Early December 2, 2011, Romine left home to go to work. 

When Romine returned, he discovered the door ajar to a closet containing 

recording equipment for the home's security cameras. The recording 

equipment had been displaced from the closet to a kitchen chair. Romine 

also discovered a kitchen window open and off its track. Additionally, 

there were pliers wedged into the sliding glass door. 

Crime scene analysts lifted fingerprints from the kitchen 

window, which were identified as belonging to Wilson. Police also 

reviewed the security camera footage, which showed an intruder wearing 

a Toronto Blue Jays hat. Later, Wilson revealed to police that he was the 

person in the video wearing the Toronto Blue Jays hat. Thus, Wilson 

admitted to entering the home, but offered that he did so to use the 

bathroom because it looked abandoned. 

On March 6, 2012, the State charged Wilson with home 

invasion. Wilson filed a discovery motion, requesting SCOPE (Shared 

Computer Operations for Protection and Enforcement) and NCIC 

(National Crime Information Center) reports for Romine and Nelson. The 

district court denied Wilson's motion, concluding that it could not order 

the State to disclose the requested reports. 

During trial, Wilson proposed a jury instruction that would 

define the term "reside" as used in the home invasion statute. See NRS 

205.067(5)(b). Wilson's proposed instruction provided: 

The term "reside," as used in these 

instructions, means a person's actual residence. 

That is, the place where an individual is legally 

domiciled and maintains a permanent habitation. 

In order to be legally domiciled in a particular 

place, there must be a concurrence of fact and 

intention: the person must make the place his 

actual abode, place of physical presence, or 

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abiding place, and he must evince intent to 

permanently remain in and/or always return to 

that place. A mere coming for a special purpose 

and for a limited time does not establish legal 

domicile. 

The district court declined to give the instruction, concluding 

that the instruction inaccurately applied domicile to the home invasion 

context. At the conclusion of Wilson's jury trial, he was convicted of home 

invasion. He appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

Brady Violation 

Wilson contends that the State was required to disclose the 

requested criminal history reports because the State must disclose 

material information under Brady. "Determining whether the state 

adequately disclosed information under Brady . . . requires consideration 

of both factual circumstances and legal issues; thus, this court reviews de 

novo the district court's decision." Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 

P.2d 25, 36 (2000). 

Brady requires prosecutors to disclose evidence favorable to 

the defense when the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Id. 

"[There are three components to a Brady violation: the evidence at issue 

is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the State, either 

intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was 

material." Id. at 67, 993 P.2d at 37 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281-82 (1999)). The evidence is favorable to the accused and requires 

disclosure "if it provides grounds for the defense to attack the reliability, 

thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation, to impeach the 

credibility of the State's witnesses, or to bolster the defense case against 

prosecutorial attacks." Id. Wilson maintains that the criminal history 

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reports would have been favorable for the purpose of impeaching the 

State's witnesses. 

Here, Wilson has no basis for inferring that Nelson or Romine 

even have a criminal history. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 286 ("Mere 

speculation that some exculpatory material may have been withheld is 

unlikely to establish good cause for a discovery request on collateral 

review."). Moreover, even if we presumed that the State's witnesses have 

extensive criminal histories, Wilson's theory of defense is not buttressed 

by impeachment of the State's witnesses. Wilson contended in the district 

court and now on appeal that he did not violate the home invasion statute 

because Romine did not technically "reside" in the home, as Romine did 

not have the intent to remain there. Impeaching the State's witnesses 

with criminal history information does not tend to prove whether, under 

the law, a victim of home invasion must have the intent to remain in the 

home. Nor would it prove whether, in fact, the victim had that intent. 

Thus, Wilson has failed to demonstrate that the evidence would have been 

favorable. 

Wilson correctly asserts, however, that under the second 

Brady factor, the reports were withheld by the State. The State insists 

the reports were not in its possession or control because they were held by 

the police department. In Roberts v. State, we determined the State was 

in possession of a criminal informant file when the file was in local law 

enforcement's possession. See 110 Nev. 1121, 1125, 1132, 881 P.2d 1, 3, 7- 

8 (1994) overruled on other grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088, 13 

P.3d 61 (2000). The working relationship between the state and local 

police compelled the determination that they were a single entity for 

purposes of producing discovery in criminal prosecutions. Wade v. State, 

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114 Nev. 914, 919, 966 P.2d 160, 163 (interpreting Roberts). We have 

emphasized that "the State may not circumvent the discovery process by 

claiming that a local police department, an agent of the State, refuses to 

disclose such documents." Id. In this case, as in Roberts, the State was in 

possession of the reports because local law enforcement was in possession. 

Furthermore, the State's argument that it was not permitted 

to disclose the criminal history records pursuant to Judicial 

Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 20.21, lacks merit. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(c)(3) 

provides: "States and local governments will determine the purposes for 

which dissemination of criminal history record information is authorized 

by State law, executive order, local ordinance, court rule, decision or 

order." In turn, NRS 179A.110 explicitly authorizes the district court to 

order disclosure of criminal history reports. Nonetheless, Wilson's 

argument that the district court was required to order disclosure also fails. 

NRS 179A.110 does not mandate disclosure, but permits it. See NRS 

179A.110 (limiting criminal record use to purpose for which it was 

requested, except in the case of a court order). Here, neither the State nor 

the police were under court order to disclose. 

Under the final Brady factor, the proper standard for 

assessing materiality of omitted evidence depends on whether the defense 

made a specific request for the evidence. Mazzan, 116 Nev. at 66, 993 

P.2d at 36. If the defense did not request the evidence or made a general 

request, the omitted "evidence is material if there is a reasonable 

probability that the result would have been different if the evidence had 

been disclosed." Id. (emphasis added). However, if the defense made a 

specific request, the omitted evidence is material if there is a reasonable 

possibility that the result would have been different had the evidence been 

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disclosed. Id. Wilson made a specific request for SCOPE and/or NCIC 

reports on September 7, 2012. Accordingly, the evidence was material if 

there was a reasonable possibility that the result would have been 

different if disclosed. We conclude, in light of the overwhelming evidence 

of Wilson's guilt, any history of criminality that may have been revealed 

by the requested reports would have had little or no bearing on the 

defense's theory. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that a decision 

other than guilty would have been reached if disclosed. 

Wilson contends, at minimum, that the district court should 

have ordered in camera review to determine whether Nelson or Romine 

had any convictions relevant for impeachment purposes. "[O]nce a 

defendant has articulated a specific basis for claiming materiality of 

particular evidence that it seeks. . . . the prosecutor bears the burden of 

avoiding disclosure by seeking in camera review." Roberts, 110 Nev. at 

1123, 881 P.2d at 2. Wilson has yet to articulate a specific basis for 

claiming materiality. He does not allege with any particularity any 

potential criminal offense that, if revealed through disclosure of the 

reports, may be useful for impeachment or may lend credence to his theory 

of defense. Therefore, Wilson was not entitled to in camera review. 

Because Wilson is unable to show, under Brady, that the 

withheld evidence was favorable to him or that it prejudiced him, the 

district court did not err when it, without in camera review, denied his 

request for NCIC and SCOPE reports on the State's witnesses. 

Jury Instruction 

Wilson asserts that the district court erred when it refused to 

give his proposed jury instruction providing that a victim only "resides" in 

a home for purposes of determining when a home invasion has been 

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committed, when he or she intends to remain there. Wilson further argues 

that Romine's lack of this requisite level of intent precludes Wilson's 

conviction for home invasion. The State contends Wilson's proffered jury 

instruction was improper for use in the context of home invasion, and if 

applied, would lead to absurd results. We agree. 

"This court reviews a district court's decision to issue or not to 

issue a particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion." 

Ouanbengboune v. State, 125 Nev. 763, 774, 220 P.3d 1122, 1129 (2009). 

However, we review whether a jury instruction is an accurate statement of 

law de novo. Funderburk v. State, 125 Nev. 260, 263, 212 P.3d 337, 339 

(2009). We have "consistently held that the defense has the right to have 

the jury instructed on its theory of the case as disclosed by the evidence, 

no matter how weak or incredible that evidence may be." Crawford v. 

State, 121 Nev. 744, 751, 121 P.3d 582, 586 (2005) (internal quotation 

omitted). The defense is not, however, entitled to jury "instructions that 

are misleading, inaccurate, or duplicitous." Id. at 754, 121 P.3d at 589. 

Wilson was charged under NRS 205.067(1), which provides: 

A person who, by day or night, forcibly 

enters an inhabited dwelling without permission 

of the owner, resident or lawful occupant, whether 

or not a person is present at the time of the entry, 

is guilty of invasion of the home. 

An inhabited dwelling is then defined by NRS 205.067(5)(b): 

"Inhabited dwelling" means any structure, 

building, house, room, apartment, tenement, tent, 

conveyance, vessel, boat, vehicle, house trailer, 

travel trailer, motor home or railroad car in which 

the owner or other lawful occupant resides. 

(Emphasis added). 

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The term resides, as used in NRS 205.067(1), does not require 

intent to remain. "Residence," the noun form of "reside," means "[t]he act 

or fact of living in a given place for some time." Black's Law Dictionary, 

1502 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). In addition, "residence" is 

distinguished from "legal residence" or "domicile," which requires bodily 

presence, in addition to intent to remain. Id; Williams v. Clark County 

Din. Attorney, 118 Nev. 473, 482, 50 P.3d 536, 542 (2002) (noting that 

actual residence is a place of living and does not require intent to remain, 

in contrast from legal residence or domicile). There is no other indication 

within NRS 205.067 that the Legislature intended the victim of home 

invasion to possess intent to remain in the home. Thus, Wilson's jury 

instruction, configured based on "legal residence" or "domicile" and 

applicable in the civil context, see NRS 10.155, clearly presents an 

inaccurate and misleading statement of law as it pertains to home 

invasion. As such, Wilson was not entitled to the instruction. Based on 

the foregoing, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Parraguirre 

r—Do 

Douglas 

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cc: Hon. Valerie Adair, District Judge 

Nguyen & Lay 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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