I N T H E

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-136

C.S., Jr.,

Appellant (Defendant),

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee (Plaintiff).

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-137

Z.T.,

Appellant (Defendant),

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee (Plaintiff).

Argued: April 25, 2019 | Decided: October 1, 2019

Appeals from the Elkhart Circuit Court, 

Nos. 20C01-1712-JD-612, 20C01-1710-JD-540

The Honorable Michael A. Christofeno, Judge

The Honorable Deborah A. Domine, Magistrate

On Petitions to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, 

Nos. 18A-JV-862, 18A-JV-1656

Opinion by Justice Goff

Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Slaughter concur.

Justice David concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion.
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Goff, Justice.

In separate proceedings, two teenagers were sent to the Indiana 

Department of Correction after a hearing where they appeared by video

rather than in person. Although the main characters differ, everything 

else about the teenagers’ stories, from the start of the hearing to this point, 

is nearly identical. The teenagers each appeared by Skype at a hearing to 

decide whether their juvenile dispositional decrees should be modified to 

make them wards of the Department of Correction. Although the 

teenagers did not object to participating via Skype, nothing in the record 

indicates that they agreed to do so or that the trial court found good cause 

for their remote participation. At the end of the hearings, both teenagers 

were made wards of the Department of Correction. They separately 

appealed, arguing primarily that their remote participation in their 

hearings did not comply with Indiana Administrative Rule 14. We find 

that Rule 14 generally governs the use of telephones and audiovisual 

telecommunication tools in our trial courts, including in juvenile cases,

and Rule 14(B) applies to the types of hearings involved here. But we 

ultimately conclude that the teenagers have failed to show that their 

remote participation resulted in fundamental error. Therefore, they 

cannot gain the relief they seek, and we affirm the trial court. However, 

we close this opinion with guidance to courts and attorneys so that this 

procedural story is not repeated.

Factual and Procedural History

Although different underlying circumstances and separate juvenile 

proceedings led them to the Department of Correction (DOC), the 

juveniles involved in both cases, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. (or, the Juveniles), 

experienced nearly identical procedures along the way.1 The same trial 

court judge separately adjudicated both C.S., Jr. and Z.T. delinquents in 

1 Because of the similarities of the procedure and arguments in both cases, we held a 

combined oral argument and choose to issue a single opinion addressing both cases.
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late 2017. The Juveniles were physically present at these hearings. The 

same judge held separate disposition-modification hearings in 2018 where 

the State requested that the Juveniles be made wards of the DOC.

2

 Both 

C.S., Jr. and Z.T. participated in these disposition-modification hearings 

via the videoconferencing application Skype. Neither C.S., Jr. nor Z.T. 

objected on the record to appearing via Skype, but there is also no 

indication in the record that the parties agreed to this type of remote 

participation or that the trial court found good cause for this procedure. 

During these hearings, testimony from multiple people—including C.S., 

Jr. and Z.T.—was noted as “indiscernible to [the court] reporter.” See, e.g., 

C.S., Jr. Tr. Vol. II, p. 43; Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, p. 47. At the conclusion of both 

disposition-modification hearings, the trial court granted the State’s 

request and made each juvenile a ward of the DOC. C.S., Jr. and Z.T. both 

indicated their intent to appeal, and the trial court appointed a new 

attorney to represent both juveniles in their separate appeals.

Before the Court of Appeals, C.S., Jr. brought a two-pronged attack. 

First, C.S., Jr. argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

wardship to the DOC. Second, relying on Indiana Administrative Rule 14 

and this Court’s interpretation of Rule 14 in the context of criminal 

sentencing, C.S., Jr. argued that he had a right to be physically present at 

the modification hearing and the trial court erred when it went forward 

with the hearing despite his Skype participation. The Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court in a published decision. C.S., Jr. v. State, 110 

N.E.3d 433, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In concluding that C.S., Jr.’s Skype 

participation was acceptable, the panel differentiated criminal defendants 

from juveniles and found that C.S., Jr. was given all that was required by 

statute: notice of the modification hearing and an opportunity to be heard. 

Id. at 436–437 (discussing Hawkins v. State, 982 N.E.2d 997, 1002–03 (Ind. 

2013), and Ind. Code § 31-37-18-1.3 (2007)). C.S., Jr. sought rehearing, 

arguing that the Court of Appeals did not adequately address his 

2 At both hearings, the same deputy prosecutor represented the State, and the same attorney 

represented both C.S., Jr. and Z.T.
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arguments based on Administrative Rule 14, but the Court of Appeals 

denied the petition. 

Z.T. brought a similar two-pronged attack, contending that the trial 

court erred in granting wardship to the DOC and in conducting the 

hearing with Z.T. participating via Skype. However, Z.T. built on C.S., 

Jr.’s argument and specifically argued that the trial court’s holding of a 

hearing at which Z.T. was not physically present contravened 

Administrative Rule 14 and thereby denied him due process. In a 

memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Z.T. 

v. State, No. 18A-JV-1656, 2018 WL 6332469, *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2018). 

Relying in part on C.S., Jr. to conclude that Z.T.’s Skype participation was 

adequate, Z.T.’s panel likewise distinguished criminal defendants from 

juveniles and found that Z.T. had notice of the modification hearing and 

an opportunity to be heard at it. Id. at *3. The panel then went a step 

further and concluded that Rule 14 did not apply to the juvenile 

modification hearing in which Z.T. participated. Id. 

C.S., Jr. and Z.T. separately sought transfer and made nearly identical 

arguments centered on the propriety of their remote participation in the 

modification hearings below. Additionally, the Indiana Public Defender 

Council, Juvenile Defense Project appeared as amicus curiae aligned with 

the Juveniles in both cases. We granted C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s petitions to 

transfer to address the issue of their Skype participation at their 

modification hearings, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinions. 

See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). We summarily affirm both Court of 

Appeals panels below on the issue of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in granting wardship of C.S., Jr. and Z.T. to the DOC. See App. 

R. 58(A)(2).

Standard of Review

This case involves a question of the scope and applicability of Indiana 

Administrative Rule 14, and we interpret our administrative rules de 

novo. See Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 1002–03 (interpreting Ind. 

Administrative Rule 14 de novo).
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However, before the trial court, neither C.S., Jr. nor Z.T. objected to 

appearing at their modification hearings by video, so they must show that 

the alleged error was fundamental to gain relief. Kelly v. State, 122 N.E.3d 

803, 805 (Ind. 2019) (“Fundamental error is an exception to the general 

rule that a party’s failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue 

on appeal.”). “An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable on appeal, if 

it ‘made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of 

basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable 

and substantial potential for harm.’” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 

(Ind. 2018) (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014)). 

“[F]undamental error is a daunting standard that applies ‘only in 

egregious circumstances’” where the trial judge should have corrected the 

situation sua sponte. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1281 (citation omitted). 

Discussion and Decision

C.S., Jr. and Z.T. challenge the process by which the trial court modified 

their juvenile dispositional decrees and made them wards of the DOC. 

They argue that the trial court violated Administrative Rule 14 and 

thereby denied them due process when it had them participate in their 

disposition-modification hearings by Skype without their express 

agreement or a finding of good cause. We proceed in four parts. First, we 

consider the scope and applicability of Rule 14, determining if the rule 

applies in these situations. Second, we determine if the trial court 

followed Rule 14 here. Third, we assess whether the alleged error in 

having C.S., Jr. and Z.T. participate in their hearings remotely resulted in 

fundamental error entitling them to relief. Fourth, we offer guidance to 

courts and parties faced with these situations going forward.

I. Administrative Rule 14 applies to juvenile 

disposition-modification hearings.

Administrative Rule 14 governs the use of telephones and audiovisual 

telecommunication tools in both criminal and civil matters in our trial 

courts. See generally Admin. R. 14. Sections A and B of the rule explain 
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when these modes of remote participation can be used in various 

situations. Section C then details the minimum technical requirements for 

telephones or audiovisual telecommunication devices under Rule 14. The 

parties agree that Rule 14 can apply in juvenile cases generally, but they 

disagree as to how the various sections of the rule might apply to the 

hearings conducted below. 

A. Rule 14(B) governs the use of telephones and 

audiovisual telecommunication devices in juvenile 

disposition-modification hearings.

Section A of Rule 14 provides specific conferences, hearings, and 

proceedings where remote participation under the rule is permissible. 

Admin. R. 14(A). These specific proceedings include pre-trial conferences, 

certain initial hearings in criminal cases, and misdemeanor guilty plea 

hearings. Admin. R. 14(A)(1)(a), (A)(2)(a), (A)(2)(b). The only juvenile 

delinquency hearings listed in Rule 14(A) are “detention hearing[s] 

pursuant to IC 31-37-6 or . . . periodic review hearing[s] pursuant to IC 31-

37-20-2.” Admin. R. 14(A)(2)(g). Because the disposition-modification 

hearings held in C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s cases were neither detention hearings 

nor periodic review hearings, Rule 14(A) does not apply. Compare I.C. ch. 

31-37-22 (2017) (disposition-modification hearings) with I.C. ch. 31-37-6 

(detention hearings) and I.C. § 31-37-20-2 (periodic review hearings). 

Section B of Rule 14 then acts as a broad, catch-all provision, governing 

remote participation in “other proceedings.” Admin. R. 14(B). 

Specifically, Rule 14(B) applies to “any conference, hearing or proceeding 

not specifically enumerated in Section (A) of this rule, with the exception 

of criminal proceedings involving the right of confrontation or the right to 

be present.” Id. In situations falling within this broad scope, remote 

participation tools can be used if either (1) all the parties consent in 

writing and that consent is entered on the Chronological Case Summary

or (2) the trial court, on its own motion or that of a party, finds good cause 

for remote participation based on factors provided in the rule. Admin. R. 

14(B)(1)–(2). As provided by the plain language of Rule 14(B), the only 

exceptions to its broad scope are situations listed in Rule 14(A) and certain 
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criminal proceedings. Otherwise, Rule 14(B) governs the use of remote 

participation tools in all conferences, hearings, and proceedings.

Juvenile disposition-modification hearings fall within the broad scope 

of Rule 14(B) because neither of the exceptions to the rule’s scope apply. 

First, as noted above, the only juvenile delinquency proceedings listed in 

Rule 14(A) are detention hearings and periodic review hearings, and the 

disposition-modification hearings at issue here are different. Second, 

juvenile proceedings are not criminal matters. E.g., D.M. v. State, 949 

N.E.2d 327, 333 n.6 (Ind. 2011). Thus, because juvenile dispositionmodification hearings are not listed in Rule 14(A) and are not criminal 

matters, Rule 14(B) applies and should have been complied with here.

B. The State’s arguments against Rule 14(B)’s applicability 

are misplaced.

The State argues that Rule 14(B) does not govern C.S., Jr.’s or Z.T.’s 

remote appearance in these cases because it addresses “the lack of the 

personal presence of a testifying witness, not of a party to the 

proceeding.” C.S., Jr. State’s Response to Pet. to Transfer, p. 7; Z.T. State’s 

Response to Pet. to Transfer, p. 7. In support of this argument, the State 

contends that the factors provided in the rule for determining whether 

good cause exists and the notice requirements for a motion to use remote 

communication tools relate to the presence of a witness. This focus, the 

State concludes, limits the scope of Rule 14(B) to non-party witnesses. 

Although Rule 14(B) uses witness-focused language in some parts, its 

applicability is not limited to situations when a non-party witness seeks to 

testify remotely for three reasons. 

First, the State’s argument ignores the broad statement of Rule 14(B)’s 

scope and would necessarily require us to read language into the rule that 

is not there. Rule 14(B) expressly applies to “any conference, hearing or 

proceeding not specifically enumerated in Section (A) of this rule, with the 

exception of criminal proceedings involving the right of confrontation or 

the right to be present.” Admin. R. 14(B). The State’s interpretation of the 

rule would add an additional limitation to that scope whereby the rule 
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would apply only to situations when a non-party witness seeks to testify 

remotely, but that limitation is not found in the plain language of the rule. 

Second, the good-cause factors do not uniformly or exclusively refer to 

out-of-court non-party witnesses. Rule 14(B) provides the following 

factors that must be considered by the court in its good-cause 

determination: 

(a) Whether, after due diligence, the party has been unable to 

procure the physical presence of the witness;

(b) Whether effective cross-examination of the witness is 

possible, considering the availability of documents and 

exhibits to counsel and the witness;

(c) The complexity of the proceedings and the importance of 

the offered testimony in relation to the convenience to the 

party and the proposed witness;

(d) The importance of presenting the testimony of the witness 

in open court, where the fact finder may observe the 

demeanor of the witness and impress upon the witness the 

duty to testify truthfully;

(e) Whether undue surprise or unfair prejudice would result; 

and

(f) Any other factors a trial court may determine to be relevant 

in an individual case.

Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(a)–(f). Reviewing this list, we see that only two of the 

six factors—(a) and (d)—necessarily refer to an out-of-court witness. 

Neither factor (e) nor factor (f) refers to witnesses at all. And both factor 

(b) and factor (c) can apply to situations involving an out-of-court party 

and an in-court witness. For example, in relation to factor (b), there may 

be real concerns about an out-of-court party’s ability to effectively crossexamine an in-court witness by video conference. 

Third, Rule 14(C), which provides the minimum technical requirements 

for remote participation, shows that out-of-court parties are contemplated 

by Rule 14. Rule 14(C) applies “to any hearing or proceeding conducted 

under this rule” and requires the court to assure that “[t]he facility and 
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equipment provide counsel with the ability to confer privately with an out 

of court party.” Admin. R. 14(C)(1). If Rule 14(B) applies only when a 

witness might testify remotely, this part of Rule 14(C) expressly referring 

to out-of-court parties would be rendered meaningless for proceedings 

that fall under Rule 14(B). Thus, the scope of Rule 14(B) is not limited to

situations involving non-party witnesses seeking to testify remotely, and 

the rule applies here.

II. The trial court did not follow Rule 14(B) in holding 

the hearings with the Juveniles participating 

remotely.

Having concluded that Rule 14(B) applies here, we consider whether 

the trial court followed its requirements. The rule allows remote, 

electronic participation only when (1) all parties consent and that consent 

is reflected in the Chronological Case Summary or (2) the court finds good 

cause. Admin. R. 14(B)(1)–(2). The entries in the Chronological Case 

Summaries for these hearings do not indicate that the parties agreed to the 

Juveniles participating via Skype. See C.S., Jr. App. Vol 2, p. 6; Z.T. App. 

Vol. II, p. 7. And the State acknowledges that the trial court did not make 

findings of good cause. C.S., Jr. State’s Response in Opposition to 

Transfer, p. 9; Z.T. State’s Response in Opposition to Transfer, pp. 7–8. 

Without an agreement on the issue or a finding of good cause on the 

record, the trial court erred when it allowed C.S., Jr. and Z.T. to appear 

and participate in the hearings via Skype. Because the Juveniles did not 

object to their remote appearance, however, this conclusion does not 

resolve these appeals.

III. The error in allowing C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s remote 

participation was not fundamental.

Although the trial court did not follow Rule 14 here, neither C.S., Jr. nor 

Z.T. has shown that the trial court’s noncompliance with the rule “made a 

fair trial [or, in this case, a fair hearing] impossible” or “present[ed] an 
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undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652 

(citation omitted). As a result, the Juveniles have failed to satisfy the 

daunting standard of fundamental error and are not entitled to relief.

A. The Juveniles’ general arguments do not show 

fundamental error occurred.

In addressing the fairness of the hearings and the potential for harm in 

appearing remotely, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. make several high-level arguments 

generally applicable to all juveniles in similar situations. They argue that 

remote participation tools make it harder for a juvenile to participate in 

the delinquency process, lessen the reformative impact of contact with the 

juvenile court, and “undermine trust in the justice system.” C.S., Jr. Pet. to 

Transfer, p. 11; Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 12. Referencing the parens patriae

role of a juvenile court, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. try to drive home their point by 

saying, “Parents talk face-to-face with children when disciplining them. 

They communicate directly, rather than indirectly through equipment, 

when disciplining their children. And a court should be expected to do 

the same unless the juvenile consents to not being personally present.” 

C.S., Jr. Pet. to Transfer, p. 12; Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 14. While some 

nuances may be lost during the course of some video-conference hearings, 

we cannot agree that a properly conducted juvenile hearing with remote 

participants necessarily results in the harms the Juveniles predict. In some 

cases, a juvenile may benefit more from sticking closely to a routine built 

for rehabilitation and appearing at a hearing remotely rather than by 

being taken out of his or her rehabilitative setting and routine to be 

transported to a hearing. And as parents traveling away from their 

children for military deployments, work trips, or other reasons know, 

under the right circumstances, a person can still effectively parent and 

discipline a child from a distance. 

In another general argument, the Juveniles contend that a substantial 

potential for harm exists because a juvenile could eventually become a 

criminal as an adult. Combined Oral Argument at 8:21–10:08, 38:33–38:45. 

But the risk that the juvenile justice system fails to set a child on the right 

path, resulting in the child later entering the criminal justice system as an 
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adult, exists in every juvenile case. We cannot agree with the Juveniles’ 

argument that this risk is necessarily increased by a trial court’s decision 

to conduct a hearing by video. Ultimately, the risk of unfairness and 

potential harms discussed in these general arguments are too speculative 

and too far removed from the error here to lead us to find fundamental 

error.

B. The Juveniles’ arguments based on the specific facts of 

their cases do not show that fundamental error occurred.

In addition to their general arguments, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. also advance 

an argument regarding fundamental error based on the specific facts here. 

They contend that their remote participation in the hearings made a fair 

hearing impossible and presented a substantial potential for harm because 

portions of their statements were noted by the court reporter as 

indiscernible. “Indiscernible testimony,” the Juveniles offer, “is likely the 

result of poor or inadequate equipment or equipment failures.” C.S., Jr.

Pet. to Transfer, p. 12; Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 13. We cannot agree. While 

notations in the transcript of indiscernible statements could indicate 

technical problems with the equipment used by the trial court, two aspects 

of these cases show that it is unlikely that technical issues impacted the 

hearings. 

First, in both hearings, statements from people who appear to have 

been in the courtroom were noted as indiscernible. C.S., Jr.’s mother 

participated in the modification hearing, and the court reporter noted 

some of her statements as indiscernible. C.S., Jr. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 42–43. But 

C.S., Jr.’s mother was in the courtroom. C.S., Jr. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, 

p. 71. In Z.T.’s case, portions of the probation officer’s and defense 

counsel’s statements were noted as indiscernible, Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 40, 

59, but they appear to have been in the courtroom, see Z.T. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II, pp. 7, 78 (showing no indication of their remote participation 

in the Chronological Case Summary or in the trial court’s order). Thus, 

the testimony noted as indiscernible in the transcripts was not tied 

exclusively to the remote participants. 
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Second, if the video feed at the hearing cut out or there was some other 

issue that rendered the Juveniles’ statements unintelligible, we would 

expect to see another participant—the trial court judge, defense counsel, 

the prosecutor, the probation officer, or one of C.S., Jr.’s or Z.T.’s family 

members—speak up and ask for clarification. But that did not happen. In 

fact, the trial judge seemed to have no problem understanding at least one 

statement from C.S., Jr.’s mother marked as indiscernible. See C.S., Jr. Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 42 (“THE MOTHER: (Indiscernible to reporter) ... what I have to 

say. THE COURT: Well, it always makes a differen[ce] what a parent has 

to say, but we don’t know if it’s going to be persuasive until you say it.”). 

And during Z.T.’s hearing, the trial court specifically asked Z.T., “[C]an 

you hear what’s going on?” to which Z.T. replied, “Yeah.” Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 40. Based on our review of the transcript, the clarity of someone’s 

statement at the hearing did not depend on whether that person was in 

the courtroom or appeared by video, and the participants in the hearing 

likely understood the statements noted in the transcript as indiscernible. 

Thus, notations that some of C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s statements at their

hearings were indiscernible to the court reporter do not show that their 

remote participation in the hearings resulted in fundamental error. 3

Neither the Juveniles’ general arguments nor their specific arguments 

have shown that the trial court fundamentally erred in having them 

participate in their hearings remotely. By failing to object at trial and 

failing to demonstrate fundamental error on appeal, C.S., Jr. and Z.T. have 

waived the issue and are not entitled to relief. “Going forward, though, 

we would expect to see what our rules require reflected in the record, and 

would urge trial courts to be cautious of using procedures—however 

efficient they may be—without following all of the steps required to 

implement those procedures . . . .” Hawkins, 982 N.E.2d at 1003.

3 Z.T. also mentions that there were questions as to whether he could see his mother during 

the hearing. Z.T. Pet. to Transfer, p. 13. However, Z.T. admits (and the record reflects) that 

the issue was resolved during the hearing after an adjustment was made. Z.T. Appellant’s 

Br., p. 24; Z.T. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 32–33. Since the issue was resolved, this does not support a 

finding of fundamental error.
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IV. Guidance for the Future

Having resolved the question before us, we pause now to offer advice 

to courts and parties faced with similar situations in the future. First, we 

give guidance to trial courts deciding whether they can hold a proceeding 

with remote participants pursuant to Rule 14(B). Then, we share advice 

regarding trial counsel’s best course of action when faced with a situation 

similar to what occurred below. 

If a trial court holds a hearing with remote participants based on a 

finding of good cause pursuant to Rule 14(B), it must base its good-cause 

determination on the factors listed in the rule and issue a written order

complying with the rule’s deadlines. Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(a)–(f), (B)(3). 

While the trial court here did not follow this requirement, the records

contain facts that likely would have been relevant to the good-cause 

determinations. See Admin. R. 14(B)(2)(f) (directing courts to consider 

“[a]ny other factors a trial court may determine to be relevant in an 

individual case”). In a prior hearing in Z.T.’s case, the trial court noted 

that it did not have transportation available every day of the week. Z.T. 

Tr. Vol. II, p. 3. And both Juveniles had exhibited highly disruptive 

behavior. Id. at pp. 37–38; C.S., Jr. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 34–37. Neither this 

opinion nor Rule 14 aims to provide a complete list of the factors relevant 

to a Rule 14(B)(2) good-cause determination, but these facts likely would 

have been relevant to a finding of good cause here.

Further, in making a Rule 14(B)(2) good-cause determination in a 

juvenile case, a trial court will necessarily need to consider the unique 

aspects of the juvenile justice system. This system “is founded on the 

notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the 

shoes of the parents.” In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004). 

Consistent with this foundation, juvenile courts are generally concerned 

with acting in the child’s best interests. Id. at 636 (quoting Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed 

that the state maintains ‘a parens patriae interest in preserving and 

promoting the welfare of the child.’”); N.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re 

N.E.), 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010) (“The resolution of a juvenile 

proceeding focuses on the best interests of the child . . . .”). This concern 
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about the child’s best interests can extend to the way the juvenile court 

addresses and interacts with the child. Thus, the child’s best interests will 

generally constitute a relevant factor under Rule 14(B)(2)(f) in a juvenile 

court’s good-cause determination.

Finally, when a party is confronted with potential noncompliance with 

an applicable rule, the party should object. Because neither C.S, Jr. nor 

Z.T. objected to participating remotely in their hearings, they faced the 

daunting burden of showing fundamental error, which they ultimately 

failed to do. A properly placed objection would have preserved the issue 

for appeal. However, the practical effect of an objection is likely more 

important to an attorney’s client. A “trial court can often correct an error 

if it is called to the court’s attention. This can result in enormous savings 

in time, effort and expense to the parties and the court, including avoiding 

an appeal and retrial.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) 

(quoting State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 835 (Ind. 1997)). While objections 

might not have changed the outcome of the hearings or the appeals, they

would have allowed the trial court to address C.S., Jr.’s and Z.T.’s 

concerns right away.

Conclusion

Administrative Rule 14 controls when telephones and audiovisual 

telecommunication tools can be used in both criminal and civil matters in 

our trial courts. Different sections of Rule 14 dictate when these remote 

participation tools may be used in different types of conferences, hearings, 

and proceedings, and here we conclude that Rule 14(B) governs the use of 

telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in juvenile 

disposition-modification hearings. However, because C.S., Jr. and Z.T. 

failed to object to the trial court’s noncompliance with Rule 14(B) and 

failed to demonstrate fundamental error, they have waived the issue. 

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

Rush, C.J., and Massa and Slaughter, JJ., concur.

David, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with separate opinion.
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A T T O R N E Y F O R A P P E L L A N TS

Nancy A. McCaslin

McCaslin & McCaslin

Elkhart, Indiana

A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Andrew Kobe

Laura R. Anderson

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

A T T O R N E Y F O R A M I C U S C U R I A E I N D I A N A P U B L I C D E F E N D E R 

C O U N C I L , J U V E N I L E D E F E N S E P R O J E C T

Joel C. Wieneke

Indiana Public Defender Council, Juvenile Defense Project

Indianapolis, Indiana
David, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I fully concur with Part I and Part II of the majority opinion. I also join 

Part IV of the opinion and wish to praise the guidance given to our trial 

judges by my colleague. I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority 

opinion, however, and would find that the failure of the trial court to 

follow Administrative Rule 14(B) resulted in fundamental error. 

Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for further 

proceedings.