UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4857

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TERRY WIGGS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, 

District Judge. (1:07-cr-00048-IMK-JSK-1)

Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: February 21, 2012

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West 

Virginia; Kristen Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, 

Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld 

II, United States Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Terry Lee Wiggs appeals from his twenty-four-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. On 

appeal, Wiggs alleges that his sentence was plainly 

unreasonable. We affirm. 

A district court has broad discretion to impose a 

sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will 

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release 

if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not 

“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation 

sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence 

for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and 

substantive considerations that we employ in our review of 

original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release 

revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory 

policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors 

that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release 

revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the 

court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation 

sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original 

sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the 
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sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper 

basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence 

imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. 

Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. 

After review of the record, we conclude that the 

revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The 

twenty-four month prison term does not exceed the applicable 

maximum allowed by statute. The district court considered the 

argument of Wiggs’ counsel, the Guidelines advisory range, the 

recommendation of the Government, and relevant § 3553(a) 

factors, addressing on the record Wiggs’ history and 

characteristics, the nature and circumstances of his violative 

behavior, the need for the sentence to deter Wiggs, and Wiggs’

breach of trust following prior lenient treatment. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2010). The 

district court adequately explained its rationale for imposing 

sentence, and the reasons relied upon are proper bases for the 

sentence imposed. 
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Accordingly, we conclude that Wiggs’ sentence was 

reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s order imposing 

the twenty-four-month prison sentence. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED