2000 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-23-2000

Shoats v. Horn

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 99-3603

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Recommended Citation

"Shoats v. Horn" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 108.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/108
Filed May 23, 2000 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 99-3603 

RUSSELL SHOATS, 

 Appellant 

v. 

MARTIN HORN, in his official capacity as the 

Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections; 

PHILIP JOHNSON, in his official capacity as 

Superintendent of the State Correctional 

Institution at Greene 

APPEAL FROM 

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. No. 97-cv-01811) 

District Judge: The Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 3, 2000 

BEFORE: MANSMANN, NYGAARD and RENDELL, 

Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: May 23, 2000) 
 Daniel M. Kovalik, Esq. (Argued) 

 Room 807 

 5 Gateway Center 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15222 

 Attorney for Appellant 

 John G. Knorr, III, Esq. (Argued) 

 J. Bart DeLone, Esq. 

 Office of Attorney General 

 of Pennsylvania 

 Department of Justice 

 Strawberry Square, 15th Floor 

 Harrisburg, PA 17120 

 Attorneys for Appellees 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 

Appellant Russell Shoats is currently imprisoned in the 

State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania 

("SCI-Greene"), and brings this civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. He challenges his continued 

confinement in administrative custody, i.e., solitary 

confinement. Shoats claims that Appellees, the 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Philip 

Johnson, Superintendent of SCI-Greene, have kept him in 

administrative custody in violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to procedural due process. He seeks

immediate release into the general prison population, 

damages, and other relief. 

Although we hold that Shoats has a protected liberty 

interest in being released from administrative confinement, 

we conclude that SCI-Greene's procedures for evaluating 

whether Shoats should remain in administrative custody 

comported with procedural due process requirements.

Accordingly, we will affirm. 

I. Factual Background 

In 1970, Shoats was convicted of first degree murder for 

his part in an attack on a Philadelphia police guardhouse. 

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Shoats participated in the attack as a member of a black 

revolutionary group that sought to eradicate all authority. 

One police officer was killed and another seriously wounded 

in the attack. Shoats was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

Seven years later, in September 1977, Shoats and several 

other inmates took over a cell block at the Huntingdon 

State Correctional Institution as part of an attempt to 

escape. Shoats injured several guards with a knife, and, 

along with three other prisoners, attempted to escape from 

the prison as planned. Two of the inmates were captured 

immediately and a third was killed during the escape. 

Shoats remained at large until he was captured in October 

1977. 

While Shoats was a fugitive, he entered the home of a 

prison guard and forced him, his wife, and theirfive year 

old son to drive him in their car to a location outside 

Cokesburg, Pennsylvania. Shoats then ordered the hostages 

to enter the woods where he left them tied to a tree for 

almost four hours. Shoats was captured, and convicted of 

escape, robbery, kidnaping and simple assault. He was 

later transferred to Fairview State Hospital for the 

criminally insane. In March 1979, Shoats had guns 

smuggled in to him and escaped from that maximum 

security institution, again taking a hostage. In addition to 

escape and taking hostages, Shoats also has a history of 

threatening and assaulting his fellow inmates, and of 

causing disruptions at the institutions in which he is 

incarcerated. 

Pennsylvania correctional institutions have two basic 

types of housing, general population and restricted

housing. An inmate in general population may be permitted 

to be outside of his cell for lengthy periods throughout the 

day. General population inmates are permitted to have 

contact visits at least one day per week, and may 

participate in educational and vocation programs, approved 

inmate organizations, and approved fund-raising projects. 

Inmates in disciplinary and administrative custody are 

confined in Restricted Housing Units (RHU). They are 

housed in disciplinary custody when, following a hearing, 

they have been found guilty of prison misconduct. The 

maximum period that an inmate may be confined in 

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disciplinary custody is ninety days. In contrast, 

administrative custody is used to assure a safe and secure 

environment for all inmates and staff by separating those 

inmates whose presence in the general population 

constitutes a threat to themselves, others, or the safety and 

security of the institution, or who represent an escape risk. 

Inmates in administrative custody are not allowed to have 

radios, televisions, telephone calls (except emergency or 

legal), personal property except writing materials, or books 

other than legal materials and a personal religious volume. 

Non-legal visits of one per week are allowed under 

appropriate security procedures designated by the Program 

Review Committee (PRC). Pennsylvania does not provide 

inmates in administrative custody with educational 

programs, and all meals are eaten in the inmates' cells. 

Unlike disciplinary custody, there is no maximum period 

of confinement in administrative custody. Rather, release 

depends upon an evaluation of many factors. While time 

spent and behavior are to be considered, so too are

continued risk, safety of others, and recommendations of 

prison personnel, including treatment staff. 

Under Department of Corrections (DOC) policy, an inmate 

must receive written notice of the reason for his placement 

in administrative custody and he is entitled to receive a 

hearing before a PRC within six days of the initial transfer 

to administrative custody. Every thirty days thereafter, 

inmates assigned to administrative custody have the

opportunity to be personally interviewed by the PRC, which 

then determines whether the inmate should continue to be 

maintained in administrative custody, taking into account 

a variety of factors including the safety of other inmates 

and staff, the continued public or institutional risk, and the 

recommendation of treatment staff. 

In addition to separation from the general prison 

population, the DOC may order that specific prisoners be 

separated from each other and, if necessary, placed in 

different institutions. The DOC may enter such orders after 

reviewing specific instances of misconduct, and determining 

that specific separation is appropriate. As a result of such 

review, Shoats currently has fifteen individuals from whom 

he must be separated. 

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As of 1989, Shoats was imprisoned at the State 

Correctional Institution in Dallas, Pennsylvania ("SCIDallas"), where he was placed in administrative custody. In 

November of that year he was transferred to the federal 

penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. When he returned to 

Pennsylvania in June 1991, Shoats was again imprisoned 

at SCI-Dallas and again placed in administrative custody. 

In January 1995, he was transferred to SCI-Greene, where 

he continues to be held in administrative custody. 

Shoats has spent an extraordinarily long period in 

administrative custody. Nonetheless, his status has been 

subject to PRC review every thirty days. No member of a 

PRC has ever recommended releasing Shoats from 

administrative custody; they have universally concluded 

that Shoats remains a significant danger to institutional 

safety and security. These conclusions are supported by 

DOC psychological evaluations of Shoats, which 

characterize him as a remorseless sociopath knowledgeable 

in the workings of prisons and escape techniques, capable 

of leading other inmates in such undertakings, and inclined 

to do so. He has also been described as volatile and 

manipulative. 

In June 1998, the Secretary of the DOC asked Thomas

James, a special assistant to the Secretary, to conduct an 

extensive review to determine whether Shoats should

remain in administrative custody. James recognized that 

such extended administrative custody was atypical for the 

prison population. He noted that Shoats' volatile nature 

and need to be separated from numerous other prisoners 

make his situation unique. However, his review also

concluded that, as with other inmates who have a history 

of escape and violence against correctional officers and 

other inmates, Shoats' continued placement in 

administrative custody is absolutely necessary. 

Thereafter, Shoats brought this action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. S 1983, seeking to be immediately released into the 

general prison population. He also sought damages and 

other relief. He claims that the appellees, the Secretary of 

the DOC and the Superintendent of SCI-Greene, have kept 

him in administrative custody in violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment right to procedural due process. 

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Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. The District Court agreed with Shoats 

that he possesses a protected liberty interest in obtaining 

release into the general population. However, adopting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge, the District Court 

held that the defendants had provided Shoats with the 

process he was due and granted the defendants' motion for 

summary judgment. This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion 

Shoats claims that the duration of his placement in

solitary confinement, and the attendant hardships of such 

confinement, require that we affirm the District Court's 

conclusion that he possesses a protected liberty interest in 

being released to the general prison population. He also 

claims that Defendants did not afford him all of the process 

he was due. The record evidence leads us to conclude that 

although Shoats' confinement is sufficient to trigger the 

procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, the 

process provided him was sufficient to pass Constitutional 

muster. 

A. Shoats' Liberty Interest 

In analyzing a procedural due process claim, thefirst 

step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is 

one within the contemplation of the `liberty or property' 

language of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fuentes v. 

Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Once we determine that the 

interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause, 

the question then becomes what process is due to protect 

it. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 

Protected liberty or property interests generally arise 

either from the Due Process Clause or from state-created 

statutory entitlement. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 

U.S. 564, 575 (1972). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 

(1995), the Supreme Court announced a new standard for 

determining whether prison conditions deprive a prisoner of 

a liberty interest that is protected by procedural due 

process guarantees. Although the Court acknowledged that 

liberty interests could arise from means other than the Due 

Process Clause itself, the Court concluded that state- 

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created liberty interests could arise only when a prison's 

action imposed an "atypical and significant hardship on the 

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 

515 U.S. at 483. 

At issue in Sandin was whether the plaintiff's thirty-day 

detention in disciplinary custody in a Hawaii prison 

impacted any protected liberty interest under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concluded that the 

prisoner in Sandin did not have a protected liberty interest 

in remaining free of disciplinary detention or segregation 

because his thirty-day detention, although punitive,"did 

not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confinement in 

either duration or degree of restriction." Id. at 486. In 

finding that the prisoner's thirty-day confinement in 

disciplinary custody did not present the type of atypical, 

significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably 

create a liberty interest, the Court considered the following 

two factors: 1) the amount of time the prisoner was placed 

into disciplinary segregation; and 2) whether the conditions 

of his confinement in disciplinary segregation were

significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon 

other inmates in solitary confinement. Id. 

The parties in this case do not dispute the fact that very 

few Pennsylvania prisoners have been confined in 

administrative custody for periods of eight years or more. 

Ben Varner, the Superintendent who reviewed the PRC

decisions on Shoats, testified that to the best of his 

recollection, approximately one percent of the inmate 

population at SCI-Greene has been confined in restricted 

housing for such lengthy periods of time. (Varner Dep. at 

54-61; A145-52). Moreover, Thomas James, Special 

Assistant to DOC Commissioner Martin Horn, concedes

that the amount of time Shoats has already spent in

administrative confinement is not only atypical, but is 

indeed "unique." A214-15. 

In addition, the record suggests that Shoats' long-term 

confinement has imposed a significant hardship on him in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Shoats has 

been confined in virtual isolation for almost eight years. See 

A45 (Shoats Dep.). He is confined in his cell for 23 hours a 

day, five days a week, and 24 hours a day, two days a 

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week. Id. He eats meals by himself. Id. His sole contact is 

with DOC officials, and has been denied contact with his 

family for almost eight years. Id. He is prohibited from 

participating in any educational, vocational, or other 

organizational activities. Id. He is prohibited from visiting 

the library. Id. James concedes that he has never witnessed 

one example of such permanent solitary confinement in his 

22 years with the DOC. See A211. Moreover, James 

explained that he would be concerned about the 

psychological damage to an inmate after only 90 days of 

such confinement and would generally recommend transfer 

to the general population after 90 days as a consequence. 

See A184-85, 188-90. 

Based on this record, we have no difficulty concluding 

that eight years in administrative custody, with no prospect 

of immediate release in the near future, is "atypical" in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and that 

Shoats' eight-year confinement subjects him to conditions 

that differ significantly from "routine" prison conditions in 

Pennsylvania state institutions. 

B. Shoats' Due Process Claim 

Although we hold that Shoats has a protected liberty 

interest that has been adversely affected by his indefinite 

segregation in administrative custody, we reject Shoats' 

argument that he has been deprived of the process he is 

due under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Supreme 

Court considered whether prison inmates were entitled to 

due process before being placed in solitary confinement for 

administrative -- rather than disciplinary -- reasons. The 

Court expressly rejected the idea that due process required 

a "detailed adversary proceeding," on the ground that it 

would not "materially assist" the decision to be made. Id. at 

473-74. The Court further held that in these situations, an 

"informal, nonadversary review" at which the prisoner has 

the opportunity to state his views, satisfies the 

requirements of due process: 

 An inmate must merely receive some notice of the 

 charges against him and an opportunity to present his 

 views to the prison official charged with deciding 

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 whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. 

 Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will 

 accomplish this purpose, although prison 

 administrators may find it more useful to permit oral 

 presentations in cases where they believe a written 

 statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, 

 and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then- 

 available evidence against the prisoner, the Due 

 Process Clause is satisfied. 

Id. at 476. 

The inmate in Hewitt received notice of the charges

against him the day after his misconduct took place. Id. at 

477. Only five days after his transfer to administrative 

segregation, a Hearing Committee reviewed the existing 

evidence against him. Id. Moreover, the inmate 

acknowledged on his misconduct form that he "had the 

opportunity to have [his] version reported as part of the 

record," and thus had an opportunity to present a 

statement to the Committee. Id. The Supreme Court held 

that this proceeding plainly satisfied the Due Process 

requirements for confinement of the inmate in 

administrative custody. Id. Here, Shoats has been given 

exactly the same opportunities as those given to the inmate 

in Hewitt; there is therefore no question that, on its face, 

the procedure provided to Shoats is constitutionally 

adequate. 

The process provided by the Pennsylvania DOC to an 

inmate confined in administrative custody is as follows. A 

hearing is conducted by the PRC, in which the rationale for 

the administrative custody placement is read and explained 

to the inmate. See A84. The inmate is permitted to respond 

to the rationale for administrative custody placement either 

orally or in writing. Id. A Committee member then drafts a 

summary of the inmate's statements. Id. A written 

summary of the entire hearing is then prepared, which 

includes the reasons relied upon by the PRC to reach its 

decision, and a copy of this summary is given to the 

inmate. Id. 

An inmate may appeal the PRC's decision to the 

Superintendent in writing within two days of the completion 

 9 
of the hearing, and the decision of the Superintendent must 

be forwarded to the inmate within ten days of the receipt of 

the appeal. See A85. The inmate's right to appeal 

terminates when he or she is released from administrative 

custody. Id. 

At least once every thirty days, those inmates assigned to 

administrative custody have the right to be personally 

interviewed by the PRC. Id. For those inmates not released 

from administrative custody following the thirty-day review, 

the reasons for the PRC's decision are forwarded to the 

Superintendent for his or her review. Id. If the 

Superintendent agrees that the rationale for holding an 

inmate in administrative custody is reasonable, he or she 

notifies the inmate accordingly. Id. If, however, the 

Superintendent believes the inmate should be released to 

the general population, he or she will so order it. Id. 

After an inmate is confined for ninety days in 

administrative custody, the Superintendent must complete 

a formal report to the Regional Deputy Commissioner, who 

then reviews the recommendation of the institution to 

determine if any further action is necessary. Id. Further 

action may include release to the general population, 

transfer to another facility or program, or continuation in 

administrative custody. Id. In light of the standard set forth 

by the Supreme Court in Hewitt, we conclude that the 

Pennsylvania procedures clearly comply with due process 

requirements. 

The record reflects that the procedures called for did in 

fact occur. Specific program review committee progress 

reports are included in the record, which reflect Shoats' 

choice to appear at some, but not all, of his PRC reviews. 

The reports reflect that Shoats raised and discussed 

various issues at these committee sessions, including his 

desire for library time, complaints about the commissary 

and medical treatment, visitation rights, and other general 

matters. In many instances, Shoats complained about the 

denial of his release into the general population, and he 

was advised of the prison's reasons for denying his release. 

There is no indication that Shoats presented any 

countervailing arguments or considerations to the review 

committee. 

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Shoats does not argue that he was denied the 

opportunity to respond or be heard, nor does he argue that 

the prison authorities failed to consider favorable

information or that they otherwise dealt with his case in a 

perfunctory fashion. Cf. Sourbeer v. Robinson , 791 F.2d 

1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986). In fact, Shoats does not contend 

that he made any arguments, or offered any favorable 

factual data to counter the prison's rationale for holding 

him. Rather, Shoats argues that his continued confinement 

in administrative custody is based solely on his past crimes 

of murder, escape, kidnaping and assault, and therefore 

has no contemporaneous justification. (Appellant's Br. at 

42-48). We disagree. Shoats is not confined to 

administrative custody simply because he committed 

crimes in the past, but because he is, in the considered 

judgment of all the prison professionals who have evaluated 

him, a current threat to the security and good order of the 

institution, and to the safety of other people. See A238-44 

(Mistrick Dep.). This assessment is based partly on Shoats' 

conduct, but also on the prison professionals' current 

impressions of him based on their day-to-day dealings with 

Shoats over time. See, e.g., A243 (Mistrick Dep.)("[H]e 

represents a danger to the secure running of the institution 

and the safety of others"); A115 (Varner Dep.)("[I]n my 

opinion, this man was still a danger"); A169 (White Dep.)("I 

felt he was still dangerous"). 

Even were we to conclude that Shoats' continued 

confinement in administrative custody is based solely on 

his past crimes, the process he received would nonetheless 

pass constitutional muster, because predictions of likely 

future behavior based on a generally volatile criminal 

character have been upheld by the Supreme Court: 

 In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional 

 security, prison administrators necessarily draw on 

 more than the specific facts surrounding a particular 

 incident; instead, they must consider the character of 

 the inmates confined in the institution, recent and 

 longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, 

 prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile 

 atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may

 constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other 

 11 
 prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed 

 no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more 

 imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially 

 disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in 

 this context, like that of those making parole decisions, 

 turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on 

 predictions of future behavior. 

See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474 (internal citations omitted). 

Thus, Shoats could conceivably be held in administrative 

custody merely because his prior crimes reasonably 

foreshadow future misconduct. 

Shoats also claims that his confinement is the result of 

the "bias" of Superintendent Varner, who reviewed his 

confinement at SCI-Greene, first as a member of the PRC 

and later as Superintendent. (Appellant's Br. at 38-39). 

However, Shoats' administrative custody dates back to 

1991, long before Shoats came to SCI-Greene, and it has 

continued to the present, long after Varner left SCI-Greene 

in April 1998. No member of the PRC, and no 

Superintendent, at SCI-Greene or elsewhere, has ever 

recommended that Shoats be released to the general prison 

population. Thus, we hold that Shoats' "bias" argument is 

without foundation. 

Shoats' confinement in administrative custody has been, 

in accordance with the DOC regulations, reviewed every 

month by the PRC and the Superintendent. Furthermore, 

Shoats has been given the opportunity to present his views 

personally at each review. See A85-86. In effect, the record 

demonstrates that Shoats' continued placement in 

administrative custody is supported by evidence sufficient 

to pass constitutional muster. Because Shoats has failed to 

provide any support for his assertions that his PRC reviews 

were constitutionally inadequate, we hold that the periodic 

reviews conducted by the PRC here comport with the 

minimum constitutional standards for due process. 

III. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision. 

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Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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