STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

FILED 

In re: I.S. November 14, 2016 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

No. 16-0658 (Raleigh County 15-JA-95-B) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Mother A.P., by counsel P. Michael Magann, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Raleigh County’s June 13, 2016, order terminating her parental rights to one-year-old I.S. The 

West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel S.L. Evans, 

filed its response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), 

Dennie S. Morgan, Jr, filed a response on behalf of the child also in support of the circuit court’s 

order. On appeal, petitioner alleges that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to extend 

her post-adjudicatory improvement period. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In May of 2015, the DHHR filed a petition for abuse and neglect against petitioner 

alleging that she tested positive for amphetamines and cannabinoids after giving birth to I.S. in 

her home. The DHHR also alleged that petitioner had a history of intravenous drug use. 

Petitioner admitted that she smoked marijuana and injected methamphetamine five days before 

she gave birth to I.S. Finally, the DHHR alleged that petitioner had her parental rights terminated 

to her two older children, in part, because of her cocaine addiction. 

Several months later, petitioner admitted to the allegations of abuse and neglect as 

alleged in the petition. Accordingly, the circuit court adjudicated petitioner as an abusing parent 

and granted her a post-adjudicatory improvement period. The terms and conditions of her 

improvement period required petitioner to obtain suitable housing and to complete a substance 

abuse treatment program. In April of 2016, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing during 

which it heard testimony that petitioner “fail[ed] to make any successful progress as to the 

improvement period” and that her parental rights to her to older children were previously 

terminated. By order entered on June 13, 2016, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental 

rights to I.S. This appeal followed. 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review: 

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“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a 

reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply 

because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if 

the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W.Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to extend 

her improvement period. West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(6) provides that “[a] [circuit] court may 

extend any improvement period . . . when the [circuit] court finds that the respondent has 

substantially complied with the terms of the improvement period[.]” This Court recently held 

that, “[a]s a general rule of statutory construction, the word ‘may’ inherently connotes discretion 

and should be read as conferring both permission and power. The Legislature’s use of the word 

‘may’ usually renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.” 

Pioneer Pipe, Inc., v. Stephen Swain, Brayman Constr. and J&J Gen. Maint. Inc., -- W.Va. --, -­

S.E.2d -- (September 19, 2016). Further, to the extent this issue requires the weighing of 

evidence and rendering of findings of fact, our case law is clear that “in the context of abuse and 

neglect proceedings, the circuit court is the entity charged with weighing the credibility of 

witnesses and rendering findings of fact.” In re Emily, 208 W.Va. 325, 339, 540 S.E.2d 542, 556 

(2000) (citing Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Travis W., 206 W.Va. 478, 525 S.E.2d 669 (1999)); see 

also Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W.Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997) (stating that 

“[a] reviewing court cannot assess witness credibility through a record. The trier of fact is 

uniquely situated to make such determinations and this Court is not in a position to, and will not, 

second guess such determinations.”). 

In this case, the record is clear that petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required 

for an extension of her improvement period. It is undisputed that petitioner did not substantially 

comply with services throughout the underlying proceedings. Petitioner admits in her brief to this 

Court that she “had not successfully completed the terms of her Family Case Plan[.]” The record 

is devoid of any evidence that would warrant an extension of her improvement period, despite 

her self-serving and unsupported contention that she should be entitled to an extension. 

Furthermore, the circuit court was not required to grant petitioner an improvement period 

because her parental rights to her two older children were terminated. West Virginia Code § 49­

4-604(7)(C) provides that “the [DHHR] is not required to make reasonable efforts to preserve the 

family if the court determines [that] [t]he parental rights of the parent to another child have been 

terminated involuntarily.” For these reasons, it was not error for the circuit court to deny 

petitioner an extension of her improvement period. 

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For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the circuit court’s June 13, 2016, order, and 

we hereby affirm the same. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: November 14, 2016 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

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