UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ZORAN ZUZA, : : Plaintiff, : : Civil Action No.: 14-01099 (RC) v. : : Re Document Nos.: 19, 28, 30, 37 OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, : et al. , : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION
D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR R ECONSIDERATION , D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO S TRIKE , D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR J URISDICTIONAL D ISCOVERY , AND D ENYING AS M OOT P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR O RDER
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Defendants in this action—the O ffice of the High Representative (OHR), and the former and current High Representatives —are international entities tas ked with managing peace agreement implementation effort s in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Zuza v. Office of High Representative , 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2015), ECF No. 18 (discussi ng the factual background of this case). Because the Court found Defendants im mune from suit under the International Organizatio ns Immunities Act (IOIA), 1 the Court dismissed Plaintiff Zoran Zuza’s claims against Defendants. See Order, ECF No. 17; Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 94–100. Zuza timely filed a motion to alt er or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Pl.’s Mo t. Recons., ECF No. 19. Zuza’s m otion urges

1 Pub. L. No. 79-291, 59 Stat. 669 (1945) (codified as amended a t 22 U.S.C. §§ 288–288f-7).2 the Court to reconsider its dismissal because he claims that (1 ) King v. Burwell , 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), is an intervening change in controlling law, and (2) th e Court’s decision was based on errors of law. See Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 1; Mem. P . & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 5– 45, ECF No. 19-1. After preliminary review of Zuza’s motion, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on one of Zuza’s arguments and also r equested a statement of inter est from the United States. See Order, ECF No. 23; Request for S tatement of Interest, ECF No. 3 3. In the course of supplemental briefing, Zuza also filed three a dditional motions: a motion to strike portions of Defendant s’ supplemental brief, a motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery, and a motion for an or der obliging Defendants to res pond to the other two recently filed motions. See Pl.’s Mot. Strike, ECF No. 28; Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Conduct Limited Jurisdictional Discovery, ECF N o. 30; Pl.’s Mot. Order, ECF No. 37. After considering all the parties’ filings and the United State s’ statement of interest, the Court finds that the arguments in Zuza’s motion for reconsidera tion, motion to strike, and motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery have no merit. Th e Court will therefore deny these three motions. And because Zuza’s last motion seeks further bri efing on his motion to strike and his motion for leave to conduct ju risdictional di scovery, the C ourt will deny Zuza’s last motion

as moot.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 59(e) motions “need not be gr anted unless the district cou rt finds that there is an intervening change of controlli ng law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Ciralsky v. CIA , 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Such motions cannot be used as “an opportunity to rear gue facts and theories upon whic h a court has already ruled, nor as3 a vehicle for presenting theorie s or arguments that could have been advanced earlier.” Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia , 771 F. Supp. 2d 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting SEC v. Bilzerian , 729 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2010)). “The burden is on the m oving party to show that reconsideration is appr opriate and that harm or injus tice would result i f reconsideration were denied.” United States ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc. , 893 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2012) (placing th e burden on the movant in the context of a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration); see also Kittner v. Gates , 783 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (D.D.C. 2011) (same, for motions under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).

III. ANALYSIS A. King v. Burwell Zuza first argues that the Suprem e Court’s opinion last year in King v. Burwellcompels an analysis of the IOIA different from the textual approach ado pted in this Court’s decision on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See King v. Burwell , 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see also Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 5–12. King teaches that, though courts “must enforce” plain statutory language, “when decidi ng whether the language is plai n, [courts] must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” King , 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). But King ’s reasoning does not affect this C ourt’s IOIA analysis, even a ssuming that King is an “intervening chang e of controlling law.” Ciralsky v. CIA , 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 2 In keeping with

2 Given that King ’s relevant portions cite repea tedly to Supreme Court precedent , King arguably does not articulate any ne w rule of statutory interpre tation. See, e.g. , King , 135 S. Ct. at 2489.4 King ’s mandate, this Court considere d “as a whole,” rather than “inisolation,” the text of IOIA sections 1, 2(b), and 7(b), the 2010 amendment to the IOIA, 3 and the relevant executive order 4 before concluding that the statut ory language was so “plain” th at it enabled an analysis that “begins and ends” with the text. See King , 135 S. Ct. at 2495 (explaining that though a statutory phrase’s meaning may seem plain “when viewed in isolation,” its plain meaning may turn out to be “untenable in light of the sta tute as a whole” (internal quo tation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc. , 510 U.S. 332, 343 (1994))); Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 93–95. Alternatively, King allows for consideration of a sta tute’s “broader structure” wh en statutory text is ambiguous. See King , 135 S. Ct. at 2492. But Zuza’s motion cites no statutory text or purpose that creates ambiguity. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 5–12. 5 Thus, to the extent Zuza seeks to advan ce an argument that the IOIA’s text is ambiguous, Zuza fails to carry his burden under Rule 59(e). See Kittner v. Gates , 783 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (D.D.C. 2011). B. OHR’s Immunity In urging reconsiderat ion of the Court’s ru ling on OHR’s intern ational organization immunity, Zuza’s motion takes issu e with the Court’s statutory interpretation, the Court’s treatment of concessions and adm issions that Zuza alleges Defen dants made, and the Court’s

3 Extending Immunities to the Offi ce of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Internationa l Civilian Office in Kosovo Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-177, 124 Stat. 1260 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 288f-7). 4 Exec. Order No. 13,568, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,497 (Mar. 8, 2011). 5 Indeed, Zuza appears to use King merely as a vehicle for reasserting his rejected arguments concerning lack of waive r, a Ninth Circuit opinion’s silence, and the “U.S. Presence Requirement.” See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 6–11; see also Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 96–97 & n.7 (rejecting these arguments).5 rejection of the “U.S. Presence Requirement” that Zuza argues t he IOIA requires. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 12–37. All of these arguments could ha ve been presented, however, in Z uza’s opposition to the motion to dismiss and in his sur -reply. And indeed, many of the se arguments were. See Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismi ss 19–37, ECF No. 6; Pl.’s Sur-Repl y Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 4–12, ECF No. 11; see also Zuza v. Office of the High Representative , 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 96–97 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting argumen ts made in Zuza’s opposition an d sur-reply to the motion to dismiss). The Court therefore d eclines to consider Zuza’s argum ents about OHR’s immunity. See Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia , 771 F. Supp. 2d 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that motions for rec onsideration may not be used as opportunities to relitigate arguments that were or could ha ve been advanced earlier). And r egardless, nothing in Zuza’s lengthy submission raises any issues meriting reconsideration. C. The Individual Defendants’ Immunity Zuza next argues that the Court erred in holding that the indiv idual defendants Inzko and Ashdown are entitled to immun ity as “officers” of OHR. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 38–42. 1. The Individual Defendant s’ Alleged Concessions In this vein, Zuza first contends that, because Inzko and Ashdo wn bore the burden to establish their immunity and because they did not argue that th ey were “officers” under the IOIA, the Court could not fi nd them immune from suit. See Zuza v. Office of the High Representative , 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 94 n.3, 99 n.8 (D.D.C. 2015). But as the Court explained, Defendants did argue that Zuza’ s argument would lead to an “abs urd result.” Id. at 98 (quoting Defs.’ Reply 5, ECF No. 7). Defenda nts also argued that “[b]oth § 288f-7 and IOIA specifically6 grant immunity to OHR’s ‘officer s or employees’ without withhol ding immunity from the head of the office” and that “IOIA immu nity has been applied to the UN Secretary General and [to other] top international organiza tion officials.” Defs.’ Reply 5–6. In addition, Defendants cited Brzak v. United Nations , 551 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), upon which the Court’s a nalysis also relied. See Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 93, 99; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dis miss 12, ECF No. 4-1. The fact that Defenda nts did not squarely contend that Inzko and Ashdown are (or were) OHR “officers” does not prev ent the Court from concluding that they carried their burden to establish their immunity. 6 2. 22 U.S.C. § 228e(a) 7 In the alternative, Z uza argues that the Court erroneously disr egarded section 8(a) of the IOIA, which states that an indi vidual must be “duly notified to and accepted by the Secretary of State as a representative, offi cer, or employee” before he can enjoy IOIA immunity. 22 U.S.C. § 228e(a). The parties’ supplemental briefs and the United Stat es’ statement of interest address this issue at length. See Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n, ECF No. 26; P l.’s Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 2 9; Statement of Interest, ECF No. 41; Defs.’ Resp. to Statement of Interest, ECF No. 42; Pl.’s Mem. Resp. to the Statement of Inter est, ECF No. 43; Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Resp. Regarding Statement of Interest, ECF No. 45; Pl.’s R eply to Defs.’ Resp. to Stateme nt of Interest, ECF No. 46.

6 Zuza avers that he is “prepare d to amend the Complaint to cite Lord Ashdown in his ‘official capacity as former High Representative.’” Mem. P . & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 3 n.2, 42 n.70. To the extent that Zuza re quests leave to amend the co mplaint in this manner, the Court denies his request because it would be futile. See Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 99 (reviewing cases and holding that a former official enjoys international officia l immunity under the IOIA “against claims arising out of actions tak en in his (prior) official cap acity”). See generally Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Wash. , 309 F.R.D. 77, 87 (D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that an amended p leading is futile if it cannot withstand a motion to dismiss). 7 Without deciding the issue, the Court’s discussion of 22 U.S.C . § 288e(a) assumes, as the Court’s prior opinion did, t hat Defendants have the burden to prove their IOIA immunity. See Zuza v. Office of the High Representative , 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 94 n.3 (D.D.C. 2015).7 a. The United States’ St atement of Interest The government’s statement of int erest states that “the United States confirms that both individual defendants satisfy section 8(a)’s requirements.” Sta tement of Interest 3. In support, the United States attached a signed l etter from Clifton Seagroves, the Department of State’s Acting Deputy Director of the Offi ce of Foreign Missions. See Statement of Inter est Ex. A, ECF No. 41-1. According to that letter, “[t ]he official records of the Department of State” indicate that Inzko and Ashdown “have been notified to the Secretary of State and accepted by the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions, a cting pursuant t o delegated au thority from the Secretary of State.” Id. b. Notification and Acceptance Shown With the government’s statement of interest and Seagroves’s sig ned letter, it is clear that Inzko and Ashdown meet 29 U.S.C. § 288e(a)’s requirements. Seag roves’s letter expressly confirms that Inzko and Ashdown ha ve been “notified to” and “ac cepted by” the S ecretary of State, just as § 288e(a) prescribes. See 29 U.S.C. § 288e(a); Statement of Interest Ex. A. Letters from Inzko to the State Department also show that the State Dep artment was notified of Inzko and Ashdown. See Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n Ex. 24 & Ex. A , ECF No. 27-1 (requesting t hat a list of individuals, including Inzko himself, be accepted as officers and employees entitled to IOIA immunity); Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n Ex. 25, ECF No. 26-11 (same, for Ashdown). And Zuza himself implies that a certificate or letter from the Department of Sta te is sufficient to show acceptance. See Pl.’s Suppl. Brief 2, 11–15. Instead of attacking the fact of Inzko’s and Ashdown’s notifica tion and acceptance, Zuza merely argues that the docum ents verifying notification and acc eptance are “unauthenticated and, therefore, inadmissible.” See Pl.’s Evidentiary Obj. 1, ECF No. 31 (objecting to Inzko’s let ters to8 the State Department); Pl.’s E videntiary Obj. Exs. Attached to Statement of Interest, ECF No. 44 (objecting to Seagroves’ s letter). But Federal Rule of Evidence 901 requires a proponent of evidence merely to produce “evidence sufficient to support a fi nding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). To satisfy the authentication requirement, the proponent may use “[t]he appearan ce, contents, substance, inter nal patterns, or ot her distinctive characteristics of the item, tak en together with all the circum stances.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4). Here, the letters from Inzko to t he State Department bear the s ame letterhead and style as a later letter, which the Unite d States expressly endorsed as b eing from Inzko. Compare Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n Ex. 24 & Ex. A and Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n Ex. 25 with Statement of Interest Ex. B. See also Statement of Interest 4 n.2 (des cribing the let ter the governm ent produced as a “Letter from Valentin Inzko to Ambassa dor Gentry O. Smith”). In light o f these circumstances, the Court sees no reason to question th e authenticity of Inzko’s le tters. Similarly, Seagroves’s letter was submitted directly by the Dep artment of Justice on behalf of the United States a nd bears the letterhead of the Sta te Department. See Statement of Interest Ex. A. Independent inqu iry confirms that Clifton Seagr oves is the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Forei gn Missions and exercises State Department functions associated with 22 U.S.C. § 288e. See Re-Delegation of Certain Author ities and Functions Under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,700 (Dec. 3, 2015) (delegating § 288e duties to the Deputy Directo r of the Office of Foreign M issions and other State Department personnel); Key Personnel , U.S. Dep’t of State, http: //www.state.gov/ofm/contact/ personnel/index.htm (last visi ted Feb. 4, 2016) (informing the public of Mr. Seagroves’s service as Acting Deputy Director). As with Inzko’s letters, nothing gi ves the Court reason to question the authenticity of the Sta te Department’s letter.9 Zuza’s evidentiary objections lack merit, and Zuza makes no arg uments disputing the relevant facts: Inzko and Ashdow n were notified under 29 U.S.C. § 288e(a) to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State accepted them under § 288e(a) as appropriate recipients of IOIA immunity. Inzko and Ashdown therefo re meet the requirements set forth in § 288e(a). On this front, Zuza has not shown a “nee d to correct a clear error” of law. Ciralsky v. CIA , 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Kittner v. Gates , 783 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172 (D.D.C. 2011) (placing the burden of proof for a Rul e 59(e) motion on the movant). c. Retroactive Notification and Acceptance Permissible Even if Inzko and Ashdown did not meet 29 U.S.C. § 288e(a)’s re quirements at the time Zuza’s complaint was filed, tha t would not bar their IOIA immun ity now. The IOIA itself states that, once individuals merit IOI A immunity, they are immune not just “from suit,” but also from “legal process.” 22 U.S.C. § 288d( b). And the weight of relevan t case law favors finding that if international officials acqui re immunity during the pendency of a suit, the suit must be dismissed. See generally Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade Cnty. , 741 F.2d 1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing diplom atic immunity and holding that it “serv es as a defense to suits already commenced”); Fun v. Pulgar , 993 F. Supp. 2d 470, 474 (D.N.J. 2014) (same); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos , 665 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same). The Supreme Co urt, in discussing foreign sovereign immuni ty, has stated that “such im munity reflects current political realities and relationships, and a ims to give foreign states an d their instrumentalities some present ‘protection from the inconvenie nce of suit as a gesture of com ity.’” Republic of Austria v. Altmann , 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004). More broa dly, the D.C. Circuit has explained that, for parties who merit IOIA immunity, t he IOIA creates a “baseline” of “absolute immunity” to all kinds of suits. Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank , 156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1998).10 These authorities persuade the C ourt that the IOIA, like diplom atic immunity and foreign sovereign immunity, can serve as a defense to suits already com menced. As this Court has noted before, IOIA immunity “is an immu nity from trial and the attend ant burdens of litigation, and not just a defense to liabi lity on the merits.” Garcia v. Sebelius , 919 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation ma rks omitted) (quoting Foremost–McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990))). 8 Because IOIA immunity can appl y retroactively, 22 U.S.C. § 288e (a)’s requirements will not bar Inzko and Ashdown’s IOIA immunity, even if they first s atisfied those requirements after Zuza filed his complaint in this case. Thus, § 288e(a) is not areason for the Court to disturb its decision to find Inzko and A shdown immune from suit. 3. Functional Immunity Zuza also argues that the Court improperly held that the “funct ional” immunity referenced in Tuck v. Pan American Health Organization , 668 F.2d 547, 550 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981), displaces the text of 22 U.S.C. § 288f-7. See Zuza v. Office of the High Representative ,

8 Analogously, courts have held tha t IOIA immunity, even if obta ined after the events at issue in the litigation, still serves as a defense to suit. See, e.g. , Garcia v. Sebelius , 867 F. Supp. 2d 125, 143–44 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated in part on other grounds , 919 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013); Weidner v. Int’l Telecomms. Satellite Org. , 392 A.2d 508, 510 (D.C. 1978). For instance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared in this cont ext that “[i]f a cause of action arises and an individual . . . is s ubsequently clothed with immunity, courts lack jurisdiction to entertain actions brought again st such individuals . . . so lon g as the immunity exists.” Weidner , 392 A.2d at 510. Although these cases assessed I OIA immunity using the date on w hich the complaints were filed, they did so because of the facts of those cases. Bo th Garcia and Weidner concerned foreign officials who gained immuni ty after the events triggeri ng the lawsuits, but before the complaints were filed. See Garcia , 867 F. Supp. 2d at 144; Weidner , 392 A.2d at 510. The question before the Court now—whe ther immunity may apply retroa ctively if it is acquired during the pendency of suit—was not squarely pres ented. Thus, where cases like Garcia and Weidner imply that, for IOIA immunity to apply, it must be present whe n the complaint is filed, that implication is merely dicta. It is not central to those ca ses’ holdings and accordingly does not affect the Court’ s analysis here.11 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 98–100 (D.D.C. 2015); Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl .’s Mot. Recons. 38–39. But his argument merely reiterates one the Court already rejected: Zuza’s previous argument that the IOIA uses the words “officer” and “employee” in their technical sense. See Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 98–99; see also Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 38–42 (making the argumen t for a technical interpretation). As t he Court noted before, “the IOIA cannot bear such an ‘absurd result.’” Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 98 (quoting Defs.’ Reply 5); see also United States v. Turkette , 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (instructing t hat, in statutory interp retation, “absurd r esults are to be avoided”). A motion for reconsid eration is not a vehicle to rel itigate this issue. See Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia , 771 F. Supp. 2d 5, 10 (D.D.C. 2011). D. Factual Background Adopted in the Court’s Opinion Lastly, Zuza contends that th e Court erred by including in its opinion certain facts not alleged in the complaint concerning the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Peace Implementation Council. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 43–44; Zuza v. Office of the High Representative , 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 91 (D.D.C. 2015). Specifically, Zuza argu es that because Defendants had “conceded” certai n factual issues, the Court sho uld not have adjudicated them in Defendants’ favor. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. 43. The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss al lows the Court to “consider the complaint suppl emented by undisputed facts eviden ced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undispute d facts plus the court’s res olution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta , 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (in ternal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). But contrary to Zuza’s argument, Def endants did not concede the fac tual issues to which Zuza refers, and so those facts are not “undisp uted.” Instead, Defendants’ m otion to dismiss outlines the very12 facts (adopted by the Court in its opinion) that Zuza says his complaint contradicts. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 2–4 , ECF No. 4-1. These facts we re thus “disputed,” and the Court was not required to adopt Z uza’s version; it could resolv e the disputed facts based on the record at the time of the Court’s decision. See Coal. for Underground Expansion , 333 F.3d at 198. For that reason, the Court’ s factual summary did not conta in “a clear error,” and the Court need not reconsider its prior decision. See Ciralsky v. CIA , 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 9 In sum, none of Zuza’s arguments urging reconsideration have me rit. The Court will therefore deny Zuza’s motion for reconsideration. E. Zuza’s Other Motions 1. Motion to Strike Zuza has also moved to strike por tions of Defendants’ supplemen tal brief. See Pl.’s Mot. Strike, ECF No. 28; see also Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n, ECF No. 26 ( containing the text at issue in Zuza’s motion to strike). But this motion, like his motion for reconsideration, lacks merit. Contrary to Zuza’s claim that the arguments contained in Defend ants’ brief are “immaterial” under Federal Rule of Civil Proced ure 12(f), Defendants’ argume nts directly respond to the Court’s order, which directs the parties to address whether “In zko and Ashdown presently satisfy

9 Moreover, in the portion of the Court’s opinion devoted to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Peace Implementation Counc il, the facts set forth there did not affect the merits of the Court’s decision. See Zuza , 107 F. Supp. 3d at 93–100 (omitting, in the entirety of the C ourt’s analysis, any reference to the Dayton Peace Agreement or the Pe ace Implementation Council). Even if the Court’s view of t hese background facts were to chan ge, it would not change the IOIA immunity analysis. Zuza’s argument here is therefore futile. See generally Aygen v. District of Columbia , 311 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2015) (e xplaining, in the Rule 60(b) context, that “the movant must provide t he district court with reason to believe t hat vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise or a fu tile gesture” (alteration and inter nal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Murray v. District of Columbia , 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).13 the requirements of section 8(a).” See Order 3, ECF No. 23; Defs.’ Suppl. Opp’n 4–12; cf. Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Strike 3–6, ECF No. 28-1. And the remai nder of Zuza’s motion seeks to strike material that does not affect the Court’s analysis he re. See Pl.’s Mot. Strike 6–8 (discussing personal jurisdicti on and other defenses briefly me ntioned in Defendant’s supplemental brief); supra Parts III.A–D (declining to addres s those topics). The Court w ill therefore deny Zuza’s motion to strike. 2. Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery Zuza’s motion for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery all eges that Zuza “requires facts in order to respond to Indi vidual Defendants’ fact-based jurisdictional defense.” Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. for Leave to Conduct Li mited Jurisdictional Disco very 3, ECF No. 30-1. But the facts here are so clear that a ny jurisdictional discovery would be futile. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 563 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[J]urisdictional dis covery . . . should not be allowed when discovery woul d be futile.” (internal quota tion marks omitted) (quoting Crist v. Republic of Turkey , 995 F. Supp. 5, 12 (D.D.C. 1998))). Zuza does not factually d ispute the government’s statement tha t Inzko and Ashdown were notified to and accepted by the Secretary of State, just as 29 U.S.C. § 288e(a) requires. See generally supra Part III.C.2 (discussing how the government’s s tatement is conclusive on thi s issue). As set forth above, Zuza only challenges the authen ticity of documents and legal im plications of those facts. See id. Neither of which requires the uncovering of unknown facts. In fact, Zuza has offered no theory of what “facts” jurisdictio nal discovery would uncover to refute Defendants’ immunity claims. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. for Leave to Conduct Limited Jurisdictional Discovery 3. Because “jurisdicti onal discovery should be permitted ‘only to verify allegations of specific facts,’” the Court will deny Zuza’s motion for14 leave to conduct juri sdictional discovery. See Crist , 995 F. Supp. at 13 (quoting Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos , 962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1992)). 3. Motion for Order Zuza’s last motion seeks an orde r obliging Defendants to respon d to Zuza’s motion to strike, Zuza’s motion for juris dictional discovery, and one of Zuza’s evidentiary objections. See Pl.’s Mot. Order, ECF No. 37. Because the Court will deny Zuza’ s other motions and also finds Zuza’s evidentiary objection meritless, the Court will deny Zuz a’s last motion as moot. See

supra Part III.C.2.b (refuting Zuza’ s evidentiary objection); supra Parts III.E.1–2 (discussing Zuza’s motion to strike and moti on for jurisdictional discovery ).

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plain tiff’s motion for reconsiderati on (ECF No. 19) is DENIED , Plaintiff’s motion to s trike (ECF No. 28) is DENIED , Plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discov ery (ECF No. 30) is DENIED , and Plaintiff’s motion for the order adverted to in the minute order of September 24, 2015 (ECF No. 37) is DENIED AS MOOT . An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and conte mporaneously issued.
Dated: February 4, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge