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___________________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

C hief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman 

# Opinion

FILED MAY 1, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 115890 MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH YOUNG, J. We granted leave in this case to consider whether firearms found in defendant’s home, upon execution by federal and state police officers of a federal search warrant, were properly excluded from evidence in a state prosecution. The firearms were suppressed on the ground that a copy of the affidavit in support of the search warrant was not provided, as required by statute, to defendant at the time the warrant

was executed. Because we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended the exclusionary rule to apply to theprocedural violation of Michigan’s statutory warrant requirements at issue in this case, we reverse.

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Defendant and her husband, Timothy Obetts, were co-owners of Pro Temp One Incorporated, 1 a Michigan corporation that provided skille d and semiskilled health care workers to hospitals, nursing homes, and private homes. In May 1997, the Michigan Accident Fund, Pro Temp One’s worker’s compensation carrier, received a call on its fraud hotline indicating that de fendant, Obetts, and Pro Temp One had misrepresente d worker’s compensation employee classifications to the fund. After gathering information from associates and former employees of Pro Temp One, a fraud investigator from the fund contacted Michigan State Police Sergeant Jack Vanderwal, who initiated a criminal investigation. Vanderwal contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation after determining that defendant and Obetts may have obtained bank loans by use of fraud in addition to defrauding the fund of worker’s compensation premiums. Special Agent David Smith of the FBI interviewe d tw o former employees of Pro Temp One and a personal friend of defendant. 2 On the basis of the information provided by these

1 Pro Temp One also conducted business as First Agency Professionals Incorporated and Agency Professionals Incorporated.

2 It appears from the record that the two former employees had been fired by defendant, and that at least one of them was (continued...) 2three sources, Smith sought a federal search warrant to search the private residence of defendant and Obetts. Sm ith’ s affidavit in support of the search warran t r eferred to the three sources as “Source One,” “Source Two,” and “Source Three.” On October 30, 1997, a federal magistrate issued the requested search w arra nt. 3 The magistrate ordered that the affidavit in support of the warrant be sealed, apparently to protect the sources. OnOctober 31, 1997, the federal search warrant was executed at the residence of defendant and Obetts by one or

more FBI a gents and one or more Michigan State Police officers. While searching the basement of the home, two of the FBI agents came up on a locked safe. The agents asked defendant about the contents of the safe, and she replied that it contained weapons. Defendant then unlocked the safe, and the agents seized two handguns from it. In accordance with federal procedure, when the search was completed, defendant

was given a copy of the search warrant and a tabulation of the items seized. Notably, defendant was not provided with a copy of the sealed affidavit. Defendant was subsequently charged by the Kent County Prosecutor with possession of a firearm by

2 (...continued) involved in litigation with defendant.

3 The magistrate also issued a warrant to search the business premises of Pro Temp One. This warrant was executed simultaneously with the warrant to search the private residence. 3a personconvicted of a felony. MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6). 4 At defendant’s preliminary examination, defense counsel requested a copy of the affidavit in support of the search warrant. The assistant prosecutor indicated that the federal magistrate would be petitioned to unseal the affidavit for purposes of the state proceedings. The district court judge presiding over the preli minary examination stated that he would bind defendant over for trial after defendant received

a copy of the affidavit. Within two weeks following the preliminary examination, the affidavit was unsealed and provided to defendant, and she was bound over for trial. Defendant moved to exclude the firearms from evidence on various grounds, including that the police did not comply with Michigan statutory requirements regarding warrant execution. Following two hearings on the motion to suppress , the trial court held that the motion had to be gran ted on the ground that defendant was not provided with a copy of the affidavit insupport of the search warrant at the time of the search in contraventionof MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). The trial court noted that the issuance and execution of the search warrant were “perfectly legitimate” under federal law. However, the court held that precedent from this Cou rt required that evidence seized in the absence of full compliance with Michigan’s statutory warrant provisions be suppressed in a state prosecution. Accordingly, the trial cou rt entered an

4 Defendant was not charged with any federal offens e o r with worker’s compensation fraud as a result of the search. 4order suppressing the firearms and dismissing the case. A

divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 238 Mich App 495, 496-504; 606 NW2d 658 (1999). In the lea d opinion, Judge Hoekstra noted first that, pursuant to People

v

Paladino , 204 Mich App 505, 507-508; 516 NW2d 113 (1994), in a joint operation between the state and federal governments, state law governs the validity of a search warrant in state court proceedings. Judge Hoekstra next opined that, although two panels of the Court of Appeal s had recently held that a failure by law enforcement officers to comply with the statutory requirement to attach a copy of the affidavit to the copy of the warrant provided to the defendant does not require suppressionof evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, 5 those decisions conflicted with this Court’s holding in People v Moten , 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925). 6 J udge Hoekstra concluded that, because Motenhad not been overturned, the Court of Appeals was constrained to hold that, where a warrant relies on an attached affidavit for its statement of probable

cause and that affidavit is not attached to the warrant as sta tutorily required, the evidence seized pursuant to th e warrant i s in admissible. However, Judge Hoekstra indicated

5 People v Garvin , 235 Mich App 90, 99; 597 NW2d 194 (1999); People v Pipok (After Remand) , 191 Mich App 669, 673; 479 NW2d 359 (1991).

6 In Moten , this Court held t hat, where the face of the search warrant did not recite all the material facts alleged inthe supporting affidavit as required by the then-applicable searchwarrant statute, the warrant was invalid, and the evidence seized pursuant thereto must be suppressed. Id. at 174. 5his disagreement with the Motenholding: While this particular statutory provision generally relates to a constitutional right, the specific portion of the statute requiring a rec itat ionof the basis for probable cause or the attachment of the affidavit only barely relates to the substantive right the Legislature is seeking to protect. The requirement is more of a ministerial duty than a right. Co nsequently, were I able, I would hold that defendant must show some prejudice before the trial court suppresses the evidence seized using a st atut orily defective warrant. In this case, for example, defendant was eventually afforded a chance to contest the basis for the warrant. I am unable to see how defendant was put at a disadvantage by being forced to delay her arguments until the parties obtained a copy of the fed era l affidavit. I think it is especially i mportant that defendant be forced to show som e level of prejudice given that the war rant met all the requirements of the federal warrant statute. Here, I find it necessary to exclude the evidence in question because the state warrant requirements differ from federal warrant requirements. Neither party has argued that the federal warrant requirements are unconstitutional, so it seems that I am forced to declare a search invalid because the ministerial duties associated with executing a federal warrant differ from those associated with executing a state warrant, a result I hope our Supreme Court will find equally unsettling. [238 Mich App 503-504.] Judge Cavanagh concurred only in the result. 238 Mich App 504. Judge Gage dissented, opining that the Court of Appeals decisions in People v Gar vin , 235 Mich App 90; 597 NW2d 194 (1999), and People v Pipok (After Remand) , 191 Mich App 669; 479 NW2d 359 (1991), controlled this case, and that this case was distinguishable from Moten . While the statute in effect at the time Motenwas decided required that the search warrant itself contain a reci tation of the affidavit’s statement of probable cause, Judge Gage noted, the current statute allows

6instead the attachment of the affidavit to the search warrant. In light of this statutory amendment, Judge Gage stated sh e would hold that Motenwas no t co ntrolling, and that suppressionof the firearms in this case was not required because defendant had failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced as a result of the “technical, nonconstitutional” statutory violation. 238 Mich App 504-508. We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal, 7 and we now reverse.

II. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW This Court reviews a trial court's ruling regarding a motion to suppress for clear error. People v Stevens (After Remand) , 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (2000) ; People v Burrell , 417 Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). However, questions of law relevant to the suppression issue are revie wed d e novo. Stevens , supra at 631; see also People v Sierb , 456 Mich 519, 522; 581 NW2d 219 (1998). Where violation of a state statute is inv olved, “‘[w]hether suppression is appropriate is a que stion of statutory interpretation and thus one of legislative intent.’” Stevens , supra at 644, quoting People v Wood , 450 Mich 399, 408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (B OYLE , J., concurrin g). “‘Because

our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices thanthose selected by the Legislature, our obligation is, by examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative

7 462 Mich 912 (2000). 7intent that may re ason ably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute.’” People v McIntire , 461 Mich 147, 152; 599 NW2d 102 (1999), quoting 232 Mich App 119 (Y OUNG , P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “‘When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretationis unnecessary and therefore, precluded.’” Stevens , supra at 644, quoting Lorencz v Ford Motor Co , 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).

III. A NALYSIS A. S TATUTORY W ARRANT R EQUIREMENTS Insupport of her motion to suppress the weapons, defendant contended that MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5)–by reference to MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4)–required the officers executing the federal search warrant to provide her with a copy of the affidavit insupport of the warrant. Because the offi cers provided only the warrant itself and not the affidavit, defendant argued that the search was defective and the handguns had to be suppressed. The trial court agreed. MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4) provides as follows: A

search warrant shall be directed to th e sheriff or any peace officer, commanding such officer to search the house, building or other lo ca tion or place, where any property or other thing for whi ch he is required to search is believed to be concealed. E ach wa rrant shall designate and descri be th e house or building or other location or place to be searched and the property or thing to be seized. The warrant shall also state the grounds or the probable or 8reasonable cause for its is suance, or in lieu thereof, a copy of the affidavit may be attached thereto. [Emphasis supplied.] The requirement that the warrant be left at the scene or otherwise given to the premises owner is found in MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5), which provides as follows in pertinent part: Whena n of ficer in the execution of a search warra nt f inds any property or seizes any of the other things for which a search warrant is allowed bythis act, the officer, in the presence of the personfrom whose possession or premises the property or thing was taken, if present, or in the presence of at least 1 other person, shall make a complete and accurate tabulation of the property and things so seized. The officer taking property or other things under the warrant shall fo rthw ith give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken a copy of the warrant and shall give to the person a copy of the tabulatio n uponcompletion, or shall leav e a copy of the warrant and tabulation at the place from which the property or thing was taken . [Emphasis supplied.] [8]

B. A PPLICATION OF THE E XCLUSIONARY R ULE 1. I NTRODUCTION

8 We no te that § 5 does not explicitly require that the affidavit in support of the search warrant, if attached to the warrant pursuant to § 4, be provided to the premises owner at the time of the seizure. Howev er, the prosecution concedes that § 5 was violated by the officers’ failure to provide defendant with a copy of the search warrant affidavit at the time the handguns were seized. This is consistent with the holdings of the Court of Appeals in People v Chapin , 244 Mich App 196; ___ NW2d ___ (2000), and Garvin , supra (where the affidavit is attached to the warrant pursuant to § 4, the affidavit becomes part of the “warrant” that must be provided or left at the premises pursuant to § 5) ; but see Chapin , supra at 208 (H OOD , J., dissenting) (the plain language of § 5 requires only that the search warrant itself be provided or left at the pre mises ). We agree with Chapinand Garvin and hold that, where an affidavit is attached to the warrant as permitted by § 4 in lieu of a statement of probable cause in the warrant itself , t he affidavit is part of the “warrant” referred to in § 5. 9The prosecution argues that, where the only defect in the searchand seizure was a technical violation of Michigan’s statutory warrant r equi rements, and where there has been no violationof defendant’s constitutional rights under the FourthAmendment, the exclusionary rule should not be applied. 9 Defen dant –who makes no argument that her constitutional rights were violated by the officers’ actions–contends tha t suppression of evidence is the proper remedy for a statutory violatio n o f this kind, and that suppressionis in deed required pursuant to this Court’s holding in Motenand its progeny. Because we conclude that Motenis distinguishable from the case at bar, and because we do not discer n an y legislative intent that the exclusionary rule be applied to a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5),

we hold that suppression of the evidence in this case was not appropriate. 2. P EOPLE V M OTEN In a trilogy of prohibition-era cas es , this Court suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to search warrants that

were violative of the searchwarrant requirements set forth in § 27 of Michigan’s “liqu or law ,” 1922 CL 7079(27), which

9 There is no federal counterpart to the Michig a n statutory requirement that the search warrant state on its face the grounds or cause for its issuance or have the affidavit attached. MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). See 18 USC 3101 et seq .; FR Crim P 41(c). Defendant did not, and does not now, claim any deprivation of constitutional rights with respect to the procedure utilized by the federal magistrate in issuing the search warrant or in sealing the affidavit, or by the federal and state officers in executing the warrant. 10provided in relevant part as follows: No warrant for search shall be issued until there has been filed with the magistrate an affidavit descri bing t he house or place to be searched, the things to be searche d f or, and alleging substantially the offense in relation thereto, and that affiant believes, and has good cause to believe tha t su ch liquor is there concealed: Provided, however, That any description that will enable the off icer t o find the house or place to be searched shall be deemed sufficient. The warrant for search shall be directed to the proper officer and shall recite all of the material fa c ts alleged in the affidavit , and describe the things to be searched for and the pl ace to be searched. A warrant for search and seizure substantially in the following form shall be sufficient: “. . . Whereas there has been filed with the undersigned an affidavit ( here set out the material facts alleged in the affidavit ) . . . .” [Emphasis supplied.] In Moten , this Court held that § 27 of the liquor law had been violated where the searchwarrant did not contain a recitation of the facts alleged in the affidavit. As a result of this statutory violation, the MotenCourt held, [t]he warrant is invalid, and the evidence procured thereunder inadmissible. “With such evidence out, defendant should have bee n di scharged.” People v Knopka , 220 Mich 540 [190 NW 731 (1922)]. [ 10 ]

10 The search war rant at issue inKnopka was held to be violative of both § 27 of the liquor l aw a nd the Michigan Constitution’s probable cause requirement, Const 1908, art 2, § 10. Id. at 545. The Knopka Court concluded: “It not appearing that the search warrant was issued upon the constitutional and statutory showing of probable cause, it must be held that the evidence procured by it was inadmissible and should have been suppressed and that, with such evidence out, defendant should have been discharged. See People v De La Mater , [213 Mich 167; 182 NW 57 (1921)]; People v Mayhew , [214 Mich 153; 182 NW 676 (1921)]; People v Halveksz , [215 Mich136; 183 NW 752 (1921)].” Knopka , supra at 545. The cases cited by the Knopka Court as authority for suppressing (continued...) 11The convictionmust therefore be set aside and defendant discharged. [ Moten , supra at 174.] In People v Bules , 234 Mich 335; 207 NW 818 (1926), the

s earch warrant suffered from the same deficiency as that in Moten : It failed to recite the facts set forth in the supporting affidavit as required by § 27 of the liquor law . Because the statute had been violated, this Court held, “[the] warrant wa s void on its face” and the evidence had to be suppressed: The mandate of the statute is clear, that the mater ial facts alleged in the affidavit for the warrant shall be recited in the warrant, and the legislature even took the pains to set out a form, inwhich it directed the user to (“Here set out the material facts alleged in the affidavit”). . . . The law cannot be made plainer, and is but expressive of long time precedent established to prevent abuse. We deplore the carelessness evidenced here and so inexcusable if the statute was read, but we are bound to correct here such a palpable bl unde r. The evidence seized on the socalled search warrant should have been suppressed. [ Bules , supra at 336.] Likewise, in People v Galnt , 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915 (1926), the search warrant failed to recite the material facts alleged inthe affidavit, contrary to § 27 of the liquor law. Accordingly, this Court held, the warrant was “void,” and “the search[was ] unla wful, a violation of [the defendant’s] constitutional right [Const 1908, art 2, § 10] that his house

10 (...continued) the evidence and dismissing the case ( De La Mater , Mayhew , and H

alv eksz ) concern searches that were held to be constitutionally deficient. Motenappears to be the first case of this Court requiring suppression of evidence as a remedy for a purely statutory search w arrant defect, and it does not appear that the Court considered this distinction in reaching its decision. 12shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 648 (emphasis supplied). Thus, what had been characterized in Motenand Bules as a purely statutory imperfection was in Galnt characterized as being of constitutional magnitude.

3. C OURT OF A PPEALS C ASES A PPLYING M OTEN In recent years, the Court of Appeals has addressed the Moten - Bules - Galnt trilogy inthe context of Michigan’s modern searchwarrant statutes. 11 In Pipok , supra , a federal search

warran t was executed by state and federal officers. The searchwarrant was issued pursuant to federal law, and it did not comply with Michigan’s req uirement set forth in MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4) that a search warrant provide on its face or in an attached affidavit the grounds on which the warrant was issued. Relying on the Motentrilogy, the defendants contended that the noncompliance with § 4 rendered the search warrant invalid, and that the evidence seized pursuant to the wa rra nt must be suppressed. The panel, finding Motento be distinguishable, held that the statutory violation 12 did not require suppression of the evidence:

11 We note that the war rant s tatute at issue in Moten , Bules , and Galnt , § 27 of the liquor law, was not a precursor of Michigan’s current search warrant statutes, contrary to the assumptions of some members of the various Court of Appeals panels that have addressed Moten ’s application to the current statutes. Rather, general search warrant statutes existed contemporaneously withthe warrant provisioncontained in the liquor law. See, e.g., 1915 CL 15879-15883. 1915 CL 15881 is a precursor of the present-day MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4).

12 The Pipok panel stated, in dicta, that “when evidence (continued...) 13The MotenCourt . . . found the recital [of materi al f acts alleged in the affidavit] to be an “essential requirement” of a valid warrant and held that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant lacking such a recital must be suppressed. Since the court’s decision in Moten , statutory law in this state has ch ange d to permit a supporting affidavit to be attached to the warrant in place of stating the material facts, or grounds for issuance, on the warrant itself. Again, the provisionis designed to guarantee that a record of probable cause is established. The Legislature has apparently recognized that the affidavit alone is sufficient to establish a record of probable cause

12 (...continued) challenged in a state prosecution is obtained in a search invol ving the joint activity of state and federal officers, the search is scrutinized under state standards.” Id. at 671. This prop osition was reiterated by a different Court of Appeals panel, again in dicta, in Paladino , supra at 507-508 (noting that “[t]his ruling was based on the need to preserve state court i ntegri ty and to govern the conduct of state officers”). The prosecution in the present case urges us to abrogate th e C ourt of Appeals “joint activity” rule and to hold that Michigan’s statutory warrant requirements do not apply to a federal search warrant or to its execution by federal and state officers. Because we hold that the statutory violation at issue in this case does not require suppression of evidence in any event, we need not address the propriety of the “joint activity” rule enunciated by the Court of App eals . Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to note our disapproval of the dicta in Pipok and Paladino suggesting tha t stat e warrant requirements apply to joint federal and state executionof state warrants. Michi gan statutory provisions governing issuance and execution of searchwarrants, on their face, and as a matter of the legislative power of this state, address only search warrants (which are judic ia l orders) issued by judicial off icers of Michigan. See United States Cons t, ar t VI, cl 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”); Const 1963, art 4, § 1 (“The leg islative power of the State of Michiganis vested in a senate and a house of representatives”) (emphasis added). The United Stat es of America is a sovereign entity; it does not require officers to provide an affidavi t un derlying a federal warrant following execution. 14and that it is not necessary to transcribe the material facts from the affidavit onto the warrant. [ Id . at 672-673.] The Pipok panel noted that t he fe deral magistrate’s determinationof pro ba ble cause was based on an affidavit, that the defendants did no t articulate any prejudice resulting from the noncompliance with § 4, and that the defendants were eventually provided with copies of the affidavit and given the opportunity to challenge the probable

cause determination. The panel thus concluded that “t he failure of the warrant to s tate the grounds for issuance or to have the supporting affidavit attached did not ab rogate the purpose of the statute and that the error was one of procedure not requiring suppression of the evidence.” Id. at 673. In Garvin , sup ra , th e Court of Appeals again addressed

a defendant’s contention that Motenrequired s uppression of evidence, this time for a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1 259(5) . Officers from the Pontiac Police Department executed a search warrant at de fendant Garvin’s residence, seizing evidence implicating Garvin in a number of c ri mes. After completing the search of the house, the officers either provided a copy of the search warrant to Garvin or left it at his residence; however, the o fficer s detached from the copy of the warrant provided to Garvin the affidavit insupport of the warr ant. The trial court granted Garvin’s motion to suppress the seized evidence on the basis that § 5 had been violated by the officers’ failure to provide Garvin with a 15copy of the affidavit. The Court of Appeals revers e d, holding that the officers’ failure to p rovide Garvin with a copy of the affidavit did not require suppression of evi dence seized pursuant to th e warrant. The panel noted that in Pipok , supra , the Court had refused to suppress evide nce on the basis that § 4 had been violated, where there were no all egations that the search warrant was constitutional ly defective or that the defendants had suffered any prejudice. Lik ew ise, the Garvinpanel concluded, suppression was not required as a remedy for a violation of § 5: [I]t follows [from Pipok ] that the failure of the police to provide or leave a copyof the aff idav it as part of the copy of the warrant does not provide a basis for suppression of evidence, be caus e Garvin ultimately has the opportunity to challenge probable cause supporting the warrant and because the requirement is merely procedural. * * * We str ongl y agree with the pertinent holding by the Pipok Court. It is one thing, under certain c ircumstances, to order the drastic remedy of suppressing highly relevant evidence to enforce the fundamental constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures of US Const, Am IV and Const 1963, art 1, § 11. I t i s quite another to extend the exclusionary rule to a technical deficiency, such as failing to provide or leave a copy of an affidavit in connectionwiththe exercise of a reas on able search in which the law enforcement officers executing the searchprovide a copy of the search warrant itself, thereby providing n otic e that the search has been judicially authorized. [ Id . at 99-101.] More recently, a panel of the Court of Appeals has retreated from the holding of Garvinthat suppression is not required for a violation of § 5. In Peo ple v Chap in , 244

16MichApp 196; ___ NW2d ___( 2000), a search warrant was execut ed at the defendant’s home. Upon completion of th e search, a copy of the search warrant was left at the home . A

copy of the affida vi t was available; however, it was not left at the home, because the prose cutor had specifically requested that t he offi cers not leave a copy of the affidavit. The defendant moved for suppressionof marijuana and other incriminating evidence seized, arguing that § 5 had beenviolated and that suppression was requir ed pursuant to Moten . The Chapinmajority, after determining th at t he statutory requirements of § 4 were “incorporated” within the provisions of § 5, 13 held that the violation of § 5 required suppressionof the sei ze d evidence. The majority opined that, although § 4 had been “amend[ed]” since the time Moten was decided, 14 [u]nder both versions o f th e statute, the requirement exists that the warrant, whether in the body of the warrant itself or by affidavit attached

13 The defendant in Chapinargued that, although § 5 requires only that “a copy of the warrant ” be provided to the person from whom or from whose premises property was taken, the “warrant” referred to in § 5 must include the affidavit if one is attached as permitted by § 4 (in lieu of a statement of proba ble ca use in the warrant itself). The Chapinmajority agreed, citing Garvin , supra a t 98 -99. Judge Hood, dissenting, disagreed and would have held that, “[p]ursuant to the plain language of this statute, the o ffi cer is only required to leave a copy of the search warrant itself . . . .” Chapin , supra at 208 (emphasis supplied).

14 We note again that the liquor law search war ran t provisionat issue in Motenand its pr ohib ition-era progeny was not a predecessor of MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). See n 12. 17thereto, must state the grounds o r the probable cause for its issuance. * * * Thus, despite recodification of th e statute, [the holding in Garvint hat, where a supporting affidavit is used in lieu of a stat ement of probable cause in the warrant pursuant to § 4, a copy of the affidavit becomes part of the “copy of the warrant” that must be provided to the defendant pursu ant to § 5] is consistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Moten , Bules , and Gal nt that the material facts insupport of the issuance of a search warrant must b e incl uded with the search warrant. [ Id . at 201-203.] Moving on to the question of the proper re me dy for a violation of § 5, the Chapinmajority declined to follow the holdings of Gar vinand Pipok that suppression was not required: [I]n Garvinthe Court held that the failure of law enforcement officers to comply wi th t he statutory requirement to attach a copy of the affidavit to the copy of the warrant provided or left does not require suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant becau se t he requirement is merely procedural. See also [ Pipok , supra ]. However, Garvin ’s holding is inconsistent withthe Supreme Court’s prono unce ment in Moten , Galnt , and Bules that violation of the statutory requirement tha t the search warrant state the grounds or probable c aus e for issuance of the sear chwarrant renders the warrant invalid and requires sup pression of the evidence. Because Moten , Galnt , and Bules remain good law, we must follow the ir p recedent. Thus, because officials left the warra nt at defendant’s home without the supporting affidav it, and the warrant itself did not state the probable cause grounds, the circuit court properly suppressed the evidence. Se e [238 Mich App 498]. [ Chapin , supra at 203-204.] Judge Hood dissent ed, opining that Motenwas distinguishable because it a ddre ssed a statutory violation different from the violation at issue in Chapin :

18Review of the stat u tes at issue reveals that Moten , supra , does not governthis case. The issue in Moteninv olved the statutory requirements that must be co ntained within a search warrant, now codified at MCL 780 .654; MSA 28.1259(4). The defendant in Motennever took issue with the delivery of the search warrant that was left at the home, but rather, took i ssue with the contents of the search warrant itself. * * * Inthe present case, MCL 780.654 ; MS A 28. 1259(4) provides that the search warrant must contai nthe basis of probable cause within the docume nt or in lieu thereof, a copy of the affidavit may be attached thereto. Defendant does not dispute th at at one time, the two documents, the search warrant and the supporting affidavit, were both available. . . . [Rather,] [d]efendant’s

c on trolling, some perceived conflict with prior challenge . . . i nvolves 28.1259(5). . . . MCL 780.655; MSA

* * * Once it is accepted that Motenis not decisions of this Court either does not exist or is distinguis hable . First, it should be noted that [238 Mich App 495] is without precedential value because a major ity of the judges concurred in the result only and did not concur in the rationale underlying the decision. . . . Additionally, the decisionof [ Pipok , supra ] is not co ntro lling because it involved the statutory interpretation of MCL 780. 65 4; MSA 28.1259(4), not the statute at issue here. I nstead , this case is factually in acc ordance with the decision of [ Garvin , supra ]. Bothcases address the issue of an all e ged technical failure to comply with MCL 780.655; [MSA 28.1259(5) ], a nd the GarvinCourt concluded that that failure did not require suppression of th e evidence. The Garvindecision was crit i cized and deemed wrongly decided for its failure to address the Motendecision. [238 Mich App] 502-503. However, as indicated, whenthe actual language of the statute addressed in Moten is traced, one concludes that the statute was recodif ied a t MCL 780.654; MSA 28.1259(4). The issue bef or e this panel and the GarvinCourt [involves] MCL 780.655; MS A28. 1259(5), a statute not addressed by [the] MotenCo u rt. Accordingly, the precedent of Moten would not be disregarded in reaching this holding.

19[ Id . at 206-210.] 4. A PPLICATION OF M OTEN TO A V IOLATION OF § 5 We agree with much of Judge Hood’s dissenting analysis in Chapinwith respect to the precedential value of Motenand its progeny in the context of a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5). Moten , Bules , and Galnt did not a ddre ss the statutory violat ion pr esent in Chapinand in this case. Accordingly, these decisions are simply not controlling here. We first note that defendant in the case at bar makes no claim that § 4 was violated, 15 that the search warrant itself

was otherwise invalid, or that her constitutional rights were inany way violated by the i ssuance or execution of the searchwarrant. Rather, her claim is that § 5 was violated because the officers failed to provide her witha copy of the affidavit at the time of the execution of the warrant. It is

onthis basis that defendant contends that the seized firearms must be suppressed. The statutory violation at issue in M ot en , Bules , and Galnt is not comparable to the st atut ory violation at issue i n the case at bar. It is possible to analogi ze 1922 C L 7079(27)–the liquor law search warrant provision at issue in Moten –to § 4 of the current statutory warrant scheme, because

15 Defendant has never claimed that the warrant itself was invalid; nor has she eve r c laimed that the original search warrant issued by the federal magistrate did not include an affixed copy of the affidavit. Indeed, we note that the face of the search warrant states: “See attached affidavit –continued on t he attached sheet and made a part hereof.” [Emphasis supplied.] 20boththose statutes pertain to t he warrant form . Where the form of the warrant is deficient, the resulting search may be constitutionally defective. 16 In contrast, § 5 of Michigan’s present st atutory warrant scheme sets forth procedural requirements that are to be followed by the police during and

a fter t he execution of an otherwise facially valid search warrant. A violation of § 5, therefore, does not render the warrant itself invalid, or the search unreasonable. We l eave for another day the question of the proper

rem edyfor a violation of the requirement of § 4 that the warrant either recite the probable cause grounds or, in lieu of such a recita ti on, incorporate the affidavit by attachment. Be cause Motendid not address a violation of a statutory prescription regarding procedural meas ures to be takenby the police intheir executionof an otherwise valid search warrant, we find it to be inapposite to this case. 5. L EGISLATIVE I NTENT Having determined that Motenprovides no guidance wi th respect to the issue before us–whether a technical violation of MCL 780 . 655; MSA 28.1259(5) r equires application of the

16 US Const , Am IV (“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”); Const 1963, art 1, § 11 (“[n]o warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issu e without describing them”). See, e.g., Galnt , supra (where search warrant did not recite the material facts alleged inthe affidavit as required by § 27 of t he liquo r law, the warrant was “void” and, therefore, the search violated the defendant’s constitutional right under Const 1908, art 2, § 10, t o be fr ee from unreasonable searches and seizures). 21exclusionary rule–we turn to the statute itself. We have recently had occasion to consider whether evidence obtained during the execution of a search w ar rant must be excluded whe re the executing officers violated our “knock and announce” statu te, MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6). 17 In Stevens , supra , we held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the exclusionary rule applied to a violation of § 6, w here the search was of proper scope under a v ali d warrant. 18 We first noted that wh et her suppression is required for a vio la tion of a statute is a question of statutory interpretation, and that our focus m ust be on legislative intent. Id. at 644. Finding that nothing in the language of t he “kn ock and announce” statute indicated that the Legislature intended that the exclusionary rule be app lied to a violation of the statute, we “decline[d] to infer such a legislative intent,” because “[t]o do otherwise would be an exercise of will rather than judgment .” Id. at 645 (emphasis in original).

17 The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance, or when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting h im i n execution of the warrant.

18 We also held in Stevens that the Fourth Amendment violationin that case did not require application of the exclusionary rule, primarily because of the lack of any causal connectionbetween the constitutional knock and announce violationand the evidence seized. Stevens , supra at 635-643. As stated, defendant in this case makes no claim that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 22Inholding that sup pression was not an appropriate

rem edy for the violation of “knock and announce” princi ple s in Stevens , we noted that the exclusionary rule “is not meant to put the prosecution in a worse position than if the police officers’ improper conduct had not occurred, but, rather, it is to prevent the prosecutor from being in a better position because of that co nduct.” Id. at 640-641, citing Nix v Willia ms , 467 US 431, 443; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 3 77 (1984). We additionally found persuasi ve t he fact that the “knock and announce” requirement “does not control the executionof a valid searc h wa rrant; rather, it only delays entry.” Stevens , supra at 645. Where it was the authority of the valid search warrant that led to the discovery of the evidence, not the means of entry , there was simply no causal relationship between the violationand t he seizing of the evidence. Because the discovery of the ev id ence was independent of the officers’ failure to co mply with the statuto ry“knock and announce” requirement, we found that suppressionof the evidence was n ot warranted. Id. at 646­ 647. As in Stevens , we now hold that suppression of the evidence seized in this case is not an appropriate remedy for the statutory violation at issue. Nothing in the language of § 5 provides any basis to infer that it was the legislators’ intent that the drastic remedy of exclusion be applie d to a violationof the statute. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of direct and indire ct evidence acquired

23from governmental misconduct , such as evidence from an illegal p olice search.’” Stevens , supra at 636, quoting People v LoCicero (After Remand) , 453 Mich496, 508-509; 556 NW2d 498 (1996) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). The requirements of § 5 are ministerial innature, and do not in any way lead to the acquisition of evidence; rather, these requirements come into p lay only after evidence has been seized pursuant to a valid search warrant. Because the exclusionary rule pertains to evidence that ha s been illegally seized , it would not be reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to apply the rule to a violation of the postseizure, administrative requirements of § 5. Just as there was no causal relationship betweenthe violation of the “knock and announce” statute and the seizing of the evidence at issue in Stevens , there is in the instant case no causal relation ship between the officers’ failure to provide defendant with a copy of the searchwarrant affidavit and the seizure of the firearms. We note further t hat the deterrent purpose 19 of the exclusionary rule would not be served by ordering suppression of the evidence in this case. The officers were executing a valid federal warrant that complied with all f e deral requirements. The federal magistrate had ordered th at the

19 “‘The core rationale consi sten tly advanced . . . for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections.’” Stevens , supra at 637, quoting Nix , supra at 442-443. 24aff idavit be sealed. Defendant does not argue that this pro cedure violated her constitutional rights or that it ra n afoul of any federal requirements concerning the validity of search warrants. Defendant’s sole contention is that the failure to leave a copy of the affidavit at her residence or to otherwise “forthwith” provide her wi th the affidavit violated MCL 780. 655; MSA 28.1259(5). The officers cannot be faulted for their inability to provide a copy of the affidavit, since the affidavit was under seal by direction of

a federal magistrate. Because there w as no police “misconduct” in thi s case, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by applying it under these circumstances. Moreover, because the police would have recovered the weapons irrespective of the alleged statutor y viola tion, suppression of the evidence in this case would “undermine the adversary system by putting the prosecution in

a worse position” than if the violat ion of § 5 had not occurred. Stevens , supra at 637, citing Nix , supra at 447. Applicationo f th e exclusionary rule would be particularly inappropriate in the ca se of a valid federal warrant. Were we to use the exclusionary rule in this case to deter officers from "violating" a state warrant execution provision, we would effectively encourage officers to violate

a federal magistrate's order sealing an affidavit. While our stat utes d o not govern federal warrants, Michigan may, of course, prescribe its own rules for th e admission or exclu sion o f evidence. Our Legislature has not, however, 25expressed an intent to require suppression evenwhen officers executing a Michigansearch warrant violate § 5; it certainly has not mandated suppression when evidenc e w as obtained through a valid federal warrant .

V. C ONCLUSION The police officers in this case were acting under a valid search warrant and within the scope of that warrant. Defendant’s constitutional rights were in no w a y infringed. There i s no causal connection between the seizure of the firearms and the officers’ failur e, after the execution of the warrant, to provide defendant with a copy of the sea rc h warrant affidavit. We ar e un able to discern any legislative intent that a violationof the te chnica l requirements of MCL 780 . 655; MSA 28.1259(5) result in the suppress io n of evidence obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant. Moreover, such a result would be particularly unwarranted in the instant case, where there has beenno police misconduct and where, therefore, the deter rent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not b e served. We therefore hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the exclusionary rule as a remedy for this statutory violation. The evidence should not have been suppressed, and the case should not have been dismissed, for a violation of the procedural requirements of § 5. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings c onsist ent with this

26opinion. 20 C ORRIGAN , C.J., and T AYLOR , and M ARKMAN , JJ., concurred with Y OUNG , J.

20 We note that, in addition to the statutory violation, defendant raised before the trial court several other grounds insupport of her motion to suppress evidence. On remand, the trial court shall address any grounds raised in support of the motionto suppress that were not disposed of in the trial court’s oral opinion of September 9, 1998. 27____________________________________ S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 115980 MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS, Defendant-Appellee
.

W EAVER , J. ( concurring ). I concur in the result, but write separat ely because I believe that the first step in resolving this matter is determining whether the state warrant requirements should be applied to a federal searchwarrant executed during a search conducted jointly by federal and state authorities. In my opinion, the state warrant requirements should not ap ply in this situat ion, and People v Pipok (After Remand), 191 Mich App 669, 671; 479 NW2d 359 (1991), was wrongly decided. 1 Because the state warrant requi re ments should not apply to these facts, the firearms found in defendant’s home should not have been suppressed. Because I would d ecline to apply the state warrant requirements to these facts, I express no opinionconcerning

1 People v Paladino, 204 Mich App 505; 516 NW 2d 11 3 (1994), a case in which I participated at the Court of Appeals, cited the Pipok holding in its analysis. Pipok was bi nding authority on the Court of Appeals when Paladino was decided. Thus, Paladino did not address whe the r Pipok was correctly decided.whether the exclusionary ru le wou ld apply to a procedural violation of the state requirements.

2________________________________ S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 115890 MICHELLE ANN SOBCZAK-OBETTS, Defendant-Appellee. CAVANAGH, J. ( dissenting ). Because I disagree with the majority’s decision to admit the challenged evid ence, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and, further, I would not disavow the Court of Appeals de ci sion in People v Chapin, 244 Mich App 196; _ NW2d _ (2001). First, I cannot agree t hat this Court’s decision in People v Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925), is not applicable to this cas e. There, this Court had to decide whether evidence gathered under a warrant that did not recite the basis for its issuance, as required by statute, had to be excluded. Id. at 174. Analyzing this question, the Court quoted approvingly from United States v Kaplan, 286 F 963, 968 (SD Ga, 1923), which stated that such w arran t requirements ensure “that the accused may promptly know whatis the accusation against him, upon what it is based . . . .” The MotenCourt concluded that the warrant was not comp let e and in violation of t he statute. Thus, the Court concluded that the accused did not “p romptly know” the accusation against him or its basis, and it excluded th e evide nce g athered under the warrant. See Moten, supra at 173-174. The majority distinguishes Moten, concluding that Motenmay require exclusio n of e vidence gathered under a warrant that does not have the proper statutory form, but does not require exclusionwhen the asserted statutory shortcoming deals only withthe proce du re of executing the warrant. It characterizes defendant’s complaint as only proce dura l, and not within Moten . See slip op at 26-27. However, the offered distinction does not account for the MotenCourt’s reasoning. There, the warrant did not recite the basis for its issuance, depriving the defendant of notice of the reasons for the search, and this Court excluded the evidence. In this case, even though the warrant may at

some prior time have had an affidavi t attached to it, see slip op at 25, n 15, when it was delivered to defendant, i t did not. In fact, defendant was not informed of the affidavit’s contents until some four months after the search. Thus, defendant did not have notice of the reasons f or the search; she could not “‘prompt lyknow what [was] the accusationagainst [her], upon what it [was] based . . . .’” Moten, supra at 173, quoting Kaplan, supra. Regardless of whether the instant warrant ever had a n affidavit reciting its basis, like the warrant that was delivered in Moten, the 2instant warrant did not state its basis when it was delivered to defendant. Like the defendant in Moten, then, the instant defendant should not have the evidence gathered under such a warrant admitted against her. Second, I fear that the ma jo rity’s search for legislative intent effectively upends the intent that is most clear. Though MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5) does not prov ide

on its face for any remedy, it clearly indicates the Legislature’s policy of requiring officers to leave a copy of th e warrant, which must recite the basis for its issuance, withthe searched party or a t the searched premises. Under the decision in this case, however, there is no c onse quence for a failur e to do so. 1 Further, under the majority’s reasoning, there would s imilarly be no consequence for a failure to tabulate the property seized, leave a copy of the tabulati on wit h the searched party or at the searched premises, file that tabulation, or safely keep the p roperty seized. 2 Each of these requirements is ministerial in nature and occurs after the search, but eac h is required by this statute. Although I would not anticipate police misconduct, 3

1 Not ably, the majority has not relied on the search warrants act’s penalty provision, MCL 780.657; 28.1259(7), as it did, erroneously in my view, in People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 641; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), as a reason not to apply the exclusionary rule in this case.

2 Inde ed, this Court has already indicated that police may destroy seized items without actually running afoul of this statute. See People v Jagotka, 461 Mich 274, 279-280; 622 NW2d 57 (1999) ; see also id. at 282-283 (C AVANAGH , J., dissenting).

3 Whatever the role of the federal actors in t his case, (continued...) 3evenif officers did purpo sef ully ignore this statute’s requirements, it apparently would make no difference. Rather thanleave the Legislature’s policy of requiring pol ic e to provide a warrant stating its basis so dou btful, I would exclude the challenged evidence to ensure that the policy is observed. Inclosing, in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 184, n 18; 538 N W2d 380 (1995), this Court stated that excludi ng evidence as a remedy for a statutory violation was not a “new phenomenon.” It a pparently has now become the old phenomenon, though, as the Court continues the trend it began in People v Stephens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626 , 641; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), and continues in this case, toward admitting evidence despite statutory violation s. In my view, this is

anerroneous course, so I continue to be unable to jointhis trend. I would exclude the challenged evidence, affirm the Court of App eals, and would not disapprove of the Court of Appeals decision in Chapin, supra. T herefo re, I must respectfully dissent. K ELLY , J., concurred with C AVANAGH , J.

3 (...continued) the prosecution has conceded that state law applies. 4