COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Fr ank, Humphreys and Haley Argued by teleconference

LEONARD BELL MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1315-10-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK JULY 26, 2011 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK John R. Doyle, III, Judge J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Robert H. Anderson, III, Seni or Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II , Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Leonard Bell, appellant, was convicted, in a benc h trial, of grand lar ceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. On appeal, he ch allenges the sufficiency of the eviden ce only as to the value of the money stolen, contending the evid ence did not prove the amount stol en was $200 or more. For the reasons stated, we affi rm the trial court.
ANALYSIS When considering a challenge that the eviden ce presented at trial is insufficient, we “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Davis v. Commonwealth , 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876- 77 (2002). We do not “substitute our ju dgment for that of th e trier of fact.” Wactor v. Commonwealth , 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002). “Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing th e evidence in the light most favorable to the

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - prosecution, any rational trier of fact coul d have found the essential elem ents of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fa irly to resolve co nflicts in the te stimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reas onable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. Code § 18.2-95 defines the offe nse of grand larceny. It provide s, in part, that “[a]ny person who . . . (ii) commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more . . . shall be guilty of grand larceny . . . .” Code § 18.2-95. Appellant does not dispute the fact that the evid ence was sufficient to prove that he was the perp etrator of the larceny. Rather, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to pr ove, beyond a re asonable doubt, that the amount of cash he stole was $200 or more. “The value of the good s specified in [Code § 18 .2-95] is an e ssential element of the crime, and the Commonwealth must prove that el ement beyond a reas onable doubt.” Walls v. Commonwealth , 248 Va. 480, 481, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994). Further, “[t]he value of the stolen property is measured as of th e time of the theft . . . .” Parker v. Commonwealth , 254 Va. 118, 121, 489 S.E.2d 482, 483- 84 (1997). The opinion testimony of th e owner of the stolen item generally is competent and admissible on the issue of the valu e of that property. Walls , 248 Va. at 482, 450 S.E.2d at 364. “There is no distinction in the law between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Muhammad v. Commonwealth , 269 Va. 451, 479, 619 S.E.2d 16, 31-32 (2005), cert. denied , 547 U.S. 1136 (2006). The Virginia Supreme Court has held that “‘circumstantial evidence is competent and is entit led to as much weight as direct evidence[,] provided that the circumstantial evidence is su fficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.’” Finney v. Commonwealth , 277 Va. 83, 89, 671 S.E.2d 169, 173 (2009) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 459, 468, 536 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2000)).- 3 - Furthermore, circumstantial evidence “is not viewed in isolation.” Muhammad , 269 Va. at 479, 619 S.E.2d at 32. “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each in sufficient in itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). E.A. testified that on Septem ber 6, 2009, her wallet was stol en from inside her car. She stated that the wallet contained betw een $210 and $215 at the time it was taken. E.A. explained that she had arrived from Boston four or five days earli er and had $250 with her when she left Boston. She testified that she had spent very little money since she arrive d, although she co uld not state with certainty how the money was spent. E.A.’s wallet was returned to her later in the day. It contained all her personal belongings except the cash. Norfolk Police Officer Stephe n Bailey encountered appellant shortly after receiving a dispatch call of a larceny that had just occurred in the area. Upon approaching appellant, Officer Bailey observed E.A.’s wa llet in appellant’s back pocket. Offi cer Bailey then searched appellant’s other pockets and recovered $212 in United States currenc y. Without ever looking inside the wallet, Officer Bailey turned the wallet over to paramedics who were attending to E.A. Appellant later admitted to stealing the wallet. Appellant contends that E.A. ’s uncertainty about the amount of cash she had in her wallet, combined with the premise that some of the money found on appe llant could have come from a source other than the wallet, refute a finding of guilt beyond a reas onable doubt. We disagree. There was no uncertainty in E.A.’s testimony as to th e amount of money stolen. The trial court found that E.A. was “very adam ant” that she had over $200 in her wallet and that the only conclusion to be drawn from the ev idence is that appellan t took the mo ney from the wallet. The court explained: [T]he fact remains that when [appellant] took the wallet away from [E.A.] and there was over $200 inside it, . . . I believe- 4 - that circumstantially, the Cour t does find that the $212 in his pocket was the money that was taken out of her purse. But the evidence is clear to the Court that there was over $200 in the wallet, [appellant] took it, and it was missing from the wallet afterwards. The trial court believed the testimony of E.A. concerning the amount of cash that she had in her wallet. “The credibility of the witnesse s and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see a nd hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth , 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). The trier of fact is not required to accept a witness’ testimony, but instead is free to “rely on it in whole, in part, or reject it completely.” Rollston v. Commonwealth , 11 Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991). Thus, the testimony of a single witn ess, if found credible by the trial court and not found inherently incredible by this C ourt, is sufficient to support a conviction. Here, E.A.’s testimony alone wa s sufficient to prove value. As corroboration, the trial court reasonably inferred that the $212 recovered from appellant shortly af ter the theft belonged to E.A. We conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that th e amount of money in the stolen wallet was $200 or more. We a ffirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed.