NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Estate of:

JOSEPH O. LAMPE, Deceased.

_________________________________

MARK WARREN LAMPE, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

MARGUERITE “SHAWN” LAMPE, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0620

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0711

 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. PB2019-002310

The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

The Law Office of Christopher Goodman, Phoenix

By Christopher M. Goodman

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

FILED 9-21-2021
2

Snell & Wilmer LLP, Phoenix

By Kevin J. Parker, Robin L. Miskell

Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix

By James Fassold, Elise B. Adams

Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Mark Warren Lampe and Craig Stryker Lampe (“Plaintiffs”)

appeal from two superior court orders granting summary judgment in 

favor of Marguerite “Shawn” Lampe, as Trustee of the JSL Trust and 

Personal Representative of the Estate of Joseph O. Lampe (“Shawn”).1 For 

the reasons below, we affirm the summary judgment on the statute of 

limitations and the related fee award but vacate the summary judgment on 

the no-contest clause and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2016, after approximately twenty-eight years of marriage, 

Joseph and Shawn created the JSL Trust (“the Trust”). The Trust was 

revocable but became irrevocable upon Joseph’s death. See JSL Trust § 1.5. 

Joseph died on January 25, 2018. Joseph had three adult sons: Scott, Mark, 

and Craig Lampe; and Shawn has one adult son, Anthony Garcia.

¶3 Plaintiffs were qualified beneficiaries of the Trust and 

received a letter from Shawn’s attorney dated October 17, 2018, nearly nine 

months after Joseph died, that included copies of his Will and the Trust. 

According to Plaintiffs, Shawn refused to provide additional information 

about the Trust despite several requests from late 2018 through 2019. As a 

result, Plaintiffs hired an attorney in July 2019, who formally requested

more information from Shawn’s attorney on August 19, 2019. Claiming 

1 We refer to the parties and decedent by their first names when 

necessary, to avoid confusion.
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Decision of the Court

3

Shawn failed to provide the requested information, Plaintiffs petitioned to 

formally probate the Will and contested the validity of the Trust. Plaintiffs

alleged that the one-year statute of limitations in Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 14-10604(A) did not bar their claim and that the Trust’s 

no-contest clause was unenforceable because they had probable cause to 

challenge the Trust based on evidence that Joseph lacked testamentary 

capacity and that Shawn exerted undue influence.

2

¶4 Shawn responded and moved for summary judgment on the 

ground that the one-year statute of limitations in § 14-10604(A)(1) barred 

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Trust. The superior court agreed, and after 

denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, entered judgment in favor 

of Shawn on Plaintiffs’ challenge to the validity of the Trust and awarded 

Shawn $30,832.50 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs timely appealed from this 

judgment.

¶5 Shawn also moved for summary judgment to enforce the 

Trust’s no-contest clause. See JSL Trust § 12.1. Plaintiffs argued that the nocontest clause was unenforceable because they had probable cause to 

challenge the validity of the Trust and the application of the one-year 

statute of limitation. The superior court found that Plaintiffs lacked 

probable cause to challenge the Trust because their petition was timebarred. The court granted summary judgment, enforced the no-contest 

clause, and removed Plaintiffs as beneficiaries. Plaintiffs appealed from 

this judgment, and both appeals were consolidated.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Summary judgment is proper only when “the moving party 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and . . . is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The superior 

court should grant summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of 

the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of 

evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the 

conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme 

School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990). We view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the parties against whom judgment was entered and 

2 The no-contest provision applied if a beneficiary contested or sought 

to invalidate the Will or Trust, claimed an oral agreement that contradicts 

the Will or Trust, sought to change the character of property subject to the 

Will or Trust, or conspired with or financially assisted any of these actions. 

See JSL Trust § 12.1.
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review de novo whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether 

the superior court properly applied the law. Awsienko v. Cohen, 227 Ariz. 

256, 258, ¶ 7 (App. 2011).

I. The Statute of Limitations

A. The Statute of Limitations Applies to the Trust

¶7 The superior court held that the one-year statute of limitations 

in A.R.S. § 14-10604(A) barred Plaintiffs’ challenge to the validity of the 

Trust. Citing In re Estate of Sibley, 246 Ariz. 498, 501, ¶ 10 (App. 2018), 

Plaintiffs argue that § 14-10604(A) does not apply because the Trust became 

irrevocable upon Joseph’s death.

¶8 Section 14-10604(A) states:

A person may commence a judicial proceeding to contest the 

validity of a trust that was revocable at the settlor’s death 

within the earlier of:

1. One year after the settlor’s death.

2. Four months after the trustee sent the person a copy of 

the trust instrument and a notice informing the person 

of the trust’s existence, of the trustee’s name and 

address and of the time allowed for commencing a 

proceeding.

This statute, like § 604 of the Uniform Trust Code (“U.T.C.”) on which it is 

based, “applies only to a revocable trust that becomes irrevocable by reason 

of the settlor’s death.” U.T.C. § 604, cmt. (2000). The Trust was revocable 

until Joseph’s death and thereafter became irrevocable. See JSL Trust § 1.5.

¶9 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, Sibley, 246 Ariz. at 501, ¶ 10, 

is not analogous. In Sibley, the trust was revocable before the settlor’s death, 

but the beneficiary challenged co-trustees’ attempt to alter the trust after it 

became irrevocable, thus § 14-10604 did not apply. Id. at 500-01, ¶¶ 4, 10. 

The co-trustees in Sibley restated the original trust into a second trust and 

sought approval of the restated trust, but one beneficiary objected. Id. at 

¶ 8. The co-trustees argued that § 14-10604 barred the beneficiary’s 

objection. Id. at 501, ¶ 10. The beneficiary, however, had not challenged

the original trust; instead, he challenged the restated trust, which had 

become irrevocable after the settlor’s death. Id. Because the statute of 

limitations in § 14-10604 applies only to revocable trusts, the court held that 
LAMPE v. LAMPE

Decision of the Court

5

it did not bar the beneficiary’s challenge to the restatement of the trust after 

it had become irrevocable. Id.3

¶10 In contrast, here, Plaintiffs’ petition challenged the original 

Trust, which was revocable until Joseph’s death. Because they filed the 

petition more than one year after Joseph’s death, it was untimely under 

§ 14-10604(A)(1).

B. No Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations Apply

¶11 Plaintiffs argue that, even if the Trust falls within § 14-10604, 

the statute should not apply because: (1) it creates an arbitrary bar; (2) it is 

unfair to apply the statute when the trustee has not complied with the 

reporting requirement of § 14-10813; and (3) Shawn should be equitably 

estopped from invoking the statute of limitations.

¶12 Plaintiffs contend that the one-year statute of limitation in 

§ 14-10604(A)(1) is arbitrary because the U.T.C. § 604 sets forth a three-year 

limitations period. The comments to U.T.C. § 604 state that it is “designed 

to allow an adequate time in which to bring a contest while at the same time 

permitting the expeditious distribution of the trust property following the 

settlor’s death.” U.T.C. § 604, cmt. Additionally, the three-year period in 

U.T.C. § 604 corresponds to the three-year limitation for contesting a nonprobated will under the Uniform Probate Code (“U.P.C.”) § 3-108 (2019). 

Citing those provisions, Plaintiffs argue that the appropriate limitations 

period should be three years.

¶13 The legislature is empowered to enact statutes of limitations 

to protect against stale claims. Florez v. Sargeant, 185 Ariz. 521, 528 (1996). 

Determining the appropriate limitations period involves “very delicate

policy decisions that properly belong to the legislative branch of

government. If the legislature wants to [enlarge the limitations period], it 

is, of course, free to do so. But the weighing, balancing, and policy making 

that go into such an enterprise are properly legislative, not judicial tasks.” 

3 Plaintiffs also cited In re Walter W. Quisling and Marcella E. Quisling 

Revocable Trust, 1 CA-CV 14-0322, 2015 WL 3767295, at *1, ¶¶ 6-7 (Ariz. App. 

June 16, 2015) (mem. decision). See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1)(C). Like 

Sibley, Quisling concerned an amendment to a trust that had become 

irrevocable upon the settlor’s death. 2015 WL 3767295, at *1, ¶¶ 4-5. 

Because the challenge was not to the original trust, which by its terms was 

revocable until the settlor’s death, but was aimed instead at the post-death 

amendment, the court held § 14-10604 did not apply. Id. at ¶ 7.
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Decision of the Court

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Id. at 529; see also Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 55 (1976) (rejecting 

due process challenge to statute of limitations that barred claims even when 

the claimants were unaware of their injuries). It is not for this court to 

determine “[w]hether the legislative policy behind the statute is good or 

bad.”). Landgraff, 26 Ariz. App. at 55. Whether a different limitations period 

is appropriate in some cases is a question that is properly directed to the 

legislature.

¶14 Plaintiffs next contend that courts should not apply the oneyear statute of limitations when “formal notice of the trust is lacking.” 

Under A.R.S. § 14-10813(B)(3), a trustee of an irrevocable trust must notify 

qualified beneficiaries within sixty days after the trustee learns of the trust. 

According to Plaintiffs, it is unfair for the limitations period to start running 

before this notice is provided.

¶15 “’When interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain 

language because that is “the best and most reliable indicator of a statute’s 

meaning.”’” Ader v. Estate of Felger, 240 Ariz. 32, 36, ¶ 9 (App. 2016) (quoting 

City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 178, ¶ 6 (App. 

2008)). Notice is not required to start the limitations period in § 14-

10604(A)(1). The statute unambiguously contains one time period that 

applies when notice is given, i.e., § 14-10604(A)(2), and one time period that 

applies in all other cases, i.e., § 14-10604(A)(1). The statute plainly states 

that the applicable filing deadline is the earlier of the two subsections. A.R.S. 

§ 14-10604(A). Thus, the legislature has determined that a four-month 

limitations period applies when notice is given and that a one-year period 

applies in all other cases. We will not impose an additional notice 

requirement when the plain language of § 14-10604(A)(1) does not include 

one. See Ader, 240 Ariz. at 39, ¶ 19.

¶16 In support of their contention that notice is required to trigger 

the limitations period, Plaintiffs cite A.R.S. § 14-11005(A), which provides 

that the one-year limitation period for a breach of trust claim starts when 

there is adequate disclosure that a potential claim exists. Here, we are not 

addressing the breach of trust claim, but rather Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 

validity of the Trust. Further, the inclusion of the adequate disclosure

requirement in § 14-11005(A) shows that the legislature knows how to 

include a notice provision when it intends to do so. See Ader, 240 Ariz. at 

39, ¶ 19.

¶17 We also reject Plaintiffs’ contention that the sixty-day notice 

requirement of § 14-10813(B)(3) is mandatory and cannot be modified by 

the terms of a trust. The Trust expressly modified this sixty-day notice
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Decision of the Court

7

period by requiring the trustee to give notice within a “reasonable time after 

accepting the trusteeship[.]” See JSL Trust § 11.4(b).

¶18 By statute, the terms of a trust prevail except for several 

statutory requirements that cannot be modified. A.R.S. § 14-10105(B). The 

sixty-day notice provision in § 14-10813(B)(3) is not listed among the terms 

that cannot be modified. See A.R.S. § 14-10105(B). The terms of the trust 

cannot alter a trustee’s “duty to respond to the request of a qualified 

beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for trustee’s reports and other 

information reasonably related to the administration of a trust.” A.R.S. 

§ 14-10105(B)(8). But the statute does not specify any time period by which 

a trustee must respond to requests for information. A trust report must be 

provided “at least annually” under § 14-10813(C). Thus, Arizona law did 

not preclude the Trust from stating that Shawn had an obligation to provide 

notice within a reasonable time after accepting the trusteeship and to 

respond within a reasonable time period to requests from current 

beneficiaries for a trust report and other information. See also U.T.C. § 105, 

cmt. (noting that U.T.C. § 105(b)(9), which is similar to A.R.S. § 14-

10105(B)(8), specifies limits upon the settlor’s ability to waive notice 

requirements, which include providing a copy of the trust or annual 

reports).

¶19 Plaintiffs argue that permitting a trust to modify the sixty-day 

notice requirement could allow a trustee to delay giving notice until after 

the limitations period has run. That did not occur, so we need not address 

this possibility. Shawn provided Plaintiffs with notice and a copy of the 

Trust more than three months before the one-year limitations period ended.

¶20 Finally, Plaintiffs claim Shawn should be equitably estopped 

from invoking the statute of limitations because of her alleged bad faith. 

According to Plaintiffs, Shawn acted in bad faith by not disclosing the 

existence of the Trust for nearly nine months after Joseph’s death and the

notice lacked sufficient information and did not mention the one-year 

statute of limitations. Plaintiffs also allege that Shawn ignored and

inadequately responded to their reasonable inquiries about the Trust and 

raised the no-contest clause in response to these reasonable requests. 

Plaintiffs also assert that within months after Joseph’s death, Mark 

contacted one of Joseph’s estate attorneys but received no information.

¶21 Shawn disputes that Plaintiffs requested information after she 

formally notified them of the Trust but contends that any factual dispute is 

irrelevant because her actions did not absolutely prevent Plaintiffs from 

bringing a timely claim. Plaintiffs contend they did not file the petition any 
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Decision of the Court

8

earlier because they relied on assertions from Shawn’s attorney that Shawn

would provide a trust report and “answer questions of a general nature.” 

Plaintiffs also argue that they could not petition any earlier because they 

had to first determine whether there was probable cause to challenge the 

Trust to avoid violating the Trust’s no-contest clause.

¶22 The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies when the acts or 

representations of one induce another to believe that certain facts exist and 

the other justifiably acts in reliance on those facts to their detriment. Heltzel 

v. Mecham Pontiac, 152 Ariz. 58, 61 (1986). Plaintiffs have not shown that 

estoppel applied here. Although Shawn, through her attorney, promised 

to respond to their inquiries, if, as Plaintiffs allege, Shawn continued to 

ignore requests for information as the end of the limitations period 

approached, then Plaintiffs could no longer reasonably rely on the assertion 

that Shawn would provide the information. See Suburban Pump & Water Co. 

v. Linville, 60 Ariz. 274, 284-85 (1943) (holding there was no reasonable 

reliance when a party “ignores highly suspicious circumstances which 

should warn him of danger or loss.”).

¶23 Assuming the truth of the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, as 

discussed supra ¶ 21, they have not shown they reasonably relied on 

Shawn’s promise. To the contrary, the facts suggested that Plaintiffs would 

have to ask the court to compel Shawn to provide the information they 

sought. Plaintiffs claim their hands were tied by the no-contest clause, 

which required probable cause to challenge the Trust. But an action to 

obtain information necessary to decide whether to institute a proceeding 

against Shawn would not trigger the no-contest provision. See JSL Trust 

§ 12.1. To be sure, Shawn’s conduct created a short time frame in which 

Plaintiffs could assert their rights, but Plaintiffs were not absolutely 

prevented from acting before the limitations period expired. Thus, the 

doctrine of equitable estoppel does not preclude application of the statute 

of limitations to Plaintiffs’ claim. We affirm the grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Shawn on the statute of limitations.

4

II. A Question of Fact Precludes Summary Judgment on the No-Contest 

Clause

¶24 The Trust contained a no-contest clause that terminated the 

interest of any beneficiary who contested or objected to the validity of any 

provision in the Trust. See JSL Trust § 12.1. A no-contest clause is 

4 Given this resolution, Shawn’s request for judicial notice of deeds 

and a notice to creditors is moot.
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Decision of the Court

9

enforceable unless the party challenging the trust has probable cause to 

support the contest. A.R.S. § 14-10113; see also In re Shaheen Trust, 236 Ariz.

498, 500, ¶ 6 (App. 2015). Probable cause means “the existence, at the time 

of the initiation of the proceeding, of evidence which would lead a reasonable 

person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there is a substantial 

likelihood that the contest or attack will be successful.” In re Estate of Shumway, 

198 Ariz. 323, 327, ¶ 12 (2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property: 

Donative Transfers § 9.1 cmt. j (1983) (“Restatement”)). A subjective belief 

is not sufficient; the belief must be “objectively reasonable.” Shaheen, 236 

Ariz. at 501, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).

¶25 The superior court found that Plaintiffs lacked probable cause 

to believe they would succeed on their challenge because § 14-10604(A)(1)

“automatically” barred Plaintiffs’ claim and Shawn’s attorney had warned 

them before they filed their petition that it was time-barred. Plaintiffs 

contend the court should have considered the likelihood of success on all 

issues. But Shawn did not argue that Plaintiffs lacked probable cause to 

allege undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, only that there 

was no probable cause to file a petition after the limitations period had run.

¶26 Whether probable cause existed “is ultimately a question of 

law, which we review de novo.” Shaheen, 236 Ariz. at 500, ¶ 7 (citing 

Shumway, 198 Ariz. at 326, ¶ 9). The superior court decided this issue on 

summary judgment, unlike Shumway and Shaheen, in which the superior 

court sat as the fact-finder. Summary judgment is proper only if no juror 

could agree that a “reasonable person, properly informed and advised,” would 

conclude that there is substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs could 

successfully challenge the statute of limitations. Shumway, 198 Ariz. at 327, 

¶ 12. In reviewing the superior court’s ruling, we must view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and review de novo whether 

genuine issues of material fact exist. Awsienko, 227 Ariz. at 258, ¶ 7. We 

also keep in mind that no-contest clauses “work a forfeiture, which is 

disfavored in the law.” Shumway, 198 Ariz. at 328, ¶ 14 (citations omitted).

¶27 The superior court relied, in part, on the fact that Shawn’s 

attorney told Plaintiffs that their claim was time-barred, but a reasonable 

person need not accept the position of opposing counsel. This is 

particularly so when, as here, Plaintiffs were represented by their own 

attorney, who provided contrary arguments as to why the statute of 

limitations did not apply. See id. at 328, ¶ 15 (holding that “[o]ne important 

factor used to determine whether the will contest was filed with probable 

cause is that the beneficiaries relied on the advice of disinterested counsel, 

sought in good faith after a full disclosure of the facts.” (citing (indirectly) 
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to Restatement § 9.1 cmt. j)).

5 Filing a claim outside the limitations period 

is not objectively unreasonable if Plaintiffs reasonably believed in the 

success of their argument that an exception to the statute of limitations 

existed.

¶28 To support their equitable estoppel claim, Plaintiffs argued 

that Shawn acted in bad faith by waiting nine months after Joseph’s death 

to notify them of the Trust. Plaintiffs further asserted that although Shawn

promised to answer general questions, she failed to provide complete 

information about Trust assets and ignored their requests for additional 

information. Shawn continued to refuse to disclose certain information 

even after Plaintiffs retained counsel, who questioned the lack of response. 

Shawn’s attorney did not tell Plaintiffs their claim was barred by the oneyear statute of limitations until after Plaintiffs notified Shawn of their intent 

to file a claim. Shawn denied that Plaintiffs requested additional 

information before the statute of limitations expired. The parties also

disputed whether Shawn’s notice provided adequate information and

whether Plaintiffs were entitled to the additional information they 

requested.

¶29 These factual disputes must be resolved before the court can 

determine whether Plaintiffs could have objectively believed that their 

estoppel argument had a substantial likelihood of success. See Bird v. 

Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 603 (App. 1981) (in a malicious prosecution case, 

“[a]ll issues of a party’s reasonable belief and prudence in bringing an 

action are to be decided by the court. The only function of the jury in the 

determination of probable cause is to determine the actual facts of what the 

prosecuting party or attorneys performed in the way of investigation and 

research.”). For example, it would be objectively unreasonable to believe 

an estoppel argument could prevail if Plaintiffs did not communicate with 

5 Restatement § 9.1 was renumbered to § 8.5 in Restatement (Third) of 

Property (Wills & Donative Transfers) (2003). Although both versions 

include a probable cause exception to no-contest clauses, Restatement 

(Third) § 8.5, comment c, unlike § 9.1 comment j, and contrary to Shumway, 

adds that “[t]he mere fact that the person mounting the challenge was 

represented by counsel is not controlling” because a party challenging a 

donative transfer is “normally” represented by counsel. This change in the 

treatment of the advice of counsel does not impact our decision because our 

finding of probable cause is not based solely on the fact that Plaintiffs had 

counsel.
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Shawn until they hired an attorney in July 2019 (after the limitations period 

had expired) or if they sought information to which they were not entitled.

¶30 As discussed above, these questions of fact did not preclude 

summary judgment on the statute of limitations. But these are two separate 

considerations. The relevant inquiry in deciding the no-contest clause 

summary judgment motion is whether, at the time they filed the petition, 

Plaintiffs reasonably believed there was a substantial likelihood that they 

could defeat the statute of limitations. On that issue, reasonable minds 

could differ. That Plaintiffs ultimately lost their challenge to the statute of 

limitations does not necessarily mean they lacked probable cause to assert 

it. “[T]he definition of probable cause does not require certainty of 

success.” Shumway, 198 Ariz. at 329, ¶ 19. Depending on the resolution of 

the factual disputes, Plaintiffs may be able to establish that they had 

probable cause to raise their challenge to the statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, we vacate summary judgment on the no-contest clause and 

remand for further proceedings in the superior court.

III. Attorneys’ Fees

¶31 After granting summary judgment on the statute of 

limitations, the superior court awarded Shawn $30,832.50 in attorneys’ fees. 

Shawn cited two statutes in support of her fee request, A.R.S. §§ 14-11004

and -1105, but the court did not specify the basis for the award. We review 

the court’s award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. In re 

Conservatorship for Mallet, 233 Ariz. 29, 31, ¶ 7 (App. 2013).

¶32 We need not determine whether Plaintiffs’ petition was 

unreasonable for purposes of § 14-1105 because Shawn also sought fees 

under A.R.S. § 14-11004, which authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees for a 

trustee’s good faith defense in a proceeding involving the administration of 

the trust. Plaintiffs do not challenge the court’s authority to award fees 

under § 14-11004. Instead, they argue the award was excessive.

Specifically, they argue it was patently unreasonable to spend 58.1 hours to 

prepare an 11-page reply memorandum in support of the motion for 

summary judgment. Shawn’s reply addressed several new arguments that 

Plaintiffs raised in response to the motion and included a supplemental 

statement of facts. Therefore, the court was within its discretion to accept 

Shawn’s assertion that the reply took significantly longer to research and 

prepare than the motion itself. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.

¶33 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on 

appeal. Shawn requests an award of fees under §§ 14-1105 and -11004. 
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Decision of the Court

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Plaintiffs cite A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01 as well as the “terms of the JSL 

Trust cited by the Appellee as part of its fee application below.” However, 

Plaintiffs do not specify which Trust provision Shawn cited in support of 

her fee request, and we need not search the pleadings or the Trust terms to 

find authority for Plaintiffs’ fee request. Further, we find no basis to award 

fees under § 14-1105, and, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to 

award fees and costs to either party under §§ 12-341.01 or 14-11004.

CONCLUSION

¶34 We affirm the summary judgment in favor of Shawn on the 

statute of limitations and the related award of attorneys’ fees. We vacate 

the summary judgment on the no-contest clause and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision.