J-S08037-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON WYATT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2206 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 9, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0013003-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 05, 2019

Appellant, Aaron Wyatt, appeals from the July 9, 2018, order entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his first petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, without 

an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On October 8, 

2015, Appellant and a cohort robbed a female, and during the robbery, 

Appellant struck the female’s head with a gun. Following his arrest, on April 

5, 2016, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, proceeded to a hearing. 

During the hearing, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the charges of 

aggravated assault, robbery, conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a 

license, and possession of a firearm prohibited. 
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On June 29, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at the 

conclusion of which the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five years 

to ten years in prison, to be followed by twenty years of probation. Appellant 

filed neither post-sentence motions nor a direct appeal.

On or about February 7, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA 

petition, and the trial court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA 

petition on January 21, 2018. Thereafter, the PCRA court provided Appellant 

with notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing, 

and on July 9, 2018, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This timely, 

counseled appeal followed. The PCRA court directed Appellant to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant timely complied, and the PCRA court 

filed a responsive opinion. 

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues (verbatim):

A. Did the PCRA court err as a matter of law by denying 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing where the issues 

alleged, if proven, would have entitled him to relief?

B. Did the PCRA court err as a matter of law by denying 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing where [Appellant] 

claimed a manifest injustice has occurred in that his guilty plea 

was not tendered knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, or 

understandably?

C. Did the PCRA court err as a matter of law by denying 

[Appellant’s] PCRA petition without a hearing where his claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel for plea counsel’s failure to 

consult with him regarding an appeal contained at least 

arguable merit?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 
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Preliminarily, we note that our standard of review from the denial of a 

PCRA petition “is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination 

is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). 

Appellant initially contends he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

with regard to his PCRA petition. It is well-settled that a PCRA petitioner is 

not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition. See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049 (Pa.Super. 2015). If the PCRA 

court can determine from the record that no genuine issues of material fact 

exist, then a hearing is not necessary. Id. We review the PCRA court’s 

decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. McGarry, 172 A.3d 60, 70 (Pa.Super. 2017). With this 

standard in mind, we proceed to examine Appellant’s specific claims.

Appellant claims that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether 

the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea where it was unknowingly, 

unintelligently, and involuntarily entered. Specifically, Appellant contends 

that the oral guilty plea colloquy did not sufficiently comply with Pa.R.Crim.P. 

590.1

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1 As this Court has acknowledged:

[Rule 590] mandate[s] that pleas be taken in open court, and 

require[s] the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to 
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“To be eligible for relief under [the PCRA], the petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence...[t]hat the allegation of error has 

not been previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). “[A]n 

issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before 

trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 

proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). 

In the case sub judice, Appellant failed to challenge the voluntariness of 

his guilty plea in either a motion in the trial court or in a direct appeal. 

Therefore, this claim is waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 9544(b); 

Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa.Super. 2008) (indicating 

that an appellant must challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea in the trial 

court in order to preserve claims related thereto). Consequently, the PCRA 

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ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the 

consequences of his plea. Specifically, the court must affirmatively 

demonstrate the defendant understands: (1) the nature of the 

charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the 

plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption of 

innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of sentences and fines 

possible; and (6) that the court is not bound by the terms of the 

agreement unless the court accepts the agreement.

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations 

omitted).
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court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing with regard to the 

claim.2 See Smith, supra.

In his final claim, Appellant contends the PCRA court erred in failing to 

hold an evidentiary hearing as to whether guilty plea counsel was ineffective 

in failing to consult with Appellant regarding whether he wished to file a direct 

appeal in order to challenge the excessive nature of his sentence.

Our standard of review when faced with a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. First, we note that 

counsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.

* * *

A petitioner must show (1) that the underlying claim has 

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors or omissions of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. The failure to prove any 

one of the three prongs results in the failure of petitioner’s claim.

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2 Appellant suggests that, due to the deficiencies in the oral colloquy, guilty 

plea counsel was ineffective in failing to ascertain “whether [Appellant] was 

entering a knowing and intelligent guilty plea or whether he was entering a 

plea to the facts as recited by the Commonwealth.” Appellant’s Brief at 8; 

PCRA petition filed 1/21/18, at 2. However, Appellant did not claim that, had 

counsel ensured the oral colloquy complied with Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Appellant 

would have declined to plead guilty and, instead, would have insisted upon 

going to trial. As such, Appellant failed to plead the prejudice required to 

merit PCRA relief, and the PCRA court properly denied this claim without an 

evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (setting forth prongs petitioner must plead and prove in 

order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel). See also 

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa.Super. 2013) (To establish 

the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness test, a PCRA petitioner “must show 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted)). 
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Rivera, 10 A.3d at 1279 (citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court has held that counsel’s unexplained 

failure to file a requested direct appeal constitutes ineffective

assistance per se, such that the petitioner is entitled to 

reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc without 

establishing prejudice. However, before a court will find 

ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to file a direct appeal, the 

petitioner must prove that he requested a direct appeal and the 

counsel disregarded the request. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1244 (citation and quotation omitted). 

In the case sub judice, Appellant has not alleged on appeal that he 

requested guilty plea/sentencing counsel to file a direct appeal and counsel 

failed to do so. Rather, Appellant contends that guilty plea/sentencing counsel 

was ineffective in failing to consult with Appellant as to whether he desired to 

file a direct appeal in order to present Appellant’s challenge to the excessive 

nature of his sentence. 

With regard to counsel’s duty to consult, this Court has held as follows:

[Case law] imposes a duty on counsel to adequately consult

with the defendant as to the advantages and disadvantages of an 

appeal where there is reason to think that a defendant would want 

to appeal. The failure to consult may excuse the defendant from 

the obligation to request an appeal...such that counsel could still 

be found to be ineffective in not filing an appeal even where 

appellant did not request the appeal.

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Pursuant to Roe6 and Touw,

7 counsel has a constitutional duty to 

consult with a defendant about an appeal where counsel has 

reason to believe either (1) that a rational defendant would want 

to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds 

for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably 

demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.

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6 Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000).
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7 Commonwealth v. Touw, 781 A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super. 2001).

Ousley, 21 A.3d at 1244-45 (footnotes in original) (quotation omitted). 

In the case sub judice, we may ignore the latter condition because 

Appellant does not argue that he reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he 

was interested in appealing. As for the former condition, Appellant suggests 

that the nonfrivolous issue which he wished to raise on appeal was the 

excessive nature of his sentence, which is a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 876 A.2d 408 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (claim that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive

sentence is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence).

In order to preserve a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence, Appellant must have been raised the issue at sentencing or in postsentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 915 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (stating that an appellant waives for appeal issues 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence where he does not raise 

them at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion). Here, Appellant did not 

present his discretionary aspect of sentencing claim in such a manner, and 

thus, had counsel presented the claim in a direct appeal, it would have been 

deemed waived.3 Therefore, as Appellant has not met his burden of 

demonstrating he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to consult regarding a 

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3 We note the sentencing court informed Appellant of his post-sentence and 

appellate rights. N.T., 6/29/16, at 9. 
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nonfrivolous ground for appeal, we find guilty plea/sentencing counsel was not 

ineffective. See Ousley, supra. Consequently, the PCRA court did not err in 

failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to 

PCRA relief, and thus, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/5/19