IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2014-IA-00436-SCT
COMMUNITY

CARE CENTER OF ABERDEEN

v.
MARY ARNETTA BARRENTINE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/13/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES SETH ANDREW POUNDS TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JIM W AIDE RON L. W O ODRUFF JOHN L. MAXEY, II S. MARK W ANN KELLY HOLLINGSW ORTH STRINGER COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JOHN L. MAXEY, II S. MARK W ANN KELLY HOLLINGSW ORTH STRINGER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JIM W AIDE RON L. W O ODRUFF NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 03/26/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., AND LAMAR, J. DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A nursing hom e em ploy ee f iled a wrongf

ul-discharge suit m ore than a y e ar af ter she
claim s she was f

ired f or reporting suspected p a t i e n t abuse. Although w rongf ul-discharge
suits in Mississippi generally m ust be based upon w ritten em ploy m ent contracts, she claim s
her suit f alls u nder the public-policy exceptio n s t h is Court announced in McArn v. AlliedBruce-Term inix C o., Inc. 1 The issue p resented is w h ether—as she argues—her wrongfuldischarge suit is governed by the general three-y ear statute of lim itat i o n s governing torts, 2

or—as the nursing hom e argues—it is governed by the one-y ear statute of l i mi t a tions applicable to unwritten em ploy m ent contracts. 3 The tri a l c o u r t h eld McArn wrongfuldischarge claim s a re tort actions, subject to the general three-y ear statute of lim itations. W e

agree.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On Novem

ber 15, 2012, Mary Barrentine sued Com m unity Care Center o f

Aberdeen

“f or discharge in violation of public policy ,” alleging she was wrongf ully discharged f

rom
her nursing position on April 29, 2011, af ter she reported suspected nursing-hom e patient
abuse to the State Om

b u dsm an and Com m

unity Care Center’s corporate c om pliance of f icer.

Com m u nity Care Center r esponded with a mo t i on f or sum m a ry judgm ent, a rguing that
Barrentine’s claim s were based upon an unwritten em ploy m ent contract and, thus, barred by
Section 15-1-29’s one-y ear s tatute of l i m itations. Barrentine opposed the m otion, arguing
that h er s uit sounded in t ort and was governed by Section 15-1-49’s three-y ear s t a t ute of

lim itations. ¶3. T h e t r i a l c o u r t denied Com m u nity C are Center’s m otion f or s u m m ary

judgm e n t , f inding “that t he statute of lim itations f or a cause of action of wrongf u l discharge i n violation

1 See McArn v. Allied Bruce-Term inix Co., Inc. , 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993).

2 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 5 -1 -4 9 (R ev . 2 0 1 2 ).

3 S ee M iss. C o d e A n n . § 1 5 -1 -2 9 (R ev . 2 0 1 2 ).
2of Mississippi’s [ public] policy is three ( 3) y ears.” Because this is a n i s s u e of f irst

i mp r ession, w e granted Com m unity Care Center’s Petition f or Perm ission to Fil e Interlocutory

Appeal.

ANALYSIS ¶4. W e review a trial c ourt’s denial of a m otion f or sum m ary j udgm ent de n ovo, because
the “[ a]pplication of a statute of lim itation i s a question of law to which a d e novo standard . . . applies.” 4

A. McArn Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy Claim s ¶5. Mississippi rigidly f ollows the com m on l aw em ploy m ent-at-will principle, that is, “a

contract f or em ploy m ent f or an indef

inite period m ay be term inated at the will of either party ,

w h e ther the discharge is f or a ny reason or no reason at all.” 5 But in McAr n , t h i s C o u r t
created two independent t ort actions based o n “a narrow public policy e xc e p t i o n to the

em ploy m ent at will doctrine.” 6
¶6. In McArn , a f

orm er term ite-control em

ploy ee sued Term inix f

o r w rongf u l discharge

af ter h e allegedly was f

ired f o r telling the State Departm ent of Ag r i c u l t u re and other

custom ers that their hom es and businesses h ad not been properly treated. 7 W e held that “an

4 K n ig h t v. K n ig h t , 8 5 S o

. 3 d 8 3 2 , 8 3 5 (M iss. 2 0 1 2 ) (q u o tin g S a rris v. S m ith , 7 8 2 S o . 2 d 7 2 1 , 7 2 3 (M iss. 2 0 0 1 )).

5 B u ch a n a n v. A m e rista r C a sin o V ick s b u rg , I n c . , 8 5 2 S o

. 2 d 2 5 , 2 6 (M iss. 2 0 0 3 ) (citin g M cA rn , 6 2 6 S o . 2 d at 6 0 6 ).

6 M cA r n , 6 2 6 S o . 2 d at 6 0 7

.

7 Id
. at 6 0 4 -0 6

. 3em

ploy e e who ref

uses to participate in an illegal act

. . . shall not be barred by t he com m on
law r ule of e mp l o y

m ent at will f

rom bringing an action in tort f or dam ages against his

em ploy e r.” 8 W e also held that “ an em ploy ee who is d ischarged f or reporting illegal acts of
his em ploy er t o t he em

ploy er or a ny one else is not barred by the e m ploy m ent at will doctrine

f rom bringing action in tort f or dam ages against his em ploy er.” 9 W e describe d t h e s e torts

as “public policy exceptions to the age old com m on law rule of e m ploy m e nt at will,” and we held that “[ t]hese exceptions apply even w here there is ‘privately m ade law’ governing the

r e l a t i o n s h i p , w here the i llegal activity e ither d eclined by the em p loy ee o r reported by h im

af f ects third parties am ong the general public, though they are not parties t o the lawsuit.” 10
¶7. In W

illard v. Parcelsus Health Care Corp. , ( Willard I ), this Court again recognized “[ t]he exception to the e m p loy m ent-at-will d octrine sounds in tort, and we recognize, as the

ma j o rity of jurisdictions do, that a party is entitled to pursue a ll r em edies available i n t o r t , including punitive dam a ges.” 11 In Willard I , com m unity h os p ital em

ploy ees sued the hospital’s p arent com

pany f or wrongf

ul d ischarge af

ter they allegedly were f ired f or reporting illegal activities of another hospital em

p loy ee. 12

8 Id
. at 6 0 7

.
9 Id
. Barrentine’s claim f

or “wrongf

ul discharge in violation o f public policy ” stem s f rom this s econd tort created in McArn , i.e., she allegedly was f ired f or reporting s uspected elder abuse.

10 Id
.

11 W i lla rd v. P a r a celsu s H

ea lth C a re C o rp . , 6 8 1 S o . 2 d 5 3 9 , 5 4 2 (M iss. 1 9 9 6 ).

12 Id
. at 5 4 0

. 4¶8. W e now m ust address an u n f

ortunate am

b iguity created in Willard II , wherein this

Court rem arked that “[ t]he basis of the action in this case is breach of the em ploy m ent
contract.” 13 W e explained that [ r]etaliatory discharge, f

ound by t his Court to be an i ndependent tort in W illard I , is but another f

orm of tortious breach of contract. Describing retaliatory di s c h a r g e as an independent tort does not m ean that the underly ing cause of action is not one f

or breach of

contract. 14
¶9. The Court in Willard II —citing two Michigan state cases and a Northern District o f
Indiana case—stated that “several courts have f o und that an action f

or retaliatory discharge
is a contract action.” 15 This was an erroneous conclusion. ¶10. The Suprem e Court o f Michigan in Phillips v. Bu t t e r b all Farm s Co., Inc. —a case
cited approvingly b y this Court in Will a r d II —actually held that a claim f o r retaliatory discharge of an e m

ploy ee who f

iles a workers’ c om

pensation claim is grounded i n tort law. 16

In f act, t he court s pecif

ically rejected the def

e ndant’s argum ent that such a claim was based

on contract a nd held that “[ t]he duty not to retaliate against an em ploy ee f or f iling a workers’

com pensation claim arises independently f rom the em ploy m ent contract.” 17
¶11. The M ichigan Suprem e Court’s decision in P hillips underm i ned the Michigan Court
of A ppeals’ holding in Mourad v. Autom obile Club Insurance Association , that retaliatory

13 P a ra celsu s H

ea lth C a re C o rp . v. W illa rd , 7 5 4 S o . 2 d 4 3 7 , 4 4 2 (M iss. 1 9 9 9 ).

14 Id
.

15 Id
.

16 P h illip s v. B u tterb a ll F

a rm s C o ., In c. , 5 3 1 N .W.2 d 1 4 4 , 1 4 7 (M ich . 1 9 9 5 ).

17 Id
. 5dem otion is based o n a breach of a just-cause contract. 18 Mourad was t h e other Michigan

case cited approvingly by this Court in Willard II

. ¶12. Today , we clear up t he am biguity b y af

f irm ing our decision in McArn that claim s of wrongf ul discharge in violation of public policy

are independent tort actions. Our holding today is in concert with the m ajority view in this country

. 19

18 M o u ra d v. A u to . C

lu b In s. A ss’n , 4 6 5 N .W.2 d 3 9 5 , 4 0 1 (M ich C t . A p p . 1 9 9 1 ).

19 S ee R o s e v. A n d

erso n H a y & G ra in C

o . , 3 3 5 P .3 d 4 4 0 , 4 4 2 ( Wash

. C t. A p p

. 2 0 1 4 ) (n o tin g th at co m m o n law claim o f w ro n g f u l d isch a r g e i n v i o l atio n o f p u b l ic p o licy is a to rt claim ); D a vis v. C

m t y. A ltern a t

i v e s o f W a sh in g to n , D .C

. , In c. , 7 4 A .3 d 7 0 7 , 7 0 9 (D .C

. 2 0 1 3 ) (q u o tin g C

a rl v. C h i ld ren ’s H o sp . , 7 0 2 A .2 d 1 5 9 , 1 5 9 -6 0 (D

. C

. 1 9 9 7 ) (“[ T ] h e co m m o n law to rt o f w r o n g f u l d isch arg e in v io l atio n o f p u b l i c p o licy

. . . creates a ‘v ery n arro w ’ ex cep tio n to th e g e n eral ru le th at at-w ill e m p lo y ees m ay b e d i sch arg e d at an y t im e f o r a n y reaso n

. ”); S a

fesh red , In c. v. M

a rtin ez , 3 6 5 S .W.3 d 6 5 5 , 6 5 9 -6 0 (T ex

. 2 0 1 2 ) (h o ld in g th at w ro n g f

u l term in a tio n cla i ms w h ere an em p lo y e e is f

ired f o r ref u sin g to p erf o rm an illeg al act so u n d in to r t); V a n B u ren v

. G r u b b , 7 3 3 S .E .2 d 9 1 9 , 9 2 3 (V a. 2 0 1 2 ) (“Wro n g f u l d isch arg e , h o w ev er, is an actio n so u n d in g in t o r t. Wh ile th ere are co m

p o n en ts o f a co n tractu a l rel a t i o n s h i p , w ro n g f u l d isch a r g e rem a i n s a to rt an d to rt p rin cip les m u st ap p ly .”); C

a m p b ell v. H u sk y H o g s, L L C , 2 5 5 P .3 d 1 , 9 (K a n

. 2 0 1 1 ) (“R etaliato r y d isch arg e is a to rt.”); W

en d eln v. T h e B ea trice M

a n o r, In c. , 7 1 2 N .W.2 d 2 2 6 , 2 3 8 (N eb

. 2 0 0 6 ) (“We ag ree t h at a p u b lic p o licy -b ased retaliato ry d isch arg e claim is b ased in to r t. A cco rd in g ly , su ch a c laim i s g o v ern ed b y th e g en eral 4

- y ear statu te o f lim i tatio n s p e rio d

. . . .”); P o rter
v. C i ty o f M a n ch ester , 8 4 9 A .2 d 1 0 3 , 1 1 9 (N .H

. 2 0 0 4 ) (“[ W] e h av e h eld th at w ro n g f u l term in atio n is a cau se o f actio n in to rt

. . . .”); C h a n d ler v. K e n y a n , 8 6 2 S o

. 2 d 1 1 8 2 , 1 1 8 5 (L a. C t

. A p p

. 2 d C ir. 2 0 0 3 ) (citin g J o n es v. O rlea n s P

a rish S ch
. B d

. , 6 8 8 F .2 d 3 4 2 (5 th C ir. 1 9 8 2 )) (“A n actio n f

o r ‘w ro n g f

u l d isch a rg e ’ in a n ‘at-w ill’ em p lo y m en t r elatio n sh ip so u n d s in to rt an d as su ch is s u b j ect to th e o n e-y ear p rescrip tiv e p e r i o d f o r d elictu al [ i.e., to rt]
a c t i o n s

. . . .”); B o o n e v . F ro n tier R efin i

n g , In c. , 9 8 7 P .2 d 6 8 1 , 6 8 8 (Wy o

. 1 9 9 9 ) (ch aracterizin g claim f

o r retaliato ry d isch arg e in v i o l atio n o f p u b lic p o licy as a to rt cau se o f actio n ); T u rn er v. A n h eu ser-B u sch , In c. , 8 7 6 P .2 d 1 0 2 2 , 1 0 3 3 (C al. 1 9 9 4 ) ( c i t i n g G a n tt
v. S en try In s . , 8 2 4 P .2 d 6 8 0 , 6 8 4 (C al. 1 9 9 2 )) (“T o rt claim s f o r w r o n g f u l d isch arg e ty

p ically arise w h en an em

p l o y er r etaliates ag ain st an em p lo y ee f o r ‘ (1 ) r ef u sin g to v io late a statu te, (2 ) p e rf o rm in g a statu to ry o b lig a tio n , (3 ) ex e rcisin g a stat u t o r y rig h t o r p riv ileg e, o r (4 ) rep o rtin g an alleg ed v io latio n o f a statu te o f p u b lic im p o rtan ce.’”); P

a in ter v. G

ra ley , 6 3 9 N

. E .2 d 5 1 ,5 5 (O h io 1 9 9 4 ) (citin g G reeley v. M i a m i V a lley M a i n t. C o n tra cto rs, In c. , 5 5 1 N

. E .2 d 9 8 1 (O h io 1 9 9 0 )) (reco g n izin g a cau s e o f actio n in to rt f o r w ro n g f

u l d isch arg e in
v io latio n o f p u b lic p o lic y ) ; M a rtin M a rietta C o rp . v. L o r e n z , 8 2 3 P .2 d 1 0 0 , 1 0 2 (C o lo

. 6¶13. B e c ause McArn w rongf ul-discharge claim s are i ndependent tort actions, w e mu s t necessarily reject Com m unity Care Center’s argu m e n t t h a t such c l aim s are based on an
unwritten em

plo y m e n t c o n t r act. They are not. As stated b y one legal authority , “[ c]ourts holding that a cause of action f or wrongf ul d ischarge i n violation of public policy sounds in

tort recognize that the duties breached by the em ploy e rs in t he cases were no t p a rt of any

1 9 9 2 ) (“[ W ] e h o l d th at L o ren z’s cau se o f actio n [ f o r w ro n g f

u l d isch a r g e] accru ed o n th e d ate o f h is actu al d isch arg e a n d th at h is to rt c laim w as f iled w ith in th e a

p p licab le statu te o f lim itatio n s.”); P

eterso n v. B ro w n in g , 8 3 2 P .2 d 1 2 8 0 , 1 2 8 4 ( U tah 1 9 9 2 ) (“O f th o se co u rts reco g n i zin g th e p u b lic p o licy e x cep tio n to th e at-w ill d o ctrin e, th e o v e rw h elm in g m aj o rity ad o p t th e to rt th eo ry .”); A m o s v. O a k d a le K n i ttin g C o . , 4 1 6 S .E .2 d 1 6 6 , 1 7 3 (N

. C

. 1 9 9 2 ) (reco g n izin g t h a t a p lain tif f m ay seek to rt rem ed ies f o r w ro n g f

u l d isch arg e b a s ed o n th e p u b lic p o licy ex cep t io n to t he e m p lo y m en t at-w ill d o ctrin e); D ’

A n g e lo v . G a r d n er , 8 1 9 P .2 d 2 0 6 , 2 1 2 (N ev

. 1 9 9 1 ) (“A n em p lo y er co m m its a to rtio u s d isch arg e b y term in atin g an em p lo y ee f o r reaso n s w h i ch v io late p u b lic p o licy .”); B u rk v. K -M a rt C o rp . , 7 7 0 P .2 d 2 4 , 2 8 (O k la. 1 9 8 9 ) (reco g n izin g th at th e p u b lic p o licy ex cep tio n to th e at-w ill term in atio n ru le creates a cau se o f a ctio n in to rt); M cC la n a h a n v. R em in g to n F reig h t L in es, In c. , 5 1 7 N

. E .2 d 3 9 0 , 3 9 2 (In d

. 1 9 8 8 ) (“A co m m o n p l ea b y d isch arg ed p lain tif f s is t h at a n em

p lo y er sh o u ld b e su b

j ected to to rt liab ility if h is f irin g o f th e em

p l o y ee co n t rav en es a w e ll-d ef in ed p u b lic p o l icy .”); S

p r i n g e r v. W

eek s & L eo C

o ., In c. , 4 2 9 N .W.2 d 5 5 8 , 5 5 9 (Io w a 1 9 8 8 ) (creatin g a cau se o f actio n f o r to rtio u s term in atio n o f em p l o y m en t at w ill w h e re em

p lo y m en t is term in ated f

o r r easo n s c o n trary to p u b lic p o licy ); B o u d a r v. E .G
. & G ., In c. , 7 4 2 P .2 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 8 (N .M

. 1 9 8 7 ) (reco g n i z i n g a c a u s e o f actio n in t o r t b a s ed u p o n d isch a rg e o f an em p lo y ee in co n trav en tio n o f a c lear m an d ate o f p u b lic p o licy ); P rice v. C a rm a ck D a tsu n , In c. , 4 8 5 N .E .2 d 3 5 9 , 3 6 1 (Ill. 1 9 8 5 ) ( citin g P a lm a teer v. In t’l H

a rvester C

o . , 4 2 1 N .E .2 d 8 7 6 ( Ill. 1 9 8 1 )) ( d escrib in g th e “to rt” o f retaliato r y d i sch arg e in v io latio n o f p u b lic p o licy ); P a rn a r v. A m erica n a H

o t els, In c. , 6 5 2 P .2 d 6 2 5 , 6 3 1 (H aw . 1 9 8 2 ) (“[ A ] n em p lo y er m ay b e h e ld l iab l e in to rt w h ere h is d isch arg e o f an em p lo y ee v io lates a clear m a n d ate o f p u b lic p o licy .”); A d

l er v. A m . S

ta n d a rd C o rp . , 4 3 2 A .2 d 4 6 4 , 4 6 8 (M d

. 1 9 8 1 ) (“A m aj o rity o f th e co u rts ex p ressly r eco g n izin g a cau se o f actio n f o r w ro n g f

u l d i sch a rg e h a v e treated th e em p lo y ees’ claim s as to rt actio n s.”); P ierce v. O rth o P

h a rm . C o rp . , 4 1 7 A .2 d 5 0 5 , 5 1 2 (N .J. 1 9 8 0 ) (“A n em

p lo y ee w h o is w ro n g f

u lly d is c h a r g e d m ay m ain tain a cau se o f actio n in
co n tract o r to rt o r b o t h .”).
7contract b etween t he em ploy ee a nd the em

ploy e r but w ere duties im

posed by law outside the

contract.” 20
¶14. A McArn claim alleging wrongf ul discharge in violation of public policy is based on

an em ploy er’s duty not t o thwart the public i nterest by term inating e m ploy ees f or speaking
the truth. 21 H aving f

o und that McArn claim s a r e tort-based actions, we next analy ze which
statute of lim itations applies to such claim s.
B. Applicable Statute of Lim itations ¶15. W e have considered which statute of l im itations applies in other em ploy m ent-related disputes. For instance, in Avery, S h anks & Waltm an, Inc. v . Giordano-Kirby Insurance Agency, Inc. , a pre- McArn c ase, this C ourt overruled a trial court’s dism issal of a claim by

one c orporation against another under Section 15-1-29’s one-y ear statute of lim itations f

or
breach of o ral em

ploy m ent contracts. 22 T his Court held t hat the trial court erred in dism issing
the action under the on e - y e a r s t a t ute of lim itations, because “[ t]his was not a suit by

em ploy e es to obtain reinstatem e nt, or dam ages f or wrongf ul term ination of em

ploy m ent.” 23
¶16. Rely ing on Avery, Shanks & Waltm an, I nc. , t he United S tates Court of Appeals f or
the Fif th Circuit f

ound i n White v. United P arcel Service that t his C o u r t h a d “im plicitly

20 8 2 A m . Ju r. 2 d Wro n g

fu l D isch a rg e § 5 8 (2 0 1 3 ).

21 S ee M cA rn , 6 2 6 S o

. 2 d at 6 0 7 (“[ A ] n e mp l o y e e w h o is d isch arg e d f o r rep o rtin g illeg al acts o f h is em

p lo y er to th e em

p lo y er o r a n y o n e else is n o t b arred b y th e em p lo y m en t at w ill d o ctrin e f

ro m b r in g in g actio n in to rt f o r d am ag es ag ain st h i s em p lo y er.”).

22 A very, S

h a n k s & W a ltm a n , In c

. v. G io rd a n o -K irb y In s. A g e n cy, I

n c. , 4 0 4 S o

. 2 d 1 0 3 6 , 1 0 3 7 (M iss. 1 9 8 1 ).

23 Id
. at 1 0 3 7 -3 8

. 8recognized” that Section 15-1-29 “applied to a ‘suit by em ploy e es to obtain r einstatem ent,

or dam ages f

o r wrongf

u l term ination of em

ploy m ent.’” 24 However, t h e i s s u e in White
concerned only whether the one-y ear statute of lim itations in Section 15-1-29 applied to 42

U.S.C. Section 1 981 e m

ploy m ent-discrim ination claim s. 25 The Fif th Circuit concluded that
the statute of lim itations governing claim s f or breach of an unwritten e m ploy m ent contract
should apply o v er the then six-y ear catch-all statute of lim ita t i ons in Section 15-1-49. 26
However, the United States Suprem e Court ultim ately ove r ruled W hite and held that state

statutes of lim itations governing personal injury actions were m ore appropriate f or Section

1981 em ploy m ent-discrim ination claim s. 27
¶17. And in Michael S. F a w e r v . E vans , t his Court—in answering a certif ied question

f rom the Fif

th Circuit—f

ound that Section 15-1-29’s one-y ear s tatute of lim itations did not apply to a contract d ispute between an attorney and his f orm er client. 28 The Court held that “[ t]he phrase ‘actions on unwritten contracts of em ploy m ent’ in [ Section 15-1-29], applies only t o traditional e m

ploy er-em

p loy ee sit u a t i o n s

. ” 29 S o “an attorney ’s action against his

24 W h ite v. U n ited P a r cel S erv. , 6 9 2 F .2 d 1 , 3 (5 th C ir. 1 9 8 2 ) (p er cu riam ).

25 Id
. at 1 -2

.
26 Id
. at 3

.
27 G o o d m a n v. L u k en s S

teel C o . , 4 8 2 U .S

. 6 5 6 , 6 6 1 , 1 0 7 S

. C t. 2 6 1 7 , 2 6 2 1 (1 9 8 7 ),
su p ersed ed b y sta tu te , 2 8 U .S .C

. § 1 6 5 8 , a s reco g n ized in J o n es v. R .R
. D o n n elley & S o n s C o . , 5 4 1 U .S

. 3 6 9 , 3 8 2 , 1 2 4 S

. C t. 1 8 3 6 , 1 8 4 5 (2 0 0 4 ) (h o ld in g t h at co n g ressio n ally created f o u r -y e ar statu te o f

lim itatio n s ap p lied to em p lo y m en t-d iscrim i n a tio n cases).

28 M i ch a el S . F a w er v. E va n s , 6 2 7 S o . 2 d 8 2 9 , 8 3 3 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 ).

29 Id
. 9client f

o r f ees f or prof essional legal services rendered by the attorney to the c lient on open account pursuant to an unwritten agreem ent is subject to the three-y ear lim itations period . . . not the one-y ear lim itation period . . . .” 30
¶18. The Court of

Appeals, at tim es, has held that the Section 15-1-29’s one-y ear statute
of lim itations applies to McArn w rongf ul-discharge claim s, and a t other tim es, has held that
the Section 15-1-49’s three-y ear statute of lim itations applies. 31 B oth the northern and
southern f

ederal district c ourts consistently h ave applied the one-y e a r statute of lim itations
in Section 15-1-29. 32
¶19. The parties h a ve argued that this C o u r t ’ s o p inions in S loan v. Taylor Machinery

Co. , 33 and Bobbitt v. Orchard, Ltd. , 34 are relevant to determ ining the applicable statute of

30 Id
.

31 C o m p a re M cC o o l v. C o a h o m a O

p p o rtu n ities, In c. , 4 5 S o

. 3 d 7 1 1 , 7 1 4 (M iss. C t. A p p

. 2 0 1 0 ) (h o l d in g th at a n em p l oy ee’s action against her e m ploy er f o r breach of contract was based on the one-y ear statute of li m i tations i n Section 1 5-1-29), with Wertz v. Ingalls Sh i p b uilding I

nc. , 7 9 0 So. 2d 841, 845 ( Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile , 608 So. 2d 324, 332-33 (Miss. 1992)) (“Pursuant t o section 1 5-1-49, the statute of lim itations f

or claim s of

. . . wrongf

u l d i s c harge, [ the plaintif f ] had three y ears within which to f

ile his claim s.”).

32 S ee D a vis v. B a n k o

f A m . C o rp . , N o

. 1 :1 0 -C V -2 3 , 2 0 1 3 W L 6 6 6 9 0 3 , at * 2 (S .D

. M iss. F e b

. 2 2 , 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ Though it does not appear that Plaintif f was e m ploy ed b y Coldata, any state claim f

or wrongf ul term ination would b e subject to a one y e ar lim itations period.”); Garrett-Greer v. K

ey Staff Source, Inc. , No. 1:08-CV-229-SA-DAS, 2010 W L 1848898, at *5 (N.D. Miss. May

6, 2010) ( dism issing a plaintif f ’s wrongf

ul term ination claim

as tim ebarred under the one-y ear statute of lim itations); Davis v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc. , No. 1:07CV537-LG-JMR, 2009 W L 44204, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 6, 2009) (sam e).

33 S lo a n v. T a ylo r M a ch . C o . , 5 0 1 S o . 2 d 4 0 9 , 4 1 1 (M iss. 1 9 8 7 )

.
34 B o b b itt v. O rch a rd

, L t d
. , 6 0 3 S o . 2 d 3 5 6 , 3 6 1 ( M iss. 1 9 9 2 ).

1 0lim itations. However, those cases address only whether an em ploy e e handbook can f

orm the
basis of a written em

ploy m ent contract. That issue is not bef o re us. ¶20. So, to sum m arize our holdings, in Avery, Shanks & Waltm an, Inc. , this C ourt tacitly acknowledged that S ection 15-1-29 applied to suits “to obtain reinstatem ent, or dam ages f or wrongf ul termi n ation of em

p l oy m ent.” 35 And the Fif

th Circuit recognized this in White

. 36

Fi n a l l y , i n Michael S. Fawer , we held that the one-y e ar statute of lim itations applies to
“traditional em

p loy er-em

ploy ee situations.” 37 W ith these p rinciples in m ind, we n ow will

attem pt to reconcile our cases. ¶21. Although we said in A very, Shanks & Waltm an, Inc. that a claim based on wrongf ul

term ination was g overned by the one-y ear statute o f l im itations in Section 15-1-29, we had

not y et d e c i d e d M

c A rn
. W hen we decided A very, Shanks & Waltm an, Inc. , Mississippi

em ploy e es had no action f

or wr o n g f

u l discharge in violation of public policy

. The only
action availab l e t o t h e m was a claim f or breach of contract. But, as we explained above,

McArn claim s h ave nothing to do with the e xistence of a contractual relationship. So our holding in Avery, Shanks & Waltm a n, Inc. does not control our analy sis. And, as we recognized in Michael S. Fawer , Section 15-1-29 applies only to tradi t i o n a l e m ploy m ent disputes. W hile McArn w rongf ul-discharge c laim s m ay be related to em ploy m ent disputes,

35 A very, S

h a n k s & W a l tm a n , In c. , 4 0 4 S o . 2 d at 1 0 3 7

- 3 8

.
36 W h ite , 6 9 2 F .2 d at 3

.
37 M i ch a el S . F a w er , 6 2 7 S o . 2 d at 8 3 3

.

1 1the em

ploy er’s d uty is based on m atters external to the em ploy m ent dispute. Thus, Michael

S. Fawer does not control our analy sis. ¶22. Both Avery, Shanks & Waltm an, I nc. and Micha e l S

. Fawer are instructive as to
what sorts of claim s should be subject to Section 15-1-29’s one-y ear statute of lim itations.

For instance, a claim by an at-will em p loy ee—with no writte n e m ploy m ent contract—f

or verbally prom ised vacation day s would be governed by Section 15-1-29. Such a claim would
be based on the em

p loy er’s alleged unwritten agreem ent. L ikewise, an at-will em ploy ee’s
claim f or the f a ilure to give a p rom ised perf o rm an c e or holiday bonus would f all within Section 15-1-29’s purview. ¶23. B u t a

n independent tort action against an em ploy er f or wrongf ul discharge in viol a t i o n
of public p olicy

has no relationship to the em ploy m ent agreem ent and cannot be subject to
the statute of lim itations in Section 15-1-29. ¶24. Because M

c A r n c l a i ms a r e i n d e p e n d e nt tort actions and are not based on any

em ploy m ent contract, they are not subje c t t o Section 1 5-1-29’s one-y ear statute of

lim itations. S e c t ion 15-1-49 provides that “[ a]ll actions f or which no other period of

lim itation is p r e s c r ibed shall be com m enced within three (3) y ears next af t er the cause of

s u c h action accrued, and n ot af ter.” W hile we h ave n ot previously stated that this is th e

s t a t u te of lim itations that applies to McArn claim s, we do so today

. Any langu a g e
inconsistent with o ur holding today f ound in our previous decisions and decisions f rom the
Court of Appeals is now overruled.

CONCLUSION

1 2¶25. McArn wrongf ul-discharge claim s are subject t o Section 15-1-49’s three-y ear statute
of lim i tations. W e af

f irm the trial court’s d e n i a l of Com m unity Care Center’s m otion f or

sum m ary judgm e nt, and we rem and this case to the tr i a l c o urt f or f u rther proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶26. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHEN S , P I ERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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