NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

Nos. 19-3227, 19-3228, 19-3322 & 19-3323 

___________ 

IN RE: PETER DIPIETRO, 

 Petitioner 

____________________________________ 

On Petitions for Writs of Mandamus from the 

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 

(Related to Civ. No. 1-19-cv-17014) 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 

October 17, 2019 

Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: December 30, 2019) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

Peter DiPietro has filed four petitions for writs of mandamus. For the reasons that 

follow, we will deny the petitions. 

 In July 2019, DiPietro filed an action in the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of 

Motor Vehicles, and various New Jersey state and municipal offices, courts, officials, and 

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
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judges. The complaint sought hundreds of millions of dollars in damages for alleged 

violations of DiPietro’s constitutional rights. The complaint included, inter alia, a claim 

for $165 million against the Gloucester County Superior Court and Superior Court Judge 

Mary Beth Kramer (“the Gloucester County defendants”) for “unlawful detainment and 

incarceration” in a state proceeding related to child support. It also included claims 

against “Hamilton Township defendants,” including for $20 million each against the 

Hamilton Township Police Department and Police Officer Christen Mandela for “loss of 

[DiPietro’s] liberties by unlawful detainment,” and against the Hamilton Township 

Municipal Court and Municipal Court Judge Michele Verno for “issuing a void and 

unenforceable arrest warrant without jurisdiction.” In an order entered October 7, 2019, 

the complaint was dismissed without prejudice and Tierno was provided 30 days within 

which to amend his complaint. 

 DiPietro filed four separate documents in this Court entitled “Claim for a Common 

Law Writ of Procedendo.” The Clerk construed them as petitions for writs of mandamus 

(as we do) and docketed the petitions separately at C.A. Nos. 19-3227, 19-3228, 19-3322 

and 19-3323. In the petitions filed in C.A. Nos. 19-3227, 19-3228 and 19-3322, DiPietro 

seeks orders directing the District Court to grant judgment against the Gloucester County 

and Hamilton Township defendants, the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey 

Department of Motor Vehicles. In the petition filed in C.A. No. 19-3223, he seeks an 

order directing judgment against all of the named defendants in the complaint. In each of 

his mandamus petitions, he seeks an order for a writ of execution to “seize all bank 

accounts, property etc.” from the defendants to satisfy the judgments. Also, in each 
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petition and in affidavits accompanying his motions to proceed in forma pauperis, 

DiPietro complains that the District Judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 

 Mandamus provides a “drastic remedy that a court should grant only in 

extraordinary circumstances in response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of 

power.” Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). To justify the Court’s use of this extraordinary 

remedy, DiPietro must show a clear and indisputable right to the writ and that he has no 

other adequate means to obtain the relief desired. Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 

81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992). Moreover, “[g]iven its drastic nature, a writ of mandamus should 

not be issued where relief may be obtained through an ordinary appeal.” In re Nwanze, 

242 F.3d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In his mandamus petitions, DiPietro 

essentially seeks relief that is sought in his related civil action. Because he can challenge 

the District Court’s judgment on appeal from a final order should it not grant relief in his 

favor on these claims, mandamus relief is not warranted. 

With respect to his bias claims, DiPietro has not shown that he is entitled to an 

order compelling the District Judge’s recusal. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 

289, 300-01 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that a mandamus petition can be a proper means of 

challenging a district judge’s refusal to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455). Although he 

asserts that he has repeatedly filed motions to recuse the District Judge, and that those 

motions all have been denied, he has not filed such a motion in the related civil action 

here. In any event, DiPietro’s complaints are related to ordinary judicial decision making 

in his cases over which the District Judge has presided. Mere dissatisfaction with rulings 
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does not warrant recusal. See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 

273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal 

rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”). 

 Based on the foregoing, DiPietro’s mandamus petitions will be denied.