Filed 8/13/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

BIJAN BOUTIQUES, LLC,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROSAMARI ISONG,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 G063288

 (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS2020995)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino 

County, Winston S. Keh, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Daniel B. Spitzer and Daniel Spitzer for Plaintiff 

and Appellant.

Nelson, Comis, Kettle & Kinney and Keith H. Fichtelman for 

Defendant and Respondent.

* * *

Bijan Boutiques, LLC (Bijan), appeals from the judgment entered 

after the court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Rosamari 
2

Isong. Bijan’s complaint, which is part of its effort to enforce a judgment (the 

Bijan Judgment) it obtained against Isong’s former husband, Richard Milam 

Akubiro, sought to void the property distribution portion of the marital 

dissolution judgment entered between Isong and Akubiro. 

Bijan argues the marital dissolution judgment was subject to the 

Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq. (UVTA)) and 

the judgment was fraudulent because it awarded Isong the couple’s only

marital property located in the United States, while awarding Akubiro other 

foreign assets and properties and assigning the Bijan liability to him. 

According to Bijan, the dissolution judgment “effectively makes enforcement 

of the Bijan Judgment impossible, without incurring the significant 

additional expense of attempting to enforce it against property and business 

interests outside the U.S.”

The trial court ruled that Bijan’s complaint was barred by Family 

Code section 916, subdivision (a)(2), which states that “the property received 

by the person in the [marital dissolution] is not liable for a debt incurred by 

the person’s spouse before or during marriage, and the person is not 

personally liable for the debt, unless the debt was assigned for payment by 

the person in the division of the property.” We agree and affirm. 

FACTS

Isong and Akubiro were married in Equatorial Guinea in 1997

and lived there together until 2006, when Isong moved to the United States 

and established residency with their children. In 2012, the couple purchased 

a home in Chino, California, for Isong to reside in with their children. 

Akubiro never lived at the Chino property and rarely visited there. 

In 2014, Akubiro, while residing in Equatorial Guinea, purchased 

over $447,000 in men’s clothing from Bijan, a Beverly Hills designer/clothier. 
3

Although not specifically identified as an undisputed fact, the parties appear

to agree that Akubiro purchased the clothing to wear, rather than for 

commercial resale.1 Akubiro paid $119,616 toward his clothing debt, leaving 

an unpaid balance of over $327,000.

In 2017, Isong heard rumors that Akubiro had taken additional 

wives in Equatorial Guinea. In March of 2017, when Akubiro admitted the 

rumors were true, Isong effectively ended their marriage. 

In July 2018, Bijan filed a lawsuit against Akubiro to collect the 

unpaid balance. Bijan served the lawsuit on Akubiro at the Chino property, 

by substituted service, in August 2018. Later that same month, Isong filed a 

petition for dissolution of her marriage to Akubiro and caused a notice of 

pending action (“lis pendens”) to be recorded against the Chino property.

2 

Akubiro defaulted in both cases. The court entered judgment against 

Akubiro in the amount of $327,994 on January 4, 2019. 

In July 2019, the court in the marital dissolution action entered a 

judgment dissolving the marriage. The judgment awarded the Chino 

property, valued at $630,000, to Isong as her sole and separate property. It 

assigned other marital properties, identified as quasi-community properties

located in Equatorial Guinea and Spain, with an estimated collective value of 

1 Invoices dated September 6, 2014, identify items purchased such 

as shoes priced at $11,500 per pair, numerous sport jackets for 

$9,500-$12,500 each, a leather blazer for $18,000, several tuxedo jackets for 

$12,000 each, multiple cotton shirts at $1,500 each, and three pairs of 

“Special Order Assorted Tuxedo Trousers” for $8,400.

2 Isong testified she filed the lis pendens because she was 

concerned Akubiro would attempt to sell the house once he received the 

divorce papers. 
4

over $4 million, to Akubiro as his sole and separate property.

3 The court

reserved jurisdiction over additional marital properties, and over the issue of 

an equalizing payment to Isong. The court also assigned the Bijan debt to 

Akubiro as his separate obligation, finding that the debt “was not acquired 

for the benefit of the community.”

4

Bijan filed this case in September 2020, against both Isong and 

Akubiro, alleging the marital dissolution judgment qualified as a voidable 

transfer under the UVTA, and seeking an award of damages plus a 

declaration that the Chino Property is held by Isong in constructive trust and 

that Bijan is entitled to have the dissolution judgment voided as a sham and 

a fraud. 

3 The property in Spain is described as “Calle De Colonia Varela, 

31 28250 Torrelodones Madrid Spain (estimated value of $556,727.85 USD).”

4 Family Code section 2625 states “debts incurred by a spouse 

during marriage and before the date of separation that were not incurred for 

the benefit of the community, shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse 

who incurred the debt.”

Although Bijan argues there is no evidence to support this 

finding in the dissolution judgment, Isong points out that personal clothing is 

generally considered to be the separate property of each spouse in a marital 

dissolution. Moreover, by the time Akubiro purchased the clothing from 

Bijan, he and Isong had been living apart and in different countries for 

several years. 

While Bijan asserts “[t]here is no question that the obligation 

underlying the Bijan Judgment was incurred as a community debt,” its only 

support for that assertion, offered in the trial court, was that Akubiro “is the 

pastor of a church and . . . it is logical that he must dress in fine attire.”

Bijan offered no evidence that Akubiro wore his fine clothing while engaged 

in his pastoral duties, let alone explained how his doing so would have 

benefitted his marital community.
5

Isong moved for summary judgment based on Family Code 

section 916, subdivision (a)(2), which states that “[t]he separate property 

owned by a married person at the time of the division and the property 

received by the person in the division is not liable for a debt incurred by the 

person’s spouse before or during marriage, and the person is not personally 

liable for the debt, unless the debt was assigned for payment by the person in 

the division of the property.” 

The court granted summary judgment. It explained that 

although our Supreme Court has carved out an exception to section 916, 

allowing a claim to be asserted under the UVTA (formerly the Uniform 

Fraudulent Transfers Act)

5 to challenge a marital settlement agreement

(Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 (Mejia)), that exception did not 

apply here. Since the court itself adjudicated the disposition of the marital 

property, the court concluded it was not the product of a negotiated

settlement. 

5 The Legislature amended what had previously been known as the 

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in 2015 (stats. 2015, ch. 44, §§ 1–15),

replacing the word “fraudulent” with “voidable.” Although the enactment 

added specified burdens of proof (Id., §§ 1–3, 6–7, 10), it did not alter the 

essential elements of a cause of action for a fraudulent or voidable transfer. 

Thus, as a general rule, we continue to rely on opinions addressing the 

UFTA. (See Civ. Code, § 3439.14, subd. (d) [UVTA provisions that “are 

substantially the same as the [UFTA] provisions” are to “be construed as 

restatements and continuations” of the former law].)
6

DISCUSSION

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, our 

review is de novo. (Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San 

Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315, 336 [“We owe the superior court no 

deference in reviewing its ruling on a motion for summary judgment; the 

standard of review is de novo”].)

Bijan contends the trial court erred in its determination that 

Family Code section 916 bars it from attempting to satisfy its judgment 

against Akubiro by executing on the Chino property. Bijan argues that the 

court’s judgment in the marital dissolution case was a transaction that could 

be declared void under the UVTA based on evidence that Isong pursued the

marital dissolution with the specific goal of preventing Bijan from satisfying 

its judgment by executing against the Chino home, which was the only

marital property located in California.

II.

FAMILY CODE SECTION 916

Until 1984, the rule was that “a spouse who received community 

property after a dissolution of marriage was liable for the community debts 

incurred by the other spouse during the marriage.” (Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th 

at p. 665.) There was no need to establish any unfairness in the marital 

property division.

However, in 1984, “‘[t]he Legislature determined that, under 

most circumstances, after a marriage has ended, it is unwise to continue the 

liability of spouses for community debts incurred by former spouses.’” (Mejia, 

supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 665.) Thus, the Legislature enacted former Civil Code 
7

section 5120.160, which became Family Code section 916 in 1992. (Mejia at 

p. 665.)

As our Supreme Court explained in Mejia, “[w]hen the 

Legislature enacted former Civil Code section 5120.160, it contemplated that 

‘“[i]n allocating the debts to the parties, the court in the dissolution 

proceeding should take into account the rights of creditors so there will be 

available sufficient property to satisfy the debt by the person to whom the 

debt is assigned, provided the net division is equal.”’” (Mejia, supra, 

31 Cal.4th at p. 665) 

Here, the court in the marital dissolution case did just that, 

allocating both the Bijan obligation and more than enough property to satisfy 

it, to Akubiro. Indeed, Bijan does not dispute that Akubiro owns significant 

other property; to the contrary, it offered two witnesses, one in Equatorial 

Guinea and one in Spain, who confirmed Akubiro was the owner of all the 

foreign properties assigned to him in the marital dissolution judgment. 

III.

THE UVTA

Nonetheless, despite the prohibition in Family Code section 916, 

Bijan seeks to enforce Akubiro’s debt against the property awarded to Isong, 

arguing that pursuant to the UVTA, the court’s decision to assign Isong the 

home she had resided in for a decade, while assigning to Akubiro the various 

properties located in the country where he lived, can be declared void because 

it operated as a fraud on Bijan under the UVTA. We disagree.

The UVTA provides that “[a] transfer made or obligation incurred 

by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose 

before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the 

debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation . . . [¶] (1) With actual 
8

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor[ or] [¶]

(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 

transfer or obligation.” (Civ. Code, § 3439.04, subd. (a)(1-2).)6 If voidability is 

based on the allegation that a transfer was made without receiving 

reasonably equivalent value in exchange, then the plaintiff must also 

establish that the debtor “was insolvent at that time or the debtor became 

insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.” (Civ. Code, § 3439.05.)

In Mejia, the Supreme Court noted that “[o]n its face, the U[V]TA 

applies to all transfers.” (Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 664; see also Civ.

Code, § 3439.01, subd. (m)), and concluded, based on policy considerations,

that when a couple enters into a marital settlement agreement to divide their 

property in a dissolution action, that agreement can be challenged as an 

avoidable transaction under the UVTA. 

In reaching that conclusion, Mejia drew a clear distinction 

between cases which involve marital settlement agreements and cases which 

do not: “When the court divides the marital property in the absence of an

agreement by the parties, it must divide the property equally [citation], 

which provides some protection for a creditor of one spouse only.” (Mejia, 

supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 668.) By contrast, that statutory requirement of a fair 

division does not apply in cases where the parties enter into an agreement to 

divide their property: “Whenever . . . the parties agree upon the property 

6 The debtor in this case is Akubiro. He alone incurred the 

obligation to Bijan, and he is the sole debtor named in the Bijan Judgment. 

Although Bijan would have been entitled to enforce its judgment against 

community property of Akubiro’s marriage to Isong, she is not a debtor. 

Consequently, assertions about Isong’s intent in filing for marital dissolution 

would appear to be irrelevant under the UVTA.
9

division, no law requires them to divide the property equally, and the court 

does not scrutinize the MSA to ensure that it sets out an equal division.” (Id.

at p. 666.) In other words, the Supreme Court recognized that a marital 

settlement agreement, like any other private agreement, can be a vehicle for 

fraud. 

The Supreme Court looked to how courts in other states have 

“constru[ed] parallel provisions of the UFTA,” explaining that in the case of a 

uniform statutory scheme, consistency of interpretation among jurisdictions 

is significant. (Mejia, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 664, citing Civ. Code, 

§ 3439.11.) In making that point, the court cited a string of cases that 

involved marital settlements, rather than cases that challenged the court’s 

division of marital property. (Mejia at p. 664, citing Scholes v. Lehmann (7th 

Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 750, 758–759 (Scholes); Kardynalski v. Fisher (1985) 

135 Ill.App.3d 643; Dowell v. Boyer (Okla.Ct.App. 2000) 998 P.2d 206, 209, 

212-213; Greeninger v. Cromwell (1996) 140 Ore.App. 241; and Federal 

Deposit Ins. Co. v. Malin (2d Cir. 1986) 802 F.2d 12, 18.) In Scholes, the court 

highlighted the same distinction emphasized in Mejia: “Douglas’s transfers 

to his ex-wife were lavish, and the principal ‘obligation’ that they are claimed 

to have discharged was one created by a voluntary settlement that received 

no judicial scrutiny.” (Scholes at p. 758.)

But unlike in Mejia and the out-of-state cases it relies upon, 

there was no negotiated marital settlement agreement here. Instead, Bijan

claims it is the court’s own “Judgment and [its] subsequent order for 
10

appointment of an elisor to effect a conveyance of the Chino Property” that 

constitute the relevant “transfer” under the UVTA.7

Bijan argues that Mejia supports the conclusion that a court

judgment could qualify as a voidable “transfer” under the UVTA, claiming 

that the court’s citation to Britt v. Damson (9th Cir. 1964) 334 F.2d 896, 899 

(Britt) reflects that determination. We are not persuaded. It is true Britt 

was cited in Mejia, and also that in Britt the 9th Circuit concluded a court’s 

division of property in a marital dissolution could theoretically qualify as a 

fraudulent “transfer” under Washington law. But the Mejia case

characterizes Britt as a “but see” citation, thus identifying it as an outlier 

from the string of marital settlement cases Mejia relies upon. (Mejia, supra, 

31 Cal.4th at p. 664.)8 

A court’s judgment, the product of its own evaluation of the 

evidence and the law, is a different creature than a private agreement 

entered into between spouses. As Bijan acknowledges, when the court 

renders a judgment in a marital dissolution, it is required to divide the 

7 “[A]n elisor is a person appointed by the court to perform 

functions like the execution of a deed or document. [Citation.] A court 

typically appoints an elisor to sign documents on behalf of a recalcitrant 

party in order to effectuate its judgments or orders, where the party refuses 

to execute such documents.” (Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014)

230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1020.) As Isong explains, the court appointed an elisor 

in this case because Akubiro refused to cooperate in effectuating the transfer 

of the Chino property into her name following the dissolution judgment. 

8 We also note that having been decided in 1964, Britt long 

predates California’s enactment of the predecessor to Family Code section 

916. Thus, at the time Britt was decided, California routinely allowed 

creditors of one spouse to satisfy their claims out of property awarded to the 

other spouse in a marital dissolution. That policy has changed.
11

marital property in a manner that is fair and equal to both parties. We are 

required to presume it did so. (Wells Fargo & Co. v. City etc. of S.F. (1944) 

25 Cal.2d 37, 40 [“‘[e]very presumption is in favor of the validity of the 

judgment, and any condition of facts consistent with its validity (and not 

affirmatively contradicted by the judgment roll) will be presumed to have 

existed rather than one which will defeat it’”].) 

Further, it was settled by our Supreme Court as far back as 1891 

that once a judgment is final, it cannot be attacked on the basis it is wrong on 

the merits or was even the product of one party’s fraud on the court: “That a 

former judgment or decree may be set aside and annulled for some frauds 

there can be no question; but it must be a fraud extrinsic or collateral to the 

questions examined and determined in the action. And we think it is settled 

beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was 

obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony.” (Pico v. Cohn (1891) 

91 Cal. 129, 133 (Pico).) That rule has not changed. (See e.g., Pacific Mut. 

Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 725-726 [a judgment cannot 

be set aside based upon court error]; Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 

Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 [“A collateral attack will lie only for a claim that the 

judgment is void on its face for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction 

or for the granting of relief which the court has no power to grant”].)

Bijan alludes to this well-established rule when it points out that 

in Mejia, the court “noted pointedly that under both federal and state law, a 

dissolution judgment may be set aside on the ground that it was obtained by 

extrinsic fraud.” (Italics added.) That was the rule announced in Pico in 

1891. Extrinsic fraud—where a party was deprived of an opportunity to 

participate in the litigation—is grounds for setting aside the judgment, 
12

whereas intrinsic fraud—flaws in the proceeding or the substance of the 

judgment—is not.

When Bijan relies on Isong’s alleged fraud in obtaining the 

court’s judgment dividing marital property as a basis for relief under the 

UVTA, it is making an argument based on a theory of intrinsic fraud—i.e., 

that the substance of the judgment is incorrect—rather than extrinsic fraud. 

We reject that argument. 

We also reject Bijan’s suggestion that a judgment obtained by 

default should not be considered a real judgment because it is “functionally 

the equivalent of a marital settlement agreement, particularly where the 

moving petitioner is the only source of evidence on which an adjudicating 

court can rely in effecting its equalizing calculus . . . . ” There is no 

precedent for the suggestion that judgments are entitled to differing levels of 

deference based on how they were obtained. 

Bijan argues that in the case of default in a marital dissolution 

case, the court will give the petitioner whatever she seeks. That suggestion 

is belied by Family Code section 2336, which expressly prohibits the court 

from basing its judgment on a party’s default. Section 2336 states “the court 

shall . . . require proof of the grounds alleged, and the proof, if not taken 

before the court, shall be by affidavit.” (Fam. Code, § 2336, subd. (a).) And 

with respect to marital property, the statute requires that “[i]n all cases 

where there is a community estate, each affidavit or offer of proof shall 

include an estimate of the value of the assets and the debts the declarant or 

affiant proposes to be distributed to each party, unless the declarant or 

affiant has filed, or concurrently files, a complete and accurate property 

declaration with the court.” (Ibid.)
13

In accordance with that default standard, Isong provided the 

court in the marital dissolution case with evidence to support her claims and 

her requested distribution of marital property, including declarations of 

appraisers to support her claimed valuation of the properties. 

Finally, Bijan relies on two cases, Frankel v. Boyd (1895) 106 Cal. 

608, 614-615 (Frankel), and In re Spirtos (9th Cir. 1995) 56 F.3d 1007, 1009

(Spirtos), in support of the proposition that California has “a hoary history” of 

protecting creditor’s rights in the wake of a marital dissolution. But Frankel

was decided nearly a century before our Legislature adopted the predecessor 

to Family Code section 916, which severely curtailed the earlier right of a 

creditor to pursue its claim against the property awarded to the nondebtor 

spouse in a marital dissolution.

And while Spirtos was decided in the wake of the changed policy, 

it supports its conclusion that “[u]nder California law, a divorce decree 

transfers property only subject to the parties’ existing liabilities to creditors,”

by citing Frankel and to two other cases which were also decided prior to the 

change in law. (Spirtos, supra, 56 F.3d at p. 1009, citing Wikes v. Smith

(9th Cir. 1972) 465 F.2d 1142, 1146-1148, and Robertson v. Willis (1978)

77 Cal.App.3d 358, 362-363 Additionally, Spirtos involves a marital 

settlement agreement, rather than a court division of marital property. 

(Spirtos at p. 1008.)

IV.

FRAUD

Because we conclude that Family Code section 916 precludes 

Bijan from seeking to satisfy its judgment against Akubiro out of the 

property awarded to Isong in the marital dissolution action, we need not 

address the substance of its fraud allegations.
14

However, some of Bijan’s assertions are so extreme they merit 

our attention. Bijan contends Isong “lied” to the court in the marital 

dissolution action and acted “like a thief in the night,” when she claimed a

quasi-community interest in the foreign properties awarded to Akubiro and 

that she lied about their value when she estimated that the total value was

significantly greater than the value of the Chino property that was awarded 

to her. Bijan explains this alleged fraud was revealed when Isong later 

testified in a deposition that she believed being awarded an ownership 

interest in the marital properties located in Equatorial Guinea would have no 

value to her because she could never have sold them or tapped into their 

value. 

Bijan offers no evidence, beyond the fact that the foreign 

properties were held in Akubiro’s name alone, to suggest they did not qualify 

as quasi-community property. Under California law, all properties, wherever 

situated, that are acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere,

qualify as quasi-community property if they would have been community 

property had the acquiring spouse been domiciled in California at the time of 

acquisition. (Fam. Code, §§ 125, 760.)

Second, contrary to what Bijan suggests, Isong never asserted in 

her deposition that she believed the Equatorial Guinean properties awarded 

to Akubiro had no market value; instead, her position was that if she had 

been awarded an ownership interest in those properties in the marital 

dissolution (rather than the right to an equalizing payment), she would not 

have been able to enforce that interest because the properties were all held in 

Akubiro’s name and he has significant influence in Equatorial Guinea. None 

of that suggests the properties do not have significant value that could be 

tapped by Akubiro’s commercial creditors, such as Bijan. 
15

Bijan does not dispute Akubiro’s ownership of the foreign 

properties, nor does it assert that their value would be insufficient to satisfy 

its judgment against Akubiro. To the contrary, Bijan provided evidence from 

witnesses in both Equatorial Guinea and Spain, who confirmed Akubiro’s 

ownership of the listed properties and did not dispute that they have 

substantial value. The estimated value of the Spanish property alone would

be sufficient to satisfy Bijan’s judgment. There is nothing in our record to 

suggest that Spain would not cooperate in Bijan’s effort to enforce a valid 

foreign judgment. 

V.

DECLARATORY RELIEF CAUSE OF ACTION

Bijan also argues that even assuming it cannot state a claim 

under the UVTA, the trial court erred by summarily adjudicating its cause of 

action for declaratory relief. According to Bijan, its claim for declaratory 

relief is warranted based on two distinct equitable arguments. 

First, Bijan claims that “Isong will be unjustly enriched if the 

Dissolution Judgment is allowed to stand [because it] excus[es] her from any

liability for the community debt incurred by her husband.” But that 

assertion fails for the same reason the UVTA claim fails: it asks the court to 

allow Bijan to enforce its judgment against the property awarded to Isong in 

the marital dissolution, despite the fact that Bijan’s judgment was not 

assigned to her. That is what Family Code section 916 is designed to 

prohibit. 9 

9 Additionally, the argument ignores the marital dissolution court’s 

specific finding, in its judgment, that Akubiro’s choice to spend an enormous 

sum on personal clothing, while living separately from his wife in a foreign 

country, was not done for the benefit of the community. 
16

Bijan also argues declaratory relief is justified because “this is an 

appropriate case for application of the equitable doctrine of marshaling 

assets.” (See Civ. Code, § 3433.) Civil Code section 3433 states that when a

judgment creditor is entitled to resort to any one of several funds for the 

satisfaction of its claim, but a second creditor is limited to only one fund, the 

second creditor can require the first creditor to seek satisfaction from the 

other funds so that both creditors can be paid. 

Under Bijan’s theory, Isong would be the first creditor, who had 

access to all the properties owned by the marital community in her marital 

dissolution action, while Bijan is the second creditor who had access to only 

the Chino property for purposes of collecting its judgment. Under those 

circumstances, Bijan argues Isong should have been required to leave the 

Chino property available for Bijan to collect its judgment. Family Code 

section 916 prohibits that result without regard to the underlying 

justification.

Finally, Bijan asserts the award of the Chino property to Isong 

was erroneous because prior to the dissolution, the property was held by 

Isong and Akubiro in joint tenancy, rather than as community property. 

Bijan contends that as joint tenancy property, “the Chino Property never 

should have been subject to division at all under Fam. C[ode,] § 2550.” Again

we disagree. 

Family Code section 2581 requires “[f]or the purpose of division of 

property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, 

property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including 

property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the 

entirety, or as community property, is presumed to be community property.” 
17

We find no error in the trial court’s award of summary judgment 

against Bijan.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Isong is entitled to her costs on 

appeal.

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, J.

DELANEY, J.