Filed 5/15/23 Bye v. Mula CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PATRICIA M. BYE, as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAUL S. MULA, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H049808, H049813, H050020,

 H050040 & H050043

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 2006-1-PR-158914

 & 2012-1-PR-171643)

Appellant Paul S. Mula, Jr. (Paul) challenges the probate court’s orders granting 

five petitions of Patricia S. Bye, trustee of the Helene Mula Stouky Trust (Stouky Trust)

and the Sarah Mula Ogier Trust (Ogier Trust) and conservator of the estate of Helene 

Mula Stouky. These orders authorized Bye to retain and pay attorneys to defend the two 

trusts, Helene Mula Stouky (Helene), Bye, the conservator of Helene’s person, the 

attorneys representing them, those attorneys’ law firms, and Bye’s sole proprietorship in 

a federal lawsuit brought against them by Paul.

1

 These orders also authorized Bye to 

retain and pay attorneys to defend against Paul’s appeals from multiple probate court 

orders. The last of these orders approved an accounting for the Stouky Trust that 

included the payment of attorney fees attributable to matters concerning the Ogier Trust. 

1 For clarity, we refer to appellant as Paul and to respondents on appeal 

collectively as Bye. 
2

Paul contends that the probate court abused its discretion in granting Bye’s 

petitions because compensating attorneys defending the trusts and Helene in his federal 

lawsuit for their representation of any other defendants will not benefit the trusts, is not 

authorized by the trusts’ terms, and will result in a conflict of interest. He also contends 

that reversal is required for several other reasons and that the use of Stouky Trust funds 

for attorney fees related to the Ogier Trust does not benefit the Stouky Trust or Helene. 

We affirm the orders.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Ogier Trust was established by Helene’s mother, Sarah Mula Ogier (Sarah 

Ogier) in 2000. The Ogier Trust expressly authorized the trustee to employ attorneys and 

to compensate them from the Ogier Trust’s assets. The primary beneficiaries of the 

Ogier Trust were Helene, Paul’s uncle, Alan Mula (Alan), and Paul’s now-deceased

father, Paul Mula, Sr. (Paul Sr.). Helene was originally the trustee of the Ogier Trust. 

Her share of the Ogier Trust was to be put in a trust for her benefit, and Paul was the

beneficiary of that trust if any property remained in it at Helene’s death. Sarah Ogier 

died in 2005. 

The Ogier Trust’s primary assets were real properties, but Sarah Ogier deeded 

these properties to Helene, Alan, and Paul Sr. before her death. Paul apparently 

questioned the validity of those deeds. In 2006, Paul accepted $100,000 from Sarah 

Ogier’s estate in return for a handwritten release stating: “I do hereby waive/release any 

future interest in any of the real property now held in the names of [Alan, Paul Sr., and 

Helene] and/or the estate of Sarah Mula Ogier.” The release expressly stated that this 

$100,000 was accepted “as final payment for any and all claims I have against the above 

parties involved.” In March 2006, the probate court issued an order confirming title to 

these real properties as deeded. Paul received the agreed $100,000 in May 2006 when 

these real properties were sold. 
3

Helene created the Stouky Trust in 1997, and Paul is one of the beneficiaries of the 

Stouky Trust. The Stouky Trust expressly authorizes the trustee to employ attorneys to 

advise and assist the trustee and to compensate those attorneys from trust assets. Helene

was conserved in 2012, and Bye was appointed conservator of Helene’s estate and trustee 

of the Stouky Trust. In 2013, Bye became the trustee of the Ogier Trust. By 2021, the 

Ogier Trust’s only remaining asset was a brokerage account containing just under 

$110,000. 

In 2013, the probate court issued an order expressly granting Bye authority to 

commence or defend litigation brought by or against Paul and to utilize Helene’s assets 

and funds from the Stouky Trust to pay litigation expenses for Helene, Bye, the 

conservator of Helene’s person, and any counsel representing them. In 2019, Paul filed 

multiple appeals from orders concerning the Stouky Trust.

2

 In 2020, Paul filed another

appeal from an order concerning the Stouky Trust.

3

 

In June 2021, Paul filed a federal lawsuit against 10 named defendants and 100 

Doe defendants. The defendants named in his original complaint are Helene, the Stouky 

Trust, Alan, Paul Sr.’s estate, the conservator of Helene’s person (Paul’s sister, who is 

also a beneficiary of the Stouky Trust), Bye, Helene’s court-appointed attorney, the 

attorney who drafted both trusts, an attorney whom Paul consulted, and Bye’s attorney. 

Paul’s federal lawsuit made allegations concerning the management of both the Ogier 

Trust and the Stouky Trust, and Paul purported to bring the federal action on behalf of 

himself and the Ogier Trust. 

In August 2021, Bye filed two petitions (one as trustee of the Ogier Trust and one 

as trustee of the Stouky Trust) seeking authority to employ and compensate a law firm to 

2

In case No. H047388, this court rejected Paul’s appeal from a probate court order 

granting a petition for substituted judgment. In case No. H049271, this court rejected 

Paul’s appeal from a probate court order approving the third accounting. 

3 Paul abandoned his appeal in case No. H049120.
4

represent the two trusts, Helene, Bye, Helene’s attorney, Bye’s attorney, and the 

conservator of Helene’s person in Paul’s federal action, “whose interests are aligned” in 

that action. Bye explained in her petitions that she intended first to use the funds in the 

Ogier Trust to pay for the defense to Paul’s lawsuit, but she expected those funds to be 

exhausted and therefore sought authority to use funds from the Stouky Trust to pay any 

additional defense expenses. She specifically sought authority to pay a $50,000 retainer 

to a law firm to defend against Paul’s federal lawsuit. Bye sought ex parte orders due to 

“the exigent nature of the circumstances,” as the defendants in Paul’s federal lawsuit 

would have only 21 days to file an answer once he served them with his complaint. 

Paul opposed Bye’s petitions. He contended that defending against his federal 

lawsuit on behalf of these defendants would not benefit either trust and was not 

authorized by the trusts’ terms. Paul asserted that defending Bye in the federal lawsuit 

would benefit only Bye personally, not her performance of her duties as trustee. He also 

asserted that it would be a violation of the rules of professional conduct for one law firm 

to represent all of these defendants in his federal lawsuit because they had conflicting 

interests. Finally, he maintained that there was no exigency to justify ex parte relief.

Bye’s reply asserted that the probate court’s 2013 order already authorized her to 

employ and compensate attorneys to represent these defendants in Paul’s federal lawsuit. 

She also asserted that Paul lacked standing to seek disqualification of counsel or to raise 

any issue concerning a conflict of interest. 

The September 9, 2021 hearing on these petitions was not transcribed. The court 

granted Bye’s petitions.

4

 Paul timely filed notices of appeal from the September 2021 

orders. 

4 Bye’s petitions sought authority to have the law firm also represent any 

additional defendants “whose interests are aligned with” these defendants. The court’s 

September 2021 orders on these two petitions restricted that authority to two identified 

persons, Juliette Nguyen, another of Bye’s attorneys, and Rebecca Weisman, the attorney 
5

In November 2021, Paul filed an amended complaint in his federal action. The 

amended complaint added as named defendants Bye’s former attorney, Helene’s 

attorney’s law firm, Bye’s sole proprietorship, and Bye’s attorney’s law firm.5

In July 2021, Bye had filed a fourth accounting petition for the Stouky Trust, 

which sought, among other things, authority to pay attorney fees to Bye’s and Helene’s 

attorneys for their services. Bye requested authorization to pay her attorneys $34,174.50 

for their services from December 2019 through July 2021. She sought authorization to 

pay Helene’s attorney $80,283.12 for attorney fees and costs incurred from January 2019 

through June 2021. 

Bye’s attorney submitted a declaration in support of the accounting petition to 

which were attached detailed billing statements. The charges included one charge for

$207.90 for discussion between the attorneys about various issues including termination 

of the Ogier Trust. Another charge of $410.85 was for six items, including “emails 

regarding [Ogier’s] assets.” A third charge of $1,017.50 was for five items, including 

“commence draft of petition to terminate Ogier Trust.” Helene’s attorney submitted a 

declaration in support of his fees and costs, to which he attached detailed billing 

statements. One charge for $700 was for four items, one of which was “discuss Sarah 

[Ogier] Trust.” Another charge, for $1,050, was for a meeting with Paul during which 

Paul made “allegations regarding Sara[h] Ogier Trust.” A third charge was for $175 and

concerned a “conference . . . regarding Sara[h] Ogier Trust matter” and other issues. A 

fourth charge, for $437.50, was for many items, including “Ogier Trust.” A fifth charge

was for $308 and related to the Ogier Trust and unclaimed property in Sarah Ogier’s 

name. A sixth charge was for $1,400 and was for a meeting with Paul and his attorneys 

for the conservator of Helene’s person, if either of them were to be added as a defendant 

in Paul’s federal lawsuit. 

5 The amended complaint also added the law firm of the attorney Paul had 

consulted.
6

at which the Ogier Trust was discussed because the meeting concerned Paul’s federal 

lawsuit. In December 2021, Bye filed a continuation of the fourth accounting petition 

that she had filed in July 2021. The continuation did not seek any additional attorney 

fees or costs. 

In January 2022, Bye filed two new ex parte petitions. She sought to add the four 

newly named defendants in Paul’s federal action to the September 2021 court orders. 

Bye also sought to add the law firm of the attorney for the conservator of Helene’s 

person, as she anticipated that Paul would add that law firm as a defendant in his federal 

lawsuit. 

Bye’s January 2022 petitions also sought authority to retain and compensate 

appellate counsel to handle the defense to Paul’s appeals, including his appeals from the 

September 2021 court orders. Paul had filed five appeals from probate court orders, and 

four of them remained pending at that time.

6

 Bye sought authorization to have the same 

attorney handle all of the appeals. She also sought authority to act as authorized by the 

challenged court orders while the appeals were pending. Bye explained that the exigency 

justifying ex parte orders was the short deadlines for acting in these litigation matters. 

Paul opposed Bye’s petitions on the same grounds that he had opposed her prior 

petitions.7 The court granted Bye’s petitions after a February 2022 hearing that was not 

transcribed. Paul timely filed notices of appeal from these orders. 

In February 2022, Paul filed objections to the fourth accounting petition. He 

objected only to the attorney fees and costs. Paul argued that defending Bye against 

Paul’s federal lawsuit would not benefit the Stouky Trust or Helene. Paul did not raise 

any specific objections to or identify as the subject of his opposition any particular 

charges for attorney fees and costs relating to the Ogier Trust. After a hearing at which 

6 See footnotes 2 and 3, ante. We resolve Paul’s remaining appeals in this 

opinion.

7 We grant Paul’s unopposed motions to augment the record with his oppositions.
7

there was no court reporter, the probate court approved the fourth accounting petition. 

Paul timely filed a notice of appeal from this order. This court ordered Paul’s appeals of 

these orders to be considered together for hearing and disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

Paul’s primary contention is that the probate court abused its discretion in granting 

the petitions because compensating attorneys to represent anyone other than the Stouky 

Trust will not benefit the trust, is not authorized by the Stouky Trust’s terms, and will 

result in a conflict of interest. 

A. Preliminary Matters

Paul raises several additional claims on appeal. First, he contends that the court’s 

orders must be reversed because Bye committed “perjury” in her petitions by recounting 

the history of Paul’s litigation with the Stouky Trust, some of which occurred prior to her 

involvement in the case, and by submitting a “false document” (the 2006 release). 

Although Paul alluded to alleged perjury in his opposition below, nothing in the 

appellate record reflects that any evidence was introduced on this point or that the probate 

court ever addressed this contention. Paul’s brief fails to cite any evidence in the record

in support of his claims that Bye committed perjury.8 Instead, he relies on various 

allegations in his unverified federal complaint. Accordingly, Paul’s appellate claim lacks 

merit as we cannot review the merits of his claim that Bye’s statements and the document 

are false. 

Paul’s reliance on Mesarosh v. United States (1956) 352 U.S. 1 is misplaced. In 

that case, the United States asked the court to remand a criminal case for a new trial 

8 His claims appear to be based on the statement of facts in Bye’s petitions. Bye 

verified the petitions under penalty of perjury. However, her verifications stated: “The 

contents are true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated on 

information and belief, and to those matters I believe them to be true.” Although the 

petitions did not specifically identify any of their contents as being stated only on 

information and belief, it was clear that the events prior to Bye’s appointment were stated 

by her on information and belief.
8

because it conceded that it had presented false testimony by a government witness. (Id.

at p. 3.) Here, in contrast, the record contains no evidence (apart from Paul’s allegations) 

of perjury and does not establish the falsity of Bye’s petitions or the 2006 release. We 

reject Paul’s contentions based on alleged perjury. 

Second, Paul contends that the probate court’s 2013 order authorizing Bye to 

employ and compensate attorneys to defend most of the same people that the court’s 

2021 orders permitted her to employ and compensate attorneys to defend is invalid 

because it was obtained by means of misrepresentations. Paul points to no evidence in 

the record before us establishing that the 2013 order is invalid or was based on any 

misrepresentations. The record contains no indication that he challenged the validity of 

that order by appeal. We reject his challenge to this long-final order as unsupported by 

the record.

Third, Paul claims, as he did below, that he has not engaged in a pattern of 

vexatious litigation. The record does not reflect that any court has made a finding that 

Paul is a vexatious litigant so there is no finding or order for Paul to challenge on this 

basis in this appeal. We note that Paul has filed at least seven appeals to this court from 

probate orders related to the Stouky Trust and the Ogier Trust. Regardless of whether 

Paul may in the future be declared a vexatious litigant, the probate court did not make 

any such finding, so this issue is not before us in these appeals. 

Fourth, Paul asserts that the probate court denied his requests for evidentiary 

hearings at the hearings on Bye’s petitions. The only records of those hearings, which 

were not transcribed, are minute orders that do not reflect that any request was made or 

denied. Paul’s oppositions below did not request evidentiary hearings. Hence, Paul has 

failed to procure a record that supports his claim that the probate court erroneously 

denied requests for evidentiary hearings.

Fifth, Paul contends that the probate court erred in approving the fourth 

accounting petition because “attorney’s fees relating to the Ogier Trust do not benefit the 
9

Stouky Trust.” (Italics added.) His opening appellate brief in his challenge to the fourth 

accounting petition identifies 10 specific charges in the detailed billing statements that he 

claims were improper because they were for services relating to the Ogier Trust. Paul’s 

appellate claim is that using Stouky Trust funds for the benefit of the Ogier Trust is not 

authorized by the Stouky Trust. Paul did not raise this claim in his opposition to the 

fourth accounting petition below. That opposition did not identify any specific charges 

and instead opposed all of the attorney fees and costs on the ground that defending Bye

would not benefit the Stouky Trust. “Generally, parties cannot argue theories on appeal 

that they did not present in the trial court; this applies both to theories of liability and 

theories of defense. [Citations.] ‘Such new arguments may be deemed waived, based on 

common notions of fairness.’ ” (In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 

Cal.App.5th 481, 510.) Although Paul claims that his appellate theory is “not new,” the 

record establishes otherwise. We decide that Paul has forfeited this claim. 

B. No Abuse of Discretion

Paul asserts that the probate court abused its discretion in granting Bye’s 

petitions.

9

 He maintains that (1) the two trusts will not benefit from a defense of anyone

other than Helene and the trusts, (2) the trusts’ terms do not permit trust funds to be used 

to defend others, (3) joint representation of all of these defendants would create a conflict 

of interest, and (4) the amount of fees authorized was unreasonable. 

“The trustee has the power to prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings 

for the protection of trust property and of the trustee in the performance of the trustee’s 

duties.” (Prob. Code, § 16249.) “The trustee has the power to hire persons, 

including . . . attorneys . . . , to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of 

9 Paul acknowledges the abuse of discretion standard, but he seems to suggest that 

we could apply de novo review to “a purely legal question.” He does not explain how 

any of the issues he raises are “purely legal question[s].” As his contentions do not raise 

purely legal issues, we apply the established abuse of discretion standard of review. 
10

administrative duties.” (Id., § 16247.) These statutes provide the trustee with the 

authority to hire attorneys to defend an action against herself and the attorneys and 

advisors she has hired to “advise or assist” her in her performance of her duties. 

“We review the trial court’s order that attorney fees may be payable from trust 

income under the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] In conducting our review, we 

are mindful that ‘[t]he underlying principle which guides the court in allowing costs and 

attorney[] fees incidental to litigation out of a trust estate is that such litigation is a benefit 

and a service to the trust.’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘[A]mong the ordinary powers and duties of a 

trustee of a private trust are those of doing all acts necessary and expedient to collect, 

conserve and protect the property of the trust, to maintain and defend the integrity of the 

trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and to employ such assistants as may be 

necessary for said purposes.’ [Citation.] If litigation is necessary for the preservation of 

the trust, the trustee is entitled to reimbursement for his or her expenditures from the 

trust; however, if the litigation is specifically for the benefit of the trustee, the trustee 

must bear his or her own costs incurred, and is not entitled to reimbursement from the 

trust.” (Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1461 (Terry).)

Paul’s primary contention is that defending individuals or entities other than 

Helene and the trusts in his federal lawsuit is not beneficial to the trusts but only to Bye 

and the other defendants. The probate court could have reasonably concluded otherwise. 

Paul’s federal lawsuit expansively targeted the trusts, the trustee, the attorneys and 

advisors that the trustee currently employed, Helene’s conservator of her person, and 

even the attorneys Bye had employed in the past to assist in the administration of the 

trust. By doing so, Paul’s lawsuit threatened to disrupt the administration of the trusts by 

subjecting to the threat of damages anyone involved in administering or assisting in the 

administration of the trusts. Since the primary purpose of the trusts was to ensure that 

Helene, an elderly woman who required constant care, had adequate funds to pay for her 

care, the avoidance of such disruption was imperative. Helene’s care could not be 
11

ensured if the trustee and her attorneys and advisors and the conservator could not 

perform their duties because they remained under the constant threat that Paul’s lawsuit 

posed. As Bye points out, all of the defendants in question are representatives of 

Helene’s interests and therefore share a single interest, Helene’s welfare, in defeating 

Paul’s federal lawsuit. Indeed, as Bye notes, Paul has not identified any basis for a 

conclusion that any additional fees will be incurred as a result of the attorneys 

representing additional defendants whose interests are aligned with those of Helene and 

the trusts. 

Paul argues that because his lawsuit alleges “mismanagement,” any attorney fees

expended to defend against it on behalf of the trustee and the other defendants would 

protect only their personal interests. The probate court, in the reasonable exercise of its 

discretion, was not required to credit Paul’s allegations, particularly since the court had 

been supervising the administration of these two trusts for many years and could assess 

for itself the propriety of the actions taken by the trustee, the attorneys, and the 

conservator, and approved by the court. The court was entitled to conclude that 

absolving the trustee and the others of these allegations would benefit the trusts by 

freeing those in charge of administering the trusts from Paul’s allegations. 

Paul contends that the mere fact that he makes allegations against Bye personally 

means that a defense against those allegations will not benefit the trusts but only Bye 

personally. The probate court could reasonably conclude, in light of its years of 

supervision of Bye’s administration of the trusts, that Paul’s allegations of misconduct 

were meritless and primarily intended to obstruct administration of the trusts and that 

therefore the trusts would benefit from Bye’s defense against Paul’s federal lawsuit. That 

Paul has included as defendants in his federal lawsuit every single person or entity that 

has ever been associated with the administration of the two trusts and the conservatorship 

constitutes substantial evidence from which the probate court could infer an intent to 

obstruct. 
12

Paul’s reliance on Whittlesey v. Aiello (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1221 is misplaced. 

In that case, the Court of Appeal upheld the probate court’s denial of a request that

attorney fees be paid from the trust’s assets where the request was made by the 

unsuccessful party in litigation between two beneficiaries of the trust. (Id. at p. 1228.) 

The Third District Court of Appeal explained: “Allowance of litigation expenses rests in 

the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent 

an abuse. [Citation.] ‘The underlying principle which guides the court in allowing costs 

and attorneys’ fees incidental to litigation out of a trust estate is that such litigation is a 

benefit and a service to the trust.’ [Citation.] Consequently, where the trust is not 

benefited by litigation, or did not stand to be benefited if the trustee had succeeded, there 

is no basis for the recovery of expenses out of the trust assets.” (Id. at p. 1230.) In the 

course of its discussion, the Third District offered an example of litigation that might not

benefit a trust. “[L]itigation seeking to remove or surcharge a trustee for mismanagement 

of trust assets would not warrant the trustee to hire counsel at the expense of the trust. 

Such litigation would be for the benefit of the trustee, not the trust.” (Id. at p. 1227.) 

The Third District’s dicta in Whittlesey has no relevance to the circumstances 

before us. Paul’s federal lawsuit was not an action to remove or surcharge a trustee, nor 

was it a contest between two beneficiaries. In Whittlesey, the Third District found no

abuse of discretion in the denial of fees, while here Paul asks us to find an abuse of 

discretion in the granting of fees. The abuse of discretion standard of review requires us 

to defer to the probate court’s exercise of discretion, as the Third District did in 

Whittlesey. We similarly reject Paul’s reliance on this court’s decision in Terry, supra, 

131 Cal.App.4th 1445. Terry, similar to Whittlesey, involved litigation between two 

competing heirs. (Id. at p. 1462.) 

Hollaway v. Edwards (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 94 supports our conclusion that a 

probate court has discretion to permit the payment of attorney fees for a trustee’s defense 

even where there are allegations of misconduct by the trustee. In that case, the Fourth 
13

District Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s contention that it was improper for the 

probate court to permit the payment of attorney fees for the defense of one cotrustee 

against allegations by the other cotrustee of breach of fiduciary duty in the administration 

of the trust. (Id. at pp. 96, 99.) The Fourth District explained that the payment of fees for 

defense of one cotrustee “benefited the trust by eliminating charges raising serious 

questions about whether she had and could continue to administer the trust properly.” 

(Id. at p. 99.) Similarly, here a defense against Paul’s federal lawsuit benefits the trust by 

combating Paul’s challenges to the administration of the trusts and permitting Bye and 

her attorneys and advisors to continue to administer the trusts for Helene’s benefit.

Paul also maintains that the terms of the two trusts do not permit trust funds to be 

used to defend anyone other than the trusts. The terms of the two trusts are not so 

limited. The Ogier Trust provides: “The Trustee shall have the power to employ 

attorneys, accountants, investment advisers, specialists and such other agents as the 

Trustee shall deem necessary or desirable. . . . The Trustee may charge the 

compensation of such attorneys . . . and other agents and any other expenses against the 

Trust.” The Stouky Trust provides: “[T]he trustee shall have all of the following 

powers . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Employ and discharge agents and employees, including but not 

limited to attorneys, . . . and other advisers . . . to advise and assist the trustee in the 

management of any trusts created under this trust instrument, and compensate them from 

the trust property.” Neither of these provisions precludes the trustee from compensating 

attorneys from the trusts’ property where the attorneys’ representation of those involved 

in assisting the trustee in the administration of the trusts will benefit the trust. Paul’s 

argument to the contrary is simply a repeat of his contention that defending these 

defendants will not benefit the trusts, an argument that we have already rejected above.

Paul contends that the probate court’s orders were abuses of its discretion because 

no attorney could properly represent all of these defendants without encountering a 

conflict of interest. While Paul mentioned this assertion below, he failed to explain and 
14

does not explain on appeal how the probate court’s orders authorizing joint representation 

of only those defendants “whose interests are aligned” would raise any conflicts of 

interest. Interests that “are aligned” necessarily do not conflict. We reject this 

unsupported contention.

Finally, Paul relies on Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259

(Donahue) to support his claim that the fees authorized by the court’s orders were an 

abuse of discretion because they were unreasonable. In Donahue, the beneficiary of a 

trust unsuccessfully opposed the former trustee’s petition for approval of his final 

accounting and compensation for his service as trustee. After approval of his accounting 

and compensation, the former trustee sought more than $5 million in attorney and trustee 

fees for the 45-member legal team at three law firms who had orchestrated his defense 

against the beneficiary’s opposition. (Id. at pp. 263–264.) The probate court granted the 

requested fees (with some small reductions), and the beneficiary appealed. (Id. at p. 

266.) On appeal, the beneficiary did not contest entitlement to fees but only the 

reasonableness of the amount incurred. (Id. at p. 268.) 

The Fourth District found that the former trustee had failed to demonstrate that the

millions of dollars in fees were reasonable. “Trustees have a duty ‘to administer the trust 

solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.’ [Citations.] They should incur and pay 

expenses, including legal expenses, which are ‘reasonable’ in amount and ‘appropriate’

to the ‘purposes and circumstances of the trust.’ [Citations.] To recover fees and costs, 

trustees must subjectively believe the expense was necessary or appropriate to carry out 

the trust’s purposes, and they must show their beliefs were objectively reasonable.” 

(Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 268.)

The case before us does not involve millions of dollars in attorney fees. Here, the 

orders anticipated the initial payment of a $50,000 retainer to fund a defense against 

Paul’s federal lawsuit and an initial $30,000 retainer to fund a defense against Paul’s 

appeals. While the orders authorized the payment of ongoing fees and costs, there was 
15

no indication that those fees and costs would be excessive. We can see no abuse of 

discretion in the probate court’s determination that these modest initial amounts of 

attorney fees and ongoing incurred fees and costs were reasonable and would provide a

substantial benefit to the trusts.

We conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the five

orders challenged by Paul.

III. DISPOSITION

The probate court’s September 10, 2021 orders (case Nos. H049808 and 

H049813), its February 9, 2022 orders (case Nos. H050020 and H050040), and its 

February 17, 2022 order (case No. H050043) are affirmed. Respondents shall recover 

their costs on appeal.
______________________________________

Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

____________________________________

Wilson, J.

H049808, H049813, H050020, H050040, H050043

Bye, as Trustee, etc. v. Mula