[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No s . 19

- 11496 & 19

- 11603

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 6:18

- cv - 00572

- RBD

- DCI
THOMAS SCOTT TUFTS , et al. , Plaintiffs

- Appell ant s - Cross

- Appellees ,
versus EDWARD C. HAY, JR. , et al. , Defendants

- Appellees

- Cross

- Appellants

.

________________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ ( October 20 , 2020 ) Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and TALLMAN , ∗ Circuit Judges. MARTIN, Circuit Judge: Thomas Tufts and the Tufts Law Firm , PLLC appeal the District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss this legal action on grounds of subject matter

∗ The Honorable Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judge for the U nited S tates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 1 of 152 jurisdiction

. Edward H ay and Pitts, Hay & Hugenschmidt , P.A. also filed a second motion to dismiss Tufts ’s action against them on the additional ground that the
court la ck ed personal jurisdiction over them

. The District Court found that personal jurisdiction did exist , and Mr. Hay and his firm cross appeal that ruling here. Up on careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, w e hold that the District Court correctly denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdi ction, but it erred in granting the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

. We therefore reverse the District Court’s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction and remand this action

. I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a dispute between two sets of lawyers who provided legal work for their mutual client, Biltmore Investments, L td . (“Biltmore”). One set of counsel includes Mr. Hay, a North Carolina lawyer, and his North Carolina law firm, Pitts, Hay & Hugenschmidt, P.A. (collectively “Hay” or “Hay counsel” )

. Hay represented Biltmore in a Chapter 11 proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina that commenced in January 2011 . The other set of counsel includes Mr. Tufts, a Florida lawyer, and his Florida law firm, Tufts Law Firm, PLLC (collectively “Tufts” or “Tufts counsel ” )

. At the time Biltmore’s bankruptcy petition was filed, Tufts represented Biltmore in various Florida cases involving a merger transaction.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 2 of 153 During the bankruptcy pr oceeding, Hay “repeated[ly]” informed Tufts that there was a “bench order” approv ing Tufts ’ s representation of Biltmore in all
matters. Hay also continuously represented to the North Carolina Bankruptcy Court that Tufts w as properly authorized to appear as “ special counsel” for Biltmore. In reliance up on th o se representations, Tufts did extensive legal work
for Biltmore. A mong other things , Tufts transferred the Florida litigation to North Carolina ; served as the disbursin g agent for settlement funds in the Florida litigation ; and appealed a “comfort order ” 1 the Bankruptcy Court issued for one of Biltmore’s creditors

. Unbeknownst to Tufts , there was no Bankruptcy Court “bench order” approving Tufts ’ s representation of Biltmore. Hay ’ s representations to the Bankruptcy Court that Tufts w as authoriz ed to appear as “special counsel” were also false. These facts ultimately came to light. Years later, a t a March 18, 2015 hearing, Mr. Hay acknowledged to the Bankruptcy Court that Mr. Tufts relied on him for advice about how to proceed with the approval of attorney’s fees, but that Hay failed to tell Tufts he need ed to apply in advance for the fees.

1 A bankruptcy court issues a comfort order to confirm that the automatic stay in bankruptcy does not apply to a specific piece of property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(j). Once a comfort order is issued as to a creditor’s collateral, for example, that creditor can proceed against the property that secures its debt without violating the bankruptcy stay

.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 3 of 154 This sequence of events le d to a Bankruptcy Court orde r disgorging Tufts of all legal fees and costs pa i d to Tufts on account of the litigation over the comfort
order

. When Tufts counsel did not return the funds to Biltmore as ordered , the Bankruptc y C ourt held Tufts in civil contempt. As a result of the disgorgement and contempt orders, Tufts engaged in costly litigation and settlement negotiations
in an effort to resolve these disputes. In December 2017, Biltmore’s Chapter 11 proceeding was dismissed by way of consent order. In Apr il of the following year, Tufts sued Hay in U.S. D istrict C ourt for , among other things , negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and
indemnification

. After Tufts counsel amended their complaint, Hay moved to dismiss the complaint for reasons that included lack of personal jurisdiction. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss , finding personal jurisdiction existed

over Hay insofar as Tufts ’s allegations satisfied the requirements of Florida’s long

arm statute and constitutional due process. Having failed in its first effort to have the Tufts action dismissed, Hay filed a
second motion to dismiss . This time Hay argu ed that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Barton doctrine. Th e Bart on doctrine requires

a plaintiff to “ obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before initiating an action in district court when that action is against the trustee or other bankruptcy

- court

appointed officer, for acts done in the actor ’ s official capacity. ” Carter v. Rodgers ,

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 4 of 155 220 F.3d 1249, 1252 ( 11th Cir. 2000). Th is time, the District Court granted Hay ’ s motion to dismiss. In short, t he court held that “Plaintiffs had to obtain leave from the Bankruptcy Court before suing,” and their “failure to do so deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.” This is Tufts ’s appeal of the dismissal of its suit against Hay based on the
Barton doctrine

. And t his consolidated appeal also presents Hay counsel ’s cross appeal of the order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo the legal conclusions upon which a district court dismisses a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets , Inc. , 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). W e employ de novo review, as well, in reviewing whether a district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A. , 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
W e begin by addressing the interplay of the Barton doctrine and subject matter jurisdiction. We then consider whether the District Court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Hay

.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 5 of 156 A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE ACTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE BARTON DOCTRINE I n Barton v. Barbour , 104 U.S. 126 (1881) , the Supreme Court recognized the “general rule that before suit is brought against a receiver leave of the court by which he was appointed must be obtained.” Id. at 128. The Supreme Court expressed the rule in terms of jurisdiction , saying : “[i]f the court below had entertained jurisdiction of this suit,” i t would have “been an usurpation of the powers and duties which belo nged exclusively to another court.” Id. at 136. Under what has become known as th e Barton doctrine, a plaintiff “must obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before initiating an action in district court when that action is against the trustee or other bankruptcy

- court

- appointed officer, for acts done in the actor ’ s official capacity. ” Carter , 220 F.3d at 1252. Our C ourt has applied the Barton doctrine to require leave of court before an action can be initiat ed against lawyers that are “court

- approved counsel” who function as the “equivalent of court

- appointed officers.” Lawrence v. Goldberg , 573 F.3d 1265, 1269

– 70 (11th Cir. 2009)

. Here, Tufts counsel initiated their action against Hay

— court

- a pproved counsel

— and Tufts did not obtain leave of the Bankruptcy Court before do ing so . T he Barton doctrine provides that “absent that leave, the district court correctly found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over [the] cause of action

. ”

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 6 of 157 Carter , 220 F.3d at 1253 . Yet Tufts says the Barton doctrine can not apply here, because it cannot properly extend beyond the jurisdiction of the B ankruptcy C ourt. Specifically, Tufts argues that because Biltmore’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case has now been dismissed, the Bankruptcy Court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims in this case . Thus, Tufts counsel says they are relieved of any obligation to seek leave from that court to bring this action

. We are persuaded by th e view advocated by Tufts counsel and hold that the
Barton doctrine has no application when jurisdiction over a matter no longer exists
in the b ankruptcy c ourt

. Our holding f low s from Barton itself : when the
b ankruptcy c ourt lacks jurisdiction, there are no “powers and duties which belong[]” to that court to be usurped by the d istrict c ourt “entertain[ing] jurisdiction of th[e] suit.” Barton , 104 U.S. at 136. As one bankruptcy court has
not ed, decisions explaining the rationale for the Barton doctrine look to “ the bankruptcy court ’ s jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case and the powers that flow from that jurisdiction .” In re WRT Energy Corp. , 402 B.R. 717, 722 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2007). For e xample, courts have recognized that the Barton doctrine is based
on “ the bankruptcy court ’ s exclusive in rem jurisdiction over the estate ” and “ the oversight and supervisory responsibilities of bankruptcy courts .” Id. (citing In re Crown Vantage, Inc. , 421 F.3d 963, 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2005) and In re
Lo w enbrau n , 453 F.3d 314, 321

– 22 (6th Cir. 2006)). Similarly, t his Court has

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 7 of 158 observed that a plaintiff’s claims can “fall within the scope of the Barton doctrine because they are ‘related to’ [the] bankru ptcy proceeding,” such that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction. Lawrence , 573 F.3d at 1270

– 71. A s Tufts
argues, “ a logical corollary to that holding” is that the Barton doctrine does not apply once the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction.
As a rule , d istrict c ourts have jurisdiction to refer to b ankruptcy c ourts “all cases under” the Bankruptcy Code and “all civil proceedings .

. . arising in or related to cases under” the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)

– (b) ; see 28
U.S.C. § 157(a)

. “ [T] he test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related
to bankr uptcy [under section 1334(b)] is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have an effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy .” In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc. , 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted) . Th us , under t his C ourt’s precedent, the Bankruptcy Court here was properly vested with jurisdiction to consider this action if it could conceivably have an effect on Biltmore’s bankruptcy estate. The question of whether this action “ could conceivably have an effect on ” Biltmore’s bankruptcy estate is an easy one here , because both parties have agreed it cannot . During a hearing on Hay ’ s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, counsel for Hay “concede[d] th[e] fact” that because “the Cha pter 11 case has been dismissed,” there is “ no conceivable effect

. . . that this case w ould

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 8 of 159 have on the estate.” Hay confirmed this concession during oral argument before

our Court. Thus, under the “conceivable effects” test for section 1334(b), the
Ban kruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Tufts ’ s action , and Tufts counsel were not required to obtain leave from that court before filing this action in the District Court. 2 The Barton doctrine did not therefore deprive the District
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case . 3 We expressly note that our holding here creates no categorical rule that the Barton doctrine can never appl y once a bankruptcy case ends. W e address t his case only , and here the se parties agreed this action could have no conceivable effect on the bankruptcy estate

. On this record , the B ankruptcy C ourt lack ed jurisdiction, and the Barton doctrine does not apply

. 4

2 T his case relates to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit , which includes North Carol i na, applies a “close nexus” test in evaluating “related to” jurisdiction in the context of a Chapter 11 plan, postconfirmation. See Valley Historic Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of N.Y. , 486 F.3d 831, 837 (4th Cir. 2007). In light of Hay’s concession, and because the Chapter 11 p roceeding has been dismissed, our conclusion that the B ankruptcy C ourt lacked jurisdiction would be the same even if the “close nexus ” test applied. See In re Resorts Int’l, Inc. , 372 F.3d 154, 168

– 69 (3d Cir. 2004).

3 In light of our holding that the Barton doctrine does not apply due to lack of jurisdiction vested in the Bankruptcy Court , we decline to address Tufts ’ s remaining arguments for why the Barton doctrine does not apply.

4 We are aware that some of our sister circuits apply the Barton doctrine after the bankruptcy case has ended. See Muratore v. Darr , 375 F.3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Linton , 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998). Indeed, we read these cases to identify important policy reasons for applying the Barton doctrine in that context

. For example , the Barton doctrine “enables bankruptcy judges to monitor the work of the trustees more effectively” and, absent the Barton doctrine, “trusteeship will become a more irksome duty, and so it will be harder for courts to find competent people to appoint as trustees.” Linton , 136 F.3d at 545. This Court has also recognized these concerns in other contexts

. See Lawrence , 573 F.3d at 1269. We accept as

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 9 of 1510 B. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED P ERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER HAY We turn now to Hay counsel’s cross - appeal of the District Court’s denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction . As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide th is issue on appeal . Although neither party considered this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in their briefing, “ it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking .” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). This Court has “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the distri ct courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Upon the district court’s entry of final judgment, this Court has jurisdiction to review its previous interlocutory orders

— like the denial of Hay’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
S ee Aaro, Inc. v. Daewoo Int’l (Am.) Corp. , 755 F.2d 1398, 1400 (11th Cir. 1985)

. However , in most cases, “ the prevailing party does not have standing to appeal because it is assumed that the judgment has caused that party no injury.” Agripost, Inc. v. Miami

- Dade C n ty

. ex rel. Manager , 195 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless , we have jurisdiction t o decide the personal jurisdiction issue here because “ a prevailing party is entitled to defend [a district court’s] judgment on

meritorious t h e se policy reasons calling for application of the Barton doctrine , and our decision today does not conflict with the views of our sister circuits in this regard.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 10 of 1511 any ground preserved in the district court.” Worthy v. City of Phenix City , 930 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation ma rks omitted)

. Since w e have jurisdiction over Tufts ’ s appeal , our jurisdiction extends to allow our consider ation of Hay ’ s argument that the District Court’s judgment should be affirmed on other grounds preserved in the District Court

— namely , Hay’s personal jurisdiction defense. 5 Having resolved th e matter of our own jurisdiction, we next consider whether the District Cou rt properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Hay . We hold that it did. A court has personal jurisdiction over a non

- resident defendant if (1) the state’s long

- arm statute provides jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Constr., N.V. , 598 F.3d 802, 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2010). Under Florida’s long

- arm statute, specific jurisdiction over a non

- resident defendant is proper when the def endant “[c]ommit[s] a tortious act within” Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Physical presence in Florida is not required. Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall , 39 So. 3d 1201, 1208 (Fla. 2010). Instead, a tortious act

5 True, Hay cross appeal ed on the personal jurisdiction issue, as opposed to simply raising this alternative ground for affirmance in response to Tufts ’ s appeal. Nevertheless , the two appeals were consolidated, and Hay rais ed the personal jurisdiction defense in response to Tufts ’ s opening brief

. As a result , Hay has adequately raised personal jurisdiction as an alternative ground for affirmance

.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 11 of 1512 “can occur through the nonresident defendant’s telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida,” so long as the cause of action arises from such communications. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Tufts all ege d that Hay counsel made “misrepresentations ” when they “made repeated reference in [their] discussion s with [Tufts] as to the purported issuance of a ‘bench order’ [they] claimed had been issued previously, approving of [Tufts’s] representation of [Bilt more] in all matters.” T he complaint goes on to allege that “[a]t all times pertinent to this action” Mr. Tufts was a resident of Florida and the Tufts Law Firm was operating in Florida

. W e therefore draw the reasonable inference that when Hay counsel made such misrepresentations to Tufts , those misrepresentations were made in Florida. See Randall v. Scott , 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We

. . . draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff ’ s favor

. ”). Hay counsel acknowledge s that they “ may have communicated with Tufts when Tufts was in Florida

. ” For this reason as well, we infer that those repeated misrepresentations were made in to Florida. See Internet Sols

. , 39 So. 3d at 1208. And Hay ’ s misrepresentations also give rise to Tufts ’ s causes of action, which satisf ies the requirements of Florida’s long

- arm statute. See id. at 1208

– 09 . Specifically, Tufts counsel allege s they performed work for Biltmore in rel iance on Hay’s misrepresentation s . So it was as a result of the se misrepresentations that Tufts did work they w ere not authorized to do. This, in turn , led to the disgorgement and

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 12 of 1513 contempt orders a s well as Tufts ’ s time and expense in working to resolve th os e disputes.
Because Tufts ’ s allegations satisfy the requirements of Florida’s long

- arm statute, we next consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process. See PVC Windoors , 598 F.3d at 811. A court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction comports with due process when (1) the

non - resident defendant “purposefully availed himself” of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, (2) the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” one of the defendan t’s contacts with in the forum state, and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is in accordance with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri , 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted)

. Hay counsel purposefully availed themselves of Florida by having minimum contacts in Florida

. 6 See id. at 1357. Hay counsel ’ s repeated misrepresentations regarding the non

- existent “bench order” w ere made to Tufts in Florida

. Th is

6 Hay counsel contend s that the District Court erred in its analysis of the purp oseful availment prong because it only applied the “effects test.” Hay argue s that under Louis Vuitton , the District Court should have appl ied both the traditional minimum contacts test and the effects test. This argument fails because o ur precedent does not require the application of both tests

. Louis Vuitton held that in “ intentional tort cases, there are two applicable tests for determining whether purposeful availment occurred”: the traditional minimum contacts test and the effects test

. Louis Vuitton , 736 F.3d at 1356

– 57. B ecause b oth tests address the same question

— whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state

— only one test need be applied. See id. at 1357. Since Hay had minimum contacts in Florida, we do not apply the effects test.

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 13 of 1514 “purposeful conduct created a substantial connection with the forum state” and supports jurisdiction. Licciardello v. Lovelady , 544 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted)

. As for the second requirement of due process, Tufts counsel’s causes of action arise out of Hay ’ s contacts in Florida. See Louis Vuitton , 736 F.3d at 1355. Hay correctly argue s that our precedent requires that its contacts be the but

- for cause of Tufts ’ claims. See Oldfield , 558 F.3d at 1222

– 23. We agree, and here Hay counsel’s misrepresentations in Florida are the but

- for cause of Tufts ’ s claims

. Bu t for th e misrepresentations made by Hay counsel , Tufts would not have performed work for Biltmore they were unauthorized to perform . This in turn led to the disg orgement and contempt orders and Tufts ’ s efforts to resolve those disputes.
A s to the third requirement of due process , it is met because the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. See Lovelady , 544 F.3d at 1288. We consider “ [r] elevant factors includ[ing] the burden on the defendant, the forum ’ s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff ’ s inte rest in obtaining convenient and effective relief and the judicial system ’ s interest in resolving the dispute. ” Id. Hay counsel concede that Tufts counsel have an interest in convenience. While we acknowledge that litigating in Florida places some burde n on Hay counsel , the interest of the forum state and the judicial

USCA11 Case: 19-11496 Date Filed: 10/20/2020 Page: 14 of 1515 system ’ s interest in resolving the dispute overcome any concerns about Hay’s burden . “F lorida has a very strong interest in affording its residents a forum to
obtain relief from intentiona l misconduct of nonresidents causing injury in Florida. ” Id

. IV. CONCLUSION Because the District Court erred in granting Hay ’ s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we REVERSE th at ruling. A s to Hay counsel’s request that we affirm on the alternative ground that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them, their argument fails. T he District Court correctly
denied Hay ’ s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We REMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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