This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A22-1528

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Dahir Abdow Noor,

Appellant.

Filed January 16, 2024

Affirmed

Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-21-8215

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, 

Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Barry S. Edwards, Max A. Keller, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for 

appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Klaphake, 

Judge.

*

 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

Appellant Dahir Abdow Noor appeals his conviction for two counts of criminal 

sexual conduct. Noor argues the district court (1) improperly admitted expert testimony;

(2) permitted prosecutorial misconduct during opening statement and closing argument;

and (3) excluded evidence that was necessary for Noor to present a complete defense. We 

affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Noor with two counts of criminal sexual 

conduct after his stepdaughter, A.W., accused him of sexual abuse. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.343, subd. 1(a), 1(h)(iii) (2020). A.W. alleged the abuse occurred when she was 

eight years old while she resided in an apartment with her mother, siblings, and Noor. The 

family contacted law enforcement after A.W. disclosed the alleged abuse to her sister. Law 

enforcement referred A.W.’s case to CornerHouse for a forensic interview. At trial, A.W. 

provided detailed testimony about her allegations, which largely tracked the substance of 

her interview with CornerHouse. After a five-day trial, a jury found Noor guilty of both 

counts. The district court sentenced Noor to 90 months in prison, the presumptive middleof-the-box sentence.

Noor appeals. 
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DECISION

In this direct appeal, Noor challenges his convictions on three grounds. First, Noor 

argues the district court erred when it admitted unobjected-to expert testimony from the 

CornerHouse interviewer because the interviewer’s testimony exceeded the limits of her 

expertise, lacked foundational reliability, and vouched for A.W.’s credibility. Second, 

Noor asserts the prosecutor committed unobjected-to misconduct during his opening 

statement and closing argument. Last, Noor argues the district court violated his 

constitutional right to present a complete defense when it did not allow him to offer 

evidence that he claims showed A.W.’s mother coached A.W. to lie about the abuse. We 

address each argument in turn.

I.

Noor first argues the district court improperly admitted the interviewer’s expert 

testimony. Specifically, Noor challenges the interviewer’s testimony about “episodic” and 

“script” memory. During her testimony, the interviewer described how children might 

recall episodes of sexual abuse and explained that “episodic” memory is memory of 

specific individual events, compared to “script” memory that generalizes a repeated 

occurrence. Noor also challenges the interviewer’s testimony that children often delay 

reporting sexual abuse due to embarrassment or fear about the consequences of disclosure.

Admission of expert testimony is within the district court’s “broad discretion,” and

we typically review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 2009). However, because Noor did not object to 

the interviewer’s testimony, we review for plain error. See State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 
4

868, 872 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02). To show plain error, Noor must 

demonstrate “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” 

State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn. 2014). If these three prongs are met, we

correct the error if it seriously impacts “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the appellant fails to meet one prong of

the plain-error test, we do not consider the remaining prongs. See id at 798.

First, Noor argues the district court improperly determined the interviewer was 

qualified to testify that children may describe sexual abuse in the form of an “episodic” or 

“script” memory. Noor contends that “episodic” and “script” memory are scientific 

concepts and the interviewer lacked the qualifications to testify about these concepts 

because she is not a psychologist, psychiatrist, or licensed counselor. 

Whether an expert is qualified is within the district court’s sound discretion. State 

v. Sandberg, 406 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Minn. 1987). “[K]nowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education” may qualify an expert to testify. Minn. R. Evid. 702. The record 

reflects the interviewer had the following qualifications. She earned a bachelor’s degree 

and a master’s degree in social work. Before CornerHouse, she was a therapist at a childtreatment facility. The interviewer also taught and attended numerous trainings on the 

CornerHouse-interview method and forensic interviews more generally. She testified that 

she had conducted over 1,309 interviews with CornerHouse. Because the interviewer had 

extensive qualifications to testify on the topic of child sex abuse, the district court did not 

plainly err when it allowed her to testify as an expert. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 422 N.W.2d 

296, 297-98 (Minn. App. 1988) (permitting the testimony on the “common characteristics 
5

of sexually abused adolescents” from an expert with an undergraduate degree in elementary 

education and course work towards a doctorate in school psychology).

Second, Noor argues the interviewer’s testimony about “episodic” and “script”

memory lacked foundational reliability. Noor claims such testimony is “pseudo-science.” 

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 “does not define, generally, what ‘foundational 

reliability’ means.” Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 165 (Minn. 2012).

Nevertheless, to establish foundational reliability under rule 702, the district court must:

(1) “analyze the proffered testimony in light of the purpose for which it is being offered”

and (2) “consider the underlying reliability, consistency, and accuracy of the subject about 

which the expert is testifying.” Id. at 167-68. Also, “the proponent of evidence . . . must 

show that it is reliable in that particular case.” Id. at 168.

We do not discern any plain error in the foundational reliability for the interviewer’s 

testimony about “episodic” and “script” memory.1

 The state established the interviewer’s 

qualifications to testify regarding the emotional and psychological characteristics of 

children who experience sexual abuse. And contrary to the appellant’s assertions, the 

interviewer testified using defined terms in her field to describe how children may 

remember events. 

1 Our recent nonprecedential opinions have also concluded that expert testimony about 

child sex abuse from experts with CornerHouse training was foundationally reliable.

Contreras v. State, No. A22-0329, 2023 WL 18279, at *2, *5-6 (Minn. App. Jan. 3, 2023), 

rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2023); State v. Shafer, No. A20-0541, 2021 WL 1082338, at 

*3, *5-6 (Minn. App. Mar. 22, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 2021).
6

Finally, Noor argues the interviewer violated the rule against an expert vouching for 

another witness’s credibility. See State v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 790-92 (Minn. App. 

2006), aff’d on other grounds, 728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007). Noor points to the 

interviewer’s testimony about “episodic” and “script” memory, and her testimony about 

delays in children reporting abuse. 

Typically, a jury’s “common experience affords sufficient basis” to assess witness 

credibility. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 (Minn. 1984). The risk that expert 

opinion might unduly influence a jury “mitigates against admission” even if it is helpful 

for deliberation. Id. at 610. However, leniency towards expert testimony that might inform 

a jury’s credibility assessment is warranted when a witness’s behavior and the nuances of 

how they might describe certain allegations fall outside a jury’s common experience. See 

id. at 609-10. Although “[a]n expert witness may not testify as to the credibility of a 

specific witness, [they] may be able to testify generally as to certain psychological or 

physiological conditions that may affect credibility, if such testimony is beyond the 

knowledge and experience of an average jury.” State v. Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736, 741

(Minn. 2005). 

In Myers, a psychologist testified about the “general characteristics [of] sexually 

abused children.” Id. at 607-09. To determine whether the district court erred in admitting 

the expert’s testimony, the supreme court emphasized that, in the specific context of child 

sex abuse, a victim’s behavior may fall outside juror’s common experience because

children tend to describe conduct as occurring over a vague time frame and may appear 

“uncertain or ambivalent.” Id. at 610. The expert testimony was admissible because it 
7

provided “relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child’s conduct and demeanor.” 

Id. In contrast, in Wembley, a CornerHouse interviewer vouched for a witness’s credibility 

when she defined four criteria for evaluating child credibility and then described that the 

child-witness met those criteria. See 712 N.W.2d at 790-92.

Here, the interviewer’s testimony falls into the type of permissible testimony Myers 

described: “[b]ackground data providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of [a] 

child’s conduct and demeanor.” See id. By providing general information about how 

children might describe sexual abuse, and why they might wait to report it, the interviewer

provided context transcending the jury’s common experience about A.W.’s allegations. 

And unlike Wembley, the interviewer did not testify about criteria for assessing childwitness credibility and then explain that A.W. met those criteria. See 712 N.W.2d at 790-

92. Thus, the interviewer did not violate the rule against an expert impermissibly testifying 

about witness credibility.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not plainly err when it allowed 

the interviewer’s expert testimony. 

II.

Noor next argues the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening

statement and closing argument. Noor asserts “[t]he misconduct included vouching for 

[A.W.], stating personal opinion as to the ultimate question of guilt, appealing to emotion, 

disparaging the defense, and misstating the testimony.” Because Noor did not object, we

apply the modified plain-error test specific to prosecutorial misconduct allegations. See 

State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). First, the defendant must demonstrate
8

“that the prosecutor’s conduct constitutes an error that is plain.” Id. If the defendant 

identifies a plain error, the state must demonstrate that there is “no reasonable likelihood 

that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the 

verdict.” Id. (quotations omitted). Whether the state met its burden depends on “the 

strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper 

suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the 

improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 681-82 (Minn. 2007). 

Noor points to the following remarks from opening statement and closing argument

to assert that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct. First, Noor contends the 

prosecutor made conclusory assertions during opening statement that did not simply 

describe the facts to be proved, thereby undermining the role of the jury to evaluate 

credibility and discern the facts for itself. Specifically:

[A.W.] was eight years old when her stepfather, [Noor], 

the Defendant, sexually abused her. It started in December of 

2020 in their apartment, and it happened numerous times over 

the course of the next several months. 

Second, Noor argues that the state inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury when 

the prosecutor commented:

Even when a victim is a child, they still have to take the stand. 

They still have to testify.

Now, [A.W.] may be scared. She may be nervous. But 

she will be here, and she’ll testify and tell you what happened 

to her.

Third, Noor argues the state invited the jury to place itself in the alleged victim’s shoes and 

invented facts when the prosecutor said:
9

[A.W.] is old enough to know to a certain extent that 

what happened was wrong or inappropriate. But [A.W.] 

doesn’t know how to deal with that, doesn’t know how to deal 

with it like an adult would. But can you imagine for a moment 

what is going on inside the 8-year-old [A.W.’s] mind when this 

is happening. 

She may not have the confidence or persistence to tell 

her mother about what was happening like she does now. . . . 

It is likely that [A.W.] saw her mother – how hard she 

was working, how stressed she was, how overburdened she 

was cooking or doing something else. . . .

. . . Maybe [A.W.] doesn’t have the words to 

communicate fully what is going on to her, the fear of not being 

believed, wanting to forget what happened because it was 

uncomfortable.

Lastly, Noor argues that the state denigrated the defense when the prosecutor 

explained that Noor’s closing argument would likely focus on “minor inconsistencies” in 

A.W.’s testimony and then stated:

[I]magine for a moment what the defense’s argument would be 

if [A.W.] was perfectly consistent. What would their argument 

be? That she memorized or rehearsed this story. That she must 

have seen it before and is remembering the details because of 

that. 

Assuming, without deciding, that these statements amounted to plain error, we 

conclude the state met its burden to show there was “no reasonable likelihood that the 

absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.” 

See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotations omitted). 

Here, the state presented a robust case against Noor, including A.W.’s testimony in 

which she detailed the abuse and the interviewer’s expert testimony in which the expert 
10

provided further context for the jury to evaluate A.W.’s testimony. The district court also 

ameliorated any impact the above statements had on the verdict when it instructed the jury 

before opening statements that “what the attorneys say is not evidence.” And the district 

court again instructed the jury prior to closing arguments that “the arguments or other 

remarks of an attorney are not evidence.” Furthermore, the portions of the state’s opening 

statement and closing argument that Noor contests represented relatively small portions of

those remarks as a whole. Therefore, the state satisfied its burden to show that any alleged 

plain errors during opening statement and closing argument did not have a significant effect 

on the jury’s verdict. 

III.

Noor finally argues the district court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence 

that A.W.’s mother had previously threatened or removed men from her home. Appellate 

courts review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 

592, 597 (Minn. 2010). Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 402, “[e]vidence which is not 

relevant is not admissible.” And even relevant evidence can “be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.

At trial, one of Noor’s defenses was that A.W.’s mother had coached A.W. to lie 

about the allegations. To support this defense, Noor’s counsel proposed using a transcript 

from a YouTube video in which A.W.’s mother allegedly described the fathers of her 

children as “losers.” Noor’s counsel also stated that Noor would testify that he heard a 
11

rumor that A.W.’s mother had driven a past partner out of the country with threats that she 

would accuse him of sexual assault. 

Before A.W.’s mother testified, the state moved for the district court to preclude this 

evidence on the grounds that it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The district court 

granted the state’s motion, determining that Noor’s counsel could not inquire into A.W.’s 

mother removing partners or threating to remove them. But the district court clearly 

indicated “[t]o the extent that the defense wishes to inquire of the victim’s mother that she 

told her daughter not to smile or laugh during the interview in support of [his] theory that 

she coached her, I will permit that on cross-examination.”

Noor contends that by excluding the evidence, the district court deprived him of his 

due-process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Noor is 

correct that defendants have a “constitutional right to present a complete defense.” State 

v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2009). But the evidence the defense presents 

must still satisfy the rules of evidence. See Minn. R. Evid. 1101(a) (stating that the 

Minnesota Rules of Evidence, subject to certain exceptions, “apply to all actions and 

proceedings in the courts of this state”).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the evidence. 

First, it is not entirely clear how the YouTube video transcript regarding A.W.’s mother

not trusting past partners was relevant to Noor’s theory that A.W. was coached. See Minn. 

R. Evid. 402. And the probative value of Noor’s second- or third-hand knowledge that 

A.W.’s mother may have driven a past partner out of the country with threats that she would 
12

accuse him of sexual assault did not outweigh any unfair prejudice likely to result from 

such an unsubstantiated allegation.2

 See Minn. R. Evid. 403. 

For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded 

evidence that A.W.’s mother had threatened or removed men from her home.

Affirmed.

2 The state did not raise a hearsay objection. See Minn. R. Evid. 801 (defining hearsay as 

“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,

offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”); Minn. R. Evid. 802 

(explaining that hearsay is inadmissible “except as provided by these rules or by other rules 

prescribed by the Supreme Court or by the Legislature”).