41042 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 131 / Monday, July 11, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

1The Bureau is generally authorized to issue 

regulations as ‘‘necessary or appropriate to 

administer and carry out the purposes and 

objectives of [the FCRA], and to prevent evasions 

thereof or to facilitate compliance therewith.’’ 15 

U.S.C. 1681s(e)(1). The CFPA did not, however, 

transfer to the Bureau rulemaking authority for 15 

U.S.C. 1681m(e) (‘‘Red Flag Guidelines and 

Regulations Required’’’) and 15 U.S.C. 1681w 

(‘’’Disposal of Records’’). 

2 15 U.S.C. 1681s(b). 

3 15 U.S.C. 1681(c). 

4 15 U.S.C. 1681t(a); see also Davenport v. 

Farmers Ins. Group, 378 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 

2004) (‘‘The FCRA makes clear that it is not 

intended to occupy the entire regulatory field with 

regard to consumer reports.’’). 

■ a. In paragraph (a), removing 

‘‘§ 404.12(e)’’ and adding ‘‘§ 404.14(e)’’ 

in its place; and 

■ b. In paragraph (c) introductory text, 

removing ‘‘§ 404.16(d)’’ and adding 

‘‘§ 404.18(d)’’ in its place. 

§ 404.17 [Amended] 

■ 7. Amend newly redesignated 

§ 404.17 in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) by 

removing ‘‘§ 404.17’’ and adding 

‘‘§ 404.19’’ in its place. 

§ 404.19 [Ameded] 

■ 8. Amend newly redesignated 

§ 404.19 in paragraph (a) introductory 

text by removing ‘‘§ 404.12(e)’’ and 

adding ‘‘§ 404.14(e)’’ in its place. 

§ 404.20 [Amended] 

■ 9. Amend newly redesignated 

§ 404.20 as follows: 

■ a. In paragraph (a), removing 

‘‘§ 404.12(e)’’ and ‘‘§ 404.14(d) and (e)’’ 

and adding ‘‘§ 404.14(e)’’ and 

‘‘§ 404.16(d) and (e)’’ in their places, 

respectively. 

■ b. In paragraphs (c) introductory text 

and (e), removing ‘‘§ 404.12(e)’’ and 

adding ‘‘§ 404.14(e)’’ in its place. 

§ 404.21 [Amended] 

■ 10. Amend newly redesignated 

§ 404.21 in paragraph (b) by removing 

‘‘§ 404.14(d) and (e)’’ and ‘‘§ 404.12(e)’’ 

and adding ‘‘§ 404.16(d) and (e)’’ and 

‘‘§ 404.14(e)’’ in their places, 

respectively. 

§ 404.35 [Amended] 

■ 11. Amend newly redesignated 

§ 404.35 by removing ‘‘§ 404.32’’ and 

adding ‘‘§ 404.34’’ in its place. 

Joyce B. Stone, 

Assistant Corporate Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2022–14068 Filed 7–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6690–01–P 

BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL 

PROTECTION 

12 CFR Part 1022 

The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Limited 

Preemption of State Laws 

AGENCY: Bureau of Consumer Financial 

Protection. 

ACTION: Interpretive rule. 

SUMMARY: States play an important role 

in the regulation of consumer reporting. 

State laws that are not ‘‘inconsistent’’ 

with the Fair Credit Reporting Act 

(FCRA) are generally not preempted by 

that statute. The FCRA also expressly 

preempts certain categories of State 

laws. This interpretive rule clarifies that 

FCRA’s express preemption provisions 

have a narrow and targeted scope. States 

therefore retain substantial flexibility to 

pass laws involving consumer reporting 

to reflect emerging problems affecting 

their local economies and citizens. For 

example, if a State law were to forbid 

consumer reporting agencies from 

including information about medical 

debt, evictions, arrest records, or rental 

arrears in a consumer report (or from 

including such information for a certain 

period of time), such a law would 

generally not be preempted. Likewise, if 

a State law were to prohibit furnishers 

from furnishing such information to 

consumer reporting agencies, such a law 

would also not generally be preempted. 

Similarly, if a State law required that a 

consumer reporting agency provide 

information required by the FCRA at the 

consumer’s requests in languages other 

than English, such a law would 

generally not be preempted. 

DATES: This interpretive rule is effective 

on July 11, 2022. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Shiva Nagaraj, Senior Counsel, Legal 

Division, and Bradley Lipton, Senior 

Counsel, Legal Division, (202) 435– 

7700. If you require this document in an 

alternative electronic format, please 

contact CFPB_Accessibility@cfpb.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The Fair Credit Reporting Act 

(FCRA)—which was enacted in 1970 

and has since been amended several 

times—was intended by Congress to 

‘‘ensure fair and accurate credit 

reporting, promote efficiency in the 

banking system, and protect consumer 

privacy.’’ Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 

551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). The FCRA 

‘‘imposes a host of requirements 

concerning the creation and use of 

consumer reports.’’ Spokeo, Inc. v. 

Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 335 (2016). 

Among other things, the statute sets 

forth the permissible uses of consumer 

reports, establishes limits for 

information included in consumer 

reports, and creates a process for 

consumers to dispute information in 

their credit files. 

In the Consumer Financial Protection 

Act of 2010, Congress granted the 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

general rulemaking authority over the 

FCRA (except for certain provisions that 

are administered by other Federal 

agencies).1 The Bureau also has 

authority to enforce the FCRA, along 

with other Federal regulators.2

States also play an important role in 

the regulation of consumer reporting. 

The FCRA itself grants States the 

authority to enforce the statute.3

Additionally, in the wake of Congress’s 

enactment of the FCRA, many States 

passed their own versions of the statute. 

States have continued to enact 

legislation regulating the conduct of 

consumer reporting agencies, furnishers, 

and users of consumer reports. In some 

cases, State legislation provides 

protections to consumers that go above 

and beyond the requirements of the 

FCRA. 

These State statutes exist alongside 

the FCRA, which says that—subject to 

certain exceptions—it ‘‘does not annul, 

alter, affect, or exempt any person 

subject to [the FCRA] from complying 

with the laws of any State with respect 

to the collection, distribution, or use of 

any information on consumers, or for 

the prevention or mitigation of identity 

theft, except to the extent that those 

laws are inconsistent with any provision 

of this subchapter, and then only to the 

extent of the inconsistency.’’ 4 In other 

words, State laws that are not 

‘‘inconsistent’’ with the FCRA— 

including State laws that are more 

protective of consumers than the 

FCRA—are generally not preempted. 

The FCRA also expressly preempts 

certain categories of State laws. As 

relevant here, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b) says 

that ‘‘[n]o requirement or prohibition 

may be imposed under the laws of any 

State with respect to any subject matter 

regulated under’’ certain sections or 

subsections of the FCRA: 

• subsection (c) or (e) of section 

1681b, relating to the prescreening of 

consumer reports; 

• section 1681i, relating to the time 

by which a consumer reporting agency 

must take any action, including the 

provision of notification to a consumer 

or other person, in any procedure 

related to the disputed accuracy of 

information in a consumer’s file, [with 

an exception for laws in effect on 

September 30, 1996]; 

• subsections (a) and (b) of section 

1681m, relating to the duties of a person 


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5The CFPB ‘‘encourages State Officials to consult 

with the Bureau whenever interpretation of Federal 

consumer financial law, as defined in section 

1002(14) of the Dodd-Frank Act, . . . is relevant to 

a State regulatory or law enforcement matter, even 

if it is not the type of action for which notification 

is required’’ pursuant to the State Official 

Notification Rule. 77 FR 39112, 39113 (June 29, 

2012). The Office of the New Jersey Attorney 

General recently notified the CFPB about pending 

litigation in which the plaintiff alleges that a New 

Jersey consumer protection statute is preempted by 

the FCRA. 

who takes any adverse action with 

respect to a consumer; 

• section 1681m(d), relating to the 

duties of persons who use a consumer 

report of a consumer in connection with 

any credit or insurance transaction that 

is not initiated by the consumer and that 

consists of a firm offer of credit or 

insurance; 

• section 1681c, relating to 

information contained in consumer 

reports, [with an exception for laws in 

effect on September 30, 1996]; 

• section 1681s–2, relating to the 

responsibilities of persons who furnish 

information to consumer reporting 

agencies [with exceptions for certain 

enumerated State laws] 

• section 1681g(e), relating to 

information available to victims under 

section 1681g(e); 

• section 1681s–3, relating to the 

exchange and use of information to 

make a solicitation for marketing 

purposes; 

• section 1681m(h), relating to the 

duties of users of consumer reports to 

provide notice with respect to terms in 

certain credit transactions; 

• subsections (i) and (j) of section 

1681c–1 relating to security freezes; or 

• subsection (k) of section 1681c–1, 

relating to credit monitoring for active 

duty military consumers. 

Similarly, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(5) says 

that ‘‘[n]o requirement or prohibition 

may be imposed under the laws of any 

State with respect to the conduct 

required by the specific provisions of’’ 

certain sections or subsections of the 

FCRA: 

• section 1681c(g); 

• section 1681c–1; 

• section 1681c–2; 

• section 1681g(a)(1)(A); 

• section 1681j(a); 

• subsections (e), (f), and (g) of 

section 1681m; 

• section 1681s(f); 

• section 1681s–2(a)(6); or 

• section 1681w. 

This interpretive rule clarifies the 

preemptive scope of 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b), 

with a particular focus on 15 U.S.C. 

1681t(b)(1) and (5), which have been the 

subject of recent legal challenges to 

State laws.5 As 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1) 

says, that provision preempts only those 

State laws ‘‘with respect to any subject 

matter regulated under’’ certain sections 

or subsections of the FCRA. Similarly, 

15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(5) preempts only 

those States law ‘‘with respect to the 

conduct required by the specific 

provisions of’’ certain sections or 

subsections of the FCRA. The term 

‘‘with respect to’’ indicates that 

Congress intended these provisions to 

have a narrow sweep. As the Supreme 

Court has held in a similar context, 

‘‘with respect to’’ means to ‘‘concern.’’ 

In other words, section 1681t(b)(1) does 

not preempt State laws unless they 

concern a subject matter regulated 

under the enumerated portions of the 

FCRA. Similarly, section 1681t(b)(5) 

does not preempt State laws unless they 

concern conduct required by the 

enumerated portions of the FCRA. 

II. Analysis 

The Supremacy Clause of the United 

States Constitution says that ‘‘the Laws 

of the United States’’ shall be ‘‘the 

supreme Law of the Land . . . any 

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 

state to the Contrary notwithstanding.’’ 

Art. VI, cl. 2. When a Federal statute 

includes a preemption clause—as the 

FCRA does—‘‘[t]he purpose of Congress 

is the ultimate touchstone’’ in 

interpreting such a clause. Altria Grp., 

Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). 

‘‘Congressional intent, of course, 

primarily is discerned from the language 

of the pre-emption statute and the 

‘statutory framework’ surrounding it.’’ 

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 

486 (1996). Thus, any preemption 

analysis must ‘‘focus on the plain 

wording of the clause.’’ Puerto Rico v. 

Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., 579 

U.S. 115, 125 (2016). 

Focusing on the plain text of sections 

1681t(b)(1) and 1681t(b)(5), it is 

apparent that both provisions have a 

narrow and targeted scope. 

A. Under 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1), State 

Laws Are Not Preempted Unless They 

Are ‘‘With Respect to Any Subject 

Matter Regulated Under’’ Certain 

Sections or Subsections of the FCRA 

Section 1681t(b)(1) has eleven 

subsections, each of which follows the 

same syntax. Each subsection preempts 

State laws ‘‘with respect to any subject 

matter regulated under’’ an enumerated 

part of the FCRA (e.g., section 1681c). 

Following the enumerated section of the 

FCRA comes a parenthetical phrase 

beginning with ‘‘relating to’’ that 

describes or further narrows the section 

that has just been enumerated. For 

instance, section 1681(b)(1)(E) generally 

preempts State laws ‘‘with respect to 

any subject matter regulated under 

section 1681c of this title, relating to 

information contained in consumer 

reports.’’ Preemption under section 

1681t(b)(1) thus depends on the 

meaning of both the ‘‘with respect to’’ 

and ‘‘relating to’’ clauses. 

Foremost, State laws are not 

preempted unless they are ‘‘with respect 

to any subject matter regulated under’’ 

the enumerated sections of the FCRA. In 

the case of section 1681t(b)(1)(E), State 

laws would not be preempted unless 

they are ‘‘with respect to any subject 

matter regulated under section 1681c.’’ 

In addition, a State law is preempted 

under section 1681t(b)(1) only if it also 

falls within the description in the 

‘‘relating to’’ parenthetical. In some 

cases, the ‘‘relating to’’ parenthetical 

merely reiterates the enumerated 

section. For instance, 15 U.S.C. 

1681t(b)(1)(C) preempts State laws 

‘‘with respect to any subject matter 

regulated under subsections (a) and (b) 

of section 1681m of this title, relating to 

the duties of a person who takes any 

adverse action with respect to a 

consumer.’’ Both subsections (a) and (b) 

of section 1681m lay out certain duties 

of a person who takes an adverse action 

with respect to a consumer. Thus, both 

the ‘‘with respect to’’ clause and the 

‘‘relating to’’ clause of section 

1681t(b)(1)(C) have the same scope. 

But in other cases, the ‘‘relating to’’ 

clause serves as a further limitation on 

the ‘‘with respect to’’ clause. For 

example (and as noted above), section 

1681t(b)(1)(E) preempts State laws 

‘‘with respect to any subject matter 

regulated under section 1681c of this 

title, relating to information contained 

in consumer reports.’’ Although section 

1681c primarily contains limitations on 

information that can be included in 

consumer reports, it also includes other 

miscellaneous provisions. See, e.g., 15 

U.S.C. 1681c(g) (requirement for 

truncating credit card and debit card 

numbers in receipts provided to 

cardholder). Thus, the plain text of 

section 1681t(b)(1)(E) indicates that only 

those State laws ‘‘with respect to’’ 

section 1681c that also ‘‘relate to’’ 

information contained in consumer 

reports are preempted. 

It has been argued by some that the 

preemptive scope of section 1681t(b)(1) 

is defined only by the ‘‘relating to’’ 

clause. For example, in Consumer Data 

Indus. Ass’n v. Frey, 26 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 

2022), the plaintiffs argued that section 

1681t(b)(1)(E) preempts any State laws 

‘‘relating to information contained in 

consumer reports,’’ regardless of 

whether the law is ‘‘with respect to any 

subject matter regulated under’’ section 

1681c. As courts have correctly held, 


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41044 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 131 / Monday, July 11, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

6See 141 Cong. Rec. S5450 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 

1995) (statement of Sen. Bond) (‘‘This bill also 

contains limited Federal preemption to ensure that 

there are uniform Federal standards to govern a 

number of procedural issues which are part of 

credit reporting and which will reduce the burdens 

on the credit industry from having to comply with 

a variety of different State requirements. For 

example, the bill preempts requirements regarding 

prescreening, information shared among affiliates, 

reinvestigation timetables, obsolescence time 

periods and certain disclosure forms.’’). 

7 15 U.S.C. 1681c(a)(1)–(5). 

8 15 U.S.C. 1681c(a)(6). 

9 15 U.S.C. 1681c(a)(7)–(8). 

10 15 U.S.C. 1681c(d), (e), (f). 

11See 141 Cong. Rec. S5450 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 

1995) (statement of Sen. Bond) (referring to 

‘‘obsolescence time periods’’ as an example of a 

subject matter on which there would be 

preemption). 

12To be sure, the title of Section 1681c is stated 

more broadly as ‘‘Requirements relating to 

information contained in consumer reports.’’ But 

the title of a statutory provision is of only limited 

significance. See, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. 

Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (explaining 

that titles and headings ‘‘are but tools available for 

the resolution of a doubt,’’ ‘‘[b]ut they cannot undo 

or limit that which the text makes plain’’). And the 

actual subject matter regulated by the text of 

Section 1681c is limited to the narrow topics 

actually addressed. Further, the legislative history 

confirms that the subject matter intended to be 

preempted is only the specific topics regulated in 

Section 1681c. 

13Section 1681c(a)(1)–(5) regulates when certain 

types of information that ‘‘antedate the report’’ by 

‘‘more than’’ certain periods of time may appear. 

But only 1681c(a)(7), relating specifically to 

veterans’ medical debt, regulates when a type of 

information that antedates the report by ‘‘less than’’ 

a period of time may appear. Hence, only 

1681c(a)(7), which is limited to veterans’ medical 

debt, regulates when a type of information that 

antedates a report by less than a certain period of 

time may appear. Moreover, restrictions on what or 

when types of information may initially appear on 

a consumer report do not alter the period of time 

that information may remain on a report under 

Section 1681c. The restrictions in Section 

1681c(a)(1)–(5) each provide that information may 

remain on a report for a certain period of time 

following the date that particular events occurred. 

A restriction on what or when information may 

initially appear on a report would not alter the date 

of those events. Such a restriction therefore does 

not change the date on which Section 1681c(a)(1)– 

(5) prohibits the information from continuing to 

appear on the report. 

that ‘‘is not the most natural reading of 

the statute’s syntax and structure.’’ Frey, 

26 F.4th at 6. That interpretation would 

render the ‘‘with respect to’’ clause 

surplusage. A statute, however, ‘‘ought 

to be construed in a way that ‘no clause, 

sentence, or word shall be superfluous, 

void, or insignificant.’’ Duncan v. 

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 

Moreover, Congress knows how to 

broadly preempt State laws that are 

‘‘related to’’ fields or topics. For 

instance, the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act ‘‘supersede[s] any 

and all State laws insofar as they may 

now or hereafter relate to any employee 

benefit plan.’’ 29 U.S.C. 1144(a). 

Congress could have used similar syntax 

in the FCRA—but it did not. Instead, 

Congress made clear that a State law is 

not preempted by section 1681t(b)(1) 

unless it falls within the ‘‘with respect 

to’’ clause. 

Whether a particular State law is 

‘‘with respect to any subject matter 

regulated under’’ the enumerated 

sections of the FCRA will depend on the 

facts and circumstances. But it bears 

noting that the phrase ‘‘with respect to 

any subject matter regulated under’’ is 

an important limiting factor. As the 

Supreme Court has noted in a case 

involving a statute that—like the 

FCRA—included a preemption 

provision with both ‘‘related to’’ and 

‘‘with respect to’’ phrases, the ‘‘with 

respect to’’ phrase served to ‘‘massively 

limit[ ] the scope of preemption.’’ Dan’s 

City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 

251, 261 (2013). The ‘‘with respect to’’ 

phrase ‘‘necessarily reaches a subset of 

laws narrower than those that merely 

relate to information contained in 

consumer reports.’’ Frey, 26 F.4th at 8. 

It narrows the universe of preemption 

only to those laws that ‘‘concern’’ the 

subject matter regulated under the 

enumerated FCRA sections. Dan’s City 

Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261; see also, e.g., 

Frey, 26 F.4th at 7 (section 

1681t(b)(1)(E) ‘‘preempt[s] those claims 

that concern subject matter regulated 

under section 1681c’’); Galper v. JP 

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 802 F.3d 437, 

446 (2d Cir. 2015) (section 1681t(b)(1)(F) 

‘‘preempts only those claims that 

concern a furnisher’s responsibilities). 

Thus, if a State law does not ‘‘concern’’ 

the subject matters regulated under the 

FCRA sections specified in section 

1681t(b)(1), it is not preempted by that 

clause. 

It bears emphasis that section 

1681t(b)(1) does not preempt all State 

laws relating to the content or 

information contained in consumer 

reports. Indeed, the legislative history of 

this provision confirms that it was 

intended to provide only ‘‘limited’’ 

preemption on ‘‘procedural’’ issues.6

For example, section 1681t(b)(1)(E) 

preempts State laws ‘‘with respect to 

any subject matter regulated under’’ 

section 1681c ‘‘relating to information 

contained in consumer reports.’’ In turn, 

section 1681c states requirements 

relating to four topics relating to 

information contained in consumer 

reports: (1) obsolescence, i.e., how long 

certain specific types of information 

may continue to appear on a consumer 

report; 7 (2) certain information about 

medical information furnishers; 8 (3) 

certain information relating to veterans’ 

medical debt; 9 and (4) certain 

information that must be included in a 

consumer report (e.g., the fact that the 

consumer has disputed information 

provided by a furnisher to the consumer 

reporting agency issuing the report).10

The legislative history of the FCRA 

preemption provision confirms that 

only subject matter at this level of 

specificity is subject to preemption. The 

legislative history expressly references 

‘‘obsolescence periods’’ as an example 

of a subject matter governed by 

preemption—not the broader subject 

matter of the content of a consumer 

report more generally.11 Hence, FCRA 

1681t(b)(1)(E) does not preempt State 

laws about subject matter regarding the 

content of or information on consumer 

reports beyond these topics.12

For instance, although how long the 

specific types of information listed in 

section 1681c may continue to appear 

on a consumer report is a subject matter 

regulated under section 1681c, what or 

when items generally may be initially 

included on a consumer report is not a 

subject matter regulated under section 

1681c. Indeed, section 1681c(a)(7) 

provides requirements about when 

veterans’ medical debt, specifically, may 

be included on a consumer report by a 

nationwide consumer reporting agency, 

but nothing in section 15 U.S.C. 1681c 

addresses what or when information of 

other types may initially be included on 

reports.13 (For example, section 

1681c(a)(5) regulates how long ‘‘adverse 

item[s] of information, other than 

records of convictions of crimes’’ may 

appear on consumer reports, but not 

whether or when adverse items may 

initially appear on a consumer report.) 

Similarly, only 1681c(a)(6) and (8), 

relating specifically to information 

about medical information furnishers 

and veterans’ medical debt, contain 

restrictions on the content of a 

consumer report; the other provisions 

restrictions relate only to how long 

information may appear. section 1681c 

therefore does not provide any general 

restrictions on the content of a 

consumer report. Accordingly, State 

laws relating to what or when items 

generally may be initially included on a 

consumer report—or what or when 

certain types of information may 

initially be included on a consumer 

report—would generally not be 

preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(E). 

States therefore retain substantial 

flexibility to pass laws involving 

consumer reporting to reflect emerging 

problems affecting their local economies 

and citizens. For instance, medical debt 

that shows up in a consumer report can 

be factored into a consumer’s credit 

score, though whether and how these 

debts affect their scores varies 


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14CFPB, Medical Debt Burden in the United 

States, at 27 (Feb. 2022), https://files.consumer

finance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_medical-debtburden-in-the-united-states_report_2022-03.pdf. 

15CFPB, Data point: Medical debt and credit 

scores (May 2014), https://files.consumer

finance.gov/f/201405_cfpb_report_data-point_

medical-debtcredit-scores.pdf. 

16 Medical Debt Burden in the United States, at 

27–28. 

17 15 U.S.C. 1681s–2(a)(1)(A). 

18CFPB, Bulletin 2021–03: Consumer Reporting 

of Rental Information, at 2 (July 2021), https://

files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_

consumer-reporting-rental-information_bulletin2021-03_2021-07.pdf. 

19CFPB, Complaint Bulletin: COVID–19 issues 

described in consumer complaints, at 14 (July 

2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 

documents/cfpb_covid-19-issues-describedconsumer-complaints_complaint-bulletin_2021- 

07.pdf. 

20CFPB, Complaint Bulletin: COVID–19 issues 

described in consumer complaints, at 15, https://

files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_covid19-issues-described-consumer-complaints_

complaint-bulletin_2021-07.pdf. 

21See FTC v. RealPage, Inc. (Oct. 2018), https:// 

www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/152_

3059_realpage_inc_stipulated_order_10-16-18.pdf; 

USA v. AppFolio, Inc. (Dec. 2020), https://

www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/ecf_1_-_

us_v_appfolio_complaint.pdf. 

22CFPB, Supervisory Highlights, at 6 (Summer 

2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_

cfpb_supervisory-highlights.pdf. 

23Adam Porton, Ashley Gromis, and Matthew 

Desmond, Inaccuracies in Eviction Records: 

Implications for Renters and Researchers, Housing 

Policy Debate 31:3–5 (Sept. 2021). 

24CFPB, Bulletin 2021–03: Consumer Reporting 

of Rental Information, at 10 (July 2021), https://

files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_

consumer-reporting-rental-information_bulletin2021-03_2021-07.pdf. 

depending on the score model.14

Research by the CFPB has found that 

medical collections are less predictive 

of future consumer credit performance 

than nonmedical collections.15

Additionally, paid medical collections 

are less predictive of future performance 

than unpaid medical collections. 

Individuals with more medical than 

non-medical collections and individuals 

with more paid than unpaid medical 

collections had delinquency rates that 

were comparable to those of individuals 

with credit scores of 10 points higher 

and 20 points higher, respectively. In 

other words, these individuals were less 

likely to be delinquent than other 

individuals with the same credit score. 

Nonetheless, some widely used models 

still weight medical and nonmedical 

collections equally.16 This means that 

consumers with medical debt may be 

negatively affected if creditors use older 

scoring models that may overweight 

medical debt. To address these concerns 

and others, States may pass laws 

addressing the furnishing and reporting 

of medical debt. 

If a State law were to forbid a 

consumer reporting agency from 

including medical debt in a consumer 

report for a certain period of time after 

the debt was incurred, such a law would 

generally not be preempted. Section 

1681c does not regulate the subject 

matter of when medical debt (or debt 

generally) may be first included in a 

consumer report. As noted above, 

section 1681t(b)(1) does not preempt all 

State laws relating to the content or 

information contained in consumer 

reports; rather, 1681t(b)(1) preempts 

only State laws concerning the subject 

matter regulated under the specified 

FCRA sections. Hence, as described 

above, 1681t(b)(1)(E) preempts State 

laws only with respect to the four 

specific topics regulated under section 

1681c. Section 1681c(a)(7) provides 

requirements regarding veterans’ 

medical debt, but section 1681c does 

not regulate the subject matter of 

medical debt information more 

generally. Further, although medical 

debt information may be ‘‘adverse 

information’’ regulated under 

1681c((a)(5), as explained above, that 

provision regulates only the subject of 

how long such information may appear 

on a consumer report, not the content of 

the information or when such 

information may initially appear. 

Likewise, if a State law prohibited a 

furnisher from furnishing information 

about medical debt for a certain period 

of time after the debt was incurred, such 

a law would not be preempted by 

section 1681t(b)(1)(F), which voids only 

State laws ‘‘with respect to any subject 

matter regulated under section 1681s–2 

of this title, relating to the 

responsibilities of persons who furnish 

information to consumer reporting 

agencies.’’ Section 1681s–2 sets forth 

several requirements for furnishers in 

order to assure the accuracy of 

information provided to consumer 

reporting agencies. For instance, ‘‘[a] 

person shall not furnish any information 

relating to a consumer to any consumer 

reporting agency if the person knows or 

has reasonable cause to believe that the 

information is inaccurate.’’ 17 However, 

section 1681s–2 says nothing about 

when a furnisher may or must begin 

furnishing information about a 

consumer’s account. Consistent with the 

discussion above about section 1681, 

the subject matter of section 1681s–2 

that is subject to preemption is limited 

to these topics that are actually 

addressed in the section. Accordingly, 

when a furnisher may or must begin 

furnishing information about a 

consumer’s account is not a ‘‘subject 

matter regulated under section 1681s– 

2.’’ Thus, a State law governing when a 

furnisher may begin furnishing on a 

consumer’s account (including medical 

debt) would not be preempted by 

section 1681t(b)(1)(F). 

Additionally, for example, the CFPB 

has noted that rental information in 

consumer reports plays a critical role in 

consumers’ access to rental housing, 

credit, and other opportunities.18 The 

CFPB has received consumer 

complaints about receiving collection 

notices from landlords or debt collectors 

for rent-related charges and fees they 

viewed as questionable.19 These charges 

may then appear on their consumer 

reports. Complaints to the CFPB also 

indicate that tenant screening 

companies may report inaccurate or 

misleading criminal and civil 

information, which led to consumers 

being denied for housing applications,20

and the Federal Trade Commission has 

found that certain tenant screening 

companies have failed to follow 

reasonable procedures to ensure the 

accuracy of their reports about potential 

tenants.21 CFPB examiners have also 

found that the oversight of public 

records providers by one or more 

consumer reporting agencies was weak 

and required corrective action.22

Further, research suggests that a 

significant number of eviction records 

‘‘contain ambiguous information on 

how the case was resolved or falsely 

represent a tenant’s eviction history.’’ 23

There is little or no empirical research 

showing that tenant screening report 

content is reliably predictive of future 

tenant behavior. For example, the CFPB 

has expressed concern regarding how 

reliably predictive pandemic era rental 

data is on a consumer’s future 

performance.24 To address these 

concerns and others, States may pass 

laws addressing the furnishing and 

reporting of rental information. 

A State law prohibiting a consumer 

reporting agency from including 

information (or certain types of 

information) about a consumer’s 

eviction, rental arrears, or arrests on a 

consumer report would generally not be 

preempted under section 1681t(b)(1). As 

noted above, section 1681t(b)(1)(E) 

preempts State laws only ‘‘with respect 

to any subject matter regulated under’’ 

section 1681c ‘‘relating to information 

contained in consumer reports.’’ Again, 

nothing in section 1681c regulates the 

content of eviction information, rental 

arrears, or arrest records or when such 

information may initially appear on a 

consumer report. Although such 

information may be information about 

‘‘[c]ivil suits, civil judgments, and 

records of arrest’’ regulated under 

section 1681c((a)(2) or ‘‘adverse 

information’’ regulated under section 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with RULES
41046 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 131 / Monday, July 11, 2022 / Rules and Regulations 

25 12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1). 

26 5 U.S.C. 553(b). 

27 5 U.S.C. 603(a), 604(a). 

28 44 U.S.C. 3501–3521. 

29 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. 

1681c((a)(5), as explained above, those 

provisions regulate only the subject of 

how long such information may appear 

on a consumer report, not the content of 

the information. Section 1681t(b)(1) 

preempts only State laws concerning the 

subject matter regulated under the 

specified FCRA sections, and whether 

or when information such as eviction 

information, rental arrears, or arrest 

records appears on a consumer report is 

not such a subject matter. 

