UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

IQBAL SINGH, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, 

United States Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 23-9548 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Iqbal Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a decision by 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA) affirming the denial of his 

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 

Against Torture (CAT). Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny the 

petition. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 24, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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BACKGROUND 

I. Underlying Facts 

Mr. Singh is a Sikh from Punjab, India. He is a worker for the Congress party, 

which is opposed by the Shiromani Akali Dal Badal party (the Badal party) and the 

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 

Mr. Singh testified that on May 10, 2016, he was hanging posters for the 

Congress party when five Badal party members initiated a confrontation. Tearing 

down the posters, they cursed and verbally abused him. When he protested, they 

began beating him with fists, sticks, and baseball bats, telling him to join the Badal 

party. After about ten to fifteen minutes, the attackers ran away when passersby 

gathered. Mr. Singh had bruises and went to a hospital, where he got “shots as well 

as some medicine.” R. Vol. 1 at 79. He went to report the attack at a police station, 

but the officers declined to help him, saying they were unwilling to put their jobs at 

risk by writing something against the Badal party. 

A few months later, on August 13, 2016, Mr. Singh was driving home on his 

motorcycle. A vehicle stopped behind him, and then it ran into him and knocked him 

off. Badal party members beat him with fists and bats for about ten to fifteen 

minutes. A passerby took him home, and his mother took him to the hospital, where 

he got medicine. In light of his earlier experience, he did not try to report the second 

attack to the police. 

The next month, Badal party and BJP members threatened Mr. Singh on the 

street, saying they were not going to leave him alone and were going to beat him or 

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shoot him. He left India in October 2016 with the assistance of a paid agent. He 

entered the United States without valid entry documents and without authorization in 

November 2016. 

After Mr. Singh left India, in 2017 and 2019 Badal party members went to the 

house where his family lives and inquired about him. During the 2017 visit, they told 

his mother to vote for the Badal party in an upcoming election. During the 2019 

visit, they slapped his mother and verbally abused his wife. 

II. Legal Standards 

For asylum, a petitioner must establish he is a refugee. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a person who is “unable or unwilling to return to the 

country of origin ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion.’” Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 645-46 (10th Cir. 

2012) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) (emphasis omitted). “Persecution is the 

infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political 

opinion) in a way regarded as offensive and must entail more than just restrictions or 

threats to life and liberty.” Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[P]ersecution may be inflicted by the 

government itself, or by a non-governmental group that the government is unwilling 

or unable to control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a petitioner 

seeks asylum based on fear of future persecution, he must show his fear is “both 

subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 

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1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2005). A petitioner does not have a well-founded fear of future 

persecution if he could avoid persecution by reasonably relocating within his country. 

See id.

The standard for withholding of removal is “more stringent” than that for 

asylum. Zhi Wei Pang v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2012). “To be 

eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate that there is a 

clear probability of persecution because of his race, religion, nationality, membership 

in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Finally, “[t]o be entitled to any type of CAT relief, an applicant must 

‘establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to 

the proposed country of removal.’” Igiebor v. Barr, 981 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 

2020) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). “Torture is defined as any act by which 

severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 

person.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). It “is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman 

treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 

or punishment that do not amount to torture.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(2). In assessing the 

likelihood of torture, a fact-finder must consider all relevant evidence, including 

“[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant.” Id. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i). 

III. Agency Proceedings 

Mr. Singh’s Notice to Appear (NTA) alleged he entered the United States 

without a valid entry document and without being admitted or paroled after 

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inspection by an immigration officer. It charged him with being an immigrant who 

was not in possession of a valid entry document. Mr. Singh admitted the factual 

allegations in the NTA and conceded removability. He applied for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. 

The immigration judge (IJ) found Mr. Singh’s testimony to be credible. 

Although he recognized that Badal party members had twice attacked Mr. Singh and 

had threatened to shoot him, the IJ concluded that the circumstances did not rise to 

the level of past persecution. He further found that Mr. Singh had not established a 

well-founded fear of future persecution and that, even if he had, he could reasonably 

relocate to other areas of Punjab or other areas of India. Because Mr. Singh failed to 

demonstrate his eligibility for asylum, the IJ held that he necessarily failed to meet 

the standards for withholding of removal. Finally, as to the CAT, the IJ held that 

Mr. Singh failed to establish it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if he 

returned to India. 

The Board adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision but also wrote separately to 

address specific arguments made on appeal. The Board rejected Mr. Singh’s claim 

that the IJ minimized and failed to consider all the harm he suffered in India. It 

upheld the IJ’s determination, under the law of this circuit, that the circumstances did 

not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. It also 

upheld the determination that Mr. Singh had failed to show he could not reasonably 

relocate. And it upheld the denial of CAT relief, rejecting Mr. Singh’s assertions that 

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the past harm he experienced qualified as torture and that he was more likely than not 

to face torture upon his return to India. 

Mr. Singh filed a timely petition for review. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standards of Review 

“Where, as here, the BIA affirms an immigration judge’s decision in a single 

Board member’s brief order, the BIA’s affirmance is the final agency decision, and 

we limit our review to the grounds for the BIA’s decision.” Escobar-Hernandez v. 

Barr, 940 F.3d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 2019). “However, we may consult the 

immigration judge’s fuller explanation of those same grounds.” Id. 

We review legal questions de novo and findings of fact for substantial 

evidence. See id. at 1360-61 (asylum and withholding); Arostegui-Maldonado v. 

Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1144 (10th Cir. 2023) (CAT claims). Under the 

substantial-evidence standard, “[t]he agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless 

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” 

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). 

II. Asylum 

A. Past Persecution 

Mr. Singh argues the Board erred in determining the attacks on him did not 

rise to the level of past persecution. In this circuit, persecution is a finding of fact 

that is reviewed only for substantial evidence. See Ting Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 

1104 (10th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, “[t]he BIA’s determination that the applicant is 

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not eligible for asylum must be upheld if supported by reasonable, substantial, and 

probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 

1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “It can 

be reversed only if the evidence presented by the applicant was such that a reasonable 

factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” Id.

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Mr. Singh largely relies on out-of-circuit precedent to argue that the 

circumstances here rise to the level of persecution. But under this circuit’s 

precedent, we cannot conclude that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 

to find past persecution. See Ting Xue, 846 F.3d at 1107 (four-day detention 

including assault did not constitute persecution); Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976 (assault 

during home invasion and attack on car did not constitute persecution); Witjaksono v. 

Holder, 573 F.3d 968, 972, 977 (10th Cir. 2009) (taunts, throwing rocks, attack on 

car, and assault did not constitute persecution); Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 

1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2007) (multiple beatings resulting in injuries and demands for 

money did not constitute persecution), abrogated on other grounds by 

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023); Tulengkey, 425 F.3d at 1280-81 

(robbery resulting in injury and attack on wedding did not constitute persecution); 

Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1991) (detentions including 

beatings and interrogation did not constitute persecution). Mr. Singh asserts that the 

Board failed to consider all the harm he suffered, minimized the harm, and failed to 

consider the threats and violent acts cumulatively. But the agency explicitly 

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recognized the attacks and the threats. Mr. Singh effectively asks us to reweigh the 

evidence, which we cannot do. See Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1233.1

Mr. Singh also asserts that he “suffered some economic harm, indirectly, as he 

was forced to leave his job, too, when he fled India.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 24. The 

government asserts that he did not raise this argument before the Board. Although a 

petitioner’s failure to raise an argument before the Board is not jurisdictional, 

§ 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement “is a quintessential claim-processing rule.” 

Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 417. Because Mr. Singh did not raise his argument 

before the Board, and the government invokes the rule, we decline to consider the 

argument. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) (“A 

claim-processing rule may be mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the 

rule if a party properly raises it.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In addition, Mr. Singh asserts the IJ ignored the 2017 and 2019 visits to his 

house by Badal party members. The Board stated that “these incidents occurred after 

[he] left India and are therefore not considered past harm suffered by [him] for the 

purposes of the past persecution analysis.” R. Vol. 1 at 4. Mr. Singh’s bare 

proclamation that “[t]he harm or threatened harm suffered by [his] mother and wife 

reverberated upon [him], even though he was in the United States at the time,” Pet’r’s 

Opening Br. at 28, does not persuade us that the Board reversibly erred in declining 

1

 Mr. Singh’s opening brief discusses whether he established a nexus between 

persecution and a protected ground, as required for an asylum (or withholding) claim. 

It does not appear, however, that the agency needed to reach this issue once it 

concluded that the harm Mr. Singh described did not rise to the level of persecution. 

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to consider these incidents in considering whether Mr. Singh experienced past 

persecution. Notably, as discussed below, the Board did consider the incidents in 

assessing whether he established a well-founded fear of future persecution. 

For these reasons, Mr. Singh has not shown that any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude that he established past persecution. 

B. Future Persecution 

Mr. Singh further argues the Board erred in failing to find he has a 

well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board recognized he had a subjective 

fear, but it held that he failed to show the fear also was objectively reasonable. It 

held that the 2017 and 2019 Badal party visits to his family did not demonstrate a 

reasonable possibility that Mr. Singh would be subjected to harm rising to the level 

of persecution. It further noted that, due to a change of government in favor of the 

Congress party, Mr. Singh failed to establish the government would be unwilling or 

unable to control his alleged persecutors.2

 Finally, the Board upheld the IJ’s finding 

that he had not met his burden to show he could not reasonably relocate within India. 

Like the finding on past persecution, we review the finding regarding future 

persecution for substantial evidence. See Escobar-Hernandez, 940 F.3d at 1361. 

Mr. Singh relies heavily on the 2017 and 2019 incidents in arguing for a 

finding of future persecution. But the Board’s decision is consistent with our 

caselaw. Although “unfulfilled threats are . . . properly considered in determining 

2

 Mr. Singh’s opening brief asserts that the IJ declined to reach this issue. But 

the Board did reach the issue in its discussion of future persecution. 

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whether a petitioner has a reasonable fear of future persecution,” “only rarely, when 

they are so immediate and menacing as to cause significant suffering or harm in 

themselves, do threats per se qualify as persecution.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 

1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). The record does not compel any reasonable adjudicator 

to find that the threats here met that standard. See Zhi Wei Pang, 665 F.3d at 1231 

(recognizing that “[m]ere denigration, harassment, and threats are insufficient” to 

establish persecution (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 975 

(recognizing that “[p]ersecution . . . must entail more than just restrictions or threats 

to life and liberty”). 

Mr. Singh also highlights evidence in his favor to argue the Board erred in 

finding he failed to show he could not reasonably relocate. But even though the 

record contains evidence supporting his position, that does not mean that the Board’s 

determination is unsupported by substantial evidence. To the contrary, the record 

contains substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding. Again, much of 

Mr. Singh’s argument amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence. To the extent 

that Mr. Singh relies on new developments in India, our review is limited to “the 

administrative record on which the order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(A). And to the extent he relies on Ninth Circuit cases regarding the 

likelihood of persecution of Mann party members in India, such decisions are 

unpersuasive. Mr. Singh is not a member of the Mann party, and as he admitted to 

the IJ, the Congress party does not support the Khalistan secession movement, which 

is a ground for persecution of Mann party members. See Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 

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643, 648 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The Mann Party advocates for the creation of a sovereign 

state for Sikh people and is opposed by the Congress Party, one of India's major 

political parties.”); Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The Mann 

Party advocates for Sikh rights and an independent Khalistan state.”). 

For these reasons, Mr. Singh has not shown that any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude that he established an objectively supportable 

well-founded fear of future persecution. 

III. Withholding of Removal 

Mr. Singh challenges the denial of withholding of removal. His failure to 

satisfy the burden of proof for asylum, however, means he also necessarily failed to 

satisfy the higher standard for withholding of removal. See Escobar-Hernandez, 

940 F.3d at 1362; Zhi Wei Pang, 665 F.3d at 1233. 

IV. Relief under the CAT 

Finally, Mr. Singh challenges the denial of CAT relief. Having upheld the 

Board’s determination that Mr. Singh did not establish past persecution or a 

well-founded fear of future persecution, we also uphold the conclusion that he failed 

to satisfy the more severe standard applicable to CAT claims. See Zhi Wei Pang, 

665 F.3d at 1234; Sidabutar, 503 F.3d at 1125-26. The Board’s findings regarding 

the likelihood of torture are supported by substantial evidence. 

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CONCLUSION 

We deny the petition for review. 

Entered for the Court 

Allison H. Eid 

Circuit Judge 

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