UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4598

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERNEST ELI COOK, III,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:10-cr-00433-CCE-1)

Submitted: January 18, 2013 Decided: February 14, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S. 

Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ernest Eli Cook, III, appeals his sentence of seventyeight months of imprisonment imposed on remand for possessing a 

firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006). Cook’s counsel has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

questioning whether Cook’s sentence is greater than necessary to 

achieve the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 

Cook’s supplemental pro se brief challenges the two-level 

increase in his offense level pursuant to U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual “USSG” § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (2010) and the 

determination of his Criminal History Category. We affirm.

We review Cook’s sentence for reasonableness, using an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). We must first review for significant procedural 

errors, including improperly calculating the Guidelines range, 

failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, 

sentencing under clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the sentence. Id. at 51; United States v. 

Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Only if we find a 

sentence procedurally reasonable may we consider its substantive 

reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th 

Cir. 2009). 
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First, Cook has at least one predicate felony 

conviction for a crime of violence, a North Carolina conviction 

for robbery with a dangerous weapon. United States v. White, 

571 F.3d 365, 371 n.5 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, under USSG 

§ 2K2.1(a)(4) (2010), Cook was correctly assigned a base offense 

level of twenty. Because the firearm he was convicted of 

possessing was in fact stolen, his offense level was properly 

increased by two levels, regardless of whether Cook knew the 

weapon was stolen. See United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 

343-44 (4th Cir.) (upholding validity of USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) 

enhancement despite the fact that it lacks a mens rea 

requirement), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1817 (2012). Cook was 

also properly placed in Criminal History Category IV, resulting 

in a sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. 

The district court also clearly explained its reasoning, which 

was properly grounded in the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). We accordingly conclude that the sentence is

procedurally reasonable. 

Cook has also failed to rebut the presumption of 

reasonableness we afford his within-Guidelines sentence. United 

States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 

132 S. Ct. 350 (2011). The district court fully considered 

Cook’s request that at least a portion of Cook’s sentence run 

concurrently with his then undischarged state term of 
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imprisonment and ordered that nineteen months of his sentence 

would run concurrently. USSG § 5G1.3(c) (2010) (policy 

statement). Accordingly, we conclude that Cook’s sentence is 

substantively reasonable, as well.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no other meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Cook’s sentence. This court requires that 

counsel inform Cook, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Cook 

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this 

court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Cook. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED