Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3 

# United Stat es Court of Appeals

For the First C ircuit

No. 04-2395 CLAUDIA ELENA ORREGO-QUIROZ, Petitioner,

v. JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before Boudin, Chief Judge , Torruella, Circuit Judge , and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge .

WilliamP. Joyce , with whom Joyce & Zerola, P.C. was on brief, for petitioner. Annemarie E. Roll , Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, with whom Peter D. Keisler , Assi stan t Attorney General, Civil Division, and Linda S. Wernery , Seni or Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent.

June 30, 20051 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms

of Cruel, Inh uman o r Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, was implemented in the United States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231).

2 The HomelandSec urity Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codif iedas amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)), abolished the INS and transferred its duties to the Department of Homeland Security. -2- Per Curiam . Petitioner Claudia Elena Orrego-Quiroz ("Petitioner") seeks review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which affirmed, without opinion, the decision of the Immigration Judge ("IJ") denying Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). 1 I. BACKGROUND Petitioner, a native and citizen of Columbia, entered the UnitedStates illegally on June 26, 2002. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 2 issued a Notice to Appear on June 28, 2002, charging her with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Petitioner conceded removability, but sought relief from removal in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding of removal under the CAT, on the ground that she f eared persecution on the basis of imputed political affiliation and membership in a particular social group.-3- Petitioner testified at her hearing be fore the IJ that she had fled Colombia because she had suffere d p ersecution, and fearedfuture persecution, resulting from he r af filiation with a youth organization called Urban Central Communal Action ("Communal Action Group"), a group that provides poor communities with food, householditems, and educational programs. Pe titi oner testified that in order to carry out their mission, the Communal Action Group hadto "pay the politicians for their help" and that their activities were financed by politicians. She further testified that a lthou gh she and the Communal Action Group did not work for the government, a terrorist grou p called the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC") believes the Communal Acti on Members

are h elp ing the Colombian government, and thus targets them for persecution on the basis of imputed political affiliation.

The incidents of alleged persecution against Petitioner in Colombia consi st of threatening phone calls and letters, and three discrete additional incidents. The first incident involved FARC members shooting at the Communal Action Group while they were attempting to carry out one of their charity missions. During this attack, members of FARC shot at Petitioner and her group and woundedthe father of her son and two others. The second attack occurredwhen she and other members of her group were traveling to

a town when FA RC members ordered them out of their cars at gunpoint, and proceeded to burn their vehicles with ignited3 We need not decide, and thus express no opinion on, the issue

of whether there is a nexus between the alleged acts of persecution against Petitioner on one of the five protected grounds that serve as a basis for asylum. -4- gasoline. In the last incident, Petitioner claims that a man threatenedher and demanded that she contribute a million pesos to FARC. Petitioner left Colombia soon thereafter. After Petitioner le ft Colombia, the owners of the taxi she used to drive were attacked, with one of the two being killed. Petitioner claims it is likely that she was the target of this attack.

The IJ found that Petitioner did not establish past persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution, because she was not a credible witness, and, even if Petitioner were credible, that she had failed to establish a nexus between the persecu tion and a protected ground. The IJ then went on t o conclude that Petitioner also had failed to satisfy her burden for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. Finding that the IJ's credibility determina tion s are supported by substantial evidence, we deny Petitioner's petition for review. 3 II. DISCUSSION While this case involves judicial review of a decision by the BIA, when the BIA summarily affirms the opinion of the IJ, we review the IJ's analysis. Diabv. Ashcroft , 397 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2005). The BIA's decision will be upheld if it is "supported byreasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record4 Petitioner also provided the IJwith a copy of her brother's

death certificate from 1988 (to corroborate her story that her brother had been murdered, and that his murder inspiredher to join the Community Action Group, following in her brother's footsteps of doing something for the greater good), a letter from the Assembly of Urban Central Communal Action stating, without evidence or example, that Petitioner had received multiple threats from armed -5- considered as a whole." INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). We will overturn a decision of the BIA "only when the recordevidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to make a contrary determination." Aguilar-Solis v. INS , 168 F.3d 565, 569 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. at 481 & n.1). A. Asylum

In order to establish eligibility for asylum, Petitioner bears the burden to show that she is a "refugee" under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), meaning that she is "unable or unwilling to return to . . . [Colombia] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Petitioner can "meet this burden in one of two ways: (1) by demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of the statutory grounds, or (2) by establishing past pe rsecution on one of the statutory grounds so as to be entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution." Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft , 390 F.3d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 2004).

Here, Petitioner relies primarily upon her affidavit and her testimony to support her claim for asylum. 4 Although an asylumrebel groups, an d s everal pieces of evidence irrelevant to this

appeal. The record also includes a U.S. Department of Justice country condition report for Colombia dated March 31, 2003, which provides some background information on the guerilla activities of the FARC. -6- applicant's testimony "may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof witho ut corroboration," such testimony must be credible. Settenda v. Ashcroft , 377 F.3d 89, 93 (1st C ir. 2 004) (quoting 8 C.F. R. 1208.13(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ foundPetitioner not to be a credible witness, stating that Petitioner was "evasive and wholly lacking in credibility in cert ain c rucial parts of her testimony." The IJ also found that her testimony was internally inconsistent and contradicted parts of the affidavit she submitted in support of her asylum application. The IJ identif i ed three particular inconsistencies: (1) disc repancies about her places of residence in Colombia; (2) inconsistencybetween her affidavit wh ich states that she last saw/heardfrom the father of her child in the hospital after he was injuredin the FARC attack, and her hearing testimony, which stated that after he was released from the hospital their " relati onship began to deteriorate;" and (3) inconsistency between her affidavit which says that both the husband and wife taxi owners were "brutallymassacred" and her testimony, which states that only the husbandwas killed, and the w ife was me rely injured. And, even though the Petitioner attempts to explain away each inconsistency, looking at all of the inconsistencies as a whole, coupled with the-7-

IJ's determination that Petitioner was evasive in her responses, the IJ's determination that Petitioner has failedto establish her eligibilityfor asylum is well-supported. Further, the limited documentaryevidence provided by Petitioner does not compel that we disregard the adverse credibility findings of the IJ. Petitioner has failed to meet her burden to establish eligibility for asylum. B. Withholding of Removal

To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, Petitioner has to prove that, "upon deportation, [s]he [was] more likely than not to face persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opini on." Salazar v. Ashcroft , 359 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2004 ) (emphasis in original). As this is a more stringent standard than that required to establish eligibility for asylum, a burden Petitioner has failed to meet, Petitioner necessarily fails to meet her burden to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. C. CAT

Lastly, Petitioner seeks protect ion under the CAT. To seek relief under the CAT, an applicant must "establish that it is

more likely than not that he or she wouldbe tortured if removed to [Colombia]." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (emphasis added). "For an act to constitute torture it must be: (1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for a proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or-8-

with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custodyor physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions." Elien v. Ashcroft , 364 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir. 20 04) (q uotation omitted). Petitioner makes no argument to this Court that she is more like than not to be tortured upon her return to Colombia, and, fails to even address the requirement that to be protectedunder the CAT, any alleged torture must be "with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim ." Id. ; see, e.g. , Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. , 323 F.3d 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Issues raised on appeal in a perfunctory manner (or not at all) are waived.") . III. CONCLUSION

For the above-mentionedreasons, the petition for review is DENIED .