(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. CLARKE ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 13–301. Argued April 23, 2014—Decided June 19, 2014 

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued summonses to respondents

for information and records relevant to the tax obligations of Dynamo

Holdings L. P. See 26 U. S. C. §7602(a). When respondents failed to

comply, the IRS brought an enforcement action in District Court.

Respondents challenged the IRS’s motives in issuing the summonses,

seeking to question the responsible agents. The District Court denied 

the request and ordered the summonses enforced, characterizing respondents’ arguments as conjecture and incorrect as a matter of law.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court’s refusal to allow respondents to examine the agents constituted an

abuse of discretion, and that Circuit precedent entitled them to conduct such questioning regardless of whether they had presented any

factual support for their claims. 

Held: A taxpayer has a right to conduct an examination of IRS officials

regarding their reasons for issuing a summons when he points to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith.

Pp. 5–9.

(a) A person receiving a summons is entitled to contest it in an adversarial enforcement proceeding. Donaldson v. United States, 400 

U. S. 517, 524. But these proceedings are “summary in nature,” 

United States v. Stuart, 489 U. S. 353, 369, and the only relevant

question is whether the summons was issued in good faith, United 

States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 56. The balance struck in this Court’s 

prior cases supports a requirement that a summons objector offer not

just naked allegations, but some credible evidence to support his 

claim of improper motive. Circumstantial evidence can suffice to 

meet that burden, and a fleshed out case is not demanded: The taxpayer need only present a plausible basis for his charge. Pp. 5–7. 
 

2 UNITED STATES v. CLARKE 

Syllabus 

(b) Here, however, the Eleventh Circuit applied a categorical rule 

demanding the examination of IRS agents without assessing the 

plausibility of the respondents’ submissions. On remand, the Court 

of Appeals must consider those submissions in light of the standard

set forth here, giving appropriate deference to the District Court’s 

ruling on whether respondents have shown enough to entitle them to

examine the agents. However, that ruling is entitled to deference only if it was based on the correct legal standard. See Fox v. Vice, 563 

U. S. ___, ___. And the District Court’s latitude does not extend to legal issues about what counts as an illicit motive. Cf. Koon v. United 

States, 518 U. S. 81, 100. Pp. 7–9. 

517 Fed. Appx. 689, vacated and remanded. 

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

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Opinion of the Court 

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–301 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL 

 CLARKE ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 19, 2014] 

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) has broad 

statutory authority to summon a taxpayer to produce 

documents or give testimony relevant to determining tax

liability. If the taxpayer fails to comply, the IRS may

petition a federal district court to enforce the summons.

In an enforcement proceeding, the IRS must show that it 

issued the summons in good faith. 

This case requires us to consider when a taxpayer, as

part of such a proceeding, has a right to question IRS 

officials about their reasons for issuing a summons. We 

hold, contrary to the Court of Appeals below, that a bare 

allegation of improper purpose does not entitle a taxpayer 

to examine IRS officials. Rather, the taxpayer has a right

to conduct that examination when he points to specific

facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of

bad faith. 

I 

Congress has “authorized and required” the IRS “to

make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of 

all taxes” the Internal Revenue Code imposes. 26 U. S. C. 
 

2 UNITED STATES v. CLARKE 

Opinion of the Court 

§6201(a). And in support of that authority, Congress has

granted the Service broad latitude to issue summonses 

“[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any

return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal 

revenue tax . . . , or collecting any such liability.”

§7602(a). Such a summons directs a taxpayer (or associated person1) to appear before an IRS official and to provide sworn testimony or produce “books, papers, records, 

or other data . . . relevant or material to [a tax] inquiry.” 

§7602(a)(1).

If a taxpayer does not comply with a summons, the IRS 

may bring an enforcement action in district court. See 

§§7402(b), 7604(a). In that proceeding, we have held, the 

IRS “need only demonstrate good faith in issuing the

summons.” United States v. Stuart, 489 U. S. 353, 359 

(1989). More specifically, that means establishing what 

have become known as the Powell factors: “that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that 

the information sought is not already within the [IRS’s] 

possession, and that the administrative steps required by 

the [Internal Revenue] Code have been followed.” United 

States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57–58 (1964). To make that 

showing, the IRS usually files an affidavit from the responsible investigating agent. See Stuart, 489 U. S., at 

360. The taxpayer, however, has an opportunity to challenge that affidavit, and to urge the court to quash the
 

summons “on any appropriate ground”—including, as

relevant here, improper purpose. See Reisman v. Caplin, 

375 U. S. 440, 449 (1964). 

—————— 

1The IRS has authority to summon not only “the person liable for 

tax,” but also “any officer or employee of such person,” any person

having custody of relevant “books of account,” and “any other person 

the [IRS] may deem proper.” 26 U. S. C. §7602(a)(2). For convenience, 

this opinion refers only to the “taxpayer.” 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

The summons dispute in this case arose from an IRS

examination of the tax returns of Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo) for the 2005–2007 tax years.

The IRS harbored suspicions about large interest expenses

that those returns had reported. As its investigation 

proceeded, the Service persuaded Dynamo to agree to two 

year-long extensions of the usual 3-year limitations period

for assessing tax liability; in 2010, with that period again 

drawing to a close, Dynamo refused to grant the IRS a 

third extension. Shortly thereafter, in September and 

October 2010, the IRS issued summonses to the respondents here, four individuals associated with Dynamo whom 

the Service believed had information and records relevant 

to Dynamo’s tax obligations. None of the respondents

complied with those summonses. In December 2010 (still

within the augmented limitations period), the IRS issued a 

Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment proposing 

changes to Dynamo’s returns that would result in greater

tax liability. Dynamo responded in February 2011 by

filing suit in the United States Tax Court to challenge the 

adjustments. That litigation remains pending. A few 

months later, in April 2011, the IRS instituted proceedings in District Court to compel the respondents to comply

with the summonses they had gotten. 

Those enforcement proceedings developed into a dispute

about the IRS’s reasons for issuing the summonses. The 

IRS submitted an investigating agent’s affidavit attesting 

to the Powell factors; among other things, that declaration 

maintained that the testimony and records sought were

necessary to “properly investigate the correctness of [Dynamo’s] federal tax reporting” and that the summonses 

were “not issued to harass or for any other improper purpose.” App. 26, 34. In reply, the respondents pointed to 

circumstantial evidence that, in their view, suggested

“ulterior motive[s]” of two different kinds. App. to Pet. for 

Cert. 72a. First, the respondents asserted that the IRS 
 

4 UNITED STATES v. CLARKE 

Opinion of the Court 

issued the summonses to “punish[] [Dynamo] for refusing 

to agree to a further extension of the applicable statute of 

limitations.” App. 52. More particularly, they stated in

sworn declarations that immediately after Dynamo declined to grant a third extension of time, the IRS, “despite

having not asked for additional information for some time, 

. . . suddenly issued” the summonses. Id., at 95. Second, 

the respondents averred that the IRS decided to enforce 

the summonses, subsequent to Dynamo’s filing suit in Tax 

Court, to “evad[e] the Tax Court[’s] limitations on discovery” and thus gain an unfair advantage in that litigation. 

Id., at 53. In support of that charge, the respondents 

submitted an affidavit from the attorney of another Dynamo associate, who had chosen to comply with a summons issued at the same time. The attorney reported that

only the IRS attorneys handling the Tax Court case, and 

not the original investigating agents, were present at the 

interview of his client. In light of those submissions, the

respondents asked for an opportunity to question the 

agents about their motives.

The District Court denied that request and ordered the

respondents to comply with the summonses. According to 

the court, the respondents “ha[d] made no meaningful 

allegations of improper purpose” warranting examination 

of IRS agents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The court characterized the respondents’ statute-of-limitations theory as

“mere conjecture.” Id., at 14a. And it ruled that the respondents’ evasion-of-discovery-limits claim was “incorrect 

as a matter of law” because “[t]he validity of a summons is

tested as of the date of issuance,” not enforcement—and 

the Tax Court proceedings had not yet begun when the

IRS issued the summonses. Id., at 15a. 

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed,

holding that the District Court’s refusal to allow the respondents to examine IRS agents constituted an abuse of 

discretion. In support of that ruling, the Court of Appeals 
 

 

 

 

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Opinion of the Court 

cited binding Circuit precedent holding that a simple

“allegation of improper purpose,” even if lacking any “factual support,” entitles a taxpayer to “question IRS officials 

concerning the Service’s reasons for issuing the summons.”

517 Fed. Appx. 689, 691 (2013) (quoting United States v. 

Southeast First Nat. Bank of Miami Springs, 655 F. 2d 

661, 667 (CA5 1981)); see Nero Trading, LLC v. United 

States Dept. of Treasury, 570 F. 3d 1244, 1249 (CA11 2009) 

(reaffirming Southeast).

Every other Court of Appeals has rejected the Eleventh

Circuit’s view that a bare allegation of improper motive

entitles a person objecting to an IRS summons to examine 

the responsible officials.2 We granted certiorari to resolve

that conflict, 571 U. S. __ (2014), and we now vacate the 

Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. 

II 

A person receiving an IRS summons is, as we have often

held, entitled to contest it in an enforcement proceeding.

See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U. S. 141, 146 (1975); 

Powell, 379 U. S., at 57–58; Reisman, 375 U. S., at 449. 

The power “vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all 

power” may be abused. Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 146. In 

recognition of that possibility, Congress made enforcement 

of an IRS summons contingent on a court’s approval. See 

26 U. S. C. §7604(b). And we have time and again stated 

that the requisite judicial proceeding is not ex parte but 

—————— 

2See, e.g., Sugarloaf Funding, LLC v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 584 F. 3d 340, 350–351 (CA1 2009) (requiring “a sufficient threshold showing that there was an improper purpose”); Fortney v. United 

States, 59 F. 3d 117, 121 (CA9 1995) (requiring “some minimal amount

of evidence” beyond “mere memoranda of law or allegations” (internal

quotations and alterations omitted)); United States v. Kis, 658 F. 2d 

526, 540 (CA7 1981) (requiring “develop[ment] [of] facts from which a

court might infer a possibility of some wrongful conduct”); United 

States v. Garden State Nat. Bank, 607 F. 2d 61, 71 (CA3 1979) (requiring “factual[] support[] by the taxpayer’s affidavits”). 
 

 

6 UNITED STATES v. CLARKE 

Opinion of the Court 

adversarial. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 

517, 527 (1971); Powell, 379 U. S., at 58; Reisman, 375 

U. S., at 446. The summoned party must receive notice, 

and may present argument and evidence on all matters 

bearing on a summons’s validity. See Powell, 379 U. S., 

at 58. 

Yet we have also emphasized that summons enforcement proceedings are to be “summary in nature.” Stuart, 

489 U. S., at 369. The purpose of a summons is “not to

accuse,” much less to adjudicate, but only “to inquire.” 

Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 146. And such an investigatory 

tool, we have recognized, is a crucial backstop in a tax 

system based on self-reporting. See ibid. (restricting

summons authority would enable “dishonest persons [to] 

escap[e] taxation[,] thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers”). Accordingly, we long ago held that courts 

may ask only whether the IRS issued a summons in good 

faith, and must eschew any broader role of “oversee[ing] 

the [IRS’s] determinations to investigate.” Powell, 379 

U. S., at 56. So too, we stated that absent contrary evidence, the IRS can satisfy that standard by submitting a 

simple affidavit from the investigating agent. See Stuart, 

489 U. S., at 359–360. Thus, we have rejected rules that 

would “thwart and defeat the [Service’s] appropriate 

investigatory powers.” Donaldson, 400 U. S., at 533. 

The balance we have struck in prior cases comports with

the following rule, applicable here: As part of the adversarial process concerning a summons’s validity, the taxpayer is entitled to examine an IRS agent when he can

point to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising

an inference of bad faith. Naked allegations of improper 

purpose are not enough: The taxpayer must offer some

credible evidence supporting his charge. But circumstantial evidence can suffice to meet that burden; after all, 

direct evidence of another person’s bad faith, at this 

threshold stage, will rarely if ever be available. And 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

although bare assertion or conjecture is not enough, neither is a fleshed out case demanded: The taxpayer need

only make a showing of facts that give rise to a plausible

inference of improper motive. That standard will ensure 

inquiry where the facts and circumstances make inquiry

appropriate, without turning every summons dispute into 

a fishing expedition for official wrongdoing. And the rule 

is little different from the one that both the respondents

and the Government have recommended to us.3 

But that is not the standard the Eleventh Circuit applied. Although the respondents gamely try to put another face on the opinion below, see Brief for Respondents 

24–25, and n. 17, we have no doubt that the Court of Appeals 

viewed even bare allegations of improper purpose as entitling a summons objector to question IRS agents. The 

court in fact had some evidence before it pertaining to the 

respondents’ charges: The respondents, for example, had

submitted one declaration relating the timing of the summonses to Dynamo’s refusal to extend the limitations

period, see App. 95, and another aiming to show that the

IRS was using the summonses to obtain discovery it could 

not get in Tax Court, see id., at 97–100. But the Eleventh 

Circuit never assessed whether those (or any other) materials plausibly supported an inference of improper motive; 

indeed, the court never mentioned the proffered evidence

at all. Instead, and in line with Circuit precedent, the

court applied a categorical rule, demanding the examination of IRS agents even when a taxpayer made only conclusory allegations. See supra, at 4. That was error. On 

remand, the Court of Appeals must consider the respond-

—————— 

3See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29 (respondents) (The taxpayer is entitled to

question the agent “when he presents specific facts from which an 

improper purpose . . . may plausibly be inferred”); id., at 5 (United 

States) (“[A] summons opponent has to put in enough evidence to at 

least raise an inference” of improper motive, and “[c]ircumstantial

evidence is enough”). 
 

8 UNITED STATES v. CLARKE 

Opinion of the Court 

ents’ submissions in light of the standard we have stated. 

That consideration must as well give appropriate deference to the District Court’s ruling. An appellate court, as

the Eleventh Circuit noted, reviews for abuse of discretion 

a trial court’s decision to order—or not—the questioning of 

IRS agents. See 517 Fed. Appx., at 691, n. 2; Tiffany Fine 

Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U. S. 310, 324, n. 7 (1985). 

That standard of review reflects the district court’s superior familiarity with, and understanding of, the dispute; and 

it comports with the way appellate courts review related 

matters of case management, discovery, and trial practice. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 

U. S. 165, 172–173 (1989); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 

U. S. 574, 599–601 (1998). Accordingly, the Court of

Appeals must take into account on remand the District 

Court’s broad discretion to determine whether a taxpayer has shown enough to require the examination of IRS 

investigators.

But two caveats to that instruction are in order here. 

First, the District Court’s decision is entitled to deference 

only if based on the correct legal standard. See Fox v. 

Vice, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 11) (“A trial 

court has wide discretion when, but only when, it calls the

game by the right rules”). We leave to the Court of Appeals the task of deciding whether the District Court

asked and answered the relevant question—once again, 

whether the respondents pointed to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of improper 

motive. 

And second, the District Court’s latitude does not extend 

to legal issues about what counts as an illicit motive. As 

indicated earlier, one such issue is embedded in the respondents’ claim that the Government moved to enforce 

these summonses to gain an unfair advantage in Tax 

Court litigation. See supra, at 4. The Government responds, and the District Court agreed, that any such 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

purpose is irrelevant because “the validity of a summons is 

judged at the time” the IRS originally issued the summons, and here that preceded the Tax Court suit. Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 7; see Reply Brief 19–20; App. to Pet. for Cert. 

15a. Similarly, with respect to the respondents’ alternative theory, the Government briefly suggested at argument that issuing a summons because “a taxpayer declined to extend a statute of limitations would [not] be an

improper purpose,” even assuming that happened here. 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. We state no view on those issues; they

are not within the question presented for our review. We 

note only that they are pure questions of law, so if they 

arise again on remand, the Court of Appeals has no cause

to defer to the District Court. Cf. Koon v. United States, 

518 U. S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law”).

For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the Court

of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.