O r al a r g u men t was he ar d i n t h i s c as e on J u n e 2, 2004, i n Cooke v i l l e, Put n am Coun t y , T en n es s ee , a s pa r t of 1 this C o u rt' s S .C .A .L .E .S . ( S upr eme C o u rt A d vanci ng L e g a l E d ucat i o n fo r S tud e n ts) p ro je c t.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE HEARD AT COOKE VILLE 1 

### June 2, 200 4 S es sio n CINDY R. LOURCEY, ET AL 

### . v. ESTA TE OF CH AR LES S CA RLE TT, De ceased App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Circuit Court

for Wilson County No. 12043 Clara Byrd, Judge

No. M2002- 00995-SC-R11- CV - F iled Septem ber 8, 2004

We g rante d revie w to de termine (1) whether the complaint states a c laim for intentional infliction of emotional di stress when it alleg es t hat t he defenda nt’s conduct was outrag eous because he shot his wife and the n himself in plaintiff C indy L ource y ’s presence ; and (2) whether the complaint states a claim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress when it does not alleg e that Cindy L ource y was related to the def

endant or his wife. The trial court dismissed the complaint for fail u re t o s t ate a cl ai m upon which re lief may be g rante d pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 12.02(6)

. The Court of Appea ls r ever sed the trial court’s judgme nt a fter c oncluding that the complaint states claims for intentional a nd neg lige nt infliction of emotional distre ss. A fter r eviewing the re cord and applicable authority , we hold that the plaintiffs state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis tr e ss b e c aus e Cin dy L ou rc e y wi tne sse d a n “ ou tr a g e ou s” a c t, i .e ., thede fe nd a nt’ s sh oo tin g of his wi fea ndhim se lf, a ndthat th e plaint if fs stat e a c la im f or ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss even thoug h CindyL ource y is not related to the defe ndant or his w ife. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the Court of Appea ls’ judgme nt.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Appe als Aff irm ed; Case R em anded to Circuit Court
E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined. J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., filed a separ ate c oncurring opinion.
Michele M. B rubake r, Parks T. Chastain and Stacey A. Ter ral, Na shville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Estate of

Charles Sca

rlett, Dec ease d.-2-

Dav id L . C oo per, Nas hv il le, Ten nes see, forth e Ap pel lee s, Ci nd y R. L ou rcey and Vern on B. L o u r c e y.
OP IN ION
BACK GR OUND The plaintiffs, Cindy

Rey nolds L ource y

and her husband, Ve rn o n Burton L ource y , filed a
c o m p l a i n ta g a i n s tt h e d e f

e n d a n t , E s t a t e o f C h ar l e s S c ar l e t t , i n t h e C i r c u i t C o u rt f o r W i l s o n C o u n t y, Tenne ss ee
. The c omplaint asserted c laims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. Th e a lle g a tio ns in the plaint if fs ’ c omp la int

area s f oll ow s:
On Fe bruary

5, 2001, CindyL ource y

was wor king a s a postal ca

rrier for t he United States Postal S ervic e. While delivering mail by postal vehicle on Rome Pike i n L eb an o n, Tenne ssee, L ou rc e y e nc ou nte re d Ch arl e s Sc arl e tt andhis wi fe , J oa nn e Sc arl e tt, wh o wa s nud e fr om the waist up, in the middle of Rome Pike. When L ource y stopped her ve hicle to provide a ssistance, Char les Sc arl e tt t oldhe r that hi s wi fe wa s h a vin g a se izur e . A s L ou rc e y

us e d h e r c e ll p ho ne to c a ll
emer g ency

911 to reque st help, Charles Scarlett pulled out a pistol and shot his wife in the hea d. He then turned and fac ed L ource y , pointed the pi stol at hi s head, pulled the trig g er, and killed himself.
Acco rd i n g to the complaint, Charles Sca rlett’s conduc t cre ated c auses of action for intentional and neg lige nt inf liction of emotional distress. The complaint alleg es that Cindy L ource y suffe red f rom post-traumatic stre ss disorder a nd maj o r d epression following the inc ident and wa s unable to re turn to work. In addition, she suffe red phy sical injury and impairment, menta l injury and impairment, pain and suf fering, me d i ca l expenses, lost wag es, and lost ea rning capa city . The complaint also alleg es that Ve rnon L ource y suffe red the loss of consortium and the loss of companionship of his wife.
The de fendant, Estate of C h ar l es Scarle tt, moved to dism iss the complaint on the g rounds that it failed to state a c laim pursuant t o Rule 12.02(6) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. The mot ion stated t hat t he claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed beca use Charle s Scarlett’s c onduct was not outra g eous and that the claim for ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed because CindyL ource y was not closely

related to either of the Scarletts. The plaintiffs re sponded that Sca rl et t ’s intentional acts of attempted murder and
su ic idewe resu ff

ic ie ntl y ou tr a g e ou s to su pp ort the int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im
a nd that be ing re late d wa s no t a re qu ir e d e le me nt fo r the ne g lig e nt i nf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im.
F o ll o w in g a

h e ar in g , th e tria l c o u rt g r a n te d th e d e f e n d a n t’ s mo ti o n a n d d is mi s s e d the complaint. The Court of Appeals reve rsed the trial court’ s judgme nt, however , and re manded the
case to the trial court f

or further proc eeding s on the claims fo r b o th intentional and neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. We therea fter g rante d this appeal.-3- AN AL YSI S
Stand ard of Review
A motion to dis miss a complaint for failure to state a c laim pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du restate s tha t the a lle g a tio ns in the c omp la int , a c c e pte d a s tr ue , f a il to establish a cause of a ction for whic h relief can beg rante d. L eac h v. Tay lor, 124 S.W .3d 87, 90 (Tenn. 2004) . A motion to dis miss admits the truth of the rele vant and materia l a lleg ations contained in the complaint. I d.
When review ing the trial court’ s dismis s al o f a complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6), we
acc ept t he factual alleg ations contained in the complaint as true. I d. The issue pre sents a question of law, w hich we revie w de novo without acc ording a presumption of corre ctness to the conc lusions
rea ched be low. I d.
Int e nt ion al I nflic ti on o f Em ot ion al D ist r e ss
Th e de fe nd a nt f

ir st ar g ue s tha t the tria l cou rt pr op e rl y dis mis se d the c omp la int fo r f a ilu reto state a c la im fo r int e nti on a l inf

lic tio n of e mot ion a l dis tr e ss be c aus e the c on du c t of Cha rl e s Sc arl e tt w a s n o t“ o u tr a g e o u s ” a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
. T h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e rt s t h a t “ l i f

e i s f u l l o f s c e n e s o f

tr a g e d y” and ar g ues that “the re w as no outrag eous conduc t directe d towards L ource y .” The plaintiffs r espond that the complaint states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on th e ac t i ons of Charles Sca rlett, which we re outra g eous. They also arg ue that Tenne ssee la w d o es not requir e that the outra g eous conduc t be direc ted at a plaintiff but that the complaint is sufficient eve n if the law r equire s that the conduc t be so direc ted beca use, in this ca se, Scarle tt’s conduct wa s directe d at Cindy L ource y
. We beg in the analy sis of these is sues by first examining the e lements requir ed for intentional infliction of em o t i o n al d i stress. We first rec og nized the tort of outrag eous conduc t in Medlin v. Allied I nv. Co., 398 S.W .2d 270, 274 (Tenn. 1966) , wh er e we adopted the lang uag e of the Restatement (Sec ond) of Torts, section 46, which provided: “One who by extreme and outra g eous conduct . . . c auses se vere emotional distress to another is subjec t to liabilityfor suc h emotional distress, and if bodily

harm [to the other] results from it, for such bodily harm.”
To state a c la im f or int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n of e mot ion a l dis tr e ss, a plaint if f mus t e sta

bli sh that: (1 ) the de fe nd a nt’ s c on du c t w a s in te nti on a l or re c kle ss; (2 ) the de fe nd a nt’ s c on du ct was so outrag eous that it cannot be tolerate d by civiliz ed socie ty ; and (3) thedefe ndant’s conduc t resulted in serious mental injury

to the plaintiff. B ain v. Wells, 936 S .W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997).
I n describing these elements, we have e mphasized that it i s not sufficient that a de fendant “has a cted with an intent whic h is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intende d to inflict emotional distress.” I d. (citations omitted). A plaintiff must in addition show that the defe ndant’s-4-

c on du c t w a s “ so ou tr a g e ou s inc ha ra c te r, a ndso e xtre me in degree, as to g o b e y on d a ll p os sib le bounds of dec ency and to be reg arde d as atroc ious, and utterly intolerable in a

civiliz ed community .” Miller v. Wil lbanks, 8 S.W .3d 607, 614 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting Restatement (Sec ond) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965))

. Ap p l y i n g t h e f

o r e g o i n g p r i n c i p l e s , w e c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e p l a int if fs ’ complaint, when a cce pted as true , state a c laim f or intentional inf

liction of emotional distress. The complaint alleg es that Charles Scarle tt’s c onduct was intentional and that it caused Cindy L ource y se ri ou s me nta l in

jury in the fo rm of

po st- tr aumatic str e ss d iso rd e r, de pr e ssi on , a ndre late d p ro ble ms. Mo re ov e r, thec omp la int

de sc ri be s c on du c t th a t is “ ou tr a g e ou s” un de r the stand ards disc us se d in Ba i n a n d M i l l e r
. T o i l l u s tra t e, C h ar l es S ca rl et tt o l d C i n d y L o u rc eyt h ath i s wi fe wa s h av i n g a s eizure; as L ource y

was c alling 911 f

or help, Sca

rlett shot his wife in the hea d, turned to fa ce L ource y , put a pistol to his head, pulled the trig g er, and killed himself. This conduct, which oc curr ed in L ou rc e y ’s imm e diate pr e se nc e a nd inv olv e d he r as a pa rt ic ipant, wa s not simp ly

a tr a g e dy that is common to daily life as asserted by the defe ndant. I ndeed, the complaint clea rly alleg es conduct that wa s o utr a g e ou s inc ha

ra c te r, e xtre me in d e g re e , b e y on d a ll p os sib le bo un ds of de c e nc y , a ndutt e rl y intolerable in a

civiliz ed socie ty . See Miller, 8 S.W.3d at 614.
I n rea ching this c onclusion, we ne ed not addr ess the def endant’ s arg ument that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law requires that the a lleg ed outra g eous conduct be “dire cted at” the plaintiff. Assuming there is such a re quirement, a question we do not decide today , t h e allegations in t he plaintiffs’ c omplaint, when ac cepte d as true, de monstrate that Sc arl e tt’ s c on du c t w a s d ir e c te d at Cin dy L ou rc e y . T he c omp la int states th at Charle s Sc arl e tt t old L ou rc e y that his wif

e wa s hav ing a se izur e a nd that he kne w L ou rc e y wa s se e kin g he lp i n r e sp on se to his statement. The complaint further states t hat L ource y was in close prox imity when Sca rlett shot h i s w i f e a n d t h a tS c ar l e t t t u r n e d t o f a c e L o u r c e y b e f

o r e s h o o t i n g h i m s e l f

i n t h e h e a d

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we c onclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint states a c laim upon which relief could be g rante d pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of C ivil Procedur e for intentional infliction of emotional dis tr e ss.
Ne gli ge nt Infli c ti on o f Em ot ion al D ist r e ss
Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt a

rg ue s that the tria l c ou rt

pr op e rl y dis mis se d th e c omp la int

fo r f a ilu reto state a c laim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress beca use the plaintiff, Cindy

L ource y , was not closely

related to Charles Sca

rlett or his wife. T he plaintiffs, howe ver, c on t en d that the
c omp la int a lle g e s th e ne c e ssa

ry e lemen ts for neg lig e nt i nf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss andthat a relationship i s not require d for a plaintiff to establish a claim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress.
To resolve this iss ue, we beg in the ana ly sis by revie wing the eleme nts of a claim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. I n Tenne ssee, suc h a claim requ i re s t hat the plaintiff
e sta bli sh thee le me nts of

a g e ne ra l ne g lig e nc e c la im: (1 ) duty , (2) br e a c h of d uty , ( 3) inj ury or los s, (4) c ausation in fact , and (5) proxi mate ca usation. See Camper

v. Minor, 915 S.W .2d 437, 446I n dee d, ou r de ci s i on s h av e emph as i ze d t h at for es ee abi l i t y is e ss ent i al i n a n al y zi n g t h e du t y a n d c au s at i on 2 elem en t s o f

a ne gli ge nc e c l aim

. S ee , e.g., M cC all v. W i l d er, 9 1 3 S .W .2d 1 5 0 , 1 5 3 (T en n.1 9 9 5 ) (st ati ng t ha t t he re is a d ut y t o “ act wi t h due care i f t he fo res eeab l e p rob ab i l i t y and gravi t y of harm po sed b y d efend ant ' s co nd uct o ut weigh t he b urden up o n de fend ant t o engage i n al t ernat i ve co nd uct t hat wo ul d have p revent ed t he harm” ).

P rior to T hu rm an , ho w ev er, a n un p ub l i she d C o urt o f A p p ea l s’ d ec i si o n ha d h eld t ha t a p l ainti f f m ust est ab l i sh 3

a cl os e r el at i on s h i p t o s t at e a cl ai m for t h e n eg l i g en t i n f l i ct i on of e mot i on al di s t r es s
. Se e B r own i n g v
. V an der g r i f f , N o. E 1 9 9 9 -0 2 7 1 1 -C O A -R 3 -C V (T e n n . C t. A p p . E .S ., Ja n . 2 2 , 2 0 0 1 ). -5- (Tenn. 1996) . I n addition, the pl aintiff mus t establish the ex istence of a serious or seve re e motional inj ury that is su pp orte d b y e xpe rt me dic a l or

sc ie nti fi c e vid e nc e . I d. ; se e a lso Ra mse y v. B e a ve rs , 931 S.W .2d 527, 531-32 (Te nn. 1996).
I n discussing the se ele ments in Ramsey , we c larified that a neg lige nt infliction of e motional dis tr e ss c la im p re mis e d u po n w itn e ssi ng thede a th o r i nju ry of a thi rdpe rs on re qu ir e s a plaint if f t o show that a “t h i rd person’s death or injury and plaintiff’ s emotional injury wer e proximate and fore seea ble re sults of defendant’ s n egli g ence .” 931 S.W.2d at 531. We commented that 2 fore seea bilityrequire d consideration of a number of rele vant fac tors but that only two of them wer e essential: (1) the plaintiff’s phy sical location showed “suff icient proxim ity

to the injury -produc ing event to allow se nsory

observation” by

the plaintiff, and ( 2) the injury “wa s, or re asonably

was perc eived to be, se rious or fatal.” I d. Stil l another f actor relating to for esee ability

is the plaintiff’s relationship t o the injured pa rty . I d. at 531-32.
I n apply ing our

decision in Ramsey , the Court of Appea ls ha s corr ectly rec og nized that the
e le me nt o f f

or e se e abil ity

do e s n ot re qu ire a plaintiff to esta blish a relationship to the injured third party . Se e T h u r man v
. Se ll e r s , 6 2 S. W. 3 d 1 4 5 , 1 6 3 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 2 0 0 1 )

