AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 9, 2020 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00318-CV

B.G.C., Appellant V. M.Y.R., Appellee On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 429-05292-2018 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Browning Opinion by Justice Browning In 2013, appellant BGC (an Oregon resident) 1 and appellee MYR (a Texas resident) began a da ting relationship. The relationship abrupt ly ended in 2017. During the relationship, MYR sen t intimate photographs of herse lf to BGC that she intended to remain private. Subs equently, MYR discovered BGC’s family viewed the photographs, and BGC secretly took other intimate photos of her during their time together.

1 Although MYR’s original and am ended petitions stated BGC lived in Washington, he testified during a deposition that he resides in Oregon.–2– MYR brought the underlying lawsuit against BGC for invasion of privacy, aiding and abetting the invasion of privacy, violating Texas Ci vil Practice and Remedies Code sections 98B.002 an d 143.001, and intentional inf liction of emotional distress. BGC filed a special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction. After a hearing, t he trial court denied BGC’s sp ecial appearance. 2 On appeal, BGC argues the trial court erred by denying his spec ial appearance because he did not have minimum contacts with Texas, and the ex ercise of personal jurisdiction offends the traditi onal notions of fair play and s ubstantial justice. We disagree. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying BGC’s special appearance. 3 Background We begin by acknowledging that the pleadings and evidence in t his case involve facts of a sensitive natu re to those involved, some of which are not relevant to our jurisdictional analysis. We include only the relevant f acts necessary to determine whether BGC’s contacts with Texas support specific ju risdiction over his
person. See T EX

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2 The original lawsuit also incl uded defendants ABC and KRC, app ellant’s adult daughters who both saw one photograph of MYR and allegedly shared it with others. ABC is a resident of Washington, and KRC is a resident of Virginia. The trial court granted their s pecial appearances and dismissed them from the suit. They are not before the Court on appeal. 3 Although BGC challenged both general and specific jurisdiction in the trial court, the parties agree only specific jurisdiction is at issue on appeal. We limit our analysis accordingly. T EX

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. P. 47.1.–3– BGC is a wealthy man who has re peatedly traveled to Texas thro ugh the years for various business reasons and for amorous meetings with MYR. The two engaged in a long-distance relationship for approximately three years. MYR believed the relationship was monogamous, and they often discussed marriage. She described the relationship as a “mature, p rivate, long-distance, intimate relationship.” When BGC visited MYR in Texas, he typically flew on his private jet, which he landed, stored, and refueled a t Dallas Love Field. He reser ved and paid for hotel rooms in Dallas where they met and engaged in intimate activiti es. When MYR traveled to meet BGC in other locations, BGC paid for her airfa re either through her use of a credit card he provided to her or by wiring money into her Texas bank

account. Due to the long-distance nature of the relationship, the two t alked on the phone daily. BGC called and texted M YR in Texas hundreds of times du ring the threeyear relationship. As the relationship progressed, BGC encouraged MYR to send him intimate photos. BGC provided MYR with a phone specifically for the pur pose of sending and receiving private, intimate photos. Although BGC did not r emember telling MYR he wanted a separate phone for sending and receiving pictur es, “I did tell her that I had another phone that I use only as a picture phone, th at if she had photos she wanted to send, she could send them to there.” MYR alleged BGC repeatedly requested and pressured her to s end intimate pictures of hersel f using the phone. He–4– claimed he wanted the pictures because he loved her, he missed her, and the photos would “forever be our private secret.” MYR eventually acquiesced “because she was in love with BGC, th ey lived in different cities, she believe d they would be married and she trusted” him. She believed the personal images “woul d forever be kept private, se cure, and viewed only” by BGC as he promised. BGC also sent MYR numerous unsoli cited photographs of his genitals with vivid descriptions of sexual a cts. He sent the photos to the phone he provided to her. MYR later discovered, that in a ddition to the intimate photogra phs she sent BGC, he secretly took naked photos of her while they stayed in hotel rooms in Texas. In October 2017, MYR received a “Dear John” letter from BGC en ding their relationship. She never saw BGC again. Two years after the break up, MYR filed suit. Relevant to thi s appeal, MYR filed suit alleging (1) invasion of privacy, (2) violation of T exas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 98B.002, a nd (3) intentional infliction o f emotional distress. BGC filed a special appearance. After a hearing, the trial cou rt denied BGC’s special appearance. This interloc utory appeal followed. Scope of Pleadings and Fair Notice Pleading Standard Before considering whether MYR pleaded sufficient facts to brin g BGC within the personal jurisdiction of this state, we must determi ne the scope of the facts–5– we may consider and whether her pleadings include the claims up on which her jurisdictional facts rely. Because the plaintiff defines the scope and nature of the lawsu it, the defendant’s corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const., Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). The defendant has no burden to negate a potential basis for personal jurisdiction when the plaintiff failed to plead it. Id .; Stocksy United v. Morris , No. 01-18-00924-CV, 2019 WL 6904546, a t *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 2019, no pet.). However, we have held the plaintiff’s ori ginal pleading as well as the response to the defendant’s special appearance can be co nsidered in determining whether the plai ntiff satisfied her burden. See Invasix, Inc. v. James , No. 05-19-00494-CV, 2020 WL 897243, a t *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb . 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Flanagan v. Royal Body Care, Inc ., 232 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (considering response to special appearance rather than limiting review to jurisdictional allega tions in third party petition); see also Alliance Royalties, LLC v. Boothe , 329 S.W.3d 117, 120–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). In BGC’s brief, he argues MYR’ s first amended petition did not plead a single fact supporting her allegation th at he invaded her privacy by s urreptitiously taking nude photos of her while in hotel rooms in Texas. Rather, MYR first included these additional allegations in an affi davit attached to her response to the special–6– appearance. Thus, he contends “the failure to mention or inclu de these specific claims related to this surreptit ious photography means that the burden never shifted to [him] and thus leaves no issu e for the Court to consider on appeal.” BGC recognized our holding in Invasix during oral argument and conceded we may consider MYR’s response wh en determining whether MYR sat isfied her burden of pleading facts in support of her claims in her first amended petition (the controlling pleading). He argued, however, MYR cannot add new claims in a
response. Under our “relatively liberal” fair notice standard, “a petitio n is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which the plea der bases his claim.” Kopplow Dev., Inc. v. City of San Antonio , 399 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex. 2013); see also T EX

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. P. 47 (requiring pleadings contain “a short statement of the ca use of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved” ). The test for determining whether a petition provides fair notice is whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature of and basic issues presented by the controversy and what evide nce might be relevant. First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker , 514 S.W.3d 214, 224–25 (Tex. 2017). The question is “whether the pleadings have provided the opposing party suffici ent information to enable that party to prepare a defense or a response.” Id .; Kopplow Dev ., 399 S.W.3d
at 536.–7– Under the fair notice pleading standard, we look to the pleader ’s intent, and a pleading will be found sufficient “e ven if some element of a ca use of action has not been specifically alleged” beca use “[e]very fact will be suppli ed that can be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated.” Roark v. Allen , 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982); see also Aldous v. Bruss , 405 S.W.3d 847, 857 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“It is not a valid objecti on to generally complain that the pleading does not set out enough factual details if fa ir notice of the claim is given.”). In the absence of special exceptions, the petition s hould be construed liberally in favor of the pleader. Roark , 633 S.W.2d at 809. In her first amended petition, MYR alleges BGC invaded her priv acy, in part, because she did not provide actual or effective consent for BGC to “maintain the Plaintiff’s illegally acquired in timate, private images, data, and private communications.” She further a lleged, “Despite Plaintiff’s rea sonable expectation of privacy, defendant’s actions , both separately and in combina tion with each other, circumvented plaintiff’s right to privacy . . . .” In the abse nce of special exceptions, we liberally construe the allega tions in favor of MYR and concl ude it is sufficient to encompass the alleged secret p hotos taken by BGC while visiting Texas. We recognize BGC, as the defendant , is expected to negate all b ases of jurisdiction and therefore, the j urisdictional basis should be pleaded clearly and concisely. See Hoffmann v. Dandurand , 180 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). A defe ndant cannot be expected to negate a the ory of jurisdiction–8– when it is buried in the pleadings. Id . (concluding alter ego theory of liability was not clearly and concisely pleaded). However, MYR’s invasion of privacy claim was not “buried” in the pleading. Rather, her cause of action was clearly pleaded. She included additional jurisdictiona l facts in the affidavit attac hed to her response, to which BGC did not object, to support her burden. She did not a dd a new claim in her response. Accordingly, we c onsider whether BGC is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas in light o f MYR’s first amended pleading and response. Special Appearance Standard of Review and Applicable Law Whether a trial court has pers onal jurisdiction over a nonresid ent defendant is a question of law we review de novo. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell , 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018); see also Golden Peanut Co ., LLC v. Give & Go Prepared Foods Corp ., No. 05-18-00626-CV, 2019 WL 2098473, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2019, no pet. ) (mem. op.). If, as in this case, the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, we imply all findings of fact necessary to support its ruling that are supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). When jurisdictional facts are undisputed, whether those facts establish jurisdiction is a question of law. Old Republic , 549 S.W.3d at 558. When the appellate record include s the reporter’s and clerk’s r ecords, as is the case here, these implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency on appeal. BMC Software , 83 S.W.3d at 795. A legal–9– sufficiency challenge to a finding fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding. Id . A factual sufficiency challenge fails unless the trial court ’s finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the eviden ce as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Hoffmann , 180 S.W.3d at 345. Texas courts may exe rcise personal jurisd iction over a nonresid ent defendant if (1) the Texas long-arm statute permits exercising jurisdicti on and (2) asserting jurisdiction satisfies constitutional due process guarantees. Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. VI, L.P ., 493 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. 2016). The Texas long-arm statute reaches “as far as the federal constitut ional requirements that due process will allow.” Am. Type Culture Collec tion, Inc. v. Coleman , 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002). Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies constitutional due process guarantees when (1) the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state and (2) exerc ising jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi- Cola Metro. Bottling Co. , 512 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. 2017) (citing Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014)). Minimum contacts are established when the nonresident defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting acti vities within the forum state, thus invoking its laws’ benefits and protections. Kelly, Inc ., 301 S.W.3d at 657–58. The purposeful-availment inquiry includes three parts: (1) only the defendant’s contacts are relevant; (2) the contacts must be pur poseful, not random,–10– fortuitous, or attenuated; and (3) the defendant must seek some advantage, benefit, or profit by availing himself of the forum. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg , 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007). A nonresident defendant’s forum-s tate contacts may give rise to two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Id . Specific jurisdiction, also called case-linked jurisdiction, is established if the defendant’s all eged liability arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Id . at 576. A claim arises from or relates to the forum contacts if there is a “sub stantial connection between [the] contacts and the operative facts of the litigatio n.” Id . at 585. Specific jurisdiction requires us to analyze jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis unless all claims arise from the same forum contacts. Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom , 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 –51 (Tex. 2013). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the defendant’s relations hip, not the plaintiff’s relationship, with the forum state is the proper fo cus of the specific jurisdiction analysis. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc ., 496 S.W.3d 58, 67 (Tex. 2016). In short, specific jurisdiction “does not turn on where a plaintif f happens to be, and does not exist where the defenda nt’s contacts with the forum st ate are not substantially connected to the alleged operative facts of the c ase.” Id . at 70. Specific Jurisdiction Analysis Three of MYR’s claims are relevant to this appeal, and we shall discuss the jurisdictional contacts of each in turn.–11– The elements of a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion ar e an intentional intrusion, physically or otherw ise, upon another’s solitude, se clusion, or private affairs, which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities and result in injur y because of the intrusion. See Moricz v. Long , No. 06-17-00011-CV, 2017 WL 3081512, a t *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jul y 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Valenzuela v. Aquino , 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993)). MYR alleged BGC solicited her in Texas to provide intimate phot os using cell phones, text messages, email, and other electronic media. The “private, intimate images/materials were all created under circumstances in which [MYR] reasonably expected and believed that they were and would always remain pr ivate and secure.” In her response, she further alleged he secretly took photos of her while the two stayed in a Texas hotel. The record indicates BGC traveled to Texas to visit MYR approxi mately a dozen times. During these visits, BGC booked and paid for hote l rooms where they spent several nights together. He secretly took naked photos o f her while staying at a Texas hotel. When BGC was not traveling to see MYR, he provided a credit car d for her use in Texas or he wired money to her in Texas to pay for her t ravel. On many occasions, BGC directly deposited $10,000 into her Texas bank a ccount for her to purchase airfare. When the funds depleted, he replenished her account. MYR estimated she traveled at his re quest from Texas to wherever he was located–12– approximately seventy times over their three-year relationship. These contacts are of such a nature and quality tha t a substantial connection exis ts between them and the operative facts of the litiga tion as they pertain to her in vasion of privacy claim. In addition to those contacts, when BGC was not in Texas, the t wo talked on the phone daily. MYR estimated B GC called and texted her in Te xas hundreds of times during the three-year relationship. We recognize the min imum contacts analysis focuses on “the quality and nature of the defendant’s contacts, rather than their number.” Searcy , 496 S.W3d at 69. The number of phone calls and text messages alone do not support min imum contacts in this case. See Invasix , 2020 897243, at *7 (seventy-seven emails and five phone calls to Tex as over three years was not dispositive of specific jurisdiction inquiry). However , the allegations that BGC repeatedly called and texted MYR in Texas “for a period of weeks and months” pressuring her to provide naked photographs on a phone he provi ded her as part of getting to know her, gaining her trust, and ultimately breaking that trust led, in part, to her present claim for invasion of privacy. In another case with different f acts, phone calls and texts mes sages to the cell phone of a Texas resident in a da ting relationship with a non-r esident defendant may not be sufficient to consider in the minimum contacts analysis. Given the nature and quality of the phone calls and texts here, however, we will not turn a blind eye to–13– BGC’s actions. Thus, we conclude consideration of the phone ca lls and text messages may be consi dered, though they are not determinative, in our analysis. 4 BGS’s contacts in Texas with MYR were not random and isolated, but instead constituted purposeful, continued contacts in Texas over the co urse of a three-year relationship. And while he contends he did not seek any benefi t from the state, he actively pursued a relationship with a Texas resident, whom he allegedly persuaded to provide intimate photos, and he likewise secretly took photo s of her while in Texas. One may speculate about the benefit BGC received from t he taking of such photos, but to say he received no benefit from a Texas resident is incredulous. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the tri al court’s order and indulging every reasonable inference supporting the trial c ourt’s implied findings, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to sup port the trial court’s implied findings and conclusions that sufficient minimum contac ts with Texas exist to subject BGC to the specific, personal jurisdiction of Texas courts regarding MYR’s invasion of privacy claim. See Olympia Capital Assocs ., 247 S.W.3d at 408 (“A legal sufficiency challenge to a finding of fact fails if t here is more than a scintilla of evidence to s upport the finding.”).

4 We acknowledge “changes in technology have made reliance on ph one calls obsolete as proof of purposeful availment.” Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 2005). Rather, the important factor is the extent of the defendant’s a ctivities, not merely the residence of the victim. Id . at 789–90. As explained, we do not rely on the phone calls a nd text messages alone to uphold the trial court’s implied conclusion that BGC purposely availed himself o f jurisdiction in Texas.–14– We now consider the jurisdictional facts as pleaded supporting MYR’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. To establi sh intentional infliction of emotional distress, she must establish that (1) BGC acted in tentionally or recklessly; (2) his conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) his actions caused her emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe. See Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu , 216 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006). In addition to the facts al leged above in her invasion of privacy c laim, which MYR incorporated by reference into her IIED claim, MYR alleged BGC sent unsolicited, graphic photo graphs of his erect penis to the cell phone he provide d her in Texas. These pictur es were sent without her request or permission and of ten contained “his graphic desc ription of what he would prefer to be doing with or to [her] at the moment.” Desp ite asking him to stop sending the illicit photos, he con tinued. BGC did not deny sen ding these unsolicited photos and actually testified during the special appearance hea ring that he believed he sent a photo of his erect pen is to MYR while she was in Texa s. MYR described feelings of hum iliation, anxiety, fear, sadness, and severe emotional distress because of BGC’s actions. She maintains tha t she has suffered sleepless nights and nightmares, lost a great deal of weight, a nd sought professional care for anxiety. She fears her daughters will see the images BGC and his family members have of her. Again, BGC’s contacts directed to a Texas resident were purpose ful, not random, fortuitous, or attenuated , and he sought a benefit by a vailing himself of the–15– forum. Moki Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 575. In reaching this conclusion, we reject BG C’s argument that MYR’s claims are nothing more than the obsolete “ direct a tort” theory of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michiana , 168 S.W.3d at 789. Our conclusion is not based on the me re fact that MYR lives in Texa s and allegedly suffered harm here. Rather, BGC became subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas wh en he allegedly “courted MYR in Texas, sent money to her here, solici ted her naked images here, defrauded her with false promises of confidentiali ty here and sent unsolicited photos of his genitals here, only to ultimately bet ray her, misuse her images and invade her privacy.” BGC aggressively contacted and maintained a steady relationship with a Texas resident ultimately leading to the alleged causes of actions. BGC’s actionable conduct from whic h MYR’s IIED claim arises occ urred in Texas. The operative facts of t he litigation concern the relat ionship of the parties, the pictures he secretly took of MYR in Texas hotel rooms, and the unsolicited pictures he sent her while she was in Texas. Thus, his potenti al liability arises from his conduct in Texas and his actions directed towards a Texas r esident. See, e.g.,
Moki Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 585. The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable a nd fair-minded people to reach t he decision under review. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). A reviewing–16– court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier-of-f act so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement. Id . at 822. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the tri al court’s order and indulging every reasonable inference supporting the trial c ourt’s implied findings, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to sup port the trial court’s implied finding and conclusion that sufficient minimum contacts with Texas exist to subject BGC to the specific, personal jurisdiction of Texas’s c ourts regarding MYR’s invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotion al distress claims. See Olympia Capital Assocs. , 247 S.W.3d at 408. Finally, MYR asserted BGC viola ted Texas Civil Practice and Rem edies Code section 98B.002, which provides da mages if a person unlawfully discloses or promotes certain intimate visual material. See T EX

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. § 98B.002(a). Regardless of the alleged facts supporting juris diction, the statute itself confers jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Sec tion 98B.006 provides in relevant part, “A court has personal jurisdiction over a def endant in a suit under this chapter if . . . the claimant who is depicted in the intim ate visual material resides in this state.” Id . § 98B.006 (2). Accordingly, BGC is subject to the personal jurisdiction of Texas’s courts r egarding MYR’s section 98B.002 claim. Having concluded minimum contacts exist, we consider whether th e exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the traditional notions of f air play and substantial justice. Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. , 414 S.W.3d at 154. This involves considering the–17– following factors, when appropriate: (1) burden on the nonresid ent defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate j udicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; an d (5) the shared interest of several states in furthering substantive social policies. Id . at 155. When a nonresident has purposefully established minimum contact s with the forum state, it will be only a rare case when the exercise of j urisdiction over that defendant does not comport with t raditional notions of fair pla y and substantial justice. Id . at 154. This is not one of those rare cases. Subjecting BGC to suit in Texas may impose some burden, but the same can be said of all nonresidents. Distance alone cannot ordinarily defeat jurisdiction. Id

. at 155. BGC admitted during th e special appearance hearing he regularly traveled to Texas on his private jet to conduct business and engage in i ntimate relations with MYR. He kept his private jet at Dallas Love Field and routinel y stayed in Texas hotels. Evidence admitted at the hearing indicates he maintain s an interest in a business entity in Texas. We can hardly conclude it imposes a substantial burden on BGC to fly on his private jet to Texas for litigation given the other circumstances in which he has repeatedly visited the state. Further, MYR, a Tex as resident, has an interest in obtaining convenient relief in Texas. To the exten t the record indicates she visited BGC in his home state, these trips were arranged an d funded by BGC; therefore, we do not weigh this factor in his favor. The alleg ations that BGC–18– committed torts in Texas against a Texas resident implicate a s erious state interest in adjudicating the dispute. See id . A state has an interest in protecting its citizens from such behavior. See, e.g., Cappucitti v. Gulf Indus. Prods., Inc ., 222 S.W.3d 468, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (Texas h ad substantial interest in protecting citizens from both breach of contract an d tortious acts committed by nonresidents). Balancing the factors, the burden on BGC of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction is minimal and outweighed by Texas’s interests in adjudicating the dispute. We overrule BGC’s specifi c-jurisdiction challenge.
Conclusion We conclude the Texas long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over BGC and the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with t he traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The trial court did not err by denying BGC’s special appearance. Accordingly , we affirm the trial court’s o rder.

200318F.P05 /John G. Browning/ JOHN G. BROWNING JUSTICE–19– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT B.G.C., Appellant

No. 05-20-00318-CV V. M.Y.R., Appellee On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 429-05292- 2018. Opinion delivered by Justice Browning. Justices Molberg and Carlyle participating.
In accordance with this Court’ s opinion of this date, the judg ment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee Maura Young Robi nson recover her costs of this appeal from appella nt Barton G. Colson.
Judgment entered October 9, 2020.