Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PC-3063 | August 8, 2019 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Jonathan O. Chenoweth

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika P. Talbot

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Alandus James,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 8, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PC-3063

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20D03-1704-PC-22

May, Judge.

[1] Alandus James appeals the denial of his amended petition for post-conviction 

relief. James raises two issues on appeal: whether the trial court adequately 

advised him of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty to a habitual
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criminal offender (“HCO”) allegation; and whether the State met its burden of 

showing James was nonetheless aware of the rights being waived. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 27, 2012, the State charged James with Class D felony battery on a 

child,

1 Class D felony strangulation,2 and Class D felony residential entry.3 On 

March 4, 2014, the State amended the charging information to add an HCO

sentencing enhancement because on two prior occasions James had been 

convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor. On March 26, 2014, after being 

convicted by a jury on the felony charges, James pleaded guilty to the HCO 

enhancement without a plea agreement. 

[3] James appealed, challenging the court’s order that he serve a thirty-month 

sentence for Class D felony residential entry consecutive to two concurrent 

eighteen-month sentences for Class D felony battery on a child and Class D 

felony strangulation, and we affirmed the trial court in an unpublished decision. 

See James v. State, No. 20A03-1405-CR-173 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2015). On

April 24, 2017, James filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial 

court appointed the Indiana State Public Defender to represent James, and on 

June 21, 2018, James filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014).

2 Ind. Code § 34-42-2-9 (2014).

3 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).
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arguing that “his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court had failed 

to advise him that he was waiving his right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses and his right against self-incrimination.” (Br. of Appellant at 5.)

[4] On July 20, 2018, the court held an evidentiary hearing. On November 30, 

2018, the court issued an order denying James’ amended petition for postconviction relief. The court concluded:

12. The Record herein shows that certain explicitly stated rights 

were not articulated by the trial court judge at the specific 

time of the guilty plea; however, they were expressed earlier 

in the trial proceedings. Also, there was no evidence 

presented at the post[-]conviction hearing from the Petitioner 

that he was inadequately informed or unaware that he was 

waiving the three rights stated in [Boykin4

]. Moreover, at the 

time of his guilty plea, the trial court noted on the record that 

the stage of the proceedings was just after the jury had 

returned the guilty verdict on the three D felony counts, and 

explained the Habitual Offender admission would apply to 

and enhance the sentence. The judge asked the Petitioner if 

he understood the penalties associated with the Habitual 

Offender Enhancement, and Petitioner responded, “yes, your 

Honor.” The trial court judge also said, “now you have all 

the rights to have an attorney, which you have.” Petitioner 

was also told that he had the right to a jury trial and that the 

jury was “ready to roll,” and it appeared to the court that the 

Petitioner was familiar with how the jury process worked, 

trial having just ended. The court then asked the Petitioner if 

he had any questions at all about his rights. The Petitioner 

 

4 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding three federal constitutional privileges—the privilege 

against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—are 

waived when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial).
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asked the judge if he was referring to a jury trial on the 

Habitual, and the court said, “yes, right.” Then the 

Petitioner asked the Court if all the [S]tate had to prove was 

that he had two prior felonies, and the Court replied, that 

was what it boiled down to. But, the trial court judge then 

proceeded to explain to the Petitioner that he had the right to 

“sit back and go through it, see how it comes out”, but that 

his attorney had suggested that he may want to admit, to 

which the Petitioner responded, “Yeah.”

13. The guilty plea colloquy proceeded with the judge asking the 

Petitioner if he had any further questions and he responded, 

“no.” Thereafter, the judge told the Petitioner that the court 

had to be satisfied that the Petitioner understood the 

proceedings and had the mental clarity of mind to decide to 

plead guilty. The trial court judge indicated that he had 

observed the Petitioner, heard his testimony and that he was 

satisfied; however, the judge again asked the Petitioner if that 

was a correct statement, and Petitioner said “yes.” The 

Court asked Petitioner if it should go ahead with the guilty 

plea on the Habitual enhancement, and the Petitioner said 

“yes.” (Trial Transcript, pp. 504-507).

14. It is evident to the Court from the guilty plea colloquy that 

Petitioner was specifically advised that he had the right to an 

attorney. Also, the Court noted that based on the 

Petitioner’s testimony earlier in the day and during the trial 

process, he was acutely familiar with the rights against self[-

]incrimination. Further, he had employed his right to 

confront and cross-examine witnesses during the 

immediately preceding two[-]day trial. Additionally, the 

court had told Petitioner that even though he was correct that 

the [S]tate had to prove two prior felonies, the Petitioner had 

the right to require the State to put on witnesses and evidence 

to prove the Habitual Offender Enhancement. Therefore, 

based on the record and evidence, it cannot be said that 

Petitioner was unaware that he was waiving his [Boykin]
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rights.” [See, e.g. Winkleman], 22 N.E.3d at 852 (defendant 

voluntary [sic] pled guilty to an enhancement in the midst of 

a jury trial where [Boykin] rights were clearly on display; 

therefore, defendant did not establish that he was unaware 

that he was waiving those rights). To the contrary, the 

record and evidence establish[] that the Petitioner understood 

that by admitting the Habitual Offender Enhancement he 

was waiving his right to an attorney, right to a jury trial, right 

against self[-]incrimination and right to confront and crossexamine witnesses.

Accordingly, his plea of guilty was voluntary. The Petitioner 

has not met his burden of demonstrating that he was 

inadequately advised of his rights at the Habitual Offender 

stage of the proceedings held on March 25, 2014. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 45-47.)5

Discussion and Decision

[5] Post-conviction proceedings afford petitioners a limited opportunity to raise 

issues that were unavailable or unknown at trial and on direct appeal. Connor v. 

State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied, cert. denied 531 U.S. 829 

(2000); see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a). Such proceedings are not 

“super appeals” through which convicted persons can raise issues that they 

failed to raise at trial or on direct appeal. McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391 

(Ind. 2002), reh’g denied. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and 

 

5 We thank the post-conviction court for its thorough and informative order, which greatly assisted our 

consideration of James’ claims. 
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petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a 

preponderance of the evidence. P-C.R. 1(5).

[6] When a petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, he appeals from a 

negative judgment. Curry v. State, 674 N.E.2d 160, 161 (Ind. 1996). 

Consequently, we may not reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court 

unless the petitioner demonstrates that the evidence “as a whole, leads 

unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.” Id. We accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not give deference to the court’s 

conclusions of law. State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1295-96 (Ind. 1996), 

reh’g granted on other grounds 674 N.E.2d 1293, cert. denied 522 U.S. 1119 (1998).

[7] In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States Supreme Court 

held a trial court must advise a defendant of his right against self-incrimination, 

right to trial by jury, and right to confront his accusers. Id. at 243. Our court 

has held Boykin “does not require that the record of the guilty plea proceeding 

show that the accused was formally advised that entry of his guilty plea waives 

certain constitutional rights[,]” nor does the holding require that the record 

contain a formal waiver of those rights. Barron v. State, 330 N.E.2d 141, 144, 

164 Ind. App. 638, 644 (1975). However, we are required to reverse a 

conviction if the defendant did not know he was waiving his Boykin rights when 

he pled guilty. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ind. 2001).
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[8] James asks us to reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and vacate 

his HCO enhancement because: (1) the trial court did not advise him that he 

was waiving his Boykin rights prior to accepting his guilty plea to the HCO

charge, and (2) the State did not meet its burden of showing James nonetheless 

was aware of the rights he was waiving. 

[9] James first argues the court, prior to accepting his guilty plea, made no mention 

of the right to confront witnesses or the right to remain silent. We agree, based 

on the following dialogue, that the trial court did not explicitly advise James of 

his Boykins rights:

[Court]: Now, you have all rights to have an attorney, which you 

have. I think you ought to kind of be familiar with the jury 

process now. You have a right to a jury trial, and they’re ready 

to roll I think. And so do you have any questions at all about 

your rights there?

[James]: A jury trial on the Habitual?

[Court]: Yes. Right.

[James]: All you have to prove [is] that I have two prior felonies?

[Court]: Well, that’s what it boils down to. Okay. But you know 

you have the right to sit back and go through it, just kind of see 

how it comes out, or the suggestion that your attorney had made 

a little bit ago was that it sounded like you might just want to say 

you are going to admit that’s true and put this up for sentencing 

on the D with Habitual?
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[James]: Yeah.

(Prior Case Tr. Vol. III at 504-05.) 

[10] However, because the HCO stage of James’ trial immediately followed his jury 

trial, we reject James’ second argument that “the fact that he exercised them at 

the felony phase does not show such knowledge, as it does not show that James 

knew that those rights would carry over to the habitual phase.” (Appellant’s Br. 

at 11.) The trial court told James he had a right to a jury and that James “ought 

to kind of be familiar with the jury process now,” (Prior Case Tr. Vol. III at 

504), because James had just finished the jury trial of the underlying felonies. 

The court’s language indicates the process for the HCO phase would be the 

same as the felony phase. Accordingly, the record demonstrates James was

aware of the rights he was waiving to plead guilty during the HCO phase

because he had just exercised those rights during the felony phase. See

Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (defendant knew 

Boykin rights based on the fact he was in the midst of a jury trial at the time he 

admitted to habitual offender allegation), trans. denied; see also Barron, 330 

N.E.2d at 144, 164 Ind. App. at 644 (defendant knew his rights under Boykin 

based on the fact that he was advised of his rights during arraignment); see also 

Dewitt, 755 N.E.2d at 171 (defendant knew his rights under Boykin because he 

had been advised of them during arraignment). James has not demonstrated 

the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition was contrary to law.
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Conclusion

[11] As we conclude James knew his constitutional rights under Boykin when he 

pled guilty to the HCO by virtue of the trial court’s partial advisement, which 

occurred just after the jury had returned its verdicts on James’ underlying 

felonies, James has not demonstrated the post-conviction court’s judgment was 

contrary to law. Accordingly, we affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.