United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued December 14, 2010

Decided January 6, 2011

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 10‐1086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JESSIE L. TRAYLOR,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:08‐cr‐20036‐MPM‐DGB‐3

Michael P. McCuskey,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Jessie Traylor was indicted on, and convicted of, four drug‐related offenses.  On

appeal Mr. Traylor argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence at trial to

sustain the jury’s verdicts on two of his convictions.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I

A grand jury charged Mr. Traylor with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine,

21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a), one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, id.

§ 841(a)(1), and two counts of using a telephone in furtherance of a drug‐trafficking crime,

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 10‐1086 Page 2

1

  A fifth criminal‐forfeiture count was dismissed before trial.

id. § 843(b).1

  Two of Mr. Traylor’s alleged coconspirators, Dana Hawkins and Djuan Davis,

pleaded guilty and testified against Mr. Traylor.

The evidence presented by the Government at trial established the following course

of events:  Hawkins and Davis began distributing cocaine in May 2007.  Hawkins, who was

based in Decatur, Illinois, supplied funds to Davis.  Davis then bought cocaine from

suppliers in Chicago and delivered the drugs to Hawkins, who sold them.  Beginning in

August 2007, Hawkins paid Mr. Traylor, a long‐time friend, to drive him to Chicago with

purchase money.  Davis would then buy the drugs and deliver them to Hawkins in Decatur.

In September 2007, Davis was arrested and ceased delivering cocaine for the next four

months.  In January 2008, Hawkins and Davis resumed buying cocaine at a rate of one to

two kilograms of cocaine per week.  The coconspirators testified that, during the first six

months of 2008, Mr. Traylor carried the drugs by bus from Davis in Chicago to Hawkins in

Decatur for most of the deliveries.

In early June 2008, Hawkins and Davis arranged to purchase another kilogram of

cocaine.  Davis testified that on June 5, 2008, he gave the cocaine to Mr. Traylor, who put the

drugs in a backpack.  Intercepted phone calls confirm that Davis then told Hawkins that

Mr. Traylor had the cocaine.  Mr. Traylor boarded a bus from Chicago to Decatur later that

day.  When the bus arrived in Champaign, Illinois, police officers from Decatur boarded the

bus and announced that they were conducting a drug investigation.  An officer identified a

bag stowed near Mr. Traylor as the same backpack Mr. Traylor had carried on a previous

trip from Chicago to Decatur.  When questioned, however, Mr. Traylor disclaimed

ownership of the bag.  None of the remaining passengers claimed the bag, so the officers

secured it as abandoned property.  Inside was a kilogram of cocaine and several of

Mr. Traylor’s personal effects.  His fingerprints were lifted from the cocaine’s packaging.

Mr. Traylor testified on his own behalf at trial.  He admitted to being a long‐time

friend to both Hawkins and Davis and to driving Hawkins several times between Chicago

and Decatur.  He also admitted that Hawkins compensated him for driving but insisted that

the reason was because Hawkins was often too drunk and did not like to drive.  He denied

transporting drugs for Hawkins and Davis.  Mr. Traylor conceded that he previously had

borrowed the backpack and that it contained several of his personal belongings.  But he

denied possessing the backpack or the cocaine inside on the day of his arrest; Mr. Traylor

told the jury that the backpack already was on the bus when he boarded.

II
No. 10‐1086 Page 3

On appeal, Mr. Traylor argues that the Government failed at trial to present evidence

sufficient to sustain his conspiracy and possession convictions.  When assessing the

sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of the

crime in question beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2010).

A.

Mr. Traylor first contends that the Government presented insufficient evidence at

trial to support his conspiracy conviction.  He argues that Hawkins and Davis, both of

whom played much larger roles in the alleged conspiracy, implicated him because they

hoped their cooperation would net them a lenient sentence.  This motivation, he argues,

rendered their testimony unreliable.  To convict Mr. Traylor of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine, the Government had to show (1) “the existence of an agreement

between two or more persons to possess with intent to distribute cocaine; (2) that the

defendant knew of the agreement; and (3) the defendant intended to join the agreement.”

Taylor, 600 F.3d at 868; United States v. Billops, 43 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).

Mr. Traylor concedes the first two elements and disputes only the element of participation.

Mr. Traylor admits, however, that, in essence, he is arguing that the Government did

not offer “credible evidence that he participated in the conspiracy.”  Appellant’s Br. 30.  This

concession dooms his argument.  We repeatedly have held that we shall not reweigh

evidence or reassess credibility determinations made by a jury.  United States v. Hampton,

585 F.3d 1033, 1042 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Anderson, 580 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir.

2009).  Hawkins and Davis both testified that Mr. Traylor knowingly participated in the

conspiracy, first driving Hawkins to drug transactions and later transporting funds and

cocaine by bus between Chicago and Decatur.  The Government corroborated this testimony

with several recorded phone conversations between the coconspirators.  Furthermore, both

Hawkins and Davis acknowledged at trial that they had cooperated in hope of securing

favorable treatment at sentencing; consequently, the jury was privy to their motivations

when it assessed their credibility. See United States v. Bailey, 510 F.3d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 2007).

Mr. Traylor claimed that he was not a knowing participant, but he admitted to several acts

consistent with his knowledge and participation (including driving Hawkins for money and

making several trips by bus on Hawkins’s and Davis’s behalf).  The jury was entitled to

reject Mr. Traylor’s version of events and, instead, credit the Government’s account.

B.
No. 10‐1086 Page 4

Mr. Traylor also challenges his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute, based on the kilogram of cocaine found in the unclaimed backpack.  To convict

Mr. Traylor on this count, the jury had to conclude that he (1) knowingly possessed the

cocaine, (2) with the intent to distribute, (3) while knowing that it was a controlled

substance.  See United States v. Carraway, 612 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2010).  Mr. Traylor

contests only the element of possession.

Mr. Traylor essentially argues that the Government failed to establish that he

possessed the backpack because, in his view, the Government introduced no evidence

showing that he behaved as if the bag were his.  In support, he points to the fact that he left

the bag on the bus when he got off to smoke, that he failed to respond when an undercover

police officer apologized for touching the bag and that he did not claim it.  However, the

Government was not required to prove that Mr. Traylor affirmatively claimed ownership of

the backpack; circumstantial evidence can be more than enough to support an inference of

possession.  See Carraway, 612 F.3d at 645.  In the present case, there was significant

evidence linking the backpack to Mr. Traylor.  First, he conceded that he previously had

borrowed the backpack, that it contained several of his personal belongings (including his

clothes and toiletries), and that he previously had traveled with it from Chicago to Decatur.

Additionally, his fingerprints were found on the cocaine packaging, which is further

evidence of his control over the bag.  See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d 795,

805‐06 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2006).  This

evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Mr. Traylor possessed the backpack.

See United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1021‐22 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that juries are

entitled to use common sense in making reasonable inferences from circumstantial

evidence).

Mr. Traylor has not met his burden of establishing that a rational jury could not have

convicted him on the evidence presented.  The district court’s judgment therefore is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED