1 While his federal petition was pending in the district court,

Watson was transferred to Menard Correctional Center. We have

substituted Donald Hulick, the warden of Menard, as the

respondent in this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-1388

SVONDO WATSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DONALD HULICK, Warden,1

Respondent-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01 C 9101—David H. Coar, Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 27, 2006—DECIDED MARCH 26, 2007

____________

Before WOOD, EVANS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. A jury in DuPage County,

Illinois, convicted Svondo Watson of first-degree murder,

attempted murder, and home invasion, but on direct

appeal the Appellate Court of Illinois overturned his

convictions after concluding that Watson was denied the

effective assistance of trial counsel. He was tried again,

and the second jury also convicted him. This time the
2 No. 06-1388

appellate court affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal. After

exhausting his state-court remedies, Watson petitioned

for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district

court denied relief, and Watson appeals. We conclude

that federal-court review of his Fourth Amendment

claim has been foreclosed, and that the state court’s

resolution of his Sixth Amendment claim was reasonable

in light of the evidence presented in that proceeding. We

therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Watson’s

petition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Watson’s Arrest and Confessions

The following facts are not in dispute. In the early

morning hours of June 7, 1994, Leo McDaniel and his

girlfriend, Keisha Twitty, were shot as they slept in

McDaniel’s apartment. McDaniel died, but Twitty survived the attack and told police officers in Lombard,

Illinois, that Watson was the shooter. At about 10:00 a.m.

that same day, officers arrested Watson at his home in

Chicago and took him to the police station in Lombard.

Watson was given Miranda warnings when he was arrested, and he told officers that he understood them. That

afternoon, Assistant State’s Attorney Brian Nigohosian

informed Watson during a twenty-minute interview that

Twitty had identified him to police. Watson also spoke

with several police officers, but he never asserted his

right to remain silent or requested counsel.

At roughly 5:30 p.m. Watson asked to speak to Lieutenant Dane Cuny, one of the officers who previously had

interviewed him. Cuny reminded Watson of the Miranda

warnings, and Watson stated that he understood his
No. 06-1388 3

rights and “wanted to tell the truth.” He then confessed to

being McDaniel’s killer and went into detail about where

he had discarded the gun. Cuny interrupted Watson’s

confession because he wanted to get a second officer to

witness the statement, but when he and another officer

returned to the interview room, Watson denied having

made the admissions.

Meanwhile, other officers had obtained a search warrant for “the house that the defendant was found at in

Chicago.” Watson lived on the second floor of a two-story

building. The building contained separate apartments

in the basement, first, and second floors, but because the

search warrant referenced “the house,” police searched the

entire building. While searching a bedroom closet in the

first-floor apartment, the officers found a backpack bearing Watson’s name and bullets matching those recovered

at the crime scene.

Back at the police station, Watson ate dinner at around

6:30 p.m., and about ninety minutes later an officer came

to retrieve the garbage from his dinner. Watson asked the

officer “what was going on,” and the officer informed him

that detectives “had gone back to the house” in Chicago

where Watson was arrested and “recovered a couple of

items.” After hearing this information, Watson volunteered

to the officer that he shot McDaniel and Twitty. The officer

called in another officer, and Watson repeated his confession. Watson then asked to speak with Assistant State’s

Attorney Nigohosian and when he arrived, Watson confessed once more. Nigohosian and one of the officers then

left the interview room to find a tape recorder. As they

walked past the lobby, Nigohosian and the officer were

told that Watson’s attorney, Todd Urban, was in the

building and wanted to speak to his client. Urban apparently had called earlier in the day, but did not tell the

police not to question Watson. Urban then directed
4 No. 06-1388

Nigohosian to not record Watson’s statements, and

his request was honored.

B. Watson’s Trials

On June 9, 1996, the jury at Watson’s initial trial found

him guilty of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree

murder, and home invasion. On appeal to the Appellate

Court of Illinois, Watson argued that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney

did not move to suppress the evidence obtained during the

execution of the search warrant. As we noted earlier,

Watson lived on the second floor of a two-story building

containing three separate apartments, but the terms of

the search warrant authorized police to search the

entire building. The appellate court concluded that the

searching officers knew or reasonably should have known

that there were separate apartments in the building, and

that the police had probable cause to search only the

second-floor apartment. The appellate court reasoned that,

because Watson’s attorney did not move to suppress the

incriminating evidence found in the first-floor apartment,

his trial performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. The appellate court determined that the

attorney’s conduct undermined its confidence in the

outcome, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Before the start of the second trial, Watson moved to

quash his arrest, to suppress the evidence seized during

the search, and to suppress his confessions. The trial court

granted Watson’s motion to suppress the items seized

during the search, but denied the remaining motions.

Because Twitty identified Watson as the shooter, the

court concluded that there was probable cause for his

arrest. With regard to his admissions, the court found

that Watson had not been denied access to counsel, that

he initiated the conversations with the police, and that
No. 06-1388 5

he was not confronted with improperly discovered evidence before he confessed. The case was tried and, on July

29, 1998, Watson was again convicted.

C. Post-conviction Proceedings

After he was convicted, Watson filed a direct appeal with

the Appellate Court of Illinois. He argued that the trial

court should have suppressed his confessions because (1)

they were the tainted fruit of illegally seized evidence

and (2) the police violated his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel by denying him access to his attorney. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s finding that

Watson waived his right to remain silent and to consult

with counsel since he talked with the officers throughout

the day without asserting either of those rights. See People

v. Watson, 735 N.E.2d 75, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). The

appellate court also agreed that Watson’s confessions

were not provoked by the mention of a “couple of items”

found at the residence, id. at 87-88, and affirmed the trial

court’s judgment.

Watson petitioned for leave to appeal to the Supreme

Court of Illinois. In his petition, Watson argued that the

appellate court (1) incorrectly held that his confessions

could be attributed to the search only if police confronted

him with specific items seized during the search;

(2) overlooked one of the factors enumerated in Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), in determining whether the

confessions were sufficiently attenuated from the

search; (3) should have determined that his waiver of his

right to counsel was uninformed; (4) incorrectly ruled

that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach when Nigohosian became involved in the investigation; and (5) deprived him of due process by affirming a

conviction that lacked evidentiary support. The Supreme

Court of Illinois denied Watson’s petition.
6 No. 06-1388

Watson filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, Watson

argued, among other things, that (1) his confessions

should have been inadmissible because officers baited

him by mentioning the search; (2) the appellate court’s

attenuation analysis was incorrect; (3) Nigohosian’s

involvement caused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach, therefore the police violated this right by

interviewing him without counsel present; (4) he was

unable to fully and fairly litigate his Fourth Amendment

claims because the state courts ignored evidence that his

confessions were prompted by notice of the search; and (5)

the Supreme Court of Illinois deprived him of due process by denying leave to appeal.

The district court held that federal-court review of

Watson’s Fourth Amendment claims was foreclosed

because Watson had the opportunity to litigate them in

state court. See Watson v. Briley, No. 01-C-9101, 2005 WL

736656, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2005). The court also

held that the state appellate court’s interpretation of the

facts and law regarding whether Watson’s right to counsel

attached because of Nigohosian’s involvement in the

investigation was reasonable, and denied relief on that

ground. Id. at 10. Although the district court denied

Watson’s petition, it concluded that he made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with

respect to two issues—whether intervening circumstances

broke the connection between the unlawful search and

Watson’s confessions, and whether Nigohosian had

assumed a formal prosecutorial role sufficient to invoke

Watson’s right to counsel—and granted a certificate of

appealability.
No. 06-1388 7

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.

1214 (1996), habeas corpus relief is available only if

Watson can establish that the state court proceedings

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). We review the denial of a § 2254 petition

de novo. Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1026 (7th

Cir. 2006).

B. Fourth Amendment Claim

On appeal Watson first argues that his confessions

should have been inadmissible at trial because they were

triggered by the officers’ illegal search of the first-floor

apartment. He further contends that the Appellate Court

of Illinois failed to determine whether intervening circumstances broke the causal chain between the unlawful

search and his confessions. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. As

the district court noted, a petitioner cannot obtain collateral relief on a Fourth Amendment claim unless the

state courts deprived him of a full and fair opportunity

to litigate the claim. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82

(1976); Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.

2005); Mahaffey v. Schomig, 294 F.3d 907, 918-19 (7th Cir.

2002). In this case, Watson challenged the admissibility

of his confessions in the trial court and renewed the

claim before the appellate court. See Watson, 735 N.E.2d

at 85-89. Watson argues that the appellate court’s “failure”
8 No. 06-1388

to consider one of the Brown factors denied him a full

and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment

claim, but we have held that a “full and fair opportunity”

guarantees only “the right to present one’s case.” Cabrera

v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003); see

Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 563-65 (7th Cir. 2002);

accord Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir.

2002). Watson presented his Fourth Amendment claim to

the Illinois courts, and “[a]bsent a subversion of the

hearing process,” we will not examine whether those

courts “got the decision right.” Cabrera, 324 F.3d at 531.

Therefore we agree with the district court that federal

habeas corpus review of Watson’s Fourth Amendment

claim was foreclosed. See Wyant, 296 F.3d at 565.

C. Sixth Amendment Claim

Watson next argues that his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel attached upon Nigohosian’s “adversarial” involvement in the investigation, and that this right was violated

because Watson did not have access to counsel during his

confessions. We review the decision of the last state court

to rule on the merits, in this case, the Appellate Court of

Illinois. See Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir.

2006). Whether the state court’s holding is contrary to

clearly established federal law is a mixed question of law

and fact that we review de novo, but we defer to any

reasonable state-court decision. See id.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the

initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, whether by

way of formal charge, indictment, information, or arraignment. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004);

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). This right to

counsel applies not only at trial, but also at any critical

stage of the prosecution. Jackson v. Miller, 260 F.3d 769,

775 (7th Cir. 2001). In this case, Watson had not been
No. 06-1388 9

indicted and charges had not been brought against him

when he confessed to Nigohosian. Watson cites Illinois

law, which holds that the level of prosecutorial involvement may bear on whether the defendant’s right to counsel has attached, see, e.g., People v. Garrett, 688 N.E.2d

614, 618 (Ill. 1997), and asks us to find that his right to

counsel attached because of Nigohosian’s participation

in the investigation. But again, formal proceedings had

not begun, so Watson had no Sixth Amendment right to

counsel when he confessed. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.

412, 428-32 (1986) (rejecting claim that Sixth Amendment

right to counsel mandated suppression of statements

made before initiation of adversary judicial proceedings

because defendant’s lawyer was not present). We have also

held that interrogation of a suspect before the filing of a

charge, without more, does not trigger the right to counsel.

See First Def. Legal Aid v. City of Chi., 319 F.3d 967, 970-

71 (7th Cir. 2003); Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128, 130

(7th Cir. 1982).

Even if Watson’s right to counsel had attached—which

it had not—he clearly waived the right. The parties did not

address this issue on appeal, but we have held that a

defendant is permitted to make a knowing and intelligent

waiver of his right to counsel during a police-initiated

interrogation. See United States v. Spruill, 296 F.3d 580,

589-90 (7th Cir. 2002). Here Watson was given the

Miranda warnings upon his arrest and was reminded of

them before he made his first confession. The Appellate

Court of Illinois found that he “voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently waived his rights,” Watson, 735 N.E.2d at

84, and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. We

therefore conclude that the state court’s decision was

reasonable and that Watson is not entitled to collateral

relief on his Sixth Amendment claim.
10 No. 06-1388

D. Due Process Claims

Watson’s final argument on appeal is that the Illinois

courts deprived him of due process. Watson faults the

appellate court for basing its decision on “sham facts of its

own creation” and further contends that the Supreme

Court of Illinois “transgressed its own rules denying

Watson’s appeal as of right.” Watson was granted a

certificate of appealability only with respect to his Fourth

and Sixth Amendment claims, and he has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,

as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) to expand the certificate. See Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir.

2002). Although he disputes the appellate court’s factual

findings, Watson cannot rebut the presumption of correctness that these findings enjoy. St. Pierre v. Walls, 297

F.3d 617, 627 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, as the district

court noted, the state supreme court’s misinterpretation of

its procedural rules does not constitute a violation of

federal constitutional law, and is therefore not a basis

for collateral relief. Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 642

(7th Cir. 2003).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district

court’s denial of Watson’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus.
No. 06-1388 11

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-26-07