to pr otect. W e hav e not resolv ed the speci fi c questi on whether a plainti ff may r ecov er damages for po s t-ar r est incar cer ati on fo l l o w in g a Four th Amendment vi olati on when pr ob ab l e c a u s e suppor ted t h e u lti mate ar r est and ini ti ati on of cr i minal pr oceedi ngs, but the appli ca t i on of the exclusi onar y r ule spar ed the plainti ff fr om the cr i minal pr osecuti on. As Mar ti n notes, ther e i s a spli t of a uthor i ty on the questi on of whether a defendant whose Four th or Fi fth Amendment ri ghts hav e b een
v i olated can re cov er damages for incar c er ati on, legal defense fees, or emoti onal di str ess in a su b s e q u ent ci v i l sui t under § 1983. Compare T

ownes v
. City of New Y

o r k , 1 76 F .3d 138, 148 (2d Ci r
. 1 9 99) (no damages for costs associ ated wi th defending agai nst gun possessi on char ges when ev i d ence for char ges
ar ose from unlawfu l sear ch); Hector v
. W a tt, 235 F .3d 154, 155–59 ( 3 d Ci r
. 2000) (no damages for c osts incur r ed in
cr i min al pr osecuti on for dr ug possessi on char ges ar i s ing fr om unconsti tuti onal sear ch) with B o runda v
. Rich m o n d, 885 F .2d 1384, 1389–90 (9th Ci r
. 1988) (allowing admi ssi on of a cqui ttal of c r i minal char ges in plainti ffs’ subsequent § 1983 s ui t to
r ecov er money s pent on attor neys’ fees d efendin g cr i minal char ges); see also T

rain v
. City of Albuquer q ue, 6 2 9 F

. Supp.2d 1243, 1255 (D.N.M. 2009) (allowing j ur y to deter min e whether

u nlawful sear ch that led to gun p ossessi on char ges p r o x imately caused plainti ff’s cr i minal defense costs, loss of income, and emoti onal di str ess damages).
Mar ti n, h ow ev er

, insi sts that in Ke r r v
. City of Chicago , 424 F .2d 1134 (7th Ci r
. 1970), we h e l d t hat such damages ar e
r ecov er able and that her e the di str i ct cour t w as obli gatedNo. 17-2667 11
under Kerr to allow hi s damages c l a im. The di str i ct cour t

r e je c t e d K e r r as contr olli ng her e gi v en “factual di ffer ence s ” a n d

case law dev elopments s ince i t w a s “ d e c i ded near ly 47 y ear s ago.” (Appellant’s App. at A-14.)
Li ke the di str i ct cour t, w e r ej ect Mar ti n ’s clai m that Kerr i s di sposi ti v e on the questi on of allow ab l e d amages. Mar tin r eli es almost exclusi v ely on a sentence from Kerr stati ng wi thout fu r ther explanati on that “ [ a] plainti ff in a ci v i l r i ghts acti o n shoul d b e allow ed to r ecov er the attor neys’ fees in a state
cr i min al acti on wher e the expendi tur e i s a f or eseeable r esult of the acts of the defendant.” Kerr, 424 F .2d at 1141. The minor plainti ff in Kerr alleged that Ch icago p oli ce had v i olated hi s Fi fth Amendment consti tuti onal r i ghts by using physi cal f or ce to obtai n an inv oluntar y confessi on, whi ch w as used to detai n hi m for 1 8 months aw a i ti ng and d u r in g tr i a l, when a n olle pr osequi w as enter ed after the jur y w as unable to r each a
v er di ct. Kerr, 424 F

. 2d at 1136–37. The pr eci se i ssue in Kerr w as thus whether the p lainti ff should hav e been allow ed to pr esent
ev i de n ce in hi s ci v i l case of attor neys’ fees expended in hi s under lyi ng cr i minal c a s e, whi ch hinged enti r ely on hi s inv oluntar y confessi on. Id. a t 1141. S o although i n the abstr act Kerr stands for the pr oposi ti on that for eseeable damages ar i sing fr om a consti tu t io na l v i olati on may be r ecov er ed, i t sheds no li ght on the pr eci se questi on Mar ti n’s a ppeal poses. 2 Using the fr amew or k of Carey , i t i s easy

2 The sa me i s true fo r a much mo re recen t c a s e fro m o ur ci rcui t ci t ed b y M a rti n i n hi s repl y b ri ef, Joh nson v
. Wi n st e a d , 9 0 0 F.3 d 4 2 8 (7 th Ci r. 2 0 1 8 ). M a rti n ch a r a c t e r i z es Joh nson a s ho l di n g tha t da ma g es co ul d b e reco v ered (co nti nued...)12 No. 17-2667

to see that the inter est pr otected by the Fi fth Amendment r i ght agai nst self-incr i minati on w as di r ectly i mpli cated b y the

coer ced confessi on and r esulting cr i minal tr i a l. Kerr is t hus enti r ely in keepi ng wi th Carey in the sense that the damages sought—expenses of d e fe n d in g th e c r i m in a l t r i a l p r o s e cu t e d on the str ength of the inv oluntar y confessi on—ar i se d i rectly fr om the consti tuti onal v i olati on and r edr ess the pr eci se inter est the Fi fth Amendment pr otects: the r i ght not to b e compell e d in a
cr i min al case t o b e a wi tness agai nst oneself. S i m p ly put, nothi ng in Kerr sheds a n y li ght on Mar ti n ’s clai m that he i s enti tled to pur sue damages forhi s post-ar r est i ncar cer ati on. That leav es us wi th t h e h a ndful of appellate cour ts that hav e consi der ed the speci fi c i s s ue of the pr oper scope of c i v i l damages for damages following an i llegal sear ch or sei zur e. In T ownes , the S econd Ci r cui t consi der ed whether to a w a r d compensator y da m a g e s in a § 1983 c i v i l sui t a fter poli ce stopped a tax i w it h out pr obable cause and di scov er ed an i llegal fi r ear mand cocaine. The plainti ff’s moti on to suppr ess

2 (...co nti nued) fo r i nca rcera ti o n sub sequent to a fa i l ure to pro v ide Mirand a wa rni ngs, d e s p i t e the fa ct tha t a fa i l u re to pro v i de such wa rni ngs i s i tsel f no t a
v i ol a ti o n o f the Fi fth A mendment ri ght a ga inst sel f-i n c r i mi n a ti o n
. But M a rti n mi srea ds Joh nson , whi ch speci fi es tha t a n a ctua l Fi fth A mendment

v i ol a ti o n o ccurs o nl y when the i nfo rma ti o n a cqu i red wi tho ut M irand a
wa rni ngs i s i ntro duced a t tri a l to s ecure a cri mi na l co nv i cti o n. M a rti n cl a i ms Joh nson wo ul d a l l o w da ma ges b a sed on a v io la ti o n o f a pro phyl a cti c rul e– the fa i l ure to gi v e Mirand a wa rni n g s i tsel f—b ut he mi srea ds Joh n son
. The da ma ges Joh nson co ntempl a tes wo ul d b e tho se a ri si n g fro m i nca rcera ti on fo r the a ctua l Fi fth A mendment v io la t i o n o f a dmi t ti ng the sta tements
a t tri a l to secure a cri mi na l co nv i cti o n, not, a s M a rti n sugg e s t s , fo r a
v i ol a ti o n o f a pro phyl a cti c rul e. Id

. a t 4 3 4– 3 5

.No. 17-2667 13
the fi r ear m w a s in i ti ally den ie d , a n d he w as conv i cted of unlawful p os s e s sio n of a fi r ear m b y a felon. Ov er tw o y ear s later , the state appellate di v i si on r ev er s ed the conv i cti on on the gr ounds that poli ce had lacked p r o b a b le cause to s top and

sear ch th e taxi cab. In hi s subsequent ci v i l sui t, the T ownes plainti ff sought to r ecov er c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s a r i sin g fr om hi s conv i cti on and incar cer ati on. Id. a t 149. Ci ti ng Carey

, the panel in T

o wnes r ej ected the plainti ff’s damages clai m
. After r uling out r ecov er y under any c ommonlaw tor t t h e o r i es, the S econd Ci r cui t also r ej ected pr oxi m ate
cause a s a possi

b l e basi s for r ecov er y

. In doi ng so, the cour t noted that “the chain on causati o n b e tw een a p oli ce offi cer ’s unlawful ar rest and a subsequent conv i c ti on a nd incar cer ati on i s br oken by the inter v ening exer c i se of in d e pendent j udgment”—sp eci fi cally

, the tr i a l cour t’s fai lur e to suppr ess the incr i minati ng ev i d ence befor e tr i al. Id. at 1 47. In an attempt to di stingui sh T

ownes , M a r t in sei zes thi s causati on a nalysi s, b ut i gnor es the rest of the h o ld i n g in T ownes, whi ch w ould squar ely for eclose Mar ti n’s clai m. In a ddi ti on to c oncluding that t he tr i al c our t’s r efusal to suppr ess the ev i dence of the unlawful sear ch w as an in ter v ening and super seding cause of the c o nv i c t i on, the S econd Ci r cui t noted that t h e pl a inti ff w as “for eclosed fr om r ecov er y for a second, independent r eason: the inj ur y he pleads ( a v i olati on of his F our th Amendment r i ght to be fr ee fr om unr easonable

sear ches a n d sei zur es) does not fi t the damages he seeks (compensati on for hi s conv i cti on and in c ar cer ati on).” Id. B e a r in g in mind the S upr eme Cour t’s di r ecti v e in Carey to tai lor § 1983 li abi li ty to match the a ffected consti tuti onal r i ghts,14 No. 17-2667
see Carey, 435 U.S

. at 258, T ownes poi nted out a “gr oss di sconnect” betw een the consti tuti onal v i olati on (the Four th Amendment r i ght to b e fr ee fr om unr easonable sear ches and sei zur es) and the inj ur y for whi ch r ecov er y w a s s ought (the subsequent

conv i cti on and incar cer ati on)

. T o w n es , 176 F .3d at 148. As the panel in T

ownes obser v ed, “[t]he ev i l of an unr easonable sear ch

or sei zur e i s that i t inv ades pr i v acy , not that i t u ncov er s cr i me, whi ch i s no ev i l at all.” Id.
T ownes thus r easoned that to aw ar d damages for a conv i cti on and incar cer a ti on that follow ed an i l legal sear ch w ould be tantamount to aw ar ding a windfall benefi t in that the plainti ff “alr eady r eaped an enor mous benefi t by r eason of the i llegal sei zur e a nd sear ch to whi ch h e w as subj ected: hi s fr eedom, achi ev ed by the suppr essi on of ev i dence obtai ned in v i olati on of the Four th Amendment.” I d. ; cf. United States v
. Calandra , 414 U.S

. 338, 3 4 7 ( 1 9 74) (“The pur pose of the exclusi onar y r ule i s not to r edr ess the in

j ur y to the pr i v acy of the s e a r ch v i c ti m
. .

. [i ]nstead, the r u le’s pr i me pur pose i s to deter futur e unlawful poli ce conduct and th e r e by effectuate the guar antee of the Four th Am e ndment a gai n st unr easonable sear ches and sei zur es[.]”). The di str i c t cour t f ound the r ati onale of T ownes p e r suasi v e and n oted that i t had b een ci ted r epeatedly by di str i ct cour ts in our ci r cui t assessing ci v i l damages for Four th Amendment v i olati ons. See Cannon v
. Christopher, No. 1:06-CV

267, 2007 WL 2609893, at *4 (“S ev e r al feder al cour ts in the S ev enth Ci r cui t hav e adopted the T o wnes pr inci ple a nd a ppli ed i t to dis m is s c ases wher e pr obable c ause exi sted despi te an allegati on of an i mpr oper ini ti a l stop and s ear ch.”); see also W illiams v
. Carroll , No. 08 C 4169, 2010 WL 5463362, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2 9, 2 010) (collectin g ca s e s and obser v ing thatNo. 17-2667 15 although “ holding of T ownes has not been ex p r essly adopted h e r e in the Sev enth Ci r cui t, i t has not been meanin g fu l l y challenged in thi s (or any other ) ci r cui t

. On the other hand, i t has been r eli ed upon in numer ous di str i ct cour t opi ni ons.”). The following y ear

, the Th i r d Ci r c u it r eached a si mi lar conclusi on in Hector v
. W att , supra
. In Hector, the plainti ff br ought a § 1983 sui t to reco v er compensati on f or expenses incur r ed dur ing hi s cr i minal pr osecuti on based on 80 pounds of hall u c in o geni c mushr ooms s ei zed fr om hi s ai r p lane. Li ke Mar ti n, the plainti ff had successfully li ti gated a suppr essi on moti on for the sei zed dr ugs and t h e pr osecuti on a gai nst hi m
w as di smi s sed. The Thi r d Ci r cui t fi r s t c oncluded , a s w e di d abov e, that exi sting common-law tor ts could not pr ov i d e the basi s for the

r equested damages. Hector, 2 35 F .3d at 156 ( “Gi v en the S upr eme Cou r t ’ s m a n date that w e look to si m i lar common-law

causes of acti on, H ector appe a r s t o be on the hor n s of a di lemma. If h i s clai m i s categor i zed as bein g l ik e false ar r est, then hi s clai m fai l s because false ar r e s t d o e s not per mi t damages incur r ed after an indi c tment, excluding a ll the damages h e s e e k s
. But i f hi s c lai m i s tr eated a s r esembling mali ci ous pr osecuti on, then he w ould face the pr oblem that a plainti ff clai ming mali c i ous p r osecuti on must be innocent of the cr i me char ged i n the under lyi ng pr osecuti on.”)
In r ej ecti ng p r oxi mate c a us e as a theor y for recov er y , the Thi r d Ci rcui t, li ke the S econd Ci r cui t in T ownes , concluded that the poli cy r easons behind the exclusi onar y r ule w ould not be

ser v ed by allowing the p lainti ff to “conti nu e to benefi t fr om the exclusi onar y r ule in hi s § 1983 s ui t and be r eli ev ed of defense16 No. 17-2667
costs fr om a pr osecuti on that w as ter minated only because of the exclusi onar y r ule.” Id. at 158. S p eci fi cally , the cour t i n Hector car efully consi der ed the competi ng poli cy concer ns that mi ght be ser v ed by allowing damages ar i sing fr om defending
a cr i minal pr oceedi ng tr i gger e d b y th e d i s c o ver y of contr aband

v i a an unconsti tuti onal sear ch. Bear ing in mind the goal of the exclusi onar y r ule to deter Four th Amendment v i olati ons, the

cour t concluded that p oli cy consi der ati ons mi li tated agai nst any incr emental contr ibuti on to such deter r ence that mi ght be had by allowing for ci v i l damages ar i sing w ell a fter the ini ti al consti tuti onal pr i v acy v i olation that led to the di scov er y of contr aband. Id. at 159. The cour t in Hector thus ulti mately conclu d e d th a t a lthough ther e w ould a d m i ttedly be some deter r ent v a l u e to i m posing li abi l i ty for all consequences that unfold f r o m a sear ch or sei zur e unsuppor ted by pr obable cause, the downsi des of such

an appr oach w ould outw ei gh i ts benefi ts. S p e c ifi cally , the magni tude of the potenti al li abi li ty w o u l d r outi nely be

unr elated to the ser i ousness of the under lyi n g Four th Amendment v i olati o n, in the sense that the damages aw a r d w ould often tur n not on the natur e of the unconsti tuti onal inv asi on of pr i v acy but on whatev er c o n t r aband offi cer s happened to
uncov er
. Id. Noti ng t h a t it w ould be i r r esponsi ble to i mpose potenti a l li abi li ty so di spr opor ti onat e t o the under lyi ng consti tuti onal v i o l a t i o n a n d th at nei ther the scholar ly author i ty
nor any common-law tor t suppor ted s uch a theor y of r ecov er y , the Thi r d Ci rcui t c oncur r ed wi th T ownes to hold that, “ Vi cti ms of u n r easonable sear ches or sei zur es m ay r ecov er damages di r ectly r elated to the inv asi on of t h ei r pr i v a cy–including (wher e appr opr i ate) damages for physi cal inj u r y , pr oper tyNo. 17-2667 17 damage, i nj ur y to r eputati on, etc.; but such v i cti ms cannot be

c o m pe n sated for inj ur i es that r esult fr om the d i s cov er y of incr i minati ng ev i dence and c onsequent cr i minal p r osecuti on.” Id. at 148 ( quoting T

ownes , 176 F .3d at 148). As Mar ti n notes, how ev er , the Ninth Ci r cui t has concluded that damages for in c a r c er ati on and legal fees ar i sing fr om an unlawful detenti on and sear ch may be r ecov er able in a § 1983 sui t. In Borunda v
. Richmond, 885 F .2d 1384 (9th Ci r
. 1988) , the

c o u r t r ej ected p oli ce offi cer s’ appeal fr om a ci v i l damages

aw ar d in f av or of the plai nti ffs after a fin ding that the offi cer s
ar rested them wi thout pr obable cause. The p r eci s e i ssue on appeal w a s whether the di str i ct cour t er red by admi tti ng
ev i dence that the plainti ffs had been acqui tted of the under lying cr i m inal char ges a s w ell as ev i dence of the plainti ffs’ attor neys’ fees in c u r r ed defending agai nst the char ges. Borunda , 885 F .2d at 1386. The c our t concluded that a “plainti ff who establi s hes li abi li ty for depr i v ati ons of c onsti t u ti onal

r i ghts a ct io nable under 42 U.S .C. § 1983 i s enti tled to r ecov er compensator y d ama g e s for a ll inj ur i es suffer ed as a consequence of those depr i v a ti ons.” Id. at 1389.
In Borunda , the cour t concluded that the plainti ffs w er e enti tled to r ecov er y because the “j u r y w as enti tled to fin d, ami dst the str i ki ng omi ssi ons in the poli ce r epor t, a s w ell as the tw o offi cer s’ confli c ti ng accounts of the inci d ent, that appellants pr ocur ed the fi ling of the cr i minal complaint by maki ng mi sr epr esentatio n s to the pr osecuting attor ney .” Id. at 1390. The attor neys’ fees incur r ed defending the cr i minal pr osecuti ons wer e thus di r ectly attr ibutable to the defendant offi cer s ’18 No. 17-2667

mi sconduct— i. e
. , falsi fyi ng in f or mati on in or der to obtai n a
cr i min al complain t. Id. Thus, whi le B o runda , li ke Kerr, may in the abstr act stand for the pr oposi ti on that ci v i l da m a ges may be r ecov er able for expenses r elated to a wr ongful sear ch or ar r est, nothi ng about Borunda ’s r ati onale i s par ti cular ly helpful to Mar ti n. Fi r st, in Borunda , the v er y basi s for the d a m a g e s aw ar d w a s the j ur y’s finding that the defendant offi cer s had ar r ested the pla in t i ffs without pr obable cause and had li kely fabr i cated facts to secur e
a cr i minal co mplain t agai nst the plainti ffs. Id. at 1386–88. On the contr ar y

, the j ur y her e concl u d e d that although Offi cer s M a r inez and Gonzalez unlawfully sei z ed Mar ti n wi thout

r easonable suspi ci on, i t f ound against Mar ti n on the clai m that offi cer s ei ther ar r ested h i m or sear ched hi m or hi s car wi thout pr obable cause. S o u nli ke the plainti ffs in Borun da , whose clai m
s ucceeded pr eci sely b ecause the j ur y concluded that t he defendant offi cer s manufactur ed a tale to s uppo r t pr obable

cause for both the ar r est and subsequent pr osecuti ons, the j ur y her e concluded that pr obable ca use exi sted for both Mar ti n’s

ar rest and any sear ch of hi s automobi le that yi elded contr a band. The holding in Borunda i s thus a far cr y fr om suppor ti ng the outcome Mar ti n seeks her e. Although Mar tin a s ser ts that Borund a s u ppor ts hi s theor y that he may r ecov er damages under a pr oxi mate cause analysi s, Borunda adds l i t t l e to the questi on of for eseeabi li ty gi v en the j ur y’s finding ther e that the defendant offi c e r s “ pr ocur ed the fi l ing of the cr i minal c omplaint by maki ng mi sr epr esentati ons to the pr osecutin g attor ney .” Id. a t 1390. That fin ding leads fai r l y uncontr ov er si ally to the conclusi on that the plainti ffs’ at t o r n e y fees “in cu r r e d dur ing the cr i minal p r osecuti ons w as a di r ect andNo. 17-2667 19
for eseeable consequence of the appellants’ unlawful conduct.” Id. Not so for Mar ti n. Mar ti n’s scenar i o i s far mor e l i ke those in T o wnes and He c t o r , wher e pr obable cause for an ar r est exi s ted d espi te a n encounter that ini ti ally v i olated the Four th Amendment. Fi r st, the pr eci se r ele v a n t questi ons in Borunda w er e ev i denti ar y: whether the di str i ct cour t h ad er r ed in a dmi tti ng ev i dence of the plainti ffs’ p r i or acqui ttal of the cr i m inal c har ges and

ev i dence of attor neys’ fees spent d u r ing the cr i min al pr oceeding. Id. at 1 3 89. And in B orunda , the cour t consi d er ed the j ur y’s finding that the offi cer s lacked pr obable cause and concluded i t w as defensi

b le in li ght of gener al tor t pr inci p les of recov er y; the j ur y’s v er di c t her e cuts in the opposi te di recti on gi v en that, wi th the excepti on of the ini ti al tr affi c stop, the j u r y concluded that the defendants did hav e pr obable c ause for ev er ythi ng that follow ed.
Fi nally , Mar ti n r eli es heav i ly on a case fr om the Di str i ct of N e w M exi co holding that a plainti ff r ai sing a consti tuti onal clai m based on a n i l l e g al sear ch may be per mi tted to r ecov er damages for post-indi ctment pr oceedi ngs i f the consti tuti onal depr i v ati on pr oxi mately caused t he damages. See g enerally T rain v
. City of Albuquer que, 629 F

. S upp.2d 1243 (D.N.M. 2009). The di str i ct cour t in T rain concluded that in addi ti on to pr otecti ng pr i v a cy

, as the cour ts in T

ownes and Hector r ecogni zed, the Four th Amendment had been descr ibed in the T enth Ci r cui t as pr otecti ng “‘liber ty , p r oper ty

, and pr i v a cy inter

ests—a per son’s s ense of secur i ty and indi v i dual di gni ty .’” Id. at 1252 (quoti n g Holland ex rel. Overdorff v
. Harrington , 268 F .3d 1179, 1196 (10th Ci r
. 2001)). Beli ev ing that the T enth Ci r cui t di d20 No. 17-2667

not “take such a n ar r ow v i ew of the Four th Amendment” as the one adv anced in T ownes a n d Hector, the d i s tr i ct cour t in T rain concluded as follows: Accor ding to the T

enth Ci r cui t’s gui d ance o n the Four th Amendment, any damage aw ar d av ai lable for a Four th-Amendment v i olati on under 41 U.S

. C. § 1983 should be tai lor ed to compensating l osses of lib er ty , pr oper ty

, pr i v acy , and a per son’s s e n se of

secur i ty and indi v i dual di gni ty

. Whi le i t may n ot be

an ev i l to u ncov er cr i me, the dr after s obv i ously di d not thi nk uncov er ing cr i me w as a hi gher v a lue than pr ot e cting and secur ing a per son’s home fr om
unr easonable sear ches. Feder al cr i minal char ges, feder al detenti on, a n d all of the negati v e consequen c e s of those char ges and attendant to feder al custody i mpli cated T

r ain ’s inter est in l iber ty and hi s
sense of secur i ty and indi v i dual di gni ty

. That i m pr i sonment occasi oned economi c losses. S uch losses should be comp e nsable, gi v en that they i mpli cate the inter ests that the T

enth Ci rcui t has explai ned the Four th Amendment pr otects. Id. Although Mar ti n ur ges us to r ej ect the logi c of both T ownes and He c to r in f av or of that found in T rain , he f ai ls to i denti fy any Sev enth Ci r cui t law ur gi ng the br oad v i ew of in te r ests pr ote c t e d by the Four th Amendment that dr ov e the di s tr i ct
cour t’s conclusi on in T

rain

. Nor d i d T

rain analyze the plainti ff’s clai m in l i ght of common-law false ar r est. Beca u s e Mar ti n expli ci tly fr amed hi s clai m as one for false ar r est,No. 17-2667 21 (Pl. Compl. 1), we ar e bound by our own pr ecedent li mi ti ng damages r egar dless of what w e m ig ht conclude u nder a pr oxi mate cause analysi s. See Gauger v
. Hendle , 349 F

. 3 d 3 5 4, 362–63 (7th Ci r
. 2003), overruled on other gr ounds by W allace v
. City of Chicago , 4 40 F

. 3 d 421 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (ci ti ng Heck v
. Hu m p hrey, 512 U.S

. 477, 484 (1994)) (av ai lable damages f or false

ar rest cov er only ti me of detenti on unti l i ssuance of pr ocess or
ar rai gnment). And although T rain ably sets for th the competing r ati onale for an expansiv e v iew of both the inter ests pr otected by the Four th Amendment as w ell a s damages

av ai lable for thei r br each, the r a ti onale in T ownes and Hector, in addi ti on to being mor e wi dely accepted as di scussed i n f r a , i s also mor e appli cable to the facts her e. Gi v en the j ur y’s v er di ct a gai nst Mar ti n on h i s c lai ms for false ar r est and unlawful sear ch, the only Four th Amendment inj ur y being r edr essed i s the br i ef ini ti al sei zur e befor e offi cer s asked Mar ti n for hi s li cense. Allowing Mar t in t o r ecov er damages for hi s subsequent i mpr i sonment, set in moti on by an
ar r e s t s u p p o r t e d b y p r obable cause, w ould a mount to pr eci sely the sor t of mi smatch betw een the v i olati o n a n d the damages that T ownes and Hector sought to av oi d. W e do not go so far as to hold that post-ar r est damages may never be r ecov er ed, only that her e such damages w ould be inconsi stent wi th the rule in Carey th a t damages should be tai lor ed to pr otect the r i ght in questi on, 435 U.S

. a t 258. Her e, the r i ght in questi on i s Mar ti n’s Four th Amendment r i ght not to be stopped by offi cer s wi thout

r easo n ab l e s u s p i ci on. That ri ght w a s v in di cated b y the nominal damages the j u r y aw ar ded Mar tin.22 No. 17-2667
It i s thus ulti ma t e l y u n necessar y to delv e in to the thor ny questi on of pr oxi mate cause. See Hector, 235 F .3d at 161 (“Gi v en that the c ases on inter v ening c auses ar e legi on and di ffi cult to
r e conci le

. .. and that w e h av e other , suffi ci ent gr ound s f o r
r esolv ing thi s case, w e wi ll n ot reach t h e issue of in ter v ening causati on.”). That sai d, i t i s w or th n oti ng that ther e i s no r eason Mar ti n’s clai m w ould f ar e any better u n d er that analysi s. Mar ti n’s stop w as c er tai nly the but-for cause of hi s i mpr i s o nment in t h e s e nse that but for the s top offi cer s w ould nev er hav e di scov er ed the handgun and cocaine and ar r ested hi m. But that tells us li ttle about whether the stop w as the proximate

cause of h i s incar cer ati on. See CSX T ransp., Inc. v . McBride, 564 U.S

. 685, 691 (2011) (“The term ‘pr oxi mate cause’ i s shor thand for a concept: Inj ur i es h av e countless causes, and not all should gi v e r i se to legal li abi li ty .”). Any number of super seding, inter v ening ev ents could hav e b r oken the chain of c ausati on, fr om the di scov er y of the contr aband i tself to the in dependent deci si o n t o deny bai l, whi ch w as undoubtedly pr edi cated in par t on Mar ti n’s cr i minal hi stor y and other factor s unr elated to the i ni ti al stop.
Mor eov er

, consi der ati on of pr oxi mate cause takes us back

ar ound to wher e we began: wi th the obser v ati on that pr obable

cause for Mar ti n’s ar r est, whi ch the j ur y concluded e xi sted shor tly after Mar ti n w as pulled ov er , for ecloses Mar ti n’s clai m for damages fr om a ll that follow ed. See T ownes , 176 F

. 3d at 146 (r ecogni zing that “or dinar y pr inci ples of tor t causati on” apply to in i ti al s top and sear ch but concluding that allowing the fr u i t
o f t h e poi sonous tr ee doctr ine to “elongate the chain of causati on” w ould “ di stor t basi c tor t concepts of pr oxi m ate causati on”); accord Edwards , 2012 WL 9 83788 at *7–8 (noti ng theNo. 17-2667 23 same). In shor t, the damages ar i s ing fr om Mar ti n’s in car cer a ti on a r e si mply too attenuated fr om a nd u n r e l a ted to the Four th Amendment v i olati on he has pr ov en: a br i ef detenti on unsuppor ted by pr obable cause or r eas onable suspi ci on. Hi s damages aw ar d w as thus pr oper ly li m i ted to the har m ar i sing fr om hi s unconsti tuti onal d e t enti on befor e h i s lawful ar r est. The d eci si on r egar ding those dama g e s w as left to the j ur y , whi ch deter m ined one dollar w a s the pr oper amount. III. For the for egoi ng r easons, w e AFFIRM the j udgment of the di str i ct cour t.