### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Marc h 6, 200 7
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . EDWARD CHARLES T ENNIAL

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04-06229 P aula S kahan , Judge

No. W2006-00999-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 9, 2007

Ap pe lla nt, Ed wa rd Cha rl e s T e nn ia l, w a s in dic te d w ithtw o c ounts of fi rs t de g re e mur de r, tw o c ounts of ag g ravated burg lary

and one c ount of theft over $10,000. A jury

convicted Ap pellant of two counts of sec ond deg ree murder, two c ounts o f aggr avate d trespass a nd one count of

theft over $10,000. The trial c ourt merg ed the second degr ee murder c onvictions into one and the ag g ravated trespass c onvictions into one. A fter holding a sentenc ing hear ing, the trial court sentenc ed Appe llant to t we nty -o ne y e a

rs fo r t he mur de r c on vic tio n a s a Rang e Ivio le nt o ff

e nd e r, wi th r e le a se e lig ibi lity a t 10 0% , thre e y e ars fo r the the ft ov e r $10 ,0 00 a s a Ran g e Ista nd ard of fe nd e r w ithre le a se e lig ibi lity of 30%, a nd eleve n months and twenty -nine da y s for the a g g ravated trespa ss in the workhouse. T he trial court or dere d all sentenc es to be serve d consec utively

. Appellant ar g ues on appe al that the trial court improperly considere d the four enhanc ement fac tors to his second deg ree mur d er s en t ence

. We conclude that the t rial court incorre ctly considere d two of t he four enhanc ement fa ctors, but the
rema ining two e nhance ment fac tors support the trial court’s enhanc ement of Appe llant’s sentenc e. Th e re fo re , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J

. , d elivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Marv in E . B a lli n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Ed wa rd Cha rl e s T e nn ia l.

Rob e rt E. Coo p e r , Jr

. , A tt o r

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F ind le y , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Paul G oodman and Chris West, A s s i s t ant District Attorney s Gene ral,for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

Factual Back

ground

For a little over a

y ear prior to the date in question, Appellant, who was eighte en y ear s old, ha d b e e n d a tin g Kr isty

Ca lla wa y , w ho wa s si xtee n ye ars old . Immediat ely before the date in question, Ms. Callaway

ended he r re lationship with Appellant. On Aug us t 2 6 , 2003, Appellant enter ed his ex-gir lfriend’ s house throug h her unloc ked bedroom window ar ound 11:00 a.m. He ha d broug ht a hammer

and scr ewdr iver with him. He intended to e ither scar e Kristy or talk to her a bout their bre ak-up. H e set off an ala rm in the house and w ent to the attic. He sta y ed t h er e fo r about thirty minutes. He took off his shirt while he was in the atti c because he was hot. After le aving the attic, he wa

ndere d around the house. Kristy ’s mother, the vic tim, came home. Appe llant approa ched her w hile she wa s in the kitchen. Appellant stabbed the victim multipl e times with his pocket knife, which had a

five-inc h long blade. After he st abbed the victim, Appellant g rabbe d the victim’s car ke y s and too k h e r c ar. He late r a

ba nd on e d it

. Th e vic tim ’s tw e lve -ye ar- old so n r e tur ne d h ome fr om s c ho ol a

nd fo un d h is mot

he r lyingin a pool of blood on the kitche n floor. He called the police. The p o l i ce fo u n d a scr ewdr iver a nd a hamme r i n K

ri sty ’s ro om. Th e y

a lso fo un d a

sh ir t in the a tti c . T he sh ir

t w a s st a ine d w ith Appellant’s blood. The police f ound no sign of

forc ed entr

y into the victim’s house. Another of fice r found the victim’s ca

r whe n s h e re s p o n d ed to an a bandoned ve hicle ca ll. She ran the tag s and discovere d that the owner of the ve hicle wa s the victim of a murde r. The of fice r sec ured the car

. On August 31, 2003, Appel l an t an d h i s mother ca me to the homicide division where he turned himself in for

the victim’s murder. A

ppellant g ave a

statement to the police duringwhich he admitted to the murder of the victim, but stated that he had not intende d to kill her. The Shelby

County Gra nd J ury indicted Appellant with two c ounts of first deg ree murder, two counts of ag g ravated burg lary , and one count of theft over $10,000. A jury convicted A

ppellant of tw o c ounts of

se c on d d e g re e mur de r, tw o c ounts of a g g ra vate d tr e sp a ss, and on e c ount o f t he ft

. Th e t r i a l c o u rtm e r g e d

t h e m u r d e r

c o n v i c t i o n s i n t o o n e c o n v i c t i o nan d t h e a g g r a v a t e d

t r e s p a ss convictions into one conviction.

The trial c ourt sente n c e d

A p p e ll ant to twenty -one year s for the murde r convic tion, three y ear s fo r t he the ft c on vic tio n, and e le ve n mont hs , twe nty -n ine da

y s for the a g g ra vate d c ri min a l tr e sp a ss c on vic tio n. Th e tr ia l c ourt de te rm ine d th a t App e lla nt w a s a vio le nt o ff

e nd e r f or purp os e s of his
mur de r c on vic tio n a

nd a sta nd ard of fe nd e r f or his the ft c on vic tio n. Al l se nte nc e s w e re or de re d to be ser ved conse cutively

to eac h other.
Ap pe lla nt f ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l.-3- AN AL YSI S Appellant’s sole issue on a ppeal relating to his conviction for second de g ree murder is that the trial cour

t errone ously

applied enha

nceme nt fac tors to enhanc e Appe llant’s sentenc e fr om the minimum

. W e beg in our ana ly sis with a brief discussion of r ece nt chang es in Tenne ssee’ s sentenc ing statutes. I n response to the United States Supreme Court’s de cision in Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Te nnessee Gene ral Assembly amende d T.C.A. § 40-35-210 so that all felonies now have a presumptive sente nce be g inning at the minimum sentenc e within the sentenc ing r ang e. Com

pa re T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2003) with T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( c ) ( 20 06 ); see als o 2005 Tenn. Pub. Act c h. 353, § 18. This amendment bec ame e ffe ctive on June 7, 2005. The Gene ral Asse mbly

also provided that thi s amendment would a pply to defe ndants who committed a criminal off

ense on or

afte r June 7, 2005. 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 353 , § 18. I n addition, the leg islation provides that a cr iminal defenda nt who committed a cr iminal offense on or af ter July 1, 1982, but is not sentenced until afte r J une 7, 2005, may elec t to be sentenc ed under these provisions by executing a

waiver of their e xpo st f ac to protec tions. Id. I n the ca se sub judice , Appellant sig ned such a w aiver

and, ther efor e, the ne w ac t applies in our re view of his sente ncing

. At the outset it should also be noted that the 2005 ame ndments to our s entencing la ws curta iled to some deg ree the g rounds that may form the ba sis of an appe al of a sentenc ing de cision. Com pa re T.C.A. § 40-35-401 ( 2003) with T.C.A. § 40-35-401 ( 2006). The amende d T.C.A. § 40- 35 -4 01 (b ) ( 20 06 ) d if

fe rs on on e ke y po int :

(b ) A n a pp e a l f ro m a se nte nc e may

be on on e (1 ) o r m or e of

the fo llo wi ngg ro un ds : (1 ) T he se nte nc e wa s n ot i mpo se d in a c c or da nc e wi th t his c ha pte r; (2) The sentenc e is excessive under the s entenc ing c onsiderations set out in §§ 40-35- 103 and 40-35- 210; or (3) The sentenc e is inconsistent with the purposes of se ntencingset out in §§ 40-35- 102 and 40-35- 103.

Prior to 2005, T.C.A. § 40-35-401(b) (2003) stated, “An appea l f rom a sente nce ma

y be on one ( 1) or more of the following g rounds: (1) The sentenc e was not imposed in acc ordanc e with t his chapter ; or (2) Thee nh an c e me nt a nd mi tig ati ng fa cto rs we reno t we igh e d p ro pe rly , a nd the se nte nc e is
excess ive under

the sentenc ing c onsiderations set out in § 40-35-103.” T.C.A. § 40-35-401( b) (2003) ( emphasis adde d).

We now analy

ze the amended statute to deter mine on what g rounds a c riminal defe ndant may seek r elief from the sentenc e imposed by the trial cour

t. Gener ally , when c onstruing a statute, eve ry word withi n the s tatute i s presumed to “have meaningand purpose and should be g iven full eff ect.” State v. Odom , 9 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d 1 8 , 2 9 -3 0 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Marsh v. He nderson , 424 S.W .2d 193, 196 (Tenn. 1968) ). This Court’s primary duty in construing a st atute is “to asc erta in and g ive ef fec t to t he le g isl a tiv e int e nt w ith out un du ly restr ic tin g or

e xpand inga

statut e ’s c ov e ra g e be y on d it s-4-

intended scope .” Ow e ns v . S tate , 9 08 S.W. 2d

92 3, 92 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; se e als o S tate v . D av is , 940 S.W .2d 558, 561 (Tenn. 1997). L eg islative intent should be gle aned f rom the “natural and or dinary meaningof the languag e used, w ithout a force d or subtle construc tion that would lim it or ext end the meaning of the languag e.” Car te r v . S tate , 9 52 S.W. 2d

41 7, 41 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . F ur the rm or e , th is Court should construe a statute so that its component parts are consistent an d re as o n able, and inconsistent parts should be har moniz ed, whe re possible. Odom , 9 28 S.W .2d at 30. When the Gene ral Asse mbly

has ame nded a statute, “[i] t is a proper method to deter mine what the intention of t he L eg islature was for us to look at prior a cts . . . .” Sta te v . D av ids on Cou nty , 277 S.W .2d 396, 401 (Tenn. 1955) . I n addition, “[w] hen the leg islature makes a chang e in the languag e of a statute, we must assume that it was de liberate .” State v. Turner , 193 S.W .3d 522, 527 (Tenn. 2006)

.
T he fa ct that the Ge nera l Assembly deleted the lang uag e re g ardingthe weig hing of
e nh anc e me nt a

nd mit ig a tin g fa c tor s d e mon st rat e s th a t th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y int e nd e d th a t a de fe nd ant m ay

no lon g e r a lle g e a s g ro un ds fo r re lie f o n a pp e a l th a t th e se nte nc ingc ourt e rr on e ou sly weig hed sente ncing enhanc ement fa ctors.
“When revie wing sentenc ing issues

. . . , the appe llate cour t shall conduct a de novo revie w on the r e c o r d o f th e is s u e s

. T h e r e v ie w s h a ll b e c o n d u c te d w it h a p r e s u mp ti o n th at the deter minations made by

the co u rt from which the appea l is taken are corr ect.” T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d ). T h i s p resumpti on will be virtually irrebuttable if there is a fac tual basis for the consideration of the enha

nceme nt fac tor, the enha

nceme nt fac tor consider ed is not an ele ment of the offe nse and, in a ddition, the consideration of the factor is not inconsistent with t he purpose s of sentenc ing c onsiderations set out in T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103 a nd -210.

I n making its sente ncing deter mination, the trial court, at the conclusion of t h e s en t en cing hear ing, f irst determines the r ang e of se ntence and then de termines the spe ci fi c s entenc e and the appropr iate combination of se ntencingalternatives by considering : (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the sentenc ing he aring ; (2) the pr esente nce r eport; (3) the principles of sentenc ing a

nd arguments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) t h e nature and c hara cter istics of the criminal conduc t involved; (5) evide nce a

nd information offe red by the par ties o n t h e en h ance ment and mitigating fac tors; (6) any

statistical information provided by the administrative off

ice of the cour

ts reg arding sentenc es for

simil ar of

fense s; (7) any

statements the defenda

nt wishes t o make in the de fenda nt’s behalf about sentenc ing; a

n d (8 ) t he potential for

reha bilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35- 21 0( a ), (b ), -1 03 (5 ); State v. W illiams , 920 S.W .2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. Whe n im po sin g the se nte nc e wi thi n th e a pp ro pr iate se nte nc ingra

ng e fo r t he de fe nd ant:

[T] he cour

t shall consider, but is not bound by , the foll o wi n g ad v iso ry sentenc ing g uid e lin e s: (1 ) T he min imum se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e of punis hme nt i s th e se nte nc e that sh ou ld be im p o s e d , b e c a

u s e th e g e n e r a l a s s e mb ly s e t th e mi n im u m le n g th o f s e n te n ce f

or eac h felony

class to re flec t the relative seriousness of eac h cr i m inal offe nse in the felony classifications; and-5-

(2) The sentenc e length within the ra ng e should be a djusted, as appr opriate, by the prese nce or

absenc e of mitig ating and enha nceme nt fac tors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35- 114.

T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2006) (e mphasis added) . Wit h this backg round in mind, we turn to the propriety of Appe llant’s sentenc es in this case.

At the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court found that there was ample fac tual support for the
c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo llo wi ng e nh anc e me nt fa c tor s: (5 ) the de fe nd ant tr e a te d or a llo we d th e vic tim in t his c a se to b e tr e a te d w ithe xce pti on a l c ru e lty ; ( 6) the pe rs on a l in jur ie s in fl ic te d u

po n th e vic tim
wer e pa rt i cu l ar l y

gre at ; (9 ) t h e d ef

en d an tp o s s es s edo r e mp l o y eda d ea d l y we ap o n ; (1 0 ) t h e d efe ndant had no hesitation about commit ting a crime when t he risk to human l ife wa s high. SeeT.C.A. § 40- 35-114. A ppellant ar g ues that ea ch of the se enha nceme nt fac tors are elements of se cond deg ree murder, the ref

ore, the ir usag e constitutes double enha nceme nt. Aft er a re v i ew of the re cord, w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt inc or re c tly c on sid e re d e nh anc e me nt fa c tor s (6) and (1 0) , b ut c or

re c tly considere d fac tors (5) a

nd (9).

I n conductingour re view of the trial court’ s sentenc ing determinations, we must consider the appellant’ s potential for reha bilitation, the trial and sente ncinghear ing e vidence , the pre -sentenc e repor t, the sentenc ing pr inciples, sentenc ing a lternative a rguments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the e nhancingand mitigating f acto rs , any

statistical information prese nted by the administrative office of the c ourts reg ardingsentenc ing pr actice s for similar off enses in the state , and the def endant’ s statements. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b) (2006)

. The trial c ourt consider ed enha nceme nt fac tor (6), the perso n al i n j uries inflicted upon the victim were particula

rly g reat. Appellant cor

rec tly argues that this enhance ment fac tor is an eleme nt of the off ense. The courts of this State have held on sever al occa sions that this e nhance ment fac tor is not applicable to off

enses whe re de ath is an eleme nt of the off ense be cause injuries sustained by a homicide victim are by

definition “par

ticularly g reat.” See State v . W

illiamson , 919 S.W .2d 69, 82 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Sta te v . La mb e rt , 7 41 S.W. 2d 12 7, 13 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ). Th is analy s i s h as b ee n specific ally applied to sec ond deg ree murder c ases. Se e Sta te v . M ic ha e l Sc ott Brogan , No. E2001-00712- CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1723702, at * 5 (Te nn. Crim

. A p p

. , a t K nox ville, J uly 25, 2002), perm. app. denied , ( Te nn . D e c . 2 , 2 00 2) ; Sta te v . Lu k e B. Col e , No. W2000-01530- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 912802, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Aug

. 10, 2001), perm. app. denied , ( Te nn . D e c . 3 1, 20 01 ); Sta te v

. J am es H e nr yDa v is , No. M1999-02467-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1130139, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Na shville, Aug . 2, 2000) , perm. app. de nied , (Tenn. F eb. 12 , 2 00 1) . Cl e arl y , e nh anc e me nt f a c tor (6 ) wa s im

pr op e rl y c on sid e re d b y

the tr ia l c ourt

be c a us e it is a n e le me nt o f t

he of fe ns e and its c on sid e ra

tio n c on sti tut e s d ou

ble e nh anc e me nt.
The trial c ourt also consider ed en h ance ment fac tor (10), the defe ndant had no he sitation
a bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me whe n th e ri sk

to h uma n li fe wa s h ig h. Th is f

a c tor is n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly inhere nt to a homicide offe nse. I t has been applied when there have be en other individuals present-6-

