Filed 12/16/14 unmodified opn. attached CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CLEVELAND NATIONAL FOREST FOUNDATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS et al., Defendants and Appellants; THE PEOPLE, Intervenor and Appellant. D063288

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00101593- CU-TT-CTL)

CREED-21 et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS et al., Defendants and Appellants; THE PEOPLE, Intervenor and Appellant. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00101660- CU-TT-CTL)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
THE COURT: It is ordered that the majority opinion filed on November 24, 2014, be modified as follows: 1. On page 18, line 2 of footnote 8, after the words "explained the Guideline," the words "which supplanted an y earlier, informal technical advice from the Governor's Office of Planning and Research" are added." Footnote 8 now reads:2 Indeed, in its statement of reas ons for adopting th e Guideline, the Natural Resources Agency expl ained the Guideline, which supplanted any earlier, inform al technical advice from the Governor's Office of Planning and Research, "reflects the existing CEQA principle that there is no iron- clad definition of 'significance.' [Citations.] Accordingly, lead agencies must use their best efforts to investigate and disclose all that they reasonably can regarding a project's potential adverse impacts. " (California Natural Resources Agency, Final Statement of Reasons for Regulatory Action (Dec. 2009) p. 20 < http ://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/Final_ Statement_of_Reasons.pdf > (as of Nov. 21, 2014).) Justice Benke's dissenting opinion, file d November 24, 2014, is modified as follows: 1. On page 8, in the last sentence of the first full paragraph, the words "should be a" are deleted and the word "is" is a dded following the word "determination." The sentence shall now read: To the extent thresholds of significance other than the three expressly provided in subdivision (b ) apply, that determination is made by an agency in the proper exercise of its discretion. 2. On page 8, after the first full para graph ending with the words "exercise of its discretion," the followi ng paragraph is added: In its petition for rehearing, SA NDAG contends that the Natural Resources Agency (NRA) has specific ally forgone any recommendation for use of the Executive Order as a CE QA standard in Guidelines section 15064.4, which SANDAG notes was specif ically developed at the direction of the Legislature to guide analysis of GHG impacts. (Petn. for rehg., pp. 4-5.) The history of Guidelines sec tion 15064.4 is significant. Following issuance of the Executive Order, in June of 2008, the Governor's Office of Planning and Research (OPR) issued a detailed 20-page technical advisory (<http://opr.ca.gov/ceqa/pdfs/june08-ceqa .pdf> [as of Dec. 2014]; hereafter Advisory.) Noting that many public ag encies were striving to determine the appropriate means by which to evaluate and mitigate the impacts of proposed projects on climate change, the Advisory set forth directions and step-by-step guidance aimed at assis ting practitioners and lead agencies. The Advisory expressly r ecognizes that the most difficult part of climate change analysis is the determination of significance. (Advisory, p. 4.) The Governor's office thus stated, "To this end, OPR has asked [C]ARB technical staff to recommend a method for setting thresholds which will3 encourage consistency and uniformity in the CEQA analysis of GHG emissions throughout the state. Un til such time as state guidance is available on thresholds of significance for GHG emissions, we recommend the following approach to your CEQA anal ysis." (Advisory, pp. 4, 8-9.) In its "Recommended Approach," the Ad visory is clear: It is lead agencies that are charged with selecting and implementing significance thresholds. (Advisory pp. 5-7.) Important to our purposes, in the selecting and implementing of significance thresholds , the Advisory gives no authority to the courts and claims no such power fo r the Governor. At the conclusion of the Advisory, the Governor's office stat es its intent is to deliver a package of CEQA Guidelines amendments to the Resources Agency by July 1, 2009. (Advisory, p. 9.) As a resu lt of the Advisory, in March of 2010, Guidelines section 15064.4 was passed. It fully implements the intent and language of the Advisory, which nullifies my colleagues' expansive interpretation of the Executive Order. 3. On page 8, in the paragraph beginning with "I t is apparent," the words "history and" are added to the second sentence, so that it now reads: Despite the clear history and language of Guidelines section 15064.4, subdivision (b) and the obvious in tent of that section, the majority asserts a right to determine that a gubernatorial policy statement, which does not qualify as a threshold of signi ficance, is to be included among the "other factors" and then orders SANDAG on remand to develop an undefined "consistency analysis" between the lead agency 's plan and the policy statement. 4. On page 14, in the second senten ce of the first full pa ragraph, the words "Office of Planning and Research (OPR)" are replaced with "OPR" and the words "Natural Resources Agency (NRA)" are replac ed with "NRA," so that the sentence now reads: SB 97 directed the OPR to prepare and submit to the NRA "guidelines for the mitigation of greenh ouse gas emissions or the effects of greenhouse gas emissions . . . including, but not limited to, effects associated with transportati on or energy consumption." There is no change in the judgment. San Diego Association of Governments et al.'s petition for rehearing is denied.

M C Connell, P. J.Filed 11/24/14 unmodified version CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CLEVELAND NATIONAL FOREST FOUNDATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS et al., Defendants and Appellants; THE PEOPLE, Intervenor and Appellant. D063288

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00101593- CU-TT-CTL)

CREED-21 et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS et al., Defendants and Appellants; THE PEOPLE, Intervenor and Appellant. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00101660- CU-TT-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of San Diego County, Timothy B. Taylor, Judge. Judgment modified and affirmed.2 The Sohagi Law Gr oup, Margaret M. Sohagi, Ph ilip A. Seymour; and Julie D. Wiley for Defendants and Appellants San Di ego Association of Governments et al. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Ti mothy R. Patterson and Janill L. Richards, Deputy Attorneys Ge neral, for Intervenor and Appellant. Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Rachel B. Hooper, Amy J. Bricker, Erin B. Chalmers; Daniel P. Selmi; Coast Law Group, Marco Gon zalez; Kevin P. Bundy; and Cory J. Briggs for Plaintiffs and Appe llants Cleveland National Forest et al.

INTRODUCTION After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (E IR) for its 2050 Regional Tran sportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (tra nsportation plan), CREED-21 and Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmen tal Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). 1 Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Cl ub and the People later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informationa l document because it did not analyze the inconsistency

1 Further statutory referenc es are also to the Public Resources Code unless otherwise stated.3 between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 (Executive Order) and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately addr ess mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. Given these findings, the court declined to decide any of the other challe nges raised in the petitions. SANDAG appeals, contending the EIR co mplied with CEQA in both respects. Cleveland National Forest Foun dation and Sierra Club (coll ectively, Cleveland) crossappeal, contending the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to analyze a reasonable range of project alternatives, failing to adeq uately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's air quality impacts, and understa ting the transportation plan's impacts on agricultural lands. The People separately cross-appeal, contending the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to adequately an alyze and mitigate the transportation plan's impacts from particulate matter pollution. We conclude the EIR fa iled to comply with CEQA in all identified respects. We, therefor e, modify the judgment to incorporate our decision on the cross-appeals and affirm. In doing so, we are upholding the right of the public and our public offici als to be well informed abou t the potential environmental consequences of their planning decisions, which CEQA requires and the public deserves, before approving long-term plans that may ha ve irreversible environmental impacts.4 DISCUSSION
I
A General Role of an EIR "The Legislature has made clear that an EIR is 'an informational document' and that '[t]he purpose of an en vironmental impact report is to provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed informatio n about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project.' " ( Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Rege nts of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 391 ( Laurel Heights ); Guidelines, § 15002.) 2 "The EIR is the primary means of achieving . . . the policy of th is state to 'take all action n ecessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the envi ronmental quality of the state.' [Cit ation.] The EIR is therefore 'the heart of CEQA.' [Citations.] An EIR is an 'environmental "alarm bell" whose purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible o fficials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no return.' [Citations.] The EIR is also intended 'to demonstrate to an apprehensive citizenry th at the agency has, in fact, analyzed and considered the ecological implications of its action.' [Citations.] Because the EIR must

2 All references to Guidelines are to th e CEQA Guidelines, whic h are located in title 14 of the California Code of Regulations beginning at sec tion 15000. "In interpreting CEQA, we accord the Guide lines great weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or erroneous." ( Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 448, fn. 4 ( Smart Rail ).)5 be certified or rejected by public officials, it is a document of accountability. If CEQA is scrupulously followed, the public will know the basis on which its responsible officials either approve or reject environmentally si gnificant action, and the public, being duly informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees. [Citations.] The EIR process protects not only the environmen t but also informed self-government." ( Laurel Heights , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.)
B Role of a Program EIR The EIR at issue in this case is a progr am EIR. A "program EIR" is "an EIR which may be prepared on a series of actions that can be characterized as one large project" and are related in specified wa ys. (Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (a); Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail Authority (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 314, 343 ( Atherton ).) The use of a program EIR can: "( 1) Provide an occasion for a more exhaustive consideration of effe cts and alternatives than woul d be practical in an EIR on an individual action, [¶] (2) Ensure consider ation of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a case-by-case anal ysis, [¶] (3) Avoid duplicativ e reconsideration of basic policy considerations, [¶] (4) A llow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mitigation measures at an early time when the agency has greater flexibility to deal w ith basic problems or cumulativ e impacts, [and] [¶] (5) Allow reduction in paperwork." (Guide lines, § 15168, subd. (b); Atherton , supra , at pp. 343- 344.)6 "[W]here an agency prepar es a 'program EIR' for a broad policy document . . . , Guidelines section 15168, subdivision (c)(2) allows agenci es to limit future environmental review for later activities that are found to be 'within the scope' of the program EIR." ( Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 192, 196; accord, Citizens Against Airport Poll ution v. City of San Jose (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 788, 801-802.) Fu rther environmental review fo r such activities is required only where "(a) Substantial changes are propos ed in the project which will require major revisions of the [EIR]. [¶] (b) Substantial changes occur with respect to the circumstances under which the project is be ing undertaken which will require major revisions in the [EIR]. [¶] (c) New information, which was not known or could not have been known at the time the [EIR] was certified as comple te, becomes available." (§ 21166; May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1325-1326; accord, Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose , supra , at p. 802.) Because of these limitations, once an EI R is finally approved, a court generally cannot compel an agen cy to perform further environmental review for any known or knowable information abou t the project's impacts omitted from the EIR. ( Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-808; Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environm ental Development v. City of San Diego (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 515, 531- 532.) A court also generally cannot compel an agency to perform further environmental review if new regulations or guidelines for evaluating the project's impacts are adopted in the future. ( Concerned Dublin Citizens v. City of7 Dublin (2013) 214 Cal.Ap p.4th 1301, 1320; Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. Department of Health Services (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1605.) Hence, "[d]esignating an EI R as a program EIR . . . does not by itself decrease the level of analysis otherwise required in the EI R. 'All EIR's must cover the same general content. [Citations.] The level of specificity of an EIR is de termined by the nature of the project and the "rule of reason" [citation], rath er than any semantic label accorded to the EIR.' " ( Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 511, 533.) Consequently, in considering a challenge to a program EIR, "it is unconstructive to ask whether the EI R provided 'project-lev el' as opposed to 'program-level' detail and analysis. Instead , we focus on whether the EIR provided 'decision makers with sufficient analysis to intelligently consider the environmental consequences of [the] project.' " ( Citizens for a Sustainable Treasure Island v. City and County of San Francisco (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1052.)8 C Standard of Review in CEQA Cases 3 "[I]n a CEQA case, as in other mandamus ca ses, [our review] is the same as the trial court's: [we review] the agency's action, not the trial court's decision; in that sense [our review] is de novo. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 427 .) However, our inquiry extends " 'only to whether there was a prejudici al abuse of discretion. ' ([§ 21168.5].)" ( Vineyard , at p. 426.) "[A]n agency may abuse its discretion und er CEQA either by failing to proceed in the manner CEQA provides or by reachi ng factual conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence. (§ 21168 .5.) Judicial review of th ese two types of error differs significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, 'scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements' [citation], we accord greater defe rence to the agency's substa ntive factual conclusions." ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) "In eval uating an EIR for CEQA compliance, then, [we] must adjust [our ] scrutiny to the nature of the alleged defect, depending on whether the claim is predominantly one of impr oper procedure or a dispute over the facts.

3 The California Supreme Court is curren tly reviewing the standard and scope of judicial review under CEQA. ( Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 704 [172 Cal.Rptr.3d 271], review grante d Oct. 1, 2014, S2197 83.) Pending further guidance, we endeavor to appl y the review dichotomy most recently articulated by the Supreme Court. ( Vineyard Area Citizens fo r Responsible Growth, In c. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 426-427, 435 ( Vineyard ); accord, Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 131; In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1161-1162 ( Bay-Delta ); Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Ca lifornia Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2008) 43 Cal.4th 936, 944.)9 For example, where an agency failed to require an applicant to provide certain information mandated by CEQA and to include that information in its environmental analysis, . . . the agency 'failed to proceed in the manner prescribed by CEQA.' [Citations.] In contrast, in a factual disput e over 'whether adverse effects have been mitigated or could be better mitigated' [cita tion], the agency's c onclusion would be reviewed only for subs tantial evidence." ( Ibid .)
II Appeal
A Background
1 In 2005 then Governor Arnold Schw arzenegger issued the Executive Order establishing greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets for California. Specifically, the Executive Order required reduction of greenho use gas emissions to 2000 levels by 2010, to 1990 levels by 2020, and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. 4

4 "[A]n executive order is generally regard ed as 'a formal wr itten directive of the Governor.' " (75 Op s.Cal.Atty.Gen. 263 (1992).) Th e Executive Orde r provided in relevant part: "I, ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Gove rnor of the State of California, by virtue of the power invest ed in me by the Constitution an d statutes of the State of California, do hereby order effective immediat ely . . . . That th e following greenhouse gas emission reduction targets are hereby es tablished for California: by 2010, reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions to 2000 levels; by 2020, reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions to 1990 levels; by 2050, reduce [greenhouse gas] emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels . . . ." (http://gov.ca.gov/news .php?id=1861 [as of Nov. 21, 2014].)10 The Legislature subsequently enacted the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Health & Saf. Code , § 38500 et seq.), referred to by the parties as Assembly Bill No. 32 (AB 32). Among its provisions, AB 32 tasked the California Air Resources Board (CARB) with determin ing the state's 1990 greenh ouse gas emissions level and approving an equivalent emissions level to be achieved by 2020. (Health & Saf. Code, § 38550.) The Legislature intended fo r the emissions limit to "continue in existence and be used to maintain and continue reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases beyond 2020." (Health & Saf. Code, § 38551, subd. (b).) The Legislature also intended for the emissions limit to work in concert with ot her environmental protection laws, expressly stating AB 32 does not "relie ve any person, entity, or public agency of compliance with other applicable federal, state, or local laws or regulations, includi ng state air and water quality requirements, and other requirement s for protecting public health or the environment." (Health & Saf. Code, § 38592 , subd. (b).) The Legislature further intended for "the Climate Acti on Team established by the Go vernor to coordinate the efforts set forth under [the Executive Order] continue its role in coordinating overall climate policy." (Health & Saf. Code, § 38501, subd. (i).) Thus, the Legislature, through AB 32, effectively endorsed the Executive Order and its ove rarching goal of ongoing greenhouse gas emissions reductions as state climate policy. (See, e.g., Professional Engineers in Califo rnia Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 989, 1000, 1043-1044, 1051 [subsequent legislative endorsement operates to ratify and validate provisions in Executive Order].)11 Bolstering this conclusion, the Legi slature also enacted the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008 (Stats. 2008, ch. 728; Stats. 2009, ch. 354, § 5), referred to by the parties as Senate Bill No. 375 (SB 375). In enacting SB 375, the Legislature found automobiles and light trucks are responsible for 30 percent of the state's greenhouse gas emissi ons. (Stats. 2008, ch. 728, § 1, subd. (a).) Accordingly, SB 375 directed CARB to develop regional greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for automobiles and light trucks for 2020 and 20 35. (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(A).) The targets established by CARB for the San Diego region require a 7 percent per capita reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 20 20 and a 13 percent per capita reduction by 2035 (compared to a 2005 baseline). 5 CARB must update these targets every eight years until 2050, and may update the targets every f our years based on cha nging factors. (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(A)(iv).)
2 The transportation plan, which SAND AG must prepare every four years (23 U.S.C. § 134, subd. (c); Gov. Code, § 65080, subds. (a ) & (d)), "serves as the longrange plan designed to c oordinate and manage futu re regional transportation improvements, services, and programs among the various agencies operating within the San Diego region." In enacting SB 375, the Legislature found the state's emissions reductions goals cannot be met without impr oved land use and transportation policy. Consequently, SB 375 (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(B)) mandate s the transportation

5 The transportation plan meets these li mited scope targets (see part II.C.1, post ).12 plan include a sustainable co mmunities strategy to, as the EIR states, "guide the San Diego region toward a more sustainable futu re by integrating land use, housing, and transportation planning to create more sustai nable, walkable, transit-oriented, compact development patterns and communities that meet [CARB's greenhouse gas] emissions targets for passenger cars and light-duty tr ucks." Once the sustainable communities strategy is approved, some tran sit priority projects consistent with the strategy are exempt from CEQA requirements. Other transit prior ity projects, residentia l projects, and mixeduse projects consistent with the strategy are subject to streamlined CEQA requirements. (§§ 21155-21155.4, 21159.28; Guidelines, § 15183.3.)
B Greenhouse Gas Emissions Impacts Analysis The EIR acknowledged the transportation plan's implem entation would lead to an overall increase in greenhouse gas emissions levels; however, the EIR did not analyze whether this consequence conflicted with the Executive Order, or would impair or impede the achievement of the Executive Orde r's goals. As it did in the EIR and below, SANDAG contends on appeal its decision to omit an analysis of the transportation plan's consistency with the Executive Order (cons istency analysis) did not violate CEQA because CEQA does not require such a consiste ncy analysis. Whether the EIR's analysis complies with CEQA depends on whether the an alysis reflects a reasonable, good faith effort to disclose and evaluate the tran sportation plan's gree nhouse gas emissions impacts. We review the suffi ciency of the analysis in light of what is reasonably foreseeable. (Guidelines, § 15151; City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.13 (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 386 ( City of Maywood ); City of Long Beach v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 889, 897-898 ( City of Long Beach ).) As the focus of SANDAG's contention is whether the EIR's analysis was reasonable and not whether the EIR violated a specific statut e or regulation, the contention presents a predominately factual question and our re view is for substantial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) Substantial evidence for CEQA purposes is "enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions mi ght also be reached." (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).) Substantial eviden ce includes "facts, reasonable a ssumptions pred icated upon facts, and expert opinion supported by facts." ( Id ., subd. (b).) It does not include argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opini on or narrative, clearly erroneous or inaccurate evidence, or evidence of social or economic im pacts which do not contribute to or are not caused by physical impacts on the environment. ( Id ., subd. (a).) "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [we] 'may not set aside an agency's approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable,' for, on factual questions, our task 'is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has th e better argument.' " ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435; Laurel Heights , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 393.) Rather, we must resolve any reasonable doubts and any conflicts in th e evidence in favor of the agency's findings and decision. ( Laurel Heights , at p. 393; Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Development v. City of San Diego , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 522-523.)14 In this case, SANDAG's decision to omit an analysis of the transportation plan's consistency with the Executive Or der did not reflect a reasonabl e, good faith effort at full disclosure and is not supported by substa ntial evidence because SANDAG's decision ignored the Executive Order's ro le in shaping stat e climate policy. The Executive Order underpins all of the state's current effort s to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As SANDAG itself noted in its Climate Acti on Strategy, the Executive Order's 2050 emissions reduction goal "is based on the scie ntifically-supported level of emissions reduction needed to avoid signific ant disruption of the climate and is used as the longterm driver for state climate change policy development ." (Italics added.) Indeed, the Executive Order led direc tly to the enactmen t of AB 32, which validated and ratified the Executive Order' s overarching goal of ongoing emissions reductions, recognized the Gove rnor's Climate Action Team as the coordinator of the state's overall climate policy, and tasked CARB with establishing overall emissions reduction targets for 2020 and beyond. The Ex ecutive Order also le d directly to the enactment of SB 375, which tasked CARB w ith establishing regional automobile and light truck emissions reduction targets for 20 20 and 2035. CARB is required to revisit these targets every eight y ears through 2050, or sooner if warranted by changing circumstances. (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(A)(iv).) Thus, the Executive Order, with the Legislature's unqua lified endorsement, will conti nue to underpin the state's efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions thro ughout the life of the transportation plan. The EIR's failure to analyze the transportation plan's cons istency with the Executive Order, or more particularly with the Ex ecutive Order's overarching goal of ongoing15 greenhouse gas emissions reductions, was theref ore a failure to anal yze the transportation plan's consistency with state climate policy. As evidence in the record indicates the transportation plan would actua lly be inconsistent with stat e climate policy over the long term, the omission deprived the public and de cision makers of relevant information about the transportation plan's environmental c onsequences. The omission was prejudicial because it precluded informed decisionm aking and public participation. ( Smart Rail , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 463; City of Long Beach , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 898.) SANDAG contends the EIR cannot analyze the transportation plan's consistency with the Executive Order because there is no statute or regulation translating the Executive Order's goals into co mparable, scientifically based emissions reduction targets. However, we do not agree the lack of such targets precl udes the EIR from performing a meaningful consistency analysis in this instance. "Draf ting an EIR . . . necessarily involves some degree of forecasting. While foreseeing the unforeseeable is not possible, an agency must us e its best efforts to fi nd out and disclose all th at it reasonably can." (Guidelines, § 15144.) Although SANDAG may not know precisely what future emissions reduction targets the transportatio n plan will be required to meet, it knows from the information in its own Climate Ac tion Strategy the th eoretical emissions reduction targets necessary for th e region to meet its share of the Executive Order's goals. It also knows state climate policy, as re flected in the Executive Order and AB 32, requires a continual decrease in the state's greenhouse gas emissions and the transportation plan after 2020 produces a continual increase in greenhouse gas emissions. With this knowledge, SA NDAG could have reasonabl y analyzed whether the16 transportation plan was consis tent with, or whether it would impair or impede, state climate policy. 6 SANDAG's attempts to disavow its respons ibility for performing this analysis are unavailing. The Legislature specifically foun d reducing greenhouse gas emissions cannot be accomplished without improve d land use and transportation policy. Accordingly, the transportation plan plays both a necessary and important role in achieving state climate policy. By failing to adequate ly inform the public and deci sion makers the transportation plan is inconsistent with state climate po licy, the EIR deterred the decision makers from devising and considering changes to favorably alter the trajectory of the transportation plan's post-2020 greenhouse gas emissions. When the decision makers are inevitably faced with post-2020 requirements aligned w ith state climate policy, their task of complying with these require ments will be more difficult and some opportunities for compliance may be lost. As SANDAG explai ned in its Climate Action Strategy, "Once in place, land use patterns and transportation in frastructure typically remain part of the built environment and influence travel behavior and greenhou se gas emissions for several decades, perhaps longer." In this regard, the EIR falls far short of being "an

6 We do not intend to suggest the tran sportation plan must achieve the Executive Order's 2050 goal or any other specific numerical goal. Ou r concern is with the EIR's failure to recognize, much le ss analyze and attempt to mitig ate, the conflict between the transportation plan's long-term greenhouse gas emissions increase and the state climate policy goal, reflected in the Executive Order, of long-term emissions reductions. In fact, the EIR does not even discuss the transporta tion plan's failure to maintain emissions reductions after 2020, which is AB 32's mini mum expectation. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 38551, subd. (b).)17 'environmental "alarm bell" whose purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental changes before they have reach ecological points of no return.' " ( Laurel Heights , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 392.) It also falls far short of " 'demonstrat[ing] to an apprehen sive citizenry that the agency has, in fact, analyzed and considered the ecological implic ations of its actions.' " ( Ibid. ) We are likewise unpersuaded by SANDAG' s assertion the EIR's analysis of the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emi ssions impacts fully complies with CEQA because it utilized significance thresholds sp ecified in Guidelines section 15064.4, subdivision (b). 7 This Guideline states in relevant pa rt: "A lead agency should consider the following factors, among others , when assessing the significance of impacts from greenhouse gas emissions on the environment: [¶] (1) The extent to which the project may increase or reduce greenhouse gas emis sions as compared to the existing environmental setting[.] [¶] (2 ) Whether the project emissi ons exceed a threshold of significance that the lead agency determines a pplies to the project. [¶] (3) The extent to which the project complies with regulations or requirements adopted to implement a statewide, regional, or local plan for th e reduction or mitigati on of greenhouse gas emissions. Such requirements must be adopted by the relevant public agency through a public review process and must reduce or mi tigate the project's incremental contribution

7 "A threshold of significance is an identifiable quantitative, qualitative or performance level of a particular envir onmental effect, non-compliance with which means the effect will normally be determin ed to be significant by the agency and compliance with which means the effect normally will be determined to be less than significant." (Guidelines, § 15064.7.)18 of greenhouse gas emissions. If there is substa ntial evidence that th e possible effects of a particular project are still cumulatively cons iderable notwithstanding compliance with the adopted regulations or requirements, an EI R must be prepared for the project." (Guidelines, § 15064.4, subd. (b), italics added.) Although this Guideline sp ecifies three means of determining whether a project's greenhouse gas emissions impacts are si gnificant, the "among others" qualifying language indicates these means are not exclusive. 8 Moreover, "the fact that a particular environmental effect meets a particular threshold cannot be used as an automatic determinant that the effect is or is not significant . . . a th reshold of significance cannot be applied in a way that would foreclose the co nsideration of other substantial evidence tending to show the environmental effect to which the threshol d relates might be significant." ( Protect The Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water Agency (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1109 ( Amador ).) Consequently, the use of the Guideline's thresholds does not necessarily equate to co mpliance with CEQA, par ticularly where, as here, the failure to consider the transportation plan's consis tency with the state climate policy of ongoing emissions reductions refl ected in the Executiv e Order frustrates the state climate policy and renders th e EIR fundamentally misleading.

8 Indeed, in its statement of reasons for adopting the Guid eline, the Natural Resources Agency explained the Guideline "reflects the existing CEQA principle that there is no iron-clad definition of 'significance.' [Citations.] Accordingly, lead agencies must use their best efforts to investigate and disclose all that they reasonably can regarding a project's potential adverse impact s." (California Natural Resources Agency, Final Statement of Reasons for Regulat ory Action (Dec. 20 09) p. 20 < http:// resources.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/Final_ Statement_of_Reasons.pdf > (as of Nov. 21, 2014).)19 We are also unpersuaded by SANDAG's assertion it was not required to analyze the transportation plan's consistency with the state climate polic y reflected in the Executive Order because SANDAG has broad disc retion to select the criteria it uses to determine the significance of the transporta tion plan's impacts. While we agree SANDAG has such discretion ( North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 614, 624) , SANDAG abuses its discretion if it exercises it in a manner that causes an EIR's analysis to be misleading or without informational value. (See Smart Rail , supra , 57 Cal.4th at pp. 445, 457.) "A lead agency cannot avoid finding a potentially significa nt effect on the environment by rotely applying standards of significance that do not address that potential effect." ( Rominger v. County of Colusa (2014) 229 Cal.App. 4th 690, 717, citing Amador , supra , 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.) By disregarding the Execu tive Order's overarching goal of ongoing emissions reductions, the EIR's analysis of the transp ortation plan's greenhouse gas emissions makes it falsely appear as if the transportation plan is furthering state climate policy when, in fact, the trajectory of the transportation plan's post-2020 emissions directly contravenes it. "[O]mitting ma terial necessary to informed decisionmaking and informed public participation" subver ts the purposes of CEQA and "precludes both identification of potential environmental consequences aris ing from the project and also thoughtful analysis of the sufficiency of measures to mitigate those consequences." ( Lotus v. Department of Transportation (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 645, 658.) Such an omission is particularly troubling where, as here, th e project under review involves long-term,20 planned expenditures of billions of taxpayer dollars. No one can reasonably suggest it would be prudent to go forward with planne d expenditures of this magnitude before the public and decision makers have been provided w ith all reasonably available information bearing on the project's impacts to the h ealth, safety, and welfare of the region's inhabitants. We, therefore, conclude SAN DAG prejudicially abus ed its discretion by omitting from the EIR an analysis of the trans portation plan's consis tency with the state climate policy, reflected in the Executive Order, of conti nual greenhouse gas emissions

reductions. 9

C Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Impacts
1 Although the EIR did not an alyze the transportation plan's consistency with the state climate policy reflected in the Executive Order, the EI R nevertheless, analyzed the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emi ssions impacts against three significance thresholds for each of the planning years 2020, 2035, and 2050. Under the first

9 Our decision will not necessarily st op any project encompassed within the transportation plan. (See Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 260, 286-289.) Our decision also will not pr ocedurally or substantively expand CEQA requirements in violation of section 21083.1 because the EIR is required to analyze the transportation plan's potential "to degrade the quality of the envi ronment, curtail the range of the environment, or to achieve short-term, to the disadvantage of long-term, environmental goals ." (§ 21083, su bd. (b)(1), italics added; Guidelines, § 15065, subd. (a)(2), (c).) Rather, our decision is consistent with the intent CE QA "be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language. (Guidelines, § 15003, subd. (f).)21 threshold, the EIR posited th e transportation plan's impacts would be significant if the transportation plan's implementation were to increase greenhouse gas emissions compared to existing, or 2010, conditions. Under the se cond threshold, the EIR posited the transportation plan's impacts would be significant if the transportation plan's implementation conflicted with CARB's regi onal automobile and light truck emissions reductions targets. Under the third threshol d, the EIR stated the transportation plan's impacts would be significant if the transpor tation plan's implementation conflicted with either CARB's Climate Change Scoping Plan (Scoping Plan) or SANDAG's own Climate Action Strategy. 10

The EIR concluded the tr ansportation plan's greenh ouse gas emissions impacts would be significant under the first significance threshold fo r the 2035 and 2050 planning years because the emissions woul d be higher in those planni ng years than in 2010. The EIR concluded the greenhouse gas emissions im pacts would be less than significant in all other respects analyzed. 11

10 The Scoping Plan is CARB's roadma p for achieving greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The Climate Action Strategy is SANDAG's guide for addressing climate change. The Climate Action St rategy emphasizes the areas wh ere the greatest impact can be made at the local level, incl uding transportation infrastructure.
11 The People and Cleveland have not challenged these conclusions and their propriety is not before us. Nonetheless, regarding the third significance threshold, we note the Climate Action Strategy expresses far stronger views than the transportation plan on the steps necessary to ach ieve the state's long-term greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals. For example, the Climat e Action Strategy maintains achieving the goals "will require fundamental changes in po licy, technology, and behavior" and "[b]y 2030, the region must have met and gone below the 1990 [emissions] level and be well on its way to doing its share for achieving th e 2050 greenhouse gas reduction level."22 2 To mitigate the significant greenhouse gas emissions impacts found under the first threshold, the EIR identified three m itigation measures it deemed feasible. 12 The first mitigation measure requi red SANDAG to update its future regional comprehensive plans, regional transportation plans, and sustaina ble communities plans to incorporate policies and measures leading to reduced greenhous e gas emissions. The second mitigation measure encouraged the San Diego region c ities and the County of San Diego (County) to adopt and implement climat e action plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to a level the particular city or the County determined would not be cumulatively considerable. The second mitigation measure also identified various provisions the plans should include and stated SANDAG would assist in the preparation of the plans and other climate strategies through the continued implementation of its own Climate Action Strategy and Energy Roadmap Program. 13 The third mitigation measure stated SANDAG would and other agenci es should require the use of best available control technology to reduce greenhous e gas emissions during the construction and operation of projects.

12 " 'Feasible' means capable of being ac complished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into accoun t economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological factors." (Guidelines, § 15364.)
13 According to the record , the Energy Roadmap Program "identifies energy-saving measures that can be integrat ed into local pla nning and permitti ng processes, ordinances, outreach and education efforts, and municipal operations."23 According to the EIR, these mitigation measures encourage reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but they do no t provide a mechanism guaranteeing such reductions. Consequently, the EIR conclude d the significant impacts found under the first threshold would remain significant and unavoidable. The EIR also considered and rejected three other mitigation measures deemed infeasible. These mitigation me asures were: (1) requiring all vehicles driven within the region to be zero-emission vehicles or to be powered by renewable energy; (2) requiring all future construction to be net-zero energy use; and (3) requiring all future construction activity to include only e quipment retrofitted to signifi cantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
3 SANDAG contends the EIR ad equately addressed mitiga tion for the transportation plan's significant greenhouse gas emissions im pacts. Given our conclusion in part II.B,

ante , this challenge is at least partially moot as the additional analysis necessary to properly address the transportation plan's consistency with the state climate policy reflected in the Executive Orde r will likely require revisions to related sections of the EIR, including the EIR's discussi on of mitigation measures. ( Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 91 [once a lead agency recognizes an impact is significant, the agency must describe, evaluate, and adopt24 feasible mitigation measures to mitigate or avoid the impact].) 14 We, nonetheless, briefly address SANDAG's contention. As this contention is predominately factual, our review is for substantial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.)

a "The core of an EIR is the mitigat ion and alternatives sections." ( Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 553, 564; Watsonville Pilots Assn. v. City of Watsonville (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 10 59, 1089.) "Section 21002 requires agencies to adopt feasible mitigati on measures to substan tially lessen or avoid otherwise significant adverse environmental imp acts. [¶] The CEQA gu idelines state that to be legally adequate mitigati on measures must be capable of : '(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action. (b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action an d its implementation. (c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restori ng the impacted environment. (d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by pres ervation and maintena nce operations during the life of the action.' [Citation.] "For each significant effect, the EIR mu st identify specific mitigation measures; where several potential mitigati on measures are available, each should be discussed separately, and the reasons fo r choosing one over the others should be stated. If the

14 We do not express any view on precisely how SANDAG must remedy the analytical deficiencies identif ied in this opinion as we recognize a court may direct SANDAG to comply with CEQA, but a court may not direct SANDAG to exercise its discretion in a particular fashion or to produce a particular result. (§ 21168.9, subd. (c); Schellinger Brothers v. City of Sebastopol (2009) 179 Cal.Ap p.4th 1245, 1266.)25 inclusion of a mitigation measure would itself create new significant effects, these too, must be discussed, though in less detail th an required for those caused by the project itself." ( Sacramento Old City Assn. v. City Council (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027.) For significant greenhouse gas emissions effects, feasible mitigation measures may include: "(1) Measures in an existi ng plan or mitigation pr ogram for the reduction of emissions that are required as part of the lead agency's decision; [¶] (2) Reductions in emissions resulting from a project through im plementation of project features, project design, or other measures . . . ; [¶] (3) Off-s ite measures, including offsets that are not otherwise required, to mitigate a project's emissions; [¶] (4) Measures that sequester greenhouse gases; [¶] [and] (5) In the case of the adoption of a plan, such as a general plan, long range development plan, or plans for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation may include the identifi cation of specific measures that may be implemented on a project -by-project basis. M itigation may also include the incorporation of specific measures or policies found in an adopted ordinance or re gulation that reduces the cumulative effect of emissions." (Guidelines, § 15 126.4, subd. (c).) b At one extreme, the EIR in this case considered and deemed feasible three measures requiring little to no effort to impl ement and assuring little to no concrete steps toward emissions reduction. In addition, according to the EIR, many of the suggestions contained in these measures ha ve already been incorporated into the transportation plan and, by implication, the tran sportation plan's emissions estimates. "A 'mitigation measure' is a suggestion or change that would reduce or minimize significant adverse26 impacts on the environment caused by the project as proposed." ( Lincoln Place Tenants Association v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 445.) A mitigation measure is not part of the project. ( Lotus v. Department of Transportation , supra , 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 656 & fn. 8.) Thus, it is questionable whether these measures even qualify as mitigation measures. At the other extreme, the EIR considered and deemed in feasible three particularly onerous measures. Each of the measures woul d be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce and each requires implementation resources not readily availabl e. Unrealistic mitigation measures, similar to un realistic project alternatives, do not contribute to a useful CEQA analysis. (See Watsonville Pilots Assn. v. City of Watsonville , supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089; 1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice U nder the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2014) § 15.10, pp . 15-16.) As none of these measures had any probability of implementation, their incl usion in the EI R was illusory. Missing from the EIR is what CEQA re quires: a discussion of mitigation alternatives that could both substantially lessen the tran sportation plan's significant greenhouse gas emissions impacts and feasibly be implemented. ( Lincoln Place Tenants Association v. City of Los Angeles , supra , 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 4 45.) A few examples of potential alternatives identifie d in the Climate Action Stra tegy include: supporting the planning and development of smart growth areas through transportation investments and other funding decisions; offering incentives for transit-oriented developments in smart growth areas; coordinating the funding of lo w carbon transportation with smart growth development; and encouraging parking manage ment measures that promote walking and27 transit use in smart growth ar eas. Given the absenc e of any discussion of such mitigation alternatives, we conclude there is not su bstantial evidence to support SANDAG's determination the EIR adequately addresse d mitigation for the tr ansportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The error is prejudicial because it precluded informed public participation and decision making. (§ 21005, subd. (a); City of Maywood , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.)
III Cross-Appeals
A Forfeiture The People's and Cleveland's pleadings and briefs below challenged many aspects of the EIR in addition to th e EIR's analysis and mitigati on of greenhouse gas emissions impacts. In its tentative ruling, the superi or court acknowledged the other challenges, but determined it could resolve the case solely on the greenhouse gas emissions impacts analysis and mitigation issues and, consequently, it did not need to address the other challenges. The People and Cleveland through their cross-appeals now seek rulings from this court on many of the other challenges. SANDAG contends they forfeited these challenges by failing to attempt to ob tain rulings on them below. Even if SANDAG's contentio n were correct, the applicat ion of the forfeiture rule is not automatic and we may excuse forfeitu re in cases presenting "an important legal issue." ( In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) We are persuaded the legal issues raised in the cross-appeals ar e sufficiently important we should exercise our discretion to28 excuse any forfeiture. Moreover, we are mindf ul of the Legislature's intent "that any court, which finds, or, in the process of re viewing a previous court finding, finds, that a public agency has taken an action without compliance with [CEQA], shall specifically address each of the alleged grounds for noncompliance." (§ 21005, subd. (c).)
B Project Alternatives
1 The EIR analyzed se ven project alternativ es. They were: 1. A no project alternative, which a ssumed the transporta tion plan would not be adopted and only transportation improv ements under construction or development would be built (Alternative 1); 2. A modified funding strategy alte rnative, which deleted some highway improvements, delayed other highway impr ovements, added some transit projects, advanced other transit projects, and incr eased some transit service frequencies (Alternative 2a); 3. The same modified funding strategy alternative coupled with a modified "smart growth" land use patte rn, which assumed added in fill and redevelopment to increase residential development density in urban and town center areas and increased employment within job centers (Alternative 2b); 4. A transit emphasis alternative, wh ich advanced the development of some transit projects, but did not add any ne w transit projects (Alternative 3a);29 5. The same transit emphasis alterna tive, but assuming the modified smart growth land use pattern (Alternative 3b); 6. An alternative implementing the transportation plan's transportation network, but assuming the modified smart gr owth land use pattern (Alternative 4); and 7. A slow growth alternative, which assumed the application of regulations and/or economic disincentives to slow population and em ployment and delayed the complete implementation of the transportati on plan by five years (Alternative 5).
2 Cleveland contends the EIR fails to co mply with CEQA because the EIR did not analyze a reasonable range of project alterna tives. As the focus of this contention is whether the analysis was reasonable and not whether it occurred, the contention presents a predominately factual ques tion and our review is for substantial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) "CEQA requires that an EI R, in addition to analyzing the environmental effects of a proposed project, also consider and anal yze project alternatives that would reduce adverse environmental impacts. [Citations.] Th e [Guidelines] state that an EIR must 'describe a range of reasonable a lternatives to the project . . . which would feasibly attain most of the basic objectives of the project bu t would avoid or substantially lessen any of the significant effects of the project . . . .' [Citation.] An EIR ne ed not consider every conceivable alternative to a project or altern atives that are infeasible. [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶]30 " 'There is no ironclad rule governing the nature or scope of the alternatives to be discussed other than the rule of reason.' [Cit ation.] The rule of reason 'requires the EIR to set forth only those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choi ce' and to 'examine in detail only the ones that th e lead agency determ ines could feasibly attain most of the basic objectives of the project.' [Citations .] An EIR does not have to consider alternatives 'whose effect ca nnot be reasonably ascertained and whose implementation is remote and speculative.' " ( Bay-Delta , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 1163, fn. omitted.) A court will uphold the selection of project alternatives unless the challenger demonstrates " 'that the alternatives are manifestly unreasona ble and that they do not contribute to a reasonable range of alternatives.' " ( California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 988.) In this case, the EIR's discussion of proj ect alternatives is deficient because it does not discuss an alternative which could signifi cantly reduce total vehi cle miles traveled. Although Alternatives 3a and 3b are labeled "transit emphasis" alternatives, the labeling is a misnomer. These alternatives mainly advance certain rapid bus projects, but leave the planned rail and trolley projects largely un changed. In addition, these alternatives do not provide any new transit proj ects or significant service increases. In fact, the "transit emphasis" alternatives include fewer transit projects than some of the other non-"transitemphasis" alternatives. The omission of an alterna tive which could significantly reduce total vehicle miles traveled is inexplicable given SANDAG's acknowledgment in its Climate Action Strategy that the state's efforts to reduc e greenhouse gas emissions from on-road31 transportation will not succeed if the amount of driving, or vehicle miles traveled, is not significantly reduced. The Climate Action St rategy explained, "Lowering vehicle miles traveled means providi ng high-quality opportunities to make trips by alternative means to driving alone such as walking, bicycling, ridesharing, and public transit, and by shortening vehicle trips that are made. This can be accomplished through improved land use and transportation planning and relate d measures, policies and investments that increase the options people have when they travel ." Accordingly, the Climate Action Strategy recommended policy measures to in crease and prioritize funding and system investments for public transit and transit operations, increase the level of service on existing routes and provide ne w public transit service thro ugh expanded investments, and improve the performance of public transit wi th infrastructure upgrades. Given these recommendations, their purpose, and their source, it is reasonable to expect at least one project alternative to have been focused prim arily on significantly re ducing vehicle trips. Instead, it appears the proj ect alternatives focused primarily on congestion relief. The Climate Action Strategy pr ovides evidentiary support for the consideration of congestion relief alternatives as it notes, "E liminating or reducing congestion can lead to more efficient travel conditio ns for vehicles a nd greenhouse gas savings." However, the transportation plan is a long-term plan an d congestion relief is not necessarily an effective long-term strategy. As the Clim ate Action Strategy expl ains, "Measures to relieve congestion also may induce additional vehicle travel during uncongested periods, particularly over the long-term , which can partially or fu lly offset the greenhouse gas reductions achieved in the short-term from congestion relief. Induced demand32 (sometimes called the rebound eff ect) in transportation refers to the increase in travel that can occur when the level of service on a roadway or other facility improves. Travelers sometimes respond to faster tr avel times and decreased costs of travel by traveling more, resulting in increased vehicle miles traveled ." (Fns. omitted.) Given the acknowledged long-term drawbacks of congesti on relief alternatives, there is not substantial evidence to support the EIR's exclusion of an alternativ e focused primarily on significantly reducing vehicle trips. The error is prejudicial beca use it precluded informed public participation and decisionmaking. (§ 21005, subd. (a); City of Maywood , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.)
C Air Quality Impacts
1 Eleven air quality monitoring stations throughout the region measure ambient air pollutant concentrations to determine whethe r the region's air quality meets federal and state standards. The region does not meet th e state standards for emissions of respirable particulate matter with an aerodynamic resi stance diameter of 10 micrometers or less (PM 10 ) and fine particulate matter with an aerodynamic resistance diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less (PM 2.5 ). 15 The EIR forecasted the daily tonnage of on -road mobile emissions of PM 10 and PM 2.5 from the transportation plan's transportation network

15 According to the EIR, "respirable" m eans the particulate matter can "avoid many of the human respiratory system defense mech anisms and enter deep ly into the lung."33 improvements would steadily and substantially increase from 2010 to 2050. The EIR did not forecast whether there would be any increa se in these emissions from regional growth or land use changes associated with the tran sportation plan. Instead, the EIR indicated such forecasting would be done during th e next tier of environmental review. Five of the region's air quality monito ring stations also sample toxic air contaminants (TACs), which are contaminants known or suspected to cause cancer or serious health problems, but for which ther e are no federal or state ambient air quality standards. State law also requires facilities to report any emissions of TACs in order to quantify the amount released, the location of th e release, the concentrations to which the public is exposed, and the resulting potential health risk. (Health & Saf. Code, § 44300 et seq.) In 2009, annual emi ssions of TACs in the region we re estimated to be more than 64.9 million pounds. According to the EIR, expo sure to TACs can cause cancer and other serious health problems. This is especially true of expos ure to diesel particulate matter, which is respirable (see fn. 15, ante ). The EIR further explained, "The carcinogenic potential of TACs is a particular public h ealth concern because many scien tists currently believe that there is no 'safe' level of ex posure to carcinogens. Any ex posure to a carcinogen poses some risk of contracting cancer." One of the thresholds the EIR used to determine the significance of the transportation plan's air qua lity impacts was whether se nsitive receptors would be exposed to substantial pollutant concentrations. For purposes of this threshold, "sensitive34 receptors" included children, the elderly, and communities already experiencing high levels of air pollution and related diseases.
As to PM 10 and PM 2.5 emissions, the EIR indicated se nsitive receptors could be significantly impacted if they were located n ear congested intersections. As to TACs, the EIR indicated TACs emitted from highway ve hicles and nonroad equipment tend to impact those closest to the em ission sources. The EIR explai ned, "[a] growing body of scientific evidence shows that living or going to school near roadways with heavy traffic volumes is associated with a number of adverse effects. These include increased respiratory symptoms, increased risk of heart and lung dise ase, and elevated mortality
rates." Although the EIR recognized regional gr owth and land use changes associated with the transportation plan had the potential to expose sensitive receptors to substantial localized pollutant concentra tions, the EIR stated the level of exposure could not and would not be determined until th e next tier of environmental review when facility designs of individual projects became available. Th e EIR made identical statements regarding proposed transportation improvements asso ciated with the transportation plan. The EIR summarized several studies linki ng proximity to heav ily traveled roads and freeways to harmful health effects to children. The EIR also noted CARB had estimated the region's health risk from diesel particulat e matter in 2000 was 720 excess cancer cases per million and had recommended sensitive land us es not be sited within 500 feet of a freeway, urban roads with 100,0 00 vehicles per day, and rural roads with 50,000 vehicles per day.35 2 Cleveland contends the EI R's air quality impacts analys is violates CEQA because the EIR's description of existing conditions does not adequately depict the public's existing exposure to TACs. Cleveland conte nds the existing conditions description also fails to identify the approximate number and location of sensitive re ceptors near planned transportation projects. SANDAG, however, a sserts its existing conditions description is sufficiently detailed for a program level EI R. As these contentions focus on the reasonableness of the EIR's analysis, they present predominately factual questions and our review is for substantial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435; accord, Smart Rail , supra , 57 Cal.4th at pp. 447-449; Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 328.) To fulfill its informati on disclosure function, "an EIR must delineate environmental conditions prevailing absent the project, defining a baseline against which predicted effects can be de scribed and quantified." ( Smart Rail , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 447; see County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 953 [without an adequate baseline description, "analy sis of impacts, mitigation measures and project altern atives becomes impossible"]; Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a).) 16 If the description of the environmenta l setting " 'is inaccurate, incomplete or

16 Guidelines section 15125, subdivisi on (a), provides: "An EIR must include a description of the physical environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project, as they exist at the time the notice of preparation is published, or if no notice of preparation is published, at the time environmental anal ysis is commenced, from both a local and36 misleading, the EIR does not comply with CEQA. [Citation.] "Without accurate and complete information pertaining to the setti ng of the project and surrounding uses, it cannot be found that th e [EIR] adequately investigated and discussed the environmental impacts of the development project." ' " ( Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 219.) In this case, for TACs exposures, the record shows there wa s available data from monitoring stations and mandatory reports with which SANDAG could have developed a reasoned estimate of the regi on's existing TACs exposures. Likewise, for sensitive receptors, the record shows S ANDAG has data showing curre nt population and land use patterns and current transportation infrastru cture from which it could have developed a reasoned estimate of the number and location of sensitive recept ors adjacent to highways and heavily traveled roadways. The fact more precise information may be available during the next tier of environmental review does not excuse SA NDAG from providing what information it reasonably can now. (Guidelines, § 15144.) Moreover, if known impacts are not analyzed and addressed in a program EIR, they may potentially escape analysis in a later tier EIR. (§ 21166; Citizens Against Air port Pollution v. City of San Jose , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-808; Concerned Dublin Citizens v. City of Dublin , supra , 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320; Citizens for Responsible Equita ble Environmental Development v. City of San Diego , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 531-532; Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. regional perspective. This environmenta l setting will normally constitute the baseline physical conditions by which a lead agency determin es whether an impact is significant."37 Department of Health Services , supra , 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1605.) We, therefore, conclude there is not substantial evidence to support SANDAG's determination it could not reasonably provid e additional baseline information in the EIR about TACs exposures and the location of sensitive receptors. The error is prejudicial because it precluded informed public particip ation and decisionmaking. (§ 21005, subd. (a); City of Maywood , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.)
3 Both the People and Clevel and contend the EIR's analysis of air quality impacts fails to comply with CEQA because it fails to correlate the transportation plan's adverse air quality impacts to resulting adverse hea lth impacts. SANDAG again contends its disclosure efforts are adequate for the pr ogram level of environmental review and producing additional information at this level is infeasible. As with the parties' other contention, this contention is predominantly factual and our review is for substantial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) "Guidelines section 15126.2, subdivision (a) requires an EIR to di scuss, inter alia, 'health and safety problems caus ed by the physical changes' that the proposed project will precipitate." ( Bakersfield Citizens for Local Co ntrol v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1219 ( Bakersfield Citizens ).) Accordingly, an EIR must identify and analyze the adverse health imp acts likely to result from the pr oject's air quality impacts. ( Id. , at p. 1220; Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Com. v. Board of Port Comrs. , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1367-1371.)38 Here, the EIR identified in a general manne r the adverse health impacts that might result from the transportation plan's air quality impacts. However, the EIR failed to correlate the additional tons of annual transp ortation plan-related emissions to anticipated adverse health impacts from th e emissions. Although the p ublic and decision makers might infer from the EIR the transportation pl an will make air quality and human health worse, at least in some resp ects for some people, this is not sufficient information to understand the adverse impact. ( Bakersfield Citizens , supra , 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220 [EIR analysis of air quality impacts deficien t where public would ha ve no idea of the health consequences of in creased air pollution].) While SANDAG contends it is not feasible to provide more definite information at this juncture, we have not lo cated nor has SANDAG identified any evidence in the record supporting this contention. Instead, SAN DAG impermissibly relies solely on its own bald assertions of infeasibility contained in the EIR. ( City of Maywood , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [an EIR must contain facts and anal ysis, not just the agency's bare conclusions].) Certainly, we recognize th ere are limitations to the precision of a program-level analysis. SANDAG is nonethel ess obliged to disclose what it reasonably can about the correlation, it has not done so , and there is not substantial evidence showing it could not do so. The error is prej udicial because it precl uded informed public39 participation and decisionmaking. 17 (§ 21005, subd. (a); City of Maywood , supra , at p. 386.)
4

a To mitigate the transportation plan's ai r quality impacts, the EIR identified the following mitiga tion measures: 1. Local jurisdictions should incorporat e into their land use decisions certain measures recommended by the California Atto rney General for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 2. At the next tier of environm ental review, SANDAG will and other implementing agencies should incorporate certain dust control measures into project specifications for transportation network improvements. 3. At the next tier of environm ental review, SANDAG will and other implementing agencies should require any heavy dut y off-road vehicles used to construct transportation network improveme nts to utilize all feasible measures to reduce specified emissions to a less than significant level. 4. At the next tier of environm ental review, SANDAG will and other implementing agencies should evaluate potential impact s from carbon monoxide, PM 10

17 Given this conclusion and its bases, we need not decide the People's conditional motion for judicial notice of examples of co rrelative information contained in comparable EIRs from other jurisdictions.40 and PM 2.5 emissions and their health risks an d, if required, add one or more recommended mitigation measures to reduce the emissions. The EIR further conc luded these were the only mitig ation measures available at the program-level of environmental review. b Both the People and Clevel and contend these measures, except for the second, violate CEQA because they im properly defer mitig ation of the transportation plan's significant air quality impacts. SANDAG once more counters these measures are adequate for the program leve l of environmental review. This issue, like the issu e involving the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions impacts, is at least partially moot gi ven our conclusion in parts III.C.2 & 3, ante , as the additional analysis necessary to correct the no ted deficiencies will likely require revisions to related sections of the EIR, includi ng the discussion of m itigation measures. ( Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond , supra , 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 91.) However, we briefly address the Peopl e's and Cleveland's contentions. As these contentions are predominantly factual, our review is for substa ntial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) "An EIR shall describe fe asible measures which co uld minimize significant adverse impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1).) An EIR may not defer the formulation of mitigation measures to a futu re time, but mitigation measures may specify performance standards which w ould mitigate the proj ect's significant e ffects and may be accomplished in more than one specified way. ( Id ., subd. (a)(1)(B).)41 "Thus, ' " 'for [the] kinds of impacts fo r which mitigation is kn own to be feasible, but where practical considerati ons prohibit devising such meas ures early in the planning process (e.g., at the general plan amendmen t or rezone stage), the agency can commit itself to eventually devising measures that will satisfy sp ecific performance criteria articulated at the time of proj ect approval. Where future action to carry a project forward is contingent on devising means to satisfy such criteria, the agency shou ld be able to rely on its commitment as evidence th at significant impacts will in fact be mitigated.' " ' [Citation.] Conversely, ' "[i] mpermissible deferral of mitig ation measures occurs when an EIR puts off analysis or orders a report without either setting standards or demonstrating how the impact can be mitigated in the manner described in the EIR." ' " ( Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal.App. 4th 260, 280-281.) In this case, with one exception, the EIR defers the analysis of appropriate mitigation measures. It also fails to set performance st andards and commit SANDAG to complying with them. Although SANDAG contends no other mitigation is feasible at the program level of environmental review, we ha ve not located nor has SANDAG pointed to any evidence in the record supp orting this contention. Accord ingly, we conclude there is not substantial evidence to support SAND AG's determination the EIR adequately addressed mitigation for the tr ansportation plan's air quality impacts. The error is prejudicial because it precluded informed pu blic participation and decisionmaking. (§ 21005, subd. (a); City of Maywood , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.)42 D Agricultural Impacts
1 The EIR evaluated the transportation plan's agricultural impacts under two significance thresholds. Under the first thres hold, the EIR evaluated the impacts to land designated prime farmland, uni que farmland or farmland of statewide significance under the California Resources Agency's Fa rmland Mapping and Monitoring Program. 18 The EIR concluded implementation of the transpor tation plan would result in the conversion of 3,485.09 acres of such farmland by 2050. Under the second threshold, the EIR ev aluated impacts to all land with existing agricultural uses regardless of classification, lands subject to Williamson Act contracts, and lands designated under the Califor nia Farmland Conservancy Program Act. 19 The EIR concluded implementation of the transpor tation plan would result in the conversion

18 According to the EIR, the Farmland Mapping and Moni toring Program is used to identify agricultural resources of 10-acres or more. "Farmlands are classified according to soil factors, including available water holding capacity, temperature regime, acidity, depth to the water table, electrical conduc tivity, flooding potential, erosion hazard, permeability, rock content, and rooting depth. The best quality land is identified as Prime Farmland and Farmland of Statewide Importance." 19 According to the EIR, "the Williamson Act [Gov. Code, § 51200 et seq.] enables local governments to enter into contracts with private landowners for the purpose of restricting specific parcels of land to agricultu ral or related open sp ace use. In return, landowners receive property tax assessments that are much lower than normal because they are based upon farming and open space uses as opposed to full market value." The California Farmland Conservancy Prog ram Act (§ 10200 et seq.) encourages "the long-term, private stewardship of ag ricultural lands through the voluntary use of agricultural conservation easements."43 of 7,023.07 acres of such land by 2050. The conclusi on was based on data from the Farmland Mapping and Monitoring Program augmented with data from SANDAG's own geographic information system.
2

a Cleveland contends the EIR violates CEQA by understating the transportation plan's growth-induced impacts on agricultural lands. As this contention is predominantly factual, our review is for substantial evidence. ( Vineyard , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 435.) As we have previously indicated, when reviewing th e adequacy of an EIR's disclosures, we are chiefly concerned with whether the EIR reasonably fulfills its function of facilitating informed decisionmaking. An analysis which understates the severity of a project's impacts "impedes meaningful public discussion and skews the decisionmaker's perspective concerning the environmental consequences of the project, the necessity for mitigation measures, and th e appropriateness of the project approval." ( Citizens to Pres. the Ojai v. County of Ventura (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 421, 431.) In this case, both of the data sets us ed to analyze the tr ansportation plan's agricultural impacts have important limita tions. The Farmland Mapping and Monitoring Program does not capture information fo r farmland under 10 acres. In addition, according to SANDAG, its ow n geographic information system's inventory of agricultural land may not includ e any agricultural lands that went into production after the mid-1990s. The combined e ffect of these limitations is that there is not substantial evidence to show the EIR's analysis account ed for impacts to fa rmland of less than 1044 acres put into production within the last 20 years. The error necessarily prejudiced informed public participation and decisionm aking because 68 percent of the farmland in the County is between one and nine acres, with the average fa rm size being four acres. (§ 21005, subd. (a); City of Maywood , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 386.) While SANDAG correctly points out CE QA permits the use of data from the Farmland Mapping and Monitoring Program to analyze a project's agricultural impacts (Guidelines, Exhibit G), CEQA does not mandate the use of such data nor does it insulate an EIR from further scrutiny if the EIR relies on the data. Moreover, because the transportation plan include d the sustainable communities strategy, SANDAG was required by statute to "gathe r and consider the best prac tically available scientific information regarding resource areas and farm land in the region . . . ." (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(B)(v).) By choosing a methodolo gy with known data gaps, SANDAG produced unreliable estimates of the amount of existing farmland and, consequently, unreliable estimates of the transportation plan's impacts to existing farmland. Accordingly, SANDAG failed to co mply with its statutory obligation as well as CEQA's information di sclosure requirements. b Finally, in addition to Clev eland's general contention th at the EIR understated the transportation plan's agricultura l impacts, Cleveland raises two specific contentions: (1) the EIR failed to disclose and analyze the tr ansportation plan's impacts to small farms; and (2) the EIR's discussion of impacts to agricultural land from growth inaccurately assumed land converted to a rural residen tial designation would remain farmland.45 SANDAG counters Cleveland is precluded under section 21177, subdivision (a), from raising these two specific contentions because Cleveland never exhausted its

administrative remedies as to them. 20 Except to the extent the specific contentions are subsumed within the genera l contention, we agree. "A CEQA challenge is not preserve d 'unless the alleged grounds for noncompliance with [CEQA] were presented to the public agency ora lly or in writing by any person during the public comment period provided by this division or prior to the close of the public hearing . . . .' [Citation. ] 'Exhaustion of admini strative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to mainte nance of a CEQA action.' [Citation.] " 'To advance the exhaustion doctrine's purpose "[t]he 'exa ct issue' must have been presented to the administrative agency . . . ." [Citation.] While " 'less specificity is required to preserve an issue for appeal in an administrative proceedi ng than in a judicial proceeding' because, . . . par ties in such proceedings gene rally are not represented by counsel . . . ' [citation]" [c itation], "generalized envir onmental comments at public hearings," "relatively . . . bland and general references to environmental matters" [citation], or "isolated and une laborated comment[s]" [citati on] will not suffice. The same is true for " '[g]eneral obj ections to project approval . . . .' [Citations.]" [Citation.]

20 Section 21177, subdivisi on (a), provides: "An action or proceeding shall not be brought pursuant to Section 21167 unless th e alleged grounds fo r noncompliance with this division were presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment peri od provided by this division or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination."46 " '[T]he objections must be sufficiently specif ic so that the agency has the opportunity to evaluate and respond to them.' " ' [Citation.] " ' "The petitioner bears th e burden of demonstrating that the issues raised in the judicial proceeding were first raised at the administrative level. [Citation.]" [Citation.] An appellate court employs a de novo standa rd of review when determining whether the exhaustion of administrative reme dies doctrine applies.' " ( Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Develop ment v. City of San Diego , supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Cleveland has not met its burden in this case. Before SANDAG approved the EIR, Cleveland submitted a letter commentin g on the EIR's analysis of agricultural impacts from growth as follows: "[T]he [EIR] states that approximately 10,500 [ 21 ] acres of agricultural land will be imp acted due to regional growth and land use change by the year 2050. [Citations.] The [EIR] also acknowl edges that its regional growth projections are based on current planning assumptions fo r San Diego County and the jurisdictions therein. [Citation.] However, the EIR for the County's current General Plan update, which by definition reflects current planning assumptions (as of 2011), shows that the General Plan expects 55,963 acres of agricultural land to co nvert to non-agricultural uses by the year 2030. [Citation.] Even though they ac count for conditions expected to exist 20 years sooner, these impacts are more than five times greater than the impacts identified in the [trans portation plan's EIR].

21 This figure apparently represents th e combined total of the impacts identified under both significance thres holds (see part III.D.1, ante ).47 "It is not clear how the [EIR] could use current planning assumptions for growth and determine that there will be only 10,500 acres of agricultural land impacted, when the current plans on which it bases its assumptions assume there w ill be more than five times as many acres impacted. SANDAG must explain if there is a basis for this discrepancy. Without any such explanation, the [EIR] appe ars to severely undere stimate the amount of agricultural land that will be impacted, in c ontravention of CEQA. [¶] In sum, the [EIR's] failure to accura tely account for impacts to agricu ltural land renders it inadequate as a matter of law." Even read liberally, Cleveland's comment letter did not fairly apprise SANDAG that Cleveland had specific concerns about the EIR's handling of impacts to small farms and lands redesignated rural residential. In stead, Cleveland's co mment letter focused on the discrepancy between SANDAG's estimate of overall growth-induced impacts and the County's estimate of overall growth-induced im pacts. Cleveland cites to no other place in the record where any other person or orga nization raised specific concerns about the EIR's handling of impacts to small farms a nd lands designated rural residential. Consequently, Cleveland has no t demonstrated exhaustion of administrative remedies as to these concerns.48 DISPOSITION The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to modify the judgment and writ of mandate to incorporat e our decision on the cross-appeals. The judgment is affirmed as so modified. The People and Cleveland are awarded their appeal and cross-appeal costs.
M C CONNELL, P. J.
I CONCUR:

IRION, J.BENKE, J., Dissenting. My colleagues and I have vastly different views on the extent to which this court can and should control environmental review of the planning decisions of a regional transportation agency such as the San Diego Associatio n of Governments (SANDAG). Where the majority, as a resu lt of the alleged inadequacy of the environmental impact report's (EIR) analysis of greenhouse gas ( GHG) impacts, would strike down the EIR implementing SANDAG's regional transportati on plan (RTP) calling for investment of about $214 billion over the next several decades in the San Diego region, I would not. Where the majority purports to enforce the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its Guidelines, 1 I believe my colleagues weaken and confuse the law. Thus, although I conclude that substantial evid ence supports the finding SANDAG's GHG impacts analysis is CEQA-compliant, I preface th at substantial evidence analysis with the following observations and concerns. In order to understand the full impact of my colleagues' decision regarding the adequacy of SANDAG's assessment of the GHG impacts of the project, it is first necessary to define a "threshold of signifi cance." CEQA requires "[a]ll public agencies . . . adopt by ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation, objectives, criteria, and procedures for the evaluation of projects and the preparati on of environmental impa ct reports." (Pub. Resources Code, § 21082.) 2 Such "objectives, criteria, and procedures" are also known

1 Citations to "Guidelines" refer to Calif ornia Code of Regula tions, title 14, section 15000 et seq., which are the guidelines for th e application of CEQA. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15000, 15001.)
2 All further statutory citations refer to the Public Resources Code unless otherwise indicated.2 as "thresholds of significance" and are used by an agency as a benchmark in determining the significance of environmental effects of a pr oject. (Guidelines, § 15064.7, subd. (a).) A threshold of significance for GHG impacts may be accompanied by a plan to achieve the reduction or mitigation of GHG emissions, but the plan must be adopted through a public review process. (Gui delines, § 15064.4, subd. (b)(3).) Executive Order No. S-3-05, signed in 2005 by then Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (Executive Or der), does not unilaterally qualify as a threshold of significance. To reach this conclusion, one n eed go no further than our Supreme Court's opinion of Professional Engineers in California Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989 ( Professional Engineers ). In Professional Engineers , the court concluded that an executive order, which attempted to implement a mandatory furlough program during our state's fis cal crisis, had no foundation in the state constitution or existing statutes. In particular, the c ourt noted "the Governor fails to cite any judicial decision or other supporting authority holding or sugg esting that the power under the California Constitution to establish or revise the terms and conditions of state employment, even in a fiscal emergency, resides in the Govern or (or any other executive officer or entity) rather than in the Legislatur e. To the contrary, the following is well established: (1) Under the California Constitution it is the Legislature, rather than the Governor, that generally possesses the ultimate authority to establish or re vise the terms and conditions of state employment through legislative en actments, and (2) any authority that the Governor or an executive branch entity . . . is entitled to exer cise in this area emanates from the Legislature's delegation of a portion of its legislativ e authority to such executive officials or entities through statutory enactments." ( Id. at p. 1015.)3 The court in Professional Engineers likewise rejected the Governor's argument that his power to impose a ma ndatory work furlou gh program through an executive order was supported by statutes, including several specific statutory provisions. Among the factors noted contrary to this position, th e court recognized that "the Legislature has demonstrated a special interest in retaining . . . [the] ultimate control over the salary and wages of such employees." ( Professional Engineers , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 1024.) The court held that the mandatory furlough program was valid only because the Legislature,

" through the exercise of its own legislative prerogative ," independently adopted the program. ( Id. at p. 1047.) Similarly, the Executive Order at issue in this case, which includes statewide GHG reduction targets for 2020, 2035 and 2050, wa s at its inception merely a broad policy statement of goals issued by the Gove rnor. Like the order at issue in Professional Engineers , it too does not have an identifiable fou ndation in the constitutional power of the Governor or in statutory law. The majority cites no judicial decision or other supporting au thority holding or even suggesting that the power to establis h thresholds of significance, qualitative or quantitative, resides in the Governor rather th an in the Legislature. Nor is there any authority supporting the view that the Legi slature has delegated to the Governor any power to enact or establish thresholds of significance, including with respect to GHG at issue in this case. To the contrary, as I discuss, the Legisl ature has clearly demonstrated it intends to retain ultimate control over the regulation of e nvironmental planning. It has vested in the California Air Resources Board (CARB) the responsibility for coordinating efforts to4 attain and maintain ambient air quality standard s, to conduct research into the causes of and solution to air pollution, and systematical ly attack the serious problem caused by motor vehicles. (Health & Sa f. Code, § 39003.) It also ha s limited by statute the ability of courts to add substantive or procedural requirements to CEQA provisions. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21083.) The majority is either unable or unw illing to expressly de clare its position on whether the Executive Order is a threshold of significance as that term is employed in CEQA analysis. I sympathize with their appare nt uneasiness. If the majority declares the Executive Order is a threshold of significance, it is faced with the reality that the Executive Order simply does not meet the requirements necessa ry to have attained that status. If it expressly acknowled ges that the Executive Order is not a threshold of significance, then it must also acknowledge th at SANDAG is quite correct that it was not required to employ it as a CEQA measuri ng stick in assessing compliance. My colleagues attempt to avoid the dile mma altogether. Th ey offer that the policy underlying the Executive Order is of such overarching importance that it must be included within the significance factors listed in Guidelines secti on 15064.4, subdivision (b), and, therefore, SANDAG was required to consider that policy in what they euphemistically refer to as a "consistency analysis" invol ving the GHG impacts of its project and the Executive Or der. Because SANDAG failed to provide such a policy analysis in its EIR, my colleagues conclude SANDAG abused its discretion. By this exercise in linguistics, the ma jority in contravention of Professional Engineers has elevated the Executive Order to the status of a threshold of significance without ever having to expressly declare they are doing so. Its action is judicial fiat, pure and simple.5 The majority seeks support for its ne w formulation of the law by noting that important legislation has sprung from the Executive Order, and th ey offer that the Executive Order will continue to be the springbo ard for legislative action. Relying on Professional Engineers , the majority also concludes th e policy underlying the Executive Order has been "ratified" by subse quent legislation. (Maj. opn. ante , at p. 14.) If, by this reasoning, the majority implies that subs equent environmental legislation somehow bestowed on the Executive Order a power it di d not have, I believe it is mistaken. As Profession Engineers recognizes, our Legislature acts in dependently. As I discuss, the fact that the Legislature has enacted envi ronmental legislation in recognition of the Executive Order's goals does not bestow on the Executive Or der any more power than it had before the Legislature acted. Moreover, although the Legislature has exercised its own independent prerogative by tasking CARB with adopting regional GHG reduction targets for 2020 and 2035, it has not done so for 2050. As I also discu ss, the Legislature is currently considering a comprehensive and complex plan for 2050 that tasks the CARB to establish regional targets. It is possible the Legislature may al ter the Executive Order's 2050 goals or reject them altogether. Using the majority's own logic, the Legislature has not ratified the Executive Order's qualitative or quantitative goals for 2050. It is true, of course, that qualitative thresholds of significance are acceptable in assessing significance. (See Guidelines, § 15064.7, subd. (a).) However, qualitatively addressing the policy and sciences underlying the Executive Order—if this in fact is what the majority means by a "consistency anal ysis"—adds little if any meaning to the discussion of the significance of GHG impa cts. SANDAG considered in its EIR the6 important public policy of GHG emissions re duction in implementing its project. It acknowledged the Executive Order and its goals. It concluded the 2050 goal in that order was not at this time applicable. The purpose of remand is therefore unclear to me if the majority merely requires additional, undefine d consideration of the qualitative aspects of the Executive Order. Quantitatively speaking, as noted, SANDAG in its EIR considered, but did not use, the 2050 GHG reduction targets set fo rth in the Executiv e Order. Until the Legislature independently acts and tasks the CARB with adopti ng regional 2050 GHG emissions reduction targets, SANDAG in my view was not required to consider in its EIR the broad 2050 statewide goals set fo rth in the Executive Order. (See Professional Engineers , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 1047.) The majority states that it is not requiring SANDAG's project to " achieve the Executive Order's 2050 goal or any other sp ecific numerical goal" in undertaking the now-required "consistency analysis." (Maj. opn. ante , at p. 15, fn. 6.) This comes as little surprise, inasmuch as an EIR is merely an "informational document." (See Guidelines, § 15003, subd. (i).) Nonetheless, whether qualitative or quantita tive, it is not clear to me how, in assessing the significance of GHG impacts of the project—including for 2050—a lead agency is suppose d to adopt from th e Executive Order regional GHG emissions reduction targets. The majority appear s to answer this question by stating SANDAG can determine its "share" of GHG emissions re duction responsibility from theoretical targets. With respect to SANDAG's share of responsibility, it is importa nt to emphasize what the majority has not acknowledged: SAND AG is responsible only for its " fair share" when7 assessing significance. Establishing an agency's " fairshare" is a complex and sciencebased process. It begins by recognizing th at the level of GHG emissions is a statewide problem encompassing a diverse array of em itters. Included in the array is not only transportation but also, for example, land us e and development, agriculture, electricity generation, forestry, and industrial sectors. The analysis of GHG impacts thus involves emissions across sectors both within SANDAG's planning discretion (i.e., transportation and land use) and outside SANDAG's pla nning discretion (i.e., heavy industry). SANDAG is not empowered or equipped to o ffer and use analyses in statewide sectors over which it has no control. The point is SANDAG, unlike the CARB, is a regional and not a state agency. Without a model addressing regional GHG emissions reduction targets between 2035 and 2050, it is impossible for SANDAG in its RT P to conduct a "consistency analysis" for these years of study. As the lack of substance in the now-require d "consistency analysis " attests, there is little to say except that, in the world of GHG emissions, "m ore of them are bad and less is good." It is a reasonable conclusion he re that the SANDAG Board of Directors, comprised of locally elected officials from San Diego County and the 18 cities in the region, are already well aware of this. Th e EIR in any event recognizes the important policy goal of reducing GHG emissions. As I discuss, there is legislation cu rrently pending tasking the CARB with setting state and regional targets for 2050. This pending legislation further demonstrates my point that the Legislature has not yet inde pendently adopted the Executive Order's 2050 statewide GHG emissions reduc tion goals. Once the CARB se ts these regional targets,8 which incidentally, may be different than the Executive Orde r's statewide goal, SANDAG and the other 18 metr opolitan planning agencies (M PO's) throughout the state can then use them to determine their " fair share" of GHG emissions in analyzing the significance of GHG impacts of their projec ts. I fear the majority's demand that SANDAG "do more" now based on mere policy goals and/ or theoretical targets, and without providing any guidance as to what mo re should be done, wi ll in effect require SANDAG to set unilaterally 2050 regional G HG reduction targets in order to try to satisfy, somehow, the majority's "consistency analysis." In doing so, it may take action that ultimately conflicts with requirements se t by CARB. Perhaps the most profound harm arising from the majority's fi nesse of CEQA is the lasting damage it does to Guidelines s ection 15064.4. This section gives a lead agency substantial discretion to determin e both the amount of GHG emissions from a project and whether such emissions are significa nt. Subdivision (b) of Guidelines section 15064.4 in particular states that in assessing GHG impacts, the lead agency should consider three factors, among others

. One such factor expressly gives a lead agency the discretion to determine the thresholds of signi ficance that should apply to its project in determining significance. (Guidelines, § 15064. 4, subd. (b)(2).) To th e extent thresholds of significance other than the three expressly provided in subdivision (b) apply, that should be a determination made by an agency in th e proper exercise of its discretion. It is apparent to me that identifying and selecting thresholds of significance is not a judicial function. Despite the clear language of Guidelines sectio n 15064.4, subdivision (b) and the obvious intent of that section, th e majority asserts a right to determine that a gubernatorial policy statement, which does not qu alify as a threshold of significance, is to9 be included among the "other factors" and then orders SANDAG on remand to develop an undefined "consistency an alysis" between the lead ag ency's plan and the policy

statement. This insinuation of judicial power into the environmental planning process and usurping of legislative prerogative is br eathtaking. Now we, the courts, without institutional planning expertise or knowledge, get to tell a lead agency what it must use as a threshold of significance. As a conseque nce of not being prescient enough to know what a court might select, the EIR's of projects such as this RTP, which, as noted, calls for investment of about $214 billion in the Sa n Diego region over the next few decades, are invalidated and sent back to the lead ag ency to anticipate what we, the court, might next decide is or has become of such critical policy significance that the agency must use it as a threshold of significance. There is no legal support for our action, which strips lead agencies of the discretion vested in them by the Legislature and reposes that discretion in the courts. To be clear, I do not believe our action expands Guidelines section 15064.4; instead, I believe it destroys the integrity of that section. (See Maj. opn.

ante , at p. 20, fn. 9.) The mischief caused by the majority would not be confined to the SANDAG region. The majority would ha ve each of our states' six appe llate districts, and multiple divisions within many of them, instru cting the 18 MPO's regarding whether a "consistency analysis" is required based on, fo r example, the Executiv e Order, and, if so, what it should contain. It does not take much energy to foresee the permutations possible as each MPO receives judicial instruction. Chaos in environmenta l planning comes to mind.10 The Legislature, in its wisdom, has forese en the kind of damage we do today, and it has taken steps to forbid such judicial interference. Firs t, the Legislature vested one agency, CARB, with creating the targets a nd metrics in assess ing, and ultimately reducing, GHG emissions regionally and stat ewide. (Health & Saf. Code, § 39003.) Second, it has, in CEQA itself, expressly prev ented courts from selecting what "other factors" an agency should consider in assessing si gnificance of GHG impacts. Indeed, section 21083.1 provides the legi slative intent underlying CEQA and the interpretation of its statutes and guidelines by our courts: "It is the intent of the Legislature that courts, consistent with generally accepted rules of statutory interpretation, shall not interpret this divisi on or the state guidelines adopted pursuant to Section 21083 in a manner whic h imposes procedural or subs tantive requirements beyond those explicitly stated in this division or in the state guidelines." Judicial imposition of significance thresholds does precisel y what the statute prohibits. As I discuss in more detail post , I conclude substantial evidence in the record shows SANDAG made a good faith and reasonabl e effort to analyze in its EIR the GHG impacts of its project. In its 39-page GHG impacts analysis, SANDAG, as noted, analyzed the targets set by the CARB for 2020 and 2035 un der three thresholds of significance, in compliance with Guidelines section 15064.4. I thus would reverse the trial court's order findi ng SANDAG's GHG impacts anal ysis of the project was inadequate, including because SAND AG did not address the 2050 GHG statewide reduction goals set forth in the Executive Order. As to the cross-appeal, because the trial court declined to re ach those issues and because the majority in any event is remanding the matter with respect to the EIR's11 treatment of GHG impacts and mitigation meas ures of the project, I would defer the issues raised in the cross-appeal to the trial court for consider ation in the first instance. I do, however, note that our instructions on re mand include what appears to be a directive that SANDAG consider further analysis of ma ss transportation. This directive, coupled with the vague requirement of a "consistency an alysis," leaves me with an uncomfortable feeling that some might believe that, in sending this case back, we are sub rosa directing SANDAG to shift the emphasis in its plan to ma ss transportation. If that is a direction in which we inadvertently ventur e, I would only comment that it is not a journey we are empowered or equipped to undertake. DISCUSSION I GHG Impacts A. Regulation of GHG by the CARB On June 1, 2005, at the United Nations World Environment Day in San Francisco, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the Exec utive Order in front of hundreds of international leaders. The Go vernor told his invited guests, which included mayors from more than 70 cities from arou nd the world, that the "debat e" over global warming from GHG emissions was "over." (Marshall, Schwarzenegger Issues Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases (June 2, 2005) N.Y. Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/02/ national/02arnold.html?_r=0> [as of November 2014].) The Executive Order es tablished the following statewide reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions: by 2010, to 2000 leve ls; by 2020, to 1990 levels; and by 2050, to 80 percent below 1990 levels. It also di rected the California Environmental Protection12 Agency (Cal-EPA) to develop strategies to me et these targets. In response, the "Climate Action Team," comprised of representatives from various agencies and commissions including the Cal-EPA and the CARB, was created. (See Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899 , 938; see also Comment, Quantifying an Uncertain Futu re: The Demands of the Califo rnia Environmental Quality Act and the Challenge of Climate Change Analysis (2012) McGeorge L.Rev. 1065, 1068- 1069.) Although the Executive Order provided th e "power" for its issuance was derived from "the Constitution and statutes of th e State of California," that order did not identify any article, section and/or statute as the source of this alleged authority. In any event, as noted, I do not believe our Constitu tion, including article V, ve sted the Governor with the authority to singlehandedly issue and en force the Executive Order. (See, i.e., Professional Engineers , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 1015 [rejecting the argument the governor had the unilateral authority to implement a ma ndatory furlough program].) I also do not believe that our Legislature expressly gran ted that authority to the Governor. (See id. at p. 1000.) Therefore, I believe the GHG stat ewide emission reduction targets set forth in the Executive Order are nothi ng more than mere policy recommendations unless and until our Legislature independently acts to adopt such targets, which, as I explain, it has done for 2020 and 2035, but not for 2050. (See ibid. ) The Executive Order was by no means the first attempt in our state to address GHG emissions. In 2002, our Legislature passed a law regulating GHG vehicle emissions. (See Stats. 2002, ch. 200, enacting Assem. B ill No. 1493 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1493).) Under this law, the CA RB was required to develop and adopt, by13 January 1, 2005, "regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles." (Health & Saf. Code, § 43018.5, subd. (a).) In enacting this law, our Legislat ure noted that the "control and reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases are critical to slow the effects of global warming." (Stats. 2002, ch. 200, § 1(c).) Th us, AB 1493 shows that our state policy of reducing GHG emissions did not originate with the 2005 Executive Orde r, as the majority appears to suggest, but rather was in existence before th e Executive Order was issued. 3 The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Health & Saf. Code, § 38500 et seq., added by Stats. 2006, ch. 4 88, § 1, enacting Assem. Bill No. 32 (AB 32)) implemented the 2020 reduction ta rget set forth in the Execu tive Order. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 38550; see also Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto , supra , 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 939.) AB 32 directed the CARB to develop a "scoping plan . . . for achieving the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from sources or categories of sources of greenhouse gases . . . ." (Health & Saf. Code, § 38561, su bd. (a); see Health & Saf. Code, § 38562, subd. (a) [requiring the CA RB to "adopt greenhouse ga s emission limits and emission reduction measures by regulation . . . to become operative beginning on January 1, 2012"]; see also Association of Irritated Residents v. State Air Resources Bd. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1487, 14 90 [noting AB 32 designated the CARB as "'the state agency

3 Our Legislature as early as 1975 tasked the CARB with th e responsibility of "coordinating efforts to atta in and maintain ambient air quality standards, to conduct research into the causes of a nd solution to air pollution, and to systematica lly attack the serious problem caused by motor vehicles, whic h is the major source of air pollution in many areas of the state." (Health & Saf. Code, § 39003.)14 charged with monitoring and regulating sources of emissions of greenhouse gases that cause global warming in order to reduce emissi ons of greenhouse gases' . . . and imposes numerous directives and tim elines on the [CARB]"].) To assist an agency in its analysis of GHG emissions in CEQA review, our Legislature in 2007 enacted, among other provi sions, section 21083.05 (added by Stats. 2007, ch. 185, § 1, enacti ng Sen. Bill No. 97 (SB 97)). 4 SB 97 directed the Office of Planning and Research (OPR) to prepare and submit to th e Natural Resources Agency (NRA) "guidelines for the mitig ation of greenhouse gas em issions or the effects of greenhouse gas emissions . . . including, bu t not limited to, effects associated with transportation or energy cons umption." (Former § 21083.05, subd. (a).) SB 97 further provided that the OPR and NR A "shall periodically update the guidelines to incorporate new information or criteria" establishe d by the CARB pursuant to AB 32. ( Id. , subd. (c).) The NRA adopted regulati ons on the significance of GHG emissions for CEQA, which were then incorporated into the CEQA Gu idelines including, as perhaps most relevant here, Guidelines section 15064.4, discussed post

. 5 In 2008, our Legislature passed th e Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008 (Sen. Bill No. 375 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.)). As the majority recognizes, SB 375 supports the state's climate action goals to reduce GHG emissions through coordinated transpor tation and land use planning . Under SB 375, the CARB—

4 SB 97 was amended effective January 1, 2013. (Stats. 2012, ch. 548, § 5.) 5 "In interpreting CEQA, we accord the Guid elines great weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or erroneous." ( Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 428, fn. 5.)15 once again—was directed to pr ovide each region by no late r than September 30, 2010 with GHG emission "reduc tion targets for the automobile and light truck sector for 2020 and 2035, respectively." (Gov . Code, § 65080, subd . (b)(2)(A).) Once th ese targets were established by the CARB, each of the stat e's MPO's was required to prepare under Government Code former section 65080, s ubdivision (b)(2) a "s ustainable communities strategy" (SCS) as part of the MPO's RTP. (See Gov. Code, former § 65080, subd. (b)(2).) 6 In developing the SCS, SB 375 required each MPO to "conduct at least two informational meetings . . . w ithin the region for members of the board of supervisors and city councils" on the SCS. (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(E).) The purpose of the meetings was to "discuss the [SCS] . . . , including the key la nd use and planning assumptions to the members of the board of supervisor s and the city council members in that county and to solicit a nd consider their input and re commendations." The SCS, if and when implemented, would allow the MPO to reach the GHG reduction targets established by the CARB. If those targets we re unmet, the MPO would be required to prepare an alternative planning strategy to the SCS. (Gov. Code, § 65080, subd. (b)(2)(E).) As the agency responsible for "target-se tting" GHG emissions reductions, the CARB in 2010 created reduction targets for SANDAG's MPO region for 2020 and 2035.

6 Government Code section 65080 was ame nded effective January 1, 2010 (Stats. 2009, ch. 354, § 1) and again effective January 1, 2011 (Stats. 2010, ch. 328, § 95). The requirement of an SCS as part of an MP O's RTP remains in the current version of Government Code secti on 65080, subdivision (b).16 SANDAG used these targets in addressing in its EIR the GHG impacts of the project. However, as SANDAG properly recognized in its EIR impact analysis, the CARB has not yet set 2050 GHG emissions reduction targ ets for the MPO's. As noted and as I discuss, there is legislation currently pend ing, Assembly Bill No . 2050 (AB 2050), that would require the CARB to do so. 7 Thus, our Legislature has recognized th e strong public policy of GHG emissions reductions in our state and has fully occ upied this enormously complex field by delegating the "target-setting responsibility" of such reductions to the CARB through a series of comprehensive legislative enactmen ts, including in AB 32 , SB 97 and SB 375. 8

7 According to a recent summary prep ared by the Senate Appropriations Committee, AB 2050 would amend SB 32 by requiring "the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to develop greenhouse gas (G HG) emissions reductions goals for 2050, including intermediate goals, a nd to perform a number of analyses of the strategies that would be required to r each those goals" for purposes of the next scoping plan update. (Sen. Appropriations. Com., an alysis of Assem. Bill No. 2050 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.)
8 This list is not exhaustive. For example, in 2010 legi slation was enacted requiring the Department of Transportation to up date the federally mandated California Transportation Plan (CTP) by De cember 31, 2015 and every fi ve years thereafter. (Gov. Code, §§ 65070, subd. (a) & 65 071.) The CTP requires iden tification of a "statewide integrated multimodal transportation system" that includes among other requirements the incorporation of all SCS and/or alternate pl anning strategies required by SB 375. (Gov. Code, § 65072.2) "In developing the [CTP] . . . , the department shall address how the state will achieve maximum feasible emissions reductions in order to attain a statewide reduction of [GHG] emissions to 1990 leve ls by 2020 as require d by [AB 32] and 80 percent below 1990 le vels by 2050." ( Ibid. ) The CTP must include: "(a) A policy element that describes the state's trans portation policies and system performance objectives. These policies and objectives sha ll be consistent with legislative intent described in Sections 14000, 14000.5, 14000.6, and 65088. [¶] (b) A strategies element that shall incorporate the br oad system concepts and stra tegies synthesized from the adopted regional transportation plans prepared pursuant to Section 65080. The California Transportation Plan shall not be project specif ic. [¶] (c) A recommendation element that includes economic forecasts and recommendations to the Legislature and the Governor to17 The CARB in response has then set reductio n targets for each of the 18 MPO's in our

state. Against this backdrop, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that SANDAG acted unreasonably in refusing to engage in a "consistency analysis " using the Executive Order as a CEQA measuring stick when ac cessing the GHG impacts of its regional project. (See Professional Engineers , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 1000.) Instead, in my view, the record contains more than sufficient evidence showing SANDAG acted in good faith and properly exercised its broad discretion un der Guidelines section 15064.4 in assessing the significance of GHG im pacts of the project.

achieve the plan's broad system concepts, strategies, and performance objectives." ( Id. , § 65072.) The Legislature in the CTP directly ( id. , § 14000.6, subd. (b)) and indirectly ( id. , § 65072.2) referenced the Ex ecutive Order and its goal of reducing GHG emissions to 80 percent of 1990 levels by 2050. Ho wever, as noted, the Legislature has not yet tasked the CARB to set 2050 GHG region al reduction targets for the MPO's.18 B. Guidelines Section 15064.4 9 As noted, CEQA requires that public agen cies "adopt by ordi nance, resolution, rule, or regulation" criteria for the evaluation of a project and the preparation of an EIR that are consistent with the statutory provisions of CEQA and its Guide lines. (§ 21082.) Section 21083, subdivision (a) directs th e OPR to "prepare and develop proposed guidelines" for implementation by a public agency. Subdivision (b) of that statute states the "guidelines shall specifically include cr iteria for public agen cies to follow in determining whether or not a proposed proj ect may have a 'significant effect on the environment.'" As noted ante , section 21083.5 was added by SB 97 to require the OPR to

9 Guideline section 15064.4 provides: "(a) The determin ation of the significance of greenhouse gas emissions calls for a careful judg ment by the lead agen cy consistent with the provisions in section 15064 . A lead agency s hould make a good-faith effort, based to the extent possible on scientific and factual data, to describe, calculate or estimate the amount of greenhouse gas emissi ons resulting from a project. A lead agency shall have discretion to determine, in the context of a particular project, whether to: [¶] (1) Use a model or methodology to quantify greenhouse gas emissions resulting from a project, and which model or methodology to use. The lead agency has discretion to select the model or methodology it considers most appropriate provided it supports its decision with substantial evidence. The lead agency should e xplain the limitations of the particular model or methodology selected for use; and/or [¶] (2) Rely on a qu alitative analysis or performance based standards. [¶ ] (b) A lead agency should consider the following factors, among others, when assessing the significance of impacts from greenhouse gas emissions on the environment: [¶] (1) The extent to which the project may increase or reduce greenhouse gas emissions as compared to the existing environmental setting; [¶] (2) Whether the project emissions exceed a thres hold of significance th at the lead agency determines applies to the proj ect. [¶] (3) The extent to wh ich the project complies with regulations or requirements adopted to implemen t a statewide, regional, or local plan for the reduction or mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. Su ch requirements must be adopted by the relevant public agency through a public review process and must reduce or mitigate the project's increm ental contribution of greenhouse gas emissions. If there is substantial evidence that the po ssible effects of a particular project are still cumulatively considerable notwithstanding compliance with the adopted regulations or requirements, an EIR must be prepar ed for the project."19 prepare specific guidelines dea ling with CEQA review of GHG. Adopted after passage of SB 97, Guid elines section 15064.4, subdivision (a) requires a lead agency to ma ke a "good-faith effort" to determine the GHG emissions of a project. In making this determination, a lead agency has the discretion to "[u]se a model or methodology to quantify greenhouse gas emissions resulting from a project, and which model or methodology to use" (Guidelines, § 15064.4, subd. (a)(1)) and/or to "[r]ely on a qualitative analysis or performance based standards" ( id. , subd. (a)(2)). After choosing a methodology and selecting signi ficance thresholds, the lead ag ency next is required under Guidelines section 15064.4 to assess the "s ignificance of impacts" of GHG emissions. ( Id. , subd. (b).) In assessing the significance of GHG impacts of a given project, Guidelines section 15064.4 states a lead agency "s hould" consider among others the following factors: (1) the extent to wh ich the project may increase or reduce GHG "as compared to the existing environmental setting"; (2) whet her the project's GHG emissions "exceed a threshold of significance that the lead agency determines applies to the project"; and (3) the extent to which the project "complies w ith regulations or requirements adopted to implement a statewide, regional, or local plan for the reduction or mitigation" of GHG. (Guidelines, § 15064.4, subd. (b)(1), (2) & (3 ), italics added.) Subdivision (b)(3) of Guidelines section 15064.4 further provides that "[s]uch requirements must be adopted by the relevant public agency through a public review process and must reduce or mitigate the project's incremental cont ribution of greenhouse gas emissions." Guidelines section 15064.4 th us "'confirms that lead agencies retain the discretion to determine the significance of greenhouse gas emissions and should "make a good-faith20 effort, based to the extent possible on scientific and factual data, to describe, calculate or estimate the amount of [GHG] emissions re sulting from a project." [Citation.]' [Citations.]" ( Citizens Against Airport Pollution v. City of San Jose (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 788, 807.) I therefore disagree with the majority's interpretation of Guidelines section 15064.4: although subdivision (b) of this section clearly states the factors listed in subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) are not exhaustive, that does not ipso facto mean the courts may require an agency to consider additio nal "factors" (i.e., the Executive Order) in evaluating the GHG impacts of a project, as the majority has done here. In my view, the majority's reading of Guidelin es section 15064.4 usurps the broad discretion afforded an agency in analyzing significan ce and improperly puts courts in charge of determining whether benchmarks other than those expressl y provided in subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) must be considered by an agency wh en undertaking such an analysis. Here, as I have noted, the EIR used th ree separate GHG analyses utilizing two of the specific significance criteria authorized by Guidelines section 15064.4. GHG-1, the first analysis, is an "exis ting conditions" baseline analysis authorized by subdivision (b)(1) of Guidelines section 15064.4. 10 Under this analysis, any increase of GHG emissions over existing conditions (i.e., 2010) was deemed to be a significant impact.

10 I note the existing environmental setti ng "normally constitute[s] the baseline physical conditions by which a l ead agency determines whether an impact is significant." (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a); see Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, 445 [holding that "[w]hile an agency has the discretion under some circumstances to omit environmental analysis of impacts on existing conditions and instead use only a baseline of projected future conditions, existing conditions 'will normally constitu te the baseline physical conditions by which a lead agency determines whether an impact is significant'"].)21 The GHG-1 analysis concluded that, alt hough regional GHG emissions would decrease under the project from existing levels until afte r 2020, they would in crease above existing levels by 2035 and increase still further by 2050, largely as a result of population increase and development. The EIR therefore determ ined the GHG impacts in 2020 would be a less than significant impact but would be significant in 2035 and 2050. The second analysis, GHG-2, used the GH G reduction targets set forth in SB 375 as a significance criteria. GHG-2 used a narr ower range of GHG emissions than GHG-1. GHG-2's approach, in my view , was also fully consistent with Guidelines section 15064.4. Under SB 375, as I have noted, the CARB prepared regional GHG emission reduction targets, compared to 2005 emissions , for cars and light trucks for 2020 and 2035 for each of the state's MPO's. In response, each of the MPO's, including SANDAG, prepared an SCS as part of its RTP to "r educe GHGs by better al igning transportation, land use, and housing. For SANDAG, th e targets are to reduce per capita CO 2 emissions 7 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 13 percent below 2005 levels by 2035. Because CARB has not developed a target for 2050, no analysis is provided for that year." Using this significance criteria, the EI R concluded the project would have less than a significant impact becau se the project met SB 375's goals, as set by the CARB, for lowered per capital vehicle-related G HG emissions in 2020 and 2035. The third GHG impact analysis, GHG- 3, analyzed whether regional GHG emissions (from both transporta tion and land use/ growth) would conflict with (1) the scoping plan adopted by the CARB pursuant to AB 32, which plan functions as a roadmap to achieve GHG reductions in ou r state, and (2) SANDAG's own adopted22 Climate Action Strategy (CAS), which was crea ted in 2010 under a partnership with the California Energy Commission "as a guide fo r SANDAG and local governments and policymakers in addressing climate change." Because the scoping plan time horizon was limited to 2020, the EIR's analysis of whether or not the project under GHG-3 would have a significant impact with respect to GHG was limited to 2020, and no analysis wa s presented for 2035 and 2050. Although recognizing 2035 and 2050 em ission reduction targets for GHG's were established in the Executive Order, the EIR in my view properly concluded the order was not a "'plan'" adopted through a public revi ew process as required in su bdivision (b)(3) of Guidelines section 15064.4. The EIR, however, analyzed transportation and land use/growth in 2035 and 2050 expected as a result of implementation of the project, with respect to the CAS. The EIR analysis concluded that with respect to transportation, the estimated emissions from transportation in 2020 woul d be less than require d by AB 32 and would constitute a less than significant impact under this threshold. The EIR also concluded that the project would not impede the CAS an d its policy of promo ting the reduction of vehicle miles traveled and minimization of GHG in transportation, inasmuch as the project also sought to reduce GHG emissions in transportation through a series of projects. Therefore, for transportation, th e EIR found the implementation of the project would constitute a less than si gnificant impact under the CAS threshold for 2020, 2035 and 2050. With respect to land use/growth, the EIR analysis conclu ded in GHG-3 that emissions of GHG in 2020 were expected to exceed the scoping pl an reduction goals. However, it noted several other measures in cluded in the scoping plan were not yet23 adopted or implemented, including "cap-and-tr ade," and, therefore, were not included in the GHG reduction calculations. Because the RT P was itself consistent with its role in the overall scoping plan strate gy, SANDAG concluded for land use/growth that for 2020 the impact would be less than significant under this threshol d. The EIR further provided for 2020, 2035 and 2050, impl ementation of the project woul d not impede the CAS but in fact would promote it and the goals of increa sing energy efficiency and reducing energy consumption and, therefore, would cons titute a less than si gnificant impact. C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding SANDAG's Assessment of Significance of GHG Impacts in its EIR Satisfied CEQA Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe SA NDAG's failure to discuss the project's consistency with the Executive Order shows a lack of a "good -faith effort" to assess in the EIR the GHG impacts of the project. 11 Rather, in my view, there is abundant evidence in the record showing that SANDAG made a "good-faith effort, based to the extent possible on scientific and factual da ta, to describe, calculate or estimate the amount of greenhouse gas em issions [in the SANDAG MPO region] resulting from [the] project" (Guidelines, § 15064.4, subd. (a)); and that it properly assessed the significance of these emissions under applicable thresholds ( id. , subd. (b)), including those adopted by the CARB (through enabling legisla tion) for 2020 and 2035. (See Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental De velopment v. City of Chula Vista (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 327, 335-336 ( City of Chula Vista ).)

11 In finding an alleged lack of evidence in the record of a reasonable, good-faith effort by SANDAG to assess the GHG impacts, the majority, in my view, is in effect applying an independent standard of review, and its contention otherwise is one of form over substance. (Maj. opn. ante , at p. 14.)24 Moreover, the record also contains substantial eviden ce showing SANDAG properly exercised its discretion when it de cided not to use the Executive Order's 2050 statewide emission reduction target as a CE QA measuring stick for its regional plan. North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Board of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 614 ( North Coast ) informs my view on this issue. There, the petitioners c ontended an EIR for a proj ect to build a sea-water desalination plant approved by a local water di strict was deficient because, among other reasons, it contained an inadequate analysis of GHG emissions. Although the trial court rejected this argument, it nonetheless found the EIR lacked substantial evidence to support the water district's conclusion the plant's GHG emissions were not cumulatively considerable. ( North Coast , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 650.) In reversing, the court concluded the EIR' s use of AB 32, and its requirement that the CARB "'adopt regulations that would re quire the reporting and verification of statewide GHG emissions and limit statewide GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020,'" was acceptable as a threshold of significance, inasmuch as the EIR properly noted "no CEQA thresholds of signi ficance have been established for GHG[]." ( North Coast , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 651.) The court also conclude d the EIR used as a threshold a program voluntarily adopted by Marin County , which the water dist rict joined, where GHG emissions would be reduced to 15 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. ( Ibid. ) The North Coast court then reviewed the EIR in light of these thresholds, which focused primarily on energy consum ption for plant operations. ( North Coast , supra , 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 652.) In concluding th e EIR's analysis "more than satisfied the requirements of CEQA" ( id. at p. 652), the court recognized that the petitioners'25 disagreement with the district's significanc e conclusion for GHG impacts was insufficient under CEQA because a "'"reviewi ng court 'may not set aside an agency's approval of an EIR on the ground that an opposite conclu sion would have been equally or more reasonable,' for, on factual questions, [the co urt's] 'task is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has the better argument.'"'" ( Id. at p. 653.) Similarly, this court in City of Chula Vista rejected the petitioner's contention the lead agency (i.e., th e city) was required to use three other well-recognized potential thresholds of significance, instead of the goal s set forth in AB 32, in analyzing the GHG impacts of a store replacement project. Citi ng to then-newly enacte d Guidelines section 15064.4, this court concluded that this regula tion "confirms that lead agencies retain the discretion to determine the significance of greenhouse gas emissions." ( City of Chula Vista , supra , 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 336.) This court also concluded the lead agency "properly exercised its discre tion to utilize compliance with [AB 32] as the threshold" and, as such, rejected the petitioner' contention the lead agency erred by not applying different thresholds. ( Ibid. ; see Citizens Against Airport Poll ution v. City of San Jose , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 8 07 [recognizing that Guidelin es, § 15064.4 gives a lead agency discretion to determine the significa nce of GHG emissions based to the extent possible on available scientific and factual data].) North Coast and City of Chula Vista , in my view, provide gui dance in the instant case and support the conclusion that SANDAG properly exercised its discretion under Guidelines section 15064.4, subdivision (b)(1 ), (2) and (3), includin g when it used the regional target numbers established by the CARB (developed in resp onse to AB 32 and SB 375) in analyzing the impacts of GHG of the project. (See Citizens for a Sustainable26 Treasure Island v. City and County of San Francisco (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1060-1061 [noting the "core principle" that an EIR is not required to engage in "speculative analysis," and, thus, a lead agency is not require d to "'forsee[] the unforeseeable,'" "predict[] the unpredictabl e or quantify[] the unquantifiable"] ( Treasure Island ).) North Coast and City of Chula Vista also support the conclusion that, subject to the requirements of Guidelines section 15064.4, lead agencies and not the courts have the discretion to determine the benchmarks to be used for determining the GHG impacts of a project. Indeed, as I previously noted, there is legislation currently pending, Assembly Bill No. 2050 (AB 2050), that among other purposes woul d delegate to the CARB the authority to set specific GHG emission reducti on targets for the MPO's, including in the SANDAG region, but in this in stance, the targets would be for 2050. Regardless of whether AB 2050 ultimately passes, the bill is significa nt because it shows our Legislature has not yet acted to set 2050 re duction targets (through the CARB). AB 2050 also demonstrates, yet again, the intent of the Legislature to fully occupy the field of regulating GHG emissions in our state. I believe the majo rity ignores this intent by requiring SANDAG, based on a strained interpre tation of Guidelines section 15064.4, to do a "consistency analysis" usin g the Executive Order as a CEQA measuring stick. I also believe doing so has far-reach ing, negative consequences. By imposing a requirement on SANDAG that does not exist under CEQA, including in the applicable GHG Guidelines, the majority is contravening section 21083.1, as I have already discussed. In ad dition, as I have noted, the regulation of GHG emissions is better left to our Legislature and government agencies like the CARB in27 what is clearly an area that "involves num erous highly technical and novel scientific, technical and economic issues" th at will span many decades. ( Association of Irritated Residents v. State Air Resources Bd. , supra , 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1502, 1505 [noting the CARB has been "assigned the responsib ility of designating and overseeing the implementation of measures" to achieve the "challenging" goals of reducing GHG emissions in our state].) The complexity of the issu es addressed by SANDAG's RTP, the first of its kind to be approved in this state, cannot be overstate d. The sheer volume of the record in this case pays homage to the difficult issues facing a lead agency like SANDAG in preparing a RTP with an SCS component, where transp ortation planning and la nd use are linked to regional GHG emissions reducti on goals for the next several decades. In contrast, judges "have neither the resources nor scientific e xpertise to engage in such analysis." ( Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Rege nts of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 393.) Until our Legislature directs the CARB to set regional goals for 2050, I do not believe SANDAG was required to use the Executive Order and/or its 2050 GHG statewide reduction goal as a threshold to a ssess the significance of the GHG impacts of the project. (See Treasure Island , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054 [refusing to "fault" an EIR for a project to redevelop a form er naval station into a new, mixed-use community because there were many project featur es that were subject to future revision, and, thus, the EIR "cannot be faulted for not pr oviding detail that, due to the nature of the [p]roject, simply does not now exist"].)28 Finally, the majority in my view is unnecessarily inte rfering with SANDAG's program EIR and tiering, which frustrates th e goal of good planni ng: "Where a lead agency is using the tiering pr ocess in connection with an EIR for a large-scale planning approval, such as a general plan or componen t thereof . . . , the development of detailed, site-specific information may not be feasible but can be de ferred, in many instances, until such time as the lead agency prepares a future environmental document in connection with a project of a more limited geographic scale, as long as deferral does not prevent adequate identification of significant effect s of the planning approval at hand." (Guidelines, § 15152, subd. (c).) Our high court in In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143 rejected a challenge to a program EIR on the basis it lacked su fficient detail regarding water sources to implement a project to restore the ecological health and improve the management of the Bay-Delta region. In so doing, the court no ted that the Bay-Delta project was a "broad, general, multiobjective, policy-setting, geographically dispersed" plan ( id. at p 1171); that at the first-tier program level, the "e nvironmental effects of obtaining water from potential sources may be analyzed in general te rms, without the level of detail appropriate for second-tier, site-specific review" ( id. at p. 1169); that the advantage of a program EIR is it allows a lead agency "'to consider broad policy alternatives and program wide mitigation measures at an early time when the agency has greater flex ibility to deal with basic problems or cumulative impacts'" ( ibid ., citing Guidelines, § 15168, subd. (b)(4)); and that because the Bay-Delta project "is to be implemented over a 30-year period[,] . . . [i]t is therefore impracticable to foresee with certainty specif ic sources of water and their impacts" ( id. at p. 1172).29 Much like the Bay-Delta project, the project here is a "broad, general, multiobjective, policy-setting" plan. (See In re Bay-Delta etc. , supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) As such, I believe substantial eviden ce in the record shows SANDAG in its EIR engaged in a "good-faith effort" to analyz e the GHG impacts of the project for purposes of the first-tier stage of what is clearl y a long-term planning process that will be implemented over decades, "with the understanding that additional detail will be forthcoming when specific second-tier pr ojects are under consideration." (See id. at p. 1172; see also Rio Vista Farm Bureau Cent er v. County of Solano (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 351, 372 [upholding program EIR against a challenge it was vague and insufficiently described potential future facilities of a county's hazardous waste management plan because the plan, much like SANDAG's proj ect at issue here, served only as an "assessment and overview, with any separate future projects, when identified, to be accompanied by additional EIR's"].) According to SANDAG, implementation of the project will involve "literally hundreds of individual freeway, highway, lo cal road, public transit, bikeway and other transportation projects, as we ll as ongoing development of various mitigation, planning and transportation management programs." In addition, many of these projects will occur 10, 20 or 30 years into the future and will be carried out by others including local governments and/or agencies, where baseline conditions may have substantially changed and after the project itself will have gone through multiple mandatory updates on a fouryear cycle as currently required under Govern ment Code section 65080, subdivision (d). Because most, if not all, of these indivi dual future transporta tion projects and/or land use decisions will be subject to its own project-level review under CEQA, and30 because, in any event, SANDAG's EIR consid ered the public policy of GHG emission reduction and the CARB has not yet established 2050 GHG re duction target numbers for the SANDAG MPO region, I believe there is ab solutely no reason to send the EIR back to the trial court for further consideration of GHG impacts utilizing the Executive Order as a threshold. Rather, I believe this is a waste of precious resources and will amount to "endless rounds of revision and r ecirculation of EIR's" that the Legislature did not intend. (See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1132; see also Gu idelines, § 15151 [stating that the "sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible" and th at "courts have looked not for perfection but for adequacy, comple teness, and a good faith effort at full disclosure" in analyzing th e adequacy of an EIR]; Treasure Island , supra , 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061 [noting it "has long be en recognized that pr emature attempts to evaluate effects that are uncerta in to occur or whose severity cannot reliably be measured is 'a needlessly wasteful drai n of the public fisc'"].) In sum, I conclude there is substantia l evidence in the reco rd showing SANDAG acted reasonably and in good faith when it a ddressed the GHG impacts of its project and properly exercised its discretion under Guide lines section 15064.4. I thus would reverse the trial court order finding SANDAG's GHG im pacts analysis insufficient under CEQA. II Mitigation Measures Initially, because I conclude the EIR adeq uately addressed the GHG impacts of the project, unlike the majority I do not deem moot (or partially moot) (Maj. opn. ante , at p. 23) SANDAG's contention that the EIR also adequately a ddressed mitigation measures31 for the project's significant GHG impacts. Al so unlike the majority , I conclude the EIR adequately considered reasonable mitig ation measures for GHG impacts. A. Additional Background As noted, the EIR under the "existing c onditions" baseline, GHG-1, concluded that the GHG impacts in 2020 would be a less than significant impact but would be significant in 2035 and 2050. Based on this analysis, the EIR proposed three mitigation measures to reduce impacts related to GHG em issions to less than significant levels. The first mitigation measure, GHG-A, pr ovided: "SANDAG shall update future Regional Comprehensive Plans and Regi onal Transportation Plans/Sustainable Community Plans to incorpor ate polices and measures th at lead to reduced GHG emissions. Such policies and measures may be derived from the General Plans, local jurisdictions' Climate Action Pl ans, and other adopted policie s and plans of its member agencies that include GHG mitigation and adaptation measures or other sources." The second, GHG-B, encouraged the "San Diego region cities and the County government" to "adopt and implement Climat e Actions Plans" (CAP's) and other climate strategies by: a) quantifying GHG emis sions, "both existing and projected over a specified time period, resulting from activities within their re spective jurisdictions"; b) establishing a "level . . . below which the contribution to GHG emissions from activities covered by the plan would not be cumulatively consider able"; c) identifying and analyzing GHG emissions "resul ting for specific actions . . . anticipated within their respective jurisdictions"; d) specifying measur es, "including performan ce standards, that . . . if implemented on a project-by-project ba sis, would collectively achieve the specified emissions level"; e) establishing a mechanism to monitor the "progr ess toward achieving32 that level" of specified emissions and requ iring an amendment if such levels are not achieved; and f) adopting such plans "in a public process following environmental review." GHG-B further provided that, when ap propriate, CAP's should "incorporate planning and land use measures from the Calif ornia Attorney General's latest list of example policies to address climate change at both the plan and project level." At the plan level, GHG-B identified various policies to be considered and, if appropriate, implemented, from the website of the Californi a Attorney General providing examples to address climate change, including "[s]mart grow th, jobs/housing balance, transit-oriented development, and infill development through land use designations, incentives and fees, zoning, and public-private pa rtnerships"; "[c]reate transi t, bicycle, and pedestrian connections through planning , funding, development requi rements, incentives and regional cooperation, and create disincentives for auto use"; [and] "[e]nergy and waterefficient buildings and landscaping through or dinances, development fees . . . and other implementing tools." GHG-B also identified project-specifi c mitigation measures available on the website that, if appropriate, should be implemented at the plan level in a CAP's planning and land use measures, including adopting a "comprehensive parking policy" that encourages use of alternate transportation and discourages use of private vehicles; building or funding a "major transit stop with in or near development"; providing public transit incentives, such as free or low-cost monthly tr ansit passes to the public; incorporating bicycle lanes a nd routes into new developmen t; and requiring facilities and amenities for non-motorized transportation, such as secure bicycle parking.33 SANDAG in connection with GHG-B stated it would assist local governments in preparing CAP's and other clim ate strategies plans through implementation of its own CAS, which, as noted, was created in 2010 "as a guide for SANDAG and local governments and policymakers in addressing climate change." The CAS "provides a toolbox of land use, transporta tion, and related policy measures and investments that help implement the 2050 RTP/SCS [i.e., the project] throu gh reducing GHG emissions. Policy measures also are identified for buildi ngs and energy use, pr otecting transportation and energy infrastructure from climate im pacts, and to help SANDAG and local jurisdictions reduce GHGs from their operations." The third mitigation measure discussed in the EIR, GHG-C, provided SANDAG and local governments should require "Best Available Control Tech nology" (BACT) in constructing and oper ating projects. SANDAG also considered a dditional mitigation measures that were found to be infeasible. One such measure was requiring all vehicles in the San Diego region to be either zero-emission vehicles or to be po wered by renewable energy. SANDAG found this measure infeasible because of the "rate of turnover of vehicles on the roadway" and because of the limited number of such vehicles available. Another measure found to be infeasible was requiring all future constructi on to be net-zero energy use. Although renewable energy is available and is an op tion for a portion of a project's energy needs, SANDAG concluded it was in feasible for all projects to ha ve net-zero emissions (i.e., hospitals). Finally, SANDAG also found infeasible the requirement that all future construction activity include only "retrofitte d equipment." Becaus e certain equipment34 does not have "retrofit comp onents," SANDAG concluded th is mitigation measure was infeasible. SANDAG in the EIR noted that implem entation of mitiga tion measures GHG-A through GHG-C "would redu ce GHG emissions through ad option of measures and policies that encourage GHG emissions reducti on in regional plans, adoption of Climate Action Plans by member agencies, and usin g BACT during construc tion and operation of implemented projects." Because of the grow th in population, housing, and employment, the EIR concluded implementa tion of the project "would result in an increase in GHG emissions" and, as such, ev en with the mitigation me asures, GHG-1, the existing conditions baseline, "would remain a signi ficant and unavoidable impact in 2035 and 2050." B. Governing Law and Analysis It is axiomatic that an EIR must descri be feasible measures that could minimize significant adverse impacts. (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1 ).) Feasible means "capable of being accomplished in a succe ssful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environm ental, legal, social, and technological factors." ( Id. , § 15364.) However, a lead agency may find that "particular economic, social, or other considerations make the alternatives and mitigation measures infeasible and that particular project benefits out weigh the adverse environmental effects. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subds. (a)(3), (b); Guidelines , § 15091, subd. (a)(3).) Specifically, an agency cannot approve a project that will have significant environmental effects unless it finds as to each significant effect, based on substantial evidence in the administrative35 record, that (1) mitigation measures required in or incorporated into the project will avoid or substantially lessen the significant effect; (2) those measures are within the jurisdiction of another public agency and have been adop ted, or can and should be adopted, by that agency; or (3) specific economi c, legal, social, technologica l, or other considerations make the mitigation measures or alternatives identified in the EIR infeasible, and specific overriding economic, legal, social, technol ogical, or other benefits outweigh the significant environmental effects. (Pub. Re sources Code, §§ 21081, 21081.5; Guidelines, § 15091, subds. (a), (b).)" ( Federation of Hillside & Cany on Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1198; see South County Citizens for Smart Growth v. County of Nevada (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 3 16, 336 [noting that "'CEQA requires the appropriate public agency "to fi nd, based on substantia l evidence, that the mitigation measures are 'required in, or inco rporated into, the project'; or that the measures are the responsibility of another agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by the other agency; or that mitigation is infeasible and overriding considerations outweigh the significant enviro nmental effects"'"].) Claims concerning the feasibility or e ffectiveness of mitigation measures are reviewed for substantial evidence, which is defined as "'enough rele vant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclu sions might also be reached.'" ( Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 486.) In reviewing an agency's decision for substantia l evidence, courts "'must indu lge all reasonable inferences from the evidence that would support the agency's determinations and resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the agency's decision.'" ( California Native Plant36 Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4t h 957, 985.) This standard of review flows from the fact that an "a gency has the discretion to resolve factual issues and to make policy decisions." ( Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 120.) "'"As with all substantial evidence challenges, an appe llant challenging an EIR for insufficient eviden ce must lay out the evidence favorable to the other side and show why it is lacking. Failure to do so is fatal. A reviewing court will not independently review the record to make up for appellant's failure to carry his [or her] burden."'" ( Pfeiffer v. City of Sunnyvale City Council (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1552, 1572.) Here, I conclude petitioners have not me t their burden of s howing the mitigation measures for GHG emissions described by SANDAG in its program EIR were inadequate. As noted, the EIR discussed three separate mitigation measures in connection with impact analysis GHG-1. Ea ch such measure comp lies with Guidelines section 15126.4, subdivision (c)(5), which was adopted in response to SB 97 and which provides the GHG mitigation measures propos ed in connection with adoption of a longrange plan, such as the instant project, "m ay include the identification of specific measures that may be implemented on a project-by-project basis." 12

12 Subdivision (c) of Guide line section 15126.4 provides in part: "[L]ead agencies shall consider feasible means, supported by substantial evidence and subject to monitoring or reporting, of m itigating the significant effects of greenhouse gas emissions. Measures to mitigate the significant effect s of greenhouse gas emissions may include, among others: [¶] (1) Measures in an exis ting plan or mitigation program for the reduction of emissions that are required as pa rt of the lead agency 's decision; [¶] (2) Reductions in emissions resulting from a pr oject through implem entation of project features, project design, or ot her measures, such as those de scribed in Appendix F; [¶] (3) Off-site measures, including offset s that are not otherwise required, to mitigate a project's emissions; [¶] (4) Measures that sequester gr eenhouse gases; [¶] (5) In the case of the37 Moreover, the record show s SANDAG considered add itional mitigation measures to reduce GHG emissions and found them infeasible. (See Clover Valley Foundation v. City of Rocklin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 245 [noting that CEQA does not require "an EIR to explain why certain mitigation measures are infeasible"]; see also C herry Valley Pass Acres & Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (2010) 190 Cal.App.4t h 316, 351 [noting CEQA does not require an EIR to analyze in detail mitigation measures deemed infeasible].) At the conclusion of the CEQA review process, the record shows SANDAG adopted both the mitigation m easures within its power to implement and a mitigation monitoring program (MMRP) for compliance. (See §§ 21081 & 21081.6.) The mitigation measures and MMR P confirm SANDAG's commitm ent to implementing GHG mitigation measures described in the EIR. I do not agree with petitioners that the mitigation measures were insufficiently unenforceable because, particular ly with respect to GHG-A and GHG-B, they depended on the cooperation of multiple other agencies. As noted, CEQA allows a lead agency to approve or carry out a project with potential adverse impacts if "[c]hanges or alterations have been . . . incorporated into[] the project" and "[t]hos e changes or alterations are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted by th at other agency." (§ 2 1081, subd. (a)(1) & (2).)

adoption of a plan, such as a general plan, long range development plan, or plans for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, mitig ation may include the identification of specific measures that may be implemented on a project-by- project basis. Mitigation may also include the incorporation of specific measures or policies found in an adopted ordinance or regulation that reduces the cumulative effect of emissions."38 Finally, because SANDAG in my view sa tisfied its initial burden to consider a range of reasonable mitigation measures in its EIR, I woul d conclude the burden then switched to petitioners to establish from the record what petitioners describe as other "effective" mitigation measures that allegedl y were omitted from cons ideration in the EIR and to show, again from the record, that su ch "effective" measur es 1) were not only legally feasible but also suitable for disc ussion in a program EIR involving a project incorporating a broad range of planning measures and po licies over the next several decades, and 2) would avoid or substantially lesse n the project's GHG impacts. (See San Diego Citizenry Group v. County of San Diego (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1, 14-17 [rejecting the petitioners' contention that uns pecified, additional mitigation measures should have been cons idered in "meaningful detail" in an EIR and noting the general rule that "CEQA does not . . . require discussi on of every mitigation measure the agency rejected as infeasible"].) I would conclude petitioners ha ve not met, and cannot meet, this burden in this case. (See id. at p. 17 [noting that "[f]easibility under CEQA encompasses desirability to th e extent that desirability is based on a reasonable balancing of the relevant economic, environmental, social, and technological factors"].) 13

BENKE, J.

13 Because the trial court never reached the issues raised in the cross-appeal and because the majority in any event is remanding the matter with respect to the EIR's treatment of GHG impacts and mitigation measur es of the project, as I have noted, I would defer the issues raised in the cross-appeal to the tr ial court for consideration. Nonetheless, I feel compelled to state my ob jection to the majority 's conclusion that SANDAG failed to consider a reasonabl e range of project alternatives.