If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

SQUARE LAKE HILLS ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED 

March 23, 2023

v No. 360405

Oakland Circuit Court

RUSSELL GARLAND, LC No. 2018-163007-CH

Defendant/Counterplaintiff/ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

HIGHLANDER GROUP MMC, INC., TINA 

SIGLER, and CYRIL CORNAK,

Third-Party Defendants-Appellees,

and

SANDRA DONIA,

Third-Party Defendant.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and SWARTZLE and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Counterplaintiff and third-party plaintiff, Russell Garland, appeals as of right the trial 

court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of counterdefendant, Square Lake Hills 

Association (“the association”), and third-party defendants, Highlander Group MMC, Inc. 

(“Highlander”), Tina Sigler, Sandra Donia,1and Cyril Cornak, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and 

(10), in this action involving claims for breach of contract and negligence arising from damages 

 

1 Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, defendant Donia was dismissed as a party to this appeal. 
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to Garland’s condominium unit from a water leak and the association’s refusal to allow Garland 

to store a boat on the condominium premises. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

The association is the condominium association for Square Lake Hills Condominiums in 

Bloomfield Hills. Garland was a co-owner of one of the units and purchased the unit on a land 

contract from the association. Cornak was president of the association, and Donia was an 

association board member. Highlander is a property management company, and Sigler is a 

Highlander employee who was the property manager for the association. 

This case was initiated on January 9, 2018, when the association filed a complaint for 

injunctive relief and money damages against Garland, alleging that Garland had violated the 

association bylaws by parking his boat and trailer on his premises.2 As relevant to this appeal, 

Garland filed a countercomplaint against the association, and a third-party complaint against 

Cornak, Donia, Highlander, and Sigler, asserting claims for (1) breach of contract against the 

association for breach of the amended and restated condominium bylaws, (2) negligence against 

the association and Highlander, (3) breach of contract against Cornak, Highlander, and Sigler, and 

(4) defamation against Highlander, Sigler, and Donia. Garland alleged that he purchased his 

condominium unit from the association on March 1, 2017, pursuant to a land contract. He denied 

being aware of or being informed of water leaking problems within his unit when he purchased it, 

or knowing that a prior water leak had taken place in 2015. Garland alleged that his unit 

experienced water leakage in December 2017, causing significant damage, and the leakage was 

the result of the association and Highlander’s negligence in failing to address ventilation issues in 

the attic of the building where his unit was located. Garland further alleged that he was promised 

when he purchased his unit that he would be able to place his boat in a carport that he could modify 

into a garage, but that the association, Highlander, Sigler, and Cornak subsequently failed to honor 

that agreement. 

In 2019, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the association, Highlander, 

Sigler, Donia, and Cornak on Garland’s counterclaims and third-party claims. The court ruled that 

the contract and negligence claims were barred by res judicata because the association filed a 

separate land contract forfeiture action in district court, the land contract was forfeited, and the 

claims “were actually litigated in the summary proceedings and decided by the District Court on 

the merits.” The trial court dismissed Garland’s defamation claim because Garland was unable to 

show “that the alleged defamatory statements were made with actual malice.” In a prior appeal, 

this Court affirmed the dismissal of Garland’s defamation claim, but reversed the dismissal of 

Garland’s claims for negligence and breach of contract because the claims were not actually 

litigated in the district court action and they could not have been litigated in that action because 

“the facts underlying Garland’s claims in the circuit court action did not arise out of the same 

transaction or set of operative facts as the facts underlying the association’s claims in the district 

court.” Square Lake Hills Ass’n v Garland, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of 

 

2 The association’s complaint against Garland was dismissed by stipulation and is not at issue in 

this appeal. 
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Appeals, issued November 12, 2020 (Docket No. 350403), pp 4-7. This Court remanded for 

further proceedings on the contract and negligence claims. Id. at 7-8. 

On remand, the association, Highlander, Sigler, Donia, and Cornak again moved for 

summary disposition of Garland’s breach-of-contract and negligence claims. The trial court 

granted their motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Garland again appeals as of right. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision granting summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Rott v Rott, 

508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d 789 (2021). Although the trial court stated in its order that it 

granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), because it was apparent from 

the record that the trial court considered evidence beyond the pleadings in rendering its decision, 

the decision is properly reviewed under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See Cuddington v United Health 

Servs, Inc, 298 Mich App 264, 270; 826 NW2d 519 (2012). In El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, 

Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019), our Supreme Court explained: 

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), on the other hand, tests the factual 

sufficiency of a claim. Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich 751, 761; 918 NW2d 785 

(2018). When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence 

submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. Id. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there 

is no genuine issue of material fact. Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc., 500 Mich 1, 5; 

890 NW2d 344 (2016). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record 

leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Johnson, 502 

Mich at 761 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).

In addition, whether a party owes another party a legal duty of care is a question of law, which this 

Court reviews de novo. Powell-Murphy v Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental 

Response Trust, 333 Mich App 234, 243; 964 NW2d 50 (2020). 

III. BREACH OF CONTRACT

In Count I of his countercomplaint, Garland asserted a claim for breach of contract against 

the association, which was predicated on Garland’s allegations that the association breached its 

obligations under the condominium bylaws by failing to repair or replace improper ventilation, 

insulation, or pipes after a water leak in 2015, and thereby causing the 2017 leak to Garland’s unit. 

In Count III, of his third-party complaint, Garland asserted a claim for breach of contract against 

Highlander, Sigler, and Cornak for breach of an oral promise to allow Garland to convert his 

carport into a garage to store his boat. Garland argues that the trial court erred by dismissing both 

of these claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We disagree. 

In Bank of America NA v First American Title Ins Co, 499 Mich 74, 100; 878 NW2d 816 

(2016), our Supreme Court explained that to prevail on a claim for breach of contract, a party must 

satisfy the following elements:

(1) there was a contract, (2) the other party breached the contract, and (3) the breach 

resulted in damages to the party claiming breach.
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To meet the first element, the existence of a valid contract, a party must establish “(1) parties 

competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of 

agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” Id. 

A. BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST THE ASSOCIATION

Garland argues that the association breached its responsibilities set forth in the applicable 

condominium bylaws when “improper venting, insulation, and pipes were damaged and not 

repaired nor replaced” after the 2015 water leak in Garland’s building. In Tuscany Grove Ass’n v 

Peraino, 311 Mich App 389, 393; 875 NW2d 234 (2015), this Court explained the role of 

condominium bylaws in the administration of a condominium project, stating:

Pursuant to the Condominium Act, the administration of a condominium 

project is governed by the condominium bylaws. MCL 559.153. Bylaws are 

attached to the master deed and, along with the other condominium documents, the 

bylaws dictate the rights and obligations of a co-owner in the condominium. See 

MCL 559.103(9) and (10); MCL 559.108. Condominium bylaws are interpreted 

according to the rules governing the interpretation of a contract. See Rossow v 

Brentwood Farms Dev, Inc, 251 Mich App 652, 658, 651 NW2d 458 (2002). 

Accordingly, this Court begins by examining the language of the bylaws. See 

Wiggins v City of Burton, 291 Mich App 532, 551; 805 NW2d 517 (2011). Words 

are interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning. McCoig Materials, 

LLC v Galui Constr, Inc, 295 Mich App 684, 694; 818 NW2d 410 (2012). Further, 

this Court avoids interpretations that would render any part of the document 

surplusage or nugatory, and instead this Court gives effect to every word, phrase, 

and clause. Id. Ultimately, we enforce clear and unambiguous language as written. 

Greenville Lafayette, LLC v Elgin State Bank, 296 Mich App 284, 291, 818 NW2d 

460 (2012). 

The Amended and Restated Condominium Bylaws of Square Lake Hills, Article V, §§ 3 

and 4 address the allocation of responsibility for damage to a condominium unit:

Section 3.

A. Definition of Responsibility 

If the damage is only to a part of a Unit or common elements which are the 

responsibility of a Co-owner to maintain and repair and/or insure, it shall be the 

responsibility of the Co-owners to promptly repair such damage in accordance with 

Subsection B, hereof. In all other cases, the responsibility for reconstruction and 

repair, although not necessarily the costs thereof, shall be that of the Association. 

B. Co-owner Items

. . . [E]ach co-owner shall be responsible for the reconstruction and repair 

of the interior of the Co-Owner’s Unit and all fixtures, equipment, trim and personal 

property, including, but not limited to, drywall, floor coverings, window shades, 

draperies, interior walls (but not any General Common Elements therein), wall 
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coverings, interior trim, furniture, light fixtures, and all appliances, whether 

freestanding or built-in. In the event damage to interior walls within a Co-Owner’s 

unit or to pipes, wires, conduits, ducts, or other Common Elements therein is 

covered by insurance held by the Association, then the reconstruction or repair shall 

be the responsibility of the Association in accordance with Section 4 of this Article, 

although the responsibility for costs thereof shall be allocated in accordance with 

the provisions of this Section and Section 4. [Emphasis added.] 

Section 4. Association Responsibility for Reconstruction or Repair of 

Common Elements. 

Subject to the responsibility of the individual Co-Owners as outlined in 

Section 3 above, and other provisions of these Bylaws or the Amended and Restated 

Master Deed applicable to such situations, the Association shall be responsible for 

the reconstruction and repair of the Common Elements. Immediately after a 

casualty causing damage to property for which the Association has the 

responsibility of maintenance, repair, or reconstruction, the Association shall obtain 

reliable and detailed estimates of the cost to place the damaged property in a 

condition as good as that existing before the damage. [Emphasis added.] 

Initially, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether improper ventilation 

issues in Building 8 caused or contributed to the 2017 leak. When asked about the leak that 

occurred in 2015, Cornak responded, “There was no [prior] issue. . . . We had a leak due to the ice 

and that has been taken care of.” The prior leak also affected an adjoining unit. The lessor of that 

unit informed the association of the leak and the association sent roofers out to investigate the leak. 

According to Cornak, the roofers discovered that there was a “shingle blown out,” the shingle was 

repaired, and snow was removed from the roof. Cornak did not know if the roofing contractor 

who replaced the shingle examined whether the leak caused damage to any of the common 

elements. 

Cornak testified that the December 2017 leak was caused by icicles that formed because of 

the weather and then melted and dripped water. The water dripped down from the ceiling all the 

way down to the first floor. While Building 8 was not the only building to have these icicles, it 

was the building that was closest to the lake and wind blowing off the lake caused the ice to melt 

and forced the droplets onto the glass of the windows. Cornak had workers put sodium chloride 

on the roof to melt the ice to stop the leak and a licensed builder and inspector was hired to replace 

insulation that was damaged because of the leak. Cornak testified that there was never any finding 

that the ventilation caused the damage to Garland’s unit. 

Garland argues that Cornak’s testimony is not admissible under MRE 1002, which provides 

that “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, 

or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.” Garland 

argues that testimony from an insurance adjustor, or a concomitant report, would have been the 

“best evidence” of what caused both leaks. During his deposition, Cornak testified that he 

reviewed a report by an insurance adjustor, who opined that ventilation issues were the cause of 

the first leak. With regard to the second leak, however, the insurance adjustor did not provide an 

opinion regarding its cause, only what it would cost to fix the damage. Garland’s reliance on MRE 
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1002 is misplaced because Cornak was not attempting in his testimony to prove the content of any

writing. Rather, he was testifying regarding his understanding of the cause of both leaks on the 

basis of his personal knowledge derived from different sources. Even if testimony from an 

insurance adjustor or a concomitant report would have been competent evidence regarding the 

nature and cause of the December 2017 leak, Cornak’s own testimony on this subject is not 

precluded by MRE 1002 because the testimony was not offered to prove the content of any writing. 

Cornak did testify that all of the ventilation in all of the buildings was replaced after the 

board discovered that the leaks could have been caused by “bad insulation, not – ventilation of the 

air.” According to Cornak, the issues with the ventilation became apparent when they were in the 

attic installing insulation after the second leak. Cornak explained that there was never any finding 

that the ventilation caused the damage to Garland’s unit, but the ventilation was replaced as a 

preventative measure because “a lot of people had speculated that must have been the cause” of 

the leaks. 

Although circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish a claim, the nonmoving 

party “must present more than conjecture and speculation to meet their burden of providing 

evidentiary proof establishing a genuine issue of material fact.” Karbel v Comerica Bank, 247 

Mich App 90, 97; 635 NW2d 69 (2001) (citations and quotations omitted). In this case, although 

Cornak stated that unnamed individuals “speculated” that a ventilation issue could be a cause of 

building leaks, there was no evidence selectively identifying improper ventilation as the cause of 

the damage to Garland’s unit, and Cornak testified that there was never any finding that ventilation 

was a cause of the leak to Garland’s unit. Moreover, Garland did not present any contrary evidence 

selectively identifying any improper ventilation, insulation, or piping issues as a cause of the 2017 

leak in Garland’s unit. Therefore, Garland failed to establish a question of fact whether the 2017 

leak resulted from a breach of the association’s obligations under the condominium bylaws. 

Garland relies on the testimony of Bert Stahl, who faulted Cornak and the association board 

for not properly addressing the issues that led to the 2015 leak and correcting them so that the 2017 

leak would not occur, including his undated letter to the board in which he made the same 

conclusory accusations. Although Stahl’s testimony and letter reflect his belief that the association 

failed to properly redress the 2015 leakage problem, it is not competent evidence that improper 

ventilation, insulation, or faulty piping that the association failed to address in compliance with 

the condominium bylaws gave rise to the 2017 leak in Garland’s unit. Indeed, Stahl testified that, 

to his knowledge, the problem that caused the 2015 leak had been corrected before Garland 

purchased his unit, he admitted that he did not have personal knowledge that it was not handled 

right, and he said that he was not aware of any incorrect venting or insulation with regard to 

Garland’s building. Therefore, Stahl’s testimony does not establish a question of fact whether the 

association breached any obligations under the condominium bylaws.

For these reasons, the trial court did not err by dismissing Garland’s breach-of-contract 

claim against the association under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 

B. BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST HIGHLANDER, SIGLER, AND CORNAK

Count III of Garland’s third-party complaint alleged a claim for breach of contract for 

breach of an oral promise to allow Garland to convert his carport into a garage to store his boat. 
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Garland asserts that this agreement is supported by a handwritten notation that he wrote on his 

rental application in which he recited his understanding that he could convert his carport into a 

garage for his boat. Specifically, Garland alleged that when he was negotiating his land contract, 

Cornak, Sigler, and Highlander were all made aware that he needed a place to store his boat, that 

Cornak orally promised him that he could convert his existing carport into a garage to store his 

boat at his own expense, and that Sigler and Highlander ratified that promise. Garland alleged that 

this agreement was breached when authorization to turn his carport into a garage for his boat was 

later withheld and he was subjected to fines for violating applicable condominium restrictions. 

Article VI, § 8 of the condominium bylaws prohibits residents from storing recreational 

vehicles, including boats and boat trailers, on the premises of the condominium. In support of his 

claim that Sigler, Highlander, and Cornak agreed that he could place his boat on the condominium 

premises, Garland relies on his written notation on an undated application for leasing or rental in 

which he wrote: “Per Bert & Cyril car port & boat is ok to build & store.” The written notation is 

not signed by either Stahl or Cornak. Moreover, the purchase agreement for Garland’s unit 

contains an integration clause stating that “[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 

between buyer and seller” and that 

[a]ll discussions, correspondence, proposals, negotiations, and representations prior 

to the execution of [the] Agreement shall be considered merged herein and of no 

further effect. Buyer and Seller acknowledge that they are not relying on any other 

written or verbal representations by each other . . . that are not explicitly set forth 

in this Agreement or attached hereto. 

When a contract contains an integration clause, it is conclusive evidence that the agreement is the 

entire agreement and parol evidence is not admissible, except “(1) to prove that the clause was 

fraudulent, (2) to invalidate the entire contract, or (3) if the contract is obviously incomplete on its 

face.” Zwicker v Lake Superior State Univ, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) 

(Docket Nos. 355128, 355377 & 357275); slip op at 14, lv pending. The parties do not dispute 

that the purchase agreement contains an integration clause. 

Citing UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 493; 

579 NW2d 411 (1998), Garland argues that parol evidence of the written notation should be 

admissible to show “that the parties did not integrate their agreement or assent to it as the final 

embodiment of their understanding.” Garland relies on the deposition testimony of Sean 

Dunleavy, who stated that Cornak would routinely unilaterally grant approval to condominium 

residents to undertake projects without seeking authorization from the association board. Even 

accepting Dunleavy’s testimony as accurate, any such unilateral approval from Cornak in no way 

suggests that the purchase agreement for Garland’s purchase of his unit was not a final and 

complete embodiment of the parties’ agreement to the extent that parol evidence could be admitted. 

Garland’s argument does not invoke any of the exceptions for allowing parol evidence to modify 

the terms of a written agreement that contains an integration clause. Accordingly, Garland cannot 

rely on any alleged oral promise to support his claim that there was a valid agreement that he could 

modify his carport into a garage to store his boat on the condominium premises. Therefore, the 

trial court did not err by dismissing this claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
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IV. NEGLIGENCE

Garland also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his negligence claim against the 

association and Highlander. We disagree. 

In Count II of his countercomplaint and third-party complaint, Garland alleged that the 

association and Highlander owed him a duty of care to “inspect, repair, and remediate common 

elements within the walls of the condominium units.” Garland alleged that the association and 

Highlander breached that duty of care by “act[ing] in a negligent, willful, and wanton manner, 

thereby demonstrating a substantial lack of concern as to the source of improper venting, 

insulation, and HVAC systems, which were damaged and not repaired nor replaced.” 

To establish a prima facie claim of negligence, a party must present evidence to satisfy the 

following elements:

(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the 

legal duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a 

proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. [Highfield Beach at Lake Mich v 

Sanderson, 331 Mich App 636, 666; 954 NW2d 231 (2020).]

In Powell-Murphy, 333 Mich App at 243, this Court discussed the legal concept of a duty 

of care, stating:

A duty of care may be one that the defendant owes specifically to the 

plaintiff, or it may be one that the defendant owes to the general public, of which 

the plaintiff is a member. Clark v Dalman, 379 Mich 251, 261; 150 NW2d 755 

(1967), impliedly overruled on other grounds by Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 

470 Mich 460, 683 NW2d 587 (2004). While one person generally does not have 

an obligation to help or protect another, a duty of care may arise by way of statute, 

a contractual relationship, or the common law. Hill [v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 

Mich 651, 660-661; 822 NW2d 190 (2012)]; Clark, 379 Mich at 261. The common 

law imposes on “every person engaged in the prosecution of any undertaking an 

obligation to use due care, or to so govern his actions as not to unreasonably 

endanger the person or property of others.” Clark, 379 Mich at 261. 

In this case, the alleged duty of care owed by the association and Highlander to Garland 

originates from the condominium bylaws. Article V, § 3A, imposes on the association “the 

responsibility for reconstruction and repair” for damage to common elements. In Fultz, 470 Mich 

at 465, our Supreme Court, quoting Clark, 379 Mich at 260-261, recognized that a duty of care 

may arise from a contractual relationship, with “the theory being that accompanying every contract 

is a common-law duty to perform with ordinary care the thing agreed to be done, and that a 

negligent performance constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract.” With regard to 

Highlander, the third-party property management company, its duty is better characterized as 

arising under the common law, which imposes on every entity engaged in the prosecution of an 

undertaking the obligation to exercise due care to not unreasonably endanger the person or property 

of others. Powell-Murphy, 333 Mich App at 243.
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However, even accepting that the association and Highlander owed Garland a duty of care, 

there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether these parties breached that duty of 

care. Garland alleged that Highlander and the association breached their duty of care by “act[ing] 

in a negligent, willful, and wanton manner, thereby demonstrating a substantial lack of concern as 

to the source of improper venting, insulation, and HVAC systems, which were damaged and not 

repaired nor replaced.” As explained earlier, Cornak testified that the 2015 leak was caused by a 

“shingle [that was] blown out,” the shingle was fixed, and snow was removed from the roof. 

Cornak did not know if the roofing contractor who replaced the shingle examined whether the 

damage to the roof caused damage to any of the common elements. Cornak explained that the 

2015 leak “was not like a huge leak.” 

According to Cornak, the 2017 leak was caused by icicles that formed because of the 

weather, which then melted and caused water to drip through the windows and into the ceiling, 

and down to the first floor. While Building 8 was not the only building to have these icicles, it 

was the building closest to the lake, and wind blowing off the lake caused the ice to melt and forced 

the droplets onto the glass of the windows. Cornak had workers come onto the roof to put sodium 

chloride to melt the ice to stop the leak, and a licensed builder and inspector was hired to replace 

the insulation that was damaged because of the leak. Afterward, the ventilation in all of the 

buildings was replaced after the board discovered that the leaks could have been caused by “bad 

insulation, not – ventilation of the air.” Cornak explained that there was never any finding that a 

ventilation problem caused the 2017 leak, but the ventilation was replaced as a preventative 

measure because “a lot of people had speculated that must have been the cause” of the leaks. 

Again, Garland relies on Stahl’s deposition testimony and his undated letter to the 

association board to support his negligence claim. In his testimony and letter, Stahl was critical 

of the association’s handling of the 2015 leak in Building 8, and the subsequent repairs, and he 

expressed his belief that the problem that caused the 2015 leak was not properly addressed. As 

explained earlier, however, there is no evidence that Stahl had personal knowledge of what was 

done to correct that leak, or knowledge that anything was done incorrectly, and Stahl admitted that 

he was not aware of any incorrect venting or insulation in Garland’s building. There is no other 

evidence that either the association or Highlander failed to address and rectify the 2015 leak in a 

competent and reasonable manner. As noted earlier, Garland did not present an affidavit or other 

testimony from any expert or other witness to suggest that the association and Highlander handled 

the 2015 leak in an unreasonable or deficient manner. Accordingly, Garland failed to establish a 

genuine issue of material fact whether the association or Highlander were negligent. Therefore, 

the trial court did not err by dismissing Garland’s negligence claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 

Finally, we reject Garland’s argument that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) 

was premature because discovery had not been completed. Although a motion brought under MCR 

2.116(C)(10) may be premature if discovery is ongoing, Pinebrook Warren, LLC v City of Warren, 

___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket Nos. No. 355989, No. 355994, No. 

355995, No. 356005, No. 356011, No. 356017, No. 356023, No. 359269, No. 359285); slip op at 

30, lv pending, summary disposition is not precluded if there is no fair likelihood that further 

discovery will yield support for the nonmoving party’s position, Liparoto Constr, Inc v Gen Shale 

Brick, Inc, 284 Mich App 25, 33-34; 772 NW2d 801 (2009). 
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The record reflects that the trial court issued a scheduling order on December 5, 2018, 

stating that discovery was to be completed by February 20, 2019. Moreover, the record reflects 

that the parties had ample opportunity to engage in discovery, and that numerous witnesses were 

deposed. Garland generally asserts that there are additional witnesses to depose and that certain 

documents have not been produced, but he does not identify these witnesses or documents, let 

alone explain how they are likely to yield support for his claims. Therefore, he has not 

demonstrated that summary disposition was premature. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Sima G. Patel

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle 

/s/ Noah P. Hood