Filed 2/2/16 P. v. Miranda CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS A. MIRANDA, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B255047

(Super. Ct. No. KA099679)

(Los Angeles County)

Carlos A. Miranda was charged with felony evasion of a peace officer with willful 

or wanton disregard for safety of other persons or property. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. 

(a).) It was alleged that he had suffered a prior strike and five prior convictions. (Pen. 

Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b).)1 Appellant 

represented himself at trial. 

The jury convicted appellant of the felony evasion charge. Appellant admitted the 

prior strike and prior convictions. The trial court sentenced him to the low term of 16 

months in state prison, doubled to 32 months for his prior strike. The court struck the 

five prior convictions. 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2

Appellant contends the trial court erred by: (1) failing to instruct the jury as to the 

Vehicle Code sections he allegedly violated; (2) denying his Batson/Wheeler2 motion; (3) 

declining to exclude evidence of the uncharged offense of grand theft auto; (4) failing to 

instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 375; (5) denying his motion for a new trial; and (6) 

committing cumulative error. We affirm. 

FACTS

On October 5, 2012, Anselma Elias reported that her black Chevrolet Suburban 

had been stolen. Elias told Deputy Jeniffer Lund of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department that the theft occurred while she was loading groceries into the vehicle. Elias 

said it was stolen by a 40- to 45-year-old Hispanic male who wore a blue shirt and khaki 

pants. 

The following evening, Deputy Ralph Polanco, Jr. saw appellant driving a black 

Chevrolet Suburban in the City of Industry. A license plate check revealed the vehicle 

had been stolen. Deputy Polanco followed appellant as he proceeded westbound on 

Valley Boulevard. After the deputy activated his lights and siren, appellant slowed down, 

moved to the right-hand side of the street but did not stop. Instead, he turned right onto 

the northbound lane of Vineland Avenue without signaling, in violation of Vehicle Code 

sections 21658 and 22107. 

Deputy Sean Cariaga joined the pursuit. He activated his lights and siren and 

drove one or two vehicles behind Deputy Polanco on Vineland Avenue. Although 

appellant could have pulled over at a commercial building, he continued to proceed 

northbound. Deputy Polanco described appellant’s driving as “slightly erratic.” 

Appellant drove the car up onto a sidewalk, in violation of Vehicle Code section 21663, 

and then back down onto a driveway. As appellant approached Nelson Avenue, he 

violated Vehicle Code sections 21650 and 22107 by swerving against traffic into the 

southbound lane of Vineland Avenue without signaling that he was turning. 

Appellant continued to drive on the wrong side of Vineland Avenue until, during a 

 

2

Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 

258 (Wheeler).
3

break in traffic, he swerved back into the northbound lane. Finding himself locked in 

traffic, appellant stopped behind a parked car and ran from the vehicle. He was detained 

at gunpoint approximately two or three houses away. Deputies found a blue shirt in the 

vehicle. 

On October 10, 2012, Detective Tracy Wright met with Elias at the police station. 

Detective Wright showed her a photographic six-pack, which contained appellant’s 

photograph. Elias identified appellant as a family friend and said the person who stole 

her car was not in the photographs. According to Detective Wright, Elias said that if 

appellant was the person driving the car, she was going to press charges. 

Elias testified that she and appellant are friends and that he was not the person 

who stole her Suburban. She denied saying she was going to press charges against 

appellant, but admitted she did not give him permission to drive her vehicle on October 5 

or 6, 2012. 

DISCUSSION

Vehicle Code Section 2800.2 Instructions

To convict appellant of felony evasion of a peace officer under Vehicle Code 

section 2800.2, subdivision (a), the jury was required to find that “during the pursuit, the 

defendant drove in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” 

The trial court delivered a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2181, which stated that 

“driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes 

but is not limited to causing damage to property while driving or committing three or 

more violations that are each assigned a traffic violation point. [¶] Each of the following 

violations is assigned a traffic violation point: And that’s Vehicle Code section 21658, 

which is unsafe lane change violation; Vehicle Code section 21663, which is driving on 

the sidewalk violation; Vehicle Code section 22107, which is a turn signal violation; and 

Vehicle Code section 21650, which is failure to drive on the right side of the roadway 

violation.” Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 

statutory elements of each of the four alleged traffic violations.
4

Appellant did not request the instruction he now contends was mandatory. 

Because the purported error does not amount to structural error, he forfeited this 

argument by failing either to object to the lack of an instruction on these elements or to 

request such instruction. (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 897, disapproved on 

other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 & fn. 22.)

Even if the claim of error had been properly preserved, any error in failing to fully 

define the Vehicle Code violations was harmless. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 

Cal.2d 818, 836.) The trial court’s abbreviated definitions accurately described each of 

the statutory violations, and the deputies’ testimony was unequivocal and undisputed that 

appellant committed the violations during the pursuit. 

Vehicle Code section 21663 states that “no person shall operate or move a motor 

vehicle upon a sidewalk except as may be necessary to enter or leave adjacent property.” 

The trial court appropriately referred to it as the “driving on the sidewalk” violation. 

Deputy Polanco testified, without contradiction, that while appellant was fleeing the 

pursuing officers, he drove the vehicle “up the driveway/sidewalk” for a brief period, and 

then came back down before continuing northbound on Vineland Avenue. Appellant’s 

claim that “it is reasonably probable” that the jury would have found that he did not 

violate Vehicle Code section 21663, if the jury had been read the entire statute, is both 

conclusory and speculative.

The same is true of the violation for “unsafe lane change.” Vehicle Code section 

21658 states that “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly 

marked lanes for traffic in one direction, the following rules apply: [¶] (a) A vehicle 

shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved 

from the lane until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.” Here, the 

evidence was undisputed that while deputies were in pursuit, appellant swerved abruptly 

into oncoming traffic and proceeded to drive on the wrong side of the road before 

swerving back into the proper lane. Deputy Polanco testified this was a violation of 

Vehicle Code section 21658. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude otherwise.
5

Appellant’s complaints about Vehicle Code sections 22107 and 21650 are 

similarly unavailing. Vehicle Code section 22107, which the trial court called “a turn 

signal violation,” states that “[n]o person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or 

move right or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable 

safety and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in 

this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” Vehicle 

Code section 21650, which the court defined as the “failure to drive on the right side of 

the roadway violation,” states that subject to exceptions that are inapplicable here, “a 

vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.” Deputy Polanco testified that 

appellant violated both sections when, while traveling northbound on Vineland Avenue, 

he abruptly swerved against traffic into the southbound lane without signaling. Appellant 

also violated Vehicle Code section 22107 when he failed to signal before making a right 

turn onto Vineland Avenue. Once again, appellant offered no contrary evidence. We 

conclude he has failed to show error.

Batson/Wheeler

Appellant contends the court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion based 

on the prosecution’s excusal of Juror No. 6182 (originally Juror No. 1). Appellant claims 

the prospective juror was dismissed in violation of his constitutional rights. We disagree.

The federal and state constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to 

exclude prospective jurors due to their race. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97; Wheeler,

supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) On a Batson/Wheeler motion, “the issue is not whether 

there is a pattern of systematic exclusion; rather, the issue is whether a particular 

prospective juror has been challenged because of group bias.” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 

Cal.4th 491, 549.) In the three-step constitutional analysis of peremptory challenges, the 

first step is for the defendant to make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality 

of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. If the defendant 

makes out a prima facie case, the second step is for the prosecutor to explain adequately 

the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the peremptory 

challenges. If the prosecutor offers adequate justifications, the third step is for the court 
6

to decide whether the opponent of the peremptory challenges has proved purposeful 

racial discrimination. (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612-613; see People v. 

Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 383.)

Here, appellant raised a Batson/Wheeler objection after the prosecutor exercised 

peremptory challenges as to four Latino or Hispanic prospective jurors (Juror Nos. 8299, 

4176, 6182 and 7858). Of the four prospective jurors, appellant specifically mentioned 

only Juror No. 8299 (formerly Juror No. 10). He noted that Juror No. 8299 has “been to 

college. He’s smart. What is the race-neutral reasons she’s dismissing all these Latinos. 

Don’t I [get] a right to a jury of my peers?” 

Without finding a prima facie showing of discrimination, the trial court asked the 

prosecutor if she wished to respond. When the prosecutor asked whether she should 

address all four prospective jurors, the trial court instructed her to discuss “the most 

recent peremptory challenge [Juror No. 7858].” The prosecutor explained that she had 

dismissed Juror No. 7858 because he had a brother who was arrested for evading a police 

officer and then sent to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. She also stated 

that “when I inquired of him on his ability to share, interact with a juror in jury 

deliberations, he indicated that his personality was of such that he did not share. He was 

more quiet and more reserved and so those are obviously qualities that a juror needs in 

engaging in jury deliberations.” The trial court found this was “a fair exercise of a 

peremptory challenge” and was “certainly [race] neutral,” noting the “juror does carry 

some baggage based on life experiences.” 

The trial court then noted that appellant had mentioned other Latino prospective 

jurors that he believed the prosecutor had excused based on race. Appellant again 

identified Juror No. 8299, a college student who had had some negative experiences with 

law enforcement, but who also wanted to work in law enforcement or attend law school. 

The court did not ask the prosecutor to provide reasons for his dismissal. It observed that 

although the juror “appeared to be pro law enforcement which I would not question 

[appellant’s] exercise of a peremptory on that basis but he also certainly expressed 
7

interest to the contrary that I don’t think is based upon race completely in terms of 

excusing that person from further jury service on our case.” 

Next, the trial court elected to address Juror No. 6182, who appeared to be a 

Hispanic male from Azusa. Once again, the court did not ask the prosecutor to provide a 

reason for the dismissal. It noted the prospective juror, who works in banking, “doesn’t 

have a whole lot of life experiences. Single, no jury duty, no children, no law 

enforcement ties. Kind of relatively new to this type of situation being a juror, being 

required to render a decision most certainly important to you, Mr. Miranda. I’m really 

keeping an eye on the issue that you’re raising, . . . [b]ut I really don’t think the [P]eople 

are excusing any of these jurors based solely upon racial or a cognizable group that 

would certainly deny you of a fair trial.”

3

 

As a general rule, when the trial court invites the prosecution to explain its reasons 

for exercising a particular peremptory challenge, the court implicitly finds a prima facie 

showing of discrimination. (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104 [“By asking 

the prosecutor to explain the peremptory challenges, the trial court here implicitly found 

that defendant had made a prima facie showing”].) Appellant argues that because the 

trial court asked the prosecutor if she wished to respond to appellant’s initial 

Batson/Wheeler objection, there was an implicit finding of a prima facie showing of 

discrimination in this case. But when the prosecutor asked whether she should provide 

reasons for excusing all four prospective jurors, the court only instructed her to discuss 

“the most recent peremptory challenge [Juror No. 7858].” It did not invite her to 

comment on the others, finding instead that appellant had failed to make a prima facie 

showing of discrimination as to those jurors. Based on this record, we conclude that even 

if the court arguably did make an implicit prima facie finding as to Juror No. 7858, it did 

 

3 The record reflects that each side was accorded 10 peremptory challenges. The 

prosecution exercised three more challenges after excusing Juror Nos. 8299, 4176, 6182 

and 7858. Appellant used all 10 of his challenges. The race or national origin of these 

other prospective jurors is unknown. 
8

not extend to the other challenges. (See People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 392-

393.) 

An appellate court affords “‘considerable deference’” to a trial court’s finding that 

a Batson/Wheeler motion fails to establish a prima facie case of group bias. (People v. 

Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155.) The reviewing court must affirm the trial court’s 

denial of the motion “‘[i]f the record “suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might 

reasonably have challenged” the jurors in question[.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. 

Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1200, abrogated on a different ground in People v. 

Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5; see People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 

60; People v. Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 500-501.) Stated differently, if 

the appellate court “can divine any nondiscriminatory basis for the challenges,” it must 

affirm the denial of the Batson/Wheeler motion. (People v. Trevino (1997) 55 

Cal.App.4th 396, 409.)

As to the four peremptory challenges at issue here, the record establishes a 

reasonable, race-neutral basis for each challenge. Indeed, appellant does not contest the 

prosecution’s excusal of Juror Nos. 8299, 4176 and 7858. His appeal is limited to Juror 

No. 6182. The trial court found that Juror No. 6182’s answers during voir dire suggested

a detachment from others based on the lack of a spouse or children, no connection with 

anyone who has ever been the victim of a crime or belonged to law enforcement, no prior 

jury service and no indication of any social interaction other than at work. This lack of 

life experience raised some concern as to whether Juror No. 6182 could deliberate and 

perhaps hold an opinion in the face of disagreement with others. “Limited life experience 

is a race-neutral explanation” (People v. Perez (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328), and 

an attorney may reasonably conclude that a potential juror’s “immaturity and 

inexperience with assuming weighty decisions and responsibilities” make one unsuitable. 

(People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 431, overruled on other grounds in People v. Storm

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1031-1032; People v. Gonzales (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 620, 

631.) Because a reasonable explanation for excusing Juror No. 6182 is apparent in the 

record, and because we view the trial court’s ruling with “‘considerable deference’”
9

(People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155), we conclude the Batson/Wheeler motion 

was properly denied.

We reject appellant’s belated attempt to engage in a comparative analysis of Juror 

No. 6182 to others who actually served on the jury. A reviewing court need not engage 

in a comparative juror analysis where, as here, the trial court has denied the defendant’s 

Batson/Wheeler motion after concluding the defendant failed to establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination. (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 350 [declining to 

employ comparative juror analysis in a first-stage Batson/Wheeler case]; accord People v. 

Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1295; People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1019-

1020.)

Evidence of Vehicle Theft

At the beginning of trial, appellant moved under Evidence Code section 352 to 

exclude evidence related to the uncharged act of grand theft auto. The trial court denied 

the motion, finding the evidence was admissible to prove motive for evading an officer. 

Appellant asserts this was error.

“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the 

issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence that a defendant 

committed an uncharged crime is admissible if relevant to prove the defendant’s motive 

in the instant case. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)

Here, there is no question that evidence of the Suburban’s theft was highly 

relevant to two issues: (1) Deputy Polanco’s reason for deciding to stop appellant and (2) 

the motivation for his flight. As the trial court told appellant, the evidence of motive is 

“sometimes imperative in the sense that explaining why you may have engaged in the 

conduct that you allegedly engaged in; that is, doing everything in your power to avoid 

apprehension by police.” 

Furthermore, the theft evidence that was admitted in the prosecution’s case did not 

identify appellant as the thief. Deputy Polanco testified on direct examination that a 
10

license plate check of the vehicle revealed that it had been reported stolen. He did not 

state that appellant stole the vehicle. It was appellant who contested the thief’s identity 

when he called the victim as a defense witness. The prosecution properly inquired, in 

rebuttal, about the reliability of the victim’s identification of the thief and her apparent 

attempt to shield appellant from liability for the act. Appellant did not object to the 

admission of that evidence.

Finally, any error in admitting the theft evidence is harmless because of the 

uncontradicted proof that appellant committed the charged offense. The evidence was 

overwhelming that appellant, while attempting to elude pursuing deputies, drove in a 

willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, 

subd. (a).)

