2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 6-15-2005 

# S c at or chi a v . C omm S o c i al S ec ur it y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 04-3626

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w Di g it al Re posit or y

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w . v i l l a no va . e du
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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/1008

### 1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E T H IRD C IR C U IT
No. 04-3626
EI L EEN C. SCATORCHI A, Ap pe lla nt v. COMMI SSI ONER OF SOCI AL SECURI TY On Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of NewJ erse y (D.C. No. 01-c v-06013) District J udg e: Honora

ble Mary L . Cooper
Submit ted Pursuant to Third Circuit L .A.R. 34.1(a)

J une 6, 2005 B e fo re : F UENT ES, VA

N A NT WERPEN a

nd B ECKER, Cir c uit

Judg e s. (F iled J une 15, 2005 )

OPI NI ONOF TH E CO UR T

VAN AN TWERP EN, Circuit J udg e. Appellant Eilee n Scatorc hia (“ Scatorc hia”) appea ls fr om the District Court’s judgme nt aff irming the denial by

the Commiss ioner of Socia l Security (“Commissioner”) of

her a pplication for disability

insurance benef

its. S cator chia c halleng es t he AL J ’s determination at steps three a nd

### 2

four of the five-step evaluation proce ss that the Social Secur ity Administration has promulgated for deter mining whe ther a

n individual is entit led t o s u ch d isability insurance benef

its. See20 C.F .R. § 404.1520. Scatorc hia alternatively argues that her c ase should be r emande d to the AL J in order t o co n s i d er

ad d i t i o n al ev i d en ce th ats h e h as n o w b ut d i d n o t at t emp t t o o b t ai nunt i l af t er h er h eari n g. We h ave jur isd ic tio n p ur su ant t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 12 91 and wi ll a ff ir m. I. Scatorc hia was 35 year s old at the time of her administrative hearing. She has a twe lfth g rade
e du c atio n a

nd pa st r e le va

nt w or k e xpe ri e nc e a s a bo ok

ke e pe r. Sc ator c hia

c la ime d th at he r d isa

bil ity be g an o n Jun e 26 , 1 99 8, wh e n s he be c ame un a ble to w or k b e c a us e of low

ba c k p a in, low

e xtre mity pain, and other

adver se sy

mptoms associated with her history of spondyl o l i sthesis, or slipped verte bra. At the conc lusion of her a dminist rative he aring , the AL J denied Scatorchia’ s application for dis a bil ity be ne fi ts o n N ov e mbe r 2 4, 19 99 . T he ALJ det e rm ine d th at Sc ator c hia wa s n ot e nti tle d to benef its because , notwithstanding e vidence of some pain a nd related sy

mptoms arising f

ro m her spondylolist hesis, she re mained able to perfor m her past work a s a bookkee per. Subseque ntly , on October 24, 2001, the Appea ls Council denied Scatorc hia’s reque st to revie w the AL J ’s d ec i sion, causingthe AL J ’s dec ision to become the fina l decision of the Commissioner. Scatorc hia then sought judi ci al review of Commissi oner’ s final dec ision in Unit ed States District Court for the District of New J erse y pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g )
. On J une 25, 2004, the District Court gr anted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgme nt. This appeal f ollowed. II. Our re v i ew o f the Commissioner’s final dec ision is necessar ily limit ed. We ar e bound by

### 3

the Commiss ioner’s f

indings of f

act pr ovided t hat they

are supported by

substantial evidence in the
rec ord. See 42 U. S.C. § 4 05 (g ); Plummer v . Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 427 ( 3d Cir. 1999). “Substantial
e vid e nc e ” is d e fi ne d a s “ mor e tha n a me re sc int ill a . It me ans su c h r e le va nt e vid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble mind might acc ept as a dequate .” Plummer , 186 F.3d at 427 (citations omitted). III
. Scatorc hia first cha lleng es the AL J ’s dec isions at steps three a nd four of the five- step evaluation process that is re quired by the Social Secur ity

Administration for use in dete rmining whether an individual is disabled. See20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In step one, the Commissioner decide s whether

the claimant is pre sently

eng ag ing in substantial g ainful ac tivity . I f the c laimant is working , he or she is not eligible for disability insurance benef

its. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In step two, the Commissi oner de termines whe ther the c laimant is suffer ing f rom a seve re impairment. I f the c laimant is not sufferingfrom a se vere impairment, the cla imant is not elig ible for disability

insurance benef

its. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). In step three , the Commi ssioner eva luates whe ther the c laimant’s impairment mee ts or equals one of the imp a ir me nts lis te d in

Ap pe nd ix 1 of

the re gulatio ns (t

he “ L ist ing s” ). 20 C.F .R. § 4 04 , Su bp t. P , App. 1. I f the c laimant’s condition meets or e quals one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, he or she is entitled to benefits; if not, the Commi ssioner proc eeds to step f our. 20 C.F.R. § 40 4. 15 20 (d ). In s te p f

our, the Commis sio ne r d e te rm ine s whe the r t he c la ima nt r e ta ins wh at is called the residual f

unctional ca

pacity to perfor m his or her pa st releva

nt work. I f the c laimant
rema ins able to perf

orm that past re levant wor k, he or she is not entitl ed to disability insurance benef its. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). F inally , in the fifth step, the Commissioner considers whe ther the re e xists wo rk

op po rt un iti e s in the natio na l e c on omy

that th e c la ima

nt c an p e rf

or m g ive n h is

### 4

or her medical impairme nts, ag e, educ ation, past work e x perie nce, a nd residual f

unctional
c a pa c ity . I f t

he Commis sio ne r d e mon str ate s th at su c h w or k e xists , th e c la ima

nt i s n ot e nti tle d to disability insurance benef

its. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)
. We first consider Scatorchia’ s step three argument. Scatorc hia ar gues that the AL J err ed at step three by

failingto determine that her impairment e qualed one in the L istings set for th at Se c tio n 1 .0 5( c ). Sc ator c hia a dmi ts that he r i mpa ir

me nt, sp on dylol ist

he sis , d oe s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly appea r in the L istings, but argues that it nonetheless fa lls withi n Section 1.05(c) ’s desc ription of

“ oth e r v e rt ob ro g e nic dis or de rs .” In li g ht o f o ur sta nd ard of re vie w, we dis a g re e wi th t his argument, beca

use substantial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s deter mination. Scatorchia’ s imp a ir me nt i s n ot e qu iva le nt t o th e L ist ingat Se c tio n 1 .0 5( c ), wh ic h r e qu ir e s a n im pa ir me nt t o consist of both “(1) Pain, muscle spasm, and sig nificant limitation of motion i n the spine; and (2) Appropriate ra dicular distribution of sig nificant motor loss with muscle wea kness and se nsory ref lex l oss.” 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.05(c). Scator chia’ s medical e vidence , howeve r, fa ils to show that she suffer ed fr om the requisite “significant limitation of motion i n the sp ine .” § 1 .0 5( c ). F or

e xamp le , D r. He ss, a

c on su lti ve e xami ne r who c omp le te d a fu ll examination of Scatorchia, f ound that “whe n [S cator chia] relaxed, ra ng e of motion [of the spine]
seeme d to be nea

r normal.” As a re sult of his ex amination, Dr. He ss reporte d “no major objective f

indings.” Be cause Scatorc hia did not offer any evidenc e at he r AL J hearing to r ebut or
c ontr a dic t D r. He ss’ ob se rv atio ns , w e fi nd that th e AL J pro pe rl y

dis c ha rg e d it s d uti e s in evaluating the r eleva

nt evidence on this claim, and that substantial evidenc e supports the AL J ’s findingas to this face t of the step thre e dete rmination. Scatorc hia next contends that the AL J failed to identify the L isting in the re gulations that

### 5

came closest to matchingher sy mptoms. S he re lies on Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Security Adm in. , 220 F.3d 112, 119- 20 (3d Cir. 2000) (pla cingthe burde n of identifying r eleva nt L istings on AL J s). Scatorc hia’s re liance on Bu rn e tt is ulti mately

misplaced, howe ver. I

n Jones
v . B ar nh ar t , 364 F.3d 501 ( 3d Cir. 2004), we a dopted, subsequent to Bu rn e tt , a mor e fl e xible approa ch on this issue of similar L istings at step thre e. See Jones , 364 F.3d at 505 (holding that an AL J is not required “ to use particula r languag e or a dhere to a par ticular for mat in conducting his analy sis,” but must m ere ly ensure “that ther e be suf

ficient e x planation to provide mea ningf ul revie w of the step thr ee de termination”). We c oncluded in J on es that an A L J had

satis fi e d th is sta nd ard by c le arl y e va luatin gthe ava ila

ble me dic a l e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d a

nd the n s e tti ngfo rt

h that evaluation in an opinion, even wher e the AL J did not identify or ana ly ze the most relevant L isting. Id. Simi larly , in this case, the AL J clea rly and fully evaluated and e x plained the medic al evidenc e set for

th in the rec ord. The A L J discussed the medic al evidenc e, and its ef fec ts on Scatorc hia, with specific ity . As such, the AL J proper ly discharg ed its responsibilities under Jones . We a c c or din g ly

dis c e rn no e rr or wi th r e sp e c t to thi s f

a c e t of the AL J’s s te p thre e ana ly sis , either. IV. Scatorc hia’s next argument is that the AL J err ed at step f our by concludingthat Scatorc hia would be a

ble to return to he r past re levant wor k as a bookke eper . The AL J based this determination on objective medic al evidenc e introduce d at her hearing, some of which w e have disc ussed in our re view of step thr ee, a s well as the AL J ’s eva luation of Scatorc hia’s
cre dibilit y

at her administrative hea

ring . Scatorc hia does not conte st this record e vidence , but rathe r only

the AL J ’s cr edibility

deter mination, in which he found that Scatorchia’ s alleg ations of

### 6

pain wer e not fully

cre dible. Under the applica

ble Social Secur ity

regulations, alleg ations of pain and othe r subjective sy mptoms advance d by

a cla imant must be supported by objective medic al evidenc e. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 . I f anALJ co n cl u d es th atth e a v ai l ab l e m ed i ca l fi n d i n gs and e vid e nc e c ou ld
re a so na bly c a us e a c la ima nt’ s a lle g e d s ub

je c tiv e sy mpt oms , th e AL J must

atte mpt to a sc e rt a in and eva luate the se verity

of the c laimant’s pain as w ell as the de g ree to which it may limitthe
c la ima nt’ s a bil ity to p e rf or m va ri ou s ty pe s o f w or

k. “ Th is o bv iou sly

re qu ir e s th e AL J to de te rm ine the e xtent to wh ic h a c la ima nt i s a c c ur ate ly

statin gthe de g re e of

pa in o r t he e xtent to which he or

she is disabled by

it.” Hartranft v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 358, 362 ( 3d Cir. 1999). When an AL J undertakes this require d cre dibilit y deter mination, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) a nd Social Security Ruling 96-7p pr ovide nec essar y guidance . SSR96-7p ar

ticulates seve ral fa ctors for an AL J to c on sid e r i n ma

kin gthe c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio n a

bo ut p a in a

nd su bje c tiv e sy

mpt oms , including, inte r a lia : “the individual’s daily activities” a

nd “the c onsistency

of the individual’s own statements.” SSR 96-7p. Those ar e the f actor s that the AL J considere d here in determining that Sc ator c hia

was not fully

cre dible. Th e AL J found

inc on sis te nc ie s b e tw e e n Sc ator c hia ’s testimony as to her da ily

living activities, on the one ha

nd, and her

claimed leve l of pain and inc apac itation, on the other hand. F or e xamp le , Sc ator c hia

claimed that she could not rema in in one position for any leng th of time,
move ea sily , or ca

rry any thing he avier

than a f ew pounds. The AL J observe d rec ord evide nce, howeve r, includingtestimony by Scatorc hia, showingthat she wa s able to cook, shop, pe rfor m household clea

ning c hores, visit with friends, provide car e for two youngchildren, a

nd drive a
car . Fur ther, the AL J obse rv e d th at me dic a l e va luatio ns by Sc ator c hia ’s phy sicians did not

### 7

support her subjec tive complaints, as none of her doc tors opined that Scatorc hia was e ither
un a ble to w or

k o r i nc a pa c itate d to the de g re e sh e ha d c la ime d. F or bo th o f t he se re a so ns , substantial evidence exis ts in the recor d to su pp or t th e AL J’s c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns a s to Scatorc hia’s leve ls of pain and inca pacitation. It w a s th e re fo re pr op e r f or the AL J to a c c or d o nly lim ite d w e ight t o Sc ator c hia ’ s t e s t i m o ny a s t o h e r s u b j e c t i v e s y mp t o m s w h e nth e A LJ de te rm ine d h e r r e sid

ua l f un c tio na l c a

pa c ity pursuant to step four
. V. Scatorc hia’s fina l argument is that she should rece ive a ne w hea ringso that the AL J may consider ne w evidenc e she a cquire d afte r her orig inal hearing. A fter r ece iving a n adver se ruling from the AL J on November 24, 1999, Scatorc hia appa rently soug ht and obtained a dditional medical opinions in an attempt to buttress her position. These included a n MRIanaly sis on Dec ember

3, 1999 and wr itten observations by new doc tors dated Oc tober 2, 2001 a nd Marc h 26, 2002. Scatorc hia asks this Court to require the AL J to consider this new e vidence on rema nd. Ho we ve r, be fo re a

c ourt may re mand an a g e nc y

de te rm inatio n o n th is gro un d, a c la ima nt m us t sh ow“ that th e re is n e w e vid e nc e wh ic h is mate ri a l and that th e re is g oo d c a

us e fo r t he fa ilure to i n co rp o ra t e s u ch ev i d en ce i n t o th e r ec o rdi na p ri o r p ro ce ed i n g. ” 4 2 U. S
. C
. § 4 0 5 (g) . Four fac tors must be considere d pursuant to this require ment. See , e.g. , Newhouse v. He ckle r , 753 F.2d 283, 287 ( 3d Cir. 1985). First, the e vidence must be new a nd not merely

cumulative of what is alre ady

in the rec ord. Id. at 287. Second, the e vidence must be material, r eleva nt and probative. Id. Third, there must ex ist a rea sonable proba bility that the new e vidence would have
cause d the Commiss ioner to re ach a differ ent conc lusion. Id. Four th, the claimant must show g ood cause as to why

the evidenc e wa s not incorporated into the ear lier administrative re cord.

### 8

Id. He re , Sc ator c hia

ha s n ot p ro vid e d a

ny e xplanatio n f

or he r f a ilure to a c qu ir e thi s additional medical infor

mation prior to her he aring . This alone is sufficie nt to determine that Scatorc hia ca

nnot make the ne cessa

ry g ood cause showing
. See, e .g., Matthews v. Apfel , 239 F .3 d 5 89 , 5 95 (3 d Ci r. 20 01 ) ( de c lin ingto r e mand fo r l a c k o f g oo d c a

us e wh e re Soc ia l Se c ur ity
c la ima nt c ou ld n ot “ e xpla in[] why sh e did no t atte mpt

to o bta in [a

n] e va luatio n at a

tim e wh e n it could be c onsidered by

the AL J ”). Mor eover , in circumstanc es such a s these, we are mindful that “[i] f we wer e to orde r re mand for e ach item of new a nd materia l evidence , we would ope n the door for

claimants to withhold evidence from the AL J in order to pr eser ve a r eason f

or
rema nd.” Ma tth e ws , 239 F.3d at 595. Finally , from our r eview of Scatorc hia’s additional evidenc e we discern that not only is good c ause la ckingfor its belate d introduction, but also that there is not a rea sonable proba bility that the new e vidence would have c aused the Commi ssioner to rea ch a dif

fer ent conc lusion. Se eNe who us e , 753 F.2d at 287. For a ll of these re asons, we decline to a cce pt Scatorchia ’s invitation to remand this matter. V I. In conclusion, the AL J ’s deter minations at steps three a nd four of the five- step eva luation proce ss for disability

insurance benef

its are both supported by

substantial evidence . Scatorc hia’s additional arguments are without merit. We have c onsidered the other a rguments advanc ed by the par ties and conc lude that no furthe r discussion is nece ssary . Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the District Court will be aff irmed.