. I n T h u r man , the 3 appellate court observed that the ke y fac tors for establishing foresee ability are whether a plaintiff’ s pr oximi ty to the in j u r y
- c a u s i n g e ve nt a llo we d f

or “ se ns ory ob se rv a tio n” a ndwh e the r the inj ury “ wa s, or wa s rea sonably

perc eived to be, serious or fata l.” I d. at 163. Moreove r, in noting that Ramsey di d n o t e xp r e s s l y s t a t e t h a t a p l a i n t i f f m u s t h a v e h a d a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e t h i r d part yto establish foreseea

bility , the intermediate court expl ained that “ the nature of the plaintiff’ s relationship wit h the third party should play a pivotal role in de termining the amount of da ma g e s to awa rd, rather than be ing a

prer equisite for e stablishing for esee ability . . . .” I d. at 164.
I n our view, the intermediate court’s analy sis in Thurman properly rec og nized that a plaintiff is not required to es t ab l i s h a cl o s e re lationship to t he injured pa rty to state a c laim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. Thereare sever al re asons why a re lationship is not require d. First, our de cision in Ramsey reje cted a rig id “zone of dang er” require ment and cla rified that a plaintiff must establish that his or her injurie s werefore seea ble in acc ordanc e w i t h traditional
ne g lig e nc e princ ipl e s. Al tho ug h we dis c us se d se ve ral c on sid e ratio ns in a na ly zing fo re se e abil ity in Ramsey , including the plaintiff’s relationship to the injured pa rty , we did not hold that the plaintiff’s relationship t o the injured pa rty was itself an element f

or stating or establishing a claim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress. See Ramsey , 931 S.W .2d at 531.Se e An n ot a t i on , Re l a t i on s h i p Be t w e e n Vi c t i m a n d Pl a i n t i f f

- W i t n e s s As Af

fe c t i n g Ri g h t t o Re c ov e r Under 4 S ta te L a w F o r N e g lige n t In fli c tio n o f E m o tio n a l D istre ss D u e to W itne ssin g In ju ry t o A n o the r W h e re B ysta n d e r P la intiff Is N o t M em b er o f

V i ct i m ’ s Imm ed i at e Fa m i l y , 98 A

. L.R

. 5 60 9 (20 0 2 ) ( d i scus si ng cases i nvo l vi ng s p o uses , chi l d ren, th p arent s, grandp arents, gr a n d c h ild re n , sib ling s, nie c e s a n d ne p h e w s, a u n ts a n d un c le s, re la tio n s b y m a rr ia g e , step -chi l d ren, unm arri ed co
- hab i t ant s, f ri end s, co wo rkers , and acq uai nt ances, am o ng other s)

. -6- Second, a r eview of

Camper v. Minor s hows that we r emande d the plaintiff’s c laim for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress for the a pplication of g ener al neg lige nce principles eve n though the plaintiff in that c ase had no relationship to the injured pa rty . Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446. I ndeed, similar to the pr esent c ase, the plaintiff i n Camper was the driver of a truc k whose c laim was based on mental harm suffe red after seeing the dea d body of an unr elated motorist who wa s killed i n a n a c c i d e n t

. Id

. a t 4 3 9

. I n s u m , t h e r e i s s i m p l y n o b a s i s u p o n w h i c h t o c o n c l u d e t h a tR a m s e y, which wa s relea sed only

nine months after

Camper by

the same Court, a dopted without comment an entire ly

new e lement for stating a claim of ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress. Finally , we obse rve that courts in other jurisdictions have encounte red nume rous obstacle s when defining a “re lationship” for ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress case s and in apply ing that e le me nt t o my

ri a d c a se s invo lvi ng re lativ e s b y blo od , r e lativ e s b y

marria g e , c o- ha

bit a nts , friends, and acquaintances. As one c ommentator has sa id: 4
Wha t ev er the articulate d relational standard, and howeve r it may g ov e rn , c ou rt s w ill ing to r e c og nize thec on c e pt o f a by stand e r’ s c la im in a context n ar rowe r than a g ener ally

available rig ht to sue for neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress have no dif ficulty apply ing it where certain relationships i nform the claim, such as parent, c hild, sibling, and spouse . The c ourts, howeve r, see m to shrink from apply ing the conce pt to more remote r elationships, even to those that
ar e, p o t en t i al l y , as gen u i n e an d d ee p as t h o s e o f p ar en t , ch i l d , s i b l i n g, or spouse, but w hich have no specia l leg al sanc tion or consang uineal aff inity

. Howar d H. Kestin , T h e By s tander ’s Cause of Action for E motional I njury : Reflections on the Rel a ti o n a l E li g ib il ity

St a n d ar d , 2 6 Se to n H a ll L

. Re v
. 5 1 2 , 5 2 6

- 2 7 ( 1 9 9 6 ) ( e mp h a s is a dded). B e c aus e of

the se int e rp re tiv e pr ob le ms, we be lie ve that th e be tter -r e a so ne d a pp ro a c h, wh ic h is consistent with our previous de cisions in Camper and Ramsey , is to hold that the prese nce or absenc e of a relationship betwee n the pl aintiff and an injured third pa rty is relevant to the duty

and ca usation
e le me nts of

a ne g lig e nt inf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di stre ss c la im, a s w e ll a s to thequ e sti on of da ma g e s, but is not di spositive of such a c laim. See id. at 52 1 n
. 4 3 (discussing case s that have not a dopted “re lationship” as an e lement of ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress claims).
I n a pp lying thefo re g oin g princ ipl e s, we c on c lud e that th e a lle g a tio ns in the plaint if fs ’
c omp la int , w he n ta

ke n a s tr ue , s tate a cl a im f

or ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. With reg ard to duty , which must be dete rmined by the t rial court as a matter of law, the complaint alleg es su ff ic ie nt f a c ts f or thec ou rt to c on c lud e that th e fo re se e abil ity a ndg ra vity

of the po te nti a l ha

rm to-7-

CindyL ource y

outweig hed the bur den on Charles Scarle tt to preve nt the harm fr om occur ring . See Mc Ca ll v . Wil de r, 91 3 S.W.2 d 150 , 1 53 (T e nn . 1 99 5) . Ind e e d, thec omp la int a lle g e s th a t Sc arl e tt sp ok e to Cin dy L ou rc e y a nd imp lic itl y re qu e ste d h e lp, that Sc arl e tt kne w that L ou rc e y wa s inc los e p h ys i c a l p r o x i m i t y, t h a tL o u r c e y s a w S c ar l e t ts h o o t h i s w i f e , t h a t S c a r l e t tt u r n e d t o f a c e L o u r c e y, and that Scarlett shot him self in the hea d. See R amsey , 931 S.W .2d at 531. I n addition, with reg ard to causation, which must be determined by t h e t rier of fac t, these and othe r fa cts alleg ed in the complaint are sufficie nt to establish a clai m t h at C indy L ource y suffe red se rious or seve re me ntal injuries an d t h at Charles Sca rlett’s conduc t was the a ctual ca use and the proxi mate ca use of the injuries. See Camper , 915 S.W .2d at 446.
Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint states a claim upon which re lief may be g rante d pursuan t to Rul e 12.02(6) of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure f or neg lige nt inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss.
CO NC LU SION
Af te r r e vie wi ng there c or d a nd app lic able auth ority , we ho ld that th e plaint if fs state a c la im
as require d by

Rule 12.02(6) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedurefor intentional infliction of emotional distress beca

use Cindy

L ource y witnessed an “ outrag eous” a ct, i

. e. , t h e def endant’ s shooting of his wifeand himself, and that the plaintiffs state a c laim as requir ed by Rule 12.02(6)
o f th e Te n n es s ee R u l es o f C i v i l P ro ce d u re fo r n egl i gen ti n fl i ct i o n o f e m o t i o n al d i s tre s s ev en t h o u gh CindyL ource y

was not re lated t o the def endant or his wife. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the Court of Ap pe a ls’ jud g me nt andre ma ndthi s c a se to the tria l c ou rt fo r fu rthe r pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion. The costs of the a ppeal a re ta x ed to the defe ndant-a ppellant, Estate of Charles Scarle tt, for
w h i c h e x e c u t i o n s h a l l i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

_________________________________

E. RILEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE