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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

TERENCE R. JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, a 

Washington State Agency,

Respondent.

No. 84246-3-I 

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, C.J. — Under Washington law, when the Department of Licensing 

receives notice from a court that an individual has failed to pay court-ordered 

fines resulting from a drunk driving offense, it must suspend that person’s 

license. After Terence Johnson repeatedly failed to pay his fines, the Kirkland 

Municipal Court provided such notice, and Johnson’s license was suspended. 

Johnson contends the Department violated due process by not holding its own 

hearing to determine his ability to pay the fines. Our Supreme Court concluded 

that the statutory scheme governing license suspensions satisfies due process in 

City of Bellevue v. Lee, 166 Wn.2d 581, 210 P.3d 1011 (2009). Lee controls 

here; therefore, we conclude due process was satisfied and affirm.

FACTS

In May 2014, Johnson was charged with and pleaded guilty to driving 

under the influence in the Kirkland Municipal Court.1 At sentencing, the 

municipal court imposed jail time and ordered Johnson to pay a series of 

 

1 Johnson was pro se during arraignment.
No. 84246-3-I/2

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mandatory and discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). These LFOs 

totaled $4,068.91 and were payable to the municipal court clerk’s office. The 

judgment and sentence contained a notice that “[f]ailure to pay [the fines] in full 

or have a payment plan set up with Signal Management by the due date . . . may 

result in additional late penalties and the matter will be referred to a collection

agency.” The notice informed Johnson that failure to pay “may also result in a 

bench warrant and/or the suspension of [his] driving privileges as directed by the 

Department of Licensing.” Johnson did not challenge the imposition of the LFOs 

at sentencing and he did not appeal the judgment and sentence.

Between May 2014 and May 2019, Johnson appeared at several review 

hearings before the municipal court to evaluate his compliance with the 

requirements of his DUI conviction. 

2015 Suspension

In 2015, the municipal court notified the Department that Johnson had 

failed to make required LFO payments. As mandated by statute, the Department 

sent Johnson a notice informing him of his pending license suspension and how 

to resolve the payment issue or seek administrative review of the Department’s 

proposed action. See RCW 46.20.245(2) (setting out notice requirements in 

license suspension process). Johnson requested an administrative review of the 

proposed suspension. The Department completed its review and informed 

Johnson it was upholding the suspension.

Johnson then both appealed the Department’s decision in King County 

Superior Court and filed a civil complaint against the Department in federal court, 
No. 84246-3-I/3

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alleging the Department unlawfully suspended his license. The federal court 

dismissed Johnson’s case for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. 

Johnson v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. C15-0446MJP (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2015). 

Following this, and while his appeal was pending in superior court, Johnson filed 

a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Filing for bankruptcy automatically stayed all 

collection actions against Johnson, which in turn stayed the Department’s 

suspension of his license. Because of the stay, the Department reissued 

Johnson’s license and the superior court dismissed his appeal as moot.

Two years later, in July 2017, the bankruptcy court dismissed Johnson’s 

petition and Johnson was again required to pay his LFOs.

2018 Suspension

Soon after his bankruptcy petition was dismissed, the municipal court 

issued another notice to the Department about Johnson’s nonpayment of the 

LFOs. In December 2017, the Department sent Johnson a new notice informing 

him that his license would be suspended if he did not either resolve the payment 

issue with the court or seek administrative review with the Department. Johnson 

did neither. Instead, in January 2018, Johnson filed a second civil complaint 

against the Department in federal court. Johnson v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. C18-

0147JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2018). The federal court again dismissed 

Johnson’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Johnson, No. 

C18-0147JLR at *1. As a result of his inaction, Johnson’s license was 

suspended for the second time in early February 2018.
No. 84246-3-I/4

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While Johnson’s license was suspended, he continued to drive and was 

subsequently charged in March 2019 for driving with a license suspended 

(DWLS) in Mercer Island District Court. The DWLS charge violated the terms of 

Johnson’s 2015 DUI conviction and, as a result, the municipal court imposed 30 

additional days of electronic home monitoring.

2019 Lawsuit

In May 2019, Johnson moved the municipal court to reduce or waive his 

remaining LFOs. The court removed his LFOs from collections, waived all 

accrued interest, cut Johnson’s principal balance in half, and required him to 

make monthly payments of fifty dollars. The court also told Johnson that if he 

made payments for six months, he could move the court to strike the remaining 

balance. The court then sent the Department a notice indicating that Johnson 

was eligible for license reinstatement. 

In September 2019, Johnson filed a third civil complaint against the 

Department, his first in King County Superior Court, alleging the Department 

unlawfully suspended his license without offering him a payment plan for his 

court fines. The Department moved for summary judgment. Johnson requested 

a continuance to obtain municipal court records, which the court denied. The 

court granted the Department’s summary judgment motion and Johnson 

appealed to this court. We concluded that the superior court abused its 

discretion in denying Johnson’s continuance motion and remanded for further 

proceedings. Johnson v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. 81646-2-I, slip op. (Wash. Ct. 

App. June 28, 2021) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov /opinions/pdf/
No. 84246-3-I/5

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816462.pdf.

2

On remand, Johnson amended his complaint, maintaining his earlier 

arguments but seeking an additional declaration that the statutory scheme for 

license suspensions is unconstitutional. The parties cross-moved for summary 

judgment. The court granted the Department’s motion and denied Johnson’s 

motion for reconsideration.

Johnson appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Johnson contends (1) that the Department’s suspension of his 

license violated his due process rights under article 1, section 3 of the 

Washington Constitution, (2) that the Department’s suspension of his license 

violated his statutory rights under RCW 10.01.160, (3) he is entitled to a “decree” 

that his claims are justiciable, (4) he is entitled to another “decree” ordering the 

Department to reinstate his license and ordering the Mercer Island District court 

to dismiss his pending DWLS citation, and (5) that the court erred in denying his 

motion for reconsideration. Because we conclude Johnson’s due process and 

statutory rights were not violated, we also conclude the court did not err in 

granting the Department’s motion for summary judgment and we affirm.

Standard of Review

“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

 

2 GR 14.1(c) (“Washington appellate courts should not, unless necessary 

for a reasoned decision, cite or discuss unpublished opinions in their opinions.”).
No. 84246-3-I/6

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nonmoving party.” Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). 

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

CR 56(c).

Due Process

Johnson asserts that the statutory scheme for suspending driver’s 

licenses—which requires the Department to automatically suspend a license if it 

receives notice from a court under RCW 46.64.025—violates the due process 

clause of article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution because it does not 

require the Department to certify that the court conducted an ability-to-pay 

hearing. He urges us to declare the automatic suspension requirement in RCW 

46.20.289 unconstitutional. The Department contends that the constitutionality of

the statutory scheme issue has already been addressed by our state Supreme 

Court in Lee, 166 Wn.2d at 589. We agree with the Department. 

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. OneAmerica Votes v. 

State, 23 Wn.2d 951, 963, 518 P.3d 230 (2022). Statutes are presumed to be 

constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must 

prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Assoc. Gen.

Contractors of Wash. v. State, 200 Wn.2d 396, 403, 518 P.3d 639 (2022).

Under RCW 46.64.025, whenever a person fails to comply with the terms 

of a criminal complaint or criminal citation for a moving violation, the court “shall

promptly give notice of such fact to the department of licensing.” (Emphasis 

added.) When the Department receives such notice from the court, 
No. 84246-3-I/7

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RCW 46.20.289 provides that “the department shall suspend all driving 

privileges.” (Emphasis added.) Before suspension, the Department must give 

the driver 45 days written notice. RCW 46.20.245(1). The driver may then 

request an administrative review within 15 days of receiving the notice. 

RCW 46.20.245(3). The only issues to be addressed in the administrative review 

are: “(i) Whether the records relied on by the department identify the correct 

person; and (ii) Whether the information transmitted from the court or other 

reporting agency or entity regarding the person accurately describes the action 

taken by the court or other reporting agency or entity.” RCW 46.20.245(b).

Our state Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the 

Department’s suspension procedures as outlined in RCW 46.20.245 and 

RCW 46.20.289 and concluded they meet due process requirements.3 Lee, 166 

Wn.2d at 583. In Lee, motorists whose driver’s licenses were suspended for 

nonpayment of traffic citations brought an action against the city, challenging the 

Department’s suspension procedures. 166 Wn.2d at 583. Applying the 

 

3

In Lee, the Court considered whether the statutory scheme violated the 

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. See 166 Wn.2d at 583-86 (citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 

Wn.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004), in which the Court invalidated a prior set of 

suspension procedures for violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process 

clause). 

The Court has also held that article I, section 3 of the Washington 

Constitution is virtually identical to its federal analogue and provides “ ‘no further 

elaboration’ ” of rights. In re Pers. Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wn.2d 298, 310, 

12 P.3d 585 (2000) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 295, 302, 831 P.2d 1060 

(1992).
No. 84246-3-I/8

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Mathews4 balancing test, the Court concluded that the Department’s procedures 

met due process requirements because they provide both notice and a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard. Lee, 166 Wn.2d at 589.

Lee is controlling in the present case. Johnson advances a similar 

argument as the drivers in Lee—he asserts that the license suspension 

procedures outlined in RCW 46.20.245 and 46.20.289 violate due process 

because he was not provided an in-person hearing. 166 Wn.2d at 583-85. But 

Johnson offers no compelling argument as to how Lee is distinguishable from the 

present case; and the cases he cites in an attempt to distinguish Lee are 

unconvincing. Both predate Lee and concern different statutory schemes for 

license suspension. See Flory v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 84 Wn.2d 568, 527 

P.2d 1318 (1974) (concluding due process requires Department to provide driver 

with full evidentiary hearing before suspending licenses under RCW 46.29.070);

State v. Dolson, 138 Wn.2d 773, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) (holding Department 

violated due process by sending notice of suspension to driver’s last known 

address, rather than driver’s address of record as required by statute); cf. Lee, 

166 Wn.2d at 583 (“We invalidated a prior set of procedures because drivers 

were not given any sort of hearing prior to the suspension of licenses [in 2004], 

 

4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18

(1976). In cases involving the potential deprivation of a private interest by the 

government, we apply the Mathews balancing test to ensure that due process 

requirements are met. Gourley v. Gourley, 158 Wn.2d 460, 467-68, 145 P.3d 

1185 (2006). The three Mathews factors are: (1) the private interest affected; 

(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the challenged 

procedures and probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the 

government’s interest, including the potential burden of additional procedures. 

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
No. 84246-3-I/9

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. . . but we hold that the new procedures . . . meet due process requirements.”) 

(citing City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 91 P.3d 875 (2004)). Though 

Johnson urges this court to conduct a Mathews balancing test to determine 

whether his due process rights were infringed, doing so would be duplicative; the 

Lee court analyzed this same statutory scheme using the Mathews balancing test 

and concluded there was no due process violation. 166 Wn.2d at 585-89. 

Though Lee concerned civil moving violations, not criminal moving 

violations, the same substantial private interest—use of a driver’s license—is 

present here. 166 Wn.2d at 586. Moreover, “there is minimal risk that a criminal 

defendant will be erroneously deprived of their driver’s license,” “since a criminal 

proceeding which results in a conviction provides sufficient due process.” City of 

Redmond v. Bagby, 155 Wn.2d 59, 63-64, 117 P.3d 1126 (2005). And the 

governmental interest is significantly higher in cases involving criminal cases, 

since those suspended drivers are “ ‘more likely to be involved in causing traffic 

accidents, including fatal accidents, than properly licensed drivers, and pose a 

serious threat to the lives and property of Washington residents.’ ” Bagby, 155 

Wn.2d at 65 (quoting LAWS OF 1998, ch. 203, § 1). Thus, the Mathews analysis 

in Lee is still applicable here. 

Johnson also asserts that Johnson v. City of Seattle involved “identical 

circumstances” and should control. 184 Wn. App. 8, 21-22, 335 P.3d 1027 

(2014). In Johnson, Johnson was cited by Seattle for parking too many vehicles 

on his single-family lot, in violation of Seattle Municipal Code 23.44.016, even 

though he subsequently established a vested right to a legal nonconforming use 
No. 84246-3-I/10

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to park the additional cars on his lot. 184 Wn. App. at 11. This court determined 

the ordinance violated due process because it prevented Johnson from 

presenting evidence of his nonconforming use during the fact-finding hearing with 

the Department of Planning and Development. Johnson, 184 Wn. App. at 20-22. 

But unlike the fact-finding hearing in Johnson, here the Department’s review of 

mandatory suspensions is administrative and “involves processing paperwork, 

not fact-finding.” Lee, 166 Wn.2d at 588. And Johnson’s argument that 

RCW 46.20.245 impermissibly deprives him of “his right to interpose a legal 

defense” in violation of due process is unpersuasive. Johnson does not specify 

what “legal defense[s]” he was deprived of making. 

Still, Johnson contends that Lee does not control and urges us to consider 

a recent Thurston County Superior Court decision—Pierce v. Department of 

Licensing—as persuasive authority.5 But we are not bound by a superior court’s 

conclusions of law and decline to consider Pierce.

6

Lee concerned the same statutory scheme and dictates the outcome of 

this case. We conclude that Johnson’s due process rights were not violated.

 

5 Pierce v. Dep’t of Licensing, No. 20-2-02149-34 (Thurston County Super. 

Ct., Wash. April 30, 2021). Johnson acknowledges that Pierce is not legal 

authority and has no precedential value to this court. 

6 We note, however, that the court’s ruling in Pierce has since been 

superseded by statute. See ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5226, 67th Leg., Reg. 

Sess. (Wash. 2021) (amending RCW 46.20.289 to remove Department’s 

authority to suspend licenses for non-payment of non-criminal moving violations).
No. 84246-3-I/11

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RCW 10.01.160

In his briefing, Johnson asserts that the Department should have 

conducted its own ability-to-pay hearing and, in the alternative, that the 

Department’s suspension of his license was based on an invalid judgment 

because the municipal court failed to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing as 

required by RCW 10.01.160(3). But at oral argument, Johnson took a different 

stance, contending that the Department must affirmatively state—via a 

checkbox—that it confirmed the court conducted an adequate ability-to-pay 

hearing before suspending a license. The Department contends that it performs 

a purely administrative function and is not authorized to evaluate the sufficiency 

of the process afforded in a judicial proceeding. We agree with the Department 

that it is not the appropriate entity from which Johnson can pursue the relief he 

seeks.

In an administrative review, RCW 46.20.245(b) authorizes the 

Department to address only the following: “(i) Whether the records relied on by 

the department identify the correct person; and (ii) Whether the information 

transmitted from the court or other reporting agency or entity regarding the 

person accurately describes the action taken by the court or other reporting 

agency or entity.” Former RCW 10.01.160(3) (2015)7 provides that “[t]he court 

shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to 

pay them.” “To determine the amount and method for paying the costs, ‘the court 

 

7 Johnson contends that the Department violated his statutory rights when 

it suspended his license in February 2018. Accordingly, the version of 

RCW 10.01.160 in effect at that time applies.
No. 84246-3-I/12

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shall take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of 

the burden that payment of costs will impose.’ ” State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 

838, 344 P.3d 680 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting RCW 10.01.160(3)). 

Here, the Department’s function and review is purely administrative. See

RCW 46.20.245(b). Neither RCW 46.20.245 nor RCW 10.01.160 permit the 

Department to intervene in court proceedings as Johnson envisions. Therefore, 

we do not reach, because the Department cannot reach, whether the court 

properly inquired into Johnson’s ability to pay as required by Blazina. Though 

the record does not reveal whether or not the municipal court conducted an 

individualized inquiry, this is not the issue before us, and would be properly 

raised only on direct appeal of the municipal court action. Johnson cannot hold 

the Department accountable for his failure to object to the court’s imposition of 

LFOs. 

The plain language of RCW 10.01.160(3) makes clear that the court, not 

the Department, is tasked with conducting an ability-to-pay inquiry. 

RCW 10.01.160(3) (“The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs. . . . In 

determining the amount and method of payment of costs . . . , the court shall take 

account of the financial resources of the defendant.”) (emphases added). 

Contrary to Johnson’s assertion, the Department has not been granted the 

authority to ensure whether litigants receive an ability-to-pay hearing before their 

license is suspended. The Department is not required to provide Johnson 

another opportunity to assert an inability to pay during an administrative review. 

Moreover, when Johnson asked the proper entity—the court—to reduce his fees, 
No. 84246-3-I/13

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it did so immediately. Any delay in receiving relief was solely due to Johnson’s 

own inaction. We conclude that the Department did not violate Johnson’s 

statutory rights under RCW 10.01.160.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: