J-S36013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLEO RUFFIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3044 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0002640-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLEO RUFFIN JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3045 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0000027-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

Cleo Ruffin, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to twentythree months of imprisonment, followed by four years of probation, imposed 

after he pled guilty to failure to comply with sex offender registration 

requirements and disorderly conduct. Appellant’s counsel, Wana Saadzoi, 

Esquire, has filed an application to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders 
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v. California, 386 U.S. 748 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We deny counsel’s petition and order new briefing.

On May 5, 2021, Officer Kenneth Collins of the Darby Borough Police 

Department received a fax from the Pennsylvania State Police informing him 

that Appellant had missed the prescribed check-in window required for 

Megan’s Law offenders.1 Officer Collins responded to Appellant’s residence

and arrested him for failing to comply with the reporting requirements and for 

disorderly conduct based on an outstanding warrant.

Appellant pled guilty in both of the above-captioned cases and was 

sentenced as referenced above. He filed no post-sentence motions. While 

still represented by counsel, Appellant filed timely pro se notices of appeal in 

both cases. The trial court held a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). At the hearing, the court allowed plea 

counsel to withdraw and granted Appellant’s request to be represented by 

counsel on appeal. Thereafter, the court appointed Attorney Saadzoi. Both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We consolidated 

the cases sua sponte. 

As noted, Appellant’s counsel filed both an Anders brief and a petition 

to withdraw as counsel. The following legal principles guide our review:

Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders

must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious 

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1 Appellant is subject to lifetime sex offender registration due to his convictions 

for rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse committed in 1997.
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examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly 

frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth 

issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any 

other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation 

thereof. . . .

Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders

petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional 

points worthy of this Court’s attention.

If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical 

requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to 

withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., 

directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an 

advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s 

petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own 

review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 720-21 (Pa.Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted). The High Court further detailed counsel’s duties as 

follows:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s 

petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the 

procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer 

to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports 

the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the 

appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have 

led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, supra at 361.

Our examination of counsel’s petition to withdraw and Anders brief 

reveals that counsel has substantially complied with the technical 
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requirements set forth above.2 As required by Santiago, counsel provided a 

summary of the case history, referred to an issue that arguably supports the 

appeal, stated her conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, and cited case law 

supporting that conclusion. See Anders brief at 6-22. 

The only issue of arguable merit identified by counsel was that Appellant 

received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas. 

Specifically, Appellant believes his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file a post-sentence motion to withdraw both of his guilty pleas, which 

Appellant alleges were not given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. As 

counsel correctly observes, our Supreme Court has articulated that, absent 

specific circumstances not applicable here, claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel should not be raised on direct appeal but should rather be deferred to 

collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 577 (Pa. 

2013); Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.3d 726, 735 (Pa. 2002). Therefore, 

raising such a claim in this appeal would be frivolous. See Commonwealth 

v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 889 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“Appellant’s ineffectiveness 

claims are frivolous as raised on direct appeal”). Thus, we proceed “‘to make 

a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to 

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. 

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2 Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s petition. 
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Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Santiago, supra 

at 354 n.5).

Our independent review of the certified record reveals a potential issue 

of arguable merit, i.e., that Appellant pled guilty to an inoperative criminal 

offense. Appellant was charged with failure to comply with registration 

requirements because he did not register with the Pennsylvania State Police

as a sexual offender pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). The 

Commonwealth eventually dismissed that charge in exchange for Appellant 

pleading guilty to a different crime, failure to comply with registration of 

sexual offenders requirements, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915(a)(1). That 

provision was a part of Megan’s Law III, which had been rendered inoperative

and replaced by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)

since December 20, 2012. Moreover, in 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court handed down its decision in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 

615 (Pa. 2013), where it abrogated Megan’s Law III as violating the 

Pennsylvania Constitution’s single subject rule. 

In Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 728 (Pa. 2017), 

the appellant was convicted of violating § 4915 after it had been ruled 

unconstitutional by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that a defendant 

cannot be convicted of violating § 4915 because that section was based upon 

the invalidated Megan’s Law III. Id. Our Supreme Court reasoned that “an 

offense created by an unconstitutional law is not a crime, and [a] conviction 
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under it is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.” Id.

(cleaned up) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). More recently,

in Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 232 A.3d 609, 619 (Pa. 2020) (cleaned up), 

the High Court held that “Appellant’s conviction and sentence cannot stand . 

. . because his conviction was likewise based on [§] 4915, which . . . must be 

regarded as void from the time of its enactment.” In sum, our Supreme Court 

held that § 4915 was void and that a conviction for failing to satisfy the 

reporting requirements pursuant to that provision could not stand. 

Accordingly, since Appellant pled guilty to an offense under § 4915, it appears 

that he has a potentially non-frivolous issue that counsel neglected to examine

in the Anders brief. 

Thus, we deny Attorney Saadzoi’s application to withdraw and instruct 

counsel to, within thirty days, file either (1) an advocate’s brief arguing that 

Appellant’s sentence is illegal and should be vacated, or (2) another 

application to withdraw and a new Anders brief explaining why an appeal 

challenging the legality of Appellant’s sentence would be wholly frivolous.3 

The Commonwealth shall have thirty days thereafter to file a response. 

Application of Wana Saadzoi, Esquire, to withdraw as counsel is denied. 

Panel jurisdiction is retained.

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3 Counsel should further address the impact of the validity of Appellant’s guilty 

plea to an invalid criminal statute.