49248 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

1 In March of 1997, NHTSA temporarily amended 

FMVSS No. 208 so that passenger cars and light 

trucks had the option of using a sled test for 

meeting the unrestrained dummy requirements. 

This option will be phased out in accordance with 

the advanced air bag rulemaking schedule.

2Conference Report 104–785, September 16, 

1996. This report accompanied H.R. 3675.

3Report to Congress, ‘‘Status Report on 

Establishing a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standard for Frontal Offset Crash Testing,’’ April 

1997.

4 Docket No. NHTSA–1998–3332.

the test device at a rate of not more than 

13 millimeters per second until reaching 

the force level specified in S5. Guide the 

test device so that throughout the test it 

moves, without rotation, in a straight 

line with its lower surface oriented as 

specified in S7.4(a) and S7.4(b). 

Complete the test within 120 seconds.

* * * * *

Issued: July 15, 2005. 

Stephen R. Kratzke, 

Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.

[FR Doc. 05–16661 Filed 8–19–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

49 CFR Parts 571 and 572 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2005–21698] 

RIN 2127–AH73 and 2127–AI39 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standards; Occupant Crash 

Protection; Anthropomorphic Test 

Devices; Instrumented Lower Legs for 

50th Percentile Male and 5th Percentile 

Female Hybrid III Dummies

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Withdrawal of rulemakings.

SUMMARY: On February 3, 2004, NHTSA 

published a notice in the Federal 

Register requesting comments on 

whether to propose adding a high speed 

frontal offset crash test to Federal Motor 

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 

208, ‘‘Occupant crash protection.’’ The 

notice informed the public about recent 

testing the agency conducted to assess 

the benefits and/or disbenefits of such 

an approach. Based on our analysis of 

those comments, and other information 

gathered by the agency, we have 

decided to withdraw the rulemaking 

proceeding to amend FMVSS No. 208 to 

include a high speed frontal offset crash 

test requirement. Additional research 

and data analyses are needed to make an 

informed decision on rulemaking in this 

area. Additionally, we have decided to 

withdraw the related rulemaking 

proceeding to amend part 572 to include 

lower leg instrumentation until further 

testing necessary for federalization is 

completed.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

non-legal issues: Lori Summers, Office 

of Crashworthiness Standards, NVS–

112, National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, 

SW., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 

(202) 366–1740. Fax: (202) 366–7002. 

For legal issues: Dorothy Nakama, 

Office of the Chief Counsel, NCC–112, 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, 

SW., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: 

(202) 366–2992. Fax: (202) 366–3820.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents 

I. Background 

II. Summary of Request for Comments 

III. Analysis of Comments 

IV. Rationale for Withdrawal 

V. Conclusion

I. Background 

Improving occupant protection in 

frontal crashes is a major goal of the 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA). Frontal 

crashes are the most frequent cause of 

motor vehicle fatalities. In 1972, 

NHTSA promulgated FMVSS No. 208 to 

improve the frontal crash protection 

provided to motor vehicle occupants. 

The dynamic performance requirements 

of the standard include frontal rigid 

barrier crash tests, at angles between 

perpendicular and ±30 degrees with 

belted and unbelted dummies.1

Occupant protection is evaluated based 

on data acquired from anthropomorphic 

test dummies positioned in the driver 

and right front passenger seats. Data 

collection instrumentation is mounted 

in the head, neck, chest, and femurs of 

the test dummies.

NHTSA initiated research in the early 

1990s to develop performance tests not 

currently included in FMVSS No. 208, 

such as high severity frontal offset 

crashes that involve only partial 

engagement of a vehicle’s front 

structure. Such performance tests result 

in large amounts of occupant 

compartment intrusion and increased 

potential for intrusion-related injury. 

The agency also instrumented the 

dummies in these tests with advanced 

lower leg instrumentation, not currently 

required in FMVSS No. 208, to assess 

the potential for lower extremity injury, 

specifically, to the knee, tibia, and 

ankle. 

During the same time period, 

considerable international research 

focused on the development of a fixed 

offset deformable barrier crash test 

procedure. In December 1996, the 

European Union (EU) adopted the EU 

Directive 96/79 EC for frontal crash 

protection. This directive required 

vehicle compliance with a 56 km/h, 40 

percent offset, fixed deformable barrier 

crash test. In 1998, Australia introduced 

a similar regulation for new passenger 

car model approvals. In addition to 

these regulations, several consumer 

information programs also began to 

utilize the EU Directive 96/79 EC crash 

test procedure, but raised the impact 

speed to 64 km/h. These programs 

included the European New Car 

Assessment Program (EuroNCAP), 

Australia NCAP (ANCAP), Japan NCAP 

and the Insurance Institute for Highway 

Safety (IIHS) Crashworthiness 

Evaluation program in the U.S. 

Given the world-wide focus on the 

fixed offset deformable barrier crash test 

procedure, the conferees on the 

appropriations legislation for the 

Department of Transportation for FY 

1997 directed NHTSA to work ‘‘toward 

establishing a Federal motor vehicle 

safety standard for frontal offset crash 

testing’’ in fiscal year 1997.2 NHTSA 

was further directed to consider the 

harmonization potential with other 

countries and to work with interested 

parties, including the automotive 

industry, under standard rulemaking 

procedures. In 1997, NHTSA submitted 

a Report to Congress 3 on the status of 

the agency’s efforts toward establishing 

a high speed frontal offset crash test 

requirement. The agency made a 

preliminary assessment that the 

adoption of the EU 96/79 EC frontal 

offset test procedure, in addition to the 

current requirements of FMVSS No. 

208, could result in substantial benefits, 

since lower leg injuries were typically 

associated with long-term recovery and 

significant economic cost. However, the 

Report to Congress also made note of 

NHTSA’s concerns relative to the 

potential for exacerbating small and 

large car incompatibility, as a result of 

adopting a frontal offset crash test 

procedure.

During 1998–2002, NHTSA 

completed over 25 frontal offset crash 

tests in an attempt to answer a number 

of research questions. Specifically, what 

are the merits of a fixed offset 

deformable barrier crash test procedure 

and what is the most appropriate 

dummy size, lower leg instrumentation 

and impact speed? Dummy injury 

measures from the fixed offset 

deformable barrier crash tests 

demonstrated the potential for injury 

reductions over and above the full 

frontal rigid barrier test configuration.4

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 49249

5Park, Morgan, Hackney, Lee, Stucki, ‘‘Frontal 

Offset Crash Test Study Using 50th Percentile Male 

and 5th Percentile Female Dummies,’’ Proceedings 

of the 16th International Technical Conference on 

the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Paper No. 98–S1–

O–01, 1998.

6 Kuppa, Haffner, Eppinger, Saunders, ‘‘Lower 

Extremity Response and Trauma Assessment Using 

the Thor-Lx/HIIIr and the Denton Leg in Frontal 

Offset Vehicle Crashes,’’ Proceedings of the 17th 

International Technical Conference on the 

Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Paper No. 456, 2001.

7See 69 FR 5110.

8Summers, Prasad, Hollowell, ‘‘NHTSA’s Vehicle 

Compatibility Research Program,’’ Society of 

Automotive Engineers Paper No. 1999–01–0071, 

March 1999.

9 In this program, vehicles are rated based on 

their performance in a 64 km/h fixed offset 

deformable barrier crash test.

10 Docket No. NHTSA–2003–15715.

11Comment period subsequently extended to July 

5, 2004 (69 FR 18015).

12 Docket No. NHTSA–1998–3332.

The results demonstrated that the 5th 

percentile female dummy generally 

produced higher normalized lower leg 

injury measurements than the 50th 

percentile male dummy under 

comparable frontal offset crash test 

conditions.5 Crash tests comparing 

lower leg instrumentation showed that 

the Thor-Lx/HIIIr lower leg 

instrumentation predicted a higher 

incidence of foot and ankle injury than 

the Denton/Hybrid III lower leg.6

Finally, fixed offset deformable barrier 

crash tests conducted at a range of 

impact speeds, including 56 km/h, 60 

km/h, and 64 km/h, demonstrated 

notable differences in the pass/fail rates, 

with the 56 km/h impact speed being 

the most benign.

In the 2000 and 2001 Regulatory Plans 

published in the Federal Register, 

NHTSA indicated that it was 

considering a rulemaking to establish a 

high speed frontal offset test. In 

response, the Administrator of the 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs of the Office of Management and 

Budget, wrote a letter dated December 7, 

2001, asking the U.S. Department of 

Transportation and NHTSA to consider 

giving greater priority to modifying its 

frontal occupant protection standard by 

establishing a high speed, frontal offset 

crash test requirement. The letter 

suggested that if the agency were to give 

this matter greater priority, the agency 

would need to refine its estimates of the 

specific safety benefits that a new offset 

test would generate. It said that this 

assessment would also need to include 

potential losses in existing safety 

benefits due to possible changes in 

vehicle structure and design. This 

reinforced the agency’s intent to look at 

both the benefits and disbenefits from 

adoption of a high speed frontal offset 

crash test requirement. 

In 2002, the agency initiated a 

vehicle-to-vehicle crash test program to 

assess the potential disbenefits of 

adopting a high speed frontal offset 

requirement.7 NHTSA used the vehicleto-vehicle crash test configuration from 

the agency’s vehicle compatibility 

program 8 and test vehicles selected 

from vehicle models that had improved 

ratings in the IIHS frontal 

crashworthiness evaluation program.9

The tests were configured to simulate 

both vehicles moving at 56.3 km/h, such 

that the subject vehicle impacted the left 

front corner of its collision partner at an 

offset of 50 percent and an impact angle 

of 30 degrees. Two vehicle-to-vehicle 

crash tests were conducted for each 

vehicle model under study, one using 

an older model and the other using a 

later redesign. Both vehicles struck a 

model year 1997 Honda Accord. The 

two sets of injury measurements for the 

driver dummy of the Honda Accord 

were compared to determine which 

version of the subject vehicle (i.e., the 

older model or the redesign) imparted 

higher injury numbers.

The results of the testing suggested 

that, for some sport utility vehicles 

(SUVs), design changes that improved 

their performance in high speed frontal 

offset crash tests may also result in 

adverse effects to occupants of their 

collision partners. The results raised 

questions about whether or not these 

results are representative of the effects 

on collision partner protection in the 

current fleet, and the extent to which 

disbenefits to crash partners are 

associated with design changes made to 

improve performance in a high speed 

frontal offset crash test. 

Because of our concern, the agency 

published a request for comments in the 

Federal Register (February 3, 2004, 69 

FR 5108).10, 11 The notice informed the 

public about the crash tests conducted 

to date, and sought comments on its 

findings and on alternative strategies 

that could be coupled with a frontal 

offset crash test requirement. The 

agency also planned to study the 

performance of four additional vehicle 

models, from different vehicle classes, 

that improved IIHS crashworthiness 

ratings as the result of a vehicle 

redesign.

Shortly after publication of the 

Request for Comments, the agency 

completed the four additional pairs of 

vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests.12 The 

combined results showed that in five of 

the six vehicle pairs, the head injury 

criteria of the Honda Accord driver 

dummy increased when struck by the 

redesigned vehicle compared to when 

struck by the older model. Similarly, in 

four of the six vehicle pairs, the chest 

acceleration of the Honda Accord driver 

dummy increased when struck by the 

redesigned vehicle compared to when 

struck by the older model. Overall, the 

earlier trends observed in the SUV 

vehicle model testing were generally 

exhibited in the other vehicle classes 

tested, but to a lesser extent for 

passenger cars.

II. Summary of Request for Comments 

A total of seventeen organizations and 

private individuals submitted comments 

in response to the February 3, 2004, 

request for comments notice on frontal 

offset crash testing. Comments were 

submitted by the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance), 

the Association of International 

Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. 

(AIAM), American Honda Motor Co., 

Inc. (Honda), General Motors 

Corporation (GM), DaimlerChrysler and 

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC 

(DaimlerChrysler), Ford Motor Company 

(Ford), the Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety (IIHS), the Property 

Casualty Insurers Association of 

America (PIA), the Advocates for 

Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates), 

and eight comments from private 

individuals. 

Vehicle manufacturers and vehicle 

manufacturer associations supported the 

overall goal of reducing lower extremity 

injuries in frontal crashes, but did not 

support the agency’s pursuing a 

rulemaking at this time. They 

recommended that NHTSA conduct 

additional research on the sources of 

lower extremity injury, as well as 

determine the appropriate 

anthropomorphic test device and injury 

criteria. Vehicle manufacturers also 

generally shared NHTSA’s concern that 

some design changes that improve a 

vehicle’s performance in a high speed 

frontal offset crash test may also result 

in adverse effects on their collision 

partner occupants. Consequently, some 

strongly advocated linking a vehicle 

compatibility strategy to any frontal 

offset crash test. 

Conversely, the IIHS, PIA, the 

Advocates, and the majority of the 

private citizen comments supported the 

immediate adoption of a frontal offset 

crash test requirement. The IIHS stated 

that such a requirement would ensure 

all vehicle types are designed with stateof-the-art frontal crash protection; 

however, it believes that NHTSA should 

not delay the implementation of an 

offset crash test requirement because of 

unsubstantiated fears of compatibility 

disbenefits. The IIHS also stated that 

such a requirement could not be 

effective without specifically addressing 

49250 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

13Farmer, ‘‘Relationship of Frontal Offset Crash 

Test Results to Real-World Driver Fatality Rates,’’

Traffic Injury Prevention, 2004.

14Lie and Tingvall, ‘‘How do EuroNCAP Results 

Correlate with Real-Life Injury Risks? A PairedComparison Study of Car-to-Car Crashes,’’ Traffic 

Injury Prevention, 2002.

15The IIHS cited a Scandinavian study that found 

that cars with better performance in EuroNCAP had 

much lower rates of serious injury than cars with 

worse performance. The IIHS also cited their own 

study that showed that drivers of vehicles with 

good frontal offset crash test ratings involved in 

fatal head-on crashes with poor-rated vehicles were 

74 percent less likely to be the fatally injured 

driver.

occupant compartment integrity. PIA 

generally supported the IIHS’s position 

and noted that frontal offset crash 

testing simulates a crash scenario that 

current Federal testing does not address. 

The Advocates further stated that it 

represents a majority of real world 

crashes and its adoption would 

complement full frontal crash tests. 

III. Analysis of Comments 

The main comments raised in 

response to the Request for Comments 

involved the projected benefits and 

potential disbenefits of a fixed offset 

deformable barrier crash test, the effect 

of industry’s voluntary compatibility 

commitments, and consideration of 

alternative approaches. The following 

sections briefly analyze each issue. 

A. Underestimated the benefits of 

improved frontal offset crash protection:

The IIHS suggested that NHTSA greatly 

underestimated the benefits of improved 

frontal offset crash protection. It stated 

that NHTSA’s analysis is inconsistent 

with real-world crash experience, which 

it said increasingly shows the benefits of 

improved frontal offset crash test 

performance for reducing serious and 

fatal injuries. The IIHS cited a study 13

indicating that drivers of vehicles with 

good frontal offset crash test ratings 

involved in fatal head-on crashes with 

poor-rated vehicles were 74 percent less 

likely to be the fatally injured driver. 

The IIHS also cited a Scandinavian 

study 14 that found that cars with better 

performance in EuroNCAP had much 

lower rates of serious injury than cars 

with worse performance.

The agency reviewed the two 

publications cited by the IIHS. The IIHS 

publication showed that drivers of goodrated vehicles involved in fatal head-on 

crashes with poor-rated vehicles were 

significantly less likely to be the fatally 

injured driver. However, since the interdependent relationship between frontal 

offset ratings and important factors such 

as vehicle age, vehicle weight, driver 

age, and driver gender were not 

examined, we question whether the 

fatality risk for better-rated vehicles 

might be overstated compared to the 

poor-rated vehicles. For example, the 

poor-rated vehicles might be 

consistently older than the good-rated 

vehicles, or the good-rated vehicles 

might tend to be heavier vehicles within 

a particular rating class. These interdependencies could decrease the fatality 

risk reduction estimated in the study. 

We also note that the fatality 

reductions were only significant for 

head-on crashes of similar vehicles 

rated good and poor. Other estimated 

fatality risk reductions for acceptably 

and marginally-rated vehicles were 

inconclusive. In addition, we found that 

certain statistics were counter-intuitive. 

For example, for cars (the largest data 

set in the study), it showed that goodrated cars had higher frontal fatality 

rates than acceptably- and marginallyrated cars. Finally, the paper did not 

address the benefits of the frontal offset 

rating when two potentially 

incompatible vehicles collided (i.e., carto-SUV, car-to-pickup, etc.) Therefore, 

the magnitude of the overall benefit is 

not clear. 

With respect to the Scandinavian field 

study cited by the IIHS, we are 

concerned that the comparison of 

EuroNCAP performance to real-world 

experience may not apply to the U.S., 

due to differences in mass distribution 

between the fleets and greater 

percentage of unbelted occupants in the 

U.S. We also observed a number of 

limitations in the study that raise 

questions as to whether it is appropriate 

to attribute life-saving benefits to a fixed 

offset deformable barrier test. First, the 

study stated there were insufficient data 

to separate the frontal impact rating 

from the side impact rating, so the 

analysis included both frontal and side 

impacts together. Consequently, it is 

unclear to what extent the front or side 

impact ratings were contributing to the 

correlation. Second, the paper used the 

Swedish injury classification of 

‘‘severe’’ (or ‘‘typically admitted to the 

hospital’’). The resulting correlation to 

‘‘severe’’ injury may have been driven 

by lower limb injuries (maximum AIS 3 

injuries), rather than life-threatening 

head or chest injuries. Also, due to 

insufficient data, the study combined all 

vehicle categories with similar 

EuroNCAP ratings together, regardless 

of mass. This may be problematic in 

providing meaningful real world results 

since frontal NCAP ratings (both full 

and offset) are only comparable within 

a given weight class. Finally, we found 

it noteworthy that the paper itself 

suggested that the results should not be 

seen as proof that there is a predictive 

value in the EuroNCAP system, 

especially not for individual car model 

scores. Thus, based on our concerns 

regarding these two studies, we believe 

more definitive analyses are needed to 

attribute lifesaving benefits to a fixed 

frontal offset deformable barrier crash 

test procedure. 

In response to the Request for 

Comments, the IIHS also stated that 

NHTSA inappropriately relied solely on 

injury measures recorded by test 

dummies and discounted important 

information about occupant 

compartment integrity in the agency’s 

tests. The IIHS stated that if the 

compartment is significantly damaged, 

good dummy injury measures offer no 

assurance of effective protection for the 

range of occupants who sit in different 

positions and may have different crash 

kinematics. It also stated that NHTSA’s 

analysis is inconsistent with real-world 

crash experience, which increasingly 

shows that improved frontal offset crash 

test performance reduces serious and 

fatal injuries.15

NHTSA has monitored toe pan and 

other intrusion measurements in its 

frontal offset crash tests. While the IIHS 

strongly advocated that intrusion 

measurement be included in a future 

requirement, we have not seen how to 

express this measurement as a 

performance requirement that could 

provide objective results and be used to 

compute benefits. Ideally, dummy 

instrumentation should provide an 

objective and direct assessment of injury 

risk to a human occupant. However, the 

IIHS noted that good dummy injury 

measures, from a test with a single-sized 

dummy in a single seating position, 

offer no assurance of effective protection 

for the range of occupants who sit in 

different positions and may have 

different crash kinematics. While we 

acknowledge that a minimum 

performance requirement cannot 

account for every intrusion scenario that 

occurs in the real world, there needs to 

be an objective method for converting 

post-crash intrusion measurements in a 

particular location, of a particular 

vehicle, to the number of injuries it 

might cause for the range of occupants 

who sit in different positions and have 

different crash kinematics. Until further 

analysis can provide guidance on an 

intrusion-based approach, the agency 

will continue to consider using two 

regulated dummy sizes in its frontal 

offset crash tests to capture the injury 

spectrum associated with the most 

vulnerable and average-sized occupants. 

However, we are exploring development 

of a performance requirement approach 

to compartment intrusion, and plan to 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 49251

16Stucki, Hollowell, and Fessahaie, 

‘‘Determination of Frontal Offset Test Conditions 

Based on Crash Data,’’ Proceedings of the 16th 

International Technical Conference on the 

Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 1998.

17Summers, Prasad, Hollowell, ‘‘NHTSA’s 

Vehicle Compatibility Research Program,’’ SAE 

Paper 1999–01–0071, SAE International Congress 

and Exposition, Detroit, MI, 1999.

18Sugimoto, Kadotani, and Ohmura, ‘‘The Offset 

Crash Test—A Comparative Analysis of Test 

Methods,’’ Proceedings of the 16th International 

Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of 

Vehicles, 1998.

19Nolan and Lund, ‘‘Frontal Offset Deformable 

Barrier Crash Testing and its Effect on Vehicle 

Stiffness,’’ Proceedings of the 17th International 

Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of 

Vehicles, 2001. 20 Docket No. NHTSA–15715–20, Appendix.

revisit its potential during the course of 

future research.

B. Increased vehicle aggressivity from 

improved frontal offset crash protection:

Some commenters shared the agency’s 

concern that vehicle design changes that 

improve performance in high speed 

frontal offset crash tests may also result 

in increased aggressivity toward the 

occupants of their collision partners. As 

previously discussed, the agency’s 

vehicle-to-vehicle crash tests 

demonstrated a trend in increased 

vehicle aggressivity towards collision 

partners in five of the six redesigned 

vehicle models tested. The AIAM and 

the Alliance concurred that the results 

justify a cautious approach in 

considering a frontal offset crash test 

requirement. The AIAM noted that there 

were instances of injury measures 

increasing in the struck vehicle, for 

every type of striking vehicle tested 

(passenger car, minivan, SUV, and 

pickup), when comparing the older and 

newer designs of the striking vehicle. 

The AIAM stated that the results raise 

questions regarding possible safety 

disbenefits resulting from design 

measures that are intended to improve 

frontal offset crash performance. 

Conversely, the IIHS disagreed with 

the results of the agency’s crash tests 

and concluded that the agency should 

ignore these test results in deciding 

whether to move ahead with a frontal 

offset crash test. The IIHS stated that, in 

theory, such tests could isolate the 

effects on driver dummy injury risk 

with changes in vehicle stiffness 

associated with improved crash test 

performance. However, it stated that 

most tests confounded changes in 

vehicle stiffness with changes in other 

important vehicle characteristics, such 

as mass and ride height. The IIHS cited 

this finding because it considers 

NHTSA’s 30-degree frontal oblique test 

to be more characteristic of a side 

impact test with respect to the timing of 

the Honda Accord driver peak injury 

measures. It stated that injury measures 

reported by the Hybrid III dummy are 

unlikely to capture the full injury threat 

to a human occupant from such an 

impact because the lateral loading 

conditions are inconsistent with dummy 

design and sensor orientation. 

We agree that some of the vehicle-tovehicle tests confounded changes in 

vehicle stiffness with changes in mass, 

ride height, and other factors. However, 

our study was not targeted at solely 

examining vehicle stiffness. Whether 

the changes were increases in mass, 

stiffness, ride height, or combinations of 

these or other factors, the fact remains 

that five out of six redesigned vehicles 

that demonstrated improved 

performance in a frontal offset crash test 

indicated increased aggressivity toward 

its collision partner. Consequently, we 

do not agree that the tests should be 

ignored. The vehicle-to-vehicle test 

configuration was identified by field 

data as representing frontal crashes with 

a high risk of serious injury or fatality.16

Additionally, NHTSA’s research has 

shown that the test configuration is able 

to show a good correlation between 

target vehicle driver injury measures 

and bullet vehicle aggressivity 

metrics.17 We further believe the Hybrid 

III dummy is the most-appropriate 

surrogate to evaluate injury risk in this 

frontal crash test configuration, with an 

11 o’clock principle direction of force. 

Since the same dummy type was used 

in each of the vehicle-to-vehicle crash 

tests, we believe the relative differences 

in results should be reasonable for 

comparative purposes.

Furthermore, our concerns were 

reinforced by vehicle manufacturers’

comments that suggested vehicles might 

become more aggressive as a result of a 

frontal offset crash test requirement. GM 

provided examples of crash test data 

from vehicle models designed with 

countermeasures to enable them to 

perform well in a high speed frontal 

offset crash test. According to GM, the 

data shows that vehicle structure has 

gotten stiffer in order to perform well in 

offset testing. Honda referenced its 1998 

study 18 where it predicted the 

occurrence of a potential increased 

stiffness trend, based on vehicle weight, 

if a high speed offset crash test were 

added to other frontal crash tests. Ford 

similarly stated that countermeasures 

intended to reduce lower extremity 

injury risk could potentially increase 

the injury risk for occupants, including 

collision partner occupants, in other 

crash scenarios, such as front-to-front 

and/or front-to-side impacts. The 

Alliance stated that design approaches 

that lead to increases in vehicle frontend stiffness could degrade full frontal 

crash protection, rear seat occupant 

protection, particularly child safety 

performance, and might increase the 

frequency of acceleration-based injuries.

Conversely, the IIHS stated that the 

assumption that manufacturers simply 

make vehicle front ends stiffer to 

perform well in the offset test is 

incorrect. It cited a 2001 study where 

stiffness, as determined by U.S. New Car 

Assessment Program (NCAP) tests, was 

unrelated to the IIHS’s structural 

ratings.19 Although it acknowledged 

that some vehicles with improved 

frontal offset test ratings were ‘‘stiffer’’

than their predecessors, it said that 

stiffness typically was evident only after 

about 50 cm of vehicle deformation, 

when the crash deformation had neared 

the occupant compartment. According 

to the IIHS, this increased stiffness is 

necessary if the overall safety of the 

vehicle fleet is to improve. To further 

this point, the IIHS conducted a second 

field data analysis 20 to determine 

whether their good-rated vehicles 

contribute to increased vehicle 

aggressivity toward their collision 

partners. Although the relationships 

across all rating levels were not 

uniform, it reported that a consistent 

pattern emerged. Driver fatality rates 

were higher in both the rated vehicle 

and its collision partner when the rated 

vehicle had a poor rating than when it 

had a good rating. It concluded that this 

pattern contradicts NHTSA’s concern 

that improved frontal offset test 

performance might lead to increased 

vehicle aggressivity.

The agency reviewed the IIHS’s study 

and observed that the opposing 

vehicles’ fatality risks appear to have 

been derived without controlling for 

factors such as vehicle make/models, 

vehicle weights, and model years. In our 

analyses, we have found that these 

factors could dramatically affect the 

fatality rate estimates. For example, if 

opposing vehicles for one rated group 

had a different vehicle profile (i.e., 

make-up of make, model and weight) 

from another rated group, we believe 

that vehicle design may not completely 

explain the discrepancy in opposing 

vehicle fatality risks. Furthermore, if the 

weight profile of the opposing vehicles 

for a particular rated group were 

different from that of their rated 

collision partners, the risk adjustment 

formula for rated vehicles might not be 

applicable to their opposing vehicles. 

Therefore, we believe it may be 

misleading to judge aggressiveness by 

directly comparing fatality rates of 

opposing vehicles without controlling 

for these factors. 

49252 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

21 Docket Number NHTSA–03–15715–15, 

Attachment 13. 22Participants include: BMW, DaimlerChrysler, 

Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, IIHS, Isuzu, 

Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki, 

Toyota, TRL, and Volkswagen. The vehicle 

manufacturers participating in this program 

represent over 99 percent of light vehicle sales in 

the U.S. and Canada. 23See http://www.autoallliance.org/archives/

commitstatement.pdf.

24Honda alternatively proposed to introduce the 

full-width deformable barrier crash test into FMVSS 

No. 208.

25A constant energy level would be determined 

by using an average-sized (or representative) 

passenger vehicle in a fixed offset deformable 

barrier crash test at a prescribed vehicle speed. That 

constant energy level would then be applied when 

testing the remainder of the fleet, such that lighter 

vehicles would be tested at higher speeds, and 

heavier vehicles would be conducted at lower 

speeds.

26 GM also commented that the intent of making 

the impact speed proportional to the mass is 

directionally sound, but impracticable since the 

approach will drive slightly different test 

conditions for any vehicle tested and a significant 

amount of confusion could result.

While we do not dispute the 

suggestion by IIHS and other 

commenters that there are 

countermeasures other than stiffening a 

vehicle’s front-end for achieving good 

performance in a frontal offset crash 

test, we are cognizant that some 

potential countermeasures could have 

adverse implications on vehicle weight, 

aerodynamics, braking effectiveness, 

and fuel economy, making it difficult for 

vehicle manufacturers to pursue them. 

GM noted that the vehicles with the 

most constraints are full size trucks, due 

to the breadth of product line, and 

small/economy size vehicles, due to 

their reduced compartment space/crush 

room. GM stated that additional crush 

space could only be achieved by adding 

extra length to the front of heavier 

vehicles; however, it stated that such 

complete engine compartment and front 

suspension repackaging are 

impracticable. While Honda commented 

that a forthcoming vehicle model 

employed its new Advanced 

Compatibility Engineering front 

structure,21 Honda stated that it 

considers this type of structural 

countermeasure when its vehicles 

undergo a complete redesign. Therefore, 

additional lead-time may be needed to 

accommodate such strategies.

C. Effect of voluntary compatibility 

commitments on disbenefits concerns:

When discussing the agency’s 

compatibility concerns, several 

commenters referred to the Technical 

Working Group on Front-to-Front 

Compatibility.22 The IIHS, a participant 

in the working group, reported that 

improved structural interaction is the 

immediate focus of the working group 

for improving vehicle incompatibility. 

To achieve this, vehicle manufacturers 

have committed to having all light 

trucks’ primary energy-absorbing 

structures overlap the bumper zone of 

passenger cars by September 2009, or, 

alternatively, have all light trucks 

incorporate a secondary energy 

absorbing structure.23 The AIAM noted 

that further commitments include 

assessing dynamic test protocols for 

enhanced structural interaction, and 

evaluating methods for determining an 

appropriate balance between small 

vehicle interior compartment strength 

and large vehicle energy absorption 

characteristics. The AIAM stated that 

over time these efforts could be 

expected to reduce aggressivity 

concerns and achieve significant 

reductions in lower extremity injuries in 

frontal crashes.

The Alliance and GM recommended 

that both NHTSA’s and the industry’s 

compatibility efforts attain a level of 

maturity before regulatory requirements 

are proposed. GM stated that each 

would contribute considerable insight 

toward improved lower leg protection, 

and improved occupant crash protection 

in vehicles and their collision partners. 

Other commenters stated that 

addressing vehicle aggressivity should 

be treated separately from the frontal 

offset crash test requirement. The IIHS 

stated that there is nothing to suggest 

that the incorporation of a frontal offset 

crash test into a standard depends on 

addressing vehicle aggressivity; 

however, it acknowledged that the 

incompatibility of vehicle structures is 

an important issue on its own.

The agency is monitoring the research 

efforts of the Technical Working Group 

on Front-to-Front Compatibility. We 

have been informed of their objectives, 

plans and timing for implementation. 

The potential for these efforts to reduce 

vehicle incompatibility in the fleet, and 

lower extremity injuries in frontal 

crashes, is dependent upon their 

effective implementation. We also 

believe that vehicle compatibility 

initiatives and any future frontal offset 

crash test proposal should be closely 

coordinated and not treated 

independently, as suggested by the IIHS. 

Our field data studies on vehicle 

aggressivity and vehicle crash test 

findings have persuaded us to proceed 

in conjunction with compatibility 

efforts when considering the adoption of 

a frontal offset crash test requirement, 

particularly for heavier vehicles. Since 

mass, stiffness, and geometric alignment 

have been identified as vehicle 

parameters that influence partner 

protection outcomes in our field data 

studies, our frontal offset strategy needs 

to be cognizant of the implications of 

these factors, so as to not promote 

countermeasures that may adversely 

affect safety. 

However, we do not necessarily agree 

with commenters who suggested that 

the compatibility research efforts need 

to be completed before implementing a 

high speed frontal offset crash test 

requirement. While the industry has 

been working to develop a set of 

commitments to reduce vehicle 

aggressivity, the implementation of its 

first phase of efforts (i.e., increased 

geometric alignment) will not be 

complete until September 1, 2009. The 

remaining commitments (assessing 

dynamic test protocols for enhanced 

structural interaction, and test 

procedures for measuring and 

controlling front-end stiffness 

characteristics) are only commitments 

for research at this point. In the long 

term, it is unclear what type of lower 

extremity injury benefits will be 

promoted by the research efforts. In the 

interim, NHTSA believes that numerous 

lower extremity injuries will continue to 

occur, and can be addressed through a 

restricted offset test. 

D. Alternative approaches: The 

Request for Comments sought comments 

on alternative strategies that the agency 

should consider in conjunction with a 

fixed offset deformable barrier crash test 

requirement. Several vehicle 

manufacturers suggested strategies 

aimed at improving frontal offset crash 

protection, while controlling for vehicle 

aggressivity. Honda recommended 

simultaneously introducing a 64 km/h 

frontal offset deformable barrier crash 

test and a full-width deformable barrier 

crash test into NCAP 24 to evaluate a 

vehicle’s partner protection. Honda 

stated that this strategy would help 

match the vehicle’s principle force and 

stiffness at the specific interaction area 

where NHTSA, and other countries, 

require bumpers be located. 

Alternatively, for the long term, Honda 

and GM supported a moving deformable 

barrier (MDB) frontal offset crash test 

procedure for managing energy and 

stiffness, while DaimlerChrysler 

supported a fixed offset deformable 

barrier crash test with a mass-dependent 

impact speed.25, 26 While the IIHS 

acknowledged that many metrics were 

under consideration by the research 

community to assess vehicle 

aggressivity and limit incompatibility, it 

stated that presently there are not 

sufficient data available on which to 

base a decision.

In consideration of these proposals, 

we believe both the MDB and fixed 

offset deformable barrier crash test with 

a mass-dependent impact speed 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 49253

27NHTSA has conducted over 30 crash tests in 

the configuration proposed by GM. In each test, the 

driver dummy lower leg injury measures were far 

below the provisional injury criteria recommended 

by GM.

28 DaimlerChrysler supported this approach as 

intermediate step towards a mass-dependent impact 

speed strategy (discussed further in the notice).

approach require extensive research to 

determine the appropriate energy 

balance (mass and velocity) for which to 

balance the self and partner protection 

of the fleet. The strategy of combining 

an offset deformable barrier crash test 

with a full-width deformable barrier has 

merit for consideration; however, we 

also agree with Honda’s belief that its 

approach is not mature enough and/or 

the fleet-wide effects are not understood 

well enough to include them in a 

standard at this time. 

Several vehicle manufacturers 

alternatively suggested the use of 

existing FMVSS No. 208 tests to reduce 

lower extremity injuries. GM suggested 

adding the Denton/HIII lower leg 

instrumentation to the 0–40 km/h offset 

deformable barrier crash test in FMVSS 

No. 208. However, based on our testing 

experience in this crash configuration,27

we are not persuaded that this proposal 

would drive the design of effective 

countermeasures that would reduce 

lower leg injuries. DaimlerChrysler also 

suggested adding lower leg 

instrumentation to the unbelted full 

frontal barrier crash tests of FMVSS No. 

208. NHTSA has conducted 16 unbelted 

rigid barrier crash tests at 40 km/h with 

Hybrid III dummies having 

instrumented lower legs. Seven out of 

16 vehicles exceeded the provisional 

injury criteria for the lower leg 

instrumentation. While 

DaimlerChrysler’s suggestion may have 

more potential for reducing lower 

extremity injuries, further testing would 

be needed to evaluate the benefits of 

this approach, as well as investigate the 

lower leg performance in other crash 

tests prescribed by FMVSS No. 208.

In the Request for Comments, the 

agency also discussed limiting the 

vehicle classes or gross vehicle weight 

rating (GVWR) of the vehicles to which 

a frontal offset crash test requirement 

would apply as one strategy to reduce 

the potential disbenefits. The example 

provided was to limit the applicability 

of the frontal offset test requirement to 

passenger cars. NHTSA estimated that 

approximately 77 percent of the benefits 

of a high speed frontal offset 

requirement would accrue to passenger 

car occupants since their vehicles 

would be required to maintain 

compartment integrity and provide 

improved lower leg protection. It was 

noted that passenger car occupants may 

also benefit from the exclusion of LTVs, 

since the LTVs striking them may not be 

designed to be as stiff. 

Several commenters on the Request 

for Comments were conceptually 

supportive of this alternative approach. 

Ford supported the European frontal 

offset crash test procedure for compact 

and subcompact passenger cars, because 

it said doing so would harmonize U.S. 

standards with those of the rest of the 

world. Ford stated that for larger, 

heavier vehicles, a deformable element 

that can absorb added kinetic energy 

must be developed to provide realistic 

test results, and vehicle design changes 

that would improve safety. GM and 

DaimlerChrysler 28 also supported the 

concept of an offset deformable barrier 

crash test with a mass limitation. GM 

and DaimlerChrysler suggested that up 

to some mass level, an offset deformable 

barrier crash test could be beneficial to 

a vehicle without increasing its 

aggressivity to a partner vehicle. 

Furthermore, the Alliance suggested 

that the potential disbenefits of a high 

speed frontal offset crash test might be 

reduced if the configuration were 

harmonized with the Economic 

Commission for Europe (ECE R94) 56 

km/h frontal offset crash test, since 

higher test speeds were more prone to 

partner protection issues in heavier 

vehicles, such as LTVs. Other 

commenters, however, were against 

creating a distinction between passenger 

cars and LTVs. The Advocates strongly 

believed that since LTVs are 

predominantly designed and marketed 

as family vehicles, safety standards 

should apply to all passenger vehicle 

types, so that benefits to LTV occupants 

would not be discarded.

NHTSA believes that a mass 

exclusion approach addressing lighter 

vehicles would be an intermediate step 

to address lower extremity injury 

protection, while solutions to 

aggressivity issues related to heavier 

vehicles are being sought. We agree with 

Ford’s observation that applying a 

frontal offset crash test requirement to 

compact and subcompact classes of 

passenger cars would be comparable to 

approaches taken in other countries. 

The results from our 56 km/h offset 

deformable barrier crash test results are 

also in agreement with the Alliance’s 

suggestion that the potential disbenefits 

may be reduced at a lower impact 

speed. In response to the Advocates, we 

believe that occupant protection for 

heavier vehicles would still be 

provided. FMVSS No. 208 requires full 

frontal barrier requirements up to 56 

km/h, and a fixed offset deformable 

barrier test up to 40 km/h for vehicles 

up to a loaded GVWR of 3,856 kg. 

Therefore, we believe concerns 

regarding crash protection to LTV 

occupants may be partially addressed 

through existing requirements until 

such time that the agency is ready to 

move forward with a more 

comprehensive approach. 

IV. Rationale for Withdrawal 

Although the agency testing and 

analyses completed thus far have 

provided a good understanding of the 

issues associated with frontal offset 

crashes, lower extremity injuries, and 

dummy instrumentation, further studies 

are needed to allow NHTSA to develop 

a proposed upgrade to FMVSS No. 208 

that would effectively provide occupant 

protection in frontal offset crashes 

without adversely affecting the 

occupant protection of its collision 

partners. In the agency’s Request for 

Comments, NHTSA used data from the 

1995–2001 National Automotive 

Sampling System Crashworthiness Data 

System (NASS–CDS) in estimating that 

approximately 84,811 front seat vehicle 

occupants annually experience AIS 2+ 

skeletal and joint injuries to the lower 

extremities and hip in frontal offset 

crashes. Based on the agency’s fixed 

offset deformable barrier crash tests 

conducted to date, and those from the 

IIHS, the agency preliminarily 

determined that such a test requirement 

would have the potential of annually 

reducing 1,300 to 8,000 MAIS 2+ lower 

extremity injuries. 

Some aspects of these preliminary 

benefit projections were based on a very 

limited number of crash tests, as noted 

by some commenters to the request for 

comments notice. The testing of some 

crash configurations had been limited, 

to some extent, by the number of 

different research alternatives that the 

agency had explored (i.e., lower leg 

instrumentation, dummy size, impact 

speed, etc.). The agency also did not 

have the opportunity to test any 

advanced air bag vehicles, as noted by 

other commenters. To accumulate the 

necessary data to refine and complete 

our benefits analysis, we believe that 

additional testing is needed, particularly 

of newer vehicles reflective of those in 

the current fleet. 

We also remain concerned about 

increasing vehicle aggressivity and fleet 

incompatibility as a result of adopting a 

high-speed frontal offset crash test, 

particularly for heavier LTVs. In making 

our decision to withdraw this 

rulemaking, the agency had also 

considered other alternative approaches 

suggested by commenters. Energy 

management approaches (MDB and 

fixed offset deformable barrier tests with 

49254 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 162 / Tuesday, August 23, 2005 / Proposed Rules 

29Specifying by regulation at 49 CFR Part 572 

Anthropomorphic Test Devices.

30 Docket No. NHTSA–2002–11838.

a mass-dependent impact speed), force 

application limits, NCAP strategies, and 

lower leg applications in existing 

FMVSS No. 208 tests were among those 

considered. However, we believe each 

of these alternative approaches needs 

some degree of research and testing 

prior to consideration for rulemaking. 

Despite this, we are concerned with 

the large number of lower extremity 

injuries associated with offset frontal 

crashes, since they are the second most 

costly long-term injuries, after brain 

injuries. Based upon our initial benefit 

analyses, we have tentatively 

determined that the most effective way 

to address these injuries while 

balancing the concerns with increased 

aggressivity is to pursue development of 

requirements in a two-step approach. 

The first step would be to develop offset 

frontal requirements for a limited 

segment of the vehicle fleet. Our initial 

cost/benefit estimates indicate that we 

would be able to maximize lower 

extremity benefits without creating 

disbenefits due to incompatibility by 

limiting applicability to a segment of the 

vehicle fleet. The second, longer-term 

step would be to develop requirements 

for those vehicles that are prone to 

increased aggressivity, perhaps in 

conjunction with compatibility 

requirements. 

Based upon testing the agency has 

completed thus far, we believe that a 

fixed offset deformable barrier crash test 

in the range of 56–60 km/h using 

advanced dummy instrumented legs 

would provide the best opportunity to 

reduce lower extremity injuries without 

exacerbating vehicle incompatibility. 

However, focused testing under these 

conditions is needed to provide a 

sufficient basis to develop an offset 

frontal rulemaking proposal. We will 

examine the number of tests needed, 

including using two dummy sizes and 

requiring left/right side impacts. We 

also plan to explore new approaches to 

developing a performance metric for 

compartment intrusion, and its 

correlation to injury during the course 

of this testing and development. 

The agency will also continue its 

efforts toward federalization 29 of retrofit 

instrumented lower legs for both the 5th 

and 50th percentile Hybrid III dummies. 

On May 3, 2002, the agency published 

an Advance Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (ANPRM) (67 FR 22381) on 

the adoption of the two potential types 

of lower leg instrumentation for 

assessing lower leg injury in full and 

offset-frontal crashes. In support of the 

notice, the agency published a technical 

report 30 describing the leg assemblies 

and documenting the lab, sled, and 

vehicle test experiences with the two 

pairs of lower leg instrumentation. 

Based on the ANPRM and subsequent 

testing, we have tentatively decided that 

the Thor-Lx/HIIIr and Thor-Flx/HIIIr 

lower leg instrumentation appear to 

have the greatest potential to assess 

lower extremity injuries. The agency is 

currently moving forward with the 

federalization of these two sets of lower 

leg instrumentation.

The agency also needs to conduct 

additional frontal high-speed offset 

crash tests to gather sufficient data for 

fleet representation and refined benefit 

estimates. These crash tests will be 

conducted with vehicle models certified 

to the advanced air bag requirements of 

FMVSS No. 208. Both 5th percentile 

female and 50th percentile male Hybrid 

III dummies will be instrumented with 

Thor-Lx/HIIIr and Thor-Flx/HIIIr lower 

leg instrumentation in the driver and 

right front passenger seating positions. 

Dummy and intrusion measurements 

from the tests will be compared to the 

field data experience. With this 

information, better estimates for the 

injury reduction rates associated with 

the proposed offset frontal requirement 

will be developed. 

Finally, the agency will conduct an 

optimization study to determine the 

appropriate applicability limit for which 

the frontal offset crash test requirement 

should apply in order to maximize self 

protection, while minimizing the 

amount of risk associated with partner 

protection. 

In sum, we believe that a fixed offset 

deformable barrier crash test, with 

applicability limited to a segment of the 

vehicle fleet and in the range of 56–60 

km/h using advanced dummy 

instrumented legs, would provide the 

best opportunity to reduce lower 

extremity injuries without exacerbating 

vehicle incompatibility. However, 

focused testing under these conditions 

is needed to develop a sufficient basis 

for an offset frontal rulemaking 

proposal. Since this additional testing 

will not be completed within a year, we 

have decided to withdraw rulemaking 

for offset frontal requirements until 

completion of the testing and analysis, 

and then re-initiate rulemaking when it 

is completed. 

V. Conclusion 

Based on our evaluation of available 

information, we have concluded that 

further study is needed to have 

sufficient data to establish the 

appropriate number of tests and 

dummies, and to refine cost/benefit 

estimates for a definitive rulemaking 

proposal. Accordingly, we have decided 

that we should remove the frontal offset 

and lower leg instrumentation 

rulemakings from the Semi-Annual 

Regulatory Agenda (Unified Agenda) 

because rulemaking action is not 

anticipated in the immediate future. 

However, during the next year, we will 

continue the testing and analyses 

necessary to develop a proposal for 

occupant lower extremity protection in 

offset frontal crashes, and again place it 

in the Unified Agenda when a proposal 

is imminent.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at 

49 CFR 1.50.

Issued: August 18, 2005. 

H. Keith Brewer, 

Director, Office of Crash Avoidance 

Standards for Rulemaking.

[FR Doc. 05–16721 Filed 8–19–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P