Claimed Failure to Instruct with CALCRIM No. 375

Appellant contends the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM 

No. 375. We disagree.

CALCRIM No. 375 limits the use of uncharged crimes and acts of misconduct to 

instances where it might show intent, motive, knowledge, intent, plan or scheme.

Appellant claims he requested the instruction when, during voir dire, he asked the trial 

court to admonish the jury that the prosecution is going to introduce evidence of a grand 

theft auto charge that was dismissed. The court responded that the request was 

premature. It stated: “We have to wait until we hear all the evidence before we can 

finalize our instructions and decide what the jury is entitled to hear and what they are not 

entitled to hear. But, again, that is a battle for a different point in this war. So let’s wait 

and fight it at the appropriate time.” Appellant failed to raise the issue at that time, 

thereby forfeiting his request. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495; People 

v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 928, fn. 23.) 

Except in extraordinary cases, a trial court has no duty to give a sua sponte 

instruction on the limited admissibility of evidence. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 

826, 864 (Rogers).) An extraordinary case exists where “‘evidence of past offenses is a 

dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and 
11

minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Collie (1981) 

30 Cal.3d 43, 64.) 

This case does not present an extraordinary situation. As previously discussed, the 

theft evidence was admitted to explain why the deputies decided to detain appellant and 

to show his motivation for attempting to evade detention. The evidence of the uncharged 

theft offense was a small part of the prosecution’s evidence against appellant, was not 

unduly prejudicial and was highly relevant to material issues. Under these circumstances, 

the court did not have a sua sponte duty to give the limiting instruction. (See Rogers,

supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 864.) And even if it did have a duty, the failure to give the 

instruction would be harmless given the uncontroverted evidence that appellant 

committed the charged offense.

Motion for New Trial

Appellant contends his motion for new trial should have been granted because he 

did not have the ability to listen to the CD of the deputies’ radio transmissions while he 

presented his defense. He claims the recordings, which described the pursuit as it took 

place, would have impeached Deputy Polanco’s trial testimony that he activated his siren 

while pursuing appellant.

In his motion, appellant argued that the radio recordings proved that if Deputy 

Polanco activated his siren at all, it was after the vehicle pursuit and perhaps not until the 

foot pursuit. The trial court acknowledged that if appellant’s assertion was correct, it 

could support a motion for new trial. After listening to the recordings, however, the court 

determined their content was inculpatory, rather than exculpatory. It found, as a factual 

matter, that Deputy Polanco activated his siren during the pursuit. It stated: “I listened to 

[the recordings] over and over again because I wanted to make certain that I could hear 

any sirens in the background of the pursuing deputy during the course of the pursuit. 

And I was able to do that indeed. And unfortunately, Mr. Miranda, my understanding of 

the content of the audio is different than yours because I did hear the siren in the 

background during the course of the pursuit but before you were captured on foot . . . .” 

The court also found that other sirens were audible and may have been louder.
12

Our review of the radio recordings supports the trial court’s findings. The 

recordings reveal that at least one siren was audible after Deputy Polanco informed the 

dispatcher he was about to conduct a traffic stop of appellant by “light[ing] him up.” 

Appellant argued the siren was from another patrol car, but the court declined to 

“speculate that that siren was coming from a unit other than the one Polanco was 

operating, who was the pursuing deputy.” 

“‘The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the 

court’s discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable 

abuse of discretion clearly appears.’” (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318; 

see People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 127.) Given that the content of 

the radio recordings is consistent with Deputy Polanco’s testimony, we conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new trial.

Cumulative Error

Appellant also claims cumulative error. Because we have concluded that all his 

claims of error are meritless or harmless, there is no cumulative error. (People v. Avila

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 608.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge

Superior Court of Los Angeles County

______________________________

Esther K. Hong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David F. Glassman, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.