# I N T HE CO UR T O F CR I M I NA L A P P E A LS O F T E X A S

N O . P D - 0 5 2 1 - 1 0

C H R I S T O P H E R L Y N N H O W A R D , A p p e l l a n t

v . T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W F R O M T H E S I X T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

G R E G G C O U N T Y
Womack, J ., delivere d the opinion for a una nimous Court. Wielding a r ifle and c oncea ling his fa ce w ith white fabric , the appe llant entere d a L ong view conve nience store shortly befor e 10:00 p.m. on October 7, 2008. The store ’s par

towner and on-duty

cashie r, Mukesh Patolia, wa s alone in the store and had g one to an of fice in the bac k. After

observing the appe llant on his security -ca mera monitor and throug h a one- way window, Patolia locked the of fice door and dia led 911. Ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord showing that the appe llant was aw are of Patolia. The a ppellant was una

ble to open the c ash reg ister, but took Patolia’s wallet from the c ounter a nd some money

from bene ath. The a

ppellant 1

## drove a

way and eva ded ca

pture that nig ht, but was arr ested a fewday s later. A jur

y convicted the appellant of

ag g rava ted robbe ry

and sente nced him to life in prison. The Sixt h Court of Appea ls aff irmed the c onviction. 1 

## We gr anted r eview on the appellant’ s sole issue: “Does the offe nse of a g g rava ted robbe ry require interac tion between the acc used and the purported vic tim? ” The appellant a sserts that beca use there was no e vidence of intera ction betwee n him and Patolia, the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to support a robbe ry conviction, and the c onviction should be ref ormed to that of 2 

## theft. This is a novel issue, on which ne ither we nor the pa rties have found controlling case law 3 

## interpre ting our

curr ent robbe ry

statute. The sec tion of the robber y statute under w hich the appe llant was cha rg ed states, in rele vant par

t, “a pe rson commits [ robber y ] i f, in the cour se of c ommitt ing the ft...and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the proper ty , he intentionally

or knowing ly

threa tens or place s another in fea r of imminent bodily

injury or dea th.” 4 

## The plain lang uag e of the statute enc ompasses not just ex plicit threats, but whateve r implicit t hrea ts may

lead to the victim being place d in fea r. So long as the defe ndant’s ac tions 5

H o w a r d v . S t a t e , 3 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 0 7 ( T e x . A p p . – T e x a r k a n a 2 0 1 0 )

. 1
T h e a p p e l l a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s f a c t u a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t , b u t s i n c e t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s b r i e f w a s 2 s u b m i t t e d w e h a v e a b o l i s h e d f a c t u a l

- s u f

f i c i e n c y r e v i e w . S e e B r o o k s v . S t a t e , 3 2 3 S

. W

. 3 d 8 9 3 , 8 9 4

- 9 5 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 1 0 ) ( p l u r a l i t y o p . ) ; i d

. , a t 9 2 6 ( C o c h r a n , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g )

.

T h e a p p e l l a n t d o e s n o t c o n t e s t t h e a g g r a v a t i n g e l e m e n t c h a r g e d i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t , u s e o r e x h i b i t i o n o f a 3 d e a d l y w e a p o n . S e e T E X . P E N A L C O D E § 2 9

. 0 3 ( a ) ( 2 )

.

T E X . P E N A L C O D E § 2 9

. 0 2 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 4
S e e O l i v a s v . S t a t e , 2 0 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 4 1 , 3 4 5

- 4 6 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) ( i n t e r p r e t i n g , w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g , t h e 5 d e f i n i t i o n o f “ t h r e a t e n ” f

o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e T e x a s a s s a u l t s t a t u t e , a n d o b s e r v i n g o f t h e r o b b e r y s t a t u t e , “ B y d e f i n i n g r o b b e r y t o b e t h e f

t p l u s e i t h e r t h r e a t e n i n g o r p l a c i n g a n o t h e r i n f e a r , t h i s s t a t u t e d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e t e r m ‘ t h r e a t e n ’ m e a n s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n p l a c i n g a p e r s o n ‘ i n f e a r o f i m m i n e n t b o d i l y i n j u r y o r d e a t h

. ’ ” ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) )

. 

## 2

## are “of suc h nature as in rea son and common experienc e is likely to induce a pe rson to part with his property

ag ainst his will,” any

actua l or perc eived thre at of imminent bodily injury will 6 

## satisfy this element of the of

fense

. The re levant par

t of the Texas statute is simil ar to Model Pena l Code § 222.1(a) (2). The 7 

## comment to the Model Penal Code notes the importance of the disjunctive: [This section] uses the lang uag e “thr eate ns another w ith...imm ediate se rious bodily injury ” to include ve rbal or othe r express offe rs of ser ious harm. Alterna tively , [t his section] applies to one who “pur posely puts him i n fea

r of immediate se rious bodily injury ,” by

which is meant to be inc luded menac ing or other implied threa t sought to be communicated to the vic tim by the ac tor’s conduc t. This latter lang uag e would thus apply to case s where the ac tor brandishe s a we apon or othe rwise display s the ability and the intention to use force if his wishes are not honored. The intent of the subsec tion is t hus to rea ch all for

ms of express or implied threat immediately to inflict serious bodily

injury

. 8 

## The c omment then notes that some statutes do not have a subsection equivale nt to the Model Penal Code’s “ puts ... in fear ” or Te x as’s “ place s in fear ,” but only use the wor d “thre aten.” These sta tutes “see m adequa te, so long as the ter m ‘threa ten’ is broa dly

interpre ted to 9 

## apply to impli cit as we ll as expl icit threats.” 1 0 

## I n Rayford v. State , we inter prete d the pre vious robbery statute to include situations in 1 1

C r a n f o r d v . S t a t e , 3 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d 9 5 7 , 9 5 8 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 6 4 ) ( “ T h e f e a r m u s t a r i s e f

r o m t h e c o n d u c t o f 6 t h e a c c u s e d h o w e v e r , r a t h e r t h a n t h e m e r e t e m p e r a m e n t a l t i m i d i t y o f t h e v i c t i m . ” )

. A l t h o u g h C r a n f o r d w a s d e c i d e d u n d e r a f o r m e r r o b b e r y s t a t u t e , t h i s l i m i t a t i o n h a s b e e n a p p l i e d t o § 2 9

. 0 2 ( a ) ( 2 )

. D e v i n e v . S t a t e , 7 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 2 6 8 , 2 7 0 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) ( c i t i n g G r e e n v . S t a t e , 5 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 2 1 1 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 7 8 ) )

.

“ A p e r s o n i s g u i l t y o f r o b b e r y i f , i n t h e c o u r s e o f c o m m i t t i n g a t h e f t , h e t h r e a t e n s a n o t h e r w i t h o r 7 p u r p o s e l y p u t s h i m i n f e a r o f i m m e d i a t e s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y . ”
M O D E L P E N A L C O D E § 2 2 2

. 1 , C o m m e n t a r i e s , v o l

. 2 , a t 1 0 9

. 8
S e e , e . g . , N

. Y

. P E N A L L A W § 1 6 0

. 0 0

. 9
M O D E L P E N A L C O D E § 2 2 2

. 1 , C o m m e n t a r i e s , v o l

. 2 , a t 1 0 9

- 1 1 0

. 10
4 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d 3 0 0 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 6 8 )

. 11 

## 3

## which ther e wa s no phy sical intera ction. The victim of the r obbery , Mrs. Salverino, wa s inside a

store whe n she saw he r husband g et shot as he wa s opening his car door immediately

outside the store, but she did not see the shooter. Mrs. Salver ino ran outside, put her purse on the c ar se at, and held he r husband a s he died. At some point, unnoticed to Mrs. Salver ino, the purse we nt missing. Acc ording to Ray ford, a n acc omplice shot Mr. Salverino and took the pur se. The robbe ry

statute in eff

ect a t the time allowed for conviction if a the ft was c ommitt ed “by putting in fe ar of

life or bodily

injury .” Even thoug h there was no phy sical intera ction

1 2 

## betwee n Mrs. Salverino and the robber s, we “ [found] no merit in appellant’s c ontention that Mrs. Salverino wa s not put in fear of her life or bodily

injury .” 1 3 

## Two dissenting judge s arg ued that no robbe ry occur red. To e levate a

theft to a robbe ry “‘the re must exist the ac tual or threa tened violenc e to the per son antec edent to the r obbery ’... but there is not a scintilla of evidenc e that ther e wa s any actua l or threa tened violenc e to [Mrs. Salverino].” Had the sta tute been limited to situations where the defe ndant ac tually threa tened 1 4 

## the victim, the dissenters would have been c orre ct. Howe ver, be cause the statute, like our c urre nt statute, broadly

included situations where the def endant plac ed the victim in fea r of bodily

injury , the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support a r obbery conviction. The a ppellant contests that he c ould not intentionally or knowingly place in fea r “a person whose pre sence or eve n exis tence [was] unknown” to him. Be cause the jury could have found the appellant g uilty

for e ither of these culpable me ntal states, we ne ed only addre ss the less-culpa

ble

T E X . P E N A L C O D E a r t
. 1 4 0 8 ( 1 9 2 5 ) ( r e p e a l e d 1 9 7 4 )

. 12
M r s . S a l v e r i n o t e s t i f

i e d t h a t s h e w a s a f

r a i d a t t h e t i m e . 13
R a y f o r d , 4 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 0 8 ( M o r r i s o n , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( q u o t i n g P o l k v . S t a t e , 2 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 9 ( T e x . C r . 14 A p p . 1 9 5 2 ) )

. 

## 4

## mental state of know ingly

.

“Knowing ly ” is a ter

m of art with a le g islatively presc ribed de finition in t he Penal Code: “A pe rson ac ts knowingly , or with knowledg e, with re spect to a r esult of his conduct whe n he is

awa re tha t his conduct is rea sonably cer tain to cause the re sult.” Thus the mental state 1 5 

## “knowing ly ” does not re fer to the defe ndant’s knowledg e of the actua l results of his actions, but knowledg e of w hat re sults his actions ar e re asonably cer tain to cause

. Using this definition, robbery -by -plac ing- in-fea r does not re quire that a

defe ndant know that he ac tually

place s someone in fe ar, or know whom he a ctually

place s in fear . Rather, it require s that the defe ndant is awa re tha t his conduct is rea sonably cer tain to place some one in fea r, and tha t someone ac tually is placed in fe ar. The e vidence in this case included a video of the a

ppellant, his fac e conc eale d, enter ing a convenie nce store late at nig ht during business hours and a g g ressively brandishing a rifle . A rational juror

could have inferr ed fr om this evidence tha t the appellant wa s awa re it wa s

rea sonably

cer tain that his actions would place someone in fe ar of imminent bodil y

injury or death. The fac t that the appellant did not see Patolia – who testified that he wa s frig htened by the appellant – doe s not neg ate the a ppellant’s culpa

ble mental state w hen he e ntere d the store a s he did and committed theft. The e vidence is sufficient to support the jury ’s ver dict, and we aff irm the dec ision of the Court of Appea ls. Deliver ed Mar ch 9, 2011. Publis h.

T E X . P E N A L C O D E § 6

. 0 3 ( b ) ; s e e T E X . G O V ’ T C O D E § 3 1 1

. 0 1 1 ( b ) ( “ W o r d s a n d p h r a s e s t h a t h a v e a c q u i r e d

15 a t e c h n i c a l o r p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g , w h e t h e r b y l e g i s l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o r o t h e r w i s e , s h a l l b e c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g l y . ” ) 

## 5