B. Under 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(5), Only 

Those State Laws ‘‘With Respect to the 

Conduct Required by’’ Certain Sections 

or Subsections of the FCRA Are 

Preempted 

Similarly, Congressional purpose in 

15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(5) is evident from its 

plain text. It has nine subsections, and 

each follows the same syntax: State laws 

are preempted to the extent they are 

‘‘with respect to the conduct required by 

the specific provisions of [an 

enumerated FCRA provision].’’ For 

example, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(5)(E) 

preempts State laws ‘‘with respect to the 

conduct required by the specific 

provisions of section 1681j(a),’’ which 

sets forth requirements for nationwide 

consumer reporting agencies and 

nationwide specialty consumer 

reporting agencies to provide free 

annual credit reports to consumers. A 

State law on this topic—for example, a 

State law requiring consumer reporting 

agencies to provide semi-annual credit 

reports to consumers—would likely be 

‘‘with respect to the conduct required’’ 

by this provision. On the other hand, if 

a State law does not concern ‘‘the 

conduct required by’’ the enumerated 

section—the annual disclosure 

requirement, in the case of section 

1681j(a)—then it is not preempted. For 

example, section 1681j(a) provides no 

requirements regarding the language in 

which disclosures of information are 

provided. Accordingly, if a State law 

required that a consumer reporting 

agency provide information required by 

the FCRA at the consumer’s requests in 

languages other than English, such a law 

would generally not be preempted by 

section 1681t(b)(5)(E). 

III. Regulatory Matters 

This is an interpretive rule issued 

under the Bureau’s authority to interpret 

the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act (CFPA), 

including under section 1022(b)(1) of 

the CFPA, which authorizes guidance as 

may be necessary or appropriate to 

enable the Bureau to administer and 

carry out the purposes and objectives of 

Federal consumer financial laws, such 

as the CFPA.25

As an interpretive rule, this rule is 

exempt from the notice-and-comment 

rulemaking requirements of the 

Administrative Procedure Act.26

Because no notice of proposed 

rulemaking is required, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act does not require an 

initial or final regulatory flexibility 

analysis.27 The Bureau has also 

determined that this interpretive rule 

does not impose any new or revise any 

existing recordkeeping, reporting, or 

disclosure requirements on covered 

entities or members of the public that 

would be collections of information 

requiring approval by the Office of 

Management and Budget under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act.28

Pursuant to the Congressional Review 

Act,29 the Bureau will submit a report 

containing this interpretive rule and 

other required information to the United 

States Senate, the United States House 

of Representatives, and the Comptroller 

General of the United States prior to the 

rule’s published effective date. The 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs has designated this interpretive 

rule as not a ‘‘major rule’’ as defined by 

5 U.S.C. 804(2). 

Rohit Chopra, 

Director, Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau. 

[FR Doc. 2022–14150 Filed 7–8–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2022–0295; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2021–00840–R; Amendment 

39–22100; AD 2022–13–14] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Airbus Helicopters Model AS–365N2, 

AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, and SA– 

365N1 helicopters. This AD was 

prompted by a large amount of critical 

scale particles found on the tail rotor 

gearbox (TGB) chip detector magnetic 

plug during an unscheduled check of 

the TGB. The particles belonged to the 

double bearing (pitch control rod 

bearing) installed inside the TGB. This 

AD requires repetitive inspections of the 

TGB chip detector for particles, 

analyzing any particles collected, 

performing a double bearing washing, 

repetitive replacements of certain partnumbered double bearings, and 

corrective actions if necessary, as 

specified in a European Union Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is 

incorporated by reference. The FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 15, 

2022. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of August 15, 2022. 

ADDRESSES: For EASA material 

incorporated by reference (IBR) in this 

final rule, contact EASA, KonradAdenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, 

Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; 

email ADs@easa.europa.eu; internet 

www.easa.europa.eu. You may find the 

EASA material on the EASA website at 

https://ad.easa.europa.eu. For Airbus 

Helicopters service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N Forum 

Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; 

telephone (972) 641–0000 or (800) 232– 

0323; fax (972) 641–3775; or at https:// 

www.airbus.com/helicopters/services/ 

technical-support.html. You may view 

this material at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, 

Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information 

on the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call (817) 222–5110. Service 

information that is IBRed is also 

available in the AD docket at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2022– 

0295. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket at 

https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2022–0295; or in person at Docket 

Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

final rule, the EASA AD, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

address for Docket Operations is U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 


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