IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” 

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), 

THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE

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CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED

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ACTION.

 
RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2020-SC-0218-WC

RAY HENRY PICKETT APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

V. NOS. 2018-CA-0415 & 2018-CA-0551

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD 

NO. WC-15-01910

FORD MOTOR COMPANY (LAP); 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. 

DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL;

HONORABLE. R. ROLAND CASE, 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD

APPELLEES

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

I. BACKGROUND

Ray Pickett began working on the assembly line for Ford Motor Company 

in 2012. Pickett claimed the repetitive nature of his job caused him to become 

occupationally disabled, which condition required a cervical fusion. After 

returning to work from the neck surgery, Pickett asserts he sustained a second 

work-related injury, this one to his left shoulder, when another employee 

lowered the back hatch of a vehicle onto it.
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The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the neck injury preexisted 

Pickett’s employment at Ford but found the shoulder injury compensable and 

awarded temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability 

benefits in his July 2017 order. The ALJ limited the award to the version of 

KRS 342.730(4) enacted in 1996, terminating Pickett’s benefits when he 

qualified for normal old-age Social Security benefits. Both parties filed motions 

for reconsideration, which the ALJ overruled, noting this Court’s opinion in 

Parker v. Webster Cnty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2017) had 

yet to reach finality. In Parker, a majority of this Court held the 1996 version 

of KRS 342.730 was unconstitutional.

Pickett and Ford both appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. By 

the time the Board considered the appeal, the Parker opinion had become final. 

The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and order and remanded the matter, 

directing the ALJ to apply the “tier down” provisions of the 1994 version of KRS 

342.730(4). Both parties then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which vacated 

and remanded Pickett’s claim to the ALJ, directing him to apply the current 

version of KRS 342.730(4) pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Holcim v. 

Swinford, 581 S.W.3d 37 (Ky. 2019), which held the 2018 amendment to KRS 

342.730(4) was retroactive.

Pickett now appeals to this Court, arguing the retroactive application of 

KRS 342.730(4) is unconstitutional, violating his rights to due process and 

equal protection pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. Pickett 
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also contends the statute amounts to the state exercising absolute and 

arbitrary power. Finally, he claims the fact that only certain statutes in the 

House Bill containing the amendment to KRS 342.730(4) were deemed 

retroactive amounts to “special legislation” in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of 

the Kentucky Constitution. 

II. ANALYSIS

KRS 342.730(4) concerns the termination of workers’ compensation 

benefits. In Parker, 529 S.W.3d 759, this Court found the then-current 1996 

version of KRS 342.730(4) unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The 

1996 version of the statute tied the termination of workers’ compensation 

benefits to the time at which the employee qualified for old-age Social Security 

benefits. This Court held this was an arbitrary distinction with no rational 

relation to a legitimate state interest. 

In Holcim, 581 S.W.3d at 41, this Court considered whether a 2018 

version of KRS 342.730(4) could be applied retroactively. Quoting a Legislative 

Research Commission comment beneath the statute, we held in Holcim that the 

amendment “applies to those cases which ‘have not been fully and finally 

adjudicated, or are in the appellate process, or for which time to file an appeal 

[h]as not lapsed, as of the effective date of this Act.’” Id. at 44. 

Whereas the pre-Parker version of KRS 342.730(4) linked workers’ 

compensation benefit termination to the time at which the worker qualified for 

old-age Social Security benefits (and thereby violated an individual’s right to 

equal protection under the law by arbitrarily treating similarly-situated 
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individuals differently), the 2018 version of the statutory subsection links the 

termination of benefits to the injured employee attaining a particular age. 

Under the amendment, a claimant’s benefits terminate on his or her seventieth 

birthday or four years after his or her work injury or exposure, whichever 

occurs later. Pickett argues this statute is constitutionally infirm on multiple 

grounds. 

A. Equal Protection

Pickett argues the amendment to KRS 342.730(4) violates his rights to 

equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the United States and 

Kentucky Constitutions. The basis for his argument is that the amendment 

treats older injured workers and younger injured workers differently. 

The 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 

2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution contain the respective federal and state 

equal protection clauses. Their “goal . . . is to ‘keep[ ] governmental decision 

makers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’” 

Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Ky. 2011) (quoting 

Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Because “[w]orkers’ compensation 

statutes concern matters of social and economic policy,” if a rational basis or 

substantial and justifiable reason supports the classifications they create, we 

must uphold it. Id. at 466 (citing Cain v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 39, 

42 (Ky. 2009)). “In sum, we will uphold the age limitation here so long as it 

rationally relates to a legitimate state objective.” Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d 

864, 871 (Ky. 2021).
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As this Court has stated, “acts of the legislature carry a strong 

presumption of constitutionality.” Wynn v. Ibold, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 695, 696 

(Ky. 1998). “Doubts regarding constitutionality must be resolved in favor of 

upholding the law.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 870. Furthermore, “the principle of 

reducing workers’ compensation benefits at an age when workers typically 

become eligible for alternative forms of income replacement is not new to 

Kentucky.” Wynn, 969 S.W.2d at 696.

We took up the constitutionality of the 2018 amendment to KRS 

342.730(4) in Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 871, holding, “the current version of KRS 

342.730(4) is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause because the age 

classification is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.” We do not 

depart from that recent holding today. 

As this Court held in Parker, “[t]he rational bases for treating younger 

and older workers differently [are]: (1) it prevents duplication of benefits; and 

(2) it results in savings for the workers’ compensation system.” 529 S.W.3d at

768. Four years later, we stated, “we remain convinced that preventing a 

duplication of wage-loss protection programs and promoting the solvency of the 

workers’ compensation system are legitimate state interests.” Cates, 627 

S.W.3d at 870. We are unpersuaded to deviate from this position by Pickett’s

arguments that KRS 342.730(4) does not prevent duplicative income 

replacement benefits, avoid duplicative governmental benefits, or provide a 

savings for the workers’ compensation system; nor are we convinced that 

savings to the workers’ compensation system is not a valid basis to uphold a 
6

statute in the face of an equal protection argument. Again, today, we hold the 

statute passes the rational basis test as it “treats alike all those who receive 

workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 871. 

Pickett argues that even if the statutory amendment were constitutional 

on equal protection grounds (as we have held), it is unconstitutional to apply 

the statute retroactively to his claim, as his injury occurred before the effective 

date of the amendment. However, “[t]he legislature ‘may amend the law and 

make the change applicable to pending cases, even when the amendment is 

outcome determinative.’” Id. (quoting Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 

(2016)). Here, this Court declared one version of the statutory subsection 

unconstitutional and the legislature passed a new subsection, providing for 

retroactive effect—and the legislature was within constitutional bounds in so 

doing. 

B. Due Process

Pickett next contends the retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) 

stripped him of his property right to workers’ compensation benefits in 

violation of his due process rights, as he did not receive prior notice or a 

hearing. We addressed this issue in Cates, holding the claimants had no 

vested right in the duration and amount of their benefits “until they have 

received a final judgment in their favor.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 873. The same 

is true here. Because Pickett had no vested right in the duration of his 

benefits, a statute terminating them at a specific age did not deny him due 

process.
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C. Absolute and Arbitrary Power

Pickett also asserts KRS 342.730(4) amounts to an exercise of absolute 

and arbitrary power in conflict with his rights pursuant to Sections 1, 2, and 3 

of Kentucky’s Constitution. Specifically, Section 2 of the Kentucky 

Constitution, reads, “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and 

property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest 

majority.” Courts in this Commonwealth have recognized for half a century 

that when a “legislative body acts in a purported policy-making or law-making 

function . . . the concept of what is ‘arbitrary’ is much more narrowly 

constricted . . . .” City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. 

1971). Such an action is only “arbitrary if there is no rational connection 

between that action and the purpose for which the body’s power to act exists. 

Where the existence of such rational connection is ‘fairly debatable’ the action 

will not be disturbed by a court.” Id. 

This Court has “consistently held that treating older injured workers 

differently from younger injured workers is rationally related to the legitimate 

government interests in preventing a duplication of benefits and saving money 

for the workers’ compensation system.” Cates, 627 S.W.3d at 869. KRS 

342.730(4) does not amount to an arbitrary exercise of power.

D. Special Legislation

Finally, Pickett argues KRS 342.730(4) violates Kentucky’s constitutional 

provisions regarding special legislation found in Sections 59 and 60, as only 
8

certain statutes amended in House Bill 2 containing the legislation were made 

retroactive. Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution states, in pertinent part:

The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts 

concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following 

purposes, namely:

. . . .

Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal causes.

. . . .

Twenty-fourth: To regulate labor, trade, mining or 

manufacturing. . . .

Pickett links this argument to his equal protection argument—essentially 

arguing the legislation’s retroactivity is arbitrary. He also makes the argument 

that older injured workers are discriminated against because if they receive 

permanent partial disability benefits, they will not receive the entirety of their 

awards unlike younger injured workers. This is another attempt at making the 

same argument under a different veil. We reject it, too, as all injured workers’ 

benefits terminate at age seventy under the amendment.

This Court addressed a similar special legislation argument in Cates, 627 

S.W.3d at 872, holding the amended statutory subsection was not special 

legislation as it did not apply “to a particular individual, object or locale.” 

(Citing Calloway Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557, 573 (Ky. 

2020)). We held in Cates, “[t]he argument that the statute differentiates 

between older and younger workers is a classification argument, which is 

properly considered under sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.” 
9

Id. And, just as in Cates, we reiterate: “KRS 342.730(4) is simply not special 

legislation.” Id. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to 

the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

All sitting. All concur. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Ched Jennings

Jennings Law Offices

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, FORD MOTOR COMPANY (LAP):

George T. T. Kitchen, III

Sewell & Neal, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. 

DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL:

Matthew F. Kuhn

Brett R. Nolan

Alexander Y. Magera

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. R. Roland Case

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:

Michael W. Alvey

Chairman