NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1044

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JEREMY M. TAYLOR.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant moved to suppress the items seized during the 

execution of a search warrant of an apartment, arguing among 

other things that the warrant's lack of specificity in its 

description of a firearm sought by police rendered it an 

unlawful "general warrant." A judge of the Dorchester Division 

of the Boston Municipal Court agreed and allowed the motion. 

The Commonwealth obtained leave to pursue an interlocutory 

appeal. Concluding that the warrant's description of a 

camouflage jacket was enough to prevent it from being a general 

warrant, we reverse the suppression order.

Background. We recite the essentials of the affidavit in 

support of the search warrant application. Boston police 

received a report of a man threatening several people with a gun 

at an apartment building in Dorchester and then fleeing into 
2

apartment 104. A resident of the building told police that the 

man named Jeremy, who lived in apartment 104 and was wearing a 

camouflage jacket, had threatened her and her child with a small 

metallic firearm, about the size of an iPhone, that he pulled 

from his sock. Police were aware that the defendant lived in 

apartment 104 and had an "extensive record of violent criminal 

offenses which included a previous firearm conviction."

Police knocked on the door of apartment 104 and found the 

defendant inside, although he was not wearing a camouflage 

jacket. After removing him from the apartment, police conducted 

a protective sweep of the apartment and unsuccessfully searched 

the area around the building for a firearm. The resident who 

said she was threatened saw the defendant and identified him as 

the assailant. The defendant was arrested on assault charges

and the apartment was secured pending execution of a search 

warrant. Police believed that, if permitted to search, they 

would find the small metallic firearm and the camouflage jacket 

inside the apartment.

The search warrant application sought a warrant to search 

for "[a] small metallic firearm and a camouflage jacket." The 

warrant as issued, however, purported to authorize police to 

search for a "[f]irearm, ammunition, all items used for the 

storage and upkeep of said firearm, [and] a camouflage jacket." 

When they executed the warrant, police recovered a camouflage 
3

jacket and numerous other items, including a Ruger .22 caliber 

long rifle automatic pistol with nine cartridges and assorted 

drugs and drug dealing paraphernalia.

The defendant moved to suppress, asserting among other 

things that "[t]he warrant lacked sufficient particularity to 

meet the requirements of G. L. c. 276, § 2, art. 14 of the 

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution, and thus the search warrant was 

an unlawful general warrant."1 At an evidentiary hearing on the 

motion, the officer who prepared the warrant application 

testified that he also prepared the (presumably unsigned) 

warrant itself. He further stated that the discrepancies

between the items listed on the application and those listed on 

the warrant were the result of a clerical error. Police did not 

bring the application when they executed the warrant.

The judge ruled that although there was probable cause to 

search the apartment for a camouflage jacket and a small 

metallic firearm, the clerical error expanded the scope of the 

1 "'[U]nlike [c. 276's] probable cause provisions, the 

particularity requirements of G. L. c. 276 essentially track the 

particularity requirements of art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment.' 

[The Supreme Judicial Court has] never held that art. 14 

requires greater particularity than the Fourth Amendment, and 

therefore we make no distinction between art. 14 and the Fourth 

Amendment in our analysis." Commonwealth v. Walsh, 409 Mass. 

642, 644–645 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 

381, 389 (1985).
4

search, in two ways. First, "[b]y failing to more accurately 

describe the firearm, the warrant authorized the officer[s] to 

search for any firearm[,] whether it was small enough to fit in 

a sock or was so big that there was no way to conceal it in any 

article of clothing." Second, "[b]y authorizing the officers to 

look for ammunition and items used for storage and upkeep of 

said firearm, the warrant allowed the officers to continue to 

search the apartment even after the jacket and small metallic 

firearm had been discovered.[2] There was no basis for these 

items to be included in the warrant and their inclusion expanded 

the scope of the warrant." The judge allowed the motion to 

suppress, and denied the Commonwealth's motion to reconsider. 

This appeal followed.

Discussion. "We view with respect the motion judge's 

conclusions of law, but, as this matter is of a constitutional 

dimension, the judge's ultimate findings and rulings of law are 

subject to de novo review." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 

403, 405 (1999). See United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 

92, 105 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1036 (2015).

2 Despite this statement, it is unclear from the record whether 

the "Ruger .22 caliber long rifle automatic pistol" seized 

during the search is a "small metallic firearm" as described in 

the warrant affidavit and application. The defendant asserts 

that the police did not find a small metallic firearm. Neither 

party argues that any issue in this appeal turns on the point.
5

"It is beyond doubt that all evidence seized pursuant to a 

general warrant must be suppressed. The cost to society of

sanctioning the use of general warrants -— abhorrence for which 

gave birth to the Fourth Amendment -— is intolerable by any 

measure" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 

141, 145–146 (1984). "Severance of the invalid from the valid 

portions of a warrant is unacceptable where no portion of the 

warrant is sufficiently particularized to pass constitutional 

muster . . . . Otherwise the abuses of a general search would 

not be prevented" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 146.

The Lett decision illustrates how these principles are 

applied. There, a search warrant authorized a search for heroin 

and a diamond ring. Lett, 393 Mass. at 146. The officers 

executing the warrant found heroin and drug paraphernalia but no 

ring. Id. at 142-143. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that

the specific authorization to search for heroin and the ring was 

not so broad as to authorize an intolerable "general rummaging 

search of the defendant's apartment." Id. at 146. "While the 

authorization to search for heroin failed for lack of probable 

cause, the valid authorization to search for the ring 

sufficiently limited the officer's discretion so as to withstand 

constitutional challenge." Id. at 146. Thus, the court allowed 

"that portion of the warrant to stand," and went on to consider 

whether seizure of the heroin and other items was valid because 
6

they were seen in plain view during the search for the ring. 

Id. The court ruled that "the application of the doctrine of 

plain view to a search conducted pursuant to a partially valid 

warrant is ordinarily permissible." Id. at 147. Accordingly, 

"[b]ecause the heroin and drug paraphernalia were in plain view 

during a permissible search, the motion to suppress those items 

was properly denied." Id. at 148. See Commonwealth v. 

Fernandes, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 335, 339-341 (1991) (warrant 

described certain items with sufficient particularity, and was 

not general warrant, notwithstanding that it also included 

insufficiently specific phrase, "any other illegally kept 

controlled drugs or firearms of various descriptions").

To similar effect is Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 

159 (2020). There, pursuant to statutory authority, the 

Commonwealth sought forty-eight hours of cell site location 

information (CSLI) for a murder defendant's cell phone. Id. at 

160, 164. The prosecutor received data for a thirty-four hour 

period. Id. at 164. On the defendant's motion, a judge 

suppressed all but the three hours of the CSLI surrounding the 

time of the shooting. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that 

"if there was not probable cause to search the entire thirtyfour hours of CSLI data, it was error for the judge to allow 

introduction of the three-hour period surrounding the shooting." 

Id. at 166.
7

In rejecting this argument, the court first acknowledged 

that "where a warrant so lacks particularity or is so overbroad 

that it begins to resemble a general warrant, total suppression 

is required." Wilkerson, 486 Mass. at 169. The court held, 

however, that "[t]he forty-eight hours requested, and the 

thirty-four hours obtained here, [were] not so overbroad on the 

facts of this case so as to be akin to a general warrant," id.; 

that the three hours of CSLI were severable from the remainder, 

id.; and that there was probable cause for the three-hour 

period, id. at 172. Suppression of the three hours of CSLI was 

therefore not required. Id.

On the other hand, a warrant was held to be an 

unconstitutional general warrant where, in the absence of the 

supporting affidavit, it effectively granted "authorization to 

search for stolen handguns, jewelry and coins, without any 

further description governing the scope of the search." 

Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 406 Mass. 673, 675 (1990). The

Rutkowski court explained that "[t]o describe general items like 

guns and jewelry as 'stolen' adds nothing instructive to a 

description in a warrant. This case is not one in which the 

stolen items could not have been described in more detail.

. . . [T]he generic reference in this case to items generally 

and lawfully available in our society . . . fails to meet the 

minimum standard of particularity." Id. at 676.
8

Against this backdrop, the defendant here does not argue, 

nor could we rule, that "no portion of the warrant is 

sufficiently particularized to pass constitutional muster" 

(citation omitted). Lett, 393 Mass. at 146. The warrant's 

specification of a camouflage jacket was constitutionally 

sufficient.3 See E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure

§ 5:107 (4th ed. 2014) ("although the items must be described 

with particularity the courts are lenient in regard to 

clothing"). The defendant does not argue otherwise. That this 

portion of the warrant was sufficiently particularized saves the 

warrant from being a general warrant.

To be sure, the warrant's omission of the adjectives 

"small" and "metallic" resulted in its description of the 

firearm being less particularized than was possible based on the 

affidavit. Even so, the warrant as a whole, authorizing a 

search for a "firearm, ammunition, all items used for the 

storage and upkeep of said firearm, [and] a camouflage jacket,"

did not authorize any "general rummaging search of the 

defendant's apartment." Lett, 393 Mass. at 146. See Wilkerson, 

486 Mass. at 169. 

3 Nor does the defendant argue that the warrant application did 

not establish probable cause to search for the jacket (or, for 

that matter, for a small metallic firearm). Although we need 

not and do not decide the point now, any such argument would 

seem to face a steep uphill battle.
9

We therefore conclude that it was error to suppress the 

items seized on the ground that the warrant here was a general 

warrant. We decide only that issue. Whether any part of the 

warrant was invalid -- for lack of particularity, lack of 

probable cause, or otherwise -- is a matter that the defendant 

may pursue through another motion to suppress. Similarly, the 

Commonwealth remains free to argue that, if any portion of the 

warrant is ruled invalid, the items seized pursuant thereto 

nevertheless need not be suppressed, because they were seized 

while in plain view during an otherwise lawful search. We 

express no views on those issues.

Order allowing motion to 

suppress reversed.

By the Court (Milkey, Blake & 

Sacks, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: November 2, 2023.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.