The Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman, District Judge for 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois is sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-1896

ANGELINA POVEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF JEFFERSONVILLE, INDIANA,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.

No. 4:09-CV-00161-RLY-WGH —Richard L. Young, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 10, 2012—DECIDED OCTOBER 4, 2012

Before RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and

COLEMAN, District Judge.

COLEMAN, District Judge. Angelina Povey injured her

wrist while working as an attendant at the City

of Jeffersonville (“Jeffersonville”) animal shelter.

Jeffersonville ultimately terminated Povey’s employ-
2 No. 11-1896

ment. Povey brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 12101

alleging that her termination violated the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court

granted Jeffersonville’s motion for summary judgment,

finding that Povey does not qualify as “disabled” under

the ADA. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

As one of three adoption assistant/kennel attendants

for the Jeffersonville animal shelter, Angelina Povey

was responsible for cleaning the shelter, feeding

and transporting the animals and assisting with animal

adoptions. In addition to these duties, the job description

for a kennel attendant noted that the position “may

require the [employee] to lift objects heavier than

30 pounds for extended periods.” Two or three adoption

kennel attendants worked from Monday through

Friday, one was assigned to work on Saturdays with

the office manager and one worked alone on Sundays

to tend to the animals. Given this schedule, Povey

was required to work both Saturday and Sunday of

every third weekend. 

In October 2007, Povey injured her wrist moving a

dog from one cage to another at the animal shelter.

Povey reported her injury to her supervisor Harry

Wilder (“Wilder”). Povey eventually had surgery on

her wrist and underwent physical therapy to address

the impairment through August 2008.

Shortly after Povey’s injury, Kim Calabro (“Calabro”),

Jeffersonville’s Human Resources Director explained
No. 11-1896 3

to Wilder that since the animal shelter did not have

light duty positions available there was no requirement

to provide Povey with an alternative assignment.

Wilder, however, allowed her to continue to work,

but limited her duties to assignments in the cat room

and the infirmary. He also exempted Povey from

working weekends because it would entail cleaning

the entire animal shelter alone, including some lifting

of heavy objects. Consequently, her co-workers were

forced to work weekends more frequently and began

to complain about the change in their work schedules.

In May of 2008, Povey reported to Calabro that one of

her co-workers, Louis Hancock, had begun to harass

her because of her work restriction and the effect it had

on his work schedule. An investigation by a

human resources consultant concluded that Hancock

was not illegally harassing Povey. Nevertheless, to

avoid friction, the animal shelter required Povey

and Hancock to work in separate locations at all

times. Failing to comply with this arrangement by

either Povey or Hancock could have led to their termination.

Despite the investigation and implementation of

the separation policy, Povey reported that she felt harassment “behind her back” and filed a complaint

against Hancock on August 8, 2008. During the

same month, Jeffersonville received medical notice

of Povey’s permanent physical restrictions which prohibited repetitive hand movement and no lifting, pushing

or pulling more than five pounds with her right arm.
4 No. 11-1896

After notice of the restrictions, Povey was placed on

leave with pay to take effect on August 28, 2008.

Jeffersonville officials discussed Povey’s restrictions

and abilities, and determined that Povey could not

perform the essential functions of adoption kennel attendant. Povey’s employment was terminated following

the meeting. 

Following her termination, Povey filed a discrimination

claim with the EEOC and a complaint alleging two

claims of discrimination under the ADA against the City

of Jeffersonville. Povey asserted that Jeffersonville failed

to accommodate her disability and subjected her to disparate treatment. Povey also claimed she was terminated

in retaliation for her prior complaints of harassment

and discrimination. Jeffersonville filed a motion for

summary judgment as to both claims. The district

court granted defendant’s motion for summary

judgment and dismissed Povey’s claims finding that

Povey failed to demonstrate that she was a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA. Specifically,

the court found that Povey failed to present

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that (1) her wrist

injury impaired her from completing daily tasks;

(2) her perceived impairment foreclosed her from accepting

a broad range or class of jobs; (3) she was perceived

unable to perform manual tasks; (4) she was a qualified

individual as defined under the ADA and (5) she

was terminated in retaliation for exercising her

rights under the ADA. 
No. 11-1896 5

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is

“no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). We review the district court’s

decision on summary judgment de novo, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to

Povey. See Powers v. Holland, 667 F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir.

2011).

Povey argues that Jeffersonville terminated her employment in violation of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual with a disability

because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The

Act defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as

“an individual with a disability who, with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position that such individual

holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). To avoid

summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate a

general issue of material fact as to whether she is disabled,

whether she can perform the essential functions of

the position and whether she has suffered an adverse

employment action because of her disability. Nese v.

Julian Nordic Const. Co., 405 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2005). 

We must first consider whether Povey is disabled

within the meaning of the ADA. Miller v. Ill. Dept. of

Trans., 643 F.3d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 2011). The ADA

defines “disability” as (1) a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of

the major life activities of the individual; (2) a record
6 No. 11-1896

Povey does not challenge the district court’s findings that 

Povey’s wrist injury did not constitute a disability under the

ADA and that Jeffersonville did not regard her as substantially

limited in her ability to perform manual tasks.

of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as

having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). On

appeal, Povey only claims that Jeffersonville regarded

her as having a substantial impairment that limits

her abilities in the major life activity of working.

To meet the “regarded as” prong, the employer must

believe, correctly or not, that the employee has an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities. Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.

3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Sutton v. United

Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149-50,

144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)). Further, when the major

life activity of working is at issue, an individual must

be regarded as “significantly restricted in the ability

to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs

in various classes as compared to the average

person having comparable training, skills and abilities.”

Powers v. U.S.F Holland, Inc., 667 F.3d 815, 820 (7th

Cir. 2011) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)).

To demonstrate that she is substantially limited in

the activity of working, Povey must provide “some

proof of the ‘number and types of jobs’ within the ‘geographical area to which the [claimant] has reasonable

access.’ ” EEOC v. Rockwell International Co., 243 F.3d

1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492-

93). This evidence does not have to be presented in quanti-
No. 11-1896 7

tative form, but does require the presentation of general

employment demographics or the approximate number

of jobs (e.g. ‘few’, ‘many’, or ‘most’) from which an individual would be excluded because of an impairment.

Rockwell Int’l, 243 F.3d 1012, 1018. 

Povey asserts that testimony from Jeffersonville

officials indicating that she was not able to use her

right hand or perform shelter work because of her

lifting restrictions is evidence that Jeffersonville

regarded her as disabled under the ADA’s definition.

Specifically, Povey points to Calabro’s testimony

that “Povey wasn’t able to use her right hand”

and Wilder’s testimony that he believed that Povey’s

work restrictions prevented her from performing her

job and that Jeffersonville did not have a job for someone

with a permanent disability. Povey maintains that

these statements demonstrate Jeffersonville’s perception

that she was substantially limited to perform any

job involving manual labor and, therefore, are sufficient

evidence from which a jury could conclude

that Jeffersonville perceived her as excluded from a class

of jobs. 

Povey relies on Armour v. Independent Limestone Co.,

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16650 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2000)

to support her argument. In Armour, the district

court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

holding that certain statements made by the

company’s president demonstrated that the plaintiff’s

employer perceived him as being unable to perform

a broad range of jobs even without evidence of the
8 No. 11-1896

actual number of jobs in the relevant geographical area.

Id. at *13-16. The court described the employer’s statements

as “sweeping,” and thereby excluding the plaintiff

from other classes of jobs beyond those at the company.

Therefore, the court found that the president’s statements alone were sufficient to allow a jury to conclude

that the plaintiff’s employer regarded the plaintiff

as disabled under the ADA. Id.

Povey’s situation is distinguishable from Armour.

Here, none of the statements made by Calabro and Wilder

are so “sweeping” as to exclude Povey from a broad

class of jobs. Calabro’s and Wilder’s statements were made

in response to questions regarding Povey’s abilities

to complete tasks specific to the Jeffersonville animal

shelter. For example, Calder’s testimony that Wilder

told her that Povey “couldn’t do a whole lot of anything”

was directly in response to a question regarding what

he specifically said she could not do related to duties in

the animal shelter facility. Wilder’s statement that

Jeffersonville, “did not have a job for that” was also

in response to a specific question regarding whether

Povey could continue to perform her job at the

animal shelter given her permanent restrictions. It is

clear that, when taken in context, the statements only

refer to Povey’s abilities to work within the animal

shelter. The fact that Jeffersonville viewed Povey as

unable to perform the tasks required at the Jeffersonville

animal shelter tells us nothing about Jeffersonville’s

perception of her abilities to perform a broad range of

jobs. See Squibb v. Memorial Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 782 (7th

Cir. 2002) (“A demonstrated ‘inability to perform a
No. 11-1896 9

single, particular job’ does not render an individual

substantially limited in the major life activity of working.”)

Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, the statements presented do not

constitute facts from which a jury can reasonably conclude

that Jeffersonville regarded Povey as disabled under

the ADA.

Having failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that

she was disabled under the ADA, Povey is not protected

by its provisions. Therefore, the Court need not

review Povey’s reasonable accommodation claim. See Id.

at 786. Without evidence that Povey is disabled,

Povey cannot survive summary judgment on her disparate

treatment and failure to accommodate claims under the

ADA.

Povey also argues that the district court erred in

granting Jeffersonville summary judgment with respect

to her ADA retaliation claim. The ADA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who assert

their right under the act to be free from discrimination.

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). “Employers are forbidden

from retaliating against employees who raise ADA claims

regardless of whether the initial claims of discrimination

are meritless.” Dickerson v. Bd. of Education, 657 F.3d

595, 602 (7th Cir. 2011). In a discrimination action,

a plaintiff can establish a valid case of retaliation using

either the direct or indirect method of proof. Kersting

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 250 F.3d 1109, 1117 (7th Cir.

2001). Povey attempts to establish a claim of ADA retaliation under the direct method of proof. Under the direct
10 No. 11-1896

method, to prove retaliation, the plaintiff must offer

evidence that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected

activity; (2) the defendant subjected her to an adverse

employment action; and (3) a causal connection

existed between the two events. Id. There is no dispute that

Povey complained to Calabro about her co-worker Hancock making continuous harassing comments about

her wrist impairment and that plaintiff’s termination

constitutes an adverse employment action. The dispute

is whether there is a causal connection between the two

events.

Povey contends that the circumstantial evidence she

presented is sufficient for a jury to find a causal connection

between her complaints of harassment and her termination. First, Povey argues that the timing of her

discharge was suspicious, occurring just three weeks

after her third harassment complaint. Second,

Povey testified that Wilder threatened her job by informing

her that “he had no problem firing employees.”

Lastly, Povey contends that Jeffersonville’s actions surrounding her discharge, including: holding a

meeting about her termination that failed to include a

person familiar with her job responsibilities, failing to

meet with her in person to explain her termination

and failing to offer her an accommodation as a result of

her permanent restriction, suggest a causal connection

between her complaints and termination. 

The mere fact that Jeffersonville terminated Povey three

weeks after a complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact to support a retalia-
No. 11-1896 11

tion claim. See Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679,

687 (7th Cir. 2010). Additionally, there is no evidence

to suggest that Wilder’s remark, that he had no problem

firing employees, motivated the decision to terminate

Povey. See Fuka v. Thompson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397,

1403 (7th Cir. 1996). Lastly, Jeffersonville’s alleged

failures in relation to the manner in which it terminated

Povey are unrelated to her harassment complaint and

Jeffersonville was under no obligation to provide her

with a reasonable accommodation for her impairment

or engage in a face-to-face meeting or any interactive

process to address her abilities to perform her job

because Povey is not disabled under the ADA. These

facts are insufficient to establish a nexus between her

termination and her protected activity. Accordingly,

Jeffersonville is entitled to summary judgment on

Povey’s retaliation claim. 

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the granting

of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing

each of plaintiff-appellant claims. 

AFFIRMED.

10-4-12