15-245 

Howell v. Vazquez

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

 Circuit Judges, 

RICHARD K. EATON,

Judge. 

_____________________________________ 

Kenneth Howell, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 15-245 

Estella Vazquez, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_____________________________________ 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Kenneth Howell, pro se, Bronx, New York. 

FOR DEFENDANTS -APPELLEES: David Slutsky, Levy Ratner, P.C., New York, New 

York. 

 

 The Honorable Judge Richard K. Eaton, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting 

by designation.
2 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Torres, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Kenneth Howell, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his complaint as untimely. Howell sued 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East 

(the “Union”) and two of its agents for violating their duty of fair representation by declining to 

arbitrate his grievance. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred because it was 

not filed within six months of when Howell knew of the alleged breach. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo, “accepting all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chambers v. 

Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). An employee’s claim that his union 

breached its duty of fair representation must be filed within six months of when the employee 

“knew or reasonably should have known that such a breach of the duty of fair representation had 

occurred, even if some possibility of nonjudicial enforcement remained.” Kalyanaram v. Am. 

Ass’n of Univ. Professors at N.Y. Inst. of Tech., Inc., 742 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Cohen v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 68 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1995)). 

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Howell’s claims as 

untimely. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough 

January 16, 2015 decision. 
3 

Howell contends that his claim did not accrue until the Union denied his internal appeal of 

its decision not to arbitrate, but we have held that accrual is not “deferred until it is clear that none 

of the internal union mechanisms will achieve success.” Santos v. Dist. Council of N.Y.C. & 

Vicinity of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 619 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1980). 

Howell filed a charge against the Union with the National Labor Relations Board, challenging the 

Union’s decision not to arbitrate, nine months before he filed the complaint. Accordingly, his 

claim had accrued by that time because he knew of the alleged breach. See Kavowras v. N.Y.

Times Co., 328 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that claim accrued, at the latest, when union 

member filed NLRB charge against the union based on the same conduct alleged in the complaint); 

see also Ghartey v. St. John’s Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Where a union 

refuses or neglects to assist a union member, decides to stop assisting a member, or acts against the 

interests of a member, a breach of duty by the union is apparent to the member at the time she 

learns of the union action or inaction about which she complains.” (citations omitted)). 

Howell also argues that the district judge should have recused herself. Howell never moved 

for recusal in the district court. Even assuming that this argument is not waived, Howell’s 

allegations do not demonstrate that “a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would conclude 

that the court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 

626 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987) 

(emphasis omitted). 

We have considered all of Howell’s arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk