[Cite as State v. Bogan, 2018-Ohio-4211.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 106183

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

CLARENCE BOGAN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-16-605087-A 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., E.A. Gallagher, A.J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 18, 2018 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Mark Stanton 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

BY: Erika B. Cunliffe 

Assistant Public Defender 

Courthouse Square, Suite 200 

310 Lakeside Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Frank Romeo Zeleznikar 

Daniel A. Cleary 

Jennifer A. Driscoll 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

The Justice Center, 8th and 9th Floors 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Clarence Bogan, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss charges pending against him on double jeopardy grounds. He raises the 

following assignment of error for review: 

The trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial where there was no manifest necessity 

to justify doing so was unreasonable and any retrial on the underlying charges 

would violate the prohibition against Double Jeopardy under the State and Federal 

Constitutions. 

{¶2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

I. Procedural History

{¶3} In April 2016, Bogan was named in a four-count indictment, charging him with 

aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A);1

 murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B); 

felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), with repeat violent offender and notice of 

prior conviction specifications; and domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The 

indictment stemmed from the death of Bogan’s girlfriend, Stacy Tucker, in February 2016. 

{¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on July 12, 2017. Throughout the course of 

trial, Bogan continuously attempted to communicate, both audibly and inaudibly, with the trial 

court and members of the jury. Based on Bogan’s repeated disruptions, the trial court was 

required to reprimand Bogan and instruct defense counsel “to exercise better control over their 

client.” 

{¶5} Relevant to this appeal, the record reflects that defense counsel requested the trial 

court to declare a mistrial on two separate occasions. The oral motions pertained to (1) an 

 1

 On July 20, 2017, Count 1 was amended to murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A). 
“unsolicited outburst” of a witness that “an innocent woman that was tinier than me * * * woke 

up dead the next morning, or being dead the next morning by his [Bogan’s] own words,” and (2) 

hearsay statements concerning Bogan’s physical abuse of Tucker. (Tr. 873, 1072.) The trial 

court denied each motion for a mistrial and offered to provide curative instructions when 

necessary. Just prior to the conclusion of trial, defense counsel renewed its request for a 

mistrial, which the trial court denied. (Tr. 1108.) 

{¶6} Closing arguments concluded on July 20, 2017. During jury deliberations, the jury 

foreperson sent the trial court a note on July 21, 2017. The note questioned the competency of 

Juror No. 5 to deliberate and render a fair verdict. Upon receiving the note, the trial court 

provided the jury with the following instruction: 

During your deliberations you must consult with one another, consider each 

other’s views and deliberate with the objective of reaching an agreement if you 

can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. 

Each of you must decide this case for yourself but you should do so only after a 

discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. Do not hesitate 

to change an opinion if convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not 

surrender honest convictions in order to be congenial or to reach a verdict solely 

because of the opinion of other jurors. 

{¶7} Later that afternoon, the trial court was notified that a courthouse employee had 

observed Bogan attempt to communicate with Juror No. 5 during the course of trial. Thus, a 

hearing was held to determine whether the perceived communications warranted further action 

by the court. At the hearing, the courthouse employee testified, in relevant part: 

I was sitting in the second row watching the defendant watching the jurors. I 

saw Clarence Bogan mouth words over as he was looking over this way to 

somebody. At the time the person testifying was the lady from the Coroner’s 

Office. And then I saw the juror, Juror [No.] 5, watching the defendant and 

smile back. That’s it. 
{¶8} The courthouse employee conceded that she did not see Juror No. 5 communicate 

anything back to Bogan and that she “could not tell what [Bogan] was mouthing” towards the 

juror. She further testified that she did not observe any other communication between Bogan 

and Juror No. 5 during the trial. 

{¶9} After careful consideration, the trial court concluded that Bogan’s attempts to 

communicate with Juror No. 5 did not “rise to a level where we need to take it any further.” 

Accordingly, the jury was instructed to continue its deliberations. 

{¶10} On July 24, 2017, the trial court received an additional note from the jury 

foreperson. The note stated, in its entirety: 

We are at an impasse on three out of four counts. Further deliberations would be 

fruitless. This morning the one juror erased out her name from the verdict form 

on Count Four, so we no longer have a verdict on that count. 

{¶11} Upon receiving the note from the jury, the trial court determined that it was 

necessary to declare a mistrial based on “the numerous allegations of jury misconduct as well as 

the difficulty with the jury.” Neither the state nor defense counsel objected to the trial court’s 

declaration. Thus, the jury was discharged. Thereafter, the parties engaged in discussions to 

schedule a new trial. In addition, defense counsel moved the court to permit Bogan to obtain an 

additional expert witness for the new trial, which the trial court granted. 

{¶12} The following day, a hearing was held to address defense counsel’s belief that a 

final verdict had been rendered on two of the counts before the mistrial was declared. The trial 

court quickly rejected defense counsel’s position, stating that the mistrial had been declared 

before the court even had the opportunity to view the jury verdict forms. In addition, the court 

noted that while the jury verdict forms reflected that the jury had reached a preliminary verdict of 

not guilty on Count 1, “they were still deliberating about it and talking about the verdicts that 
they had rendered.” Thus, the trial court concluded that because the verdict forms had not been 

taken by the court or announced in open court, no final verdict occurred prior to the mistrial 

declaration. 

{¶13} Immediately following the court’s assessment of the verdict, defense counsel 

argued, for the first time, that the trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial before considering 

alternative remedies was improper. Defense counsel argued, in relevant part: 

You went ahead and dismissed the case without giving anybody any type of an 

opportunity to cure it, and now that not guilty is not going to be on the record and 

now, from what our perspective is, if you’re going to retry it, which I know you 

intend to do on August 22nd, we believe it’s double jeopardy. Definitely on 

Count 1. 

{¶14} On July 31, 2017, the trial court issued a written order in support of its decision to 

declare a mistrial. The order provides, in part: 

Due to the Court’s belief that the behavior on the part of Defendant Bogan, as 

well as Juror [No.] 5, undermined the integrity of the proceeding, and led to the 

manifest necessity for a mistrial, Defendant’s Double Jeopardy defense will be 

unavailable to the Defendant, and this case will be scheduled for a retrial. As no 

final verdict was reached in the first trial, the retrial will be as to all counts 

previously submitted to the jury. 

{¶15} The trial court reiterated its position that the circumstances of this case presented a 

manifest necessity for a mistrial, stating: 

The entire trial was marred with misconduct on behalf of the Defendant as well as 

a juror, which ultimately led to a declaration of a mistrial. During the course of 

trial it was necessary for the Court to advise Defendant’s counsel, as well as 

Defendant directly, that the Court would not allow the continued disrespect on 

behalf of Defendant towards the jurors as well as the Court. Defendant’s 

conduct during trial was so egregious that it was determined by the Court to be 

undermining the integrity of the proceedings, and Defendant [was] therefore 

reprimanded in open court and advised to cease the disrupting behavior. 

Throughout the jury deliberations process there were also multiple notifications to 

the Court, via the jury foreperson, of juror misconduct and bias on behalf of one 

of the jurors, Juror [No.] 5. Throughout the trial it was noted by a number of 

individuals, individuals on the jury as well as the court, that it appeared that Juror 
[No.] 5 and Defendant were communicating with one another during testimony, 

both by non-audible mouth movements and body gestures. The foreperson 

further instructed the court that the jurors were unable to communicate with Juror 

[No.] 5, thereby hindering their ability to come to a verdict. There was an 

undeniable perception, in the Court’s view, that there was misconduct by both the 

Defendant and Juror [No.] 5 during the pendency of the case which undermined 

the integrity of the proceedings and required both a reprimand, as it pertains to 

Defendant, and ultimately the declaration of a mistrial prior to completion of the 

jury deliberation and verdict, based upon the behavior of both Juror [No.] 5 and 

Defendant. 

* * * 

The circumstances represented above proved to the Court that the prosecution 

would not be afforded a fair trial based on the misconduct of the Defendant and 

Juror [No.] 5, and that there existed no possibility of a just result. Accordingly, a 

mistrial was declared. 

{¶16} Just before the retrial was set to commence, Bogan filed a motion to dismiss his 

indictment pursuant to Crim.R. 12(C). In the motion, Bogan argued the trial court abused its 

discretion in ordering a mistrial in the absence of a manifest necessity and, therefore, his retrial is 

barred by constitutional double jeopardy protections. Following a hearing, the trial court denied 

Bogan’s motion to dismiss. 

{¶17} Bogan now appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his motion to dismiss. 

II. Law and Analysis

{¶18} In his sole assignment of error, Bogan argues the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to dismiss his indictment. Bogan contends that there was not a manifest necessity for 

the trial court’s mistrial declaration and, therefore, any retrial on the underlying charges would 

violate the prohibition against double jeopardy under the state and federal constitutions. 

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

{¶19} “A grant of a motion for mistrial has long been held not to be a final appealable 

order ‘for the basic reason that it is not a judgment or order in favor of either of the parties which 
gives finality to the case.’” State v. Nixon, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2016 CA 0008, 2017-Ohio-8, 

¶ 16, quoting Mack v. Gulf Oil Co., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 76AP-299, 1976 WL 190161 

(Aug. 24, 1976). But an order denying a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a 

final appealable order. State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 

61. Thus, a court can review the granting of a mistrial in an appeal from the denial of a motion 

to dismiss an indictment after the mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 4th Dist. Adams No. 

15CA1015, 2016-Ohio-5371, ¶ 36-39. 

{¶20} “Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing the denial of 

a motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of double jeopardy.” State v. Anderson, 148 

Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-5791, 68 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 20. But when the dismissal motion is based 

on a challenge to a trial court’s underlying declaration of a mistrial, we apply an abuse of 

discretion standard of review to that part of our analysis. Carter at ¶ 38, citing U.S. v. Keene,

287 F.3d 229, 233-234 (1st Cir.2002); U.S. v. Williamson, 656 Fed.Appx. 175, 180 (6th 

Cir.2016) (appellate court reviews de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on 

double jeopardy, but reviews the trial court’s underlying decision to grant a mistrial for abuse of 

discretion); State v. Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, ¶ 28-29 

(applying an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s declaration of mistrial). 

B. Manifest Necessity and Double Jeopardy

{¶21} The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 

10 of the Ohio Constitution protect a criminal defendant against repeated prosecutions for the 

same offense. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); 
State v. Kareski, 137 Ohio St.3d 92, 2013-Ohio-4008, 998 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 14. The policy 

underlying this protection is to ensure that 

“the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated 

attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 

embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing 

state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even 

though innocent he may be found guilty.” 

U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), quoting Green v. U.S., 355 

U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). 

{¶22} The constitutional protection granted a criminal defendant under the Double 

Jeopardy Clause also encompasses the defendant’s “‘valued right to have his trial completed by a 

particular tribunal.’” Oregon at 671-672, quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 

834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949). This right, however, is not unlimited. In some instances, the 

defendant’s right to have his case resolved by a particular tribunal must “be subordinated to the 

public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Wade at 689; see also Arizona 

v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 515, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (“Neither party has a 

right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias; in these circumstances, ‘the 

public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments’ must prevail over the defendant’s 

‘valued right’ to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled.”). Thus, the Double 

Jeopardy Clause does not bar reprosecution in every case. “Generally, retrial is permitted 

whenever a mistrial is declared at the request of or with the consent of the defendant.” State v. 

Juchum, 9th Dist. Summit No. 2186-M, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2699, 3 (May 26, 1993), citing 

21 American Jurisprudence 2d 504, Criminal Law, Section 286 (1981). 

{¶23} In a case where a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s request or 

consent, double jeopardy will not bar a retrial if (1) there was a manifest necessity or high degree 
of necessity for ordering a mistrial; or (2) the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. 

State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189, 429 N.E.2d 1065 (1981), citing Washington at 505. 

“Manifest necessity” means a “high degree” of necessity must exist before a mistrial may 

properly be declared. However, it does not require a showing that a mistrial was “absolutely 

necessary” or that there was no other alternative but to declare a mistrial. Washington at 511. 

{¶24} There is no “mechanical formula” for determining what constitutes a “manifest 

necessity” for a mistrial. “[T]he manifest-necessity standard ‘abjures the application of any 

mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and 

often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal trial.’” Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 

442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, at ¶ 27, quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462, 

93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). What constitutes a manifest necessity for a mistrial is, 

therefore, left to the discretion of the trial court to be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into 

account all the relevant circumstances. This approach is “in recognition of the fact that the trial 

judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his [or her] courtroom warrants 

the declaration of a mistrial.” State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19, 517 N.E.2d 900 (1988). 

However, “‘the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, 

and for very plain and obvious causes.’” Gunnell at ¶ 26, quoting U.S. v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 

580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). “A mistrial should not be ordered in a criminal case merely because 

some error or irregularity has intervened, unless the substantial rights of the accused or the 

prosecution are adversely affected * * * .” State v. Reynolds, 49 Ohio App.3d 27, 550 N.E.2d 

490 (2d Dist.1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. The granting of a mistrial is necessary only 

when “a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 

1 (1991). 
{¶25} In determining whether a mistrial is necessary, the exercise of “sound discretion” 

generally requires that a trial court (1) allow both parties to state their positions on the issue, (2) 

consider their competing interests, and (3) explore reasonable alternatives, if any, before 

declaring a mistrial. N. Olmsted v. Himes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 84076 and 84078, 

2004-Ohio-4241, ¶ 44. A trial court must act “rationally, responsibly, and deliberately” in 

determining whether to declare a mistrial. Gunnell at ¶ 33. However, a trial court’s failure to 

make an explicit finding of “manifest necessity” does not render a mistrial declaration invalid, as 

long as the record provides sufficient justification for the ruling. Washington, 434 U.S. at 

516-517, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717. 

{¶26} On appeal, Bogan argues the reasons provided by the trial court for its declaration 

of a mistrial were inconsistent with the court’s earlier determination that defendant’s non-verbal 

communications with juror No. 5 during trial were not significant enough to require “further 

action.” According to Bogan, “the trial court based [its] mistrial declaration on ‘juror 

misconduct’ even though the court had just concluded that there had been none.” Thus, Bogan 

contends that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the record “in any fashion.” Bogan 

further argues that, even if the record supported a finding of juror misconduct, the trial court 

failed to explore alternative remedies, including the substitution of juror No. 5 with the alternate 

juror. 

{¶27} Unquestionably, the record reflects that the trial court did not consider the 

procedural guidelines discussed in Himes before it declared a mistrial in this case based on a 

manifest necessity. At the onset of the July 24, 2017 hearing, the trial court immediately 

declared a mistrial based on “numerous allegations of jury misconduct as well as the difficulty 

with the jury.” Thus, the trial court declared a mistrial before allowing the parties to state their 
positions on the issue, considering their competing interests, or exploring reasonable alternatives 

on the record. Nor did the trial court conduct an inquiry of Juror No. 5 to “ascertain the scope 

of the prejudice, if any, to the [state] before determining that the juror could not be rehabilitated 

and that a mistrial was necessary.” Gunnell, 132 Ohio St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 

243, at ¶ 40. Thus, the procedural deficiencies complained of by Bogan are readily apparent on 

this record. 

{¶28} However, having acknowledged the trial court’s shortfalls, we find the unique 

circumstances of this case do not require this court to evaluate the substantive basis supporting 

the court’s discretionary finding of manifest necessity. For the reasons that follow, we find 

Bogan implicitly consented to the mistrial at the time it was declared on July 24, 2017. 

Therefore, he cannot now claim his retrial is barred by the principle of double jeopardy. See 

State v. Jackson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-89-196, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1340 (April 6, 1990). 

{¶29} As stated, “[t]he general rule is that mistrials, granted at the request of defendant or 

with the defendant’s consent, do not bar retrial on the basis of double jeopardy.” (Emphasis 

sic.) Id. at 4, citing U.S. v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267(1976); 

U.S. v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.1987). In determining whether a defendant has consented 

to the declaration of a mistrial, the consent need not be expressly stated. Id., citing Puleo at 

705. Rather, consent may be implied from the “totality of the circumstances attendant on a 

declaration of mistrial.” Id., citing U.S. v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir.1973). For 

instance, in Puleo and Jackson, the courts held that “when a defendant has had an opportunity to 

object to the declaration of a mistrial and fails to do so his consent to the declaration of a mistrial 

may be implied.” Puleo, at 705; Jackson at 4. 
{¶30} In this case, our review of the record demonstrates that Bogan did not expressly 

object to the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial during the July 24, 2017 hearing. Bogan had a 

meaningful opportunity to raise an objection to the mistrial declaration during the remainder of 

the hearing, but chose to forego that opportunity. See Love v. Morton, 944 F.Supp. 379 

(D.N.J.1996) (“Counsel has ample meaningful opportunity to object where following a mistrial 

declaration the trial judge remains available to entertain other objections, schedule the second 

trial, or otherwise discuss the case with counsel.”) We recognize that the failure to object is just 

one factor to be considered and may not always equate to a finding of implied consent. See 

Washington v. Jarvis, 137 Fed.Appx. 543, 554 (4th Cir.2005) (finding the United States Supreme 

Court has always required that consent to mistrial must be determined based on a “totality of the 

circumstances” and has never adopted a bright-line rule that consent is implied when a defendant 

has an opportunity to object but does not explicitly express an objection). Nevertheless, we 

conclude that a finding of implied consent is warranted in this case. 

{¶31} Beyond the lack of an express objection, Bogan’s consent may be implied from the 

“totality of the circumstances attendant on the declaration of a mistrial,” including the motions 

raised on Bogan’s behalf during trial and defense counsel’s conduct during the July 24, 2017 

hearing. As discussed, defense counsel zealously maintained, on separate occasions, that the 

trial court was required to declare a mistrial due to its admission of highly prejudicial testimony 

during the trial. In fact, counsel renewed her motion for a mistrial just prior to the conclusion of 

trial on July 20, 2017. In addition, the record reflects that immediately following the court’s 

declaration of a mistrial on July 24, 2017, defense counsel actively participated in the scheduling 

of the retrial, agreed to a tentative new trial date, requested the trial court to consider allowing the 
defense to obtain an additional expert witness for retrial, and requested the trial court to thank the 

jury on behalf of the defense. 

{¶32} Individually, each of the foregoing circumstances may not equate to a finding of 

consent. Collectively, however, we can only view Bogan’s acceptance of the court’s judgment 

as consensual, intentional, and consistent with defense counsel’s repeated requests for a mistrial 

during trial, albeit on different grounds. This was more than a case of uninformed silence. 

{¶33} We recognize that defense counsel actively raised concerns with the trial court’s 

declaration of a mistrial during the July 25, 2017, and August 20, 2017 hearings. However, we 

do not find Bogan’s subsequent objections to the trial court’s judgment served to rescind the 

implicit consent given during the July 24, 2017 hearing. In this case, it is evident that the July 

25, 2017 hearing was only held to assess defense counsel’s belief that a final verdict had been 

rendered on Count 1 of Bogan’s indictment. It did not morph into a debate on the substantive 

merits of the trial court’s mistrial declaration until the court rejected defense counsel’s final 

verdict argument, and after counsel became aware of the jury’s preliminary not guilty verdict on 

Count 1. Thus, defense counsel’s objections were predicated on the discovery of favorable 

information that was not known at the time implied consent was given. In addition, the timing 

of counsel’s objections precluded practical consideration, as they were not raised until after the 

court had discharged the jury. Accordingly, the arguments posed by counsel during the July 25, 

2017, and August 20, 2017 hearings have no bearing on our analysis. 

{¶34} Having determined the mistrial was not declared “without defendant’s consent, the 

presence or absence of manifest necessity is not a consideration.” State v. Mengistu, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 02AP-497, 2003-Ohio-1452, ¶ 28, citing Oregon, 456 U.S. at 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 

72 L.Ed.2d 416; U.S. v. Mitchell, 736 F.2d 1299, 1300 (9th Cir.1984) (“Where defendant 
consents to a mistrial * * * the ‘manifest necessity’ doctrine does not come into play and as a 

general rule retrial is permitted because defendant himself has elected to terminate the 

proceedings and begin afresh”); U.S. v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1991) (manifest necessity 

test does not apply when defendant has effectually consented to the mistrial). Thus, we find 

Bogan’s challenges to the trial court’s finding of a manifest necessity are not determinative and 

do not implicate the double jeopardy protections afforded under the state and federal 

constitutions. 

{¶35} Because the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial was made with Bogan’s implicit 

consent, we are unable to conclude that this is the rare or exceptional case where the protections 

of the Double Jeopardy Clause require the dismissal of his indictment with prejudice. See State 

v. Kelly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101457, 2015-Ohio-1948, ¶ 25, citing State v. Smith, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-990689, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5082, 19 (Nov. 3, 2000) (noting the “extremely 

rare” circumstances where the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause bar 

reprosecution following a mistrial). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Bogan’s 

motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 

{¶36} Bogan’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶37} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY (SEE SEPARATE 

OPINION); 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., DISSENTS (SEE SEPARATE OPINION) 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY: 

{¶38} I respectfully concur in judgment only. I write separately to reiterate, as both the 

majority and dissenting opinions make clear, that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring 

a mistrial when there was no manifest necessity to do so. 

{¶39} Without any investigation, the trial court simply concluded that based upon 

“multiple communications” from the jury foreperson “of juror misconduct and bias” by Juror No. 

5, a mistrial was required. The court’s characterization of “multiple” communications from the 

foreperson is exaggerated; there were two. And even if there were multiple communications, 

the trial court never bothered to interview either the jury foreperson or Juror No. 5 to ascertain 

what the problem was, if there was indeed a problem, and even if there were some problem, 

whether the jury could continue deliberating. The court also did not consider whether the 

alternate juror could be seated if there were issues with Juror No. 5 that prevented her from 

deliberating with the jury. 

{¶40} Furthermore, in its rush to declare a mistrial, the trial court failed to interview the 

jury on the record in the presence of the lawyers to determine if it had reached a verdict on any of 

the four counts. If the jury had reached a verdict on some but not all of the counts, the judge 
could have declared a mistrial as to the counts the jury was unable to resolve but taken a verdict 

on the count(s) upon which the jury had reached a verdict. 

{¶41} Because the trial court failed to investigate the alleged juror misconduct or consider 

any alternatives to a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial. 

Nevertheless, I concur in judgment only that the trial court did not err in denying Bogan’s motion 

to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. I disagree with the implied consent doctrine because I 

believe it places the defendant in a difficult if not impossible strategic position. However, in 

light of the federal and Ohio case law regarding implied consent cited by the majority, as well as 

defense counsel’s apparent acquiescence to the mistrial order, I am constrained to agree that the 

mistrial was not declared without Bogan’s consent. 

{¶42} Defense counsel twice asked for a mistrial during trial and renewed the motion just 

prior to the conclusion of trial. Then, at the July 24, 2017 hearing before the trial court 

dismissed the jury, defense counsel actively engaged with the court in scheduling a new trial 

date, asked the court to consider allowing the defense an additional expert witness for trial, and 

asked the court to thank the jury on behalf of the defense. I am satisfied that defense counsel by 

his words and conduct affirmatively consented to the mistrial. See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 621 F.2d 

350 (9th Cir.1980) (No double jeopardy bar to retrial where defense counsel asked that in 

discharging the jury, the court not blame the defendant because “he may see these people in other 

trials”; counsel responded “yes” when the court asked whether counsel’s schedule would allow 

him to conduct a retrial within a few weeks; and counsel told the court he “had no problem” with 

the court resolving two evidentiary matters for retrial while they were waiting for the jury to 

arrive to be discharged.). 

{¶43} Accordingly, I concur in judgment only. 
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER. A.J., DISSENTING 

{¶44} For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I 

would decline to adopt the implied consent doctrine relied upon in the majority opinion. 

Because I find that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a mistrial in the absence of 

manifest necessity, I would hold that double jeopardy bars a retrial in this case. 

I. Implied Consent

{¶45} My principle disagreement with the majority opinion lies in the adoption of the 

implied consent doctrine as advanced in State v. Jackson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-89-196, 1990 

Ohio App. LEXIS 1340 (April 6, 1990). While it is well established that a mistrial granted at 

the request of the defendant or with the defendant’s consent will not operate to bar a retrial on 

double jeopardy grounds, the implied consent doctrine set forth in Jackson expands that rule to 

instances where an appellate court believes consent can be implied from the totality of the 

circumstances. The Jackson court cited U.S. v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987) for the 

proposition that “when a defendant has had an opportunity to object to the declaration of a 

mistrial and fails to do so his consent to the declaration of a mistrial may be implied.” Puleo, at 

705. Puleo, however, involved the declaration of a mistrial after the jury indicated that they 

were deadlocked, the court provided the Allen charge, and thereafter the jury advised the court 

that they were, indeed, at an impasse. 

{¶46} The Second, Third and Fourth Districts have similarly adopted the implied consent 

doctrine. See State v. Hittle, 2d Dist. Miami No. 80-CA46, NO. 80-CA47, 1981 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 12975 (Mar. 3, 1981); State v. Workman, 60 Ohio App.2d 204, 208, 396 N.E.2d 777 (3d 

Dist.1977); State v. Tanner, 4th Dist. Ross No. 1256, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8117 (July 24, 
1986). However, I note that the Third District subsequently issued a conflicting decision where 

it appeared to reject the doctrine of implied consent. State v. Dewald, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 

13-82-10, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 14924 (Nov. 9, 1982). 

{¶47} I would not adopt the implied consent doctrine and would certify a conflict 

between the present case and the above cited decisions. Consistent with my view, I note that 

this court declined an opportunity to adopt the implied consent doctrine in State v. Marshall, 

2014-Ohio-4677, 22 N.E.3d 207 (8th Dist.). In Marshall, this court considered a trial court’s sua 

sponte declaration of a mistrial. We noted that the defendant had been denied relief under 

habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in part 

because he had “impliedly consented to the mistrial by failing to object.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing 

Marshall v. Ohio, 443 F.Supp. 2d 911 (N.D.Ohio 2006). Despite acknowledging this fact, the 

panel in Marshall did not deny the appeal under the implied consent doctrine and, instead, 

considered the trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial under the manifest necessity standard. 

Id. at ¶ 18-40. 

{¶48} In State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 517 N.E.2d 900 (1988), the Ohio Supreme 

Court did not apply the implied consent doctrine in an instance where the defendant failed to 

object to a sua sponte mistrial declaration. Id. at 20. As in Marshall, the Glover court 

considered the mistrial declaration under the manifest necessity standard. 

{¶49} In my view, the implied consent doctrine places an undue burden on a defendant to 

make an immensely important, strategic decision immediately and without warning. The 

doctrine only becomes relevant in instances where the trial court improperly grants a mistrial. 

As applied to cases such as the one presently before us, when faced with a sua sponte mistrial 

declaration, announced without warning, the implied consent doctrine shifts the onus to the 
defendant to instantaneously evaluate his interest in being tried by the present jury as opposed to 

facing a new trial. The doctrine provides no room for an informed calculation on the part of the 

defendant but rather terminates his double jeopardy rights if he does not immediately object. 

{¶50} Conversely, the implied consent doctrine absolves the trial court of any 

responsibility for failing to follow procedural safeguards set forth under the law and for 

erroneously declaring a mistrial. The doctrine is simply incompatible with a power that “ought 

to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious 

causes[.]” U.S. v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). 

{¶51} Therefore, I would not find the doctrine of implied consent to bar Bogan’s double 

jeopardy rights in this instance. 

II. Manifest Necessity 

{¶52} I would also find that the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial without manifest 

necessity. “[T]he question of whether, under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second 

trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest 

necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) the ends of public justice 

would otherwise be defeated.’” Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d at 19, 517 N.E.2d 900, quoting State v. 

Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189, 429 N.E.2d 1065 (1981). 

{¶53} “Manifest necessity” means a “high degree” of necessity must exist before a 

mistrial may properly be declared. However, it does not require a showing that a mistrial was 

“absolutely necessary” or that there was no other alternative but to declare a mistrial. Arizona v. 

Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 511, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). 

{¶54} There is no “mechanical formula” for determining what constitutes a “manifest 

necessity” for a mistrial: “[T]he manifest-necessity standard ‘abjures the application of any 
mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and 

often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal trial.’” State v. Gunnell, 132 Ohio 

St.3d 442, 2012-Ohio-3236, 973 N.E.2d 243, ¶ 27, quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 

462, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). What constitutes a manifest necessity for a mistrial 

is, therefore, left to the discretion of the trial court to be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking 

into account all the relevant circumstances. This approach is “in recognition of the fact that the 

trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the situation in his [or her] courtroom 

warrants the declaration of a mistrial.” Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d at 19, 517 N.E.2d 900. 

However, “‘the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, 

and for very plain and obvious causes.’” Gunnell at ¶ 26, quoting Perez, 22 U.S. at 580, 6 L.Ed. 

165. “A mistrial should not be ordered in a criminal case merely because some error or 

irregularity has intervened, unless the substantial rights of the accused or the prosecution are 

adversely affected * * * .” State v. Reynolds, 49 Ohio App.3d 27, 550 N.E.2d 490 (2d 

Dist.1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. The granting of a mistrial is necessary only when “a 

fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991). 

{¶55} The trial court’s mistrial declaration is reviewed to determine if the trial judge 

exercised “sound discretion in determining whether juror bias existed and whether it could be 

cured.” Gunnell at ¶ 29. 

[A] trial judge’s determination of possible juror bias should be given great 

deference only upon the appellate court’s satisfaction that the trial judge exercised 

sound discretion in determining whether juror bias existed and whether it could be 

cured. * * * [T]he mere specter of bias is [not] a manifest necessity that 

warrants mistrial. * * * [A]lthough a trial judge’s determination of juror bias is 

entitled to great deference, it must be predicated on the judge’s proper discretion 

in hearing the case. Mere supposition, surmise, and possibility of prejudice are 

not sufficient. 
Id. at ¶ 29, 31. 

{¶56} In determining whether a mistrial is necessary, the exercise of sound discretion 

generally requires that a trial judge allow both parties to state their positions on the issue, 

consider their competing interests, and explore reasonable alternatives, if any, before declaring a 

mistrial. N. Olmsted v. Himes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 84076 and 84078, 2004-Ohio-4241, ¶ 

44, citing Ross v. Petro, 515 F.3d 653, 661 (6th Cir.2008). A trial court must act “rationally, 

responsibly, and deliberately” in determining whether to declare a mistrial. Gunnell at ¶ 33. 

However, a trial court’s failure to make an explicit finding of “manifest necessity” does not 

render a mistrial declaration invalid, as long as the record provides sufficient justification for the 

ruling. Washington, 434 U.S. at 516-517, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717. 

{¶57} I would find, in this case, that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a 

mistrial after determining, through its journal entry, that it was necessary “based upon the 

behavior of Defendant and Juror 5.” As the majority opinion concedes, it is clear from the 

record that the trial court failed to comply with any of the procedural safeguards set forth in 

Hines, Ross and Washington. 

{¶58} The trial court ruled that “[d]efendant and Juror 5’s behavior permeated so deeply 

into the trial and jury deliberations ... that the integrity of the proceeding was compromised and 

that there was no way to properly cure the problem, thereby ultimately resulting in the necessity 

of a mistrial.” 

{¶59} The trial court’s ruling is inconsistent with that which did occur during the trial of 

this case and is unsupported by the record. 

{¶60} Throughout the course of the trial, the trial court repeatedly chastised Bogan for his 

contumacious behavior in open court and before the jury. 
{¶61} In fact, during jury selection, the trial court indicated that she would “gag him” (the 

appellant) if he attempted to disrupt the proceedings. The record reflects that “Mr. Bogan has 

resorted in front of the jury to jumping out of his seat, yelling at the top of his lungs, throwing his 

hands around, grabbing his binder that’s full of documents and yelling and screaming about he 

was innocent, that he was being railroaded that Cuyahoga County was corrupted and totally 

disrupted those proceedings. 

{¶62} Irrespective of that, the trial court never took action against the defendant other 

than repeated verbal admonishments and a request that his trial counsel “control him.” 

{¶63} The trial court could have, at any time, had him removed from the courtroom, 

placed into a holding facility and made arrangements for him to otherwise participate in the trial 

from a remote location or even taken the most extreme measure of gagging him in the courtroom. 

{¶64} This was never done. 

{¶65} Additionally, while the jury was deliberating, the court conducted a hearing 

wherein a court employee was questioned. Apparently this court employee, who was merely an 

observer during the trial, contacted the assistant prosecuting attorney and reported observations 

which she had made during the trial. She testified that on one occasion she “was sitting on the 

second row watching the defendant watching the jurors. I saw Clarence Bogan mouth words 

over as he was looking over this way to somebody. . . . And then I saw the juror, Juror No. 5, 

watching the defendant and smile back. That’s it.” She denied seeing any other 

communication between Juror No. 5 and the defendant. 

{¶66} At the conclusion of the testimony of that court employee, the court stated “[a]fter 

listening carefully I don’t think it rises to the same level we had initially thought that it did. I 

was under the impression that they communicated. I know and I’ve indicated to counsel at the 
sidebar that he was making faces and trying to communicate with me. I asked counsel to 

correct it and I think they did. So if it was that same thing I don’t think it rises to a level where 

we need to take it any further.” 

{¶67} Also, during deliberation the trial court received a communication from the jury 

foreperson which she shared with counsel. The communication read “[a] number of jurors, 

including myself as foreman, are questioning the competency of Juror # [sic] 5 to deliberate and 

render a verdict.” The trial court then provided, again, to the jury the standard instruction on 

conduct during deliberation as to consulting with one another, considering each other’s views 

and deciding the case for themselves after discussion and consideration with the other jurors. 

{¶68} The record is devoid of any investigation by the court, with or without counsel, 

through questioning of the jury foreperson or the juror about whom a complaint was made, as to 

what the perceived problem was or, if in fact, other jurors were aware of the foreperson’s 

communication on this issue. We know not what the issue was, if it was a personality conflict, 

if that juror was merely maintaining her opinion of the case or if there was a legal competency 

issue. The trial court should have explored the alleged problem. 

{¶69} Further, we do not know whether an alternate juror was available to participate in 

deliberations if, in fact, Juror No. 5 needed to be removed from the case as the record is devoid 

of any discharge of the jury or any record that attempts to contact an alternate were made. 

{¶70} Notwithstanding all of the above, the trial court did not act until that time that the 

jury sent forth another written communication which read “[w]e are at an impasse on three out of 

the four counts. Further deliberations would be fruitless. (This morning, the one juror crossed 

out her name from the verdict form on Count 4, so we no longer have a verdict on that count.)” 
{¶71} The court did not offer a Howard charge. It merely informed counsel that “at this 

point because of the numerous allegations of jury misconduct as well as the difficulty with the 

jury the court is going to declare a mistrial.” 

{¶72} There is no identifiable jury misconduct on the record. An allegation was made 

by a court employee of communication between a juror and the defendant and the court 

discounted it after hearing the testimony. In fact, the prosecuting attorney who examined this 

person on the record indicated that “So I misunderstood. I thought you had said you saw her say 

something.” On these facts I cannot say that manifest necessity existed to support a sua sponte 

mistrial declaration. The trial court ignored the relevant procedure and substituted supposition 

and speculation for appropriate investigation in concluding that juror misconduct necessitated a 

mistrial. 

{¶73} I would find that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial and that 

further prosecution of the charges in this case should be barred by double jeopardy.