1

The Honorable D.P. Marshall, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 10-1885

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United States of America, * 

*

Plaintiff - Appellee *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota.

Walter Perrin, *

* 

Defendant - Appellant. *

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Submitted: December 16, 2010

Filed: October 28, 2011

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Before LOKEN and BYE, Circuit Judges, and MARSHALL,1

 District Judge.

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MARSHALL, District Judge.

Walter Perrin admitted possessing child pornography. He made this admission

in his bedroom under questioning by Craig Scherer, an agent with the Immigration

and Customs Enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security. Agent

Scherer led the team that2

 executed a search warrant looking for child pornography at

the small house in Sioux Falls where Perrin lived with his mother, five other people,

and many computers. United States v. Boll, 635 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2011) is a
2

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota. 

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companion case. After the District Court2

 denied Perrin’s motion to suppress his

statements to Agent Scherer, Perrin pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the

suppression ruling.

The issue is whether Perrin was in custody when he confessed to Agent Scherer.

If so, Perrin’s statements must be suppressed because the Agent gave Perrin no

Miranda warnings before the questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

If not, then his statements come in and Perrin’s conviction stands. We review the

District Court’s decision on custody—a mixed question of law and fact—de novo, and

its factual findings for clear error. United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 719 (8th

Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

1. “The ultimate question in determining whether a person is in custody for

purposes of Miranda is whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of

movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” United States v. Czichray,

378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1060 (2005) (quotations

omitted). Agent Scherer did not arrest Perrin before questioning him. So the question

comes down to the situation’s restraints. E.g., United States v. Lowen, 647 F.3d 863,

867–68 (8th Cir. 2011). We consider “first, what were the circumstances surrounding

the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person

have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave[ ]” the

bedroom and the house. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011)

(quotation omitted). We do not ask how Perrin perceived the situation; as the

Supreme Court recently emphasized in J.D.B., the point is how a reasonable person

would have seen his options in the circumstances. Ibid. 
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The District Court analyzed the custody issue through the non-exclusive Griffin

factors, as modified by Czichray and later precedent. United States v. Griffin, 922

F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1990). The parties argue the case here the same way. With the

caution that Griffin is simply a rubric for considering the ultimate issue, not a

mandatory checklist, we move to the merits. The dispositive question remains: would

a reasonable person in Perrin’s circumstances have considered himself free not to

answer Agent Scherer’s questions and leave the premises?

2. Perrin does not assert clear error in any of the District Court’s factual

findings. We see none. Here, then, is what happened—“the circumstances

surrounding [Perrin’s] interrogation[.]” Lowen, 647 F.3d at 867 (quotation omitted).

After state investigators detected downloads of child pornography at the house

where Perrin lived, federal agents got a warrant to search the premises. At least six

officers in tactical gear entered the house, while several Sioux Falls police officers

secured the perimeter. The search began around 1:45 in the afternoon. Agent Scherer

led the group executing the warrant. Perrin and his mother were in the living room;

another resident was in a bedroom. A fourth resident (Terry Boll of the related case)

was leaving the house for work but came back inside at the officers’ request. The

officers had all four people stay in the living room with an armed officer. This small

room was crowded with four residents, two officers, two dogs, and lots of furniture.

After the premises were swept, Agent Scherer retrieved the warrant from his vehicle

and gave it to Perrin’s mother.

Agent Scherer told the group four things: the officers were looking for child

pornography; the residents were free to leave; if anyone remained, he or she had to

stay in the living room; and he wanted to ask questions but no one had to answer. The

residents indicated as a group that they understood. Agent Scherer then began to ask

about computers, access to them, and internet use. When he asked if anyone used

Limewire, a file-sharing software often associated with child pornography, Perrin and
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Boll said yes. Perrin avoided eye contact with Scherer, slumped in his chair, and

started fidgeting.

Perrin was in his mid-twenties at the time. He had always lived with his

mother. He was always in special education classes until he dropped out during his

senior year of high school. His intellectual functioning is sub-average. Perrin had

worked for many years at TC’s Referee restaurant, first as a dishwasher and then a fry

cook.

Agent Scherer asked Perrin if they could talk privately in Perrin’s bedroom, a

short distance away. Perrin said yes and they went. Five to ten minutes had passed

since Agent Scherer started talking to the group. Detective Sean Kooistra went to the

bedroom too; he searched the room while Agent Scherer questioned Perrin, and left

before the questioning ended. After they entered the bedroom, Scherer closed the

door but it remained cracked open. Agent Scherer did not repeat his earlier

admonitions about Perrin being free to leave or not answer questions.

Agent Scherer questioned Perrin for about ten minutes. His side arm was

visible, but he had removed his protective vest. He did not touch or threaten Perrin,

make any promises, or raise his voice. The Agent did not perceive that Perrin had any

trouble understanding or answering questions about internet use and child

pornography. Though neither Perrin nor the officers testified at the suppression

hearing about the specifics of the questions and the answers, Agent Scherer’s report

was admitted without objection and it summarized Perrin’s admissions.

At the end of the bedroom questioning, Agent Scherer and Perrin returned to

the living room. There were conversations between Perrin and his mother, some of

which included Agent Scherer. The search ended an hour and a half or so after it

began. Agent Scherer did not arrest Perrin after the bedroom questioning or when the

officers left the home.
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3. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Perrin was not

in custody when Agent Scherer questioned him in Perrin’s bedroom. Most

importantly, about ten minutes beforehand, Agent Scherer had told Perrin and the

three other residents present that they could leave and did not have to answer

questions if they stayed. We have long regarded these admonitions as weighty in the

custody analysis. E.g., Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349–50. And we have never held that a

person was in custody after receiving them. Czichray, 378 F.3d at 826. Perrin argues

that Agent Scherer should have told him again, and individually, before starting the

bedroom questioning. We disagree. The ten-minute distance between the two events

undermines Perrin’s argument. While we may some day confront a case where the

distance between warning and questioning, in the totality of the circumstances, puts

the efficacy of an officer’s original no-custody statements in doubt, this is not that

case.

Beyond the clear ground rules that started Agent Scherer’s questioning, other

circumstances indicate that Perrin was not in custody in his bedroom. He volunteered

to go there. The questioning lasted about ten minutes. The bedroom, like the house,

was police dominated, as the District Court found. A reasonable person would have

taken some comfort, however, in being in his own bedroom instead of an interrogation

room at the police station. Compare Czichray, 378 F.3d at 826–27, with Griffin, 922

F.2d at 1355 n.15. The bedroom door was almost closed; but a cracked bedroom door

presents a different obstacle than a closed storage-room door blocked by a police

officer. Compare United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008).

Neither Officer Kooistra nor Agent Scherer prevented Perrin from exercising his right

to leave—they did not physically restrain him, and nothing of record suggests that

they positioned themselves or acted to inhibit Perrin’s exit.

Against all this, Perrin stresses two points: the overwhelming police presence

and his sub-average intelligence. Neither point is disputed. But considering all the
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circumstances surrounding the interrogation, which we must do, the many officers

present and Perrin’s mental deficits do not establish custody. We have held that

circumstances more dominated by police were not custodial. E.g., Czichray, 378 F.3d

at 825, 830; LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 718, 724. Any warrant search is inherently police

dominated; there is nothing untoward about that circumstance. Perrin’s mentaldeficits argument fails on the facts. Agent Scherer testified that Perrin neither

appeared to have any difficulty responding to the questions in the bedroom nor

exhibited any unusual intellectual deficit. Because Perrin has not crossed the factual

threshold, we need not consider this issue further on the law. United States v.

Galceran, 301 F.3d 927, 929, 931 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (analyzing the issue

as a matter of voluntariness); see also United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th

Cir. 1994) (en banc) (reiterating objective nature of the inquiry).

Having considered the totality of the surrounding circumstances de novo, we

hold that Perrin was not in custody during the ten minutes of voluntary questioning

in his bedroom. A reasonable person in his position would have felt at liberty not to

answer Agent Scherer’s questions or leave or both, just as Agent Scherer advised

Perrin and his housemates they could do before he asked any questions. No Miranda

warnings were required. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Affirmed.

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