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- 20 2020 PA Super 200

IN THE INT. OF: K.M.W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.W.R., MOTHER : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1537 MDA 2019 Appeal from the Decree Entered August 23, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at No(s): 13

- AD

- 2019, CP

- 22

- DP

- 98

- 2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J.,

NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J. CONCURRING STATEMENT BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 18, 2020 I agree with the Majority that this case should not be quashed based on Walker 1 and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing the goal from reun ification to adoption. However, I disagree with the Majority’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Larkin and Stansbury as its basis for an exception to the bright

- line rule set forth by our Supreme Court in Walker

. In Commonwealth v. Stansbury , 219 A .3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), this Court declined to quash under Walker due to a “breakdown in court operations”

– the breakdown being the PCRA court’s statement to the appellant that he could file a singular notice of appeal, rather than plural

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______ 1 See Commonwealth v. Walker , 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018).J

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notices of ap peal because the order cont ained multiple docket numbers. Stansbury , 219 A.3d at 1 59

- 60 (“we may overlook the defective nature of Appellant’s timely notice of appeal rather than quash pursuant to Walker ”) ; see also Commonwealth v. Larkin , __ A.3d __ , 2020 WL 3869710 , at *6 (Pa. Super. 2020) ( en banc ) (same)

. T his Court has frequently cited and relied upon Stansbury because it affords appellants a reprieve from the “bright

- line” rule of Walker , and a popular means for this Court to circumvent Walker when t he trial judge advises a defendant of the right to file a notice of appeal rather than notices, when the order or judgment contains more than one docket number

— resulting in a “breakdown in court operations.”
I nstead, I would base my decision not to quas h Mother’s appeal on the reasoning recited in In re K.T.E.L. , 983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009), which I find much more persuasive than Stansbury

. As the Majority points out, in
K.T.E.L. , the appellant failed to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal contemporaneously with her notice of appeal as required by
Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2) , and thus rendered the appellant’s notice of appeal procedurally defective. See K.T.E.L. , 983 A.2d at 747 (holding that an appellant’s failure to file a simultaneous concise statement and notice of appeal violated Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2) and, as such, is defective). K.T.E.L. , however, declined to adopt a per se rule requiring
automa tic quashal or dismissal of children ’s fast track cases for such a failure. Id. Rather, we held that a disposition must be “decided on a case

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basis” because Rules 905(a)(2) and 1925(a)(2) are “procedural, not jurisdictional.” Id. Like wise , I view an appellant’s non

- compliance with Rule 341 to be a procedural, not jurisdictional, defect. See also Walker , 185 A.3d at 976 (describing Rule 341 as a “[p]rocedural rule,” which “should be construed to give effect to all their provisions. . . .”). W e are not divested of j u risdiction by non

- compliance; failure to comply with Rule 341 results in a defective notice of appeal. Further , because th is is a children’s fast track case, “[t]he extreme action of dismissal should be imposed by an appellate cour t sparingly, and clearly would be inappropriate when there has been substantial compliance with the rules. . . .” K.T.E.L. , 983 A.2d at 747. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.