who wer e put in dang er by the ac tions of the defe ndant. See W illiamson , 9 19 S.W. 2d a t 83 ; Sta te v. Mak oka , 8 85 S.W. 2d 36 6, 37 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Lam be rt , 741 S.W .2d at 134. Howe ver, the victim and Appellant we re the only people pr esent at the time of the incident. The only human lif e a t r isk wa s th a t of

the vic tim , th e re fo re , th is e nh anc e me nt f a c tor is a n e le me nt o f t

he of fe ns e in thi s p art ic ula

r f a c tua l si tua

tio n, and its c on sid e ratio n w ou ld a lso c on sti tut e do ub le e nh anc e me nt.
Enhanc ement fa ctor (5) , t re at ing the victim with ex ceptional c ruelty , is not considered a n element of

second de g ree murder. I n State v. Gray , 960 S.W .2d 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) , the
a pp lic a tio n o f t

his e nh anc e me nt fa c tor fo r a se nte nc e fo r se c on d de g re e mur de r w a s u ph e ld b y thi s Court. 960 S.W .2d at 611. Howe ver, “ [i ]t i s we ll established that proper application of
e nh ancemen t f

a c tor (5 ) r e qu ir e s a

fi nd ingof

c ru e lty un de r t he statut e “ ov e r a

nd a bo ve ” wh a t is
r e qu ir e d to s u s ta in

a c o n v ic ti o n f

o r an o f f e n s e

. . . . I no th e r

w o r d s , s u c he v id e n c e mu s t ‘ d e n o te [ ] the infliction of pain or suffe ring inflicted as the me ans of a ccomplishing the cr ime char g ed.’” Sta te
v . A rn e tt , 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d

2 5 0 , 2 5 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Kelly Hay nes , No. W1999-01485- CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 298744, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Ma r. 14, 2000))

.
I n the ca se sub judice , A p p e ll an t s u r p r is e d th e un ar

me d v ic ti m in h e r o w n home. The fore nsic patholog ist, who completed the autopsy on the victim, testified that she identified e leven to t we lve sta b wound s, but only on e of the e le ve n to tw e lve wo un ds wo uld have c a us e d imme diate de a th. On e wo un d w a s to the c he st a nd pie rc e d the he art wh ic h c a us e d int e rn a l ble e din g , a s w e ll a s, impeding the hear

t’s ability to pump blood to t he re st of the victim’s body

. There fore , there wer e ten to eleve n wounds in addition to the one that was the proxi mate cause of the victim’s death. The
wo un ds oth e r t

ha n that wh ic h c a

us e d the vic tim ’s de a th are “ ov e r and a bo ve ” that ne e de d to su sta in Appellant’s c onviction for sec on d d egr ee murder. T hese f acts a re suf ficient to support the trial court’s c onsideration of e nhance ment fac tor (5).

We now turn to the trial cour t’s consideration of enhanc ement fa ctor (9) , the def endant employ ed a de adly wea

pon. This Court has held that this enhance ment fac tor is not an element of the offe nse. State v. Butler , 900 S.W .2d 305, 312-13 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994). In B u tle r , the defe ndant used a firea

rm to kill the victim resulting in the de fenda nt’s conviction for se cond deg ree murder. Id. This Court stated tha t t h e use of a fire arm is not an ele ment of the off ense of second d e g r e e murde r. Id. Th e same is tru e of the us e of

a kn if e . T he re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y considere d this enhance ment fac tor when de termining Appellant’s se ntence

. The trial c ourt sentenc ed Appe llant to twenty -one year s. T he sente ncingrang e for second deg ree murder, a

Class A felony , as a Rang e I offe n der is fifte en to twenty -five year s. We have conclude d that the trial cour t errone ously

considere d two of the four enhanc ement fa ctors wh en deter mining Appe llant’s sentence. Howe ver, w e conc lude that the two prope rly considere d enhanc ement fa ctors amply support the trial cour

t’s imposit ion of an incr ease of the minimum sentenc e by

six y ear s to twenty -one.-7- CO NC LU SION

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m ju dg me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt

.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE