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******************************************************MARY ANN BRITTO v. JOHN J. BRITTO, JR. (AC 36973) (AC 37117)
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Agati, Js. Argued March 8—officially released June 14, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Hon. Howard T. Owens, Jr., judge trial

referee.)
William B. Kellogg, for the appellant (defendant). Timothy F. Butler, with whom was Meredith F. McBride, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion ALVORD, J. The defendant, JohnJ. Britto, Jr., appeals from thejudgment ofthe trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Mary Ann Britto. In these consolidated appeals,1 the defendant claims that the court’s findingsastohisannualincomeandthevaluesassigned to certain real estate holdings were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the record, and that the court abused its discretion by entering financial orders applicable to the defendant that were erroneous and burdensome. We reverse thejudgment ofthe trial court limited to its findings regarding the values it assigned to the real estate holdings because we conclude that thecourtimproperlydisregardedtheparties’stipulation
as to those valuations.
The following facts and procedural history are relevanttothedefendant’sappeal. Thepartiesweremarried
on September 4, 1994, and two children were born of the marriage.2 The plaintifffiled for dissolution ofmarriage on March 28, 2012, and a trial commenced on September 18, 2013.
The defendant was the principal owner ofA-1 Janitorial, LLC, a single-member limited liability company, and he also owned several residential rental properties in Bridgeport. Prior to the trial, a forensic accountant
was hired to determine the defendant’s income from his janitorial company. The defendant did not provide the accountant or the court with tax returns from the previous year (2012) or certain other business records that could have aided in determining the defendant’s income. Ultimately, the court found that the defendant had intentionally tried to hide assets: ‘‘The court is particularly concerned with the [defendant’s] flagrant violations of the court orders relating to the transfer of assets. He fully acknowledged that several transfers ofcashandrealpropertyweremade deliberatelysubsequent to the service of process and the complaint in this dissolution action.’’3
On October 8, 2013, the court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage. The court issued its memorandum of decision on December 20, 2013, and ordered the defendant to pay alimony of 30 percent of his net annual income for sixteen years from the date of the judgment. Net income was defined by the court as: ‘‘all gross receipts from [the defendant’s] self-employment, including but not limited to A-1 Janitorial, LLC, and A1 Properties, LLC, after deductions for reasonable and actual business expenditures and state and federal taxes.’’4 Onthe basis ofthe forensic accountant’s analysis, the courtconcludedthatthe defendant’snetincome for2012was $230,000. Incometaxeswerenotdeducted. The defendant did not provide the court with evidence of income tax liability, and he did not claim to owe taxes on his income.5The courtalso orderedthe defendanttopaytheplaintiff the cash equivalent of 60 percent of the value of four Bridgeport properties. The court found that the properties had been purchased by the defendant’s girlfriend and his father using marital assets provided to them by the defendant while the divorce was pending. The court identified the four properties and their assigned values as: 25 Cartright Street, Unit 1K ($106,917); 2980 Madison Avenue, Unit G ($106,892); 2950MadisonAvenue, UnitC ($72,444); and3012-7Madison Avenue6 ($107,041). The defendant was also ordered to payto the plaintiff$191,641.95, representing the amount of marital assets that was transferred to the defendant’s fatherwhile the dissolution ofmarriage
was pending.7 This appeal followed. ‘‘The standard of review in family matters is well settled. Anappellate courtwillnotdisturb atrial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.

. . . In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.

. . . Appellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light ofthe evidence andthe pleadings in the record as a whole.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidenceto supportit, the reviewing court onthe entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

. . . Therefore, to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mensah v. Mensah, 145 Conn. App. 644, 651–52, 75 A.3d 92 (2013).
I
The defendant claims on appeal that the court erred in calculating his net income for purposes of alimony. The defendant argues that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous because the court relied on evidence ofhisgrossincome anddidnotconsiderhistaxliability. We disagree. ‘‘It is well settled that a court must base its child supportandalimonyorders onthe availablenetincome of the parties, not gross income.

. . . Whether or not
an orderfalls within this prescription must be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. Thus, while our decisional law in this regard consistently affirms the basic tenet that support and alimony orders must be based on netincome, the proper application ofthis principle is context specific.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cleary v. Cleary, 103 Conn. App. 798, 801, 930 A.2d 811 (2007).
This court cannot pass on issues of credibility and must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment thereof. Mensah v. Mensah, supra, 145 Conn. App. 651–52. The court, as trier offact in this case, imputed anet income of $230,000 to the defendant.8 A review of the record supportsthe court’sfindingthat$230,000wasthedefendant’s income net of taxes.
The court was not provided with the defendant’s income tax filing for the previous year (2012), and the defendanttestifiedthat he hadrepresentedto the Internal Revenue Service that he had no tax liability for 2012. The testimony of the forensic accountant only covered the valuation of A-1 Janitorial, LLC, and the veracity ofthe company’s records. The accountant did not testify as to the defendant’s personal tax liability. Onthebasis ofthe evidence, the courtcouldreasonably concludethatthe defendant’s gross incomewas equivalent to his net income because he testified that he had
no tax liability. The defendant has complained about a lack of evidence presented to the court to establish his income after taxes, but if evidence of tax liability existed, the defendant was in the best position to disclose that information, and he failed to do so. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the defendant’s income after taxes
was $230,000.
II
The defendant also claims that the court’s findings
as to the values of the four Bridgeport properties that
were acquired for the defendant by his girlfriend and his father were clearly erroneous. The court ordered the defendanttopaytheplaintiff60percentofthevalue of the four properties acquired in this manner. Before the court entered its order, the parties stipulated as to the values ofeach ofthe four properties. However, the court’s judgment relied upon values that were greater thantheparties’ stipulation. We concludethatthe court exceeded its authority by disregarding the stipulation. The court’s findings as to valuation are severable from its financial orders. Remanding this issue to the court does not implicate the correctness ofthe court’s other financial orders.
The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant’s claim. The parties stipulated as to thevalue of thirteen properties that were potentially marital assets.9 This stipulation contradicted an earlier submission by the plaintiff as to the values of some of the properties. In fact, several of the properties were assigned an agreed upon lower value than the plaintiff had previously proposed.10 The stipulation was enteredas an exhibit with the court.
In its financial orders, the court awarded the plaintiff titletothe maritalhome, atime-share, andfourresidential rental properties. The defendant retained title to all other properties that were listed in his name. As for the properties in dispute, the court elected to award theplaintiff60percentofthevalue offouroftheproperties. The court disregarded the stipulation agreed to by the parties regarding valuation of the four properties. Instead, the court used the higher valuations that the plaintiff had originally proposed. In its memorandum ofdecision, the court made no finding as to its basis for adopting the higher valuations. A review of the record reveals that the court did not notify the parties that it
was disregarding the stipulated values.
A
We begin with our standard regarding a stipulation. ‘‘Ingeneral, the effectofatrialstipulationbytheparties is well established. While stipulations are not necessarily binding on the court and may justifiably be disregarded in certain circumstances, they ordinarily are adopted by the court.

. . . If the court decides that it cannot adopt the parties’ stipulation, the court should state on the record its disapproval of the agreement,
as well as the reasons for its disapproval.

. . . The court also should offer the parties an opportunity to present evidence prior to proceeding tojudgment.

. . . A trial court exceeds its authority if it disregards the terms of the parties’ stipulation without notifying the parties and providing them an opportunity fully to litigate the controversy.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cupe v. Commissioner of Correction, 68 Conn. App. 262, 268–69, 791 A.2d 614, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 908, 795 A.2d 544 (2002).
At no point did the court state on the record its disapproval ofthe stipulation orprovide its reasons for disregarding it. The record does not indicate that the court notified the parties that it was disregarding their stipulation or that the court provided the parties an opportunity to fully litigate the valuation issues. Although the court may have had a sound basis to disregardthe stipulation, the courtabusedits discretion by not complying with our well settled procedural standards.
B Having concluded that the court abused its discretion, we must consider whether reversing the court’s judgmentregardingthevaluationswillrequirereconsideration of the entirety of the court’s financial orders. ‘‘We previously have characterized the financial orders in dissolution proceedings as resembling a mosaic, in whichallthevariousfinancialcomponentsare carefully interwoven with one another.

. . . Accordingly, when
an appellate courtreverses atrial courtjudgmentbasedon an improper alimony, property distribution, or child support award, the appellate court’s remand typically authorizes the trial court to reconsider all ofthe financial orders.

. . . We also have stated, however, that [e]very improper order

. . . does not necessarily merit
a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors.

. . . In other words, an order is severable if its impropriety does not place the correctness of the other orders in question.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.)Maturo v.Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 124–25, 995 A.2d 1 (2010). Only the plaintiff’s portion ofthe real property in the marital estate willbe diminishedbyadoptingthevalues stipulated to bythe parties.11 The plaintiffhas informed this court that upon afinding oferrorbythe trial court, she has no interest in opening the remaining orders of the judgment. There is no evidence in the record that the court’svaluationfindingswere interdependentwith other orders and are based on a factor that is linked to otherfactors. Accordingly, the valuation findings are severable from the court’s financial orders.
III
We now address the defendant’s claim that the court erred by distributing the same marital asset twice. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred by awardingtheplaintiff$99,505.77thathehadtransferred from the marital estate, in violation ofthe court’s automatic stay on transfers, as well as 60 percent of the value of the real estate that these transferred funds
were directly used to purchase.12 We disagree. The defendant has failed to show that the court’s financial orders were clearly erroneous. The court found that the defendant transferred $191,641.95 out ofthe marital estate in violation ofthe court’sautomaticordersprohibitingdissipationofmarital assets.13 As part of its financial orders, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff 100 percent of these funds. The defendant presented evidence that
some of these funds were directly used to finance the purchase ofresidentialrentalpropertieswheretitlewas acquired in the name of the defendant’s girlfriend and his father. The plaintiffwas awarded 60 percent ofthe value of four properties that were purchased by the defendant’s girlfriend or his father using marital assets provided to them by the defendant.14
An appellant bears a heavy burden to show that the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. In re Halle T., 96 Conn. App. 815, 825, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006). ‘‘With respect to the financial awards in a dissolution action, great weight is given to the judgment of the trial courtbecause of its opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence.

. . . Our function in reviewing such discretionary decisions is to determine whether the decision ofthe trial court was clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.

. . . In otherwords,judicialreviewofatrial court’s exercise of its broad discretion in domestic relations cases is limited to the questions of whether the [trial] court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did.

. . . In making those determinations, we allow every reasonable presumption

. . . in favor of the correctness of [the trial court’s] action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Wood, 160 Conn. App. 708, 723, 125 A.3d 1040 (2015). Throughoutthe trial and even now on appeal, quantifying the full extent ofthe assets available to the defendant and tracing the prohibited transfers of marital assetsis akintothe challenge ofhittingamovingtarget. Duringthetrial, thedefendantadmittedthatwhilebeing deposed he lied about assisting in the purchase of a condominium for his girlfriend.15 The court found that the defendant made ‘‘flagrant violations of the court orders relating to the transfer ofassets’’ and attempted to hide assets. Nowon appeal, the defendantrepresents to this court that in his initial brief he confused which propertieswerepurchasedwiththemaritalassetstransferred in violation of Practice Book § 25-5.
The defendant clearly sought to deceive the trial court, yet now complains that the court in fact misapprehended the conversion of marital assets into real estate and the total value ofthe marital estate. It is the defendant’s burden to show how the court’s financial orders were clearly erroneous. Instead, the defendant has adopted a narrow view of the court’s financial orders and has not presented a clear and concise accountingofallofthemaritalassetsthathetransferred from the marital estate. As the trial court noted in its memorandum ofdecision, ‘‘[t]he [defendant] has infact turned a relatively uncomplicated dissolution action into a knotty and labyrinthian exercise

. . . .’’ In view of the entire record in this case, we conclude that the trialcourt’sdivisionofassetswasnotclearlyerroneous. IV
In his final claim, the defendant argues thatthe court abused its discretion in entering financial orders that the defendant cannot satisfy. The defendant complains that he has been ordered to make monthly payments of child support, alimony, restitution for money transferred out ofthe marital estate, and the plaintiff’s interest inthe defendant’s real estate holdings. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ‘‘Our review is guided by the well established principle that [t]he resolution of conflicting factual claims falls within the province of the trial court

. . . [and][t]he trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unlesstheyare clearlyerroneousinlightofthe evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hopfer v. Hopfer, 59 Conn. App. 452, 457, 757 A.2d 673 (2000). Apart from the argument advanced in part II of this opinion, the defendant does little more than express general dissatisfactionwiththe court’s financial orders. The court made detailed findings concerning the parties, including but not limited to those related to the amount and sources of their incomes, their financial assets, and their liabilities. The defendant has not provided any detailed facts to refute these findings or to demonstrate his inability to meet the court’s financial orders. The court did not abuse its discretion.
The judgment is reversed only as to the trial court’s decision to disregard the parties’ stipulation as to the values assigned to certain real estate holdings and the
case is remandedwith directionto incorporate the stipulatedvalues inthe financial orders in accordance with this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 OnJune27, 2014, thedefendantappealed(AC36973)fromthedissolution judgment as amended and clarified. On August 19, 2014, after the trial court issued a second clarification and a postjudgment order that the defendant pay the fees of a forensic accountant, the defendant filed a second appeal (AC 37117) claiming error in regard to the ordered fees. In December, 2014, the defendant amended his appeal in AC 36973 to challenge additional trial court rulings on numerous postjudgment motions, including motions for contempt and motions for counsel fees. On January 6, 2016, this court ordered that the appeals be consolidated. The defendant has not briefed the claims oferror identified on his appeal forminAC 37117 oronhis amendedappealforminAC 36973. The defendant has therefore abandoned these claims. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co

. v. Bertrand, 140 Conn. App. 646, 648 n.2, 59 A.3d 864, cert. dismissed, 309 Conn. 905, 68 A.3d 661 (2013).

2 Both children were minors at the time of the dissolution judgment.

3 In an articulation issued by the court on June 12, 2015, the court further stated: ‘‘[A]ssetforthinthe originalorder, the courtfoundthatthe defendant wilfully and intentionally failed to disclose his true income on his financial affidavit which was relied upon by the court in the Stipulation and Order Regarding Support dated June 21, 2012.’’

4 The court provided its definition of ‘‘net income’’ in an amendment to and clarification of its order.

5 During his testimony, the defendant was shown a federal income tax extension form for tax year 2012 that was sent to the Internal Revenue Service andpreparedbythe defendant’s accountant. The defendanttestified that the form stated that he would have zero tax liability for 2012.

6 In theirbriefs, the parties referto this property as 3012 MadisonAvenue, Unit F.

7 The court also issued orders dividing other assets of the marital estate and awarding child support. These orders have not been appealed.

8 In the text of his brief, the defendant implies that the court’s finding of $230,000 of gross income was not supported by evidence. After reviewing the record we disagree. On the basis of those partial business financial records that were obtained despite the defendant’s recalcitrance, the forensic accountant testified at trial that A-1 Janitorial, LLC, generated $221,869 in earnings forthe defendant in 2012. The accountanttestifiedthat he tested his assumptions aboutthebusinessbyalso lookingatthe defendant’s annual cash flows and personal expenses over a three year period. Using this approach, the accountant concluded that on average the defendant received $180,000 in earnings from A-1 Janitorial, LLC, per year and an additional$52,000 per year in salary from A-1 Janitorial, LLC.

In estimating the defendant’s 2012 earnings as $221,869, the accountant testified that the figure did not include any income that the defendant may havereceivedfromanotherjobheworkedorrentalpropertiesthatheowned. In addition, the accountanttestifiedthathe believedthatA-1 Janitorial, LLC, had unreported sales in 2012 based on tax documents and the defendant’s

ownrepresentations. Inhiscalculations,theaccountantincludedanestimate forthe unreported sales, buthe also testifiedthatifactual sales were higher, then his estimate of the defendant’s earnings from the business would be higher. Finally, he testified that the defendant did not draw a salary from A-1 Janitorial, LLC, in 2012. On the basis of the record, there was evidence to support the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s income was $230,000.

9 Whenthe stipulationwas submittedto the court, the defendant’s counsel informed the court that, although he agreed with the property values, he did not agree that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over all of the properties listed. The defendant’s girlfriend and his father held title to six of the properties listed as part of the stipulation.

10 The valuations ofthe following properties decreased in the stipulation: 25 Cartright Street, Unit 1K, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $70,400); 2980 Madison Avenue, Unit G, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $49,500); 2950 Madison Avenue, Unit C, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $60,500); 3012 Madison Avenue, Unit F, Bridgeport (stipulatedvalue: $60,500); 50 Greenhouse Road, Unit 41D, Bridgeport (stipulated value: $63,800); and 65 Hedgehog Road, Trumbull (stipulated value: $291,500) The plaintiff was not awarded any portion of the value of the real estate located on Greenhouse Road and Hedgehog Road.

11 The sum of $152,394 is the difference between the values that the court adopted from the plaintiff’s proposed amended orders that were submitted

on September 19, 2013, and the values that the parties stipulated to in court

on October 8, 2013. Applying the trial court’s 60 percent allocation in favor of the plaintiff to the lower values from the stipulation will reduce the plaintiff’s financial awardby $91,436.40. Theplaintiff’s counsel stated during oral argument before this court: ‘‘The court can easilyjust order the valuations changed, it doesn’t impact the rest of [the financial orders]. That is a detriment to my client, she’s going to get less money as a result ofthat, she understands that.

. . . The mosaic that would be upset if it’s upset in any fashion, it’s only to the detriment of my client, and she’s aware of this and

so advised me to relay to the court.’’

12 In his brief, the defendant argued that the court had erred as to its financial orders regarding three Bridgeport properties: 3012 Madison Avenue, Unit F; 2890 Madison Avenue, Unit G; and 25 Cartright Avenue, Unit 1-K. In his reply brief, he has dropped this claim as it pertains to 2890 Madison Avenue, Unit G and 25 Cartright Avenue, Unit 1-K. However, he

now argues that his claim also applies to the real estate located at 2950 Madison Avenue, Unit C, Bridgeport. The defendant’s only explanation for the change is that he confused the properties.

13 The rules ofpractice address automatic orders in family matters. Practice Book § 25-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The automatic orders shall be effective with regard to the plaintiff or the applicant upon the signing of the complaint or the application and with regard to the defendant or the respondent upon service and shall remain in place during the pendency of the action, unless terminated, modified, or amended by further order of a judicial authority upon motion of either of the parties

. . . [i]n all cases involving a marriage or civil union, whether or not there are children

. . . [n]either party shall sell, transfer, exchange, assign, remove, or in any way dispose of, without the consent of the other party in writing, or an order of ajudicial authority, any property, except in the usual course ofbusiness

orfor customary and usual household expenses orforreasonable attorney’s fees in connection with this action

. . . [and] [n]either party shall conceal any property.

. . .’’

14 The plaintiff contends that additional cash was withdrawn from the business during the pendency ofthe divorce and that there was no accounting for the size of these withdrawals or how this money was used by the defendant.

15 ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Do you recall being asked these questions about 2950-C Madison Avenue condominium at your deposition? ‘‘[The Defendant]: I believe so. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And do you recall me specifically asking you whether you made any contributions to that property?‘‘[The Defendant]: I think so, yes.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And do you recall hearing this question: And is—question, and it’s your testimony that none ofthe income that you have earned has gone towards or been contributed towards the purchase of the condominium as far as you know that was done by Elizabeth Pereira. And your answer was, excuse me, yes, that’s correct. Do you recall that testimony? ‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah, I believe I do. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Pardon? ‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I believe I do. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So that testimony that you gave was false, is it not? ‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m sorry, is it false? ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Is it false? ‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I have interest into it, yes. ‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So at the time when I asked you on June 19, 2013, under oathwhetheryou had an interest in it, you denied it. Nowtoday, you acknowledge it. ‘‘[The Defendant]: After speaking to my attorney, correct.’’