AFFIRM; Opinion Filed November 14, 2013. 

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In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05
- 12
- 00151
- CR No. 05
- 12
- 00152
- CR JAMES RANDOLPH BELL , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11
- 70232
- H , F11
- 70233
- H MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Lang, and Richter 1 Opinion by Justice Moseley A jury convicted James Randolph Bell on two counts of possession of child pornography. In four issues, Bell asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to support either conviction and the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment s requiring him to pay court costs. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. T EX
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. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court’ s judgment. Karen Thomas and Jessie Joseph and their respective children li ved together in Thomas’s home. The complainants, N.T. and L.C., are the daughters of Thomas and Joseph , respectively. At the time of the relevant events, both complainants were thirteen years old. A few months

1 The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Assigned– 2

– before the offenses occurred, Bell began visiting Thomas’s home almost every day. Bell regularly brought his laptop computer, cell phone, digital camera, and camc order with him. L.C. testified Bell never left his laptop at Thomas’s house overnight. N.T. and L.C. occasionally used Bell’s laptop

— with his consent

— to download music or complete homework assignments. One night while L.C. was using Bell’s laptop, she
i nadvertently opened Bell’s photo gallery. While looking through the photographs, L.C. saw nude photographs of herself while she was drying off after a shower. The laptop also contained photographs of N.T. that depicted her naked. The girls showed the ph otographs on Bell’s laptop to Thomas. When confronted about the photographs, Bell said, “I don’t know why I did it. I don’t know what I was thinking. It’s not like I was going to show anybody.” Bell then left the house with his computer and the police we re called. Subsequently, investigating officers obtained a warrant to search Bell’s residence; they seized the laptop from Bell’s bedroom. A forensic exam of the laptop produced photographs showing the complainants in various states of undress. The phot ographs appear to have been taken through a window with the photographer s tanding outside the complainant s ’ bedrooms. At trial, the State’s exhibits included photographs of each girl that showed their faces and bare breasts. As applicable here, a person commits the offense of possess ion of child pornography if he knowingly or intentionally possesses visual material that visually depicts a child younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was made who is engaging in sexual conduct and he knows that the material depicts the child in this manner. T EX
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. § 43.26(a) (West Supp. 2013). On appeal, Bell does not dispute he owns the computer o n which the photographs were found or that the images depict child pornography. Rather, he only– 3

– challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in each case showing he knowingly possessed the child pornography. We review the evidence under the legal sufficiency standard of review. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Adames v. State , 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1763 (2012). In a legal sufficiency review, “we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have f ound the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Adames , 353 S.W.3d at 860. This standar d “recognizes the trier of fact’ s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence after drawing reasonable inferences from th e evidence.” Id. We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See i d. (citing Malik v. State , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A person possesses a thing when he exercises actual care, custody, control, or management over the thing. T EX
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. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2013). A person acts knowingly or with knowledge of the nature of his conduct or circumstances “when he is aware of the nature of hi s conduct or that the circumstances exist. ” I d. § 6.03(b) (West 2011). Proof of a culpable mental state almost invariably depends upon circumstantial evidence. See Hernandez v. State , 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) overruled on other grounds by Fuller v. State , 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 992). A trier of fact can infer knowledge from all the circumstances, including the acts, conduct, and remarks of the accused. See Dillon
v. State , 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978)

. There is evidence in the record that investigators seized Bell’s laptop from his bedroom and the photographs were recovered from the laptop by a forensic examiner. L.C. testified Bell took his computer home with him when he left Thomas’s house and neve r left it at Thomas’s– 4

– house overnight. The record reflects that when Thomas confronted Bell about the photographs on his laptop he said, “I don’t know why I did it. I don’t know what I was thinking. It’s not like I was going to show anybody.” On appeal, Bell also argues numerous people in Thomas’s house had access to his laptop. The jury heard evidence that other people in the home had access to Bell’s laptop, including two adult men who lived in the home. However, the jury could have reasona bly believed these men were not responsible for placing the images on Bell’s computer. See Adames , 353 S.W.3d at
860. Bell also argues the police did not investigate the offenses thoroughly, no one saw Bell taking videos or photos from outside the window s of the house , and no contraband was found on Bell’s other electronic devices . The jury heard evidence on all these issues and was free to determine the weight a nd credibility of that evidence. N evertheless it conclude d Bell was guilty of knowingly poss essing the child pornography. See id. Further, the State need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses for the evidence to be sufficient. See Wise v. State , 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Considering all the evidence (including that summarized above) in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found Bell knowingly possessed the photographs. Bell concedes the images were child pornography. Thus, a reasonable jury could have found hi m guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses of knowingly possessing child pornography

. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319 ; Adames , 353 S.W.3d at 860. Thus w e overrule Bell’s first two issues. In issues three and four, Bell argues the evidence is insuffic ient to support the trial court’ s order that he pay $ 594 and $614 in court costs

. Therefore, Bell argues, the judgment should be reformed to delete the court costs. Because the clerk’s record did not contain a bill of costs, we ordered the Dallas County District Clerk to file supplemental records containing the certified bill– 5

– of costs associated with these two cases. The clerk did so, filing two supplemental clerk’s records in each case. See T EX
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. 34.5(c)(1) (stating rules of appellate procedure allow supplementation of clerk’ s record if relevant item has been omitted). Bell makes two objections to the supplemental records in each case . He first complains the clerk did not file a “proper bill of costs” because it is an unsworn, unsig ned computer printout. While the code of criminal procedure requires a record be kept, it does not specify the form of the record except to stat e that it must be certified and signed “by the officer who charged the costs or the off icer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost.” T EX
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. art. 1 03.001, .006; Coronel v. State , No. 05

- 12

- 00493

- CR, 2013 WL 3874446, at *4 (Tex

. App.

— Dallas July 29, 2013, pet. filed ). The district clerk’s supplemental record in each case contains a “Bill of Costs Certification” containing the costs that have accrued to date; the documents are certified and signed by the clerk. Because the documents meet the mandate of the code of criminal procedure, we conclude Bell’s first objection tha t the bill of costs is not “proper” lacks merit. See id. at *4. Bell also complains the record does not indicate the bill s of costs was filed or brought to the trial court’s attention before costs were entered. We previously addressed and overruled this argument in Coronel

. See id. at *5. With the supplemental records containing the bill of costs now before us, we conclude Bell’s complaint that the evidence is insufficient to support the imposition of costs lacks merit. See id. at *4

- 5; Franklin v. St ate , 402 S.W.3d 894, 894 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2013, no pet.).
Acc ordingly, we overrule Bell’ s third and fourth issue s .– 6

– We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX
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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JAMES RANDOLPH BELL, Appellant
No. 05

- 12

- 00151

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11

- 702 32

- H. Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley. Justices Lang and Richter participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 14th day of November, 2014.

/Jim Moseley/ JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE– 8

– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JAMES RANDOLPH BELL, Appellant
No. 05

- 12

- 00152

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11

- 70233

- H. Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley. Justices Lang and Richter participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 14th day of November, 2014

.

/ Jim Moseley/ JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE