PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1055

MONICA GUESSOUS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

FAIRVIEW PROPERTY INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

-----------------------------------

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Amicus Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:14-cv-00224-GBL-IDD)

Argued: December 9, 2015 Decided: July 6, 2016 

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and DIAZ, Circuit 

Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote 

the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Arinderjit Dhali, DHALI PLLC, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellant. Hans Paul Riede, ODIN, FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, P.C., 

Reston, Virginia, for Appellee. Gail S. Coleman, U.S. EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for 
2

Amicus Curiae. ON BRIEF: Lauren Friend McKelvey, ODIN, 

FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, P.C., Reston, Virginia, for Appellee. 

P. David Lopez, General Counsel, Jennifer S. Goldstein, 

Associate General Counsel, Lorraine C. Davis, Assistant General 

Counsel, Office of General Counsel, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
3

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

On February 28, 2014, Monica Guessous filed suit against 

Fairview Property Investments, LLC (“Fairview”). She alleged 

six claims in her complaint: pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

Guessous asserted claims for race discrimination (“Count I”), 

hostile work environment (“Count II”), and retaliation (“Count 

III”); and pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., she asserted claims for 

discrimination based on religion, national origin, and pregnancy 

(“Count IV”), hostile work environment (“Count V”), and 

retaliation (“Count VI”). On December 16, 2014, the district 

court granted summary judgment for Fairview on all six counts. 

For the reasons that follow, we vacate the order granting 

summary judgment on all counts and remand for further 

proceedings.

I.

We recite the facts drawing reasonable inferences in favor 

of the non-movant, Monica Guessous. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A.

Fairview manages several real estate properties and engages 

in real estate leases and sales. Guessous is an Arab-American 

Muslim woman from Morocco who worked for Fairview from February 
4

2007 until March 2013 when she was terminated from her position 

as a bookkeeping assistant. She was terminated by her direct 

supervisor, Greg Washenko, who became Fairview’s Chief Financial 

Officer (“CFO”) in October 2008. Prior to Washenko’s arrival, 

Guessous had been supervised by Peter Arey who was Fairview’s 

Vice President at that time.

In deposition testimony, Guessous recounted numerous 

allegations of mistreatment by Washenko during the final fourand-a-half years of her employment at Fairview.1 Guessous and 

Washenko met for the first time at a meet-and-greet event held 

in October 2008, shortly after Washenko was hired. At that 

first meeting, Washenko asked Guessous where she was from and, 

when she replied that she was Middle Eastern, he said that in a 

previous job he had worked with “a bunch of Middle Easterners 

and they are a bunch of crooks, [who] will stop at nothing to 

screw you.” J.A. 207-08.2 From that point forward, Washenko 

exhibited a habit of discussing Moroccans, Muslims, and Middle 

Easterners in disparaging and offensive ways. For example, in 

January 2010, after reading news reports about Islamic 

 1 Unless noted otherwise, quotations of conversations 

between Guessous and Washenko come from Guessous’ testimony. 

They are not direct quotes from Washenko, but Guessous’ 

recreation of those past statements.

2 References to “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix submitted 

by the parties to this appeal.
5

terrorism, Washenko came out of his office and walked to 

Guessous’ desk to ask her, “Why do Muslims hate America?” J.A. 

216. Guessous replied that she was Muslim and did not hate 

America. She further stated that “Muslims are not terrorists,” 

to which Washenko responded, “Yeah, sure. Like my buddy 

says . . . not all Muslims are terrorists, but most are.” J.A. 

216. Guessous testified that Washenko’s body language during 

that conversation made her feel “cornered” and “intimidated,” in 

particular because he stood over her while she sat at her desk.

On another occasion in May 2010,3 following a series of 

Hamas attacks on Israel, Washenko again left his office to 

approach Guessous. When he said, “I need your intake on this,” 

Guessous believed he was bringing her something to work on. 

Instead, Washenko proceeded to tell her, “I could never 

understand this whole suicide bomber thing. . . . These poor 

Israelis are being bombed every day by Muslim Palestinian 

terrorists.” J.A. 217. Guessous attempted to explain that 

“[s]uicide is prohibited in the Koran” and that it “specifically 

says that it does not condone killing innocents.” J.A. 217. 

She also told him she was not Palestinian and that she “ha[d] no 

 3 The district court appears to have committed a 

typographical error in citing this event as occurring in May 

2012. Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Investments, LLC, No. 1:14-CV00224-GBLIDD, 2014 WL 7238993, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014). 

Deposition testimony and Guessous’ complaint both indicate that 

it occurred in 2010.
6

business speaking about” the issue. J.A. 217. On yet another 

occasion, in February 2011 during the Arab Spring, Washenko 

again left his office to approach Guessous at her desk and ask,

“What’s up with Egypt and why are the Muslims killing people?” 

J.A. 239. Guessous testified that by this time she had become 

frustrated with these kinds of inquiries and tried to explain to 

him that she was not Egyptian and had no particular insight into 

the uprising.

In fact, Washenko consistently conflated Guessous’ identity 

as a Moroccan Muslim with other Middle Eastern identities, 

blurring the lines between race, ethnicity, national origin, and 

religion. For example, in late 2011, Guessous was called to the 

basement of one of Fairview’s buildings where a restaurant was 

located. She was then asked to act as a translator for one of 

the restaurant’s employees who was a Farsi-speaking Persian 

Iranian. When Guessous told Washenko that she did not speak 

Farsi, he replied, “‘So you don’t speak Iranian? Shouldn’t 

there be some secret [] language that you all understand?’”

Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Investments, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00224-

GBLIDD, 2014 WL 7238993, at *5 (E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014).4

 4 The word “Muslim” has been excised from our quotation 

where indicated. Although the district court relied on 

Guessous’ own complaint, in her deposition testimony she did not 

include the word “Muslim” in her quotation of Washenko. J.A. 

246.
7

Washenko continued to direct these kinds of inquiries at 

Guessous throughout 2011. In August or September of that year, 

as Muamar Gaddafi’s rule in Libya was coming to an end, Washenko 

asked Guessous to explain the situation in that country to him. 

Again, she responded that she was not Libyan and did not have an 

interest in events going on there. Around this time, Guessous 

sent an email to her brother-in-law, a police officer, 

explaining some of the issues she was having with Washenko and 

asking for his advice. Among other complaints, she said,

I am sick and tired of been the 411 for issues 

relating to a Muslim terrorist and or a Islamic 

country’s national conflicts and or cultural issues or 

weirdness that he is trying to find out about. I feel 

targeted for my believes and my ethnicity and culture 

and for all the year I have been in the good all 

united stated of America I have never felt so inferior 

to anyone as I am feeling at this point.

J.A. 329 (errors in original).

But being dragged into uncomfortable, and often offensive, 

discussions on current events was hardly the only behavior to 

which Guessous objected. Much of Washenko’s conduct was more 

personal in nature. For example, beginning in early 2010, 

Washenko spent several months referring to Guessous by her 

Moroccan name, “Mounia,” instead of her chosen Americanized 

name, “Monica.” Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at *3. While 

Fairview asserts that Washenko desisted at Guessous’ request, 

Guessous herself stated in the same 2011 email to her brother-
8

in-law that she had “struggled for quite some time to have him 

call me Monica instead of Mounia,” J.A. 328, and noted in her 

complaint that Washenko only stopped “[a]fter 2-3 months of 

repeated requests and protests,” J.A. 16. In September of that 

same year, Guessous wished Washenko a happy birthday, which 

happens to fall on September 11th. Washenko responded to his 

sole Muslim Arab employee’s well wishes by saying that each year 

on his birthday he was “reminded of the terrorist attacks by the 

Muslims” and then walking out of his office. J.A. 235.

Another of their conversations in 2010 turned personal 

after Washenko initiated a discussion on the differences between 

Christianity and Islam. First, Washenko asked Guessous to 

describe Islam to him, and in turn he described Christianity to 

her. Guessous then began to explain that Judaism, Christianity, 

and Islam are all Abrahamic religions, that their adherents 

worship the same God, and that Islam treats Jesus as a prophet 

who was raised to Heaven by God and who will return to Earth.

Although initially uncomfortable with the conversation, as she 

explained Islam to Washenko, emphasizing the similarities 

between their faiths, Guessous testified that she began to feel 

“happy because I was like I’m doing something good.” J.A. 225. 

But Washenko was apparently incensed at the suggestion, saying, 

“‘No Monica! We are not the same, you might think we are, but 

we are not! We do not believe in the same God!’ and then 
9

storm[ing] away.” Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at *3. Guessous 

was hurt by the reaction, recalling in testimony that the 

statement, “We’re not the same . . . . made me feel like I’m not 

even a human being.” J.A. 226.

Washenko’s personal and offensive comments continued into 

2011 and 2012. In the fall of 2011, Washenko was shopping for a 

new car for his son. Guessous suggested he purchase a 

Volkswagen because her mother drove one and it had been 

reliable. Washenko replied, “[T]hat car must have taken a lot 

of beating from a Moroccan driver.” J.A. 246. Guessous 

testified that she was deeply offended and “couldn’t 

believe . . . he [was] insulting my own mother.” J.A. 246.

Also in late 2011, Washenko engaged in an extended prank, 

telling staff members over the course of two weeks that Guessous 

had tried to poison him. In fact, Guessous had shared some Taco 

Bell with Washenko at lunch one day, and that evening Washenko 

had gone to the emergency room with abdominal pain. Although he 

was unable to get a diagnosis at the hospital, Washenko told 

Guessous, and apparently others, that the doctor had asked him 

who gave him the food, that Washenko had replied “my Muslim 

employee,” and that the doctor then responded, “Well she’s 

obviously trying to poison you or kill you.” J.A. 249.

Watching Washenko tell the story repeatedly around the office, 

Guessous said she “just felt like a terrorist.” J.A. 249-50.
10

One of the most offensive episodes began differently than 

most of the encounters described in Guessous’ testimony. While 

these conversations were typically initiated by Washenko, in 

this case Guessous decided to try to “educate” her boss about 

her culture in order to frame it in a more positive light. In 

late 2011 or early 2012, Guessous was sent photos from a friend 

who had moved to Dubai. When she received the pictures of the 

clean and modern city she wanted to show Washenko the images to 

demonstrate “we’re not a bunch of like morons or idiots.” J.A. 

247. Rather than being impressed as Guessous had hoped, 

Washenko told her that he had a friend who lived in Dubai for a 

year and had hated the experience, and that this friend had told 

him, “Despite all the buildings and modern [sic], they are just 

a bunch of camel people.” J.A. 247.

Most of Guessous’ remaining allegations concern what she 

characterized in her complaint and testimony as Washenko’s 

intrusive and overbearing approach to managing her as his 

subordinate employee. After assuming the position of CFO, 

Washenko monitored Guessos directly. Guessous testified that 

Washenko would often leave his office to stand behind her desk 

and inquire what she was working on. These inquiries were 

repeated as many as forty times in a single day. Guessous felt 

that Washenko would sometimes badger her in this manner, wait 

for her to become irritated or overwhelmed, and then accuse her 
11

of being overly upset. On at least one occasion, Washenko 

followed Guessous into the copy room, asked her what she was 

working on in there, and then told her, “I’m watching you.” 

J.A. 215-16. This conduct was specifically aimed at Guessous 

and not at other employees. In fact, other employees joked 

about how, even when Washenko was out of the office, he would 

constantly call Guessous to ask her what she was doing and to 

tell her not to leave early.

Washenko once asked Guessous just five minutes after she’d 

been given an assignment whether it was done. When she said it 

was not, Washenko looked at his watch, snapped his fingers, and 

said, “[T]his is not Morrocan time.” J.A. 238. This close 

supervision, combined with the troubling statements Washenko had 

made about Muslims’, Arabs’, and Moroccans’ trustworthiness and 

work ethic, made Guessous feel “like maybe I’m a crook. Like he 

made me rethink myself. . . . So now I felt like he is not 

seeing me as me and what I can bring to the table and my work. 

Now he labeled me as this Middle Easterner.” J.A. 212.

In the winter of late 2011 or early 2012, another incident 

occurred which reinforced this link in Guessous’ mind. Washenko 

called Guessous into his office in what she described as a 

secretive manner, asking her to close the door behind her. He 

proceeded to tell Guessous that Rashid Lakroun, a Moroccan 

restaurant manager in one of Farivew’s buildings, had been 
12

fired. Guessous was confused as to why she would be informed 

since she was not involved with the restaurant and had only seen 

Lakroun occasionally when he came into Fairview’s offices. As 

she expressed this confusion, Washenko told her, “I just thought 

you should know since you are both Moroccan,” adding, “He’s a 

very bad guy, Monica . . . . Monica, Monica, [h]e’s a very bad 

guy.” J.A. 250–51. This conversation left Guessous feeling 

targeted, and she testified that “after I got fired, when I 

left, I felt like I was [Lakroun]. Because now [Washenko]’s 

probably calling somebody in his office telling them that I was 

bad.” J.A. 251.

B.

In late 2011, Guessous became pregnant. During most of 

2012, Washenko’s comments about Arabs and Muslims apparently 

slowed. Guessous attributed this to her own conduct—she said 

she avoided engaging with him in order to reduce stress during 

her pregnancy. In July 2012, Guessous requested a three month 

maternity leave. She stated in her complaint that Washenko felt 

this was excessive and that she had to inform him that she was 

legally entitled to twelve weeks off. Guessous was on leave 

from August 2012 until October 2012. When she returned she said 

Washenko largely ignored her, keeping all of her old work duties 

assigned to other staff members whom Guessous described in her 

complaint as “two non-Muslim, non-Arab, Christian American 
13

females, who also did not seek maternity leave.” Guessous, 2014 

WL 7238993, at *6.

On December 6, 2012, Guessous initiated a conversation with 

Washenko in which she asked for her old duties back, to be 

trained for additional duties if needed, and also confronted 

Washenko about his past discriminatory and offensive conduct. 

Guessous testified that she told Washenko that, as a new mom, 

she did not want the stress she had endured in the past. 

Approximately seventy-five minutes after that conversation 

ended, Mary Alexander, Fairview’s president, sent two emails to 

other employers not associated with Fairview. The subject lines 

of the emails read “Hiring?” and Alexander asked whether either 

of these employers had any openings for “a wonderful girl that 

works for me that we simply do not have enough work for right 

now.” J.A. 325-27.

Three months later, on March 1, 2013, Washenko terminated 

Guessous. Guessous was asked to sign a severance agreement that 

would have waived her employment law rights, but she refused. 

There is a dispute about whether Washenko initially cited a 

change in Fairview’s financial situation or a lack of work for 

Guessous’ position. Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at *7. Fairview 

alleges that the issue of insufficient work for Guessous’ 

position was discussed periodically over approximately two years 

prior to her termination. But Fairview avers that the decision 
14

to terminate Guessous was made by Washenko in “late November or 

early December 2012 . . . and that [the] decision was approved 

by Ms. Alexander.” J.A. 339. In other words, Fairview admits 

the decision was made by Washenko at or around the time that 

Guessous confronted him about withholding her job duties and 

treating her poorly prior to her pregnancy.

Guessous’ position was not filled by any new hire. 

Instead, Fairview shifted her work duties to two staff members, 

Kara Diaz and Tara Berger; an outside contractor, Kurt Johnson; 

and to Washenko himself. Johnson is an accountant who owns his 

own business and serves multiple clients. He testified, 

however, that he is in the Fairview office three to four days 

each week and that he spent even more time there in the past. 

Ms. Diaz and Ms. Berger are both administrative assistants.

Guessous filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC on 

March 5, 2013, just a few days after her termination. She filed 

her civil complaint approximately one year later on February 28, 

2014. Guessous’ claims were divided into six counts. Counts I, 

II, and III asserted race discrimination, hostile work 

environment, and retaliation respectively under § 1981. Counts 

IV, V, and VI, also asserted discrimination, hostile work 

environment, and retaliation, but based on religion, national 

origin, and pregnancy as covered under Title VII.
15

On December 16, 2014, the district court granted Fairview’s 

motion for summary judgment on all counts. The court first 

noted that Guessous “failed to comply with Local Rule 56(B) in 

her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement” by 

citing to her own complaint and by failing to cite certain 

factual allegations at all rather than pointing to evidence in 

the record to show a dispute of material fact. Guessous, 2014 

WL 7238993, at *10. The court “refuse[d] to consider 

Plaintiff’s self-serving statements as evidence to create a 

dispute of material fact” on these issues. Id. The court went 

on to note that it would be proper to “consider[] the 

defendant’s facts as undisputed for purposes of the motion” and 

evaluate the motion as such. Id. However, the court decided to 

“nevertheless proceed to assess the merits of Plaintiff’s 

claims.” Id.

The district court held that Counts I, III, IV, and VI (the 

discrimination and retaliation claims under both statutes) 

failed because Fairview had met its burden to produce a nondiscriminatory reason (lack of work) for its underlying conduct 

(terminating Guessous), and Guessous had not demonstrated a 

genuine issue of material fact to show that this reason was a 

pretext. As to Count II, the court concluded that only one of 

Washenko’s statements “can be construed as a racially derogatory 

comment,” id. at *11, and held this was insufficient to 
16

establish a hostile work environment. Finally, as to Count V, 

the court found that the last act contributing to the alleged 

hostile work environment occurred more than 300 days before 

Guessous filed a complaint with the EEOC and that this claim was 

therefore time-barred. Id. at *18.

Guessous timely appealed.

II.

All issues in this appeal arise from an order of summary 

judgment and are reviewed de novo. Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 

558, 563 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is properly granted 

where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden is on the 

nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of 

material fact for trial. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 

The nonmoving party must do so by offering “sufficient proof in 

the form of admissible evidence” rather than relying solely on 

the allegations of her pleadings. Mitchell v. Data General 

Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).

The court must “view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the [nonmoving] party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 

S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). “The 

court . . . cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility 
17

determinations.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 

780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015). In general, if “an issue 

as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation of 

the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their 

credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment.

III.

The district court granted summary judgment for Fairview on 

the discrimination claims (Counts I and IV) and retaliation 

claims (Counts III and VI) under both § 1981 and Title VII by 

applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. This 

framework was initially developed for Title VII discrimination 

cases, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 

but has since been held to apply in discrimination cases arising 

under § 1981, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 

186 (1989); Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 

257 (4th Cir. 2001), and in retaliation cases under both 

statutes, Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 

1997) (addressing Title VII retaliation claim); Hawkins v. 

PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000) (addressing 

§ 1981 retaliation claim). The framework applies in employment 

discrimination and retaliation cases where a plaintiff does not 

present sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence showing 
18

that an adverse employment action was motivated by intentional 

discrimination aimed at the plaintiff’s protected 

characteristic(s). Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 

243, 250 (4th Cir. 2015). This is such a case.

The McDonnell Douglas framework is comprised of three 

steps: (1) the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie 

case of employment discrimination or retaliation; (2) the burden 

of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; 

(3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the stated reason for the 

adverse employment action is a pretext and that the true reason 

is discriminatory or retaliatory. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs 

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); see also Reeves v. 

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) 

(holding that the employer’s burden in step two is one of 

production, not persuasion). For status-based discrimination 

claims, the employee must “show that the motive to discriminate 

was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had 

other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s 

decision.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 

2517, 2523 (2013). Retaliation claims, by contrast, require the 

employee to show “that retaliation was a but-for cause of a 

challenged adverse employment action.” Foster, 787 F.3d at 252; 
19

see Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533 (“Title VII retaliation claims 

must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for 

causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e–

2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would 

not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action 

or actions of the employer.”). The Supreme Court has recently 

reiterated that a cause need not work in isolation to be a butfor cause. Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014) 

(“Thus, if poison is administered to a man debilitated by 

multiple diseases, it is a but-for cause of his death even if 

those diseases played a part in his demise, so long as, without 

the incremental effect of the poison, he would have lived.”).

As the district court noted, the plaintiff’s burden to show 

pretext “merges with the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of 

persuading the court that she was a victim of intentional 

discrimination.” Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at *9 (citing 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).

A.

The facts and reasoning supporting our decision on 

Guessous’ retaliation claims are also essential for analyzing 

her discrimination claims. As such, we address the retaliation 

claims first. In Count III, Guessous alleges that her 

conversation with Washenko in December 2012 (in which she asked 

for her old duties back and confronted Washenko about past 
20

hostile and discriminatory conduct) constituted protected 

activity under § 1981. She further alleges that Fairview 

retaliated against her for engaging in that conduct by deciding 

within seventy-five minutes to terminate her, as evidenced by 

the emails sent by Alexander to two outside employers inquiring 

whether they might hire her away from Fairview. In Count VI, 

Guessous makes essentially the same allegations but seeks relief 

under Title VII. Since the elements of these retaliation claims 

are identical, Honor v. Booz–Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 

180, 188 (4th Cir. 2004), and because the district court granted 

summary judgment on both for effectively the same reasons, we 

review them together.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either 

statute, Guessous must show “(i) that [she] engaged in protected 

activity, (ii) that [her employer] took adverse action against 

[her], and (iii) that a causal relationship existed between the

protected activity and the adverse employment activity.”

Foster, 787 F.3d at 250 (alteration in original) (quoting Price 

v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004)) (quotation marks 

omitted). The district court held these elements were met. 

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, establishing a prima 

facie case shifted the burden to Fairview to produce a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment 

action. Fairview alleged that Guessous was terminated because 
21

there was insufficient work to support her position. The burden 

then shifted back to Guessous to show this reason was a pretext 

to disguise the true retaliatory reason for her termination.

The sole issue on appeal, therefore, is whether Guessous 

met her summary judgment burden of demonstrating a genuine 

dispute of material fact on the question of pretext sufficient 

to make Fairview’s proffered justification a triable issue. 

Foster, 787 F.3d at 254; see also King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 

145, 154 (4th Cir. 2003) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“To survive 

summary judgment, however, King need not squarely rebut his 

employer’s explanation. Instead, King must cast sufficient 

doubt upon the genuineness of the explanation to warrant a 

jury’s consideration of possible alternative and discriminatory 

motivations for the firing.”).

Rather than engaging in a detailed analysis of the 

competing evidence proffered by Fairview to support its lack-ofwork theory, and by Guessous to support her retaliation theory, 

the district court granted summary judgment for Fairview for one 

reason: that Guessous’ position remained unfilled. Guessous, 

2014 WL 7238993, at *15. The court offered no elaboration in 

its opinion, but its logic appears to have been that, because 

the work was absorbed by Fairview’s other employees, Guessous 

cannot show that there was enough work to justify keeping her on 

staff and she therefore cannot prevail. If that is, indeed, the 
22

court’s reasoning it is a fallacy: because Fairview has shown 

it could operate without Guessous does not mean that it would

have done so absent the protected activity. Guessous’ burden is 

only to show that the protected activity was a but-for cause of 

her termination, not that it was the sole cause. Foster, 787 

F.3d at 252; see also Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., 

Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 507 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[I]n retaliation 

cases, courts must determine ‘what made [the employer] fire [the 

employee] when it did.’” (emphasis and alteration in original) 

(quoting Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 

2009))).

The district court and Fairview are both correct that 

Guessous failed to show there was so much work to be done that 

the bookkeeping assistant’s position was an absolute necessity. 

The position was not back filled and Guessous acknowledged in 

her testimony that she was not always busy. A reasonable jury 

could easily conclude, however, that the termination decision 

was made only seventy-five minutes after Guessous’ complained to 

Washenko about past comments and treatment, and that it was 

therefore motivated by the complaint itself. See Okoli v. City 

of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 223 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 

the “deeply suspicious [fact] that Stewart fired Okoli only 

hours after she . . . complain[ed] to the Mayor” about 
23

harassment was sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden to show 

pretext at the summary judgment stage).

The December 6, 2012, emails from Alexander are substantial 

evidence in support of Guessous’ argument that when she 

complained to her supervisor, who was also her alleged harasser, 

Washenko decided to terminate her and immediately got the 

decision approved by Alexander. Fairview counters that 

Alexander did not know about the confrontation. This argument 

has two problems. First, Guessous has presented evidence that a 

co-worker brought the confrontation to Alexander’s attention 

while it was ongoing because Washenko had made Guessous cry.

This alone would be enough to allow a reasonable jury to 

conclude Alexander knew about the complaint and that the 

termination decision was made in response. Second, Fairview has 

admitted that the decision to fire Guessous was made by Washenko 

in “late November or early December 2012 . . . and that [the] 

decision was approved by Ms. Alexander.” J.A. 339. This 

admission is consistent with Guessous’ claim that the 

termination decision was made on December 6, 2012, that 

Alexander was involved, and that the termination was 

retaliatory.

The absence of any evidence to support Fairview’s lack-ofwork explanation is also important. Although Fairview claims 

that Washenko and Alexander had discussed eliminating Guessous’ 
24

position in the past, there is no record evidence to support 

that claim—no emails, no meeting minutes, no performance 

reviews, nothing. The only thing Fairview even points to as 

evidence is the pair of December 6, 2012, emails from Alexander. 

Fairview points out that they explicitly say there was not 

enough work for Guessous. But the fact that these emails came 

on the heels of the protected activity in this case suggest that 

the reason given in the emails was a pretextual one. Even if a 

jury accepted Fairview’s argument that it did not need an 

assistant bookkeeper, based on the record evidence it could 

still conclude that the protected activity was the final straw 

that motivated Guessous’ termination. See Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 

at 888. Because Guessous’ evidence puts the validity of 

Fairview’s explanation in doubt, it is sufficient to survive 

summary judgment. See Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 

311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding a plaintiff will not survive 

summary judgment by “focusing on minor discrepancies that do not 

cast doubt on the explanation’s validity”); King, 328 F.3d at 

154 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“Because he has made out a prima 

facie case, if King also has cast doubt upon the real 

motivations behind his unique treatment, he has adduced 

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.”).

We therefore reverse the district court and vacate the 

order of summary judgment with respect to Counts III and VI.
25

B.

In Count I of her complaint, Guessous alleges that Fairview 

treated her differently based on her race, ultimately 

terminating her and giving her work duties to several non-Arab 

employees in violation of § 1981. In Count IV, she makes the 

same allegations except that she asserts the discriminatory 

conduct was based on her religion, national origin, and 

pregnancy as covered under Title VII. As the elements of these 

discrimination claims are effectively the same and the district 

court granted summary judgment on both for effectively the same 

reasons, we review them together.

In a typical discriminatory discharge case, the plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case by showing “(1) that [s]he is a 

member of a protected class; (2) that [s]he suffered from an 

adverse employment action; (3) that . . . [s]he was performing 

at a level that met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations; 

and (4) that the position was filled by a similarly qualified 

applicant outside the protected class.” King, 328 F.3d at 149. 

As we have explained, however, the prima facie requirements are 

not set in stone, and “differing factual circumstances may 

require adaptation.” Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 

(4th Cir. 1991). An adaptation of the prima facie case is 

required here, because this is not a typical discriminatory 

discharge case, where a putatively poor-performing employee is 
26

terminated and replaced by someone outside the protected class.

Because Fairview claims it terminated Guessous because it lacked 

enough work for a full-time bookkeeping position, this case is 

closer to a reduction-in-force case, where unnecessary positions 

are eliminated, than it is to a typical discharge case. 

Accordingly, adapting the final prima facie requirement to the 

facts of this case means that Guessous was required to show that 

her job duties were absorbed by employees not in the protected 

class or otherwise show that Fairview did not treat Guessous’ 

protected characteristics neutrally when deciding to terminate 

her. See id.; Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 

690 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that in a “mini-RIF” case, 

which involves the elimination of only one position, “[t]he 

retention of an employee outside the protected class to perform 

the plaintiff’s duties is nothing more than a demonstration of 

more favorable treatment, particularly tailored to the factual 

circumstances of a mini-RIF case.”). Given the undisputed 

evidence that Guessous’ duties were absorbed by non-Arab, nonMuslim employees, Guessous has established a prima facie case of 

discriminatory discharge. The question, then, is whether 

Guessous met her summary judgment burden of demonstrating a 

genuine dispute of material fact on the question of pretext 

sufficient to make Fairview’s proffered justification a triable 

issue. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 
27

310, 319 (4th Cir. 2005). The district court recognized that 

Guessous offered three arguments, supported by the record, to 

rebut the proffered justification as pretextual: “(1) the 

decision to terminate her was finalized seventy-five minutes 

after she engaged in protected activity, (2) no one else was 

terminated for the reasons provided by Defendant, and (3) she 

was terminated by her aggressor.” Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at 

*11. But the court concluded that “[n]one of these . . . could 

lead a reasonable jury to conclude by a preponderance of the 

evidence that . . . lack of work [] was not its true reason” for 

terminating Guessous. Id. The court did not offer further 

reasoning in support of this legal conclusion.

As with the retaliation claims, the court observed that 

Guessous’ position was not filled after her termination. Id. 

As noted above, however, this is not a typical discharge case, 

so the fact that Guessous was not replaced by a new hire does 

not prevent Guessous from establishing pretext and thus is not 

fatal to her claim. Whether or how this played into the court’s 

analysis, however, is unclear because replacement by a person 

outside the protected class is a prima facie element of a 

discrimination claim. King, 328 F.3d at 149. The district 

court explicitly found that Guessous had established a prima 

facie case, so to the extent it relied on the fact that the 

position was never filled to conclude she had not met her 
28

burden, the court’s opinion appears to be internally 

inconsistent. Nor is there anything in the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework that says “a plaintiff must always 

introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.” 

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149. To the extent that the evidence 

supporting a plaintiff’s prima facie case also undermines the 

employer’s non-retaliatory justification, that evidence may be 

called upon by the trier of fact in determining whether or not 

the proffered justification is pretextual. Id. at 143. It is 

therefore not clear why the court felt Guessous’s evidence of 

discriminatory purpose was outweighed by Fairview’s evidence 

that it had not hired a replacement.

For largely the same reasons discussed in connection with 

Guessous’ retaliation claims, the evidence in the record is 

sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that 

Fairview’s lack-of-work claim is a pretext for discrimination. 

Fairview contends that it had been considering the elimination 

of Guessous’ position for two to three years before she was 

terminated, but there is no evidence in the record documenting 

the existence of a years-long evaluation of the need for 

Guessous’ position. While Fairview contends the “wonderful 

girl” emails sent by Alexander on December 6, 2012, confirm the 

lack of work, a jury would be entitled to take those emails at 

less than face-value, given that they were sent so soon on the 
29

heels of Guessous’ conversation with Washenko about his 

treatment of her, a conversation about which Alexander had 

contemporaneous knowledge. Moreover, the record evidence shows 

that other employees—including those to whom Guessous’ work was 

redistributed—were not busy and yet kept their jobs. J.A. 260-

61 (“Kara . . . said to me, ‘Oh, my god, Monica, I have nothing 

to do today.’ . . . And [Kara’s] like, ‘I’m browsing Pinterest, 

I’m just pinning this, pinning this, pinning that.’ And 

[Washenko] even confirmed it that Kara had nothing to do.”). 

More to the point, all of the evidence of Washenko’s disparaging 

remarks and statements that Muslims and Middle Easterners were 

“crooks” and untrustworthy support the allegation that the 

termination was a continuation of past discrimination, brought 

to a head by Guessous’ complaint about that very discriminatory 

conduct. The record establishes a history of discomfort, 

distrust, and disparaging treatment directed at Guessous, and it 

demonstrates a discriminatory animus on the part of Washenko.

At oral argument, counsel for Fairview attempted to 

distinguish between what it admitted were Washenko’s 

inappropriate comments and Guessous’ allegation that the 

termination was motivated by animus. Oral Argument 25:00. But 

Guessous’ burden is only to “produce sufficient evidence upon 

which one could find that ‘the protected trait . . . actually 

motivated the employer’s decision.’” Hill v. Lockheed Martin 
30

Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141). That counsel believes the 

statements were inappropriate but not indicative of animus is of 

no moment—a reasonable jury would certainly be entitled to reach 

a different conclusion. As this is the extent of Guessous’ 

burden at the summary judgment stage, we reverse the district 

court and vacate the order of summary judgment with respect to 

Counts I and IV.

IV.

In Count II, Guessous alleges she was subjected to a 

hostile work environment based on her race and seeks to recover 

under § 1981. In Count V she makes the same allegation with 

respect to her religion, national origin, and pregnancy, seeking 

recovery under Title VII. The elements of a hostile work 

environment claim “are the same under either § 1981 or Title 

VII.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 184 (4th 

Cir. 2001). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, “a 

plaintiff must show that there is ‘(1) unwelcome conduct; (2)

that is based on the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic]; (3) 

which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an abusive 

work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer.’” 
31

Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220 (quoting Mosby-Grant v. City of 

Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2010)).

A.

Because Count V squarely presents a statute of limitations 

issue also implicating Count II, we address it first. The 

district court granted Fairview’s motion for summary judgment on 

Count V, finding that Guessous’ Title VII hostile work 

environment claim was time barred. To pursue a claim under 

Title VII, a Title VII Charge must be filed with the EEOC within 

a statutorily defined period of time of either 180 or 300 days. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Holland v. Washington Homes, 

Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007). The district court 

found, and the parties agree, that the statutory period for this 

case is 300 days.

“A hostile work environment claim is composed of a series 

of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful 

employment practice,’” and the Supreme Court has held that such 

claims are subject to a “continuing violation” theory5: “In 

 5 To be precise, the Supreme Court rejected the “continuing 

violation” doctrine then followed in the Ninth Circuit, which 

held a defendant could be liable for discrete discriminatory 

acts that were otherwise time barred if those acts were related 

to subsequent violations falling within the statutory period. 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). 

However, it adopted such a doctrine with respect to hostile work 

environment claims, and this and other courts have referred to 

this doctrine as a “continuing violation” approach. E.g., 

(Continued)
32

determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim 

exists, we look to ‘all the circumstances,’” and “[p]rovided 

that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing 

period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be 

considered by a court for the purposes of determining 

liability.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 

116-17 (2002) (emphasis added). In other words, even if most of 

the harassing conduct on which a plaintiff relies to establish 

her hostile work environment claim occurred outside the 

statutory period, the claim will be considered timely if at 

least one act continuing the violation occurred within the 

statutory period. Furthermore, the plaintiff may recover for 

all of the harm resulting from the hostile work environment, not 

just those contributing acts that occurred during the statutory 

period. Id. at 119 (“If Congress intended to limit liability to 

conduct occurring in the period within which the party must file 

the charge, it seems unlikely that Congress would have allowed 

recovery for two years of backpay.”).

 

Gilliam v. S.C. Dep’t Of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 140 

(4th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court, however, in its Morgan

decision in 2002, explained the standards for applying the 

continuing violation doctrine-undermining our earlier authority 

on this point-and instructed that evidence of behavior occurring 

outside of the applicable limitations period can be used to 

support a plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.”).
33

The discriminatory and retaliatory termination claims 

(Counts IV and VI) survived the limitations inquiry because each 

of those counts was predicated on the termination itself, which 

occurred on March 1, 2013, just days before Guessous filed her 

charge with the EEOC. Guessous argued to the district court

that the termination was also a constituent act contributing to 

the hostile work environment and that Count V was therefore also 

timely. Alternatively, Guessous argued that Washenko’s decision 

to remove her assignments from her in November 2012 after she 

returned from maternity leave was a constituent act supporting 

the hostile work environment claim and also occurred within the 

statutory period.

The district court held that “[d]iscrete acts includ[ing], 

inter alia, termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer 

and refusal to hire,” as well as removing work assignments, are 

“different from the hostile work environment claims” and that, 

because such discrete acts are separately actionable, they

cannot comprise part of a hostile work environment claim. 

Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at *17. That holding was in error.

In Morgan, the Supreme Court held that a time-barred 

discrete act claim remains time-barred even if it is part of a 

series of related actions, some of which occurred during the 

limitations period. See id. at 113 (“[D]iscrete discriminatory 

acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are 
34

related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”). Morgan thus 

establishes that the continuing-violation doctrine cannot be 

used to pursue claims challenging time-barred discrete acts.

That, however, is not the issue in this case, as Guessous 

does not rely on the continuing-violation doctrine to revive 

time-barred discrete acts. Indeed, there are no time-barred 

discrete acts here—the discrete acts about which Guessous 

complains occurred only a few months before she filed her EEOC 

charge. Instead, the issue in this case is whether non-timebarred discrete acts can be considered part of the “series of 

separate acts that collectively” create a hostile work 

environment, id. at 117, thus rendering a hostile-environment 

claim timely under the continuing-violation doctrine.

The Supreme Court has recently explained that in a 

constructive-discharge case, the employee’s resignation is the 

culmination of the intolerable discriminatory conduct of the 

employer, such that the relevant limitation period starts with 

the employee’s resignation, not the last act of the employer. 

See Green v. Brennan, 2016 WL 2945236 at *6 (U.S. May 23, 2016). 

If a constructive discharge can be part and parcel of a 

discriminatory pattern of conduct, we see no reason that a 

discrete act cannot. So long as the act is part of the pattern 

of discriminatory treatment against the employee, then that act 

should be sufficient for purposes of the continuing-violation 
35

doctrine, even if the act would otherwise qualify as a discrete 

act that is independently actionable.

In Green, the Supreme Court also clarified the holding in

Morgan to be that a hostile-environment claim “includes every 

act composing that claim, whether those acts are independently 

actionable or not.” 2016 WL 2945236 at *6 (emphasis added). It 

pointed out that “even if a claim of discrimination based on a 

single discriminatory act is time barred, that same act could 

still be used as part of the basis for a hostile-workenvironment claim, so long as one other act that was part of 

that same hostile-work-environment claim occurred within the 

limitations period.” Id. at *9 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117). As such, the district court’s 

conclusion that neither the withdrawal of work from Guessous nor 

her termination were facts that could support her Title VII 

hostile work environment claim was erroneous. Because the work 

assignments were withdrawn in November 2012, and the termination 

occurred in March 2013, both constitute facts within the 

statutory period which contributed to the hostile work 

environment and make that claim timely.

B.

With respect to Count II, the district court granted 

summary judgment for Fairview, holding that only one of 

Washenko’s comments was racially derogatory, that this was the 
36

only unwelcome conduct alleged to be based on Guessous’ race, 

and that this was insufficiently severe or pervasive conduct to 

support a hostile work environment claim under § 1981.

Hostile work environment claims under § 1981 are subject to 

a four year limitation period. White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 

375 F.3d 288, 291-92 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Guessous filed 

her complaint in the district court on February 28, 2014, 

“unwelcome conduct” occurring on or after February 28, 2010,

falls within the statutory period. As already discussed, 

however, hostile work environment claims under Title VII are 

also subject to the “continuing violation” theory for 

establishing limitations periods which can make the defendant 

liable for conduct occurring prior to the statutory period as 

well. As there was relevant conduct that occurred before 

February 28, 2010, this Court must decide whether the same 

continuing violation theory applies in § 1981 cases.

Four of our sister circuit courts of appeal have addressed 

this issue, and all four have held that the Morgan continuing 

violation approach applies to § 1981 hostile work environment 

claims just as it does to such claims under Title VII. Tademy 

v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2008); 

Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 

2004); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 

2003); Shields v. Fort James Corp., 305 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th 
37

Cir. 2002). In Morgan, the Supreme Court characterized hostile

work environment claims as addressing “a single unlawful 

employment practice,” rendering the constituent acts forming 

that practice effectively indivisible. 536 U.S. at 115, 117. 

Our sister circuits have viewed this as a simplification of the 

law, e.g., Shields, 305 F.3d at 1282, allowing the courts to 

view a hostile work environment claim holistically in the same 

way that discrete act claims are normally treated. This is 

consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis explicitly 

contrasting the simple task of identifying a discrete act “such 

as termination, failure to promote,” etc., with the murkier task 

of pinning down hostile work environment claims that by “[t]heir 

very nature involve[] repeated conduct.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 

114-15. That problem is as present in § 1981 claims as it is in 

Title VII claims, and the Morgan Court’s solution is therefore 

equally applicable. Applying the continuing violation approach 

to § 1981 claims would also extend this Court’s policy of 

treating Title VII and § 1981 hostile work environment claims 

the same. Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 184. As such, we hold that 

Morgan applies with equal force when such claims arise under 

§ 1981.

We now turn to the merits of the race-based hostile work 

environment claim. We first note that application of Morgan to 

the facts of this case results in all of the alleged conduct 
38

being relevant to our inquiry. The district court held that the 

first element for a successful claim was met as the alleged 

conduct was, indeed, unwelcome. It granted summary judgment for 

Fairview, however, based on a combination of the second and 

third elements of the claim—that the conduct be based on the 

plaintiff’s race and be severe or pervasive. First, the court 

held that Washenko’s statement calling the people of Dubai 

“camel people” was the only one that could be characterized as 

racially derogatory. Second, it determined that this one 

comment was insufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe 

“the environment [was] objectively hostile or abusive.” EEOC v.

Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 318 (4th Cir. 2008).

Two aspects of the district court’s decision were in error: 

with respect to the second step of the analysis, the district 

court took an overly cramped view of what constitutes race-based 

conduct; with respect to the third step, the court failed to 

consider the totality of circumstances, as it must when 

determining whether unwelcome conduct is severe or pervasive. 

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th 

Cir. 2015).

Turning first to the district court’s approach to race, the 

Supreme Court has held that “Congress intended to protect from 

discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected 

to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry 
39

or ethnic characteristics.” Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 

481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). Where the conduct at issue is “based 

on the fact that [the plaintiff] was born an Arab, rather than 

solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he 

will have made out a case under § 1981.” Id. Based on 

legislative history, the Court further noted that many of the 

“races” which members of Congress perceived to be covered by 

§ 1981 comprised ancestrally related peoples more easily 

identifiable by their cultural affinities than their 

physiognomic characteristics.6 Id. at 612 (noting references to 

“Scandinavian races,” “the Chinese,” “Latin,” “Spanish,” AngloSaxon races,” “Jews,” “Mexicans,” “blacks,” “Mongolians,” 

“Gypsies,” and “the German race”). In fact, the Court went so 

far as to say “that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential 

to qualify for § 1981 protection.” Id. at 613.

Guessous’ assertion is that her Arab ethnicity7 motivated 

Washenko’s conduct, or at least enough of his conduct to 

 6 In fact, the word “race” does not appear in § 1981 at all, 

although the statute has long been construed as barring racial 

discrimination in public and private contracts. Runyon v. 

McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-69 (1976).

7 Although “Arab” is usually considered a cultural rather 

than racial designation, the Supreme Court has specifically held 

that it is a cognizable protected class under § 1981. Saint 

Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613; see also id. at 610 n.4 

(discussing Arab peoples as members of the Caucasoid race, as 

(Continued)
40

constitute intolerable working conditions. Viewed through the 

lens just established, it is not at all clear how the district 

court concluded that “camel people” was racially derogatory, but 

all8 “of Washenko’s [other] statements toward [Guessous], while 

distasteful, were references to and questions about Islam and 

Moroccan culture” and not her Arab ethnicity. Guessous, 2014 WL 

7238993, at *13. To begin, the comments were more than 

distasteful, and it is beyond euphemistic to characterize them 

as references and inquiries. More to the point, many of these 

comments were either clearly or conceivably racial.

During their very first interaction, Washenko told Guessous 

that “Middle Easterners . . . are a bunch of crooks, [who] will 

stop at nothing to screw you.” J.A. 207-08. A broad comment 

like this one, aimed at no particular religion or nationality, 

could certainly be construed as racially motivated. That 

comment also set the stage for Guessous’ and Washenko’s working 

relationship from that point forward. In late 2011, Washenko 

assumed that Guessous, an Arab from Morocco, would be able to 

 

well as the limitations of a purely scientific approach to such 

determinations).

8 The district court used the word “most” rather than “all” 

as we use here. We make this substitution based on the district 

court’s holding that only one of Washenko’s many statements was 

racially hostile. By implication, the court must have concluded 

that none of the rest of his comments was racial in nature.
41

interpret for a Persian Iranian restaurant employee who did not 

speak English. When Guessous told him the employee spoke Farsi 

and she did not, Washenko said “shouldn’t there be some sort of 

secret language you all understand?” J.A. 246. A jury could 

easily conclude that “you all” referred to a racial category, 

that it was a reference to Middle Eastern people, and that 

Washenko perceived Arabs and Persians to be members of the same 

race (or was entirely unaware of any distinction at all). Even 

his comment that Muslims and Christians do not worship “the same 

God,” while clearly motivated in large part by a religious 

animus, could be construed as taking on racial overtones when 

Washenko followed up by saying, “We are not the same.” J.A. 

225-26. The manner in which Washenko delivered this statement 

left Guessous feeling less than human, a hallmark of racially 

insensitive conduct.

The district court put itself in the place of the jury when 

it decided that only one of the remarks was racial. The court 

said the remaining comments “were references to and questions 

about Islam and Moroccan culture,” but a jury might well decide 

they were also motivated by broader ethnic animus. See Saint 

Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (holding that discrimination 

“based on the fact that [plaintiff] was born an Arab, rather 

than solely on the place or nation of his origin” will support a 

§ 1981 claim (emphasis added)). After all, Washenko regularly 
42

interchanged his harassment of Guessous, referring to Muslims, 

Morrocans, Palestinians, Egyptians, Middle Easterners, and North 

Africans. A jury could reasonably conclude that Washenko bore 

animus towards all Middle Eastern people (other than Israelis 

whom Washenko referred to as the victims of Palestinian 

attacks); that Guessous reasonably perceived many of these 

comments as racial insofar as Washenko considered most Middle 

Easterners and Middle Eastern Muslims to be “crooks” or 

“terrorists”; and therefore that Washenko harassed Guessous 

based on her Arab ethnicity even when his comments referred to 

other, related aspects of her identity. In reaching this 

conclusion, we do not endorse Guessous’ argument that a § 1981 

claim may be pursued on the theory that all aspects of her 

identity form “an amorphous whole,” making Fairview liable under 

that statute for non-race-based harassment.9 We hold only that 

it would be possible for a jury to interpret many of Washenko’s 

comments as based on race in addition to other forms of animus.

 9 Such a theory may be available under Title VII to the 

extent that it covers multiple elements of identity, including 

religion and national origin, not covered by § 1981. This Court 

has not decided whether such “hybrid” claims may be maintained, 

and has no occasion to do so here, but several of our sister 

circuits have agreed that, under Title VII, “where two bases for 

discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct 

components.” Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th 

Cir. 1994).
43

Finally, on the question of whether the conduct was severe 

or pervasive, the district court erred by failing to take into 

account the totality of the circumstances as we have held it 

must do at this stage of the analysis. Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 

184. The “severe or pervasive” question is subject to the same 

standard under § 1981 that applies to Title VII. “When the 

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, 

ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 

alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 

abusive working environment, Title VII [and therefore § 1981] is 

violated.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 

(1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents 

(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory 

changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. 

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Because its analysis of what constitutes a racially 

derogatory comment was flawed, as just discussed, much more 

conduct should have been reviewed by the court in addressing 

this question. As the district court noted, we have found 

conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive where an Iranian 

employee was called “the local terrorist, a camel jockey, and 

the Emir of Waldorf” repeatedly throughout the duration of his 
44

employment. Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 

1126, 1131 (4th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted). But the 

district court attempted to distinguish Amirmokri from this 

case, noting that there the plaintiff developed an ulcer and 

resigned. Guessous, 2014 WL 7238993, at *12. There is, of 

course, no requirement that the plaintiff develop physical 

symptoms, nor that she leave her job, to prove sufficiently 

severe or pervasive harassment. See Forklift, 510 U.S. at 21–

22. The question is whether Guessous reasonably perceived “the 

work environment to be abusive.” Amirmokri, 60 F.3d at 1131. 

The conduct overlooked by the district court demonstrated a 

greater “frequency of the discriminatory conduct,” some of the 

episodes were more “sever[e]” than the single “camel people” 

comment, and there was substantial testimony that the 

discrimination “unreasonably interfere[d] with [Guessous’] work 

performance.” Forklift, 510 U.S. at 23. There was also 

evidence—in the form of Guessous’ email to her brother-in-law

and testimony that she often left the office to cry and that she 

was concerned about how the stress from her work environment 

might affect her pregnancy—that Guessous’ “psychological wellbeing” was at risk, which “is, of course, relevant to 

determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment 

abusive.” Id.
45

Moreover, the court did not look at the evidence of 

Washenko’s intimidating and intrusive management of Guessous or 

that behavior’s relationship to his race-based statement that 

“Middle Easterners . . . are a bunch of crooks.” J.A. 207-08. 

Guessous testified that she felt demeaned by Washenko’s 

intrusive management of her (and her alone), the intimidating 

way he would stand over her during confrontational 

conversations, and the underlying assumption that she was not to 

be trusted. The evidence suggests Washenko thought Guessous was 

untrustworthy—and intended to make that clear to her—from the 

moment she disclosed her origins to him at their initial 

meeting. A jury would certainly be entitled to reach that 

conclusion. We have long held that “whether harassment was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive is quintessentially a question 

of fact,” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 208 

(4th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted), and 

here Guessous has presented diverse evidence sufficient to 

create a material dispute as to the severity of the unwelcome 

conduct.

By failing to address numerous comments that were open to a 

racially motivated interpretation, and by circumscribing its 

analysis to just one comment without reviewing the totality of 

the circumstances, the district court committed reversible error 
46

in its grant of summary judgment for Fairview. As to Count II 

we reverse.

V.

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the order of summary 

judgment on all claims and remand for further proceedings.

VACATED AND REMANDED