The Hon. Richard S. Arnold stepped down as Chief Judge of the United States 1 Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circ uit at the close of business on April 17, 1998. He has been succeeded by the Hon. Pasco M. Bowman II. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-3551EM

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * On Appeal from the v. * United States District Court * for the Eastern District * of Missouri. Albion Norman, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 14, 1998 Filed: April 23, 1998

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, LAY and LOKEN, Circuit Judges. 1

___________ RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge. Dr. Albion A. Norman, Jr., was co nvicted after a jury trial of two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), two counts of transportation of stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S .C. § 2314 (1994), four counts of engaging in monetary transactions derived from unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §The Hon. Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District 2 of Missouri. -2- 195 7 (1994), and seventeen counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C

. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994). The District Court sentenced Norman to 109 months (12 2 years and one month) in prison, and he appeals. Norman contends, among other things, that he cannot be found guilty of money laundering because he used his own name and made no effort to conceal his identity in the transactions thatare the basis of the moneylaund ering charges. We reject this contention, as well as other arguments made o n appeal, and affirm the convictions and sentence. Norman's first argument has to do with count VIII, one of the counts chargi ng that he engaged in monetary transactions derived from unlawf ul activity. This case revolves around funds o n deposit in a Florida bank, amounting initially to some $9,225,000.00. It is sufficient for present purposes to know that the evidence tended to show that the money belonged not to Norman but to the Fernc liff Cemetery Association of Hartsdale, New Yo rk, and that Norman knew this. (We recount the facts in the light mos t favorable to the jury's verdict.) Without the authority or knowledge of the true owner, Norman caused or attempted to cause certain funds, amounting ultimately to the entire $9,225,000.00, to be transferred into other accounts under his control.
The particular transaction charged in count VIII was the attempt by Norman to transfer the then-remaining bal ance in the account, amounting to $7,980,993.78. If the transfer had t aken place, the money would have gone to an account in another bank in the name of entities controlled by Norman and his associates. Norman's defense is that the bank in which the funds were originally deposited had asked that this transfer b e made. The bank wanted the account closed. De fendant argues that he cannot be guilty of a crime for following the directions of the bank. W e disagree. The particular motive or cause that led Norman to attempt the transfer is not material.-3-

The p oint is that the money did not belong to Norman, and that he had no authority to direct that it be transferred to an account under his own control. Norman's next argument h as to do with the seventeen money-laundering counts. Inorder to place the argument in an understandable context, we state the facts of one of these counts. Using part of the money that had earlier been transferred from th e account in the Florida bank, Norman bought a blue 1993 Range Rover for $47,790.00. He paid for

the car with a check drawn on an account of a business he controlled, and the car was ti tled in the name of the same business. Norman made no attempt t o conceal from the seller of the car his own identity, or the fact that he owned the business that was to become the owner of the car. This absence of concealment, he now argues, prevents him from being convicted of money laundering. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), provides as follows: (a)(1) Whoe ver, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the pro ceeds of some form of unlawf ulactivity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a fina ncial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds o f specified unlawful activity -

* * * (B) knowing t

hat the transaction is designed in whole or in part - (i) to c onceal or disguise the nature, the loc ation, the source, the ownership, o r the control of the proceeds of specifie d unlawful activity; . . .-4-

The statute does not require that there be any intention or design to conceal the identity of the person dealing with the property. It requires, instead, that a defendant know that the transacti on is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, th e location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. There is no contention that the money used to buy the car was not the proceeds of specifie d unlawful activity. The contention is, rather, that there was no proof tha t Norma n intended to disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the money. We disagree. The point is not whether the seller of the car is deceived as to who Norman was, but rather that by changing the proceeds of unlawfu l activity from the formo f money (or, more properly, a bank account) -- through the use of other , undisclosed business accounts -- i nto the form of an automobile, Norman made it more difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to it.
Un der our cases, this is sufficient to make out a violation of the statute. Se e Uni ted States v. Nattier , 127 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 66 U.S.L. Wee k 3655 (U.S. April 6, 1998) (No. 97-8170), where we said:

Second, Nattier and Coley [the defendants] conten d that their actions did not demonstrate an intent to conceal their identity and relationship to the funds because they were readil y identifiable as officers of the corporation through which they were spending the funds. Reg ardless of whether Nattier and Coley attempted to conceal their ownership of o r relationship to the fu nds, their intent to conceal the nature or source o f the funds within the meaning of section 1956 (a)(1) (B)(i) was evident. . . . [E]venthough the defendants did not use false names in a n at tempt to conceal their identity, they used their legitimat e real estate business and Nattier's father in an attempt to-5-

conceal the source of the funds within the meaning of subsectio n (a)(1)(B)(i). . . . In the present case . . . the defendants first deposited th e embez zled Mercantile Bank's checks in IRI's business bank account and then invested the ill egal proceeds in property by drawing checks on IRI's account, thus representi ng the illegal proceeds as funds of their legitimate business. Additionally, Na ttier transferred some of the illegal funds from IRI' s account to the Texas bank account and represented the funds as money borrowed from his father. Id. at 659.
Norman relies on United States v. Rockelman , 49 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1995), but we believe the case is distinguishable. There, the defendant purchased a cabin with cas h derived from his drug sales, in person. In contrast, the proceeds of Norman' s unlawful activity were held and spent in ways that evidenced the necessary intent t o conceal. The money was deposited into three bank accounts held in two names, neither of which was on the Florida bank account known to Ferncliff Cemetery Association

. The subsequent purchases were made by checks. The y involved automobiles and other goods that were not matters of public record, as the real estate trans action in Rockelman was. Thus, the facts of this case present neither the "straightforward real estat e tran saction," nor the "conspicuous connection" between the defendant and hi s purch ases, that characterized Rockelman

. Id. at 422. Rather, there was sufficien t evidence for the jury to find that Norman "intended (at least in part) to disguise th e relationship of the item purchased with the person providing the proceeds and that the proceeds w ere obtained from illegal activities," thus violating the statute. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, Norm an challenges the sentence that was imposed on him. Because all twenty-five counts on which he was convicted related to the same basic series of-6-

transac tions, the setting up of the bank account and Norman's diversion or attempte d diver sionof the contents thereof, the District Court grouped all of the counts fo r purposes of determining the appropria te offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. There i s no contention that grouping was improper. It is agreed, in addition, that th e proper pro cedure when counts are grouped is to use the offense level of the count o r counts that carry the most severe sentence. Here, those counts were the money

laundering charges. The District Court enhanced the offense level on these counts by two levels f

or obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. This action was base d upon the Court's finding, which is not contested on appeal, that Norman perjure d himself during his testimony at trial. Norman now argues that this procedure wa s improper, and that the two-level enhancement should not have been applied, because his perjury at trial related only to the wire-fraud and interstate-trans portation counts, and had nothing to do with the laundering counts.
We affirm the District Court's obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Contrary to Norman's assertions, his perjury was releva nt to the money-laundering counts. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) requires t he defendant to know that the financial transaction at issue invo lves the proceeds of unlawful activity. The Court found that Norman lied about his understanding of the ownership of the money in the Florida bank account , among other things. This information was t herefore relevant to the jury's determination of wh ether Norman was guilty of money-laundering, and Norman's perjury was a n obstruction of justice "during the . . . prosecution . . . of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1997).
Affirmed.-7-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.